

# SECURITY ON AMERICA'S COLLEGE CAMPUSES

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## HEARING

BEFORE THE

### COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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APRIL 23, 2007

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## **SECURITY ON AMERICA'S COLLEGE CAMPUSES**

**MONDAY, APRIL 23, 2007**

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY  
AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,  
*Washington, DC.*

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Lieberman, Collins, and Warner.

### **OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN**

Chairman LIEBERMAN. This hearing will come to order.

Good afternoon and thanks to everyone for being here.

Today, for the first time since the awful outburst of violence and death on their beautiful campus last Monday, students at Virginia Tech are returning to their classes. But neither they nor the rest of our country, including, of course, the Members of this Committee, can return to where we were before that terrible tragedy, certainly not the families and friends of the 32 people who were murdered in Blacksburg, Virginia. Our hearts go out to them and our prayers do, as well.

This afternoon's hearing is not about what happened at Virginia Tech last Monday. It's about what we can do together to prevent anything like it from ever happening again on any other American college campus. Virginia's Governor, Tim Kaine, has appointed a commission that will thoroughly investigate and review the events of last Monday, and that is the best place for such a review to be carried out.

We have convened this hearing not to investigate but to educate, to help answer the questions that so many college students and faculty, their families, friends, and surrounding communities are asking in the aftermath of Virginia Tech. Are America's colleges and universities doing enough to maintain security? What are the best ways to do that? What methods and technologies does experience tell us have been most effective in keeping college communities safe? How can campuses be more alert to the needs of emotionally troubled students and the dangers that they may pose?

How can those students best be helped before they hurt themselves or others? Are there Federal laws or programs that should be changed to help America's colleges and universities maintain better security on their campuses?

In short, we are here to begin a discussion after Virginia Tech to make sure that together we are doing everything we possibly can to prevent any other campus and any other students and their families from experiencing the nightmare and loss Virginia Tech experienced last Monday.

I thank the witnesses who have come here on short notice, and I look forward to their testimony with confidence that their considerable and relevant experience will be very helpful to this Committee.

Senator Collins.

#### **OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS**

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you mentioned, our hearts go out to those who died or were wounded or who lost family members or friends in that terrible campus attack of a week ago. Their pain reminds us that there are more than 4,100 colleges and universities in this country with more than 16 million students. And as Cornell University's Director of Campus Security has warned, "This type of thing could have happened anywhere."

Unfortunately, history confirms that statement is true. Killers have targeted students of all ages, not only in our country but in Great Britain, Israel, Russia, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. The murderers have ranged from disturbed individuals to terrorist squads, and their weapons have included guns, rocket grenades, and explosives.

Sadly, this threat is not new. Eighty years ago this May, a disgruntled school board member in Michigan blew up that town's school, killing more than 40 people, most of them children.

As we will hear today, colleges and universities defy easy answers for law enforcement officials and first responders. Typically, these institutions contain many buildings and hundreds, even thousands, of students, teachers, staff, and visitors who are moving about freely and who, at larger institutions, are likely to be strangers to one another. Campus safety officers confront the daunting challenge of defending campuses that are largely open to anyone who chooses to walk in, whether it is a troubled student with a gun or a terrorist with a suicide belt.

Our college campuses, when one starts to think about it, are in many ways attractive targets for those who intend to harm Americans. Besides educating our most precious resource, our sons and our daughters, research universities can house nuclear reactors, anthrax research facilities, and stocks of dangerous materials that could cause injury and death if seized by the wrong hands. Tens of thousands of people gather on college campuses in stadiums to enjoy concerts or sporting events.

Although campus security is primarily a State, local, and institutional responsibility, the Federal Government plays a role in strengthening security through the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Education, the Secret Service, the FBI, and other agencies. It is our hope that today's hearing will shed light on what the Federal Government can do to help bolster the security of the 4,100 colleges and universities across the Nation.

We should also consider the issue of campus security in the broader context of homeland security. As potential targets for mass

murderers, educational institutions have vulnerabilities similar to those of shopping malls, theaters, and transportation hubs—that is, large numbers of people and relatively open public access. And not even a police state could guarantee security at the thousands of sites like that across this country.

But we can do more in a free society to identify best practices, to disseminate them, to help with their implementation, and to assess their effectiveness. As my good friend, the University of Maine Public Safety Chief, Noel March, has pointed out to me—and I know that he speaks very well of one of our witnesses today, Mr. Healy—the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators is now cooperating with the Department of Justice on developing a National Center for Campus Public Safety that would work toward those goals. We can work with our first responders to ensure more effective responses. Campus communications systems could be improved to allow for more effective alert.

Detecting and preventing threats to campus communities, while being duly mindful of personal freedom and privacy issues, is also at least as important as being ready to mount an effective and rapid response to an attack. And that is an area that this Committee has also spent a great deal of time on. Perhaps we can promote better use of homeland security and community policing techniques to identify potential threats more effectively, as well as providing more mental health counseling and intervention.

As a member of the Senate's Bipartisan Mental Health Caucus, I am keenly aware of both the terrible effects of serious mental illness, but also of increasingly effective means of treatment. One of the difficult issues that we all need to wrestle with is whether or not the laws and the regulations that are needed to protect sensitive medical information make it too difficult to share vital threat information with campus law enforcement officials.

But perhaps our greatest service to our colleges and universities would be to make sure that they are integrated into emergency preparedness and response planning for all hazards. For if schools are better prepared for natural disasters and terrorist attacks, then they will be better prepared to deal with the random and senseless acts of violence like the one that visited such awful sorrow on the families and friends of the Virginia Tech victims.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Collins. We will go to the panel of witnesses now.

Again, I thank you for coming on relatively short notice. This is an extraordinarily experienced and diverse panel.

While you are addressing a committee of the U.S. Senate, I wanted to ask you to have it in your mind or to speak as if you were addressing the parents and students that we have met in the last week, that probably each of you have come across in the last week, who have asked, "Are we safe on our college campus? And is there more that can be done to make sure that we are?"

We are going to begin first with David Ward, Ph.D. Dr. Ward is currently President of the American Council on Education (ACE). From 1994 to 2000, he served as Chancellor of the University of Wisconsin at Madison, during which time he was responsible for managing the university's response to a number of crises, including

a stampede of students at a football stadium. ACE represents approximately 1,800 accredited degree granting colleges and universities and higher education related associations. Dr. Ward, we are grateful that you are here, and we look forward to your testimony now.

**STATEMENT OF DAVID WARD, Ph.D.,<sup>1</sup> PRESIDENT, AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION**

Mr. WARD. Thank you, sir. Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins, and Members of the Committee who may eventually join us, I want to thank you for this opportunity to testify today about the important and timely issue of emergency preparedness on our college and university campuses.

Let me say at the outset the security of students, faculty, and staff is a preeminent concern of every college and university president, and my association is essentially a representation of those presidential roles in higher education.

On the other hand, the strength of the presidency is reflected in the team that they lead. And many of the other testimonials you hear today will be from the people who are, in a sense, in the trenches developing the plans and providing the expertise the presidents rely on. But ultimately it is the judgment of presidents that often is determinative of the response and the planning that goes on.

The events of September 11, 2001, certainly changed the way campuses, as well as the rest of the country, view the issue of security. Four years later, the devastation wrought by Hurricane Katrina challenged the survival of our institutions in New Orleans and the Mississippi Delta as never before. And of course, last week's tragedy at Virginia Tech has put these issues at the forefront of our Nation's consciousness tragically once again.

In thinking about this topic, I think it would be useful to put the issue of emergency planning as it relates to colleges and universities in some context and to identify those factors that make securing our campuses particularly challenging. We are not, in a sense, a firm. We are not a defined entity in space. And I think we need to keep reminding ourselves how complex they really are.

Not only are universities complex, but they are also open by design. The campus that I supervised in Madison covered, in its various sections, almost 10,000 acres. It enrolled 42,000 students, employed 16,000 people. And on any given day, there were thousands of visitors either attending extension classes or other functions on campus. This mobility is a characteristic that is equally pronounced on campuses with a large number of commuter students so that the community is in constant motion. Knowing where they are at any time is extremely difficult. And the campus itself is multi-centered.

Colleges and universities are complex places with a great number and variety of facilities—dormitories, dining halls, classrooms, offices, power plants, laboratories, field houses, and stadiums. In Madison, we had 600 buildings, a hospital, a medical school, a research park, a nuclear reactor, an 80,000-seat football stadium, and a 17,000-seat fieldhouse, just for starters. So they're really more

<sup>1</sup> The prepared statement of Mr. Ward appears in the Appendix on page 39.



like small towns than they are even like a shopping center or an airport.

Colleges and universities also have large numbers of faculty and staff. In many places they are the largest employers in the area. Their defining characteristic is that they serve a population—and this, I think, is important—that consists predominantly of young adults whose attitudes and behaviors often differ significantly from workplace employees or even elementary and secondary school students.

From my own experience as chancellor, I can tell you that crises can happen when you least expect them. I think crisis management has become one of the defining skills that all chancellors and presidents surely now need to have.

In my case, as has been mentioned, I faced an unexpected challenge of dealing with a post-game crowd surge at a football game that resulted in 70 students being treated for injuries in our hospital, 15 of whom were, in fact, so seriously injured that it was thought that we might not be able to save all of them. They were all saved by the enormous and effective treatment at our university hospital by our trauma surgeons. But we did use that incident to spur improvements in our communications plan, upgrade the stadium facilities, and augment medical and security staff at such events.

Without any hesitation I can tell you that the safety and well-being of students, faculty, and staff is a subject that keeps all presidents up at night, whether the campus sits on the San Andreas fault like the University of California at Berkeley, on a coastal floodplain like Dillard University, or in Lower Manhattan like Pace University which, in addition to its main campus, had classrooms in one of the World Trade Center buildings.

While all campuses engage in serious emergency preparedness and contingency planning, there is no question that security efforts were dramatically stepped up on all our campuses following September 11, 2001. The same kind of increased scrutiny will take place now, as well, as each of our colleges and universities tries to make sense of the unspeakable tragedy at Virginia Tech by sharing the kind of research and information that will be gathered in its wake and using it as a means to help avert future disasters.

A careful planning effort is, of course, one of the key reasons why our Gulf Coast institutions accomplished the smooth evacuation of all of their student and faculty when Hurricane Katrina struck. Over 120,000 students were able to register at other institutions within 2 weeks of that disaster.

In contrast to the extensive death toll caused by the storm throughout the region, the evacuation and reregistration of more than 100,000 students and faculty from 30 institutions was achieved without a single loss of life and is an unheralded success story of that particular disaster.

Even as the tragic events of the past week were unfolding, many campuses around the country took immediate steps to place their own institutions on a heightened state of alert. Why? As the campus chief at the University of Texas said, “A concern for every law enforcement official in the Nation right now is copy cats.”

We will continue to learn more about what added security measures campuses intend to take to bolster their own planning and prevention efforts, but they have each begun the task of re-examining the needs of their campus. Rice University is attempting to work with residential college leaders to identify students who appear to be under extreme stress so that they can be referred to counseling. This is truly one of the great legal challenges of our campuses.

The University of Memphis plans to build a system that will act as a schoolwide intercom. The University of Iowa is weighing a similar outdoor system. The College of the Desert has a new phone system that allows it to quickly send out announcements to every phone on campus and a backup loudspeaker system when phone contact is not possible.

Nearer to home, at Johns Hopkins University, 100 smart cameras have been installed on campus that are linked to computers which will alert campus security and Baltimore City Police when suspicious situations arise.

The International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators, who we will hear from, is the professional association and accrediting agency which has been instrumental in developing best practices, training materials, and guidance for the campus community in matters of security. We support their recommendation to take the next logical step toward strengthening campus first responder capabilities.

In the end, it comes down to planning. It is essential that every campus have an emergency plan in place that identifies a core response team, a communications plan, and a way to implement the movements of emergency and other staff in a variety of scenarios.

No one wants to consider the unthinkable. But in our post-September 11 world, all of us must consider it and plan for it. This includes college and university presidents. We have already made great strides to upgrade campus security and ensure that our world-class institutions remain safe places to live, learn, and innovate. The thing we have to remember is that we cannot rest on our laurels; as the events of Virginia Tech have shown, there is always some new and tragic episode around the corner.

And ultimately, I believe, there are two big problems that we face. One of them is that we are, by nature, rational communities and the worst disasters are, in fact, the result of levels of distress in human beings that are often not susceptible to rational treatment. And how we deal with this challenge where the predictability of so many things on the campus we can plan for, but the unpredictable, which is often built in to some of these human tragedies, is very hard to cater for.

And finally, not only are our college campuses extremely complicated, very large, and almost different from any other institutional form, but they are also very different themselves. The plan that might meet the needs of a small liberal arts college, great research university, a community college, something that is in a downtown setting or in a rural setting, all will require some subtle differences in how they develop their emergency planning. One size in our response will certainly not fit all.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Dr. Ward. That is a very good beginning to the discussion.

Our next witness is W. Roger Webb, who is currently the President of the University of Central Oklahoma, a public university of approximately 16,000 students in the greater Oklahoma City area.

Mr. Webb is testifying on behalf of the American Association of State Colleges and Universities, which represents over 400 public 4-year colleges and universities.

Of real interest to us is that before being a college president, which Mr. Webb has been for 20 years, he was the Commissioner of Public Safety for the State of Oklahoma and a member of the State Highway Patrol.

Thanks very much for being here. We look forward to your testimony.

**STATEMENT OF W. ROGER WEBB,<sup>1</sup> PRESIDENT, UNIVERSITY  
OF CENTRAL OKLAHOMA**

Mr. WEBB. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman and Ranking Member Collins.

Thank you for this hearing and thank you for your opening statements which very well, I think, set out the issues that we face today.

Let me tell you about an experience that I had just last Friday, which drove home to me the significance of these issues. I was walking across our campus during the noon hour, and I ran into a campus tour of approximately 25 students, many of them there with parents. They were checking out our campus, making decisions about where to go next fall.

As the tour guide introduced me to the group, he asked are there any questions of the president? One lady, a mother, quickly held up her hand and said, Mr. President, we are seriously thinking about your university for next year. But I have one question for you. And that is will Amanda be safe on your campus?

Mr. Chairman, that is the question that parents all over America are asking today as they prepare to send their sons and daughters off for what should be the best 4 years of their life.

She did not ask me about the library. She did not ask me about our wireless campus. She did not ask about any academic programs. She was, first of all, concerned about the safety of her daughter.

I entered academia after 12 years in law enforcement, the last 4 years serving as Commissioner of Public Safety for Oklahoma. Perhaps this makes me one of the few college presidents in America who once carried a badge and gun and now serves as a university president. Hopefully some of the experience that I had living in both worlds, law-enforcement and higher education, will provide me some insight as my colleagues and I deal with these very complex issues involving campus security.

College administrators today are facing many competing priorities. One is the mind set of law enforcement which says that to curb crime, to prevent violence, we need a greater police presence. The academicians say no, we cannot do anything to chill the open

<sup>1</sup> The prepared statement of Mr. Webb appears in the Appendix on page 44.

and free environment that we have that is so important to a quality education. So this is a debate that often carries over in budget decisions that presidents and senior administrators must make about how to spend the money. Do we invest more in cameras and equipment, in police personnel? Or do we put more money over in the chemistry department?

For years those of us in the heartland thought that we were pretty well immune to mass violence and acts of terrorism. Twelve years ago just last week this erroneous assumption was shattered when Timothy McVeigh ignited a Ryder truck loaded with fertilizer and racing fuel and brought down a Federal building, taking the lives of 168 innocent women, children, and men, seriously injuring over 500 more in a blast that was heard and felt on our campus 18 miles away. No one had ever thought about a truck becoming a weapon of mass destruction. Neither had law enforcement planned on hijacked airplanes flying into buildings and becoming instruments of death, nor a one-room Amish schoolhouse becoming a killing zone.

Certainly September 11 should have been a wake-up call for all of us to the potential of mass violence and even the threat of terrorism on our campuses. But in reality not much has happened on most college campuses in this country in terms of increasing our level of security.

Just one week ago our world again was turned upside down by this tragedy that occurred when an individual became a weapon of mass destruction with two handguns when he walked into a dormitory and a classroom on one of the great campuses in Blacksburg, Virginia.

In the aftermath of all of this the spotlight is shining squarely today on college presidents and senior administrators, and that question is before us, how safe are our campuses?

Most universities have a campus police system and certified officers, and Mr. Healy represents a great association. They do a great job with their campus security. Most of our campus police, they do a good job on the routine day-to-day operations of the campus, crowd control, preventing theft, dealing with small issues. But they are challenged in that rare case when there is a major crisis.

This is why partnerships between the local campus police and the city, State, and Federal Government is so important. So when an event happens, we can quickly bring in the experts who are experienced in dealing with these major situations, can take over the jurisdiction on our campuses.

Colleges and universities are experiencing another challenge, and that is the significant rise in the percentage of students who are coming to our campus already diagnosed with mental illnesses. In coping with this, the universities have to balance the privacy rights of the individual student against protecting the entire student body. This is a particularly complex task.

Because of this challenge, we must have professional counselors on staff. And as presidents, we must fund those counseling staffs adequately to handle those students as they come to our attention. All university personnel, particularly faculty and staff, need to be trained to be able to report signs of troubling behavior.

So often these students are crying out. They are reaching out to us, and we do not hear them and we do not see them. But when they are identified, the hope is that the students will agree to be treated.

It is in those cases when they do not agree to voluntarily submit themselves to treatment that we have this quandary. The threshold is set very high as to when we can forcibly remove that student from the college campus. This is the gray area. This is a problem area that campuses are having to deal with. It is one of those difficult situations. And our goal has to be to discipline the disruptive behavior, not disparage the individual.

There are severe limits on sharing of information, sharing information with other campuses who these individuals may transfer to. We transfer problems from campus to campus and do not even know it. Sharing information with parents. So certainly issues should become a focus of a national debate on when we can lift this protective shield of privacy and help deal with these troubled students.

There are issues about communication that we have talked about in recent days. How can we best communicate with students on our campus?

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Webb, if you need a little extra time, go ahead and take it. I notice you are moving your pages because the clock is moving. So if you need a few extra minutes to finish your statement, go ahead.

Mr. WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am concerned about the communications methods that we have. There is a lot of debate about that. We have to use all forms of communication. We have to use old media and new media. We know that the students communicate differently. We can use those social networks, MySpace and Facebook and text messaging. But for those commuter students and those non-traditional-age students, perhaps who have not reached campus when a crisis is alerted, we need to go back to the old-fashioned radio and TV announcements, the alarm systems, the flashing alarm systems for those students who may be hearing impaired, the old-fashioned kind of intercom system, the voice-activated alarm systems where we can tell students what to do when there is a dangerous situation on our campus.

Many States now are already reviewing their campus security. I know the Governor of Virginia has started that. Our own governor, Governor Brad Henry of Oklahoma, created a task force last week. He asked our chancellor, Glen Johnson, to head that task force. Every college and university in our State will be reviewing our security plans.

And then on May 30, there will be a national summit on campus security that will be held at the University of Central Oklahoma. And we will have national speakers there. This will be sponsored by our State Regents for Higher Education, by our American Association of State Colleges and Universities (AASCU), the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, and the University of Central Oklahoma.

After Columbine, there was a number of Federal dollars that were dispersed for materials. There are some good materials out

there. They need to be reviewed and updated, and they need to be distributed to our campuses once again.

One great source I mentioned is the Memorial Institute for Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), a trust that was created after the Oklahoma City bombing. It is the top website in the world on terrorism. I would suggest that the Department of Homeland Security may help MIPT put together a link on campus security. And then, of course, AASCU is also a great clearinghouse for that.

There are other experiences out there that we can look to. I have cited them in my written remarks, the University of West Florida for hurricanes, California State University at Northridge, Sonoma State, and there are others.

Mr. Chairman, I cannot guarantee that Amanda will be 100 percent safe on our campus. I can say that this campus and campuses across America are among the safest places that she could spend the next 4 years of her life. Much to do with Amanda's safety will be the decisions that she makes while she is on our campus. But we need her and we need the eyes and ears of every faculty member, every staff member, to help us to be able to identify individuals who may be troubled and may need some help. And I would suggest that we all use that safety mantra on the New York subways that if you see something, say something.

And finally, Mr. Chairman and Senator Collins, I assure you that every college, every university in America, and every parent in America will appreciate any help, any assistance, any guidance that this Committee can provide us.

Thank you very much.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, President Webb, for the help you have provided us in your testimony this morning.

Our next witness is Steven Healy. He is the President of the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators and Director of Public Safety at Princeton University, where he has served since 2003.

Chief Healy, thank you for being here, and we look forward to your testimony now.

**STATEMENT OF STEVEN J. HEALY,<sup>1</sup> PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CAMPUS LAW ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATORS; DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SAFETY, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY**

Mr. HEALY. Thank you and good afternoon Mr. Chairman and Senator Collins.

As you mentioned, I am the President of the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA), an association that represents the campus public safety executives at 1,100 institutions of higher education and more than 1,800 members. I am also the Director of Public Safety at Princeton University.

IACLEA joins with you in mourning the loss of so many students and faculty at Virginia Tech last week. Our shared efforts to advance campus public safety must acknowledge and honor the stu-

<sup>1</sup> The prepared statement of Mr. Healy appears in the Appendix on page 57.

dents and faculty who perished and were injured one week ago today.

This tragic event has heightened the urgency of our continuous efforts to enhance campus public safety at the more than 4,000 institutions of higher education serving 15 million students. I thank and commend the Committee for holding this important hearing.

This afternoon I hope to accomplish three goals. First, I want to assure the Committee and the American people that vigorous efforts are underway to develop and implement best practices in campus public safety. With our partners, such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police, College and University Policing Section, and several Federal agencies, we are committed to enhancing safety and security on our Nation's campuses.

Second, I hope to paint a picture of the complexity of this very critical mission.

And finally, I hope through my testimony that we can identify additional ways to supplement our current efforts.

Campus public safety continues to evolve into a complex responsibility. Our officers must be trained and equipped to deal with a variety of issues. These include community policing, crime prevention and control, alcohol and substance abuse, sexual assault, dating violence, students with mental health issues, and campus crime reporting compliance.

Colleges and universities are traditionally open and accessible environments that reflect our free and democratic society. We must balance that openness that is the center of American higher education with the need to protect students, faculty, staff, and visitors. We must assure the safety of our students in the classrooms and in their dormitories while protecting facilities critical to business, health, and national defense. We do this while fostering an environment that is conducive to learning, teaching, and research.

There are a number of critical safety issues facing colleges and universities today. At the top of the list are issues related to high risk drinking and the use and abuse of illegal and prescription drugs. In the year 2001 alone more than 1,700 students died from unintentional alcohol-related injuries. The problem has reached devastating levels, and campus public safety agencies are key partners in addressing these critical challenges.

Homeland security, of course, is also a priority on our campuses. It is no secret that campuses have many elements that make them attractive targets for terrorism. These include international communities, sensitive research materials, controversial research projects, and sporting venues that accommodate tens of thousands of spectators. These realities prompted FBI Director Mueller to identify campuses as soft targets for terrorism.

Campus public safety is provided in a variety of ways. Some institutions have sworn armed officers with full police powers while others have non-sworn unarmed officers. We work within different governing structures and under an array of Federal and local laws.

Given this complexity of the campus public safety environment, I am able to report to you that we are continually vigilant to the issues of safety and security on our campuses. That said, we must continually review and when necessary enhance our policies and procedures to address new and emerging challenges.

I would like to discuss areas where we are leading the way. I have submitted additional materials that supplement my comments and welcome the opportunity to further speak with Committee members about these important issues.

Since 2004, grant support from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security has enabled IACLEA to develop a variety of training programs and resources for campus public safety agencies. Thousands of our officers and first responders have attended these training programs. We are currently delivering a command and control course that has trained more than 700 command-level officers in its first year of operation.

The multiagency response at Virginia Tech last Monday underscores how important it is for our campus public safety agencies to exercise and train with their law enforcement partners outside of campus. IACLEA, together with Texas A&M University, has developed a Threat and Risk Assessment Tool to assist campus executives in performing an assessment of their vulnerabilities and implementing solutions. In doing so, the capacity of the university to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from catastrophic events is enhanced.

IACLEA has also partnered with the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI to produce a lessons learned white paper based on the experiences of the Gulf Coast campuses during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. This widely distributed white paper sets forth specific recommendations to enhance campus preparedness.

Of course, we also offer educational workshops at our annual conferences and other training venues.

While we currently reach nearly half the traditional higher education institutions, we need to ensure that all colleges and universities are committed to and have access to high-quality information, best practices, and training. Greater Federal, State, and local support for campus public safety agencies—both public and private institutions—would provide additional opportunities.

Campus public safety agencies are not explicitly recognized as potential recipients of Federal funds administered by DHS and the Justice Department. This presents a major challenge in many States when decisions are being made about the allocation of formula grant funds. We urge Congress to consider creating a dedicated funding stream to strengthen public safety on our Nation's campuses.

In late 2004, the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Community Oriented Policing Services convened a National Summit on Campus Public Safety. The summit brought together nationally recognized experts on campus public safety, campus risk management, and emergency preparedness. A consensus recommendation was the need for a National Center for Campus Public Safety to support research, information sharing, best and model practices, and strategic planning.

Tomorrow I will be meeting with representatives from the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services and the National Center for Campus Public Safety Advisory Board to further develop the framework for this center. A national center would serve as an invaluable resource for all those who have a stake in campus public safety and thus, the success of our colleges and universities.



In summary, Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, and other Members of the Committee, adequately protecting our Nation's colleges and universities relies on important partnerships. There are very critical relationships that we must continue to develop and nurture on our campuses and with our Federal, State, and local partners. These partnerships are developing but must be stronger. In light of the tragic events at Virginia Tech, we will work with the FBI and the U.S. Secret Service to expand previous studies of middle and high school-aged shooters to take a deliberate, campus-focused look at rampage shooting incidents at colleges and universities. This examination and the lessons learned from it will surely result in the identification of best practices.

IACLEA will also work with the national associations of higher education and our other partners to adopt a four-point risk management strategy that we believe may help us prevent future tragedies. I have outlined those four points in the statements provided to you.

Of particular interest is the need for mass notification systems that have the appropriate capacity, security, and redundancy. These systems must be capable of reaching our community members using several methodologies including landline and cellular phones, text messaging, and e-mail. I believe this approach will address potential gaps that may exist on some campuses and establish a framework for addressing future challenges.

In closing, for the past 49 years, IACLEA has worked to advance campus public safety. We understand the vital role our colleges and universities play in ensuring democracy throughout the world. We will continue to be an advocate for the 30,000 public safety officers who serve over 4,000 unique communities.

Thank you for your commitment to this important issue. As I mentioned at the beginning of my statement, advancing campus public safety is a shared responsibility and requires efforts from all of us.

I would also like to thank the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, the Justice Department, and the Department of Education for their support, along with many State and local agencies who are our partners. These partnerships are vital to fulfilling our promise to ensure that every campus community remains safe and open.

I appreciate the opportunity to contribute to this conversation.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Chief Healy, thanks very much for some very constructive thoughts, which we want to discuss further in the question-and-answer period.

I want to welcome Senator John Warner, our friend and colleague from Virginia. Senator Warner, before we go to the final two witnesses, would you like to offer an opening statement?

#### **OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR WARNER**

Senator WARNER. I thank you for that courtesy, Mr. Chairman. I think at this moment I will just listen to the rest of the testimony, and in my time I will take a question or two.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Very well. Thank you. I am very glad you are here.

Our next witness is Dr. Russ Federman, Director of Counseling and Psychological Services, Department of Student Health, University of Virginia, where he has served since 2000.

Dr. Federman, we welcome your presence and your testimony.

**STATEMENT OF RUSS FEDERMAN, Ph.D., ABPP,<sup>1</sup> DIRECTOR OF COUNSELING AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF STUDENT HEALTH, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA**

Mr. FEDERMAN. Thank you. Distinguished Senators, Senate staff, members of the media, and all others present today, as clinical psychologist and Director of Counseling and Psychological Services at the University of Virginia, I am here today to try to provide you with an overview of the current state of mental health issues and responses on university campuses across the country.

According to the Department of Education, there were 17.3 million students enrolled in over 4,500 colleges and universities nationwide in 2004. The Chronicle of Higher Education projects 2007 enrollment figures at nearly 18 million.

From the 2006 National Survey of Counseling Center Directors, which surveyed 376 directors across the country, we see that 8.9 percent or one in every 11 students has sought counseling or psychological help within the past year. When we take this 8.9 percent and apply it to the current projected enrollment of 18 million, it yields a total of 1.6 million students having sought counseling or psychological help during the same time period.

Since 2003 the American College Health Association has been conducting the National College Health Assessment. The most recent 2006 survey involved the largest randomized sample since the survey's inception, and that included 94,806 students from public and private universities across the country. The survey reports some striking data.

Within the past year, 94 out of 100 students reported feeling overwhelmed by all they had to do; 44 out of 100, almost one-half, have felt so depressed it was difficult to function; 18 out of 100, or close to one out of every five, reported having a depressive disorder; 12 out of 100 had an anxiety disorder; 9 out of 100, or one out of every 11, reported having seriously considered suicide within the past year; 1.3 percent actually did attempt suicide. That's 13 out of every 1,000 students.

If we have 18 million enrolled students, this means 234,000 suicide attempts every year, 19,500 every month, 642 attempts per day. That is staggering.

Why stop suicide? Well obviously, it saves student lives. But we also know that some students become suicidal before they become homicidal, before they act on their murderous wishes.

In the past 10 to 15 years, we have seen a significant sea change with university counseling center work. More effective psychotropic medication, improved education of primary care providers in childhood and adolescent disorders, and gradual destigmatization of treatment allow for enrollment of far more students today with pre-existing psychiatric disorders than we would have seen 10 or 20 years ago. The traditional university counseling center has become

<sup>1</sup> The prepared statement of Mr. Federman appears in the Appendix on page 63.

the university community mental health center, where we are faced with high volume, high risk, and very serious illnesses.

The kinds of mental disturbances which yield extreme violence are rare. Individuals with this level of disturbance typically experience a degree of impairment that is inconsistent with requirements of university life. Given the ongoing interactions with peers, faculty, and residence life staff, when a student's functioning deteriorates within a university setting, the student's aberrant behavior is usually observable and distressing to others. In most instances, university faculty, deans and administrators, in addition to university mental health professionals, are notified of these instances and appropriate attention and limits are brought to bear upon the individual.

Counseling centers have received increased resources over the last 10 years in an effort to keep up with need. But the gradual expansion of resources has also corresponded with ever increasing student enrollment. From the National Director Survey, we see that in 1996 we had a ratio of one clinical staff per 1,598 students. This past year, in 2006, we see a ratio of one per 1,697. We are not getting ahead of the curve. If anything, we are beginning to slide behind.

With limited resources, counseling centers are usually directed toward crisis intervention, stabilization, and brief treatment approaches. Many students may need more than brief approaches. And when resources are stretched to meet the greater needs of more acutely disturbed students, this consumes important hours that could be used to treat a larger number of students.

University mental health clinicians devote considerable time toward consultation with administrators, deans, faculty, staff, and parents creating an interconnected web of support. Although confidentiality laws generally prevent university counseling centers from sharing confidential information without the student's permission, in most instances students are willing to provide this permission as they recognize the helpful intent of our efforts. It is said that it takes a village to raise a child. My experience is that within Divisions of Student Affairs, the village is a very interactive one where students' well-being is our primary concern.

Today's hearing exists against the backdrop of a tragic event, the recent shooting at Virginia Tech. What we must keep in mind is that this was one incident. Its proportions were greater and more tragic than we have ever witnessed on a university campus, but it was one incident. The frequency of a mentally disturbed student perpetrating senseless violence on a university campus can almost be counted on one hand. The Virginia Tech shooting does not bring our attention to large numbers of students falling through the cracks. In actuality, it was an extreme exception to the norm, and as such, it illustrates that university officials, in collaboration with mental health professionals, are doing an exceptional job in managing those mentally ill students who do represent a threat to university communities.

The most obvious challenge faced by university counseling centers involves funding to adequately meet the increasing demand for mental health services across the country. Those resources currently available do allow us to be responsive to high needs stu-

dents. However, this capacity is quite variable from one university to the next. Most university counseling center staffs are overworked. During peak times of the semester, we are all barely able to keep up with the influx of new students.

Furthermore, as long as resources are consumed with clinical treatment and case management, university counseling centers cannot do an adequate job with the preventative work of outreach and education. Most directors feel they are only scratching the surface with regard to the delivery of truly effective preventative educational services. More truly is needed.

We are also faced with the dilemma of how university communities can best work together to identify and manage those students with complex mental health needs. The issue of communication among campus officials pertaining to disturbed students is a complex one. Mental health licensing laws prohibit clinicians from communicating about patients without a signed release.

To those who are not regularly engaged in mental health work, the limitations of patient confidentiality may seem frustrating and counterproductive. However, from the point of view of the patient, confidentiality is one of the salient factors that allow them to reach out in the first place. Students need to be able to express their most disturbing and frightening thoughts without fears of unwanted consequence. If students perceive confidentiality as permeable and easily dispensable, then large numbers of students will not come for help and our ability to protect the community will become further diminished. Confidentiality saves lives. Confidentiality does not place more lives at risk. Confidentiality is essential to good psychotherapy.

Having said that, it is clear that university officials also need to be able to communicate to one another, and sometimes with parents, when student threat of harm reaches a threshold where the university community is no longer safe. Here lies the rub.

Federal Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA) is intended to protect the confidentiality of student records and define under what instances parents can have access to student information and grades. Access is given "in connection with an emergency to appropriate persons if the knowledge of such information is necessary to protect health or safety of the student or other persons."

This definition is vague and is left to the interpretations of individual universities. A more liberal interpretation which does allow for open communication of high-risk issues comes into direct conflict with mental health ethics and licensing codes pertaining to confidentiality. Unless imminent danger to self or others is at hand, then clinicians' capacities to communicate with other university personnel or even patients' families are limited. If and when we do choose to breach confidentiality in order to address issues of safety, then we risk violating mental health and ethics codes. Essentially, we are faced with circumstances where we are damned if we do and we are damned if we do not.

The complex interplay between students' rights to confidentiality, university personnel's need to communicate, families' inclusion in this communication, and the inherent conflicts of our health care, educational, and confidentiality policies need serious consideration and review.

We need to get ahead of the curve with resources devoted to mental health. The cost of university education is more than many families can bear. We cannot simply add to tuition or support fees as a solution.

In 2003, during the 108th Congress, members of the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives introduced bipartisan legislation that was designed to help campus counseling centers provide mental services and meet the increasing needs of students. Provisions of this important legislation were included as part of the Garrett Lee Smith Memorial Act, a law named after Senator Smith's son who committed suicide.

The Campus Suicide Prevention Program exists now as a competitive grant program administered by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. Funded at \$5 million, it is a small program but one whose value has become more evident in the past few years.

While the Campus Suicide Prevention Program did integrate many of the important provisions of the Campus Care and Counseling Act, it did not provide the authority that would allow campus counseling centers to expand their staff, internship, or residency slots, an option that would ensure greater availability of clinical services.

Further, the authorization of appropriations was capped at \$5 million.

The Campus Suicide Prevention Program must receive an increase in appropriations. The use of funds must be broadened to allow centers to strengthen long-term staffing.

New funding for student outreach, education, and prevention is absolutely necessary. We must join the academic community in teaching students about healthy lifestyles which truly are the strongest protective factors against depression and other mental illnesses. Educational efforts must also extend to involve student peer connections. Students know students. They know when students are doing well and they typically know when they are not doing well. We need to do a better job of partnering with students and utilizing their own awareness of their troubled friends in bringing those students to our attention and in facilitating appropriate help.

The legislature needs to attend to the important intersect of HIPAA, FERPA, and confidentiality codes. Greater consistency between laws and policies are needed.

Within recent years, we have also seen numerous initiatives and foundations created in response to the growing awareness of university mental health issues. Research endeavors and policy initiatives such as those being conducted by the Association of University and College Counseling Center Directors, the Jed Foundation, the National Research Consortium of Counseling Centers in Higher Education, and the Center for the Study of College Student Mental Health are all essential to our understanding and response to student mental health issues. And we need more.

In closing, I appreciate the Committee's attention to these pressing problems. We face urgent challenges and unmet needs. Our university students are our Nation's future, and we must ensure they receive the help they need.

Thank you very much.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Dr. Federman.

You touched directly on some Federal laws there and funding programs, and I will want to come back and talk to you some more about that in the question and answer period.

Our final witness this afternoon is Dr. Irwin Redlener, a pediatrician by training. Dr. Redlener is President and Co-founder of the Children's Health Fund. He is also Director of the National Center for Disaster Preparedness and Associate Dean for Public Health Preparedness at Columbia University's Mailman School of Public Health.

His recent book, "Americans at Risk," explored the Nation's lack of preparedness for large-scale disasters, including the vulnerability of soft targets such as schools.

Dr. Redlener, we welcome your testimony now.

**STATEMENT OF IRWIN REDLENER, M.D.,<sup>1</sup> DIRECTOR, NATIONAL CENTER FOR DISASTER PREPAREDNESS, ASSOCIATE DEAN FOR PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS, MAILMAN SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY**

Dr. REDLENER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator Collins and Senator Warner.

Thank you on behalf of a lot of Americans who are depending on this kind of leadership to demonstrate how concerned the country is officially about the events that occurred like the one in Virginia last week.

I am sure that it is the collective hope of this entire panel that we provide you with insights and perspectives that may help you meet some of the challenges that will help make institutions of higher learning, and schools in general, be as safe and secure as possible.

I really want to focus on some specific recommendations that I think might be appropriate for consideration. The first is I want to emphasize the point that has been made before, that, by and large, American schools and colleges and universities are safe places. I think the statistics bear that out, even though the emotional impact of these horrible events seem to belie the reality. The fact is that most schools and campuses are entirely safe. And Amanda should be happy to go to your university.

But like all other places and institutions they are subject to an array of hazards and risks and accidents. And the millions of children who go to these campuses and the parents who send them there need to be sure that we are doing everything we can collectively to make sure that these children are safe.

That said, we do many things in our country and our society, like wearing seat belts in cars and keeping smoke alarms in our homes and taking proper precautions at the workplace, all preventive public health strategies that are instituted to help make sure that people are safe wherever they are. Similarly, I think all of the efforts that you have heard discussed today do require a "public health approach" to make sure that we have done what we can do.

<sup>1</sup> The prepared statement of Dr. Redlener appears in the Appendix on page 72.

What this means is that sufficient attention and resources need to be devoted to establishing and sustaining a prudent, smart, all hazard approach to campus safety without compromising a primary commitment to education, and without undermining the sense of an open and free campus.

It is a difficult balance, I should say, to keep this perspective of trying to make sure that campuses are safe, while underscoring the importance of core values.

Second, it is my strong opinion that tragedies like what occurred at Virginia Tech or Columbine or other sites are not about movie violence, video games, Goth culture, or even, in most cases, anything resembling reality-based revenge. These events are about people with extreme, potentially intractable and violent psychiatric disorders. The prevention of these catastrophes is therefore about sophisticated detection, appropriate intervention, and doing everything possible to keep instruments of mass destruction out of their hands.

This is a difficult task, to be sure. But it is also essential that we do what can be done to reduce the possibility of more Virginia Techs in the future.

Third, like any card-carrying public health doctor, I believe in prevention as the first priority of action. There are things that can be effective in preventing, perhaps not all, but some of these terrible tragedies. But when prevention fails, all of our response and mitigation strategies and systems must be ready, capable of dealing with extreme life-threatening situations.

So my recommendations will be in two categories. First, improving our ability to prevent catastrophe; and second, enhancing our capacity to respond effectively to save lives.

My fourth observation, though, is that prevention and response strategies involve a wide range of players from government at all levels to community responders, campus officials, students themselves, and concerned family members. It is very important therefore to understand the roles of each of these sectors because they are different. They need to be coordinated; they need to be integrated. What the Federal Government needs to do is very different than, say, what State governments or campus authorities need to do.

So, I am going to limit my comments to those actions which I think might be helpful for Federal consideration.

Finally, I believe it is also essential to raise the specter of a potential disaster which could become a reality at some point in our Nation's future. I am referring to the possibility of a planned terrorist attack on one or more of America's softest targets, our schools and college campuses. These places, like hospitals and public spaces in the workplace, are known as soft targets because access is relatively simple, absolute security is virtually impossible, and the potential for terror-induced, high degrees of society-wide grief and reaction are assured.

In fact, the question of children as targets of terrorism was addressed at a national conference we held at Colombia in the fall of 2005. Our concerns were driven by a well-established history of terror organizations explicitly attacking children throughout history and in many parts of the world. We are painfully aware of the hor-

rific 2004 attack on a school in Beslan, Russia, where more than 150 children were slain before the perpetrators could be neutralized by authorities. Although this attack was clearly the work of Chechen rebels, there was a continuing suspicion that Al Qaeda was somehow involved in the planning, if not the execution, of the assault. Our concern, of course, is that the possibility of a Beslan-style attack on a U.S. school or campus cannot be dismissed.

Other realities that have gotten our attention include the fact that in late 2001, a planned attack on an American school in Singapore was thwarted by counterterrorism officials.

In the fall of 2004, an Iraqi insurgent captured in Baghdad was discovered to have had detailed plans and layouts of schools in five States.

And perhaps most unsettling have been the writings by Al Qaeda leaders who have articulated a kind of Jihadist mandate to attack U.S. citizens in general and children in particular. Among the more notable and chilling examples of these threats was written by Sulieman Abu Gheith, a key bin Laden lieutenant subsequently captured by coalition forces. But his writings included quotes like the following, "We have not yet reached parity with America. We have the right to kill 4 million Americans, 2 million of them children."

All of this suggests that the United States cannot afford to be sanguine about the dangers facing our children and young people, and we need to be sure that efforts to prevent, mitigate, and respond to strategies encompass a wide range of potential hazards including, as I have just mentioned, non-domestic terrorism.

So as to my specific recommendations, I want to start with a couple of comments about what needs to be done as far as prevention is concerned. With respect to the prevention of major school violence or campus shootings, there are at least three major unsolved challenges that really impede our ability to make progress here.

The first is that while the responsibility for responding to emotional and psychiatric concerns of students rests predominately with campus staff and, to a certain extent, parents of affected students, there are seemingly serious and pervasive gaps in our knowledge about best practices to most effectively manage individuals with disorders that can result in the most egregious consequences in terms of violence against oneself or others.

On the other hand, a great deal is already known about the identification of such individuals who might be at significant risk of committing violence in school. In particular, I want to remind us that the U.S. Secret Service, along with the U.S. Department of Education, completed a major analysis of all shootings on U.S. campuses prior to 2002. That document, which is superb, resulted in guidelines with respect to identification of high-risk individuals in schools for whom urgent intervention is needed. We do not need to reinvent that particular piece of work. It is called the Final Report of the Safe School Initiative and is a very sophisticated analysis, with clear recommendations for actions at the local level and in schools.

Second, and I debated whether to say this or not, but I do want to note without prejudice or any political considerations that there are major inconsistencies with respect to State and Federal regula-



tion of gun purchases that have created gaps in the ability to interdict purchases of weapons by individuals with serious psychiatric problems. These legal and legislative loopholes in gun purchase regulations represent a significant threat to soft target populations in schools and college campuses and other public spaces.

The third unresolved situation or issue is that although, as Dr. Federman pointed out, many students will allow reporting of psychiatric problems to their parents, some, who may be the most dangerous, will not allow it. This is a problem that we have to face and solve because these are, in fact, adult-aged students who have rights as individuals to either give or deny permission to talk about their mental health conditions to anyone they wish.

The Federal strategies, I think, to address these issues could potentially include the following six recommendations. First of all, as Chief Healy pointed out, I think there is a great need for a national dialogue and a conference. I suggest that this be a federally funded, national conference on the state of knowledge regarding identification and intervention strategies likely to be most effective in the prevention of campus violence.

The caveat here is that we do not just rehash the work that has been already done by the Secret Service, Department of Education, and other places.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Dr. Redlener, can I ask you, I would like to hear the other five, but do them as briefly as you can.

Dr. REDLENER. I understand.

The second recommendation, already mentioned, is a new research center on this subject.

The third is that we take a very hard look at multiagency coordination in the counterintelligence community and make sure that they are tracking any potential evidence that someone is planning an attack on a U.S. school. I am not sure the extent to which that is happening effectively.

There are other issues that I think I am just going to leave to my written response and testimony. But I would say that closing critical loopholes in Federal and State gun purchase laws would be a reasonable thing to do.

And finally, I will conclude by saying that a Federal grants program to establish six to 10 diverse university and public school model programs designed to identify and manage instances of potential extreme violence would be very useful as sources of information and direction for the country.

I hope that the terrible event at Virginia Tech is really a wake-up call and not just a snooze alarm, which seems to happen over and over again. We have an event, we get aroused, we have meetings, we have hearings, and then we fall back into complacency. It is my hope, and I think all of ours, that we are going to see a new, intense focus on preventing violence in our schools and campuses.

Thank you.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Dr. Redlener. We certainly agree with that last statement.

Ms. VAN SYCKEL. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman, may I have a moment? I do not mean to be disrespectful, but I am a parent of a child who was violent and suicidal in school, and it is important that we did ask the Committee if our organization from Con-

necticut and New Jersey could come and at least testify and speak with you before this panel.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Let me ask this——

Ms. VAN SYCKEL. We are parents. We are just as important.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I understand. I did not know that. I am going to ask you to wait to the end. If there is time, we will hear you today.

I want to assure you this is not the last hearing we will hold on this subject.

Ms. VAN SYCKEL. My daughter did not just become violent and suicidal within the school. She was a danger to herself and others.

Today we are mourning a young man in our own community, and we will be burying him tomorrow. This hearing should not even be held today until parents could also participate and not just schools and not just the mental health community.

Parents care. We love our children. They matter. They are not anecdotes. And we are the ones that refuse to give up our children. Not the government. Not the mental health community. And not the schools. It is we, the parents, who care for and love our children. Please give us our parental rights back so we can save lives.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. We will definitely hear you, if not today, at a future hearing. I promise you that.

Let me just ask you to stop for a moment because one of the Members——

Ms. VAN SYCKEL. That is what we see in our schools every day.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Understood, and we will come back to you.

Senator Warner, I know, has to leave for other pressing business, and Senator Collins and I are going to yield to him for the first round of questioning.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank Senator Collins.

We discussed on the floor the desire of you and Senator Collins to have this very important hearing, and I am pleased to have attended. And I commend you, and I think we have drawn on a very distinguished panel to help initiate our study.

We bear in mind, however, that the primary responsibility for education rests with the governors, the State legislatures of our 50 States and territories, and we must be careful that the Federal Government recognizes that only in rare exception should we ever try to depart from our role as advisers, helpers in funding, and so forth to direct and mandate to all 50 States.

There may well be an area here, particularly with the mental health and the dichotomy between Federal and State law, in which we can be of service and perhaps others.

But this was an important hearing, and I was privileged last Tuesday to join with the greater Virginia Tech family.

I want to pick up on one phrase that you used, Dr. Federman. I am a graduate of our university. As I look back on a long lifetime that I have had, perhaps one of the happiest chapters was my education at both Washington and Lee University and the University of Virginia. And to listen to your opening comments was very chilling about the problems that confront our educators and indeed those on campuses today.

So Mr. Chairman, I say my intention is to take that public testimony and draw it to the attention of the Secretary of Education. I think other committees and other areas of the Congress should take a focus on that and see what we can do to help.

But you said partnering with the students. If I came away with one impression on last Tuesday, it was the magnificence of that student body of close to some 10,000 or 12,000 in one auditorium who were perfectly disciplined, emotionally. Yes saddened, but nevertheless secure and with the determination to go on and move forward. And that they have done, with the help of the parents and others.

But I come back to the point, a very simple thing. Chief Healy, I listened to you very carefully. We have to look at what is in hand by way of technology to try to alert students to this type of problem. I have had a lot of experience with the military and have been posted overseas in years gone and in areas where there is high risk and so forth.

A simple alarm system to be put in place on campuses, tested occasionally to make sure it is secure, just a siren that would simply alert students there is a problem, go to your other resources to determine the specificity of the problem, Blackberries or whatever the communication may be. Then let them draw on their own instincts. Because these youngsters today are good, tough, and solid citizens, and they recognize the world is not perfect. And as wonderful as these campuses have been and hopefully always will be, there is some element of risk.

So look at what is at hand now and let us think for the best. These students will help us. I think we should partner with them here on the Committee and get their views maybe in the next panel of witnesses. Thank you very much.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Warner, for taking the time. I know you made a special effort to be with us. I appreciate it.

Let us go to the panel of witnesses. I want to pick up on something that Senator Warner said in terms of the environment in which this is happening. It is chilling to hear about the increase in mental health problems among college students. It is probably a subject for a separate hearing as to why that is happening.

But just in brief, I wonder if Dr. Federman or either of the college administrators would want to testify, what is going on?

Mr. FEDERMAN. I ask myself that same question every day. I do not think I have a simple answer for you. I know that the university environment, particularly with a top tier university like the University of Virginia, is a very stressful one.

When I mentioned the statistic that 94 out of 100 students feel overwhelmed by all they have to do, that is real. I recall statistics that say that 60 percent of students work at least part time. And so you combine the academic challenges, the part-time work, and simply the transitional stage that late adolescence represents where they are not adult and yet they are not the child and the kind of transitions they experience from one day to the next where the ground is not necessarily a stable ground and where the intense feelings they are experiencing and the new challenges com-

bined with all the other external stresses just represent a very vulnerable time of development.

In tandem with that, you have much more effective psychotropic meds so that you have more students attending universities today. And I really cannot say with certainty that the incidence is greater. What we are seeing is more. But are we truly seeing more students with mental illness now or are they simply being better identified and more readily coming for help? I do not have an answer for that, but it is a question I ask myself much of the time.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. In preparation for this hearing, I looked at a 2006 National Survey of Counseling Center Directors, which I believe you referred to, in which they examined 13 years worth of data.

I was interested that they concluded not only that the numbers have gone up but the complexity and severity of mental health problems seen in counseling centers at colleges had increased significantly over that period of time. Obviously, having anxiety or depression is one thing. Having the number of students who are at a point where they may do damage to themselves or others is quite something else.

Is it fair to say that the latter category, in your experience or your knowledge of the literature nationally, has also gone up? That is, those who are more severely stressed to the point of doing damage to themselves or others?

Mr. FEDERMAN. Yes, I can definitely support that, though I can do so anecdotally. I do not have hard data to support that. But if you look at the survey you are looking at, I believe something like 92 percent of directors believe that within the last 10 years they are seeing more acute and more serious psychopathology. So this certainly corresponds with the perception of folks on the front line.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. President Webb, have you noted that in the years you have been a university administrator?

Mr. WEBB. We have this phenomenon, Senator Lieberman, a number of clinical psychologists actually recommend to some of their patients to go to college and enroll because of the counseling centers that are there and the environment that is there. So we are getting a lot of referrals to our campus for people who are coming in with problems.

And an issue that we have, and on many campuses, we may have one counselor for well over 1,000 students. And for a counselor, and these gentleman are experts, to do his job, it takes a lot of time to develop a rapport and trust with that student, particularly if you have a student that is in danger of doing harm to himself and others, to develop that kind of confidence where you can recommend that the student voluntarily submit himself to counseling.

And it is that gray area where the student may not have met the threshold where you can actually site enough to force that student to leave campus.

This puts the university and the counseling center in a real dilemma. If you move too quickly, you are subject to liability under Federal law. If you wait too long, you also have a situation where you can endanger your entire college campus.

So this is an area which I think we all recommend that we need dialogue and we need guidelines as to how to act.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I agree.

Dr. Ward and Mr. Webb, who represent two organizations of colleges and universities, what are the best practices with regard to setting up a system on a college campus that would identify those who are not simply suffering from anxiety or depression, serious problems obviously, but who are capable of doing damage to themselves or others? What is the way in which parents should expect the colleges that they send their kids to to be able to identify students who may really be a danger?

Mr. WARD. Two comments. First of all, I want to just amplify the observation about the numbers of students being treated. I think 20 years ago either the parents, the students, or the universities would never have admitted some of these students. It is our capacity, in effect, to meet these needs that is making it possible for the students to attend. So some of the increase is a reflection of the coping capacity that we have developed even though it may be inadequate. It is true in other disability areas where we are now obviously meeting the needs of the disabled in decisive ways that we would not have met 20 years ago.

To come back to the second question, I think it is the question of a communication structure that allows the cross-wiring of evidence of behavior that is potentially threatening. As I mentioned in my oral remarks, we are a very diffuse community, very departmentalized, in some respects very individualistic. The social networks have to be created by the campus itself in some ways that are not naturally there like a family.

So I think one of the challenges is whether there is a failsafe reporting system and some one point at which the amplitude of these findings can be really addressed. I think it is the fact that you have different parts of the enterprise knowing a little bit but perhaps nobody knowing the whole. And I felt frequently, when it came to my attention as a college president, I was not well qualified to make that judgment. I was given the pieces. I would need to call in everyone, and it usually means you need a meeting of these people. You cannot rely on that one person.

So I do not think we have a communication structure that allows the complete filtering of the diffuse kinds of evidence that is available unless you have a lead person—maybe it is from the student counseling area—who is so convinced this is a problem that they are prepared to take this all the way. But I do think there is a weak communication structure for sharing the evidence.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is not anything we can or should mandate by law, but it is certainly something that the university community itself should try to organize itself to do. I hear you and it sounds like an understandable problem but one—

Mr. WARD. We must address.

Chairman LIEBERMAN [continuing]. That needs to be addressed or else people are put in peril.

Chief Healy, on your college campus or generally on college campuses, are the law enforcement people, the chiefs or representatives of campus police, brought in on any regular basis in discussions with academic officials or counselors in discussing students who there is some reason to be concerned may be a danger to them—

selves or others? And would you recommend that be so if it is not so now?

Mr. HEALY. Mr. Chairman, one of the points in the four-point strategy that I mentioned in my prepared comments is that we definitely need to have a methodology, a structure for an assessment team. I believe that there are many colleges and universities that currently use that approach. I know for a fact that the University of Maryland has a very good assessment team approach where individuals from student affairs, mental health counseling, public safety, and other concerned groups on campus come together on a regular basis.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. To talk about individuals?

Mr. HEALY. To talk specifically about individuals that they believe, through whichever avenue the information becomes known, present a threat. I think we have to have a structure for that, a best practice that we can recommend to institutions. Because I think you will see different approaches at every single institution. There is not a universally accepted or best practice that you will find across institutions.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks. My time is up for this round.

Senator Collins.

Senator COLLINS. President Webb, let me pick up on the point that Senator Lieberman was just making about communicating information about troubled students.

You have a very unusual background for a college president. In fact, I wonder if you are unique in the country, of having been a law-enforcement officer who went on to be a Commissioner of Public Safety, who went on to be a college president. Because of that background, you bring an understanding of law enforcement as well as the academic world that it is very helpful to us as we struggle with these issues.

I think one of the most difficult issues that you all confront is balancing the need to protect the privacy of a troubled student versus the security of your campus. And in a way that same kind of dilemma is one that this Committee wrestles with all the time, whether we are talking about screening at airports or the provisions of the Patriot Act. How do we strike the right balance between personal privacy and freedom versus security in a world of terrorism?

We have heard about Federal laws today that restrict the communication of information, restrict it for very good reasons. You want to encourage students to get help, and if they feel that confidential medical information is going to be shared with either their parents or with university officials, they may not get that help. The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 was mentioned. One that is more familiar to many of us is the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), which restricts sharing of medical information.

What is your assessment of current laws? Are we striking the right balance?

Mr. WEBB. Senator Collins, you have touched on issues that keep many of us awake at night. It is knowing when to act, at what point in time, where do you go to get answers?

It takes more than just seeing a student who is different or a student who is odd, a student who is a loner, to be able to identify that student and pull that student out. Differences make our campuses beautiful and wonderful.

It is when the law enforcement officer or when the counselor sees the student and in their mind and in their gut they recognize that this is a troubled student that is dangerous. But yet, the student will not agree, cannot consent to allow himself to be removed from campus or to receive treatment.

I think we may need to look at some kind of intervening authority, perhaps as we did in the Patriot Act, where we can go to a third party, perhaps a court or judge, where the university can get authority to at least temporarily isolate or remove this student for further assessment rather than just leave him on the college campus until something erupts.

This is an issue for which we need the help of the medical profession, but we struggle with this issue because there are huge liability considerations. And this hesitation that may happen on the part of law-enforcement, on the part of our campus counselor or president, can result in serious ramifications to the student and to other innocent people on our campuses.

Senator COLLINS. Dr. Federman, do you want to comment?

Mr. FEDERMAN. Yes. I would like to say that I think what you are talking about does exist. But it exists uniquely on different campuses, not uniformly. To use our campus as an example, if we have a student where we perceive typically through behavior that they represent danger to the community and that individual is not amicable or open to receiving help, our dean of students has the authority to initiate an interim suspension and to require a psychological assessment at that point with recommendations then given to the dean as to how to best proceed with the student.

But the point is that it is not uniformly done across campuses. It is something we have put together in recent years, and I think many universities would be better off to have something like that in place.

Senator COLLINS. But you also described it as often being a no win situation, that there is a risk of being sued.

Mr. FEDERMAN. Correct.

Senator COLLINS. And it just strikes me as a terrible dilemma.

Mr. FEDERMAN. You've got it.

Senator COLLINS. In these cases, and without going to the details of Virginia Tech, which is not the purpose of this hearing, but oftentimes in these cases there are warning signs. There are people who identified the student as being very troubled and in need of help.

Mr. FEDERMAN. The more we can educate the university community as to what to be attentive to, what to be mindful of, what the resources are. Going back to Senator Warner's comments about partnering, I do not want to partner just with students, but I want to partner with the whole university community such that we become a tightknit web, a tightknit support net such that when students are in trouble the community takes responsibility to bring that information forward to appropriate individuals. Once we have

that information at hand, then we can begin to look into it further and take appropriate action.

Senator COLLINS. Chief Healy, one of the sources of information that I learned about in preparing for this hearing, and which Dr. Redlener mentioned in his statement, is the work that was done primarily by the Secret Service in 2002 which seeks to identify warning behaviors. It does a profile of someone who may be prone to violence. It strikes me as enormously helpful work.

And yet, I am wondering how prevalent is the knowledge of this document? Could you give us your impression, as the head of the law enforcement association, are campuses generally familiar with the work done by the Secret Service that might be so helpful, as Dr. Federman mentions, to identifying troubled individuals who need help now?

Mr. HEALY. Senator, I believe that most institutions' campus public safety departments are aware of this document. It is listed as a resource on the IACLEA website. Keep in mind that all institutions do not belong to our association, so unfortunately they may not have access to it although it is publicly available.

When we had the shooting at Dawson College in Montreal back in September at the beginning of school, there was a lot of interest in our association and in colleges and universities around the issues of active shooters. At that time, we widely distributed that report along with a number of other resources that are, again, publicly available resources that speak to the issues of active shooters.

You are right, that is an absolutely wonderful document. Every institution should have access to it. One of the things on which we are going to work with the U.S. Secret Service is to refresh the information that is in that report and to take, again, a campus-focused look because that study was primarily geared toward incidents of violence that occurred in K through 12 institutions. We do believe that there are some distinct differences between active shooter situations in K through 12 institutions versus those situations in colleges and universities.

Again, I think that is a good starting point, but I believe it needs to be refreshed, updated as appropriate to be more applicable to us in colleges and universities.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Collins.

Dr. Federman, let me come back to you because I am interested in the effect of Federal law or law generally on what you can do on the college campuses to protect the community.

In the case that you described, where you have a procedure at UVA, where the dean can initiate suspension proceedings and, if I heard you correctly, require some kind of psychiatric consultation, that is done without a court order, I presume?

Mr. FEDERMAN. Correct.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. What is the premise for it? In other words, is it that the student does not have an absolute right to remain at school and so you are creating, as a condition of the right to remain, a requirement that they seek some counseling?

Mr. FEDERMAN. No. What I would say is that it comes out of some mild but helpful coercion. Here is how the process runs. At UVA, and at most universities, there are specific standards of con-



duct. They may be called different things. At UVA, they are standards of conduct. I think there are 12 of them.

The second one has to do with individuals who pose a threat to the health and safety of the community. And that could involve themselves, as well. They are part of the community. And if one is behaving in such a way where they are in violation of that standard of conduct, then they come under the purview of the judicial process. The dean of students can say to the student, I am going to bring forward charges that you are in violation of standard number two. And if that is the case then this is the process you will proceed through.

An alternate to that would be that we do an interim suspension and, during that time where you are not attending classes, you proceed with a psychological assessment. You get that recommendation back to me and then we look at your situation and decide where we go next.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Very interesting. So it is a negotiated settlement?

Mr. FEDERMAN. Correct.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. If the student does not accept the offer of a negotiated settlement, then presumably the university would initiate judicial proceedings?

Mr. FEDERMAN. Correct. And one outcome of that could be removal from the university.

Now keep in mind that just because you remove someone from a university community, it does not protect the community. As we all have been discussing this afternoon, these are open communities. Someone can be removed and come back to that community even with more anger than they had prior to the incident.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is a very powerful sobering point. So that exclusion from the student body is not ultimate protection from someone who is truly violent.

Mr. FEDERMAN. The situation is not resolved at the point the individual is removed.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Chief Healy, you wanted to add something?

Mr. HEALY. I just wanted to add that there is also a second alternative available in most States where law enforcement officers have the authority to involuntarily hospitalize someone wherein usually the term is for approximately 24 to 48 hours and they are forced to undergo some psychiatric evaluation.

I would like to point out that this alternative is obviously limited to those institutions who have sworn law enforcement officers with the appropriate authority. But it is another alternative.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That does not require a judicial proceeding.

Mr. HEALY. It does not.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Many States give law enforcement officials the right to do that for a preliminary consultation.

Mr. HEALY. Absolutely.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Let me come back because apart from the general education, and this panel has been really wonderful at this, we naturally have a special concern about the impact of existing Federal law on the goal that we all have, which is to protect the

safety of our college campuses and the people who live, work, and study on them.

I am interested in hearing a little more detail about how the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) affect your pursuit of safer campuses. These are complicated questions. I do not minimize that. But to the extent that you have thoughts about it today, if you had the capacity to single-handedly amend either of these laws, what would you do? Dr. Ward, do you have any thoughts about it?

Mr. WARD. Yes and no. I think it is kind of technical. I think my colleagues mentioned earlier in the division of mental health, it depends on the particular case. One of the challenges, I think, that makes it difficult is that generally parents are involved until the point of the student arriving on the college campus in whatever condition was pre-existing. If an alienation occurs between the parent and the student at that point, the university community has no capacity to replace that connectivity. And if the student then, in effect, makes it impossible for us to draw on that resource, which I believe in some cases we should, maybe for medical reasons, maybe not in others. But that, it seems to me, is very difficult.

By the way, these crises are not just suicidal. I think the issues of alcoholism on campus, which precede—in almost every case I dealt with, the student was an alcoholic before arriving on campus. This was not something created as a freshman on the campus but something which went back. And how the parent, in a sense, was aware of that and certainly that distance was now created. And yet there were times in which I could not have the family reengaged.

But I do think that there is some set of what one might call medical details here as to whether that is or is not desirable. And that is what I think makes this quite difficult is that you need an assessment team. I was frustrated because I often needed seven or eight people in the room with me to make these decisions. The decisions were so eclectic and individual when you were getting down to this level of disruption, which is relatively rare, that this is a great challenge.

And whether the laws were, in the end, an obstruction, they were always there in my general counsel. The general counsel was always there saying if you do that you will be sued. So that was one voice in the room that felt very strongly that there was a vulnerability for liability.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is the dilemma right there. If there is something you should do which you think is in the interest of the safety of the people on the campus and your lawyer tells you you may be sued for doing it.

Mr. WARD. You tend not to do it.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. And then you may be erring on the side of caution which is on the side of creating a peril. FERPA, as I understand it, says that a college student older than 18 has a right to withhold his own information even from his family, or maybe most particularly from his family. And HIPAA also obviously protects the privacy of health information. Although my understanding is that both statutes have exceptions that allow disclo-

sure of information in the event that the individual is a threat to the health or safety of the community. Dr. Federman.

Mr. FEDERMAN. Let me clarify that. If a student represents danger to self or others, as a licensed clinician my obligation is to ensure that student's safety. And typically that means getting him or her into a nearby hospital. Once there, they are safe, at least for the day or two that they are there.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And everybody else is, too.

Mr. FEDERMAN. Alright. Contacting student's parents is not a part of bringing about that rapid resolution of threat and safety. And I absolutely understand that parents want to be informed. I have two adolescents, one of them at college. If he was hospitalized, I want to know.

But the reality is I would be informed if his or her life were in danger, if they were in a coma, if they were seriously ill in critical condition, I would be informed. But once we get somebody into a psychiatric unit and they are contained and protected, then our obligation to communicate beyond that stops.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Understood, but let me just ask you because you talked about it a little bit in your prepared testimony, if you could rewrite HIPAA or FERPA, what kinds of changes would you make? Are you prepared to answer that today?

Mr. FEDERMAN. Sir, I am not.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Please think about it because these are very important questions. We want to respect the privacy of individuals and yet, ultimately, I think we have a greater responsibility to protect the safety of the community.

Mr. FEDERMAN. What I would strive to do is to write them in such a way that they do not clash, that we have more internal consistency between policies such that they fit together in a way that one policy works seamlessly—

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Because you deal with this every day, and I know this is not the normal expertise, this is lawyering and legislating, but I think you can do a great public service if you have the time to try to do some of exactly what you said now for us, which is to see if you can better connect these values and these statutes.

Dr. Redlener.

Dr. REDLENER. The one clarification, especially with FERPA, is that it might be helpful to look at the language very closely to see specifically what kinds of conditions are critical where a college or university might need to make a decision but is constrained by potential liabilities. Under certain conditions there could be liability protection if the university can establish by very clear criteria a situation of significant danger to the students or others.

So in other words, maybe it would be going to a judge and getting a court order, provided the college meets certain criteria, they are then protected from legal liability.

But the other quick point to make about this—

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is a very interesting idea which we ought to consider.

Dr. REDLENER. Not all universities and colleges are located near an appropriate mental health facility that can accommodate a student or anybody with this kind of psychiatric condition. In fact, one piece of the larger context is that the expertise to deal with these

kinds of problems, where we are talking about potentially really serious implications, may not be available or accessible. Putting somebody in a general community hospital for 24 hours when they are having a major psychiatric break does not do much except buy a very little bit of time.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Dr. Redlener, very helpful.

Senator Collins.

Senator COLLINS. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Redlener got exactly to the issue that was going to be my final question to this panel. And that is as I listen to the testimony, it strikes me that it is going to be hard to define more precisely the public safety exception or the health exception to the two laws that we have been discussing because you cannot possibly come up with all of the scenarios to define that more precisely, which is why it is not defined more precisely.

Therefore, it seems to me the answer is, just as Dr. Redlener was suggesting, that perhaps we should look at some sort of liability protection because when you hear Dr. Ward say that your fear is always that you are going to be sued and you have the general counsel in the room saying well, you can do that, but there is a risk of litigation. Then you do not do it. You are going to err on the side of not being sued. And most of the time everything is going to work out fine. But there are those small number of cases where it is not, it is going to lead to catastrophe.

So it seems to me if we could perhaps look at providing some sort of limited liability protection in cases where a certain process is followed. You cannot stipulate all of the circumstances, but a process is followed. So then you can make the decisions without fear of being sued.

I was going to ask that as my final question of the panel. I think I still will, although we already know Dr. Redlener's reaction to it. But let me start with you, Dr. Ward, and just go across.

Mr. WARD. I think you have summarized quite effectively. I kind of like the solution at the end. I always refer to the combination of the lawyers and the doctors who have helped me out in these situations.

But I do think, as a college president, the thing that most struck me about this was how well most things worked most of the time. It was extreme events, unpredictable, frequently not following any rules. I think if you might describe them, they were eclectic. The preconditions, even if they were there, would not have predicted the violence or the negative outcomes.

So one of our challenges here is that we may have systems that are capable of dealing with 90 or 95 percent of the situations, and we want to make sure that when we tinker with the system to deal with these extreme events, we do not disrupt a system that is meeting needs which are serious but not in the sense of the savage or horrific nature we are dealing with.

And from those events sometimes we can learn a great deal. But the specifics of that event may not be as generalizable as the general practices that meet the needs of most students. I think that strategically, as you deal with crisis management, all of the crisis management I was involved in, I think the five that I remember most and still remember, and they are seared in my mind, I still

have difficulty both anticipating why we did not anticipate. And even the lessons that followed from them, in a sense, might never have prevented those specific actions.

And yet there were many other actions that were problems for us that we resolved. There were systemic solutions to them.

I think extreme events present us with such extraordinary challenges in coming up with generalizations. In many cases, the most successful way of dealing with extreme events is usually good judgment and great leadership rather than the systems. They are so unusual.

So I think we can stretch ourselves to take as much advantage as we can, but there is a limit to how far we can stretch in dealing with the unpredictable. I think there is an underlying sanity for the rest of society in trying to recognize that the degree to which we control extreme events is extremely small, and it is extremely frustrating to us.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. President Webb.

Mr. WEBB. Dr. Ward and the other panelists have spoken effectively about the many mental health concerns that we have on all of these campuses. And they are real and they deserve this discussion and dialogue.

But I would hope that the Committee and the Homeland Security Department will not overlook the issues that we have from a law enforcement standpoint, just a basic security standpoint of training that our campus police officers need. Mr. Healy's association is an excellent one. They provide excellent training for campus police officers. But every college campus is not 55,000 students. You have those institutions with 5,500 students that are not that well manned, and we need support from the standpoint of training.

Quite frankly, college presidents and senior decisionmakers need training on threat assessment and critical incident management planning. We need associations like our own AASCU and ACE and others to perhaps help us with forums to get the president and decisionmakers to know what to do when you have a crisis.

One of my deans approached me last week and she said I am not sure I know what to do. If a gunman comes into my building and holds a class hostage, what are the protocols? We have a code of conduct and protocols, but she needs training and our faculty members need training about what to do in times of emergency. So I would urge that there also be some consideration to—and I am not talking about great sums of money—but we need a lot of training out there on our various colleges across the country about how to deal with these crises that I am afraid in the past we felt like we were immune, we were invincible on the college campus to these issues.

Senator COLLINS. Chief Healy.

Mr. HEALY. Yes, ma'am. I would just echo President Webb's comments. And I think really what he is talking about is greater levels of relationship building, partnerships between all of the higher education associations. For example, we need to work with NACUBO, that is the business officers association. And we need to work with ACE to assist in providing that training to a wider group of the campus community. Really what we are talking about here is our efforts to further engage with community policing and

making sure that we have the appropriate resources to develop these training programs and then to deliver them in a very significant way to ensure that they reach all 4,200 institutions across the country.

On the issue of FERPA, I would just say the one issue that we would obviously like to see is much greater flexibility in the public and personal safety exceptions that are currently in FERPA so that we can share information. One of the other things that President Webb mentioned was what about sharing information from institution to institution. So when someone leaves Princeton and goes to Central Oklahoma, they are not bringing those problems and I can share that information so that they can make a sound admissions decision.

Senator COLLINS. Dr. Federman.

Mr. FEDERMAN. Personally, I would sleep better more nights if I knew that we had some liability protection. But I also want to point out that we are really looking at dual liability here. It is not just the liability of breaching confidentiality. But what we have seen in some recent high profile court cases, such as the Elizabeth Shin case at MIT or several years prior to that there was a case at Ferrum College where university officials were found liable for not taking sufficient action to get an individual help or to protect him from his own impulses.

So we really do face dual liability, either—going back to what I said, you are damned if you do, you are damned if you do not.

The choice I'm often faced with is: Am I more willing to face suit due to breach of confidentiality or due to lack of activity which then results in someone's death? Most of the time I choose the latter. But we face it every day.

The other point, before I end here, is to say that often in these kind of processes the devil is in the details. If we put together processes where we must be cleared in order to proceed and communicate with parents, families, or other individuals, we need those processes to be very quickly implemented. We need efficacious processes because often we need to act quickly. You may get information and within a couple of hours you may need to contact individuals, and you do not necessarily have time to convene panels and have case review. That could take several days.

Senator COLLINS. That is a good point, as well. Dr. Redlener, any final comments?

Dr. REDLENER. Yes, Senator Collins. The key thing is what you originally said as you framed the question to us, which is that the drivers for liability protection must be a prescribed process. They cannot be assessment driven because of the variability of potential situations that are so specific.

But the truth is that we have other examples where that kind of liability protection has already been worked out. I would suggest looking at, for example, the child abuse laws where children can be involuntarily taken from families. Many times, as a pediatrician, I know that parents may deny medical care in circumstances that are life threatening to the child, and we can get court override of that denial. These kinds of events are protected from legal liability.

So I would look into what exists out there in related areas, but keep it process-driven.

If I could just have a final thought. I know we did not have a chance to discuss this in detail, but I hope that you all, on this particularly vital Committee, are making sure that the intelligence/counterterrorism apparatus is clearly focused on the possibility of people out there planning to harm our children in a Beslan-style way. My conversations with the FBI and other officials have not been comforting in the sense of authorities actually paying sufficient attention to this. I think there is an extreme vulnerability for American children and young people, and I hope we can make sure that they are paying appropriate attention.

Senator COLLINS. Excellent point. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I just want to thank the panel for absolutely terrific testimony, very thoughtful. You bring such expertise to our hearing today.

I also want to commend the Chairman for holding the hearing and our staffs for identifying such excellent witnesses. So thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Collins, as always, for the partnership that allows us to go forward.

I do want to ask one or two more questions because although some of you in your opening statements focused on what I am about to ask, and there was a little bit of a response in the last question, it is interesting that we spent more time today talking about how to help troubled students and identify them—and some of the problems with law that limits your ability to deal with troubled students—than we spent time talking about what happens when that all fails and, either from a troubled student or, God forbid, a terrorist, violence breaks out on campus.

Dr. Ward, you raised this in your opening statement, and President Webb you spoke about it some just a moment ago. It is a very difficult process. How do you train a university president to be a crisis manager? Because you, President Webb, of course, come to the job with very unusual capabilities. A lot of university presidents come because they are academics.

So what I am saying is that in the midst of the multiple demands on university administrators, to raise money, to oversee an academic program, there comes this crisis management capability, very difficult.

The same is true, Chief Healy, I think President Webb talked about it. But what can we do? And again, I do not know that there is any role for government, perhaps it is up to your association to set some standards for the training of campus police, particularly in smaller institutions which do not have the resources and therefore may not have the training for their personnel.

I noted that one of the individuals my staff talked to said that 90 percent of colleges have an emergency response plan on paper. But some questions remain as to whether those plans are as robust and actionable as they should be.

What do you think, Chief Healy? The crisis has begun. Are most college campuses in America ready to respond?

Mr. HEALY. Mr. Chairman, I think that I speak with confidence that I support the idea that most colleges and universities have plans. Have those plans been exercised? Have they fully been evaluated? I would say there is probably as many answers as there are

institutions, 4,200. Every institution has engaged in this emergency management and planning exercise with a different level of energy.

And I would say that if there is one thing that I would love to be able to accomplish is to ensure that with our partners such as DHS, that we develop the capacity to help institutions exercise their plans, to run those plans. There is some of that capacity that currently exists at the States where they will get assistance to help them set up an evaluation, and then to grade that evaluation, and therefore the institutions know what they need to do to enhance their plans.

But I think that we are a long way from being able to say with any surety that all institutions know how those plans will play out in the case of an emergency situation.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Let me ask you to respond to a question that Senator Warner raised, and I am going to ask you, President Webb, to do the same. This, after all, is the Homeland Security Committee. We have dealt with the subject of communications during a crisis in very intense and direct ways. Obviously, in a terrorist attack, one of the great tragic shortcomings on September 11, 2001, was that the emergency responders, firefighters, and police could not communicate with each other. The same happened in a different way in Hurricane Katrina.

I do not know whether your organization has a recommendation on this, but what are the best practices? Senator Warner said maybe there ought to be an audible siren or lights flashing, which is the first indicator to students of today to go to their cell phones or BlackBerries. But what do you recommend in this regard?

Mr. HEALY. Sir, what we recommend is obviously systems that are multi-faceted. And so what Senator Warner mentioned was the alarm, the giant voice kind of systems that have been around for many years. I believe that we cannot discard those. But I also believe that we need to have additional levels of sophistication.

I spoke briefly about mass notification systems that are capable of reaching our community members using a number of different methodologies: Landline phones, cell phones, BlackBerries, text messages, or e-mail messages. Whatever system one has. I am fortunate that at my university we have such a system. But it has to be able to reach all community members using whatever methodologies those members are willing to give us.

We have talked a lot about mass notification systems over the past week. What people fail to realize is even if you have a system that can reach a person's cell phone number, their e-mail, maybe two e-mails, a text message, a BlackBerry, or whatever device they have, they still have to be willing to give you those numbers. So that is an additional challenge that we have to face at our institutions. How do we encourage primarily students and some staff and faculty members to give us cell phone numbers so that we then are able to reach them in an emergency situation?

But this technology is evolving. There are several systems out on the market. Unfortunately, there are also a number of fly-by-night companies that have come about as a result of this tragedy. And so we have to really encourage our institutions to be very thoughtful about how they go about selecting a system that will really be



one of the primary ways that they will be able to warn members of the community or to give instructions to those members as well.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. President Webb, what would you add to that? What kind of communication system should a college or university have after the crisis begins?

Mr. WEBB. There must be multiple forms of communication, new media, old media. Chief Healy mentioned the text message and the cell phones and the Internet and the campus websites and just being aware of the new ways that students communicate with each other. That method has to be used.

But the old forms of communication are also good, too. We have fire alarm systems in every building. We are having an audio capability placed in every one of those fire alarm panels where we can give audio, we can voice-activate messages to students as to what to do, evacuate the building, stay in the building.

Throughout the Midwest, and I suspect on most college campuses, we are used to storms. We are used to tornadoes. We do have sirens. And we need alarms, and we need flashing alarms that also alert for hearing impaired students. So we have to communicate in multiple ways.

How can we get the attention of the college presidents and the decisionmakers? I am proud that our governor, Governor Henry, is saying to every college and university in Oklahoma, take a look at your emergency response. Let us review it. This is your responsibility. And perhaps more than anything that this Senate panel can do, the respective governors can do that. And I am sure that is happening in many States around the country.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Dr. Ward, do you have a final word?

Mr. WARD. One, is I think you are asking about the college president's role. I do think that team leadership is now required. It really is an executive role. And so if the chief executive does not know how to tap specialized talent and create leadership of value from the specialists, it will not work, particularly at large universities.

The second thing is that professional development, which did not use to be a big part of either the pre-presidential or the presidential experience, is now increasingly valued by presidents. All of the associations have both short and longer courses, which you call programs, to provide both pre-presidential experience of what they may face and then actually when they are in the presidency, case studies of what would go on.

The most popular sessions at our annual meetings now are actually crisis management where people recall from each other the case studies of what they did. I would say in post-September 11, 2001, there is probably almost a quadrupling of interest as an agenda issue in these issues. Whether we are at the point where we are effective yet, I do not know. But there is an exponential increase in interest and I hope competency in dealing with these things that has occurred in the last 4 or 5 years.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is interesting because going back to something that Dr. Redlener asked or said, you would say that what you are finding at your meetings is that people, college administrators, college presidents, are taking seriously the possibility that their campus might be the target of terrorism?

Mr. WARD. And of a natural disaster. Or even a health disaster. Those are, I think, on the minds of everybody.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. OK. Do you have any other questions?

Senator COLLINS. No.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I thank you very much. I echo what Senator Collins said. On short notice you have come in, you have brought tremendous experience to this table. You gave us some very helpful suggestions about some programs that we might better support with funding, including programs that relate to suicide prevention, perhaps even supporting some of the national center ideas that you have suggested, Chief Healy.

And you invite us, I think the situation invites us to take a new look, a thoughtful look at both the two laws we talked about, FERPA and HIPAA, and to try to deal with this question of fear of legal liability that may inhibit a college administrator from taking action that otherwise he or she would take, and not to be punitive against a student, but in the interest of campus safety.

I will say in that regard, to say the obvious first, that we all know that life is full of risks. And at any time in history, no one could say that we are perfectly safe, particularly unfortunately post-September 11. We all live with that reality.

But relatively speaking, I think each of you have given me, and I hope anyone else who has listened to the hearing, a reassuring sense that overall our college and university campuses are safe places to be. Not that we couldn't do more to try to prevent the kind of extreme acts of violence that we saw last week at Virginia Tech. But by and large, compared to other places in our society, college campuses are safe. I thank you for that reassurance.

We are going to leave the record of this hearing open for 15 days if any of you would like to file additional comments or we would like to ask you further questions.

In the meantime, I thank you all for a very important contribution to public dialogue and maybe, in some sense, to our Nation's recovery in a constructive way from the trauma that happened not just at Virginia Tech but to the whole country last Monday.

Thank you very much. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:45 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

# **A P P E N D I X**

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**Testimony  
on**

**Security on America's College Campuses**

**Presented by:**

**David Ward  
President  
American Council on Education**

**Before the**

**Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs**

**April 23, 2007**

Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins and Members of the Committee—

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today about the important and timely issue of emergency preparedness on our college and university campuses. My name is David Ward, and I am president of the American Council on Education (ACE). ACE is the coordinating body for all of higher education and a membership organization representing more than 1,800 two- and four-year, public and private colleges and universities. Prior to coming to ACE six years ago, I was Chancellor of the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

Let me say at the outset: The security of the students, faculty and staff is a preeminent concern of every college and university president. The events of 9-11 permanently changed the way campuses—as well as the rest of the country—view the issue of security. Four years later, the devastation wrought by Hurricane Katrina challenged the survival of our institutions in New Orleans and Mississippi as never before. And of course, last week's tragedy at Virginia Tech has put these issues at the forefront of the nation's consciousness once again.

In thinking about this topic, it might be useful to put the issue of emergency planning as it relates to colleges and universities into some context and to identify those factors that make securing our campuses particularly challenging.

Colleges and universities are large places that are open by design. The UW-Madison campus covers over 1,000 acres, enrolls 42,000 students, and employs 16,000 people. On any given day, there can be thousands of visitors attending classes or functions on campus. This mobility is a characteristic that is equally pronounced on campuses with large numbers of commuter students.

College and university campuses are complex places with a great number and variety of facilities—including residence and dining halls, classrooms and offices, power plants and laboratories, field houses and stadiums. At Madison, for example, I was responsible for more than 300 buildings, including a hospital and medical school, a research park, a nuclear reactor, an 80,000-seat football stadium, and a 17,000-seat field house.

Colleges and universities have large numbers of faculty, staff and students. In many places, they are the largest employers in the area. The defining characteristic of a college or university is that it serves a student population that consists predominately of young adults whose attitudes and behaviors differ significantly from workplace employees.

Finally, while New York may boast about being the city that never sleeps, our campuses are truly places that course with activity 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

In short, the best way to think of a campus is to view it as a self-contained, small-to medium-sized city—with all the activity, vibrancy and, sadly, vulnerability, associated with cities. With that view in mind, it is appropriate to note that in 2005—the most recent year for which statistics are available—there were 42 violent crimes per 100,000 students on college campuses compared with 2,000 violent crimes per 100,000 people per year in the general population. Furthermore, it is important to note that the violent crimes category as defined by the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act ("Clery Act") encompasses not only murder and manslaughter, but forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault. When you consider only murder and manslaughter, there has been an average of 16 violent crimes per year at the more than 8,000 campuses identified by the Department of Education as submitting Clery Act data. Without question, this is 16 deaths too many, but a small number in comparison to society as a whole.

From my own experience as a chancellor, I can tell you that crises can happen when you least expect them. For example, at Madison I faced the unexpected challenge of dealing with a post-game crowd surge at our football stadium that resulted in 70 students being treated for injuries at our hospital. We used that incident to spur improvements to our communications plan, upgrade stadium facilities, and augment medical and security staff for such events. Without any hesitation, I can tell you that the safety and well-being of students, faculty and staff is a subject that keeps ALL presidents awake at night, whether the campus sits on the San Andreas fault like the University of California at Berkeley, or on a coastal flood plain like Dillard University in New Orleans, or in lower Manhattan like Pace University which, in addition to its main campus, had classrooms in one of the World Trade Center buildings.

While all campuses engage in serious emergency preparedness and contingency planning, there is no question that security efforts were dramatically stepped up on campuses throughout the nation after September 11, 2001. The same kind of increased scrutiny will take place now as well, as each one of our colleges and universities tries to make sense of the unspeakable tragedy at Virginia Tech by sharing the kind of research and information that will be gathered in its wake and using it as grist to help avert future disasters. In this fashion, the University of Florida drew from its own repeated experiences, and that of other institutions, to develop hurricane evacuation models and tools that have been widely adopted by other institutions along the coastal plain. Having such models to draw from and adapt to their own planning efforts is one reason that our Gulf Coast institutions accomplished the smooth evacuation of their students and faculty when Hurricane Katrina struck. In contrast to the extensive death toll caused by the storm throughout the region, the evacuation of the more than 100,000 students and faculty from 30 New Orleans/Gulf Coast institutions was achieved without a single loss of life—it remains one of the unheralded success stories of that horrific disaster.

Even as the tragic events of last week were unfolding, many campuses around the country took immediate steps to place their own institutions on a heightened state of alert. Why? As the campus police chief at the University of Texas said, "A concern for every

law enforcement official in the nation right now is copycats.” We will continue to learn more about what added security measures campuses intend to take to bolster their own planning and prevention efforts, but they have each begun the task of re-examining the needs of their campus. For example, Rice University in Houston is attempting to work with residential college leaders to identify students who appear to be under extreme stress to that they can be referred to counseling. The University of Memphis plans to build a system that will act as a school-wide intercom. The University of Iowa is weighing a similar outdoor system. The College of the Desert in California has a new phone system that allows it to quickly send out announcements to every phone on campus and a backup loudspeaker system when phone contact is not possible. At Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, 100 “smart” cameras have been installed on campus that are linked to computers which will alert campus security and Baltimore City Police when suspicious situations arise. At the University of Minnesota, 101 of the university’s 270 buildings have electronic access devices linked to a control center that can selectively lock and unlock doors, send emergency e-mail and phone messages, and trigger audio tones. These are just a few of the examples of the steps colleges are taking to upgrade their security to prepare for the unthinkable and the unforeseen.

A critical element of emergency planning and preparation is allocating sufficient resources to upgrade the equipment and tools that will promote and enhance security. As I have already noted, technology increasingly plays an important role in protecting the campus community—but it can be expensive to purchase and it is never foolproof. Ultimately, how effectively campuses respond to crises depends on the people who are responsible for executing the prevention or containment plan and how well they are prepared to handle the situation. In this regard, colleges have come a long way since 9-11 in advancing the sophistication and expertise of their law enforcement and first-responder personnel. Grant money from the Departments of Justice (DOJ) and Homeland Security (DHS) has provided invaluable support for incident training efforts, creating opportunities for incident intervention trials, and making this kind of training widely available.

The International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA) is the professional association and accrediting agency which has been instrumental in developing best practices, training materials, and guidance for the campus community in matters of security. We support their recommendation to take the next logical step toward strengthening campus first-responder capabilities by creating a National Center for Campus Public Safety as recommended by a 2004 DOJ summit. The function of the Center would be to promote collaboration among national and local law enforcement agencies, and strengthen the administrative and operational components of campus security systems.

In the end, it all comes down to planning. It is essential that every campus have an emergency plan in place that identifies a core response team, a communications plan, and a way to implement the movements of emergency and other staff in a variety of scenarios. It is also vital that such plans are routinely reviewed and upgraded. Hurricane Katrina taught us that the communication elements of such plans are key and that

campuses must have backup plans and technologies in place to handle the loss of major campus facilities. All emergency plans must consider not only the campus community but the surrounding area and region, and staff must drill frequently to find vulnerabilities and refine capabilities.

There also is a useful role for ACE and other presidential associations to play in the identification and dissemination of best practices to our members. For several years, ACE has hosted sessions at our annual meeting that feature presidents using their own experiences as case studies in crisis management. While information is widely shared among the crisis management team on campus, and among specialists such as campus law enforcement officers and mental health professionals, we have found that when opportunities for give-and-take are afforded them, presidents learn a great deal from each other about critical aspects of emergency planning that may not have occurred to them.

No one wants to consider the unthinkable, but in our post 9-11 world all of us must consider it and plan for it—this includes college and university presidents. We have already made great strides to upgrade campus security and ensure that our world class institutions remain safe places to live, learn and innovate. But we cannot rest on our laurels, as the events at Virginia Tech have shown, there is always some new and tragic episode or circumstance around the corner.

Thank you.

**U.S. Senate**

**Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs**

**“Security on America’s College Campuses”**

**April 23, 2007**

**Statement by W. Roger Webb  
President, University of Central Oklahoma  
On behalf of  
the American Association of State Colleges and Universities**



Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. My name is Roger Webb and I am the President of Central Oklahoma University located in Edmond, Oklahoma. My oral and written statements today are made on behalf of my institution and the American Association of State College and Universities, which represents more than 400 public colleges and universities.

Last Friday while walking across our campus, I met a tour of high school students, many with parents, who were visiting our university as they make decisions about next fall. The tour guide asked if anyone had any questions for the President, one mother quickly asked, “Will Amanda be safe on your campus?”

All across America parents are asking this same question. Parents want to know, and have a right to know, how safe are our universities?

I’d like to talk with you about three sets of tension on today’s campus:

- The tension of an open campus versus a secure campus
- The tension of individual privacy versus community safety

- The tension of expensive systems and training versus limited resources

I entered academia after twelve years in law enforcement, the last four serving as Commissioner of Public Safety for Oklahoma. This perhaps makes me one of the few college presidents who carried a badge and a gun in a previous life. Hopefully, the experiences of living in both worlds has provided me some insight that might be helpful to my colleagues in higher education as we wrestle with the complex issues involving campus security.

College administrators today face competing priorities rarely found outside an educational environment. Not the least among these priorities is providing a secure environment for a community disposed toward freedom: freedom of thought, of speech, of access and of movement.

Most college and university populations live with a sense of invincibility. The academic mindset often assumes there exists some sort of moral protective barrier surrounding our campus and that serious crime is something that happens outside our walls and quadrangles.

For years those of us in the Heartland naively thought that we were immune to mass violence and acts of terrorism. In 1986, Patrick Sherrill

calmly walked into the Edmond, Oklahoma, post office and murdered fourteen people. That post office is located two blocks from our campus. Then, twelve years ago our erroneous assumptions were again shattered when Timothy McVeigh ignited a Ryder truck loaded with fertilizer and race car fuel and brought down the Oklahoma City Federal Building, destroying the lives of 168 men, women and children with a blast that was heard and felt on our campus. We had not planned for a parked truck becoming a weapon of mass destruction. Neither had law enforcement planned for hijacked airplanes flying into buildings becoming instruments of death, nor a one-room Amish school house becoming a killing zone.

Certainly 9/11 should have been a wake up call to the potential of mass violence on our university campuses, but in reality, not much has happened to change the level of campus security at most universities. And then just one week ago, our world was turned upside down once again when a young man, in the agonies of his hatred, became a weapon of mass destruction and with semi-automatic handguns, wiped out the lives of more than thirty people, living, working, studying on a campus of a great university in Virginia.

So today the spotlight is shining squarely on every college president and every senior campus administrator in this country.

Because of my earlier career, I am keenly aware of the tension that exists on virtually every campus between the security mindset and the academic desire for an open environment. Such tensions require careful judgments because both sides have valid concerns.

In light of the realities of 1995 in Oklahoma City, 1999 in Columbine, 2001 in Washington D.C. and New York City, and just a week ago today in Blacksburg, campus administrators must review and revise their security procedures, their technology and communication measures, their budget commitments and perhaps most importantly, their training and awareness programs – not only for security personnel, but for all staff, faculty and students.

College and university campuses are also encountering another challenge. There has been a significant rise in the percentage of students coming to us who already have mental illnesses. Laws such as the Americans with Disabilities Act prevent discrimination due to a disability, including mental illness.

Universities have to weigh the rights of individuals against the safety concerns of the community. Balancing the rights of individual students while protecting the university body at large is a particularly complex task.

Because of this challenge, we must have in place professional counselors to assist with our troubled or disturbed students. Every case involving a troubled student is different. Moreover, all university personnel should be trained to recognize and report signs of troubling behavior. In these instances, the hope is that the disturbed student will agree to be treated in a hospital setting. But when a student refuses to admit himself voluntarily, the threshold necessary to remove the student from that university community is set very high. This is the gray area.

I am certainly no expert in this field but I believe in situations where the safety of our university community is involved and the individual will not allow counseling or treatment, we must look for ways to eliminate this behavior. Our goal must always be to discipline the disruptive behaviors, not disparage the person.

Universities typically have codes of conduct that define parameters of acceptable behavior for the community. When behaviors approach the limits

of these parameters, the university is compelled to respond. Counselors, campus police and student housing and conduct officers must be able to cite such disturbing behaviors in order to demand that the student obtain effective treatment, withdraw from the university, or no longer be permitted on campus.

All these efforts must currently be attempted in a legal and policy context which places severe limits on sharing of information regarding such matters. Moreover, the ability to intervene in a situation of potential, rather than actual danger, is severely limited, as well. It may be that the lines are currently drawn in ways that prevent prudent and appropriate responses. Certainly such issues should again become the focus of public debate.

For example, at the University of Central Oklahoma, we are now dealing with a former student who is continuing to make threats to our faculty, and yet we are prevented by federal law from notifying other institutions of his potentially dangerous behavior.

For a campus to get out in front of an actual threat, threat assessments are necessary in order to determine possible risks to critical support facilities, critical research infrastructure, communication systems, cyber

systems, and most importantly, the people. Protection of people and spaces such as, residence halls, classrooms and common areas are vital to every campus.

Needed today on most college campuses is training in threat assessments and in analyzing a threat in order to provide proper response and intervention. This training should be comprehensive and include the campus administration, decision makers, counselors and school psychologists, security and law enforcement leaders, risk managers, and communication specialists. Maintaining a safe campus requires a holistic approach that brings all relevant personnel and tools together in a coordinated and balanced effort. While every school is unique, essential elements of an effective security program are the same. For this reason every campus should have a thorough understanding of Critical Incident Management and the various roles from decision makers to security personnel. A Critical Incident Management Plan is a must for every campus and one that should be rehearsed regularly.

According to Mary Ellen O'Toole of the F.B.I. Academy, in her document, *The School Shooter: A Threat Assessment Perspective*, *National*

*Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime*, “A school cannot ignore any threat of violence. A clear, consistent, rational, and well-structured system for dealing with threats is vitally important in a school. If students or staff feel that threats are not addressed quickly and sensibly, or if school administrators appear overwhelmed and uncertain at every threat, confidence in the school’s ability to maintain a safe environment will be seriously undermined. An effective threat management system will include a standardized method for evaluating threats, and consistent policies for responding to them.”

I am urging today that we as a nation, and particularly our nation’s campuses, become aware of security materials that already exist and take advantage of training opportunities that prepare us to handle the unexpected event and, hopefully, prevent it from occurring in the first place through training, education and preventive assessments.

We must also be able to respond to emergencies with contemporary technologies.

In addition to standard, proven alert systems such as alarms, flashing alarm systems and voice activated warning systems, universities need to



know how students on their campuses like to communicate. By using all available methods, including the social networking sites such as Facebook and MySpace, etc., as well as third-party mass communications systems such as voice mail and text messaging, we improve our odds of reaching our students on campus in the event of an emergency.

For commuter students and others who have not yet arrived on campus for the day, enlisting the help of the local media, radio and television, as well as using our campus website, calling trees, and e-mail, would, again, help us reach our campus community quickly and efficiently. A complete array of communications modalities is vital.

The federal government should make broader availability of the materials, resources and programs that already exist. For example, although InfraGard is designed to share intelligence and information between academic institutions, state and local law enforcement agencies, public utilities and the federal participants, it is doubtful that many academic institutions are familiar with this and other valuable resources. Campuses across this nation should be encouraged to become members and take advantage of such opportunities.

In the aftermath of the Columbine shootings, federal dollars were distributed as grants to many agencies and institutions for training materials that should be in the hands of college campuses today. These materials and training aids should be easily accessible and readily available so that all campuses can take advantage of the tremendous effort already produced from past tragic events. Web sites such as those maintained by the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (M.I.P.T.), [www.mipt.org](http://www.mipt.org), provide invaluable service as a clearing house for information and training. I would strongly recommend that M.I.P.T. be supported by the Office of Homeland Security to provide a new link involving campus security.

States are already reviewing their campus security practices in the wake of last week's tragedy. Oklahoma Governor Brad Henry has formed a task force to re-evaluate safety and security at our colleges and universities. Also, on May 30, a National Summit on Campus Security will be held on the University of Central Oklahoma campus, jointly sponsored by the Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education, American Association of State Colleges

and Universities (AASCU), M.I.P.T. and the University of Central Oklahoma.

There are other resources that Universities can look to.

- The University of West Florida – President John Cavanaugh and the University of West Florida, can offer an excellent management template for dealing with major disasters after their experiences with at least four hurricanes that have rocked their campus in recent years.
- California State University – California State University at Northridge, will share lessons learned from their experiences following an earthquake a few years ago.
- Sonoma State University – Policy statement on a violence-free campus.
- Disaster Resistant University – FEMA – a planning process for mitigation and responsiveness to any crisis. This outstanding program has been closed and is worthy of renewal.
- Homeland Security – Sentinel Project – sponsors high-quality security and safety training.
- I.A.C.P. – International Association of Chiefs of Police has available training aids for all levels of law enforcement.
- I.A.C.L.E.A. – International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators – Coordinate and provide emergency response training (federal grant) and provide resources/support to campus law enforcement nationally and internationally.

- The F.B.I. National Academy is reaching out to the campus community by making available more training slots for campus police officers.

Mr. Chairman, I cannot guarantee that Amanda will be 100% safe on my campus.

Amanda's safety has a lot to do with the decisions she makes while she is away from home. We need every member of our campus community to be alert to their surroundings and like the safety mantra on the New York subway, "If you see something, say something."

And finally, I can assure you every college and university in America will welcome any support that this committee can provide.

Thank you.

**Testimony of Steven J. Healy, President, International Association of  
Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA)  
U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs  
April 23, 2007**

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Senator Collins, Members of the Committee. My name is Steven Healy and I am the director of public safety at Princeton University. I am also the President of the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA), an association that represents the campus public safety executives at 1,200 institutions of higher education, mostly in the U.S., and more than 1,800 individual members.

I thank and commend the Committee for holding this hearing on security on America's campuses. IACLEA joins with you in mourning the loss of so many students and faculty at Virginia Tech last week. This tragic event has heightened the urgency of our continuous efforts to enhance campus public safety. Important questions exist about safety and security at the more than 4,000 institutions of higher education that provide education, training and a home community for 15 million students in our nation. Our shared efforts to advance campus public safety must acknowledge and honor the students and faculty who perished and were injured one week ago today.

Over the next several minutes I hope to accomplish three primary purposes. First and foremost, I want to ensure this Committee and the American people that vigorous efforts are underway to develop and implement best practices in campus public safety. With our partners, such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police, College and University Policing Section (IACP) and several federal agencies, we are committed to enhancing safety and security on our Nation's campuses. Secondly, I want to paint a picture that fully describes the complexity of this critical mission. Finally, I hope that through my testimony we can identify additional ways to supplement our current efforts. First, I would like to describe the current state of campus public safety.

Campus public safety continues to evolve into a complex responsibility. Campus public safety officers must be trained and equipped to deal with a variety of issues. These include community policing strategies, crime prevention and control, alcohol and substance abuse, sexual assault, dating violence, students with mental health issues, and campus crime reporting compliance. In short, we face all of the challenges confronted by our municipal, county, state, and federal law enforcement partners, and more.

College and university campuses are traditionally open and accessible environments that reflect our free and democratic society. We must balance the openness that is the hallmark of the American system of higher education with the need to protect students, faculty, staff, and visitors. We must assure the safety of our students walking at night from the library to their dormitories as well

as ensure the security of nuclear reactors on nearly a dozen campuses. We must also protect campus venues such as sports arenas and the facilities that host Presidential debates and other important public functions serving not only campus communities, but the cities and towns where they are located. We must maintain a welcoming environment while simultaneously protecting laboratory facilities critical to medicine, information technology, and basic sciences that contribute to business, individual health, and national defense.

There are a number of critical safety challenges facing colleges and universities today. At the top of the list are issues related to high risk drinking and the use and abuse of illegal and controlled prescription drugs. Each year, we lose more than 1600 students from unintentional alcohol related injuries. Abuse of controlled drugs has risen substantially. The negative outcomes related directly to alcohol and drug abuse include poor academic performance, depression, anxiety, suicide, and unwanted sexual advances. The problem has reached devastating levels, prompting the National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University to say that we are "wasting the best and the brightest." Campus public safety agencies are key partners in addressing these critical challenges.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have further complicated our mission. It's no secret that campuses have many elements that make them attractive targets for terrorism. These elements include international communities, sensitive research materials, controversial research projects, sporting venues that accommodate tens of thousands of spectators, and visits by high profile dignitaries. Campuses have been identified by FBI Director Robert Mueller as "soft targets" for terrorists in testimony before Congress in February of 2003.

Our community is a diverse group whose institutions range from two-year community colleges and small private colleges to large, public four-year universities. Campus public safety is provided in a variety of ways; some institutions have sworn, armed officers with full police powers, while others have non-sworn, unarmed officers and still others have contract security. We work within different college and university governance structures and under an array of Federal and local laws.

Given the increasing complexity of campus public safety and the diverse social fabric of our colleges and universities, I am still able to report to you that campuses are reasonably safe when compared to the larger communities in which they exist. That said, we must continually review and, when necessary, enhance our policies and procedures to address new and emerging challenges. We must ensure we have adequate resources to deal with a full spectrum of incidents that may occur on our campuses.

As an association, IACLEA, along with our partners in the IACP College and University Policing Section, are at the forefront of campus public safety. I would like to discuss four areas where we are leading the way. I have submitted additional materials that supplement my prepared statement.

#### Training and Emergency Preparedness

Since 2004, grant support from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security has enabled IACLEA to develop a variety of training programs and emergency planning resources for campus public safety departments in the U.S. These programs include a one-day All-Hazards Awareness class that has trained more than 4,500 emergency responders. IACLEA developed this program in conjunction with Louisiana State University. We are also delivering a three-day Incident Command System course that has trained more than 700 campus and non-campus command-level staff in its first year of operation. This training, while hosted by campus public safety agencies, includes state and local law enforcement. On April 16, we witnessed the VT Police, the Blacksburg Police, the Montgomery County Sheriff's Office, the Virginia State Police, the FBI and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives working seamlessly together in their response to this horrific event at the University. That response underscores how imperative it is that campus public safety agencies train and exercise with their law enforcement partners outside of campus. To assist in delivering this very important program, IACLEA has established 4 training sites throughout the country. Current sites are at the University of Maryland, Florida State University, Rice University, and the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. We have also implemented a mobile version of this training which allows us to move the program around the country to various campuses.

IACLEA, in concert with Texas A&M University, has developed a Threat and Risk Assessment Tool to assist campus executives in performing an assessment of their vulnerabilities and implementing solutions identified during the assessment. In so doing, the capacity of the University to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from catastrophic events, both natural and human-made, is enhanced. While the instrument is designed as a self-administered tool, some colleges and universities have expressed a desire for on-site technical assistance in carrying out the assessment. We will work with DHS to establish this capacity.

#### Resources for Campus Public Safety Agencies

DHS and the FBI partnered with IACLEA to produce a "Lessons Learned" white paper based on the experiences of Gulf Coast campuses during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, as well as the experiences of Oklahoma University and Georgia Tech University with explosives on their campuses in September 2005. We distributed an executive summary of this report to members of Congress, federal executive agencies, and national associations of higher education. This white

paper sets forth specific recommendations to enhance campus preparedness for catastrophic events, from weather-related incidents to terrorism. We also distributed this document to campuses across the nation and other national law enforcements associations.

IACLEA has developed a web-based Campus Preparedness Resource Center, which features best practices in emergency preparedness, communications with first responders, and comprehensive guidelines for developing emergency management plans. We continue to encourage and support our members in their long range planning and critical incident training. Along with training to prepare for natural and other disasters, IACLEA also offers educational workshops at its annual conference and other training venues. Training topics include campus crime prevention, suicide prevention, programs to combat violence against women, and alcohol and substance abuse prevention. To further illustrate this point, two weeks ago the Mid-Atlantic Region of IACLEA teamed with the New Jersey College and University Public Safety Association to hold a two-day training seminar focusing on Pandemic Flu planning, Interoperability, and Gang Awareness and Response. Again, our partnerships with local, state, and federal agencies and other associations enhance our ability to provide first-rate training to colleges and universities.

IACLEA reaches nearly half of all traditional higher education institutions. While this is a significant number, we need to ensure all colleges and universities are committed to and have access to high quality information, best practices, and training. Greater Federal, state and local support for campus public safety agencies – whether at public or private institutions – would provide greater training opportunities and other necessary resources for campus public safety.

Campus public safety agencies are not explicitly recognized as potential recipients of federal funds administered by the DHS or the Justice Department. This presents a major challenge in many states when decisions are made about the allocation of formula grants funds. We urge Congress to consider creating a dedicated funding stream to strengthen public safety on our nation's campuses.

#### National Center for Campus Public Safety

In late 2004, the US Department of Justice's Office of Community Oriented Policing Services convened a National Summit on Campus Public Safety. The Summit brought together 40 nationally-recognized subject matter experts on campus public safety, campus risk management and emergency preparedness to engage in this important dialogue. A consensus recommendation from the Summit was the need to establish a National Center for Campus Public Safety to support research, information sharing, best and model practices, and strategic planning.



Tomorrow, I will be meeting with the COPS Office and the National Center for Campus Public Safety Advisory Board to further develop the framework for this center. A National Center will be an invaluable resource for all who have a stake in campus public safety, and thus the success of our colleges and universities.

#### Accreditation

IACLEA received funding from the COPS Office to begin developing an accreditation program to recognize those campus public safety agencies that adhere to the highest standards of professionalism, training, and excellence. IACLEA has four pilot agencies participating in the Accreditation process and has received 13 applications from institutions seeking IACLEA Accreditation.

#### Summary

Protecting our nation's colleges and universities is a partnership among Federal, State and local agencies. This partnership is developing, but it needs to be stronger. Our campuses are significant assets in our shared responsibility for crime prevention and control and Homeland Security.

In light of the tragic events at Virginia Tech, we will work with the FBI's National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime and the U.S. Secret Service Threat Assessment Center to expand previous studies of middle and high school aged shooters, to take a very deliberate, separate look at rampage shooters on college and university campuses.

IACLEA will work with national associations of higher education, our external law enforcement partners and individual campuses to adopt a 4-point risk management strategy that we believe may help us prevent future tragedies like Virginia Tech.

#### Point 1:

We are aggressively promoting the use of the IACLEA Threat and Risk Assessment instrument. We are confident that this tool will help campuses identify and prioritize vulnerabilities tied to known and potential threats. Rampage shooters, which have always represented a potential threat, now move to the top of the list.

#### Point 2:

We will work with our federal partners and individual campuses to create multi-disciplinary assessment teams, comprised of student affairs professionals, counselors and psychologists, substance abuse professionals and campus public safety to develop a structure and methodology for addressing those in the campus community who are potential threats.

## Point 3:

We intend to fast track our efforts to provide a comprehensive tool to assist campuses in evaluating their physical security environments. This tool must take into account the need for a layered approach to security on campus, beginning with highly trained professional campus public officers, the appropriate implementation of security technology such as cameras with smart analytics, and crime prevention through environmental design. I should also note that of particular interest is the need for mass, emergency notification systems that have appropriate capacity, security and redundancy, as well as experience and focus on the higher education community. These systems must be capable of reaching our community members using several methodologies, including landline phones, cellular phones, text messaging, and email.

## Point 4:

Finally, we want to ensure that rapid response training is made available to all campuses that need it. On the IACLEA List Serve this past week, I have seen repeated emails asking for additional training and resources for active shooter response. On Thursday, I'll be meeting the Bureau of Justice Assistance to discuss how they can assist us in providing that training in the very near future. Director Domingo Herraiz, the head of BJA, has committed to supporting is in this endeavor.

We believe this 4-Point approach not only addresses potential gaps that may exist on some campuses, but it will also establish a framework for systematically addressing other safety and security challenges.

In closing, I would like to add that for the past 49 years, IACLEA has worked to advance campus public safety. We understand the vital role our colleges and universities play in ensuring democracy throughout the world. We are committed to our mission of protecting and serving students, faculty, staff and visitors on our campuses. We will continue to be an advocate for the more than 30,000 public safety officers in America whose special mission is to protect and serve over 4,000 unique communities.

Thank you for your interest and commitment to this very important issue. I would also like to thank DHS, the FBI, the Justice Department and the Department of Education for their support, along with the many state and local agencies who are our partners. These partnerships are vital to fulfilling our promise to ensure that every campus community remains safe and open.

I appreciate the opportunity to contribute to this important conversation.

**Opening Statement Testimony for the Committee on  
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs**

**“Security on America's College Campuses”**

**Committee Chair: Senator Joseph Lieberman**

**Testifying Professional:**

**Russ Federman, Ph.D., ABPP  
Director, Counseling and Psychological Services  
Department of Student Health  
University of Virginia  
Charlottesville, Virginia**

**April 23, 2007**

### **Introduction**

Universities need your help. Universities and our surrounding communities need more mental-health resources. Conflicts between FERPA, HIPPA and mental health licensing codes need to be lessened. Universities do an excellent job of managing high risk patients but we strive to do better.

Distinguished senators, Senate staff, members of the media and others attending today's hearing, as a clinical psychologist and Director of the Counseling and Psychological Services at the University of Virginia, I'm here today to provide an overview of the current state of mental health issues and responses on University campuses across the United States.

The college years represent a complex period of development. Individuals within this age range are no longer children, though they have not yet fully completed the transition into adulthood and full autonomy. They exist in the period of development we refer to as "late adolescence" with the inherent tension of continued dependence vs. strivings towards autonomy. This is a transitional time where core values and mores, emotional states, day-to-day functioning and the broad spectrum of interpersonal relationships undergo considerable change. University students are faced with many new challenges and must learn to manage these, without the parental support they had relied upon during earlier years. These elements lead to significant vulnerability and potential turbulence in students' psychological well-being.

### **Utilization of services**

According to The Department of Education, there were 17.3 million students enrolled in over 4500 colleges and universities nationwide in 2004. The Chronicle of Higher Education projects 2007 enrollment figures at nearly 18,000,000. From the 2006 National Survey of Counseling Center Directors which surveyed 376 Directors, we see that 8.9 percent or one in every 11 enrolled students has sought counseling or psychological help in the past year. When this 8.9% is applied to the current projected national enrollment, it yields a total of 1.6 million students having sought counseling or psychological help in that same time period.

### **Overview of the Clinical Landscape**

Since 2003 the American College Health Association has been conducting the National College Health Assessment. The most recent 2006 survey involved the largest randomized sample since the survey's inception - 94,806 students, from public and private universities across the country. This survey reports some striking data. Within the past year:

- 94 out of 100 students reported feeling overwhelmed by all they had to do.
- 44 out of 100 - almost half - have felt so depressed it was difficult to function.
- 18 out of 100 or close to one out of every five reported having a depressive disorder.
- 12 out of 100 had an anxiety disorder.
- 9 out of 100 or approximately 1 out of every 11 students reported having seriously considered suicide within the past year.
- 1.3% actually did attempt suicide. That's 13 out of every 1000 students. If we have 18,000,000 million enrolled students, this means 234,000 suicide attempts every year, 19,500 every month or 642 attempts every day.

Why stop suicide? We save students lives. But also, we know that some students become suicidal before they become homicidal ... before they act on their murderous wishes.

In the past 10 to 15 years, we have seen a significant sea change with University counseling center work. More effective psychotropic medication, improved education of primary care providers in childhood and adolescent disorders and gradual destigmatization of treatment allow for the enrollment of far more students with pre-existing psychiatric disorders than would have attended 10 to 20 years ago. The traditional University counseling center has become a University community mental health center.

At University of Virginia, 1750 students, or one out of every eleven students, were seen during the past academic year. One third of our patients present with depression and one of five with anxiety disorders. We psychiatrically hospitalize 40 to 60 students every year, most of them for acute depression, suicidal ideation and bipolar disorders. Most of our work is devoted to crisis intervention with acute and complex psychopathology. Both nationally and at UVA we are faced with high-volume, high-risk, and very serious illnesses.

### **Potential Violence Due to Mental Illness**

While University counseling centers have seen more and more students struggling with mental health issues, it is important to note that the frequency with which University communities are faced with students posing significant danger to others as a result of serious mental illness is very small. Many forms of violence such as incidents of robbery, simple assault, sexual assault, stalking, and hazing do not necessarily emerge from a psychological disorder. Indeed, the single factor that contributes most to intermittent aggressive conflicts, assault and violence on campus is the use of alcohol. And most forms of psychological disorder carry no increased risk of violence. University police departments are working assiduously to lessen campus violence, and according to a 2005 Violent Victimization of College Students report, the violent crime rate of universities declined 54% between 1995 and 2002.

The kinds of mental disturbances which yield extreme violence are rare. Individuals with this level of disturbance typically experience a degree of impairment that is inconsistent with the requirements of University life. Given the ongoing interactions with peers, faculty and residence life staff, when a student's functioning deteriorates within a University setting, the student's aberrant behavior is usually observable and distressing to others. In most instances University faculty, deans and/or administrators in addition to University mental health professionals are notified of these instances and appropriate attention and limits are brought to bear upon the individual.

### **Available Resources and the Provision of Services**

Counseling centers have received increased resources over the last 10 years in an effort to keep up with student need. But the gradual expansion of resources has also corresponded with ever increasing student enrollment. From the National Director Survey we see that in 1996 we had a ratio of one FTE clinical staff per 1598 students. This past year, in 2006 we see a ratio of one per 1697. We are not getting ahead of the curve; if anything, we are sliding behind. With limited resources University counseling services are usually directed towards crisis intervention, stabilization and brief treatment approaches. Many students may need more than brief approaches and when resources are stretched to meet the greater needs of more acutely disturbed students this consumes important hours that could be used to treat larger numbers of students.

University mental health clinicians devote considerable amount of time towards consultation with University administrators, deans, faculty, staff and parents creating an interconnected web of resources. Although confidentiality laws generally prevent University counseling centers from sharing confidential information without the student's permission, in most instances students are quite willing to provide this permission, as they recognize the helpful intent of our efforts. It is said that it takes a village to raise a child. My experience is that within Divisions of Student Affairs the village is a very interactive one where students' well-being is our primary concern.

Within today's proceedings there is an elephant in the room; that is - the recent shooting at Virginia Tech University. What we must keep in mind is that this was one incident. Its proportions were greater and more tragic than we've ever witnessed on a university campus, but it was one incident. The frequency of a mentally disturbed student perpetrating senseless violence on a university campus can almost be counted on one hand. The Virginia Tech shooting does not bring our attention to large numbers of students falling through the cracks. In actuality, it was an extreme exception to the norm and as such it illustrates that University officials in collaboration with mental health professionals are doing an exceptional job managing those mentally ill students who do represent a threat to University communities.

### **Current Challenges**

The most obvious challenge faced by University counseling centers involves funding to adequately meet the increasing demand for mental health services across the country. Those resources currently available do allow us to be responsive to high need students. However this capacity is quite variable from one university to the next. Most university counseling staffs' are overworked. During peak times of the semester we all are barely able to keep up with the influx of new students. Furthermore, as long as resources are consumed with clinical treatment and case management, University counseling centers cannot do an adequate job with the preventative work of outreach and education. Most directors feel they are only scratching the surface with regard to the delivery of truly effective preventative educational services. More is needed.

Earlier I had discussed current available psychiatric resources. Six out of 10 Directors report that their university does fund the provision of psychiatric services on campus at an average of 22 psychiatric consultation hours per week. This still leaves 42% of universities without available on-campus psychiatric resources. Charlottesville, Virginia, the home of UVa, is a unique community. For a university town that has yet to become a bustling urban setting, we are fortunate to have many off-campus referral resources for students needing extended help. This is not the case for universities across the country. Nor is it the case that many students have the economic means to easily receive treatment within the private sector. There exists a large gap between universities' capacities to manage complex mental health issues and communities' capacities to receive and respond to the longer-term treatment needs of University students. This is an unacceptable state of affairs.

We are faced with the dilemma of how University communities can best work together to identify and manage those students with complex mental health needs. The issue of communication among campus officials pertaining to disturbed students is a complex one. Mental health licensing laws prohibit clinicians from communicating about patients without a signed release. To those who are not regularly engaged in mental health work, the limitations of patient confidentiality may seem frustrating and counterproductive. However, from the point of view of the patient, confidentiality is one of the salient factors that allow them to reach out in the first place. Students need to be able to express their most disturbing and frightening thoughts without fears of unwanted consequence. If students perceive confidentiality as permeable and easily dispensable, then large numbers will not come for help and our ability to protect the community will become further diminished. Confidentiality saves lives. Confidentiality doesn't place more lives at risk. Confidentiality is essential to good psychotherapy.

Having said that, it is clear that University officials also need to be able to communicate to one another, and sometimes with parents, when student threat of harm reaches a threshold where the University community is no longer safe. Here lies the rub.



FERPA or The Federal Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 is intended to protect the confidentiality of student records and define under what instance parents can have access to student information and grades. Access is given "in connection with an emergency, [to] appropriate persons if the knowledge of such information is necessary to protect the health or safety of the student or other persons." This definition is vague and left to the interpretations of individual universities. A more liberal interpretation which does allow for open communication of high-risk issues comes into direct conflict with mental health ethics and licensing codes pertaining to patient confidentiality. Unless "imminent danger" to self or others is at hand, then clinicians' capacities to communicate with other University personnel or even patients' families are limited. If and when we do choose to breach patient confidentiality in order to address issues of safety, then we risk violating mental health ethics and licensing codes. Essentially we are faced with circumstances where we are damned if we do and damned if we don't.

A similar limitation is seen where restrictions of HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) disallow communication between health care facilities and an educational institution. When a student is treated and released from a psychiatric hospital, a university has no way of receiving the student's discharge records without said records being released by the student. Continuity of care is impeded as is the university's ability to be informed of the vulnerabilities and special needs of particular students.

The complex interplay between students' right to confidentiality, University personnel's need to communicate, families inclusion in this communication and the inherent conflicts of our health care, educational, and confidentiality policies requires serious consideration and revision.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

Universities must be able to get ahead of the curve with resources devoted to the mental health needs of their students. The cost of University education is more than many families can bear. We cannot add to tuition or student fees as a solution.

In 2003 during the 108th Congress, Members of the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives introduced bi-partisan legislation that was designed to help centers on college

campuses that provide mental and behavioral health services meet the increasing needs of students. Provisions of this important legislation were included as part of the Garrett Lee Smith Memorial Act, a law named after Sen. Smith's son who committed suicide.

The Campus Suicide Prevention program exists now as a competitive grant program administered by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). Funded at \$5 million, it is a small program but one whose value has become more evident in the past few years. While the Campus Suicide Prevention program did integrate many of the important provisions of the Campus Care and Counseling Act, it did not provide the authority that would allow campus counseling centers to expand their staff, internship or residency slots -- an option that would ensure greater availability of clinical services. Further, the authorization of appropriations was capped at \$5 million.

The Campus Suicide Prevention program must receive an increase in appropriations. The use of funds must be broadened to allow centers to strengthen long term staffing and to expand training opportunities in internship and residency programs.

New funding for student outreach, education and prevention is absolutely necessary. We cannot remain in our offices providing outpatient treatment. We must join the academic community in teaching students about healthy lifestyles which are truly the strongest protective factors against depression and other mental illnesses.

Educational efforts must also extend to involve student peer connections. Students know students. They know when students are doing well and they typically know when they are not. We need to do a better job of partnering with students and utilizing their own awareness of their troubled friends in bringing those students to our attention and in facilitating their receipt of appropriate help.

The Legislature needs to attend to the important intersect of FERPA, HIPAA and confidentiality codes. Greater consistency between laws and policies is needed while also maintaining sharp focus upon that which is in the best interests of University students.

Within recent years we have also seen numerous initiatives and foundations created in response to the growing awareness of University mental health issues. Research endeavors and policy development initiatives such as those being conducted by the Association of University and College Counseling Center Directors (AUCCCD), the Jed Foundation, the National Research Consortium of Counseling Centers in Higher Education (University of Texas, Austin) and the Center for the Study of College Student Mental Health (Penn State University) are all essential to our understanding and response to University mental health issues. And we need more.

In closing I appreciate this Senate committee's attention to these pressing problems. We face urgent challenges and unmet needs. Our university students are our nation's future. We must insure they receive the help they need.

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23 April, 2007

**“Improving the Safety and Security of  
Schools and Campuses in the United States:  
What Can Be Done By the Federal  
Government?”**

TESTIMONY OF

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**Security on America's College Campuses**

**Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs  
United States Senate**

**23 April, 2007**

**Honorable Joseph L. Lieberman  
Chairman**

**Honorable Susan M. Collins  
Ranking Member**

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Senators:

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Committee as part of this expert panel. It is our collective hope to provide you with some insights and perspectives which may help your continuing deliberations and potential legislative strategies designed to make U.S. institutions of higher learning, and schools in general, be as safe and secure as possible.

And I want to say at the onset, and, if time permits, emphasize this again at the end of my remarks: American schools and campuses are by and large safe environments where millions of our children are secure and thriving. The heart-breaking disasters that rock our nation are, fortunately, rare. Still there are things that can be done to significantly reduce the possibility or the consequences of disasters on American campuses. And I realize that is why we are here today. Your leadership through this Committee and that of your colleagues in the Congress is crucial.

A few introductory thoughts:

#1 First, it should be pointed out that the recent tragedy in Virginia had a deeply unsettling impact on all Americans, and our hearts have gone out to the victims and their families for whom this event is virtually unbearable. Like the families who lost children in Columbine, Nickel Creek and the other sites of random and deadly violence, it is almost impossible for loved ones to imagine how and why an experience meant to be filled with learning, social and emotional growth and hopefulness about the future turns into an unspeakable nightmare.

And, having heard and read the news from Blacksburg while on a trip to Africa, I can also attest to the fact that the tragedy was inexplicable and heartbreaking to people well beyond American shores.

#2 Secondly, while all of us have ideas and proposals, none of us can, sadly enough, offer strategies that could unfailingly prevent tragedies such as the shootings at Virginia Tech. There are several reasons why absolute safety is virtually impossible. The first is that the spectrum and prevalence of severe emotional and psychiatric disorders is such that infallible screening and fail-safe interventions are not possible. And, secondly, the nature of schools, particularly colleges and universities is such that imposing air-tight security on a campus is profoundly antithetical to the nature, philosophy and reality of what is expected in the environment of higher education.

#3 My third introductory observation is that the concerns about campus security and safety, as we have heard today, range widely from the very rare mass murder committed by a highly deranged individual to campus fires and natural events such as hurricanes, earthquakes and tornados. Institutions need to have broad plans in place to respond to a variety of scenarios, under a preparedness doctrine we know as "all hazard".

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#4 Unfortunately, there is also the potential for tragedies on campus or in schools that we have not yet seen in the United States. I am referring here to the possibility that terrorists bent on causing overwhelming grief might deliberately target children in a school or on a college campus. These places are known as “soft targets” where access is relatively simple, absolute security virtually impossible and the potential for terror-induced, high degrees of societal-wide grief and reaction are assured.

In fact, the question of “children as targets of terrorism” was addressed at a national conference held at Columbia in the fall of 2005. Our concerns were driven by:

- A well-established history of terror organizations explicitly attacking children throughout history and in many parts of the world. In particular, we were painfully aware of the unspeakable 2004 attack on a school in Beslan, Russia where more than 150 children were slain before the perpetrators could be neutralized by authorities. Although this attack was clearly the work of Chechen rebels, there was a continuing suspicion that al Qaeda was somehow involved in the planning, if not the execution, of the assault. Our concern is, of course, that a Beslan-style attack on a U.S. school or campus cannot be dismissed as a potential future calamity, even though the potential is admittedly small.
- In late 2001, a planned attack on an American school in Singapore was thwarted by counter-terrorism officials.
- In the fall of 2004, an Iraqi insurgent captured in Bagdad was discovered to have had detailed plans and layouts of schools in five U.S. states.
- Many writings by al Qaeda leaders have spoken to the mandate to attack U.S. citizens in general and children in particular. Among the more notable – and chilling – examples of these threats was written by Sulieman Abu Gheith, a Bin Laden lieutenant, subsequently captured by coalition forces says the following: “We have not reached parity with [America]. We have the right to kill 4 million Americans, 2 million of them children...”

All of this suggests that the United States cannot afford to be sanguine about the dangers facing our children and young people. And we need to be sure that efforts to prevent, mitigate and respond to tragedies encompass a wide range of potential hazards. While there is much to be done, appropriate and effective strategies in terms of response, security and notification of student and staff can be applicable no matter what specific situation or event is unfolding. This is the concept of dual or multiple use protocols and procedures.

#5 My fifth observation is that improving the security of soft targets, including schools and college campuses, is a shared responsibility. In addition to important steps that should be considered by the federal government, local and state governments, school authorities, faculty and staff all have major responsibilities, as do students themselves as well as their families. The responsibility matrix is indeed complex, but necessary to understand if progress is to be made. The approach recommended by my colleagues and I at the

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National Center for Disaster Preparedness is based on organizing our thinking in three distinct functional categories of strategic proposals:

- Prevention
- Mitigation and response
- Recovery

In each of these categories it is useful to think about what would be the purview of the federal government, versus other levels of government, the institution itself or other sectors that might be essential such as law enforcement and emergency medical response capacity. For the purpose of this Hearing, I will focus on the potential strategies that might be considered by the federal government.

#### Prevention

The concept of prevention is the *sine qua non* of public health practice and the first priority in thinking about securing the safety of schools and campuses. Mitigation and response follows the failure or inability to prevent disasters. In some instances, prevention of hazards associated with disasters is, for all practical purposes, not possible. Major weather related events and earthquakes will fall into this category. Such instances aside, other disasters – such as campus fire emergencies – are generally preventable.

In terms of the availability of timely and appropriate mental health services, serious concerns are ubiquitous in the United States. The quantity and quality of evaluative services are spotty at best. And few schools or colleges have the consistent ability to intervene effectively, even if highly dangerous individuals are identified.

In terms of what might be considered *relatively* preventable, there are steps that can reduce, though not eliminate, the chance of shooting or terror-related disasters. And for these issues, the federal government has a number of important opportunities. Some examples:

- While the responsibility for responding to emotional and psychiatric concerns of students rests predominantly with campus staff and, to a certain extent, parents of affected students, there are serious and pervasive gaps in our knowledge about best practices to most effectively screen for disorders that can result in the most egregious consequences in terms of violence against oneself or others. Even if suspicions are appropriately aroused, access to reliable data supporting the most effective interventions remains a major challenge.
- Major discrepancies with respect to state, local and federal regulation of gun purchases have created serious gaps in the ability to interdict purchase of weapons by individuals with serious psychiatric problems, including those at higher risk of committing violent crimes. These legal and legislative loopholes in existing gun purchase regulations represent a significant threat to soft-target populations in

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schools, college campuses, hospitals, workplace environments and other public spaces.

- Substantial constraints prohibit institutions from contacting parents, regardless of great concerns about the welfare of “adult-age” students. These policies, as extended to extreme cases of psychiatric disturbance can be exceedingly dangerous to the individual, as well as the community at large.

Federal strategies to address these issues could potentially include:

- Calling for a federally sponsored national conference on the state of knowledge regarding identification and intervention strategies likely to most effective in the prevention of campus violence.
- A new research fund created explicitly for studying ways of improving the effectiveness of protocols to identify (a) potential perpetrators of deadly violence and (b) optimal intervention strategies.
- Ensuring that multi-agency, coordinated counter-intelligence strategies are in place to early identify evidence of potential threats against schools or universities by terrorist organizations.
- The Department of Education, working with national organizations, such as the American Council on Education, should be mandated to establish national standards of fire and disaster safety for potential hazards including fires and natural events. These can be regionally customized in terms of explicitly recognizing local or regional threats such as coastal storms, earthquakes and so forth.
- Introducing legislation to close critical loopholes in federal, state and local regulations with respect to gun purchase.
- Federal legislation to eliminate constraints regarding informing and engaging parents of young adults who pose a major threat to themselves or others. Two existing laws that should be revisited in the light of recent events are: (1) the Federal Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) – which currently allows parental reporting under certain circumstances is still seen as leaving institutions legally liable - and (2) the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), which bans parental reporting in the absence of a signed waiver by the student.

#### Mitigation and Response

Once a major, non-preventable disaster begins to unfold, the priority is clearly mitigation of harm to individuals to the extent possible. The effectiveness of such efforts is dependent upon optimal means of communication to students, faculty and staff, coordination among responders, appropriate interventions and availability of necessary medical response. All of this is predominantly the responsibility of the individual institutions and local responder organizations.

That said, it needs to be acknowledged that the quality of disaster preparedness across the nation’s schools and campuses is variable in the extreme. Furthermore, data establishing



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evidence-based best practices is generally lacking. Communities are essentially “on their own”, re-inventing (or not) protocols and doctrines for a range of hazards. Even when recommendations are made by national organizations or governmental agencies, it is unclear how much these guidelines are based on solid data. It is also challenging for many schools and universities to identify sufficient resources to ensure that such programs, even if effective, are actually implemented. Specific issues that require attention by campus safety officials include:

- Multi-agency, multi-sector disaster preparedness planning, including table-top and field exercises.
- Alarm and alert systems, including the utilization of new technologies to ensure rapid dissemination of critical information and communication with relevant agencies. Emergency cell phone text messaging systems and campus-wide public address systems are examples of potentially effective alert technologies deployed at some institutions already.
- Protocols for campus lock-downs and efficient coordination protocols among campus-based and local law enforcement and response agencies.
- Pre-existing and well-rehearsed plans for deployment of large-scale medical response that might be required in the event of a high casualty event.
- Education around identification and response to “new threats” such as chemical, biological or radiological threats whether from natural, accidental or intentionally induced sources.
- Disaster awareness programs for faculty, staff and students.

The federal government can support these efforts as follows:

- **Create a federal grants program to establish six to ten diverse model university and public school programs to identify and manage instances of potentially extreme violence. These models would be based on solid research methodologies and available for replication throughout the nation, covering all essential areas of disaster response, communications and mitigation strategies.**
- **Urge the Department of Justice to emphasize in the guidance accompanying DOJ grants to local law enforcement agencies the need for establishing explicit mutual aid agreements with university or college police departments in their communities. Restoration of full funding under the Community Oriented Policing Program (COPS) could be a particular benefit to these efforts.**

#### Recovery

Large-scale disasters involving civilian casualties are inevitably painful to families and local communities. When major disasters are thought to have been preventable or the result of deliberate acts of violence, either at the hand of a deranged loner or, perhaps even more horrifically, as the result of a planned terror attack, national grief is profoundly

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exacerbated. In the case of terrorism, the desired effect might well be achieved, i.e., societal-wide anger, fear and demoralization.

The process of recovering from the impact of serious disasters is multi-dimensional. But efforts to reduce the intensity and duration of impact on the general population are well worth considering. In part, this process has to do with the degree to which civilian populations are considered to be resilient, i.e., able to grieve, readjust, re-evaluate prevention or response strategies and, eventually, move on.

In a sense, every disaster should serve as an unanticipated test of prevention and response strategies and an opportunity to improve in all areas. Sometimes, in fact, major tragedies are referred to as “wake-up calls”. But too often, the “wake-up” is short-lived; lessons are not learned, questions not asked and challenges are not met. The events, and the extreme media attention associated with them, more resemble “snooze alarms”, since effective remediation and new, more perfected response or prevention strategies fail to appear. This reality clearly may exacerbate public anxiety, as well as loss of confidence in government. That being said, what can the federal government do to re-normalize citizen populations following a major disaster? Here are some suggestions for strategies that will help sustain confidence in government and improve resilience among the American people:

- **Communicate timely and appropriate concerns during and immediately following disasters.**
- **Ensure that needed federal response assets are available – if and when needed – in a timely and organized way to assist local agencies, officials and victims. These may include, as needed, support from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Department of Education (DOE) for counseling and mental health programs for local communities, including university and community responders in the aftermath of large-scale disasters.**
- **Ensure Congressional oversight and sustained efforts to continually improve prevention, mitigation and response strategies following major disasters.**

**Conclusion:**

Once again, it is an honor to appear before this Committee. I am sure I speak for the entire panel in expressing the sincere hope that these remarks and suggestions will be helpful to your continuing deliberations. And, finally, as I noted at the beginning of my remarks, parents and family members of our children in schools and colleges across the nation should be reminded that painful and heart-breaking tragedies such as those we have seen in Virginia, Pennsylvania, Colorado and other communities remain exceedingly rare. And, it is our hope that this hearing, others like it in Congress, follow-up legislation, as well as actions taken by the administration, local governments and at schools and universities everywhere will continue to improve our ability to prevent or respond effectively to tragedy, regardless of cause.

Thank you.

**Statement to the United States Senate  
Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs**

**April 30, 2007**

Submitted by  
Sheldon F. Greenberg, PH.D.  
Associate Dean, School of Education  
Director, Division of Public Safety Leadership  
Johns Hopkins University

It is an honor to submit the following statement concerning the safety and security of the nation's college and universities to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs. I am Associate Dean of the Johns Hopkins University School of Education and Director of the JHU Division of Public Safety Leadership. In this capacity and in my former positions as Associate Director of the Police Executive Research Forum and member of the command staff of the Howard County, Maryland, Police Department, I have been engaged in K-12 and university campus safety issues for over 20 years.

Two years ago, The Johns Hopkins University hosted the National Summit on Campus Safety, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. I was selected to write the Summit report and several subsequent documents addressing the crime, terror-related threat, and security-related challenges and vulnerabilities of concern to colleges and universities. The recent, tragic events at Virginia Tech University have brought new attention and a sense of urgency to these concerns.

The Virginia Tech shooting should be kept in perspective. It was a heinous act, but an aberration. Our 4,000 colleges and universities are among the safest locations in the nation, providing a haven to approximately 17 million students (data from National Center for Educational Statistics, 2005). While there is a need for a collective, national response, overreaction could cause undue fear and strip from our colleges and universities the peace, freedom, and sanctuary they provide. Measured response is essential.

There are significant differences in approaching safety and security in public schools (elementary, middle, and high) and college campuses. Since the Virginia Tech incident, many media, political, and government leaders have sought to link them. This is a mistake and disservice. Colleges and universities are unique environments. Excessive reference to Columbine and other K-12 incidents serves little purpose.

Public elementary and high schools are controlled environments in which students, teachers, and staff are compelled to follow rigid schedules; they are

present for only part of a day and few leave the confines of their building during school hours. Teachers get to know students well. Students and parents must accept support and intervention services. By contrast, college campuses are open environments. Students and faculty move freely, on and off campus, according to their needs. The campus is a temporary home to many students. Faculty members, particularly in large universities, do not know their students well. Students are adults and, as such, do not have to accept suggested support and intervention services.

While many issues on campus safety have emerged over the past few years, ten stand out that warrant immediate consideration in looking to the future. All of them existed prior to the tragedy at Virginia Tech.

1. There is no national center or institute dedicated to serving campus police and security agencies. No federal agency has embraced support of campus police and security operations as an ongoing priority. There are few national standards to guide campus police and security operations.
2. Campus security and police operations are highly fragmented. Security services are provided by full-service campus police departments, security departments with no police powers, private contractors, off-duty police officers from nearby agencies, and various combinations of these entities. There is no "one size fits all" security operation and there are no "one size fits all" solutions to security-related concerns on campuses.
3. Although FBI Director Mueller and others have identified colleges and universities as "soft targets", most have been slow to accept the needed changes and costs associated with increased security and homeland security.
4. Campus police and security agencies are not on an "equal playing field" with municipal police and sheriffs departments in competing for federal and state grants and technical assistance.
5. Allocation of resources by municipal and state police and sheriffs' agencies rarely considers the needs of college and university campuses, particularly in urban areas. Support by these police agencies for campus security is minimal, at best.
6. Colleges and universities are expansive centers of activity that foster and take pride in providing open, unrestricted environments. Target hardening (securing facilities with locks, barriers, sensors, and other physical security systems) on campuses is difficult. Many faculty members, administrators, students, and parents oppose a restricted environment and overreact to security restrictions as an imposition on personal and academic freedom.

No university, federal agency, or professional association is leading this complex and often emotional discussion toward a reasonable resolve.

7. Universities and colleges are not considered in many local and regional preparedness, response, and other homeland security planning activities.
8. Local, county, and state police officers generally are unaware of the potential risks, threats, and needs associated with campuses located in the areas in which they work. Many municipal and county police officers assume that there is greater prevention and response capability on campus than actually exists. As such, they disengage from patrolling on or near campuses.
9. Campuses are vulnerable. Securing chemicals, biologicals, radiologicals, and other potential targets in a highly accessible environment (many campus facilities are open 24 hours per day, seven days per week), creates a unique set of security concerns and risks. Special events (sports, lectures, protests, graduation, etc.) occur frequently and draw thousands of people to the nation's campuses, create potential targets.
10. Information and research on campus safety and security, including best practices, case studies, empirical data, and technology assessment, are lacking.

Virginia Tech was an "inside job." Students, faculty, staff, and others are granted liberty to move freely within the campus environment. Reasonable precaution must be taken, but no amount of security can protect fully against someone who has such access and independence.

The needed solutions to campus security issues go far beyond "active shooter" and "electronic warning" programs, funding more people, and allocating large amounts of money. The demand for "more" is a simple hue and cry that may not affect intended change.


A number of important steps can be taken to advance safety and security on the nation's campuses and, ultimately, improve the quality of life for all stakeholders. Many of these steps were identified in the National Summit Report published by the Department of Justice in 2005. The following selected recommendations are of particular interest to The Johns Hopkins University.

1. A national center for campus safety should be established to support the field, foster collaboration and interjurisdictional relationships, facilitate information sharing, and provide quality education. The Center will increase cooperation, collaboration, and consistency in prevention, response, and problem-solving methods among agencies and jurisdictions serving the nation's colleges and universities.

2. The Department of Justice and/or Department of Homeland Security should establish and sustain a National Advisory Panel on Campus Safety. The National Advisory Panel should be used in a consultation capacity to assist in defining issues and needs, setting goals, providing input from the field, and maintaining standards of excellence in matters related to campus safety.
3. Federal and state guidelines for grants and other funding to public safety agencies should be expanded to consider greater eligibility for campus police and security departments.
4. Allocating increased funding for research on campus public safety should be a priority of college and university administrators, state education and funding agencies, professional associations, private foundations, and the federal government.
5. All jurisdictions should be required to engage colleges and universities in prevention and response activities related to catastrophic events. The nation's college and university chiefs of police and security directors should be involved directly in planning and coordinating local, state, and federal response to homeland security and all hazards.
6. Federal agencies and professional associations should assist colleges and universities in finding new ways (policies, processes, technology, research, promising practices) to deal with the complex task of balancing traditional open campus environments with increased security.
7. Campus police and security operations should be a viable part of the nation's intelligence gathering, sharing, analysis, and application processes and should be incorporated in regional and national efforts to improve intelligence and intelligence analysis networks.

The Johns Hopkins University and its faculty, students, and staff would be honored to assist the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs in any way possible, as it continues its focus on the safety and security of the nation's colleges and universities.

Thank you for the opportunity to present this testimony.



Statement of

**Jeff and Debbie Shick, parents of David Shick, a student killed on campus**

On

**College Campus Safety**

Before

**The Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs**

April 23, 2007

#### **Our Story**

On February 18, 2000, two groups of Georgetown students were returning from a night on the town when they literally crossed paths. A shouting match ensued that quickly escalated into pushing and shoving. Our oldest son, David, was trying to break apart two students involved in the incident when a blind sided punch, thrown by another student, caught him squarely on the mouth. David fell backwards over a curb and cracked his head on the pavement. In the parking lot of the library at Georgetown University, only yards from his on-campus housing, he lay unconscious and bleeding severely from his head. He died four days later in the hospital, never having regained consciousness from the blunt force head trauma he had sustained.

Georgetown University held a closed disciplinary hearing the following summer and an appeal sometime in the fall. Georgetown agreed to release to us the outcome of the hearing and sanctions imposed only if we signed a confidentiality agreement that would prohibit us from sharing the information with anyone, including our other children and our parents. For almost two years we begged the University to share with our family the decision and sanctions imposed by the hearing board. After exhausting all avenues, we had no choice but to resort to civil litigation to obtain the information we so desperately needed to know.

David's assailant was found responsible for David's death. He was found responsible for assault with bodily injury, disturbing the peace, and alcohol violations by the student/faculty disciplinary hearing board. Upon appeal, his punishment was reduced to a warning, a ten-page reflection paper, and alcohol counseling. As an end result, he never missed a day of classes nor an athletic contest.

In order to obtain this information, we had to spend most of our life savings on legal fees. The lengthy battle to obtain the decision and sanctions also resulted in additional emotional strain. Subsequently, we went through mental and physical turmoil and eventually lost our jobs. Perhaps we would have been able to better deal with our grief if we did not have the additional stress of banging our heads against a wall of silence and/or indifference for so long.

All of this anguish could have been minimized by the release of information that we believe a victim has the right to know. Our family was and will always be victimized by a single act of violence. Georgetown kept the decision and sanctions imposed on the student responsible for our son's death from our family and the community under the pretense that federal laws prohibited disclosure.

### **The Law**

Expecting that Colleges and Universities would want to release this information, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) specifically states:

*(6) (A) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit an institution of postsecondary education from disclosing, to an alleged victim of any crime of violence (as that term is defined in section 16 of title 18), or a nonforcible sex offense, the final results of any disciplinary proceeding conducted by such institution against the alleged perpetrator of such crime or offense with respect to such crime or offense.*

*(B) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit an institution of postsecondary education from disclosing the final results of any disciplinary proceeding conducted by such institution against a student who is an alleged perpetrator of any crime of violence (as that term is defined in section 16 of title 18), or a nonforcible sex offense, if the institution determines as a result of that disciplinary proceeding that the student committed a violation of the institution's rules or policies with respect to such crime or offense.*

*(C) For the purpose of this paragraph, the final results of any disciplinary proceeding—*

- (i) shall include only the name of the student, the violation committed, and any sanction imposed by the institution on that student; and*
- (ii) may include the name of any other student, such as a victim or witness, only with the written consent of that other student (20 USC Sec. 1232g).*

However, because of the way it is worded, school officials use FERPA as justification for non-disclosure, noting that while it permits them to disclose this information, it does not require them to do so.

Since it was originally introduced in 2003, the "David Shick Honesty in Campus Justice Act" (H.R. 128) has sought to correct the problems our family faced following the death of our son. As is stated in the purpose of the bill, H.R. 128 will amend FERPA "to improve the access of the



victims of crimes to information concerning the outcome of disciplinary proceedings by institutions of higher education.”

H.R. 128 will close the loophole by striking “Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit an institution of postsecondary education from disclosing” and replacing it with “Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, an institution of postsecondary education shall disclose,” thus allowing victims to find out what action will be taken against their attacker.

It is important to note that H.R. 128 only applies to incidents of violent crimes and non-forcible sex offenses. Incidents of typical college mischief and youthful indiscretions will still be treated as confidential information. Additionally, should the perpetrator be found guilty, the majority of their academic records will still remain confidential, as is already the case under U.S. law. Only the perpetrator’s name, the violation committed, and any sanction/penalty imposed by the institution will be released to the victim or, should the case warrant it, the victim’s next of kin. H.R. 128 will not require the release of this information to any other parties.

We would like to thank the Committee for this opportunity to share our story. Please help us close the loophole in federal law that allows, but does not require, disclosure in cases of violent crime. Don't allow another family that finds itself in a similar situation to suffer our fate. If colleges and universities are required to disclose how they handle violent crime then maybe college campuses will be a little safer for all of our children.

Jeff and Debbie Shick reside in Long Valley, NJ. They can be contacted through their son, Matthew, at: <matthew.shick@gmail.com> or 202-258-5338.

# Ablechild.org

*Parents for Label and Drug Free Education*

April 20, 2007

Senator Joe Lieberman  
Chairman, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs  
340 Dirksen Senate Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Senator Susan Collins  
Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs  
340 Dirksen Senate Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senators Lieberman and Collins:

On October 10<sup>th</sup>, 2006, Mrs. Lisa Van Syckel, a parent's rights advocate for Ablechild and the New Jersey director for the International Coalition for Drug Awareness, was invited to attend the White House conference on school safety. Mrs. Van Syckel presented the panel with information regarding the link between psychiatric drugs and acts of school violence, citing the Food and Drug Administration's Medwatch guides as well as international drug regulatory agencies which have issued warnings on the potential for antidepressants and other psychiatric drugs to induce acts of violence. Mrs. Van Syckel worked with victims of the Columbine massacre and other incidents of violence where the killer was under the influence of psychiatric drugs at the time of the killings, and called on the panel to investigate the role of these medications. After presenting, Attorney General Gonzales requested that Mrs. Van Syckel provide additional information regarding the link between psychotropic drugs and school violence.

In October 2006, Mrs. VanSyckel and others provided Attorney General Gonzales with documents confirming the suicide and violence inducing nature of antidepressants and other psychiatric drugs.

On October 17, 2006 Attorney Derek Braslow sent a letter to Attorney General Gonzales on behalf of Mrs. Van Syckel, documenting thirteen cases of school violence while the perpetrator was on psychotropic drugs. Ten of those cases involved antidepressants.

On October 20, 2006 Attorney General Gonzales wrote a letter to Ms. VanSyckel informing her that he has referred the matter to Secretary Mike Leavitt of Health and Human Services. Despite the forwarded letter from Attorney General Gonzales and repeated phone calls from Mrs. Van Syckel, Secretary Leavitt did not respond.

On October 25, 2006 Harvard trained psychiatrist Stefan Kruszewski wrote to Attorney General Gonzales referencing the school violence phenomenon as it relates to the perpetrator's use of antidepressants. In that letter, he stated that the evidence would be

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**Parents for Label and Drug Free Education**

satisfy Daubert rules of evidence production which validates the violent risk potential associated with antidepressant use.

To date Secretary Leavitt has not responded.

Had Secretary Leavitt investigated the link as defined herein, the massacre at Virginia Tech may have been avoided. It is incumbent upon the Secretary of Health and Human Services to insure that the pharmaceutical products approved by the FDA not cause a national crisis of unprecedented violence in our schools.

Since the Virginia Tech massacre, more than 2,500 letters from constituents across the country have been sent to members of Congress urging them to investigate the role of psychiatric drugs relating to school violence. It is time for Congress to formally investigate the link between psychiatric drugs and violence.

Respectfully,

Sheila Matthews  
National Vice President and Co-Founder

Cc: Senator Carl Levin  
Senator Ted Stevens  
Senator Daniel K. Akaka  
Senator George V. Voinovich  
Senator Thomas R. Carper  
Senator Norm Coleman  
Senator Mark L. Pryor  
Senator Tom Coburn  
Senator Mary L. Landrieu  
Senator Pete Domenici  
Senator Barack Obama  
Senator John Warner  
Senator Claire McCaskill  
Senator John Sununu  
Senator Jon Tester

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DEREK T. BRASLOW, ESQ.  
 dbraslow@pogustbraslow.com

October 17, 2006

**VIA FACSIMILE ONLY (202) 307-2825**

The Honorable Alberto Gonzales  
 Attorney General  
 Department of Justice  
 950 Pennsylvania Ave., NW  
 Washington D.C., 20530-0001

**RE: Lisa Van Syckel Meeting on Antidepressants and School Violence**

Dear Mr. Attorney General,

Last week you spoke with our client Lisa Van Syckel at your one day summit on school violence and requested that she contact you to set up a personal meeting. As you may recall, Lisa is the mother of a child who became violent and attempted suicide while taking an antidepressant. I represented Lisa in the lawsuit against the manufacturer of the antidepressant that injured her child and continue to represent those injured due to violence as a result of ingesting these dangerous medications. Since the resolution of Lisa's suit, she has become a strong advocate for patient and physician rights in fighting for the disclosure of the risks of antidepressant medication.

As Lisa began to explain to you at the meeting, studies have linked antidepressant medication to violence, and at least 10 school shooters since 1998 were under the influence of antidepressant drugs.

- May 20, 1988: Winnetka, Illinois: Laurie Dann walked into a second grade classroom and killed one child and wounded five others before killing herself. The antidepressant Anafranil was in her bloodstream at the time of the murder.
- September 26, 1988: Greenwood, South Carolina: 19-year-old James Wilson took a .22 caliber revolver into an elementary school and killed two 8-year-old girls and wounded seven other children and two teachers. He had been on several psychiatric drugs, including Xanax and Haldol.
- January 17, 1989: Stockton, California: Patrick Purdy opened fire on a school yard full of young children, killing five schoolchildren and wounding thirty others before killing himself. Purdy had been on two strong psychiatric drugs.
- December 1993: Chelsea, Michigan: Steven Leith walked back into a school meeting and fatally shot the school superintendent and wounded two others including a fellow teacher. He was on Prozac at the time of the shootings.


The Honorable Alberto Gonzales  
 October 17, 2006  
 Page 2 of 2

- May 21, 1998: Springfield, Oregon: 15-year-old Kip Kinkel murdered his own parents and then proceeded to school where he opened fire on students in the cafeteria, killing two and wounding 22. Kinkel had been on Prozac.
- April 16, 1999: Notus, Idaho: 15-year-old Shawn Cooper fired two shotgun rounds in his school narrowly missing students; he was taking a mix of antidepressants.
- April 20, 1999: Columbine, Colorado: 18-year-old Eric Harris was on the antidepressant Luvox when he and his partner Dylan Klebold killed twelve classmates and a teacher before taking his own life in the bloodiest school massacre in history. The coroner confirmed that the antidepressant was in his system while Dylan Klebold's autopsy was never made public.
- April 29 1999: Taber, Alberta: 14 year old boy shot two children, killing one. He was taking Dexadrine.
- May 20, 1999: Conyers, Georgia: 15-year-old T.J. Solomon was being treated with a mix of antidepressants when he opened fire on and wounded 6 of his classmates.
- March 7, 2000: Williamsport, Pennsylvania: 14-year-old Elizabeth Bush was on the antidepressant Prozac when she shot at fellow students, wounding one.
- March 22, 2001: El Cajon, California: 18-year-old Jason Hoffman was on two antidepressants, Effexor and Celexa, when he opened fire at his California high school wounding five.
- April 10, 2001: Wapluke, Washington: 16-year-old Cory Baadsgaard took a rifle to his high school, and held 23 classmates and a teacher hostage while on a high dose of the antidepressant Effexor.
- March 21, 2005: Red Lake Indian Reservation, Minnesota: 16-year-old Native American Jeff Weise, reportedly under the influence of the antidepressant Prozac, went on a shooting rampage at home and at his school, killing nine people and wounding five before committing suicide.

These are but a few of the cases that have been made public and while you may be familiar with risks of suicide and antidepressants because the FDA has formally concluded that a causal relationship exists, just last month a new study published in the Public Library of Science ("PLOS"), reports that in addition to suicide, these antidepressant drugs can also cause some people to become violent and homicidal.<sup>1</sup> This is the latest of numerous studies over the course of last decade that have reached the same conclusion. These drugs not only cause self-harm but cause homicide.

Thank you for your time, and we look forward to meeting with you.

Sincerely,



Derek T. Braslow, Esq.

cc: Lisa Van Syckel

<sup>1</sup> See <http://medicine.plosjournals.org/perlserv/?request=get-document&doi=10.1371/journal.pmed.0030372>



**The Attorney General**  
Washington, D.C.

October 20, 2006


Lisa Van Syckel  
5 Mills Court  
Flemington, N.J. 08822

Dear Ms. Van Syckel:

This letter is to follow-up on our brief exchange last week at the Conference on School Safety which Secretary Spellings and I convened at the President's request to discuss how Federal, State, and local governments can work together with schools, communities, and families to help ensure our schools are safe places for students to learn. I appreciate your interest in this area, and I am glad that you were able to participate in last week's Conference.

I have forwarded the materials you provided me regarding the affect of anti-depressants on youths to Secretary Mike Leavitt at the Department of Health and Human Services, which is the appropriate federal agency to consider the issues you have raised.

Sincerely,

  
Alberto R. Gonzales

Enclosure



**The Attorney General**  
Washington, D.C.

October 20, 2006

The Honorable Mike Leavitt  
Department of Health and Human Services  
200 Independence Ave. S.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20201

Dear Secretary Leavitt:

As you know, at the request of the President, Secretary Spellings and I convened a Conference on School Safety to discuss how Federal, State, and local governments can work together with schools, communities, and families to help ensure our schools are safe places for students to learn. During the event, I had a brief discussion with Ms. Lisa Van Syckel, who provided me with materials on the affect of anti-depressants on youths. I informed Ms. Van Syckel that I would pass along her information to you. I trust that your office will review the enclosed materials.

I appreciate your consideration of this matter.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "A. Gonzales".

Alberto R. Gonzales

Enclosures

**STEFAN P. KRUSZEWSKI, M.D.**  
732 Forest Road  
Harrisburg, PA 17112

October 25, 2006

**VIA FAX (202) 307-2825  
AND U.S. MAIL**

Hon. Alberto Gonzales  
Attorney General for the United States  
Department of Justice  
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
Washington, DC 20530-0001

Dear Attorney General Gonzales:

I am writing in support of comments to be shared by Lisa Van Syckel and her attorney, Derek T. Braslow. I understand you will be meeting with them to hear their concerns about the use of antidepressants and the potential for violence. I am writing as a concerned Princeton and Harvard-trained Board-certified psychiatrist, who is an advocate for patient rights, clinical research transparency and the recognition of conflicts of interest in academic and clinical medicine. I am a mainstream psychiatric practitioner concerned with judicious use of psychotropic medications across all age groups. Although a vocal contributing member of numerous organizations, including the American Psychiatric Association, the comments I share are my own.

On 17 October 2006, Derek Braslow faxed you a letter regarding "Lisa Van Syckel meeting on antidepressants and school violence." I would like to make two comments in support of that letter. I believe these comments are timely and represent critical issues facing neuropsychiatric medicine specifically, and clinical medicine in general

**Informed Consent Demands Transparency**

In 2004, all antidepressants were mandated by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to contain black box warnings regarding the potential for suicidal risks. I was present in Bethesda in the second of two advisory committee meetings to advocate for this labeling change. In my opinion, the labeling change was essential because, prior to it, significant risks associated with antidepressants had been recognized by manufacturers, but went unreported.



The issue of non-transparency is compelling. Neither patients nor physicians can accurately assess the risks and benefits of any medicine if the pharmaceutical manufacturers and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration do not work together to ensure that all information is transparent and readily available. This issue was starkly illustrated by New York Attorney General Elliot Spitzer in his discovery regarding suppression of negative clinical trial data in regard to Paxil. In your position as the most authoritative spokesperson for American jurisprudence, you must share the opinion that informed decision-making, drug prescribing and consent to treatment can only occur when all information pertaining to a pharmaceutical is available and understood: communicated in a readily open manner.

**Daubert Evidentiary Assessment would Confirm Violent Risk Potential**

Braslow's letter elaborated 13 cases where antidepressants emerged as a possible associative or causative agent in the induction of violence and aggression. This is important. Scientific analysis would be required to confirm an epidemiologically-based and statistically valid causal relationship between these 13 cases and the resultant violence. However, there is a neurobiochemical explanation that underscores the association between antidepressant medication and the risk of activation and aggressive acting out, including homicide. This information, in fact, would satisfy Daubert rules of evidence production since it is based upon substantial and accepted peer-reviewed scientific literature that underscores the pharmacodynamics, pharmacokinetics and psychophysiological sequelae of antidepressant treatment.

It is my opinion, shared by others but minimized by manufacturers of antidepressants, that these drugs can increase the risk of suicide, violence and aggressive acting out due to predictable neurochemical changes in the human central nervous system. It is also my opinion that the public, including the physicians who prescribe these medicines, have not been adequately warned about this known risk.

I would be delighted to speak with you about the risk/benefit profile of antidepressants. Separately, I have included my contact information and stand ready and able to articulate these problems in any forum helpful to the U.S. Department of Justice.

Sincerely,

Stefan P. Kruszewski, M.D.

cc: Lisa Van Syckel  
Derek T. Braslow, Esq.

**International Association of Campus  
Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA)**

**Responses to Questions for the Record**

**Submitted to Steven J. Healy**

**From Senator Mark L. Pryor**

**June 4, 2007**

- 1. The American Association of State Colleges and Universities publishes a brochure entitled, "Addressing the Challenges of Campus Security," with suggestions for improving physical security and restricting access to vulnerable facilities.**
  - a. What percentage of college campuses around the country do you estimate use these or similar standards in creating their campus security plans?**
  - b. Do you think it would be helpful to issue and mandate federal guidelines for campus security or would this impede individual campuses' abilities to respond to the threats unique to their campuses?**

**IACLEA Response**

In 2005, IACLEA published in printed form and on its web site a Threat & Risk Assessment Tool called the Campus Preparedness Assessment Manual. IACLEA developed this Manual in cooperation with the National Emergency Response and Rescue Training Center (NRRTC), Texas Engineering Extension Service (TEEX), at Texas A&M University, with support from a U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) grant. The Manual outlines a process for public safety professionals, campus facility managers, administrators, and other emergency responders to perform a threat and vulnerability assessment on their campus, including a site survey of facilities, and to implement solutions identified during the process to enhance security and improve preparedness for a WMD event. Although not designed as an assessment tool to protect against a lone rampage shooter, this instrument, if implemented successfully, would strengthen campuses against any type of man-made hazard.

A recent survey conducted in the fall of 2006 by IACLEA included questions about domestic preparedness. According to the survey results, nearly 30 percent of respondents said they have conducted a formal weapons of mass destruction threat and risk assessment. Half of the survey respondents said they were aware of IACLEA's grant-supported Campus Preparedness Assessment Manual and

more than 80 percent said they planned to download the Manual from the IACLEA web site. About two-thirds said they plan to conduct a formal threat and risk assessment.

With regard to the question about issuing and mandating federal guidelines for campus security, IACLEA believes the federal government must be extremely careful about mandates, especially ones that place additional responsibilities and requirements upon colleges and universities without providing adequate resources. IACLEA has a diverse membership that includes sworn and non-sworn agencies, public and private colleges and universities, two-year and four-year institutions, and colleges that opt for contract security forces. Each campus is unique and has its own characteristics. A "one size fits all" approach will not work with regard to campus security standards. Rather than attempting to mandate a set of uniform standards that may not work for some colleges and universities, IACLEA would instead encourage institutions to seek Accreditation under IACLEA's Accreditation program or that offered by the Commission on Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) or both. Accreditation by a certified accrediting body is the best way for a campus public safety department to assure parents and consumers that it adheres to the highest standards of professionalism and training.

**2. Primary and secondary school students are required to participate in all-hazards emergency drills.**

- a. Are college campuses required to run these drills in preparation for emergency situations? How often?**
- b. Do campus police participate in simulation exercises with state and local police forces in order to understand the chain of command and authority in a crisis situation? How often?**

**IACLEA Response**

Colleges and university students are generally not required to participate in all-hazards drills, although requirements vary by state and institution. Some colleges and universities conduct regular exercises in preparation for emergency situations and some of these drills utilize student volunteers as first responders or as "victims." According to the results of the 2006 IACLEA member needs assessment survey, more than 80% of IACLEA members have a multi-hazard emergency response plan. Of this group, more than one-third has a "weapons of mass destruction (WMD)" annex to their plan and nearly 60% conduct exercises of their multi-hazard emergency response plans.

In response to the second part of the question regarding participation in simulation exercises with state and local police forces, IACLEA offers a free Incident Command System (ICS) course under its DHS grant that includes

classroom instruction on the National Incident Management System (NIMS), ICS and Unified Command, case studies, and simulation exercises using a model campus simulator. IACLEA is permitted to fill up to 50% of the seats in each class with non-campus emergency responders. This allows campus emergency responders to train with their local mutual aid partners. More than 700 command-level emergency responders have completed this course in its first year of operation and IACLEA has expanded the program with a Mobile ICS component to make this course available to campuses in all regions of the U.S.

The survey results also found that 71% of those who responded use the Incident Command System to manage critical incidents and/or major events.

**3. What is the nature of the relationship between campus police and local city/municipal police forces? Are campus police forces allowed to carry weapons? Are they allowed to use these weapons in the same situations that local, state, and federal police are or are they governed by different procedures?**

**IACLEA Response**

IACLEA encourages campus public safety agencies to establish close working relationships with local and state law enforcement and emergency response agencies. Many of our member institutions have close working relationships with their local law enforcement agencies. Under its DHS grant, IACLEA has developed a Guide to Strengthened Communications between Campus Public Safety Departments and Federal-State-Local Emergency Response Agencies.

One of the chief recommendations in this Guide is for campus public safety agencies to “develop mutual aid agreements and/or memoranda of understanding in cooperation with local law enforcement and other emergency response agencies.” Another recommendation urges campus public safety agencies to “train and conduct exercises to validate, enhance, or improve all procedures resulting from developed mutual aid agreements and/or memoranda of understanding.”

According to the 2006 survey, 62.1% of respondents reported their institution participates in a mutual aid agreement with local emergency response agencies, 25.5 % participate in such an agreement with state agencies, and 22.4% participate in mutual aid agreements with other educational institutions.

Another key finding of the survey was that 91.3% of those who responded reported that they meet with other local agencies for emergency planning and information sharing.

With regard to arming campus public safety officers, the decision whether to arm campus police officers usually is made at the institutional level, in the absence of

a governmental mandate. Our official IACLEA position, established in 1990, recommends that institutions that have sworn campus police officers arm those officers to ensure effective responses to a range of incidents on campus.

Institutions that authorize their officers to carry weapons generally establish their own policies for use of force and align them with state policies.

IACLEA would be happy to respond to any questions or provide additional information regarding these matters.

Please feel free to contact IACLEA staff at (860) 586-7517.

Steven J. Healy  
President

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record  
Submitted to Irwin Redlener, M.D.  
From Senator Mark L. Pryor

"Security on America's College Campuses"  
April 23, 2007

1. What is the normal procedure for dealing with a student that faculty, administrators, or other students have identified as of questionable mental health? Are there circumstances under which parents or other emergency contacts are contacted?

There is a wide range of policies and procedures practiced on campuses across the U.S. To my knowledge, no standards exist, although privacy of medical records is a generally strictly adhered to. Once a student is no longer a "minor", parents may only be contacted with the student's permission. The Federal Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) restrict universities from telling parents about challenges that students are having in school (like if there are suicidal or are abusing alcohol or drugs). FERPA does allow colleges to release information without student permission in cases of "health and safety emergencies" (very vaguely defined in the text), but because of the fear of liability exposure many universities have hesitated to go down that road. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) currently protects the healthcare information of students and their privacy, thereby banning disclosure of any potential mental-health problems, even to family members, without a signed waiver from the student.

It is important to recognize that in most jurisdictions, a police officer or a physician can mandate a psychiatric evaluation and involuntary hold be placed on an adult or child if they pose an imminent risk to their own or someone else's safety. This does not include parental notification for those over 18.

2. What do you believe would be the best and most comprehensive way to increase mental health and mental health awareness on college campuses?

Every campus should have programs that make mental health assessment and management services available on site. Campus wide strategies should be developed to (a) increase awareness to and reduce the stigma of mental illness and stress-related disorders; (b) improve awareness of "danger signals" that indicate the possibility of serious trouble that should be reported, even anonymously, to school authorities; (c) ensure that appropriate mental health services are available to any student who desires or needs such care; and (d) facilitate an appropriate, anonymous system for the reporting and immediate investigation of anyone on campus who appears to pose even a *potential* risk to themselves or others due to either a mental health condition or who is exhibiting any of the warning signs of future violent behavior. It is important to realize that these are not automatically one and the same. Students need an option other than "911" to make this notification. One effective model to consider could be the "311" system in New York City-- an effort to

put all non-emergency calls for government services through an easy to remember but non-emergency number. The "311" operators can refer a caller to the appropriate references quickly, but without the consequences of activating a police, fire, and/or EMS response.

Reference: [http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac/ssi\\_final\\_report.pdf](http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac/ssi_final_report.pdf)

Reference: [http://www.nyc.gov/html/doitt/html/about/about\\_311.shtml](http://www.nyc.gov/html/doitt/html/about/about_311.shtml)

**3. Primary and secondary school students are required to participate in all-hazards emergency drills.**

**a) Are college campuses required to run these drills in preparation for emergency situations? How often?**

While many colleges do conduct drills, there is no federal requirement that to do so. In fact, the K-12 schools only conduct them because of state laws which actually vary to a certain degree across the country. Apart from fire drills which may be mandated by local jurisdiction, it is uncommon for colleges and universities to conduct other types of exercises that involve students and preparing them for emergencies.

**b) Do campus police participate in simulation exercises with state and local police forces in order to understand the chain of command and authority in a crisis situation? How often?**

As far as I know, there is no comprehensive survey of what is done on campuses throughout the nation. With recent federal and state government promoting the importance of ICS and NIMS training, such programs should be integrated into every campus' all hazard emergency response plan. The bottom-line is that there are far too few good examples of effective joint training involving campus security officials with local agencies. There is occasionally a tension between campus policing authorities and the surrounding state and local law enforcement assets on a day-to-day basis which may impede routine but essential integrated training. As the likely first responders to any emergency, campus authorities must be provided adequate training and equipment to initially manage any situation, regardless of the scope or severity. This involves drilling with the integration of off-campus responders.

**c) Do you think college campuses are taking proper precautions for pandemic flu or other contagious diseases that would be disastrous for college campuses where students are on the go and live in close proximity? How can colleges and universities better prepare for this contingency?**

It is essential that colleges and universities develop disaster contingency plans that include all-hazards and potential threats, including pandemics and bioterrorism. There are currently many sources of information and expertise

which can assist colleges in such endeavors. These would include my own National Center for Disaster Preparedness at Columbia University's Mailman School of Public Health. The campus environment poses many unique twists on the same issues that all communities are facing surrounding pandemic influenza--such as the willingness of officials to work during an incident, and uncertainty as to how the community will respond to information put forth by school officials. The development of campus-specific plans for issues such as pandemic flu are still a work in progress due to the many unanswered questions--an effort being put forth by the CDC and the CDC-funded Centers for Public Health Preparedness. Finalizing these plans is difficult for the same reasons that planning for the general population is challenging-- a lack of reliable information surrounding issues such as what type of precautions will be most effective, what will be the role of quarantine and isolation, and how will the community respond to the projected medical needs of the public.



**Post-Hearing Questions for the Record  
Submitted to W. Roger Webb  
From Senator Mark L. Pryor**

**“Security on America’s College Campuses”  
Monday, April 23, 2007**

1. The American Association of State Colleges and Universities publishes a brochure entitled “Addressing the Challenges of Campus Security,” with suggestions for improving physical security and restricting access to vulnerable facilities.

a) What percentage of college campuses around the country do you estimate use these or similar standards in creating their campus security plans?

Like many other areas, security plans can develop incrementally or result from wholesale changes following a change in leadership or after a significant event (VT). How many schools use standards issued by “authorities” is impossible to quantify. It is safe to say that most should examine standards and best practices of others when developing security plans. I highly recommend the standards suggested by the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA).

b) Do you think it would be helpful to issue and mandate federal guidelines for campus security or would this impede individual campuses’ abilities to respond to the threats unique to their campuses?

Recommendations articulating areas of concern, responses, tools, etc. would be helpful if it was in the form of a checklist. Mandating a plan that follows federal guidelines would create challenges in meeting the needs of each campus community, potentially increase cost and consume personnel resources. Conversely, some institutions will not make proper preparations unless they are required to do so. This might be an area where individual states may be in the best position to implement “requirements” following a federal model that allows for great flexibility but covers the core issues.

2. How do campus emergency alert and notification systems differ across campuses? Do criteria for when to send out alert and notification messages to students exist? If so, what are they? Has any effort be made to use new media technologies (cell phones, blackberries, I-pods, MP-3 players, etc.) for emergency notification purposes?

Campuses across the country rely on varying levels of systems. These are dependent upon demand, budget, and needs assessment. Comprehensive systems that contact students through voice, text, e-mail, and possibly video are becoming the standard. Additionally, integrated systems which use fire alarm panels, intercom systems, and other infrastructure are becoming available to campuses. Many campuses have, or are planning to implement mass notification systems. Each campus is unique both in terms of its community members as well as its geography and the right combination of programs and systems is different for each campus. Comprehensive voice/text/e-mail systems are becoming standard tools. When to activate individual systems will vary from campus to campus. Using these systems for purposes of promoting athletic events, academic activities or campus arts programs will undermine their effectiveness. Campus administrators should rely on these systems only when they have a valid safety or

security issue that needs to be communicated. In most cases the most common use will be in response to impacts to campus operations from severe weather or winter weather conditions. Periodic tests of the system should be performed as well, but these need to be limited.

3. What is the nature of the relationship between campus police and local city/municipal police forces? Are campus police forces allowed to carry weapons? Are they allowed to use these weapons in the same situations that local, state, and federal police are or do they governed by different procedures?

The quality of relationships between city and campus police forces varies from campus to campus, but is critical to the overall safety of each community. Strong emphasis should be placed on establishing partnerships, policies, cooperative training and communications capabilities between local, state and federal law enforcement agencies.

If a campus maintains a “police” department as opposed to a “security” office, it is likely that the officers are properly certified by their state governing entities and that they carry handguns and other forms of firearms on a daily basis. The laws regulating their use are no different than what would be expected of a municipal police department.

Many colleges and universities, even some large institutions, have only a “security” force that does not carry weapons. Some employ armed guards like neighborhood patrols. Most often these are employees who are not commissioned or certified by attendance at a state sponsored/approved police academy. In this case, the use of those firearms is also regulated by federal and state laws. Campuses that maintain security offices must rely on their municipal police agency or county police agency for law enforcement services.