[House Hearing, 107 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
RESTRUCTURING GOVERNMENT FOR HOMELAND SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, DECEMBER 5, 2001
__________
Serial No. 107-19
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Budget
Available on the Internet: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/
house04.html
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COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
JIM NUSSLE, Iowa, Chairman
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire JOHN M. SPRATT, Jr., South Carolina,
Vice Chairman Ranking Minority Member
PETER HOEKSTRA, Michigan JIM McDERMOTT, Washington
Vice Chairman BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi
CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire KEN BENTSEN, Texas
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota JIM DAVIS, Florida
VAN HILLEARY, Tennessee EVA M. CLAYTON, North Carolina
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina
JIM RYUN, Kansas GERALD D. KLECZKA, Wisconsin
MAC COLLINS, Georgia BOB CLEMENT, Tennessee
ERNIE FLETCHER, Kentucky JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia
GARY G. MILLER, California DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon
PAT TOOMEY, Pennsylvania TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
WES WATKINS, Oklahoma CAROLYN McCARTHY, New York
DOC HASTINGS, Washington DENNIS MOORE, Kansas
JOHN T. DOOLITTLE, California MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
RAY LaHOOD, Illinois JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL III, Pennsylvania
KAY GRANGER, Texas RUSH D. HOLT, New Jersey
EDWARD SCHROCK, Virginia JIM MATHESON, Utah
JOHN CULBERSON, Texas
HENRY E. BROWN, Jr., South Carolina
ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida
ADAM PUTNAM, Florida
MARK KIRK, Illinois
Professional Staff
Rich Meade, Chief of Staff
Thomas S. Kahn, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
Page
Hearing held in Washington, DC, December 5, 2001................. 1
Statement of:
Dr. Scott Lillibridge, Special Assistant to the Secretary of
Health and Human Services for Bioterrorism................. 3
Joseph Mahaley, Director, Office of Security Affairs for the
Department of Energy....................................... 8
Kenneth Baker, Principal Deputy Administrator, Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation, Department of Energy............. 13
Prepared statement of:
Dr. Lillibridge.............................................. 6
Mr. Mahaley.................................................. 11
Mr. Baker.................................................... 16
RESTRUCTURING GOVERNMENT FOR HOMELAND SECURITY
----------
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 5, 2001
House of Representatives,
Committee on the Budget,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:12 a.m. in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jim Nussle (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
Members present: Representatives Nussle, Thornberry, Ryun,
Collins, Fletcher, Watkins, Hastings, Schrock, Spratt,
McDermott, Bentsen, Price, Moran, Hooley, McCarthy, Moore, and
Holt.
Chairman Nussle. Good morning. The Committee on the Budget
will come to order. We are not where we are supposed to be,
which is especially fun for me today, because when I was a
freshman Member of Congress, I served on the Banking Committee,
and it was in this room where I had some of my very first
committee meetings, and Henry Gonzales, whose picture hangs on
the wall over here to my right, was the chairman. It was always
a very interesting experience to work with Henry on banking
issues, a real gentleman and someone that I admired, even
though we disagreed on a number of issues at that time. But it
is a real honor for me to be back in the Finance Committee
room, Financial Services Committee room, Banking Committee
room.
We appreciate Chairman Oxley and the Finance Committee's
willingness to allow us to use the hearing room, as ours is
being renovated, hopefully so that we can begin the budget
process when we return to session next year.
Today's hearing is the second in a series of Budget
Committee hearings that will examine how the Federal Government
organizes itself for fighting terrorism in ensuring domestic
security. As our previous hearing made clear, with at least 43
agencies across the Federal Government having some
responsibility for combatting terrorism, it is vital that we
know who is in charge and what the coordinating mechanisms are
and who controls those resources.
Strengthening our national security against deadly
criminals and terrorists, requires inner agency cooperation and
coordination on an unprecedented scale. This hearing will focus
on the following key issues, what deficiencies and preparedness
were demonstrated by events of September 11, what is our
current state of preparedness, what changes have been made and
what changes are being considered for the future in programs,
organization, infrastructure and how will the budget impact of
all of these very important questions. We know that we are
going to need to make some additional investments, and where
are those greatest needs for those investments?
The war on terrorism is being fought against an
unconventional enemy with no moral inhibition about using
unconventional weapons. We may be facing chemical threats,
biological warfare, or even the nightmare scenario of something
nuclear. But the frightening impact of such an attack on the
United States has to be confronted, otherwise we will be
unprepared for the catastrophe and the reality that follows.
The cost of an uncoordinated, ineffective response will be
paid in human lives, loss of civil liberties and economic
disruption that could fundamentally undermine our national
security and the way of life.
Testifying today will be the following individuals, and we
are honored to have them all here today. Scott Lillibridge, who
is the special assistant to the Secretary of Health and Human
Services for bioterrorism. He will join with us today to
discuss the status of the Health and Human Services' response
to the anthrax attacks and potential enhancements to counter
future attacks. Joseph Mahaley, director of the Office of
Security Affairs for the Department of Energy. He will be here
to discuss the status of the Department of Energy's security
measures in light of the unprecedented terrorist threats.
Kenneth Baker, principal deputy administrator for the Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation, Department of Energy, will be here to
discuss the status of the government's nonproliferation
programs.
I look forward to a very interesting and candid exchange.
The reason for this hearing today was because the leadership of
our ranking member, John Spratt, who requested it at the
previous hearing. We appreciate the suggestion. We were very
interested in accommodating this hearing as a result, and I
recognize you now for any statement you would like to make.
Mr. Spratt. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I do
appreciate the fact that you have called this hearing and have
worked to make it an effective and fruitful hearing.
Since January of this year, our budget has changed, and
changed drastically. We began the year with a situation where
we were flushed with surpluses, $5.6 trillion according to CBO
over the next 10 years. Right now we find that $5.6 trillion
surplus diminished to as little as $2.6 trillion, and most of
that consists of Social Security and Medicare.
There have been policy changes. There have been economic
changes, but there has also been a change which we have yet to
monetize, to put a price tag or a dollar cost upon, and those
are the changes that follow from the events of September 11. We
have been privileged for all of our history to live buffered by
two oceans, privileged by geography. We have largely not had to
contend with our enemies on our own soil. We could deal with
them somewhere else. Now we are going to have to turn our focus
to internal defenses, as much as external defense, and deal
with vulnerabilities that have been there for years, decades
literally, but we have not had to worry about them because they
weren't problems.
The security of our airlines, the security of our
transportation system, our electricity grid, all kinds of
different threats. And one of the threats that most concerns us
is the threat of chemical, biological and nuclear warfare due
to the spread of this kind of technology.
What we have seen now is we have got an enemy that has
insidious potential, and coupled with these kinds of weapons,
it could do enormous damage to our country in very unsuspecting
places. The question for us on the Budget Committee is, what
does this add to the budget, what is the cost of it going to
be? We have seen a lot of the back-of-the-envelope exercises as
we begin to identify these particular vulnerabilities and try
to decide or prioritize which need to be protected first.
Usually we see the initial cost. That is only part of it.
We also need to know the recurring costs.
Today is not just a satellite hearing. Today is what the
new budget will have to contend with and accommodate if we are
going to directly and squarely address the threat that faces
the United States of America today. We appreciate all of our
witnesses coming in from different viewpoints, and we look
forward to your testimony and your participation in the
hearing.
Chairman Nussle. Thank you, Mr. Spratt. I ask unanimous
consent that all members have 7 days to submit written
statements for the record at this point. Without objection, so
ordered.
STATEMENTS OF DR. SCOTT LILLIBRIDGE, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES FOR BIOTERRORISM,
ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN MCBROOM, DIRECTOR OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT;
JOSEPH MAHALEY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SECURITY AFFAIRS FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; AND KENNETH BAKER, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
ADMINISTRATOR, DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY
Chairman Nussle. Let us begin today with Scott Lillibridge,
special assistant to the Secretary of Health and Human Services
for bioterrorism. We welcome all three of you, but Special
Assistant Secretary of Health and Human Services, we are very
interested in your testimony, and we would ask your written
statement to be in the record, and we would ask you to proceed
as you would like. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF SCOTT LILLIBRIDGE
Dr. Lillibridge. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee, I am Scott Lillibridge, Special Assistant to the
Secretary for National Security and Emergency Management. Thank
you for having me here today to discuss HHS's role in preparing
our Nation for nuclear, biological and chemical attacks.
Our department's work has primarily been in the area of
bioterrorism response. To say we have been busy lately would be
an understatement. Under Secretary Thompson's leadership, we
have mounted an unprecedented national public health response
involving our agencies, our State and local health departments,
and all the capacities of NIH, FDA, CDC and our other agencies.
HHS is the primary agency responsible for the health and
medical response under the Federal response plan. Under FEMA's
Federal response plan. This plan provides HHS with the
framework to respond with FEMA and 26 other Federal agencies,
along with the American Red Cross. Prior to September 11, the
attack on the United States, HHS, through the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, had made substantial gains in
addressing HHS's role in preparing for the response to
bioterrorism. Since September 11, this progress has been
dramatically accelerated and HHS has been in constant
communications with its agencies, as well as other Federal,
State and local governments in order to assure our preparedness
to protect the Nation's health in future attacks.
To support that process, President Bush has requested an
additional $1.5 billion as a supplemental to the fiscal year
2002 request to strengthen our ability to respond to
bioterrorism, particularly at the State and local level. Within
HHS, the component agencies are each moving ahead with programs
to further support these efforts.
Allow me to describe some of these programs. Over the past
3 years, CDC has awarded grants to 50 States, one territory,
and four major metropolitan departments to support the goals of
building infrastructure and increasing response capacity. The
funded programs have included for this year, at least a request
for 300 million more for State and local preparedness that
include the Health Alert Network, our Laboratory Response
Network, and the Epidemiologic or Disease Detective Information
Exchange System.
The Health Alert Network is a nationwide integrated
electronic communication system for public health professionals
to share health advisories, distance-based learning and
laboratory findings and other information relevant to disease
outbreaks.
It proved useful during the anthrax mobilization over the
past 2 months. Health Alert Network also provides high-speed
Internet connections and tailored content to local health
officials and other essential personnel.
The laboratory response network is a partnership among the
Association of Public Health Laboratories, APHL, CDC and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, State, public health
laboratories and the Department of Defense and the Nation's
clinical laboratories. The LRN, as it is called, is designed to
ensure that the highest level of containment, expertise and the
identification of rare and lethal biologic agents is available
at the most local level in an emergency event. The LRN also
includes the rapid response and advanced technology laboratory
at CDC, which has the sole responsibility for providing rapid
and accurate triage and subsequent analysis of biologic agents
suspected or terrorism--suspected or being terrorist weapons.
It is been useful in our response for hoaxes and real response
over the past several months.
The final example is the Epidemic Information Exchange
System, a secure Web-based communications network that will
strengthen bioterrorism preparedness efforts by facilitating
the sharing of preliminary information about disease outbreaks
and other health events among officials across jurisdictions
and provide experience in the use of secure communications for
public health workers.
The HHS Office of Emergency Preparedness has also been
providing assistance at the State and local level, by
developing local metropolitan medical response systems, MMRS.
Through contractual relationships, the MMRS uses existing
emergency response systems, emergency management, medical and
mental health providers, public health departments, law
enforcement, fire departments, EMS and the national guard to
provide an integrated unified response to mass casualty events.
As of September 30th, 2001, this office had contracted with 97
municipalities to provide MMRS systems and during fiscal year
2002, we intend to invest in 25 additional cities for a total
of 122 locations for bioterrorism-related planning through the
MMRS system.
Our Office of Emergency Preparedness also coordinates the
National Disaster Medical System, a group of more than 7,000
volunteer health and support professionals who can be deployed
anywhere in the country to assist communities in which local
response systems are overwhelmed. MDS also includes a
partnership with the Department of Veterans' Affairs,
Department of Defense, and the Federal Emergency Management
Agency.
One area of particular interest has been the development of
the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile. CDC has established and
manages the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile, which provides
us with the ability to rapidly respond to a domestic biological
or chemical terrorist event with antibiotics, antidotes,
vaccines and medical material to help save lives and prevent
the further spread of disease, resulting from a terrorist
attack. The administration has included $644 million to expand
that program. The PS program also provides an initial broad-
based response within 12 hours with Federal authorization to
deploy Push Packs that target specific communities stricken by
terrorism.
The first example of deployment was following the World
Trade Center. As you may have heard, HHS has recently awarded a
$428 million contract to Acambis Baxter, Incorporated, to
produce 155 million doses of smallpox vaccine by the end of
2002. Those doses, added to the current quantity in the
National Pharmaceutical Stockpile, would be enough to treat
every American in the event of a smallpox bioattack.
An example of FDA funding initiatives includes a $61
million to enhance the frequency and quality of imported food
inspections and to modernize the import data system to enable
us to detect tainted food. This funding will also help provide
for 410 new FDA inspectors an help ensure that our food is
better protected. FDA is also requesting additional resources
to assist with these development and licensing of vaccines,
therapeutics and blood products to counter bioterrorism.
I would like to mention briefly our research activities,
which are headed by our National Institutes of Health that
include the development of new treatments for the complications
of smallpox vaccination, improvements in developing new
vaccines for items such as anthrax and trials to determine the
extent that the current smallpox vaccine can be stretched until
the new contracts kick in.
In conclusion, the Department of Health and Human Services
has been and continues to be committed at every level in
ensuring the health and medical care of our citizens. We have
made substantial progress to date in enhancing the Nation's
capacity to respond to a bioterrorism event, and these
preparations ensured a strong response during the recent
emergencies.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared remarks, and I
would be pleased to answer any questions that you or the
members of the committee may have. Thank you.
Chairman Nussle. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Scott Lillibridge follows:]
Prepared Statement of Scott R. Lillibridge, M.D., Special Assistant to
the Secretary of Health and Human Services for Bioterrorism
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am Scott Lillibridge,
the Special Assistant to the Secretary for National Security and
Emergency Management. Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss
the HHS role in preparing our Nation for nuclear, biological and
chemical threats, primarily in the area of bioterrorism response. This
had already been a major focus of HHS activities, and the horrific
events of September 11, and the subsequent events related to anthrax
have only sharpened that focus.
HHS is the primary agency responsible for the health and medical
response under the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's)
Federal Response Plan (FRP). This plan provides HHS with a framework to
respond with FEMA and 26 other Federal departments and agencies, along
with the American Red Cross.
Prior to the September 11 attack on the United States, HHS, through
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), had made
substantial gains in addressing HHS' role in preparing for response to
terrorism. Since September 11, this progress has been dramatically
accelerated, and HHS has been in constant communication with its
component agencies, as well as other federal, state, and local
government components, in order to ensure our preparedness to protect
the Nation's health in the event of future attacks. To support this
process, President Bush has requested an additional $1.5 billion to
strengthen our ability to respond to bioterrorism.
Within HHS, the component agencies are each moving ahead with
programs to further support our efforts. Allow me to describe some of
these programs:
state and local preparedness
Over the last 3 years, CDC has awarded grants to 50 states, 1
territory and 4 major metropolitan health departments to support goals
of building infrastructure and increasing response capacity.
The funded programs have included the Health Alert Network (HAN),
the Laboratory Response Network (LRN), and the Epidemic Information
Exchange System (Epi-X).
The Health Alert Network (HAN) is a nationwide, integrated,
electronic communications system for public health professionals to
share health advisories, distance learning, laboratory findings and
other information relevant to disease outbreaks. HAN provides high-
speed Internet connections and tailored content to local health
officials and other essential personnel.
The Laboratory Response Network (LRN) is a partnership among the
Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL), CDC, the Federal
Bureau of Investigations (FBI), State public health laboratories, the
Department of Defense (DOD), and the Nation's clinical laboratories.
The LRN is designed to ensure that the highest level of containment and
expertise in the identification of rare and lethal biological agents is
available in an emergency event. The LRN also includes the Rapid
Response and Advanced Technology Laboratory at CDC, which has the sole
responsibility of providing rapid and accurate triage and subsequent
analysis of biological agents suspected of being terrorist weapons.
A final example is the Epidemic Information Exchange System (Epi-
X): a secure, Web-based communications network that will strengthen
bioterrorism preparedness efforts by facilitating the sharing of
preliminary information about disease outbreaks and other health events
among officials across jurisdictions and provide experience in the use
of a secure communications system.
The Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) has also been providing
assistance at the State and local level, by developing local
Metropolitan Medical Response Systems (MMRS). Through contractual
relationships, the MMRS uses existing emergency response systems,
emergency management, medical and mental health providers, public
health departments, law enforcement, fire departments, EMS and the
National Guard, to provide an integrated, unified response to a mass
casualty event. As of September 30, 2001, OEP has contracted with 97
municipalities to develop MMRSs. During FY 2002, we intend to invest in
25 additional cities (for a total of 122) for bioterrorism-related
planning through the MMRS and to help them improve their medical
response capabilities.
OEP also coordinates the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), a
group of more than 7,000 volunteer health and support professionals who
can be deployed anywhere in the country to assist communities in which
local response systems are overwhelmed or incapacitated. Organized into
44 Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs), these volunteers would
provide on-site medical triage, patient care and transportation to
medical facilities. Four National Medical Response Teams (NMRTs), which
travel with their own caches of pharmaceuticals, have capabilities to
detect illness-causing agents, decontaminate victims, provide medical
care and remove victims from the scene. Three of the four NMRTs can be
mobilized and deployed anywhere in the Nation; the fourth is
permanently stationed in the Washington, DC, area. The NDMS also
includes Disaster Mortuary Operations Response Teams that handle the
disposition of the remains of victims of major disasters, as well as
provide for victim identification and assistance to their families.
The Administration has requested $300 million in Emergency Response
Funds (ERF) for State and local preparedness activities, including $40
million for communications systems such as the Health Alert Network and
Epi-X, $35 million to improve State and local laboratory capacity and
CDC's internal laboratory capacity, $50 million to upgrade MMRS'
capabilities, and $20 million for the National Disaster Medical System
and the Disaster Medical Assistance Teams.
national pharmaceutical stockpile
CDC has also established and manages the National Pharmaceutical
Stockpile (NPS), which provides us with the ability to rapidly respond
to a domestic biological or chemical terrorist event with antibiotics,
antidotes, vaccines and medical materiel to help save lives and prevent
further spread of disease resulting from the terrorist threat agent.
The NPS Program provides an initial, broad-based response within 12
hours of the Federal authorization to deploy, followed by a prompt and
more targeted response as dictated by the specific nature of the
biological or chemical agent that is used. The first emergency
deployment of the NPS occurred in response to the tragedy at the World
Trade Center, and was soon followed up by deployments related to the
anthrax attacks.
HHS has recently awarded a $428 million contract to Acambis, Inc.,
to produce 155 million doses of smallpox vaccine by the end of 2002.
These doses, added to the current quantity in the National
Pharmaceutical Stockpile, are enough to treat every American in the
event of a smallpox bio-attack.
The additional smallpox vaccine doses will also, we hope, serve the
function of acting as a deterrent to those who might launch such an
attack against our Nation. We are not only increasing our stockpile for
smallpox, however. The current stockpile consists of 8 Push Packs, each
containing antibiotics and other essential medical supplies, and each
transportable within 12 hours to any area of the country requiring
assistance. These Push Packs are complemented by large quantities of
additional pharmaceuticals stored at manufacturers' warehouses, a
system called Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI).
Between them, the Push Packs and the VMI have enough drugs
currently to treat 2 million persons to prevent inhalation anthrax
following exposure to the anthrax spores. The Secretary has now
directed that this quantity be increased during fiscal year 2002, so
that 12 million persons can be treated for anthrax. With those and
other additional resources, we will also add four more Push Packs to
the current eight already located across the country, making more
emergency supplies available and augmenting our existing supplies of
400 tons by another 200 tons. The administration request includes $644
million to expand the pharmaceutical stockpile.
food safety and drug therapies
Over the last few years, FDA has worked with food safety agencies
at federal, State and local levels to strengthen the Nation's food
safety system across the entire distribution chain--from the farm to
the table. The main results of this cooperation--more effective
prevention programs, new surveillance systems, and faster foodborne
illness outbreak response capabilities--enable the agency to protect
the safety of our food supply against natural and accidental threats.
Part of FDA's ability to protect the food supply is enhanced by its
strong partnership with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and
the surveillance infrastructure that has been built between the two
Departments. USDA conducts surveillance of the food supply, and HHS's
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, in partnership with State
and local health departments, conducts surveillance for foodborne
illnesses. Cooperative efforts between HHS and USDA form the foundation
for protecting our Nation's food supply and will ensure the American
public can continue to have complete confidence in their food supply
now and well into the future.
Coming FDA funding initiatives include a request for $61 million to
enhance the frequency and quality of imported food inspections and
modernize the import data system to enable us to detect tainted food.
This funding will also provide for 410 new FDA inspectors to help
ensure that our food is better protected.
FDA is also requesting additional resources to assist with the
development and licensure of vaccines, therapeutics and blood products
to counter bioterrorism. In addition, the agency is developing
regulations to identify the information needed to evaluate
bioterrorism-related therapies when the traditional efficacy studies in
humans are not feasible and cannot be ethically conducted under FDA's
regulations for adequate and well-controlled studies in humans.
research
The NIH bioterrorism research program, spearheaded by the National
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, includes both short- and
long-term research targeted at the design, development, evaluation and
approval of diagnostics, therapies and vaccines needed to control
infections caused by microbes with potential for use as biological
weapons. Specifically, this includes the development of:
New treatments for complications of the smallpox
(vaccinia) virus;
Improved vaccines and treatments for anthrax;
Trials to determine if the current Dryvax smallpox vaccine
can be diluted to ``stretch'' the current supply until a new vaccine is
produced;
Research into novel drugs, including cidofovir, to treat
orthopox infections (including smallpox and vaccinia), as well as other
viral infections;
Improved research infrastructure, including the purchase
of essential biosafety level containment equipment to facilitate
studies on strains of bacterial pathogens of high virulence;
Research to completely sequence the genome for Bacillus
anthracis, the causative agent for anthrax disease, as well as other
bacterial pathogens with potential for use as bioterrorism agents; and
Collaborative research with USAMRIID to create rapid
diagnostic assays for diagnosis of orthopox infections, particularly
smallpox.
conclusion
In conclusion, the Department of Health and Human Services has
been, and continues to be, committed at every level to ensuring the
health and medical care of our citizens. We have made substantial
progress to date in enhancing the Nation's capability to respond to a
bioterrorist event, and these preparations ensured a strong response
during recent events.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared remarks. I would be
pleased to answer any questions you or members of the committee may
have.
Chairman Nussle. Next is the director of the Office of
Security Affairs for the Department of Energy, and am I
pronouncing your name correctly, Joseph Mahaley?
Mr. Mahaley. It is Mahaley, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Nussle. Mahaley. Welcome and pleased to receive
your testimony.
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH MAHALEY
Mr. Mahaley. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman and members of
the committee, I want to thank you for the opportunity to
appear before your committee today to speak with you about the
Department of Energy and its response to the threat of
terrorism since September 11. I am the DOE director of
security. I report directly to the Office of the Secretary, and
I am responsible for the development of department-wide
policies that govern the protection of national security assets
entrusted to our charge.
In addition to this policy development responsibility, my
office is also charged with the conduct of security operations
at DOE facilities in the Washington, DC, metropolitan area. The
world, as we know it, changed on September 11. After the
attacks in New York and on the Pentagon, with the threat of
still a fourth plane headed in to Washington, DOE immediately
went to Security Condition-2, what we call SECON 2, our highest
security level absent an imminent threat to a specific DOE
facility.
We shut down all shipments involving nuclear materials
throughout our nationwide complex. We also put our national
nuclear emergency response assets on a heightened level of
alert. I want to point out to the committee and to the
committee members that General John McBroom, our Director of
Emergency Management, is here today and is available to discuss
DOE emergency response assets.
While we have since stepped down from our SECON 2, we
remain on heightened security status, SECON 3, throughout the
complex. For the information of all of the members, SECON 3 is
our highest security level that can be maintained indefinitely.
The DOE SECON system has served the Department well, and that
its purpose is to establish standardized protective measures
for a wide range of threats and to help disseminate
appropriate, timely and standardized information for the
coordination and support of DOE crisis or contingency
activities.
In DOE, the highest level of protection is associated with
protection of special nuclear material, or what we call SNM.
SNM in the Department ranges from complete nuclear weapons to
the raw materials used to create the nuclear weapon. DOE refers
to the protection program for this material as nuclear
safeguards and security. The DOE nuclear safeguards and
security program is focused on the protection of the most
critical nuclear assets and classified information and is
geared toward the prevention of theft or unauthorized use of
nuclear weapons and the prevention of acts of radiological
sabotage.
The worst-case scenario that we protect is an aggressive
terrorist adversary. Our security forces are trained and
performance tested against this terrorist scenario. Over
4,000--and I will testify to this, very dedicated security
police officers, including approximately 3,500 armed officers,
are involved in our protection efforts across our complex.
Additionally, of those officers, more than 550 are
counterterrorism-trained personnel, deployed at 11 separate
locations as part of our special response teams. That is our
SWAT team equivalent. DOE also provides training and equipment
to enable first responders to deal with a chemical or
biological attack.
My office also manages a Safeguards and Security Technology
Development effort. Its four-key program elements include
nuclear material, control and accounting, physical security,
information protection and counterterrorism. The Department is
also fully involved and committed as a cochair and funding
provided to the Technical Support Working Group, the
inneragency counterterrorism research and development team, led
by the State Department's Ambassador-at-large for
counterterrorism.
In addition to DOE's counterterrorism development projects,
a key function of my technology development program is
providing a source of access--translate that to security
clearances--and leveraging for the counterterrorism community
to utilize the resources of our national laboratories.
Events of September 11 dramatically changed our Nation's
threat environment, and as a result, has necessitated an
examination of DOE's ability to respond to this new
environment. We are working in conjunction with the Department
of Defense at this time to develop a combined joint threat
policy that will serve as a foundation for the protection
strategy to be deployed at all Department of Energy and
Department of Defense nuclear facilities. And I am talking
about domestic facilities, sir.
Prior to September 11, the Department has just completed a
review of security policies and procedures. Some very useful
recommendations emerged from this review that are currently
being implemented. We will be looking more closely than ever at
innovative approaches to our protection strategy. This will
involve better use of technology, more and better training of
our security employees and more emphasis on security education
and the awareness among all of our employees.
In our continuing battle against the terrorist threat, we
are working with the Congress and other Federal agencies,
including the FBI, the Department of Defense, Department of
Justice and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to enhance our
security posture. We continue to work with other agencies as
well. For example, we worked with the U.S. Postal Service and
the Department of Health and Human Services to help them deal
with the challenge of anthrax-tainted mail.
We are also supporting the newly established Office of
Homeland Security in its very critical role of coordinating the
protection and emergency response assets across the Federal
Government.
As the lead agency for coordinating Federal activities
within the energy infrastructure, we are working closely with
emergency industry representatives from oil, gas and electric
power industries, to share information and help them assess
their protection posture. We continue to work with State and
local officials to address areas of concern that they might
have and have provided technical expertise in the form of
security assessments and recommendations to several States.
We have learned some valuable lessons since September 11,
and particularly with respect to working in partnership with
industry. First, cooperation and coordination with industry was
excellent, primarily because of the crisis of the moment. We
need more noncrisis dialogue with industry. We also need clear
and dedicated lines of communication. We have made substantial
progress in this area in the past few months.
Second, industry has demonstrated a willingness to share
some information. They followed our lead in many respects and
used our security conditions, our SECONS, as a guide. In
general, however, industry continues to express concern about
sharing security-related information with the Federal
Government for fear it might be made public through a Freedom
of Information Act request.
Third, the oil and gas industry recently established their
Information Sharing and Analysis Center, what we call an ISAC.
This is a laudable effort, but needs to mature as quickly as
possible to provide more timely dissemination and analysis of
information for this important energy industry segment.
Fourth, we need to devise a workable way of sharing
intelligence threat data with industry; addressing this issue
is a DOE priority. Finally, we need standardized industry
security levels and criteria, so that when we go to a
heightened security level, we will all know what that means.
Industry has taken the initiative and is developing
standardized security measures much along the lines of our
security conditions.
We have been busy and will continue to be so for some time
to come. We do not ever expect things to return to the pre-
September 11 normal, because normal is changed forever. Within
DOE, there is a new paradigm underscored most recently by
Secretary Abraham when he told senior DOE leaders that he
expects every manager to understand that they should instill a
respect for and observe the highest standards of security.
We cannot control or alter the threats to the security
interests entrusted to our care. What can be controlled is our
ability to plan and respond to threats should they ever
materialize. September 11 has fundamentally altered the
Department's security perspective and posture. This is a
significant challenge, but one that we are prepared to meet.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks.
Chairman Nussle. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Joseph Mahaley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joseph Mahaley, Director, Office of Security
Affairs for the Department of Energy
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before your
committee today to speak with you about the Department of Energy and
its response to the threat of terrorism since September 11. I am Joseph
Mahaley, Director of DOE's Office of Security. I report directly to the
Office of the Secretary, and am responsible for the development of
department-wide policies governing the protection of national security
assets under our charge. In addition to this policy development
responsibility, my office is also charged with the conduct of security
operations at DOE facilities in the Washington, DC, metropolitan area.
The world as we know it changed on September 11. After the attacks
in New York and on the Pentagon, and with the threat of still a fourth
plane headed east, DOE immediately went to Security Condition-2 (SECON
2), our highest security level absent an imminent threat to a specified
Departmental target. We shut down our shipments involving nuclear
materials throughout the complex. General John McBroom is here today
and is available to discuss the DOE response assets. While we have
since stepped down from SECON 2, we remain on heightened security
status, SECON 3, throughout the DOE complex. SECON 3 is our highest
security level that can be maintained indefinitely. The DOE SECON
system has served the Department well in that its purpose is to
establish standardized protective measures for a wide range of threats,
and to help disseminate appropriate, timely, and standardized
information for the coordination and support of DOE crisis or
contingency activities.
The highest level of protection in the DOE is associated with the
protection of special nuclear material or SNM. The SNM in the
Department ranges from complete nuclear weapons to the raw materials
used to create the nuclear weapon. DOE refers to the protection program
for this material as Nuclear Safeguards and Security. The DOE Nuclear
Safeguards and Security Program is focused on the protection of the
most critical nuclear assets and classified information, and is geared
toward the prevention of the theft or unauthorized use of nuclear
weapons and the prevention of acts of radiological sabotage. The worst
case scenario that we protect against is an aggressive terrorist
adversary. Our security forces are trained and performance tested
against the terrorist scenario. Over 4,000 dedicated security personnel
including approximately 3,500 armed officers are involved in our
protection efforts. Additionally, more than 550 counterterrorism
trained personnel at 11 separate locations are part of our Special
Response Teams, our ``SWAT'' team equivalents. DOE also provides
training and equipment to enable first responders to deal with a
chemical or biological attack.
My office also manages a safeguards and security Technology
Development effort. Its four key program elements include nuclear
material control and accounting, physical security, information
protection and counterterrorism. The Department is also fully involved
and committed as a co-chair and funding provider to the Technical
Support Working Group, the interagency counterterrorism research and
development team, led by the State Department's Ambassador-at-Large for
Counterterrorism. In addition to DOE's counterterrorism development
projects, a key function of our Technology Development Program is
providing a source of access and leveraging for the counterterrorism
community to the resources of the DOE National Laboratories.
The events of September 11 dramatically changed our Nation's threat
environment, and as a result, has necessitated an examination of DOE's
ability to respond to this new environment. To this end, we are working
in conjunction with the Department of Defense to develop a combined
Joint Threat Policy that will serve as the foundation of the protection
strategy to be employed at all DOE and DOD nuclear facilities.
Prior to September 11, the Department had just completed a review
of security policies and procedures. Some very useful recommendations
emerged from this review that are currently being implemented. We will
be looking more closely than ever at innovative approaches to our
protection strategy. This will involve better use of technology, more
and better training of our security employees, and more emphasis on
security education and awareness among all employees.
In our continuing battle against the terrorist threat, we are
working with Congress, the and other Federal agencies to include the
FBI, DoD, Justice, and the NRC to enhance our security posture. We
continue to work with other agencies as well. For example, we worked
with the U.S. Postal Service and the Department of Health and Human
Services to help them deal with the challenge of Anthrax-tainted mail.
We are also supporting the newly established Office of Homeland
Security in its critical role of coordinating the protection and
emergency response assets across the Federal Government.
As the lead agency for coordinating Federal activities within the
energy infrastructure, we are working closely with energy industry reps
from oil, gas, and electric power industries to share information and
help them assess their protection posture. We continue to work with
State and local officials to address areas of concern that they might
have and have provided technical expertise in the form of security
assessments and recommendations to several states.
We have learned some valuable lessons since September 11,
particularly with respect to working in partnership with industry.
First, cooperation and coordination with industry was excellent,
primarily because of the crisis of the moment. However, we need more
non-crisis dialogue. We also need clear and dedicated lines of
communication. We have made substantial progress in this area in the
past few months.
Second, industry demonstrated willingness to share some
information. They followed our lead in many respects and used our
SECONs as a guide. In general, however, industry continues to express
concern about sharing security-related information with the Federal
Government for fear it might be made public through a Freedom of
Information request.
Third, the oil and gas industry recently established their
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC). This needs to mature as
quickly as possible to provide more timely dissemination and analysis
of information for this important energy industry segment.
Fourth, we need to devise a workable way of sharing intelligence/
threat data with industry. Addressing this issue is a DOE priority.
Finally, we need standardized industry security levels and criteria
so that when we go to a heightened security level, we will all know
what that means. Industry has taken the initiative and is developing
standardized security measures much along the lines of the DOE SECONs.
We have been busy, and will continue to be so for some time to
come. We do not ever expect things to return to pre-September 11
``normal,'' because ``normal'' has now changed forever. Within DOE,
there is a new paradigm, underscored most recently by Secretary Abraham
when he told senior DOE leadership that he expects every manager to
understand that they should instill a respect for and observe the
highest standards of security.
We cannot control or alter the threats to the security interests
entrusted to our care. What can be controlled, however, is our ability
to plan and respond to threats, should they ever materialize. September
11 has fundamentally altered the Department's security perspective and
posture. This is a significant challenge, but one that we are prepared
to meet.
Chairman Nussle. Next is the principal Deputy Administrator
for the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation from the Department of
Energy, Kenneth Baker. Welcome, Director, and we are pleased to
receive your testimony.
STATEMENT OF KENNETH BAKER
Mr. Baker. Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee,
thank you for inviting me here today. I would like to make a
short statement with your permission and submit a longer one
for the record.
Chairman Nussle. Without objection.
Mr. Baker. This is an important opportunity to describe the
nonproliferation work that is administered by the Department of
Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration, or NNSA. I
will discuss programs that reduce threats to our American
citizens and are of great importance to this committee. I will
also review areas where we are accelerating programs after the
aftermath of the September 11 attacks. There is both a supply-
and-demand side aspect to the proliferation threat. Over the
past decade, both have become worse. There are now any numbers
of actors of concern, so-called rogue states, as well as
terrorist organizations, seeking to procure weapons of mass
destruction capabilities. The international community sees a
crisis in the fact that accelerated measures are needed to
improve the physical protection of nuclear materials worldwide
as well as improve control and accounting of nuclear material
and prevent illegal trafficking and handling of nuclear
materials. These rogue actors view the crisis as an
opportunity.
Enormous strides in securing this material have been made
in Russia and elsewhere, but the fact remains that the threat
of only a few kilograms of highly enriched uranium and
plutonium, deadly ingredients needed to fashion a nuclear
device, would be enough for a weapon. The prospect that weapons
usable materials could be stolen or sold to terrorists and
hostile states and used against American citizens is a clear
and real threat that cannot be underestimated.
The Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security
Administration is a key element in the U.S. response to today's
threats. Within the NNSA, the Office of Defense Nuclear Non-
Proliferation, from now on called DNN, is responsible for the
nuclear nonproliferation mission. DNN programs help the United
States to detect the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction worldwide, prevent the spread of WMD materials,
technology and expertise, and reverse the proliferation of
nuclear weapons capabilities.
At the heart of the NNSA, efforts to detect proliferation
threats worldwide are our technology research and development
programs. NNSA develops innovative solutions to detect and
deter nuclear proliferation, smuggling, terrorism worldwide and
to detect and respond to chemical and biological attacks in the
United States. Indeed, our chemical and biological R&D is
leading to major improvements in how the United States prepares
for and responds to a chemical or biological attack against our
civilian population. Just last night we ran a chemical
detection test in the Washington Metro at the Smithsonian
Station at 3 o'clock in the morning. Our efforts encompass
anthrax strain analysis, establishing biological detection
capability at the Salt Lake City Olympics, decontamination and
other critical missions.
NNSA is clearly well-poised to continue to make a
significant contribution to our national efforts to address
today's and tomorrow's threats. We do long-term, needs-driven
R&D. Without long-term R&D today, the threat will be much worse
tomorrow.
The material protection, control and accounting program, is
our primary vehicle for addressing threats to the United States
national security poised by possible diversion of unsecured
Russian weapons and materials. Through this program, NNSA has
helped Russia to improve security at 95 sites; completed rapid
security upgrades for thousands of Russian navy warheads, and
improved security for 220 metric tons of highly enriched
uranium and plutonium in Russia and other independent states,
have enabled enough material to make about 20,000 nuclear
devices.
DNN is training Russian experts to take responsibility for
long-term security at sensitive sites, consolidating Russian
materials into fewer buildings at fewer sites and converting
tons of materials to forms that are less attractive to
terrorists. The United States is working with Russia to improve
export control from the enforcement level with Russian customs,
to the industrial level with internal compliance training, and
at the regulatory and legal level by working with relevant
Russian ministries.
The United States is working to reduce the stockpiles of
dangerous materials in Russia. Last year, Russia and the United
States agreed to dispose of 68 metric tons of surplus weapons-
grade plutonium, 34 metric tons in each country. The
administration is currently examining alternatives to reduce
the cost of this program and make it sustainable. A final
decision on this program is expected within 2 months. Under the
HEU purchase agreement, the United States has removed more than
141 metric tons of highly enriched uranium from Russia's
military programs, enough material for more than 5,500 nuclear
devices. 500 metric tons will eventually be downblended and
used for civilian reactors in the United States.
The United States is working with Russia to improve its own
capability to implement a strongly enforced export control
program, as well as the ability to detect and interdict nuclear
materials along its borders.
The United States is working with Russia to transform the
nuclear infrastructure by developing civilian employment
opportunities for displaced nuclear scientists and engineers.
This is pursued mainly through DNN's Russian transition
assistance program, which encompassed the Initiative for
Proliferation Prevention, called IPP, and the Nuclear Cities
Initiative called NCI.
IPP helps to commercialize technology for the benefit of
U.S. industry and simultaneously provides gainful employment
for former Russian weapons scientists and technicians at more
than 160 institutes in the former Soviet Union. While IPP is
only a $24.5 million program, U.S. dollars invested in projects
during the past year are required to be matched by commercial
investment on these projects. This year U.S. companies have
already stepped up and put in $50 million for successful
completion of five commercialization projects; 20 other IPP
projects are on the verge of commercialization in mid to late
2002. On the horizon are a robotic system to support
humanitarian demining operations, an advanced prosthetic device
that will significantly improve the quality of life for land
mine survivors and other new amputees. In conjunction with
major Russian software company, IPP will help direct up to 500
Russian scientists and engineers toward commercial
opportunities in the information technology area.
The Nuclear Cities Initiative removes functions and
equipment from Russia's nuclear weapons complex and reduces its
physical footprint, while creating sustainable and alternative
nonweapons work to support the irreversible, transparent
downsizing of the Russian nuclear complex. NCI is putting
greater emphasis on commercialization by facilitating the
production of a kidney dialysis equipment through a joint
venture with a U.S. corporation that will employ up to 1,000
Russian scientists.
At the Avanguard nuclear weapons assembly plant, located in
the city of Sarov, Russia, a number of other commercial
projects are underway. In the aftermath of the September 11
attack, the NNSA is accelerating many ongoing efforts. A
recently signed access memorandum with the Russians has given
us access to sensitive sites in Russia. Secretary Abraham and
Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Rumyantsev agreed just last
week to accelerate and expand U.S. Russian efforts to
strengthen the protection of nuclear material.
An MPC&A team just this week was granted unprecedented
access to a sensitive location in Russia, becoming the first
foreign delegation to ever step foot in these buildings. NNSA
was able to confirm the presence of highly enriched uranium at
this location and is now working on arrangements for follow-on
visits. Today we have 12 teams in Russia working to better
secure these materials.
We are accelerating cooperation with the Ministry of Atomic
Energy on protective force training and equipment and working
with the Russian navy to complete security upgrades for
approximately 4,000 nuclear weapons. NNSA has purchased over
700 sets of winter protective gear so that guards will be able
to continue their duties year round. The United States and
Russia began negotiations on a material consolidation and
conversion program that will consolidate weapons-grade
plutonium in fewer locations. This will strengthen control over
the material, make it more secure and reduce its vulnerability
to sabotage. NNSA is expanding the second line of defense
program, which is working with Russian Customs to help improve
security checkpoints, at borders, airports and seaports. We
hope to increase, by the end of the year, the number of second
line of defense sites from four to at least 12. I will
personally be in Russia next week to ensure that this
acceleration program is working.
The NNSA is working to speed up the pace of a program that
will take back spent fuel from Russian-supplied research
reactors in approximately 16 countries. Many are located in
sensitive regions. NNSA officials recently met with their
Russian counterparts to discuss and implement this program.
Mr. Chairman, there is no way we can underestimate the
importance of this work in turning around the proliferation
threat. The NNSA is committed to this goal, and we will
continue to work tirelessly to achieve it. This work requires
our NNSA team to experience significant family separation,
often living in substandard buildings, with inadequate heat and
hot water and working 14 to 15 hours a day. But given the
threat facing us, American citizens deserve nothing less.
Ask yourself one question. What if the September 11 attack
involved nuclear devices? Thank God it did not, but we must be
prepared for future situations. We cannot assume the next
attack will mirror the first. I look forward to taking your
questions.
Chairman Nussle. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Kenneth Baker follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kenneth Baker, Principal Deputy Administrator,
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Department of Energy
introduction
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I thank you for having me
here today. This hearing is an important opportunity to describe a
number of key nonproliferation programs that are administered by the
National Nuclear Security Administration, or NNSA.
This is a timely hearing. More than any time in the past, much
greater attention is now paid to the ``proliferation threat.'' It could
almost be said that since the Cold War, we've traded one form of threat
for another--and today's threat is much less predictable and more
difficult to plan against. So I'd like to talk about what the threat
is; how the National Nuclear Security Administration is responding to
it; and some programs that I know are of interest to this committee. I
will also discuss how NNSA is accelerating some of its efforts, in the
aftermath of the September 11 attacks.
the proliferation threat
There are now any number of actors--so called ``rogue'' states as
well as terrorist organizations--seeking to procure weapons of mass
destruction capabilities. The international community sees a crisis in
the fact that intensified and accelerated measures are needed by all
states to improve the physical protection of nuclear materials
worldwide, to improve control and accounting over this material, and to
prevent illegal trafficking and handling of nuclear and radioactive
materials. But these rogue actors view this crisis as an opportunity. A
recent report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
estimates that in recent years, there have been some 175 cases of
possible nuclear trafficking in sensitive nuclear materials.
Enormous strides in securing this material have been made in Russia
and elsewhere. But the fact remains that the theft of only a few
kilograms of High-Enriched Uranium (HEU) or Plutonium (Pu), the deadly
ingredients needed to fashion a nuclear device, would be enough for a
weapon. The threat that weapon-usable material could be stolen or sold
to terrorists or hostile nation states and used against American
citizens is a clear and real threat that cannot be underestimated. Only
a few kilograms of High-Enriched Uranium (HEU) or Plutonium (Pu), the
deadly ingredients needed to fashion a nuclear device, would be enough
to serve as a basis for a weapon.
Almost a year ago, in its January, 2001 report, the bipartisan
Baker-Cutler task force warned that ``weapons of mass destruction or
weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to
terrorists or hostile nation states, and used against American citizens
at home. This threat is a clear and present danger to the international
community as well as to American lives and liberty.''
The events of September 11 have brought home the magnitude of the
proliferation threat, and have led me to conclude that the threat has
become a little more clear, a little more present, and very much more
dangerous and real.
the nnsa response
The Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) is a key element in the U.S. response to today's threats. Within
the United States Government, only the NNSA has the overwhelming
corporate expertise in working with and understanding nuclear weapons
and nuclear power; and only the NNSA is situated fully to exploit the
world-class expertise of the U.S. national laboratories--a key asset in
our arsenal.
Within NNSA, the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)
is directly responsible for the nuclear nonproliferation mission.
Through DNN, NNSA supports U.S. efforts to help the United States to
detect the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction worldwide;
prevent the spread of WMD material, technology, and expertise; and
reverse the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities.
technology research and development
At the heart of our efforts to detect weapons of mass destruction
proliferation are NNSA research and development programs. Harnessing
the technical excellence of the National Laboratories, NNSA develops
innovative solutions to detect and deter nuclear proliferation,
smuggling, and terrorism worldwide, and to detect and respond to
chemical and biological attacks in the United States.
The R&D program responds to the needs of the nonproliferation
community, in advance of specific formal requirements. The program
pushes the state-of-the-art in technology to detect and analyze
proliferation activities. End-users rely on us to conduct the long-term
R&D to provide innovative solutions for future systems to address their
missions, while their resources focus on short-term requirements.
Our Chemical and Biological National Security R&D will lead to
major improvements in how the U.S. prepares for and responds to
chemical and biological attacks against civilian populations. Key
elements of the cutting-edge technology being brought to bear against
the bio-terrorism threat is the product of NNSA's Nonproliferation and
Verification R&D Program:
NNSA's prototype Biological Aerosol Sentry and Information
System (BASIS) will be deployed to demonstrate biological detection
capability at the Salt Lake City Olympics.
Many techniques that NNSA has helped to fund and develop
are currently being applied in anthrax strain analysis.
Decontamination foam developed by the R&D program at
Sandia National Laboratories has been transitioned to commercial
vendors.
A chemical detection system developed by the Sandia and
Argonne National Laboratories was part of a recent Washington Metro
emergency response exercise.
NNSA is clearly well poised to continue to make significant
contributions to our national efforts to address today's--and
tomorrow's--threats.
non-proliferation programs in the former soviet union
The Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program is
our primary vehicle for addressing threats to United States national
security posed by the possible diversion of undersecured Russian
weapons and materials. In consolidating, securing, and reducing stocks
of weapons-grade fissile material, MPC&A is a critical element in this
Nation's ``first line of defense'' against nuclear smuggling and
terrorism.
In a moment I'll discuss steps we're taking to accelerate MPC&A
programs. But I'd first like to note that this program continues to
enjoy notable success:
Since 1993, the U.S. has helped Russia to improve security
at 95 nuclear sites.
NNSA has completed rapid security upgrades for thousands
of Russian Navy warheads and improved the security for 220 metric tons
(MT) of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and plutonium in Russia and other
newly independent states--enough material for roughly 20,000 nuclear
devices.
NNSA is training Russian experts to take responsibility
for long-term security at sensitive sites, consolidating Russian
materials into fewer buildings at fewer sites, and converting tons of
materials to forms less attractive to terrorists. We're also finding
ways to work with Russia to help it dispose of its own surplus
materials.
MPC&A programs are but one element of our response. The
United States is also working with Russia to improve its export control
system, from the enforcement level with Customs, to the industry level
with internal compliance training, and at the regulatory and legal
level of the ministries involved.
The United States seeks not only to secure, but to reduce
the stockpiles of dangerous materials throughout Russia. Last year,
Russia and the United States agreed to dispose of 68 MT of surplus
weapon-grade plutonium--34 MT in each country. The administration is
currently examining alternatives to reduce the cost of this program and
make it more sustainable. A final decision is expected within 2 months.
Under the HEU purchase agreement, the United States has removed more
than 141 metric tons of HEU from Russia's military programs--enough
material for more than 5,000 nuclear devices. Under this program, 500
MT will eventually be downblended and used for civilian reactors in the
United States.
The United States is also working with Russia to improve
its national capabilities to implement and enforce export controls, as
well as its ability to detect and interdict nuclear materials at border
checkpoints and borders. Some borders are thousands of miles long and
present difficult challenges. Efforts in both areas need to be shored
up as quickly as possible.
enhancing irreversibility of nuclear downsizing
The United States is working with Russia to ensure the
irreversibility of steps taken to downsize Russia's nuclear weapons
complex. We are helping Russia transform its closed nuclear cities by
developing civilian employment opportunities for displaced workers.
These objectives are pursued principally through our Russian Transition
Assistance efforts, which encompass the Initiatives for Proliferation
Prevention (IPP) program and the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI).
IPP helps to commercialize technology for the benefit of U.S.
industry and simultaneously provides gainful employment for former
Russian weapons scientists and technicians at more than one hundred and
sixty institutes in the Former Soviet Union.
While IPP had only $24.5 million in U.S. dollars to invest in
projects during the past fiscal year, it required its commercial
partners at least to match its investment in each project. This helped
IPP and its Russian partners to identify technologies offering the
greatest commercial promise by requiring U.S. industry to commit to the
project's technological development from the outset. This year, equity
sources have already stepped forward to commit more than $50 million
for the successful commercialization of five projects for the next
fiscal year. Twenty other IPP projects are on the verge of
commercialization for mid/late 2002.
Through IPP, we've successfully commercialized several energy
related technologies, including a radar intended to enhance coal and
oil recovery. This could result in revenues exceeding $2 billion during
the next 10 years.
A wheelchair seat cushion that can prevent pressure ulcers
responsible for causing tens of thousands of deaths in the U.S. every
year has just received FDA approval. When commercialized, this project
could save Medicare more than $3 billion in annual treatment costs for
pressure ulcers.
IPP is developing a robotic system to support humanitarian demining
operations; an advanced prosthetic device that will significantly
improve the quality of life for land mine survivors and other new
amputees; and in conjunction with a major Russian software development
company, will help redirect up to 500 Russian scientists and engineers
toward commercial opportunities in the information technology sector.
These are but a few examples; there are many others. We're proud of
IPP's success, and we look forward to future commercialization of its
myriad ongoing projects.
I also want to touch on the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI). NCI's
mission is to reduce the physical footprint of Russia's nuclear weapons
complex, in part through the creation of sustainable, alternative non-
weapons work that will help to achieve that objective and emphasize
commercialization.
NCI's first major commercial effort facilitates the production of
kidney dialysis equipment by a joint venture established between
Fresenius Medical Care of Lexington, Massachusetts, and the Avangard
nuclear weapons assembly plant, located in the closed city of Sarov,
Russia. At Avangard, six buildings have been converted to form an open
industrial park. Last year, the fence at Avangard was moved to carve
out this commercial floor space, and thereby reduce the weapons portion
of the complex. A number of other commercial projects are in process to
make use of this industrial park, which is expected to expand to
include even more production space in 2002.
A little over a year ago, virtually no Westerners had ever been
allowed to set foot in Avangard. Now they are part of a joint venture
that will use resources, buildings and personnel that previously
produced nuclear weapons to manufacture life-saving medical devices.
This is truly beating swords into plowshares--almost in a literal
sense. We hope to carry out a similar effort at an excess Russian
nuclear weapons production facility in Zarechnyy, formerly known as
Penza-19.
multilateral approaches
Complementing our bilateral cooperation with Russia and other
former Soviet states is NNSA's support of the International Atomic
Energy Agency. Speaking to the IAEA's Board of Governors last week,
Secretary Abraham observed that, ``The work the Agency does to deny
nuclear material and radioactive sources to terrorists and state
sponsors of terrorism is an integral part of our effort to stem the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.'' NNSA is working with
other U.S. agencies to increase our support of the IAEA's programs in
physical protection, illicit trafficking, and radiation source
management. NNSA expertise and technology helps the IAEA strengthen its
safeguards system, giving the Agency an enhanced capability not only to
detect the diversion of nuclear material from declared programs, but
also to detect clandestine, undeclared nuclear programs.
Last week Secretary Abraham pledged $1.2 million to match a
contribution from the Nuclear Threat Initiative, with the aim of
enhancing the IAEA's role in the fight against nuclear terrorism.
looking ahead
While NNSA considers new avenues, it is also accelerating ongoing
efforts.
Taking advantage of a recently signed Access Memorandum, MPC&A is
working with Russian officials to identify and make more secure
additional locations in Russia where nuclear materials are located. New
contracts are being signed for security upgrades at Tomsk and Mayak,
two critical Russian sites. We are accelerating our cooperation with
MinAtom on Protective Force training and equipment for these and other
sensitive facilities, and working with the Russian Navy to complete
security upgrades for approximately 4,000 nuclear weapons. An NNSA team
has purchased over 700 sets of winter protective gear, so that the
guards will be able to continue their duties during the winter.
The United States and Russia are beginning negotiations on a
Material Consolidation and Conversion agreement that would consolidate
sites where weapons-grade material is located. NNSA is also expanding
its Second Line of Defense program to increase by the end of this
fiscal year the number of such sites operating on the Russian border
from four to at least twelve.
NNSA is committed to improving safety at Russian reactors that now
operate at levels below minimum acceptable international standards for
reactor safety. And it is vital to improve the physical security of
nuclear power plants throughout the former Soviet Union. NNSA is also
looking to speed up the pace of a program that would ``take back''
spent fuel from Russian-supplied research reactors in approximately 16
countries, many of which are located in sensitive regions. NNSA
officials recently met with their Russian counterparts to discuss
implementing this program.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear today. I look
forward to taking any questions you may have.
Chairman Nussle. Let me alert members, there are three
votes on the floor. It is my intention to ask questions and
then turn to Mr. Spratt and then we will recess until after the
three votes. So if members can proceed as they would like.
First I would like to turn to you, Administrator Baker. The
government has several large nonproliferation programs in our
budget. One is the Cooperative Threat Reduction, Nunn-Lugar. It
is controlled, obviously, by the Department of Defense, spends
about $400 million annually. We have got a DOE nonproliferation
program, which spends roughly the same. In addition, there are
a number of other smaller programs at Commerce and State. This
is not to suggest in my question that any of them are less
important than the next, but as a general question to begin,
shouldn't all of these programs be consolidated and be given an
improved oversight mechanism through the administration or
through Congress? I would ask your advice on that subject as we
proceed.
Mr. Baker. Working in this program 9 years, sir, and before
that writing the ``Go To War Black Book'' for the President,
which I did for years, the threat is much worse today than it
was during the cold war. There is no doubt in my mind about
this. We have a program--many programs that make sure that we
don't have redundant work being done. We have a stucture called
the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee--which is
headed at the Under Secretary level at Defense, Energy and
Intelligence the CPRC transmits a report once a year to the
Senate Armed Services Committee--which shows what each program
is doing and that there is no redundancy. This report is signed
off by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy,
and show that there is no redundancy going on.
Number two, we have a policy coordinating committee in the
White House, headed by a senior person that reports right to
Dr. Rice that also ensures that we don't have redundancy in
these programs. In this group, this PCC group is made up of
Defense, Energy, Intelligence, State and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. I do not think in 9 years in this business, though, that
there is much redundancy in these programs.
The lead of this program or the coordinator in this program
needs to sit in in the National Security Council, needs to
report to Dr. Rice--which the person does right now, and it
works very effectively. There is one small program that may
have a little redundancy, and that is a program the State
Department has called ISTC, and the program that Energy has
called IPP. These programs both work to reduce the number of
nuclear scientists working on weapons work. The ISTC program
puts nuclear scientists to work part-time, temporarily. The IPP
program puts them to work permanently.
There is a little redundancy in these programs, but I think
the programs are working well between the agencies. There is
coordination in the agencies. There is not redundancy, and the
money is being well spent.
Chairman Nussle. The General Accounting Office disagrees
with some of your judgments on that, and it is not to suggest
that anyone has the market on this, but this is an issue that
obviously is going to continue to be heightened, and so as a
result, I would ask that you work with our General Accounting
Office to see if we can't improve some of that coordination and
application of resources.
Mr. Baker. Yes, sir.
Chairman Nussle. Just as a follow-up, one of the things
that we have heard reported upon is that it has really been the
slowness of the Russian government to grant access to
facilities and to enter into agreements. In other words, it has
really not been the funding of these programs, services, it has
been the ability to garner a trust between the United States
and Russia since the end of the cold war. Do you believe that
the new relationship and agreement--personal agreements that
have been reached between the President and Mr. Putin will
improve that to a degree? And do you believe that that will
assist us in successful implementation of some of these
programs?
Mr. Baker. Mr. Chairman, I have never seen in all my times
working with the Russians the relationship any better than it
is right now. We have an access agreement now with the
Russians. The work was slowing down a couple years ago. It was
because we didn't have an access agreement. We have an access
agreement, and we are getting in to about every sensitive site
that we have in Russia, that we know about. The relationship
that the Secretary of Energy has with Minister Rumyantsev is
outstanding. He was with him last week.
They agreed, as I said in my testimony, to open up all the
doors, to stop any bureaucracy, to get this work done for the
common good of the world. The relationship that the President
has with President Putin I think is absolutely outstanding, so
I can say that I don't think the relationship has ever been
better, and I think now we can get things done quicker and
better, and the only thing that could slow us down at all is
resources.
Chairman Nussle. Thank you. I have other questions, but I
will stay within my time.
Mr. Spratt.
Mr. Spratt. Mr. Baker, let me pick up on where you were and
look at the budget for defense nuclear nonproliferation
programs, which fall in the domain of DOE, comparing last year
with this year, 2001 with 2002. In 2001, if you add up R&D for
nonproliferation arms control measures like Nuclear Cities; IPP
Initiatives to Prevent Proliferation; MPC&A Material Production
Control and Accounting; Fissile material Disposition; the
Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase Agreement; and the
International Reactor Safety Study Agreement. If you add all of
those up, in 2001, we spent $874 million, all told. The request
for this year, 2002, was fully $100 million less than that.
What happened? Has the problem become less compelling that we
would cut it by $100 million?
Mr. Baker. Well, sir, we think our work is very important.
I cannot judge why it was reduced; some of these programs are
like a thermometer, you can turn them up or turn them down; you
can work faster or slower. Regardless, we are still getting the
work done. With this budget we will get our work done. Some of
it will not be as be fast as maybe we could do if we had more
money, but the work is getting done, and we are reducing the
threat to this country.
Mr. Spratt. Let me rest at that, because we have got to
run. I am told we have about 3 minutes to cast a vote. We will
be back as quickly as possible to pick up on that.
Chairman Nussle. We will pick up where we left off. The
committee will stand in recess and we ask the indulgences of
our witnesses as we run and catch three votes here on the
floor.
[Recess.]
Chairman Nussle. I know Mr. Spratt is on the way, and we
will recognize him when he comes back, but in the meantime we
will turn to Mr. Thornberry for any questions you may have.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate each of the witnesses being here today. It
seems to me that each of you is responsible for an area of the
government that raises some particular issues that, Mr.
Chairman, I think we are all going to face in next year's
budget. One of those issues is how much money can you use
effectively.
We hear in some of the debates going on now that there is
plenty of money in the pipeline, don't give us any more, we
can't use it. We have heard debates in the past, particularly
with the nonproliferation programs, about money being wasted
and so forth. So one issue is how much money can be used
effectively.
The other one is what is the proper balance of risk and
benefit? It seems to me in this war, there is no limit to the
number of ways we can be attacked. We could spend the whole
budget many times over preparing, protecting against one thing
and another, but what really makes sense? I think those are two
challenges that each of us are going to have to look at as we
think about the budget over the next year, but you all have to
do so now.
I have a couple of specific questions that I would like to
address on those topics, but if you all have thoughts on the
general area, I would like to hear that as well.
Doctor, I would like to ask you specifically on this idea
of risk benefit, how do you decide what drug to stockpile, for
example? One of the specific questions I have is the drug
potassium iodide. There is a lot of discussion these days about
a radiological weapon, apparently if you take this potassium
iodide, you can protect yourself against thyroid cancer, which
was responsible for thousands of deaths at Chernobyl. Are we
stockpiling this drug? Does it make sense to do so? Then I
would like for you to express to us a little bit how you decide
what drug makes sense to stockpile, what not.
My second question for you, Mr. Baker, as the Chairman
started this about whether you are limited by access to the
Russians or whether you are limited by money. I would like for
you to take another little part of that. Some of the criticism
we have heard in the past is that the Russians siphon off some
of the money for taxes, and some of it goes to the Mafia, and
various other things. I have always been a supporter of the
nonproliferation programs because I believe even with a lot of
waste you are getting an enormous amount of good. I think it is
appropriate for you to update us as to the efficiency and
effectiveness of the money we are spending now and how that
will proceed.
So, Doctor, if you would start with the drug issue, and
then Mr. Baker.
Dr. Lillibridge. Yes, sir. Let me begin by addressing the
issue how do we decide what to build and ultimately what drugs
to stockpile. Our initial impression as we began to build the
antibioterrorism program was that, as you said, the range of
potential options were enormous. It looked to us that our
thrust would be building a broad public health infrastructure
honed for emergency preparedness around key issues of the tools
to respond to bioterrorism. Those would be the things like
surveillance, laboratory, communications, trainings, things
that health departments need to operate and respond to these
kinds of epidemics.
The issue of how do you choose specifically then from that,
what goes into a stockpile as you begin to build a national
stockpile, and we have all seen the rhetoric and information in
the newspapers about different things at different times that
come on the horizon. We began to look at this as a matrix of
risk-benefit, and as we did that, we looked at the things that
were a combination of things known to be weaponized, things
that were truly dangerous if released into the population that
had potential for mass killing, things that had had some
research and development in one of the bio-offensive programs,
and that diseases for which--could easily be packaged had shock
value.
Looking at that matrix and cross-referencing it with law
enforcement and our Intelligence Community, we came up with a
critical agents list that we have used for 3 years with the
response community, and this is specific to bioterrorism
activities. That list includes things on most people's list,
whether you read the intelligence or the New York Times or in
preparedness circles, things like anthrax, smallpox, botulinum
toxin, plague, et cetera. We also conducted--that was our A
list--a second tier list, which things didn't have all those
features of risk as the first tier, but had had some investment
where some specific preparedness effort, whether it was
education or an antidote, needed to be stockpiled; and the
third was the capacity to respond to things for which we were
unclear, emerging infectious diseases, unknown threats and that
sort of thing.
What this did for us, it gave us a chance to organize a
stockpile around those kinds of threats on the bio circle. With
the chemical and the radiation components, these were less
directed than the emphasis on getting the biocomponents
operational early. We do maintain some chemical antidotes, a
small portion of our stockpile, toward nerve agents and things
that might help with mustard and other general chemical
exposures, and at this time the Department is debating and, in
fact, tomorrow we will be discussing the issue of potassium
iodide radiation burn packs and expanding the stockpile to
include medical treatment issues for a wider range of
activities, but that is how we basically crafted the biological
activities. That has been a printed, open list.
What the A list had done for us--with the highest order of
threats--is given us experience to build infrastructure and
response capacity to toxins, bacterial agents, and viral agents
if you prepare for those while knocking off the things that
were at greatest risk for the population.
Last, I would like to answer that by saying we can't
predict which of those things are most likely in any given day
in the absence of intelligence communications coming in from
the Intelligence Community, and we are networked with that
group on a daily basis. Thank you.
Mr. Baker. Congressman Thornberry, the question of how
effective are these programs and is money being siphoned off, I
want to applaud the White House, what they did initially when
they came in to look at all our nonproliferation programs. It
was a step that needed to be done. I think that now these
programs are more effective because of what the White House did
in this.
One of the things they looked at is ineffectiveness of
these programs, is money being siphoned off? We had the
Intelligence Community look at this, and I can't say that every
penny went for nonproliferation work. I can say that the
majority of it did, and in some programs almost all of it. A
program like materials protection control and accounting we
have, are task-order-type contract. We have people go in to
look at these facilities, give an estimate of what it is going
to cost. We have the Russian contractor do the work. Then we go
back and look. If we do not have assurances for this committee
or any other committee, we stop work. We have access, but if we
don't have access, we don't put a contract, and every contract
we write now has access in that contract. So we are pretty sure
that--we know the work is being done, and if we don't have
access, the contract will not be let.
Again, I think, like I said in my testimony, I have never
seen the relationship with Russia better than it is now. I give
thanks to the President who has started this relationship with
President Putin, and I have seen my Secretary act in person. I
was not with him last week, Ambassador Brooks was, but I was
recently with the Secretary in Vienna. I saw the relationship
he has with Minister Ramyantsev. It is an excellent
relationship. Minister Ramyantsev is not like Minister Adamov,
not like Minister Mikhailov; he is a different individual that
wants to work, wants to clear all the bureaucracies, wants to
get this done.
There is, as I said in my testimony, a clear and present
danger, and we are not throwing money at something that is not
being done, in my opinion, sir.
Chairman Nussle. Mr. Spratt.
Mr. Spratt. Thank you very much. If we could go back to
where we left off, and that is with the requests this year and
the amount provided last year and the amount appropriated. Just
looking at some of these different accounts, for example,
Nuclear Cities went from $26 million to $6 million. Was there a
particular reason for that? Was there a lack of faith in it or
a backlog of money or what?
Mr. Baker. I think on that, Congressman Spratt, there was
some lack of faith in the NCI program. I think if any program
has not shown what it can do yet, it is probably the NCI
program. We know 2 years ago that we got a bad report on the
IPP program from the GAO. That program was turned around, and
it is one of the best programs that we have got in
nonproliferation now. It is almost paying for itself, and
companies want in on this than we have money for in this area.
So I can say I think part of it was, yes, sir, it takes a
long time to build these programs, and we have not done as well
as I wished in that area.
Mr. Spratt. Given your knowledge of these programs, the
Initiative to Prevent Proliferation and the Nuclear Cities
Initiative, do you think if you get your budget level restored
you can spend it effectively?
Mr. Baker. I think, sir, we can spend it effectively, yes,
sir. I do think now we have got a better handle than we have
ever had on these programs. We can always use more money, but I
will carry out these programs to the best of my ability, and so
will Ambassador Brooks, with the money that is given to us on
nonproliferation. It is that critical.
Mr. Spratt. Another account is the R&D account, which was
$244 million in '01 and reduced to $206 million in the request.
Fortunately the appropriators restored the amount. A number of
small things that don't have high visibility such as sensors
that are piggybacked on satellites and used to detect nuclear
explosions that are above ground or that leak out of the
ground, critical to our basic surveillance of the threat
worldwide, it was actually threatened if we cut it back from
206 to 244 million; was it not?
Mr. Baker. Well, sir, budgets have priorities. As I said in
my testimony, the R&D program is critical to this country. We
are doing a needs-based program based on things that need to be
done. If that work is not done, we will be blinded in the
future to these type threats, and the program is critical. The
work we are doing right now in the chemical-biological area, as
I explained in my testimony, has been critical.
So, again, can one use more money? The answer is yes, but
we will carry out our mission with the budget that was given to
us, and we will do it effectively.
Mr. Spratt. Is this a marketing problem? A couple of years
ago, Representative Ellen Tauscher's initiative, we had a
science fair in the Cannon Caucus room full of the things that
DOE has done mainly through the labs over the years, out of
this account mainly, some other smaller accounts, but this is
one of the prime sources for it, and there are all kinds of
things being done there. You don't really notice them, but they
are critically needed. Detectors, for example. If you get a
strange container, if you think it is radioactive, you want to
find out what kind of radioactive materials might be there,
what kind of weapon might be in it without taking the container
apart. The labs have been working on that for years
anticipating the kind of problems we could be faced with, I
hope not, but we could be, and yet marking that is difficult to
do.
Let me give you one personal example. You mentioned in your
testimony, I believe, or Mr. Mahaley did, about the chemical
detectors that were tried out in Washington Metro. I would love
to go see the results of that. I happen to be the host in my
congressional district of a hazardous waste landfill, the
second largest east of the Mississippi, and it has two
hazardous waste incinerators, and I was concerned about the
manner in which the emissions from that incinerator were
monitored. They were hardly monitored at all. And someone else
got involved, and he called of all people--Charlie Townes, a
renowned South Carolinian who won the Nobel Prize for
discovering the laser--and Charlie Townes put us on the path of
something, work being done at Argonne Labs, a detector that
would be able to sample the emissions from the smokestack of a
chemical hazardous waste incinerator and give you a realtime
qualitative analysis. It turns out Argonne was doing, I think,
organic compounds, and Sandia was doing inorganic compounds.
They were both developing it, both excited about it, because
they said software just in the algorithms for this kind of
quantitative analysis just exploded and had all kinds of
implications.
I called EPA to see if they could possibly get that in
their budget, called them in Raleigh where they have their
research center, and I was told that the annual budget for
things like that was $500,000 a year, and it was more than
fully subscribed. They just flat couldn't even think about it.
I went over to the Energy and Water Appropriations
Committee for about 4 or 5 straight years, and each year I'd
get $500,000 to a million dollars for Sandia and Argonne to
develop that technology. Part of it was just marketing the idea
and talking to the subcommittee chairmen and ranking members
and members of the committee to convince them it was a good
idea. I know it is arduous work, but I think, first of all, you
have got a problem probably--you don't have to answer this
question--down the street at OMB ,and then you have probably
got a problem back here in Congress.
I think nonproliferation is a much harder sell than it
ought to be in the Congress of the United States, and I have
got a feeling the same is true down at OMB. They see all these
things, and DOD doesn't have a great enchantment with these
things because they don't put ships at sea, they don't put
forces in the field. This is not their traditional notion of
what defense is, but it is effective when it comes to defending
us against the real threats we are faced with. I think part of
it is selling the idea, making people understand what is needed
and why you have a capability to provide that.
Mr. Baker. Congressman, number one, I want to thank you for
the support you have given us on nonproliferation. You and
Congressman Thornberry have really been supporters of this
program with other people, and I want to thank you for what you
have done.
On the R&D program I think part of it is marketing, because
a lot of it is SCI, special category-type briefings. Which
given to some of the staffers up here. Some of them have
elected not to come yet, and when we gave the briefing of what
we are really doing in some of these areas, their eyes opened
up wide and said, oh, my God, I didn't know you were doing it.
Mr. Spratt. Nuclear Cities I happened to see Dr. Hacker a
couple of years ago, and it was just a chance meeting, but we
were together for a couple of days at a conference in Berlin,
and he told me some of the things that don't get quantified,
monetized, or they are unexpected, resulting from this
particular program.
We have learned all kinds of things about what their
capabilities and capacities are. We have gotten to know their
best scientists, and it has been a godsend to us, and given the
budget, $2 trillion, surely we can afford $25 million for
something like that. I know the cow gets skimmed. We have got
opponents of this program here in the Congress who claim that
the labs are the worst of all when it comes to skimming it.
They were taking 40 percent off the top before anything went to
Russia. But to have it properly administered, we have to do
that.
Let me ask you this and ask the whole panel this. If you
have money, where could you put it to do the most good? If you
have more money than the budget currently provides, what kind
of programs or what kind of existing accounts would you choose
to plus it up as the highest priority to give us the best
return? I will start with you, Mr. Baker.
Mr. Baker. Well, the first thing I would do is I would
accelerate the MPC&A program. I would put more money, put more
teams and more resources into Russia. That would mean some
program direction money. I have got to have people to put in
there besides resources. The programs are effective. I would
speed up the materials consolidation program in Russia. That is
putting the material in less sites so that we can guard them
better.
I have got programs in the Initiative for Proliferation
Prevention that have not been funded, $20 million worth. I
would put the money there so that companies can go to work
putting more scientists to work.
I would put some more money into the R&D program, into the
detection area, both chemical and biological. I explained what
we are doing in the chemical and biological area, in the R&D
program, the Protect System which we demonstrated last night,
the work we are doing for the Winter Olympics in Salt Lake
City, and on what we are doing in the abstract.
We are also doing things on forensics analysis, where these
things come from. I would put more money there. This is a one-
of-a-kind R&D program. There is none like this in government
where we can go with needs-based long-term R&D, and that is
what has to be done.
So that is where I would put the money if I had more money.
Mr. Spratt. Let me ask you and Mr. Mahaley both, is any
serious consideration being given to accelerating at some cost
the acquisition of Russian HEU or the acquisition for the MOX
fuel conversion of excess plutonium stocks? Those are big bucks
if you are really going to do that right.
Mr. Baker. In the White House study all the programs were
looked at. The one program that right now is still being
reviewed, and we will have an answer by 1 January, in a month,
because the White House wants a decision before the next budget
cycle, and that is plutonium disposition, whether we go with
MOX or something else. We have a briefing put together. My
people briefed General Gordon and Under Secretary Card just
last night. We are over at the State Department briefing them
today. We are going to have an interagency meeting toward the
end of the week. The Secretary will have to buy our
recommendation, and then we will go to the interagency and to
the White House for a decision on MOX. Again, the decision will
come down within 2 months on how we are going to go with this
plutonium disposition system.
Mr. Spratt. Mr. Mahaley.
Mr. Mahaley. Mr. Spratt, I get together with the other
security directors of Federal agencies, and we have been doing
that with a lot more frequency lately. I would say that every
one of them would agree with me that on September 11, we would
do everything we were planning to do in the next 2 years in
about the next 2 weeks.
If we had extra money, I would accelerate programs we have
on the books, but in a bigger picture, I was, in my testimony,
talking about the design basis threat. That is a requirements
driver that we use to size our force to defend the DOE sites
throughout this country. I can't go into the specifics in an
open hearing, but I can tell you one thing. What happened on
September 11 wasn't in my design basis threat, and I am not
unique. So our design basis threat is going to change, and it
is a requirements driver, and that is going to require
resources.
The people who did what they did on September 11 went out
to Reagan National Airport and, instead of seeing
transportation, saw missiles, and they thought way out of the
box, way beyond what security professionals have been thinking
about. We got a hard lesson on September 11. We are working
right now with the Department of Defense to change that threat
picture, so that is going to require some additional resources.
As far as----
Mr. Spratt. Could I interrupt to ask a question because it
is consistent with what you are talking about. Mr. Obey, the
ranking Democrat on the Appropriations Committee, following
September 11 had lots of agencies over, from NSA to DOE, and in
closed session said, tell me what your real vulnerabilities
are, particularly in the areas of facilities, something you
might be worried about where something catastrophic like a
plane crash would wreak havoc. I won't begin to go into all of
that in open session, but he has been pushing to get $7 billion
in homeland security appropriations just to deal with these,
and if you ask him, he will sit you down, close the door and
show you photograph after photograph of major facilities at the
end of major metropolitan runways or in the proximity to them
that will be vulnerable to another catastrophic aircraft
collision. We are dealing with nuclear material, everything
from nuclear materials to highly secret, sensitive data that is
not backed up, it is on the site, all kinds of risks like that.
Have you done a facilities inventory to see what facilities
might have that kind of vulnerability that wasn't considered
because you weren't thinking out of the box, so to speak, in
the past?
Mr. Mahaley. Yes, sir, we have. We have completed what I
would call a short, quick look under leadership of General John
Gordon, the Administrator of the NSA, and we have undertaken
longer studies based on that.
The vulnerabilities are there and are going to be
addressed, but I will just say to you, sir, and the other
members of the committee that I don't expect these folks to
repeat. I think they are going to surprise us again, and what I
want my folks to work on, in this threat area, is to think
outside the box, think outside of our pattern that we have
developed over the last few years, and I think I would be
echoed by all the other security directors in the other
government departments.
For Energy specifically, I would prioritize additional
funding in this way: First cybersecurity. The reason why is
that is where we are most vulnerable. I get security incidents
reported to me daily throughout the complex. I will tell you
that most of the time it involves information, and most of the
time it is connected with cybersystems. We could use additional
resources there because if somebody is coming against one of
our facilities or any facility, a key element is going to be
planning, and planning is all predicated on information you can
get about that facility.
We have taken steps. Deputy Secretary Blake ordered last
month a review of all Energy sites, and we pulled down
information that we might have had out there that might have
some operational usefulness to some people who don't wish us
well. We had to do that, and we are continuing to do that, but
in general I think that is one of the big problem areas that I
have got, and every agency in government and, in, fact up here
in this institution I am sure you have the same problem. Those
systems are vulnerable.
The next one is nuclear material consolidation. I know this
is a very touchy issue, and it is surrounded by a lot of
politics and a lot of NIMBY type of feelings in terms of not
wanting material next to your house, but from a security
professional standpoint, if you consolidate the material, you
can protect it much more efficiently. It reduces risk.
The last one is personnel. I am very, very privileged to
lead a Federal staff of over 200 people. A couple of years ago
my folks in the human resources came and talked to me and said,
``Joe, in 5 years 75 percent of your people are going to be
retired.'' There really wasn't a program following up on that
to build a staff. So we set up a career development program,
professional program, and we are trying to fund it out of hide.
We are getting support from John Gordon, the NNSA, because they
see the problem, too.
I think that is the area I would emphasize to try to build
a follow-on professional core of security specialists. This is
tough work, especially in the nuclear area. There is just not
physical security and alarm systems, you are talking about
nuclear material, control, and accounting. That is
sophisticated work, and you have got to build a core staff to
be able to answer those questions correctly. That is where I
would put my priorities, sir.
Mr. Spratt. Dr. Lillibridge, one of the crown jewels in
your domain is the CDC, but I have seen photographs of the
facilities at the CDC outside and inside which are in
shockingly poor state, and I understand that the request for
CDC this year was increased substantially up to $2.1 billion
over the request. The administration's request was $600
million. Congress raised it to $2.1 billion, and Dr. Koplan
came up recently and said we need at least $3 billion in
additional funds to prepare for a biological assault. Is this
where you would put your money if you had more?
Dr. Lillibridge. I think it is two-pronged for us,
Congressman Spratt. We think that having dealt with the
bioterrorism issue for the past 3 or 4 years, and looking at
the kinds of things we need to respond to and the breadth of
our response and the fact that we have to respond through not a
standing army, but through the State and local health
departments, that our primary thrust would be twofold. One is
to develop that critical public health infrastructure at the
State and local level, and, second, hone those critical
capacities of institutions like CDC, NIH and FDA to be there to
provide consultation, response, and detect and control the
epidemic, those sorts of things, and I believe a two-tiered
approach would be best.
We are certainly grateful for the interest in the CDC
structure. It is an area that we have looked at and have
brought to the attention of different folks, particularly the
delegations here in the House and Senate, over the past years,
and we are really grateful to have some attention on those
issues.
Mr. Spratt. Lee Hamilton and Newt Gingrich were here a
couple of weeks ago and testified based upon the findings of
their commission, and one of their recommendations which seemed
to me to have sense was what we don't want to have. No
question, the public health infrastructure is woefully
inadequate. We need to strengthen it across the board, but they
were suggesting, for a lot of these highly specialized
emergency responses, that what you want is a regional
capability, not a community-by-community, State-by-State
capability; otherwise you will have a lot of duplication, a lot
of stuff sitting in the parking lot waiting for things that
don't actually happen.
Dr. Lillibridge. I believe the talk about the Department in
terms of our preparedness and planning efforts is beginning to
center on regional planning and response. This is particularly
important for the biologic or epidemic response that we talk
about. That will unfold over a region of the United States
statewide or perhaps nationwide, and that is going to be key to
our planning and activities in the future, and we would
certainly agree with that kind of thinking.
Mr. Spratt. Thank you all for your testimony. There are
plenty more questions I could ask, and maybe I will ask them in
a one-on-one session at some time, but there are others here
that would like to ask questions as well. Thank you for coming.
Chairman Nussle. Mrs. McCarthy.
Mrs. McCarthy. Thank you, and thank you for the testimony.
I am actually finding it fascinating. I come from New York, so
obviously there are a number of issues that we in New York are
extremely concerned about, our subways, future attacks. Many
feel strongly that we are probably going to have another attack
in New York because it is a symbol. We don't know.
Going back with talking about local response and working
regionally, one of the things we did find, and hopefully are
going to bring it up, after the initial attack the FEMA people
were trying to get to New York, but because we had stopped all
flights across the Nation, the people couldn't get on planes to
get to New York really fast. I am bringing this up because I am
sure you have heard of it, but I think in the future whether we
have to shut down the airports, or whether we can't allow
flights, there has to be some accommodation so that your people
wherever they are would be able to get onto a plane to get to
where they have to go and not get in cars and drive for 72
hours.
We all learned a lot on September 11. My concern is--and I
know that you have to be very careful about this--that we are
prepared next time, because we don't know where it is going to
come from. In listening to your testimony and thinking, when
you are starting to transport nuclear waste, are they being
guarded? I am just thinking maybe like a terrorist? Would I be
on one of these roads?
I will be honest with you. Being on the Budget Committee, I
never thought I would be dealing with these particular issues.
So as a normal person I am trying to figure out how do I go
back to my constituents and say, this is what we are doing to
make sure these things don't happen. When Mr. Spratt went over
the budget, and we very strongly here on the committee want to
keep within our budget, but we also realize what the
emergencies are, and I would like to ask and I know I am being
parochial about this, but what would they do in New York with
our subway system, with our bridges, certainly upstate New York
with our water? I mean, all these things go through my mind.
Are we prepared to really protect all these areas, and being
that this is a nation of--we come and go freely, how do we
protect everything that needs to be protected?
Dr. Lillibridge. I will jump in and take the stab at that.
One of the things for us, we are not physical security experts
nor intelligence experts. We are health-related experts who are
concerned about the medical and the public health components in
that, and that as we begin to think about our preparedness
effort and the piece that we could work best on, the broader we
got in terms of contingency planning for mass casualties,
shoring up things like the National Disaster Medical System for
surge capacity to help State and local communities, and
widening that net for early detection of diseases or chemical
exposures seem to be a prudent investment into the fabric,
whether it be emergency management or public health
infrastructure at the State and local level.
Mrs. McCarthy. Following through with that, especially in
New York City, we have some tremendous hospitals. When you talk
about your emergency response, are you talking about also on
trying to educate the different departments in our city
hospitals, and, to be honest with you, even on Long Island,
because a lot of times we do get patients from the cities when
they are overflowed? So are you talking about basically having
resources go into our hospitals to make sure they are prepared,
because they are not going to do it on their own because they
are broke. They have no money.
Dr. Lillibridge. Right. Some of the things we have done in
the past is embarked on training of health care providers. That
has turned out to be critically important for early detection
and awareness, and we are probably in our third year of
providing that kind of training and cooperation with the
Department of Defense and other groups that go out to health
providers through training courses, regional courses, distance-
based learning. I myself was in Valhalla just last week on a
training initiative that involved regional hospitals and
regional training.
The other capacity on that is this is the first year our
budget has a request for hospital preparedness funding, and
that would be a new element for us to address these kinds of
issues. I think that will be an important thing to follow, and
it is going to help address some of these critical needs
through planning and then follow-up preparedness activities.
Mr. Mahaley. Congresswoman, Joe Mahaley from Energy.
We had a lot of senior officials trapped around the country
when they shut down all the airlines. Some of my folks drove
from Albuquerque to Washington over a number of days. One of my
office directors, I think, was in Minnesota. She showed up
about a week later. It happened. Shame on us if we don't learn
from it and make arrangements.
I will tell you, when we are talking about our emergency
response assets, we have dedicated military air that will move
that, but that will take the most critical assets where we need
them. But you are right, it is a problem that needs to be
addressed.
Shortly after September 11, I started attending the Justice
Department Coordination Protection Working Group chaired by the
Deputy Attorney General at that time. It is Larry Thompson, and
it was evident from the first meeting that a lot of
coordination was needed.
You can address all of these problems to a certain extent.
You are not going to protect every reservoir or everything, but
the one thing you don't want to do is waste money. The key to
that efficient spending is coordination. So what has happened
with that Justice Department working group is it has been
supplanted now by the Office of Homeland Security. The Homeland
Security Office is doing, in my judgment, a critical job of
trying to coordinate all these activities. That is the only way
we are going to be able to address these very, very wide-
ranging threats with potential huge consequences.
Mrs. McCarthy. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Nussle. Thank you.
Mr. Price.
Mr. Price. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our
witnesses for appearing here and for your very helpful
testimony.
I would like to address my question to Dr. Lillibridge, at
least initially. It has to do with the matter Mr. Spratt began
to explore, the emergency supplemental appropriation directed
toward bioterrorism preparedness mainly involving the CDC. As
passed by the House, the bill contains $2.1 billion for this
purpose, and that is an increase of nearly $600 million over
the administration's request. As you know, Doctor, the CDC's
Director, Dr. Jeffrey Koplan, has stated recently that the CDC
needs at least $3 billion in additional funds to prepare for a
biological assault, not the $2.1 billion contained in the House
bill nor the $1.7 billion requested by the administration. This
emergency infusion of funds, he argued, is necessary to
adequately stockpile vaccines, to upgrade laboratories and to
expand health surveillance nationwide.
With that background I would like to ask you about your
view of the funding needs. Of course, Dr. Koplan is not alone.
His viewpoint has been mirrored by the American Public Health
Association, the American Hospital Association, other experts
and others on the front lines. Do you regard this supplemental
as a down payment or a first installment on addressing
remaining unfunded needs? Then in terms not just of the amount,
but also the priorities, how adequate is the sense of
priorities that this supplemental reflects? Are there others
that need funding?
So my question both goes to the overall amount of funding
and also the way that funding is prioritized.
Dr. Lillibridge. I would be delighted to answer that,
Congressman Price. Let me begin by saying that the effort of
public health preparedness is something we hope will continue
over time. The status of public health declined over a period
of two or three decades and will need consistent nurturing,
development and building over time. The figure that was derived
by the HHS and the administration, in discussions were derived
and predicated largely, particularly the supplemental, on the
kinds of things that we thought could be done right now, things
that needed initial emphasis including the payment for a
vaccine to get manufacturers moving, shoring up our stockpile
around the threats of anthrax, and beginning to expand some of
the issues on State and local preparedness. And those are the
kinds of things that I think would be priorities for our kinds
of development over time.
I believe over time you would see less development in terms
of purchases, of stockpiling, and then more emphasis over time
on State and local health infrastructure and key components of
key agencies and alert response capacities, particularly CDC,
FDA, and so forth.
Mr. Price. Do you have any reflections on the adequacy of
the present levels of Federal support available to those State
and local authorities? Do we need to reconsider that in light
of what these local capacities look like, the new kinds of
demands that are going to be placed on them, and, frankly, the
many stresses and strains that State budgets are now subject
to?
Dr. Lillibridge. We don't dispute that there are tremendous
needs at the State and local level. In fact, we have often been
a champion of those. There is some new information coming in.
We have done core capacity work. We have also caucused with
State and local guilds about what kinds of infrastructure needs
to be built and that this will be widespread over time for some
duration of activity.
We think the emphasis clearly remains on the kinds of
things that CDC and the Secretary have spoken to in the past,
and those are the laboratory capacities both at the State and
local level, and I will give you sort of a highlight thumbnail
sketch of where we are. We have about 81 State and local
laboratories that have the capacities for advanced biological
detection. That is a start and helps us maintain some regional
capacity, but to include the full clinical laboratories, to
include more agents will require an effort over time both at
CDC and at the emphasis of the State and local level.
Surveillance, our communications capacity, and indeed, as
you well know--in terms of our information or dissemination of
management capacities--that we are developing with State and
local health departments, through our health alert network.
When we started this effort, very few of our State and local
health departments had the advanced information technology
capacity to even receive health alerts. We are working on those
things.
So is this the right priority? Is this the right direction?
I would say yes. Clearly infrastructure, key components of key
agencies and developing the kind of concerted partnership with
State and local community and the Federal component of HHS is
the way to go.
Mr. Price. Would you expect this thinking, these
projections, to be mirrored in perhaps an additional
supplemental request, or is it fair to expect this to be
mirrored in the fiscal 2003 request?
Dr. Lillibridge. Good question, sir. We think both
actually. Administration, HHS is open to working with OMB,
Congress throughout this year as new threats, new situations
develop during this ongoing emergency.
Second, we are working on the 2003 request, and it will
reflect some expansion of these areas.
Mr. Price. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Nussle. Mrs. Clayton.
Mrs. Clayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also thank the
panelists. Although jurisdiction in the Budget Committee may
not be all three of your areas, but the interest of the Budget
Committee is widespread, and it gives us an opportunity to
learn from you, so I appreciate the opportunity to hear what
various agencies are doing.
I want to follow up on the health as well. Coming from
rural America, the infrastructure obviously is not there to
receive it, but even when we try to get the supplement from the
CDC sometime to supplement and disseminate the information they
know, we are having a hard time understanding that. Can you--is
it Dr. Lillibridge?
Dr. Lillibridge. Yes ma'am.
Mrs. Clayton. Would you just walk through what a county
health official should expect to receive, given your capacity
now, if they have an outbreak in bioterrorism, whether that be
anthrax or some other threat right now?
Dr. Lillibridge. I would be delighted. One of the things
that I would like to mention is perhaps I could use Florida as
an example.
Mrs. Clayton. How about using North Carolina since I am
from North Carolina.
Dr. Lillibridge. Even better. Using North Carolina as an
example of what might unfold, we can look at the already
existing strengths in there that we have been working with in
North Carolina, the health department and some of the local
communities. As you know, over the past 3 years there has been
resources moved into the State for things ranging from
laboratory to surveillance activities, and then through our
Metropolitan Medical Response System, key cities in North
Carolina have received grants to develop local preparedness
planning activities, and some of them are quite strong.
What we would see unfold at the time of a crisis or when
the alarm was sounded, you could expect to see that the public
health medical community and those in emergency management and
leadership positions in the State would be on high alert to
evaluate the threat. We have done this perhaps 200 times over
the past year, and most of these are ruled out until we had the
recent anthrax event in Florida, New Jersey, New York and
Connecticut. That would trigger a cascade of events that would
bring in Federal responders from the health and law enforcement
community to work with State and local authorities. This would
involve perhaps components of stockpile, perhaps flying in
locally to engage in prophylaxis, or to have medications or
equipment ready to go.
The second thing you would expect would be epidemiologists
or disease detectives from CDC to arrive to help work with the
disease detection investigation with both State and local
authorities, looking at and following up in cases, looking at
clues, validating disease.
The third thing is that you would see an activation of the
laboratory network. You would see specimens moving from A level
to B level to C level labs and then back to CDC, and perhaps
the facility at USAMRIID coordinated through law enforcement/
FBI channels. This has been drilled and practiced and gives us
kind of an impression on what are the main lessons learned from
these events, and clearly we get back to communications.
Mrs. Clayton. Can I just interrupt? There is perhaps that
in some places permitted in actuality, but more cases in theory
have tested it out and wanted to have discussions around what
the health response would be and how we would get CDC to
interact with that; in fact, made efforts to call CDC to work
with them. The health departments felt quite inadequate to face
their own citizens to say their preparedness--and then I pulled
off of your Web page North Carolina's bioterrorism plan, and
when I got the director who had worked on that for the last 3
years to say, well, Ms. Clayton, we do have that in theory, but
we don't quite have that implemented as well.
There were a lot of gaps and lot of reasons given to me why
health professionals felt very insecure of speaking before the
constituents, and we attempted to do that in Edgecombe County.
We attempted to do that in Pitt County. We called the State
person. I know they are training the health providers. In fact,
they had a telecommunication where they were walking through
that step with them. So apparently the State plans that we have
need to be updated and validated by walking through that to see
where those gaps are.
Now, if it is not a process of not having to do it so--you
haven't done it as thoroughly in all the places, or there is a
need for new resources, I can just tell you are depending on a
system that is untested, and so we shouldn't feel very
confident that what is in place is even giving those who are on
the front lines, our community health officials, the confidence
to do what they need to do. They point out a lack of equipment,
they point out a lack of information, and true, they know where
to send a specimen to have it tested, but health education
involves communication, and to the extent you can, you want to
talk about prevention.
I am not sure what is missing, but I suspect resources may
be part of it. I don't subscribe to the fact that resources is
all of it, but I suspect resource is part of it. Usually people
are active in those areas of health where there is a critical
need, so you don't put staff resources where they are not.
There isn't a level of confidence nor capacity at the State
level nor at the local levels, and the reason I can say this is
because I have tested it.
I am going to work with them, but I would also like to
think that you would want to feel--because in your statement
here you say the predication of a smallpox theory is based on
working with coordination with local and State agencies. Well,
incidents happen in local communities, incidents happen in
States, and to the extent that where the incident happened we
are not prepared, I don't care how sophisticated you are at
CDC, it is not going to make much difference in responding to
that crisis.
So what would you say we need to do to make sure that our
State and local----
Dr. Lillibridge. We quite agree with you. One of the
smallest areas of our preparedness effort over the last 3 years
has been the preparedness planning element, and that has been
less than $2 million per year in support of extremely large
mobilization. One of the things that we requested was
additional resources to address the planning at the State and
local level, which for the first time will become a serious,
significant part of our effort.
We would quite agree with you that having all the bells and
whistles and tools available without plans, knowledgeable and
trained people to use them would seem less effective than had
you spent the investment in planning and training. Those would
be extremely important.
The other thing is the issue of communications. We realize
that the issue of communications extends way beyond the issue
of simple notification. The health officers need training,
access to prepackaged alerts. We need to have serious
preparedness planning in the area of communication, a risk
communication to populations. Our State and local health
officers are going to need more help and training on that.
Mrs. Clayton. Now, this question probably shouldn't go to
you. I guess it should go to Mr. Baker, but inasmuch as the
Washington Post have recently indicated that bin Laden now has
something we call a dirty bomb, and also given the fact that
Governor Ridge has just announced that we have a new alert, I
don't know if the two are related to each other, to what extent
are we prepared, or what should we be mindful of? What does
this alert mean?
Mr. Baker. Very good question. The work we are doing in
Russia is securing material above 20 percent enriched. You can
make a dirty bomb with 20 percent below enriched like uranium.
The scare of the dirty bomb is not how many people it could
kill, it is just putting some material with an explosive device
that will explode and put radiation out. It is kind of like a
little Chernobyl where people died of cancer. Some people very
close to the blast could die.
What we are doing now is we are looking into, at least our
program in Russia, trying to secure this material that is below
20 percent that you can make dirty bombs with and do as much as
we can to make sure that this does not happen. It is a real
threat. It is not nearly as sophisticated as a nuclear weapon,
of course, but it is something that we are concerned about.
Mrs. Clayton. So concentrating on Russia would take care of
bin Laden?
Mr. Baker. It would help at least secure this stuff that
Russia--they can't steal the material out of Russia if we
secure the material that is below 20 percent enriched.
Mrs. Clayton. Is it the only source of it?
Mr. Baker. Yes.
Mrs. Clayton. So the only source for material for a dirty
bomb is in Russia?
Mr. Baker. No. I am sorry. It could be in other places
also, so it is a very big concern.
Mrs. Clayton. I am trying to get to the connection of the
Washington Post saying bin Laden has the capacity. He is not in
Russia; so he has the capacity where? If we know he has the
capacity, how do we know that and don't know where he is? Help
me understand why that is related to domestic security. So is
there a relationship of the materials being here under disguise
of people who are connected with that organization and to what
extent we ought to be concerned if you have any responsibility
that the defense is doing about it?
Mr. Baker. There is a lot of nuclear material all over the
world. Osama bin Laden could get it from many places. It is
just not in Russia, of course. How we know he could have this
and not know where he is located is, of course, through
intelligence sources. Intelligence picks up a lot of things
and, of course, I am sure some of it that we pick up in
intelligence is from sources that they want us to pick up, so
they may exaggerate what they have got. But you have at least
got to take it in and consider that it may be true, but a lot
of it may not be true.
Mrs. Clayton. The final question, is there a danger that
that source of materials may be here and that organization--why
is that connected to our domestic threat?
Mr. Baker. I will let Mr. Mahaley answer that for security,
about it being here.
Mr. Mahaley. Ma'am, security is about reducing risk, and
the nonproliferation program that Mr. Baker administers is
attempting to plug one hole. I don't know what Mr. bin Laden or
some other terrorist may have here, but we can't discount the
possibilities. The government is engaged in measures, but it is
going to be something I can't go into in an open hearing. But
the----
Mrs. Clayton. But is there a connection?
Mr. Mahaley. The intent----
Mrs. Clayton. Is it just the media putting together, is
there a connection here for us----
Mr. Mahaley. Whether it is out in the media or not, I'm
sure you understand I cannot go into the material that I get
briefed in an open hearing .
Mrs. Clayton. I respect that.
Mr. Mahaley. OK. I can offer you a closed hearing or a
hearing in our facilities, or a briefing, I should say, that I
would go into much more detail.
I will let the media speculation speak for itself, but we
cannot discount that possibility, and the Department of Energy
does have some responsibilities in that area. General McBroom
actually leads those efforts, and I am sure he and I will be
pleased to meet with you in any capacity to go into our efforts
in more detail.
Mrs. Clayton. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Baker. Mr. Chairman, I would like to add one more thing
for you, sir, to this committee. When Congressman Spratt asked
if one could use more money, one could give us all the money in
the world, but if they don't give money in an area called
program direction, which is people and salaries--it is more
difficult for us to do our job. Congress cut the NNSA program
direction below the President's budget by $25 million. At the
same time, we have accelerated these programs.
The President has accelerated them. The Secretary of Energy
has accelerated them, and we are going to burn up people,
because our people are in Russia.
Program direction is salaries and travel--you have got to
travel to do our work. So it is one area, sir, that I would
like to go on record that we need more money. We need help, and
we may ask for a reprogramming, because if it is not in the
program direction, we may have the money to do it, but if we
don't have the people to do it, we can't do it. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Nussle. Thank you.
Are there any other final comments that witnesses would
like to make?
Then I would like to thank you. I think to follow up on
what Mrs. Clayton was saying, if we can speculate about it,
they are probably thinking about it, too, and dreaming up--if
we have learned anything from September 11, if we can speculate
about it, they are thinking about doing it, and that is in part
why we are talking today about restructuring the government
into homeland security to take these new threats into
consideration and to do something about it. I know we only
scratched the surface today; we probably barely even did that.
We could go on and on for hours talking about these issues, but
we have to start somewhere, and we appreciate your effort to
help us begin that task up here in Congress as we explore next
year's budget.
Please continue to give us your thoughts and your ideas. We
are all in this together, and we want to be on the same team,
and we appreciate the good work that you and your folks do on
behalf of all of us so that we can sleep a little bit more
soundly at night. And that is not easy to do these days, it
seems, but we appreciate the good work that you and the people
that work for you do for us. So thank you very much. And with
that, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]