

**US POLICY TOWARDS SECESSION IN THE  
BALKANS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF  
*DE FACTO* PARTITION**

Evelyn N. Farkas

and

**IMPROVING US-RUSSIAN RELATIONS  
THROUGH PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

Beth L. Makros

Jeremy C. Saunders

INSS Occasional Paper 40

*Regional Security Series*

June 2001

USAF Institute for National Security Studies  
USAF Academy, Colorado



The views expressed in this volume are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Air Force or Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. The papers are approved for public release by the Marine Corps Staff College (Farkas) and SAF/PA (Makros/Saunders); distribution is unlimited.

\*\*\*\*\*

Comments pertaining to this paper are invited; please forward to:

Director, USAF Institute for National Security Studies  
HQ USAFA/DFES  
2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 5L27  
USAF Academy, CO 80840  
phone: 719-333-2717  
fax: 719-333-2716  
email: james.smith@usafa.af.mil

*Visit the Institute for National Security Studies home page at*  
<http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss>

ISBN: 0-9710900-3-3

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Forward	vii
Executive Summary- Farkas	xi
Executive Summary- Makros/Saunders	xiii

### US POLICY TOWARDS SECESSION IN THE BALKANS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF *DE FACTO* PARTITION

Introduction	3
Bosnia	5
-Security	6
-Political Institutions and Processes	11
Kosovo	17
-Security	18
-Political Institutions and Processes	24
Conclusion and Recommendations	27
Endnotes	31

### IMPROVING US-RUSSIAN RELATIONS THROUGH PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Introduction	41
-Significance of US-Russian Relationship	42
-Improving the US-Russian Relationship Through Peacekeeping	44
Assessment of Russian Peacekeeping	46
-Russian Political Environment	46
-Russian Peacekeeping Forces	49
-Russian Peacekeeping Doctrine	51
Case Studies of Russian Peacekeeping	54
-Case Study of Bosnia (IFOR/SFOR)	55
-Lessons Learned in Bosnia	62
-Case Study of Abkhazia (UNOMIG)	64

-Lessons Learned in Abkhazia	70
The Future of Russian Peacekeeping	72
Recommendations	73
-Recommendations for Bosnia and Combined Operations	73
-Recommendations for US Support in Abkhazia	76
-Overall Recommendations	78
Summary	81
Endnotes	81



## FOREWORD

We are pleased to publish this fortieth volume in the *Occasional Paper* series of the US Air Force Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). The decade following the Cold War has seen a rise in ethnic conflict, and the United States military has found itself involved in a range of humanitarian intervention situations. The US Commission on National Security Strategy/21<sup>st</sup> Century—the Hart-Rudman Commission—has forecast a continuation in this type of conflict and in concomitant calls for United States military intervention at some level. While the US military has expressed mixed attitudes toward this type of political-military mission, and while they have had to climb a relatively steep learning curve gaining experience and expertise in the range of “peacekeeping” operations, several issues have been identified as important to the success of current operations and to planning for future situations. These two papers identify, explain, and analyze two very important sets of those issues. They are presented here not as endorsements of US military intervention or as a “cookbook” of keys to successful peace operations, but as solid and sobering examinations of the complexity of this operational realm and of the unique military requirements and opportunities it presents.

In the first paper, *US Policy Towards Secession In The Balkans And Effectiveness Of De Facto Partition*, Evelyn Farkas addresses inherently non-military contextual challenges encountered by military forces during NATO efforts to make or enforce peace in Bosnia and Kosovo. She highlights significant problems that have emerged in both former Yugoslavian states; namely, that the initial progress towards establishing stable multiethnic states has been stalled by criminal networks and the lack of functioning central governments. She concludes that civil and military peace implementers must be more aggressive in administering the protectorates NATO has established in order to advance the political and economic reforms that are needed to

achieve a lasting peace. Her efforts help to detail the struggle of institution-building that accompanies peace enforcement and peacekeeping efforts.

In the second paper, *Improving US-Russian Relations Through Peacekeeping Operations*, Beth Makros and Jeremy Saunders use Bosnia and Abkhazia peacekeeping interventions as case studies to show the need for, and possible strategic benefits from, improving cooperation during combined or multinational peacekeeping operations. Not only do they outline the major weaknesses of Russian peacekeeping efforts and spell-out the differences between Russian and American peacekeeping doctrine, but they identify a major US weakness in combined settings: the lack of US peacekeepers' knowledge of the Russian language and culture and how such knowledge would improve the ability of US troops to effectively function in the field with their Russian counterparts within these combined settings. Their paper highlights both the wider potential benefits that can be gained from multinational operations and the further complexity and requirements they generate in order to ensure such broad success.

It is hoped that the issues and lessons highlighted by the authors of both papers will enable US policy makers and military commanders to identify means to more effectively lead or participate in such interventions for as long as the international situation and United States policy dictate a need for military intervention.

#### *About the Institute*

INSS is primarily sponsored by the National Security Policy Division, Nuclear and Counterproliferation Directorate, Headquarters US Air Force (HQ USAF/XONP) and the Dean of the Faculty, USAF Academy. Our other sponsors currently include the Air Staff's Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Directorate (XOI) and the Air Force's 39th and 23rd Information Operations Squadrons; the Secretary of Defense's Office of Net Assessment (OSD/NA); the Defense Threat Reduction Agency; the Army Environmental Policy Institute; and the Air Force long-range plans directorate



(XPPX). The mission of the Institute is “to promote national security research for the Department of Defense within the military academic community, and to support the Air Force national security education program.” Its research focuses on the areas of greatest interest to our organizational sponsors: arms control, proliferation, aerospace planning and policy, information operations, and regional and emerging issues in national security.

INSS coordinates and focuses outside thinking in various disciplines and across the military services to develop new ideas for defense policy making. To that end, the Institute develops topics, selects researchers from within the military academic community, and administers sponsored research. It also hosts conferences and workshops and facilitates the dissemination of information to a wide range of private and government organizations. INSS provides valuable, cost-effective research to meet the needs of our sponsors. We appreciate your continued interest in INSS and our research products.

JAMES M. SMITH  
Director



# US POLICY TOWARDS SECESSION IN THE BALKANS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF *DE FACTO* PARTITION

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

During the decade of the 1990s, as ethnic conflicts obtained greater salience and demonstrated renewed ability to destabilize the international order, successive US administrations fostered cautious multilateral policies. Washington advocated interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo that were designed to end conflict and restore order in the short-run while firmly denying the right to partition the original state. Partition—the creation of one or more new independent states from an existing one—was normatively and practically rejected. Instead, the US and its NATO allies opted for *de facto* partition as the “best of the worst” policy choices.

The *de facto* partitions in Bosnia and Kosovo are short-term military and political expedients involving the use of non-sovereign boundaries to divide states ethnically, geographically and politically. Simultaneously, the regimes imposed by the Dayton Accords in Bosnia and the UN protectorate in Kosovo emphasize the use of political and economic incentives to bridge military and territorial boundaries. The following study examines the two major ongoing civil-military attempts to manage ethnic conflict in the Balkans via *de facto* partition. The analysis focuses on the extent to which policy implementation bolsters the underlying objective—to maintain a multiethnic sovereign state and prevent secession or partition. The study assesses the *de facto* partition regimes in Bosnia and Kosovo in terms of their short-term effectiveness containing conflict and the long-term prospects for state preservation. In each case, the analysis begins with a brief review of the objectives of the intervenors. Subsequent sections focus on the military and political aspects of the intervention, and the extent to which they are reinforcing partition or integration. The conclusion offers a blunt final assessment of international efforts in the Balkans and policy recommendations addressing current shortcomings.

The evidence demonstrates that some progress has been made towards achieving the underlying objective in both cases—to establish multiethnic democracy and prevent secession or partition. *De facto* partition has brought short-term gains to Bosnia and Kosovo. It has proven to be an effective post-conflict mechanism to separate formerly warring parties. The international forces have restored peace to Bosnia and Kosovo. However, progress towards establishing a stable multiethnic state and territory in Bosnia and Kosovo, respectively, has been slowed and is in danger of stalling. The continued presence of war criminals and associated mafias in both states provides a sustained threat to internal security. The criminal networks prevent true freedom of movement of peoples, goods and capital, affecting long-term economic prospects as well. Finally, in Bosnia the lack of a functioning central government leaves the state out of the European integration process and continues to prevent compromise and a power shift from nationalists to more moderate politicians.

The study recommends that the implementers in Bosnia and Kosovo move quickly and assertively to: 1) remove internal security threats, 2) begin to reform the economic system and 3) in Bosnia, rewrite the constitution to strengthen the central government. The author asserts that *de facto* partition cannot become the basis for policy, if civilian and military peace implementers are unwilling to aggressively administer the protectorates that result. Firm international administration is required to implement the political and economic reforms that will bridge the *de facto* partition. Imposing reform upon these ethnically divided societies is the only “shock-therapy” that will allow for relatively quick political change and conditions conducive to a removal of the international forces that enforce the *de facto* partitions.

# **IMPROVING US-RUSSIAN RELATIONS THROUGH PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The post-Cold War era has seen a rise in the number of international peacekeeping operations undertaken by the world community. While these missions have often consumed the world's attention, the US-Russian relationship still plays a crucial role in world affairs. This paper seeks to answer three main questions:

- 1. Can relations between the US and Russia be improved through combined peacekeeping operations and support for Russian peacekeeping in the near abroad?*
- 2. In what areas can the US most effectively use resources to enhance cooperation in peacekeeping?*
- 3. What actions should the US take to initiate or improve relations in these areas?*

## **Cooperation in Peacekeeping**

The US has several vital and important interests involved in maintaining a cooperative relationship with Russia. While the current relationship is somewhat tense, one of the most promising ways to improve the overall strategic relationship is through cooperation in peacekeeping efforts. These efforts provide an opportunity for higher level political figures to interact and allow the US and Russia to promote their mutual interests.

## **Assessment of Russian Peacekeeping**

To find the areas where the US can most effectively use its resources to enhance cooperation in peacekeeping, this paper assesses: 1) where Russia is most likely to participate, 2) Russian peacekeeping training and equipment, 3) Russian peacekeeping doctrine, 4) a case of participation in an international operation, Bosnia, and 5) a case of involvement in the near abroad with a low level of UN supervision, Abkhazia.

*Participation:* Russia's economic and political situations limit them to participation in peacekeeping missions in the near abroad, the Balkans, and, to a limited extent, UN operations.

*Training and Equipment:* The training Russian forces receive for these missions is adequate, but their equipment is outdated and poorly maintained.

*Doctrine:* Russian peacekeeping doctrine, at least in practice, differs from US doctrine in three areas: 1) a greater propensity to use force, 2) an often-times partial approach to promote Russian interests, and 3) the inclusion of combatants in the peacekeeping force.

*Performance in Bosnia:* As an example of Russian participation in combined operations with the US under NATO auspices, Bosnia shows that Russian troops perform adequately. The major issues in Russian performance include setting up a mutually agreeable command and control structure, questions of Russian partiality and lack of professionalism, equipment and maintenance problems, and language and cultural barriers.

*Performance in Abkhazia:* In Abkhazia, Russian forces act under CIS auspices with UN supervision. They perform the minimum task of maintaining stability reasonably well, partly because of their heavy-handed approach. Russian troops have frequently acted with partiality towards the Abkhaz, and have been unable or unwilling to completely fulfill their mandate to provide a secure environment and to facilitate the return of refugees.

*The US has an opportunity to improve the overall strategic relationship with Russia by improving cooperation in the Balkans and finding areas to support Russian peacekeeping in the near abroad.*

#### **Bosnia**

The US should seek to improve cooperation and communication in Bosnia by: increasing the number of LNO's (liaison officers) to the Russian Brigade, including a Russian Representative in PfP command post exercises, and restarting the combined patrolling missions that the Russian and US troops perform. To reduce cultural misunderstandings and break down language

barriers, the US should set aside more time to brief incoming American commanders (down through platoon leaders and NCO's) and develop phrase books on various differences in military culture, terminology, and procedures.

#### **Abkhazia**

The US can support Russian peacekeeping in the near abroad by allowing American UN observers more freedom to travel in the conflict region and increasing their interactions with CIS peacekeeping forces. The US should also encourage and support other CIS nations, such as the Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Georgia, to take a more active role in CIS peacekeeping missions, bolstering the CIS and improving its peacekeeping capabilities and legitimacy.

#### **Overall Recommendations**

These recommendations can improve the US-Russian relationship in the context of any type of peacekeeping operation:

- 1) Define each nation's participation in the operational planning of multinational peacekeeping operations by the level or amount of their participation in the operation.
- 2) Restart educational exchanges between US and Russian military personnel.
- 3) Perform combined exercises of staff level officers under the established PfP program.
- 4) Improve Russian language and cultural expertise among US officers.
- 5) Increase cultural training for officers and NCOs assigned to work with Russian units.
- 6) Give more credit to Russia for its peacekeeping operations in recognition of improved performance in desired areas.





**US POLICY TOWARDS SECESSION IN THE BALKANS  
AND EFFECTIVENESS OF *DE FACTO* PARTITION**

Evelyn N. Farkas

USAF Institute for National Security Studies  
USAF Academy, Colorado



# ***US POLICY TOWARDS SECESSION IN THE BALKANS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF DE FACTO PARTITION***

## **INTRODUCTION**

Issues of separatism in its extreme form—secession—are a direct challenge to the international system, as the 1999 Kosovo crisis vividly illustrated. The decision to allow, facilitate, support or obstruct efforts by ethnic or communal groups to carve their own states out of existing entities is the most difficult and controversial one confronting powerful states and the international community. This is particularly true in Europe, where ethnic conflict affects the viability and credibility of NATO, the uniquely operational transatlantic political-military alliance. As the NATO operation in Kosovo demonstrated, miscalculations threaten to shatter alliances, bring great powers to blows, and render international organizations (chief among them the UN) irrelevant.

During the decade of the 1990s, as ethnic conflicts obtained greater salience and demonstrated renewed ability to destabilize the international order, successive US administrations fostered cautious multilateral policies. Washington advocated interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo which were designed to end conflict and restore order in the short-run, while firmly denying the right to partition the original state. Partition—the creation of one or more new independent states from an existing one—was normatively and practically rejected. Instead, the US and its NATO allies opted for *de facto* partition as the “best of the worst” policy choices.

The *de facto* partitions in Bosnia and Kosovo involve the use of non-sovereign boundaries to divide states ethnically, geographically and politically. Diplomats advocate *de facto* partition for several reasons having to do with justice, demonstration effects, and most obviously, halting and preventing conflict. *De facto* partition does not fully reward secessionists for adopting violence or criminal means such as genocide and “ethnic cleansing.”

Policymakers regard it as less precedent setting than outright partition, and as such less likely to cause demonstration effects (attempts by other secessionists to achieve results in a similar fashion). Finally—and most significantly—*de facto* partition has been portrayed by US and European officials as an interim solution, a means toward reinstating or establishing a tolerant multiethnic state.

Policymakers regard *de facto* partition as a short-term military and political expedient formulated to allow a return to rational interest-based, as opposed to nationalist, politics. The fundamental assumption driving US policy towards secession and *de facto* partition is the notion that ethnic conflict is instrumental. While nationalists may appeal to primordial instincts, ethnic conflict itself is not inevitable and immutable; it can be managed based on an appeal to interests.<sup>1</sup> Political and economic mechanisms can be employed to reduce the benefits of ethnically-based politics.

The regimes imposed by the Dayton Accords and the UN protectorate in Kosovo emphasize the use of political and economic incentives to bridge military and territorial boundaries. The following study examines the two major ongoing civil-military attempts to manage ethnic conflict in the Balkans via *de facto* partition. The analysis focuses on the extent to which policy implementation bolsters the underlying objective—to maintain a multiethnic sovereign state and prevent secession or partition. The study assesses the *de facto* partition regimes in Bosnia and Kosovo in terms of their short-term effectiveness containing conflict and the long-term prospects for state preservation.

The evidence demonstrates that some progress has been made towards achieving the underlying objective in both cases—to establish multiethnic democracy and prevent secession or partition. However, integration or multiethnic coexistence has not gained the upper hand against

separatism. Peace has been restored to both Bosnia and Kosovo; NATO and its allies have completed the fundamental security assignments, reinforcing cease-fires and boundaries against major incursions or excursions. Yet, on the political and legal front much remains to be done. Bosnia is not functioning as a unified state; its central government barely functions. In Kosovo, there is still less ethnic tolerance and Serbs and Albanians fail to even cooperate on the question of elections. In both cases the rule of law is weak, interethnic trust is low, and only international edict has been able to bring about the minimal progress that has occurred. This paper examines the peace implementation efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo. In each case, the analysis begins with a brief review of the objectives of the intervening organs. Subsequent sections focus on the military and political aspects of the intervention, and the extent to which they are reinforcing partition or integration. The conclusion offers a blunt final assessment of international efforts in the Balkans and policy recommendations addressing current shortcomings.

### **BOSNIA**

The 1995 Dayton Peace Accords established the framework for maintaining peace in Bosnia, preserving the sovereignty of the Bosnian state—albeit in a much diluted form—and for forging a democratic system of government. The agreement divides Bosnia into two non-sovereign political “entities” or nationalist boundaries. The cease-fire line, with some modifications, became the Inter-entity Boundary Line (IEBL) designating 49 percent of Bosnian territory as the Republika Srpska and 51 percent as the Bosnian-Croat Federation. The peace accords consist of eleven articles and thirteen annexes. The first two annexes outline the partition, including the role of NATO and its allies in enforcing the separation of the warring parties. The remaining eleven annexes comprise the civilian program for establishing a confederation,

securing justice (including the right of refugees to return) and respect for human rights.<sup>2</sup>

US negotiators accepted *de facto* partition as an undesirable but necessary way to achieve Serbian acceptance of an agreement ending the war. The NATO military forces would oversee the separation of the military forces, while the creation of the entities ensured that the political elites would maintain local control. At the same time, the negotiators intended to bridge the territorial and military divisions through state institutions, and provisions related to human rights, refugee return and property rights.

### **Security**

In 1996 NATO and its partners sent 60,000 troops into Bosnia to keep the peace. By D+120 they succeeded in securing the IEHL, separating the warring parties and moving weapons into cantonment sites. Their success enabled subsequent reductions so that by May 2000 the Stabilization Force (SFOR)'s total strength had tapered off to 23,000 troops, including 4,600 US troops (about 20 percent of the total.) The cease-fire holds, and the boundaries are set. The status of Brcko—straddling the strategic Posavina corridor, which potentially links north-central Bosnia to eastern Bosnia and Serbia—was arbitrated and declared without any armed resistance.<sup>3</sup> Brcko, a single demilitarized unit of local self-government outside of the entities and directly under the sovereignty of Bosnia and Hercegovina, is functioning as a multiethnic district.<sup>4</sup> Beyond Brcko, there is one country, but there are currently three armies in Bosnia, which absorb about forty percent of all public spending.<sup>5</sup> Finally, Bosnia's borders remain unregulated and "probably the greatest revenue source for criminal elements and hard-line nationalists in Bosnia and Hercegovina."<sup>6</sup>

In a step toward creating a unified military the international

community pushed the entity armed forces to establish a functioning Secretariat for the Dayton mandated Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM) in July 1999, and is pressuring the entities to forge—via the SCMM—a common state security policy. International officials assert that the Bosnian leadership should be focused on joining European organizations. Yet, there cannot be any question of association with NATO, much less membership, if Bosnia has three militaries and no defense policy.<sup>7</sup> To date, Bosnia still has no national security strategy. The international political-military leadership did, however, manage to convince the entities to plan and implement a 15 percent reduction in military personnel and budget. As of May 2000, according to SFOR, the reduction was complete.<sup>8</sup> Meanwhile, the January 2000 elections in Croatia yielded a change of government and a pledge to cut off support to the Herceg-Bosna extremists. The US, Croatia and the Federation signed an agreement in the spring of 2000 asserting that all security assistance would be channeled through the SCMM.<sup>9</sup> But as of now—even with the international community's recent seizure of the banks funding the Bosnian Croat nationalist movement—none of this has removed the threat of independent Bosnian Croat military action.

On the internal security front, there are also three *de facto* police forces, and all three ethnic groups manage to employ illegal secret police. Political patronage is the thread holding this system together. The UN Mission in Bosnia, with the mandate for police restructuring and reform, is trying to tear holes into this venal web. On the entity or federal levels the UN is actively working to foster multiethnicity. The UN established a Standing Committee on Police Matters and on 3 May 2000 the entities signed an agreement to facilitate the redeployment of 200-300 police across the IEHL to their pre-war assignments. At about the same time, a specially trained twelve-member multiethnic police unit was sent to East Timor. In addition, the UN

Special Representative and Head of Mission established a small multiethnic border police force, which deployed to the Sarajevo airport on 6 June 2000. The UN, with the help of the Austrian government, hopes to expand this force, ultimately, to address the porous nature of Bosnian borders.<sup>10</sup>

Unfortunately, while it is possible for the UN to take decisive action at the highest levels to create state-level cooperation, or structures, the UN is severely restricted by its mandate on the local level. The UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) only has a mandate to advise and observe the local police, not to enforce the law themselves. As a result, though they routinely review police organization and behavior, they cannot force implementation. Nonetheless, the IPTF audits local police and conducts human rights training. The IPTF attempts to work with local police to help them deal with organized crime and corruption, but in most cases police are part of the patronage systems, and even criminal networks. The Office of the High Representative (OHR) bolsters these efforts by removing cantonal ministers and local police chiefs for noncompliance.<sup>11</sup> Meanwhile, SFOR made one of the most significant contributions to crime fighting, successfully “busting” an extensive criminal network in West Mostar. This is another way to attack the obstructionist political actors, shaking the socioeconomic foundation of its power.

The environment in Bosnia is generally secure, although ethnically motivated violence is still common, especially in areas where minorities are returning. Local criminal rings serve their own economic interests, intimidating refugees and others who represent a threat to their objectives. Many of the ringleaders are war criminals who control formal and/or informal patronage systems, much like Mafia dons. They often act in collusion with local nationalist political leaders, and since NATO forces have not apprehended them, their influence remains without serious challenge. As of



June 2000 the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) reported 67 indictees. Of those, 41 had surrendered or been captured and were in proceedings. Twenty-five remain at large.<sup>12</sup>

The shaky security situation—with many key war criminals at large—has directly impacted the refugee issue. Article 7 of the Dayton Accords is the single most significant integrating mechanism established by the US and its allies. Its promise, however, goes unfulfilled. Refugees, especially those returning to areas where they will be in the minority, are afraid to return. The war left Bosnia with over 2 million refugees and displaced persons. Since 1996, however, 310,000 refugees returned to Bosnia and an additional 250,000 displaced persons went home. At the start of 1999 experts estimated that about 400,000 refugees and 800,000 displaced persons were still waiting to return.<sup>13</sup> The international community has only made half-hearted, toothless attempts to address this situation. OHR's Reconstruction and Return Task Force has been gradually working to address administrative and legal obstacles to return and has used economic leverage in targeted areas to encourage and support returns. Still, while the UN declared 1998 the Year of the Refugee, only 100,000 Bosnians, half of the official target, went home. Of that group only 30,000 returned to areas where they would be in the minority. In the following year about 70,000 minority returns occurred. Most of the remaining one million or so displaced persons and refugees are potential minority returns. However, unorchestrated returns have been increasing over the last year, signaling a shift of initiative to the population. Perhaps in response to this phenomenon—and to international pressure—the ethnic Serb leadership has demonstrated more willingness to address the issue of resettlement.<sup>14</sup>

Current criticism of NATO's efforts focuses on the issue of civil

violence and arson in refugee resettlement areas, and SFOR's reluctance to apprehend war criminals.<sup>15</sup> For the first two years of the mission, NATO commanders interpreted their mandate to capture war criminals "during the course of normal duties" in the strictest fashion. Indeed, they went to great lengths to avoid coming across war criminals during normal operations. From July 1997 onward, however, SFOR began staging raids aimed at capturing them. British troops were the first to act, conducting two operations in July 1997, which led to the capture of one war criminal and the death of another. Since then several others have been apprehended by British or US troops. The French commanders have been most reluctant to act, and most of the remaining indictees are believed to be in their sector, including the former Bosnian Serb President, Radovan Karadzic.<sup>16</sup> In April 2000, under acute pressure from their allies, the French finally seized Momcilo Krajsnik, a senior deputy to Karadzic and the Serb member of the first Dayton Presidency.

Meanwhile, after SFOR troops had demonstrated a hampered ability to respond to various civil disturbances in Brcko in 1997 and elsewhere, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) members and NATO agreed to establish the Multinational Special Unit (MSU). The MSU, initially 800-strong and composed mainly of European police units, is the SFOR Commander's emergency force in the event of riots or other civil disturbances.<sup>17</sup> In 1998, the international political and military leadership began to develop a more cooperative and coordinated approach. The High Representative began to remove local officials who were violating electoral laws or otherwise blocking the implementation of Dayton. SFOR and the IPTF stepped in to ensure that OHR's decisions were implemented. The MSU provided confidence that this could be achieved with minimum unrest. There were some successes, most notably the Westar operation.<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless, change—especially of the demographic sort—is strongly resisted by local nationalists and war criminals.

It is this *de facto* alliance that prevents most refugees from returning and blocks implementation of Dayton beyond Annex 1A. “As long as these criminals remain at liberty, the rule of law is incomplete—police and judges are intimidated, corruption is rife, normal democratic politics is impossible.”<sup>19</sup>

#### **Political Institutions and Processes**

Politically speaking, Bosnia is a shell of a state. Indeed, the federal government exists largely on paper. Over the last six years the international community has been unable to transform the constitution into reality. Bosnia does not exist as a united functioning federal state. Instead, there are two entities grudgingly co-existing, but not cooperating. Indeed, the Spring 2001 secession declaration by the nationalist Croats in western Bosnia highlights the serious division within the Bosnian-Croat Federation; there are three competing groups preventing the government from functioning. The federal government is “at the mercy of three entities; two don’t want the central government to function and the central government needs the entities for the authority to function.”<sup>20</sup> The central government remains hostage to nationalism. After more than \$5 billion in foreign aid, including over \$1 billion from the US, this is where Dayton has failed most.

Yet Dayton has failed on this score partly because it has acknowledged nationalism and ethnic interests. In the compromise between the nationalist Serbs and Croats, who wanted as much separation as possible, and their Muslim counterparts, who insisted on integration and a unified state, the negotiators created a European government unlike any other. The entities were to resolve their differences through an ethnically divided assembly and a tripartite Presidency representing the major Bosnian ethnic groups. “The entire constitution enshrines ethnic discrimination as a principle of law.”<sup>21</sup> Under this system the basis for all politics remains ethnic. Not only has it proved unworkable, but also experts point out that it is incompatible with

European human rights law. Bosnia cannot join the Council of Europe or the European Union with such a constitution (and joining NATO would require the creation of a single Bosnian army).

From 1996 to 2001, three OHR administrations have worked to establish common institutions and to invest them with power. After two frustrating years where the OHR struggled simply to bring the three Presidents together—literally in one room—the international community adopted a harder line toward the Bosnian leaders. In 1997-98 at the meetings of the Peace Implementation Conference (PIC) in Sintra (Portugal) and Bonn, the OHR obtained support for a stronger interpretation of its mandate (Article 5 of Annex 10 of the DPA.)<sup>22</sup> As a result, in the face of extended stalling and contention, the High Representative, Carlos Westendorp, was able to impose a common license plate, flag and currency upon the Bosnian Presidency. The PIC reaffirmed the authority of the OHR and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to remove obstructionist officials from office or ballots. This practice has been exercised with some vigor ever since, though OHR and OSCE decisions often must be enforced by police forces, and even after problematic individuals are removed from office they generally continue to function behind the scenes. The Sintra/Bonn decisions brought about the single most dramatic change in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Suddenly, freedom of movement existed. From 1998 onwards the climate shifted. The prevalent fear for one's physical safety gave way to concern about long-term economic viability.

Meanwhile, the central institutions meet infrequently and usually to no effect. The Parliamentary Assembly passed over twenty laws over the course of three years, but only due to coercion from the international community. Few of these laws have proper provisions for enforcement.<sup>23</sup> As a result, the state legislature has failed to alter the political or economic

landscape in Bosnia. Despite all of this, at the end of 1998 the PIC members agreed that the subsequent two years would involve “the authorities in BiH [*Bosnia and Hercegovina*] increasingly assuming greater responsibility.”<sup>24</sup> Then, in September 1999 Wolfgang Petritsch was appointed High Representative. His tenure marked the shift from the aggressive quasi-protectorate-style Westendorp espoused, to a coaxing effort Petritsch characterizes as “ownership.” According to the OHR, this concept “emphasizes the fact that it is the leadership and authorities of BiH who are primarily responsible for the implementation of the Peace Agreement, and not the International Community.”<sup>25</sup>

Petritsch’s deputy concedes that there is an apparent contradiction between ownership and unity, in as much as the “owners” are not interested in unity. However, he explains that, “local indigenous politicians need to be more responsible, because if we can’t succeed, they will develop a readiness to depend on the International Community for decisionmaking.”<sup>26</sup> Indeed, OHR officials state that the Bosnian politicians hide behind international officials and refuse to take blame or credit themselves. They stonewall until the internationals impose a solution. Of course, these nationalist leaders have everything to lose from the provisions aimed at strengthening the central government and establishing a multiethnic system of government. They have no interest in furthering change and therefore achieve their objectives by stalling and hoping that the passage of time will favor their interests. It generally has. Therefore, it is not surprising that ownership looks relatively ineffectual. Its critics maintain that Petritsch’s approach is “like Vietnamization—it provides the US with cover so we can leave.”<sup>27</sup> General Wesley Clark, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe reckons, “Ownership is a step backwards.”<sup>28</sup>

As a result, the burst of progress in 1998 has been followed by far too

plodding efforts, as the OHR makes an “effort to continue to resist stepping in too early.”<sup>29</sup> OHR officials aim to encourage the development of a successor generation of politicians. Faced with indigenous opposition, they insist, “[if]...people don’t cooperate we need to take people off the table. If people obstruct, they need to be removed. Maybe that encourages successors.”<sup>30</sup> Indeed, Petritsch has exercised this power much more frequently than his predecessor, removing a total of forty-five officials between November 1999 and September 2000; Westendorp only removed one obstructionist politician. It is unclear whether this has encouraged cooperation, or merely increased public disgust with politics. Nonetheless, the *modus operandi* is to push the Bosnian leaders or wait them out on more urgent issues, hoping that they might be forced to take action under the threat of public embarrassment.

In the meantime, the OHR has made progress on the issue of creating new ministries. Quietly, it has also been formulating a solution to deal with the fact that the rotational Presidency is unconstitutional. The Social Democratic Party of Bosnia proposed a new ethnically blind electoral law, so that, for example, a Serb living in the Federation can become a President too. They explain, “If the Presidency is made up of three representatives of three peoples, then this does not reflect the civic principle. That principle exists to the extent that individuals feel that they are first of all citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina. But according to the Constitution and the structure of the electorate, the national principle is absolutely dominant.”<sup>31</sup>

In theory, the most encouraging development is the 4 July 2000 decision by the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina that it “shall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether any provision of an Entity’s Constitution or Law is consistent with this Constitution.”<sup>32</sup> The exercise of this right would be truly exciting. In the meantime, OHR and the UN (under the auspices of its Judicial Assessment Program) have focused on pressuring

the entities to reform their judicial systems. Reform legislation has been adopted by the parliament; similar legislation was imposed by OHR on the Federation in May 2000. The objective is to establish a judicial selection commission to review the appointments and dismissals of judges and prosecutors, and to review all sitting judges and prosecutors. In an effort to tackle the criminal problems from another angle, OHR imposed a law directing the Federation to establish a first instance criminal court to try criminal, terrorist and organized crime cases. The court was established in February 2000, but the Federation did not authorize funding for it.<sup>33</sup> Developing a robust independent judiciary does not appear to be on the agenda of the Federation leadership. Naturally, this does nothing to establish respect for law and justice.

There is no escape from the fact that, “Very few [*Bosnian leaders*]*—*Silajdzic and Izetbegovic excepted*—*want the central institutions to work.”<sup>34</sup> And even the Bosnian Muslim leadership is unwilling to make significant changes that might jeopardize its grip on power. In short, as Jacques Klein the head of the UN mission sees it, “The leaders that got us into war, can’t get us out.... Here in Bosnia, things are frozen.”<sup>35</sup> The electoral process is partly to blame, as it has reinforced ethnic divisions and made it difficult for moderates to attempt to gain large multiethnic constituencies. The nationalist parties control the machines, which include the jobs, the media and business. OHR addressed this conundrum by instituting a regulation prohibiting members of any government from simultaneously holding positions as business managers or board members of state-owned or private enterprises. Nonetheless, change is slow. “The April municipal elections demonstrated that hard-line nationalist parties remain a powerful force, even though their grip is weakening.”<sup>36</sup>

Indeed, the fall national elections brought more moderates to power

among the Muslims, but Bosnia's problems go beyond security and ethnic harmony. The economic foundation upon which the entire Dayton structure rests, arguably, is rotted through and incapable of supporting a robust multiethnic democratic state.<sup>37</sup> OHR officials cite fewer attacks on returnees in 2000 and early signs of an increasing return rate as encouraging trends.<sup>38</sup> Nonetheless, "as each year passes, the clock runs out. The economic situation hinders the process because of the lack of employment."<sup>39</sup> The private sector in Bosnia is at a standstill; corruption and red tape prevent new enterprise. Foreign investors are deterred by corruption and communist-era red tape. Domestic investors are also inhibited by the patronage systems; they also suffer for lack of capital and an open banking system. Unfortunately, the internationals only began to express concern about such issues about two years into the peace implementation process. Now, new reform proposals must contend with the fact that economic assistance to Bosnia is shrinking. More disturbingly, the Bosnian government appears uncommitted to working with the Stability Pact, the international community's latest proposal for bolstering the economies of Southeastern Europe.<sup>40</sup> Sadly, this only bolsters assessments that the Stability Pact itself "is likely to remain a framework organization."<sup>41</sup>

The internationals have concluded that in Bosnia, "It's easier to turn an aquarium into fish soup than to make fish soup into an aquarium."<sup>42</sup> It certainly took less time to rip Bosnia apart than it is taking to reconstruct a stable, nominally democratic multiethnic state. Nonetheless, much progress has been made—especially from 1998 on. Mistakes were made and lessons learned. The civilian and military components of the IFOR operation did not have a close cooperative or collaborative relationship. In fact, IFOR commanders resisted pressure by the OHR, the civilian coordinating authority, to interpret the Dayton mandate more broadly. IFOR commanders provided



minimal assistance to civilian agencies implementing Annexes 2-11 of the Accords. Moreover, the lack of civil-military cooperation was compounded by the fact that the OHR did not have its own operational arm at the outset, and had no direct authority over the other civilian institutions operating in Bosnia. OHR's coordinating function, in short, was weak. Ultimately, *de facto* partition was enforced within a few months. Yet, the measures that were to soften the boundary lines did not begin to be implemented until 1998. Today, after more active SFOR-OHR coordination, there is freedom of movement, but progress on refugee returns remains tentative. Four years later, the international community has realized that keeping people (especially educated youths) in Bosnia, much less returning them, requires addressing not only security, but also economics. Bosnia is in dire need of judicial and economic reform.

### **KOSOVO**

The multinational peace operation, headed by the UN, aims to maintain the boundaries and stability of the province of Kosovo and to establish an autonomous democratic government for the territory. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 authorizes and establishes the framework for achieving those objectives. The UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) is charged with coordinating the effort "to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."<sup>43</sup> UNMIK's mandate includes establishing a transitional administration to run the province, ostensibly until a future date when Kosovo's political and territorial status will be definitively settled. In the meantime, a NATO-led international Kosovo Force (KFOR) provides for overall security.

Though the first head of UNMIK, Bernard Kouchner, assumed office asserting that a multicultural society must be established in Kosovo within six

months, he was referring to achieving “coexistence” among Serbs, Albanians, Roma (Gypsies), and others. The goal now is to establish mono-ethnic communities through which other communities can move freely.

The final disposition of Kosovo has been put off into the indefinite future; the first prerequisite was regime change in Belgrade—removal of Milosevic, which has occurred. Nonetheless, the Kostunica government must also be willing and able to negotiate with the Kosovar Albanians; conversely the Albanians must be willing to meet with representatives of the government in Belgrade. Even the new regime may not be able to solve the long-term self-determination issue. For now, the Kosovars must settle for *de facto* autonomy, enforced by the international *de facto* partition of Serbia.

### **Security**

KFOR troop strength is approximately 50,000, with 42,500 troops from 28 countries in Kosovo and another 7,500 supporting troops in Macedonia, Albania and Greece.<sup>44</sup> The US contributes about 5,500 military personnel, roughly a 14 percent contribution. KFOR’s mission is to “establish and maintain a secure environment in Kosovo, including public order” until UNMIK can assume this responsibility. KFOR is also responsible for enforcing the Military Technical Agreement reached with the Yugoslav military—providing for their pullout from Kosovo—and demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA.) Significantly, one of three KFOR mission objectives is to “provide assistance to the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), *including core functions* until they are transferred to UNMIK.”<sup>45</sup> The KFOR command asserts that “KFOR and UNMIK are Partners in the international effort to restore Kosovo and to help the local population to transfer the province into a free and democratic society.”<sup>46</sup> Thus, though KFOR’s main function is to provide security, it will provide resources and manpower to directly assist the various organizations and entities working under UN

auspices or coordination.<sup>47</sup> Unquestionably, this language is a direct outcome of a lesson learned in Bosnia, where lack of coordination or even cooperation, especially during 1996-97 led to slow implementation of the nonmilitary annexes of Dayton, and even victories for nationalists.<sup>48</sup>

KFOR has managed to prevent major military incursions or excursions through Kosovo's boundaries. The Yugoslav army in accordance with the Military Technical Agreement and KFOR has established military dominance over the territory. Yet, there are still external security challenges in the form of incursions by the Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac (UCPMB), a military organization mirroring the KLA with a mission to wrest majority Albanian towns just southeast of Kosovo from Serbian/Yugoslav control. UCPMB militia use Kosovo as a base or safe haven and a weapons transit point. Through attacks on Serb police units in the Presevo valley inside Serbia, the UCPMB hopes to wrest this eastern border area from Yugoslav control and to attach it to Kosovo. Increased military activity in the buffer zone separating Kosovo from Yugoslav territory led KFOR to conclude an agreement in early 2001 allowing Yugoslav troops to reenter the zone. KFOR officials insist, "KFOR is determined to prevent any action that would make Kosovo a staging area for exporting violence."<sup>49</sup> They have been sorely tested by the UCPMB and also by the related ethnic Albanian militia elements crossing back and forth between Kosovo and Macedonia.

On the internal security front, the KLA and associated Kosovar Albanian extremists have posed the greatest challenge. On 21 June 1999 the KLA Commander-in-Chief signed the "Undertaking of Demilitarization and Transformation," which effectively disbanded the KLA. KLA forces were divided into a new Kosovo Police Service (KPS), and the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC, functioning), and some KLA members formed the Party of

Democratic Progress of Kosovo (PPDK). Still others returned to civilian life. The 5,000 man KPC, though it functions akin to a national guard with a civil relief mission, is also aimed to “defuse possible resistance to the KLA’s demilitarization by providing ex-KLA fighters and commanders with jobs and a quasi-military structure.”<sup>50</sup> By September 1999 the demilitarization of the KLA was complete. Tons of weapons and ammunition have been seized or relinquished. However, informed observers insist that the KLA still exists as a *de facto* organization, and that its access to arms remains unobstructed. “No one in Kosovo believes that the KLA has simply disappeared: it remains as a powerful and active element in every aspect of Kosovo Albanian life.”<sup>51</sup> Nevertheless, the KLA, formerly a large grass-roots military organization, has shrunk and the new leaders of the PPDK and KPC no longer have the popular appeal they had two years ago.

The former KLA elements have proved troublesome in as much as they are suspected to be behind organized and ethnically motivated crime. The international community has not been able to ascertain the extent to which violence against Serbs, Roma, Slavic Muslims and others has been coordinated. In addition, it is also unclear how many perpetrators are masquerading as KLA members. Most analysts believe that “criminal groups, including some from Albania, have taken advantage of the slow deployment of international police and the lack of a functioning judicial system.”<sup>52</sup> While not all of the criminals are former KLA, “anecdotal and circumstantial evidence has made it harder to believe that the KLA is entirely clean at any level.”<sup>53</sup> There have been countless allegations against KPS members for unmandated or criminal activity. KFOR initiated 95 investigations of individuals, and subsequently expelled four men from the KPS and suspended a further nine.<sup>54</sup>

The single biggest challenge to achieving a peaceful security environment within Kosovo are the acts of intimidation and violence directed at ethnic minorities, especially Serbs and Gypsies. Most of the roughly 830,000 ethnic Albanian refugees in neighboring countries returned to Kosovo in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, leaving only 25,000 Albanian, Serb and Roma refugees in the Balkan region and several thousand others outside the region.<sup>55</sup> However, since NATO troops entered Kosovo in June 1999 approximately 190,000 Serbs have left—about three-quarters of the pre-war population of 200-250 thousand.<sup>56</sup> This exodus of the largest minority population in Kosovo is generally attributed to intimidation by Kosovar Albanians, who are seeking retribution for past individual or collective Serb actions.<sup>57</sup> At the onset of the mission the interethnic murder rate averaged about 50 per week. About a year later, in the summer of 2000 the rate of such killings was 1-2 per week.<sup>58</sup> Lesser ethnically motivated crimes have continued at a higher rate than that of homicides.

Most of the ethnic Serbs live in northern Kosovo, with about 55,000—about half the total—in the town of Mitrovica.<sup>59</sup> Yet Mitrovica is also home to Albanians who have resisted Serb pressure to leave entirely. Still, in February 2000 there were hundreds of Albanians expelled from the north side of town. KFOR was unable to prevent this population shift, and their attempts at quelling the concomitant violence highlighted alliance and coalition weaknesses. Several countries had let their troop contingent number fall and had significantly circumscribed their activities to prevent them from undertaking potentially dangerous tasks. The French KFOR troops in Mitrovica were unable to cope with the turmoil and requested US assistance. The US forces were subsequently attacked by rock-throwing mobs, and this in turn provoked a DoD decision to bar US troops from moving outside their sector in non-emergencies.<sup>60</sup>

In the aftermath of the February violence the town and the two ethnic groups were clearly divided by the Ibar River, with the Serbs in the north and Albanians in the south. Low-level unrest continued and on 22 March 2000 KFOR established a “confidence area” within the town. This measure was adopted “with the purpose of providing a visible reassurance of their security to the general population of Mitrovica, protecting minorities, controlling access to the Confidence Area, and improving the freedom of movement of those living or working in the Confidence Area.”<sup>61</sup> When it came to the last objective, freedom of movement was only secured within each side of the river. The UN and KFOR ultimately solidified the *de facto* partition of the town. This was far from the original intent; indeed, the UN intended to establish a “united city” with a joint administration including Serbs and Albanians. Since then, frustrated at every turn by the hard-line pro-Milosevic Serbs in Mitrovica, the UN has focused on economic mechanisms for achieving a sustainable level of coexistence. On 14 August 2000 the UN authorized KFOR to seize the mining facilities at Trepca, in the immediate proximity of Mitrovica. Also on that date, UNMIK signed an agreement with a French-Swedish-American consortium to rehabilitate the mining and metallurgical complex. The UN now manages it as a public enterprise. On this front at least the UN had moved closer to one final objective of their strategy for coexistence—establishing an industry that can attract investment and provide employment for the province.<sup>62</sup> Indeed Kouchner declared, “By providing jobs and income for Kosovo, Trepca could be a key to achieving coexistence in northern Kosovo.”<sup>63</sup>

Mitrovica stands as a stark symbol of the failure to achieve multiethnicity. Undeniably, for the internationals, “their signal failure, so far, has been to get the [*Albanian*] Kosovars to live with the remaining [*Kosovar*] Serbs.”<sup>64</sup> According to one UN official, “The UN had lost [*this battle*] by

August because we came in too slow.”<sup>65</sup> In the eight months it took the UN to install their personnel and take control of local administration, the KLA leaders managed to place their people in influential positions, where they continue to shape current political struggles. The fact that there was effectively no judicial system until the spring of 2000 benefited extreme nationalist and criminal elements. Ultimately, a common refrain among international observers and minorities in Kosovo was that the UN and KFOR effectively favored the Albanian Kosovars.

Since the spring of 2000, however, UNMIK and KFOR have made concerted attempts to address the persecution of the ethnic minorities, as well as the related rule of law vacuum. The internationals reached out to the moderate Serbian National Council located in Gracanica, central Kosovo. On 28 February US Secretary of State Madeline Albright met with Bishop Artemije, the leader of the Serbian National Council, and secured his agreement to support a US government project to gradually return approximately 440 internally displaced Serbs to Kosovo. In March KFOR and the UN International Police (UNIP) initiated Operation Trojan I to provide security to Serbs traveling to and from church, market and as they worked their fields. In May a joint committee on returns, including UNMIK, KFOR and moderate Serbs, was established.<sup>66</sup> And finally, during July 29 Serbs were returned to Slivovo in the predominantly Albanian area of eastern Kosovo.<sup>67</sup>

In a significant departure from, and improvement based on, UN experiences in Bosnia, the UN civil police in Kosovo are responsible for law enforcement and for developing a professional impartial Kosovar police force. Unlike the IPTF, its counterpart in Bosnia, UNIP does not simply monitor the local police. As of 29 March 2000 only 2,734 of the 3,500 police authorized by the international community had been deployed to Kosovo.<sup>68</sup> By April, in response to pressure from Kouchner and the UN Secretary-General (who

recommended a force strength of 3,110), the deployed police force had grown to 3,954.<sup>69</sup> In addition, only somewhat more than half of the special police unit for riot control—similar to the MSU in Bosnia—had been deployed by late-spring 2000.<sup>70</sup> Even with the OSCE graduating approximately 800 new recruits from its police school and planning to train 4,000 by early 2001, security demands outpaced the international and local police supply.<sup>71</sup>

#### **Political Institutions and Processes**

UNMIK, currently headed by Hans Haekkerup, is responsible for running the transitional administration for Kosovo and preparing the province for elections and local autonomy. The UN coordinates its efforts with those of the OSCE and EU. Under the “pillar” system UNMIK provides the roof or umbrella, with the head of each organization responsible for implementing a portion of the mandate reporting to Haekkerup. The UN itself is responsible for civil administration, the OSCE handles democratization and institution building, and the EU focuses on economic development. Humanitarian assistance, a fourth pillar run by UNHCR, completed its work in the spring of 2000. Its remaining longer-term development projects were absorbed by UNMIK.

On 16 July 1999 UNMIK established a Kosovo Transition Council of Kosvar Albanians and minority ethnic group political leaders to serve as a consultative body. Six months later, on 15 December 1999 UNMIK and three Albanian leaders (of the PSDK, LDK and LBD parties) signed an agreement establishing a Joint Administrative Structure (JIAS.) The agreement also stipulated that all monies of the former shadow government and parallel government structures be transferred to the JIAS. This organization is composed of an Interim Administrative Council of three Albanians, one Serb, four UNMIK representatives, and 19 administrative departments. It has been boycotted off and on by the Serb National Council (whose representatives joined the administrative departments in June 2000 as observers), as well as by



the Albanian PDK party. Nevertheless, it meets twice a week, has appointed administrative department heads and has approved measures to increase security and improve the judicial system.<sup>72</sup> On the municipal level, UNMIK officials tout the establishment of representative municipal councils, including minorities, as a key success.<sup>73</sup> Certainly, measures to include minorities and to address their security concerns, while a bit belated, have somewhat dispelled the notion that UNMIK is Albanian-partisan.

UNMIK was given a robust mandate with clear civilian lines of authority in order to avoid the delays in implementation experienced in Bosnia. “The international effort to organize the civil implementation mission in Kosovo drew heavily on the lessons learned from Bosnia.”<sup>74</sup> Nonetheless, almost a year later, US officials conceded that UNMIK “has not fully established its authority over civil administration.”<sup>75</sup> The experience in Bosnia proved that the first three months make or break a mission, but the UN, greeted in 23 out of 29 municipalities by self-appointed KLA administrators, scrambled to gain control.<sup>76</sup> Administrative services arrived slowly and complaints regarding UN management of utilities and public services were rampant during the first six months of the mission. Since then UNMIK appears to have settled these issues, but as of July 2000 it was only 60 percent staffed.<sup>77</sup> Nonetheless, one distinguished Kosovar Albanian asserts, “The truth is that in Kosov[o] there is no political system. There is a vacuum and not only in politics. There is a vacuum also in security, in the administration, and in the economy. We are the only country in Europe today that I can think of that is ruled by the self-constraint of its citizens rather than by the rule of law.”<sup>78</sup>

The JIAS will be replaced sometime after province-wide elections are held. UNMIK is currently holding negotiations among Kosovar Albanians and Serbs regarding Kosovo’s internal legal structure. Meanwhile, the 28

October 2000 municipal elections yielded victory for the moderate Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) party, run by Ibrahim Rugova, the former shadow President of Kosovo. This is significant, signaling that a significant number of Kosovar Albanians no longer remain as militantly nationalist as they were during the war in 1999. “In contrast to Bosnia immediately after the war, political trends in post-war Kosovo seem to be moving in favour of moderate political leaders and parties and away from the party most closely associated with the war-time KLA.”<sup>79</sup> Seen in this light, elections are a positive step for Kosovo, clearly transferring authority from the more radical nationalists to the moderates. Unfortunately, few ethnic Serbs registered or voted and no Serb parties participated.<sup>80</sup>

The elections provided an impetus for politically motivated violence throughout Kosovo, with the local media fueling vigilante killings of Serbs allegedly guilty of war crimes during the 1999 war.<sup>81</sup> This only serves to highlight the fact that the rule of law is virtually absent in Kosovo. When the UN entered Kosovo, it “was devoid of laws and institutions. There were no police, no judicial system, no prisons.”<sup>82</sup> Since then, UNMIK appointed 242 local judges and 75 local prosecutors, and re-established the court system.<sup>83</sup> Six foreign judges were brought to Kosovo to preside over the most sensitive interethnic cases. “But after more than a year, the courts are still barely working.”<sup>84</sup> There are shortages of facilities, local and international judges, and prison space.<sup>85</sup> Even if they do function, they do not do so impartially, especially when it comes to the Kosovar Serbs.

Kosovo “remains a poor, disorganized society with a long-term security problem.”<sup>86</sup> The UN together with KFOR has made some progress addressing the sources of instability most notably by providing overall security for the province, ensuring against large incursions or excursions. Other successes include organizing Operation Trojan I and II to protect the

Serbs, as well as seizing the Trepca mining facility, placing it under UN supervision and beginning to clean up and reorganize the enterprise. The *de facto* partition of Serbia—as well as the localized *de facto* partition of Mitrovica—has kept the peace.

In the meantime, achieving multiethnicity has been replaced by securing coexistence as a long-term objective of the UNMIK mission. Yet, aiming for coexistence is not conceding defeat or capitulating to extreme nationalist forces. In Kosovo the largest ethnic groups—the Serbs and the Albanians—may have worked together over time, but they did not have a high rate of intermarriage and lived instead, side-by-side, coexisting until outside forces or opportunities prompted them to try to take the upper hand and seize military and political control of the territory.<sup>87</sup> Thus, the original language was a misstatement and misunderstanding of Kosovar history. It is surely not in the UNMIK mandate to attempt to create something that has never existed before. The current effort in Trepca is on the right track. As one KFOR officer explained, “If the Serbs in the north will cooperate we will have various sites working without multiethnicity at the site level, but at the higher level.”<sup>88</sup> This is certainly a stable scenario.

#### **CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

*De facto* partition has brought short-term gains to Bosnia and Kosovo. It has proven to be an effective post-conflict mechanism to separate formerly warring parties. The international forces have restored peace to Bosnia and Kosovo. However, the presence of war criminals and criminal networks has stalled the prospects for long-term change. In Bosnia, the baseline requirement for establishing any type of unity is the capture of persons indicted by the ICTY. SFOR and KFOR must increase their operations in this area. Radovan Karadzic, foremost among others, must be brought to trial, even at the risk that his revelations might tarnish Western European and

American reputations. In both Bosnia and Kosovo the criminal networks must be broken so that refugees can return and foreign investment can resume. The international police forces in both operations must be expanded and directed towards Westar-type operations, where the local criminal networks are threatening the physical security of returnees. In other cases, economic reform—coupled with law enforcement—may be sufficient means to deal with local mafias.

If the long-term objective in Bosnia and Kosovo is reintegration and coexistence, respectively, it is imperative to remove the internal security threats to all minorities. Beyond that, the basis for genuine stability is the overall reform of the economic systems so that there are employment opportunities for all ethnic groups in every corner of the state or territory. The security measures must be taken in the near-term even if there is no movement in dealing with the political structures and questions of sovereignty. At the same time, however, political reform is a prerequisite for long-term stability in Bosnia. The federal government is not functioning and has not done so for over four years. Moreover, the nationalistic principles used to award quotas and ethnically based representation only serves to stymie liberalization efforts. The recent Bosnian Constitutional Court decision that Serbs, Croats and Muslims must enjoy full legal equality everywhere on Bosnian territory” must be enforced; undoubtedly such thinking should become reflected in the constitution itself.<sup>89</sup> In short, the constitution must be revised. Bosnia must prepare for a future within Europe. Its current ethnically divided institutions only hold it back.

The future status of Kosovo is currently in limbo. There have been vocal calls for a decision to prepare for independence or reintegration. The change in regime in Serbia has provided an opportunity to open negotiations about Kosovo’s future within the context of a long overdue redrafting of the

Serb/Yugoslav constitution. However, most Kosovar Albanians are still bent on achieving full independence; they might take military action if forced to accept anything short thereof. They should not be *forced* to remain within Yugoslavia. They must be given incentives to remain, but at the end of the day the most sustainable outcome may be a negotiated departure arrived at with the full participation and acquiescence of the government in Belgrade.

The ouster of Slobodan Milosevic, unfortunately, did not provide hope for an immediate breakthrough on the question of Kosovo. Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica is a true nationalist, committed to avoiding further territorial losses. More significantly, the bulk of the Serbian population is still unprepared for the concession that forfeiting Kosovo entails. Until the Serbs of Yugoslavia are convinced that it is in their political and even nationalistic interest (given demographic trends) to allow Kosovo to split off from Serbia, it will be political suicide for any federal or Serbian leader to make such a proposal. Yet, it is up to moderate Serbian leaders to prepare the groundwork, and to provide antidotes to the virulent nationalist arguments of the past that have so sickened the Yugoslav body politic. Strong decisive leadership focused on contemporary political realities is required. The Kosovo problem will be on the road to resolution when Serbian leaders realize that power today is derived from links to the global and European economy and not from possession of territory and stringent control of minorities.

The implementation of international policy in Bosnia and Kosovo has not sufficiently furthered the ultimate objective in both cases—fostering the multiethnic state. In a desire to avoid establishing a protectorate in Bosnia and a fear of violent backlash, political and military implementers have not been consistently firm and aggressive. In Kosovo, the fear of a military response from either local ethnic group or their allies has had a similar—though less intense—braking effect. Four years into peace implementation in Bosnia and

a year into the effort in Kosovo, US politicians are eager to pull American troops out and turn the field operations entirely over to the Europeans (who currently shoulder 75-85 percent of the total cost of both operations.) Yet, as the military generals have stated time and again, in peace operations the military needs to “get in to get out.” The US military—with its unparalleled capabilities and credible deterrent force—is needed in order to maintain stability and deter large-scale violence if the international community is to make a final push to achieve its objectives. But it is US political leadership that is most crucial. The US government can provide the will and resources to fuel an international push based on the recommendations stated above.

To summarize the recommendations of this study, the implementers in Bosnia and Kosovo must move quickly and assertively to: 1) remove internal security threats, 2) begin to reform the economic system and 3) in Bosnia, rewrite the constitution to strengthen the central government. The first recommendation entails the capture of war criminals, a task for SFOR/KFOR. It also includes breaking the mafias, a job of the international police with the help of law enforcement agencies such as the FBI and the gendarme forces of the MSU. The second measure involves legal and political reform and should be orchestrated by the UN and OHR. The third recommendation, applying to Bosnia alone, would fall to OHR with heavy input from professionals representing the Council of Europe and other European institutions. Again, capture of war criminals, especially in Bosnia, would begin to create a more secure environment for refugee returns, and in both Bosnia and Kosovo economic liberalization will bring investment and competition and a reason for ethnic groups to cooperate.

In the meantime, the international community must not encourage the Kosovar Albanians, and by extension Albanians in Macedonia and other nationalists in the region. Would-be separatists must not be tempted to follow

the Kosovo pattern, provoking military operations by their central government, hoping for US or international intervention.<sup>90</sup> It is clearly in the US interest to prevent further state fragmentation in Europe. Yet, *de facto* partition cannot become the basis for policy if it is nothing but a vehicle for stalemate. The civilian and military peace implementers must put more energy into bridging ethnic divisions at the outset of their operations, even as they enforce territorial divisions. Then, over time, political and economic reforms can soften territorial divisions through a gradual process of liberalization. In the short term, international implementers must be honest about the degree of control they possess. They must openly concede that these entities are protectorates and administer them in an aggressive fashion, while at the same time empowering and cultivating moderates who can take over sooner rather than later. Imposing reform upon these ethnically divided societies is the only “shock-therapy” that will allow for relatively quick political change and conditions conducive to a removal of the international forces that enforce the *de facto* partitions.

#### ENDNOTES

---

<sup>1</sup> The terms “instrumental” and “primordial” refer to two schools of thought regarding the theoretical basis for nationalism and ethnic conflict. Instrumentalists tend to believe that nationalism is created by manipulative leadership, whereas primordialists generally believe that nationalism is an inborn trait or instinct that cannot be manipulated or created from something that did not already exist. Since US policy generally follows the assumption that Milosevic manipulated the Serbian masses which greatly contributed to the problems in Bosnia/Kosovo, undoing his efforts over time by first separating the parties and allowing *de facto* partition, then later reuniting the policy organs of each nation (Serb/Croat/Bosnian Muslim or Serb/Albanian) into each of the respective states (Bosnia and Serbia/Yugoslavia), the manipulations can be undone and the ethnic groups will once again over time be able to live together in multiethnic societies.

---

<sup>2</sup> U.S. Department of State, *The Dayton Peace Accords: General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Hercegovina* (Washington, DC: US Department of State, Office of Public Communications, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1995).

<sup>3</sup> The district was established on 8 March 2000 by the arbitration final award as stipulated in the Dayton Accords.

<sup>4</sup> A multiethnic district assembly, judiciary, mayor's office and police force are governing, enforcing and adjudicating based on an increasingly harmonized (between Yugoslav and entity laws) legal regime. This is a significant development, in as much as it represents the general arrangement the US hopes to achieve Bosnia-wide.

<sup>5</sup> *Draft Report of President to Congress in compliance with Section 7 of Public Law 105-174 on the Latest Developments in the Efforts to Achieve Sustainable Peace in Bosnia and Hercegovina*, July 2000. Other estimates place spending lower at approximately twenty-five percent. Alan J. Carlson, Second Secretary, US Embassy, Sarajevo, Bosnia, email correspondence, 20 October 2000.

<sup>6</sup> Jacques Klein, *The Activities of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Hercegovina, Statement to the OSCE Permanent Council*, Vienna, Austria, 3 February 2000, 6.

<sup>7</sup> Ambassador Ralph Johnson, Deputy High Representative, Office of the High Representative, interview, Sarajevo, Bosnia, 22 March 2000, and Ambassador Jacques Klein, Special Representative of the Secretary General and Coordinator of United Nations Operations in Bosnia and Hercegovina, interview, Sarajevo, Bosnia, 23 March 2000.

<sup>8</sup> *Draft Report of President to Congress*, 2.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Klein interview.

<sup>11</sup> The UN Security Council is responsible for appointing the OHR, who is the ultimate civil authority in Bosnia responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Dayton peace settlement. He has power to establish subordinate civilian commissions and also is tasked to meet in a Joint Consultative Committee with the IFOR Commander. However, he cannot interfere with the military authorities under IFOR (now SFOR). See *Dayton Accords*, Annex 10.



---

<sup>12</sup> Online at <http://www.un.org/icty/glance/indictlist-e.htm> and Carlson, email correspondence, 20 October 2000 regarding suicide of Janic Janko on 13 October 2000.

<sup>13</sup> Ray Wilkenson, "Decisive Year," *Refugees*, vol. 1, no. 114 (1999), 4-10.

<sup>14</sup> Ambassador Johnson explains that most of the returns in the early part of 2000, even those recorded, are spontaneous. See also Report of President to Congress, 6-7. As an encouraging example, for the first time since 1996 Muslims (about 20 families) have returned to Serb-held Kopaci, a village designated by IFOR as a top-ten hotspot during the 1996 elections. Also, in April 2001 RS officials opened a resettlement office in Sarajevo to assist Serbs who want to return to homes in the Federation.

<sup>15</sup> Steven R. Bowman, *Bosnia: U.S. Military Operations*, CRS Issue Brief (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 20 July 1993), 3.

<sup>16</sup> Charles Trueheart, "A New Kind of Justice," *The Atlantic Monthly* (April 2000), 80-90.

<sup>17</sup> Bowman, 3.

<sup>18</sup> As of October 1999, the MSU had conducted over 260 public disorder operations, and numerous information gathering patrols. MSU contributed to Operation Westar, which struck at illicit intelligence and criminal activity. MSU commanders also credit the unit with seizing two internationally-wanted terrorists, supporting ICTY exhumations and investigating the Arizona market and Stolac car market, human organ theft and PWICS. Maj. J.S. Hoffman, *SFOR After-Action Review: April - October 1999*, slide presentation.

<sup>19</sup> Jacques Paul Klein, "Commentary: War Criminals," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, 28 February 2000.

<sup>20</sup> James Lyons, Director, International Crisis Group, interview, Sarajevo, Bosnia, 22 March 2000.

<sup>21</sup> *Is Dayton Failing? Bosnia Four Years after the Peace Agreement* (International Crisis Group, 1999), 16. Only the Brcko constitution meets European standards.

<sup>22</sup> *Office of the High Representative: Information*, online at <http://www.ohr.int/info.htm> (Accessed on 7 March 2000).

<sup>23</sup> *Is Dayton Failing?* 53.

<sup>24</sup> *Office of the High Representative: Information*.

- 
- <sup>25</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>26</sup> Johnson interview.
- <sup>27</sup> Lyons interview.
- <sup>28</sup> General Wesley Clark, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, interview, Washington, DC, 7 November 2000.
- <sup>29</sup> Johnson interview.
- <sup>30</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>31</sup> Sabrija Pojskic, Member, Steering Committee of the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina, South Slavic Report, RFE/RL, March 2, 2000, vol. 2, no.9, online at <http://rferl.org/southslavic/index.html>.
- <sup>32</sup> SFOR Transcript: Joint Press Conference, 4 July 2000 received from NATODATA@LISTSERV.CC.KULEUVEN.AC.BE, 4 July 2000.
- <sup>33</sup> *Report of President to Congress*, 3.
- <sup>34</sup> Klein interview.
- <sup>35</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>36</sup> *Report of President to Congress*, 2.
- <sup>37</sup> For more on the dismal investment climate in Bosnia see, *Why Will No One Invest in Bosnia and Herzegovina: An Overview of Impediments to Investment and Self-Sustaining Economic Growth in the Post Dayton Era*, International Crisis Group Report, No. 64 (21 April 1999).
- <sup>38</sup> Johnson.
- <sup>39</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>40</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>41</sup> Andrew J. Pierre, *De-Balkanizing the Balkans: Security and Stability in Southeastern Europe*, United States Institute for Peace Special Report, 20 September 1999, 13.
- <sup>42</sup> Klein interview.
- <sup>43</sup> *United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999)*, online at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/99sc1244.htm> (accessed on 17 April 2000).

---

<sup>44</sup> *KFOR Online: Structure, Objectives, MNBs*, online at <http://www.kforonline.com/kfor/objectives.htm> (accessed on 3 March 2000).

<sup>45</sup> Ibid. Author's emphasis.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> According to one UNMIK administrator, the Norwegian commander in the Oblic area asked during the first KFOR-UNMIK meeting "What can I do for you?" Laura Dolci, Deputy Civil Administrator, Oblic region, UNMIK, interview, Pristina, Kosovo, 30 March 2000.

<sup>48</sup> One example of a victory for nationalists occurred in February 1996 when Serb extremists organized the burning of the Serb inhabited areas of Sarajevo that were being turned over to the Muslim-Croat Federation for administration, and forced the Serb population to evacuate to the Republika Srpska. The UN Secretary General reports, "UNMIK and KFOR have established close working relationships and have put in place a comprehensive structure of coordination mechanisms..." *Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo*, 12 July 1999, online at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1999/s1999779.htm>.

<sup>49</sup> *KFOR Daily Press Release 2 August 2000*, from NATODOC ([natodo@HQ.NATO.INT](mailto:natodo@HQ.NATO.INT)).

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>51</sup> For details on this process see *What Happened to the KLA?* International Crisis Group Balkan Report, No. 88, Pristina/Washington/Brussels, 3 March 2000.

<sup>52</sup> Woehrel and Kim, 3.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 14.

<sup>54</sup> James W. Pardew, Jr., Principal Deputy Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for Dayton and Kosovo Implementation, U.S. Department of State, Statement, *Kosovo: One Year After the Bombing*, Foreign Relations Committee, United States Senate, 8 June 2000. In March 2000 two KPC members were dismissed after it was proven that they were assisting the UCPMB. See Bernard Kouchner, *Weekly Situation Report for 21 to 27 March 2000*, UNMIK-247, 28 March 2000, 10.

<sup>55</sup> Woehrel and Kim, 9.

<sup>56</sup> Mark Baskin, Deputy Regional Administrator, Prizren, *Plan for Community Development in the Tusus Area of Prizren*, 19 March 2000.

---

<sup>57</sup> However, during a March trip to the region the author heard internationals blame Serbs for some of the cleansing by “ceding” certain areas to the Albanians. Serb realtors were pressuring their co-nationals to sell their properties at prices drastically lower than market value.

<sup>58</sup> Michael Ignatieff, “The Reluctant Imperialist,” *NY Times Magazine*, 6 August 2000, 44.

<sup>59</sup> Ignatieff, 44.

<sup>60</sup> Woehrel and Kim, 6. Given the high potential for escalation, this begs the question: what constitutes an emergency?

<sup>61</sup> UNMIK Executive Decision No. 2000/1 *On the Confidence Area in the City of Mitrovica*, 16 March 2000.

<sup>62</sup> *Mitrovica - A Strategy Towards Coexistence*, UNMIK planning document.

<sup>63</sup> UNMIK Assumes Responsibility for Operations at Zvecan Smelter, UNMIK Press Release, 14 August 2000, online at <http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/press/templ.pr312.html> (accessed on 22 August 2000).

<sup>64</sup> Ignatieff, 44.

<sup>65</sup> Mark Baskin, Deputy Regional Administrator, UNMIK, Prizren, Kosovo, interview, 30 March 2000.

<sup>66</sup> Bernard Kouchner, *Weekly Situation Report for 21 to 27 March 2000*, 10.

<sup>67</sup> The author attended a 28 March 2000 *Operation Trojan* planning meeting.

<sup>68</sup> Bernard Kouchner, *Weekly Situation Report for 21 to 27 March 2000*, 6.

<sup>69</sup> UN Interim Administration in Kosovo, Deployment, August 4, 2000 online at [http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/kosovo\\_status.htm](http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/kosovo_status.htm) (accessed on 14 August 2000).

<sup>70</sup> Pardew, 6-7.

<sup>71</sup> Pardew 6-7.

<sup>72</sup> Woehrel and Kim, 7.

<sup>73</sup> J.F. Carter, Deputy Civil Administrator, Pristina Region, UNMIK, interview, Pristina, Kosovo, 27 March 2000.

<sup>74</sup> Pardew, 4.

<sup>75</sup> Pardew, 9.

---

<sup>76</sup> Carter interview.

<sup>77</sup> Pardew, 9. A year later the pressure was on to downsize the mission.

<sup>78</sup> *Surroi Wants Concepts*, Radio Free Liberty/Radio Europe Balkan Report, Vol. 17, No. 1, 29 February 2000.

<sup>79</sup> *Elections in Kosovo: Moving Toward Democracy?* International Crisis Group, 7 July 2000, 25; online at <http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/kosovo/reports/kos37erep.htm> (accessed on 1 August 2000).

<sup>80</sup> Meanwhile, more than 30 ethnic Albanian parties have registered. *Starting From Scratch in Kosovo: The Honeymoon is Over*, International Crisis Group, 10 December 1999 online at <http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/sbalkans/reports/kos31rep.htm> (accessed on 9 March 2000).

<sup>81</sup> *Kosovo's Interim Administrative Council Condemns Recent Spate of Violence*, online at <http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/news/kosovo2.htm> (accessed on 14 August 2000).

<sup>82</sup> Pardew, 3.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

<sup>84</sup> Richard Mertens, "Justice a Foreign Term in Kosovo," *Christian Science Monitor*, 1 August 2000, 6.

<sup>85</sup> Pardew, 10-11.

<sup>86</sup> Morton I. Abramowitz, Board of Trustees, International Crisis Group, statement, *Kosovo: One Year After the Bombing*, 25.

<sup>87</sup> See Noel Malcom, *A Short History of Kosovo* (New York: University Press, 1998).

<sup>88</sup> Lt. Col. Joseph Abbott, USAF, J-5 Plans, HQ KFOR, interview, Pristina, Kosovo, 29 March 2000.

<sup>89</sup> *Three Overlooked Stories*, Radio Free Liberty/Radio Liberty Balkan Report, Vol. 4., No. 50 (4 July 2000).

<sup>90</sup> This is not to lift the blame off of Slobodan Milosevic's government for its decade-long suppression of the Albanians and the brutal execution of Operation Horseshoe in the spring of 1999.

---

**IMPROVING US-RUSSIAN RELATIONS THROUGH  
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

Beth L. Makros  
Jeremy C. Saunders

USAF Institute for National Security Studies  
USAF Academy, Colorado





# ***IMPROVING US-RUSSIAN RELATIONS THROUGH PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS***

## **INTRODUCTION**

More than a decade after the Cold War, the US-Russian relationship maintains an axiomatic position in international affairs. Due to the important roles of both countries, it remains in US interests to improve its relationship with Russia. The election of the Bush administration provides a fresh opportunity to shape US-Russian relations. One of the key areas where cooperation is feasible is in peacekeeping efforts, which play an important role in the post-Cold War world. By cooperating with Russia in combined peacekeeping, as in Bosnia and Kosovo, and providing support for Russian peacekeeping efforts in its near abroad,<sup>1</sup> as in Georgia, the US has the opportunity to improve the overall strategic relationship.

The authors seek to provide an academic basis for improving combined peacekeeping (PK) efforts and supporting Russian PK operations in their near abroad by answering three main questions:

1. *Can relations between the US and Russia be improved through combined peacekeeping operations and support for Russian peacekeeping in the near abroad?*
2. *In what areas can the US most effectively use resources to enhance cooperation in peacekeeping?*
3. *What actions should the US take to initiate or improve relations in these areas?*

We begin by analyzing the significance of US-Russian relations and the impact combined peacekeeping and support for Russian peacekeeping efforts have on the US-Russian relationship. After examining the importance of cooperation in peacekeeping, we then assesses Russian peacekeeping policy and forces to determine the quality and nature of Russian peacekeeping and where it will most likely be applied in the future. Next, we provide two case studies, Bosnia and Abkhazia (Georgia), to evaluate Russian peacekeeping in each of the two main peacekeeping arenas where Russia is likely to engage:

combined operations in the Balkans and Commonwealth of Independent States' (CIS) activities in the near abroad. Using insights from each of these cases, we then look at ways the US is able to and would most benefit from providing support for Russian peacekeeping. Finally, based on this assessment, we recommend specific courses of action to improve cooperation within combined peacekeeping and support for peacekeeping in the near abroad, as well as the most robust recommendations that can be applied across both arenas in order to improve relations.

### **Significance of the US-Russian Relationship**

While the relationship between Russia and the US has deteriorated over the past five years, the importance of the relationship remains evident because of Russia's nuclear strength. Many scholars argue that the future of a reforming Russia, if not handled correctly, is one of the greatest threats to US national interests.<sup>2</sup> Although the effectiveness of its military equipment continues to diminish, Russia maintains significant military might and influence, with its vast nuclear arsenal and its military dominance over the former Soviet states. In addition, there are a number of issues of concern to national security shared by both Russia and the United States. Transnational problems such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism can best be solved through a cooperative relationship between the two countries. Given Russia's significant position in global affairs and its ability to influence and assist proliferating nations, an uncooperative relationship would be detrimental to US national security.

At the end of the Cold War, Russia and the United States had high expectations for a close, cooperative partnership to be achieved. Russia looked to the US to provide economic support and advice for its developing democracy, and the US sought cooperation on the nuclear drawdown and security and other transnational issues. At the height of this partnership was the success of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program (CTR) to draw down and secure nuclear forces and the successful agreement incorporating Russia into the peacekeeping force sent to implement the Dayton Accords in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Relations between NATO and Russia also took a positive turn

in May 1997 with the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation. The Founding Act established the Permanent Joint Council made up of NATO countries and Russia. The act provides a mechanism for consultation, coordination and, where appropriate, for joint decisions and actions with respect to security issues of common concern.<sup>3</sup> The Founding Act places Russia at a higher status with NATO than other non-NATO countries in the Partnership for Peace program (PfP).

Since the initial successful cooperation between the US and Russia in Bosnia, the relationship has deteriorated. Russia's dismal economy, due in part to poor advice from the West and disillusionment with democracy, coupled with their perception of a hostile, expanding NATO and the West's treatment of them as a secondary power, has led to distrust and a state of non-cooperation. While discussion on START III has increased, the US and Russia frequently disagree over START II and the ABM treaty, a key component of the Bush administration's foreign policy. Deeply engulfed in the Chechnya conflict, Russia resents Western, and particularly US, criticism over their methods of waging war and has increased its anti-West and anti-NATO rhetoric. The US, for its part, has chosen not to give Russia a place at the table in NATO and has been reluctant to provide any further support for Russia's transition to a free market, while at the same time contemplating the construction of a national missile defense system that has greatly upset Russia. Recent revelations of continued espionage efforts and the expulsion of foreign diplomats from both countries have further exacerbated the situation. The relationship with Russia is judged by many to be at a post-Cold War low with little hope for improvement.

However, recent political changes inside Russia have provided the US and Russia with an opportunity to expand relations. Although the relationship between Presidents Bush and Putin remains uncertain, Putin commented on his desire to work with NATO as "equal partners" after a year of tensions over issues such as Kosovo and Chechnya.<sup>4</sup> Putin enjoys a high enough level of domestic support from the Russian people to allow him a

significant role in shaping the future of Russia's security and economy, and the new US administration should seize the opportunity to reinvigorate the post-Cold War cooperation.

### **Improving the US-Russian Relationship Through Peacekeeping**

Given the significance of the US-Russian relationship and the present tension, the US should look for areas to improve this relationship. The recent increase in peace operations in the second post-Cold War era provides the US and Russia just such an opportunity. Russia has and continues to be an important player in these operations in the Balkans, its near abroad, and UN missions worldwide. With a lack of more conventional threats, peacekeeping operations are the most visible and likely way to increase cooperation between US and Russian forces.

Currently, the US and Russia are successfully working together in SFOR in Bosnia, KFOR in Kosovo, and to a lesser extent, in several UN missions. Two former Cold War enemies working side by side in peacekeeping operations provides evidence to the world of the professionalism and capabilities of both military forces and enriches the US-Russian relationship.<sup>5</sup> The more often the two militaries are able to operate together, the more likely they will be able to close both operational and cultural gaps that hamper successful missions. For example, Brigadier General Peterson (US Army) attributes much of his successful cooperation with the Russian troops in the beginning of KFOR's establishment to his working with the Russians in Bosnia and thus understanding their peacekeeping forces and doctrine.<sup>6</sup> If the two countries are to work together in future peacekeeping efforts or other low-intensity conflicts, then well-planned and efficient operations today will aid in effective operations in the future.

The interaction between the two militaries in peacekeeping operations provides an area of engagement between higher political figures. Regardless of other events affecting the relationship, involvement in peacekeeping operations offers, at a bare minimum, a reason for interaction because both nations are committed to a number of peacekeeping operations. While there are often disagreements over political issues that may be harmful to the

relationship, it is nevertheless important that dialogue occurs and there is a continued agreement on the involvement of the two countries.

US-Russian cooperation provides a special degree of impartiality and legitimacy to the peacekeeping operation, whether real or perceived, in the world arena. Joint involvement gives both sides a greater chance of being accepted as part of an impartial peacekeeping force. This is particularly important to the US in the NATO-led operations in Bosnia and Kosovo because it dampens criticism of Western partiality and heavy-handedness. The coming together of the Cold War superpowers provides a sense of legitimacy and commitment to resolve conflict. This show of commitment will perhaps encourage more hesitant states to participate in peacekeeping activities when they might otherwise choose not to, and it will decrease the likelihood of any party opposing the peacekeeping action.

In addition to being important for the US-Russian relationship, cooperation in peacekeeping efforts in the Balkans and the near abroad helps the US protect and promote its interests in those areas. The Balkans continue to be a flash point for European security. The US already has a strong commitment in the region, with troops participating in peacekeeping operations in both Bosnia and Kosovo. Considering the US ties with Europe, developing and maintaining peace in the Balkans is of great importance to the US. Conflicts in the Balkans threaten not only mass atrocities and large refugee flows, but also a possible spread of the conflict into other regions of Europe.

US interests in the near abroad do not justify as strong a commitment of resources as in the Balkans. For the most part, recent US policy in Russia's near abroad has been to offer economic and political support for nascent democracies, while acknowledging Russia's prominence in the region and encouraging them to solve some of the crises left behind when the Soviet Union broke apart. Russia's suspicion of US designs on the region has caused the US to defer to Russian prerogatives on many occasions. However, while they should not be overstated, the US does have several interests in the near abroad that should be protected: (1) preventing the conflicts from spreading

into neighboring countries such as Turkey (a NATO ally) or Iran and growing into regional conflagrations, (2) helping these new countries develop strong democracies and free market economies where the rights of the citizens are respected and opportunities for investment are protected, (3) securing the developing Transcaucasus oil pipeline, and (4) ensuring that the peacekeeping missions carried out respect the human rights of the inhabitants. These interests in the near abroad must be balanced with the implications any US actions will have on the US-Russia relationship.

### **ASSESSMENT OF RUSSIAN PEACEKEEPING**

Although combined peacekeeping efforts and support for Russian peacekeeping will benefit the US-Russian strategic relationship, the US must balance this interest with its interest in successfully accomplishing its peacekeeping tasks. The US must therefore assess Russian peacekeeping to decide what areas of cooperation in peacekeeping efforts would be most beneficial for achieving US objectives, both to improve the relationship and ensure the success and legitimacy of the peacekeeping operation. This assessment analyzes the Russian political environment, forces, and doctrine for peacekeeping operations.

#### **Russian Political Environment**

##### *Russian Goals and Objectives in Peacekeeping Activities*

Russia's involvement in peacekeeping activities stems from its national interests and the perceived threats to those interests. According to the Russian Federation National Security Concept, the basic external threats to Russian national security are due to, among other factors:

1. the danger of a weakening of Russia's political, economic and military influence in the world;
2. the appearance and escalation of conflicts near the Russian state border and CIS external borders; and
3. an attempt to minimize the role of existing mechanisms for ensuring international security, above all the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).<sup>7</sup>

These threats provide the rationale for Russia's involvement in peacekeeping in the near abroad, the Balkans, and UN operations under UN, CIS, or OSCE auspices.

Since the demise of the Soviet Union, one of Russia's primary security concerns has been to demonstrate to the rest of the international community that it remains a powerful state and will play an important role in the New World Order. As part of this effort, Russian leaders actively seek a peacekeeping role for their military. Involvement in peacekeeping is seen as necessary if Russia is to continue to maintain significant influence and prestige in the international community.<sup>8</sup> Russia's participation in peacekeeping operations in the near abroad, the Balkans, and within the UN illustrates its desire to be a contributing member of the world community.

Another of Russia's primary security concerns is to contain any threat that appears on its borders. These conflicts in former Soviet states have occurred frequently in recent years as a result of a decline in the population's standard of living and as a result of ethnic, interreligious and other conflicts.<sup>9</sup> Russia often gets involved in these conflicts because no other security apparatus is willing or available to take on the mission and the conflicts threaten to spill over into Russian territory or endanger the Russian population in the state.

Russia also has an interest in maintaining its influence in these regions. Peacekeeping forces allow Russia to maintain influence, as well as military bases, in these former Soviet states, providing an arena to shape the region and maintain access to natural resources. The Russian forces in the near abroad act under CIS auspices so that they appear more legitimate to the rest of the international community. For the most part, however, only a negligible number of forces from other CIS nations ever participate in these missions. Although Russia maintains that it becomes involved in peacekeeping efforts on CIS territory at the request of other CIS states seeking Russia's assistance in settling the conflict,<sup>10</sup> it has been accused of strong-arming these former Soviet republics into accepting peacekeeping forces. This quite possibly happened in Abkhazia, where Georgia was left with little choice

but to join the CIS and accept a CIS peacekeeping force that ensured continued Russian presence on its territory.<sup>11</sup> One of the primary reasons Russia pursues zealous peacekeeping forms and mechanisms in the UN and regional organizations is to support these interventions in the near abroad with a conceptual, legal and practical framework. The actual peacekeeping mandates in the near abroad demonstrate that Russia is focused on keeping the conflict to a minimum and is less likely to pursue more ambitious objectives to resolve the crisis and thus remove the need for Russian troop presence.

Further threats to Russian security stem from Russian perceptions of NATO's actions in Kosovo. According to the Russian National Security Concept, "NATO's transition to the practice of military operations of force without UN Security Council (UNSC) sanction is fraught with the threat of destabilizing the entire strategic situation in the world."<sup>12</sup> While the working relationship between NATO and Russian forces in SFOR and KFOR remains on a successful and steady path, Russian policy maintains that it is not willing to transform its equipment and safety procedures to NATO standards of operation. Therefore, according to the primary Russian military representative to the UN, Russia will not look to participate in any further joint operations with NATO.<sup>13</sup> However, as mentioned previously, President Putin has expressed a willingness to cooperate with NATO as long as Russia was considered an equal partner in the operation.<sup>14</sup> This may be seen as encouragement that Russia is willing to work through some of the difficulties and compromise to enhance NATO-Russian cooperation.

Together, the Russian security interests and threats to those interests have led to its foreign policy focus on strengthening key mechanisms for multilateral management of world political and economic processes, and keeping Russian assistance in settling conflicts under the aegis of the UN, OSCE, or CIS.<sup>15</sup> Russia has been particularly interested in strengthening the UNSC, where it has veto power, and in receiving UN mandates and money for its CIS peacekeeping forces in the near abroad.



The military plays a significant role in Russian politics. Recent military operations like Kosovo and Chechnya provide examples of the type of pressure ranking military generals are able to put on politicians. In November 1999, Russian generals were pressing publicly for an all-out military victory against Chechen rebels, and in “unusually strident fashion warning Russian politicians to get out of the way.”<sup>16</sup> In interviews, Russian commanders stated that they would not be robbed of their victory as politicians had allowed in 1996. General Anatoli Kvashin, then Chief of the Russian General Staff, threatened to resign when President Yelstin’s administration proposed sending out peace feelers to Aslan Maskhadov, the Chechen leader. General Vladimir Shamanov, commander of the western group of forces in Chechnya, warned that if an order came down from Moscow “to stop the army, there would be a massive defection of officers of all ranks from the armed forces, including generals.”<sup>17</sup>

A similar situation arose in June 1999 when some 200 Russian troops left their posts in Bosnia and headed into Kosovo, taking over the Pristina airport. This move forced the rest of the international community to face the frightening possibility that Russia’s military, which has been under-funded and humiliated for years, may now be forcing the Kremlin to bend to its views.<sup>18</sup> To many, the fact that the Russian military was able to “bypass most of the country’s top civilian decision-makers showed that Yelstin had a new set of favorites—Russian generals with a bleak view of the outside world and its designs.”<sup>19</sup> For the US, this military influence on political affairs makes cooperation with the Russian military even more important for improving security relations.

### **Russian Peacekeeping Forces**

Since the Cold War, the Russian military has been in turmoil. While the US forces underwent a significant drawdown in the 1990’s, the Russian military cutbacks have been described as a virtual freefall.<sup>20</sup> Their forces went from numbering 4.3 million active duty personnel in 1986 to 1.27 million in 1996.<sup>21</sup> Along with force cutbacks has come an enormous drop in military

expenditures. In 1999, the military was allocated \$3.7 billion, or 2.3 percent of Russia's GDP, down almost \$2 billion from the original presidential decision of \$5.6 billion, but it failed to receive even that amount.<sup>22</sup> This underfunding has caused severe payment delays and underfunding of defense sector needs, thus undermining military training programs, research and design projects, production and supplies of new types of military equipment, and the maintenance and repair of equipment in service.<sup>23</sup> With the current state of the Russian military, any peacekeeping effort is certain to be challenged by insufficient funding, a lack of training, outdated equipment, poor equipment maintenance, and morale problems due to payment arrears and other personnel issues.

Although it suffers from great financial problems, the Russian military maintains two different types of training for peacekeeping forces: UN peacekeepers and the airborne and motorized rifle divisions designated for deployment to peacekeeping operations. Those going to participate as UN observers must be trained at the Vystrel Academy near Moscow for a period of two to three months. The Academy trains three groups of students per year using UN doctrine and guidelines for training its forces.<sup>24</sup> According to US General John Reppert, former defense attaché to Moscow, this is one of the only academies of its sort with this type of extensive training exclusively using UN materials.<sup>25</sup> The school is taught in English and includes exchange students from several nations, including the US, although currently there are no US students there. It has both political and military faculty, often bringing in foreigners to help teach UN doctrine and practices. The UN observers produced by the Vystrel Academy have been noted as quality participants in UN peacekeeping operations. Russia has recently designated two battalions and their required support structure to be at the UN's disposal.<sup>26</sup>

The forces Russia uses for other peacekeeping situations (working with NATO, the CIS, or unilaterally) are led by the Airborne Forces (VDV). VDV forces are equipped with light armor, which are deployable by standard military transport aviation and have maintained a high level of discipline, training, and combat experience.<sup>27</sup> The peacekeeping environment

corresponds to the VDV's wartime mission to work far in enemy rear areas cut off from main lines of logistical support and to learn to deal with the local populace.<sup>28</sup> As Commander of the VDV, Colonel-General Shpak has designated unilateral and multilateral peacekeeping as his units' main peacetime mission and has put his effort towards the development of command, control and intelligence systems and the maintenance of discipline and effectiveness at the small unit level.<sup>29</sup> The Russian airborne divisions have better training and mobility than most of the Russian troops, though they suffer from logistical problems and have not been able to maintain their units at full strength. Along with the VDV, Russia has designated two motorized rifle divisions (MRD's) for service in peacekeeping operations. Officers sent to peacekeeping missions receive three months of training prior to deployment, while enlisted troops receive six months of training.<sup>30</sup> The training program gives considerable attention "to preparing personnel for independent actions in an environment and in situations where use of weapons is prohibited."<sup>31</sup>

Unlike the conflict in Chechnya, Russia uses only volunteer soldiers for its peacekeeping missions. While personnel have for the most part been sufficiently trained for their missions, many of the other essentials for a successful mission have been lacking. The units are often at low strength when called upon, as in the example of Georgia when the 145<sup>th</sup> Motorized Rifle Division was called to provide forces for the Abkhazia conflict and it only had 3,000 of its allotted 13,000 troops.<sup>32</sup> When the troops do arrive, they often lack the necessary equipment to complete their assigned task, as they did after the taking of the Pristina airport when the Russian troops were soon asking the British troops for water.<sup>33</sup> Russian equipment is old and the military's ability to maintain it often inadequate, with the result that many of their vehicles and machinery are simply unusable. The Russian forces, though capable, are hampered by insufficient finances and outdated equipment.

### **Russian Peacekeeping Doctrine**

The Russian peacekeeping doctrine springs from its experience in the field. Russia's peacekeeping experiences are much different from those of most

other nations. Having been influenced by Russia's initial experience after the Cold War, they bear more of a counter-insurgency flavor.<sup>34</sup> Russian operations have differed from typical peacekeeping operations in several ways. First, all of Russia's operations were in "Russia's backyard," where Russia is the strongest player in the region and the military commanders are very familiar with the environment. Second, Russian activities were not constrained by anything besides the available means, the resolve of the command in Moscow, and political infighting or indecisiveness.<sup>35</sup> Problems of legitimacy, rules of engagement, collateral damage, and public scrutiny were raised but did not have a significant effect on operations as compared to most other UN operations.<sup>36</sup> A third difference is that indecisiveness, and at times incompetence, of political leadership often forced or allowed local military commanders to act autonomously with little guidance or support.<sup>37</sup> These differences have led to a uniquely Russian view of peacekeeping operations that looks at the issue as primarily a military rather than political problem and thus bypasses the creation of a political solution.

The Russian term most often used for peacekeeping operations is "miro-tvorcheskiye operatsii," or peace-creation operations, showing Russia's penchant towards a greater use of force in keeping the peace. Russia has recently developed a new military doctrine for peacekeeping. According to Lieutenant-General Meleshkov, the Russian military representative to the UN Military Staff Committee, this policy breaks peacekeeping into three main tasks: (1) separate the warring parties, (2) ensure provision of humanitarian aid and evacuation of refugees, and (3) carry out the provisions of the mandate.<sup>38</sup> The Russians do not use a doctrine that complies with the three UN principles of consent and invitation of all parties, impartiality, and use of force only in self-defense.<sup>39</sup> Instead, their actions more resemble the criteria put forth by former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his *Agenda for Peace*: the peacekeeping force may intervene without the consent of all parties, the force does not necessarily seek to be impartial, and offensive use of weapons may be required.<sup>40</sup>

While Russia's peacekeeping methods derive naturally from some of their experiences in the field, the West has often criticized Russian methods. Three main issues cause frequent conflict between the Russian and Western philosophies of peacekeeping: (1) Russia's extensive use of force, (2) criticisms of Russian partiality, and (3) the use of belligerents in the peacekeeping force. Each is examined below.

1. Extensive Use of Force: The Russian doctrine allows for the use of force to separate belligerents and force them to the negotiating table, a different approach than that of the UN, which requires the consent of all the parties to the conflict.<sup>41</sup> This approach is more similar to the Western concept of peace-enforcement. Colonel-General Aleksandr Lebed, former commander of the Russian Federation's 14<sup>th</sup> Army, describes the necessary approach this way: "If a decision is made to use troops, they must be employed decisively, firmly, and without delay. And it must be clear to everyone that a force has arrived capable of putting every insolent, encroaching bandit in his place."<sup>42</sup> While this doctrine allows for the more frequent and heavy-handed use of force, it is not that different from the direction the international community is headed in peace operations such as Kosovo. It allows Russia, a far superior force to those in its near abroad, to come in and force the two sides to reach an agreement. Indeed, Russia has shown great restraint in its use of force in the past. According to US Lieutenant Colonel Tom Wilhelm, in Tajikistan "the Russians had the means of overwhelming force—tanks, helicopters, and fighter aircraft; they never brought them to bear in any decisive manner, choosing instead to try to secure through consecutive diplomatic summits a peacekeeping force in accordance with internationally-recognized norms and standards."<sup>43</sup> A danger in the approach of using force to separate belligerents is when it is combined with the second criticism of Russian forces—partiality.

2. Partiality: Russia has been accused frequently of showing partiality in a conflict in accordance with the interests of the Russian Federation. In several cases, the Russian government has forced local authorities into compromise to allow the deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces or manipulated local groups to obtain settlement terms favorable to

Russian interests.<sup>44</sup> Russia's interests in the near abroad often cause it to take a somewhat less than neutral role in conflicts. However, the US is often considered a partial force in conflicts such as Haiti or Kosovo, and its interests are often a driving factor. While Russia's ultimate goal is almost always to settle the conflict, it also uses the situation to promote its policy interests, as in the case of Abkhazia where it pressured Georgia to join the CIS.<sup>45</sup> At times, Russian forces have played a direct role in some conflicts. They provide weapons to belligerents, carry out punitive strikes against local forces, or perform other actions favoring one side over another.<sup>46</sup> In many regions, even if the Russians acted impartially, it would be difficult for the belligerents to accept them as an impartial force because of their history in the region. This is certainly the case in Georgia, where Russia aided both the Abkhazians and the Georgians at different times during the fighting, making it impossible for the Russians to be regarded as impartial.<sup>47</sup> In several cases, Russian partiality, whether real or perceived, has harmed the peacekeeping mission. However, Russia has often helped its appearance of impartiality by including belligerents in the peacekeeping force.

3. Use of belligerents in peacekeeping forces: In Russian peacekeeping doctrine, direct control of peacekeeping forces in a region is exercised by a joint staff composed of representatives from Russian forces as well as the combatants in the conflict zone.<sup>48</sup> These forces take part in policing the zone of separation and other activities.<sup>49</sup> The UN and NATO do not have any legal agreement on belligerent participation, but it has generally not been a part of traditional peace operations. Including belligerents may put peacekeeping forces at risk of being caught in the middle of renewed fighting, but it also may have the benefit of creating cooperation between the parties, allowing for an eventual opportunity for the third party to slowly withdraw its forces.<sup>50</sup> Russians believe that combatant participation has the potential to build relationships and mechanisms for resolving future conflicts.<sup>51</sup>

#### **CASE STUDIES OF RUSSIAN PEACEKEEPING**

Russian peacekeeping forces and doctrine can best be analyzed in terms of their actual participation in peace operations. Looking at the Russian forces in

the light of a multinational operation, Bosnia (IFOR/SFOR), provides an opportunity to see how they perform within a UN/NATO framework. This allows an analysis of how their participation in combined peacekeeping efforts, particularly within the NATO structure, can be improved. The case of Russian troops in Bosnia was selected because of the wealth of information available. In addition, the length of the mission allows for more thorough analysis of the case. The second case study looks at the operation in Abkhazia, Georgia, to analyze Russian performance in the near abroad under the CIS aegis in coordination with UN military observers. Since Russia's priority is to maintain stability along its borders, it is more likely to be involved first in operations in its near abroad before involving itself in peacekeeping efforts elsewhere. Abkhazia was selected because of the interaction between CIS forces and UN observers.

These case studies provide the framework for our recommendations to improve combined operations and support for Russian peacekeeping efforts in the near abroad.

#### **Case Study of Bosnia (IFOR/SFOR)**

On 14 December 1995, the Bosnia Peace Agreement was signed in Paris, after its negotiation in Dayton, Ohio. On 16 December, NATO launched the largest military operation ever undertaken by the Alliance, Operation Joint Endeavor. NATO was given a mandate to implement the military aspects of the agreement based on UN Security Council Resolution 1031. Although NATO-led, the multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) included 16 non-NATO nations. IFOR was given a one-year mandate and began its operations on 20 December 1995.<sup>52</sup> As a part of IFOR, The Russian Brigade operated as one of the five maneuver brigades under Task Force Eagle, led by an American commander. Its area of responsibility covered 1,750 square kilometers.

Following the peaceful conduct of the September 1996 elections, IFOR successfully completed its missions. In November/December 1996, NATO foreign and defense ministers concluded that a military presence, although reduced, would be needed in Bosnia. Therefore, NATO created the

Stabilization Force (SFOR, also known as Operation Joint Guard), which was activated 20 December 1996, the date the IFOR mandate expired.

SFOR operates under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (peace enforcement).<sup>53</sup> SFOR has the same rules of engagement as IFOR, allowing the “robust use of force,” as it is necessary to accomplish the mission and protect the forces.<sup>54</sup> SFOR’s size is approximately half the size of IFOR, at just under 32,000 troops, including 1,500 Russian airborne troops.

#### *Including the Russians in IFOR*

The decision to include Russian forces in the operation in Bosnia was plagued with a number of difficult political and military issues. While both governments felt Russian participation was necessary, overcoming command issues proved troublesome. The possible role of Russian troops ranged from various “special operations” tasks such as engineering, transport, and construction, to full fledged peacekeeping.<sup>55</sup> Eventually it was decided, due to political constraints, that Russian forces, acting in their own area within the US sector, would be placed under American General George Joulwan acting as Commander of US Forces in Europe, not under NATO. Another obstacle involved who maintained operational and tactical control. Operational control refers to the selection of tasks a given unit is assigned, while tactical control refers to the daily orders to do something or go somewhere called for by the operational control tasks. Since the Russians were most concerned with operational control, it would be necessary to develop a solution that allowed the Russians to maintain operational control, while still giving the US commander tactical control. Therefore, the chain of command needed to be redefined by separating tactical and operational control. Russian General Shevtsov and General Joulwan were able to create such a solution by placing the Russian troops under tactical control of the Multi-National Division Commander, in this case an American, while operational control remained in the hands of Russian General Shetsov as General Joulwan’s Deputy Commander for Russian Forces.<sup>56</sup>

The ability to resolve these military command and control issues made it possible to avoid a political disaster. This was due in large part to the



defense-to-defense cooperation. In the few years leading up to IFOR, Secretary Perry and Defense Minister Grachev established a working relationship which, when combined with the relationship between General Joulwan and General Shevtsov, made it possible to win support within a critical constituency: the militaries themselves.<sup>57</sup>

*Training for Combined Operations in IFOR*

Combined troop training is vital for the military and political success of a peacekeeping contingent. Prior to the Dayton Accords, US and Russian troops had engaged in two Field Training Exercises (FTX): Totsk, Russia in 1994, and Ft. Riley, Kansas in 1995. The pre-deployment phase of the train-up began on 17 November 1995. Elements of the Russian force were brought to Germany to participate in the planning process. Russian forces training took place within the parent divisions of the Airborne Troops and was conducted in accordance with the Guidelines for the Russian Federation (RF) Armed Forces Actions as UN Troops, and the training program for the peacekeeping units of the Airborne Troops.<sup>58</sup>

There was a variety of additional components in the training of the Russian peacekeeping forces devoted to unconventional actions in emergency situations. This included working with professional psychologists in order to determine good psychological compatibility in forming squads and teams. Only personnel with six months in service were selected for the brigade<sup>59</sup> and approximately forty percent of the personnel were combat veterans.<sup>60</sup> Legal training was also strongly emphasized with legal briefings and consultations with international lawyers. This training provided a basis for understanding international legal standards for Russian personnel.

One specific joint training event, the participation of Russian officers in the command post exercise conducted in the 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division in Germany, is often noted as an exercise that increased the ability of the two militaries to work together in the multinational operation. During this exercise, Russian officers, in concert with their American counterparts, were able to clarify certain details of the joint tasks and define the situation in the conflict zone in greater detail.<sup>61</sup> Combined peacekeeping force training,

including firing exercises, seminars, and sharing of experiences and lessons learned, has continued throughout the operation, though the amount of training depends on Russia's ability to finance it.

Once IFOR was established, a high level of cooperation continued as the forces were deployed. American and Russian forces worked together in the areas of air and ground logistics. Since both the US and Russia utilize air and rail transportation for the deployment of troops, such coordination is essential and, if handled properly, can help avoid early problems in performing this massive task. A Russian liaison officer in Vicenza, Italy, coordinated air movement. Russian officers also helped to coordinate movement of rail with the Movement Control Center of NATO. These initial actions of coordination in both training and deployment of forces set the stage for a fairly cohesive combined peacekeeping force.

#### *Working with the Russian Brigade*

Upon arrival in Bosnia, Major General William Nash, Commander of the US sector (Task Force Eagle), and his Russian counterparts found immediate means to cooperate. Both Russian and US military leaders have been insistent upon developing, planning, and carrying out a robust series of combined exercises within the Bosnian area of operations. Cooperation on the ground is evident as US troops have provided fire support for Russian platoons, while Russian units have served as a covering force for US infantry.<sup>62</sup>

The majority of duties assigned to the forces relate to the show of force, blockades and the armed presence of forces in conflict regions. The most common task of ground forces is patrolling in the area of responsibility. These patrolling missions, consisting of ten to fifteen soldiers, were designed to investigate the areas beyond the limits of control posts in the base areas, demonstrate IFOR/SFOR presence, gather information, and protect freedom of movement. Ground troops are also used in escorting representatives from various international organizations helping to resolve the conflict. In addition to each country doing patrols independently, Russian and US troops also work in combined patrols. The frequency of these patrols ranged from once a week

to once a month. Intelligence and counter-intelligence operations, as well as the majority of intelligence sharing, are planned and conducted in order to support these tasks. However, due to political fallout over the NATO bombing of Serbia, combined patrolling has been halted.

*Problems in Working with the Russian Brigade*

Although the Russians serve a larger strategic purpose in Bosnia, differences in operating procedures, language, military cultures, and equipment continue to create tension in the working relationship of soldiers in the daily operations of SFOR. At the operational level, the command and control system was often ineffective and inefficient. Operation participants noted that, in the initial format of IFOR (now SFOR), due to the large size of the force and the many participating countries:

Individual elements of this design must be optimized to emphasize the following: the unique features of multinational cooperation; the scope and complexity of the MNF missions; the quantity of information and operations documents developed and used for troops; command and control; and troop coordination.<sup>63</sup>

Due to the newly established command structure, military-political tasks were to be carried out upon coordination with the Deputy SACEUR for the Russian Contingent, leaving for discussion whether a significant number of orders were narrow tactical or political-military issues. This problem caused the Russian Brigade to react more slowly to orders and caused friction between the command of the Russian Brigade and higher headquarters, especially on politically sensitive issues. Another reason for slow reaction to headquarters commands arose from the need of the US liaison officers (LNO's) to interpret the tasks for the Russian commander. While American officers are used to generating "implied tasks" from verbal orders, the Russian forces were often confused and spent a great deal of time having the LNO call back and forth to the US Divisional Headquarters in Tuzla, officially the Multinational Division (North)—MND(N), to get the order refined to list each specific item in great detail.<sup>64</sup>

The sharing of intelligence is another often-cited concern. Russian and American military personnel jointly collected, exchanged, and processed intelligence information in their zone of responsibility, thus allowing the sharing of information and experiences between the two forces.<sup>65</sup> The sharing of such information between groups allowed both groups to become more aware of events in the sector without duplication of effort. Currently, the sharing of intelligence between US and Russian forces has decreased due to mistrust developed during NATO's bombing of Serbia in 1999.<sup>66</sup>

Before the deployment of IFOR/SFOR, many politicians and military commanders doubted the ability of the Russian troops to remain impartial in Bosnia due to the Russian reputation in peacekeeping activities elsewhere. Measures were taken to ensure the impartiality of the Russian contingent by placing one of the Russian battalions in Serb territory and the other in the Muslim region.<sup>67</sup> To many that worked with the Russians, they were considered to be just as impartial to the warring factions as any part of Task Force Eagle. General Nash points out that during an incident in the Russian area of responsibility where Bosnian Serbs were behaving provocatively, the Russians were "even-handed in their approach, treated all parties with dignity and respect, and were firm in pursuit of their assigned mission."<sup>68</sup> General Nash further explained in an interview that Russian troops treated Serbs with the same distrust as the other military forces, as almost no one trusted any of the warring factions.<sup>69</sup> On the other hand, many US officers interviewed responded negatively when asked about the impartiality of the Russian peacekeepers. The presence of Russians, according to one Colonel who served in Bosnia as a troop commander, provided a safe haven for the violation of the Dayton Peace Accords by harboring Serb criminals.<sup>70</sup> However, the Balkan Task Force has seen no overt reporting of Russian partiality and maintains that it is often difficult to find reports that are completely truthful and reliable.<sup>71</sup>

There is also concern over the Russian procedures for performing inspections of weapons storage sites within its area of responsibility within US-led MND (N). In discussing US-Russian cooperation with US military

officers who have participated in SFOR, many expressed their concern over the lack of inspections done by the Russian Brigade. Evidently, there was little value placed on this action by the Russian brigade. In fact, the US soldiers often performed the inspections within the Russian area of responsibility.<sup>72</sup> However, one LNO pointed out that while some officers feel that Russians are not executing up to standard, they are executing to their own standard, which is no better or worse.<sup>73</sup>

The overall level of professionalism of Russian members has also been questioned. A number of officers responded with instances of high levels of alcohol abuse by Russian soldiers and the creation of a brothel in the Russian area of responsibility.<sup>74</sup> However, as Colonel Kaufmann, commander of the Balkan Task Force, points out, while these types of instances are harmful to the overall peacekeeping mission of SFOR, they are not uncommon in any multinational operation, even with other NATO countries.<sup>75</sup>

The Russians also reportedly had problems with their equipment and maintenance. The US provided some of the necessary communication devices for the Russian Brigade since they did not own or operate any communications devices that were compatible with the US system. However, the US provided similar equipment to all of the participating forces operating in the US sector.<sup>76</sup> The Russian Brigade also suffered further problems with equipment, especially vehicles, which were old and unusable for operations because the Russians did not have the necessary maintenance upkeep.<sup>77</sup> This not only meant that the Russian Brigade would be slower to respond, but also that the US commander would often have to compensate in other ways. Problems with the poor quality and short range of the Russian radios caused difficulties in their ability to communicate and report quickly to MND (N). US forces were unable to pick up a phone or radio and speak with the person they were trying to contact from the Russian contingent. This caused a great deal of frustration for the US forces, who were used to instantaneous communication.

The language barrier was, and continues to be, one of the biggest problems between the Russian Brigade and US forces. Since communication is paramount to combined missions, the language barrier can have a large

impact on the effectiveness of the combined force. Currently, US liaison officers receive approximately eighteen months of language training, but some are put into liaison positions before their training is complete.<sup>78</sup> Upon their arrival to SFOR, LNO's live and work with the Russian Brigade. However, for those who did not receive this amount of training, communicating and establishing rapport with the Russians is more difficult.

Overall, the working relationship in SFOR between the US command of the US-led MND (N) and the Russian Brigade has been cooperative and effective since it began in 1995. Although there are still issues of concern that cause friction between the two forces, they are not crucial to the overall effectiveness of the peacekeeping forces in Bosnia.

#### **Lessons Learned in Bosnia (IFOR/SFOR)**

*Lesson 1: Russia and the US can work together under NATO and with the international community.* Having Russian forces under a US commander five years after the Cold War ended was an unexpected event. After conducting the two major peace operation exercises and their experience in IFOR/SFOR, the two forces have learned more about each other's operating procedures. In the course of conducting operations, Russian and US troops expanded their military cooperation, including joint combined-arms training. They were able to develop unified procedures and standards, as well as increase tactical-level liaison, thus increasing both coordination and security.<sup>79</sup> Numerous mine locating and clearing activities were performed together, especially since there were an estimated 1000 mine fields located in the Russian sector alone.<sup>80</sup> Coordination also occurred in places where the warring parties might use toxic substances. Working contacts were set up between the Russian and American CBR (chemical-biological-radiological) defense services, including periodic environmental checks at the permanent base camps and smaller units. These examples demonstrate just a few of the many instances of successful coordination between the two forces.

*Lesson 2: Once there is a political will expressed and the US Secretary of Defense and Russian Minister of Defense sign the agreement that lays out the terms of the mission, the militaries must be able to execute plans*

*as they see necessary.* Both US and Russian troops have been able to conduct a number of integrated operations to resolve military aspects not specifically addressed in the accords. A study conducted by the Foreign Military Studies Office discussing the Russian and NATO forces in Bosnia, indicates that, “in the overall opinion of the operation participants, the partnership of NATO and Russia in Bosnia symbolized the obligation that the world community had taken itself to end the war there.”<sup>81</sup> Generals Joulwan and Shevtsov were able to overcome issues of command and the forces in Bosnia have been able to conduct a successful combined peacekeeping operation. The relationship between the two forces suffers greatly when forced apart by politics at higher levels.

*Lesson 3: A successful operation requires a common strategic objective and the professionalism of soldiers.* Despite different national interests and a competitiveness in pursuing those interests in the region, the mission of effective peacekeeping requires a high level of coordination and cooperation between the American and Russian forces. Regardless of the various cultural and military differences, the two groups were most often able to present and act as a unified force, showing the Bosnians that a soldier is a soldier, no matter what uniform he or she wears.

*Lesson 4: Russian and American soldiers are in agreement on a number of issues vital to the peacekeeping effort.* In a survey of US and Russian officers conducted by a joint US-Russian research team,<sup>82</sup> there was a broad area of professional consensus among both populations. Both groups agreed that the success of multinational peace operations depends on how carefully such operations are prepared and both emphasized the need for continued attention to operational planning, organizing supply and logistics, and maintaining coordination in order to secure success. Both groups of officers also supported, although to a differing degree, the need to improve coordination between commands and staffs and among the various national military contingents and with civilian agencies.<sup>83</sup> Improved training and support for training for civil affairs to enhance cooperation was given a high priority.<sup>84</sup> The survey revealed that both groups oppose having the OSCE

assume responsibility for conducting multinational peace operations and felt that multinational peace operations should not be entrusted to the military of a single nation, nor should the multinational staffing be extended down to brigade-battalion level.

These results highlight the fact that the two militaries agree on a number of important issues affecting their performance as peacekeeping forces. However, the areas of disagreement, especially those concerning strategic and operational command and control of multinational peacekeeping forces, illustrate the need to engage in US-Russian and NATO-Russian dialogue on the issue of future command arrangements for these operations. As this cooperation and teamwork becomes the norm in Bosnia, future operations will benefit from the lessons learned in IFOR/SFOR.

*Lesson 5: Developing and maintaining working relationships between US and Russian leaders, especially the US Secretary of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Defense and other top military leaders, makes a significant difference in combined peacekeeping operations.* The success of IFOR/SFOR is due in large part to the hard work and personal interest in building relationships between Secretary Perry, Minister Grachev, General Joulwan, General Shevtsov, and many others. Their ability to develop a partnership between the two militaries and work out issues of concern to both sides proved invaluable to the success of IFOR/SFOR. Had there not been such a desire to work together, Russia would not have participated and SFOR may not have achieved the same level of success it has as of this writing.

#### **Case Study of Abkhazia (UNOMIG)**

While the conflict in Abkhazia had been building since 1989, it began in earnest in early 1992, when the Abkhaz minority (17 percent of the population, about 93,000 people) began pressing for complete independence from Georgia after nationalist rhetoric from the Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia encouraged them to seek greater autonomy.<sup>85</sup> Georgian forces stormed the Abkhaz capital city, Sukhumi, in July 1992, claiming their purpose was to restore order.<sup>86</sup> Fighting then broke out between the two sides in August 1992. During that portion of the conflict, the Russian military aided the Abkhaz side



by providing equipment and expertise, although it is unclear whether the military was acting independently or following orders from Moscow.<sup>87</sup> At that point the Georgian military was more of a renegade band of local clan leaders than a professional fighting force.<sup>88</sup> From August 1992 to October 1993 the Russian government brokered three cease-fire agreements, all of which were subsequently breached. The breaking of the third agreement highlights the convoluted involvement of Russian forces.

On 27 July 1993 the third agreement was reached, which provided for disarmament, withdrawal of Georgian troops, and restoration of the legitimate government to Sukhumi but made no decision as to the political status of Abkhazia.<sup>89</sup> Neither the Georgians nor the Abkhaz disarmed, and Abkhazia attacked Sukhumi in September 1993, when Georgia was vulnerable because they were embroiled in a conflict in South Ossetia. At the same time, Russia was in the midst of a constitutional crisis, making it difficult for Russian troops to receive clear direction from Moscow. The Abkhaz offensive used military equipment the Russians had supposedly rendered useless.<sup>90</sup> The Russians gave at least tacit assent to the Abkhaz and are alleged to have provided aircraft and other heavy equipment for the offensive.<sup>91</sup> During this offensive, the Abkhaz were able to take control of all of Abkhazia. Only at that point did the Russians threaten the Abkhaz with economic sanctions in order to broker a cease-fire. If Russia's government had not been in turmoil at the time, perhaps they would have acted more quickly and decisively, as Georgian President Shevardnadze claims, "If the events of the third and fourth of October [referring to the crisis in Moscow] had happened earlier, then Sukhumi would not have fallen."<sup>92</sup>

The fourth cease-fire agreement, reached in Moscow in 1994, has held to date. The situation remains volatile, with frequent clashes between paramilitary groups and acts of terrorism and sabotage committed by criminal organizations and paramilitary groups. Most of these paramilitary groups are semi-organized Georgian freedom fighters trying to regain the territory claimed by the Abkhaz in the final conflict before the Moscow Agreement. No agreement has been reached on the political status of Abkhazia or the

repatriation of the 300,000 Georgian refugees driven from the region during the conflict.<sup>93</sup> Since the cease-fire, Abkhazia has held “presidential elections” and established its own constitution, further exacerbating differences on its political status, and Georgian paramilitary groups heighten tensions through frequent disturbances in the security zone.<sup>94</sup> At present, attempts to achieve a political solution have produced only limited success.

The UN maintains 101 military observers in the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). The UN’s mandate is to “(a) monitor and verify the implementation by the parties of the Agreement on a Cease-fire and Separation of Forces signed in Moscow on 14 May 1994; (b) to observe the operation of the CIS peacekeeping force within the framework of the implementation of the Agreement; (c) to verify through observation and patrolling that troops of the parties did not remain in or re-enter the security zone and heavy military equipment did not remain or was not reintroduced in the security zone or restricted weapons zone;” and several other stipulations to ensure compliance with the agreement and the return of refugees.<sup>95</sup>

Under the aegis of the CIS, Russia maintains about 1,500 forces in the region, although the authorization calls for the presence of 3,000 troops. The Russians have frequently called for the support of other CIS nations, but none have responded. At the CIS meeting in which the Moscow Agreement was concluded, the other CIS nations agreed to return to their respective governments and request troops for the operation. However, each government responded negatively to the request. This is due to the poor condition of many of the CIS countries’ militaries and economies, their desire not to be involved with a Russian-dominated force at least perceived to be partial, and the tension between these governments and Russia. The Ukraine and several other CIS nations have only been willing to send observers to the UN observer mission, not troops to the CIS peacekeeping force.

According to UNOMIG official Wolfgang Weber, the UN mandate is sound and does not over-stretch UN capabilities as in some other peacekeeping missions. The Russian/CIS forces maintain a stable environment for the political settlement to be worked out, or, at the very least,

keep armed conflicts to a minimum. Weber says that the UN and Russian/CIS forces work together successfully and the Russian troops are relatively well disciplined, equipped, and fed. However, the former Russian commander in Georgia, General Bobkin, claims that the force is not large enough or adequately equipped to take on a more ambitious mission of policing throughout Abkhazia and ensuring the safe return of refugees.<sup>96</sup> To perform that mission, he claims, would require eight to ten thousand troops.<sup>97</sup> Although the effectiveness of Russian forces is in question, Weber believes that without continued Russian presence, or the presence of an equally capable UN force, fighting would resume almost immediately.

UN forces perform regular patrols, man checkpoints, conduct regular weapons inspections, and monitor the performance of Russian/CIS forces. UN actions are limited by the size of the force and the security risks of being unarmed in an unstable environment. Weber believes that the fact that the UN troops are unarmed improves the impression of impartiality, though at times there have been security problems. One such problem in which seven UN members were taken hostage by a criminal group on 13 October 1999 caused the US to recall its military observers to Tbilisi, the Georgian capital,<sup>98</sup> where they remain to date in accordance with US policy. Because of this and other incidents, the UN attempted to introduce a UN protection force in 1998. However, Russia struck down the proposal at the UNSC, claiming that the Russian/CIS forces were acting as a protection force for the UN and thus the introduction of 300 additional UN troops was unnecessary. Russia has been extremely suspicious of any attempts to get them out of Georgia, fearing NATO or US attempts to increase their influence in Russia's backyard. As an alternative to the UN Protection Force, the UN has augmented its staff with 17 international and 34 locally-hired security personnel. The lack of security for UN troops has forced them to close several team bases situated in isolated locations and has forced them to conduct only limited patrolling, leaving their mission only partially fulfilled. In particular, the US observers cannot perform their part in the mission adequately while being forced to remain in Tbilisi for security reasons.

The UN task of monitoring the Russian/CIS peacekeepers has proved delicate because the Russian forces are also the only protection the UN members have from the warring factions. Regular UN-Russian troop exercises are conducted to maintain a high degree of readiness for security back up, and information of mutual interest is frequently exchanged.<sup>99</sup> The UN has actively encouraged Russia to perform more extensive mobile patrols and to be proactive in ensuring the dismantling of the military positions of both sides, which Russia has done to some degree. The UN would still like to see additional Russian and combined Russian-UN patrols, and has often coordinated with the Russians in performing minesweeping operations or in doing patrols in mine-laden areas. However, security concerns of both the UN, who does not want to be perceived as partial by doing patrols with the Russians, and Russia, often a target of partisan groups, have caused both forces to take more limited actions. Therefore, both are not completely fulfilling the mandate to secure the area, facilitate the return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP's), and ensure that no heavy weapons are brought into the restricted weapons zone.<sup>100</sup>

UNOMIG has had only limited success in ensuring the implementation of the stipulations of the cease-fire agreement. The main obligations in the agreements on the separation of forces made in Tbilisi on 25 June 1999 have been fulfilled.<sup>101</sup> The number of skirmishes on both sides of the cease-fire line has also decreased.<sup>102</sup> A system of joint investigations with the UN, Russia, and both parties to the conflict, has been set up to investigate violent incidents, with thirteen successful investigations already complete. However, a number of the key aspects of an eventual resolution have not been resolved. The return of refugees to Abkhazia, the political status of Abkhazia, and the establishment of a more secure environment will be necessary before a more permanent resolution can be achieved.

The 1,500-man Russian/CIS peacekeeping force has received recognition from a UN mandate for its role in maintaining security in the region in accordance with the 1994 Moscow Agreement. The UN mandate has provided some much-desired legitimacy for the Russians, although they

have been unable to secure any UN funding for the operation. The US and other nations have been skeptical of providing any further legitimacy to the Russian force because of its alleged partiality and questionable performance.

Major Owen Cheney, US Army officer and UN Military Observer in Georgia, evaluates the Russian performance as a successful effort at completing the minimum task of keeping people from fighting.<sup>103</sup> They have performed reasonably well at maintaining security in an extremely volatile region. UN requests of Russia are generally followed, though they are usually limited only to what the UN knows Russia is willing to perform. Russia's first priority is force protection. Russian troops sometimes suffer equipment shortages or maintenance problems, several incidents due to Russian soldiers selling fuel on the black market, and have occasional discipline problems. Maintenance problems often result in valuable equipment eventually becoming unusable.

According to Weber, the primary drawback of the Russian/CIS peacekeeping force is Russia's strong political interest in the region, thus making it difficult, if not impossible, for them to be neutral. Russian forces are perceived as too dominating and party to the conflict, often making them a target for both sides at various times during the fighting. This limits the Russian forces' ability to perform routine patrols for fear of the safety of their troops. At present, they are only able to man checkpoints and maintain large clusters of forces to provide a separation between the two sides. According to Cheney,

The CIS (Russian) Peacekeeping Force (PKF) continues to be unable or unwilling to fulfill its mandated tasks. In particular, Russian inactivity in patrolling and delays in expanding its AOR [Area of Responsibility] to include both the security zone (SZ) and restricted weapons zone (RWZ) have failed to create security conditions conducive to the return of internally displaced persons (IDP's) to their pre-war homes. The CIS PKF appears content to maintain the pre-May [1998] fighting status quo in the SZ and conduct operations to support only those CIS mandated tasks which minimize the threat to their own forces in the conflict zone. After the recent fighting in May,

the Russian PKF appears to be taking a more active role in Gali with increased patrolling and establishment of new checkpoints. However, these actions are more likely linked to the PKF command's desire to minimize casualties than to fulfill its mandated tasks.<sup>104</sup>

The Russian peacekeeping forces on the ground argue that they need a more robust force to completely fulfill these mandates, but such a force remains unlikely in the foreseeable future.

In addition to its inability to fulfill its mandate, Russia has frequently come into question for its partiality to the Abkhaz. According to Etery Astemirova, Chairwoman of the Human Rights Commission of the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic, there are specific accounts of “peacekeepers detaining citizens and handing them over to Abkhaz authorities who then jailed, beat, and tortured them; threatening and robbing citizens at gunpoint, sometimes claiming to be collecting ‘pay’ for protecting Georgian interests; providing cover for Abkhaz paramilitaries conducting punitive combat operations; and even killing individual citizens.”<sup>105</sup> Though these allegations are disturbing, Weber believes that in recent times the impression of the Russians as partisan has slightly decreased and their leadership is better at ensuring disciplined and professional performance.<sup>106</sup>

Russian involvement provides a more secure environment and maintains the status quo but does little to provide for a more lasting peace. The military forces are inadequate for a more ambitious mission, and the political will, both in Russia and internationally, has not been sufficiently committed to resolving the conflict. The Abkhaz, bolstered by the Russian presence, have little incentive to negotiate a solution. The Russians have no desire to leave and thus lose their influence in the region. Until a concerted political effort is made to find a solution, the status quo will remain indefinitely, with its high costs to Georgia, Russia, and the UN.

### **Lessons Learned in Abkhazia**

*Lesson 1: The US should expect Russian involvement in operations in Russia's near abroad.* The Russians will be heavily engaged in the near abroad, promoting their interests and often times acting as a partial force or a

domineering parent controlling its children. Russia spends over \$526,000 per month maintaining forces in Abkhazia, placing a difficult burden on the Ministry of Defense.<sup>107</sup> Despite this high economic cost and the political pressure from Georgia for the Russians to leave, Russia has continued and will continue to maintain its presence in keeping with its interests. Any solution to the situation in Georgia or elsewhere in the near abroad must therefore include Russian participation.

*Lesson 2: Russia's forces are adequate for maintaining peace and stability, but greater political effort is required to broker a more comprehensive peace settlement.* The Russian forces in Abkhazia prevent a re-escalation of the conflict, but many observers claim that until Russian forces leave, Abkhazia has no incentive to reach an agreement on either its status within the sovereignty of Georgia or the return of refugees, thus preventing a resolution. The problems of Russian partiality and heavy-handedness encourage the continuation of the status quo. Russian troops can maintain because of superior force and the threat of even greater force, but if a resolution is not in Russian interests, it will not happen.

*Lesson 3: Russian/CIS and UN forces need to improve cooperation and coordination.* The situation in Abkhazia is extremely unstable and any small conflict has the potential to incite a larger one. The UN and Russia must coordinate to make sure all required areas are watched and adequate patrols are performed so that they do not miss a build-up of troops or minor altercation that may lead to a larger conflict. The UN cannot perform all these missions without Russian protection, and Russian forces are unlikely to perform many of them on their own. In addition, many of the missions that might facilitate a political solution, such as the return of the IDP's, can only be performed through joint efforts. One positive example of this is the UN's recent success in setting up a joint investigating team with Russia and the warring parties to investigate terrorist or criminal incidents in the region. However, only a small number of incidents have been investigated. The Coordination Council, a forum for the four parties to discuss implementation of the agreement, has had minimal success and has often stalled in the

negotiation process. The UN and Russia do little to coordinate activities except when the UN requires protection to accomplish an activity.

*Lesson 4: Any apparent pressure to replace the Russian mission with UN or other international troops will be met with fierce Russian resistance.*

Russia believes that the CIS peacekeeping force is a legitimate force that should receive full UN recognition and funds. UN protection forces will continue to be vetoed in the UNSC. While Russia theoretically approves of using the UN and OSCE as peacekeeping bodies, they have resisted most efforts to use them in the Russian near abroad. Anything that they perceive as Western encroachment into their sphere of influence will meet with strong resistance.

### **The Future of Russian Peacekeeping**

After looking at Russia's interests, political environment, peacekeeping forces, doctrine, and case studies from combined operations in Bosnia and CIS operations in Abkhazia, it is possible to draw several conclusions about where and how Russia is likely to involve itself in future peacekeeping operations. According to Russian President Putin, territorial integrity and domestic order are his top priorities.<sup>108</sup> Conflicts on Russia's borders, most likely to occur in the near abroad, will take precedence among Russia's peacekeeping missions because of the potential they have for destabilizing areas within Russian territory and because of Russia's desire to maintain its sphere of influence in the near abroad. Outside this region, however, Russian peacekeeping will not take a high priority for the next several years. Russia still fears a weakening of its influence in the world, and thus will remain engaged with NATO in the Balkans and, to a certain extent, with UN missions, but its resources will be much more limited for such endeavors.

In the near abroad, Russia will prefer to work under the aegis of the CIS while striving to receive a UN mandate and funding for its operations. It will most likely be unwilling to sacrifice control of the operation for a full UN mandate and funding,<sup>109</sup> but will continue to request funds and troops from other CIS states. Despite the high costs of involvement, Russia will continue to get involved in conflicts in the near abroad to protect its interests and



maintain influence in the region. At the same time, it will seek to keep the US, and especially NATO, out of its sphere of influence.

Russia will maintain its commitment to the Balkans out of pride and a desire to protect its interests in the area. Russia desires to remain an important player in the world arena. However, the military may seek to reduce the level of commitment because of financial constraints and the high level of operations they have had to sustain. As Putin announced, they will continue to work with NATO,<sup>110</sup> desiring a more equal voice in the operation. Despite this desire, the military is unlikely to devote many of its scarce resources to conform its equipment and procedures to NATO standards of operation. They will continue to put pressure on the US and other NATO countries to work through the OSCE and the UN as a conflict resolution body, rather than performing operations outside the purview of the UN.

### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

With the future of Russian peacekeeping in mind, this section recommends actions to be taken to improve combined operations in Bosnia and to support Russian operations in Abkhazia, with consideration given to those actions most likely to improve the US-Russian strategic relationship. The final portion of this section looks at the more robust options that are effective in both spheres and can be used in future operations to build and maintain a cooperative relationship.

#### **Recommendations for Bosnia and Combined Operations**

Most of the combined operations problems in US-Russian relations stem from a lack of understanding or communication between the two militaries. This gap exists on every level of the relationship, from the highest levels of the US Department of Defense (DoD) and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to interactions between individual soldiers. Therefore, the following recommendations have been divided at various levels to address such issues.

##### *Operational Level Recommendations*

*Problem: Misunderstandings of military-political tasks between the Russian Brigade and MND(N) headquarters causing difficulties in their abilities to respond to tactical orders.*<sup>111</sup> US commanders are accustomed to

verbal orders. However, the Russians would prefer to have all tasks published in the form of Implementation Instructions (IMPIN's) before they act. In addition, the Russians interpret some tasks as political-military tasks, not solely military tasks. Therefore, they must get permission through the Russian chain of command, which is time consuming.<sup>112</sup>

*Recommendation:* Increase the number of liaison officers to the Russian Brigade to five or six, three or four with the Russian Brigade and two in Tuzla. Currently, there are three LNO's stationed with the Russian Brigade at the Russian Headquarters in Ugljevik and one working at the US division Headquarters in Tuzla. Their job is to maintain connectivity between the Russian Brigade and MND(N) HQ by serving as translator and interpreter between the two headquarters. Additional LNO's would be tasked with jobs similar to those currently in service. LNO's are indispensable to the operation for translating and offering professional opinions to the Russian Brigade. Civilian translators are not able to translate the military concepts and do not have the same level of experience as LNO's.

Moreover, a Russian Representative should be included in PfP command post exercises. During these command post exercises, focus should be placed on coordinating staff organizations and developing practical recommendations on the use of military force and on the basic premises for assessing the effectiveness of its use. A mobile staff made up of US and Russian officers should be created from these exercises to work issues in case of necessary emergency deployments to conflict regions. Russian officers can provide experience from their peacekeeping operations (with the CIS, NATO, or the UN) that may be helpful in dealing with combined peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, they will be able to troubleshoot possible operational problems concerning Russian units in combined operations, such as the difficulty of understanding "implied tasks" assigned by MND(N).

#### *Tactical Level Recommendations*

*Problem: Lack of professionalism and partiality shown on the part of the Russian soldiers, as well as differences in military culture and a lack of coordination.*

*Recommendation:* Restart combined patrolling missions with US and Russian forces. Continual reevaluation of NATO and other participating countries' actions towards the former warring parties shows that it was not always completely balanced.<sup>113</sup> Currently, the US and Russian forces do not perform any combined patrolling missions due to political fallout during the summer of 1999.<sup>114</sup> Before this, the Russians and Americans did approximately six combined patrols per month, three in the American sector, and three in the Russian area of responsibility with one LNO present with the patrol to facilitate the mission and communication. Combined patrols help the relationship in two ways: they serve as a way to present a unified front to the people in Bosnia who were hoping to drive a wedge between the two forces, and they allow the soldiers to learn more about each other. One LNO called the combined patrols the biggest "money-maker for US-Russian military relations."<sup>115</sup> Additionally, Set aside more time to brief incoming American commanders (down through platoon leaders and NCOs) on various differences in military culture, terminology, procedures, etc. This can be done by the Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) in the area that have served with the Russian Brigade, if available.

*Problem:* Language barriers affect all levels of operations. Typically only the LNO's speak any amount of Russian, and few Russians speak English. This problem has been recognized as one of the biggest issues that continues to cause difficulties in combined operations.

*Recommendation:* DoD should ensure that liaison officers receive adequate training in the necessary language. Also, DoD should develop phrase books that provide essential information on carrying out common or shared tasks in both Russian and English. Captain Leyde, a current LNO in SFOR commented that "a LNO who arrives with a high proficiency in Russian has a much easier time establishing rapport and proving his professional competency."<sup>116</sup> The current Air Staff emphasis on raising Air Force language abilities among officers to 10 percent is thus rightly justified. Other branches of service should set and achieve similar goals.

## **Recommendations for US Support for Peacekeeping in Abkhazia and the Near-Abroad**

With US interests in mind, this section looks at how the US can improve the US-Russian strategic relationship through supporting Russia in performing its peacekeeping functions in the near abroad. The analysis lists several of the problems in Abkhazia and gives recommendations for solving or improving them that provide the best combination of positive impact on the situation and on the US-Russian relationship.

*Problem: The UN Observers are not able to completely fulfill their mandate due to travel restriction and security concerns.* The UN observers, because they are unarmed, have become targets of criminal groups and partisan forces. The limitations on UN observers allow for a more unstable environment because the observers cannot ensure the guidelines for restricted weapons' zones are completely followed or that there is not a build-up of troops preparing for an attack in certain areas of the security zone.

*Recommendation: Allow US UNOMIG observers more freedom to travel to certain areas within the conflict regions and increase the number of US observers from two to five.* The US troops can only perform their mission if they are able to more directly view the conflict zone. The UN observers have taken adequate precautions to protect their troops while still performing the mission. US troops should not show a lack of commitment to the region by being unwilling to perform the tasks that the rest of the observers perform. While the DoD may deem it necessary to restrict them from isolated regions because of security concerns, they should at least be allowed to visit Sukhumi, where Russian/CIS and UN headquarters are located, as well as the more protected areas around Zugdidi and Gali.

Many in the UN and Russia see a lack of US commitment because of their unwillingness to bear the same risks as the other UN observers. Lifting the restriction and increasing the number of observers will show more support for the UN mission and will enable the US observers to better monitor the belligerents' compliance with the mandate and the performance of Russian/CIS forces. By remaining in Tbilisi, US observers give the Abkhaz

the impression that the US is partial to the Georgians, decreasing Abkhaz trust in US efforts to resolve the crisis. Increasing the number of observers and allowing them to interact with the Russian/CIS forces will improve the familiarity with and understanding of the Russian military. If the US is unwilling to allow its observers to actually observe the conflict, their presence hurts UN and Russian perceptions of US troops because it highlights the fact that US presence is more for political purposes than an actual sign of commitment.

The DoD must necessarily be concerned with the security risks to its personnel. Another hostage crisis, if it involved an American, could be much more serious than the previous incident where seven UN observers were taken hostage by a criminal group and later released unharmed.<sup>117</sup> None of the UN observers have been seriously harmed to date, and the UN has taken precautions to improve security by limiting patrols and not manning checkpoints in isolated locations. The UN has also increased security by hiring armed guards from both within and outside the region, which should help to convince the DoD to loosen restrictions on its observers.<sup>118</sup>

*Problem: The Russian/CIS Forces are not able to completely fulfill their mandate and sometimes act (or are perceived to act) with partiality to the Abkhaz.*

*Recommendation: Increase US UNOMIG observers' interactions with CIS peacekeeping forces.* The US observers should increase the amount of time spent with Russian forces to improve the relationship and assess what areas the UN and/or US might be able to provide help either through education and training in necessary subjects, encouragement to undertake certain activities, or logistical support for operations. In the future, the US may be able to use that knowledge in offering education and training in facilitating the return of IDP's and policing the conflict zone, though the US has its own difficulties with this. In addition, by understanding the weaknesses of the Russian peacekeepers, US observers may be able to interact with the Russians to develop solutions for fulfilling the mandate and moving towards a resolution of the conflict.

Additionally, the US should encourage and support other CIS nations, such as the Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Georgia to take a more active role in CIS peacekeeping missions. Both politically and militarily, the US can support these nations in an effort to make the CIS an organization less dominated by Russia and more capable in its peacekeeping efforts. The US should give political encouragement for these nations to provide troops for the operations. In addition, the DoD can provide increased funding through the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) initiative to improve facilities, equipment, and training for CIS countries, including Russia. In 1999, the US spent \$1million through EIPC on the Ukraine's peacekeeping capabilities. This funding could also be given to Russia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Georgia, and other CIS states. Outside of EIPC, whose mission is to "increase and improve the pool of capable peacekeepers,"<sup>119</sup> the US can also support countries like the Ukraine and Azerbaijan with funds for participation in peacekeeping activities in the near abroad. This would cost in the range of \$3-5 million per year per country.

#### **Overall Recommendations to Improve US-Russian Relations through Peacekeeping**

*Recommendation 1: Define the circle of participants in the operational planning of multinational peacekeeping operations by the level or amount of their participation.* While the involvement of non-NATO countries in the policy planning stages of an operation would only create additional congestion and cause the policy planning to be more difficult than it currently is, NATO should look to include all participants in the operational planning of missions. Although the inclusion of Russia in the planning of combined peacekeeping operations like IFOR and KFOR involves changing NATO policy and not solely US policy, it would be beneficial for the US to ask for the inclusion of Russia in the operational planning process.

During the planning for IFOR and KFOR, there was a lack of coordination and involvement with Russia on a political and operational level regarding its participation in the joint peacekeeping missions. This lack of coordination and planning for IFOR was one of the top concerns expressed by

the Russian military once they were established in Bosnia.<sup>120</sup> In the future, greater Russian participation in the planning of operations can reduce their overall concern in becoming a part of a multinational peacekeeping force. By enlarging the planning circle, Russia and other participating countries gain a vested interest in the Peacekeeping operation and this allows contributing countries to express and work through areas of concern before the commencement of the mission. In addition, working together to plan the operation facilitates the development of relationships at a higher level of political and military structure. Evidence suggests that such combined planning is very important in the success of IFOR/SFOR implementation.

The planning structure will depend greatly on how the multinational force is structured. If it is a NATO force, the NATO allies will be hesitant to include Russia in operational planning because of concerns about sharing intelligence.<sup>121</sup> Including non-NATO countries in combined peacekeeping efforts is an ad-hoc process that requires extensive planning and coordination each time it occurs. Although the inclusion of Russia in IFOR was difficult, it was not nearly as complicated as the more formal Helsinki Agreement reached during summer 1999 before the introduction of Russian forces to KFOR. Formal political agreements require a considerable amount of political and military effort to find solutions to both Russian and American concerns. In addition, certain members of NATO prefer little Russian involvement and do not want to provide Russia with any form of veto power in the planning process. There is already an opportunity for Russia to voice its opinions through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) or the Permanent Joint Council. NATO is obligated to respond to such concerns and either justify the action or make a change in the planning. However, because of Russia's large contribution to the peacekeeping effort, it should be given more opportunity to provide input than simply reviewing the final operational plan and commenting on it. All non-NATO participants who make significant contributions to the peacekeeping effort and whose forces will be used in the operation should be given a larger voice in the operational planning.

*Recommendation 2: Restart educational exchanges between US and Russian military personnel.* Educational exchange programs and funding are already established for Russian officers to the US in the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program. The current funding for Russia in FY00 is \$900,000, which includes the tuition costs, travel expenses, supplemental living allowances, and medical expenses of students.<sup>122</sup> However, Russia suspended its participation in IMET programs after summer 1999. Russia should reestablish its participation in those courses.<sup>123</sup> In addition to Russian participation in American courses, US Army officers should be sent to the Vystrel Academy in Russia, which teaches peacekeeping courses.<sup>124</sup> The Academy has made offers to accept international students, but the US has not sent its officers to the program for several years.

*Recommendation 3: Perform combined exercises for staff level officers under the established PjP program.* Exercises should include the active participation of Russian staff level officers in the planning and implementation of peace operations. Combined exercises in the early 1990's are credited for making the inclusion of Russia into IFOR possible.

*Recommendation 4: Improve Russian language and cultural expertise among US Foreign Area Officers.* Already suggested above, we want to emphasize again that working together in peacekeeping and on other transnational issues requires an ability to communicate. The military should allow FAO's to receive language training earlier. FAO's are often not given language training and designated as FAO's until their 6<sup>th</sup> or 7<sup>th</sup> year of service, when they are often near age 30. To become truly fluent, language training needs to occur earlier in their careers. In addition, the military should ensure that FAO's are not put in liaison positions before they have received adequate training. According to Captain Leyde, those US officers who have not received enough training and are not proficient in the Russian language have a difficult time establishing a good rapport with the Russian military.<sup>125</sup>

*Recommendation 5: Increase cultural training for officers and NCO's assigned to work with Russian units.* US officers sent to the Balkans receive training in understanding the Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats, but not necessarily



their fellow Russian peacekeepers. US officers and NCO's sent to work with Russian units should be taught the cultural differences as well as the differences in the way Russian military units operate. This does not have to be an extensive training program, but could be done by Russian FAOs in a day's training during mission preparation for a mission in Bosnia, Kosovo, or in any future US-Russian combined operations.

*Recommendation 6: Give more credit to Russia for its peacekeeping operations in recognition of improved performance in desired areas.*

When Russia successfully undertakes an activity with the encouragement or approval of the US, the US should give them credit in the international arena for their actions. The Russian forces have performed reasonably well in areas such as Moldova and South Ossetia, and they should be given credit for it.<sup>126</sup> In situations like Abkhazia, the US should recognize positive steps Russia takes toward facilitating the return of IDPs and accomplishing other tasks that provide for a more lasting solution. Russia has frequently expressed its desire for international recognition for its significant efforts to stabilize the near abroad. In fact, recognition seems just as important to the Russians as receiving funds for their operations.<sup>127</sup>

#### **SUMMARY**

Peacekeeping operations provide an excellent opportunity for the US and Russia to improve their strategic relationship. While the US should be careful not to exaggerate the impact this cooperation can have on the relationship, it should commit itself to making the best possible strategic use of peacekeeping cooperation and providing the necessary resources to accomplish that goal. This paper has provided several recommendations for improving US-Russian relations through these peacekeeping operations. By making efforts to improve the relationship now, the Bush administration can alleviate misunderstandings and pave the way for future cooperation with Russia.

#### **ENDNOTES**

---

<sup>1</sup> The *near abroad* refers to the former Soviet states surrounding the Russian Federation.

- 
- <sup>2</sup> Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, *Preventative Defense* (Washington DC: Brookings Institute Press, 1999), 15.
- <sup>3</sup> "Russia-NATO Founding Act," online at <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/fndact-a.htm>, para 5 (Accessed 4 January 00).
- <sup>4</sup> Martin Nesirky, "NATO and Russia aim to improve relations," *Boston Globe*, 17 February 2000, World Section, A20.
- <sup>5</sup> Interview with Major General William Nash, US Army, Commander of Task Force Eagle, 3 December 1999.
- <sup>6</sup> Interview with Colonel Greg Kaufmann, US Army, Director of the Balkans Task Force, OSD, 20 January 2000.
- <sup>7</sup> "Russian Federation National Security Concept," 11 Nov 1996, 5. Approved by the members of the RF Security Council on 5 October 1996.
- <sup>8</sup> Micheal Croft, *Russia's Peacekeeping Policy, Part II: Differences in Approach and Obstacles*, (Peacekeeping and International Relations, Ottawa, Sept/Oct 1996), 34.
- <sup>9</sup> Ibid, 34.
- <sup>10</sup> Lieutenant General Anatoly Meleshkov, Representative of the RF Armed Forces to the UN Military Staff Committee, 25 January 2000.
- <sup>11</sup> See Abkhazia case study for further discussion of this issue.
- <sup>12</sup> Russian National Security Concept.
- <sup>13</sup> Interview with Gen Meleshkov.
- <sup>14</sup> Dominic Evans, "Putin: If treated fairly, Russia could join NATO," *Reuters*, 6 March 2000.
- <sup>15</sup> Russian National Security Concept.
- <sup>16</sup> Celestine Bohlen, "Russian Military, Usually Silent, Urges Hard Line on Chechnya," *New York Times*, 7 November 1999, International Section.
- <sup>17</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>18</sup> John Thornhill and John Lloyd, "Yeltsin's Balkan Question," *Financial Times*, 14 June 1999, Comment and Analysis Section, 24.
- <sup>19</sup> "Yeltsin's Fast Breaking Generals," *Time*, 28 June 1999, World Section.
- <sup>20</sup> Interview with Col Kaufmann
- <sup>21</sup> Stuart D. Goldman, "Russian Conventional Armed Forces: On the Verge of Collapse?" *CRS Report for Congress* (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 4 September 1997), Table 1.

---

<sup>23</sup> Nikolai Novichkov, "Russian Defense Budget Eaten up by Huge Debts," *Jane's Information Group*, June 1999, 25.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Information on Vystrel and other information about the training of their forces comes from the interview with Gen Meleshkov.

<sup>26</sup> Interview with General John Reppert, US Army (retired), former Defense Attache to Russia, November 1999.

<sup>27</sup> Interview with Gen Meleshkov.

<sup>28</sup> James Yentz, "Peace Operations as Reaction to the New World Disorder: Russian and Ukrainian Approaches," unpublished paper, 14 December 1998.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Interview with Gen Meleshkov.

<sup>32</sup> Colonel Vladimir I. Krysenko, "Military Aspects of Peacekeeping and the Participation of Russian Armed Forces in Areas of Armed Conflict on the Territory of the CIS and Russia." Unpublished text of an oral presentation given at a TRADOC Peacekeeping Conference in December 1993, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, online at <http://call.army.mil/call/fms/fmsopubs/issues/peace.htm> (Accessed on 20 Jan 2000).

<sup>33</sup> Kevin O'Prey, "Keeping the Peace in the Borderlands of Russia," *Occasional Paper #23*, Henry L. Stimson Center, July 1995, 29.

<sup>34</sup> Interview with Col Kaufmann.

<sup>35</sup> A. Raevsky and I.N. Vorob'ev, *Russian Approaches to Peacekeeping Operations*, UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR/94/31), Research Paper 12 (New York: UN, 1994), 5.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid, 6.

<sup>39</sup> Interview with Gen Meleshkov.

<sup>40</sup> Raymond C. Finch, III, "The Strange Case of Russian Peacekeeping Operations in the Near Abroad 1992-1994," (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, July 1996).

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Roy Allison, "Peacekeeping in the Soviet Successor States," *Chaillot Paper #18*, November 1994), 14; online at

---

<http://www.weu.int/institute/chailot/chai18e.htm> (Accessed on 20 Jan 2000).

<sup>43</sup> O'Prey, 8.

<sup>44</sup> Tom Wilhelm, "Russian Peacekeeping Forces in Tajikistan," (Carlisle, PA: US Army Peacekeeping Institute), 11.

<sup>45</sup> Yentz.

<sup>46</sup> O'Prey, 9.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> See Abkhazia case study for more information on Russia's perceived partiality in the region.

<sup>49</sup> Allison, 14.

<sup>50</sup> Yentz.

<sup>51</sup> Interview with Gen Reppert.

<sup>52</sup> For a good analysis of using combatants in peacekeeping forces, see Tom Wilhelm, "Using Belligerents as Peacekeepers" (Carlisle, PA: US Army Peacekeeping Institute).

<sup>53</sup> "History of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina," NATO homepage, 1 October 1999, online at <http://www.nato.int> (Accessed on 5 Mar 00).

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Carter and Perry, 43.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid, 45.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> "Lessons and Conclusions on the Execution of IFOR Operations and Prospects for a Future Combined Security System: The Peace and Stability of Europe after IFOR," Joint US/Russian Research Project of the Foreign Military Studies office (FMSO), Center for Army Lessons Learned, US Army Combined Arms Center, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas and the Center for Military-Strategic Studies (CMSS), General Staff of the Armed Forces, Moscow, Russia, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 1998), Chapter 3.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> Major Fernando Buesa, "Russians Homeland Defense Day in Ugljevik," *SFOR Informer* #31, 11 March 1998, 1.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

- 
- <sup>63</sup> “Lessons and Conclusions on the Execution of IFOR Operations,” Chapter 4.
- <sup>64</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>65</sup> E-mail interview with Major Warren, US Army (served as FAO in SFOR Aug-Dec 1998), 22 March 00.
- <sup>66</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>67</sup> Interview with anonymous US officer.
- <sup>68</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>69</sup> General William Nash (US Army, Retired), “Give the Russians a Chance,” *New York Times*, 22 June 1999, Op-Ed Section.
- <sup>70</sup> Interview with Gen Nash.
- <sup>71</sup> Interview with anonymous US officer.
- <sup>72</sup> Interview with Col Kaufmann.
- <sup>73</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>74</sup> E-mail interview with Captain Eric M. Leyde (current LNO to the Russian Brigade), 28 Mar 00.
- <sup>75</sup> Interview with anonymous US officer.
- <sup>76</sup> Interview with Col Kaufmann.
- <sup>77</sup> Interview with Gen Nash.
- <sup>78</sup> Interview with Col Greer.
- <sup>79</sup> Interview with Capt Leyde.
- <sup>80</sup> “Lessons and Conclusions on the Execution of IFOR Operations,” Chapter 4.
- <sup>81</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>82</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>83</sup> The research team was composed of members from The Center for Military-Strategic Research of the Russian General Staff and the Foreign Military Studies Office of the US Army’s Center for Army Lessons Learned. The survey was conducted during August-October 1997.
- <sup>84</sup> Dr. Jacob W. Kipp, “US-Russian Military Cooperation and the IFOR Experience: A Comparison of Survey Results,” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, September 1998).
- <sup>85</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>86</sup> Finch, 3.
- <sup>87</sup> Ibid.

---

<sup>88</sup> Ibid.

<sup>89</sup> Finch, 3.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

<sup>92</sup> According to Finch, there exists a considerable body of evidence that the Abkhazians received support from a number of different Russian groups. For examples, see Catherine Dale, "Turmoil in Abkhazia: Russian Responses," (RFE/RL Research Report, 27 August 1993), 48-57; Dr. Tamara Gragadze, "Conflict in the Transcaucasus and the Value of Inventory Control," *Jane's Intelligence Review* (February 1994), 71-73.

<sup>93</sup> Misha Glenny, "The Bear in the Caucasus," *Harpers* (March 1994), 49.

<sup>94</sup> "The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping," (New York: The United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), 576-7.

<sup>95</sup> "Report of the Secretary-General Concerning the Situation in Abkhazia, Georgia" (S/1999/1087), 22 October 1999.

<sup>96</sup> "The Blue Helmets," 578.

<sup>97</sup> Interview with UN official Wolfgang Weber, 24 Jan 2000.

<sup>98</sup> Interview with Major Owen Cheney, US Army, UN Military Observer in Georgia, 19 Jan 2000.

<sup>99</sup> "Report of the Secretary-General Concerning the Situation in Abkhazia, Georgia."

<sup>100</sup> Ibid.

<sup>101</sup> Interview with Maj Cheney.

<sup>102</sup> "Report of the Secretary-General Concerning the Situation in Abkhazia, Georgia."

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

<sup>104</sup> Interview with Maj Cheney.

<sup>105</sup> Owen Cheney, "UNOMIG Mandated Observance of CIS Peacekeeping Forces in Georgia," 5 August 1998.

<sup>106</sup> Irakli Zurab Kakabadze, "Russian Troops in Abkhazia: Peacekeeping, or Keeping Both Pieces?" *Perspectives on Central Asia*, Vol II, No. 6 (September 1997), Center for Political and Strategic Studies, online at

<http://www.cpss.org/casianw/perca0997.txt> (Accessed on 20 Jan 2000).

<sup>107</sup> Interview with Weber.

<sup>108</sup> O'Prey, 29.

- 
- <sup>109</sup> Henry E. Hale, *Russian Election Watch No. 8, March 15, 2000*, (Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, Harvard University), 2.
- <sup>110</sup> O'Prey, 29.
- <sup>111</sup> Evans.
- <sup>112</sup> For a more detailed discussion, see pages 58-62.
- <sup>113</sup> "Lessons and Conclusions on the Execution of IFOR Operations," Chapter 4.
- <sup>114</sup> Interview with Capt Leyde.
- <sup>115</sup> Interview with Maj Warren.
- <sup>116</sup> Interview with Capt Leyde.
- <sup>117</sup> "Report of the Secretary-General Concerning the Situation in Abkhazia, Georgia."
- <sup>118</sup> Because the attempt to introduce a UN protection force was refused by Russia, the UN mission hired seventeen international and thirty-four local armed guards. Contracting armed guards is cheaper than a UN protection force and does little to harm the US-Russian relationship. UN observers would then be able to expand their patrols and maintain more team bases with less fear of criminal groups or partisans. They would thus be able to fulfill more of their mandate and provide more stability in the region. The armed guards will require a commitment of funds (around \$1M/year) from the UN, but without the added security, UN observers will continue to be unable to fulfill their mandate.
- <sup>119</sup> "The Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) Initiative." Briefing slides, Office of the DASD for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance, May 1998, 3.
- <sup>120</sup> "Lessons and Conclusions on the Execution of IFOR Operations," Chapter 4.
- <sup>121</sup> Problems arose in the summer of 1999 when many questioned if the Russians were passing information to Serbian President Milosevic.
- <sup>122</sup> *Peacetime Engagement Planning Reference Book*, Joint Staff Publication, June 1999, 308.
- <sup>123</sup> The following levels of Russian participation in US courses were submitted as part of the FY 00 IMET proposed training plan: Civil-Military Strategy for International Development (2 persons), Language Instructor (6 persons), Executive Program in Civilian Military Relations (3 persons), and Legal Considerations in Military and Peace Operations (4 persons).
- <sup>124</sup> Interview with Gen Reppert.
- <sup>125</sup> Interview with Capt Leyde.

---

<sup>126</sup> Interview with Maj King.

<sup>127</sup> O'Prey, 29.