[House Report 107-200]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
107th Congress Rept. 107-200
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session Part 2
======================================================================
BUDGET RESPONSIBILITY AND EFFICIENCY ACT OF 2001
_______
November 14, 2001.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on
the State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Dreier, from the Committee on Rules, submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
DISSENTING VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 981]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on Rules, to whom was referred the bill (H.R.
981) to provide a biennial budget for the United States
Government, having considered the same, report favorably
thereon with amendments and recommend that the bill as amended
do pass.
The amendments (stated in terms of the page and line numbers
of the introduced bill) are as follows:
Page 6, line 13, strike ``(as amended by section 3)''.
Page 6, line 16, strike ``(13)'' and insert ``(11)''.
Page 10, line 21, insert ``after `May 15' '' before the
period.
Page 25, line 3, strike ``(as amended by section 6(a) is
further'' and insert ``is''.
Page 25, line 6, strike ``318.'' and insert ``316.''.
Page 26, line 1, strike `` `(3) For'' and insert `` `(b)
For'' and strike ``subsection'' and insert ``section''.
Page 26, line 7, strike ``317'' and insert ``315'' and after
line 8, strike ``318.'' and insert ``316.''.
Page 26, line 14, strike ``2004'' and insert ``2003''.
Page 26, amend lines 16 and 17 to read as follows:
(A) by striking ``at least every three years'' and
all that follows thereafter and inserting ``at least
every 4 years, except that strategic plans submitted by
September 30, 2003, shall be updated and revised by
September 30, 2006.''; and
Page 26, line 23, strike ``2004'' and insert ``2003''.
Page 28, line 18, insert ``two'' before `` `years' ''.
Page 29, strike lines 1 through 7 and redesignate the
succeeding subsections accordingly.
Page 29, line 11, strike ``2004'' and insert ``2003''.
Page 29, line 13, after ``4 years'' insert ``except that
strategic plans submitted by September 30, 2003, shall be
updated and revised by September 30, 2006''.
Page 29, line 14, insert ``in subsection (b),'' after
``(3)''.
Page 29, line 19, strike ``2004'' and insert ``2003''.
Page 32, line 16, strike ``319.'' and insert ``317.''.
Page 33, line 4, strike ``318'' and insert ``316'' and after
line 4, strike ``319.'' and insert ``317.''.
Purpose of the Bill
The purpose of H.R. 981, the Budget Responsibility and
Efficiency Act of 2001, is to: (1) increase Congressional
control of the budget process by reducing the amount of time
spent on budget matters while improving the quality of those
deliberations; and (2) encourage longer time horizons in policy
planning and greater stability in fiscal policy.
Summary of the Bill
H.R. 981 establishes a two-year budgeting and
appropriations cycle and timetable, defining the budget
biennium as the two consecutive fiscal years beginning October
1 of any odd-numbered year.
H.R. 981 requires the President to submit a two-year budget
at the beginning of the first session of Congress. This budget
would cover each year in the biennium and planning levels for
the four out-years. In addition to submitting a Mid-Session
Review by July 16 of each year, the President will also be
required to also submit a Mid-Biennium Review on or before
February 15 of each even numbered year (the second year of the
biennium).
H.R. 981 requires Congress to enact two-year appropriations
bills (which specify the amount of appropriations provided for
each fiscal year) during the first session of each Congress.
The bill provides a new point of order against appropriations
bills, other than supplemental appropriations bills, that fail
to cover two years.
Under H.R. 981, the second session of a Congress will be
devoted to consideration of biennial or multi-year
authorization bills and oversight of federal programs. The bill
provides a majority point of order against authorization
legislation that covers less than two years except those
measures limited to temporary programs or activities lasting
less than two years.
H.R. 981 modifies the Government Performance and Results
Act (GPRA) to fit the government performance planning and
reporting process into the two-year budget cycle to enhance
oversight of federal programs.
The bill further allows the House and Senate to consider
reconciliation legislation, if necessary, during this second
session of a Congress.
Background and Legislative History
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of
1974 (Public Law 93-344) provides Congress with an overall
framework for considering separate and revenue legislation. The
primary purpose of this Act were to reassert the congressional
role in budgeting, to add some centralizing influence to the
Federal budget process, and to constrain the use of
impoundments.
General agreement exists that the Congressional Budget Act
has been successful at increasing the attention of Congress to
the whole budget, reasserting the congressional role in
budgeting and controlling impoundments, but the Act is now
viewed as an overwhelming success in every respect. First, it
has not brought the order and timeliness to congressional
budget action for which advocates had hoped. Deadlines for
enacting budget resolutions and the passing of appropriation
bills have routinely been missed. Second, establishing the
Budget Committees and a centralized decision-making process may
have increased the level of budgetary conflict in the Congress.
Authority and power were not significantly redistributed among
committees and the leadership; rather new layers of
responsibilities and procedures were added to those that
already existed. The result has been to create a good deal of
repetition where the same issue--for example, the fate of the
B-2 bomber--can be debated three times (during consideration of
the budget resolution, the defense authorization bill, and the
defense appropriation bill).
TABLE 1.--HISTORY OF REGULAR AND CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS, FY 1974-2001
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regular
appropriations Continuing
bills enacted resolutions
Fiscal year by the start enacted for
of the fiscal the fiscal
year year
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1974....................................... 3 7
1975....................................... 7 4
1976....................................... 2 3
1977....................................... 13 2
1978....................................... 9 3
1979....................................... 5 1
1980....................................... 3 2
1981....................................... 1 2
1982....................................... 0 5
1983....................................... 1 2
1984....................................... 4 4
1985....................................... 4 4
1986....................................... 0 5
1987....................................... 0 5
1988....................................... 0 5
1989....................................... 13 0
1990....................................... 1 3
1991....................................... 0 5
1992....................................... 3 4
1993....................................... 1 1
1994....................................... 2 3
1995....................................... 13 0
1996....................................... 0 5
1997....................................... 13 0
1998....................................... 1 6
1999....................................... 1 6
2000....................................... 4 7
2001....................................... 2 21
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sources: CRS Reports (98-800 GOV, 96-224 GOV, 94-799 GOV, and RL 30343).
During the 27-year history of the Budget Act, Congress has
met the deadline for completion of a budget resolution only
four times. Also since 1974, Congress has failed to complete
action on the thirteen individual appropriation bills to fully
fund the government before the start of the fiscal year for
every year except three. In 1988, 1994 and 1996, the Congress
barely made the fiscal year deadline. When action on regular
appropriations bills is delayed, this requires Congress and the
President to agree on a continuing resolution (CR) to provide
interim funding the Federal government's operations until a
specific date or until the enactment of the applicable regular
appropriations acts. If the appropriations bills are not passed
by the date specified in the CR, then another CR must be
passed. The passage of multiple successive CR's in one
appropriations cycle is not uncommon.
The annual rush to complete action on budget,
authorizations and appropriations items not only produces a
poor budget process, it also comes at the expense of careful
deliberation on matters that are not related to the budget.
During the 1993 Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress
hearings, one theme predominated the review of Congress:
Members of Congress are spread too thin to adequately carry
their duties. Senator Byrd captured this problem by referring
to the ``fractured attention spans'' of Senators. Congress
rarely meets its deadlines, frequently debates the same issues
again and again, and devotes more and more of its time to the
budget process.
The annual process of developing budgets and justifications
has also kept federal agencies on a perpetual budget cycle
treadmill, leaving little time to step back and review the
management and effectiveness of the programs they run.
Executing an annual budget requires nearly three years of
combined effort by the Congress and the Administration. The
Federal government expends an enormous amount of effort to
prepare, review, submit and ultimately legislate the budget.
the benefits of biennial budgeting--reducing repetition
The current budget process is overly repetitive,
inefficient and bureaucratic, and filled with time-consuming
budget votes. Effective oversight gets crowded out.
Currently, Congress completes at least four separate budget
processes annually following Presidential submission of the
Administration's budget: (1) the concurrent budget resolution,
(2) program authorizations, (3) budget reconciliation, and (4)
consideration of thirteen individual appropriation bills. H.R.
981 would not eliminate any of these processes, but it would
require their consideration biennial instead of annually. As
Table 2 show, Congress devotes much of its time to budget-
related measures, which because of their repetitive nature,
have become confusing to the public. Between 1990 and 2000, x%
of all roll call votes were budget-related.
TABLE 2.--HOUSE BUDGET-RELATED ROLL-CALL VOTES, BY TYPE OF MEASURE, CALENDAR YEARS 1990-2000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar years--
Measure ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appropriations \1\................. 112 105 138 176 113 292 147 155 124 156 178
Authorization \2\.................. 96 79 76 98 81 67 57 52 48 57 66
Tax \1\............................ 0 1 17 0 2 15 9 3 11 9 35
Budget Resolution \1\.............. 8 9 10 13 9 14 8 10 4 9 12
Reconciliation \1\................. 7 0 0 9 0 9 9 12 0 4 12
Debt Ceiling \1\................... 6 0 0 4 0 11 10 0 0 0 0
Miscellaneous \3\.................. 5 3 12 11 19 30 4 6 9 9 9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Budget-Related Votes... 234 197 253 311 224 438 244 238 196 244 312
Total Votes.................. 536 444 488 615 507 885 455 640 547 611 603
============================================================================
Percentage Budget-Related Votes.... 44 44 52 51 44 49 54 37 36 40 52
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
\1\ Includes votes on amendments, motions to recommit, measures, and conference reports, as well as all
procedural issues.
\2\ Includes votes on amendments, motions to recommit, conference reports, and motions to instruct conferees.
Excludes most procedural votes.
\3\ Includes votes on amendments, motions to recommit, measures, conference reports, and motions to instruct
conferees. Excludes most procedural votes. [``Miscellaneous'' covers votes not included in other categories,
such as measures to change the budget process, override the President's line item veto, change revenues
directly through tariff revisions, and reduce spending directly.]
Source: Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1990-1998 and 2000 and Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports, 1999
(Washington, Congressional Quarterly, Inc.). Compiled by Congressional Research Service, Government and
Finance Division.
Congress' annual struggle to complete the budget,
authorization, and appropriations processes results in all
three processes falling short. The solution is not to eliminate
any one of these important functions. The solution is to do
them less often.
Although the annual budget process is encumbered by missed
deadlines, redundancies and waste, the Federal government can
govern effectively under a biennial budget. A biennial budget
dovetails with the two-year session of a Congress. Members of
Congress already are personally aware of how such budgeting can
be more efficient. Since 1990 for the Senate and 1995 for the
House, committee funding has been provided in two-year funding
bills. A survey of 50 federal agencies done by Senator Domenici
found that thirty-seven agencies supported biennial budgeting.
None opposed it. The agencies generally responded they could
operate more efficiently under a biennial budget.
The Benefits of Biennial Budgeting--Improving Oversight
The current overwhelming appropriations workload upsets the
intended balance between the authorization and appropriations
committees. Biennial budgeting would help restore the influence
of the authorization process.
Congress has a clear constitutional responsibility to
conduct oversight to improve the efficiency, economy, and
effectiveness of governmental operations and programs. In
Watkins v. United States, the Supreme Court described Congress'
oversight power by stating that the ``power of the Congress to
conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process.
That power is broad.'' The Supreme Court also observed that ``a
legislative body cannot legislative wisely or effectively in
the absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change.''
The fact is that the annual appropriations process is so
time-consuming has led to neglect of the authorization process,
where most programmatic oversight is conducted. As a result,
large portions of the discretionary federal budget are left
unauthorized each year. The programs which receive taxpayer's
dollars to function each year are not receiving the careful
scrutiny that they should from the committees in Congress with
the greatest expertise. Every year the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) generates a thick report identifying the programs
that are operating without current authorization. In fiscal
year 2001, $112 billion in appropriations were provided for 112
federal programs whose authorizations had expired.
H.R. 981 converts the annual budget and appropriations
process to a biennial or two-year cycle. Biennial budgeting
would divide each Congress into a budget year and an
authorization year. In that second year, the legislative branch
could more effectively use the authorization process to
inspect, examine and review the executive branch and its
agencies. Increased oversight will also contribute to more
appropriate funding decisions in biennial appropriations bills
and deliberative consideration of any necessary supplemental or
recission legislation.
In its report to Congress, the Joint Committee on the
Organization of Congress recommended that the Budget Committees
``use the second year of each biennium to study issues with
long-term budgetary and economic implications which would
include holding hearings to receive testimony from committees
of jurisdiction to identify problem areas and to report on the
results of oversight; and by January 1 of each odd-numbered
year, issuing a report to the Speaker which identifies the key
issue facing the Congress in the next biennium.'' This
provision is included in H.R. 981.
THE BENEFITS OF BIENNIAL BUDGETING--INCREASING STABILITY AND
PREDICTABILITY IN FEDERAL FUNDING
A major source of budgetary uncertainty at the state level
is the result of matters involving federal action. In addition,
under the annual budget process, individuals and nonprofits
receiving government benefits or paying government fees may not
know from year to year exactly what level of resources will be
available to them.
Biennial budgeting will provide more predictability for
those served by federal funding and those who administer it.
Under a biennial budget, states, localities and private
organizations will become more efficient in the long-term
planning and management of their programs due to more
predictable federal funding streams. For those citizens who are
served by federal programs, biennial budgeting will provide
more predictability and peace of mind.
Biennial budgeting will strengthen fiscal management. Given
the enactment of the Government Performance and Results Act,
the Chief Financial Officers Act, the Government Management
Reform Act, and the Information Technology Management Reform
Act, a biennial budget process would be a logical next step in
promoting long-term planning, and improving the efficiency of
government and the use of taxpayer dollars.
Some charge that there is too much uncertainty to project
for a two-year period. CBO's analyses indicate the opposite is
true: most federal funding is predictable anyway. A CBO study
indicates that only 5.6% of discretionary spending in FY 2001
($36 billion of the $642 billion appropriated) required annual
funding due to volatile spending patterns. Additionally, from
1997 to 1998 (the last time period for which data is currently
available), 70% of the 872 discretionary spending accounts
changed less than 10%. Those few programs that do change (most
of which relate to international or emergency activities) can
be accommodated during the normal supplemental appropriations
process.
STATE EXPERIENCE WITH BIENNIAL BUDGETING
Since 1980, four states have switched from an annual cycle
to a biennial cycle or a partial biennial cycle. Currently,
more than twenty states operate under biennial budgets,
providing ample precedent for the two-year budget cycle. While
significant differences exist between the Federal budget and
state budgets, this Committee believes that the experience of
states can provide valuable insights for the Federal
government, including specific implementation strategies. The
most important lesson from the states' experience with biennial
budgeting is that the degree and nature of any power shift that
occurs has more to do with the political culture of a state
than with the actual nature of a state's budget process. In
addition, a 1988 study conducted by Texas A&M University for
the State government of Texas found that biennial budgeting did
not result in increased micromanagement of programs by the
legislatures but, the legislatures did retain a significant
influence over the flow of funds throughout the state budget.
ADDITIONAL ISSUES
H.R. 981 does not shift power to the executive branch. Some
changes will occur in the current roles played by both the
executive and the legislative branches in the budget process.
However, these changes will not result in massive shifts of
power but rather will allow the legislative branch to more
efficiently exercise its constitutional oversight
responsibility. Congress will continue to decide, down to the
account level, the exact amount of spending in every
appropriation bill just as is done under current law. Under a
biennial appropriations process, agencies would not be given a
lump sum of money, even at the account level, to spendover a
two-year period. Rather, Congress will appropriate a separate
individual sum for each of the two fiscal years covered by the biennial
appropriation bill. Additionally, the President will be able to spend
only the amount that Congress has provided in each of those years and
all of the current mechanisms and procedures for moving funds between
accounts would remain in place. Also, Congress would still exercise its
significant oversight and enforcement role through the reprogramming
authority of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. Finally,
it should be remembered that biennial appropriations, like the current
annual appropriations process, cover only one-third of the Federal
budget, since two-thirds of the budget is considered mandatory spending
and is not under Congress' annual control.
H.R. 981 will not lock Congress into policy decisions that
will need to be changed as a result of changing
circumstances.--Biennial budgeting does not mean that Congress
and the President cannot appropriate money or modify previous
appropriations during the second year. The supplemental
appropriations process would still exist and would continue to
be used. If biennial budgeting and appropriations were combined
with a mechanism to budget in advance for emergencies and
unintended contingencies, a biennial budgeting process would be
more than able to respond to these unpredictable situations.
H.R. 981 will not necessarily lead to an increase in the
size and number of supplemental appropriations.--It is
important to remember that supplemental appropriation bills
will always be a part of the budget process. Supplemental
appropriations bills are vehicles used by Congress and the
President to reconcile the current fiscal year's budget with
the nation's current needs and priorities. Whether biennial
budgeting will increase or decrease the number of supplementals
is an open question, but since there has been one or more every
year since the adoption of the Budget Act in 1974 (see Table
3), everyone can agree that there will always be at least one
supplemental.
TABLE 3.--SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS, FISCAL YEARS 1974-2001
[Dollars in millions]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of Amount of
Fiscal year supplemental budget
bills authority
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1974......................................... 5 $14,796
1975......................................... 7 27,587
1976......................................... 5 24,636
1977......................................... 5 49,482
1978......................................... 8 8,219
1979......................................... 2 13,784
1980......................................... 5 19,575
1981......................................... 3 12,461
1982......................................... 4 21,020
1983......................................... 2 22,654
1984......................................... 4 16,357
1985......................................... 3 14,804
1986......................................... 3 8,191
1987......................................... 2 9,370
1988......................................... 2 1,310
1989......................................... 1 3,295
1990......................................... 2 2,039
1991......................................... 3 19,786
1992......................................... 1 2,806
1993......................................... 3 9,848
1994......................................... 2 7,822
1995......................................... 2 -9,847
1996......................................... 6 1,523
1997......................................... 1 1,670
1998......................................... 5 3,409
1999......................................... ............ ...........
2000......................................... ............ ...........
2001......................................... ............ ...........
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under biennial budgeting, instead of guaranteeing that
Congress will consider 18 budget-related bills (13
appropriations bills, 1 budget resolution, and on average, 3
supplemental bills), Congress may only consider 3 bills in off-
budgeted years. All supplemental bills in a biennial budgeting
system will be subject to the same budgetary constraints that
currently exist; while many argue that these constraints should
be tighter, biennial budgeting in no way weakens the existing
constraints of our budget laws. In fact, it could be argued
that with a longer planning horizon we can meet enforcement
targets every two years instead of year to year as with the
current budget system. The bottom line is that the existing
annual budget process does not always function the way in which
it was intended. Similar problems will occur with biennial
budgeting but the opportunities for the process not to work as
promised will be less frequent because we will be opening up
the whole process half as much.
It is not difficult to budget two years in advance.--The
Committee would note that under the current budget process,
many advance projections already are done for a much longer
period than just two years--most often for 5 or 10 years.
According to the Office of Management and Budget, second year
numbers and projections are not only as precise as those for
the current fiscal year but they also serve as ceilings for the
next year's budget requests. Both the President and the
Congress are already required to prepare multi-year budgets.
Nothing in the biennial budget proposal (or in the existing
annual process) states that Congress and the President cannot
revisit a budgetary decision. Section 304 of the Budget Act
currently allows for revisions to any already agreed to budget
resolution when necessary. Biennial budgeting would in no way
interfere with the use and availability of this fail-safe
mechanism. In addition, the biennial budgeting process retains
the ability to revisit prior budgetary decisions, to exercise
corrective action to provide a great deal of budgetary
enforcement in that, the budget situation would have to be
universally recognized as a problem, in order to utilize the
revision process.
Under H.R. 981, the Congressional Budget Office is required
to provide quarterly reports to the Budget Committees comparing
the assumptions of the levels of revenues and spending included
in the budget resolution to reality. In addition, the Office of
Management and Budget must provide regular six-month reports on
the current state of the budget.
H.R. 981 will not reduce Congressional control over Federal
agencies. The concern that Congress would relinquish control
over Federal agencies assumes that the appropriations process
is the only way in which Congress can exercise control over
agencies. While use of the appropriations process to keep
federal agencies in check is very important, it is only one of
the ways Congress can oversee federal agencies' spending. Under
our current process, the appropriations committees are treated
as the first string of the team and the authorization
committees as bench players.
The authorization committees must be integrated into the
first team as both authorizers and appropriators play an
important and distinct role in the budget process. If the
authorization process is more vigorous and committees are more
active in their programmatic oversight, Congress will play an
even greater role in controlling not just the funding of
agencies but their overall operations and policies as well.
More long term budget planning will result in more long
term control over federal agencies, not only fiscally, but from
a policy standpoint as well.
history of biennial budgeting legislation
1974 (93rd Congress)--The Congressional Budget Act of 1974
required the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to issue a
report on the ``feasibility and advisability'' of budgeting and
appropriating a full year in advance.
1977 (95th Congress)--In response to 1974 directive, CBO
issued ``Advance Budgeting: A Report to Congress.'' This
included a study of two-year appropriations, and concluded that
if ``committees did not have to spend so much time each year on
routine `budgetary' matters, they would in fact have more time
for their oversight work. * * *'' A parallel report made in
1977 by the Office of Management and Budget, entitled ``A Study
of the Advisability of Submitting the President's Budget and
Enacting Budget Authority in Advance of the Current
Timetable,'' also advocated the concept of multi-year
budgeting, on the grounds that, ``Both the President and
Congress will reap significantly greater benefits from multi
year budgeting. * * *'' Also in 1977, Representative Panetta
introduced the first legislation to establish a biennial budget
process. Panetta's legislation, the Biennial Budget Act, sought
to create a two-year budget process devoted in the first year
to oversight of Executive branch agencies.
1979 (96th Congress)--Representative Panetta again
introduced a biennial budget bill. In the Senate, Senator
Bumpers introduced a resolution directing a study of the
feasibility of a biennial budget. No action was taken on either
bill.
1981-82 (97th Congress)--Four bills (Ford, Roth, Cochran,
and Quayle) to establish a biennial budget process were
introduced in the Senate. Representative Panetta again
sponsored a House bill. In 1981, biennial budgeting was
discussed during Government Affairs Committee hearings on the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974. Separate
hearings on Senator Roth's biennial budget bill also were held
by the Committee.
1983-84 (98th Congress)--Several biennial budget bills were
again introduced. Governmental Affairs held hearings on Senator
Roth's bill. Also in 1984, the Temporary Select Committee to
Study the Senate Committee System recommended that a select
committee be established to study the feasibility of biennial
budgeting. No committee was formed.
1985-86 (99th Congress)--The FY 1986 Defense Authorization
bill included an amendment proposed by Senator Nunn to, among
other things, require the President to submit two-year budget
proposals for the Defense Department. The provision was
retained through conference, and the conferees expressed their
belief that a biennial budget would ``substantially improve DOD
management and congressional oversight.'' They further
indicated that it was preferable for all Federal spending to be
under a two-year system. While DOD submits a two-year budget,
Congress continues with the annual cycle--so the long-term
planning benefit is still not realized.
1987-88 (100th Congress)--President Reagan and
congressional leadership approved the Budget Summit Agreement,
setting specific funding totals for domestic, international,
and defense discretionary spending for FY 1988 and VY 1989.
Longstanding supporters of biennial budgeting note that the
``biennial character'' of the summit agreement demonstrates
that the time had come to move to a two-year budget cycle. The
Balanced Budget and emergency Deficit Control Act of 1987
directed the appropriate congressional committees to develop a
plan to experiment with multi-year authorization and
appropriations.
1989-90 (101st Congress)--As Chairman of the Governmental
Affairs Committee, Senator John Glenn held hearings and ordered
favorable reported S. 29 (sponsored by Senators Ford, Roth and
Domenici) providing for a two-year budget resolution and
appropriations. Thebill was not taken up by the full Senate.
1993-94 (103rd Congress)--Senators Boren and Domenici in
1994 introduced S. 1824 to implement the recommendations of the
Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, which included
a provision to shift to a biennial budget cycle. The bill
reported by the Rules Committee as an outgrowth of the Joint
Committee's included the provision for biennial budget and
appropriations. Senator Domenici offered the Joint Committee's
legislative recommendations as an amendment to the District of
Columbia Appropriations bill. Senator Byrd raised a point of
order under section 306 of the Budget Act, and the Senate voted
58 to 41 in favor of the motion to waive the Budget Act with
respect to consideration of the amendment. Since the motion did
not gain the 60 votes necessary, the amendment failed.
1995-96 (104th Congress)--Four bills providing for a
biennial cycle were introduced. In July 1996, Senator Fred
Thompson, Chairman of the Financial Management and
Accountability Subcommittee of the Governmental Affairs
Committee, held a hearing on biennial budgeting. In September
1996, Senator Thompson introduced a biennial budget bill (S.
2049), emphasizing the need to provide Members of Congress with
time for increased legislative oversight and time at home.
1997-1998 (105th Congress)--One bill, S. 261, was
introduced by Senator Domenici on February 4, 1997. On February
13, 1997 the Budget Committee held a hearing on S. 261. On
April 23, 1997 Senator Thompson held a full Governmental
Affairs Committee Hearing on S. 261. On May 22, 1997, the
Governmental Affairs Committee ordered to be reported S. 261,
with an amendment in the nature of a substitute, and the bill
was reported to the Senate on September 4, 1997. On October 6,
1997 the Senate Committee on Budget discharged S. 261 and it
was placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders.
No further action was taken.
1999-2000 (106th Congress)--During the 106th Congress, no
less than four biennial budgeting bills were introduced in the
House of Representatives. Each of these bills were referred to
the Committee on Rules and the Committee on the Budget. In
addition, 245 Members signed onto a sense of the House
resolution (H. Res. 396) calling for the enactment of a
biennial budget process in the second session of the 106th
Congress. Accordingly, the Committee held a series of lengthy
hearings to examine proposals from various Members of Congress,
the Executive Branch, and outside experts on establishing a
two-year budget and appropriations cycle in an effort to
develop consensus legislation that would streamline the budget
process, enhance programmatic oversight, strengthen the
management of government programs and bureaucracies, and reform
Congress. These hearings laid the groundwork for a bipartisan
biennial budgeting amendment during floor consideration of H.R.
853, the Comprehensive Budget Process Reform Act. This
amendment was narrowly defeated on May 16, 2000, by a record
vote of 201 to 217. The House also defeated the broader bill,
but by a much larger margin.
Committee Consideration
At the beginning of the 107th Congress, Representative
Charles Bass of New Hampshire, a Member of the House Budget
Committee, introduced H.R. 981, which was referred to the
Committee on the Budget and in addition to the Committee on
Rules and the Committee on Government Reform.
On July 25, 2001, the Rules Subcommittee on Legislative and
Budget Process held a hearing on biennial budgeting. Mitchell
E. Daniels, Jr., Director of the Office of Managementand
Budget, noted that ``This idea [biennial budgeting] has had the support
of at least two Administrations and Members of Congress from both
parties. We should not spend a whole lot more time talking about the
pros and cons * * *. Let's make this the year we finally act on this
reform proposal''.
The Committee heard testimony from the following Members of
Congress: Representatives Charles F. Bass (R-NH), Bill Luther
(D-MN), Bob Clement (D-TN) [testimony submitted for the
record], Joe Barton (R-TX), David L. Hobson (R-OH), Joe
Knollenberg (R-MI), David E. Price (D-NC), and James T. Walsh
(R-NY).
On August 3, 2001, the Budget Committee reported a
substitute version of H.R. 981 out of Committee by voice vote.
The Budget Committee's version would create a Commission on
Federal Budget Concepts to study the idea of biennial
budgeting, among other things.
On November 1, 2001, the Rules Committee met in open
session and ordered favorably reported the bill H.R. 981, with
amendment, by voice vote, a quorum being present.
The bill was discharged from the House Committee on
Government Reform on November 9, 2001, after its referral
expired.
Section-by-Section Summary
Section 1. Findings
States the title of the legislation, the ``Biennial
Budgeting and Efficiency Act of 2001,'' and outlines nine
congressional findings on the budget process and biennial
budgeting.
Section 2. Revision of timetable
Amends section 300 of the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 to revise the timetable of the
congressional budget process to reflect a biennial budget
schedule. The first session of any Congress is primarily
devoted to the consideration of the budget resolution, the
regular appropriations bill, and any necessary reconciliation
legislation. In general, the revised timetable is similar to
the current timetable except that most of the milestones only
apply to the first session of a Congress. The timetable is
modified to extend the deadline for completion of the biennial
budget resolution to May 15th. The revised timetable contains
only three deadlines for the second session: (1) the President
must submit a mid-biennium budget review to Congress by
February 15th; (2) the Congressional Budget Office must submit
its annual report to the Budget Committees of the House and the
Senate no longer than six weeks after the President submits the
budget review; and (3) Congress must complete action on bills
and resolutions authorizing new budget authority for the
succeeding biennium by the last day of the session. This
section also creates a new section 300(b) of the Budget Act
that establishes a special timetable for the submission and
consideration of a budget in the case of any first session of
Congress that begins in any year during which the term of a
President (except a President who succeeds himself) begins.
Generally, the budget deadlines are extended by 6 weeks to give
a new President more time to prepare and submit the budget.
Section 3. Amendments to the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act of 1974
Section 3(a) amends section 2(2) of the Budget Act relating
to the ``Declaration of Purposes'' of the Budget Act to account
for the congressional determination biennially of the
appropriate level of Federal revenues and expenditures.
Section 3(b)(1) amends the definition of a budget
resolution in section 3(4) of the Budget Act to reflect its
application to a biennium as opposed to a fiscal year.
Section 3(b)(2) amends section 3 of the Budget Act by
adding a new paragraph (13) to define the term biennium as
``the period of two consecutive fiscal years beginning on
October 1 of any odd-numbered year.''
Section 3(c) amends the Budget Act to make the budget
resolution a biennial concurrent resolution on the budget.
Section 3(c)(1) amends section 301(a) of the Budget Act
regarding the required contents of the budget resolution to
conform its application to the biennium beginning on October 1
of each odd-numbered year and its consideration tothe biennial
timetable for completion, which is by May 15 of each odd-
numbered year.
Section 3(c)(2) amends section 301(b) of the Budget Act to
ensure that the additional matters which may be included in the
budget resolution apply to a biennium.
Section 3(c)(3) amends section 301(d) of the Budget Act to
conform the submission of committee views and estimates to the
Budget Committees to a biennial cycle.
Section 3(c)(4) amends section 301(d) of the Budget Act to
conform the requirements of the Budget Committee's hearings on
the budget and the Budget Committee's reporting of the budget
resolution to a biennial schedule. The House Budget Committee
would report a biennial budget resolution by April 1st of each
odd-numbered year.
Section 3(c)(5) amends section 301(f) of the Budget Act
relating to the achievement of goals for reducing unemployment
to conform it to a biennial cycle.
Section 3(c)(6) amends section 301(g)(1) of the Budget Act
to conform the provisions relating to the economic assumptions
of the budget resolution to a biennial schedule.
Sections 3(c)(7) and (8) amend section 301 to make
conforming changes to the section heading and the table of
contents of the Budget Act.
Section 3(d) amends section 302(a) of the Budget Act,
regarding committee allocations in the budget resolution, to
require the conference report on a budget resolution to include
an allocation of budget authority and outlays to each committee
for each year in the biennium and the total of all fiscal years
covered by the resolution as well as makes conforming change to
subsections (f) and (g) of section 302 to reflect a biennial
cycle and the biennial timetable.
Section 3(e)(1) amends section 303(a) of the Budget Act,
which prohibits consideration of legislation, as reported,
providing new budget authority, changes in revenues, or changes
in the public debt for a fiscal year until the budget
resolution for that year has been agreed to, to reflect the
application of the budget resolution to a biennium.
Section 3(e)(2) amends section 303(b) of the Budget Act
relating to the exceptions in the House of Representatives from
the application of this point of order, to account for a
biennialbudget cycle. The application of these exceptions are
also amended to reflect the special biennial timetable utilized during
the first term of a new President.
Section 3(e)(3) amends section 303(c)(1) of the Budget Act
to conform the application of this point of order in the Senate
to a biennial budget cycle.
Section 3(f) amends section 304 of the Budget Act,
regarding permissible revisions of budget resolutions, to
conform to the biennial budget cycle. This subsection maintains
current law which allows Congress to revise the budget
resolution at any time during the biennium.
Section 3(g) amends section 305(a)(3) of the Budget Act,
relating to the procedures for consideration of the budget
resolution, to conform references to the budget resolution to
account for its application to a biennium.
Section 3(h) amends section 307 of the Budget Act to
conform the timetable for completing House Appropriations
Committee action on regular appropriations bills by June 10 to
a biennial cycle. This section also makes conforming amendments
to reflect the special biennial timetable utilized during the
first term of a new President.
Section 3(i) amends section 308 of the Budget Act to
require the Congressional Budget Office to file quarterly
budget reports with the House and Senate Budget Committees.
These reports are to compare revenues, spending, and the
deficit or surplus for the current fiscal year with the
assumptions used in the congressional budget resolution. CBO is
also required to make the reports available to other interested
parties upon request. These reports will enable the Congress to
compare actual budget results to earlier estimates. The
frequent periodic reports by CBO on the progress of fiscal
policy and economic developments since action on the budget
resolution will inform the Congress about current status of the
budget and its earlier underlying projections by using updated
projections and actual budget figures to date. The reports can
also serve to facilitate additional reconciliation legislation
(between biennial budget resolutions) as necessary due to
changes in the economy or policy emphasis.
Section 3(j) amends section 309 of the Budget Act to
conform the timetable for completion of all House action on the
regular appropriation bills before the House adjourns for more
than three calendar days during the month of July. This section
also makes conforming amendments to reflect the special
biennial timetable utilized during the first term of a new
President.
Section 3(k) amends section 310 of the Budget Act to
conform the reconciliation process to a biennial budget cycle.
It also strikes subsection (f) which currently prohibits the
House from adjourning for more than 3 calendar days during the
month of July until all required reconciliation legislation is
completed. This is necessary to reflect the budget resolution's
application to the biennium and the possibility of considering
reconciliation legislation during the second session.
Sections 3(l)(1) and (2) amend section 311(a)(1) and (2) of
the Budget Act respectively, to prohibit consideration in the
House or Senate of any legislation that would cause the total
levels of budget authority or total levels of outlays to be
exceeded or that would cause the total level of revenues to be
less than those levels set forth in the most recently agreed to
budget resolution for either fiscal year of the biennium or for
the total of each fiscal year in the biennium and the ensuing
fiscal years for which allocations are provided in the budget
resolution.
Section 3(l)(3) amends section 311(a)(3) of the Budget Act
to conform the point of order in the Senate against any
legislation that would cause a decrease in the Social Security
levels set forth in the budget resolution for a biennial budget
cycle.
Section 3(m) amends section 312(c) of the Budget Act to
conform the Senate's maximum deficit amount point of order for
a biennial budget cycle.
Section 4. Amendments to the Rules of the House of Representatives
Section 4(a) amends clause 4(a)(1)(A) of rule X of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, relating to the required
Appropriations Committee hearings on the President's budget
submission, to conform to the biennial timetable.
Section 4(b) amends clause 4(a)(4) of rule X of the Rules
of the House, relating to the suballocations of the
Appropriations Committee, to conform to a biennial budget
resolution.
Section 4(c) amends clause 4(b)(2) of rule X of the Rules
of the House, relating to the Budget Committee's hearings on
the budget, to conform to a biennial budget resolution.
Section 4(d) amends clause 4(b) of rule X of the Rules of
the House to add a new subparagraph (7), to require the House
Budget Committee to use the second session of each Congress to
study issues with long-term budgetary and economic
implications, including holding hearings and receiving
testimony from committees of jurisdiction to identify problem
areas and to report on the results of their oversight
activities. The Budget Committee should issue to the Speaker by
January 1 of each odd-numbered year a report identifying the
key issues facing the Congress in the next biennium.
Section 4(e) amends clause 11(i) of rule X of the Rules of
the House, relating to the duties of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, to conform to a biennial cycle.
Section 4(f) amends clause 4(e) of rule X of the Rules of
the House, relating to the duties of the standing committees of
the House to maximize annual appropriations for the programs
and actives within their jurisdictions, to establish a new
preference of biennial appropriations.
Section 4(g) amends clause 4(f) of rule X of the Rules of
the House, relating to the Budget Act responsibilities of the
standing committees of the House, to conform to a biennial
timetable.
Section 4(h) amends clause 3(d)(2)(A) of rule XIII of the
Rules of the House, relating to committee cost estimates, to
conform to a biennial timetable.
Section 4(i) amends clause 5(a)(1) of rule XIII of the
Rules of the House, relating to privileged reports from the
Appropriations Committee, to conform to a biennial timetable.
Section 5. Amendments to Title 31, United States Code
Section 5(a) amends section 1101 of Title 31 to define the
term biennium as ``the period of two consecutive fiscal years
beginning on October 1 of any odd-numbered year.'' This is the
same definition given such term in paragraph (11) of section 3
of the Budget Act.
Section 5(b)(1) amends section 1105 of Title 31 to require
that on or before the first Monday in February of each odd-
numbered year (or, if applicable, as provided by section
300(b)of the Budget Act), the President shall transmit to Congress, the
budget for the biennium beginning on October 1 of such calendar year.
The President must include a budget message and summary and supporting
information with the budget submission.
Section 5(b)(2) amends section 1105(a)(5) of Title 31 to
conform the required contents of the budget submission with
respect to expenditures to account for a biennial budget cycle.
Section 5(b)(3) amends section 1105(a)(6) of Title 31 to
conform the required contents of the budget submission with
respect to receipts to account for a biennial budget cycle.
Section 5(b)(4) amends section 1105(a)(9)(C) of Title 31 to
conform the required contents of the budget submission with
respect to balance statements to account for a biennial budget
cycle.
Section 5(b)(5) amends section 1105(a)(12) of Title 31 to
conform the required contents of the budget submission with
respect to government functions and activities to account for a
biennial budget cycle.
Section 5(b)(6) amends section 1105(a)(13) of Title 31 to
conform the required contents of the budget submission with
respect to allowances to account for a biennial budget cycle.
Section 5(b)(7) amends section 1105(a)(14) of Title 31 to
conform the required contents of the budget submission with
respect to allowances for unanticipated and uncontrollable
expenditures to account for a biennial budget cycle.
Section 5(b)(8) amends section 1105(a)(16) of Title 31 to
conform the required contents of the budget submission with
respect to tax expenditures to account for a biennial budget
cycle.
Section 5(b)(9) amends section 1105(a)(17) of Title 31 to
conform the required contents of the budget submission with
respect to estimates for future fiscal years to account for a
biennial budget cycle.
Section 5(b)(10) amends section 1105(a)(18) of Title 31 to
conform the required contents of the budget submission with
respect to prior year outlays to account for a biennial budget
cycle.
Section 5(b)(11) amends section 1105(a)(19) of Title 31 to
conform the required contents of the budget submission with
respect to prior year receipts to account for a biennial budget
cycle.
Section 5(c) amends section 1105(b) of Title 31, regarding
estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations for the
legislative and judicial branches, to required the submission
of these proposals to the President by October 16th of even-
number years.
Section 5(d) amends section 1105(c) of Title 31, regarding
the President's recommendations if there is a proposed deficit
or surplus, to conform to a biennial budget cycle.
Section 5(e) amends section 1105(e)(1) of Title 31,
regarding capital investment analyses, to conform to a biennial
budget cycle.
Sections 5(f)(1) and (2) amend section 1106(a) and (b) of
Title 31 respectively, relating to the President's submission
of supplemental budget estimates and changes, ton conform to a
biennial budget cycle. The President is still rerquired to
submit a Mid-Session Review of thebudget by July 16 of each
year as well as will now be required to also submit a Mid-Biennium
Review on or before February 15 of each even numbered year.
Section 5(g)(1) amends section 1109(a) of Title 31,
regarding the President's submission of current program and
activity estimates, to conform to a biennial budget cycle and
require its submission with the overall budget submission for
each odd-numbered year as required by section 1105.
Section 5(g)(2) amends section 1109(b) of Title 31,
regarding the Joint Economic Committee's analysis of the
President's current program and activity estimates, to require
the Joint Economic Committee to submit an economic evaluation
of such estimates to the Budget Committee as part of its views
and estimates within 6 weeks of the President's budget
submission for each odd-numbered year.
Section 5(h) amends section 1110 of Title 31, regarding
advance requests for authorization legislation to require the
President to submit requests for authorization legislation by
March 31st of even-numbered years.
Section 6. Two-year appropriations; title and style of appropriations
acts
Section 6 amends section 105 of Title I of the U.S. Code to
conform the statutory style and definition of appropriations
Acts to require that they cover each of two fiscal years of a
biennium.
Section 7. Multi-year authorizations
Section 7(a) amends Title III of the Budget Act by adding a
new section 318 that establishes a new point of order in the
House and Senate against the consideration of any bill, joint
resolution, amendment, motion or conference report that does
contains a specific authorization of appropriations for any
purpose for less than each fiscal year in one or more
bienniums. This prohibition does not apply to an authorization
of appropriations for a single fiscal year for any program,
project or activity if the measure (defined as a bill, joint
resolution, amendment, motion or conference report) containing
that authorization includes a provision expressly stating the
following: ``Congress finds that no authorization of
appropriation will be required for [Insert name of applicable
program, project, or activity] for any subsequent fiscal
year.'' It further defines a specific authorization of
appropriations as an authorization for the enactment of an
amount of appropriations or amounts not to exceed an amount of
appropriations (whether stated as a sum certain, as a limit, or
as such sums as may be necessary) for any purpose for a fiscal
year.
Section 8. Government strategic and performance plans on a biennial
basis
Section 8 amends the Government and Performance and Results
Act of 1993 (the Results Act) to incorporate GPRA into the
biennial budget cycle. The Results Act requires federal
agencies to develop strategic plans, performance plans, and
performance reports. Strategic plans set out the agencies'
missions and general goals. Performance plans lay out the
specific quantifiable goals and measures. Performance reports
compare actual performance with the goals of past performance
plans. The Results Act currently requires federal agencies to
consult with congressional committees as they develop their
strategic plans. The Results Act requires all federal agencies
to submit their strategic and performance plans to the Office
of Managementand Budget, along with their budget submissions,
by September 30 of each year. Finally, the Results Act requires the
President to include a performance plan for the entire government.
Sections 8(a) through (g) amend section 306 of title 5,
sections 1105, 1119 and 9703 of title 31, and sections 2802 and
2803 of title 39 requires agencies to prepare strategic and
performance plans every two years, in conjunction with the
President's development of a biennial budget. In addition,
these amendments make other changes to conform strategic and
performance plans to a biennial budget cycle.
Section 8(h) amends section 301(d) of the Budget Act to
require Congressional committees to review the strategic plans,
performance plans, and performance reports of agencies in their
jurisdiction. Committees may then provide their views on the
agency's plans or reports as part of their views and estimates
on the President's budget submitted to the Budget Committees.
Section 8(i) provides that the amendments by this section
shall take effect on March 1, 2005.
Section 9. Biennial appropriations bills
Section 9(a)(1) amends clause 2(a) of House Rule XXI to
provide that in the House of Representatives an appropriation
may not be reported in a general appropriation bill (other than
a supplemental appropriation bill), and may not be in order as
an amendment thereto, unless it provides a new budget authority
or establishes a level of obligations under contract authority
for each fiscal year of a biennium. It further provides that
this prohibition shall not apply with respect to an
appropriation for a single fiscal year for any program,
project, or activity if the bill or amendment thereto
containing that appropriation includes a provision expressly
stating the following: Congress finds that no additional
funding beyond one fiscal year will be required and the [Insert
name of applicable program, project, or activity] will be
completed or terminated after the amount provided has been
expended. The subparagraph is further amended to provide that
such a statement shall not constitute legislating on an
appropriation bill if it is included with an appropriation for
a single fiscal year for any program, project, or activity.
Section 9(a)(2) amends clause 5(b)(1) of House Rule XXII to
apply similar prohibitions against appropriation conference
reports.
Section 9(b)(1) amends Title III of the Congressional
Budget Act of 1974 to add a new section 319 to create a point
of order in the Senate against consideration in any odd-
numbered year of any regular appropriation bill providing new
budget authority or a limitation on obligations under the
jurisdiction of the Committee on Appropriations for only the
first fiscal year of a biennium, unless the program, project,
or activity for which the new budget authority or obligation
limitation is provided will require no additional authority
beyond one year and will be completed or terminated after the
amount provided has been expended.
Section 9(b)(2) amends section 1(b) of the Budget Act to
conform the table of contents of the Budget Act to account for
this new section 319.
Section 10. Assistance by Federal agencies to standing committees of
the House of Representatives and the Senate
Section 10(a) requires the head of each Federal agency
under the jurisdiction of a standing committee to provide to
the committee those studies, information, analyses, reports,
and assistance as may be requested by the chairman and ranking
minority member of the committee.
Section 10(b) requires the head of each Federal agency to
furnish to such committee documentation containing information
received, compiled, or maintained by the agency as part of the
operation or administration of a program, or specifically
compiled pursuant to a request in support of a review of a
program, as may be requested by the chairman and ranking
minority member of such committee.
Section 10(c) requires that, within 30 days after the
receipt of a request from a chairman and ranking minority
member of a standing committee having jurisdiction over a
program being reviewed, the Comptroller General furnish to the
committee summaries of any audits or reviews of such program
the Comptroller General has completed during the preceding six
years.
Section 10(d) reaffirms the role of the Comptroller
General, the Director of the Congressional Research Service,
and the Director of the Congressional Budget Office to furnish
(consistent with established protocols) to each standing
committee of the House and Senate such information, studies,
analyses, and reports as the chairman and ranking minority
member may request to assist the committee in conducting
reviews and studies of programs under its jurisdiction.
Section 11. Report on two-year fiscal period
Requires that, not later than 180 days after the enactment
of this Act, the Director of OMB shall determine the impact of
changing the definition of a fiscal year and the budget process
based on that definition to a 2 year fiscal period with a
biennial budget process based on the 2 year period, and shall
report his findings to the Committee on Budget in the House and
Senate and the Committee on Rules in the House.
Section 12. Special transition period for the 107th Congress
Section 12(a) requires the President to include in the FY
2004 budget submission an identification of the budget accounts
for which an appropriation should be made for each fiscal year
of the FY 2004-2005 biennium and any necessary budget authority
that should be provided for each such fiscal year for those
identified budget account.
Section 12(b) requires the Appropriations Committees of
each House to review the President's recommendations and
include an assessment of those recommendations and any
recommendations of their own in the committee's overall views
and estimates on the President's budget which they are required
to submit to their respective Budget Committees.
Section 12(c)(1) requires the Budget Committees of each
House to review the recommendations of both the President and
the Appropriations Committees with respect to those budget
accounts that should be funded for the biennium.
Section 12(c)(2) requires the report of the Committee on
the Budget of each House and the joint explanatory statement of
the managers accompanying the budget resolution for FY 2004 to
include an allocation to the Appropriations Committees for FY
2005 from which the Appropriations Committee can fund certain
accounts in the FY 2004 appropriation bills for each of the
fiscal years in the FY 2004-2005 biennium.
Section 12(c)(3) requires the report of the Committee on
the Budget of each House and the joint explanatory statement of
the managers accompanying the budget resolution for FY 2004to
include the assumptions upon which the allocation to the Appropriations
Committees for FY 2005 is made.
Section 12(d)(1) directs the GAO to work with the
Committees of Congress during the first session of 108th
Congress to develop plans to transition program authorizations
to a multi-year schedule.
Section 12(d)(2) requires GAO to continue to provide
assistance to the Congress with respect to programmatic
oversight and in particular to assist committees in designing
and conforming programmatic oversight procedures for the Fiscal
Year 2005-2006 biennium.
Section 12(e) provides for a CBO report to Congress (before
January 15, 2004) listing all those programs and activities
that were funded during FY 2004 with no authorization and all
those programs and activities whose authorizations will expire
during that fiscal year, FY 2005 and FY 2006.
Section 12(f) requires the President's budget submission
for FY 2005 to include an evaluation of an recommendations
regarding the transitional biennial budget process for the
fiscal year 2004-2005 biennium.
Section 12(g) requires CBO to issue a report on or before
March 31, 2004 include an evaluation of an recommendations
regarding the transitional biennial budget process for the
fiscal year 2004-2005 biennium.
Section 13. Effective date
Except as provided by sections 8, 11 and 12, the Act is
effective January 1, 2005, and applicable to budget,
authorization and appropriations legislation for the biennium
beginning with fiscal year 2006.
Matters Required Under the Rules of the House
Committee Vote
Clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of
Representatives requires the Committee Report to include for
each record vote on a motion to report the measure or matter
and on any amendments offered to the measure or matter, the
total number of votes for and against, and the names of the
Members voting for and against. No rollcall votes were
requested during consideration of H.R. 981.
Committee Cost Estimate
Clause 3(d)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of
Representatives requires an estimate and a comparison by the
Committee of the costs that would be incurred in carrying out
H.R. 981. However, clause 3(d)(3)(B) of that rule provides that
this requirement does not apply when the Committee has included
in its report a timely submitted cost estimate of the bill
prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office
under section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act. An estimate
prepared by the Congressional Budget Office is included below.
Congressional Budget Office Estimate
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, November 7, 2001.
Hon. David Dreier,
Chairman, Committee on Rules,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 981, the Budget
Responsibility and Efficiency Act of 2001.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Sandy Davis.
Sincerely,
Barry B. Anderson
(For Dan L. Crippen, Director).
Enclosure.
H.R. 981--Budget Responsibility and Efficiency Act of 2001
H.R. 981 would amend the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Title 5 of the U.S. Code,
other laws, and the Rules of the House of Representatives to
establish a biennial budget cycle for the federal government.
The bill would revise the budget timetable, change the number
of years covered by certain budget legislation, and make
conforming changes in various budget rules and procedures, but
would not directly affect spending or receipts. Thus, pay-as-
you-go procedures would not apply. The bill contains no
intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and would not affect the budgets
of state, local, or tribal governments.
H.R. 981 would establish a two-year budgeting and
appropriations cycle. A biennium, defined in the bill as a
period of two consecutive fiscal years beginning on October 1
of each odd-numbered year, would become the standard fiscal
period. The President's budget and the Congressional budget
resolution would be conformed to a biennial framework,
appropriation acts would be required to provide new budget
authority for each fiscal year in the upcoming biennium, and
authorization laws would be required to cover two or more
fiscal years.
The budget timetable would be changed to a biennial cycle.
Most major budgetary actions--the President's budget
submission, Congressional action on the budget resolution, and
the enactment of appropriation and reconciliation legislation--
would generally occur in the first session of each Congress
under a schedule that parallels the current annual timetable.
If the first session followed a year in which a new President
was elected, the bill would establish a revised budget
timetable allowing more time for the President and the Congress
to develop their respective budget plans. The second session
generally would be reserved for authorization bills and
oversight by Congressional committees.
The bill also would conform reporting requirements under
the Government Performance and Results Act to the new two-year
budget cycle, and would require federal agencies to provide
Congressional committees with additional information, as
requested, on the programs within the committee's jurisdiction.
The CBO Director would be required to submit quarterlybudget
reports comparing actual spending and revenue amounts for the current
fiscal year with the estimates for that year.
H.R. 981 would establish a special transition period,
during which the biennial budget cycle would be phased in over
the 2004-2005 biennium. The bill would require the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, within six months of its
enactment, to evaluate the impact of the change to a biennial
budget cycle. It would also require the President, in his
budget for fiscal year 2005, and the CBO Director, in a
separate report due by March 31, 2004, to evaluate and make
recommendations regarding the transitional biennial budget
process for 2004-2005. The biennial budget process would take
effect fully on January 1, 2005, for the biennium that begins
with fiscal year 2006.
The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Sandy Davis.
This estimate was approved by Robert A. Sunshine, Assistant
Director for Budget Analysis.
constitutional authority statement
Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee finds that the
Constitutional authority for this legislation is provided in
Article I, section 8, clause 18, which grants Congress the
general legislative power to make all laws necessary and proper
for carrying into execution the enumerated powers of Congress.
federal mandates statement
Section 423 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974
requires the report of any committee on a bill or joint
resolution that includes any Federal mandate to include
specific information about such mandates. The Committee states
that H.R. 981 does not include any Federal mandate.
preemption clarification
Section 423 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974
requires the report of any committee on a bill or joint
resolution to include a committee statement on the extent to
which the bill or joint resolution is intended to preempt state
or local law. The Committee states that H.R. 981 is not
intended to preempt any state or local law.
oversight findings
In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII and clause
(2)(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of
Representatives, the Committee's oversight findings and
recommendations are reflected in the body of this report.
general performance goals
In accordance with clause (3)(c)(4) of House Rule XIII, the
goal of H.R. 981 is to improve the management of Federal
resources by enhancing Congressional oversight of Federal
agencies and program by reducing the time spent budgeting and
appropriating funds; reduce time spent by Federal agencies
preparing and justifying their annual budgets; and create a
more stable and predictable federal budget environment that
allows state and local governments to better plan their own
budgets.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is
proposed is shown in roman):
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET ACT OF 1974
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
short titles; table of contents
Section 1. (a) * * *
(b) Table of Contents.--
Sec. 1. Short titles; table of contents.
TITLE III--CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS
Sec. 300. Timetable.
Sec. 301. [Annual] Biennial adoption of concurrent resolution on the
budget.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 316. Multiyear authorizations of appropriations.
Sec. 317. Consideration of biennial appropriation bills.
* * * * * * *
declaration of purposes
Sec. 2. The Congress declares that it is essential--
(1) to assure effective congressional control over
the budgetary process;
(2) to provide for the congressional determination
[each year] biennially of the appropriate level of
Federal revenues and expenditures;
* * * * * * *
definitions
Sec. 3. In General.--For purposes of this Act--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(4) The term ``concurrent resolution on the budget''
means--
(A) a concurrent resolution setting forth the
congressional budget for the United States
Government for a [fiscal year] biennium as
provided in section 301; and
(B) any other concurrent resolution revising
the congressional budget for the United States
Government for a [fiscal year] biennium as
described in section 304.
* * * * * * *
(11) The term ``biennium'' means the period of 2
consecutive fiscal years beginning on October 1 of any
odd-numbered year.
* * * * * * *
TITLE III--CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS
* * * * * * *
[timetable
[Sec. 300. The timetable with respect to the congressional
budget process for any fiscal year is as follows:
[On or before: Action to be completed:
First Monday in FePresident submits his budget........................
February 15.......Congressional Budget Office submits report to Budget
Committees.
Not later than 6 wCommittees submit views and estimates to Budget ....
Committees.
April 1...........Senate Budget Committee reports concurrent .........
resolution on the budget.
April 15..........Congress completes action on concurrent resolution .
on the budget.
May 15............Annual appropriation bills may be considered in the
House.
June 10...........House Appropriations Committee reports last annual .
appropriation bill.
June 15...........Congress completes action on reconciliation ........
legislation.
June 30...........House completes action on annual appropriation .....
bills.
October 1.........Fiscal year begins.]................................
timetable
Sec. 300. (a) In General.--Except as provided by subsection
(b), the timetable with respect to the congressional budget
process for any Congress (beginning with the One Hundred Ninth
Congress) is as follows:
First Session
On or before: Action to be completed:
First Monday in FePresident submits budget recommendations............
February 15.......Congressional Budget Office submits report to Budget
Committees.
Not later than 6 wCommittees submit views and estimates to Budget ....
Committees.
April 1...........Budget Committees report concurrent resolution on ..
the biennial budget.
May 15............Congress completes action on concurrent resolution .
on the biennial budget.
May 15............Biennial appropriation bills may be considered in ..
the House.
June 10...........House Appropriations Committee reports last biennial
appropriation bill.
June 30...........House completes action on biennial appropriation ...
bills.
October 1.........Biennium begins.....................................
Second Session
On or before: Action to be completed:
February 15.......President submits budget review.....................
Not later than 6 wCongressional Budget Office submits report to Budget
Committees.
The last day of thCongress completes action on bills and resolutions .
authorizing new budget authority for the succeeding
biennium.
(b) Special Rule.--In the case of any first session of
Congress that begins in any year during which the term of a
President (except a President who succeeds himself) begins, the
following dates shall supersede those set forth in subsection
(a):
First Session
On or before: Action to be completed:
First Monday in ApPresident submits budget recommendations............
April 20..........Committees submit views and estimates to Budget ....
Committees.
May 15............Budget Committees report concurrent resolution on ..
the biennial budget.
June 1............Congress completes action on concurrent resolution .
on the biennial budget.
June 1............Biennial appropriation bills may be considered in ..
the House.
July 1............House Appropriations Committee reports last biennial
appropriation bill.
July 20...........House completes action on biennial appropriation ...
bills.
October 1.........Biennium begins.....................................
[annual] biennial adoption of concurrent resolution on the budget
Sec. 301. (a) Content of Concurrent Resolution on the
Budget.--On or before [April 15 of each year] May 15 of each
odd-numbered year, the Congress shall complete action on a
concurrent resolution on the budget for [the fiscal year
beginning on October 1 of such year] the biennium beginning on
October 1 of such year. The concurrent resolution shall set
forth appropriate levels for [the fiscal year beginning on
October 1 of such year] each fiscal year in such period and for
at least each of the 4 ensuing fiscal years for the following--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(6) For purposes of Senate enforcement under this
title, outlays of the old-age, survivors, and
disability insurance program established under title II
of the Social Security Act [for the fiscal year] for
each fiscal year in the biennium of the resolution and
for each of the 4 succeeding fiscal years; and
(7) For purposes of Senate enforcement under this
title, revenues of the old-age, survivors, and
disability insurance program established under title II
of the Social Security Act (and the related provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986)[for the fiscal
year] for each fiscal year in the biennium of the resolution and for
each of the 4 succeeding fiscal years.
(b) Additional Matters in Concurrent Resolution.--The
concurrent resolution on the budget may--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(3) require a procedure under which all or certain
bills or resolutions providing new budget authority or
new entitlement authority [for such fiscal year] for
either fiscal year in such biennium shall not be
enrolled until the Congress has completed action on any
reconciliation bill or reconciliation resolution or
both required by such concurrent resolution to be
reported in accordance with section 310(b);
* * * * * * *
(7) set forth procedures in the Senate whereby
committee allocations, aggregates, and other levels can
be revised for legislation if that legislation would
not increase the deficit, or would not increase the
deficit when taken with other legislation enacted after
the adoption of the resolution, [for the first fiscal
year] for each fiscal year in the biennium or the total
period of fiscal years covered by the resolution;
* * * * * * *
(d) Views and Estimates of Other Committees.--Within 6 weeks
after the President submits a budget under section 1105(a) of
title 31, United States Code (or, if applicable, as provided by
section 300(b)), or at such time as may be requested by the
Committee on the Budget, each committee of the House of
Representatives having legislative jurisdiction shall submit to
the Committee on the Budget of the House and each committee of
the Senate having legislative jurisdiction shall submit to the
Committee on the Budget of the Senate its views and estimates
(as determined by the committee making such submission) with
respect to all matters set forth in subsections (a) and (b)
which relate to matters within the jurisdiction or functions of
such committee. The Joint Economic Committee shall submit to
the Committees on the Budget of both Houses its recommendations
as to the fiscal policy appropriate to the goals of the
Employment Act of 1946. Any other committee of the House of
Representatives or the Senate may submit to the Committee on
the Budget of its House, and any joint committee of the
Congress may submit to the Committees on the Budget of both
Houses, its views and estimates with respect to all matters set
forth in subsections (a) and (b) which relate to matters within
its jurisdiction or functions. Any Committee of the House of
Representatives or the Senate that anticipates that the
committee will consider any proposed legislation establishing,
amending, or reauthorizing any Federal program likely to have a
significant budgetary impact on any State, local, or tribal
government, or likely to have a significant financial impact on
the private sector, including any legislative proposal
submitted by the executive branch likely to have such a
budgetary or financial impact, shall include its views and
estimates on that proposal to the Committee on the Budget of
the applicable House. Each committee of the Senate or the House
of Representatives shall review the strategic plans,
performance plans, and performance reports, required under
section 306 of title 5, United States Code, and sections 1115
and 1116 of title 31, United States Code, of all agencies under
the jurisdiction of the committee. Each committee may provide
its views on such plans or reports to the Committee on the
Budget of the applicable House.
(e) Hearings and Report.--
(1) In general.--In developing the concurrent
resolution on the budget referred to in subsection (a)
for each [fiscal year] biennium, the Committee on the
Budget of each House shall hold hearings and shall
receive testimony from Members of Congress and such
appropriate representatives of Federal departments and
agencies, the general public, and national
organizations as the committee deems desirable. Each of
the recommendations as to short-term and medium-term
goal set forth in the report submitted by the members
of the Joint Economic Committee under subsection (d)
may be considered by the Committee on the Budget of
each House as part of its consideration of such
concurrent resolution, and its report may reflect its
views thereon, including its views on how the estimates
of revenues and levels of budget authority and outlays
set forth in such concurrent resolution are designed to
achieve any goals it is recommending. On or before
April 1 of each odd-numbered year (or, if applicable,
as provided by section 300(b)), the Committee on the
Budget of each House shall report to its House the
concurrent resolution on the budget referred to in
subsection (a) for the biennium beginning on October 1
of that year.
* * * * * * *
(f) Achievement of Goals for Reducing Unemployment.--
(1) If, pursuant to section 4(c) of the Employment
Act of 1946, the President recommends in the Economic
Report that the goals for reducing unemployment set
forth in section 4(b) of such Act be achieved in a year
after the close of the five-year period prescribed by
such subsection, the concurrent resolution on the
budget for the [fiscal year] biennium beginning after
the date on which such Economic Report is received by
the Congress may set forth theyear in which, in the
opinion of the Congress, such goals can be achieved.
(2) After the Congress has expressed its opinion
pursuant to paragraph (1) as to the year in which the
goals for reducing unemployment set forth in section
4(b) of the Employment Act of 1946 can be achieved, if,
pursuant to section 4(e) of such Act, the President
recommends in the Economic Report that such goals be
achieved in a year which is different from the year in
which the Congress has expressed its opinion that such
goals should be achieved, either in its action pursuant
to paragraph (1) or in its most recent action pursuant
to this paragraph, the concurrent resolution on the
budget for the [fiscal year] biennium beginning after
the date on which such Economic Report is received by
the Congress may set forth the year in which, in the
opinion of the Congress, such goals can be achieved.
* * * * * * *
(g) Economic Assumptions.--
(1) It shall not be in order in the Senate to
consider any concurrent resolution on the budget [for a
fiscal year] for a biennium, or any amendment thereto,
or any conference report thereon, that sets forth
amounts and levels that are determined on the basis of
more than one set of economic and technical
assumptions.
* * * * * * *
committee allocations
Sec. 302. (a) Committee Spending Allocations.--
(1) Allocation among committees.--The joint
explanatory statement accompanying a conference report
on a concurrent resolution on the budget shall include
an allocation, consistent with the resolution
recommended in the conference report, of the levels
[for the first fiscal year of the resolution,] for each
fiscal year in the biennium, for at least each of the
ensuing 4 fiscal years, and a total [for that period of
fiscal years] for all fiscal years covered by the
resolution (except in the case of the Committee on
Appropriations only [for the fiscal year of that
resolution] for each fiscal year in the biennium) of--
(A) total new budget authority; and
(B) total outlays;
among each committee of the House of Representatives or
the Senate that has jurisdiction over legislation
providing or creating such amounts.
* * * * * * *
(f) Legislation Subject to Point of Order.--
(1) In the house of representatives.--After the
Congress has completed action on a concurrent
resolution on the budget [for a fiscal year] for a
biennium, it shall not be in order in the House of
Representatives to consider any bill, joint resolution,
or amendment providing new budget authority for any
fiscal year, or any conference report on any such bill
or joint resolution, if--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
would cause the applicable allocation of new budget
authority made under subsection (a) or (b) for the
[first fiscal year] either fiscal year of the biennium
or the total of fiscal years to be exceeded.
(2) In the senate.--After a concurrent resolution on
the budget is agreed to, it shall not be in order in
the Senate to consider any bill, joint resolution,
amendment, motion, or conference report that would
cause--
(A) in the case of any committee except the
Committee on Appropriations, the applicable
allocation of new budget authority or outlays
under subsection (a) for the [first fiscal year
or the total of fiscal years] each fiscal year
of the biennium or the total of all fiscal
years covered by the resolution to be exceeded;
or
* * * * * * *
(g) Pay-as-You-Go Exception in the House.--
(1) In general.--(A) Subsection (f)(1) and, after
[April] May 15, section 303(a) shall not apply to any
bill or joint resolution, as reported, amendment
thereto, or conference report thereon if, for each
fiscal year covered by the most recently agreed to
concurrent resolution on the budget--
(i) * * *
* * * * * * *
concurrent resolution on the budget must be adopted before budget-
related legislation is considered
Sec. 303. (a) In General.--Until the concurrent resolution on
the budget [for a fiscal year] for a biennium has been agreed
to, it shall not be in order in the House of Representatives,
with respect to [the first fiscal year] each fiscal year of the
biennium covered by that resolution, or the Senate, with
respect to any fiscal year covered by that resolution, to
consider any bill or joint resolution, amendment or motion
thereto, or conference report thereon that--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(b) Exceptions in the House.--In the House of
Representatives, subsection (a) does not apply--
(1)(A) to any bill or joint resolution, as reported,
providing advance discretionary new budget authority
that first becomes available for the first or second
fiscal year after [the budget year] the biennium; or
(B) to any bill or joint resolution, as reported,
first increasing or decreasing revenues in a fiscal
year following [the fiscal year] the biennium to which
the concurrent resolution applies;
(2) after May 15 (or June 1 whenever section 300(b)
is applicable), to any general appropriation bill or
amendment thereto; or
* * * * * * *
(c) Application to Appropriation Measures in the Senate.--
(1) In general.--Until the concurrent resolution on
the budget for a [fiscal year] biennium has been agreed
to and an allocation has been made to the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate under section 302(a) for
that year, it shall not be in order in the Senate to
consider any appropriation bill or joint resolution,
amendment or motion thereto, or conference report
thereon for [that year] each fiscal year of that
biennium or any subsequent year.
* * * * * * *
permissible revisions of concurrent resolutions on the budget
Sec. 304. At any time after the concurrent resolution on the
budget for a [fiscal year] biennium has been agreed to pursuant
to section 301, and before the end of such [fiscal year]
biennium, the two Houses may adopt a concurrent resolution on
the budget which revises or reaffirms the concurrent resolution
on the budget [for such fiscal year] most recently agreed to
for such biennium.
provisions relating to the consideration of concurrent resolutions on
the budget
Sec. 305. (a) Procedure in House of Representatives After
Report of Committee; Debate.--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(3) Following the presentation of opening statements
on the concurrent resolution on the budget for a
[fiscal year] biennium by the chairman and ranking
minority member of the Committee on the Budget of the
House, there shall be a period of up to four hours for
debate on economic goals and policies.
* * * * * * *
house committee action on all appropriation bills to be completed by
june 10
Sec. 307. On or before June 10 of [each year] each odd-
numbered year (or, if applicable, as provided by section
300(b), July 1), the Committee on Appropriations of the House
of Representatives shall report [annual] biennial appropriation
bills providing new budget authority under the jurisdiction of
all of its subcommittees for the [fiscal year] biennium which
begins on October 1 of [that year] each odd-numbered year.
reports, summaries, and projections of congressional budget actions
Sec. 308. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(d) Quarterly Budget Reports.--The Director of the
Congressional Budget Office shall, as soon as practicable after
the completion of each quarter of the fiscal year, prepare an
analysis comparing revenues, spending, and the deficit or
surplus for the current fiscal year to assumptions included in
the congressional budget resolution. In preparing this report,
the Director of the Congressional Budget Office shall combine
actual budget figures to date with projected revenue and
spending for the balance of the fiscal year. The Director of
the Congressional Budget Office shall include any other
information in this report that it deems useful for a full
understanding of the current fiscal position of the Federal
Government. The reports mandated by this subsection shall be
transmitted by the Director to the Senate and House Committees
on the Budget, and the Congressional Budget Office shall make
such reports available to any interested party upon request.
house approval of regular appropriation bills
Sec. 309. [It] Except whenever section 300(b) is applicable,
it shall not be in order in the House of Representatives to
consider any resolution providing for an adjournment period of
more than three calendar days during the month of July of any
odd-numbered calendar year until the House of Representatives
has approved [annual] biennial appropriation bills providing
new budget authority under the jurisdiction of all the
subcommittees of the Committee on Appropriations for the
[fiscal year] biennium beginning on October 1 of such year. For
purposes of this section, the chairman of the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives shall
periodically advise the Speaker as to changes in jurisdiction
among its various subcommittees.
reconciliation
Sec. 310. (a) Inclusion of Reconciliation Directives in
Concurrent Resolutions on the Budget.--A concurrent resolution
on the budget for [any fiscal year] any biennium, to the extent
necessary to effectuate the provisions and requirements of such
resolution, shall--
(1) specify the total amount by which--
(A) new budget authority for [such fiscal
year] any fiscal year covered by such
resolution;
* * * * * * *
(C) new entitlement authority which is to
become effective during [such fiscal year] any
fiscal year covered by such resolution; and
(D) credit authority for [such fiscal year]
any fiscal year covered by such resolution,
contained in laws, bills, and resolutions within the
jurisdiction of a committee is to be changed and direct
that committee to determine and recommend changes to
accomplish a change of such total amount;
* * * * * * *
[(f) Completion of Reconciliation Process.--It shall not be
in order in the House of Representatives to consider any
resolution providing for an adjournment period of more than
three calendar days during the month of July until the House of
Representatives has completed action on the reconciliation
legislation for the fiscal year beginning on October 1 of the
calendar year to which the adjournment resolution pertains, if
reconciliation legislation is required to be reported by the
concurrent resolution on the budget for such fiscal year.]
[(g)] (f) Limitation on Changes to the Social Security Act.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it shall not be in
order in the Senate or the House of Representatives to consider
any reconciliation bill or reconciliation resolution reported
pursuant to a concurrent resolution on the budget agreed to
under section 301 or 304, or a joint resolution pursuant to
section 258C of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985, or any amendment thereto or conference
report thereon, that contains recommendations with respect to
the old-age, survivors, anddisability insurance program
established under title II of the Social Security Act.
budget-related legislation must be within appropriate levels
Sec. 311. (a) Enforcement of Budget Aggregates.--
(1) In the house of representatives.--Except as
provided by subsection (c), after the Congress has
completed action on a concurrent resolution on the
budget [for a fiscal year] for a biennium, it shall not
be in order in the House of Representatives to consider
any bill, joint resolution, amendment, motion, or
conference report providing new budget authority or
reducing revenues, if--
(A) the enactment of that bill or resolution
as reported;
(B) the adoption and enactment of that
amendment; or
(C) the enactment of that bill or resolution
in the form recommended in that conference
report;
would cause the level of total new budget authority or
total outlays set forth in the applicable concurrent
resolution on the budget for [the first fiscal year]
either fiscal year of the biennium to be exceeded, or
would cause revenues to be less than the level of total
revenues set forth in that concurrent resolution for
[the first fiscal year] either fiscal year of the
biennium or for the total of [that first fiscal year]
each fiscal year in the biennium and the ensuing fiscal
years for which allocations are provided under section
302(a), except when a declaration of war by the
Congress is in effect.
(2) In the senate.--After a concurrent resolution on
the budget is agreed to, it shall not be in order in
the Senate to consider any bill, joint resolution,
amendment, motion, or conference report that--
(A) would cause the level of total new budget
authority or total outlays set forth [for the
first fiscal year] for either fiscal year of
the biennium in the applicable resolution to be
exceeded; or
(B) would cause revenues to be less than the
level of total revenues set forth for [that
first fiscal year] each fiscal year in the
biennium or for the total of [that first fiscal
year and the ensuing fiscal years] all fiscal
years in the applicable resolution for which
allocations are provided under section 302(a).
(3) Enforcement of social security levels in the
senate.--After a concurrent resolution on the budget is
agreed to, it shall not be in order in the Senate to
consider any bill, joint resolution, amendment, motion,
or conference report that would cause a decrease in
social security surpluses or an increase in social
security deficits relative to the levels set forth in
the applicable resolution [for the first fiscal year]
each fiscal year in the biennium or for the total of
[that fiscal year and the ensuing fiscal years] all
fiscal years for which allocations are provided under
section 302(a).
* * * * * * *
determinations and points of order
Sec. 312. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(c) Maximum Deficit Amount Point of Order in the Senate.--It
shall not be in order in the Senate to consider any concurrent
resolution on the budget [for a fiscal year] for a biennium, or
to consider any amendment to that concurrent resolution, or to
consider a conference report on that concurrent resolution,
if--
(1) the level of total outlays for the [first fiscal
year] either fiscal year in the biennium set forth in
that concurrent resolution or conference report
exceeds; or
(2) the adoption of that amendment would result in a
level of total outlays for [that fiscal year] either
fiscal year in the biennium that exceeds;
the recommended level of Federal revenues for [that fiscal
year] the applicable fiscal year, by an amount that is greater
than the maximum deficit amount, if any, specified in the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 for
that fiscal year.
* * * * * * *
multiyear authorizations of appropriations
Sec. 316. (a) Point of Order.--(1)(A) It shall not be in
order in the House of Representatives or the Senate to consider
any measure that contains a specific authorization of
appropriations for any purpose unless the measure includes such
a specific authorization of appropriations for that purpose for
not less than each fiscal year in one or more bienniums.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, a specific authorization
of appropriations is an authorization for the enactment of an
amount of appropriations or amounts not to exceed an amount of
appropriations (whether stated as a sum certain, as a limit, or
as such sums as may be necessary) for any purpose for a fiscal
year.
(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply with respect to an
authorization of appropriations for a single fiscal year for
any program, project, or activity if the measure containing
that authorization includes a provision expressly stating the
following: ``Congress finds that no authorization of
appropriation will be required for [Insert name of applicable
program, project, or activity] for any subsequent fiscal
year.''.
(b) For purposes of this section, the term ``measure'' means
a bill, joint resolution, amendment, motion, or conference
report.
consideration of biennial appropriation bills
Sec. 317. It shall not be in order in the Senate in any odd-
numbered year to consider any regular appropriation bill
providing new budget authority or a limitation on obligations
under the jurisdiction of the Committee on Appropriations for
only the first fiscal year of a biennium, unless the program,
project, or activity for which the new budget authority or
obligation limitation is provided will require no additional
authority beyond one year and will becompleted or terminated
after the amount provided has been expended.
* * * * * * *
----------
RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 107TH CONGRESS
* * * * * * *
RULE X.
Organization of Committees.
* * * * * * *
Additional functions of committees
4. (a)(1)(A) The Committee on Appropriations shall, within 30
days after the transmittal of the Budget to Congress each odd-
numbered year, hold hearings on the Budget as a whole with
particular reference to--
(i) * * *
* * * * * * *
(4) In the manner provided by section 302 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee on
Appropriations (after consulting with the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate) shall subdivide any allocations
made to it in the joint explanatory statement accompanying the
conference report on such concurrent resolution, and promptly
report the subdivisions to the House as soon as practicable
after a concurrent resolution on the budget for a [fiscal year]
biennium is agreed to.
(b) The Committee on the Budget shall--
(1) * * *
(2) hold hearings and receive testimony from Members,
Senators, Delegates, the Resident Commissioner, and
such appropriate representatives of Federal departments
and agencies, the general public, and national
organizations as it considers desirable in developing
concurrent resolutions on the budget for [each fiscal
year] the biennium;
* * * * * * *
(5) study on a continuing basis proposals designed to
improve and facilitate the congressional budget
process, and report to the House from time to time the
results of such studies, together with its
recommendations; [and]
(6) request and evaluate continuing studies of tax
expenditures, devise methods of coordinating tax
expenditures, policies, and programs with direct budget
outlays, and report the results of such studies to the
House on a recurring basis[.]; and
(7) use the second session of each Congress to study
issues with long-term budgetary and economic
implications, which would include--
(A) hold hearings to receive testimony from
committees of jurisdiction to identify problem
areas and to report on the results of
oversight; and
(B) by January 1 of each odd-numbered year,
issuing a report to the Speaker which
identifies the key issues facing the Congress
in the next biennium.
(e)(1) Each standing committee shall, in its consideration of
all public bills and public joint resolutions within its
jurisdiction, ensure that appropriations for continuing
programs and activities of the Federal Government and the
government of the District of Columbia will be made [annually]
biennially to the maximum extent feasible and consistent with
the nature, requirement, and objective of the programs and
activities involved. In this subparagraph programs and
activities of the Federal Government and the government of the
District of Columbia includes programs and activities of any
department, agency, establishment, wholly owned Government
corporation, or instrumentality of the Federal Government or of
the government of the District of Columbia.
(2) Each standing committee shall review from time to time
each continuing program within its jurisdiction for which
appropriations are not made [annually] biennially to ascertain
whether the program should be modified to provide for [annual]
biennial appropriations.
Budget Act responsibilities
(f)(1) Each standing committee shall submit to the Committee
on the Budget not later than six weeks after the President
submits his budget during each odd-numbered year, or at such
time as the Committee on the Budget may request--
(A) its views and estimates with respect to all
matters to be set forth in the concurrent resolution on
the budget for the ensuing [fiscal year] biennium that
are within its jurisdiction or functions; and
(B) an estimate of the total amounts of new budget
authority, and budget outlays resulting therefrom, to
be provided or authorized in all bills and resolutions
within its jurisdiction that it intends to be effective
during [that fiscal year] each fiscal year in such
ensuing biennium.
* * * * * * *
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
11. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(i) Subject to the Rules of the House, funds may not be
appropriated for a fiscal year, with the exception of a bill or
joint resolution continuing appropriations, or an amendment
thereto, or a conference report thereon, to, or for use of, a
department or agency of the United States to carry out any of
the following activities, unless the funds shall previously
have been authorized by a bill or joint resolution passed by
the House [during the same or preceding fiscal year] to carry
out such activity for such fiscal year:
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
RULE XIII.
Calendars and Committee Reports.
* * * * * * *
Content of reports
3. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(d) Each report of a committee on a public bill or public
joint resolution shall contain the following:
(1) * * *
(2)(A) An estimate by the committee of the costs that
would be incurred in carrying out the bill or joint
resolution in the fiscal year in which it is reported
and in each of the [five] six fiscal years following
that fiscal year (or for the authorized duration of any
program authorized by the bill or joint resolution if
less than [five] six years);
* * * * * * *
Privileged reports, generally
5. (a) The following committees shall have leave to report at
any time on the following matters, respectively:
(1) The Committee on Appropriations, on general
appropriation bills and on joint resolutions continuing
appropriations for a [fiscal year after September 15 in
the preceding fiscal year] biennium after September 15
of the year in which such biennium begins.
* * * * * * *
RULE XXI.
* * * * * * *
Restrictions on Certain Bills.
General appropriation bills and amendments
2. (a)(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(3)(A) Except as provided by subdivision (B), an
appropriation may not be reported in a general appropriation
bill (other than a supplemental appropriation bill), and may
not be in order as an amendment thereto, unless it provides new
budget authority or establishes a level of obligations under
contract authority for each fiscal year of a biennium.
(B) Subdivision (A) does not apply with respect to an
appropriation for a single fiscal year for any program,
project, or activity if the bill or amendment thereto
containing that appropriation includes a provision expressly
stating the following: ``Congress finds that no additional
funding beyond one fiscal year will be required and the [Insert
name of applicable program, project, or activity] will be
completed or terminated after the amount provided has been
expended.''.
(C) For purposes of paragraph (b), the statement set forth in
subdivision (B) with respect to an appropriation for a single
fiscal year for any program, project, or activity may be
included in a general appropriation bill or amendment thereto.
* * * * * * *
RULE XXII.
House and Senate Relations.
* * * * * * *
5. (a) * * *
(b) The managers on the part of the House may not agree to a
Senate amendment described in paragraph (a) that--
(1) would violate clause 2(a)(1) [or (c)] or (3) or
2(c) of rule XXI if originating in the House; or
* * * * * * *
----------
TITLE 31, UNITED STATES CODE
* * * * * * *
SUBTITLE II--THE BUDGET PROCESS
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 11--THE BUDGET AND FISCAL, BUDGET, AND PROGRAM INFORMATION
Sec. 1101. Definitions
In this chapter--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(3) ``biennium'' has the meaning given to such term
in paragraph (13) of section 3 of the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C.
622(13)).
* * * * * * *
Sec. 1105. Budget contents and submission to Congress
[(a) On or after the first Monday in January but not later
than the first Monday in February of each year the President
shall submit a budget of the United States Government for the
following fiscal year. Each budget shall include a budget
message and summary and supporting information. The President
shall include in each budget the following:]
(a) On or before the first Monday in February of each odd-
numbered year (or, if applicable, as provided by section 300(b)
of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974), beginning with the
One Hundred Ninth Congress, the President shall transmit to the
Congress, the budget for the biennium beginning on October 1 of
such calendar year. The budget transmitted under this
subsection shall include a budget message and summary and
supporting information. The President shall include in each
budget the following:
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(5) except as provided in subsection (b) of this
section, estimated expenditures and proposed
appropriations the President decides are necessary to
support the Government in [the fiscal year for which
the budget is submitted and the 4 fiscal years after
that year] each fiscal year in the biennium for which
the budget is submitted and in the succeeding 4 years.
(6) estimated receipts of the Government in [the
fiscal year for which the budget is submitted and the 4
fiscal years after that year] each fiscal year in the
biennium for which the budget is submitted and in the
succeeding 4 years under--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(9) balanced statements of the--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(C) estimated condition of the Treasury at
the end of [the fiscal year] each fiscal year
in the biennium for which the budget is
submitted if financial proposals in the budget
are adopted.
* * * * * * *
(12) for each proposal in the budget for legislation
that would establish or expand a Government activity or
function, a table showing--
(A) the amount proposed in the budget for
appropriation and for expenditure because of
the proposal in [the fiscal year] each fiscal
year in the biennium for which the budget is
submitted; and
* * * * * * *
(13) an allowance for additional estimated
expenditures and proposed appropriations for [the
fiscal year] each fiscal year in the biennium for which
the budget is submitted.
(14) an allowance for unanticipated uncontrollable
expenditures for [that year] each fiscal year in the
biennium for which the budget is submitted.
* * * * * * *
(16) the level of tax expenditures under existing law
in the tax expenditures budget (as defined in section
3(a)(3) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2
U.S.C. 622(a)(3)) for [the fiscal year] each fiscal
year in the biennium for which the budget is submitted,
considering projected economic factors and changes in
the existing levels based on proposals in the budget.
(17) information on estimates of appropriations for
[the fiscal year following the fiscal year] each fiscal
year in the biennium following the biennium for which
the budget is submitted for grants, contracts, and
other payments under each program for which there is an
authorization of appropriations for [that following
fiscal year] each such fiscal year when the
appropriations are authorized to be included in an
appropriation law for the [fiscal year before the
fiscal year] biennium before the biennium in which the
appropriation is to be available for obligation.
(18) a comparison of the total amount of budget
outlays for [the prior fiscal year,] each of the 2 most
recently completed fiscal years, estimated in the
budget submitted [for that year] with respect to those
fiscal years, for each major program having relatively
uncontrollable outlays with the total amount of outlays
for that program [in that year] in those fiscal years.
(19) a comparison of the total amount of receipts for
[the prior fiscal year] each of the 2 most recently
completed fiscal years, estimated in the budget
submitted [for that year] with respect to those fiscal
years, with receipts received [in that year] in those
fiscal years, and for each major source of receipts, a
comparison of the amount of receipts estimated in that
budget with the amount of receipts from that source [in
that year] in those fiscal years.
* * * * * * *
(28) [beginning with fiscal year 1999, a] beginning
with fiscal year 2006, a biennial Federal Government
performance plan for the overall budget as provided for
under section 1115.
(b) Estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations for
the legislative branch and the judicial branch to be included
in each budget under subsection (a)(5) of this section shall be
submitted to the President before October 16 of [each year]
each even-numbered year and included in the budget by the
President without change.
* * * * * * *
(c) The President shall recommend in the budget appropriate
action to meet an estimated deficiency when the estimated
receipts for [the fiscal year for] each fiscal year in the
biennium for which the budget is submitted (under laws in
effect when the budget is submitted) and the estimated amounts
in the Treasury at the end of the current fiscal year available
for expenditure in [the fiscal year for] each fiscal year of
the biennium, as the case may be, which the budget is
submitted, are less than the estimated expenditures for [that
year] for each year of the biennium. The President shall make
recommendations required by the public interest when the
estimated receipts and estimated amounts in the Treasury are
more than the estimated expenditures.
* * * * * * *
(e)(1) The President shall submit with materials related to
each budget transmitted under subsection (a) on or after
January 1, 1985, an analysis for the [ensuing fiscal year]
biennium to which such budget relates that shall identify
requested appropriations or new obligational authority and
outlays for each major program that may be classified as a
public civilian capital investment program and for each major
program that may be classified as a military capital investment
program, and shall contain summaries of the total amount of
such appropriations or new obligational authority and outlays
for public civilian capital investment programs and summaries
of the total amount of such appropriations or newobligational
authority and outlays for military capital investment programs. In
addition, the analysis under this paragraph shall contain--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
Sec. 1106. Supplemental budget estimates and changes
(a) Before July 16 of each year and before February 15 of
each even numbered-year, the President shall submit to Congress
a supplemental summary of the budget for the [fiscal year]
biennium for which the budget is submitted under section
1105(a) of this title. The summary shall include--
(1) for [that fiscal year] each fiscal year in such
biennium--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(2) for the [4 fiscal years following the fiscal
year] 4 fiscal years following the biennium for which
the budget is submitted, information on estimated
expenditures for programs authorized to continue in
future years, or that are considered mandatory, under
law; and
(3) for future fiscal years, information on estimated
expenditures of balances carried over from the [fiscal
year] biennium for which the budget is submitted.
(b) Before July 16 of each year and before February 15 of
each even numbered-year, the President shall submit to Congress
a statement of changes in budget authority requested, estimated
budget outlays, and estimated receipts for [the fiscal year]
each fiscal year in the biennium for which the budget is
submitted (including prior changes proposed for the executive
branch of the Government) that the President decides are
necessary and appropriate based on current information. The
statement shall include the effect of those changes on the
information submitted under section 1105(a)(1)-(14) and (b) of
this title and shall include supporting information as
practicable. The statement submitted before July 16 may be
included in the information submitted under subsection (a)(1)
of this section.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 1109. Current programs and activities estimates
(a) [On or before the first Monday after January 3 of each
year (on or before February 5 in 1986)] At the same time the
budget required by section 1105 is submitted for a biennium,
the President shall submit to both Houses of Congress the
estimated budget outlays and proposed budget authority that
would be included in the budget for [the following fiscal year]
each fiscal year of such period if programs and activities of
the United States Government were carried on during that year
at the same level as the current fiscal year without a change
in policy. The President shall state the estimated budget
outlays and proposed budget authority by function and
subfunction under the classifications in the budget summary
table under the heading ``Budget Authority and Outlays by
Function and Agency'', by major programs in each function, and
by agency. The President also shall include a statement of the
economic and program assumptions on which those budget outlays
and budget authority are based, including inflation, real
economic growth, and unemployment rates, program caseloads, and
pay increases.
(b) The Joint Economic Committee shall review the estimated
budget outlays and proposed budget authority and submit an
economic evaluation of the budget outlays and budget authority
to the Committees on the Budget of both Houses before [March 1
of each year] within 6 weeks of the President's budget
submission for each odd-numbered year (or, if applicable, as
provided by section 300(b) of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974).
Sec. 1110. Year-ahead requests for authorizing legislation
A request to enact legislation authorizing new budget
authority to continue a program or activity for a fiscal year
shall be submitted to Congress before [May 16] March 31 of the
[year before the year in which the fiscal year begins] calendar
year preceding the calendar year in which the biennium begins.
If a new program or activity will continue for more than one
year, the request must be submitted for at least the first and
2d fiscal years.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 1115. Performance plans
(a) In carrying out the provisions of [section 1105(a)(29)]
section 1105(a)(28), the Director of the Office of Management
and Budget shall require each agency to prepare [an annual] a
biennial performance plan covering each program activity set
forth in the budget of such agency. Such plan shall--
(1) establish performance goals to define the level
of performance to be achieved by a program activity for
both years 1 and 2 of the biennial plan;
* * * * * * *
(5) provide a basis for comparing actual program
results with the established performance goals; [and]
(6) describe the means to be used to verify and
validate measured values[.]; and
(7) cover each fiscal year of the biennium beginning
with the first fiscal year of the next biennial budget
cycle.
* * * * * * *
(d) An agency may submit with its [annual] biennial
performance plan an appendix covering any portion of the plan
that--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(f) For purposes of this section and sections 1116 through
1119, and sections 9703 and 9704 the term--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(6) ``program activity'' means a specific activity or
project as listed in the program and financing
schedules of the [annual] biennial budget of the United
States Government; and
* * * * * * *
SUBTITLE VI--MISCELLANEOUS
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 97--MISCELLANEOUS
* * * * * * *
Sec. 9703. Managerial accountability and flexibility
(a) Beginning with fiscal year 1999, the performance plans
required under section 1115 may include proposals to waive
administrative procedural requirements and controls, including
specification of personnel staffing levels, limitations on
compensation or remuneration, and prohibitions or restrictions
on funding transfers among budget object classification 20 and
subclassifications 11, 12, 31, and 32 of each [annual] budget
submitted under section 1105, in return for specific individual
or organization accountability to achieve a performance goal.
In preparing and submitting the performance plan under [section
1105(a)(29)] section 1105(a)(28), the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget shall review and may approve any proposed
waivers. A waiver shall take effect at the beginning of the
fiscal year for which the waiver is approved.
* * * * * * *
(e) A waiver shall be in effect for [one or] two years as
specified by the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget in approving the waiver. A waiver may be renewed for [a
subsequent year] for a subsequent 2-year period. After a waiver
has been in effect for [three] four consecutive years, the
performance plan prepared under section 1115 may propose that a
waiver, other than a waiver of limitations on compensation or
remuneration, be made permanent.
* * * * * * *
----------
SECTION 105 OF TITLE 1, UNITED STATES CODE
[Sec. 105. Title of appropriation Acts
[The style and title of all Acts making appropriations for
the support of Government shall be as follows: ``An Act making
appropriations (here insert the object) for the year ending
September 30 (here insert the calendar year).''.]
Sec. 105. Title and style of appropriations Acts
(a) The style and title of all Acts making appropriations for
the support of the Government shall be as follows: ``An Act
making appropriations (here insert the object) for each fiscal
year in the biennium of fiscal years (here insert the fiscal
years of the biennium).''.
(b) All Acts making regular appropriations for the support of
the Government shall be enacted for a biennium and shall
specify the amount of appropriations provided for each fiscal
year in such period.
(c) For purposes of this section, the term ``biennium'' has
the same meaning as in section 3(11) of the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 622(11)).
----------
SECTION 306 OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE
Sec. 306. Strategic plans
(a) No later than September 30, [1997] 2003, the head of each
agency shall submit to the Director of the Office of Management
and Budget and to the Congress a strategic plan for program
activities. Such plan shall contain--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(b) The strategic plan shall cover a period of not less than
[five years forward] six years forward from the fiscal year in
which it is submitted. The strategic plan shall be updated and
revised [at least every three years, except that the strategic
plan for the Department of Defense shall be updated and revised
at least every four years.] at least every 4 years, except that
strategic plans submitted by September 30, 2003, shall be
updated and revised by September 30, 2006.
(c) The performance plan required by section 1115 of title 31
shall be consistent with the agency's strategic plan. A
performance plan may not be submitted for a fiscal year not
covered by a current strategic plan under this section
including a strategic plan submitted by September 30, 2003,
meeting the requirements of subsection (a).
* * * * * * *
----------
TITLE 39, UNITED STATES CODE
* * * * * * *
PART III--MODERNIZATION AND FISCAL ADMINISTRATION
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 28--STRATEGIC PLANNING AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT
* * * * * * *
Sec. 2802. Strategic plans
(a) No later than September 30, [1997] 2003, the Postal
Service shall submit to the President and the Congress a
strategic plan for its program activities. Such plan shall
contain--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(b) The strategic plan shall cover a period of not less than
[five] six years forward from the fiscal year in which it is
submitted, and shall be updated and revised [at least every
three years] at least every 4 years except that strategic plans
submitted by September 30, 2003, shall be updated and revised
by September 30, 2006.
(c) The performance plan required under section 2803 shall be
consistent with the Postal Service's strategic plan. A
performance plan may not be submitted for a fiscal year not
covered by a current strategic plan under this section
including a strategic plan submitted by September 30, 2003,
meeting the requirements of subsection (a).
* * * * * * *
Sec. 2803. Performance plans
(a) The Postal Service shall prepare [an annual] a biennial
performance plan covering each program activity set forth in
the Postal Service budget, which shall be included in the
comprehensive statement presented under section 2401(g) of this
title. Such plan shall--
(1) establish performance goals to define the level
of performance to be achieved by a program activity for
both years 1 and 2 of the biennial plan;
* * * * * * *
(5) provide a basis for comparing actual program
results with the established performance goals; [and]
(6) describe the means to be used to verify and
validate measured values[.]; and
(7) cover each fiscal year of the biennium beginning
with the first fiscal year of the next biennial budget
cycle.
* * * * * * *
DISSENTING VIEWS
The Rules Committee has, over at least the past 25 years,
examined the federal budget process time and again in what now
seems to be a biennial ritual. During that time, many, both in
and outside the Congress have complained that the existing
budget process does not work, yet no major overhaul of the
fundamental process has ever been enacted. The Congress has
tinkered around the edges, has enacted major limits on spending
and overspending, but has never successfully fashioned a
complete package of reforms that has met the approval of both
houses. Yet, during those years and in spite of the complaints
about the inefficiencies of the system, the work of the
Congress has gone on as required by the Constitution and the
1974 Congressional Budget Act. Budgets have been enacted,
committees have conducted oversight, and appropriations bills
have been sent to the President.
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 itself
came about as a result of what was then an increasingly
inefficient process that ceded too much spending decision-
making authority to the Executive. The Act was envisioned as a
means to enable the Congress to more efficiently make budget
decisions by requiring the timely enactment of authorizations
for federal programs, passage of a budget resolution which
would outline the spending priorities for the coming year based
on those authorizations, and enactment of appropriations acts
which would fund them. The Act was also designed to take back
control of the Constitutionally-mandated power of the purse
responsibilities of the Congress by requiring that the
Executive submit to Congress, for its approval, any proposed
rescission of spending authority.
The Act did not, and could not, anticipate the economic and
budgetary rollercoaster of the 1980's, nor could it anticipate
the change in the political dynamics that took place during
those years. The first change in the 1974 Act came about as a
result of the soaring deficits of the early 1980's and the
desire of the Congress to gain a measure of control over its
spending. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act
of 1985 (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings) changed the process by
establishing deficit targets for six fiscal years beginning in
FY 1986 and created a new budget tool known as sequestration.
Sequestration was designed to cut spending across-the-board
when total spending exceeded those deficit targets set in law.
Gramm-Rudman Hollings did not, however, make other major
procedural changes in the budget process and it kept in place
the annual process of appropriating funds for the government.
Ultimately, the Congress, working with the Executive in two
succeeding Administrations, made budgetary choices and
decisions that led to the reappearance of budget surpluses
which, until this summer, seemed to stretch far into the
future.
The notion of changing the current budget and
appropriations process from an annual cycle to a biennial cycle
is not new and, in fact, the first proposal to move to a two-
year cycle was introduced in 1977. Since then, over 60
proposals to move to biennial budgeting have been introduced.
In the 106th Congress, an amendment offered by the Chairman of
this Committee to wide-ranging budget process reform bill
failed by only 16 votes. It is obvious many Members of Congress
genuinely feel that a two-year budget cycle is preferable to
the current process. Biennial budgeting, in their view, would
reduce the amount of time dedicated to making budget decisions
which would result in an increase in the amount of time
dedicated to oversight of the programs those budgets fund. They
argue that a biennial budget would lead to better management of
federal programs because time would be freed on the
Congressional calendar for the consideration of authorization
legislation. Supporters of biennial budgeting claim it is a
more efficient and less cumbersome process, that it would
result in a more thoughtful decision-making process, and that
it would force Congress to be more careful in its spending
habits. We agree that these goals are worthy, but disagree that
a two-year cycle would ensure they would be met.
In fact, we believe a two-year budget cycle would seriously
undermine the ability of the Congress to control federal
spending. We submit that to operate under a biennial budget is
to operate under a budget framework that depends upon an
endless series of supplemental spending bills. Those
supplemental bills might or might not adhere to a spending
framework adopted one or two years before and thus pose a
threat to any sort of fiscal discipline that proponents of this
budget scheme say would be enhanced in a two-year cycle. This,
we believe, is good reason for fiscal conservatives to oppose
this scheme. We can envision that two-year appropriations will
have to build in additional spending in anticipation of
unforeseen future events, yet those funds will more than likely
not sufficiently cover the myriad of events that could occur
over a two year period. Experience and academic research
conform our common sense intuition: states with biennial
budgets invariably spend more (per capita per year) than do
states with annual budgets. A lot can happen in two years and
we submit it would be far better to plan 12 months out rather
24 or 28 months out.
In addition, we believe biennial budgeting would, in fact,
diminish rather than enhance the oversight of federal programs.
During the round of budget process reform hearings in early
2000, GAO Associate Director Susan Irving testified before this
Committee and said, ``A two-year appropriation cycle would
change--and could lessen--congressional influence over program
and spending matters, since the process would afford fewer
scheduled opportunities to affect agency programs and
budgets.'' We concur that biennial budgeting would weaken
rather than strengthen Congressional control over the
administration of federal programs because agencies and
departments would not be subjected to an annual accounting on
the Hill. We would like to remind this Committee of an argument
in support of this position made to the Committee during those
hearings. Rep. Dave Obey (D-WI), who serves this institution as
the Ranking Member of the Committee on Appropriations and who
has some experience dealing with Executive branch agencies and
department personnel, both political and career, said on
February 19, 2000:
The fact that proponents of this legislation have not
placed in perspective is that there are numerous
agencies in this government that are not even
responsive to their own appointed leadership. They are
even less responsive to departmental management or the
White House and still less responsive to the Congress
and this proposition will make matters worse. The
healthiest single event that occurs in this town each
year is the annual budget review. It is the one moment
in time when many senior program managers are
confronted with the possibility that they were not
ordained by God to set government policies on their
own. Removing this requirement will affect not only our
ability to ensure that laws are fully and faithfully
executed, it also diminishes the ability of House
Members to effectively represent and advocate for their
constituents.
We heartily concur with proponents of biennial budgeting
that committees other than the Appropriations Committee must
strive to fully examine the programs under their jurisdiction
in order to hold the Executive accountable. But we do not
understand how giving the Executive branch a biennial pass on
answering questions posed to them by the very committees who
write their checks will ensure that the programs and activities
administered by the self-same Executive are ``fully and
faithfully executed.'' Again, we submit a lot can happen in two
years and that the Congress has a Constitutional responsibility
to ask questions about money, management, and administration on
a regular, ongoing basis.
There is nothing in either law or in the process that
hinders the ability of the committees of the Congress to
conduct oversight during any one Session of a Congress. Nor is
there really any procedural reason why authorization
legislation cannot move through the system in a timely manner.
What stands in the way of the conduct of these activities has
been, and will most likely continue to be, a political problem
rather than a procedural problem. Authorizations are not
enacted because agreement cannot be reached about their scope
and content, not because there isn't time on the floor. In
fact, this Committee often limits debate and amendments in
order to assure that the House can meet a two and one half day
a week legislative schedule. There may have been limited
oversight of federal programs but we propose that it has been
because committee chairs have been too busy pursuing
ideological agendas to focus attention on the work that should
fall within the purview of their committees. It is a lack of
political will rather than procedural roadblocks that has kept
the Congress from meeting its responsibilities in this area. We
cannot agree that moving to a two-year budget cycle will give
the Congress any more political will to resolve these issues
than it has now.
We would like to return to the point that a lot can happen
in two years that no one, not even with the collective wisdom
of Congress, can safely predict. In fact, a lot can happen in a
day. If the tragic and horrific events of September 11 do not
point to how dangerous it can be to make plans two years in
advance, then perhaps the disappearing surpluses of September
10 might bolster our argument. Formulating a budget for the
programs and activities of the federal government up to 28
months before the beginning of a fiscal year seems to defy
logic. As we have seen, decisions can be outdated in a moment.
How this Congress could have anticipated the need 28 months ago
to help rebuild the southern end of Manhattan amidst a
recession defies reason. How the Congress could have foreseen
in May that the Federal Reserve would be cutting interest rates
to 2 percent in order to stave off the worst effects of an
economic slowdown complicated by a war of indeterminate scope
and determination is also impossible to comprehend.
On Monday, October 29, the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, Mitch Daniels, issued a statement in
which he said ``Circumstances have changed radically.'' The
statement was issued in response to OMB's finding that the
total surplus for Fiscal Year 2001 is more than $30 billion
less than what was predicted on September 26 and less than half
the estimate made when the Administration released its budget
last Spring. Yes indeed, circumstances have changed radically.
We believe it is the role and responsibility of the Congress to
be able to respond to such dramatic changes in an effective and
expeditious manner that does not shortchange the Nation's
pressing needs as well as its long-term priorities. We strongly
believe it is critical that the Congress be able to respond to
the crisis at hand, a crisis none of us ever wanted, much less
ever anticipated. In September, shortly after the attacks on
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, this Congress passed a
$40 billion supplemental to provide the money needed to
immediately respond to the crisis. It is impossible to predict
what further funding will be required to help rebuild the
shattered lives created by that attack, nor is it possible to
predict what will be required to provide our military with the
funds needed to conduct the war that has ensued from the attack
or to ensure that our bridges, airports, seaports and harbors,
information systems, and health systems and citizens are safe
and can be protected from an enemy operating in the shadows.
It seems only logical to us that next Spring the Congress
must fashion a new budget resolution that takes into account
the long-term effects of September 11, the fact that the U.S.
economy is in a recession, and the fact that there are still
pressing needs in our country that need to be addressed. We are
at a loss to explain how the Congress might have done this a
year ago. It is clear that a budget prepared two and a half
years ago could not have anticipated the events of September 11
or our response to them. But that is also true of a budget
prepared two and a half months ago. The real issue is the
difficulty of preparing a two year budget after September 11.
The concept of biennial budgeting has been examined at some
length over any number of years, yet we have seen no really
convincing argument that would change our view that a wholesale
change to biennial budgeting is a prudent course of action. We
see the current proposal as a proposal to effect change for the
sake of change rather than furthering a responsible budget
framework. We see the current proposal as one that has little
regard for the complex problems facing this nation as we go to
war against terrorism, as we seek to protect the American
public from dangers on our own shores, and as we do this in the
midst of a recessionary economy. For the reasons enumerated
above, as well as in previous dissenting views filed in
preceding committee reports, we urge the defeat of this
proposal.
Martin Frost.
Louise Slaughter.
Alcee L. Hastings.