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**PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS:
A CASE FOR INTERAGENCY NATIONAL
SECURITY REFORM?**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS: A CASE FOR INTERAGENCY NATIONAL SECURITY REFORM?

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**PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS: A CASE FOR
INTERAGENCY NATIONAL SECURITY REFORM?**

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE,
Washington, DC, Thursday, February 14, 2008.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:05 p.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vic Snyder (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VIC SNYDER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARKANSAS, CHAIRMAN, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Dr. SNYDER. We will go ahead and start. Mr. Akin is on his way and said it is okay for us to start without him.

Again, I want to apologize for what occurred. It is just the nature of our legislative body that sometimes happens.

Your written statements, including the statement of Ambassador Mull, who we knew had to leave—when we originally were planning to start here at 2:00, we knew he had to leave by 4:00, but all of your written statements—I think three of you have written statements—will be made of the record.

When we are concluded, there may be members that will want to ask you questions for the record. We may want to do that.

But mainly we want to continue this discussion on how to do things better in these conflicts that we find ourselves in now and will find ourselves in in the future, and this subcommittee for the last several months has been looking at the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) which has led to a lot of discussions about the relationships between the different agencies of government, not just the military ones, as you know, but State and the Agency for International Development (USAID) and others.

And the staff here have heard me say several times one of my constituents from back home, who is a civilian in Iraq today, sent me an e-mail some months ago that was asking about this, and she said, “I sometimes think that the differences in conflicts between our agency and other agencies of the U.S. Government are greater than the differences between us and the Iraqis,” which I think brought home some of the challenges that we have.

I also wanted to indicate that Mr. Tierney from the Government Oversight and Reform Committee has had some hearings on these issues. He is aware of and his staff are aware of what is going on here. Sam Farr on the Appropriations Committee has the bill on the Civilian Reserve Corps and has attended hearings. He is inter-

ested in this and has attended hearings before. Mr. Delahunt and I have already talked about doing joint hearings together on this.

So there is some growing interest in this congressional body working across the different committees and subcommittees, and you all are part of that today, having both represented the State Department and the Department of Defense (DOD).

And so what we will do is—should we begin with Secretary Henry and then—

Let us have your opening statement. We will put this five-minute clock on you. The red light, if it goes off, means at the end of five minutes, if you have other things to say, you keep going, but it is just for your indication of when five minutes will have passed.

So Secretary Henry.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Snyder can be found in the Appendix on page 23.]

STATEMENTS OF RYAN HENRY, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; BARRY PAVEL, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS, LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT AND INTERDEPENDENT CAPABILITIES, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; MICHAEL HESS, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR OF THE BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

STATEMENT OF RYAN HENRY

Secretary HENRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, actually, we generally are pleased to be here. You know, a lot of times over at the executive branch, we scratch our heads and say, “Why doesn’t Congress ever hold hearings on things that are really important, you know, where we need to work together?” and this is one area that is quite important to us and the Department of Defense, and so we appreciate your interest in this area, and we want to do what we can to be supportive.

I have submitted a written statement for the record, as you mentioned, and ask that it be entered, so I will just make a few opening remarks.

Current and future adversaries are and will seek to exploit the seams in our society and our government, and they are presenting fundamentally new challenges to our post-Cold War governmental organization and structure, as you pointed out. The key to the future success will be our ability to adapt and respond more rapidly, creatively, and coherently than our enemies do.

Today’s government architecture, both the executive and, perhaps to a lesser extent, the legislative is beginning to reflect the growing recognition that the U.S. national security should not rely on the use of military power at the expense of a coordinated whole-of-government capability. Responding effectively to emerging threats in the international security environment will be a function of post-9/11 adaptation across the entire government.

I would like to highlight three areas in which we are growing from lessons learned during our activities in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere in Operation Enduring Freedom to inform our needed

changes, and the three areas are in the area of capacity, planning, and operating.

First, the key adaptation is the development of a robust civilian capacity and capabilities to address emerging security challenges. As you may be aware, Secretary Gates has spoken recently about the need to increase the government's investment in nonmilitary capability and capacity, and his thinking is echoed by all elements of the Defense Department, both military and civilian. DOD supports the State Department's Civilian Stabilization Initiative and H.R. 1084, which will provide trained, equipped, and mission-ready civilian experts that we need to partner with, both inside the beltway, at regional headquarters, and as boots on the ground, thereby reducing the burden on our soldiers, sailors and airmen.

The second key adaptation will be the development of a whole-of-government planning capability. DOD is a key player in advancing this effort, including our participation in the development of a strategic planning process for combating terrorism, security, stability, and transition reconstruction operations, and in the area of, also, homeland security, working with our partners in the executive branch.

Two recent initiatives of Congress and this Administration have fostered such an integrating planning effort at the programmatic level. Correspondingly, we urge Congress to reauthorize and expand the critical authorities previously that we have been able to use in what we refer to as Section 1206, which is the Global Train and Equip authorities that we have been given, and Section 1207, which is the Security and Stabilization Assistance, and these are part of a larger package that we presented last year and will present again this year under a Building Global Partnership Act from the Administration.

A third key adaptation is in the development of integrated and civilian military operational structures and mechanisms that can further support interagency cooperation. The department is engaged through the National Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44) implementation and the development of operational models for improved civil-military integration in the planning and operation during crises.

But in addition, with the establishment of African Command (AFRICOM) and the reorganization of our Southern Command, we think that this is heralding a new way forward for interagency operations at the regional and tactical level, and they highlight the critical role that civilian agencies play in the activities of our combatant and unified commands in improving our steady-state security cooperation in critical countries and regions.

Additionally, internally, DOD is adapting our approach to these security challenges by moving away from simply contingency planning and moving more to what we refer to as campaign planning and looking at the steady-state conditions and peacetime—or what we refer to as Phase Zero conditions—and putting our emphasis on those and then including the contingencies as branches and sequels to that broader planning effort.

DOD is focusing more effort in military planning on robust, steady-state planning to better align our security cooperation and shaping activities with national security goals, and the department

is working further to expand our integration with civilian agencies during this entire planning process. Through these improved capacity and integrated planning and operations efforts, our government will be better poised to execute the bureaucratic boundary-spanning activities needed to respond effectively to the changing national security environment.

Congressional engagement in this activity at the national security architecture level is also critical, and that is why we welcome so much these hearings and look forward to the opportunity to cooperate with this committee and other parts of Congress in raising these issues. We are very certain that we do not have all the answers. We are coming, we think, to a fairly good understanding of some of the problem sets, and so we, again, look forward to working with you on coming up with what some of the solutions might be.

And with that, I will turn it over to the others and then look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Henry can be found in the Appendix on page 32.]

Dr. SNYDER. If you will just hang on, Mr. Pavel, we have been joined by Mr. Akin.

Do you have anything you want to say—

STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I could just submit my opening statement for the record?

Dr. SNYDER. Without objection. Without objection.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Akin can be found in the Appendix on page 25.]

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Pavel.

Secretary PAVEL. I have no opening statement. I will defer my time to—

Dr. SNYDER. Okay. Mr. Hess.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL HESS

Mr. HESS. Sure.

Dr. SNYDER. We are moving right along here, aren't we?

Mr. HESS. It is great, sir.

With your permission, sir, I will submit my statement for the record.

Dr. SNYDER. Without objection.

Mr. HESS. I will try to cut it back.

Chairman Snyder, Ranking Member Akin, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you today. I am pleased to have the opportunity to meet with you and to discuss the United States Agency for International Development's views on the overwhelming challenges in the context of future interagency operations.

I am going to concentrate on three points. One is that the training that is going on right now for the PRTs that are deploying in Afghanistan right now and at Fort Bragg—I will talk about that—and a little bit about the programming in Afghanistan as an exam-

ple of how the PRTs work together, then wrap up with some concluding statements on how we are working together as an inter-agency.

As an example of our 3-D coordination, our Office of Military Affairs is currently contributing to presentations at a three-week-long interagency predeployment training at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

USAID contributes particularly to these discussions in that we have an expert on the Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework, which provides an overview of the standardized diagnostic framework for tactically assessing the causes of instability and conflict in the area of operations, with emphasis on viewing the environment through culturally sensitive and consistent data collection, understanding how to change that environment by identifying and targeting the causes of instability and conflict, implementing programs that diminish the causes, and finally measuring the effectiveness of that program.

USAID trainers also stress the importance of community input into the PRT process and priority setting.

Just as a side note, we have also trained an infantry brigade, the 52nd Brigade of the British army, before they deployed to Afghanistan.

In terms of programming, our programs and projects are designed and developed by the PRT team members as their teams form and as they arrive on station and include efforts to ensure adequate supplies of clean water, functioning utilities, safe recreational facilities, especially for children, and competent administrators to manage cities, town, and regions. The combined efforts of these interagency teams serve to build provincial capacity, foster economic development, strengthen rule of law, and promote reconciliation.

The main objective of the PRT program is to help the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in partnership with local communities develop the capacity to identify and address issues of development, governance, and security in the outlying provinces. Development, governance, and security are three different missions with one common objective: a stable and prosperous Afghanistan.

PRTs represent the leading edge in interagency operations. PRT commanders are trained to listen to what the community leaders need. The teams now in training will be the first units to fully benefit from the government of Afghanistan's Provisional Development Planning Process undertaken in 2007.

Our predecessors have been working with local village leaders and provincial leaders to determine priority development projects. This will save valuable time and ensure that the teams do not reinvent the wheel.

We stress the importance that development activities be led by Afghans. We understand that Afghanistan will never move forward without Afghans taking the lead, and this knowledge serves as the foundation of our investment in time to engage the Afghan communities and local officials to foster their ownership and buy in of development projects.

It is just as important as actually constructing the schools or paving the roads. As one Afghan participant put it, "The overall process will build trust and improve the relations between the gov-

ernment and the public because, for the first time, we are involved in this practice with government officials.”

One of the most successful aspects of the PRT program is the interagency cooperation between the military, USAID, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the U.S. Department of State officials co-located in the PRT.

I will skip my example on that one and conclude by saying that I would like to stress that we appreciate and understand that the most effective PRTs are those in which the military and civilians from across the interagency focus on joint decision-making and planning and carry out our respective civilian and military missions.

We continue to learn and advance our understanding of how these teams can be most effective and transfer responsibility of their activities to Afghans and Iraqis to guarantee the long-term success in our efforts to help local communities find reconciliation, modernization, and transition to self-reliance.

We are improving our interagency training for the next generation of officers going to the PRTs.

Thank you for this opportunity, and I would be happy to take your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hess can be found in the Appendix on page 40.]

Dr. SNYDER. We are going to let Mrs. Davis begin the questioning for us. I mentioned, I think, perhaps before she arrived that there is a lot of interest in several subcommittees of this Congress and committees of this Congress in doing something about this. There is interest in the memberships, also, and as some of you may know, Mrs. Davis and Geoff Davis, our colleague from Kentucky, have formed a working group on interagency reform, which is also part of this conversation.

Mrs. Davis for five minutes.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you to all of you for being here. I am sorry this has got to be so terribly disjointed and that we do not have the benefit of more time with you, and I am going to have to leave for an appointment.

Mr. Hess, just in talking about the issues that you just raised, one of the things that we know about USAID now is that you are not as well staffed as you were a number of years ago and that, in fact, there are a lot of contracts that you engage in, but that we have not really had the bench, we have not had the personnel that are trained and there and ready.

Is what you were discussing? What else do really you need to make that effective and to enable this interagency process to move forward? Is there a need for more USAID, more trained people that can do that so that we do not rely on our military? Why hasn't that worked better? Help fill in the gap for us.

Mr. HESS. There are a couple of questions, I think, that you have in there. What are we doing to improve and improve the bench strength? The administrator has submitted—I think you have seen it in the 2009 request—to increase the staffing of USAID, and there is a request in the 2009 budget, is the first step to increase the number of people. She has already taken the action to increase

the staff above attrition hiring for the first time in, I think, 10 or 12 years. So she has recognized that effort, and we are moving on to hire more people in terms of basic fundamental staffing.

In terms of the interagency, we have been working very closely with the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) at the State Department. We have participated in all the sub-Policy Coordinating Committees (PCCs) and working groups to work better to try this interagency coordination. I have personally witnessed this, having served in Iraq in 1991 and Bosnia and Kosovo. We are committed to that interagency coordination. That was one of the reasons why we created the Office of Military Affairs, to ensure that those things happen.

We have also worked with DOD very closely on putting senior development advisers with all the geographic combatant commands, except for Northern Command (NORTHCOM) so that we could further integrate our planning and coordination and work better and have more successful projects.

So all of those things kind of work together.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. What do you all see then included in terms of Congress's role here, and is it a budget connection? You know, there is really a disconnect in many ways in terms of what we are saying we need and the way we are actually budgeting. What role do you think Congress should be playing, or should we not engage in more national security, have a different committee that would go across jurisdictions? I mean, do you have a sense of what might be helpful to really task the different agencies to do this differently?

Secretary HENRY. I will start with that. I think if you would have asked us that three or four years ago, yes, we would say reorganize and make things easier and make it easier for us to deal with. I think we have come to a realization that reorganization is the easy part. The hard part is the thought process, the culture, how does one deal with that.

Let me talk about some destructive things that we think are really helpful that Congress has done. These hearings, you know, are recognizing the problem. We think that with the staffs we have a certain degree of resonance, and now with the House on the issue, that the solutions are not found in the Defense Department.

We happen to have extremely helpful committees of jurisdiction. They help fund us fairly robustly. We do not see the same mindset necessarily on supporting State activities, it does not seem to us, and to be able to start to look at national security, as I believe that State is in with Justice and some other organizations, and we feel very close to State and to the intelligence community and the military, to be able to start to look at them holistically in some sort of method. I am not sure it is reorganization of any sort, but it is an ability in being the mechanisms to be able to look across that.

Within DOD, we have started to do things to be able to look at virtual budgets. So eventually, you know, in another year or so, if you want to do what we are doing in stabilization, we will be able to put the equivalent of a major force program together for stabilization or whatever you might want to look at. You know, we will be able to have the data mechanisms and accounting to be able to start to look at that. To a certain extent, if the Congress could

start to look at what are we doing across national security, we think that would be helpful.

Another helpful thing we think Congress has done is given us legislation in this last Defense Authorization bill to go out and do a study and to work with the nonprofits, somebody outside of government, to look at what some of the interagency problems are.

This is something that our Secretary has got his head into. He has actually changed the contract we were putting out to include come up with a "National Security Act of 2009." How would you do it? You know, 1947 worked for good for setting up a Cold War structure to be able to meet our national security interests. Going forward, what would it look like post-9/11?

And so while we would not expect anybody to necessarily go out and adopt what they come up, it will start to generate a conversation. So we think that we are in the stage at the whole-of-government level of starting to do some experimentation. That is why, you know, we appreciate the support that we have with AFRICOM. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) is reorganizing itself, bringing different components inside of the government to be able to do that, too. So this is a time we think really of experimentation.

I personally am a little concerned that we would overcompensate, and looking at the lessons learned of Afghanistan and Iraq, PRTs worked very well there, but we do not have Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) engagement. The next place we go, NGOs could be a much bigger part of the equation. USAID might play, you know, a much more significant role then, and we might be relying on them more.

So we think it is a very broad problem set that we are confronted with in the future. We happen to have two examples right now of a somewhat non-permissible environment, but we tend to think that there is a more military heavy end of how you meet that set of problems.

There are other areas where we are going to want to try to go in and make a difference, eliminate ungoverned areas, where it might be more at the developmental end and the military is just playing a smaller supporting role.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you.

Secretary PAVEL. I would just reinforce two particular points that I just think are critically essential from the Defense Department point of view, and one is just funding the needed capacities of the relevant civilian agencies, which our Secretary has been quite prominent in calling for recently, and then, two, just looking at things from across traditional boundaries in an integrated way as much as possible and maybe from as diverse a set of perspectives as possible would really, I think, help to strengthen the different approaches that we are taking and help us develop the capabilities that we need.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Do you want to keep going, Mr. Chairman?

Dr. SNYDER. Well, I was going to let you finish whatever you want to finish.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Mr. Hess, would you like to say something?

Mr. HESS. No, ma'am. I think we have hit the points, and I think where we are going with the combatant commands is a step in the right direction.

And we have been working very closely with our friends in Defense to make sure those are properly staffed, and we had people on the AFRICOM initial planning group and the transition group to ensure that that integration was happening, and that is how we plan on taking it to the next level.

I think Ryan is right that, you know, Afghanistan PRTs and Iraq PRTs are good for today, but they may not be for the next one, and we work very hard and closely with the Lessons Learned Center out at Fort Leavenworth and with the Marines Lessons Learned Center and the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) Lessons Learned Center to make sure that we are capturing those and how we can work more closely together.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Do folks around the table have a diverse perspective, or is that mostly Pentagon?

Mr. HESS. Well, right now, it is predominantly military and predominantly uniformed military, but more and more we are at the table and able to influence it, and the Tactical Complex Assessment Framework (TCAF) model that I talked about, too—we train military units before they deploy on that Tactical Complex Assessment Framework.

That is important because we know we cannot be everywhere on the ground, and if we can at least influence the activities of the planning process through that model, that is important, and the Army is looking at that model in particular and putting it into their doctrine.

So we realize we have to work across the spectrum—doctrine, planning, exercises—so that before units deploy, they know how to work with civilian agencies better. We are going to keep pushing that pretty hard.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Akin.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr.—is it Pavel?

Secretary PAVEL. Yes.

Mr. AKIN. There seems to be a little bit here making my brain on Thursday afternoon struggle a little bit. We are talking about—that you are in charge of special operations that are low intensity. Somehow those do not seem to go together, but I guess my question is: Are you involved to some degree in overseeing some of the various preemptive kinds of things that we might be doing in places that most people had not heard of before, but there might be some problem and you are taking some action there?

Secretary PAVEL. Part of the responsibilities of the assistant secretary of defense for special operations low intensity conflict and interdependent capabilities now is—

Mr. AKIN. You have it down pretty good.

Secretary PAVEL [continuing]. Providing policy oversight of operational activities, you know, in whatever form, and those include the full spectrum of such activities from—

Mr. AKIN. More kinetic to less kinetic.

Secretary PAVEL. Exactly, yes. From the Defense Department point of view.

Mr. AKIN. So I think a whole lot of us have been seeing the fact that there needs to be a jointness beyond just the Navy, Air Force, and Army that needs to extend more broadly, and that seems to be shared by most people on the committee here and a lot of other places as well.

I guess my question is not having that in place right now, how do you make decisions as to, "I think we ought to go do this thing, but, over here, we better just stay clear of it," because you have to have a cultural context to put those decisions in? And is it your job and you have people that work for DOD that can help you that, or how does that process work right now?

Secretary PAVEL. I think this is a call often from the combatant commanders in the field who know the local conditions and the units under them who understand the different dynamics that are at play from those that would call for softer approaches as well as those that would call for harder approaches, and so our job is to provide the broad policy oversight back here, but not to get into the specific details of very specific operations that a combatant commander oversees.

What we do try to do, however, is at that broad level link up policies and oversight for different agencies' capabilities that can be brought to bear and try to incorporate lessons learned into the policy oversight that we sustain on a pretty routine basis. But we do not get into sort of the specifics of combatant commanders' or tactical operational commanders' approaches for particular local circumstances.

Mr. AKIN. So the final decision is combatant commander basically?

Secretary PAVEL. It depends on the size of the challenge. I mean, obviously, if we are talking about a major combat operation that would be commencing, that is a national security decision and, obviously, can only be handled by the commander in chief. If you are talking about local issues in a contained way, then that becomes a much more local or regional—

Mr. AKIN. Combatant commander kind of thing?

Secretary PAVEL. Yes.

Mr. AKIN. Okay.

Secretary HENRY. Can I just take a stab at that, Mr. Akin, because—

Mr. AKIN. Sure.

Secretary HENRY. You are asking a very important question, and there are obviously places we are engaged in that have a lot of our attention, but how do we do things to avoid the next conflict, and that is something where we have been putting a lot of intellectual energy into. You might think of it as—

Mr. AKIN. The reason we ask it is because we as legislators always pass laws that have unintended consequences. I mean, we are experts at doing that, and so I am thinking you have to have that same problem, that you do something with good intentions, and yet, because of a cultural situation or something that you cannot foresee, it ricochets in a way you were not expecting. That is what I am—

Secretary HENRY. Yes, that is almost the law of nature, you know. No matter what you do, it is going to have some sort of unin-

tended consequences. We are never going to hit the nirvana where everything is working the way we put things in place and everything worked out.

There will always be sources of friction. I mean, we saw that with the end of the Cold War. You know, we eliminated the threat to the existence of this Nation, but we still have our hands full on security threats, and we would see the future of that. We do not see the need for national security going away in the foreseeable future.

But to get to your point of how you do this, at the strategic level, that is something that is normally done inside the beltway here in the interagency process, coordinated by the National Security Council, and it is where do we want to put our emphasis, where do we need to be looking out in the future.

For us, the driving factor is where are those ungoverned areas where bad things can fester and that we need to go in and eliminate them. And so the whole idea is to build up local capability, what we would refer to as effective sovereignty, for them to be able to work their problems out, and that is looked at at the National Security Council, which brings in the whole interagency.

Then you shift to the theater. Once it is said we want to do something—and that is what Barry was speaking to—it is how do we put those things together in the theater. One of the things we have done in the Defense Department is ask the combatant commanders to stop just looking at how are you going to go out and fight these different fights that are potentials out there—and that is the way we have approached it in the past—and instead come in and give us a comprehensive plan on what you want to do with in your area to get end states that are to the benefit of our Nation and the folks that we work with. And in that process, we are bringing in our different partners in the interagency to be able to look at that.

I would just like to say that we spent the last 50 years—

Mr. AKIN. Can I just stop you for a second? I do not want to put words in your mouth. Am I starting to hear you say that there was a time when we looked at it from a defense planning, that if we get in trouble with them, what do we have to do to kick them into shape or whatever your words were—

Secretary HENRY. Yes, sir.

Mr. AKIN [continuing]. Whereas now the perspective is more what is the long-term sense of vision for who this nation is, how they fit in, and how can we be helpful to them and encourage a good sense of peace and responsibility and community and all? Is that what you are saying?

Secretary HENRY. We have always looked at that. That is captured in the national security strategy regardless of what administration. They try to put that out. I think what we realize, though, is that we have to do it in a whole-of-government coherent way, both at the national level, the regional level and then the tactical level, which is going to be tailored to individual circumstances.

So we are putting together mechanisms where we can do a more coherent job of looking at that regionally on where we want to go.

It might be food for thought. In the Department of Defense, we had to think 50 years—it took us 5 decades—to understand how we operate jointly and to get that down, and I think we have it down.

We appreciate the help the Congress gives us, but we have religion on jointness is the way to go, and it is the name of Barry's area. He works in interdependent capability. If we become interdependent upon each other, we can do a much more effective job and everyone does not have to buy the same capability to be able to do it themselves. They can depend on others.

We are coming to the realizations that in the interagency, the different departments, we have to be interdependent and operate that way and rely on each other's strength and have a seamless approach. But I would suggest to you if we are going to really meet the problem set that is out there, is we have to think about that, not just from a, you know, joint service or interagency.

But we also have to think about our partners, and we are going to have to work with the European countries and those countries that are capable of exporting security to be able to bring them in. We are going to be a leader in how we learn this, but as you are thinking big term on how we put this together, to us, there is a very large international component. How do we bring the Japans, the Australias, the NATOs along?

Mr. AKIN. You know General Bell in Korea, sort of a shy and retiring sort of fellow?

Secretary HENRY. That is not the one we know, but—

Mr. AKIN. He made that point to us on a missile defense trip that we took about the significance of Korea and the jointness and an overall perspective of jointness, and so I understand.

Secretary HENRY. And we have it there, and our effort there is focused on the peninsula, but I am talking about—and that is good, and we need to have that—something where we can work with NATO as we are trying to do right now in Afghanistan, which is a Petri dish on how do we make this work, and it has not been frictionless, on how do we get our partners out there contributing to this, and, to be honest, we think that we are a couple of years ahead of them in understanding where one has to make the investments in your military capability.

But, as you think about the big problem set, I just suggest that you do not forget the international component of this because we do not want to be the 911 force. The military does not want to be it, and I do not think we want the United States to be it either. We want to be able to work with others.

That is a whole push that we are doing in AFRICOM. Everywhere else in the world, we think of our combatant commanders as being the leaders. In AFRICOM, we want to support the good efforts of others and not necessarily, you know, be the first one somebody looks to.

So I hope that is helpful.

Mr. AKIN. It is pretty general, but I think I am getting your direction and your drift. Yes. Thank you.

Mr. HESS. Mr. Akin, if I may add on to what Ryan was saying there and amplify it a little bit more, part of the reason we put these senior development advisers in the combatant commands is because we need to integrate how we operate. We are doing development, for example, on the continent of Africa all the time, and DOD units go down there and they build schools, clinics, roads, drill wells, and we think that if we better integrate those programs

that we will have more success. I mean, obviously, the combatant commanders have been engaged in their theaters to try and prevent conflict for a long time, and we need to amplify that.

And another example of that is we have an Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation where we work very closely with our colleagues in DOD and State to try and look at those ungoverned spaces or areas where we might see extremism or instability to identify those factors and try and eliminate them or at least develop programs for, for example, disengaged youth, folks like that.

And so we are working more closely together, and I think AFRICOM is a step in the right direction. Certainly, Southern Command is as well. We believe in getting out there ahead of the game, and that is why we created the Office of Military Assistance, so that we have a single point of contact where we can work together on these issues specifically.

Mr. AKIN. Good. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Akin.

I wanted to mention first, too, we have had a lot of interest by Chairman Skelton about this, and he is hopeful that sometime relatively soon we will have a full committee hearing—and he is hoping to have both Secretary Gates and Secretary Rice there—just to focus on this issue.

Ambassador Mull had to leave us, but he was kind of brought in at the last minute, and we were pleased to have him. He recognized he probably was not the best person in the State Department to come in on the topic, but we had some frustration about, you know, what level person and what job they are occupying should be participating in this kind of hearing.

But I think it is just part of this whole discussion, which is that, you know, at what levels are we going to have these kinds of discussions, which leads me to this question. And I do not want to overread, you know, one sentence in each of your statements here, Mr. Henry and Mr. Hess.

On page two of your statement, Secretary Henry, you say, “To realize this goal may require some bureaucratic restructuring and will require larger cultural shifts causing us all to step away from our institutional biases and make the system more coherent on a national level.”

And then, Mr. Hess, in your opening statement, you say, “There is no denying that civilian and military organizations can be quite different, but there are now proven ways to bridge these two cultures.”

And I cannot disagree with, you know, anything either of you say in those statements, but they are not synonymous statements. I think I would come down more on the side of Mr. Henry’s statement, again, without overreading into one sentence out of a very complicated topic.

But the implication, I think, that I picked up from yours, Mr. Hess, is that, yes, we have two different cultures out there. I would probably say there is a culture for every organization—USAID has one, and State Department has one, and the military has one—but that is okay if those cultures continue as long as every so often, when something flares up, we have a way to reach across.

I think the experience that we are having here is that—and what has led to a whole lot of people, before we ever started looking at this, to conclude that will not work very well—that by the time you figure out how to build bridges at a time of a new conflict, you have lost a lot of time, and you have lost opportunity, and so that is why, I think, maybe Secretary Henry's is bigger.

Doesn't there need to be the cultural change so that you do not have to bridge cultures? Recognizing there are different tasks and different jobs and being an infantryman is a whole lot different than being a USAID, you know, observer of what local contractors are doing or something. But there needs to be more of a merger of the cultures or more compatibility with cultures so you do not have to try to reinvent this bridge every time you come to a new conflict.

And I do not want to overread one sentence, but I think in a way it does get at some of the heart of the problem.

Any comments you want to make, Mr. Hess?

Mr. HESS. Sure. I may need to relook at my sentences and how I write them, but—

Dr. SNYDER. Somebody actually reads them, you know.

Mr. HESS. Absolutely. That is good. I am glad you did.

It is interesting. Right after I started on this, we were creating the Office of Military Affairs. We created it for that reason, because we knew that we had to start bridging this.

USAID has worked with the military on and off for years. You can go back to Vietnam. You can go back to even before that. The reason we did that was to formalize that relationship. We recognized this relationship exists, and it is going to continue to exist. We can do it on an ad hoc basis, or we can do it on a formal basis, and that is why we did the Office of Military Affairs, so we could take that to the next level.

Right after we formed the office, we went over and the current administrator Andrew Natsios went over and met with the Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, and they talked about the cultures. The cultures between AID and the military are a lot closer than you would probably recognize. USAID people are very goal oriented, very task oriented. They implement things. They want to get the job done, just like the military does. And so I do not think the cultures are all that far apart.

I have visited most of our missions, at least in the troubled areas of the world, and the mission directors there understand that they need to work with the military. What we have to do is give them the framework and the boundaries and where we are going to work within that. That is, again, why we created the Office of Military Affairs—was to help design that policy framework, and we are doing right now.

Probably within a month, we will have a USAID policy on how we will do civ-mil operations so that we can define those boundaries and where we can work because we owe that to our missions to provide them a framework because they are going to do it and they do it all the time.

But the other thing that we have to look at is how does the military approach us. For example, in a country, who is there to interface with that mission director? In some cases, it is just a defense attaché who has other assignments as ordered, and so we may not

be able to do the interface that we need to do to implement our programs and coordinate those as effectively as we could, and that is why we have been looking at other structures with the military on how we could better do that because we need people on the ground who could help coordinate and implement our programs in the field.

We have a long way to go, but I do not think the cultures are all that far apart, having been now in both of them.

Dr. SNYDER. Let me pick at that a little bit more. We have had both hearings and private discussions with people who have participated in PRTs, both military and civilian. One of the things that came out as we started looking at these PRTs is—I forget exactly who it was—in fact, we heard it from more than one person—that while we have PRTs in Iraq and we have PRTs in Afghanistan—these were from people now who had worked these things—they felt like they were so dramatically different they ought to not even have been called the same thing—the missions and how they went about doing it, their focus.

They felt, I guess, to summarize it, the PRTs in Afghanistan really early on got focused on building things, projects, kind of things. In Iraq, it is more of a capacity building in terms of local governance, and yet we call on PRTs as if they are the same thing. So I may say maybe one is learning from the other. I might say, though, that you created the bridge between the cultures, and the bridge ended up to be a different kind of a bridge.

Now maybe that is overreading that metaphor again, but it does bring home that we are thinking we may need to be spending a whole lot of time working at this now so that we do not have to kind of invent our solution each time out of whole cloth, that there is always going to be modifications based on local situations. But we really ended up with some fairly dramatically different approaches in those situations.

Am I off base there?

Mr. HESS. I think there was a structure created so that there could be an interface and an interaction. You are right. The goal may end up differently because of the different needs in the situation. In Iraq, where we do focus a lot on capacity building, sort of the local governance aspects, then that is going to have the predominance, and that is where we are going to put the weight of our effort.

But the fact of the matter is we created a structure and a mechanism where that interface can take place. That is the important thing, and I think whether you call it a PRT—we used to call them civil-military operations centers (CMOCs) when I was in the military—whatever you call it—I used to say it does not make any difference what we call it, it is the concept, it is how you think about the problem set, how you engage your partners in looking for a solution to that problem set.

Once we create that, then we succeed, whether we are going to call it a CMOC, a PRT, whatever we are going to call it. I think the name is irrelevant as long as we can create a structure where we can talk and engage and look at where the priorities ought to be and where the emphasis ought to be. If it is going to be reconstruction, we will do reconstruction because the infrastructure is

lacking. If it is going to be building local governance, then we will do that.

Dr. SNYDER. Do you have any comment, Secretary Henry?

Secretary HENRY. Well, I do not think our statements are incompatible. They are not synonymous. I agree with you. I do not think they are incompatible.

I think I was speaking to a larger institutional approach. I think we do on the ground have mechanisms that are working, and I guess listening to the discussion, I am just continually reminded that—in getting ready for this, I went back and looked at the statements before your subcommittee by somebody that I respect a lot, Carlos Pascual, and I think he was right on on the way he described things.

When we get people in the field and they work together toward a common goal, our feeling is, in the field, they can work inter-agency a lot of times much much better than we can inside the beltway. So I am a little surprised to hear the comments from your constituent because the feedback we are getting is the teams work well together.

When you start to feed into their institutional stovepipes, that is where some of the conflicts come. So what we would really like to do is to be able to operate at the theater level, and here at the Washington, D.C., level, as well, as they tend to out in the field. The point Carlos made is that if the first time you are trying to work together is when you are in a crisis situation, there is going to be a clash of cultures.

We think in Iraq and Afghanistan we are in the process of having worked through those. We know a lot. The feedback we are getting is the commanders love the PRTs, even though we put the same label on different goals that we are trying to get from the two of them. I think we did that a little from the perspective that it would be easier for people to know what we are trying to accomplish.

PRT is a brand for the interagency working together at the boots-on-the-ground level locally, and so we kept that brand name. But we think we have to have instances where we regularly interface with the developmental side, the diplomatic side, and the defense side, and, again, Carlos laid out some suggestions on where institutional investments can be made, again, through the support of our committees of jurisdiction, we have been able to do things to train our people, to give them different enrichment opportunities, where they can get out and spend a lot of time exercising and training.

We need to be able to do that with our partners on the diplomacy and development side, and so we are used to working together, and——

Dr. SNYDER. And one of the points Secretary Gates has made on behalf of USAID and the State Department is your organizations do not have the kind of redundancy you need to be able to have the luxury of going out and doing that kind of training. We pull you all over the place, particularly for the last seven or eight years.

We are going to shut down here fairly quickly. You all have been so patient.

But you made the comment, Secretary Henry, consistent with Secretary Gates about the—and then you talked about it, too, Mr. Hess—call for additional resources and personnel for both USAID and the State Department and the issue of how much is this a resource issue for this end of the table, the State Department, USAID, and how much is a reform issue. I am one of those that will be very supportive. You know, if we did nothing more than give additional personnel, I just think that we have cut the State Department and USAID too much. On the other hand, there are people who say you better be paying attention to the stovepipes and what is going on up there, you are not going to get the bang for the buck that you want.

Do you have any comments about that, Mr. Hess?

Mr. HESS. I think it certainly is a resource issue, first of all. We are working on the cultural issues and the mission issues. As I have indicated, the majority of the people with whom I have worked in the agency understand that this is a new era where we have to work with our partners in the military if we are going to be successful. We have always worked very closely with the State Department, so that is not an issue. But it is got to be an inter-agency if we are going to succeed at this.

That cultural aspect is being institutionalized, as I mentioned, in our policy reform. By putting this into policy and looking at issues like promotions for senior Foreign Service officers—I mean, when we talk about jointness, what really got Goldwater-Nichols institutionalized was the promotion requirement. Then people had a self-interest and a vested interest in going at that.

We are going to do the same thing within the agency on promoting people based on or making it a precept for promotion that they would have an interagency assignment. Then you know that it is real and it is going to stay and it is going to be a lasting institutional change. And we are moving forward to make those changes within the institution so that they can get to the reform issue as well.

So I think it is both issues, and I think we are moving forward on both fronts.

Dr. SNYDER. Gentlemen, I appreciate you being here. I appreciate your patience with us this afternoon.

I think probably almost for sure we will have some questions for the record, and if you can respond to those in a timely fashion. Every once in a while this happens, that we get interrupted. It generally does not happen as devastatingly as today because there really were some disappointed members, as I said, actually from other full committees that were interested in attending if we had been able to have it at 2:00.

But thank you for your patience, and we look forward to work with you on these issues.

And we will be adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

FEBRUARY 14, 2008

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

FEBRUARY 14, 2008

**Opening Statement of
Chairman Dr. Vic Snyder
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations**

Hearing on “Provincial Reconstruction Teams: A Case for National Security Reform?”

The hearing will come to order.

Good afternoon, and welcome to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations' hearing to discuss the case for national security reform based on our examination of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq as a study on interagency planning and operations. This is a companion hearing to the hearing we had on January 29th with outside witnesses.

We've received testimony from numerous witnesses regarding our experience with PRTs and we've heard about their “tactical” successes and shortcomings. Many times the drawbacks we've seen can be traced back to weaknesses in the interagency process at the “operational” and “strategic” levels.

As the subcommittee broadened its focus to the larger interagency context of developing a “whole of government” planning and operational capability for stabilization and reconstruction operations, the weaknesses, such as the need for a robust interagency planning process and the ability to deploy trained personnel with the appropriate technical skills as needed, have become more evident.

Secretary Gates has been speaking publicly about this issue and he puts it this way: “Looking forward, bureaucratic barriers that hamper effective action should be rethought and reformed. The disparate strands of our national security apparatus, civilian and military, should be prepared ahead of time to deploy and operate together.”

The intent of this hearing is to receive testimony from our government witnesses on how to rethink and reform those bureaucratic structures to support effective action.

The subcommittee's heard a lot about the lack of civilian capacity, and, in a sense, we're experiencing that here today because, while we very much appreciate the participation of our State Department witness and look forward to his testimony, the State Department was unable to provide a senior witness who can authoritatively address these policy issues from a departmental perspective.

We are joined today by:

The Honorable Ryan Henry
Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Policy
Department of Defense

Mr. Barry Pavel
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Special Operations, Low Intensity Conflict & Interdependent Capabilities
Department of Defense

Ambassador Stephen Mull
Acting Assistant Secretary,
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
Department of State

The Honorable Michael E. Hess
Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for Democracy,
Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance
U.S. Agency for International Development

After Mr. Akin's opening remarks, I'll turn to each of you for a brief opening statement. Your prepared statements will be made part of the record.

We will use our customary five-minute rule today by seniority and arrival time.

Let me turn it over to our ranking member, Mr. Akin.

February 14, 2008

Opening Statement of Congressman Todd Akin

**Oversight & Investigations Subcommittee Hearing on Provincial Reconstruction
Teams & Interagency Stability Operations**

“Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon to our witnesses, we appreciate you being here today.

“After studying Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the subject of interagency stability operations for over four months, the subcommittee is nearing the close of this investigation. Today’s hearing offers an opportunity to hear from administration witnesses on how we are learning from the PRT program as we plan and execute stability operations across the interagency.

“One of the challenges this subcommittee faces as we close out our work on the PRTs and interagency stability operations is figuring out how – if at all – the Congress can move legislation that will ensure that agencies like the Departments of Defense and State will work in lockstep, seamlessly applying the tools of national power. Much of what needs to be done are matters that are within the constitutional prerogative of the Executive Branch, and I’d like to hear from our witnesses on steps they are taking to address this issue. Other initiatives that the Congress could appropriately address would still face hurdles, because much of what needs to be done can only emerge outside the stove piped Congressional committee system.

“I thought the initiatives you’ve raised in your prepared testimony, particularly Secretary Henry’s statement, are helpful and reflect how the Executive is thinking about these issues. As we discuss your initiatives today, I’d like our witnesses to discuss whether and how Congress can advance these priorities.”

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Testimony for HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing
February 14, 2007
Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Political Military Affairs
Stephen D. Mull

Chairman Snyder, Ranking Member Akin, members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to address the ways in which the State Department contributes to our collective efforts to improve interagency planning and coordination. I understand that my colleague Ambassador Herbst has already briefed you on the work of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations and its intersection with the U.S. military. Today, I would like to brief you on the activities of the Bureau for Political-Military Affairs at State in supporting and promoting State-DoD collaboration.

The Political-Military Bureau serves as the principal institutional link between our Departments, and in that capacity manages issues from State-DoD policy coordination and personnel exchanges to licensing U.S. defense trade and formulating and execute over five billion dollars annually in U.S. foreign military assistance, including the five-year Global Peace Operations Initiative to expand the worldwide capacity and availability of peacekeepers.

In addition, my bureau is State's institutional lead on a range of innovative political-military policy and planning initiatives germane to the interests of this committee. I will briefly address the most important of these, which are the Building Partner Capacity programs; our political-military planning work; expansion of the POLAD program and POLAD

Reserve Corps; the Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative; our recent work on Security Sector Reform.; and our support to DoD as they stand up the new U.S. Africa Command.

Authored by Defense, the new Building Global Partnership legislation has become a shared strategic priority of both Defense and State. It consists of various legislative proposals to expand existing authorities and create new tools for addressing rapidly evolving security challenges. Of particular note is our close and successful collaboration on the formulation of “1206” programs, referring to the section of the NDAA that authorized the expenditure of DoD funds on emergent foreign train and equip programs for which State’s resources were neither sufficiently agile nor robust. We jointly executed nine projects totaling over \$100 million in 16 countries in FY 2006 and forty-one projects totaling nearly \$280 million in 25 countries in FY 2007. We will continue our joint efforts with the Defense Department during FY 2008, for which Defense received an appropriation for 1206 of \$300M, and will work with both Defense and Congress to seek renewal of this important interagency effort for FY 2009 and beyond.

In an unprecedented decision by the Secretary of Defense, based largely on our successful collaboration on the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, OSD invited State PM beginning in late 2006 to coordinate State involvement in developing selected Defense strategic guidance and contingency planning documents. This decision has provided a welcome opportunity to involve regional and functional experts throughout the State Department in helping DoD to establish the diplomatic context for their military plans and assuring that those plans are consonant with U.S. foreign

policy. This valuable initiative is additive to NSPD-44 implementation mechanisms and fills an important gap, since many Defense plans are not directly focused on stabilization and reconstruction activities. As we carry on this collaboration, we not only continue to confirm its value, but have reinforced the importance of involving interagency partners in the earliest stages of planning to establish a common understanding of the problems and of the USG interests at stake. Only then can we ensure that our military and diplomatic efforts are applied coherently toward a set of commonly held objectives. In light of this, we consider it important to establish replicable processes through which collaboration on military planning can become an accepted routine, and we are jointly exploring mechanisms to deepen and expand our ongoing collaboration.

A related set of planning activities involved the formulation of DoD's Defense Planning Scenarios, a series of complex, holistic, and realistic future crisis scenarios against which military force structure and capabilities can be tested and evaluated. For the first time in institutional memory, OSD invited State to participate in the development of these scenarios beginning in late 2006. State's involvement helps to ensure that the scenarios are both credible and reflective of U.S. foreign policy considerations. Led on the State side by PM, and incorporating regional and functional experts from across the Department, including S/CRS, this effort has been remarkably fruitful in helping to build relationships and mutual understanding between our two departments.

For many years, State has provided senior foreign policy advisors to our nation's most senior military commanders. Called POLADs, these

advisors provide highly regarded expertise and advice on the complex dynamics of foreign policy and international relations in military theaters of operation. In response to demand from DoD, and recognizing the value of POLADs to our national security posture, the Secretary has submitted a request to Congress for an unprecedented expansion of this program. Over the last three years we have already doubled the number of POLADS, and hope to expand the program by a factor of four over the next three years, in order to encourage professional exchanges among our younger diplomats and military officers in operational and tactical venues to complement our growing relationships at the strategic level. We have also instituted a program to provide surge support – the POLAD Reserve Corps – to deploy foreign policy experts on short notice and for limited periods to meet the emergent needs of military commanders in humanitarian or other crises. This capability again, is complementary and additive to the new Civilian Stabilization Initiative pursuant to implementation of NSPD-44.

I invite your attention to the new State-led Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, or ICI. We face today, and are likely to face for the foreseeable future, insurgencies that threaten our security and that of our friends and allies. If insurgency is a violent competition to govern, then the war on terror can be viewed in part as a global counterinsurgency campaign, as we seek to help strengthen responsible and effective governance and control over sovereign national territory that will prevent sanctuary for terrorists and their supporters. Counterinsurgency is an inherently interagency undertaking, and the purpose of the ICI is to improve the ability and capacity of the civilian organs of the U.S. Government to plan, conduct, and support partners in conducting both preventative and

reactive counterinsurgency campaigns. To date, PM and our institutional partners have produced the first interagency COIN framework document to be issued by the U.S. G. since 1962; inspired NATO to begin development of NATO COIN doctrine; are helping OSD to create the new Consortium for Complex Operations; and are working closely with OSD and the Joint Staff to ensure that military COIN doctrine both reflects and supports interagency efforts in insurgency-related stabilization efforts. Again, this effort incorporates a whole-of-government approach that is complementary and supportive of S/CRS, which has been a material supporter of the ICI.

PM is engaged in close collaboration with DoD, USAID and other interagency counterparts, as well as with other bureaus within the State Department, to advance a holistic U.S. Government approach to security sector reform policy and programs. One of the strategic priorities identified in the joint State Department/USAID Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2007-2012 is our commitment to “develop and maintain effective security relationships with other countries and international organizations.” This includes a focus on security sector reform, which can “enhance ... governments’ ability to deliver adequate security and responsive, transparent, and accountable government through the rule of law.” By integrating our numerous defense, development and diplomatic tools and resources, we seek to ensure that our support to partners reflects the inherently interdependent nature of the different elements of the security sector – including but not limited to armed and public security forces (such as military and police forces), civil management and oversight bodies (such as the justice system), and civil society. Each of these actors must be capable in its own right -- and capable of working together effectively -- if

the challenges of today's security environment are to be met. We value the expertise resident across the U.S. government -- including the Congress -- that can be applied in support of security sector reform and will continue to strengthen these working relationships.

Finally, we are working in close concert with the State Department's Bureau of African Affairs and the relevant functional bureaus to advise and assist DoD as they create the first new regional combatant command in many years -- the U.S. Africa Command. This important strategic development will support and enable our diplomatic engagement on the continent of Africa to the mutual benefit of Africans and Americans. AFRICOM represents an unprecedented effort to coordinate interagency activities in the political, military, and developmental spheres to promote peace, prosperity, and freedom in and between African nations, and we are working very hard with DoD to set the conditions for the command's success.

In summary, State PM is engaged on many levels and to considerable effect in helping to improve interagency planning and operations. I hope and believe that these efforts will improve our institutional ability to shape both the context for deployment and capabilities of interagency teams of the future. I welcome the committee's interest and questions.

**STATEMENT OF
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
RYAN HENRY**

**HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS**

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 2008

Good afternoon, Chairman Snyder, Ranking Member Akin, members of the Subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss the critical issue of how we are preparing our Department and our government to meet 21st century international challenges.

Meeting those challenges in the current and future international security environment requires a variety of diplomatic, development, defense, and other tools all working in harmony. Our enemies seek to exploit weak and failing states for use as sanctuary. A stove-piped, slow U.S. Government can offer them a kind of sanctuary as well. We are working to avoid such exploitation.

Our enemies have proven effective to capitalizing on weak governments, disorder or collapse with rapid relief or coercion, thereby gaining and empowering local support for their activities. U.S. Government responses to societal disorder, on the other hand, can be relatively slow and ill-fitting to the needs. We have struggled to convert our ability to achieve military victory into successes in providing essential services, rule of law, a viable market-based economy, and effective indigenous governance.

Key to winning the Long War is the ability to adapt and respond even more rapidly and creatively than our enemies. While the national security architecture created in 1947 worked well for the Cold War, it is straining to meet today's security challenges, which blur the line between peace and war demanding a continuum of responses, involving multiple government agencies and Congressional committees.

To succeed in this environment we need the tools to rapidly develop effective indigenous governance and capabilities, calling on the most appropriate interagency, international, regional, and local partners for support. Obviously, the ability to marshal these tools and capabilities are not the purview of any one agency.

Our current government architecture (both executive and legislative) – in terms of resourcing, authorities, and derivative capabilities – must reflect the growing recognition that U.S. national security cannot rely on the use of the military instrument of power alone but requires coordinated, whole-of-government action. We are taking steps to move away from practices that encourage an over-reliance on military capabilities and continued agency stove-piping.

We need to better ensure that our national security system is adapting to provide the proper tools, processes and incentives to encourage cooperation across the government – between the Legislative and Executive Branches, and among Departments and Agencies, offices, and individuals. To realize this goal may require some bureaucratic restructuring and will require larger cultural shifts – causing us all to step away from our institutional biases and make the system work coherently on a national level. Our collective aim should be to improve our national security apparatus to be more:

- Strategy-driven, not reactive;
- Flexible, agile, and prepared;
- Coordinated to ensure unity of effort;
- Appropriately resourced; and
- Operationally-focused and rapidly deployable.

Fortunately, the President's National Security Strategy (NSS) highlights this need to transform key national security institutions. While underscoring progress in key areas, the NSS outlines a way ahead to sustain and expand upon that achievement through a re-orientation of our foreign policy institutions and improvement in Executive Branch agencies' abilities to plan, prepare for, coordinate, and execute integrated responses. While progress is being made, the needed reform will take time and concerted effort by a

variety of actors working together. I would like to highlight three areas in which this change is being realized and more can be done:

- 1) Capacity (People & Training)
- 2) Planning
- 3) Operating

These efforts draw from our experiences here at home, and in overseas operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other operations, and together should help improve the U.S. government's ability to meet the national security challenges of the 21st century.

CAPACITY:

There is an old adage that when all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail. The U.S. military is a powerful, effective hammer. But that does not mean we can achieve our goals with only hammers and nails, with the rest of our toolbox remaining inadequately equipped and employed. Secretary Gates has spoken recently about the need to increase and improve the U.S. government's civilian capabilities and their integration with our military capabilities in order to better address current and future security challenges. That a Secretary of Defense is calling for increased resources for other agencies only highlights the need to address seriously the current situation and the urgency the Department feels regarding the state of our national security capabilities.

Limited civilian agency capacity means an expanded mission set, footprint and time on the ground for the U.S. military – at substantial cost to other national military needs. We need the capacity of our civilian agencies to be equal to the challenge at hand. The Department of Defense supports the Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI), a \$249M program in the State Department's FY09 budget request, which answers the President's call to improve the United States' ability to respond to instability and conflict. By funding the development of an Active, Standby, and Reserve Corps across eight civilian agencies, CSI provides the trained, equipped, and mission-ready civilian experts who can partner with U.S. Armed Forces in an integrated fashion to achieve our international strategic

objectives. To fully realize the capabilities of the Civilian Stabilization Initiative, the Department also supports passage of H.R. 1084, the Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Management Act of 2007.

Capacity for executing critical national security activities – at home or abroad – can also be increased across the government by providing incentives and opportunities for national security professionals to gain the experience, education, and training required to integrate the capabilities of individual U.S. Departments and Agencies to achieve common national security objectives. The Department of Defense supports and remains an active participant in the National Security Professional Development initiative launched via Executive Order last year.

PLANNING:

Increased civilian capacity should be coupled with increased effort to integrate planning on multiple levels. We cannot expect field-level activities, such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams, to be coordinated and integrated without effective structures to plan for and support them at the country, regional, and national level. DoD is a key player in the interagency development of strategic planning processes for combating terrorism, reconstruction and stabilization, and homeland security. DoD continues to support the interagency implementation process led by the National Counterterrorism Center under the direction of the 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism which underscores a planning requirement not only for the military, but also for the employment of diplomatic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement capabilities in a coordinated and integrated fashion. In accordance with National Security Presidential Directive-44 (“Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization”), DoD supports the State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in the development of a U.S. Government Planning Framework for Reconstruction and Stabilization which is currently undergoing testing and revision. DoD also supports the Department of Homeland Security in execution of Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 (“National

Preparedness”) Annex I, which directs the establishment of a standard, coordinated set of plans by all levels of government to enhance our national all-hazards preparedness. Further, the Department supports many interagency planning efforts, mostly at the field-level, to proactively address specific policy objectives.

Nascent whole-of-government planning processes, however, face obstacles in the form of limited civilian agency capacity dedicated to planning and differences in agency planning cultures. In addition to developing national-level processes, past experience has proven that the quality of military plans improves with appropriate participation from other U.S. Departments and Agencies. Currently, the Department shares aspects of many of our plans with other agencies and we are working to further expand our outreach to civilian agencies during our planning process.

Additionally, we are focusing more effort in our military planning on robust steady-state military planning that aligns ongoing military security cooperation, shaping activities, and contingency operations with national security goals. This type of planning focuses on integrating the day-to-day engagement efforts of various defense organizations to shape the actions of others towards accepted behaviors, create a more stable international environment, develop partnerships to assist in addressing current and future challenges, and help win the Long War. This planning process is designed to ensure the Department applies resources across all missions, thereby preparing to respond to crises, preventing or mitigating conflict, building capacity, and developing common perspectives on security challenges.

Two recent initiatives of Congress and this Administration have fostered integrated planning at the programmatic level. They demonstrate that when resources are available and flexible, when effective interagency planning and implementation structures exist, and when there is accountability, agile responses to challenges can be achieved. Both initiatives provide resources for rapid execution of programs to seize opportunities and mitigate emerging threats. Section 1206 authority (“Global Train and Equip”) allows the Department to train and equip foreign forces to address their own security problems,

recognizing a military requirement in avoiding future military interventions and mitigating long-term risk. This authority is executed under joint “dual key” (State and Defense Department) procedures, requiring joint approval of proposals by Combatant Commanders and Embassies in the field, and both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State in Washington D.C.. Section 1207 authority (“Security and Stabilization Assistance”) provides the U.S. Government with greater flexibility to bring the right civilian expertise from across our government to bear alongside or instead of U.S. military forces. These authorities complement foreign assistance resources for security, stabilization, and reconstruction assistance. The Department encourages Congress to support DoD’s proposed Building Global Partnerships Act to re-authorize and expand these vital authorities.

OPERATING:

The Department of Defense recognizes that strategic success in a variety of national security operations will only be possible with unified civil-military planning, deployment, and action – from the earliest time possible. Institutionalizing integrated civil-military operational structures and mechanisms will provide the final pillar to support the type of interagency cooperation that is required in the current national security environment.

The Department is engaged in the development of operational models for improved civil-military integration of planning and operations during crises through support to NSPD-44 implementation. That process aims to build upon the best practices from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan to create even more effective civil-military teams for the future.

There is also a need for more integrated efforts across the range of day-to-day interactions overseas. We need to build upon long-standing successful interagency coordination mechanisms, like the Joint Interagency Task Force – South, to most effectively execute the nation’s strategic objectives. The establishment of AFRICOM and

the transformation and reorganization of SOUTHCOM herald a new way forward for interagency operations in the field. Both commands offer new approaches for restructuring the traditional Combatant Command and highlight the critical role civilian agencies play in the planning and operations of the Command. These changes should primarily improve “steady-state” security cooperation in critical countries and regions and serve to better align military activities with ongoing diplomatic and development efforts in a way that complements the responsibilities, authorities, and resources of the Chiefs of Mission. These new organizational structures integrate civilian expertise into the Combatant Command and establish integrated interagency teams with functional divisions reflecting the types of missions they are likely to be called upon to execute.

Through improved capacity and integrated planning and operations, the U.S. government will be better poised to execute the critical interagency activities required to manage evolving national security challenges. As war blends into peace and our enemies become more amorphous and adept at exploiting the seams of society and government, the line between civilian and military activities, which we previously thought to be clean, can become blurred. Defining the appropriate roles, responsibilities, capabilities, and relationships between the U.S. Armed Forces, domestic and international civilian agencies in whole-of-government operations is challenging.

In this new environment, civilian agencies, both domestic and international, must be supported in their efforts to become more operational, expeditionary, and capable of planning for contingencies. But let me also be clear that the Department of Defense needs to adapt its own capabilities. Several existing guidance documents, such as DoD Directive 3000.05 and the Quadrennial Defense Review highlight the importance of improving the capabilities of our military forces to carry out and support non-kinetic missions, and integrating them into their traditional combat missions. As we assess the proper balance of capabilities, shifts are being communicated throughout the Department through strategic-level guidance documents that will have cascading effects in

programming, resourcing, and organizational structure to ensure our military is better prepared to work with its civilian partners to achieve our national security goals.

Finally, Congressional engagement in the evolution of our national security architecture – particularly regarding required authorities and resources – is critical and I welcome this Committee’s interest and participation.

**Statement by Michael Hess
Assistant Administrator
Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance
U.S. Agency for International Development
Before the
U.S. House of Representatives
Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Thursday, February 14, 2008**

Chairman Snyder, Ranking Member Akin, distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you today. I am pleased to have the opportunity to meet with you to discuss the United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) views on overcoming challenges in the context of future interagency operations, policy development and guidance as illuminated, at least in part, by the provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, how to improve and better integrate interagency participation to achieve government-wide "unity of effort" in all aspects of national security policy, planning, and operations.

As you are aware, the President and Secretary of State have endorsed the concept of the Provincial Reconstruction Team as a critical component of the interagency effort to bring civilian and military experts together to help local Iraqi and Afghan communities find reconciliation, moderation and transition to self-reliance. Since the first PRT was created in Gardez in December 2002, it has become clear that the types of success experiences by PRTs in certain locations and under certain conditions cannot be achieved through military efforts alone. These are areas that require a robust partnership across the "Three D's" of the National Security Strategy. Our approach to PRTs continues to evolve as does the USAID over-arching policy on civil-military cooperation, which is currently making its way through the internal vetting process. I would emphasize the following points with regard to this higher policy dimension, one aspect

of the numerous larger national security reform concepts required to achieve whole of government “unity of effort.”

USAID is currently in the process of integrating the foundational documents of the 3-D strategy into agency policy. I would be happy to provide a copy of the final policy document on Civil-Military Cooperation when it makes its way through the USAID internal vetting process in the coming weeks. It addresses many of your questions concerning USAID’s role in interagency coordination with DOD’s efforts on stability operations and USAID’s role in the implementation of NSPD 44 and other higher level efforts to better integrate defense, diplomacy and development to meet national security priorities.

Our Office of Military Affairs is currently in the final phase of coordination and delivery of a three week interagency Afghanistan PRT Pre-Deployment Training being conducted at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. For this reason, I will focus the remainder of my remarks on our experience and planning in Afghanistan. The training program brings active and reserve military members from the Department of Defense together with their peers and counterparts from the Department of State, USAID, and the Department of Agriculture. The training, evolving through the combined dedicated efforts of representatives of these agencies, serves to provide trainees the basic building blocks and skill sets required to form a cohesive team and embark on programs and projects that will bring stability to fragile provinces.

The training begins with an introduction to the USAID organization, followed by sessions explaining USAID’s work in Afghanistan and specifics on working in Afghanistan. It includes sessions on mental health, wills, insurance, contracting, working in conflict situations and the “alphabet soup” that comes with the interagency. Later sessions are designed to introduce civilian PRT members to Stability, Transition and Reconstruction Operations, as well

as counterinsurgency and foundational military structure. The USAID resident expert in the Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework (TCAF) provides an overview of the standardized diagnostic framework for tactically assessing the causes of instability and conflict in an Area of Operation, with emphasis on viewing the environment through culturally sensitive and consistent data collection; understanding how to change the environment by identifying and targeting the causes of instability and conflict, implementing programs that diminish the causes, and finally measuring the effectiveness of the programming.

Trainees are introduced to planning concepts, funding sources, and working partnerships. They receive briefings from Afghan Embassy Representatives, Department of Treasury experts, and Department of State counter-narcotics experts, as well as military medical and veterinary engagement experts. The classroom training culminates with each PRT team working through an exercise designed to sharpen their team skills and test their understanding of the classroom materials. The capstone experience is a field exercise simulating the real life experience they will share over the coming year.

The interagency PRT training continues to evolve with representatives of the Department of State (S/CRS) working to integrate field “lessons learned” into the broader assessment framework. An interagency After Action Review, conducted later this week, will serve as the framework for planning the next round of training scheduled for September-October this year. We continue to integrate lessons learned in the field and in the classroom and are working hand-in-hand with our military counterparts to ensure that our training is current, relevant, and meaningful – designed to produce results on the ground.

Programs and projects designed and developed by the PRT team members as their teams form and as they arrive on station include efforts to ensure adequate supplies of clean water,

functioning utilities, safe recreational facilities, and competent administrators to manage cities, town, and regions. The combined efforts of these interagency teams serve to build provincial capacity, foster economic development, strengthen Rule of Law and promote reconciliation.

We are most proud of the ten major achievements outlined in our Fall 2007 PRT report published through the cooperative effort of the USAID Bureau for Asia and Near East and the Bureau for legislative and Public Affairs. At that time we reported:

- In the area of Economic Growth, PRTs had supported the Iraqi Company for Bank guarantees and helped establish five small business development centers supporting local companies for over 30,000 businesses linked through central and regional registries.
- In the area of Microfinance development, microfinance lending had been established through PRT support in all eighteen provinces. The current loan portfolio then consisted of nearly 55,000 outstanding loans totaling over \$115 dollars with a 96% percent payback rate.
- In the area of Agricultural Production Rehabilitation, nearly 70 veterinary clinics had been established, serving 5 million animals and 135,000 animal breeders. Over 570,000 sheep had been vaccinated against brucellosis.
- Assistance to National and Provincial Governments had included the training of 2,000 council members (15% of whom were women) in our Local Governance Program, 28 governors, 42 deputy governors, 420 directors general, and key staff in 380 Iraqi ministries and departments to increase capacity to manage and execute budgets in a transparent and sustainable manner.

- With regard to Municipal and Local governments, PRTs had helped establish or rebuild 16 governorate councils, 96 district councils; 195 city or sub-district councils and 437 neighborhood councils; elections for governors, mayors, and local councils have been organized.
- The Community Stabilization Program had employed more than 54,000 Iraqis, provided over 7,000 Iraqis with vocational education; and established apprenticeships for 2,000 Iraqis. Over 1,400 community associations had been established in all 18 provinces by the PRTs. More than 2 million days of employment and 33,000 long-term jobs had been created. Additionally, over \$276 million had been made available for 5,930 projects – to which Iraqi communities have contributed more than \$73 million.
- Iraq Government funds had been shifted to the provinces. The Ninewa PRT assisted the provincial government in executing \$241 million of Iraq reconstruction and infrastructure improvement funds. The Baghdad PRT worked with the governor to improve essential services and, with the Provincial reconstruction and Development Committee, to award 42 construction projects valued at \$81 million.
- Embedded PRTs projected governance and rule of law programs to the district level. In Anbar Province, the PRT launched projects worth \$450,000 for university and provincial institutions. They pioneered the “helicopter engagement” initiative which is reconnecting Anbar’s far-flung cities and towns with the provincial government.

Today we can report there are 172 ongoing Local Governance and Community Development (LGCD) projects. One hundred thirty-nine projects are under development, with engineering work being completed, RFAs identifying grantees, sub-contractors being identified. Contracting

Technical Officers are monitoring projects to set up detailed, time-lined plans to move projects into implementation. As of January 31, 2008, in the first 16 months of the program, LGCD's estimated expenditure was over \$33 million out of a total obligated base amount of nearly \$43 million. LGCD expended an estimated 78.5% of base obligated funds as of January 31, 2008, with anticipated increases in monthly expenditures once the construction season begins in March and April. Dozens of projects have been completed including:

- In Kandahar Arghandab, a District Center Upgrade in April 2007 at a cost of \$28,944
- In Kandahar Shah Wali Kot, a Labor-Intensive Shah Wali Kot District Center Rehabilitation in November 2007 at a cost of \$94,499
- In Paktya Gardez, a Province-Based PDC Facilitator in September 2007 at a cost of \$2,395
- In Paktya Jaji, Kharmana and Ali Khil, Labor- Intensive Retention Walls & Dam Rehabilitation in August 2007 at a cost of \$79,000
- In Khost, District Governors Capacity Building Programs in December 2007 at a cost of \$18,165; and
- In Khost Bak, Kuchi EMT Training in November 2007 at a cost of \$25,394.

The main objective of the PRT program is to help the Islamic republic of Afghanistan, in partnership with local communities, develop the capacity to identify and address issues of development, governance, and security in outlying provinces. Development, governance and security are three different missions with one common objective – a stable and prosperous Afghanistan.

USAID posts over 20 Field Program Officers and 8 Development Advisors to Coalition and ISAF PERTs, Task Forces, and Regional Commands around the country. As

USAID's primary representative in the provinces, field officers help assess, plan, implement, and monitor all U.S. reconstruction and development efforts in the PRT's area of responsibility. USAID Field Program Officers work to build relationships with local leaders to identify local needs, and then work with the USAID mission in Kabul and USAID's implementing partners to design and deliver projects. USAID Field Program Officers also help our military colleagues understand the range of civilian reconstruction and development projects in each province, so that military-funded projects and activities can complement and strengthen civilian efforts.

PRTs represent the leading edge in interagency operations. PRT Commanders are trained to listen to what the community leaders need. The teams now in training will be the first units to fully benefit from the Government of Afghanistan's provincial development planning process undertaken throughout 2007. Their predecessors have been working with local village leaders and provincial leaders to determine priority development projects. Given the short rotations of everyone in the PRT, this will save valuable time and ensure that the teams don't reinvent the wheel.

Within PRTs, significant efforts have been made to facilitate the transition to the new rotation and preserve continuity in terms of provincial information, counterparts, and priorities. We stress the importance that development activities be Afghan led. We understand that Afghanistan will never move forward without the Afghans taking the lead and this knowledge serves as the foundation for our investment in time to engage with Afghan communities and local officials to foster their ownership and buy-in of development projects. It is just as important as actually constructing the school or paving the road.

One of the most successful aspects of the PRT program is the interagency cooperation between the military, USAID, the U.S. Department of Agriculture and U.S. Department of State officials co-located in the PRT. For example, at the suggestion of the local community, the full interagency team at the Ghazni PRT worked with local officials to make physical upgrades to the town market (clean up, lighting, etc.) as well as introduce related municipal services like garbage collection. With modest PRT funding (less than \$200k) and equally modest community resources, the project demonstrated local government commitment to making a tangible difference in citizens' lives and livelihoods – helping to advance security, governance and development goals.

Much progress has been made over the past year on putting in place effective mechanisms for fostering effective interagency planning and decision-making. Quarterly conferences between USAID and the U.S. command at Bagram (CJTF-82) have not only increased information sharing, but have also contributed to deconflicting USAID and military programming. Another effective interagency tool has been the assignment of a US military liaison officer housed at USAID in Kabul. There is no denying that civilian and military organizations can be quite different, but there are now proven ways to bridge these two cultures.

Since 2003, the PRT program has moved from a focus on quick-impact programming designed to meet immediate needs to more transitional programming designed to support Afghanistan's longer term development objectives. From 2003-2007, USAID implemented the Quick Impact Project managed through the PRTs. During this period, over 440 projects were completed. Many of these were small infrastructure projects. In 2006, a new PRT-managed Local Governance and Community Development (LGCD) project was inaugurated

and shifted PRT program activities to encourage communities to take an active role in their own development and involve provincial and local government officials in the delivery of services. The overall aim is to build capacity of local governments as well as look at the root causes of instability in a given area. Afghanistan has reached a critical point in its post-conflict development in terms of the ability of its government officials to connect with their constituents and deliver services at the sub-national level. For example, USAID Field Program Officers through the Local Governance and Community Development (LGCD) program helped facilitate the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) sub-national consultation process this past summer. The program provided orientation workshops for provincial officials about ANDS, the SNC process, and other government initiatives in 14 provinces, and provided facilitators to assist with SNC implementation in the north and west regions. This assistance was important because the SNC process is how the IRoA is going to determine provincial needs and ensure that plans and strategies developed as part of the ANDS address the needs and priorities of the Afghan populace. As one Afghan participant put it, “The overall process...will rebuild trust and improve the relations between government and the public...because for the first time we are involved in this practice with government officials”.

In conclusion, I would like to stress that we have come to appreciate and understand that the most effective PRTs are those in which the military and civilians from across the interagency focus on joint decision-making and planning in carrying out respective civilian and military missions. We continue to learn and advance our understanding of how these teams can be most effective and transfer responsibility for their activities to Afghans to

guarantee long-term success in our efforts to help local Afghan communities find reconciliation, moderation and transition to self reliance.

I thank you for the opportunity to meet with you and look forward to discussing these topics with you and members of the Committee today. I will be happy to take your questions.

**QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE
RECORD**

FEBRUARY 14, 2008

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. SNYDER

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Henry, a number of commentators have cited an over-reliance on DOD in times of crisis when, perhaps, other instruments of national power—diplomacy, economic measures, or effective strategic communications—would have been more effective. Do you share this view and if so, what specific changes can be made and by whom to the interagency process that would strengthen the “voice” of non-DOD agencies and enable non-military solutions or solutions where the military is only in the supporting role?

Secretary HENRY. Secretary Gates has played a leading role in advocating for increased civilian capacity. As he stated in his speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the “military and civilian elements of our national security apparatus have responded unevenly and have grown increasingly out of balance.” On April 15, he and Secretary Rice testified before the HASC that if State is to be the lead agency for our foreign policy, it must be given the authorities and resources commensurate with that mission.

DOD supports a number of initiatives to increase the capabilities of civilian agencies and develop whole-of-government planning processes to apply all USG capabilities in an efficient, effective, and unified manner in the achievement of national goals. Such efforts include:

- NSPD-44 “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization”, particularly the President’s FY09 budget request for \$248.6M for the State Department to build expeditionary capacity at eight civilian agencies through the Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI). CSI will provide trained, equipped, and mission-ready civilian experts who can partner with the U.S. Armed Forces in an integrated fashion, applying multiple elements of national power to meet national security imperatives.
- National Counterterrorism Center’s efforts to employ diplomatic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement capabilities in support of the 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.
- HSPD-8 “National Preparedness” Annex I, directing the establishment of a standard, coordinated set of plans by all levels of government to enhance our national all-hazards preparedness.

At the same time, Secretary Gates made clear in his April 15 testimony that today’s threats require a shift in understanding about the tools needed by the U.S. military to fulfill its core security responsibilities. Secretary Gates has also emphasized that DOD must enhance its traditional capabilities to provide humanitarian relief, establish stability, restore governance, and foster economic development immediately following conflict. While these are military missions, they must be accomplished in close cooperation with State, which has broader regional expertise and understanding of U.S. foreign policy objectives. The Global Train and Equip (“Section 1206” Authority) offers a model for interagency coordination that makes the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense co-equal decision makers by law. We should seek to build on tools like 1206 to create an interagency architecture that can address complex challenges.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Henry, how satisfied are you that OSD, DOD and the Services really accept the critical role that effective interagency coordination and planning must play for success? What steps has DOD taken to implement the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review’s recognition that national security challenges often require interagency solutions? Can you outline the work that’s being done as a result of the Building Partnership Capacity Roadmap? What has the DOD’s Office of Policy done to implement that roadmap?

Secretary HENRY. Across the board the Department recognizes the critical role interagency coordination and planning have in ensuring the USG meets its national security objectives. All relevant components of the Department are actively engaged in improving interagency processes and DOD’s involvement in them.

The Department has made considerable progress in many areas of the Building Partnership Capacity Roadmap (BPC). The Department has made significant strides in supporting the strengthening of interagency planning and operations. DOD has

also participated in the establishment of the National Security Professional program and the development of national planning processes for combating terrorism, homeland security, and reconstruction and stabilization. Additionally, DOD has facilitated increased civilian agency input into DOD's planning processes.

Building partner security capacity is a fundamental military mission. In order to complete fully the actions called for in the BPC Roadmap to enhance the capabilities of, and cooperation with, international partners, DOD seeks Congressional support for several legislative initiatives and appropriations enabling the U.S. military to build secure partners. Many of these initiatives are novel in proposing to capture appropriate interagency roles, including Secretary of State or Chief of Mission concurrence, in law.

In particular, DOD seeks to make the Global Train and Equip authority permanent, expand the authority to include partner security forces, and increase the limit of the authority to \$750M. DOD also seeks extension and expansion of the Security and Stabilization (Section 1207/1210) authority; expansion of the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster Assistance, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) program to include stabilization activities; enhancements to DOD fellowship, regional center, and other partner education, training, and support programs; and other legislative proposals designed to increase our military's ability to build partner capacity. When matched with the proper appropriations, these enhancements to DOD authorities will provide the U.S. military with the tools needed to help build more effective security partners while reducing the burdens on our forces.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Henry, can you comment on how the Joint Interagency Coordination Groups that the Combatant Commanders are establishing are working? Has DOD, as a result of the Building Partnership Capacity Roadmap, issued guidance on the role and staffing for Joint Interagency Coordination Groups, the placement, role, and staffing of Department of State Political Advisors and the placement of OSD advisors at the Combatant Commands? It seems to me the role and placement of these advisors is intended to improve operational-level interagency unity of effort. Please give us examples of the progress being made.

Secretary HENRY. Each of the Geographic Combatant Commands (COCOM) has established a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) to assist with liaison and planning at the operational level. The structure of the JIACGs varies based on the COCOM's priorities and the participation of interagency personnel. All COCOMs have noted that other Federal Agencies have difficulty providing qualified liaisons to JIACGs on a permanent basis. DOD does not want to impose a one-size-fits all approach. Rather, we recommended that the COCOMs tailor their JIACGs for regional missions.

To improve interagency coordination, the COCOMs work through OSD, and in some cases directly with, other agencies to coordinate activities. Beyond the establishment of U.S. Africa Command, some other examples are illustrative:

- U.S. Southern Command has established a J9 staff section that includes the JIACG liaisons as well as military staff to coordinate interagency efforts. In the context of SOUTHCOM's operational environment and focus, this approach works well.
- U.S. Northern Command's mission and location uses a different approach—using direct liaison with Federal agencies as well as a JIACG.
- U.S. European Command and U.S. Pacific Command both employ JIACGs for interagency planning, and participation is tailored to their respective missions.

It is important to note that DOD is currently funding interagency participation in JIACG organizations. It may be more effective for other Federal Agencies to program and fund JIACG personnel, creating a more stable personnel management method and expanding the pool of qualified interagency planners and operators. The Department supports current Department of State initiatives to expand its capacity, including selective placement of Political Advisors with military units. We believe these are important steps to improve interagency integration.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Henry, while we have seen that a big part of the problem with the interagency process is how various agencies react to particular crises once they are underway, another big, and often overlooked, part of the equation is the interagency planning framework. Do you have any thoughts on how that might be more constructively structured and developed? Why hasn't the framework developed under NSPD-44 been used?

Secretary HENRY. A key challenge in any interagency operation is to unify various funding streams, Congressional Committee jurisdictions, agency plans, and bureaucratic cultures to have an aggregate effect on the problem—that is done through

unified strategic- and operational-level planning, which the Executive Branch is working to improve.

As such, DOD supports the development and use of whole-of-government planning frameworks to facilitate civilian agency integration into military planning and vice versa. In particular, DOD supports the State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in the development of a U.S. Government Planning Framework for Reconstruction and Stabilization as part of NSPD-44 implementation. That framework is:

- Being tested through experiments and exercises with Combatant Commands and across the USG. It will be revised based on those results.
- Designed to address planning for a major response that requires significant and complex humanitarian, security, reconstruction, governance, and economic efforts utilizing civilian and military instruments of power.
- Intended for use in contingency planning and crisis response planning.
- Designed according to universally agreed-upon planning steps and accounting for an iterative planning process between higher and lower level organizations.

Recent changes to DOD planning guidance also ensure a more holistic look at planning by:

- Moving the Department away from an exclusive focus on contingency-driven planning by tasking COCOMs to develop campaign plans. These campaign plans will provide an opportunity for greater coordination and synchronization of USG activities to shape the current security environment in order to prevent potential threats to our national security interests from developing.
- Ensuring that stabilization and reconstruction concerns are highlighted in contingency planning.
- Encouraging interagency cooperation in the development of military plans. DOD is working with interagency partners on selected plans already. As these efforts progress, DOD will identify best practices and incorporate lessons learned into future guidance. We are grateful to the State Department for the input it has provided on selected plans.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Henry, GAO testified before the subcommittee that DOD's efforts to implement DOD Directive 3000.05 have been hampered by a lack of guidance from your office on how to identify and prioritize needed stability operations capabilities. Has guidance been given? Has the Under Secretary of Defense developed a list of priority capabilities? Has your office given guidance on developing measures of effectiveness to be used in evaluating progress in meeting the directive's goals?

Secretary HENRY. DOD Directive 3000.05 provides broad policy guidance for various DOD components to adapt processes and develop capabilities accordingly. DOD's approach has been to focus on updating strategic-level guidance documents and working through the formal capabilities development process to ensure stability operations and irregular warfare considerations are included in the analysis agenda that informs our Department-wide capabilities analysis efforts. Thereby, DOD components, including Combatant Commands, are instructed to incorporate stability operations considerations in the planning and conduct of operations.

The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations Capabilities is working with the Services to identify and prioritize the "full range" of capabilities required for irregular warfare and stability operations and their doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities implications.

As an integral part of capability development, for both U.S. and international partners, Combatant Commands provide information to the Department on the capabilities needed to conduct their mission through the standardized Integrated Priority List (IPL) process. These requirements are assessed in program development across all Combatant Commands using a prioritization process that seeks to balance risks. Each Combatant Command has priorities unique to the nature of its region. DOD does not expect that each Combatant Command will submit the same requirements or priorities, but instead expects each to provide an assessment of their requirements across the spectrum of capabilities.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Henry, can you comment on how the President's FY 2009 budget reflects implementation of the policy to make stability operations as important as combat operations in terms of doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities?

Secretary HENRY. DOD will not be creating separate stability operations budget lines, but rather driving a shift in capability development priorities. DOD is working through existing capabilities development processes to determine future needs. A critical element of that process will be determining those adaptations made in response to Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom and funded through supplemental appropriations that need to be institutionalized for this new environment.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense is working with the Services and Combatant Commands to identify and prioritize the “full range” of capabilities required for Irregular Warfare and Stability Operations to include their DOTMLPF implications.

In his recent testimony regarding the FY09 budget, the Secretary of Defense highlighted a theme running throughout the FY09 budget request: ensuring the Department is prepared to address the international landscape characterized by new threats and instability. Specific budget requests highlight this change:

- Increased End Strength: increasing Army size by 7,000 over and Marine Corps by 5,000 over FY08 levels enabling the Department to relieve stress on the force caused by the Long War and ensuring it is able to excel at conventional warfare and counterinsurgency operations. (Personnel)
- Global Train and Equip: providing commanders a means to fill longstanding gaps in our ability to build the capacity and capabilities of partner nations. (Authorities)
- Security & Stabilization Assistance: allowing the Department to transfer up to \$200 million to the State Department to facilitate whole-of-government responses to stability and security missions. (Authorities)
- AFRICOM: funding to launch the new Africa Command, allowing the Department to have a more integrated approach. (Organization)
- Foreign Languages: providing for increased language training for all forces to improve preparation for irregular warfare, training and advising missions, humanitarian efforts, and security and stabilization operations. (Training)

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Henry, how is implementation of DOD Directive 3000.05 affected by Secretary England’s direction to Assistant Secretary Vickers to rewrite the directive as a directive on irregular warfare? Does the decision to rewrite DOD Directive 3000.05 mean that the policy establishing stability operations as a core mission comparable in priority to combat operations is being changed?

Secretary HENRY. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review identified the need to rebalance capabilities across the Department to improve joint force proficiency in countering irregular challenges. To implement the vision of the QDR, the Department developed implementation roadmaps for building partnership capacity, irregular warfare, and supporting DOD processes. DODD 3000.05, which pre-dates the 2006 QDR, provided influential foundational concepts for Departmental programs to counter irregular challenges.

Last summer, the Department reported on the progress of DODD 3000.05 initiatives to give stability operations a priority comparable to combat operations. These initiatives informed Department-wide concepts for defeating irregular challenges by working with and through the indigenous population and legitimate government to isolate and defeat irregular adversaries. As DOD worked to enhance relevant capabilities, significant synergies across capabilities became evident.

The Department is now developing a directive to capitalize on these synergies, establish capstone policy for irregular warfare capabilities, and describe the relationship among key activities, including stability operations. In so doing, the directive will integrate the key lessons learned from the QDR Execution Roadmaps, DODD 3000.05, and best practices from current operations. It will synchronize capability development across a wider range of operational environments—permissive, contested, and denied. This approach will help DOD maintain readiness for more contingencies—and provide the nation with more strategic alternatives.

Recognizing that stability operations are essential to traditional warfare, irregular warfare, and a range of activities that are not characterized as warfare per se, the Department continues to develop initiatives under the auspices of NSPD-44 and other interagency authorities. Our strategic guidance reflects this view, and recognizes that in many cases unified action across multiple government agencies is crucial to enduring success. DOD remains engaged with our interagency and international partners to create synergies among our capabilities and synchronize their application in pursuing national security objectives.

Dr. SNYDER. A number of commentators have cited an over-reliance on DOD in times of crisis when, perhaps, other instruments of national power—diplomacy, economic measures, or effective strategic communications—would have been more effective.

tive. Do you share this view and if so, what specific changes can be made and by whom to the interagency process that would strengthen the “voice” of non-DOD agencies and enable non-military solutions or solutions where the military is only in the supporting role?

Secretary PAVEL. The Department is in agreement regarding the need to increase the U.S. Government’s non-military capability and capacity to more effectively and efficiently address current national security threats and opportunities. DOD supports a number of initiatives to support increased capabilities of civilian agencies and the development of whole-of-government planning processes to apply all USG capabilities in a efficient, effective, and unified manner to achieve national goals, to include:

- NSPD-44 “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization”, particularly the President’s FY09 budget request for \$250M for the State Department to build expeditionary capacity at eight civilian agencies through the Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI). CSI will provide trained, equipped, and mission-ready civilian experts who can partner with the U.S. Armed Forces in an integrated fashion, applying all elements of national power to meet national security imperatives.
- National Counterterrorism Center’s efforts to employ diplomatic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement capabilities in support of the 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.
- HSPD-8 “National Preparedness” Annex I, directing the establishment of a standard, coordinated set of plans by all levels of government to enhance our national all-hazards preparedness.

Appropriate resourcing of civilian agencies commensurate with the extent of the requirements and the agility needed to meet today’s threats is essential to achieving the ambitious and laudable goals of these above efforts.

Dr. SNYDER. While we have seen that a big part of the problem with the interagency process is how various agencies react to particular crises once they are underway, another big, and often overlooked, part of the equation is the interagency planning framework. Do you have any thoughts on how that might be more constructively structured and developed? Why hasn’t the framework developed under NSPD-44 been used?

Secretary PAVEL. A key challenge in any interagency operation is to unify various funding streams, Congressional Committee jurisdictions, agency plans, bureaucratic cultures, etc., to have an aggregate effect on the problem—that is done through unified strategic- and operational-level planning, which the Executive Branch is working to improve.

As such, DOD supports improvement of whole-of-government planning. In particular, DOD supports the State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in development of a U.S. Government Planning Framework for Reconstruction and Stabilization as part of NSPD-44 implementation. That framework is:

- Being tested through experiments and exercises with Combatant Commands and across the USG. It will be revised based on those results.
- Designed to address planning for a major response that requires significant and complex humanitarian, security, reconstruction, governance, and economics efforts utilizing civilian and military instruments of power.
- Used for contingency planning and crisis response planning.
- Designed according to universally agreed-upon planning steps and accounting for an iterative planning process between higher and lower level organizations.

Recent changes to DOD planning guidance also ensure a more holistic look at planning by:

- Moving the Department away from an exclusive focus on contingency-driven planning by tasking COCOMs to develop steady-state campaign plans. These steady-state campaign plans will provide an opportunity for greater coordination and synchronization of USG activities to shape the current security environment in order to prevent potential threats to our national security interests from maturing in and emanating from weak and fragile states.
- Ensuring that both stabilization and reconstruction concerns are highlighted in contingency planning.
- Reaching out to the Department of State and other civilian agencies to help make more realistic and holistic assumptions about potential field activities, and to better identify issues/questions that can be resolved or better prepared for with advance discussion in Washington prior to a contingency.

Dr. SNYDER. In May of 2007, President Bush named Lt. General Douglas Lute as assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan. In that position, Lt. General Lute was charged with coordinating the efforts of the Executive Branch to support our commanders and senior diplomats on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan. Could you comment on the effectiveness of that position to date, and why you believe it was necessary to create this position? What is wrong with the interagency structure that required “ad hoc” corrections? Have those conditions changed? Are there more “war czars” in our future?

Secretary PAVEL. Based on the size and complexity of the crisis or issue, it is sometimes necessary to have a high-level individual dedicated to overseeing the task at hand. Such an action does not necessarily indicate a flaw in the system, but rather can be an appropriate response to ensure critical USG goals are met.

Dr. SNYDER. The Defense Science Board made recommendations to the Secretary that DOD’s policy to put stability operations on equal footing with combat operations would involve a massive transformation that required sustained senior executive level involvement, management, and focus and suggested that the transformation needs an “agent of change” at a sufficiently senior level. The DSB specifically conducted that a Deputy Assistant Secretary level official was of insufficient rank to lead the transformation. Who is DOD’s agent of change for stability operations and what was the rationale for that decision?

Secretary PAVEL. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities as established through the reorganization of Policy last year is an integrated, single policy advocate for needed priority capabilities for the future force. This office is best placed to develop a strategically balanced mix for Irregular Warfare, Stability Operations, and future state adversaries.

In addition, Directive 3000.05 led to the creation of two DOD offices to advocate for enhanced capability in stability operations, in Policy and on the Joint Staff, J-5:

- Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations; and
- Joint Chiefs of Staff Stability Operations Division.

The fundamental logic behind the Policy re-organization, however, is that capabilities can be applied across a wide range of conditions. The efforts of these offices can be applied to the range of IW-related mission sets. For example, the DASD for Stability Operations Capabilities is leading a Department-wide review of the capabilities required to “Train, Advise, Assist” (TAA) foreign security forces. Such capabilities have obvious applications across the spectrum of operations.

Dr. SNYDER. Can you comment on how the President’s FY 2009 budget reflects implementation of the policy to make stability operations as important as combat operations in terms of doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel and facilities?

Secretary PAVEL. DOD will not be creating separate stability operations budget lines, but rather driving a shift in capability development priorities. DOD is working through existing capabilities development processes to determine future needs. A critical element of that process will be determining those adaptations made in response to OEF/OIF and funded through supplemental appropriations that need to be institutionalized for this new environment.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense is working with the Services and Combatant Commands to identify and prioritize the “full range” of capabilities required for Irregular Warfare and Stability Operations to include their DOTMLPF implications.

In his recent testimony regarding the FY09 budget, the Secretary of Defense highlighted a theme running throughout the FY09 budget request: ensuring the Department is prepared to address the international landscape characterized by new threats and instability. Specific budget requests highlight this change:

- Increased End Strength: increasing Army size by 7,000 over and Marine Corps by 5,000 over FY08 levels enabling the Department to relieve stress on the force caused by the Long War and ensuring it is able to excel at conventional warfare and counterinsurgency operations. (Personnel)
- Global Train and Equip: providing commanders a means to fill longstanding gaps in our ability to build the capacity and capabilities of partner nations. (Authorities)
- Security & Stabilization Assistance: allowing the Department to transfer up to \$200 million to the State Department to facilitate whole-of-government responses to stability and security missions. (Authorities)

- AFRICOM: funding to launch the new Africa Command, allowing the Department to have a more integrated approach. (Organization)
- Foreign Languages: providing for increased language training for all forces to improve preparation for irregular warfare, training and advising missions, humanitarian efforts, and security and stabilization operations. (Training)

Dr. SNYDER. DOD witnesses testified that measuring the progress or impact of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams is very difficult. What thought are you giving to how the PRTs' work should be assessed? Without metrics, how do we know that the PRTs' work is supporting our strategy or how to adjust their efforts as conditions change? What thought is being given to how future reconstruction and stabilization operations should be measured?

Secretary PAVEL. It is important to evaluate success by outcomes—progress toward strategic objectives. In contested environments, progress is not linear. Conditions change, and our operations must adapt to the new conditions.

Drawing on the work done in metrics for Iraq and Afghanistan, The Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), in conjunction with S/CRS, USAID, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the U.S. Institute for Peace, are working to establish a system of more detailed metrics and transition points for conflict transformation that will assist in campaign design for counterinsurgency and stability operations.

Currently in Iraq and Afghanistan, PRT metrics vary by each of the provinces in the regions—depending upon the needs and existing capacity of the region. The ultimate measure will be the withdrawal of the PRT because of the existence of sufficient freedom of commerce, effective government rule over territory, and freedom of the population to participate in that governance and commerce. Most general categories of metrics focus on the ability of the local government to take action, to include: ability to request, receive, and expend funds from the central government and other sources; ability to run educational and health systems. Many of our metrics are subjective—direct proportional relationships between the reduction of violence and reconstruction efforts; number of unsolicited tips; etc.

Effective evaluation (metrics) is part of a more holistic process executed through a continuous planning process, to include: (1) carrying out joint assessments; (2) establishing clear objectives; (3) applying resources in a coordinate manner; and (4) developing milestones and transition points for achieving that objective. DOD is working with interagency partners to refine that planning process.

Note: Specifics on Iraq/Afghanistan metrics should be directed to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Central Asia, respectively.

Dr. SNYDER. A number of commentators have cited an over-reliance on DOD in times of crisis when, perhaps, other instruments of national power—diplomacy, economic measures, or effective strategic communications—would have been more effective. Do you share this view and if so, what specific changes can be made and by whom to the interagency process that would strengthen the “voice” of non-DOD agencies and enable non-military solutions or solutions where the military is only in the supporting role?

Mr. HESS. We believe that this observation has merit, and that a whole-of-government preventative engagement with the developing world is always better than a military crisis response. A crisis for which a military response is needed is the sign of a failure to address the underlying causes of conflict. The choice should not be seen in terms of choosing between one agency and another in addressing crises. The choice should rather be made in favor of addressing the root causes of conflict over a sustained period rather than responding to a crisis after it has occurred.

Dr. SNYDER. While we have seen that a big part of the problem with the interagency process is how various agencies react to particular crises once they are underway, another big, and often overlooked, part of the equation is the interagency planning framework. Do you have any thoughts on how that might be more constructively structured and developed? Why hasn't the framework developed under NSPD-44 been used?

Mr. HESS. The framework has not been used to date in part because the negotiations about how it will be made operational are still ongoing, and in part because no suitable crisis response requiring its use has occurred. USAID continues to be actively involved with S/CRS in working out these details, through the PCC process and numerous working groups. There remain many unanswered questions about how the framework will be made operational if it is stood up, and how activities on the ground will be funded, implemented, evaluated, and integrated with existing U.S. government development programs.

Dr. SNYDER. In May of 2007, President Bush named Lt. General Douglas Lute as assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan. In that position, Lt. General Lute was charged with coordinating the efforts of the Executive Branch to support our commanders and senior diplomats on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan. Could you comment on the effectiveness of that position to date, and why you believe it was necessary to create this position? What is wrong with the interagency structure that required “ad hoc” corrections? Have those conditions changed? Are there more “war czars” in our future?

Mr. HESS. We have no information about how the decision was made to appoint Lt. General Lute to coordinate these efforts, nor about whether similar arrangements will need to be made in the future.

Dr. SNYDER. GAO reported that the State Department’s internal guidance puts S/CRS’s roles and responsibilities in “conflict with State’s regional bureaus and Chiefs of Mission.” Can you comment on GAO’s conclusion and tell us what is being done to address that issue?

Mr. HESS. This is an internal Department of State matter on which it would not be helpful for USAID to comment.

