[Senate Hearing 111-100, Part 5]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-100, Pt. 5
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2010
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 1390
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
----------
PART 5
EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
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JUNE 18, 2009
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2010--Part 5 EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
S. Hrg. 111-100 Pt. 5
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2010
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 1390
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
__________
PART 5
EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
__________
JUNE 18, 2009
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
JACK REED, Rhode Island SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JIM WEBB, Virginia RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
MARK UDALL, Colorado SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Joseph W. Bowab, Republican Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
BILL NELSON, Florida MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
EVAN BAYH, Indiana SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
MARK UDALL, Colorado
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
U.S. Special Operations Command
june 18, 2009
Page
Olson, ADM Eric T., USN, Commander, U.S. Special Operations
Command........................................................ 4
(iii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2010
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 18, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:28 p.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Reed, Martinez, and
Wicker.
Majority staff members present: Michael J. Kuiken,
professional staff member; Thomas K. McConnell, professional
staff member; and Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Adam J. Barker,
professional staff member; and Dana W. White, professional
staff member.
Staff assistants present: Paul J. Hubbard, Christine G.
Lang, and Jennifer R. Knowles.
Committee members' assistants present: Carolyn Chuta,
assistant to Senator Reed; Patrick Hayes, assistant to Senator
Bayh; Dan Fisk and Brian W. Walsh, assistants to Senator
Martinez; and Erskine W. Wells III, assistant to Senator
Wicker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED, CHAIRMAN
Senator Reed. Let me call the hearing to order and welcome
Admiral Olson and Senator Wicker.
Today we are welcoming Admiral Eric T. Olson, Commander of
the United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM), to
testify regarding the President's fiscal year 2010 budget
request for SOCOM. The threats our Special Operations Forces
are facing around the world and the challenges facing the
command as it seeks to meet today's requirements while also
ensuring future needs are the focal point of our discussions
today.
Admiral Olson represents more than 55,000 military and
civilian SOCOM personnel, who are fulfilling a variety of
missions all over the globe in the fight against terrorists and
to further other United States security interests. In the last
year, Special Operations Forces (SOF) conducted operations and
training in more than 100 different countries.
However, more than 85 percent of SOF are currently
concentrated in the Central Command (CENTCOM) theater. I look
forward to hearing Admiral Olson's thoughts on how the drawdown
of conventional forces in Iraq is likely to impact the SOF
deployed there. While our conventional force continues to
reduce its footprint, there is no indication that the
requirements for SOF and the unique skill set they bring to the
fight will be similarly reduced for the foreseeable future.
Special operators will continue to require enabling support,
including airlift and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance, as they remain in Iraq to carry out kinetic and
nonkinetic missions against the enemy. These missions come with
significant risks, and SOF must continue to receive adequate
support from their general purpose counterparts if they are to
remain successful.
I also look forward to hearing Admiral Olson's thoughts on
special operations activities in Afghanistan and specifically
whether or not requirements for mobility and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance assets are being adequately
addressed.
While the heavy commitment of SOF in Iraq and Afghanistan
is understandable, SOCOM's focus must remain global. I am
concerned about the ``opportunity cost'' of tying down so many
forces in a single region for an extended period of time and
how it is affecting the command's ability to maintain critical
language and cultural skills and relationships in other parts
of the world.
Given the extraordinarily high operational tempo faced by
SOF, the long-term sustainability of such deployment remains a
concern. I know that addressing this challenge is one of
SOCOM's highest priorities, and I look forward to hearing more
from Admiral Olson on the recruiting, retention, and family
support issues facing the command.
I was pleased to see the fiscal year 2010 budget increased
procurement funding after that portion of SOCOM's budget
experienced a significant decrease from fiscal year 2008 to
2009. Recent congressional testimony indicated that equipment
procurement, including radios and some weapons, has lagged
behind SOCOM's personnel growth in the last few years. I look
forward to Admiral Olson's thoughts on any equipment shortages
the command has experienced, and what steps are being taken to
address these shortages.
Lastly, I am interested in hearing Admiral Olson's thoughts
on the balance of focus and resources on direct versus indirect
action within the command. Direct action, kill-or-capture
missions, are critical to dismantling terror networks, but are
only truly effective when coupled with indirect activities
aimed at winning the hearts, the minds, the support, and the
confidence of the population. Some have argued that SOCOM has
disproportionately focused on direct action in recent years at
the expense of its indirect action community.
Admiral Olson, it's a pleasure to have you with us today.
We look forward to your testimony.
I'm going to recognize Senator Wicker. He has informed me
that there's a vote scheduled for 2:45 p.m.
Senator Wicker. 2:50 p.m. now.
Senator Reed. 2:50 p.m. now? Marked down from 2:45 p.m. to
2:50 p.m.
So, Senator Wicker?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I very much
appreciate the cooperation that you've already exhibited toward
me as the ranking member.
I want to thank Admiral Olson for being here today. In
light of the fact that there will be a vote within 20 minutes
or so, I think I will submit my full opening statement to the
record, and simply state that I look forward to the Admiral
testifying and answering questions concerning a wide range of
issues, such as long-term sustainability, his efforts to
increase SOF by 4 percent, and growing the force at that level
without compromising quality, what efforts he's taking to deal
with the strain placed on our troops because of extended and
repeated deployments, and I also hope to have a discussion
about efforts to enhance cultural and language proficiency.
So, with that, I will yield back to the Chair, and ask that
my statement be placed in the record in full.
Senator Reed. Without objection, all statements will be
placed in the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Wicker follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Roger Wicker
Mr. Chairman, thank you for scheduling this hearing to inform the
committee on the current posture of U.S. Special Operations Command
(SOCOM) as we prepare to begin deliberations on the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. Admiral Olson, I want to thank
you for appearing before us today and for your many years of dedicated
service. I'd also like to take a moment to send my deepest appreciation
to the extraordinary soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines under your
command who continue to serve our country with the highest level of
professionalism and skill, even in the most trying of circumstances. We
in Congress take our obligation to these servicemembers seriously and I
look forward to working with you to ensure they continue to be the
best-equipped and best-trained fighting force in the world.
Special Operations Forces (SOF) are playing an integral role in our
struggle against terrorism in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and the
demands on these forces will only increase in the months and years to
come. Despite the planned drawdown of conventional forces from Iraq
later this year, SOF will continue to maintain a robust presence in
country. Couple this sustained presence with an increase of SOF
personnel in Afghanistan, not to mention other commitments around the
globe, and you have a force that is under immense pressure and strain.
Just last week, Admiral, you stated that ``long-term sustainability
remains a concern.'' I'm interested in what steps, if any, your command
is taking to mitigate this stress.
Mr. Chairman, I know this budget plans for a SOF increase of 4
percent. Recently, I reviewed the ``SOF Truths'' in preparation for the
hearing. Paraphrasing them, they state: humans are more important than
hardware, quality is more important than quantity, SOF cannot be mass
produced, and competent SOF cannot be created after the emergency
arises.
It seems that there is no quick and easy answer to mitigating the
stress on our SOF. I note that you have said SOF cannot grow more than
3 to 5 percent per year. Therefore, I am interested in hearing how the
Special Operations community is achieving its growth objectives and how
large our SOF can grow without compromising quality.
It is important when discussing the strain placed upon our
servicemembers as a result of extended and repeated deployments that we
include their families, as well SOCOM has taken the family support role
seriously and I appreciate the assistance they are providing through
various innovative means, including the SOCOM Care Coalition, a program
widely hailed as a remarkable success.
I am also interested in what steps the command is taking to
increase and enhance cultural and language proficiency among your
personnel. While no one can doubt the importance of the direct action
mission SOF performs, our ability to engage foreign populations through
nonkinetic means will be the lynchpin of our long-term success in the
struggle against terrorism. This will include continuing the training
of indigenous security forces and other activities aimed at
strengthening civic institutions, as well as taking measurable steps to
limit civilian casualties. I am interested in your appraisal of SOCOMs
current capacity and level of success in this vital role, particularly
with regard to the training of Iraqi and Afghan security forces.
With asymmetric threats and irregular conflict likely to dominate
the security environment for the foreseeable future, the role SOF will
play in our military strategy will prove invaluable. Striking the
correct structural balance for SOCOM to meet this long-term demand will
be of the utmost importance and I am interested in your vision for the
future composition and role of SOF.
Again, Admiral, thank you for taking the time to be with us today
and I look forward to your testimony.
Senator Bayh. Senator Martinez.
Senator Martinez. Thank you, I don't have a statement.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Admiral Olson? Please.
STATEMENT OF ADM ERIC T. OLSON, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL
OPERATIONS COMMAND
Admiral Olson. Good afternoon, Chairman Reed, Senator
Wicker, and Senator Martinez. Thank you very much for the
invitation to appear before the committee to highlight the
current posture of the SOCOM.
I'll say upfront that, thanks to the foresight, advocacy,
and strong support of this body, we remain well-positioned to
meet the Nation's expectations of its SOF.
SOCOM and SOF are a team of teams. The joint force itself,
those assigned by the military Services for most of their
careers, comprises Special Forces, Rangers, SEALs, combatant
craft crewmen, many submarine operators, Marine Corps special
operators, fixed- and rotary-wing aviators, combat controllers,
pararescue jumpers, practitioners of civil-military affairs and
military information support, and more, all augmented,
supported, and enabled by a wide variety of assigned
specialists, great men and women, Active Duty and reservists,
military and civilian, who generally work within the special
operations community for an assignment or two over the course
of their military careers, and bring us much value.
SOF is a force that is well-suited to the operating
environments in which we are now engaged. Its proven abilities
have created an unprecedented demand for its effects in remote,
uncertain, and challenging operating areas. Whether the
assigned mission is to train, advise, fight, or provide
humanitarian assistance, the broad capabilities of SOF make
them the force of choice.
Primarily, SOCOM headquarters is responsible for
organizing, training, equipping, and providing fully capable
SOF to serve under the operational control of geographic
combatant commanders. In this role, SOCOM headquarters shares
many of the responsibilities, authorities, and characteristics
of a military department, including a separate, major force
program budget, established by Congress for the purpose of
funding equipment, materiel, supplies, services, training, and
operational activities that are peculiar to SOF in nature.
SOCOM is also responsible for synchronizing Department of
Defense (DOD) planning against terrorists and terrorist
networks globally. In this role, we receive, analyze, and
prioritize the geographic combatant commanders' regional plans
and make recommendations to the Joint Staff on force and
resource allocations.
Additionally, we are the DOD proponent for security force
assistance globally. In this role, we expect to help foster the
long-term partnerships that will shape a more secure global
environment in the face of global challenges such as
transnational crime and extremism.
While the high demand for SOF in Iraq and Afghanistan--as
you noted, Chairman Reed--has caused the large majority of SOF
to be deployed to the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR), SOF
do maintain a global presence.
So far, in fiscal year 2009, SOF have conducted operations
and training in 106 countries, as you noted, with operations in
75 to 80 countries on most days. In most of these operations,
SOF have taken a long-term approach to engagement designed to
forge enduring partnerships that contribute to regional
stability. This balance of effective direct and indirect skills
inherent to the force, and an understanding of the operational
context of their application, is the core of special
operations. From support to major combat operations to the
conduct of irregular warfare, SOF are often first in and last
out, accomplishing their missions with highly capable, agile,
and relatively small units. So, SOF must be properly manned,
trained, and equipped to operate globally to the standard the
Nation has come to expect. The SOCOM fiscal year 2010 budget
request includes the resources necessary to continue providing
full-spectrum, multimission, global SOF.
While the SOCOM budget request has historically been robust
enough to meet basic special operations mission requirements,
the success of SOF depends not only on SOCOM's dedicated budget
and acquisition authorities, but also on SOCOM's Service
partners. SOF rely on the Services for a broad range of support
and required enabling capabilities. With the combination of the
SOCOM budget and the support of the Services, SOCOM seeks a
balance, first, to have sufficient organic special operations
enablers for speed of response to operational crisis, and
second, to have enabling capabilities assigned in support of
SOF by the Services for sustainment and expansion of
operations.
SOCOM headquarters will continue to lead, develop, and
sustain the world's most precise and lethal counterterrorism
force. We will provide the world's most effective special
operations trainers, advisors, and combat partners with the
skills, leadership, and mindset necessary to meet today's and
tomorrow's unconventional challenges. This Nation's Joint SOF
will continue to find, kill, capture, or reconcile our
irreconcilable enemies, to train mentor and partner with our
global friends and allies, and to pursue the tactics,
techniques, procedures, and technologies that will keep us
ahead of emerging and dynamic threats.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you
today. I'll conclude my opening remarks with a simple statement
of pride in the SOF that I'm honored to command and provide to
other commanders. SOF are contributing, globally, well beyond
what their percentage of the total force numbers would
indicate. Every day they are fighting our enemies, training and
mentoring our partners, and bringing value to tens of thousands
of villagers who are still deciding their allegiances.
I stand ready for your questions, sir.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Olson follows:]
Prepared Statement by ADM Eric T. Olson, USN
INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank
you for this opportunity to report on the state of the United States
Special Operations Command (SOCOM).
Created by Congress just over 22 years ago, the Command implemented
its original charter and Title 10 authorities primarily as a resourcing
headquarters, providing ready and relevant Special Operations Forces
(SOF) in episodic engagements against threats to the Nation and its
vital interests. Following the attacks of September 11, SOCOM quickly
became a proactive, global and strategically focused headquarters while
the Joint SOF were employed primarily in decisive direct action
missions against terrorists and insurgents. Throughout, we have also
taken a long-term approach of engagement in Central Command and other
regions, designed to forge enduring partnerships contributing to
regional stability. This balance of direct and indirect actions, the
combination of high-end tactical skills and an understanding of the
operational context of their application, is the core of special
operations. Success of Special Operations depends on SOCOM's dedicated
budget and acquisition authorities to meet SOF-peculiar mission
requirements, heavily supported by general purpose force capabilities.
COMBATANT COMMAND FUNCTIONS
SOCOM is responsible for synchronizing Department of Defense
planning against terrorists and terrorist networks globally. In this
role, we receive, analyze, and prioritize the Geographic Combatant
Commanders' regional plans, and make recommendations to the joint staff
on force and resource allocations. We also serve as an extension of the
joint staff in the interagency arena. We have established effective
collaborative venues to do this, collectively known as the global
synchronization process. Because SOCOM does not normally have
operational authority over deployed forces, the plans and operations
themselves are executed by the Geographic Combatant Commanders.
In October 2008, SOCOM was designated as the Department of Defense
proponent for Security Force Assistance (SFA). This designation will
cause SOCOM to perform a synchronization role in global training and
assistance planning that is similar to our role in synchronizing
planning against terrorist networks. This role will be another
collaborative effort that is nested within our existing global
synchronization process.
Additionally, SOCOM is now the Department's designated lead for
countering Threat Financing. In this capacity, we advocate the
Department's policies in direct coordination with our interagency
partners, primarily within the U.S. Treasury and Justice Departments.
Although synchronization is a robust daily activity, a key element
is the semi-annual Global Synchronization Conference, coordinated and
hosted by SOCOM, designed to provide a venue for structured
determination of roles, missions and priorities among organizations
with equities in the outcome.
MILITARY DEPARTMENT-LIKE FUNCTIONS
SOF must be manned, trained, and equipped to operate globally with
unmatched speed, precision, and discipline within a culture that
promotes innovation, initiative and tactical level diplomacy. To enable
this, SOCOM has responsibilities and authorities similar to Service
Departments and Defense Agencies. The key element of our ability to
assure the readiness of SOF is the Major Force Program (MFP) 11 budget
line.
The people of the Special Operations community are its greatest
asset, but we refer to MFP-11 as ``the pearl of SOCOM'' because it is
the single greatest contributor to our ability to train, equip and
sustain our force. We are grateful for the wisdom of Congress in
providing MFP-11, and in its continued strong and knowledgeable support
for the peculiar needs of SOF.
A manifestation of this support is the recent expansion of SOCOM's
section 1208 authority for fiscal year 2009.
We pride ourselves on our understanding of the needs of our
operational force and continually seek ways to accelerate delivery of
essential equipment and systems. To this end, SOCOM established a new
Directorate for Science and Technology (S&T) in early fiscal year 2009.
S&T is responsible for technology discovery, technology developments
and demonstrations, and rapid insertions of new capabilities to SOF in
concert with our Acquisition Executive.
New to the S&T portfolio is a unique `rapid exploitation'
capability comprising a distributed network of SOF operators,
technicians, engineers, and managers tasked to identify timely
technical solutions to solve operational problems.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE THREE-DIMENSIONAL OPERATOR
The complexity of today's and tomorrow's strategic environments
requires that our SOF operators maintain not only the highest levels of
warfighting expertise but also cultural knowledge and diplomacy skills.
We are developing ``3-D Operators''--members of a multi-dimensional
force prepared to lay the groundwork in the myriad diplomatic,
development, and defense activities that contribute to our Government's
pursuit of our vital national interests.
Fundamental to this effort is the recognition that humans are more
important than hardware and that quality is more important than
quantity. Investments in weapons platforms and technologies are sub-
optimized if we fail to develop the people upon whom their effective
employment depends. Within SOCOM, we strive first to select and nurture
the extraordinary operator and then to provide the most operationally
relevant equipment.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES RETENTION AND RECRUITING
SOF retention remains one of our highest priorities. The factors
that most influence retention of the force are the quality of the
mission, the quality of individual and family support, operational
tempo and monetary compensation. In 2008, Congress granted a 2-year
extension of current SOF incentives designed to keep our senior
operators in billets requiring their special skills and experience. Our
retention is good, but long-term sustainability remains a concern.
In November 2008, thanks to a very positive response by the
Secretary of the Army and the approval of the Secretary of Defense, we
made progress in one of SOCOM's high priority initiatives: increasing
our level of regional expertise through the recruitment of native
heritage speakers. As of today, over 100 legal non-permanent residents
with special language skills and abilities have joined the Army under a
pilot program. This new program, Military Accessions Vital to the
National Interest (MAVNI), is something of a phenomenon within certain
foreign populations of the United States and attracts highly qualified
candidates. Some of these will serve in Special Operations units.
SOF recruitment and retention programs must be innovative, flexible
and open to possibilities previously deemed impractical. We will
continue to refine our overall recruitment and retention strategies in
coordination with the Department and the Services.
HEALTH OF THE FORCE
SOF remain strong and ready despite an unprecedented operational
tempo. They are, for the most part, doing what they joined the military
to do and feeling that their impact is positive and meaningful. Still,
we are asking a lot of them and their families, and we have every
indication that they will be in ever-increasing demand.
We must continue to support our personnel and their families to
confront the future fragility of the force. We know well that
psychological trauma is often observed in the families before it is
manifested in the SOF operators themselves.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES CARE COALITION
SOCOM recognizes the correlation between supporting our wounded
personnel and their families and overall mission readiness. As such, we
have continued to develop programs within our award-winning (both the
2006 Armed Forces Foundation's Organization of the Year, and the 2008
Navy SEAL Warrior Fund's ``Fire in the Gut'' Award), nationally-
recognized SOCOM Care Coalition that looks after our entire SOF family.
The Care Coalition is a responsive, low-cost clearinghouse that matches
needs with providers and currently supports 2,300 wounded SOF warriors
with every benefit of treatment, recovery, and rehabilitation to
improve their opportunity to return to duty or to succeed in post-
military service. Working closely with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD), the Services, and the Department of Veterans Affairs,
the SOCOM Care Coalition has resolved myriad financial, logistical,
social, occupational and other support issues for our wounded
servicemembers and their families.
SERVICE ENABLING CAPABILITIES
Demand for SOF is on the increase; yet, by their very nature, SOF
are limited in size and scope.
I am already on record as stating that SOF cannot grow more than 3
to 5 percent per year in those key units and capabilities that must be
developed within our own organizational structures and training
pipelines. This growth rate will not meet the already obvious appetite
for the effects of SOF in forward operating areas.
The solution, beyond the necessary continued steady and disciplined
growth of specific Special Operations capabilities, is to mitigate the
demand on SOF by developing and sustaining supporting capabilities
within the Services that are beyond their organic needs, and can
therefore be used in direct support of Special Operations commanders.
This will enhance the impact of forward-deployed SOF without placing
additional demand on SOF's own limited enabling units.
The enabling capabilities that must be provided in greater number
by the Services include mobility, aerial sensors, field medics, remote
logistics, engineering planners, construction, intelligence, regional
specialists, interpreters/translators, communications, dog teams, close
air support specialists, security forces, and others that permit SOF
operators to focus more directly on their missions. Assigned at the
unit or detachment level to support Joint SOF commanders away from main
bases, the effects of such a combined force can be impressive.
Our goal is balance: first, to have sufficient organic SOF-peculiar
enablers to permit rapid response to operational crises; and second, to
have enabling capabilities assigned in direct support of SOF for longer
term sustainment and expansion of the operation. We are and will be
dependent upon our Service partners for key force enablers. The non-
availability of these force enablers has become our most vexing issue
in the operational environment. Another growing challenge, especially
as we begin a responsible general purpose force drawdown in Iraq, is
base operating support and personnel security for SOF remaining in
dangerous areas after the larger force departs, as SOF cannot provide
for itself.
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT AND READINESS ENHANCING AUTHORITIES
Combat readiness depends on personnel readiness. Ready and relevant
SOF can only be sustained with the recognition that our people, both
our SOF operators and the full range of supporting personnel, are our
top priority.
Although title 10 holds the Commander, SOCOM, responsible for the
combat readiness of SOF, many of decisions and processes that impact
SOF's readiness are held within the Services. To address this
situation, section 167 of the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act
tasked SOCOM to submit proposals to enhance SOF personnel management.
The SOCOM plan submitted to the OSD contains initiatives intended to
improve coordination of personnel management, including assignment,
promotion, compensation, and retention.
BUDGETARY AND ACQUISITION AUTHORITIES
The Department's fiscal year 2010 base budget submission, along
with the Overseas Contingency Operations request, recognizes the
increasing role of SOF across the globe. As the administration
rebalances toward an Irregular Warfare (IW) portfolio, we anticipate
the importance of, and Services support for, IW will continue to
increase. SOCOM is actively participating in the Department's
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) with the view that the budget request
before you this year will adequately serve as the bridge toward the
results of the QDR and the fiscal year 2011 budget submission.
In addition to an appropriate baseline budget, SOF readiness
requires investment in the rapid fielding of both existing solutions
and cutting edge technologies, even when the relatively small purchase
quantities do not optimize production costs. SOCOM's aggressive use of
our acquisition authority is a key factor in providing wide-ranging,
time-sensitive capabilities to our widely dispersed and often isolated
forces. Because our budget authority is limited to SOF-peculiar
equipment and modifications, SOCOM also depends heavily on Service
acquisition programs that develop and procure Service-common mobility
platforms, weapons, ammunition, and other equipment that we then modify
to meet SOF's mission needs.
We are constantly evaluating our acquisition processes and looking
for new opportunities to streamline and accelerate our acquisition
procedures. An example of this is SOCOM's Urgent Deployment Acquisition
(UDA) process which provides a rapid acquisition and logistics response
to critical combat mission needs statements (CMNS) submitted by
deployed SOF. Most UDA capabilities are delivered to operational forces
within 6 months after receipt of the requirement. We will continue to
sustain and modernize the force by equipping our operators, upgrading
our mobility platforms and further developing persistent ISR sensors
and systems. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
platforms and their associated analysis and information distribution
systems are now essential to success. Our needs for ISR are still
undermet, and we must ensure that our ISR fleet is appropriately
balanced for enduring global requirements.
We will continue to rely on service ISR programs as we develop new
capabilities to meet the dynamic Special Operations mission needs. We
will continue our tactical focus with high-grade sensors on both manned
and unmanned platforms. While some capabilities are truly SOF-peculiar
and are within SOCOM's processes, most Special Operations capabilities
are based upon Service-provided systems. It is therefore important that
we immediately and collectively transition from a platform-based
acquisition cycle to one that is capabilities-based, wherein
capabilities such as ISR collection suites or specific weapons packages
can be ``rolled on and rolled off'' a variety of ground, air, and
maritime platforms to increase our tactical and operational reach.
Implementation of such a cycle would allow SOCOM to buy, try and modify
capabilities without being constrained by Service platform
considerations, and also would allow SOCOM to upgrade modular
capabilities at the pace of technology advancement.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES MOBILITY
Future SOF will require a robust mobility fleet tailored to global
demand and an ever-changing strategic environment. Our intent is to
recapitalize our 37 oldest C-130 aircraft with modern C-130J aircraft.
The first platforms in this program are already funded. SOCOM continues
to evaluate the modernization options for the remaining aircraft to
provide the optimum in force capability to the warfighter.
SOCOM's Nonstandard Aviation program answers longstanding
operational requirements for small team intra-theater movement in
politically sensitive areas.
We continue to evaluate the proper aviation capacity tailored to
each Geographic Combatant Commander's prioritized needs in order to
provide troop and cargo movement, aerial refueling and surveillance or
penetration of denied areas through higher readiness rates and
increased aircraft availability. We continue to explore emerging
technologies that will enable these missions to be performed in a
higher threat environment.
The CV-22 remains one of SOCOM's premier programs. This
transformational platform provides sufficient speed for long-range
vertical lift missions within a single period of darkness. The CV-22's
defensive systems, enhanced situational awareness, and Terrain
Following and Terrain Avoidance (TF/TA) capabilities provide greater
survivability for SOF aircrews and ground operators. We decommissioned
SOCOM's fleet of venerable MH-53 Pave Low helicopters in October 2008,
making accelerated delivery of CV-22 a top priority.
The proliferation of inexpensive and advanced surveillance
technologies and capabilities threaten SOF's unique access
capabilities, particularly in denied or politically sensitive maritime
surface and subsurface environments. To meet both the known and
projected threats, we continue to seek designs and technologies that
permit SOF to go where they are not expected.
In 2007, SOCOM commissioned an analysis of ways that the US
military can clandestinely move SOF over strategic distances into and
out of littoral, medium-to-high threat environments. This study,
combined with several other exhaustive analytical studies, led to the
Joint Multi-Mission Submersible (JMMS) program. JMMS will provide
longer range transits, through extreme water temperatures, with greater
on-station endurance than current SOF undersea mobility platforms;
thereby permitting a wider range of options to answer national
requirements. Additionally, SOCOM needs to evaluate the potential to
conduct long range, clandestine infiltrations by air.
SOCOM also commissioned an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) to
address undersea mobility requirements in the 2015-2030 timeframe. The
AOA was completed in February 2008 and confirmed the need for a new
mobility system, now referred to as the Shallow Water Combat
Submersible (SWCS). The SWCS program, initiated in 2008, will replace
the legacy SEAL Delivery Vehicle and provide a significant increase in
shallow water, clandestine access.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES PRECISION STRIKE SYSTEMS
SOF require a family of precision strike systems to address current
and future static and mobile targets. The current inventory and
capabilities of AC-130 ``gunships'' and smaller manned and unmanned
platforms are insufficient to meet our need for guided munitions that
minimize unintended deaths and damage. I intend to fill this capacity
gap by installing a platform neutral Precision Strike Package on our
existing MC-130W aircraft, and to field them as soon as practical. I
will accept short-term risk in SOF's aerial refueling fleet in order to
do this quickly, recognizing that a future program will be required to
address the resultant shortfall.
SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE
As the designated DOD proponent for SFA, SOCOM leads a
collaborative effort to develop and provide DOD elements to enhance the
capabilities of our allies and partners. We will assist the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense by recommending
overarching priorities for force and resource allocation. Our product
will be informed by several non-DOD government agencies, including the
Department of State, and will be fully coordinated with the Services
and Joint Forces Command. Our work in this very important area will
include development of policy and legislative proposals to improve the
efficiency and effectiveness of international military assistance
programs.
One method by which SOCOM is now able to assist in the development
of foreign Special Operations capabilities is through the reallocation
of funds under section 1208 authorities.
SOCOM also strongly supports the administration's requests for
section 1206, section 1207, and International Military Education and
Training funding.
LANGUAGE AND CULTURE PROGRAM EXPANSION
Last year we called attention to the importance of language and
regional knowledge as essential to strengthening relations and
facilitating more effective operations with foreign partners. We
initiated recruiting, training, and personnel management mechanisms,
and partnered with OSD and the Services to expand the pools from which
the Services recruit. As mentioned earlier, the MAVNI program is a
small and growing success in this regard. Historical models, such as
the Korean Augmentation to the United States Army and the Alamo Scouts
who operated in the Philippines during World War II, are also being
evaluated. To meet more immediate tactical needs, we initiated steps to
dedicate in-service translators and interpreters to our Army component
for joint use. Individual development aimed at correctly aligning
language testing, career management, and incentives remains important
to our capability; therefore, we strengthened our institutional
programs at the Army, Air Force, and Marine component level and worked
closely with the Services and OSD to support our career model. We have
a long way to go in recognizing and incentivizing such expertise as an
operational necessity before we can truly develop and sustain real
experts in specific key regions around the world. I call this ``Project
Lawrence,'' after T. E. Lawrence of Arabia.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES PERSONNEL GROWTH
As stated earlier, our assessments indicate that SOF cannot grow
more than 3 to 5 percent per year in those key units and capabilities
that must be developed within our own organizational structures and
training pipelines. This growth rate will not meet the appetite for the
effects of SOF in forward operating areas.
A partial solution is to mitigate the demand on SOF by developing
and sustaining supporting capabilities within the Services that are
beyond their organic needs and can be assigned in direct support of
Special Operations commanders. This solution will enhance the impact of
forward-deployed SOF without placing additional demand on SOF's own
enabling units.
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
Today, SOCOM is a strategic-level organization that addresses
global threats to our national interests. SOCOM observes trans-regional
dynamics from a uniquely cross-organizational perspective. This
perspective provides us with a comprehensive appreciation of the
strategic environment that suggests that the type, scope, and scale of
the security challenges facing our Nation have changed significantly in
recent years. In light of this knowledge, our approach to the security
environment must be increasingly agile and adaptive.
The problems we must be prepared to address include the inability
of nation states to deal with increasingly complex challenges or to
meet the needs and expectations of their populations. These challenges
are exacerbated by the growing number of non-state actors who have
strategic effect in a networked and interconnected world. In the vacuum
created by weak or failed governments, non-state actors have achieved
greater influence over benign populations by addressing their basic
needs and grievances, and by intimidating and sometimes brutalizing
them into submission. When governments fail to address the needs of the
population, they become irrelevant and the people will make choices
that are shaped by their own immediate needs for survival.
One such choice is to leave their current situation in the hope of
finding greater opportunity. As a result, uncontrolled migration is
occurring across the world and the challenges associated with this
dynamic are manifesting themselves in numerous ways. A few examples are
the accelerating urbanization that is overwhelming many under-developed
cities; the burgeoning diasporas that are becoming increasingly
difficult to assimilate into host nation societies; and the continuing
brain drain that hinders growth in the developing world.
Another choice that people make is to turn to non-state
organizations, groups, or ``super-empowered individuals'' that
demonstrate state-like capacities. In the best case, people will turn
to a benevolent nonstate actor such as a nongovernmental organization,
a moderate and tolerant religious group, or a local ethnic or
traditional institution. However, we also see populations that must
turn to extremist or criminal organizations, many of which are
sponsored by rogue nation states. Nonstate groups such as al Qaeda,
Taliban, Hamas, Hezbollah, MEND, Jamal Islamiyah, FARC, and MS-13 are
growing in influence and shaping the choices of populations as nation
states fail to adequately address their needs and grievances. In short,
nonstate actors effectively compete for sovereignty with the
traditional nation state system.
Taken alone, uncontrolled migration, extremism, or crime are
significant problems, but in combination the difficulty and complexity
of these problems grow exponentially. We see a dangerous convergence of
these problems, producing corrosive effects across the entire nation
state system. Our perception of what constitutes a threat to our
national security ought to consider these nontraditional and persistent
threats, and therefore, we need to strike the proper balance within the
Department of Defense and across our Government to address these
threats.
SOCOM favors a ``populace-centric'' approach in lieu of a ``threat-
centric'' approach to national security challenges. More specifically,
we believe that SOF must focus on the environmental dynamics and root
causes that create today's and tomorrow's threats and adversaries. This
belief requires an approach that is integrated with the long-term work
of civilian agencies, especially the State Department and U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID), to foster U.S. credibility and
influence among relevant populations.
SOCOM, as a strategic headquarters, applies an Irregular Warfare
(IW) mindset towards national security. IW is a logical, long-term
framework that focuses on relevant populations and describes the
activities that the Department of Defense will perform to support
State, USAID and other civilian agencies to address the many complex
environmental challenges that are emerging on a global scale. The
Irregular Warfare approach seeks a balance between direct and indirect
activities that focus on the operational environment within the context
of interagency and international collaboration.
It is important to note that IW is not new to SOF. Unconventional
Warfare, Counterterrorism, Counterinsurgency, Civil-Affairs,
Information Operations, Psychological Operations, and Foreign Internal
Defense are traditional IW activities and historic SOF core activities.
What is new is that an Irregular Warfare approach requires broader
participation on the part of the entire Department of Defense. We must
also develop the appropriate mechanisms to effectively mesh DOD IW
activities with the diplomatic and development efforts of our
interagency partners.
This comprehensive appreciation of the strategic environment is why
SOCOM is committed to developing the ``3-D Operator.'' Understanding
the synergy of development, diplomacy and defense, we see the ``3-D
Operator'' as an essential element of a strategy that employs both
``hard power'' and ``soft power'' methods.
CONCLUSION
Thank you again for the opportunity to update you on SOCOM
Headquarters and the SOF community. It remains a profound honor to be
associated with this extraordinarily capable and uniquely innovative
force and to represent them before this esteemed body.
SOCOM headquarters will continue to lead and to manage the
development and sustainment of the worlds most precise and lethal
counterterrorism force. We will provide the world's most effective
Special Operations trainers, advisors and combat partners. We will
provide advice and comment on issues of national security.
This great Nation's Joint SOF will continue to find and kill or
capture our irreconcilable enemies, to partner with our global friends
and allies, and to pursue the tactics, techniques, procedures and
technologies that will keep us ahead of dynamic threats.
You have much cause for deep pride in your SOF. They, and I, thank
you for your continued service and support.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Admiral. I wish that you
will convey to your Special Forces operators our great respect
and appreciation for what they're doing.
Admiral Olson. Thank you, sir, I will.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
As I suggested in my opening statement, there's an issue
of, as we draw down in Iraq, conventional forces redeploying
and there's the expectation that SOF elements will help us make
that transition and continue our presence there. Do you see any
complications, in terms of this withdrawal, in terms of support
for your operators and the continued presence of your
operators?
Admiral Olson. Sir, thank you. The short answer is, yes, we
see complications, but none that can't be overcome. The reality
is that, whether the force presence in an area is small or
large, it requires some degree of support for cordon-and-search
forces, quick-reaction forces, medical support, air-control
support, airfield operations, intelligence analysts, all of
that, whether the force is large or small. We are working
closely with the Army and the Marine Corps, who are the main
force providers, to ensure that, as the major forces draw
down--and we've seen no indication that special operations
drawdown will be commensurate with that--that there is a
dedicated, reliable, available measure of support responsive
enough to meet special operations needs.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Admiral.
We are moving, significantly, to the Afghanistan theater of
operations, with your special operations, as well as
conventional brigade combat teams and Marine regiments. As you
point out in your testimony, you rely upon the support of other
forces and other Services, one of which is airlift. There is
some indication that many of the requests from special
operations for airlift support in Afghanistan can't be
fulfilled because of its limitations. Is that an accurate
assessment, and what can we do about that?
Admiral Olson. That's a true statement, Chairman. The
reality is that there is simply insufficient rotary-wing lift,
helicopter lift, available in Afghanistan. There is some moving
there. The Marines have moved some airlift with their force
into southern Afghanistan. There is Army aviation moving in.
So, I can't predict precisely what the situation will be after
those forces are settled and made available, but I believe that
there will be, still, insufficient lift available.
We are doing what we can to satisfy that by continuing to
appeal to the Services for support, and to appeal to the
operational commanders in the theater, to prioritize where they
can and favor special operations support.
Senator Reed. By the way, we'll do about 8-minute rounds,
so everyone'll have a chance, I think, to ask questions before
we have to run over and take a vote.
Something that Senator Wicker pointed out, which I think is
an excellent point, and that's just language and cultural
skills. I'm old enough to remember when everyone studied
Russian and everyone was a Soviet expert, and I never thought
in my lifetime that that would all be history, at least the
Soviet Union would be history.
Now we find ourselves in areas with Arabic, Farsi, Pashtun,
Chinese, et cetera. How well are you doing, given the fact that
we're flowing so many people into CENTCOM, which has some of
these languages, but then we have the traditional areas that
concern across the globe and have other languages. Any
comments?
Admiral Olson. Sir, if the question is, ``How well are we
doing?'' the answer is, we're not doing well enough. My opinion
is that we still have a long ways to go to truly understand the
operational contexts in the places where we are because we
don't understand the people there well enough yet. Language is
certainly a key way to gain insight into the people and how
they interrelate.
We do have a number of initiatives. One, I euphemistically
call it Project Lawrence, is inspired by Lawrence of Arabia,
but certainly is not limited to Arabia--Lawrence of Pakistan,
Lawrence of Afghanistan, Lawrence of Colombia, Lawrence of
wherever it is--because we are operating around the world, or
assisting, or working with our partners.
There are a number of initiatives contained within this
that are beginning to show some benefit, but you know that
language skill is a perishable skill, and it must be sustained,
maintained, incentivized so that individuals will dedicate some
of their free time to do it.
All of the Services are moving forward in this regard. Our
responsibility in special operations, I think, is to seek ways
to really steep people in languages and cultures over the
course of their careers. We do have some advantages in being
able to regionally orient our force in order to do that.
Senator Reed. Thank you. This is a good point, I think, to
recognize Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
I think we're all agreed it's more than language
proficiency that is needed; it's understanding that, in some
cultures, and some countries, ``I'll think about it,'' really
means, ``No way.'' You mentioned Lawrence of Arabia; Lawrence
of Arabia depicted the concept of, ``It is written,'' in that
particular culture, where there was nothing you could do about
it because it was going to happen anyway, and it was written.
In the Army, at least, there's been the concept of AOR,
Admiral, where, over a career, the forces were, as you say,
steeped in the people and steeped in the language. Is it true
that we've had to get away from that because over 80 percent of
our SOF are now deployed in either Iraq or Afghanistan? Do you
think we'll ever get back to the concept of AOR, where a
military member can stay for a long time, or keep coming back
to the same place, and really understand that society?
Admiral Olson. Yes, that's certainly the goal, Senator. The
reality is that, historically, SOF, and Army Special Forces in
particular, have been regionally oriented. Of the five Active
Duty Special Forces groups, there was one allocated to each
geographic combatant command region of the world, so we only
had 20 percent of our force focused on CENTCOM. As Chairman
Reed noted in his remarks, we've had about 85 percent of our
force deployed to CENTCOM for the last several years. So, we
have taken people regionally oriented to someplace else and
assigned them to duty in CENTCOM. Over time they've adjusted to
that, they've trained to that, but we have been in fewer places
with fewer people, less often, for shorter periods of time,
around the rest of the world because of our commitment in
CENTCOM.
Senator Wicker. Do you see that we are doing what we need
to address that problem? Do you ever see us getting back to a
situation where the skills are more widely spread?
Admiral Olson. Sir, our current program grows actually one
battalion in each of our Special Forces groups, giving us a
fourth battalion. The intent is to enable us to get back into
the region with that battalion, in a dedicated way. Whether or
not we're able to do that as planned, time will tell, but that
is the rate at which we can grow the force. So, we are doing
what we can do, for now.
Senator Wicker. Tell us a little about Project Lawrence.
How many service personnel would be involved in this training
project at this given time?
Admiral Olson. Sir, in one way or another, we pump more
than 15,000 people a year through some sort of language
training. Every Green Beret, for example, has to prove
proficiency at the one-one level, that's basic survival level,
but it at least indicates some ability to operate in another
culture. He has to qualify at the one-one level in order to put
on his beret for the very first time.
Senator Wicker. What does a one-one level get you?
Admiral Olson. What will one-one get you?
Senator Wicker. Yes.
Admiral Olson. Not much, sir. It will get you the
pleasantries, respect from the people you're conducting
business with for the fact that you have taken some effort to
learn a few words of their language. It won't enable you to
have a sophisticated conversation or catch the evening news,
typically. It's an introduction.
So, in terms of steeping people in a culture, that doesn't
do it. So, we do run advanced training courses. We've given
directives across our force to qualify specific numbers of
people at the two-two and three-three levels for specific
languages, at a pace that is doable.
The Army has leaned forward in initiating a program called
Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI), and
has recruited, now, I don't know the number this week, but I
think it's somewhere around 300 people, who are native
linguists, who are in the United States as non-immigrant
residents. This is a new program, initiated just in February,
so it's already demonstrated a great success, and there's a
vibrant blog occurring.
Senator Wicker. Is that MAVNI program just the Army?
Admiral Olson. At this point, it is executed only by the
Army. The Navy has an intent to execute the program, at a much
smaller scale. The Air Force has not indicated an intent to do
it yet.
Senator Wicker. So, we would be recruiting, essentially,
foreign nationals who wish to become American citizens and
giving them a fast track because of their service as visa-
holders?
Admiral Olson. Yes, sir. These are visa-holders in the
United States for a purpose--student, fiancee, work, athlete--
who meet a set of criteria to become eligible to enlist in the
United States Army.
Senator Wicker. But, certainly, they already know the
language and the culture, and that's a great advantage there.
Admiral Olson. Yes, sir. In fact, the evidence is that we
are, so far, pulling in very highly qualified applicants. Most
of them are college students or degree-holders. In fact, well
over 75 percent have an associates degree or higher, at this
point.
Senator Wicker. Where are these advanced training courses
that you mentioned being conducted? Are they being done by the
Services?
Admiral Olson. Mostly, we run our own training courses
under our U.S. Army SOCOM at Fort Bragg, NC. We do take
advantage of service and defense schools, where we can.
Senator Wicker. Have you looked into using our universities
and our ROTC programs in this regard, partnering between
detachments and language and international studies programs at
the various universities?
Admiral Olson. Yes, sir. We've looked at that. We're taking
advantage of a few of those programs. For example, the Olmsted
Scholarship program, which permits a student to go to a
university in a foreign country--I have some special operations
students in it. But, we've found that keeping the student near
where he lives, dedicated to language training full time, is
the best way to obtain language skills quickly.
Senator Wicker. As an Active Duty member.
Admiral Olson. As an Active Duty member, yes, sir.
Senator Wicker. Tell us what you need in this regard,
Admiral, and Senator Reed, Senator Martinez, and I will try to
bring that information to the full committee.
Admiral Olson. Yes, sir. It's really a matter of capacity.
First of all, we need the capacity to make the students
available to go through language training full time, and then
we need the schoolhouse capacity to absorb them into its
programs. We have a plan in place, not yet fully funded, but
we're seeking the funds within our own resources to do that, to
expand our program incrementally. Most language training,
frankly, takes place in a laboratory environment, utilizing
native speakers as instructors. So, a lot of the native
speakers are contract hires for that purpose, and that's the
way that we can best get about the program.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
Senator Reed. Senator Martinez.
Senator Martinez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Olson, great to see you.
Admiral Olson. Yes, sir.
Senator Martinez. Always good to remember your home is in
Tampa, and we appreciate your having your command there, and
we're proud of that, and proud of the role of MacDill and the
Tampa community play in hosting so many important missions for
our military.
I wanted to ask you a few questions about the joint cargo
aircraft, or the ``gunship-light,'' as I guess it's referred to
sometimes, the C-27J. There's been a decision made by the Air
Force to reduce the number of airplanes that are going to be
purchased to 38, which concerns me greatly, and I know you've
expressed your opinion about the importance of this aircraft to
some of what you do. I just wondered if you could tell the
subcommittee how you view this aircraft and the importance of
this aircraft to your mission. We have an aircraft here that's
a little smaller, a little lighter, a little cheaper to
operate, a little easier to get in and out of places, and
perhaps with a smaller footprint. So, could you comment on the
importance of this aircraft, to you and the operations that you
and your forces conduct?
Admiral Olson. Thank you, Senator Martinez.
The requirement for an airborne platform to monitor an
operational situation, with the capability of providing precise
fires, is a very important requirement. I expect that, as the
pace scale of operations in Afghanistan increases with the
increased force level, it will become a capability that's even
more in demand.
We are working to develop, and in fact, we have made great
progress in developing a platform-neutral, precision-strike
package. The platforms that we are currently looking to install
that on, as the most immediately available, are within our own
MC-130 fleet. But, our own requirement study showed that, for
global application, and regional application within CENTCOM, to
a great degree, an airplane that gives us the capability to
operate more remotely, with a smaller footprint, at a lower
operating cost, off less-improved runways, is very important.
An analysis of alternatives conducted by SOCOM identified the
C-27J as the preferred alternative to meet that requirement.
Senator Martinez. This was an aircraft that was going to be
purchased by the Army, as well as the Air Force. Now it's only
going to be the Air Force. I'm not sure it matters exactly
which Service purchases it, as long as it's available to you
and in sufficient numbers to be able to carry out your mission.
My concern is, with 38, that we're not going to be in that
position to do that, and I wondered if you shared my concern.
Admiral Olson. Sir, at the time our analysis of
alternatives was done, the C-27 had been selected through a
competitive process as the Army joint cargo aircraft. We really
do depend on Service commonality, to the extent that we can get
it, in the platforms that we have. It becomes, then, the
responsibility of the Service to procure the aircraft and
provide it to us.
So, to that extent, a Service common aircraft, whether it's
in the Air Force or Army, is very helpful to us.
Senator Martinez. I know we've had great success in the SOF
in the retention and recruitment efforts. Are those still being
maintained at levels that give you comfort, and what do you
attribute the success to, as well?
Admiral Olson. Yes, sir. We're on pace to achieve our
programmed growth in almost every element of our force, but
we're lagging behind a few percent in a couple of specialties.
The largest portion of our growth, frankly, is in the Army
Special Forces community, and they've proven that they're able
to grow, essentially, a battalion-a-year increase to the force.
So, we're actually ahead of pace on that.
So, recruiting is good. Retention is satisfactory. The
training pipelines are sufficient to produce the force that
we're programmed to grow.
I'm on record, Senators, of saying that, within our own
pipelines, our own processes, our own institutions, we really
can't absorb more than about 5 percent per year growth, and
we're on pace to do that.
Senator Martinez. I understand you were looking to replace
the SEAL delivery vehicle with a new shallow-water combat
submersible. Tell us where we are on that, and what is the
status of that new vessel?
Admiral Olson. Sir, the SEAL delivery vehicle is simply
reaching the end of its service life, and so we're looking for
the next-generation capability. We have about $3.2 million in
the fiscal year 2010 budget for research, development, test,
and evaluation in order to determine what the best craft will
be to meet that need.
Senator Martinez. Finally, let me ask you briefly about the
challenge that you've undertaken to train Pakistani forces to
assist in defeating the insurgents in Western Afghanistan, in
the tribal border regions. How is that role going, and how are
you doing in training the Pakistani forces? How are they doing,
in terms of beginning to achieve the kind of success that will
be necessary for them to have in order to achieve our goals?
Admiral Olson. Sir, I'm the force provided for that
mission, but I don't have operational control over those
forces. Of course, once we deploy them, we monitor them very
carefully. We're working very closely with the Pakistanis to
provide partners to them at the pace and scale that they want
and can accept them. That effort is going along in a way that
is satisfactory for both countries. If I go deeper than that,
sir, I think we'll have to go into closed session.
Senator Martinez. Understood.
In closing, I wanted to say thank you to you and the people
who work under your command for the great successes that you've
had, not only in Iraq and Afghanistan, now, and the challenges
that Pakistan faces, but, I think, also something that doesn't
get nearly talked about enough, is the incredible success
you've had in Colombia, where we have really made a tremendous
difference in one of our most important partners and neighbors
in the region. We've really turned around a situation. I don't
think we could have dreamed that things would be going as well
as they are in that country, and a lot of it is due to the work
of the Special Forces that we've had there--the success we've
had in training the Colombians, and the joint work that we've
done there is remarkable. I think it's also, perhaps, a
blueprint to be followed elsewhere, and perhaps that's what
you're doing in Pakistan, as well.
Thank you for your service.
Admiral Olson. Thank you for noting that, sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Martinez.
We have a vote right now, in fact, they've reached the
midway point in the timing. In addition, at the end of the
vote, Senator Levin is going to ask us to remain so we can vote
on nominations, including General Rodriguez, to assume his
position in Afghanistan.
What I would suggest, and I've talked to the ranking
member, if there are additional questions, we would submit them
to the Admiral for the record, and then we could adjourn at
this moment.
Senator Reed. I think, Admiral, that there's probably not a
need, now, to go into closed session because I don't think
there's an issue that we would raise here that would require
that closed session.
So, I thank you for your service, for your attendance here
today, and for also being understanding. We are running around,
as you are.
So, at this point, with our deep appreciation and thanks to
you and members of SOCOM, I will adjourn the hearing.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
BALANCE BETWEEN DIRECT AND INDIRECT ACTION
1. Senator Reed. Admiral Olson, in your prepared testimony, you
discussed the importance of ``balance between direct and indirect
activities'' in irregular warfare. Recent congressional testimony
indicated that while the resources devoted to the indirect capabilities
of Special Operations Forces (SOF) have increased since September 11,
2001, the indirect warfare community within Special Operations Command
(SOCOM) is still under-represented bureaucratically when compared to
the direct action community. This imbalance has reportedly manifested
itself in a number of areas including competition for resources,
mission support, and promotions. Do you believe the indirect warfare
community receives their fair share of funding and mission support
within SOCOM?
Admiral Olson. Overall, SOCOM's fiscal year 2010 baseline budget
request is $5.9 billion. This funding will support SOCOM's continued
role in defeating terrorist networks around the globe. Irregular
warfare, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, civil affairs (CA)
operations, information operations, psychological operations (PSYOP),
and foreign internal defense are traditional activities for SOF. This
request provides the resources necessary to ensure SOF are properly
trained and equipped to successfully execute these core activities.
2. Senator Reed. Admiral Olson, some have suggested that the
creation of a Joint Irregular Warfare Command, led by a three-star
officer, should be created to counterbalance the direct action
community within SOCOM. Do you believe this is an option that should be
considered? If not, what other ways can SOCOM reorganize itself to
adequately address the concerns of the indirect warfare community?
Admiral Olson. No, I do not believe there is a requirement to
create a new three-star Joint Irregular Warfare Command within SOCOM.
If created, it would prove redundant and would possibly create a
division between the indirect and direct approaches, which we seek to
avoid. As such, the concept would not provide any further assistance or
enhance the ongoing effort in monitoring the balance between direct or
indirect approaches.
Irregular warfare is a form of warfare that encompasses both the
direct and indirect approaches. The irregular warfare concept, applied
appropriately, strives to synthesize both approaches and bring all
elements of U.S. national power to bear in a synchronized and
coordinated manner. This means that elements of each approach are
employed in an integrated, complementary fashion to address today's
threats across the operational environment. As such, a balance must
exist between these approaches focused on the operational environment
within the context of interagency and international collaboration, a
concept that SOF understand well, due to our history and experience in
conducting irregular warfare.
3. Senator Reed. Admiral Olson, some observers contend that
national intelligence agencies focus on special operators engaged in
direct action operations against terrorists and insurgents as the
agencies assist the Department of Defense (DOD) in Afghanistan, Iraq,
and elsewhere. Consequently, it is alleged that general-purpose forces
and SOF engaged in foreign internal defense and population protection
receive less intelligence support. Do you think that the national
intelligence agencies are naturally drawn to support direct action
operations?
Admiral Olson. SOCOM receives a tremendous amount of support from
the intelligence community and from the larger interagency community.
SOCOM shares both analytical and operational partnerships at all levels
from embedded support at SOCOM headquarters down to forward SOCOM
supported deployed task forces. As an example, the National Geospatial
Agency has embedded support at the headquarters, component, theater,
and forward operating levels. The range of this support covers the
gambit from direct action missions to humanitarian assistance. Many SOF
task forces are engaged in direct action. However, the range of SOCOM's
capabilities cannot be defined by this singular mission because it
excludes the mutually supporting activities occurring at multiple
levels. It is fair to say that direct action receives most of the
public attention, but Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-
Afghanistan's success is more correctly defined by its foreign internal
defense and security force assistance engagement.
SHORTAGES OF EQUIPMENT AND ENABLING SUPPORT
4. Senator Reed. Admiral Olson, recent congressional testimony and
news reports have indicated that the fielding of equipment, support
personnel, and enablers have not kept pace with the growth in SOF. Some
have argued that the SOF growth directed by the 2006 Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) was not balanced with appropriate support,
enabling personnel, or adequately resourced, resulting in shortages of
equipment including weapons and radios. What is being done to ensure
the recent and planned increase in SOF is adequately equipped to carry
out their mission?
Admiral Olson. SOCOM's QDR 10 Force Structure efforts focus on
balancing the force between combat, combat support, and combat service
support capabilities. QDR 2006 provided critically short/stressed SOF
combat forces to SOCOM. Since QDR 2006, it became apparent based on
current Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF) operations that the proper balance of combat-to-combat support
and combat service support force structure was not achieved. SOF
operations are clearly dependent on broader conventional force
infrastructure. SOCOM is working with the Services via the QDR to
ensure the balance of critical organic, dedicated support and direct
support enablers are available to support global SOF operations
including Security Force Assistance (SFA) and Foreign Internal Defense
(FID). SOCOM is working closely with all of the QDR issue teams and
leadership to ensure the critical enablers (such as rotary wing
support, Civil Affairs, and recapitalization of gunships) are available
to support future SOF operations.
SOCOM continues to address equipping personnel associated with SOF
growth from QDR 2006 by increasing the required basis of issue (BOI) of
equipment through the SOCOM Requirements Evaluation Board (SOCREB)
approval process as required. This process ensures the right types of
equipment and the resources necessary to procure it are in place as new
personnel come on board and/or enter critical training and deployment.
These BOI adjustments are done as individual equipment items or as
aggregate equipment items for specific SOF units. For example, in
September 2007, the SOCREB approved BOI increases for over 150
equipment items to address QDR 2006 growth to the 75th Ranger Regiment;
in 2009 BOI increases for Multi-Band Inter-Team Tactical Radios for
Naval Special Warfare Forces were approved as new forces and units were
generated. SOF capacity and enabling capability shortfalls that were
not adequately addressed in QDR 2006 are a focus of SOCOM's inputs to
the Force Structure Phase of QDR 2010. Primary examples include
shortfalls in rotary wing airlift capacity, and support from the
Services for filling low density, high demand military occupational
specialties (MOSs) that provide critical enablers to SOF.
5. Senator Reed. Admiral Olson, your prepared testimony indicates
that the non-availability of force enablers has become SOCOM's ``most
vexing issue in the operational environment.'' You go on to say that
general-purpose forces should develop and sustain supporting
capabilities ``beyond their organic needs'' that can be used in
``direct support of special operations commanders.'' What is the
largest unmet requirement for support of special operations personnel?
Admiral Olson. The Services do develop and sustain supporting
capabilities beyond their organic needs; however, the current demand
exceeds the supply. As a result, there are a limited number of general
purpose forces available to optimize SOF especially in austere
distributed operations. The largest unmet requirement requested by the
geographic combatant commands to support SOF, whether you measure
personnel requested or individual capabilities requested, is rotary
wing aviation, intelligence support, engineer support, and military
working dog teams. These capabilities provide mission essential combat
support and combat service support that is currently required.
6. Senator Reed. Admiral Olson, how have the Services reacted to
your proposal of growing more support personnel for the support of SOF?
Admiral Olson. For years, SOCOM has advocated four ``SOF Truths.''
This year, the command added a fifth SOF Truth, ``Most Special
Operations require non-SOF support.'' To this end, the Services have
been cooperative during this period of heavy demand. For example, the
command recently completed SOCOM-Army staff talks, followed by a SOF
enablers working group, which were both productive. SOCOM does not
possess the full amount of organic support personnel and enablers
required to conduct operations, which makes the continuation of the
dedicated support provided by the Services to SOF critical to the
success of current and future SOF operations.
7. Senator Reed. Admiral Olson, do you believe there are additional
support functions that should be grown within SOF?
Admiral Olson. Yes, within select support functions, but this
growth must continue to be complemented by additional Service enablers.
The command is working very hard to achieve the right mix of, and
balance between operators and support functions. Over the last 4 years,
SOCOM has worked aggressively to increase the number of operators on
the ground. Currently, a major focus is to right-size the force by
seeking continued growth of organic combat support and combat service
support.
ACQUISITION REQUIREMENTS PROCESS
8. Senator Reed. Admiral Olson, many have criticized the DOD for
the speed with which its acquisition system produces and delivers
capability to the warfighter. There is broad consensus that the DOD
should not waste unnecessary time when troops are engaged in combat if
there is a clear, low-risk path forward with regard to an acquisition
program. That goal must be balanced with the knowledge that some major
systems acquisition programs are neither low-risk, nor is there a clear
path forward.
SOCOM's acquisition authorities are unique within the DOD. You are
the only uniformed commander who has a senior acquisition executive
reporting to you. That places a special burden on you to ensure that
requirements are adequately vetted and balanced against available
resources before moving forward with an acquisition program. The Weapon
System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (Public Law 111-23) has a number
of aims, one of which is to ensure that DOD adequately focuses on the
requirements process portion of the acquisition cycle.
What actions have you taken to ensure that the SOCOM requirements
process filters out the nice-to-have ideas from the real requirements,
or appropriately decides when something should be bought under rapid
acquisition procedures versus the normal acquisition process?
Admiral Olson. SOCOM has an established, proven, deliberate, and
adaptable requirements process titled Special Operations Forces
Capabilities Integration and Development System (SOFCIDS); this process
is documented through SOCOM Directive 71-4. SOFCIDS parallels, and is
fully compatible with, the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System (JCIDS) process; approved Special Operations-
Peculiar (SO-P) documents are entered into the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC) process. The command's SOFCIDS is managed by
the Center for SOF Structure, Requirements, Resources, and Strategic
Assessments. Within the command, SO-P capabilities documents are
presented to a SOCOM Requirements Evaluation Board (SOCREB) for
approval, chaired by the SOCOM Deputy Commander.
SOCOM staff responsible for managing the SOFCIDS/JCIDS processes
have completed the mandated requirements management certification
(Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (Public Law 111-23))
program offered through the Defense Acquisition University. Some SOCOM
requirements managers are also certified acquisition professionals.
Requirements managers are tasked to ensure proper vetting and
visibility of all SO-P capabilities documents using the SOFCIDS process
that prescribes both the deliberate and rapid processes. The
requirements vetting process that is used throughout includes analysis
and verification of the capabilities-based assessments, evaluations of
the technical feasibility and risk factors for the proposed materiel
solution, validity of Key Performance Parameters, fiscal realities and
resourcing strategies. Proposed requirements are staffed throughout
SOCOM, and require proper certifications for intelligence
supportability, operational mission need, and interoperability
determinations prior to approval. Requirements are then prepared for
validation by the J8 in preparation for presentation to the SOCREB,
which is comprised of general/flag officer and Senior Executive
Servicemembers who provide recommendations for approval/disapproval to
the SOCOM Deputy Commander.
For addressing SO-P urgent requirements, SOCOM has developed rapid
acquisition procedures to satisfy capability gaps referred to as
``equip for the fight, not for the force.'' This process, known as
SOFCIDS-Urgent, is not used to equip all SOF components with a single
item, but only in quantities for those in or going into combat. For
those requirements that could lead to unacceptable force protection
risk or potential mission failure, the command has developed a
formalized Combat Mission Needs Statement (CMNS) process. Through Rapid
Response Teams (RRTs), SOCOM subject matter experts work to
expeditiously conduct and certify CMNS Need, Solution, and Resourcing
and prepare courses of actions for presentation to the approval
authority (SOCOM Deputy Commander). The majority of CMNS approved by
SOCOM are for non-developmental items and only for necessary equipping
(``fight'') quantities. When CMNS capabilities are determined to be
enduring requirements for use beyond the duration of the current combat
operations, or 1-year from fielding, the user-unit must document the
enduring requirement and submit it for approval through the normal
SOFCIDS processes.
ADVANCED SEAL DELIVERY SYSTEM AND JOINT MULTI-MISSION SUBMERSIBLE
9. Senator Reed. Admiral Olson, the Advanced SEAL Delivery System
(ASDS) has a difficult history that was further complicated when much
of the first submarine was destroyed by a fire on November 9, 2008.
With the fiscal year 2010 budget request, SOCOM has announced plans to
initiate a follow-on program called the Joint Multi-Mission Submersible
(JMMS), based largely on the hull design and lessons learned from ASDS.
Has the decision been made whether or not to repair ASDS-1? If the
decision has been made, what is the rough schedule and cost of this
repair?
Admiral Olson. The requirement for the ASDS capability still
exists. ASDS repair is estimated to cost $237 million and will be
completed by the third quarter of fiscal year 2012, if the repairs are
initiated this summer. SOCOM is pursuing various options to obtain
funding to repair the vehicle. The program cost estimates have been
reviewed by the cost engineers and are considered reasonable for the
anticipated repairs. The Naval Sea Systems Command Program Office will
continue to refine the cost and schedule estimates as additional
information becomes available.
10. Senator Reed. Admiral Olson, do you consider ASDS a SOCOM-
unique asset?
Admiral Olson. The ASDS provides SOCOM the capability to conduct
clandestine insertion or extraction of SOF and their equipment into
denied areas from strategic distances. The ASDS also provides
Geographic Combatant Commanders, Joint Force Commanders, and other
government agencies the capability to conduct other types of
clandestine missions in denied areas. As such, the ASDS provides the
United States Government with a strategic national asset that can
fulfill a variety of extraordinary requirements.
11. Senator Reed. Admiral Olson, how many ASDS and JMMS platforms
are needed to fully meet the requirement?
Admiral Olson. One ASDS and three JMMS, for a total of four
undersea clandestine mobility vessels, will meet SOCOM's requirement to
conduct two simultaneous deployments.
12. Senator Reed. Admiral Olson, what is the total cost of the JMMS
program?
Admiral Olson. The total acquisition cost for the JMMS program is
estimated at $1.2 billion. This will provide three complete operational
systems. The fiscal year 2010 President's budget includes $43.4 million
pre-design refinement Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
funds.
13. Senator Reed. Admiral Olson, how is the JMMS acquisition
strategy different than the one used for ASDS?
Admiral Olson. The strategy is based upon lessons learned and
technology developed from the ASDS program to lower acquisition and
performance risk. SOCOM in conjunction with the Naval Sea Systems
Command program office is taking the following steps:
(1) The JMMS program will use only high Technical Readiness
Level components vice new highly technical subsystems that were
used with the ASDS.
(2) Program oversight will be greatly increased over the ASDS
by initiating JMMS as an ACAT ID Special Interest program vice
ACAT III; significantly increasing government program staff
assigned to perform programmatic and contractor oversight; and
by increasing the number of Milestone Decision Authority review
and decision points to six prior to commencing construction of
the first JMMS unit.
(3) Increased effort has been applied to achieving better
match between performance desired by the warfighter and the
ability to develop and produce the product by industry.
(4) Evaluation of the industrial capability of potential
contractors for production of JMMS will be a significant input
into selection of the contractor.
(5) Cost estimates from the Cost Analysis Improvement Group
will be involved from the beginning of the JMMS acquisition
process and at a much higher level than with the ASDS.
(6) Using historical data from ASDS, requested program
resources for JMMS will be matched to the requirements based on
evaluation of actual returned costs from the ASDS.
(7) Consistent with the level of technical maturity required
and intent to limit cost growth, the JMMS program will use a
fixed price vice cost contract employed with ASDS.
(8) The design for JMMS will take advantage of lessons
learned from the design of the ASDS by: directly or nearly
directly using components such as the pressure hull design,
mating system, and propulsor; providing significantly greater
detail to the contractor to enable compliance with all
requirements during the construction process; and aggressively
addressing all of the reliability problem recommendations from
the ASDS Critical Systems Reviews.
(9) Lastly, the program office will establish earlier and
more comprehensive testing and evaluation that will include
detailed component level testing in advance of construction
through Operational Testing of the first JMMS system.
14. Senator Reed. Admiral Olson, do you expect JMMS to deliver
capabilities above what ASDS can provide or just to improve
reliability?
Admiral Olson. The ASDS and JMMS fulfill a common requirement. The
JMMS is intended to incorporate the reliability improvements derived
from the ASDS, not to change the capabilities required from the vessel.
At the threshold level, the JMMS provides ASDS-1 level capabilities
with improved reliability.
GUNSHIP RECAPITALIZATION
15. Senator Reed. Admiral Olson, the AC-130 gunship has been used
heavily and with great success in Iraq and Afghanistan, providing
critical air support and overwatch for SOF conducting ground
operations. However, the heavy use of the aircraft has taken its toll
on these airframes and the demand for these aircraft far outweighs
their availability. SOCOM currently has 25 AC-130 gunships, and I
understand that there are plans to modify 8 MC-130Ws with a roll-on,
roll-off precision strike and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance package to meet urgent operational needs. I understand
that you have also identified the modification of four additional MC-
130Ws as SOCOM's top unfunded requirement for fiscal year 2010. How
many total gunships does SOCOM need to fully meet its requirements?
Admiral Olson. SOCOM has a requirement for 33 airborne precision
fire support platforms.
16. Senator Reed. Admiral Olson, does this number take into account
the significant increase in special operations ground forces?
Admiral Olson. The long-term requirement for airborne precision
strike platforms is 33. SOCOM currently has 25 gunships. We seek 16
additional precision strike platforms to meet the immediate requirement
in Afghanistan. Over time, we will attrite the 8 oldest in the
inventory to achieve a steady state of 33.
17. Senator Reed. Admiral Olson, are you aware of missions being
cancelled in Iraq or Afghanistan due to a lack of gunship availability?
Admiral Olson. With respect to AC-130 gunships in both OIF and OEF,
there are more potential missions than gunships available. The Combined
Joint Special Operations Air Component Commander (CJSOAC CDR), having
responsibility of command and control of all AC-130 gunship assets in
both OIF and OEF, must conduct real-time prioritization of these high-
demand, low-density assets. The CJSOAC CDR maintains the ability to
shift gunship allocation to support ground forces and/or prosecute
high-value targets based on mission priority.
18. Senator Reed. Admiral Olson, what is SOCOM's long-term plan for
replacing or modernizing the AC-130 gunship?
Admiral Olson. SOCOM is developing and fielding a scalable,
modular, platform-neutral, airborne sensor and weapons package with a
common battle management system. This Precision Strike Package (PSP)
can be configured to include multiple sensors, precision-guided
munitions, gun systems, and other weapons. Using a modular approach
allows the command to rapidly integrate proven systems on a variety of
aircraft. In addition to the current gunship mission, SOCOM also has a
requirement for a small footprint, sensor, and precision-strike
capability to support SOF troops in austere and politically sensitive
areas. SOCOM's original intent was to fill this capability gap with a
SOF-modified, Service-common C-27J aircraft. Although this platform is
currently not available, the capability gap remains. The goal is to
ultimately recapitalize and expand the fleet of 25 AC-130H/U to 33 PSP-
equipped aircraft.
19. Senator Reed. Admiral Olson, you indicated in your prepared
testimony that the MC-130W modifications will force SOCOM to accept
some short-term risk in its aerial refueling fleet and a ``future
program will be required to address the resultant shortfall.'' Please
elaborate on the risk SOCOM is accepting by modifying these C-130Ws.
Admiral Olson. The specific PSP modification to the MC-130W still
allows limited mobility capability and the short-term risk is within
acceptable limits. To meet the immediate demand for airborne sensors
and fire support, SOCOM intends to modify the fleet of 12 MC-130W
aircraft with a PSP. Integrating PSP on an existing SOF mobility
platform is the fastest way to provide SOF warfighters with increased
capacity of armed over watch and precision-strike capability. The
modular nature of PSP enables the command to add or remove precision-
strike capability to this platform as the requirements on the
battlefield change.
MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT TEAMS
20. Senator Reed. Admiral Olson, the National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2009 requires the administration to develop
a comprehensive interagency strategy for strategic communications and
public diplomacy. While your command does not play a large role in
strategic communications, SOCOM does have important and growing
responsibilities in this area. SOCOM has deployed a number of Military
Information Support Teams (MISTs) that work with embassy country teams
to develop and implement information operations campaigns to counter
support for terrorism and to counter radicalization in certain high
priority countries. Are you aware of the reporting requirement in the
NDAA for Fiscal Year 2009 and has SOCOM had a role in the development
of the strategy the NDAA requires?
Admiral Olson. We are aware of the strategy development and
reporting requirements as codified in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2009.
SOCOM supports both the development of a comprehensive interagency
strategic communication and public diplomacy strategy and will support
any existing or emergent reporting and analysis requirements. At
present, SOCOM is participating in a comprehensive strategy development
at both the departmental and national levels.
At the national level, SOCOM is supporting the development of an
interagency strategic communication plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Led by the National Security Staff (NSS) through the Interagency Policy
Committee (IPC) on Strategic Communication, SOCOM is participating with
representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
staff, the Joint Staff and CENTCOM to ensure the capabilities,
authorities, and resources of DOD are effectively and efficiently
reflected in the strategy. Specifically, SOCOM's collaborative planning
processes and tools suite (known as Prospector) have been adopted by
the NSS IPC and the National Counterterrorism Center as they lead the
strategy development process. Operationally, in addition to the MIST
capability mentioned above in the question, SOCOM executes multiple
programs which support the ongoing efforts to counter violent extremism
to include programs focused on intelligence analysis and assessment,
information operations, psychological operations, and public affairs
support both unique to SOCOM and in support of the efforts of the
geographic combatant commanders and ambassadors in priority countries.
At the departmental level, SOCOM is supporting OSD development of
planning guidance for countering violent extremism. This effort, led by
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Joint Communication),
connects the Countering Violent Extremism pillar of the 2008 National
Implementation Plan for the global war on terror with the DOD plan for
global operations against terrorist networks. As the DOD lead for
synchronizing this planning, as specified in the Unified Command Plan,
SOCOM will continue to assist OSD in the development of this
consolidated planning guidance for the Department as it relates to
countering violent extremism.
As efforts toward a comprehensive interagency strategic
communication and public diplomacy strategy continue to mature, SOCOM,
at the direction of the SECDEF, will continue to support interagency
planning processes, provide operational capabilities, and employ
measurements of effectiveness for these efforts.
21. Senator Reed. Admiral Olson, what is your assessment of the
value of these MISTs to SOCOM's ongoing operations?
Admiral Olson. The MISTs are an invaluable tool to SOCOM's ongoing
operations. We provide MISTs to combatant commands (COCOMs) under our
Title 10 authorities utilizing personnel primarily from our Army
component, the United States Army SOCOM. These are small teams,
generally four to six soldiers, comprised of individuals that are hand-
selected for their expertise and experience with the country they're
needed for, the problem sets they're facing, and their ability to work
with interagency partners, allies, and host nations. The MISTs work in
close coordination with the local embassy to support the regional
COCOM's operational and strategic military objectives by engaging host
nation governments and selected segments of the population to advance
U.S. interests. MIST operations are tailored also to support and
enhance the mission of our theater SOCOMs. MISTs work hand-in-hand with
the country team to amplify the U.S. embassy's information efforts and
create synergy to achieve greater reach and effect within the area of
responsibility (AOR). All actions are approved by the Ambassador and
coordinated with the country team before execution. This relationship
provides a constant liaison with COCOMs, U.S. embassies, and theater
SOCOMs to accomplish information objectives designed to address and
combat many of the underlying causes that support violent extremism and
terrorism.
22. Senator Reed. Admiral Olson, please articulate the value of
MISTs to the broader U.S. strategic communications effort.
Admiral Olson. The MISTs are a key tool in the overall strategic
communications effort and provide a vital link between strategic and
operational communicators within diplomatic, military, and information
pillars of national power. The MISTs work with the embassy country team
to execute COCOM CDR and the Ambassador's strategic communications
objectives. They work in concert with embassy staffs and host nation
organizations. MISTs communicate using all forms of media to build
enduring information links and capacities for future use, from the
ministerial level within a government down to the face-to-face
engagements with the local population. MISTs are a key capability to
deliver strategic communication themes and messages as well as
providing military support to public diplomacy.
23. Senator Reed. Admiral Olson, do you believe MIST operations
have been adequately coordinated with the country teams where they are
working?
Admiral Olson. MIST operations are extremely well coordinated. All
MIST activities are approved by the Ambassador and coordinated with the
country team before execution. This begins with a request from the
Ambassador for a MIST. The request defines when and for how long the
MIST will operate in the country and the objectives he/she would like
achieved. The MIST then develops an information program or plan, based
on United States, COCOM, and theater SOCOM information requirements and
then ties it to specific objectives outlined in the Ambassador's
Mission Strategic Plan for his/her country. As the MIST develops
messages and/or products for dissemination, they are reviewed and
approved by the Ambassador or his/her designated representative before
release. As you can see, from planning through development and
dissemination, MIST operations are continuously coordinated with the
country team and its efforts.
JOINT COMBINED EXCHANGE TRAINING
24. Senator Reed. Admiral Olson, each year, our SOF participate in
dozens of Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) sessions with partner
nations around the world. These JCET sessions provide host nation units
with valuable training in counterterrorism tactics, techniques, and
procedures while also enhancing the language and cultural understanding
of our own forces. Unfortunately, most of these JCET sessions are only
episodic in nature, often only lasting a few weeks at a time. Do you
believe more persistent engagement through JCET is desirable? If so,
what is the greatest limiting factor in providing for persistent JCET
sessions?
Admiral Olson. Longer persistent engagement is better, but the end-
state must be clearly defined. One of the limiting factors to
persistent engagement is the operational tempo (OPTEMPO) of the Partner
Nation unit being trained. Oftentimes the units we engage with on a
persistent basis perform a myriad of tasks for the partner nation. In
some cases it is because of operational necessity, but other times it
may be because of administrative or logistical issues. Human Rights
Vetting (HRV) is always a concern. Even though HRV is good for a year
it is something that requires a degree of vigilance to stay current and
not become an impediment to engagement.
Availability of SOF is another factor in limiting more quality
persistent engagement opportunities. Geographic Combatant Commanders
outside the CENTCOM AOR oftentimes are unable to maintain a constant
presence with a dedicated unit due to limited availability of SOF.
25. Senator Reed. Admiral Olson, roughly what percentage of JCET
sessions are cancelled due to a lack of available special operations
personnel?
Admiral Olson. A total of three JCET have been cancelled during
fiscal year 2009; one in fiscal year 2008 and three in fiscal year
2007, about 1 percent per year. Most are cancelled due to host nation
access or host nation OPTEMPO.
26. Senator Reed. Admiral Olson, are there requests for JCET
sessions from priority countries that have gone unfilled because of a
lack of available special operations personnel? If so, which ones?
Admiral Olson. Yes. During this fiscal year, one in priority
country (PC) Jordan and one in high priority country (HPC) Lebanon,
fiscal year 2008 one in PC Oman and for fiscal year 2007 one in HPC
Mali and one in HPC Mauritania.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger Wicker
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN
27. Senator Wicker. Admiral Olson, are you confident that you will
have sufficient enabler forces, specifically logistics, airlift, and
linguist support, to sustain SOF in Afghanistan, given the significant
increase in general purpose forces and the demands they will place on
support personnel and equipment?
Admiral Olson. I have full confidence that General McChrystal's 60
day assessment will result in both an appropriate weighting of
priorities for support and increase enabler support to SOF in
Afghanistan.
28. Senator Wicker. Admiral Olson, more broadly, do you believe
there are sufficient SOF in Afghanistan to meet your requirements?
Admiral Olson. No. SOCOM is a force provider of SOF in response to
requirements forwarded by Commander, CENTCOM. There is now insufficient
SOF available to meet the demand.
TRAINING OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES
29. Senator Wicker. Admiral Olson, please provide your assessment
of SOCOM's current capacity and level of success in training Afghan
security forces.
Admiral Olson. SOF is partnered with the Afghanistan National
Security Force (ANSF) throughout the country and together have had
great success. SOF train and conduct operations by, with, and through
ANSF on a daily basis. Noted deficiencies in Afghanistan is the fact
there are not enough ANSF units partnered with SOF, and the inability
to deploy ANSF units country-wide to conduct large-scale ANSF-led
operations against the insurgency.
DIRECT ACTION VS. NON-KINETIC OPERATIONS
30. Senator Wicker. Admiral Olson, our long-term success against
terrorism will depend on our ability to engage civilian populations
through non-kinetic means and to win the war of ideas, rather than
relying solely on direct action operations. Striking the correct
balance between these is vital to forging a successful strategy. In
visiting with General McChrystal, he discussed with me the difference
between counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. What do you see as the
correct balance between direct action operations and non-kinetic
operations in Afghanistan?
Admiral Olson. SOF plan and conduct both kinetic and non-kinetic
operations. Direct action is a core task and one of the many kinetic
types of operations that SOF conducts through the ANSF. All of our
operations are intelligence-based rather than simply kinetic or non-
kinetic. SOF commanders plan and conduct kinetic and non-kinetic
operations on a daily basis and routinely conduct non-kinetic
operations as a follow-up to kinetic operations. This is used to
maintain and regain support of the local populous for the legitimacy of
the Government of Afghanistan (GOA). These non-kinetic operations are
also led by the ANSF with SOF support.
Furthermore, in the event of an unplanned kinetic event such as an
enemy strike against our forces, an ambush on one of our convoys, or an
IED detonation, SOF commanders have plans for ANSF led operations. This
allows SOF and ANSF to go non-kinetic when tactically feasible
following enemy strikes against our forces.
Lastly, our strategic communication plan is utilized in addition to
our kinetic and non-kinetic operations to help maintain and regain
support of the local populous adding legitimacy for SOF and the GOA.
31. Senator Wicker. Admiral Olson, what steps is SOCOM taking to
win the war of ideas? Are we doing enough to ensure tribal leaders and
the civilian population are informed when the Taliban or other
insurgents kill civilians? What steps are being taken to counter
Taliban propaganda?
Admiral Olson. SOCOM synchronizes planning under its Unified
Campaign Plan responsibilities and provides forces to COCOMs under
title 10 authorities. SOCOM through DOD CONPLAN 7500 establishes
specific tasks to the other COCOMs and suggestions for our interagency
partners with regards to informing populations and countering adversary
propaganda. SOCOM has worked through the Joint Staff and with the other
COCOMs to acquire additional authorities to increase our commanders'
freedom of movement in the information domain. Two examples include the
Expanded Trans-Regional PSYOP Program and the Trans-Regional Web
Initiative. These grant authorities to our forces inside the areas of
hostilities to engage selected populations to do just what you ask
here.
Per General McChrystal: ``Our military strategic goal is to defeat
the insurgency threatening the stability of Afghanistan. Like any
insurgency, there is a struggle for the support and will of the
population. Gaining and maintaining that support must be our overriding
operational imperative.'' (USF-A/ISAF Policy Guidance).
To that end, the two biggest tools we have to win the war of ideas
are the truth and our actions. Many times, what we do is more important
than what we say.
SOCOM personnel are currently assigned to CENTCOM and also
assisting U.S. embassies within the AOR. They are working for these
organizations in a myriad of capacities to include engaging the
population and countering propaganda. I believe that we're competing in
the war of ideas better than we have in the past. While we are always
seeking ways to improve our methods--to engage more people more
frequently and with faster response times--we're proud of the
capabilities in personnel and equipment we provide to ensure the truth
is heard and understood. Our biggest weapon in countering Taliban
propaganda is the truth.
2010 QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW
32. Senator Wicker. Admiral Olson, given the importance the 2010
QDR will play in the development of the fiscal year 2011 and subsequent
years' defense budgets, it is vital the drafting of this document is
informed by the candid contributions of its stakeholders. Are you
actively involved in the ongoing process to draft the 2010 QDR?
Admiral Olson. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
established a thorough and inclusive process by which the 2010 QDR is
proceeding. SOCOM has been an active participant in this process from
the beginning, and will continue to provide timely inputs toward the
final report.
33. Senator Wicker. Admiral Olson, what would be your top
recommendations for this document concerning the future role,
structure, and requirements of SOCOM?
Admiral Olson. SOCOM's intent in the 2010 QDR is to sustain
programmed growth to enhance SOF global presence, while simultaneously
recapitalizing the force in accordance with established priorities.
SOCOM is committed to an investment strategy which enables true global
engagement to allow SOF, through a wider and more collaborative
interagency partnership, to continue to bring security and stability to
countries at strategic crossroads. Investments must therefore include
material and nonmaterial solutions, new authorities in conducting both
operations and training, and new policies in resourcing operations and
training.
While it is critical to have sufficient organic capabilities to
ensure rapid responses to global crises, most SOF operations require
non-SOF support. We are, and will continue to be, dependent on our
Service partners to provide key force enablers for a broad range of
support functions, including mobility, ISR, medical, and logistics. It
is crucial to mitigate the demand on SOF by developing and sustaining
supporting capabilities within the Services that are dedicated to
support SOF. SOCOM is working to clearly define and establish these
supporting capabilities and relationships within the framework of the
QDR and through direct engagement and discussion with our Service
partners.
PERSONNEL GROWTH
34. Senator Wicker. Admiral Olson, you have stated, ``our
assessments indicate that SOF cannot grow more than 3 to 5 percent per
year . . . and this growth rate will not meet the appetite for the
effects of SOF in forward operating areas.'' To what degree does this
shortfall of SOF personnel affect your ability to meet global demands
on your forces?
Admiral Olson. With the unique, inherent capabilities of Special
Forces, SOCOM projects the demand for SOF will remain high around the
globe, and these capabilities cannot be mass produced. To best meet the
global demand with the current and future force, the command is
planning for 3 to 5 percent growth per year, based upon the ability to
recruit, train, and sustain a quality force.
35. Senator Wicker. Admiral Olson, are there any steps that can be
taken, aside from growing the force, to mitigate this shortfall?
Admiral Olson. One lesson learned over the last 8 years is that SOF
must leverage enablers from the Services, because most special
operations require non-SOF support. Aside from growing the force, SOCOM
will continue to work with the Services to ensure there is sufficient
dedicated support, specifically combat support and combat service
support enablers.
36. Senator Wicker. Admiral Olson, in your opinion, how large can
SOF become without compromising on quality and still remain sustainable
for the purposes of recruiting and retention?
Admiral Olson. SOF growth cannot grow more than 3 to 5 percent a
year. Because we rely on the Services for overall personnel management
of the force, we are inextricably tied to the Service's personnel
management infrastructure to include recruiting and basic training.
Since September 11, SOF has experienced significant growth, but any
growth must be balanced with the production pipeline of SOF and
absorption into community force structure. We work closely with the
Services to ensure we do not compromise quality.
37. Senator Wicker. Admiral Olson, are there any current SOF
missions that can be fulfilled or augmented by conventional forces?
Admiral Olson. In an environment of increased security force
assistance, many SOF missions require enabler support that can be
provided by conventional forces. Additionally, there are a number of
tasks that conventional forces could assist with or perform entirely
such as: patrolling, traffic control point operations, maintenance,
property accountability, noncommissioned officer development courses,
et cetera. Many of those tasks are basic soldier skills and would not
require specialized training or equipment. In many cases the units
being trained lack even the basic soldier skills many conventional
forces could be utilized to train.
38. Senator Wicker. Admiral Olson, are there current missions that
conventional forces are filling that should be filled by SOF?
Admiral Olson. As a general rule there are no missions being
conducted by conventional forces that should be filled by SOF. Due to
the high demands placed on SOF, and the limited availability of those
SOF resources, operational commanders have been exceptionally vigilant
in the application of SOF-to-SOF missions. In some cases commanders are
reviewing existing SOF missions, with the intent to transition those
missions to conventional forces where appropriate and supportable. The
trend has been to ensure conventional forces are executing conventional
missions and SOF executing SOF missions. Of the 11 core activities that
SOF performs, there exists a degree of overlap with the core
capabilities of conventional forces. Direct Action, Security Force
Assistance, and Counterinsurgency Operations are three core activities
that SOF may share with conventional forces. It is incumbent upon
commanders at each level to ensure a proper alignment of forces to meet
a given requirement. In some cases the delineation may not be clear,
but commanders and their staffs are diligent about matching a force to
appropriate mission.
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
39. Senator Wicker. Admiral Olson, you have submitted several
policy proposals to increase SOCOM's involvement in the management of
personnel, including some that you say require amending Title 10 of the
U.S. Code. Several of these proposals have been met by resistance from
the Services and even the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Please describe
why you view these proposals, specifically the request to ``coordinate
on Military DOD and Service personnel management policy and plans'' as
necessary to the readiness of SOCOM forces.
Admiral Olson. It is not the intent of SOCOM to become another
Service. Rather, I seek alignment of readiness responsibilities with
existing Title 10 requirements to ensure the combat readiness of Joint
SOF. As written, 10 U.S.C. Sec. 167 assigns the responsibility of
ensuring combat readiness of SOF to the Commander, SOCOM but only
monitor-ship of personnel metrics such as promotions, assignments,
retention, training, and professional military education of SOF
officers. An amendment to Title 10 would align responsibilities with
authority and ensure policy decisions affecting SOF would be
appropriately coordinated.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT ON SOCOM CONTRACTING
40. Senator Wicker. Admiral Olson, on May 28, 2009, the DOD
Inspector General released a report on Logistics Support Contracting
for SOCOM. This report was critical of your command's management of
nearly $1.7 billion in logistic support contracts spanning 20
locations. Some of the criticism was directed at a lack of adequate
oversight, improper authority given to contractors to perform
inherently government functions, and that no quality assurance plan was
developed for contracting tasks. Please comment on this report and
describe what steps, if any, are being taken to correct these
deficiencies.
Admiral Olson. The overall objective of the DOD IG audit was to
determine whether the SOF Support Activity (SOFSA) logistics support
contracts USZA22-03-C-0056 and USZA22-03-D-0006 were properly managed
and administered by SOCOM. SOCOM has taken several steps to address the
report's recommendations and improve existing oversight processes and
procedures at SOFSA to include the following:
(1) The Director of SOFSA has reinforced his efforts to
ensure contractor personnel are properly identified and perform
only non-inherently governmental tasks. For example, SOFSA has
reiterated in writing existing DOD and SOCOM Federal
Acquisition Regulations, supplement policy, and local
procedures that directs all SOFSA support contractors to
clearly identify themselves as contractors in all written and
electronic correspondence, while attending meetings, in
telephone conversations, and while working in other situations
where their contractor status is not obvious. All SOFSA
government personnel are responsible for daily and ongoing
checks of contractor adherence to policies related to the
proper use of contractor personnel.
(2) The Director of SOFSA has reiterated to SOFSA customers
in writing that SOFSA will only accept contractual direction
and documentation signed by a government employee with
authority to issue said direction.
(3) SOFSA has fully implemented a Quality Assurance
Surveillance Plan that ensures all work is performed to
government specifications. SOFSA also uses customer surveys,
monthly government review meetings, and customer generated
Quality Deficiency Reports to assess contractor performance.
(4) SOFSA currently has nine government Contracting Officer
Representatives (COR) appointed to oversee active task orders.
Ten additional government employees are being trained for COR
duties and responsibilities. In addition, the Defense Contract
Management Agency has onsite quality assurance personnel
specifically dedicated toward independent oversight of aviation
maintenance operations.
ADVANCED SEAL DELIVERY SYSTEM AND JOINT MULTI-MISSION SUBMERSIBLE
41. Senator Wicker. Admiral Olson, ASDS has been plagued by
significant delays and cost overruns since its inception over 15 years
ago. Originally planned as a fleet of six submersibles, production has
been stopped at one, and this submersible has been hobbled by repeated
mechanical problems. What lessons has SOCOM learned during the
development and production of ASDS?
Admiral Olson. Just prior to the fire in November 2008, Northrop
Grumman Corporation completed Phase II of the ASDS Improvement Program
(AIP). The goal of the AIP was to review the ASDS design and make
recommendations to address the known reliability deficiencies with the
vehicle and to identify any changes that were required to address other
potential reliability issues discovered in the course of completing the
design reviews. Phase I of the AIP identified a total of 48
improvements that either had been or were being developed for
incorporation into the ASDS design. The AIP Phase II report included
additional recommendations that the Naval Sea Systems Command is
currently evaluating. The results of the AIP will be provided as part
of the JMMS Request for Proposal, so the deficiencies can be addressed
in the proposed design of the follow-on vehicle.
42. Senator Wicker. Admiral Olson, what steps is SOCOM taking to
ensure that the development of the follow on to ASDS, JMMS, does not
encounter similar design and acquisition problems?
Admiral Olson. The strategy is based on using lessons learned and
technology developed from the ASDS program to lower acquisition and
performance risk. SOCOM in conjunction with the Naval Sea Systems
Command program office is taking the following steps:
(1) The JMMS program will use only high Technical Readiness
Level components vice new highly technical subsystems that were
used with the ASDS.
(2) Program oversight will be greatly increased over the ASDS
by: initiating JMMS as an ACAT ID Special Interest program vice
ACAT III; significantly increasing government program staff
assigned to perform programmatic and contractor oversight; and
by increasing the number of Milestone Decision Authority review
and decision points to six prior to commencing construction of
the first JMMS unit.
(3) Increased effort has been applied to achieving better
match between performance desired by the warfighter and the
ability to develop and produce the product by industry.
(4) Evaluation of the industrial capability of potential
contractors for production of JMMS will be a significant input
into selection of the contractor.
(5) Cost estimates from the Cost Analysis Improvement Group
will be involved from the beginning of the JMMS acquisition
process and at a much higher level than with the ASDS.
(6) Using historical data from ASDS, requested program
resources for JMMS will be matched to the requirements based on
evaluation of actual returned costs from the ASDS.
(7) Consistent with the level of technical maturity required
and intent to limit cost growth, the JMMS program will use a
fixed price vice cost contract employed with ASDS.
(8) The design for JMMS will take advantage of lessons
learned from the design of the ASDS by: directly or nearly
directly using components such as the pressure hull design,
mating system, and propulsor; providing significantly greater
detail to the contractor to enable compliance with all
requirements during the construction process; and aggressively
addressing all of the reliability problem recommendations from
the ASDS Critical Systems Reviews.
(9) Lastly, the program office will establish earlier and
more comprehensive testing and evaluation that will include
detailed component level testing in advance of construction
through operational testing of the first JMMS system.
43. Senator Wicker. Admiral Olson, do you believe the current
development and acquisition capacity of SOCOM is adequate to produce
large, exceptionally complex platforms, such as a miniature submarine?
Admiral Olson. For exceptionally complex platforms, SOCOM leverages
acquisition expertise and capacity residing in the appropriate military
Service. Regarding the JMMS, the SOCOM Acquisition Executive in
conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,
Development, and Acquisition and his Program Executive Office for
Submarines will jointly exercise oversight of this complex project
through the execution of a Program Specific Memorandum of Agreement.
However, SOCOM will continue to retain control of all SO-P funding.
44. Senator Wicker. Admiral Olson, do you foresee any reforms
necessary to creating this capacity?
Admiral Olson. The JMMS will be procured in accordance with the
requirements of the recently issued DODI 5000.2, including utilizing
the new Navy gate review process and a competitive pre-design
refinement. No additional reforms are considered necessary to ensure
the success of this acquisition program.
INTERAGENCY COOPERATION
45. Senator Wicker. Admiral Olson, the necessity of creating
sustainable, long-term conditions for stability in foreign countries
requires significant coordination between our military and civilian
agencies, such as USAID and the intelligence community. What is SOCOM
doing to ensure unity of effort among its personnel and those of
civilian agencies who can provide useful support abroad?
Admiral Olson. SOCOM has three main efforts to help ensure unity of
effort among its personnel and the broader interagency community. The
first is organization structure in which SOCOM has a standing
interagency task force within its headquarters that includes
representatives from the Department of State, U.S. Agency for
International Development, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the National
Security Agency, and several other agencies and departments. SOCOM has
also placed over 40 liaison officers in over 18 Federal agencies and
departments in the National Capital Region. These networks foster
information sharing, coordination, and unity of effort between SOCOM
and other agencies.
The second effort is that of utilizing collaborative venues. SOCOM
hosts the Global Synchronization Conference twice a year. This venue
provides a collaborative platform for over 500 representatives from all
of the Federal agencies and departments, as well as partner nations to
discuss mutual issues and concerns in the domain of terrorism,
insurgency, and irregular warfare.
The third effort is education. SOCOM's Joint Special Operations
University regularly provides interagency collaboration courses
workshops and seminars that help prepare military and civilian
personnel to operate successfully as part of an interagency team.
46. Senator Wicker. Admiral Olson, have you encountered any
roadblocks, bureaucratic or otherwise, that inhibit your ability to
work in close coordination with these agencies?
Admiral Olson. Interagency coordination has improved greatly since
September 11. To assist in improving collaboration with other Federal
agencies, SOCOM has established an interagency task force as an
integral part of its headquarters and employs liaison officers
throughout the National Capital Region. To take interagency
coordination to the next level more still needs to be done in aligning
interagency structures and communications and also incentivizing
interagency assignments and training.
[Whereupon, at 3:06 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]