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111th Congress
2d Session COMMITTEE PRINT S. Prt.
111-54
_______________________________________________________________________
SAUDI ARABIA AND SYRIA:
IMPROVING BILATERAL RELATIONS,
ADVANCING U.S. INTERESTS
__________
A MINORITY STAFF REPORT
prepared for the use of the
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
One Hundred Eleventh Congress
Second Session
July 21, 2010
?
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
Frank G. Lowenstein, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
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C O N T E N T S
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Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ v
I. Introduction.................................................. 1
II. Staff Findings............................................... 1
A. Saudi Arabia.............................................. 1
1. Substance............................................. 2
a. Critical Infrastructure Protection................ 2
b. Regional Stability................................ 4
2. Process............................................... 6
B. Syria..................................................... 7
1. Ambassadorial Access (or Lack Thereof) . . ........... 7
2. . . . To Better Advance U.S. Interests............... 8
a. A Suitable New Embassy Compound................... 8
b. A Responsible Syrian Role in the Region........... 9
c. Halting Missile Transfers to Hizballah............ 9
3. Security and Morale................................... 10
III. Conclusion.................................................. 10
Appendix.--Interlocutors......................................... 11
(iii)
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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
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United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC, July 21, 2010.
Dear Colleague: In late May, I directed my senior
professional staff member for the Middle East, Dorothy Shea, to
visit Saudi Arabia and Syria to review bilateral relations as
well as cooperation on regional issues. Although the
circumstances facing Saudi Arabia and Syria differ greatly,
U.S. foreign policy toward both countries warrant continued
oversight, given the importance of U.S. interests at stake.
In Saudi Arabia, staff paid particular attention to a
relatively new bilateral cooperation program on Critical
Infrastructure Protection, a partnership that is important not
only for stability in the Kingdom, but for the protection of
energy security more broadly. It is too early to judge the
success of the relatively new partnership. Looking forward,
staff recommended the development of rigorous metrics to
measure progress and ensure transparency. Staff also reviewed
U.S.-Saudi efforts to promote greater stability in the region,
finding a solid basis of shared interests and constructive
collaboration to advance those goals. That said, there is room
for greater cooperation.
Relations with Syria, meanwhile, remain quite strained. The
Bush Administration decided to recall its Ambassador to Syria
in the aftermath of the assassination of Rafik Hariri, who was
then Prime Minister of Lebanon. After a five-year hiatus, the
Obama Administration has nominated a U.S. Ambassador to Syria,
making the case that a U.S. Ambassador on the ground would not
be a reward to the regime in Syria, but rather would represent
a tool to advance U.S. interests. Against the backdrop of
Congressional debate about the nomination of Robert Ford as
U.S. Ambassador to Syria, staff reviewed Embassy operations in
the absence of an Ambassador. Staff found that the lack of an
Ambassador in Damascus has rendered the Embassy extremely
limited in its ability to conduct normal business. The
Embassy's resultant lack of access has left it hampered in its
ability to press for progress on a range of specific issues,
some of which are of great importance to U.S. interests, such
as obtaining a property for a new, more secure, Embassy
compound. In addition, recent reports of Syrian transfers of
ballistic missiles from Iran to Hizballah in Lebanon underscore
the importance of ensuring that the U.S. message is heard and
understood in Damascus. U.S. Embassy officials told staff that
in the midst of this missile incident, they had experienced
difficulties delivering an urgent demarche to the Syrian
Government.
(v)
In the interest of contributing to Congressional
deliberations on the prospects for advancing U.S. interests in
the Middle East, I wanted to share with you the staff trip
report, which I believe provides useful insight into key issues
at play with respect to Saudi Arabia and Syria, as well as
their respective roles in the region. I hope that you will find
this information helpful.
I look forward to continuing to work with you on these
issues and welcome any comments you may have on this report.
Sincerely,
Richard G. Lugar,
Ranking Member.
SAUDI ARABIA AND SYRIA: IMPROVING BILATERAL RELATIONS, ADVANCING U.S.
INTERESTS
I. Introduction
As part of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's
oversight of the management of U.S. foreign policy, Senior
Professional Staff Member for the Middle East Dorothy Shea
visited Saudi Arabia and Syria May 28-June 2, 2010. In both
countries, staff reviewed the state of bilateral relations as
well as cooperation on regional issues. Despite the vastly
different contexts, U.S. relations with both countries warrant
continued oversight, albeit for different reasons. In Saudi
Arabia, oversight was focused on the broader relationship;
whereas in Syria, staff was particularly concerned with the
question of the merits of having a U.S. Ambassador on the
ground. Both the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and that
in Damascus, Syria have recently undergone internal reviews,
having been inspected by the State Department's Office of the
Inspector General (OIG).\1\ The staff delegation followed up on
several of the OIG's findings and recommendations with Embassy
staffs in the respective countries.
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\1\ See U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of
Governors Office of Inspector General's Report of Inspection: Embassy
Riyadh and Constituent Posts, Saudi Arabia, Report Number ISP-I-10-19A,
March 2010; and Report of Inspection: Embassy Damascus, Syria, Report
Number ISP-I-10-34A, March 2010.
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II. Staff Findings
a. saudi arabia
The United States Government and the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia have long enjoyed strong relations. The relationship is
built on mutual interests, including regional stability, energy
security, and the fight against terrorism. Relations have not
been without challenges, however, particularly in the aftermath
of the attacks of September 11, 2001, in which 15 of the
hijackers were Saudi nationals. That said, the trajectory is
positive, as the relationship has matured and strengthened over
time. The purpose of this report is not to review the history
of those relations--many documents available to the public do
an excellent job in this regard.\2\ Nor is the purpose to
provide a comprehensive overview of U.S. policy vis-a-vis the
Kingdom. Rather, staff looked into a couple of discrete areas
where there might be opportunities to better advance U.S.
interests vis-a-vis the Kingdom. Findings relate to both the
substance and process of U.S.-Saudi relations.
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\2\ See, for example, Christopher M. Blanchard, ``Saudi Arabia:
Background and U.S. Relations,'' (Congressional Research Service
RL33533, December 16, 2009); and the Department of State's Background
Note on Saudi Arabia (April 5, 2010); http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/
3584.htm.
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1. Substance
The U.S. Embassy Country Team has laid out several core
objectives with respect to Saudi Arabia. These include working
cooperatively to counter the threat of terrorism; working
constructively to promote regional stability; improving U.S.-
Saudi economic ties, including through increased
diversification of the Saudi economy; building and improving
ties between the Saudi and American people; and promoting good
governance. The reality is that the United States has many,
sometimes competing, interests, and staff found that the U.S.
Embassy was aggressively pursuing progress on these fronts. Of
paramount concern to U.S. national security interests are
energy security, which is being addressed in Saudi Arabia,
among other ways, through a new program on critical
infrastructure protection; and regional stability, which the
Kingdom is working to promote both domestically and abroad,
both at the operational level, through counter-terrorism
programs, and at the societal level, through counter-
radicalization efforts. Staff focused on U.S.-Saudi cooperation
on critical infrastructure protection and regional security.
a. Critical Infrastructure Protection
Saudi oil reserves are the largest in the world, estimated
at 263 billion barrels, and over one million barrels of Saudi
oil are supplied to the U.S. market on a daily basis. As the
State Department Background Note puts it, ``The continued
availability of reliable sources of oil, particularly from
Saudi Arabia, remains important to the prosperity of the United
States.'' \3\
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\3\ Department of State's Background Note on Saudi Arabia (April 5,
2010).
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Following the May 2006 attempted terrorist attack on the
Abqaiq oil processing facility, the United States and Saudi
Arabia stepped up their cooperation on the protection of the
Kingdom's energy resources. In May 2008, the United States and
Saudi Arabia signed a Technical Cooperation Agreement on
critical infrastructure protection. Meetings to set the agenda
for the program and review progress will be held semi-annually
and chaired on the U.S. side by Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs Bill Burns, and on the Saudi side by Deputy
Interior Minister Prince Mohammed Bin Nayef.
A key challenge to infrastructure protection is that energy
infrastructure in Saudi Arabia is dispersed throughout the
country. The goal of the technical assistance program is to
establish and improve the Saudis' capability to protect
critical infrastructure via the transfer of technical
knowledge, advice, and resources. The new bilateral program has
begun execution through project-specific agreements, which are
fully funded by the Saudi government. The value of agreements
in place for the next three years is about $800 million. In
October 2008, then-U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Ford Fraker
predicted that the value of contracts associated with the
program could reach tens of billions of dollars.\4\ Key
components include:
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\4\ As quoted in above cited Congressional Research Service report
on Saudi Arabia, RL3533.
The Facilities Security Force. Standing up a 35,000-strong
force to defend critical sites. The Saudis will do the
recruiting; the U.S. will help provide basic training,
English-language training, and specialized training;
Site Assessments. Identification of priority sites, which
are then visited for assessment of vulnerability;
There is agreement in principle for future cooperation on
Diplomatic Security; Maritime Security; and Cyber
Security.
Staff had the opportunity to meet with members of the new
team of U.S. experts in Riyadh, who are funded by the Saudi
government. They are contractors employed under the banner of
the new Office of Program Management--Ministry of Interior.
Staff found the growing cooperation, of both a policy and
technical nature, to be promising. While it is still too early
to assess progress, the program is working from sound guiding
principles, including:
The need to be anticipatory and adaptable;
The need for continuous planning and adaptation;
The need for seamless inter-agency coordination on the part
of both Saudi Arabia and the U.S. Government; and
The need for independent evaluation and auditing.
Given the importance to U.S. interests of protecting
critical infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, staff believes that
this area of cooperation will merit continued oversight.
Suggested areas of oversight include:
Measuring success. Ultimately, the success of this program
will be measured by the extent to which the security of
Saudi energy infrastructure sites is enhanced. It is
important that precursor metrics be developed, however.
One can imagine metrics to gauge the effectiveness of
the training of the 35,000 new recruits for the new
Facilities Security Force, for example. Similarly, the
ability of this new force to deter attacks could be
tested by targeted drills. The point is not for the
Legislative Branch of the U.S. Government to develop
metrics, but to be sure that the U.S. Administration
and Saudi overseers of this program do, and that they
are used to make improvements where necessary as the
program matures.
The degree to which seamless inter-agency cooperation is
achieved and maintained. This pertains to both the
U.S. side (where the State Department, the Departments
of Defense, Energy and Homeland Security, and the
Intelligence Community are all stakeholders), and the
Saudi side, which one observer described as
``hopelessly stove-piped,'' particularly in the
security sphere.
Transparency in awarding contracts. The prospect that the
value of contracts that could be associated with this
program may reach tens of billions of dollars
underscores the need for vigilance in ensuring that
contracts are awarded in a transparent, results-based
manner. In addition, both sides must take pains to
avoid potential perceptions of diplomatic payoff to buy
American goodwill, and/or greed on the part of U.S.
contractors. Under Secretary Burns and Prince Nayef can
play an important role in this regard by setting a tone
of professionalism and accountability in the bilateral
oversight meetings.
b. Regional Stability
Staff had hoped to follow up on Washington-based
discussions about regional dynamics, including Saudi views of
Iran's role in the region, Saudi Arabia's role in Yemen, in
Syria and Lebanon, as well as in promoting Israeli-Palestinian
peace talks. Unfortunately, suitable interlocutors were not
available in Riyadh to have a meaningful exchange. (See below
section on Process issues.) Even so, based on conversations
with State and Embassy officials in the field, staff would
recommend continued oversight on the following areas:
Cooperation on Iran. Saudi Arabia can play an important
role in bolstering and helping preserve the integrity
of the sanctions regime. Saudi views about Iran's
nuclear program are also important and should be given
serious consideration.
Cooperation on Yemen. Saudi Arabia exercises far more
leverage in Yemen than does the United States. As the
United States seeks to prevent state failure in Yemen
and to counter the threat of terrorism emanating from
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, there is potential
for improved cooperation. Indeed, considerable
international cooperation, including with the Kingdom,
is already in evidence through the Friends of Yemen
Group. But to achieve lasting results, a closer
alignment of the U.S. and Saudi approaches would be
helpful. For example, job creation for the 40% of the
Yemeni population that is estimated to be unemployed--
especially youth--is critical. Saudi Arabia and other
Gulf Cooperation Council member states could play an
important role in this regard. In addition, the
distribution of cash payments to Yemeni President Saleh
and the tribal leaders contributes to a lack of
transparency in governance and is thus part of the
problem, not the solution.
Syria/Lebanon. Saudi-Syrian relations became quite strained
after the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister
Rafik Hariri in 2005, since Hariri, who had acquired
Saudi citizenship, was close to the royal family.
October 2009 marked a turning point in relations, with
a visit by King Abdullah to Damascus. Among other
things, his visit is believed to have helped break the
logjam in the formation of the Lebanese government.
Relations have since continued to thaw, as evidenced by
Syrian President Assad's reciprocal visit to Riyadh
last January. Many observers perceive the King's
overture to Damascus as motivated in part by a desire
to displace Iranian influence in Damascus. Although the
U.S. Administration shares this goal, it has been
sensitive to the concern expressed by many Lebanese
observers, particularly those sympathetic to the pro-
Western March 14th Coalition, that any Saudi-Syrian
rapprochement should not come at the expense of
Lebanon. Indeed, Syria has been reasserting its
influence in Lebanon, evidenced most recently by the
visits to Damascus by Prime Minister Saad Hariri both
before and after his May 25th visit to Washington. The
degree to which there is room for closer U.S.-Saudi
cooperation in Syrian-Lebanese dynamics is unclear but
should nonetheless be explored.
Promoting Middle East Peace. In the face of hard-lined
resistance in the Arab League, Saudi Arabia has helped
keep alive the Arab Peace Initiative, first put forward
by then-Crown Prince Abdullah and later endorsed by the
Arab League at the 2002 Beirut Summit. Similarly, the
Kingdom has played a relatively positive role in the
Arab League supporting Palestinian participation in
Israeli-Palestinian proximity talks. Continued
oversight can help underscore the importance of
continued Saudi moderation.
Countering Terrorism. Administration officials with whom
staff met gave the Saudi government high marks for
improved cooperation in countering terrorism. That
said, the latest State Department report on money
laundering noted that Saudi Arabia ``continues to be a
significant jurisdictional source for terrorist
financing worldwide.'' \5\ It goes on to state that the
Kingdom ``could do more to target Saudi-based support
for extremism outside of Saudi's borders'' by, for
example, holding terrorist financiers publicly
accountable through prosecutions and full
implementation of United Nations Security Council
obligations'' and establishing a ``charities oversight
mechanism.'' Continued oversight in this area may help
encourage more rigorous enforcement.
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\5\ Department of State's International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report (2009); http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/120055.pdf.
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia deserves credit for the fatwa that
was recently issued by Council of Senior Ulema denouncing
terrorism, which it defines as ``a crime aiming at
destabilizing security'' by attacking people or property,
including by ``blowing up dwellings, schools, hospitals,
factories, bridges, airplanes (including hijacking), oil, and
pipelines.'' The fatwa also specifically disallows the
financing of terrorism, which it specifies as ``a form of
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complicity to those acts.''
Countering Radicalization. The Kingdom has developed an
innovative religious-based rehabilitation program to
help de-radicalize terrorists by discrediting the
ideological and religious underpinnings of violent
Islamic extremism. The program uses a combination of
religious counseling, psychological treatment and
family interventions, which, taken together, provide a
foundation to promote reintegration and prevent
recidivism.\6\ The results of the program are not
perfect; there has been some recidivism, including on
the part of several who have then gone on to leadership
and membership in al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,
based in Yemen. Even so, to the extent that the program
has had some success, it is worthy of further study.
Many observers caution, however, that lessons learned
from the Saudi experience may not be applicable
elsewhere, given that the Saudi program relies heavily
on socio-cultural aspects which are considered sui
generis.
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\6\ See Christopher Boucek, ``Counter-Terrorism from Within:
Assessing Saudi Arabia's Religious Rehabilitation and Disengagement
Programme,'' (Royal United Services Institute Journal, vol. 153, no. 6,
pp. 60-65), December 2008.
The de-radicalization program has largely focused on
returned detainees from Guantanamo Bay and convicted
terrorists. In addition, the Kingdom is seeking to do more in
the area of pre-emptive programs to counter the appeal of
extremism to at-risk populations. Staff had the opportunity to
meet with the leadership of the King Abdulaziz Center for
National Dialogue, along with several youth volunteers who have
participated in various national and international dialogues to
promote tolerance. The Center represents a potentially
important mechanism to foster religious and cultural tolerance.
More could be done in this regard, however, including by more
thoroughly vetting the curricula of Saudi-funded madrassas,
both within and outside the Kingdom.
2. Process
Doing business with the Saudi government is complicated.
Power is concentrated among a small group of individuals that
includes the King and several key advisors. Mid-level
officials, and even relatively high-level officials outside
that circle, are generally not empowered to take independent
action or convey official positions. As a result, day-to-day
diplomacy is often subject to bureaucratic holdups.
Complicating this process challenge is a long-standing
tradition whereby the Saudi King prefers to rely on the Saudi
Ambassador to the United States as his exclusive intermediary
with the U.S. Government. As a result, the U.S. Ambassador and
team are not always in a position effectively to perform their
proper functions. This phenomenon of over reliance on the
Washington channel is not new; many observers point out that
Prince Bandar served such a function during his long tenure as
Ambassador to the United States. The status quo is,
nonetheless, frustrating to the U.S. Embassy and to the State
Department. The United States has a capable Ambassador and
Country Team in Riyadh; they should be empowered with a greater
role in the division of labor between the Washington and Riyadh
channels.
One of the ideas for changing this dynamic includes the
reinvigoration of the U.S.-Saudi strategic dialogue. This
dialogue was established in 2005 and provided a strategic
framework for discussions on issues including counterterrorism,
energy, political-military issues, economic and trade issues,
consular issues, and education, exchange, and human
development. Asked about the merits of such a mechanism, some
interlocutors underscored the significant potential benefits of
the imposition of discipline on official interactions, on the
one hand, and of having a formal framework for resolving
differences, on the other. Both Saudi and U.S. diplomats
cautioned, however, that an inherent drawback of such strategic
dialogue exercises is that they sometimes end up being process-
driven without producing sufficient results to justify the
outlay in effort.
b. syria
Relations with Syria have been strained for many years,
reflecting U.S. rejection of Syria's sponsorship of terrorism,
not only through hosting and supporting Palestinian
rejectionist groups, but also by providing materiel and
financial assistance to Hizballah in Lebanon. Tensions
culminated with the recalling of the U.S. Ambassador to Syria
five years ago in the aftermath of the assassination of
Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. This move sent a strong
signal of condemnation of Syria's destabilizing behavior in the
region and served to further isolate the regime in Damascus.
The Obama Administration has for the past year changed tack,
pursuing an engagement track with the Assad regime, including a
series of visits by high-level delegations to Damascus. The
purpose of the staff trip was not to review the history of
bilateral relations--many public reports provide such
background.\7\ Instead, taking into consideration the pending
nomination of Robert Ford as U.S. Ambassador to Syria, staff
focused primarily on the extent to which the U.S. Embassy in
Damascus is able to operate effectively in the absence of a
U.S. Ambassador. Staff also reviewed several key U.S. interests
that have not been advancing adequately in the absence of a
U.S. Ambassador.
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\7\ See, for example, Jeremy M. Sharp, ``Syria: Background and U.S.
Relations,'' (Congressional Research Service RL33487, April 26, 2010);
and the Department of State's Background Note on Syria (February 17,
2010); http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3580.htm.
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1. Ambassadorial Access (or Lack Thereof) . . .
Against the backdrop of Congressional debate about the
nomination of Robert Ford as U.S. Ambassador to Syria, staff
reviewed Embassy operations in the absence of an Ambassador.
Staff found that the lack of an Ambassador in Damascus renders
the Embassy extremely limited in its ability to conduct normal
business. For protocol reasons, the Syrian Government will not
receive the very capable Charge d'Affaires ad interim at the
Ministerial level or above. The only exceptions have been the
Charge's meeting with the Foreign Minister to present the U.S.
request for agrement for Robert Ford's nomination, and when he
has accompanied delegations of high-level U.S. visitors. The
business the Embassy does manage to conduct is hardly
efficient: all interactions with the Government of Syria must
be handled by diplomatic note--the Embassy had logged some 400
in the first five months of 2010. Of course, the presence of an
Ambassador would not negate the continued need to conduct much
day-to-day business via diplomatic note, but an empowered
Ambassador could be expected to break through logjams.
As a result of its relative lack of access, the Embassy has
been hampered in its ability to press for progress on a range
of specific issues, some of which are of great importance to
U.S. interests. The Embassy is often unable to deliver critical
demarches to policy makers, as in the aftermath of reports of
the transfer of long-range missiles via Syria to Hizballah.
This has led to an over-reliance on the Washington channel. In
this context, some critics have expressed doubts about whether
the Syrian Ambassador to Washington is a reliable conveyor of
U.S. views to his home capital. One thing is clear: in the
absence of an Ambassador, the U.S. message is not adequately
heard.
It should be noted, however, that even in such a non-
permissive environment, the Embassy has done an admirable job
of breaching obstacles to engage directly with the Syrian
people. In the above-cited report, the OIG credited the
Embassy's Public Affairs Section with the ``best practice,''
now being replicated by other U.S. Missions, of initiating a
free text messaging service to improve recipients' English,
offering a weekly example of American idiomatic usage. As a
result, the Embassy has a growing client base of service
subscribers with whom it can engage. The Public Affairs shop
has also made excellent use of the extremely limited exchange
programs available to Syrians. Although the Fulbright exchange
program came under serious strain in recent years, the section
was able to generate 10 Fulbright exchanges and 34
International Visitor Leadership Program participants. Staff
had the opportunity to make a site visit to a Syrian non-
governmental organization that provides services to and raises
public awareness about autistic and hearing-impaired children.
The NGO is benefiting from a series of U.S. experts provided
under the auspices of the Fulbright program. This kind of
collaboration represents a positive case study in how
creatively to build bridges through partnerships in difficult
environments.
2. . . . To Better Advance U.S. Interests
Of course, having a U.S. Ambassador on the ground is not an
end in itself but should be a means to more effectively pursue
U.S. goals. Staff made this point directly to Syrian Deputy
Foreign Minister Miqdad and asked whether it was reasonable to
expect that with an Ambassador on the ground the United States
would be able to make progress on issues of key concern. The
Deputy Minister emphasized a willingness on the part of the
Syrian leadership to improve relations with the United States.
He said that a U.S. Ambassador with the full confidence of the
U.S. Administration would find ``all doors open to him.'' He
predicted that differences would not disappear instantaneously
but undertook that such differences could be moved to the
margins. He observed that much would depend on the instructions
given to the U.S. Ambassador, however.
Among the key issues on which a U.S. Ambassador should be
able to press for progress are the following:
a. A Suitable New Embassy Compound
The Embassy compound does not meet U.S. State Department
security guidelines for setback and the physical space is no
longer sufficient. The Administration has long been seeking
permission from the Government of Syria to relocate its Embassy
away from the busy thoroughfare on which it is situated, to a
more secure location and larger facility that can better
accommodate the Embassy's needs. Syrian foot-dragging on this
issue probably reflects a combination of bureaucratic inertia
as well as Syrian pique over U.S. sanctions and disengagement.
In the above-cited report, the OIG found that the security
situation faced by the Embassy had not materially changed since
the unsuccessful vehicle-borne attack on the embassy compound
in 2006, meaning that U.S. and Syrian personnel working there
continue to be vulnerable. Experts believe that Hizballah and
Hamas have residences in Damascus and that the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps has a presence as well. Based on
staff interviews it is quite possible to imagine that these
groups, other Palestinian rejectionist groups headquartered
there, or Islamist extremists might wish to target Embassy
staff. In light of the potential threat, staff shares the OIG's
assessment that, ``Physical security at the aging, poorly
situated chancery is shocking.'' \8\
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\8\ U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of
Governors Office of Inspector General's Report of Inspection: Embassy
Damascus, Syria, Report Number ISP-I-10-34A, March 2010, p. 1.
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During the staff visit, the Charge d'Affaires was granted a
meeting with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to review
prospective properties for a New Embassy Compound. This was a
promising development, but the presence of an Ambassador on the
ground would no doubt enhance forward movement for a new
property. Staff pressed the Foreign Ministry for early progress
on identifying suitable land for a New Embassy Compound,
emphasizing that the security of U.S. Embassy staff was at
stake.
b. A Responsible Syrian Role in the Region
There are many ways in which Syrian actions in the region
are hostile to U.S. interests. It would be naive to believe
that the regime will alter its policies dramatically in the
near term, but a U.S. Ambassador in place would be able to make
the case that Syria's own interests are not being well served,
for example, by its friendly relations with Iran, its support
for Hizballah and Palestinian terrorist groups, its meddling in
Lebanon, its role as a ``spoiler'' in the Middle East peace
process, or by its efforts to encourage continued unrest in
Iraq. The fact that Syria has tightened controls on the Syrian-
Iraqi border to stem the flow of foreign fighters is indicative
that it can be persuaded to take some responsible actions.
c. Halting Missile Transfers to Hizballah
In mid-April, reports began to surface that Syria had
transferred long-range SCUD missiles to Hizballah from Iran.
Israeli Government officials reacted strongly to this
potentially game-changing development, pointing out that
missiles with longer range and greater accuracy could
effectively put the entire State of Israel at risk. The
Administration has since stated publically that it does have
information confirming that Syria has transferred ballistic
missiles to Hizballah. The Administration has demanded an
immediate end to arms transfers to Hizballah, pointing out that
they are in contravention of UN Security Council Resolution
1701. Staff took advantage of meeting with Foreign Ministry
officials to underscore strong concern about these
destabilizing weapons transfers. Syria has denied the
accusations, including in exchanges with staff. It is unlikely
that the presence of a U.S. envoy on the ground alone would
change the Syrian leadership's calculus on such weapons
transfers, but given the stakes involved, it would be
irresponsible to risk that U.S. warnings about the potential
consequences of such activities might not be properly heard or
interpreted.
3. Security and Morale
Given the difficult work environment in Syria, staff made a
point of sounding out Embassy employees about morale issues.
Not surprisingly, safety and security impact staff morale in a
significant--and negative--manner. Embassy personnel expressed
genuine fear about the Embassy compound's lack of a setback.
They also pointed out that the Embassy in Syria is the longest-
operating Embassy located in a designated state-sponsor-of-
terrorism where employees are not compensated with premium
danger pay. The need for a new Embassy compound has already
been addressed; staff believes the issue of danger pay warrants
reconsideration by State Department authorities.
III. Conclusion
The United States has critical interests at stake in Saudi
Arabia and Syria. The U.S. Embassies in those countries should
be empowered to work to maximum effect to advance those
interests. In Saudi Arabia, that means the widening of official
exchanges beyond the Washington channel, including the
reinvigoration of the strategic dialogue. In Damascus, that
means the presence of an Ambassador at the helm to make sure
the U.S. message is heard. Strong leadership and open channels
are necessary precursors to advance U.S. interests, but
concerted U.S. diplomacy will be necessary to gain traction on
the more difficult issues.
Appendix--Interlocutors
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia:
Ambassador James Smith and the Country Team
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Head of Arab Affairs Department
Representatives of the American business community
Office of Program Management-Ministry of the Interior
Naif Arab University for Security Studies
Assistant Minister for Petroleum Affairs
King Abdulaziz Center for National Dialogue
Damascus, Syria:
Charge d'Affaires Charles Hunter and the Country Team
Vice Foreign Minister of Foreign Affairs
Syrian non-governmental organization AAMAL
UN High Commissioner for Refugees Deputy Country Representative
Select group of Syrian youth
Select group of Syrian business people
UN Relief Works Agency Country Representative