[Senate Prints 107-26]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
107th Congress S. Prt.
1st Session COMMITTEE PRINT 107-26
_______________________________________________________________________
U.S. DEFENSE POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN: IN NEED OF AN OVERHAUL
__________
A STAFF TRIP REPORT
TO THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
One Hundred Seventh Congress
First Session
April 2001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
BILL FRIST, Tennessee RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia BARBARA BOXER, California
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BILL NELSON, Florida
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ v
I. Executive Summary................................................1
II. The PRC Threat to Taiwan.........................................2
Taiwan's Defense Needs...........................................3
III.
IV. Shortcomings in Current U.S. Policy..............................7
V. Conclusions and Recommendations..................................9
(iii)
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
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March 8, 2001.
The Honorable Jesse Helms,
United States Senator,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations.
Dear Senator Helms:
Attached you will find a trip report for my recent travel
to Taiwan.
From February 18-23, I toured several Taiwan military
installations and met with numerous high-ranking military and
civilian defense officials in and around Taipei, Kaoshiung and
Hualien. The purpose of my visit was to become better
acquainted with Taiwan's defense needs and to gauge the
effectiveness (or lack thereof) of U.S. policy in response to
those needs.
Installations visited included army, navy, air force and
marine corps bases, several defense command centers, the Chung
Shan Institute of Science and Technology and Taiwan's Institute
for National Strategic Studies. Individuals with whom I met
included President Chen, several of his top civilian defense
advisors, a variety of flag officers from each of Taiwan's
services and representatives from Taiwan's Foreign Ministry.
All of my interlocutors pleaded for full approval of Taiwan's
defense requests and expressed a keen interest in the fate of
the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, stating that the bill was
in Taiwan's interest. At no time did I hear of any opposition
to the TSEA. All of the information in this report was gathered
from Taiwan Government briefings, meetings and conversations in
Taiwan as well as unclassified U.S. Government reports and
press accounts.
In general, I found Taiwan's civilian and military
officials charged with security to be concerned, thoughtful and
prepared vigorously to defend Taiwan's democracy if the need
arises. However, Taiwan's military possesses a number of
shortcomings, particularly in light of Communist China's
sustained military buildup and ever more threatening posture.
While there are steps that Taiwan can and must take by
itself to address some of these shortcomings, U.S. assistance
is required for many others. Unfortunately, current U.S. policy
is totally inadequate to the task. Without radical surgery,
U.S. policy toward Taiwan threatens to leave that young
democracy dangerously exposed to Communist Chinese attack.
Sincerely,
James P. Doran,
Senior Professional Staff Member,
Asian and Pacific Affairs.
(v)
U.S. DEFENSE POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN: IN NEED OF AN OVERHAUL
----------
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Taiwan's military is confronted with a host of needs to
counter the People's Republic of China's military buildup and
increasingly hostile posture. Specifically, Taiwan desperately
needs more advanced, longer-range weaponry, early warning
capabilities, and better C41 (command, control, communications,
computers and intelligence) capabilities. It also needs several
new hardware platforms, particularly submarines and advanced
destroyers. Taiwan also needs a much better working
relationship with the United States military.
However, the U.S. Government imposes a host of petty and
humiliating restrictions on our relationship with Taiwan. For
instance, it requires Taiwan military personnel to wear
civilian clothes or coveralls when they train in the United
States. The U.S. Government routinely rejects Taiwan's defense
sale requests for reasons that can only be described as a
desire to placate China. Examples include not only major
hardware items such as submarines, but also maintenance
equipment for major weapons systems. Furthermore, the U.S.
Government engages in the practice of degrading or ``dumbing
down'' the capabilities of weapons that have been approved for
Taiwan (such as the F-16).
Though it may once have made strategic sense, current U.S.
policy toward Taiwan is outdated, dangerous and, frankly,
embarrassing. A radical change in mind set is needed to pave
the way for a series of common sense changes in policy. Some of
the changes recommended in this report are:
Strict adherence to section 3(b) of the Taiwan
Relations Act when considering defense sales to Taiwan
and ending the practice of ``dumbing down'' Taiwan's
approved equipment;
Lifting petty restrictions on visiting Taiwan
officials and military officers, and on U.S. military
officer travel to Taiwan;
Establishing communications links between the Taiwan
and U.S. defense establishments;
Establishing operational training programs with
Taiwan's military, including joint exercises;
Devoting more intelligence community resources to
studying the PRC threat to Taiwan and establishing a
``Team B'' of analysts to provide an alternative
assessment of the situation; and
Making the defense of Taiwan an illustrative case in
the Department of Defense's Quadrennial Defense Review.
II. THE PRC THREAT TO TAIWAN
The basic parameters of China's increasing threat to Taiwan
are well known, even if downplayed by the Clinton
administration and China's many supporters in Washington.
China's military budget has increased by double digit
percentages for over a decade. Girded by its bulging trade
surplus with the United States, cheap loans from the World Bank
and the Asian Development Bank, and aid from Japan and other
nations, China is procuring a raft of advanced and dangerous
weaponry, particularly from Russia.
A 1999 Pentagon report to Congress states that this
buildup, combined with China's short-range missile deployments
opposite Taiwan (which press reports indicate will number 600-
800 by 2005) will give the PRC, by 2005, the ability to attack
and degrade Taiwan's key military facilities and damage its
economic infrastructure. Furthermore, the report concludes that
by 2005, the PRC will posses the ability to gain air
superiority over Taiwan and will ``retain'' its ability to
effect a naval blockade of Taiwan. These developments represent
of shift in the balance of power away from Taiwan and toward
Beijing in the coming years, should current trends continue.
China's buildup is accompanied by ever more threatening
rhetoric toward Taiwan, which reflects the growing importance
the Chinese Communists place on ``re-unifying the motherland''
by absorbing Taiwan. This is evidenced by: China's February
2000 White Paper, in which it asserted another, new yardstick
for the possible employment of force against Taiwan (that being
if Taiwan merely delays reunification talks for too long);
Jiang Zemin's November 2000 statement that, ``It is imperative
to step up preparations for a military struggle so as to
promote the early solution of the Taiwan issue. To this end, it
is necessary to vigorously develop some `trump card' weapons
and equipment.''; and People's Liberations Army (PLA) Chief
Zhang Wannian's November 2000 statement that war between China
and Taiwan was inevitable by 2005.
The staff of Taiwan's J-2 (intelligence) and various
commanders are increasingly worried about China's developing
satellite capabilities (including electro-optical and radar
satellite capabilities), evolving information warfare
capabilities (One general commented that the PRC's IW
capabilities will pose a ``lethal'' threat to Taiwan by 2005 or
so) and China's growing missile deployments and related
testing. Also of concern to Taiwan is the recently-begun and
pending deliveries of Russian Su-30 fighter/bombers armed with
the advanced R-77 (AA-12) missile, recent and possible further
delivery of Sovremenny destroyers armed with Sunburn missiles,
the growing size and complexity of China's military exercises
(including efforts to improve their logistical capabilities for
Taiwan scenarios), numerous recent simulations of cross-Strait
attacks and airborne assaults by the PLA and China's potential
for landing huge numbers of troops on Taiwan through irregular
means.
Taiwan's military believes the PLA is moving toward a quick
strike sort of ``solution'' to the Taiwan ``problem'' that can
be effected before U.S. forces, should they be so ordered, have
a chance to arrive on the scene.
The Taiwan military is also concerned about the security
ramifications of the so-called ``Three Links'' (direct trade,
transport and postal links with China), toward which Taiwan
seems inexorably to be moving.
III. TAIWAN'S DEFENSE NEEDS
While Taiwan's military consists of many dedicated, capable
leaders and personnel, and a good number of modern weapons
platforms, it desperately needs more advanced, longer-range
weaponry, early warning capabilities, and better C41
capabilities. For Taiwan's detractors in the United States,
this means that Taipei does not need new weapons platforms.
This is not true. Taiwan does need new platforms, particularly
submarines and advanced destroyers. Taiwan also needs a much
better working relationship with the U.S. military in the
fields of defense planning, intelligence, training, operational
methods and tactics.
While the Government of Taiwan would not provide its
official defense request list, below are some items in which
Taiwan has publicly expressed an interest.
More Advanced, Longer-Range Weaponry/Platforms
Many of Taiwan's high profile weapons platforms, such as
the F-16 fighter and the Lafayette-class frigate, are mere
shells of what they could be, possessing weapons that have very
limited range and/or guidance systems. For instance, the
Lafayettes carry only subsonic anti-ship missiles with an
effective range of just 35 miles, surface to air missiles with
only a two mile range and a Gatling gun that would
automatically shut down if the Sunburn were coming toward it.
Commanders and operators stressed the need to have better
standoff capability to defend against the Chinese threat. This
will require air, sea and ground-based weapons with longer
ranges and better guidance systems than Taiwan currently
possesses. It will also require several new platforms.
AIR FORCE
Taiwan's pilots stressed the need to be able to take out
China's numerous and increasingly long-range surface-to-air
missiles (such as the long-range S-300), which pose a
potentially lethal threat to Taiwan's air force, as well as the
ability to counterattack numerically superior Chinese aircraft
and naval vessels from a longer distance. The Taiwan Air
Force's current standoff capability is severely limited. As the
Pentagon noted in its 1999 report to Congress, China's
increasingly capable air force is on the verge of attaining the
ability to achieve air superiority over Taiwan, if it hasn't
already.
To ward off this dangerous development, Taiwan pilots
specifically expressed interest in HARM missiles (High-speed
anti-radiation missiles, employed to counter SAM sites), Joint
Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) and longer range, infra-red
guided missiles capable of attacking ground targets. They
further requested that the recently approved AIM-120 air-to-air
missiles be delivered to Taiwan rather than stored in Arizona
(an arrangement imposed on Taiwan by the Clinton administration
in 2000).
Taiwan's air force (and navy) also has other significant
shortcomings. For instance, it has no identification friend or
foe capabilities. Thus, Taiwan aircraft returning home from a
dogfight with Chinese fighters over the water could be in
substantial danger of being shot down by friendly fire.
Taiwan's F-16 pilots also lack night vision equipment and
helmet-sighted air-to-air missiles (which the PRC has recently
acquired from the Russians).
Taiwan's Indigenous Defense Fighters (IDF) are plagued by
the lack of ability to detect illumination by enemy radar and a
shortage of guidance systems for their missiles. Attempts to
procure technology to solve these problems from the United
States have been unsuccessful.
NAVY
To counter the PLA's growing naval threat, Taiwan's naval
commanders are interested in improving their sea-based air
defenses, acquiring longer range and more accurate ship-to-ship
and anti-air missiles, protecting their communications
infrastructure, improving their ASW capabilities and developing
a survivable force to counter a blockade. Taiwan will also need
new naval platforms simply to replace its aging fleet, one-half
of which will need to be retired in the coming years.
1. Submarines
Taiwan commanders repeatedly stated that by far the most
important item for Taiwan's navy, indeed for Taiwan's entire
military, is the acquisition of submarines. China maintains an
overwhelming 65-4 advantage in submarines over Taiwan. Two of
Taiwan's submarines are WWII-era Guppy-class boats which are
unsuitable for combat. Acquisition of new submarines must be a
part of any prudent ASW strategy for Taiwan. More importantly,
because of their survivability, submarines will be a crucial
last line of sea-based defense against a Chinese blockade.
Should, as the 1999 Pentagon report intimated, Taiwan's surface
fleet be blitzed with air- and sea-launched missiles early in a
confrontation, and should Taiwan's air bases be rendered
inoperative by SRBM strikes, a fleet of surviving submarines
could still possibly allow Taiwan to thwart a Chinese blockade
by stealthily attacking the surface ships that would enforce
that blockade.
The standard State Department argument against selling
submarines to Taiwan--that they are offensive--is an example of
moral equivalence at work. It is absurd on its face not to
consider that Taiwan is a democracy, has no designs on any of
its neighbors, and faces a Communist China that has threatened
to ``drown it in a sea of fire.''
Others attempt to make ``military'' arguments against
submarines for Taiwan, asserting, among other things, that
submarines have a very limited sonar range and need to receive
queuing information from elsewhere, rendering them less
effective than aircraft at locating Chinese targets. This
argument not only ignores the survivability of submarines
(especially given China's weak ASW capabilities), but also
neglects the fact that a Chinese blockade of Taiwan would have
to take place near a few relatively narrow choke points, making
it easier for Taiwan's submarines (especially if aided by an
underwater surveillance system) to locate and destroy Chinese
ships and submarines. In addition, these ``military'' arguments
usually emanate from voices that are generally dovish on China.
Thus, one can see that the principal objection against
submarines for Taiwan remains the fact that it would displease
the PRC.
2. Aegis destroyers
Taiwan has requested four Aegis destroyers for the past
three years, only to be turned down by the Clinton
administration. It is a common misconception that Taiwan wants
Aegis as a Theater Missile Defense system. In fact, Taiwan is
currently ambivalent about purchasing TMD from the United
States, based upon concern over technological developments and
cost. Besides, the Pentagon has identified THAAD, not Aegis, as
potentially a more suitable U.S. TMD system for Taiwan in the
future.
Taiwan wants, and Taiwan needs, Aegis destroyers to provide
it with an adequate sea-based air defense and C41 system to
deal with rapidly developing PRC air and naval threats. As of
now, Taiwan's sea-based air defense and C41 capabilities are
rudimentary at best. If Taiwan is to have any chance of
overcoming China's 10-1 combat aircraft advantage, 2-1 surface
fleet advantage, and its new and pending acquisitions of modern
and deadly weapons such as Su-27 and Su-30 fighters, Sovremenny
destroyers and Sunburn and AA-12 missiles, a modern integrated
sea-based air defense system will be crucial. Aegis will
provide exactly that.
One problem with Aegis, however, is that it is now
impossible for Taiwan to have Aegis ready by the crucial year
of 2005, since it will take 8-10 years for the platform to
become operational in Taiwan.
3. Kidd-class destroyers
To deal with this problem in the interim, Taiwan is
potentially interested in acquiring four existing Kidd
destroyers that the U.S. Navy wishes to unload. The Kidds
possess a radar system that is nowhere near as capable as
Aegis, yet is at least one generation ahead of what Taiwan
currently has. Costing a fraction of Aegis destroyers and able
to be delivered and operational within a couple of years, the
Kidds might provide a practical interim solution to Taiwan's
sea based air defense needs before 2005. However, the Kidds are
already 25 years old and will be nearing the end of their
useful lives by the time Aegis, if approved this year, is
operational. Thus, both Kidds and Aegis need to be approved by
the Bush administration this year.
Taiwan's Navy has also expressed an interest in P-3
submarine hunting aircraft, as well as longer-range and more
accurate missiles and torpedoes, all of which will be vital in
countering blockade efforts.
ARMY
There has been a tendency by some in the United States to
malign Taiwan's army as less than relevant, given that, at
least in the early phases, this battle would be fought in the
sea and in the air. Nonetheless, Taiwan's army commanders are
dedicated, tough and thoughtful. They make a convincing case
that, as long as Taiwan's political leadership holds out and as
long as the United States will provide them with quality
weapons and training, they have the wherewithal to repel a
Chinese amphibious and/or airborne assault.
Of course, there is great question as to whether China
could even mount an all-out invasion of Taiwan and a serious
case could be made that Taiwan's Army may be less relevant than
the navy or air force. But deterrence involves raising the
potential costs to the aggressor, and every little bit helps.
The army is the last resort for Taiwan's defense, and a strong,
viable ground force may be the critical factor that could give
the Taiwan political leadership confidence and reduce its
vulnerability to coercion in a crisis situation. Nor can we
ignore China's massive irregular fleet of fishing and merchant
vessels which could one day be used to land soldiers on Taiwan.
Furthermore, China will almost certainly use Special Operations
Forces in an attack against Taiwan. Thus, it would be a mistake
to ignore Taiwan's army.
Taiwan's army officers expressed interest in longer-range
and more accurate artillery, advanced attack helicopters with
advanced radars, and a limited number of advanced tanks, not to
engage in a land battle, but to repel Chinese invaders while
they are still in the water.
Early Warning
Taiwan's commanders repeatedly mentioned the need for
better early warning capabilities. Taiwan's ability to detect
missile launches is virtually nil, and though Taiwan can better
detect aircraft sorties, the short flying time across the
Strait means Taiwan will have very limited warning time of an
aerial attack or airborne assault. During that time, Taiwan
will desperately need to scramble (or hide) its aircraft,
disperse its naval vessels and deploy its rapid reaction ground
forces. Extra minutes will be crucial. Thus, Taiwan is seeking
from the United States longer range radars with missile
detection capabilities. Taiwan commanders also made a desperate
plea for U.S. satellite early warning data, which we presently
share with several gulf states and Russia.
Software and C41
Some in Washington make the specious and condescending
argument that Taiwan's military commanders just want to buy and
play around with their ``toys,'' with no regard for the
software or C41 systems that make modern weapons work properly,
efficiently and in an integrated fashion.
This is not the case. The need for C41 was brought up
repeatedly, and in quite urgent tones, by an array of different
officers with whom I met. Taiwan's commanders are fully
cognizant of the fact that, being outnumbered by the PRC,
integration and coordination of their counterattack will be
crucial. (To be sure, intensive work by some Pentagon officials
over the past few years may be responsible for convincing some
Taiwan officers of this necessity.) In fact, Taiwan has been
seeking to buy a U.S.-made system that will provide them with
integrated C41 capabilities--so far without success. Taiwan has
also sought to buy other software items and a maintenance
facility for one of its premier defense platforms, also
unsuccessfully. These items will be detailed in section IV of
this report.
Working Relationship With the United States
Taiwan's military has been isolated for 22 years. This has
inevitably degraded Taiwan's readiness. The lack of interaction
between the United States and Taiwan militaries will also
result in great confusion, which could unnecessarily cost
lives, should U.S. forces have to enter into battle with
Taiwan.
Taiwan's commanders expressed an interest in conducting
joint exercises with the United States, joint planning, more
robust and on-site training, direct, secure communications
(both at the policy and operational levels), more technology
cooperation, expanded intelligence sharing and joint special
forces work (including with Taiwan's impressive Marine Corps).
Finally, there is an unmistakable resentment that simmers
in Taiwan toward what they view as shabby and impolite
treatment by U.S. Government officials, particularly from the
State Department and the American Institute in Taiwan. Taiwan's
culture is exceedingly polite and it is unusual to hear direct
criticism of anyone. Moreover, the Taiwan Government rightly
fears retribution if it is too vocal on these matters.
Nonetheless, a palpable sense of dismay and resignation is
evident in Taiwan over the way some U.S. Government officials
treat their Taiwan counterparts.
IV. SHORTCOMINGS IN CURRENT U.S. POLICY
The aforementioned attitudes on the part of both U.S. and
Taiwan officials are undoubtedly an outgrowth of the petty and
humiliating restrictions the U.S. Government imposes on its
relationship with Taiwan. Examples include:
--requiring Taiwan military personnel to wear civilian
clothes or coveralls when they train in the United
States (the French impose no such restrictions when
Taiwan personnel train in France). In fact, a Taiwan
Marine told me that, while training at Quantico on the
day after de-recognition in 1979, he was ordered
immediately to take off his uniform on orders that came
from Washington. (The directives addressing this and
other restrictions placed on Taiwan which must have
been issued by President Carter have never, to my
knowledge, been made public or provided to Congress.);
--forbidding Taiwan pilots from wearing flight suit name
badges while training in the United States;
--prohibiting the Taiwan defense minister from traveling to
the United States, while at the same time granting red
carpet treatment to Communist Chinese officers,
including many who were involved in the Tiananmen
Square Massacre;
--denying Taiwan military personnel access to the Joint
Forces Command, while at the same time granting such
access to Communist Chinese officers;
--denying Taiwan personnel access to U.S. submarines, while
at the same time granting such access to Communist
Chinese officers;
--prohibiting direct training by Americans of Taiwan pilots
in Taiwan and limiting other types of training
(particularly operational training). In many cases, a
handful of Taiwan trainers must come to the United
States to learn training techniques and then return
home to train their personnel;
--keeping the President of Taiwan under wraps while
transiting the United States and forbidding him to meet
with Members of Congress;
--forbidding the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative
Office to fly Taiwan's flag over its building in
Washington;
--forbidding U.S. Government personnel to set foot on the
grounds of Twin Oaks, the Taiwan Government's historic
estate in Washington; and
--forbidding Taiwan diplomats in the United States from using
diplomatic license plates (no such restriction is
imposed on Taiwan diplomats in Canada).
The U.S. Government also routinely rejects Taiwan's defense
requests for reasons that can only be described as a desire to
placate China. This is, of course, a flat violation of section
3(b) of the Taiwan Relations Act, which states that sales to
Taiwan shall be based solely on Taiwan's defense needs. Given
China's military buildup and increasing verbal threats, there
can be no legal justification for denying items such as Aegis,
submarines and P-3s--all of which have been rejected in recent
years--or Maverick G or AIM-120 missiles, which were rejected
for several years before being approved in 2000. (The AIM-120s
were only partially approved, as they will be stored in the
United States until or unless China acquires the AA-12.)
The U.S. has also rejected or delayed the following
requests by Taiwan in recent years:
HARM missiles, which Taiwan needs to counter the
PRC's growing SAM threat;
Technology to allow Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF)
pilots to know whether they have been illuminated by
enemy radar;
Guidance systems for the IDF's missiles;
Depot-level maintenance facilities for the Patriot
anti-missile systems, requiring Taiwan to send faulty
parts back to the United States for repair. This can
take as long as two years and has resulted in Taiwan's
Patriot system being inoperable for periods of up to
one week; and
K-band traveling wave tubes, to assist in
researching and developing anti-missile systems.
``Model T''s
In addition to rejecting and delaying defense sales to
Taiwan, the U.S. Government also engages in the practice of
``dumbing down'' (often at late stages in the process) weapons
that have been approved for Taiwan. Taiwan officers derisively
refer to many of their U.S. weapons systems at ``Model T''s
(for Taiwan). Thus, Taiwan did not buy F-16As and F-16Bs from
the United States; it bought F-16Ts, which don't exist anywhere
else in the world. The weapons systems, avionics and tactical
training given to Taiwan along with the aircraft neither met
Taiwan's expectations nor do they match that which has been
given to other foreign recipients of the F-16. In particular,
the United States for years did not provide ground attack
munitions for the F-16s and has never provided the F-16's
tactical training manual to Taiwan. Similar examples abound
with other platforms, weapons and equipment sold to Taiwan.
U.S. policy toward Taiwan has also been almost wholly
passive. We have spent 22 years merely responding to Taiwan's
defense sales requests. Only recently have efforts begun to
study Taiwan's real needs, as with the recent Air Defense and
Naval Modernization studies prepared by the Department of
Defense. But it is frankly unclear whether those studies were
ordered to fill a real need or to deflect attention from
rejected defense sales.
And it is far from clear that the lessons learned in those
studies have been or will be applied. For instance, the Air
Defense Review was rumored to have endorsed the sale of Aegis
prior to the 2000 defense talks, but Aegis was not approved.
Similarly, the more recent Naval Modernization Study is
reported by the New York Times to endorse the transfer of
submarines, Aegis and P-3s to Taiwan, but the contents of this
study have been kept from the public and Congress.
The United States has also not devoted enough attention to
collecting and analyzing information regarding the cross-Strait
military situation. As a December 2000 Pentagon report to
Congress on the implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act
stated, there are three main gaps in our knowledge of the
situation.
First, we need to know more about how the authorities in
the PRC and Taiwan view their military and political situations
in order to identify the most important conflict scenarios and
to assess whether the balance of forces adequately deters
Chinese attack and reassures Taiwan. Second, we need to know
more about each side's training, logistics, doctrine, command
and control, special operations and mine warfare capabilities.
Third, we cannot confidently assess how each side's
capabilities will develop and how each side will respond to
these developments.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Though it may once have made strategic sense, current U.S.
policy toward Taiwan is outdated, dangerous and, frankly, an
embarrassment. It is difficult to look Taiwan's pilots, sailors
and soldiers in the eye, knowing that one day they might die in
combat due to the callousness and negligence of U.S. policy.
An elaborate game that is tantamount to a policy of
appeasement of Communist China, U.S.-Taiwan policy threatens to
precipitate a war that neither the United States, nor Taiwan,
is prepared to fight. A radical change in mind set is needed to
pave the way for a series of common sense changes in policy,
with the specific goal of deterring a conflict. Such changes
should include:
(1) Strict adherence to section 3(b) of the Taiwan
Relations Act when considering defense sales to Taiwan. This
would mandate that all of Taiwan's requests be approved, unless
they are obviously militarily unnecessary (for instance, if
Taiwan were to request long-range bombers or huge numbers of
landing craft) or if the PRC threat were to diminish tangibly,
and as long as the requests do not violate U.S. technology
transfer policies.
(2) End the practice of ``dumbing down'' Taiwan's approved
equipment; no more ``Model T''s. Again, this is so long as
deliveries to Taiwan are in line with U.S. global technology
transfer policies.
(3) Lift petty restrictions on visiting Taiwan officials
and military officers. Taiwan's President should not be kept
locked up in a hotel, and Taiwan's proud military men and women
should be allowed to wear their uniforms in the United States.
Taiwan's access to U.S. military facilities should far exceed,
not trail behind, that afforded to Communist China.
(4) Lift restrictions on U.S. military officer travel to
Taiwan. The limit is currently set at the relatively junior
rank of 0-6. American flag officers need to see Taiwan and
Taiwan needs to benefit from the experience which U.S. flag
officers have to share. In addition, when sending tough
messages to urge Taiwan to improve its capabilities in certain
areas, it is more effective, and respectful, if delivered by a
general officer.
(5) Allow more U.S. military personnel to train Taiwan
personnel in Taiwan and allow U.S. pilots to fly backseat with
the Taiwan Air Force (as French pilots do).
(6) Establish direct, secure communications between the
Taiwan and U.S. defense establishments. At a minimum, this
should be done at the policy level, with either a hotline or a
video-teleconferencing system linking the Pentagon, the U.S.
Pacific Command and Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense.
Ideally, an entire set of operational links should be
established that allows U.S. and Taiwan aircraft, ships and
shore units to communicate. Without this, chaos will certainly
ensue should hostilities break out.
(7) Establish operational training programs with Taiwan's
military. Taiwan's military needs to work with ours. Ideally,
the U.S. and Taiwan should conduct joint exercises. At a
minimum, we should allow Taiwan to observe a U.S.-only exercise
that is modeled on a Taiwan scenario. A permanent PACOM J-3
presence should also be established at AIT in Taipei.
(8) Enhance intelligence exchanges with Taiwan and
establish intelligence contact between Taiwan and PACOM.
(9) Provide Taiwan with satellite shared early warning
data. This is simply a one-way flow of information that warns
23 million democratically-governed people that missiles are
coming.
(10) Cooperate with Taiwan on information and electronic
warfare.
(11) Scrap the annual defense sale process. This is a hoary
holdover from the Carter administration, designed to control
Taiwan. There is no good reason why, if an item cannot be
approved one year, that Taiwan must wait 12 months for another
answer. We should accept and evaluate Taiwan's requests on a
rolling basis, as we do with other countries.
(12) Devote more intelligence community resources to
studying the PRC threat to Taiwan (and to U.S. forces) and
establish a ``Team B'' of analysts to provide an alternative
assessment of the situation.
(13) Make the defense of Taiwan an illustrative case in the
QDR. A conflict in Taiwan is at least as likely as one on the
Korean Peninsula, yet it seems little thought has gone into
just what would be required for the United States to fight and
win a war in the Taiwan theater.
(14) Continue the focused studies on aspects of Taiwan's
overall defense needs (we should initiate an Army study and a
C41 study), but not as a means of unnecessarily delaying
approval of Taiwan's legitimate defense requests. It is time to
admit that, absent democratic political change in the PRC,
continuing our current policy toward Taiwan will guarantee the
destruction of that island democracy by China's rapidly
expanding military forces. The fall of Taiwan will usher in an
era of Communist Chinese hegemony in Asia, and the United
States will be saddled with a new cold war, at the outset of
which American credibility in the region will be in tatters.
(15) Last, but not least, the U.S. Government needs to
scrap the policy of strategic ambiguity. The U.S. needs to
state unambiguously that we will defend Taiwan if it is
attacked. In so doing, the U.S. must not fall into the trap of
qualifying this assertion by stating that we will not defend
Taiwan if it declares independence. In addition to being a
betrayal of American values, such an overly clever policy
construct would leave too much room for Beijing to try to
exploit.
While the corrective measures suggested above will
certainly evoke howls of protest from the PRC, they are
urgently needed both to deter conflict and, should deterrence
fail, to save Taiwanese and American lives in combat.
Naysayers will insist that these measures are inconsistent
with our ``unofficial'' relationship with Taiwan, whatever that
means. But these measures are entirely consistent with the
law--the Taiwan Relations Act. Nothing in the TRA prohibits
these activities; in fact, the TRA seems specifically to allow
them. Section 4(a)(1) of the TRA states, ``Whenever the laws of
the United States refer or relate to foreign countries,
nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms
shall include and such laws shall apply with respect to
Taiwan.'' In other words, other than not recognizing Taipei as
the Government of China, we are legally to treat Taiwan as a
country.
Pretending Taiwan does not exist is no longer an option.
Nor is pretending that Communist China is not a threat. Nor is
it an option to pretend that everything is fine between the
United States and Taiwan, as some former U.S. officials have
recently stated, Things are not just fine, and they need to be
fixed. Soon.