[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 107 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-480
AIRLINE SECURITY
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JOINT HEARING
before a
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE
and the
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SPECIAL HEARING
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 2001--WASHINGTON, DC
__________
Printed for the use of the Committees on Appropriations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
______
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COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii TED STEVENS, Alaska
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania
TOM HARKIN, Iowa PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri
HARRY REID, Nevada MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky
HERB KOHL, Wisconsin CONRAD BURNS, Montana
PATTY MURRAY, Washington RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado
TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota LARRY CRAIG, Idaho
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
JACK REED, Rhode Island MIKE DeWINE, Ohio
Terrence E. Sauvain, Staff Director
Charles Kieffer, Deputy Staff Director
Steven J. Cortese, Minority Staff Director
Lisa Sutherland, Minority Deputy Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Transportation and Related Agencies
PATTY MURRAY, Washington, Chairman
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania
HARRY REID, Nevada CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri
HERB KOHL, Wisconsin ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
Professional Staff
Peter Rogoff
Kate Hallahan
Wally Burnett (Minority)
Paul Doerrer (Minority)
Administrative Support
Angela Lee
Candice Rogers (Minority)
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
C.W. BILL YOUNG, Florida, Chairman
RALPH REGULA, Ohio DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin
JERRY LEWIS, California JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania
HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington
JOE SKEEN, New Mexico MARTIN OLAV SABO, Minnesota
FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia STENY H. HOYER, Maryland
TOM DeLAY, Texas ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia
JIM KOLBE, Arizona MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
SONNY CALLAHAN, Alabama NANCY PELOSI, California
JAMES T. WALSH, New York PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana
CHARLES H. TAYLOR, North Carolina NITA M. LOWEY, New York
DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio JOSE E. SERRANO, New York
ERNEST J. ISTOOK, Jr., Oklahoma ROSA L. DeLAURO, Connecticut
HENRY BONILLA, Texas JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia
JOE KNOLLENBERG, Michigan JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts
DAN MILLER, Florida ED PASTOR, Arizona
JACK KINGSTON, Georgia CARRIE P. MEEK, Florida
RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi CHET EDWARDS, Texas
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, Jr., Washington ROBERT E. ``BUD'' CRAMER, Jr.,
RANDY ``DUKE'' CUNNINGHAM, California Alabama
TODD TIAHRT, Kansas PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island
ZACH WAMP, Tennessee JAMES E. CLYBURN, South Carolina
TOM LATHAM, Iowa MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York
ANNE M. NORTHUP, Kentucky LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California
ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama SAM FARR, California
JO ANN EMERSON, Missouri JESSE L. JACKSON, Jr., Illinois
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan
KAY GRANGER, Texas ALLEN BOYD, Florida
JOHN E. PETERSON, Pennsylvania CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
JOHN T. DOOLITTLE, California STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
RAY LaHOOD, Illinois
JOHN E. SWEENEY, New York
DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
DON SHERWOOD, Pennsylvania
VIRGIL H. GOODE, Jr., Virginia
James W. Dyer, Clerk and Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Department of Transportation and Related Agencies
Appropriations
HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky, Chairman
FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia MARTIN OLAV SABO, Minnesota
TOM DeLAY, Texas JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts
SONNY CALLAHAN, Alabama ED PASTOR, Arizona
TODD TIAHRT, Kansas CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan
ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama JOSE E. SERRANO, New York
KAY GRANGER, Texas JAMES E. CLYBURN, South Carolina
JO ANN EMERSON, Missouri
JOHN E. SWEENEY, New York
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Opening statement of Senator Patty Murray........................ 1
Statement of Congressman Harold Rogers........................... 3
Prepared statement of Senator Richard C. Shelby.................. 4
Prepared statement of Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell............ 5
Statement of Congressman Martin Olav Sabo........................ 6
Statement of Senator Robert C. Byrd.............................. 7
Statement of Senator Ted Stevens................................. 9
Statement of Congressman David R. Obey........................... 9
Statement of Norman Y. Mineta, Secretary of Transportation,
Office of the Secretary, Department of Transportation.......... 10
Heightened security measures..................................... 11
Prepared statement of Norman Y. Mineta........................... 13
Broader security concerns........................................ 14
Economic response................................................ 15
Statement of Jane F. Garvey, Administrator, Federal Aviation
Administration, Department of Transportation................... 16
Security measures................................................ 16
System efficiency................................................ 16
Rapid response team.............................................. 17
Statement of Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector General, Office of the
Secretary, Department of Transportation........................ 17
Organization of aviation security................................ 18
Recommendations to enhance aviation security..................... 19
Prepared statement of Kenneth M. Mead............................ 19
Governance, organization and delivery of aviation security....... 20
Changes needed to supplement and enhance security actions already
underway....................................................... 20
Security of checked baggage...................................... 21
Screening checkpoint security.................................... 21
Cargo security................................................... 21
Airport access controls.......................................... 21
Issuing airport identification................................... 22
Federal Air Marshal Program...................................... 22
Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D., Director, Physical
Infrastructure Issues, General Accounting Office............... 24
Air traffic control.............................................. 25
Unauthorized access to secure spaces............................. 25
Passenger and baggage screening.................................. 25
Prepared statement of Gerald L. Dillingham....................... 26
Terrorist acts illustrate severe weaknesses in aviation security. 26
Background....................................................... 28
Potential for unauthorized access to aviation computer systems... 28
Weaknesses in airport access controls............................ 29
Inadequate detection of dangerous objects by screeners........... 29
Differences in the screening practices of five other countries
and the United States.......................................... 30
Statement of Hank Queen, Vice President for Engineering and
Product Integrity, The Boeing Company.......................... 31
Prepared statement........................................... 33
Airplane security................................................ 33
History.......................................................... 34
Flight deck doors and Federal regulations........................ 35
Hardened doors................................................... 39
Transponders..................................................... 39
Industry and Government activity since September 11.............. 39
Security badges.................................................. 40
Bogus credentials of airport and airline workers................. 41
Proposed security recommendations................................ 41
Emergency security recommendations............................... 41
Screening at security checkpoints................................ 42
Fines and enforcement............................................ 42
Screening and access violations.................................. 43
Compliance with security measures................................ 44
Security contracts............................................... 44
Airport security companies....................................... 44
Baggage screeners................................................ 44
Airport Security, Inc............................................ 45
Logan and Newark screeners....................................... 45
Argenbright violations........................................... 45
Turnover of airport security screeners........................... 46
Watch list of terrorist suspects................................. 47
Computer assisted passenger prescreening system.................. 47
Other transportation modes, terrorist risk assessment............ 48
Essential Air Service............................................ 49
Airline funding request.......................................... 50
Security of private aircraft..................................... 51
Aviation regulations for private charters........................ 52
Tracking flight traffic.......................................... 52
Cockpit security................................................. 53
Federal responsibility for airport security...................... 53
Federal loan guarantees for airlines............................. 55
Reopening of Reagan National Airport............................. 56
Baggage screening................................................ 56
Security of other transportation modes........................... 58
Uniformed law enforcement officers at airport screening points... 58
Law enforcement oversight of baggage screeners................... 59
Prepared statement of Senator Richard J. Durbin.................. 60
Liability of airlines............................................ 62
Airline operations............................................... 63
Airline employee benefits........................................ 63
Airport security firms........................................... 64
Federalization of aviation security.............................. 64
Cockpit security--door hardening................................. 65
Manufacturers financial impact and Federal response.............. 65
Impacts on general aviation and flight schools................... 66
Prepared statement of Congressman Todd Tiahrt.................... 67
Database tracking of potential terrorists........................ 68
General aviation security measures............................... 68
Flight schools................................................... 68
Sky marshals implementation...................................... 69
Airline solvency proposal........................................ 69
Database tracking of potential terrorists........................ 70
Airline safety and public confidence............................. 71
Additional committee questions................................... 72
Question submitted by Senator Herb Kohl.......................... 72
Container hardening.............................................. 72
Questions submitted by Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell........... 72
Lines of communication........................................... 72
Cockpit door..................................................... 73
Security loophole rule........................................... 73
Cross-check...................................................... 73
Security personnel............................................... 74
General aviation................................................. 74
Questions submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy.................. 74
Airport security measures........................................ 74
Question submitted by Congressman Ed Pastor...................... 77
Airline industry and related businesses emergency aid............ 77
AIRLINE SECURITY
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THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 2001
U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Transportation,
Committee on Appropriations; jointly with House
of Representatives, Subcommittee on
Transportation, Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met at 2:10 p.m., in room SD-106, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Patty Murray (chairman of the
Senate subcommittee) and Hon. Hal Rogers (chairman of the House
subcommittee) presiding.
Present from the Senate committee: Senators Murray
(presiding), Byrd, Kohl, Durbin, Specter, Bond, Stevens,
Hutchison, and Domenici.
Present from the House committee: Representatives Rogers,
Young, Wolf, Callahan, Tiahrt, Aderholt, Granger, Emerson,
Sweeney, Sabo, Obey, Olver, Pastor, Kilpatrick, and Serrano.
opening statement of senator patty murray
Senator Murray. Good afternoon. This joint committee will
come to order. We are meeting today under extraordinary
circumstances. Our country has been attacked. Our people are in
mourning and our Nation is preparing for a long battle against
terrorism. There is little we can say today to bring comfort to
those who lost friends and loved ones in the attack on
September 11. Our thoughts and prayers are with all of the
victims, their families and their friends. We are all grateful
to the rescue workers and relief organizations who are
containing the damage and comforting the affected, and we are
grateful to the military families of our Nation who may be
called on to protect and defend us in the coming months.
In the past few days, I have been struck by how all
Americans have come together to show our national unity. At
this hearing we have Democrats and Republicans from the House
and from the Senate, all coming together to improve aviation
safety, and I just want to add that, whatever the coming days
may bring, we have got to hold on to this sense of unity we
have discovered in the past 9 days.
Because the attacks were launched from our Nation's own
transportation system, today we have brought together the
Transportation Subcommittees of the House and the Senate for
the first joint hearing in recent memory. I want to thank
Chairman Rogers especially for recommending that we do this
hearing jointly, and I welcome the leadership of the chairman
and all of our colleagues from the House.
The terrorist attacks have revealed gaping holes in our
transportation system and in our intelligence-gathering system.
My purpose in calling this hearing is not to place blame on any
one individual or agency. I want to be very clear that there
were many failures here. We are not here to blame those workers
who operate X-ray machines or screen passengers. We also had a
failure of our intelligence system, on which we spend billions
and billions of dollars each year. We cannot expect an $8 an
hour security screener to foil an attack that a multi-billion
dollar intelligence system could not prevent. Those airport
security workers are no more responsible than the airlines that
hired them, and the airlines are no more to blame than the FAA
for allowing a vulnerable system to persist. Similarly, I do
not believe the FAA is any more responsible than the
intelligence agencies that are charged with monitoring
suspected terrorists and thwarting their efforts.
On Monday I met with a number of security screeners in
Seattle. I was impressed by their dedication, but I am
concerned about the lack of consistent standards, training, and
experience throughout each airport and throughout our country.
For too long, we have focused on how to do security
inexpensively. From now on we have to focus on how to do it
well.
In truth, these workers are just part of our transportation
system. From the airport parking garage to the turnoff, from
the gate to the cockpit, and from the tower to the cabin,
thousands of people are responsible for our safety when we step
on an airplane. These are human beings, and they are making
decisions about safety and security in a fast-moving
environment, with little margin for error.
I want to make sure that those workers have the most
experience and best training possible, because our
transportation security system is only as strong as its weakest
link.
As we have all seen in this past week, the aviation
industry is a key part of our economy, a part that we cannot
allow madmen to shut down. We must be safe, but we must also
keep our transportation system running efficiently. In recent
days, airlines and suppliers have cut service and laid off
employees. The Boeing Company has just announced it is laying
off as many as 30,000 employees because aircraft orders have
been cancelled or delayed.
I am vigorously supporting efforts to help the ailing
aviation industry and its workers. As chairman of this
subcommittee, I will work to make sure that the funding is
there both to get this critical industry back on its feet and
to make our aviation system once again the safest in the world.
We called this hearing today to answer these two questions:
Is it safe to fly today, and what steps must we take to prevent
future tragedies? To answer these questions, we have this
afternoon both Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta and
FAA Administrator Jane Garvey. We also have testimony from the
DOT Inspector General and the General Accounting Office, which
both have done extensive work in this arena. We will also have
a representative from the Boeing Company to discuss specific
issues of securing cockpit doors and the safety tradeoffs that
come with that enhanced security measure. With the help of our
witnesses today, we will take the lessons of this tragedy and
turn them into safer airports and safer travel.
Because we have a large number of colleagues here today, I
will call on our chairmen and ranking members of the full
committee and subcommittee for opening statements. Then we will
have the testimony from all of our witnesses, and then each
member that is here will have an opportunity to make a
statement as they ask their questions after the testimony from
our witnesses today.
Chairman Rogers, thank you so much for joining us here
today, and please join me with your opening statement.
statement of congressman harold rogers
Chairman Rogers. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
First, I would like to thank Senator Murray and ranking member
Shelby for agreeing to this joint hearing today. There will be
many hearings in the aftermath of September 11, but this is the
first one that shows the unity of both Houses of Congress and
both political parties. This is the first bipartisan, bicameral
hearing on the crucial subject of aviation security.
We stand united before the American people today to create
a stronger front against terrorism. We will do our part on
these subcommittees and do it quickly. We will ensure that the
Nation's security is fortified and that the American people are
assured of their safety as they return to our aviation system.
First, we need to recognize and applaud the extraordinary
effort being made by the Secretary, the FAA Administrator, and
the thousands of departmental employees who are addressing this
crisis. We need to recognize the hard work of our air traffic
controllers on September 11 who helped guide thousands of
aircraft with tens of thousands of people to the ground quickly
amidst the most confusing and harrowing circumstances.
My own view is that many lives were saved by that step, and
I congratulate, Mr. Secretary, you and the Administrator
particularly for that decision. We all owe all of the employees
a big debt and the American people should be proud of the job
you are doing on their behalf.
Transportation, as Senator Murray has said, is critical to
the Nation's economy. Already we are seeing the economic side
effects spreading throughout the Nation. Turmoil in the airline
industry leads to cancelled orders for aircraft. That in turn
causes cancelled orders for aircraft engines, avionics, and
other critical parts. When transportation suffers, the retail,
conference and tourism sectors are also equally damaged.
Terrorist organizations, of course, know this. They know
the importance of the air transportation system, as the events
of September 11 have so dramatically revealed. We must get our
transportation networks and transportation industries back on
their feet. We must show these organizations that we will not
be defeated by these heinous acts.
It is important to look backward to find the holes in our
safety net and patch them up. But we must remember that this
type of attack has never occurred before. Never has someone
used a commercial airliner to deliberately create destruction
on the ground, to strike the national symbols and
infrastructure of a country.
Since this was an attack using our own transportation
system, it is urgent that our particular subcommittees focus on
immediate preparedness. This must include a review of current
security programs and their effectiveness as a starting point
for a coordinated plan of improvements.
But we must also be inspired to be creative, innovative,
daring. We must think of new ways of doing business and develop
breakthroughs to meet this threat to our Nation and to our way
of life.
Personally, I am focusing on improving three areas of our
aviation security posture. I hope the witnesses will address
these issues today. I am sure you will. First, of course, the
sky marshal program. We must employ sky marshals, as I know we
already are, and do it as quickly as possible.
Second, we must secure the cockpit against intrusion by
hijackers and deprive them of the capability of using the
aircraft as a guided missile, and develop clear procedures to
prevent cockpit takeover.
Third, we must find ways to improve security on the ground,
including passenger screening and unauthorized access to
airport operating areas on the tarmac.
For the good of the Nation, we must all continue to work
together. Other committees must work together even as we are.
Federal agencies must coordinate, communicate, cooperate for
the security of our people. We can do this, we can accomplish
this. The American people deserve it and the urgency of our
situation demands it.
Thank you.
Senator Murray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The ranking member of the Senate Transportation Committee,
Senator Shelby, is unable to be here at this moment. Without
objection, I will include his statement in the record along
with a statement from Senator Campbell.
[The statements follow:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Richard C. Shelby
Madame Chairwoman. I thank you for holding this hearing and thank
the witnesses for making themselves available during a very tragic and
stressful time. I do have a number of questions that I will submit for
the record, but I would like to make a few comments and observations
about the tragic events that occurred on September 11th and about some
of the issues and areas that I would encourage you to focus on during
this critical response and recovery period.
But before we get to that, we now know that on September 11th, a
group of the passengers on United flight 93, the ill-fated flight that
crashed in Pennsylvania, in the ultimate act of self-sacrifice and
heroism appear to have rushed the cockpit and thwarted the terrorists
aboard that flight from inflicting additional damage and loss on this
great nation. Without doubt, those fathers, mothers, husbands and
wives--patriots one and all--saved the lives of hundreds of Americans
wherever that aircraft was targeted. That was an extraordinary act.
They understood what was happening and that they would probably never
again see their loved ones; but they acted heroically and, in
sacrificing their own lives and dreams, probably saved the lives of
hundreds of their fellow citizens.
This nation owes them a debt of honor and gratitude that is hard to
articulate. They deserve our recognition and our commitment that we
will meet, address, and repel the threat that forced them to pay so
great a price. They were among the many Americans in New York,
Virginia, Pennsylvania, and around the nation who acted courageously
during and in the aftermath of the terrorist attack on September 11th.
They brought honor to all who love this country and what it represents.
They are what America is all about. These were not warriors or law
enforcement officials. You might say that they were neighbors, members
of parishes, or people we might meet in our grocery stores. They were
just ``average'' Americans. And the world should wonder and our enemies
should tremble at their mettle.
As devastating as the heinous act of September 11th was, and as
incalculable as the pain, disruption, and loss inflicted upon the
victims at the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and on onboard the
four hijacked United and American flights was, America and our very way
of life we cherish will endure. No one can make right the loss that the
families, the co-workers, the friends and loved ones of the victims
suffered because of these despicable acts. But endure we must and
endure we will. I know that all of us here today and across this great
nation reflect and pray every day for the aggrieved and the fallen.
Madame Chairwoman, Chairman Rodgers, Secretary Mineta, and
Administrator Garvey, we must take every step to assure the nation that
this tragedy cannot be repeated. That is a tall order. I commend to
your attention the comments made by the pilot of United flight 564 on
Saturday, September 15th to the passengers aboard that flight after the
doors closed and as they prepared to depart from Denver International
Airport. He said: ``I want to thank you brave folks for coming out
today. We don't have any new instructions from the Federal government,
so from now on we're on our own.'' (He explained that airport security
measures had pretty much solved the problem of firearms being carried
aboard, but not weapons of the type the terrorists apparently used,
plastic knives or those fashioned from wood or ceramics.)
He continued: ``Sometimes a potential hijacker will announce that
he has a bomb. There are no bombs on this aircraft and if someone were
to get up and make that claim, don't believe him. If someone were to
stand up, brandish something such as a plastic knife and say, `This is
a hijacking' or words to that effect, here is what you should do: Every
one of you should stand up and immediately throw things at that
person--pillows, books, magazines, eyeglasses, shoes--anything that
will throw him off balance and distract his attention. If he has a
confederate or two, do the same with them. Most important: get a
blanket over him, then wrestle him to the floor and keep him there.
We'll land the plane at the nearest airport and the authorities will
take it from there.
``Remember, there will be one of him and maybe a few confederates,
but there are 200 of you. You can overwhelm them.
``The Declaration of Independence say, `We, the people . . .' and
that's just what it is when we're up in the air: we, the people, vs.
Would-be terrorists. I don't think we are going to have any such
problem today or tomorrow or for a while, but some time down the road,
it is going to happen again and I want you to know what to do.
``Now, since we're a family for the next few hours, I'll ask you to
turn to the person next to you, introduce yourself, tell them a little
about yourself and ask them to do the same.''
Madame Chairwoman. This sounds sensible to me. That pilot's
guidance is serious, but these are serious times. Americans are a
people who empower themselves to do great things. We should not delude
ourselves into thinking that simple pronouncements from the FAA, with
all due respect, or tweaks to the Federal Aviation Regulations will
allow us to sleep comfortably on transcontinental flights. It is all of
our responsibility to ensure the safety of our airways. The passengers
aboard United flight 93 knew that instinctively. The pilot on
Saturday's flight out of Denver merely reminds of it.
Accordingly, as we review and reform our safety and security
procedures, we must ask a simply question: will the actions and
initiatives we undertake have prevented the recent terrorist attacks
and will they prevent other acts by these barbaric thugs.
Mr. Secretary and Madame Administrator. Our actions must be
meaningful, effective, and they must restore the confidence of the
American public in the integrity and safety of our transportation
systems. If there ever were a time for bold and aggressive steps to
improve the safety of our transportation systems, now is that time. I
believe--no, I know--that this Congress and the American people will
accept and embrace meaningful steps toward that end. We only need look
at the full measure of sacrifice made by the passengers aboard United
flight 93 to know the depths of our responsibility, and I am heartened
by the fact that I know that same spirit is aboard every plane in the
sky.
I thank the Chair.
______
Prepared Statement of Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell
Thank you Chairmen Murray and Rogers for holding this important and
timely joint-subcommittee hearing.
First of all, I want to express my sincere sympathy to the family
members and friends of the thousands of victims of September 11th.
Those tragic events are fixed in our minds and in our hearts, and we
are all anxious about the future, but we must move as quickly as
possible to ascertain our security deficiencies and prevent such events
from ever happening again.
For the past several years, this subcommittee has been concerned
with chronic airline cancellations and delays and with the inadequate
communication systems in place for reporting such incidents. Each year,
constituents have complained by the thousands, but representatives from
the airline industry have pointed fingers at one another without much
progress being made. Finally, when we were faced with the ultimate need
for an industry-wide communication system, the already inadequate
system failed miserably.
Additionally, this committee has continually been concerned with
security measures at airports and in the air. In my opinion, the lack
of adequate security industry-wide has been appalling. Four-inch knives
were allowed on planes, security personnel, sometimes folks who do not
have a command of the English language, are contracted out by the
airlines to the lowest bidder, and cockpit doors are so flimsy that you
can kick them in--but you don't need to, because the pilots and crew go
in and out during flight. None of this may have been against
regulations, but someone should have anticipated that these regulations
were completely inadequate to secure public safety. In fact, Mary
Schiavo, former Department of Transportation Inspector General has been
warning the FAA and the public for years of such dangers. She was
responsible for conducting security tests from 1990-1996 and I think
it's high time we listen to her and others, including pilots, crew and
passengers about any and all security concerns.
We all understand that the airlines must be profitable, but the FAA
and the airline industry should be put on notice that the public and
Congress are demanding real solutions for serious problems. We want to
keep the airline industry safe and financially healthy, because this
nation depends so heavily on the services they provide. But today I say
to everyone, the continued profitability of the airline industry will
not come at the expense of the safety of every American who steps
aboard an airplane.
On behalf of all Americans, I demand that we move past the deft
deflection of responsibility and do whatever it takes to make certain
that security measures are updated and strictly enforced and that the
communications systems between the towers, air traffic controllers, the
airlines, federal agencies, and ultimately the passengers are fully
integrated.
We can and must offer financial support of the airline industry in
light of the recent attacks, but that does not mean that emergency
financial support comes without our demands the industry improve. Our
safety cannot and will not be dependent on the professionalism of
minimum-wage employees.
Thank you, Madam Chairman, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing
the witness's testimony and their answers to questions and to hear
precisely what steps the airline industry intends to make in this
regard.
Senator Murray. I will turn to the ranking member of the
House Subcommittee on Transportation, Representative Sabo.
STATEMENT OF Congressman MARTIN OLAV SABO
Mr. Sabo. Thank you, Madam Chairman. We are here in
response to the devastating acts of terrorists in New York,
Washington, and Pennsylvania last week and to evaluate measures
necessary to assure civil aviation's security and restore
public confidence in air travel. First, I extend my deepest
sympathies to the victims and their families. The human losses
and senseless destruction are incomprehensible.
I also commend the heroic acts of public servants and
private citizens to address the crisis as it was happening, to
work hard to rescue victims, and to continue to conduct rescue
and recovery operations.
As we begin this hearing, I hope we will proceed with cool
and clear heads, focusing first on the appropriate short-term
actions we must take now to heighten aviation security. We must
also commit to carefully thinking through the longer-term
measures needed to maintain security in air travel and across
other transportation modes.
Thank you.
Senator Murray. Chairman Byrd.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I commend you for
calling this hearing today. I welcome Chairman Rogers, Mr.
Sabo, and our other colleagues. Especially I welcome Mr. Obey
and my bosom friend Ted Stevens. I also welcome Secretary
Mineta, FAA Administrator Garvey, and other witnesses here this
afternoon.
It is most appropriate that this hearing take the form of a
joint hearing between the House and Senate. Secretary Mineta,
what you see is a bipartisan and bicameral committee ready,
willing, and able to help. Just 72 hours after the tragic
events of September 11, the Congress demonstrated its ability
to respond and to respond quickly by appropriating $40 billion
to address the crisis, not a small amount by any means, $40 for
every minute since Jesus Christ was born.
That supplemental appropriation bill provided $40 billion
for five stated purposes, one of which was to improve aviation
security. The House and Senate Appropriations Committees have
been funding the Department of Transportation's initiatives in
the area of aviation security for years. We have met or
exceeded the administration's request, including a substantial
increase in funds that were sought after Pan Am Flight 103
exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, and when TWA Flight 800
exploded over the Atlantic Ocean.
Over the years, at the request of current and prior
administrations, we have provided billions of dollars for the
deployment of explosive detection systems and for the hiring of
hundreds of security inspectors stationed at airports across
the country and abroad. Clearly, however, the DOT's efforts in
this area have been misguided to a certain extent. At a
minimum, they were directed only at one portion of the threat,
because just last week four teams of terrorists permeated our
aviation security measures with apparent ease and triggered the
most horrifying series of events witnessed in our country since
the invasion of the United States at Pearl Harbor.
As an immediate step to accompany the reopening of the air
traffic control system, the FAA has imposed new safety
requirements. If we want a safe and efficient air
transportation system, we are going to need to step up to these
and other requirements. Some of those requirements will bear a
considerable cost and we should have an honest and
straightforward discussion of how we expect to pay for these
new requirements.
For example, I have heard one proposal that would take all
the personnel that worked at security checkpoints and make them
Federal employees. That proposal would relieve the airlines of
at least a billion dollars of cost every year and transfer that
amount or more onto the taxpayers. If that is what is necessary
to ensure that we have effective safety at the checkpoints,
then we should do it. But 5 or 10 years from now, when
attention to this tragedy may have faded a bit, I hope that we
will not hear repeated calls to shrink the size of the Federal
Government.
In addressing the costs of these new security procedures, I
am particularly concerned about the burden that will be placed
on the Nation's smaller airports, airports like the ones we
have in Bluefield, Clarksburg, Beckley, Parkersburg, West
Virginia. These airports have had modest operating budgets.
Just the interim security enhancements that were ordered by the
FAA last week will work a hardship on these small airports.
This is not to be unexpected, but as we look at the costs
that are incumbent on us to improve aviation safety we must
recognize the needs of the smaller and more remote outposts of
the aviation network.
Separate from the issue of whether emergency funding is
needed for airports, I am aware of proposals to provide very
sizable appropriations of direct grant assistance to bail out
the airlines. The airline industry is essential to this
Nation's commerce, producing about $125 billion annually and
creating work for manufacturers and other companies. The
Federal Government cannot allow this industry to fold without
seriously disrupting the U.S. economy and I am fully aware of
that, fully supportive of doing whatever needs to be done to
keep that from happening.
But if we have now reached the point that this industry
must live off the generosity of the U.S. taxpayer, then I think
we have a responsibility to ensure that the taxpayers are well
served. I am thinking particularly about our constituents that
live in smaller cities and towns in rural America. Ever since
we deregulated the airlines in 1978, these citizens have been
asked to pay through the nose for infrequent and in most
instances quite poor air service.
Now, at the same time that the airlines are cutting back
service to some cities and eliminating service to others, they
are asking for a Federal bailout. I am not necessarily against
providing some measured assistance to pump some fresh blood
into the airlines. But I must ask, how will we ensure that the
airlines are accountable with the taxpayers' money?
I must also ask whether we need to look at re-regulating
the airlines to ensure that all taxpayers, not just those in
the big cities--and I have nothing against those in the big
cities, but not just those in the big cities--get their money's
worth.
During a time of war, we should require that there be air
service to all parts of America to ensure that there is
mobility for all Americans.
Mr. Secretary, I was the Majority Leader in 1978 when we
deregulated the airlines, and in sackcloth and ashes I have
wept and kicked myself repeatedly over the years since 1978 for
going along with deregulation of the airlines. Why? Because the
big airlines pulled out of West Virginia as soon as we
deregulated the airlines. They left us hanging without adequate
service, and then they gouged the taxpayers in these rural
communities for service.
We pay--I can get the figures; you have them--$600, $700
for a round trip ticket to Charleston, West Virginia. It is
unfair. The airlines provide service to London and back in many
instances for less money than they require from the coal miner,
the steel worker, the farmer, the school teacher, the little
people, if we might call them little, in West Virginia and in
other rural communities.
Now, I am going to ask these airlines, you can believe
that, because some of this money is going to flow through the
Appropriations Committee, what are you going to do for our
little people, if you want to call them little? We have been
treated like little people and we are tired of it, and I am
seething, seething with anger at myself for voting for
deregulation.
Now there has come a time when you, the airlines, need
help. I am going to be there to help you. I want to help you,
because we are all in this boat together. But I am going to ask
you some questions about what kind of service you are going to
give us, the people in the rural communities all over America.
Thank you. Thank you, our witnesses.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Murray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Stevens.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR TED STEVENS
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. In
the interest of time, I would like to have my statement appear
in the record.
Just two comments. One, I am certain our two committees,
the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, will provide
the funds to restore and repair the critical transportation
services of our country, not just the airlines, but also the
rail and port facilities, pipeline and highway facilities. They
all must be looked at as far as security is concerned.
Secondly, I want to say, as I said this morning, our two
witnesses here probably deserve greater recognition than anyone
could realize, because between them they ordered the airplanes
to come to the ground. That probably contained other terrorists
who would have wreaked great damage, not only in the country,
but particularly right here in this city. I hope, Mr. Mineta,
you relate, as you did this morning, how you came to that
conclusion. And he came to it very fast, because there were
planes that were in the air or on the taxi strip that could
have caused us all great harm had he not taken that action.
I again publicly congratulate him, and I think we are very,
very privileged to have two people such as Secretary Mineta and
Administrator Garvey to head this team for us in terms of this
subject, and in particular its impact and implications for
general aviation and commercial aviation.
Thank you very much.
Senator Murray. Representative Obey.
STATEMENT OF Congressman DAVID R. OBEY
Mr. Obey. I thank the chair for calling these hearings, and
I agree with much that Senator Byrd and Senator Stevens have
said. Today we simply need information. We need action. It
would be nice if that action is accompanied by some thought. We
also need a sense of balance. We do not need scapegoats.
Members of Congress are going to have plenty of time to
make their views known on this subject. Today we need to hear
the witnesses. We do not need any opening statement from me. I
think we just need to get on to the testimony.
Senator Murray. Thank you very much.
We will now turn to our witnesses that are here today.
Secretary Mineta, we will begin with you.
STATEMENT OF NORMAN Y. MINETA, SECRETARY OF
TRANSPORTATION, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
ACCOMPANIED BY MICHAEL JACKSON, DEPUTY SECRETARY, OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Secretary Mineta. Chairman Murray, Chairman Rogers,
Chairman Byrd, Senator Stevens, Congressman Sabo, and
Congressman Obey, and members of the two Transportation
Appropriations Subcommittees: It is with both sadness and
resolve that Administrator Garvey and I appear before you
today. I join all Americans in my sadness and anger about the
lives that were lost during the heinous, cowardly terrorist
attack on September 11. I also follow President Bush with a
firm, unfaltering commitment to help our Nation, and
specifically our transportation system, to respond, rebuild,
and recover.
Though we will never overcome the sorrow that we feel for
the families and friends who lost loved ones, we will ensure
public safety and protect economic vitality. While it may take
time to recreate comfortable confidence in travel, I can assure
this committee that we can and we will enjoy a transportation
system that is safe, secure, and stable.
I want to also publicly express my gratitude and pride at
the performance of the Department of Transportation's employees
throughout the crisis. I would like to call particular
attention to the professionalism displayed by the FAA, from
Administrator Jane Garvey, Deputy Administrator Monte Belger,
on down. The FAA has performed magnificently, as have crucial
players in our Department, including the United States Coast
Guard and all of those who work so well and who were well
prepared in our Department of Transportation Crisis Management
Center.
On the morning of Tuesday, September 11, I was having
breakfast with the deputy prime minister of Belgium, Isabel
Durant, who is also their minister of transport, and my chief
of staff, John Flaherty, came in and said: Excuse me, Mr.
Secretary; may I see you? So I excused myself and went into the
office, and the television set was on. The first thing I see is
smoke billowing from the World Trade Center building.
So he said: We don't know what it is. We think it might
have been some sort of an explosion. So I said: Well, keep me
posted, and I went back into the meeting with Mrs. Durant.
Around 5 or 6 minutes later, he came back in and said: Mr.
Secretary, may I see you? So I came back out, and he said: It's
been confirmed it is an airplane that went into the World Trade
Center. And as I am sitting there watching the television, all
of a sudden from the right came this grey object, and then all
of a sudden this plume of orange smoke that came out from the
other side of the building.
So I immediately went into the conference room and said to
Mrs. Durant: You are going to have to excuse me; I am going to
have to attend to some matters here. By that time I had been
called by the White House to come immediately to the White
House, and I went over there, walked into the White House, went
into the situation room, and was briefed by Dick Clark, a
member of the staff of the National Security Council.
Then he said: You have got to join the Vice President over
in the operations center. So I was escorted by the Secret
Service over to the operations center.
You know, when one of something occurs it is an accident.
When two of the same thing occur, it is a pattern. While we
were in the operations center, we then heard about an explosion
at the Pentagon. We thought we heard also that it might have
been a helicopter. Then it became apparent it was an American
Airlines air carrier that had gone into the Pentagon. But when
you have three of the same thing occur, it is a pattern.
So immediately I called the FAA and I said: Get all the
airplanes down right now. We do not know what is going on. All
we are getting are, frankly, watching CNN, Fox, and other
reports coming into the operations center. Well, at that point
I believe there were a little over 4,500 aircraft in the air,
and in less than 2 hours, 1 hour and 56 minutes, we were able
to get every one of those airplanes down, due to the great
professionalism of the air traffic controllers, flight deck
crews, and pilots throughout the country.
All that we have learned since that fateful morning leaves
me convinced that this unusual command was the right thing to
do. And thanks to thorough preparation, the Department of
Transportation's Crisis Management Center took only minutes to
kick into action, and the various modal administrations secured
thousands of transportation facilities, and the United States
Coast Guard secured our harbors and waterways while also
readying its rescue operations.
Heightened security measures
As we look into the future, the administration is already
moving to restore public confidence in our transportation
system and infrastructure. On September 11 I announced the
gradual restoration of mobility within the national air space
system. We took immediate steps to develop heightened security
measures, to ensure the safety of airline passengers as well as
people on the ground.
As all of you are very well aware, all of the country's
major airports, with the exception of the Ronald Reagan
Washington National Airport, have resumed air service
operations. We are working with the United States Secret
Service, and they are considering the security implications of
the reopening of Ronald Reagan National Airport.
Now, because safety is of paramount importance, I required
that heightened security measures, including a thorough search
and security check of all airplanes and airports, were to be in
place before any air service resumed last week. In addition, we
discontinued curbside check-in at every airport, and passengers
are now required to go to the ticket counters to check baggage.
We also discontinued off-airport check-in. Only ticketed
passengers are allowed to proceed past airport screeners. Well-
wishers must stay out of the secured areas, and there will be
no exceptions.
Now, consistent with the strict security measures imposed
upon startup last week, I announced on Sunday the creation of
two rapid response teams, consisting of FAA employees, to offer
specific recommendations to me for the further improvement of
security within our national aviation system. One team is
focusing on ways to increase security at our Nation's airports.
The other is focusing on aircraft integrity and security, with
specific attention to cockpit access and an expanded Federal
air marshal program. Both teams are meeting regularly and with
urgency. Their reports are due October 1 at the latest, and I
am in touch just about daily with the work of those two rapid
response teams.
Now, these internal teams will have input from a
distinguished group of Americans with a wide range of
expertise, and a key assignment to the airport security team is
how best to increase the Federal role and presence in security
screening. We are past the question of ``whether'' and are now
focused on the question of ``how''.
Now, please note that the need for a broader perspective as
we address both security and commerce is paramount. The events
of September 11 have focused media and public attention almost
exclusively on aviation, which is understandable. However, our
departmental responsibility is to be equally concerned about
other modes of transportation. Under authority from the Ports
and Waterways Safety Act, we have taken action to control the
movement of all vessels in the navigable waters of the United
States. All ports and waterways have remained open and secure
since September 12, and we have put pipeline operators on
alert.
As we restore America's confidence in our ability to
maintain the mobility and general freedoms that we hold dear,
Congress, the Executive Branch, and the American people must
not lose sight of the fact of the sobering need for heightened
vigilance. We cannot allow this enemy to destabilize our
political system, our economy, and our way of life, and we will
not.
As I am sure this committee understands, the economic
viability of the United States airlines is now also an urgent
and crucial matter. Given the crucial role of air carriers and
the role of terrorist attacks in this economic trauma,
immediate action is mandated. Today we hope to be submitting a
proposal that will include certain general principles and
specifics, because we have been working on these issues
urgently and intensely since last week. We have worked with
airline CEO's, labor union leaders, and the financial
community, and we have met with congressional leaders from both
sides of the aisle last night, this morning, and these meetings
are going on. Those meetings are continuing at this present
time.
Now, the package at this point includes $3 billion for
airlines to offset new costs for heightened and tightened
security, $5 billion in direct economic relief, authorization
for use of the war risk insurance program at the President's
discretion in the domestic as well as in the international
arena, and, fourth, limited modification to certain aspects of
collateral liability in order to avert a near-term threat to
continued availability of insurance.
These modifications will provide a brief time in which to
resolve that threat for the longer term. Also, there has been a
strong message of support from congressional leaders on both
sides of the aisle in both bodies of the United States Congress
for some near-term financial support, and administration and
congressional leaders are attempting to address these issues at
this very moment.
Time is of the essence for these proposals, and therefore I
hope that the measure that we offer up will move forward
immediately. We would then have the time necessary to consider
and consult with you about additional measures that may prove
to be necessary.
I would like to close by noting my own firm commitment to
working with the legislative leaders here today. You already
deserve thanks for the swift bipartisan action that you took
last week to provide supplemental appropriations that helped
get action under way across the Federal Government. In these
traumatic times, I look forward to the honor of working closely
with all of you as we face the complex and crucial challenges
that lie ahead.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Madam Chairwoman, I would like to ask unanimous consent
that my full statement be made a part of the record.
Senator Murray. Without objection.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Norman Y. Mineta
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, it is with both sadness and
resolve that I appear before you today. Obviously, our lives, and the
life of our nation, changed dramatically as a result of the terrible
attack of September 11.
Though we will never overcome the sorrow we feel for the families
and friends who lost loved ones, we will be able to ensure public
safety.
And, while it may take time to recreate comfortable confidence in
air travel, I assure this committee that we can--and will--enjoy a
transportation system that is safe, secure, and stable. The effort
being expended by the government, the carriers, airport authorities,
local police forces, and others on behalf of aviation will continue,
and the traveling public can count on this.
That is the President's commitment, and I will marshal all
resources of the Department of Transportation to accomplish that
fundamental goal.
I should begin by taking this public opportunity to express my
profound gratitude and pride in the performance of the employees
throughout the Department of Transportation. I want to emphasize
particularly my appreciation for the professionalism displayed by the
FAA from top-to-bottom since the attack. From Administrator Garvey on
down, the FAA has performed magnificently, as have other crucial
players in our Department, including the Coast Guard and all those who
worked with the well-prepared DOT Crisis Management Center.
I hope here briefly to outline some of the key activities of our
Department on September 11 and then to move to essential plans for our
future.
On the morning of September 11th, on first word of the attack, I
moved directly to the Presidential Emergency Operations Center in the
White House. As soon as I was aware of the nature and scale of the
attack, I called from the White House to order the air traffic system
to land all aircraft, immediately and without exception. That was an
unprecedented step. But with the risk of additional flights that might
be used as terrorist weapons, I believe that it was the right and
necessary step to take.
In the moments that followed my call, countless brave, tough, and
smart Federal air traffic controllers worked with courageous and calm
pilots and flight crews to land over 4,500 aircraft. Though all these
emergency landings were entirely unplanned, they were safely and
successfully accomplished. That was a historic feat in crisis
management, and it illustrated the magnificent skill of key players in
our transportation systems.
This Committee should also be aware of the extraordinarily rapid
response achieved with respect to all modes of transportation
throughout our country on September 11th.
Thanks to elaborate simulation and preparation, the Department of
Transportation's Crisis Management Center took only minutes to kick
into action. The first crash occurred at 8:46 am, and the Crisis
Management Center was fully operational--with secure lines of
communication, initiation of security procedures, and key contacts on
line--by 9 am. Then, in a pre-planned fashion, the Department rapidly
secured thousands of transportation hubs and corridors across the
United States--including bridges and rail lines, roads and harbors.
Of course, as we move forward, we must dramatically alter our
approach. As President Bush has said: the world has changed. I add: so
too has the very nature of our national transportation system.
The events of the past several days require us to take new steps to
move people and commerce safely and efficiently, despite the fact that
the nature of the threat has clearly changed. It is a mission we cannot
afford to leave for a later time.
This Administration is already moving to restore and enhance our
air transportation system. On September 13th, I announced the gradual
restoration of flights within the national airspace system. We took
immediate steps to develop heightened security measures to ensure the
safety of airline passengers as well as people on the ground.
All of the country's major airports have resumed scheduled domestic
commercial and cargo service operations, with the exception of Reagan
National Airport, which remains temporarily closed. Scheduled passenger
airline service is operating at about 78 percent of normal levels.
General aviation operations have also resumed except for visual flight
rules operations in the immediate vicinity of our nation's 30 largest
airports. We are currently increasing access to international
commercial and general aviation flights.
Because safety is of paramount importance, I required that
heightened security measures be in place before any air service
resumed. A thorough search and security check of all airplanes and
airports took place before passengers were allowed to enter and board
aircraft.
We discontinued curbside check-in at every airport. We discontinued
off-airport check-in. We no longer allow passengers to check in for
their flights at hotels or other locations. All passengers are now
required to go to the ticket counters to check baggage. Only ticketed
passengers and authorized personnel are allowed to proceed past airport
screeners--well-wishers must stay out of the secured areas.
Let there be no doubt: we will soon be taking additional steps to
increase security beyond those already taken.
Now we must deal more broadly with the aftermath of September 11th.
We have already turned toward development of long-term, sustainable
security improvements within our airports and on our aircraft to ensure
American passengers are provided with the highest possible levels of
safety.
Consistent with the strict security measures imposed upon startup
last week, I announced on Sunday the creation of two Rapid Response
teams to make specific recommendations for the further improvement of
security within the national aviation system. Their conclusions are due
October 1, at the latest. One team is focusing on ways to increase
security at our nation's airports. The other is focusing on aircraft
integrity and security. Among those areas that will be addressed will
be making airport screening a more credible deterrent, expanding the
Federal Air Marshal program, and enhancing cockpit security. Both teams
are now undertaking their tasks with a sense of urgency.
As they work on these teams, our own experts at the Federal
Aviation Administration and Department of Transportation will have
input from a distinguished group of Americans with a wide range of
expertise in many different aspects of air transportation and law
enforcement.
I understand the complexity of these issues, and I know there have
been numerous studies on many of these issues. Yet the larger context
has changed dramatically. We now face a different security threat not
only in transportation, but in all aspects of American life. We have to
be willing to meet that changed threat with additional counter-
measures, and still find ways to keep our transportation systems the
efficient and vital circulation system of our economy. We must
therefore judge our security options in a different light than we might
have judged them in the past.
What I expect now are good, unambiguous answers to the new
questions and heightened risks. The Department of Transportation has
acted promptly in response to the changed circumstances, and we will
take further actions promptly.
broader security concerns
We also need to keep a broad perspective as we address both
security and commerce. The events of September 11th have focused media
and public attention almost exclusively on aviation, which is
understandable. Yet, as Vice President Cheney has noted, the odds are
good that terrorists may use entirely new lines of attack. The
Department I am honored to direct is focusing on all modes of
transportation, including but not limited to airplanes and airports.
Thus, under authority from the Ports and Waterways Safety Act, we
have taken action to control the movement of all vessels in the
navigable waters of the United States.
All ports and waterways have remained open and secure since Sept.
12 with very limited exceptions. We put pipeline operators on alert.
And with the resources provided to the U.S. Coast Guard, it has
performed with monumental efficiency.
In the New York City area, our employees have worked selflessly for
days to bring services back, provide alternative means of access to the
City, and, at the same time, guard against possible further acts of
terrorism.
I want to emphasize the over-arching threat we now face. The new
security measures we have already implemented--and those we will
implement both publicly and discreetly--are not designed simply to deal
with threats of further attacks like those of September 11th.
For example, the President has asked our Department to help protect
the integrity of our nation's entire transportation infrastructure. And
that is what we are doing. But we also have to recognize that we have
to meet the challenge of new and different security threats not only in
transportation, but throughout our society.
We will have to take precautions in transportation that we have
never taken before, and we will have to do the same in virtually every
aspect of American life. We will find ways to preserve the best of our
transportation systems--the freedom of movement, the safe and efficient
movement of goods and people that is so necessary to our economy. We
will find ways to accomplish both heightened security and the benefits
of an efficient transportation system.
economic response
I turn now to another critical topic--maintaining the air
transportation system in the face of severe financial problems. The
current situation in the airline industry is that access to credit
markets is greatly restricted and revenues dramatically diminished.
I would emphasize that the task at hand is not to prop up one or
another of the carriers. It is not to ``make whole'' the industry as if
September 11th had never occurred. Rather it is to recognize that this
key part of the economy of this country requires new foundations in
security and confidence as solid as they were once before. I believe
the Federal Government has a responsibility for the safety of the
public, airline passengers and crews in particular, and to ensure the
foundation of security, insurance, and other necessities that will help
this key part of the U.S. economy function. This nation needs a vital,
viable, and competitive airline industry.
Accordingly, we are proposing on an expedited basis an initial
package to provide strength, security, and confidence in air
transportation.
Our proposal includes:
--$3 billion to airlines to help offset the substantial new costs
they are incurring because of tightened security requirements.
--$5 billion in direct and immediate payments to airlines, roughly in
proportion to their size.
--Authorization for the War Risk Insurance Program to be invoked, at
the President's discretion, in the domestic arena as well as
the international.
--Limited modifications to certain aspects of collateral liability,
in order to avert a near-term threat to the continued
availability of insurance coverage. The main purpose is to give
us a brief period of time in which to try to resolve that
threat.
We have additional steps under consideration, some of which would
take additional time to fully sort out. We believe that on the measures
we are now proposing, time is of the essence. We believe these
proposals should move forward immediately, and we would then have
additional days to consider and to consult with you on additional
measures that may be needed.
I would like to close by taking this occasion to thank this
Congress for its swift, bipartisan action last week in providing needed
supplemental appropriations to get action underway across the
Government. I look forward to working closely with each of you as we
face and meet the challenges ahead.
This completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond
to the Committee's questions.
Senator Murray. Ms. Garvey.
STATEMENT OF JANE F. GARVEY, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL
AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION
Ms. Garvey. Thank you. Madam Chair, Chairman Rogers, and
Members of the Committee: It is an honor for me to be here
today to appear before you. I would like to begin by joining
the Secretary in offering my heartfelt condolences and prayers
and those of everyone at the FAA to the family and friends of
those who were lost last Tuesday. I know a number of you had
constituents on several of those flights involved in the World
Trade Center. I offer you our condolences as well.
I would also like to take a moment, if I could, to publicly
express my profound gratitude to the staff of the FAA and in
particular to the air traffic controllers. One editorial writer
who traveled on a plane that morning wrote later that: ``In a
life and death situation that might have been even more
catastrophic, the controllers, the systems people, the
management supporting them, did their jobs and in so doing
brought tens of thousands of Americans safely back to earth.''
It is a singular honor to associate myself with their
professionalism today.
Security measures
As the Secretary has noted, in the aftermath of last
Tuesday the President called on all Americans to begin to
return to normal as quickly as possible. For those of us at the
FAA, that has meant that we need to focus on two principal
areas. One is to work with the airport community and with the
airlines to put in place more stringent security measures. The
Secretary has mentioned a number of those measures. Some of
them are clearly visible to the traveling public; others are
less so.
I would just add that one overriding principle for us was
to create a series of redundancies in the system that would
make the system even more secure. We are--and I know this has
been mentioned by Chairman Rogers, so I do want to comment on
the Federal air marshal program. We are enormously grateful to
Congress. The money and the resources that you provided have
allowed us to move forward very, very quickly to put in place
more Federal air marshals. We think that is extraordinarily
important. We are also deeply grateful to the Attorney General,
who has come forward with a number of Treasury and Justice
officials to help us in that program. We are very grateful for
that.
System efficiency
The second focus for us, of course, has been to restore the
system. We have been doing that in a methodical and a very
deliberate way and in very close daily collaboration with the
aviation community and with the airport community. It began, of
course, with the airlines by their systematic sweep of all the
aircraft that were involved and on the ground. We worked very
closely with the airports to bring those airports into full
certification. We continue to do that. Every day there are more
parts of the system that we want to open up and we will
continue to do that on a daily basis.
As the Secretary has mentioned, the incidents of last week
have really caused all of us--and I really mean all of us, the
airlines, the airport operators, the public policymakers--to
rethink the balance of responsibility for civil aviation
security. It has changed the way we think. I think if you look
at the security measures that we had in place, much of it was
very much geared toward explosives, and we have had to really
rethink and challenge every assumption that we had in place
before September 11. We are doing that.
Rapid response team
That really leads me to my last point. I believe that the
measures we have put in place are the right measures, but they
are not the only measures. The Secretary spoke about the rapid
response teams that we put in place last weekend. We are
vigorously working those issues and we believe that those
recommendations will allow us to move forward. I will only add
that the direction that I have given to the staff based on my
conversation with the Secretary is that this must be action-
oriented, this must be viewed both in the short term and in the
long term with some very specific action items that we can
undertake.
Finally, Madam Chairman, if I could, let me just add that,
like all Americans, there were moments last week when all of us
at the FAA felt quiet moments of despair and to some degree
desperation. There were some pretty tough moments in the
operations center, but I have to say that even in those moments
of despair there was an overarching sense of resolve. We are
determined to do whatever it takes to work, if it means 24
hours a day as some people have been working, we are committed
to restoring public confidence in the aviation system.
We thank you for your support and your confidence and your
continued attention to this issue. Thank you.
Senator Murray. Thank you, Ms. Garvey.
Mr. Mead.
STATEMENT OF KENNETH M. MEAD, INSPECTOR GENERAL, OFFICE
OF THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION
Mr. Mead. Thank you.
I think there are some things that get engraved in your
mind, as in marble. I remember to this day President Kennedy
getting shot and exactly what I was doing, and the day that the
Challenger blew up, and now the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon is forever embedded there. So I think I just wanted to
start off my brief remarks by expressing sorrow to the many
families who have lost loved ones as a result of the attacks of
last week and my enormous regard for Secretary Mineta and
Administrator Garvey and the many rescue and relief workers
that have sacrificed so much over the past week.
I must say that Mr. Dillingham of GAO and ourselves in the
Inspector General's Office have for at least a decade, perhaps
a little more, made numerous recommendations for strengthening
the aviation security system on a number of fronts. Reports
showing vulnerabilities in the screening of passengers, checked
and carry on baggage and cargo, access to security areas of the
airport, and the issue of controlling airport identification
badges.
Most recently, a private security company was placed on 36-
month probation, ordered to pay over $1 million in fines for
failing to conduct background checks, falsifying training
records for employees entrusted with security screening at a
major U.S. airport. As recently as Friday, we arrested 12 non-
U.S. citizens for illegally obtaining airport access media or
identification badges.
I wanted this subcommittee to know that we have temporarily
detailed some of law enforcement staff to the Federal Air
Marshal program. I think it is a very wise decision to beef up
this program and make it more robust. I think that will go a
long way toward restoring confidence and having a deterrent
effect.
I think we all know that the events of last week show the
need to tighten up aviation security, that there are
vulnerabilities in it. But it is not going to be foolproof,
especially when you have people who are willing to die in the
commission of their criminal acts. That is why I think it is
always important in discussions, on the subject of aviation
security, to say why it is important to root out this terrorism
to begin with, because it is going to be impossible to design a
system that will be foolproof.
I would like to highlight two sets of issues. One has to do
with the governance and organization of aviation security, how
we deliver it in this country; and secondly, just highlight a
few aviation security areas I think can be strengthened in
addition to the measures that have already been put in place
over the past week.
Organization of aviation security
Given the scope and complexity of the security challenge as
we know it now, coupled with the longstanding history of
problems with the aviation security program, I think the time
has come to revisit the option of vesting governance of the
program and responsibility for the provision of security in one
Federal organization or not-for-profit Federal corporation.
It does not mean that everybody has to be a Federal
employee, but it does mean a much more robust Federal presence
and control. That entity would have security as its primary and
central focus, profession, and mission. Under our current
oversight system, we have asked FAA to oversee and regulate
aviation security and those charged with providing the
security, the airlines and the airports, themselves face other
priorities, missions, and indeed in some cases competing
economic pressures.
I think a centralized, consolidated approach with a
security mission would require passenger and baggage screeners
to have uniform, more rigorous training and performance
standards applicable nationwide. I think that would result in
more consistent security across this country and of higher
quality.
You will not be able to do this overnight. A transition
period would be required. So in the interim some measures have
to be put in place to make the best of what we have and restore
public confidence. I would just like to make a few points that
weigh in this regard. Congress has put a lot of money into
these explosive detection machines. I believe they are
substantially underutilized. They continue to be substantially
underutilized, and I think that we should immediately increase
the utilization of these machines. They detect sophisticated
explosives. They do a good job, I think, and now is the time to
use them, even though it may mean some extra delay in checking
in a passenger.
Recommendations to enhance aviation security
Screening checkpoint security. It is imperative that we get
tougher standards out there for these screeners and soon, and
that will probably have a resultant effect of increasing their
pay somewhat. But that has been a problem going back 14 years.
Airport access controls. This is very important, too. This
is where you do not go through the passenger screening station;
instead, you go through a door. There is a technique called
piggybacking, where a legitimate employee walks through the
door and someone can follow that person right out, if they are
not careful. So it is very important that we get tight security
in the airport secure operations area.
PREPARED STATEMENT
I think also we should immediately begin doing criminal
background checks on all employees at the airport and
screeners, even those that have been employed for a while, in
other words not just new employees.
Those are a few steps I think we can take in addition to
the ones that are already in place. Thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kenneth M. Mead
Chairpersons Murray and Rogers, Ranking Members Shelby and Sabo,
and Members of the Subcommittees: We want to first express our sorrow
to the many families who have lost or are missing loved ones as a
result of the terrorist attacks last week. We also want to acknowledge
the national response the President, Secretary Mineta, other Department
heads, the Congress, law enforcement, and the many rescue and relief
workers have taken regarding these attacks.
We have been reporting on aviation security for at least a decade
and have made numerous recommendations for strengthening the system
covering a broad range of issues within the security system--advanced
security technologies, passenger and baggage screening, airport access
control, and cargo security. In the last several years alone, we have
issued reports showing vulnerabilities with screening of passengers;
checked and carry-on baggage and cargo; access to secure areas of the
airport; and issuing and controlling airport identification badges.
We also have conducted numerous criminal investigations resulting
in prosecutions involving the falsification of airport identification,
security screener training records, and background checks. Most
recently, a private security company was placed on 36 months probation
and ordered to pay over $1 million in fines and restitution for failing
to conduct background checks and falsifying training records on
employees staffing security checkpoints at a major U.S. airport. Also,
since last Friday, we have arrested 12 non-U.S. citizens who illegally
obtained security badges necessary to gain admittance to secure areas
at another major U.S. airport. We would like the Subcommittees to know
that we temporarily detailed some of our law enforcement staff to the
Federal Air Marshal Program, and we are assisting the FBI in various
aspects of its investigation.
The horror and tragedy of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,
with the loss of thousands of lives and the resultant economic damage,
illustrates the vulnerability of the current security system. It also
shows that our transportation systems, in this case aviation, can be
used as a weapon against us. The aviation security system, as a vital
national security interest, is a critical line of defense, but it is
not foolproof, particularly against terrorists who are willing to die
in their criminal schemes. This is why the effort to stop terrorist
attacks along with the strengthening of transportation security is so
important.
Also, public confidence in the security of the Nation's
transportation systems, especially aviation, has been seriously damaged
and needs to be restored. The President, Departments of Justice and
Transportation and others already have a broad range of security
measures underway to address this issue. One such measure is increasing
the workforce in the Federal Air Marshall Program. Other additional
measures currently in place at all the Nation's commercial airports
include increased security such as: eliminating curbside baggage check-
in, intensified passenger and carry-on baggage screening at security
checkpoints, and limiting access beyond the screening checkpoints to
passengers with tickets or ticket confirmations.
Today, I would like to highlight some issues concerning governance
and organizational structure of how to approach aviation security and
then proceed to some specific areas that need to be strengthened. We
will be sharing these points in detail with the Secretary's Rapid
Response Teams.
governance, organization and delivery of aviation security
The current U.S. system has a variety of organizations responsible
for various elements of aviation security. Other Nations use models
different from ours. In Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom, the
airports are responsible for screening. In the Netherlands, the
government is currently responsible for passenger screening, but
employs a security company to conduct the screening operations.
Given the scope and complexity of the security challenge as we now
know it, coupled with a longstanding history of problems with the
aviation security program, we believe the time has come to consider the
option of vesting governance of the program and responsibility for the
provision of security in one Federal organization or not-for-profit
Federal corporation. This entity would have security as its primary and
central focus, profession, and mission. Under the current system, those
charged with aviation security oversight and regulation (FAA) and those
charged with providing the security (the airlines and airports) are
themselves facing other priorities, missions, and, in some cases,
competing economic pressures.
A centralized, consolidated approach by an organization with a
security mission would require passenger and baggage screeners to have
uniform, more rigorous training, and performance standards applicable
nationwide. The employees of this entity would not necessarily need to
be Federal employees, but would be required to meet established
performance standards, and would be subject to termination if they do
not perform. This should result in more consistent security at our
Nation's airports.
A Federal organization or Federal corporation would be responsible
for screening passengers, employees (anyone with access to the aircraft
or secure areas of the airport), carry-on baggage, checked baggage, and
cargo. It would also issue, control and account for identification
media at airports nationwide; search aircraft and airport facilities
with canine units; and manage airport access control systems. The
organization could also include the current Federal Air Marshals; and
could take over responsibility for developing, purchasing and deploying
advanced security equipment, such as explosives detection equipment.
The organization, not the airlines, FAA, or airports, would determine
when the security equipment should be used to screen baggage and be
responsible for the maintenance and upgrading of this equipment.
This entity would also be able to maintain close ties to the
intelligence community, revise requirements or procedures without going
through a lengthy rulemaking process, require employees to be U.S.
citizens and have background and credit checks, and provide screening
personnel better salaries and a career path.
Any change in the governance and organization of this system will
require careful analysis, cannot be done overnight, and will require a
transition period. In the interim, we must sustain the current system
and improve security measures now in place.
changes needed to supplement and enhance security actions already
underway
The aviation security system in place today is a layered system of
systems in place at the Nation's airports. This system involves
prescreening passengers at check-in; screening passengers' checked and
carry-on baggage, and cargo at security control points in the airports;
controlling access to secure areas of the airport; and restricting
access to secure areas of the airport to unauthorized individuals.
Aviation security in the U.S. is also based on a system of shared
responsibilities among FAA, air carriers, and airport operators. FAA is
responsible for establishing and enforcing regulations, policies, and
procedures; identifying potential threats and appropriate
countermeasures; deploying Federal Air Marshals on selected U.S. air
carrier flights; and providing overall guidance and oversight to ensure
the security of passengers, crews, baggage, cargo, and aircraft. Air
carriers are primarily responsible for applying security measures to
passengers, crews, baggage, and cargo. This includes screening all
passengers, and passengers' carry-on and checked baggage, which is
usually performed by contractors. Airports, run by State or local
government authorities, are responsible for the security of the airport
environment and for providing law enforcement support for
implementation of air carrier and airport security measures.
The Department of Transportation's Office of Inspector General
(OIG) and the General Accounting Office (GAO) have issued numerous
reports identifying weaknesses in the aviation security system and
recommending corrective actions. Many of these weaknesses are still
present and need to be addressed without delay. The following
paragraphs highlight those areas that need immediate attention by FAA.
These areas include security of checked baggage, screening checkpoint
security, cargo security, controlling access to secure areas of the
airport, issuing airport identification, and the Federal Air Marshal
Program. We will be providing this information to the Secretary's Rapid
Response Teams.
security of checked baggage
Explosives detection equipment such as the CTX machine was
developed to assist screeners in identifying threat items in passenger
baggage. In our 1998 report on Deployment of Explosives Detection
Equipment, we recommended that FAA develop a strategy to more
effectively utilize the CTX machines and enhance screener performance.
Recently, Congress passed the Aviation Security Improvement Act of
2000, which requires FAA to maximize the use of explosives detection
equipment. Today, however CTX machines are still underused, and
screeners' performance needs improvement.
FAA has taken action to increase utilization of bulk explosives
detection machines. However, we do not accept the utilization goals
that FAA has chosen. It is too low. Nor do we accept that FAA's goals
are responsive to the requirements mandated in the Airport Security
Improvement Act of 2000. The majority of the machines are still
underutilized. A bulk explosives detection machine in use has an
immediate, powerful, and visible deterrent effect on potential
terrorist attack. One sitting idle does not.
screening checkpoint security
In our 1996 report on efforts to improve airport security we found
screeners frequently failed to detect threat items at security
checkpoints. More recently, GAO completed a review titled Long-Standing
Problems Impair Airport Screeners' Performance.\1\ In this 2000 report,
GAO found that long-standing problems combine to reduce screeners'
effectiveness in detecting dangerous objects, most notably (1) the
rapid turnover of screener personnel, and (2) human factors conditions
that for years affected screeners' hiring, training, and working
environment. GAO found that despite several laws enacted by Congress,
concerns remain over screeners' ability to detect dangerous objects.
Furthermore, FAA has acknowledged that screeners' detection of
dangerous objects during testing is unsatisfactory and needs
improvement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Aviation Security: Long-Standing Problems Impair Airport
Screeners' Performance, Report Number GAO/RCED-00-75, dated June 2000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This is a long-standing problem--one that was reported on over a
decade ago by the Department of Transportation and GAO.
cargo security
We just completed a follow-up audit of FAA's Cargo Security
Program. We continue to find weaknesses in FAA's policy for allowing
cargo on passenger aircraft. We will not discuss the details of those
weaknesses here today, but will be briefing the Secretary of
Transportation, the Federal Aviation Administrator, and the Secretary's
recently created Rapid Response Teams.
airport access controls
Controlling access to secure areas of the airport is critical in
protecting the airport's infrastructure and aircraft from unauthorized
individuals. During late 1998 and early 1999, we successfully accessed
secure areas \2\ in 68 percent of our tests at eight major U.S.
airports. Once we entered secure areas, we boarded aircraft 117 times.
The majority of our aircraft boardings would not have occurred if
employees had taken the prescribed steps, such as making sure doors
closed behind them. In addition to recommending that FAA work with
airport operators and air carriers to implement and strengthen existing
controls to eliminate access control weaknesses, we also recommended
that comprehensive training programs be developed that teach employees
their role in airport security, and make employees accountable for
compliance. These recommendations along with others were incorporated
into the Airport Security Improvement Act of 2000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ OIG uses the term secure area to define the area of an airport
where each person is required to display airport-approved
identification. Each airport defines this area, which may be the entire
Air Operations Area or may be limited to a smaller, more restrictive
area.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FAA recently issued regulations making individuals directly
accountable to FAA for noncompliance with access control requirements.
But testing and assessing fines for security violations is not the only
answer. FAA must assist airport operators and air carriers in
developing and implementing comprehensive training programs. All
security training programs, not just for access control, must teach
employees their role in aviation security, the importance of their
participation, how their performance will be evaluated, and what action
will be taken if they fail to perform.
issuing airport identification
Additional actions are needed to improve the process used to ensure
that employees with access to secure areas of an airport are
trustworthy. Our 2000 report on Controls Over Airport Identification
Media looked at industry's compliance with FAA's background
investigation requirements at six U.S. airports and found that the
requirements were ineffective, and airport operators, air carriers and
airport users \3\ frequently did not comply with these requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Airport users include foreign air carriers, non-air-carrier
airport tenants, and companies that do not have offices at the airport,
but require access to the secure airport areas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We made recommendations to FAA to: strengthen background
investigation requirements to include initial and randomly recurring
FBI criminal checks for all employees; expand the list of crimes that
disqualify an individual from unescorted access to secure airport
areas; and incorporate in background investigation requirements the use
of credit checks and drug tests to help assess whether individuals can
be trusted with the public's safety and be permitted to work in secure
airport areas.
The Airport Security Improvement Act of 2000 incorporated some of
our recommendations and required FBI criminal checks at Category X
airports as of December 2000. However, other airports will not enter
this program until December 2003, even though FAA has stated the
capacity to process additional checks exists. We recommended that all
airports be required, immediately, to conduct criminal checks for all
employees that have access to secure airport areas, and for all
screeners, including cargo screeners. Also, criminal checks must not be
restricted to first-time applicants, as the current law provides, but
should include all employees regardless of their employment date.
Further, criminal checks must be recurring.
We also must consider additional methods of determining the
trustworthiness of individuals, especially for individuals who have not
been in the U.S. long enough for a criminal records check to be
effective. FAA has stated that conducting foreign criminal checks
presents numerous problems and, therefore, would not be feasible. FAA
also declined to implement the use of credit checks and drug tests
because Airport Security Improvement Act of 2000 did not include these
requirements. But, we believe that alternate investigation methods,
such as those used by Canada, must be explored, including: credit
checks, requirements that applicants be U.S. citizens, and an automated
profiling system that takes into consideration factors including an
individual's place of birth.
federal air marshal program
In the 1970's, hundreds of security officers were hired through an
agreement between the FAA and U.S. Customs Service. In 1973, after the
Customs Sky Marshal program phased out, the FAA continued a limited Air
Marshal Program using volunteer special agents from its Civil Aviation
Security.
Following the Cuban refugee problems in Florida and the hijacking
of Trans World Flight 847 in 1985, the Secretary of Transportation
released a report, in 1987, which concluded there was a need for an
expanded Federal Air Marshal (FAM) Program to supplement ground
security measures. Initially, all FAA security specialists hired
between 1985 and 1992 were required to also serve as FAMs. Currently,
FAA has a dedicated staff of FAMs, but the actual number of FAMs is
classified. We think it is a wise decision to substantially increase
use of this Program in the interest of restoring public confidence and
as a deterrent to criminal on aircraft.
This concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer any
questions.
AVIATION SECURITY TESTIMONY AND REPORTS AS OF SEPTEMBER 14, 2001
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date Title Report Number
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Testimony
04/06/2000.................. Aviation Security. Statement of Alexis Stefani, Assistant AV-2000-076
Inspector General for Auditing Before the Subcommittee on
Aviation, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
U.S. Senate.
03/16/2000.................. Aviation Security. Statement of Alexis Stefani, Assistant AV-2000-070
Inspector General for Auditing Before the Subcommittee on
Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S.
House of Representatives.
03/01/2000.................. Improving Aviation Safety, Efficiency, and Security: FAA's fiscal AV-2000-054
year 2001 Request For Research, Engineering, and Development,
Statement of Alexis Stefani, Assistant Inspector General for
Auditing Before the Subcommittee on Technology, Committee on
Science, U.S. House of Representatives.
03/10/1999.................. Aviation Security. Statement of Alexis Stefani, Deputy Assistant AV-1999-068
Inspector General for Aviation Before the Subcommittee on
Transportation and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations,
U.S. House of Representatives.
05/14/1998.................. Aviation Security. Statement of Alexis Stefani, Deputy Assistant AV-1998-134
Inspector General for Aviation Before the Subcommittee on
Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S.
House of Representatives.
Audit Reports
12/07/2000.................. Controls Over Airport Identification Media........................ AV-2001-010
11/18/1999.................. Airport Access Control............................................ AV-2000-017
10/21/1999.................. Deployment of Explosives Detection Equipment...................... AV-2000-002
07/16/1999.................. Security of Checked Baggage on Flights Within the United States... AV-1999-113
10/05/1998.................. Deployment of Explosives Detection Systems........................ AV-1999-001
07/17/1998.................. Dangerous Goods/Cargo Security Program............................ AV-1998-178
06/01/1998.................. Management Advisory on Review of Security Controls Over Air AV-1998-149
Courier Shipments.
04/17/1997.................. Federal Air Marshall Program...................................... R9-FA-7-006
7/03/1996................... Efforts to Improve Airport Security............................... R9-FA-6-014
09/20/1993.................. Audit of Airport Security......................................... R9-FA-3-105
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AVIATION SECURITY--INVESTIGATIONS
[February 3, 1999 through September 14, 2001]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subject Area Date Summary
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Screeners & Baggage Handlers... Sept. 14, 2001........... Employees who are non-U.S. citizens without proper
INS status were authorized to enter secured areas
of Dulles, ongoing investigation.
Security Badges................ Sept. 14, 2001........... Arrest warrants were issued against non-U.S.
citizens who obtained security badges at Miami
International Airport.
Security Badges................ Sept. 13, 2001........... Employee at Miami International Airport pleads
guilty to using job in ID section to make false
security badges for coworkers.
Cockpit Access................. June 7, 2001............. Civilian used false FAA ID card to obtain
unauthorized cockpit access on 3 separate flights.
Access Control................. June 5, 2001............. Non-employee of Miami International Airport
illegally used an Airport Secured ID Display Area
access badge to gain entry to a secured area.
Access Control................. February 1, 2001......... Miami International Airport employee gained access
to secured areas by providing false data on Airport
ID Badge application.
Screeners...................... October 25, 2000......... Private firm (Argenbright) failed to conduct
background checks on checkpoint screeners at
Philadelphia Airport. Company fined $1 million,
$350,000 restitution and $200,000 in investigative
costs.
Access Control................. May 1, 2000.............. Employees at Dallas-Ft. Worth Airport allowed
unauthorized personnel to use their security badges
to gain access to secured areas.
Screeners...................... March 27, 2000........... Private firm (Aviation Safeguards) falsely certified
on at least 70 occasions that criminal background
checks had been accomplished on employees seeking
access to secure areas at Miami International
Airport.
Access Control................. Feb. 3, 1999............. Miami-Dade County Police Office falsely certified
that criminal background checks had been
accomplished on 22 employees seeking access to
secure areas at Miami International Airport. Upon
hiring, applicants had clearance to enter secured
areas of the airport.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Murray. Thank you, Mr. Mead.
Dr. Dillingham.
STATEMENT OF GERALD L. DILLINGHAM, Ph.D., DIRECTOR,
PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES, GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Dr. Dillingham. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you for
the opportunity to be here this afternoon. We join with others
in acknowledging that we do not know all the elements of our
Nation's aviation security system that failed and served as a
contributing cause to the horrendous disaster that occurred on
September 11. We also are cognizant of the fact that aviation
security is a shared responsibility and that no security system
will be 100 percent safe. However, we do believe that more can
be and should be done to increase the effectiveness of our
Nation's aviation security system.
The work we have done for this committee and other
committees of the Congress over the last few years has
identified weaknesses and potential vulnerabilities throughout
the system. As a basis for going forward this afternoon, I
would like to present a summary of our assessment of security
concerns in three areas: one, air traffic control or ATC; two,
unauthorized access to secure areas; and three, the performance
of the passenger and carry on baggage screening system,
including how the United States and selected other countries'
systems differ. I would also like to offer some suggestions as
to some immediate actions that might improve aviation security
in these areas.
Air traffic control
With regard to ATC security, our reviews of ATC security
have identified significant deficiencies in the physical
security of the facilities that house ATC systems, the systems
themselves, and the security status of the FAA personnel and
contract personnel who assess these systems. The potential
implications of these deficiencies is tremendous. The ATC
system is the heart of our aviation system. It is the system
that manages the tens of thousands of aircraft that cross the
Nation on a daily basis.
Over the past few years, we have made nearly 25
recommendations to address these identified deficiencies. To
its credit, FAA has worked to address these recommendations and
is making some progress. However, most have yet to be
completed.
Unauthorized access to secure spaces
With regard to secure areas, in May of 2000 we reported
that our special agents had used fictitious law enforcement
badges and credentials to gain access to secure areas in
airports and bypass security checkpoints at two airports. They
walked unescorted to airport departure gates. These agents had
been issued tickets, boarding passes, and could potentially
have carried weapons, explosives, or other dangerous objects
onto the aircraft.
FAA acted immediately to require airport law enforcement
officers to review the credentials of all armed law enforcement
officers seeking to board aircraft. This was an interim measure
as a more permanent fix is being developed.
Passenger and baggage screening
With regard to passenger carry on baggage screening, this
has been a longstanding problem. Our research showed that in
1978 screeners were missing about one out of ten threat objects
that FAA used to test performance. FAA and the airlines
characterized that level of performance as significant and
alarming. By 1987 they were missing two out of ten.
For the decade of the nineties, test results showed that in
some cases screener performance has gotten worse. In our latest
research we found that as testing gets more realistic, that is
as the tests become more closely to approximate how a terrorist
might attempt to infiltrate a checkpoint, the screener
performance declined significantly.
A principal cause of performance problems is the rapid
turnover among screeners. It exceeds 100 percent annually at
most large airports, leaving few skilled and experienced
screeners on the job, to say nothing of security issues
associated with that. People leave these jobs because of low
wages with few if any fringe benefits, the repetitive,
monotonous nature of the work, and by and large the efforts
today to address this problem area have been slow and largely
ineffective.
We believe the tools, techniques, and technologies are
available to address these challenges. Generally, they have
either not been used or not used effectively or just taken more
time than should. A case in point is the promulgation of rules
to implement the provisions of FAA's Reauthorization Act of
1996 that would establish screening company certification
programs. The relevant rule is now scheduled for issuance this
month, more than 2\1/2\ years later than originally scheduled.
Now I would like to turn briefly to what we found in our
examination of screening companies and screening programs in
foreign countries. The question is, are there lessons that we
can learn from other countries? The answer is maybe. The
foreign screening operations we examined differed significantly
from U.S. operations in many of the areas we listed as
challenges in the United States. Generally speaking, the
screening operations required more extensive screener
qualifications and training, including higher pay, better
benefits, and often included different screening techniques,
such as a physical patdown of some passengers.
One other significant difference is that in most of these
countries responsibility for screening is placed with the
government or airport authority instead of air carriers. The
foreign screening operations reported significantly lower
screener turnover and there was some evidence that they may
have better screener performance as well.
FAA and the air carriers have implemented new controls that
promise a greater sense of security. We believe that to further
minimize the vulnerabilities in our aviation security system
more needs to be done. Some immediate actions that we would
suggest is: limiting passengers to one carry on bag, with
increased manual searches; screen all airport and airline
employees who have access to sterile and secure areas,
including mechanics, ramp workers, food service workers,
vendors, store employees, at the same time limiting access;
strengthen--and I think this is the most important--strengthen
intelligence-sharing among law enforcement agencies, FAA, and
cleared airport and airline personnel. A key action is to
complete the promulgation of the screening company
certification regulation.
Concurrently, it might be time for Congress to consider
whether airlines should continue to bear primary responsibility
for screening operations at the Nation's airports. It has been
observed that previous aviation tragedies have resulted in a
cycle of activity, but the long-term resolve and actions to
correct flaws in the system diminishes as the memory of the
crisis recedes. The future of the Nation's aviation system and,
as we are only beginning to understand, so much more hinges in
large part on overcoming this cycle.
The GAO continues to stand ready to assist this committee
in this extraordinarily difficult challenge. Thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham
terrorist acts illustrate severe weaknesses in aviation security
Madam Chairman, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Subcommittees: A
safe and secure civil aviation system is a critical component of the
nation's overall security, physical infrastructure, and economic
foundation. Billions of dollars and a myriad of programs and policies
have been devoted to achieving such a system. Although it is not fully
known at this time what actually occurred or what all the weaknesses in
the nation's aviation security apparatus are that contributed to the
horrendous events of last week, it is clear that serious weaknesses
exist in our aviation security system and that their impact can be far
more devastating than previously imagined.
We are here today to discuss the vulnerabilities that we have
identified throughout the nation's aviation system. Our testimony is
based on our prior work and includes assessments of security concerns
with (1) aviation-related computer systems, (2) airport access
controls, and (3) passenger and carry-on baggage screening, including
how the United States and selected other countries differ in their
screening practices. Our testimony will also offer some observations
about improving aviation security in these various areas.
In summary:
As we reported last year, our reviews of the Federal Aviation
Administration's (FAA) oversight of air traffic control (ATC) computer
systems showed that FAA had not followed some critical aspects of its
own security requirements. Specifically, FAA had not ensured that ATC
buildings and facilities were secure, that the systems themselves were
protected, and that the contractors who access these systems had
undergone background checks. As a result, the ATC system was
susceptible to intrusion and malicious attacks. FAA is making some
progress in addressing the 22 recommendations we made to improve
computer security, but most have yet to be completed.
Controls for limiting access to secure areas, including aircraft,
have not always worked as intended. As we reported in May 2000, our
special agents used fictitious law enforcement badges and credentials
to gain access to secure areas, bypass security checkpoints at two
airports, and walk unescorted to aircraft departure gates. The agents,
who had been issued tickets and boarding passes, could have carried
weapons, explosives, or other dangerous objects onto aircraft. FAA is
acting on the weaknesses we identified and is implementing improvements
to more closely check the credentials of law enforcement officers. The
Department of Transportation's Inspector General has also documented
numerous problems with airport access controls, and in one series of
tests, the Inspector General's staff successfully gained access to
secure areas 68 percent of the time.
As we reported in June 2000, tests of screeners revealed
significant weaknesses as measured in their ability to detect threat
objects located on passengers or contained in their carry-on luggage.
In 1987, screeners missed 20 percent of the potentially dangerous
objects used by FAA in its tests. At that time, FAA characterized this
level of performance as unsatisfactory. More recent results have shown
that as testing gets more realistic--that is, as tests more closely
approximate how a terrorist might attempt to penetrate a checkpoint--
screeners' performance declines significantly. A principal cause of
screeners' performance problems is the rapid turnover among screeners.
Turnover exceeded over 100 percent a year at most large airports,
leaving few skilled and experienced screeners, primarily because of the
low wages, limited benefits, and repetitive, monotonous nature of their
work. Additionally, too little attention has been given to factors such
as the sufficiency of the training given to screeners. FAA's efforts to
address these problems have been slow. We recommended that FAA develop
an integrated plan to focus its efforts, set priorities, and measure
progress in improving screening. FAA is addressing these
recommendations, but progress on one key effort--the certification of
screening companies--is still not complete because the implementing
regulation has not been issued. It is now nearly 2\1/2\ years since FAA
originally planned to implement the regulation.
Screening operations in Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands,
and the United Kingdom--countries whose systems we have examined--
differ from this country's in some significant ways. Their screening
operations require more extensive qualifications and training for
screeners, include higher pay and better benefits, and often include
different screening techniques, such as ``pat-downs'' of some
passengers. Another significant difference is that most of these
countries place responsibility for screening with airport authorities
or the government instead of air carriers. The countries we visited had
significantly lower screener turnover, and there is some evidence they
may have better screener performance; for example, one country's
screeners detected over twice as many test objects as did U.S.
screeners in a 1998 joint screener testing program conducted with FAA.
The events of September 11, 2001, have changed the way this country
looks at aviation security. Last week, FAA and the air carriers
implemented new controls that promise a greater sense of security. We
support these actions. Yet, to further minimize the vulnerabilities in
our aviation security system, more needs to be done. Additional
considerations for the immediate future could include prioritizing
outstanding recommendations that address security, developing a
strategic plan to address the recommendations, assigning specific
executive responsibility for carrying out this plan, and identifying
the sources and amounts of funding needed. In establishing priorities,
a key action needed is to complete the promulgation of the screening
company certification regulation, which also implements the
requirements of the Airport Security Improvement Act of 2000, enacted
by the Congress last November. The Congress also needs to reconsider
whether airlines should continue to bear primary responsibility for
screening operations at the nation's airports. Aviation security has
truly become a national security issue, and responsibility for
screening may no longer appropriately rest with air carriers.
Consideration of the role of air carriers in conducting passenger
screening could be examined as part of the ongoing effort to identify
and structure mechanisms to provide financial and other assistance to
help the aviation industry emerge from the current crisis.
It has been observed that previous tragedies have resulted in
congressional hearings, studies, recommendations, and debates, but
little long-term resolve to correct flaws in the system as the memory
of the crisis recedes. The future of aviation security hinges in large
part on overcoming this cycle of limited action that has too often
characterized the response to aviation security concerns.
background
Some context for my remarks is appropriate. The threat of terrorism
was significant throughout the 1990s; a plot to destroy 12 U.S.
airliners was discovered and thwarted in 1995, for instance. Yet the
task of providing security to the nation's aviation system is
unquestionably daunting, and we must reluctantly acknowledge that any
form of travel can never be made totally secure. The enormous size of
U.S. airspace alone defies easy protection. Furthermore, given this
country's hundreds of airports, thousands of planes, tens of thousands
of daily flights, and the seemingly limitless ways terrorists or
criminals can devise to attack the system, aviation security must be
enforced on several fronts. Safeguarding airplanes and passengers
requires, at the least, ensuring that perpetrators are kept from
breaching security checkpoints and gaining access to secure airport
areas or to aircraft. Additionally, vigilance is required to prevent
attacks against the extensive computer networks that FAA uses to guide
thousands of flights safely through U.S. airspace. FAA has developed
several mechanisms to prevent criminal acts against aircraft, such as
adopting technology to detect explosives and establishing procedures to
ensure that passengers are positively identified before boarding a
flight. Still, in recent years, we and others have often demonstrated
that significant weaknesses continue to plague the nation's aviation
security.
potential for unauthorized access to aviation computer systems
Our work has identified numerous problems with aspects of aviation
security in recent years. One such problems is FAA's computer-based air
traffic control system. The ATC system is an enormous, complex
collection of interrelated systems, including navigation, surveillance,
weather, and automated information processing and display systems that
link hundreds of ATC facilities and provide information to air traffic
controllers and pilots. Failure to adequately protect these systems
could increase the risk of regional or nationwide disruption of air
traffic--or even collisions.
In five reports issued from 1998 through 2000, we pointed out
numerous weaknesses in FAA's computer security.\1\ FAA had not (1)
completed background checks on thousands of contractor employees, (2)
assessed and accredited as secure many of its ATC facilities, (3)
performed appropriate risk assessments to determine the vulnerability
of the majority of its ATC systems, (4) established a comprehensive
security program, (5) developed service continuity controls to ensure
that critical operations continue without undue interruption when
unexpected events occur, and (6) fully implemented an intrusion
detection capability to detect and respond to malicious intrusions.
Some of these weaknesses could have led to serious problems. For
example, as part of its Year 2000 readiness efforts, FAA allowed 36
mainland Chinese nationals who had not undergone required background
checks to review the computer source code for eight mission-critical
systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Aviation Security: Weak Computer Security Practices Jeopardize
Flight Safety (GAO/AIMD-98-155, May 18, 1998), Computer Security: FAA
Needs to Improve Controls Over Use of Foreign Nationals to Remediate
and Review Software (GAO/AIMD-00-55, Dec. 23, 1999), Computer Security:
FAA is Addressing Personnel Weaknesses, But Further Action Is Required
(GAO/AIMD-00-169, May 31, 2000), FAA Computer Security: Concerns Remain
Due to Personnel and Other Continuing Weaknesses (GAO/AIMD-00-252, Aug.
16, 2000), and FAA Computer Security: Recommendations to Address
Continuing Weaknesses (GAO-01-171, Dec. 6, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To date, we have made nearly 22 recommendations to improve FAA's
computer security. FAA has worked to address these recommendations, but
most of them have yet to be completed. For example, it is making
progress in obtaining background checks on contractors and accrediting
facilities and systems as secure. However, it will take time to
complete these efforts.
weaknesses in airport access controls
Control of access to aircraft, airfields, and certain airport
facilities is another component of aviation security. Among the access
controls in place are requirements intended to prevent unauthorized
individuals from using forged, stolen, or outdated identification or
their familiarity with airport procedures to gain access to secured
areas. In May 2000, we reported that our special agents, in an
undercover capacity, obtained access to secure areas of two airports by
using counterfeit law enforcement credentials and badges.\2\ At these
airports, our agents declared themselves as armed law enforcement
officers, displayed simulated badges and credentials created from
commercially available software packages or downloaded from the
Internet, and were issued ``law enforcement'' boarding passes. They
were then waved around the screening checkpoints without being
screened. Our agents could thus have carried weapons, explosives,
chemical/biological agents, or other dangerous objects onto aircraft.
In response to our findings, FAA now requires that each airport's law
enforcement officers examine the badges and credentials of any
individual seeking to bypass passenger screening. FAA is also working
on a ``smart card'' computer system that would verify law enforcement
officers' identity and authorization for bypassing passenger screening.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Security: Breaches at Federal Agencies and Airports (GAO/T-OSI-
00-10, May 25, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department of Transportation's Inspector General has also
uncovered problems with access controls at airports. The Inspector
General's staff conducted testing in 1998 and 1999 of the access
controls at eight major airports and succeeded in gaining access to
secure areas in 68 percent of the tests; they were able to board
aircraft 117 times. After the release of its report describing its
successes in breaching security,\3\ the Inspector General conducted
additional testing between December 1999 and March 2000 and found that,
although improvements had been made, access to secure areas was still
gained more than 30 percent of the time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Airport Access Control (AV-2000-017, Nov. 18, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
inadequate detection of dangerous objects by screeners
Screening checkpoints and the screeners who operate them are a key
line of defense against the introduction of dangerous objects into the
aviation system. Over 2 million passengers and their baggage must be
checked each day for articles that could pose threats to the safety of
an aircraft and those aboard it. The air carriers are responsible for
screening passengers and their baggage before they are permitted into
the secure areas of an airport or onto an aircraft. Air carriers can
use their own employees to conduct screening activities, but mostly air
carriers hire security companies to do the screening. Currently,
multiple carriers and screening companies are responsible for screening
at some of the nation's larger airports.
Concerns have long existed over screeners' ability to detect and
prevent dangerous objects from entering secure areas. Each year,
weapons were discovered to have passed through one checkpoint and have
later been found during screening for a subsequent flight. FAA monitors
the performance of screeners by periodically testing their ability to
detect potentially dangerous objects carried by FAA special agents
posing as passengers. In 1978, screeners failed to detect 13 percent of
the objects during FAA tests. In 1987, screeners missed 20 percent of
the objects during the same type of test. Test data for the 1991 to
1999 period show that the declining trend in detection rates
continues.\4\ Furthermore, the recent tests show that as tests become
more realistic and more closely approximate how a terrorist might
attempt to penetrate a checkpoint, screeners' ability to detect
dangerous objects declines even further.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Information on FAA tests results is now designated as sensitive
security information and cannot be publicly released. Consequently, we
cannot discuss the actual detection rates for the 1991-99 period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As we reported last year, there is no single reason why screeners
fail to identify dangerous objects.\5\ Two conditions--rapid screener
turnover and inadequate attention to human factors--are believed to be
important causes. Rapid turnover among screeners has been a long-
standing problem, having been identified as a concern by FAA and by us
in reports dating back to at least 1979. We reported in 1987 that
turnover among screeners was about 100 percent a year at some airports,
and according to our more recent work, the turnover is considerably
higher.\6\ From May 1998 through April 1999, screener turnover averaged
126 percent at the nation's 19 largest airports; 5 of these airports
reported turnover of 200 percent or more, and one reported turnover of
416 percent. At one airport we visited, of the 993 screeners trained at
that airport over about a 1-year period, only 142, or 14 percent, were
still employed at the end of that year. Such rapid turnover can
seriously limit the level of experience among screeners operating a
checkpoint.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Aviation Security: Long-Standing Problems Impair Airport
Screeners' Performance (GAO/RCED-00-75, June 28, 2000).
\6\ Aviation Security: FAA Needs Preboard Passenger Screening
Performance Standards (GAO-RCED-87-182, July 24, 1987).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Both FAA and the aviation industry attribute the rapid turnover to
the low wages and minimal benefits screeners receive, along with the
daily stress of the job. Generally, screeners are paid at or near the
minimum wage. We reported last year that some of the screening
companies at 14 of the nation's 19 largest airports paid screeners a
starting salary of $6.00 an hour or less and, at 5 of these airports,
the starting salary was the then--minimum wage--$5.15 an hour. It is
common for the starting wages at airport fast-food restaurants to be
higher than the wages screeners receive. For instance, at one airport
we visited, screeners' wages started as low as $6.25 an hour, whereas
the starting wage at one of the airport's fast-food restaurants was $7
an hour.
The demands of the job also affect performance. Screening duties
require repetitive tasks as well as intense monitoring for the very
rare event when a dangerous object might be observed. Too little
attention has been given to factors such as (1) improving individuals'
aptitudes for effectively performing screener duties, (2) the
sufficiency of the training provided to screeners and how well they
comprehend it, and (3) the monotony of the job and the distractions
that reduce screeners' vigilance. As a result, screeners are being
placed on the job who do not have the necessary aptitudes, nor the
adequate knowledge to effectively perform the work, and who then find
the duties tedious and dull.
We reported in June 2000 that FAA was implementing a number of
actions to improve screeners' performance. However, FAA did not have an
integrated management plan for these efforts that would identify and
prioritize checkpoint and human factors problems that needed to be
resolved, and identify measures--and related milestone and funding
information--for addressing the performance problems. Additionally, FAA
did not have adequate goals by which to measure and report its progress
in improving screeners' performance.
FAA is implementing our recommendations. However, two key actions
to improving screeners' performance are still not complete. These
actions are the deployment of threat image projection systems--which
place images of dangerous objects on the monitors of X-ray machines to
keep screeners alert and monitor their performance--and a certification
program to make screening companies accountable for the training and
performance of the screeners they employ. Threat image projection
systems are expected to keep screeners alert by periodically imposing
the image of a dangerous object on the X-ray screen. They also are used
to measure how well screeners perform in detecting these objects.
Additionally, the systems serve as a device to train screeners to
become more adept at identifying harder-to-spot objects. FAA is
currently deploying the threat image projections systems and expects to
have them deployed at all airports by 2003.
The screening company certification program, required by the
Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, will establish
performance, training, and equipment standards that screening companies
will have to meet to earn and retain certification. However, FAA has
still not issued its final regulation establishing the certification
program. This regulation is particularly significant because it is to
include requirements mandated by the Airport Security Improvement Act
of 2000 to increase screener training--from 12 hours to 40 hours--as
well as expand background check requirements. FAA had been expecting to
issue the final regulation this month, 2\1/2\ years later than it
originally planned.
differences in the screening practices of five other countries and the
united states
We visited five countries--Belgium, Canada, France, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom--viewed by FAA and the civil
aviation industry as having effective screening operations to identify
screening practices that differ from those in the United States. We
found that some significant differences exist in four areas: screening
operations, screener qualifications, screener pay and benefits, and
institutional responsibility for screening.
First, screening operations in some of the countries we visited are
more stringent. For example, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom routinely touch or ``pat down'' passengers in response to metal
detector alarms. Additionally, all five countries allow only ticketed
passengers through the screening checkpoints, thereby allowing the
screeners to more thoroughly check fewer people. Some countries also
have a greater police or military presence near checkpoints. In the
United Kingdom, for example, security forces--often armed with
automatic weapons--patrol at or near checkpoints. At Belgium's main
airport in Brussels, a constant police presence is maintained at one of
two glass-enclosed rooms directly behind the checkpoints.
Second, screeners' qualifications are usually more extensive. In
contrast to the United States, Belgium requires screeners to be
citizens; France requires screeners to be citizens of a European Union
country. In the Netherlands, screeners do not have to be citizens, but
they must have been residents of the country for 5 years. Training
requirements for screeners were also greater in four of the countries
we visited than in the United States. While FAA requires that screeners
in this country have 12 hours of classroom training before they can
begin work, Belgium, Canada, France, and the Netherlands require more.
For example, France requires 60 hours of training and Belgium requires
at least 40 hours of training with an additional 16 to 24 hours for
each activity, such as X-ray machine operations, that the screener will
conduct.
Third, screeners receive relatively better pay and benefits in most
of these countries. Whereas screeners in the United States receive
wages that are at or slightly above minimum wage, screeners in some
countries receive wages that are viewed as being at the ``middle
income'' level in those countries. In the Netherlands, for example,
screeners received at least the equivalent of about $7.50 per hour.
This wage was about 30 percent higher than the wages at fast-food
restaurants in that country. In Belgium, screeners received the
equivalent of about $14 per hour. Not only is pay higher, but the
screeners in some countries receive benefits, such as health care or
vacations--in large part because these benefits are required under the
laws of these countries. These countries also have significantly lower
screener turnover than the United States: turnover rates were about 50
percent or lower in these countries.
Finally, the responsibility for screening in most of these
countries is placed with the airport authority or with the government,
not with the air carriers as it is in the United States. In Belgium,
France, and the United Kingdom, the responsibility for screening has
been placed with the airports, which either hire screening companies to
conduct the screening operations or, as at some airports in the United
Kingdom, hire screeners and manage the checkpoints themselves. In the
Netherlands, the government is responsible for passenger screening and
hires a screening company to conduct checkpoint operations, which are
overseen by a Dutch police force. We note that, worldwide, of 102 other
countries with international airports, 100 have placed screening
responsibility with the airports or the government; only 2 other
countries--Canada and Bermuda--place screening responsibility with air
carriers.
Because each country follows its own unique set of screening
practices, and because data on screeners' performance in each country
were not available to us, it is difficult to measure the impact of
these different practices on improving screeners' performance.
Nevertheless, there are indications that for least one country,
practices may help to improve screeners' performance. This country
conducted a screener testing program jointly with FAA that showed that
its screeners detected over twice as many test objects as did screeners
in the United States.
This concludes my prepared statement. I will be pleased to answer
any questions that you or Members of the Committee may have.
Senator Murray. Thank you, Dr. Dillingham.
I especially want to welcome Mr. Queen for being here
today. He is Vice President of Engineering and Product
Integrity for the Boeing Company. They have spent a great deal
of time, I know, in assisting the Secretary of Transportation.
I spent a great of time with him earlier this week out in
Seattle and he flew out here with me yesterday from Seattle. So
we appreciate your coming all the way across the country and
the Boeing Company for working with all of us as we try to make
sure we have done the right thing for the safety of our
airlines.
Mr. Queen.
STATEMENT OF HANK QUEEN, VICE PRESIDENT FOR ENGINEERING
AND PRODUCT INTEGRITY, THE BOEING COMPANY
Mr. Queen. Thank you, Chairman Murray and Chairman Rogers.
As you say, I am Hank Queen. I am Vice President of Engineering
and Product Integrity for Boeing Commercial Airplanes. I am
responsible for the design, certification, product development,
and continued operational safety of all Boeing commercial
airplanes.
I would like to start by offering, on behalf of the entire
Boeing Company, our condolences to the friends and families of
the victims of the terrible events of September 11. We build a
little bit of ourselves into every one of those airplanes.
Senator Murray. Do you want to pull the mike closer?
Mr. Queen. And it was truly horrifying to us to see our
airplanes used as weapons of destruction.
The Boeing Company supports the measures already taken to
strengthen security of the aviation system and we agree that
the aviation system security is paramount and must be taken to
a higher level. Boeing is pledging total cooperation and
support to this effort. On September 12 Boeing began working
with the airlines, the government, airline associations, pilot
associations, and flight attendant associations on immediate
and longer-term actions to address this new threat.
We must take a systematic approach to aviation security.
The first line of defense is airport security. The crew in the
airplane should not be the last line of defense.
I am here today specifically to address improved aircraft
security. As we consider our options for achieving that goal,
we must ensure that we do not jeopardize safety in other
unintended ways. As you know, every part of the airplane is
subject to Federal aviation regulations established to ensure
safety. These regulations require a delicate balance of
multiple safety objectives. For example, cockpit doors must be
lockable, but not inhibit emergency evacuations. Also, the
structure of the flight deck must be able to withstand pressure
differences in the event of a rapid decompression. That is why
cockpit doors are designed with vents that open or the entire
door opens whenever there is a significant pressure difference
between the cockpit and the cabin.
There have been over 600 decompressions in commercial jet
transportation history. Half of these were severe enough to
cause the oxygen masks to deploy. Approximately 50 of these
rapid decompressions could have stressed the structure, and in
fact 2 of these led to accidents that resulted in new
requirements and changes in the commercial airplane fleet. So
solutions to enhance the integrity of the flight deck door must
allow for rapid decompression.
There is another important consideration as we look at
changes. There are more than 7,000 commercial jet airplanes
registered in the United States, with over 40 different flight
deck door designs. We need to keep these numbers in mind as we
consider any design changes to improve aircraft security.
Finding solutions that can be implemented quickly with a large
number of airplanes is essential. We face many challenges.
However, we have a dedicated team working to meet these
challenges. They are coordinated with the government and
airline manufacturing efforts since September 11 and we have
included in this effort examining such possible changes as crew
procedural changes to restrict access to flight decks, using
all the resources in the cabin to overpower hijackers, and
potential maneuvering of the aircraft; also, there have been
near-term design and hardware changes to further inhibit entry
to the flight deck; longer term solutions, such as securing the
flight deck to deny access to hijackers and technology to
prevent the use of airplanes as a weapon. We are also working
with NASA and the FAA on other technologies, such as bomb
protection and advanced ballistic materials.
So in summary, we do recognize the need for immediate
improvements in aviation security. We are actively working with
the airlines, the FAA, pilot associations, flight attendant
associations, and others to rapidly develop solutions in
response to the actions of September 11.
Thank you.
Senator Murray. Thank you, Mr. Queen.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hank Queen
airplane security
Thank you Madam Chairman Murray and Chairman Rogers. I am Hank
Queen, Vice President of Engineering and Product Integrity for Boeing
Commercial Airplanes. In that position, I am responsible for design,
certification, product development and continued operational safety of
all Boeing commercial aircraft.
Let me open my remarks by offering, on behalf of the entire Boeing
Company, our condolences to the friends and families of the victims of
the terrible events of September 11. We at Boeing have spent our
working lives dedicated to a safe and efficient global air
transportation system, a system that enhances peace and prosperity
through the flow of people, goods and ideas around the world. We build
a little bit of ourselves into every one of our magnificent airplanes.
To see those airplanes used as weapons of destruction horrified us
beyond words. Our hearts go out to all those touched by these vicious
acts.
The Boeing Company supports the measures already taken to
strengthen the security of the aviation system. We applaud the recent
action taken by Transportation Secretary Norm Mineta in naming two high
level rapid response teams to address airport and aircraft security
issues. Boeing is pledging total cooperation and support to this
effort. In fact, on September 12, government, Boeing, airlines, airline
associations, pilot associations and cabin attendant associations began
working together on immediate and longer term actions to address the
new threat. The team's activity and progress to date will become a part
of the support to the rapid response team.
Enhancements to commercial aviation security must be approached by
looking at the entire system, as the airlines, manufacturers and
government work together to provide a layered defense against many
threats. The aviation security environment is very complex. (Figure 1).
The first layer is to prevent unauthorized access to the airport and
the airplane. The crew and the airplane should be the last lines of
defense. Boeing has been increasingly involved with aviation security
as the threat has grown. However, on September 11, 2001, we were all
shocked with a new threat, that of using the aircraft as a weapon.
history
In the 1960's, skyjacking incidents led to the need to screen
carry-on baggage and incorporate both noticeable and behind the scenes
security changes to airports, airline operations and airplane designs.
After the Lockerbie bombing, the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) began to address aircraft design standards that
could enhance security. In 1997, they called upon their member nations
to adopt new design requirements to address the threat of bombs, fire,
smoke, bullets, and grenades.
In October 27, 1999, the FAA directed its Aviation Rulemaking
Advisory Committee to study implementation of the ICAO requirements. On
June 11, 2001, to counter the increased threat of passenger air rage,
the FAA added strengthening flight deck doors to the committee's work
agenda.
This history is shown on Figure 2.
The fundamental approach to airplane security has been to keep
dangerous objects and individuals off airplanes. Current Federal
Aviation Regulations governing airplane design and operation have
addressed the many hazards facing a modern commercial transport.
flight deck doors and federal regulations
As you know, every part of the airplane is subject to Federal
Aviation Regulations. The regulations affecting flight deck door design
require a delicate balance of multiple safety objectives. (Figure 3)
The design balances the needs for providing a sterile environment for
the flight crew; the ability for rescue crew to reach the pilots; the
need to withstand rapid depressurization in the flight deck or
passenger compartments; and, the need for the pilots to command
emergency situations in the cabin.
We are making assessments about what could be done to better ensure
aviation security through potential changes to aircraft. Some of these
enhancements may require FAA rule changes.
The FAA regulations drive the design of the flight deck and door
installation. Summaries of the major rules that the design must satisfy
are:
--The flight deck must be secure from passengers. This is why cockpit
doors have locks and why pilots are required to keep the doors
shut and locked during flight.
--The lockable door cannot inhibit emergency evacuations. This is why
cockpit windows or emergency escape hatches are designed to
open and why cockpit doors are designed to open under force
from rescuers.
--The flight deck must be able to withstand pressure differences
between the cabin and the flight deck in the event of a rapid
decompression. This is why cockpit doors are designed with
vents that open, or the entire door opens, whenever there is a
significant pressure differential between the cockpit and the
cabin. There have been over 600 decompressions in commercial
jet transportation history. Half of these were severe enough to
cause the oxygen masks to deploy. Approximately 50 were rapid
decompressions that could stress the structure. Only two of
those led to accidents.
--The flight crew must have overall command of evacuations. This is
why cockpit doors are designed to be forced open in the event
the door gets jammed.
--The door must prevent light, noise or odor from entering the flight
deck and fatiguing the crew.
Solutions to enhance the integrity of the flight deck door must
allow for rapid decompression and address both the door itself and the
door's installation. The door hinge, door lock, door frame and the
bulkhead on which the door is mounted must be all considered. (Figure
4)
There are more than 7,000 commercial jet airplanes registered in
the United States, with over 40 different flight deck door systems.
(Figure 5) The balance needed to meet competing door design
requirements will lead to different solutions for most of the doors in
service. (Figure 6) There may not be a simple design solution that can
be quickly implemented. Enhancements may take from several months to
years to install in the fleet and must be integrated with existing
safety requirements.
hardened doors
Boeing has provided a bullet resistant, reinforced flight deck door
with Kevlar material to one customer on two models of aircraft. As
requested by the customer, we also:
--Installed a steel plate over the door lock mechanism
--Strengthened flight deck door jams, headers, hinge pins and latch
mechanism
--Lined the forward walls of the lavatories immediately aft of the
flight deck
--Lined the rest of the bulkhead near the lavatories.
Even with these changes, this does not prevent access by a
determined intruder. This installation does not meet current FAA
regulations.
transponders
We know there are many questions about transponder systems and the
ability to turn them off in flight. Transponders continuously transmit
aircraft identification, altitude and air speed data to ground radar.
The flight crew can turn off the transponder when requested to do so by
Air Traffic Control because of clutter on the ATC radar screen or when
there are faults in the transponder. Flight crews are trained to use
the transponder to notify ATC when the aircraft is in distress and/or
being hijacked. The crew can also use special radio terminology to
alert ATC of a hijacking. There are also special codes between the
flight deck and cabin crews to indicate a hijack situation. Even with
the transponder turned off, the flight path of the airplane is still
visible on radar.
If it is deemed necessary to change the existing transponder design
requirements, the designs can be changed. However, once again, there
are more than 7,000 airplanes in the U.S. fleet, so it would take time
to incorporate changes.
industry and government activity since september 11
The coordinated government, airline and manufacturer efforts since
September 11, 2001 have focused on possible changes in the following
areas:
--Immediate flight and cabin crew responses such as procedural
changes to restrict access to flight decks, using all the
resources in the cabin to overpower hijackers, and potential
maneuvering of the aircraft.
--Examining near-term design and hardware changes to prevent entry
into the flight deck.
--And identifying longer-term solutions to study such as secure and
hardened flight decks to deny access to hijackers, and
technology to prevent the use of the airplane as a weapon.
Boeing is beginning to look at what would be required to deny
unwanted access to the flight deck if that is where the government and
industry decide to go. A truly impenetrable door design would have to
go beyond a simple dead bolt or add-on door brace. The door may have to
prevent access by people, fire, smoke, toxic gases, bullets, and
grenades. It would also have to meet multiple other safety objectives.
Boeing is also working on other technologies with NASA and the FAA
such as bomb protection and advanced ballistic materials.
summary
Boeing is actively working with the airlines, the FAA, pilot
associations, flight attendant associations and others to develop
practical measures in response to the acts of September 11. We will
focus on airplane-related issues, including flight deck security and
modifications to operating procedures, in the context of broader system
solutions to enhance safe, efficient global air transportation. (Figure
7)
Security badges
Senator Murray. We will now move to the question portion of
this hearing. There are a number of colleagues here who have
questions to ask, so we are going to keep strict adherence to
the 5-minute time. We will do this. I will open with questions,
turn to Mr. Rogers, and then go back and forth from side to
side as we move through all our committee members.
I would like to remind all of our colleagues that at 4:30
we will go into a closed hearing session. So we have a lot of
people to get to in a short amount of time and I would ask our
witnesses to keep their answers short, giving us the
information we need as quickly as possible.
Bogus credentials of airport and airline workers
Mr. Mead, let me begin with you. You stated in your remarks
that we have arrested 12 non-U.S. citizens since last Friday
who had illegally obtained security badges that allowed them
access to the secured section of the airport. Can you tell us
if all airport personnel have been revalidated and granted new
badges since September 11?
Mr. Mead. No, I do not believe so.
Senator Murray. So is it likely that we still have some
individuals with bogus credentials?
Mr. Mead. Yes.
Senator Murray. Ms. Garvey, can you respond and tell us
what we are doing about that?
Ms. Garvey. Madam Chair, actually we have directed all the
airlines and the airports to revalidate the badges. There is
more perhaps we could add in the closed session. They were
directed to do that, I believe yesterday or the day before
yesterday, and that is both for airports and airlines.
Senator Murray. So that process is in place and moving
forward?
Ms. Garvey. It is under way.
PROPOSED SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS
Senator Murray. Mr. Secretary, the Department of
Transportation has received numerous recommendations to close
the loopholes in our security systems. The Inspector General,
the GAO, NTSB, Pan Am 103, many, many commissions. The FAA's
record for moving out on these recommendations has been
painfully slow. Can you tell us what some of the principal
causes for these delays are and what measures you have put in
place to make sure that these specific delays do not repeat
themselves now at this critical juncture?
Secretary Mineta. Madam Chairman, let me speak to the time
since I have been Secretary of Transportation, since January
25. One of the problems that I have found when I got to the
Department was the prolonged time it does take to get rules and
regulations out. That now has changed and we are getting the
rules and regulations out on a timely basis.
Last year Senator Hutchison had a bill on airport
improvements in security. We got those rules out this year and
those were pending at OMB. This is the one that gave the FAA
more authority to increase the level of training requirements,
the kinds of standards, as related to the screeners. That was
at OMB when September 11 occurred. So OMB is holding it up
right now, pending any improvements we may want to add to that
rule.
But in terms of my stewardship, I am going to make sure, as
I have since the 25 of January, that rules and regulations are
promulgated on a timely basis.
EMERGENCY SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS
Senator Murray. Ms. Garvey, you have put out a number of
emergency procedures since September 11 regarding the security
of the system. Should we expect further system directives in
the very near term?
Ms. Garvey. Madam Chair, you will be seeing more. Every day
we are in constant communication with both the airports and the
airlines. Some have asked for further clarification on some of
the emergency rules, so we are doing that. As the Secretary
mentioned, we are also, as a result of the rapid response
teams, expecting some additional recommendations. So there will
be more to come. I think we will in some cases be seeing a very
fundamental change.
Senator Murray. In the next several days, what are you
looking for?
Ms. Garvey. Well, actually in the next several days there
may be additional rules or amendments based upon what we are
hearing from the airlines, although I talked with some of the
airline officials today and they were focusing more on
clarification in a couple of areas. So almost on a daily basis
we are putting out some clarification where need be.
If I could also make just one very quick mention, you are
right, we take too long in government to get rules out. The
public process sometimes in responding to some of the
comments--I think of the certification rule as one of them--is
sometimes overwhelming. We should make no excuses there. We
should simply do better.
I will say that with the Gore Commission there were 31
recommendations and 28 have actually been implemented. There
are seven, including the two rules that both you and the
Secretary spoke about, rather, that are pending and ready to
go, and one thorny negotiation with the post office that I see
coming to a rapid conclusion, in part as a result of this
terrible tragedy.
Senator Murray. So I can assume that your agency is moving
forward quickly to enact as many of these as possible?
Ms. Garvey. Yes, you can, Madam Chair.
SCREENING AT SECURITY CHECKPOINTS
Senator Murray. Mr. Mead, Dr. Dillingham, let me ask you
this question. As you know, there have been many reports that
have criticized the airlines for failing to do adequate
screening at security checkpoints. Your investigators, you
testified, have brought weapons and bomb-like devices onto
aircraft with relative ease, and unauthorized personnel got in
secure spaces around the aircraft just as easily. To your
knowledge, has the FAA ever used its authority to shut down a
concourse temporarily when screeners are not doing a good job?
Mr. Mead. I can't speak to that in open session.
FINES AND ENFORCEMENT
Senator Murray. Dr. Dillingham, I assume the same. Well,
let me ask you if you think the fines that the FAA has imposed
on airlines in the past are adequate?
Mr. Mead. In some cases yes, in some cases no. I see from
where we sit a lot of variance among FAA regions. It is not
consistent across the board. I think they can do a lot more in
the enforcement end of things in assessing fines.
Senator Murray. Do you think increasing fines will mean
increasing responsibility on the airlines to do the right
thing?
Mr. Mead. In my opinion, Senator Murray, it would help. But
I think the issue needs to be addressed through the front door,
and I think the front door is making sure that we have
screeners of higher caliber, that are better motivated and have
some type of career path.
Senator Murray. Dr. Dillingham.
Dr. Dillingham. If fines are increased, the agency will
have to stick with the fine. You cannot have a fine where you
pay 50 cents on the dollar or 25 cents on the dollar if you
hold out long enough.
Screening and access violations
Senator Murray. Mr. Secretary, let me just end with you.
Can you share with us how the FAA's enforcement posture has
changed regarding screening and access violations since
September 11?
Secretary Mineta. Since the 11th? Well, it has increased
appreciably. After we increased the requirements being placed
on airports and airlines, each of the airports--not each of the
airports, but there are FSM's, Federal security managers, and
those FSM's are responsible for making sure that the airports
that are under their jurisdiction were adhering to the new
increased stringent requirements.
So before any of the airports could be cleared to be added
back onto the list to be able to have planes going in and out,
the FSM had to sign off that the airport was now meeting those
stringent requirements. A lot of those are visible stringent
requirements; some of them are not.
Senator Murray. I assume your agency has authorized the FAA
to take enforcement activity on these?
Secretary Mineta. Take enforcement action?
Senator Murray. Take enforcement action, since the 11th on
violations, fines, shutting down an air carrier?
Secretary Mineta. I will have to ask Administrator Garvey
if there have been any airports since Tuesday the 11th that
have been fined or whatever.
Ms. Garvey. We have asked our security managers and, by the
way, also the airport directors. I spoke with 31 of the top
airport directors on Monday and asked them to pull together
technology security companies and the airport station managers,
the airline station managers, to talk directly with them,
making sure everybody understands what the regulations are,
what the changes are, what needs to be done, and report back to
security managers if they were having any difficulty. We have
asked our security managers to redouble their efforts in those
areas. So we have got a lot to keep up with. But they are
circling back and getting to us.
Whether or not there has been any specific or additional
fines since the 11th, I would have to get back to you on that.
I do not know of any now. I know they have been given strong
direction to be as aggressive as they need to be.
Senator Murray. And they understand what will be enforced?
Ms. Garvey. Yes. Yes, they do.
[The information follows:]
Compliance With Security Measures
Since September 11, FAA Security Special Agents have
documented 1,487 findings on airports, air carriers, and
screening checkpoints for compliance issues with the new
security measures. Of these, 1,462 have been resolved through
immediate corrective action and for the other 25, Enforcement
Investigative Reports (EIR) have been initiated. The 25 cases
that could result in enforcement action are still under
investigation by the respective civil aviation security field
offices.
Security contracts
Secretary Mineta. If I might, one of the questions I asked
Administrator Garvey last week, since these are contracts
between the security company and the airlines at any given
airport, I asked can we as the DOT/FAA go in and abrogate those
contracts and throw them off the property?
Senator Murray. Can we?
Secretary Mineta. We are in the middle of still looking at
that. It is very difficult for us to be able to go in and do
that since it is an airline-security company contract. But if
they are not meeting standards----
Senator Murray. But it is my understanding that you can
shut an airport or an airline down if they do not meet the
enforcement standards that you have put out, correct?
Ms. Garvey. That is correct, yes.
Senator Murray. Thank you. I will yield to Mr. Rogers.
AIRPORT SECURITY COMPANIES
Mr. Rogers. Following up on the same point, and that is
security of the personnel, the passengers and the baggage that
is allowed on an airplane, that is the airlines have the
obligation, do they not, to check passengers and baggage that
come on their planes; is that not correct?
Secretary Mineta. That is correct.
Mr. Rogers. So they have contracted at various airports,
the airlines have, with security companies to perform that
chore for them, correct? Is that not a low bid contract?
Secretary Mineta. Generally they are.
Mr. Rogers. So the security company is interested, and the
airlines presumably, in getting the job done as cheaply as they
can, correct?
Secretary Mineta. There are certain standards that are
required, even if it is low bid.
BAGGAGE SCREENERS
Mr. Rogers. But those standards have not been enforced,
have they? In fact, we have been waiting now for 3 years or
more in the Congress for the FAA to issue a final rule on the
performance of screeners; is that not correct, Madam Garvey?
Ms. Garvey. Mr. Chairman, that is the rule that the
Secretary was referring to, that is ready to go, that we are
looking at again to determine whether, in light of what we
experienced last Tuesday, we want to make any additional
changes. But it is ready to go, and you are right that that is
something that has been required.
Airport Security, Inc.
Mr. Rogers. Let me ask Mr. Mead: Have you checked out
Dulles Airport, for example, on the qualifications of the
employees of the, is it, the Argenbright Company?
Mr. Mead. Yes. I think you may be referring to--the Dulles
Airport work is on going. Philadelphia Airport clearly had a
problem.
Mr. Rogers. I want to ask you about Dulles. Did you check
on the employees at the screening operation at Dulles Airport?
Mr. Mead. Yes, we are checking.
Mr. Rogers. Tell us the makeup of the staff there in terms
of their citizenship in the United States, for example.
Mr. Mead. Yes, a substantial percentage of them are not
U.S. citizens.
Mr. Rogers. What percent?
Mr. Mead. I think it is about 80 percent. It may be
somewhat more.
Mr. Rogers. 80 percent of the people checking for
terrorists at Dulles Airport are not American citizens?
Mr. Mead. I believe that is so.
Mr. Rogers. Is that one of the airports where one of these
planes originated the other day?
Mr. Mead. Yes.
Logan and Newark screeners
Mr. Rogers. Have you checked Logan in Boston in the same
fashion?
Mr. Mead. No.
Mr. Rogers. Or Newark?
Mr. Mead. No.
Mr. Rogers. What about whether or not those employees have
been checked for a criminal record?
Mr. Mead. New employees, under a law that was passed
recently, have to undergo a criminal background check. That
does not apply to existing employees. In my statement, sir, I
recommended that it should apply to all employees.
Argenbright violations
Mr. Rogers. Well, the company that has been employed by the
airlines at Dulles, what is the name of the company there at
Dulles?
Mr. Mead. Argenbright.
Mr. Rogers. Do they also have the Philadelphia contract as
well?
Mr. Mead. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Have you noticed any unusual things happening
under that contract in Philadelphia?
Mr. Mead. Well, in Philadelphia less than a year ago,
because of falsification of training records and problems with
background checks, there was a criminal plea to a $1 million
fine.
Mr. Rogers. A criminal plea by whom?
Mr. Mead. By Argenbright.
Mr. Rogers. In criminal court?
Mr. Mead. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Have they paid the fine?
Mr. Mead. I do not know if they have paid the fine.
Mr. Rogers. Do they still hold the contract in
Philadelphia?
Mr. Mead. Yes, they do.
Mr. Rogers. And at Dulles?
Mr. Mead. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rogers. And other airports?
Mr. Mead. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Where?
Mr. Mead. 46 other airports.
Mr. Rogers. Let me get this straight. One company is
checking for terrorists at 46 of our Nation's airports and the
company itself is in violation of America's criminal laws?
Mr. Mead. That is true, at least in Philadelphia.
Mr. Rogers. And at one of the other airports that you are
very familiar with, Dulles, 80 percent of their employees
screening for terrorists are not even citizens of the United
States of America?
Mr. Mead. No. Well, currently I am not sure if this
particular security company should be singled out there,
because there is no requirement in the program currently that
they be U.S. citizens.
Mr. Rogers. Has this company been in trouble at any other
airports that they are in?
Mr. Mead. I cannot speak to that, sir. I would have to get
back to you on the record.
Turnover of airport security screeners
Mr. Rogers. What about the turnover rate, Mr. Dillingham? I
have been reading the GAO's report on aviation security issued
June of 2000. You are the principal author, are you not?
Dr. Dillingham. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Tell us about the type of personnel screening
companies are hiring around the country at the airports to
screen for terrorists.
Dr. Dillingham. Let me get back just a little bit to the
point you raised before. Screeners do not have to be a U.S.
citizen. They can have a resident alien card as well.
The other point you raised with regard to Argenbright, I
think IG Argenbright is also a foreign-owned company as well.
With regard to the types of personnel that are being hired,
one of the requirements is that you have a high school diploma
or a GED. We have not checked the records of individual
companies, but in the course of doing our work we clearly got
the idea that this was not a job where you would find the most
skilled person.
Mr. Rogers. They are minimum wage jobs, are they not?
Dr. Dillingham. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rogers. And the turnover rate is exorbitantly high, is
it not?
Dr. Dillingham. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rogers. In one airport the turnover rate is 400 percent
a year?
Dr. Dillingham. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rogers. At Atlanta it is 375 percent a year, at
Baltimore-Washington 155, Boston Logan 207, Chicago O'Hare 200,
and Houston 237 percent a year, at St. Louis 416 percent a
year; is that correct?
Dr. Dillingham. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rogers. So these are untrained, inexperienced, lowest
paid personnel, many of them certainly not citizens, and the
company got the contract by the lowest bid?
Dr. Dillingham. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Now, what is wrong with this picture?
Dr. Dillingham. I think the picture is clear to everyone.
There are a couple of things that even make this a little more
problematic. It is not only that the high turnover rate means
that the people that are doing the baggage checking have very
little experience, but it is also the case that they are there
long enough to learn the techniques of baggage screening and
going through screening points. So you have a huge number of
people out there who know parts of how aviation security works.
That is probably as important as the lack of experience on the
screening pad there.
WATCH LIST of terrorist suspects
Mr. Rogers. Let me ask anyone that may know--Madam
Chairman, I thank you for the time--we let 19 hijackers get
through the system the other day. None of them were caught or
stopped. I assume that all 19 of those names or at least a
portion of them were on a watch list, were they not?
Ms. Garvey. Mr. Chairman, they were not on a list that was
provided to the aviation community. Perhaps we could say more
in closed session.
Could I just add one note to what Mr. Mead said about the
Dulles situation? Mr. Mead has been very forthcoming with us at
the FAA about his investigation and has reported to us as
recently as a few days ago about the status of it. We are
working very closely with him. Although these are contracts,
obviously, nationwide these are contracts with airlines, we are
working closely with them to look at what options are
available. So we know this is a real issue.
Mr. Rogers. Well, this system, not curbside baggage
curbing, not checking checked baggage--none of those things
were relevant, were not the proximate cause of Tuesday. The
proximate cause, the real cause, was these people got through
our screening system at three of our Nation's major airports.
So we know where we need to do work.
Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Mineta. Mr. Chairman, the only problem is that,
even though they did get through the screening system, the
question is what is it that would have triggered them to be
stopped. They were carrying either plastic-type knives--they
had box-openers, which are this long with a sharp hook, razor-
sharp. But under the four-inch requirement at the time, it
would not have been picked up as being an illegal carryon
knife.
Computer assisted passenger prescreening system
Mr. Rogers. There is a little thing called CAPPS.
Secretary Mineta. But as Administrator Garvey said, and I
am not sure at this point as to whether or not those names were
part of the CAPPS. They were held by the Immigration Service.
They knew. They had them on the Immigration watch list. But
again, there is no requirement that Immigration submit that to
DOT or to FAA to pass it along to the airlines to be part of
the CAPPS.
Mr. Rogers. It seems to me that if you are on a terrorist
watch list one of the places that that name ought to go quickly
is the FAA to go into the computer-assisted profile system.
Secretary Mineta. Mr. Chairman, that is something we can
discuss more fully in a closed session.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
Senator Murray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Byrd.
OTHER TRANSPORTATION MODES, TERRORIST RISK ASSESSMENT
Senator Byrd. Madam Chairman, I think that the line of
questioning that has been opened by Mr. Rogers is one that
ought to be pursued, perhaps quite extensively, in closed
session. This goes to the weakness of the 5-minute limitation
on questions.
Let me shift to another area, and I will try to be brief. I
have to leave soon. What steps, in view of the likelihood, Mr.
Mineta, that in the future terrorists will turn their attention
to still other untried mechanisms to disrupt our way of life,
either on the water or on the railways, what steps have you
been able to take to minimize the risk of terrorism on all
modes of transportation--railroads, bridges, and so on--since
September 11?
Secretary Mineta. Well, first of all, right from the 11th
of September when we activated the crisis management center
with all of the DOT modes, they notified all of the companies
or facilities within those jurisdictions, whether they be
ports, pipelines, truck companies, railroads, et cetera. They
were all notified in terms of taking increased security
measures. Pipeline companies employed helicopters to check
their pipelines. Railroads, whether it be at the station or
whether it is freight rail or Amtrak, they increased their
security measures.
That is something that I ask each of our modes every day,
as to what is going on. When someone says, well, I talked to
the railroads or talked to whomever, to me that is not
satisfactory. What I want to know is what are they doing; once
they institute those measures, are we monitoring them to make
sure that they are in fact doing what they told us?
So we are trying to be as comprehensive and inclusive as
possible. I get a briefing every morning at 8:30 or 8:00
o'clock from the intelligence agencies, as does Administrator
Garvey. I asked on Wednesday the 12th of September whether or
not all these things we have been told and read about, whether
or not there is a matrix that we could build with all that
information we knew since I have been there on the 25th of
January to even come near indicating that an airplane would be
used as a lethal weapon, where the targets might be, what the
kind of things that might occur.
Senator Byrd. Excuse me, if I may interrupt. I am on a very
limited time.
Secretary Mineta. Yes, sir.
Senator Byrd. In other words, you are saying to me, I hope,
that, while everyone is focused quite properly on the new
threat of hijacked aircraft being used as weapons, I hope you
are assuring me that you are also focusing on the containment
of other threats, other vulnerabilities, in our transportation
system, such as railroads, bridges, and so on?
Secretary Mineta. Absolutely, absolutely. That was why I
said in the statement our responsibility is to be equally
concerned about other modes of transportation, and we are
focusing not just on aviation, but on the security aspects of
all modes of transportation.
Essential Air Service
Senator Byrd. Good, good. I am pleased to have that
assurance.
I have one other question. I introduced it in my opening
remarks. I happen to believe that the airlines should not be
allowed to take billions of dollars in relief from the general
treasury and simultaneously reduce or eliminate air service to
taxpayers in small cities and rural communities. Now, this
sounds very critical of the airlines. I guess you can
understand why I seem to be a little bitter in the light of the
history, which I have also already mentioned, as to the
treatment that small communities have had in rural areas of
this country since and beginning with the deregulation of the
airlines, concerning which I feel very badly with respect to my
own vote.
But let me ask you specifically, how does your statutory
proposal address the issue of maintaining air service to our
small cities, our towns and rural communities during this
industry downturn?
Secretary Mineta. In the package that is being discussed
right now, there is no further enhancement of the Essential Air
Service program. It stands as it is right now, at $50 million.
Hopefully, there would be some discussion about the possibility
of increasing that amount, but right now it is $50 million for
the Essential Air Service program as we know it right now.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Mineta, I just hope that we will give
more attention than that to our rural areas in this country.
Secretary Mineta. Yes, you and I, sir, have had many
conversations about this. So to the extent that it has been a
budgetary limitation, it has been kept at $50 million.
Senator Byrd. Well, you and I really have not had many
conversations along this line. Perhaps the fault is mine, but
we are looking ahead now, and I hope that we will focus our
attention in considerable degree at least on the plight of the
small areas, these communities, the small towns in the rural
areas of this country, as we quite properly consider helping
the big airlines, bailing out the airlines, which in times past
in considerable measure have turned their backs on the rural
areas of this country.
Madam Chairman, I want to thank you. I want to thank all
the other members, and I beg their pardon for having to step
out during the questioning and meet with Senator Stevens and
Mr. Young concerning the appropriation bill. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Mineta. Thank you.
Secretary Mineta. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Sabo.
Mr. Sabo. We wish Senator Byrd well in his meeting. Before
I start, I would like to yield 30 seconds to our colleague
Frank Wolf, who has to get back to the floor.
Mr. Wolf. Thank you, Mr. Sabo, and I thank both the
chairmen.
Very, very quickly, with the airlines in trouble
financially, they are not going to move ahead aggressively.
Secondly, we need to federalize the inspection service
immediately, including the baggage and doing background checks.
You cannot do background checks on people who have only been
here for a year because they cannot go back over to the
country.
Third, it ought to be in the Department of Justice, which
is the law enforcement agency, so that the FAA is not
conflicted with promoting aviation. It should be in law
enforcement. Also, we should secure the cockpit.
When we come back in private session, I will raise some of
the issues that you already know. We should have air marshals,
but we have armed pilots in certain airlines. We had air
marshals. We have pilots who are well trained, and as pilots--
particularly since they got up and left the seat--I believe the
pilots ought to be given weapons, as in some other airlines,
whereby they can be in essence an air marshal. Had the pilots
in this case had weapons, these cases would not have happened.
With that, I will just yield back the balance of my time
and thank you. But we ought to federalize this. There is no
contracting out, there is nothing that any private sector or
nonprofit can do. We do not contract out the FBI, we do not
contract out the Customs Service. We ought not contract out
this.
I thank the chairman.
airline funding request
Mr. Sabo. Let me indicate, I really do think this issue of
how we deal with the cockpit is absolutely crucial. As
everything we discover, all issues are more complicated than
one thinks. But that clearly would have dealt with the heart of
the problem on September 11. I think it also fundamentally
deals with the problem of other hijackings. If the hijackers
know they are not going to get control of the plane, there is
not much reason for doing it.
But let me ask a question on a different subject. I
understand the administration is sending up their request on
the airline package which includes $5 billion. I am curious as
to the source. I assume it does not come from the $40 billion.
Is it an emergency supplemental that is being requested? What
form does it take?
Secretary Mineta. I will tell you. Let me ask our Deputy
Secretary Michael Jackson to come up, because he just returned
from a meeting with the House and Senate leadership, I believe
it was, or at least the House leadership, on discussions
relating to the package that is being considered for submission
to Congress.
Mr. Sabo. As I understand it, you are allocating $3 billion
from the $40 billion for some of the enhanced security
measures?
Secretary Mineta. The $3 billion, I believe, comes from the
original $20 billion, and I will have to see where they came
out in this meeting today.
Mr. Jackson. Congressman, we are proposing that the
additional $5 billion would be a new emergency appropriation.
Mr. Sabo. It is not something that is coming out of this
committee's jurisdiction?
Mr. Jackson. It will have to have an appropriation and so
the House and Senate will have to deal with that issue as an
appropriation, to my understanding.
Mr. Sabo. Mr. Chairman, I will yield and let you move on to
other committee members.
Senator Murray. Thank you very much.
Senator Kohl.
Senator Kohl. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Earlier this week a member of my staff discovered some
disturbing facts regarding chartering of aircraft. We are
talking about private jets. She called several companies that
charter these jets of all sizes and tried to determine how
difficult it would be to rent a jet. I do not want to get into
the details of what she discovered, but let me just summarize
it by telling you that one representative actually said to this
person on my staff, and I quote: ``Renting one of our jets is
not that different from renting an automobile. The procedures
are not entirely dissimilar.''
So I would like to get into this whole question of private
aircraft and how people secure them, how they get a hold of
them, what kind of security we have with respect to private
aircraft. I can tell you, in my own experience, I have used
private aircraft from time to time and I have never had any
security whatever in connection with the boarding of an
aircraft, myself or the people with whom I travel, my friends.
When you go down after you have secured an aircraft, if you are
renting it and there are pilots, you simply walk into the place
and they say, are you Mr. Kohl, and I say yes, I am, and off we
go, and everything else is come as come be.
Now, there is no, to my experience and what I have been
able to learn in the last week, there is literally no security
with respect to private aircraft in this country. I would like
you to please comment on that, not with respect so much to what
has been, but with respect to what is going to be, because the
citizens of America need to be protected from all the things
that can happen as a result of a private aircraft being
hijacked as it is from commercial airlines. Is that not true,
Secretary Mineta?
Security of private aircraft
Secretary Mineta. Senator, let me have Administrator Garvey
address that issue.
Ms. Garvey. Senator, I will take your cue and focus on the
going forward. You are right that private charters do not have
to meet the same security requirements. Public charters who
have individual passengers pay for their individual seats do
have to go through the same security requirements. Public
charters involving aircraft with 30 or fewer seats have to meet
security requirements, under certain conditions. The
applicability of securing requirements to private charters is
going to change in November of this year. This was an issue, we
felt was an issue, even before this incident had occurred, and
we have been developing a change, a regulation change, which is
to go into effect in November of this year. With the new
requirement, private charters will be treated the same as
public charters with 30 or fewer seats.
I think what we need to do in the next 30 days is see if we
can move that November date up even sooner, and we are doing
that. One note, though, or really a compliment to the general
aviation airports and to the fixed base operators who operate
on larger aircraft--they are, on their own, really stepping out
and putting in place some additional security managers, using
in many cases a member of the local police force.
But again, November of this year was the original date for
the change. We will see about moving it up.
[The information follows:]
Aviation Regulations for Private Charters
The FAA did issue Special Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 91 on October
1, 2001, addressing security checks for all operators, including
private charters, that enplane or deplane passengers into sterile
areas. The SFAR essentially advances the November 14, 2001, date for
private charters to comply with the provisions of the amendment to part
108, which was published on July 17, 2001.
The FAA is requiring operators to implement security procedures:
(1) by October 6, 2001, for all aircraft operations in which
passengers, crewmembers, or other persons are enplaned from or deplaned
into a sterile area regardless of weight; and (2) when notified, for
all aircraft operations conducted under part 91 in aircraft with a
maximum certificated takeoff weight exceeding 12,500 pounds. Item No. 2
applies regardless of whether passengers, crewmembers, or other persons
are enplaned from, or deplaned into, a sterile area.
Senator Kohl. So you do recognize the danger inherent in
that whole private aircraft business?
Ms. Garvey. Yes, sir, and the new requirement will treat
private charters in the same way, with the same security
requirements as public charters with 30 or fewer seats.
Senator Kohl. Well, I will be looking forward to seeing
that; and you are saying hopefully even sooner than November?
Ms. Garvey. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Kohl. Thank you. I thank you very much.
I thank you, Madam Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Olver.
Tracking flight traffic
Mr. Olver. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I am going to attempt something I have never done before,
which is to try to get three questions in my 5 minutes. I have
a very short follow-up to the question posed by Senator Byrd a
little bit earlier. Many of the airlines have announced 20 to
25 percent reduction in the total flights that they expect to
be carrying out in the near future. Is anybody from the
Secretary, the Administrator, or the IG's Office, watching
whether the flight reduction is coming disproportionately from
any sector of the country or from large communities or small
communities? Is there any pattern beginning to emerge from
that? And if there is not, if it has not been looked at, should
we not be looking at it somewhere in your area?
Secretary Mineta. Our office has not. It is something that
I will take a look at.
Mr. Mead. I think it should be looked at. It is probably a
little early to say exactly what the patterns are going to be,
but I agree wholeheartedly it is something that needs to be
watched, and we will do that.
cockpit security
Mr. Olver. I think I am getting agreement that it should be
looked at, and I trust that you will look at it rather
carefully as this develops.
I want to follow up on Mr. Wolf. My colleague from the
House had zeroed in on two issues. Cockpit security was number
one. Mr. Queen, you had mentioned that there was something like
7,000 planes and 40 designs. Are there either national airline
companies from other countries that have a system of restricted
access all the way to--well, I think this goes through a
process of hardening--perhaps all the way to an access which is
totally outside the access from the passenger cabin, separate
access for the flight deck?
Is that true, that there are companies, national companies
or other than our companies, that do that sort of thing?
Mr. Queen. I will tell you what I know and do not know. I
do know that there are some customers who, after delivery, do
what is called door-hardening.
Mr. Olver. The customer has done it?
Mr. Queen. Airlines, yes, after delivery from Boeing. I
know that we, at Boeing, on one customer's airplanes, two
different model types, in the late eighties added kevlar to
their doors on the cockpits.
Mr. Olver. Is there any kind of a report that would
summarize the kind of hardening mechanisms that are in place by
airlines, different airlines or different nations?
Mr. Queen. I personally do not know. I think we have an
opportunity in the working group that we have to gather that
kind of information. To be honest, most airlines are a little
reluctant to share that because they do not want to share the
details of what they have done to enhance their security.
Mr. Olver. That is probably obvious, that they would be
reluctant. But I would be very interested in seeing what we can
know about that kind of thing.
Mr. Queen. We will try to find out.
FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR AIRPORT SECURITY
Mr. Olver. Then my third one--I am getting close to doing
this--has to do with Mr. Mead and Mr. Dillingham. Mr. Mead,
each of you has used some cases, cases of breakdowns in the
security system, some of them looking fairly egregious and some
of them looking like a randomized pattern almost. Mr. Mead, you
have said it is time, I think very close to your words, to have
Federal responsibility for airport security.
Mr. Dillingham said it might be time to give that
responsibility. It seems that the case is fairly strong. That
is Mr. Wolf's other zeroed-in point.
I am curious if the Secretary and the Administrator would
give us their estimate of how close we are to the time to do
this kind of overall security responsibility directly under a
Federal agency.
Ms. Garvey. The rapid response team, of course, that the
Secretary mentioned will be coming to the Secretary very soon
with a response. I can tell you that the principle going in is
that we need, we absolutely need, a fundamental change in the
way we approach screening.
The second principle going in is that we absolutely need to
have a much stronger Federal presence. I think some of the
questions that Chairman Wolf pointed to--for example, should it
be in Treasury--as Mr. Mead said--we were talking about that
this morning and he said the devil is sometimes in the details.
So we are very, very close to coming to the Secretary with
these options very much fleshed out. But the fundamental
principle about it must change, it must change, and we need to
have a much stronger presence. Whether that assumes a true
federalization is, I think, the issue we are working on now.
Mr. Olver. Any other comments, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Mineta. I guess what we are trying to do
throughout the system as we see these shortcomings is try to
plug, so to speak, the loophole, because there is no question
that life is vastly different for all of us, whether you are a
passenger or an airline operator, in terms of the requirements.
We are going to be looking at, we are looking at all these
requirements.
Mr. Olver. How long would it take to get a thoughtful
response to that question of whether we need to do that
nationalization?
Secretary Mineta. We hope to be able to do that very
quickly. Part of the solution may be in part of the funding
that is available through the emergency supplemental bill.
Senator Murray. Thank you very much.
I would remind all of us that we do want to go into closed
hearing in half an hour, so if we can keep our questions and
answers short I would appreciate it.
Mr. Mead. I just want to say that there has been a lot of
talk about federalization or nationalization. I think it is a
term that is not self-defining. Ms. Garvey said, I think, the
devil is in the details on exactly what we mean by that.
Senator Murray. Thank you.
Senator Specter.
Senator Specter. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Let me thank
you and Chairman Rogers for suggesting this joint hearing. I
think it has been a very good hearing. I would also be
interested to work with the House colleagues to see the
interaction. Perhaps we ought to do it more often.
Mr. Secretary, in just the few minutes I have I am going to
direct my questions to you. At the outset, let me say it is
reassuring to have you in this tough position in these tough
times with your legislative background and your capabilities in
this arena.
I think that Congressman Rogers has been very effective in
his examination in pointing out some major deficiencies which
really need very prompt correction. It is very distressing to
hear Inspector General Mead comment about the criminal
conviction and payment of a large fine for a company which is
handling security clearance in many places, and then to hear
that they ought not to be singled out, that there may be
similar problems at other places.
I quite agree with Dr. Dillingham that it is fine to have
resident aliens with green cards in key positions, but I do
believe that it merits some inquiry to be sure that they are
not part of some plan with some foreign conspirators. There is
no inference that that is so, but it requires a look. When you,
Mr. Secretary, say that there is no positive factor established
because some of the evidence is box-cutters and knives, of
course we do not know as we sit here, probably will never know,
what happened on all the other planes, whether the others had
guns or what they had.
I think it has become very obvious that the existing steps
at airports need to be corrected immediately. We have seen the
very serious deficiency in law enforcement officials and
immigration notifying the FAA as to what is happening. So that
there is a good blueprint which is emerging fairly rapidly in a
fairly brief hearing.
FEDERAL LOAN GUARANTEES FOR AIRLINES
Mr. Secretary, the questions that I want to cover with you,
in the couple minutes that I have, relate to the response of
the airlines. It seems to me that there is a solid legal basis
at least for consideration on losses which are directly
attributable to the terrorist acts being borne by the country,
as opposed to by any specific business entity or individual.
This is really an attack on our country and we are at war. When
we try to figure out what is fair and just, some consideration
ought to be given to how we are going to bear these costs,
whether they are national costs as a cost of war.
I had asked you informally before the hearing started--that
is when, people might be interested to know, we transact most
of our business, as opposed to the formal question and answer
session, which may be somewhat guided or inhibited by the
television cameras. But a constituent, US Airways, is only
symbolic of the entire airline industry as to what is
happening, and the $5 billion in cash has to be supplemented by
stopgap loan guarantees of $12.5 billion behind it, and speed
is really the essence of what we have to accomplish.
The Congress, to its credit, which is somewhat unusual,
responded very promptly last week with $40 billion as the
President requested and a resolution for the use of force. It
is my hope that we will move promptly with a package which will
stop the hemorrhaging now.
Last week, had there been $2.5 billion advanced, it is
entirely possible that might have foreclosed the matter for a
larger advance. So I would hope that you would weigh in from
your authoritative position to couple to $5 billion with a
backup $12.5 billion loan guarantee.
Secretary Mineta. Senator Specter, since those negotiations
were going on while I was here and I sent Deputy Secretary
Jackson to those meetings that went on between the White House
and the House leadership, I believe he can bring us up to date
on what is going to happen on that issue specifically of loan
guarantees.
Senator Specter. Thank you.
Mr. Jackson. Senator, the administration has reached a
position where we would be supportive of a package of
additional financial supplemental aid for the near term and
believe that that is an important component of the
stabilization of the airlines. So we are supporting money for
safety, as the Secretary described in his opening remarks, and
money for the $5 billion initial recapitalization and cash
infusion, some prospective and retroactive insurance liability,
terrorism insurance provisions, and a few other items that are
being discussed this afternoon.
So on the longer-term financial mechanisms, we are
supporting some measure there.
Senator Specter. The $12.5 billion backup line of credit?
Secretary Mineta. Senator, I think the amount is something
that is still in flux. I think the subject matter you are
interested in is part of the package. As to how much it is
specifically, it is still open.
Mr. Jackson. And how that would be structured and
administered.
Secretary Mineta. And how it would be structured.
Senator Specter. Madam Chairman, one further question.
Senator Murray. One further question. You are 2 minutes
over your time.
REOPENING OF REAGAN NATIONAL AIRPORT
Senator Specter. Mr. Secretary, with respect to Reagan
National Airport, very important for the Nation, especially for
US Airways, the biggest occupant there. It is very close to the
Capitol, about 90 seconds. But it is comparable to Dulles,
which is 2\1/2\ minutes. I know it is a security issue, but
could you give us some idea as to what may happen with Reagan
National Airport with respect to reopening?
Secretary Mineta. Senator, you have hit it on the head. It
is a security issue. We are working with the National Security
Council and, more specifically, with the United States Secret
Service on this issue, trying to fashion some way to get Reagan
National Airport back on line. The desire is to have takeoffs
to the south and arrivals from the south and nothing going
north or approaching from the north, but that cannot be done
all the time, because the laws of nature and the physics of
aircraft lift require a different set of wind conditions and
they do not always exist in terms of a southerly approach or a
southerly takeoff.
But in any event, I suggested maybe putting a sky marshal
on every flight that departs National or comes into National.
Well, that is a whole slug of flights in terms of the number of
air marshals that we will have. In any event, every day we are
talking to the National Security Council/U.S. Secret Service
about coming up with alternatives as to what we might be able
to do to get Reagan open, up again, recognizing that there is a
major airline that is on the precipice.
Senator Specter. Thank you.
Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Pastor.
BAGGAGE SCREENING
Mr. Pastor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the
leadership of the subcommittee for holding this joint hearing.
Also, I would express my condolences and heartfelt sympathy to
the pilots, attendants, and passengers who perished in this
tragic attack, and hopefully from this hearing we will secure
the airline industry, but also secure the entire transportation
industry.
One of the things, during these hard times we look for
culprits, but I have to tell you that a person's status, legal
immigrant, does not translate into a guage for judging loyalty.
I know that they have to do background checks. I know we have
to be secure. But being here legally but not being a citizen
does not translate to disloyalty. I just have to remind my
friends what happened in Oklahoma. Those were U.S. citizens. So
we just need to be careful in how we translate loyalty and
status.
I know you have ongoing investigations on how the
terrorists got on the planes and what they carried. What
security measure right now in place do you think would avoid it
happening again?
Secretary Mineta. Next question. I do not have a good
answer for that one.
Mr. Pastor. This last weekend I traveled back to Phoenix
and back to D.C. and I see still people carrying as many bags
as they want.
Secretary Mineta. Well, we have not done anything on the
limit. We were just talking earlier about limiting it to one
bag per person, including purses for women.
Mr. Pastor. Well, I have to tell you----
Secretary Mineta. That is not in effect yet.
Mr. Pastor. I understand that.
Secretary Mineta. The question is should we be doing things
like this.
Mr. Pastor. I saw in Dulles Saturday, where people had
their carry on bags, and the impatience of many of the
passengers, the pressure put on the people looking through the
bags. I can tell you that, even though they are trained and
they are trying to beef up security, I am sure there were some
things that passed through those bags that you would not want
to have carried on airplanes.
Secretary Mineta. I experienced the same thing when I went
to BWI to watch what was happening there on Saturday, and the
long lines. The whole function of wanding an individual was
sort of a function of how long is a line. Long line, nobody got
wanded. Yet we said specifically random wanding of passengers
coming through the security point. That does not say give up
wanding because it is a long line. It still says random
wanding.
Mr. Pastor. But then who would be selected randomly? Why
not everybody? Because there are certain people that
obviously----
Secretary Mineta. But by the same token, I know that when
the line got shorter everybody got wanded.
Mr. Pastor. Well, I would think that possibly they might
look at me and I might profile someone that might be carrying
something they should not be carrying. I may be wanded, but
someone what may not look like a terrorist might not be wanded.
I think you need to wand everybody, even though it takes time.
People ought to be limited to carrying one bag that is
small enough that it can be monitored and be made secure and at
least allow a person to carry an ID, maybe a plane ticket and a
few things. But I think that is going to stop probably 90
percent or more of the things that you do not want to have on
airplanes not to get on airplanes.
Secretary Mineta. ID's are required.
Mr. Pastor. I understand it, but what I am saying is the
bag you carry should be small enough that it can be secured
within a reasonable amount of time, but allow the things that
you need to carry on to be carried on--your ID, your ticket,
and a few things, pocketbook and stuff like that. But there are
still things on the airline. In first class I saw the attendant
opening a bottle of wine with a corkscrew, and it is longer
than four inches. What are you going to do with a glass that is
still being used, or bottles that are given out. So there are
different ways that people can still use what is being used on
the airlines to handicap an attendant or possibly create chaos
on an airline.
SECURITY OF OTHER TRANSPORTATION MODES
Senator Byrd asked a question. In Japan they use the
subways in a terrorist attack. What are we doing to ensure that
the subway trains are secure?
Secretary Mineta. Well, both the Federal Raiload
Administration and the Federal Transit Administration have been
having conversations with either APTA or with AAR on specific
things that are going to be required of the railroads to
increase their surveillance and security measures, part of
which I suppose goes back to that earlier question that was
raised by someone about the cost of this kind of surveillance,
especially with public transit agencies. How do you do it with
a transit agency that has, let us say, 57 buses or 1,300 buses?
How do they inspect those vehicles to make sure as they are
going through the Holland Tunnel that they do not have some
unwanted baggage on it?
Those are being talked about right now, and the early part
of next week I hope to be getting a report back on some of the
specific stuff they will be looking at and incorporating in
terms of their operation.
Mr. Pastor. I thank the panel, Madam Chair.
Senator Murray. Senator Durbin.
Senator Durbin. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Chairman Rogers,
I thank you for this hearing. I thank you for this hearing. I
think this is appropriate and timely.
I also want to thank Secretary Mineta and Administrator
Garvey. You have a tough job and you have done good work. In
fact, in many ways your public service has saved lives,
particularly in light of this national crisis.
Uniformed law enforcement officers at airport screening points
I would like to focus, if I can, on an area of questioning
which has already been addressed. There has been a lot of
attention since I returned to Washington on our airlines. I
think it is appropriate and I hope that we move very quickly to
respond. It appears that the legislation moving forward is
focusing on the solidness of the airlines--loans, grants, tax
considerations, questions of liability. These are all very
important and without the prompt attention of Congress and our
action I am afraid that we will face an even greater crisis in
our airline industry.
This is the first hearing I am aware of that has focused on
the security aspect of this. I would suggest to everyone here
the fact that yesterday in the United States of America
airlines operated at 31 percent of their capacity has much more
to do with security than it does with solvency. I think people
are reluctant to use our airports and our airlines, this brings
me to my question, Secretary Mineta.
I do not think there is anything that has come forward in
this hearing today which will make people feel safer about
using our airports and airlines. I am sad to report that,
because I want us to return to normal as quickly as possible,
but the questions that have been propounded and answered and
the testimony that we have about the gross inadequacy of the
screening system in American airports has to give every member
of this panel pause, let alone the flying public.
The suggestion that we have gone to the lowest bidder time
and again, hired people who are not well trained, not as
conscientious as they should be, who are not well supervised,
who have often been found to fail in their attempts to stop
people who would bring weapons on airplanes, has to be a matter
of great concern to all of us.
LAW ENFORCEMENT OVERSIGHT OF BAGGAGE SCREENERS
My specific question to you, Mr. Secretary, is this. On
September 11, 2001, in a matter of moments you made a decision
which saved lives. You brought down planes across America, as
you said, in less than 2 hours. Because of that decision,
people are alive today who might not otherwise be alive. I
would like to ask you this: Are you prepared now through the
FAA to make an order that at every screening station in every
airport in America there will be a uniformed law enforcement
officer to supervise the activity of these screeners until
Congress can respond with the administration to federalize this
activity with the appropriate people to give us the sense of
security we need?
Secretary Mineta. I know that at Baltimore they are doing
that. There is a police officer at the screening point
overseeing that operation. That is what I saw Saturday. Whether
or not we are considering doing that nationally, let me ask
whether Administrator Garvey or General Canavan.
Ms. Garvey. Senator, the major airports are doing just
that. We contacted them immediately and said, we would like you
to use your local, State police, your local county police,
metro police, whatever, and beef up the security, the security
checkpoints. I was looking at some numbers the other day and
they are dramatic.
The challenge for us is that many of the Federal law
enforcement officers that we want to use we are using Federal
marshals on the aircraft. So in many ways we are relying on
some of the local officials at the local level. But I do think
at the larger airports they have done that. This weekend we are
going to be visiting some of the major airports to see if there
are additional things we can do.
Senator Durbin. May I suggest, it seems eminently sensible,
based on what we have heard today at this hearing, that we have
an order coming from the FAA at every airport in America that
every screening team, every screening device, has a uniformed
law enforcement officer there. I think it accomplishes two
things. It reminds the employees of the seriousness of what
they are doing and it could certainly discourage some
wrongdoers from trying anything.
Yesterday I went to Lambert Airport in St. Louis. There
were five people at my screening station. Three were
conscientiously doing what they were trained to do and two were
involved in a kind of game-playing and horseplay that high
school teachers would not tolerate. That is unacceptable. If
this is truly our first line of defense, before we start
talking about arming pilots and sky marshals, should we not put
a law enforcement official at every screening device in every
airport?
Ms. Garvey. That would be one option. Two is to use the AIP
funding. The Secretary has asked for a recommendation on that,
to use AIP funding so that they can supplement those forces.
Senator Durbin. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Madam chair.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Richard J. Durbin
Chairman Murray, Chairman Rogers thank you for holding this
important hearing today. And a special thank you to Secretary
Mineta and Administrator Garvey for taking time to come back to
Capitol Hill to brief us and to work with us on ways to make
our aviation system the safest in the world. I want to commend
the Secretary and the Administrator for their quick work on
Tuesday, September 11, to halt national aviation operations and
to institute a ground stop for all aircraft. These prudent
actions likely prevented further tragedy and confusion.
This Congress and this Administration must expeditiously
develop a cooperative, comprehensive plan to ensure the safety
of the traveling public, the security of our airports, and the
continued economic viability of the aviation industry.
First and foremost, the federal government should
immediately take responsibility for the screening of passengers
and luggage and the control of security checkpoints at our
nation's airports. We can no longer rely on contractors and
subcontractors nor on employees with high turnover rates. We
need well-trained, professional federal government security
experts to be the central line of defense for airport security.
I plan to introduce legislation shortly that would require
these airport security check points to be staffed by federal--
FAA--employees. I also will co-chair a Governmental Affairs
Committee hearing with Senator Lieberman on Tuesday, September
25, to more thoroughly examine this issue. While this proposal
appears to be supported by the airlines and by the
Administration, I think it's important for Congress to act
swiftly to codify this important change.
I have heard from a number of Downstate Illinois airports
who support the stronger security procedures. However, these
airports are being asked to shoulder a heavy financial burden.
For example, the Central Illinois Regional Airport in
Bloomington-Normal will likely need to spend as much as $30,000
per month for additional security measures. These funds are
above and beyond what has been budgeted and could create a
financial hardship for the airport. The Department should
explore ways to help smaller airports by providing resources
and technical assistance to upgrade security and enhance
passenger safety.
With regard to on board security, I am encouraged by
Monday's announcement that federal law enforcement officers
will resume the sky marshal program. This gives peace of mind
and real safety assurances to the traveling public. I am a
cosponsor of Senator Hutchison's Emergency Aviation Security
Act, which would reinstate the federal sky marshal program.
However, I believe we can do more. Clearly, we have the
technological expertise to explore additional cockpit security,
from video cameras to tamper proof transponders. While we
pursue common-sense solutions like stronger and more secure
cockpit doors, we shouldn't delay developing high-tech
solutions that very well may save lives.
Finally, the airline industry is still reeling from last
week's senseless attacks. While carriers are doing their best
to resume operations while implementing stringent new security
procedures, it's clear that they face a significant economic
loss, both short- and long-term.
It has been estimated that the industry is losing $250 to
$300 million a day as a direct result of the attacks. In fact,
some airlines have already announced major layoffs--nearly
90,000 employees throughout the industry. Chicago-based United
Airlines announced lay offs of 20,000 employees. Milwaukee-
based Midwest Express has cut 15 percent of its workforce.
American Airlines will trim 20,000 jobs. U.S. Airways will be
cutting 11,000 jobs while Continental scales back by 12,000
employees. Last week, Midway Airlines permanently shut its
doors. And now the Boeing Company has announced a workforce
reduction of up to 30,000 employees by 2002 due, primarily to
falling aircraft orders.
I strongly support legislation that would help the airline
industry get back on its feet through special grants and loans.
This industry is simply too important to my home state of
Illinois and to the nation for it to face an uncertain future.
So many Illinoisans and Illinois communities rely on commercial
service for economic development and tourism, not to mention
the more than 50,000 airline jobs that are based in the
Chicagoland area and throughout the state.
I appreciate the difficult tasks that lie ahead for the
Department, the Congress, and our nation. Together, we can
craft common-sense solutions that protect passengers and ensure
that our aviation system is the safest in the world.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Callahan.
Mr. Callahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief
because I think it is important that we go into executive
session as quickly as we can.
Obviously, we have some very chilling deficiencies in the
system. I do not think this committee's role is to lay blame on
anyone, but rather as appropriators to find out what resources
you need to correct the problems. We are not an authorizing
committee and we are not permitted to make rules and
regulations. We are appropriators. I think that we have shown a
great willingness to the executive branch of the government,
both with the financial problems facing the airline industry
and with DOT, by saying there are deficiencies, tell us what
you need to correct the problem.
This business of just asking people if they packed their
own bags is not working. In fact, it is asinine that we go
through that. The fact that we have noncitizens who cannot even
speak English scanning people--undereducated, unable to speak
English, and not doing an appropriate job because they are
undertrained and underpaid.
We are coming to you as our representatives in the
executive branch of government and telling you we have the
money, we will provide it for you, provided you tell us what
you want, and we need answers immediately.
I think, Madam Chairman, the quicker we go into executive
session so we can find out some of these problems, the more
concerned we are going to be and the more willing we are going
to be to work with DOT to correct the problems. We need to do
this, Mr. Secretary, immediately. We need to begin this process
before we recess this year, which we are going to try to do
before the end of October. We need to provide you with
resources, if indeed you need them, or authorization if you
need any authorization.
So I am ready, willing, and able to go into executive
session to listen to the other horror stories that we do not
want to make public, and with good cause, but to tell you that
our role in this play is as appropriators who provide
resources. We are willing to do that. You justify what you need
the money for.
Thank you.
Secretary Mineta. That is very reassuring, Congressman
Callahan. Thank you very much.
Senator Murray. Senator Bond.
Senator Bond. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, Administrator Garvey: First, I join in
saying, thank you for the tremendous job that you have done.
Really, you took heroic actions to minimize potential future
danger. In the long and very difficult hours since then you
have been very responsive. I can only imagine the amount of
burdens on your shoulders. Thank you for doing that.
Now, there are a number of things that I may or may not be
able the touch on in this time, but I am interested in the
security issues, and I happen to feel that somehow we need to
have Federal law enforcement officials doing the screening. I
am advised that at the St. Louis Airport the turnover of
screeners is 416 percent per year. That kind of makes you
wonder about how well qualified they could be if they are
turning over that fast.
But I have been exploring and discussing on the floor a
number of things we need to do to help the airline industry,
and I want to take this opportunity, since this might be my
only opportunity to get to you, Mr. Secretary, in a public
forum, to ask your view on the liability issue, because we are
preparing to put in probably $5 billion to the airlines, $3
billion to security.
LIABILITY OF AIRLINES
It is my view that if we do not do something to limit the
scope of liability to the carriers and provide backup so that
everybody with a legitimate claim can be paid, that we will be
dropping $5 billion down a rat hole. I made this argument on
the floor and it was countered by someone saying: Well, do not
worry about liability because any lawsuit is 3 to 5 years down
the road. My understanding, and I ask your comment on this, Mr.
Secretary, is it is not whether or how many lawsuits will
ultimately result in judgments for plaintiffs, but the fact
that there are potentially 5,000 plus, plus, plus lawsuits out
there that is inhibiting the ability of the airlines, even the
relatively well-to-do airlines, getting the continuing funding
they need, the short-term funding, and inhibiting the ability
of other airlines just to get the cash they need to keep
operating in the next couple of months. The prospect of
unlimited liability going forward without some war risk
protection that you have proposed makes it unlikely that they
will be able to buy the insurance that you require them to have
before they operate.
Would you comment on that for the record, please, sir?
Secretary Mineta. First of all, New York has what is
referred to as a collateral damage liability law. So right off
the bat, United and American Airlines are facing tremendous
liability.
Senator Bond. If I may interrupt, Continental conducted the
screening and USAir brought some of the passengers in.
Secretary Mineta. That is correct. You are absolutely
right. I suppose if you wanted to, if I get in a taxi and get
on Continental and then get on United Airlines, then someone
could take it all the way back to the taxi company if they
wanted to.
But in any event, part of the problem is now the capital
markets have dried up for the airlines. So that is why in this
legislation that will be coming to you there is a provision
dealing with the whole issue of liability, both retrospective
as well as prospective. The details of that are being worked
out right now, but the liability issue is very, very big for
all the airlines. So that is going to be an integral part of
that package.
Airline operations
Senator Bond. In your judgment--and I might ask the
Administrator to comment on it--are we likely to see airlines,
significant airline carriers, unable to continue because of a
lack of availability of access to the financial markets without
this liability limitation?
Secretary Mineta. I believe that is the case. That is the
case right now.
Senator Bond. Madam Administrator, is that the case?
Ms. Garvey. It is, Senator.
Senator Bond. So you are saying that if we are going to
appropriate money, as I strongly believe we must, and I support
what appears to be developing as the administration's package,
that must, in addition to including the assistance for the
airlines in security measures, it must include liability
protections as well?
Secretary Mineta. That is correct. The other piece of it is
the fact that in some instances--in meeting with one of the
CEO's of an airline, he said that they had already received
their 7-day cancellation notice. Others are finding tremendous
increases in their insurance premiums. So it is not only a case
of insurance premiums going up, but it is also in some cases
insurance not being available to them at all.
Senator Bond. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you, Madam chair.
Mr. Rogers. Ms. Kilpatrick.
airline employee benefits
Mrs. Kilpatrick. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Murray, as
well as Congressman Rogers, for having this hearing.
Of the money being appropriated, $3 billion from what I
understood the Secretary to say earlier as a part of the $40
billion that was passed last week; another $5 billion which we
think will be in a new supplemental to recapitalize the
industry; and the $12.5 billion in loan guarantees, is there
language--and I am stressing in the strongest way possible that
there be language--that would make sure that those dollars go
to not just security, but the employees?
We have heard today over the last 24 hours that nearly
100,000 employees will be laid off. Where will those employees
be laid off? What kind of benefits will they have? What kind of
health care will they be able to obtain for themselves and
their families?
I want to make sure that these moneys do not go to the
CEO's and other high-ranking officials who already make over $1
million a year. I want to make sure that the money does not go
to the stockbrokers, although I am a stock owner in some of
them and we may take a brunt. It has to go to the families who
have also been serving these airlines.
There has been a lot of discussion, and I would like you to
answer that, Mr. Mineta. I want to make sure that when we do
infuse the money into the industry that it goes to securing the
industry and making whole as much as possible those employees
who have served well. No more curbside check-ins, so that is
inconvenient for a lot of us. What happens to all of those
employees? What happens to the baggage handlers and all that?
Secretary Mineta. The latter part of last week, maybe on
Thursday or so, because most of the focus was on foreign and
military relations and operations, the President established,
let us call it, the DCPC, Domestic Consequences Policy
Committee. So there are a number of us who are part of that
Domestic Consequences Policy Committee. One of the things that
the President has explicitly outlined is to make sure that
unemployment benefits, that retraining moneys and programs that
are similar to what would be otherwise available under the
Trade Adjustment Act assistance, would be there for those in
the airline industry.
airport security firms
Mrs. Kilpatrick. Happy to hear it, and I will continue to
work with that. But finally for me, this company that is in 46
airports, that had the low bid contract and non-citizens that
handle security, and has criminal convictions, who hired them?
Secretary Mineta. The airline is the one that contracts
with each----
Mrs. Kilpatrick. An airline? One airline? So do they all go
together and hire them or does each airline?
Secretary Mineta. The airline hires the company and then
the airlines--well, let me have Ken maybe go into that, because
he has maybe got the list of airports with the contractors.
Mr. Mead. Different airlines can hire the same security
company and that does happen.
Mrs. Kilpatrick. Obviously, low bid?
Mr. Mead. In some airports, Dulles for example, you have
the airlines get together there, they hire one vendor. In the
case of Dulles it is Argenbright. In the case of other
airports, where you have an airline, say, that has a dedicated
concourse, and you have two or three concourses at that
airport, you may have in fact three different firms providing
the security, each hired by a separate airline.
Federalization of aviation security
Mrs. Kilpatrick. Really, finally for me is the suggestion
that much of what I have read today and has been said before,
the suggestion that the Federal Government become more active
in that and that we take that responsibility from the airlines
and perhaps do something more federally. Mr. Secretary, Madam
Garvey, what is your position on that?
Secretary Mineta. We are looking very actively at that
whole issue of what some people have called nationalization.
Some people have referred to it as federalization. In any
event, it is going to be an enhanced system, better than where
we have been, let us say, on the 11th of September. In fact,
right away, before the airlines were able to get back in, we
had increased the security measures.
But on the screeners specifically, one of the things we
will be looking at is this whole issue of federalization.
Mrs. Kilpatrick. Thank you, Madam Chair, Mr. Chairman.
COCKPIT SECURITY--DOOR HARDENING
Senator Murray. Thank you.
I am going to ask just one quick question and then turn it
back over to those who have not had an opportunity. Mr. Queen,
while you are here and we have your expertise, we have heard a
lot in recent days about hardening the cockpit doors with
kevlar and some kind of suggestions like that. From your
expertise, can you tell me if there are specific safety
tradeoffs if we were to require those doors to be hardened?
Mr. Queen. The short answer is yes, because as you look at
the doors, at least in our models today, anywhere between 80
pounds to 130 pounds of force is required to open the door, and
they are designed to open at that force because they are the
vent path in the event of a decompression. So at a very low
delta psi, on the order of a tenth of one pound pressure on
that door, they open. It adds up to about that much.
The reason why that happens is you need to protect the
basic structure of the airplane. So a quick example is, on the
757, if you were able to increase that to one psi, hold the
door to that level of pressure, you have put about 9,000 pounds
of pressure on the bulkhead and 6,000 pounds of pressure on the
cockpit floor, and both the floor and the bulkhead have control
cable runs that are critical to the control of the airplane,
and you could not ensure that those bulkheads or floor would
not fail and you would lose control of the airplane as a result
of that.
So clearly there are things we can do to make the doors
more secure, but since they are the only available venting path
out of the cockpit, we have to also make sure we meet that
equal pressure requirement, which is why we have to be careful
not to rush into something without understanding all the
consequences.
Senator Murray. Thank you very much.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Tiahrt.
Mr. Tiahrt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have a statement
I would like to put in the record and go directly to my
questions.
Ahead of us I think there is a bright day in aviation, but
a lot of things are going to have to happen before we get
there. We have talked about these things. We have seen them on
the television, heard them on the radio. We have talked about
them in this committee, we have talked about the need for sky
marshals and increasing the strength of security doors. But
there are some things that we have not talked much about. We
can begin to look at some of the employees whose lives have
been disrupted. And while there is no comparison as we look at
the families of those who lost their lives.
manufacturers financial impact and federal response
When we look at the people whose lives are going to be
disrupted, I would urge, Mr. Secretary, that the administration
create a policy which addresses these work interruptions and
layoffs. The Administration should allow employees who have
lost their jobs, whether they were working for the airlines or
for aircraft manufacturers, to receive benefits in terms of
retraining and education or perhaps a hardship withdrawal on
401[k]'s without any penalty. These steps will help to soften
the blow. Perhaps we could create a program which would allow
an employee to move from a technician to an engineer or from a
parts deliverer to a machinist. Such a program would let them
improve their lives while their employment is interrupted.
Administrator Garvey, there are several long and
complicated things that I would like you to consider and
perhaps get back to me with your thoughts. We are seeing some
ripple effects that get to Wichita, Kansas. There may be as
many as 4,000 or 5,000 people laid off at the Boeing Company
alone. There are three other manufacturers in that area--
LearJet, Beech, and Cessna. Each of them are impacted because
they are single-engine aircraft, they are business jets, they
are charter jets.
We do not know the impact, but I would like for you, Mr.
Secretary, and you, Administrator Garvey, to include in a
financial stabilization package, small manufacturers as well as
large manufacturers like Boeing, because they are going to be
impacted by this event of September 11. Just one sentence would
solve that problem and allow them to stabilize the jobs they
have for their people and also the industry that they are such
a vital part of. That one sentence is to include in
protections, ``air carriers and other companies that hold FAA
certificates and rely on U.S. airspace to conduct their primary
business.''
If you could give me some assurance that you will fight for
those people who are part of this ripple effect, I would be
very happy.
Secretary Mineta. There is nothing in there to limit it in
terms of what kinds of companies would be eligible, other than
that, for instance, some of the funds are for airports, some of
the funds would be for airlines. The airlines could be major
commercial or it could be a cargo.
Mr. Tiahrt. Or it could be charter airplanes, I am
assuming, too, charter airlines?
Secretary Mineta. Charter? 91, I am not sure. I do not
think Part 91 is covered. I am not sure. Part 135 and Part 121
are covered, but I am not sure it gets down to the Part 91
charters.
Mr. Tiahrt. As you and Deputy Secretary Jackson get into
the recommendations that come from the administration, I hope
that you will include small manufacturers as well as larger
manufacturers of aircraft, the charter companies. They are part
of this air transportation industry that is 10 percent of our
gross domestic product. They are a very important spoke in our
economic wheel, and if one part of it is shaken, I am afraid it
will have additional bad effects.
Impacts on general aviation and flight schools
Administrator Garvey, I would like you to get back with me
on any indication of security measures that may be proposed for
general aviation as a result of these terrorist attacks. Also,
I note that the pilots association has been outstanding to work
with as far as the FAA and they have some good recommendations.
I would like to know what guidance you have given your staff
and organizations involved with them in terms of helping craft
a solution for class B flight training prohibitions and what
will be acceptable for the future.
My third concern is about these flight schools. We know
that some of these terrorists were actually trained in
America's flight schools. I think that is an awful, awful
thing. Certainly it clouds everything. But in the future we
want people to fly. We have a pilot shortage now. Perhaps we
could develop some guidelines, some red flags. I do not want to
penalize flight schools because we had a deficiency within the
INS. We should be able to give them some kind of guidelines so
that they can operate safely and protect our skies and yet
continue with the business of training future pilots. I believe
that is very important for our industry. Please give me some
kind of an idea as to what guideline or direction you plan to
go in those areas, because my goal is to have safe skies and
people back traveling again and feel confident in doing that.
Ms. Garvey. Congressman, we actually are working on that
today. That was one of the areas, when we lifted the ban last
night on some of the restrictions in aviation, that was an area
that was still outstanding. We heard mention this morning about
perhaps doing background checks on some of the students who
would register at the flight schools. We are looking at a
couple of other recommendations as well.
PREPARED STATEMENT
So if I could get back to you in a day or two as we think
those through and talk them through among ourselves, I will do
that. We know it is a real issue, not just for your State, but
for other States as well.
Thank you.
Mr. Tiahrt. Thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Congressman Todd Tiahrt
The terrorist attacks last Tuesday left an enormous void in the
hearts of all Americans. It has not only had an emotional impact on our
nation, it is having an economic impact as well.
I would not begin to compare America's horrible loss of lives to
the potential loss of jobs as a result of this horrific act. However, I
believe it is the responsibility of both Congress and the
Administration to guarantee that the air industry moves forward. As we
work to secure air travel for all citizens, we must work to secure the
jobs of those who depend on this industry for their livelihood.
Mr. Secretary, as you know it's not just the pilots, flight
attendants, and CEOs of the major commercial carriers who feel the
pinch of an industry-wide slowdown. It's the Skycap who doesn't know if
he can count on checking bags at curbside to make a living. It's the
counter agent whose job will be among the first to go if travel doesn't
pick-up. It's the Travel Agent who fears for the future of her small
business as a result declining bookings. And it's any of the thousands
of workers, such as those at Boeing, who face massive layoffs as a
result of the impact this tragedy has had on the commercial aircraft
production industry.
There is no spoke more important to America's economic wheel than
the air industry. And one of the most important components of that
spoke is general aviation. As you know, the shutdown of the National
Airspace System had a significant economic impact on general aviation
and the long-term viability of many GA companies has been threatened. I
urge my colleagues in the House and Senate, as well as President Bush,
to remember the issues facing general aviation in any efforts to craft
a financial stabilization package. This sector of the air industry is
vitally important to America's transportation system, manufacturing
base, and our economy.
Thank you for appearing before the committee today and I look
forward to working with you as we strive to protect America's air
passengers and strengthen our air industry.
Mr. Rogers. Secretary Mineta has another engagement that he
is late for already. We have kept him now half an hour past the
time he allowed for us. Before he leaves, if any of the
remaining four members would have a quick question for the
Secretary before he is excused, we would entertain that now.
But we hope you would be very brief.
Mr. Aderholt.
database tracking of potential terrorists
Mr. Aderholt. Since before the terrorist attacks, I
understand that there has been the use of a computer database
scripting language mechanism that has been used by the
Department of Defense to link different databases together in
order to compare and correlate their data. I understand that
meetings have recently taken place between the FAA and the
companies that could provide this technology. I think this is
something that the FAA should take into consideration to see if
there can be an implementation of some kind of database so that
they can review the technology to screen out those potential
terrorists that could be on there.
I just wanted to ask you what your thoughts on that might
be.
[The information follows:]
General Aviation Security Measures
The security measures the FAA currently is working for general
aviation primarily involve air traffic restrictions. In addition, to
enhance security of aircraft operations, on October 1, 2001, the FAA
issued Special Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 91, which imposes security
requirements for the following operations, including general aviation:
--1. Aircraft that enplane passengers from or deplane passengers into
a sterile area, and
--2. Aircraft weighing more than 12,500 pounds maximum certificated
takeoff weight. For this category, notification of the security
procedures would be in the form of a NOTAM (Notice to Airman),
which may or may not direct implementation of the procedures
for all affected operators simultaneously.
The SFAR:
--1. Immediately implements security procedures for private charters
and all other operations in which persons are enplaned from or
deplaned into a sterile area, regardless of aircraft weight.
Security procedures include the screening of passengers, crew,
other persons, and their accessible property and aircraft
searches.
--2. When activated by FAA by NOTAM, implements security procedures
for operation of aircraft in excess of 12,500 pounds maximum
certificated takeoff weight except for those required for
security measures under parts 108 and 129, regardless of
enplanement and deplanement through a sterile area. The FAA is
closely monitoring threat information and if conditions
warrant, the agency is prepared to impose additional security
measures.
flight schools
The FAA continues to consider what security measures might be
effective and appropriate for flight schools. Criminal history
background checks for persons applying for enrollment in flight schools
are among these; however there are some practical problems. Flight
schools train many foreign students who come to the United States
specifically for pilot training. As foreign citizens, they would not be
tracked in U.S. law enforcement databases. In addition, criminal
history checks would not necessarily deter an individual from receiving
flight training, since an individual can arrange for informal, non-
regulated training.
Secretary Mineta. Let me turn to Administrator Garvey on
where we are on the database technology.
Ms. Garvey. Well, you are absolutely right, those
discussions have been under way. It is something we are looking
at aggressively and it may very well be part of the program as
we move forward with some of the money that we have received
from Congress and from the President. This may be something
that we will target. It is not something that has been, as you
know, a high priority for us because of other competing
interests in the past, and we also obviously want to hook in
with the FBI and with the other intelligence agencies as well.
So those discussions are ongoing and we would be happy to keep
you and your staff informed of that.
Mr. Aderholt. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. This only applies to the Secretary. If you have
a peculiar question that only he can answer, let us ask that
now. Then we will come back to the others.
Ms. Granger.
SKY MARSHALS IMPLEMENTATION
Ms. Granger. I have one question. I do not know, perhaps it
is not yours. But I understand it takes 14 weeks additional for
sky marshals for special training. If that is true, then if we
said do it or you said do it, how long would it be before they
would be on the planes?
Secretary Mineta. We hope to have sky marshals in the air,
in terms of the new group we are getting in right now, very,
very quickly. I do not know where the 14 weeks figure came
from, but no, it is going to be much quicker than that.
Again, just for security purposes, we just have not been
talking about how many or when they are going to be on board.
We already had a small force, but we are having it implemented
through other agencies that are volunteering their folks to be
trained quickly. In the meantime, as we get those temporary
folks into the airplanes, we are going to build up our own air
marshal program. So those will be on board very quickly.
Mr. Rogers. Mrs. Emerson.
Ms. Emerson. Mr. Secretary, I would love to ask you a
question, but I am going to save mine for Ms. Garvey.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Sweeney.
airline solvency proposal
Mr. Sweeney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief.
In fact, I want to thank the Secretary and the rest of the
panelists for being here. I am going to make a point, because I
am going to submit my questions to you or speak to your staff
directly.
But like Senator Byrd and many other members, I have had
great consternation, as you know, as it relates to the airline
performance. Lest I appear to be gratuitous here, I, as one
member, suffered losses on the 11th. So I would urge you in
your negotiations with the airlines on the solvency package to
develop as comprehensive a response in terms of their role as
corporate citizens, because that mindset, I believe, as one
member, led in part to some of the lapses that we have now.
So I would urge you to understand that many of us are going
to move in the direction we need moving, because we recognize
national priorities here. But underneath that is a deeper
problem, as you know.
Secretary Mineta. We recognize that as well, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Secretary, we realize you are late for your
meeting and we deeply appreciate your agreeing to stay this
extra half hour. We are going to let you go about your
business. We hope the other members of the panel can stay
briefly for any remaining questions the members have not had a
chance to ask. But thank you so much, Mr. Secretary, for being
here. We congratulate you on your good work.
Secretary Mineta. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Madam
Chairman. Thank you very much, and to all the members of the
panel.
Senator Murray. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. We appreciate you
being here. We will let you go, and I will ask our members that
did not have their 5 minutes to quickly ask their remaining
questions. We do want to recess and reconvene in Hart 219 as
quickly as possible in a closed session.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Aderholt?
Mr. Aderholt. No.
DATABASE TRACKING OF POTENTIAL TERRORISTS
Mr. Rogers. Ms. Emerson.
Ms. Emerson. I want to just address something, and this
might be something that we actually need to talk about in
closed session, but it goes back to what Robert was talking
about as well as others at the beginning. You know, I think we
have a lot to do for the second, third, fourth lines of
defense, if you will, to stop a potential hijacker. But we
still have not attacked and we still must address the first
line of defense, which is when somebody books a ticket on an
airplane how can we find out very quickly if that person is on
a potential list of suspects.
It is something that I have been studying, that the Israeli
government does. I think that it would be certainly an
important investment for us to try to determine how to best
weed those folks out before we even proceed to a security
checkpoint in an airport. I cannot tell you how strongly I feel
about that, because so much--it appears that if we were able to
do that, and I am certain the technology is there to do that,
and the cooperation could be there to do that, that many of
these problems may possibly be averted in the future.
So, please.
Ms. Garvey. Congresswoman, thank you. Let me say, first of
all, there is a process in place and I would appreciate the
chance to talk about that in more detail in closed session.
Having said that, I think that you raise an excellent point,
which is are there more technologies out there, are there other
procedures that we need to put in place. So again, what I would
like to do is cover what we do in closed session and then offer
some thoughts on other things we are thinking about.
Ms. Emerson. Thank you.
Senator Murray. Thank you.
Senator Domenici has asked for 3 minutes of time before we
adjourn and I would be happy to allow him that.
airline safety and public confidence
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much, Madam Chairperson.
I just wanted to make an observation for you all and to ask
if you agree. First let me ask, before this terrorist act were
American citizens flying in airplanes safe? Was it a safe way
to travel?
Ms. Garvey. Yes.
Senator Domenici. Has anything changed so that it is unsafe
now as compared to 3 weeks ago? Should the American people be
worried about flying American airlines once you release them to
fly? Who wants to answer that? Do you, Jane Garvey?
Ms. Garvey. Thank you very much, Senator. Certainly before
the 11th, I think all of us really believed that the system was
safe. I think what we encountered on the 11th was something
that none of us had ever imagined possible. As I mentioned a
little bit earlier and mentioned again this morning, much of
what we had focused on in the area of security never took into
account someone who is willing to commit suicide and was
willing to use an airplane as a lethal weapon.
So in that sense it has changed all of the rules. We are
asking ourselves every day, of course, what else we should be
doing, what else we can be doing. Congress has certainly raised
questions. The chairman started with the three areas that we
are focusing on: more Federal marshals, securing the cockpit,
much better security system, even federalizing it, as has been
suggested. I think those are all steps we must take to deal
with what is a very new reality for us.
Senator Domenici. I just want to say, before this act, it
was my opinion as one Senator that the American economy was in
recession. I believe that will be proved up here in about a
month or less, that we are growing at a negative rate. If you
stay there for a couple of quarters, it is deemed to be America
in recession. I think that was going to happen whether or not
the terrorist attack occurred.
What I am fearful of is that it will last longer than it
should because the American consumers will not return quickly
to their original habits and be American consumers, who buy a
car if that is what they intended to do, or add to their house
or go shopping and buy some new clothes for the ensuing season.
If there is fear among the American people and they do not
return to being consumers, I am very fearful that we will have
a recession that will last very long, because the consumers are
going to lead us out of it.
So I am very hopeful that wherever you can, everybody in
charge of our American airline industry, as soon as possible
tell the American people with confidence that it is safe to
fly. I think in that context it is as safe today as it was 3
weeks ago, once you let the airlines all take off and clear the
airports. I think that is what will be the case. It will be as
safe or safer than it was.
I am hopeful that the American people will believe that
that is the case, so they will start flying again, and they
will also believe that it is time to buy the car they planned
to buy, not wait around. The terrorists will have won if our
consumers wait around because they are fearful.
Do you have any thoughts on that?
Ms. Garvey. Restoring public confidence is really what we
are very, very focused on. The methods that we are taking, the
fact that we will be using the system ourselves, I hope will be
the right steps. I think certainly the suggestions that we have
heard today are absolutely initiatives we must undertake and
undertake quickly.
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much. I appreciate it.
Additional committee questions
Senator Murray. Thank you.
Senator Shelby was unable to be here in this open session
today. He was in New York City reviewing the damage.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Question Submitted by Senator Herb Kohl
container hardening
Question. In light of the recent disaster, it is expected that the
FAA will greatly increase its security spending. And while greater
security on the ground will clearly be a priority, we must not overlook
the continued threat posed by in-flight explosions. In 1991, the
Aircraft Hardening Program was initiated, which included funding for
the Hardened Container Project. The goal of the program is the
protection of commercial aircraft from catastrophic damage or critical
system failure due to in-flight explosions. What is the current status
of this project? It is my understanding that this project has required
a great deal of cooperation between the FAA and the air carriers. Have
the air carriers assisted the FAA in the implementation of the project?
Does the DOT plan on using a portion of the supplemental that was
passed by Congress last week for the Hardened Container Project?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) continues
to support the hardened container program and is attempting to foster a
relationship with U.S. air carriers to support another operational
demonstration program. To date, one of the major difficulties in
executing an operational demonstration has been the lack of a U.S. air
carrier willing to assist in the evaluation effort. Operational data
gathering has been limited to the demonstration program with Tower Air,
which is no longer in business.
Since air carrier ground handling equipment and procedures vary, we
anticipate other modifications to accommodate air carrier operations
will be necessary. Damage tolerance limits have yet to be established
for hardened containers. Therefore, once the units exhibit any visible
damage, their blast-resistance cannot be assured and the units should
be pulled from service for repair. An operational evaluation would
provide the opportunity to establish damage tolerances for the
containers.
Unfortunately, the level of support provided by U.S. air carriers
prior to 9/11 was minimal. Both Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
and now the TSA have worked with the airline industry in developing the
fabrication standard for the hardened container, but there has not, so
far, been a significant level of interest on the part of air carriers
in taking steps to implement the project.
Within the supplemental passed by Congress, there is $100 million
of operational funds available for the aircraft hardening program.
However, these resources will be used for cockpit hardening rather than
container hardening.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell
lines of communication
Question. Every time we have a hearing involving the FAA and/or the
airlines, the question of the stability of the line of communication
between the airlines and their customers is always raised. Now it is
clear that the line of communication between everyone involved in air
travel--the FAA, Federal authorities, airlines, and customer--is
severely deficient, if not to say completely inadequate. What steps are
you going to take to improve this so that information moves quickly and
accurately from the air traffic controllers to the airlines to the
passengers, and most importantly, to the appropriate agencies in the
event of an emergency?
Answer. The FAA, in concert with the Department of Defense, NORAD,
and other federal agencies, has in place policies, procedures, and a
communications infrastructure to monitor aircraft for suspicious
activity and deviation from authorized flight. Awareness, refinement,
and training on these policies and procedures since September 11, 2001,
are on going. A system is in place for interagency, DOD, and law
enforcement information sharing to facilitate each organization's
requirements. Additionally, the FAA is currently working with the
Office of Homeland Security and other agencies to meet interagency
requirements for enhanced ground/ground communications and surveillance
availability. Certain current and planned technologies are considered
Security Sensitive Information (SSI) and are prohibited from
dissemination.
cockpit door
Question. A recent Washington Post article reported not only FAA
concerns with the cockpit doors, but also individual pilots concerns
with the fact that these doors are flimsy and easily penetrable. It
seems to me that these doors are probably no more effective than the
curtains that separate the first class cabin from the rear of the
plane. In light of the recent testimony of the men convicted of the
1993 World Trade Center bombing regarding the use of hijacked airplanes
in a terrorist attack, such as the attacks of September 11th, 2001, why
hadn't the FAA taken appropriate precautions after such a clear
warning?
Answer. No specific and credible information regarding an active
conspiracy to use a commercial aircraft as a weapon against U.S.
targets was passed to the FAA prior to the events of September 11,
2001. Regardless, clearly we could have done more to prepare for such
attacks.
security loophole rule
Question. For years we have realized that there is need to increase
the levels of airline security and to assess threats and to coordinate
actions to deal with these threats. One commission after another has
been created to look into how to deal with these threats. Rules to
tighten security loopholes were proposed in 1997 and were to take
effect this month. Why has it taken so long for these rules to go into
effect?
Answer. The vast majority of the measures recommended by both the
1990 President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism
following the Pan Am 103 disaster, and the 1996 White House Commission
on Safety and Security following the TWA 800 crash, have in fact, been
implemented.
The implementation of some recommended measures have been
difficult. The rulemaking process requires an agency to properly
consider and evaluate quite substantial industry comments, write and
coordinate the lengthy final rules, implement security program
requirements, and deploy systems for detection and measuring
performance at airports. FAA is also required to complete a thorough
analysis of the impact of the rules on small businesses. There was
significant OMB interest in these rules that would affect many small
entities as defined by the Small Business Administration. FAA
estimated, but could not conclusively determine, whether or not the
proposed rules would have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities. Therefore, FAA undertook an
outreach to small businesses and conducted listening sessions during
extended comment periods.
In the meantime, numerous improvements were implemented via air
carrier and airport security programs or through Security Directives in
response to immediate threats. The change in perspective produced by
both the terrible attacks of September 11th, and by the increased
awareness of the threat posed by Al Qaeda worldwide will make the full
implementation of appropriate security measures much quicker in the
immediate future.
cross-check
Question. Two of the accused hijackers were listed on the FBI's
list of terrorists to watch. We know that these men were on the planes
because their names were listed on the flight manifests. How could
these men purchase tickets and board a plane when they are on the FBI
list of terrorists without any second glances?
Answer. Prior to September 11, 2001, as a matter of routine, FAA
was not provided comprehensive watch lists from the FBI and other
agencies on individuals of interest to those agencies. As of September
11, 2001, the FBI and other entities provide information on a case-
specific basis to the FAA concerning individuals who pose a threat to
civil aviation. To the extent such information is authorized for public
release, it is used by the FAA to alert air carriers to such
individuals.
Question. It is so easy to check whether a person is using a stolen
credit card or trying to cash a bad check. Why is it so difficult to
have a cross-check system, not only with the FBI, but with all law
enforcement agencies, to see if there are any threatening people
purchasing tickets or checking onto our nation's airplanes?
Answer. We believe this technique does in fact have merit and are
pursing ideas of this type.
security personnel
Question. Airlines subcontract security responsibilities to
companies with the lower bid who in turn hire inattentive, uneducated,
and poorly trained security personnel without thorough background
checks. The FAA's own tests have shown that security checkpoints can be
easily breached. The FAA testers have casually thrown fake guns and
grenades into purses and bags that went undetected by security. Fake
identification badges are also used by testers and go unnoticed by the
security personnel. What are the FAA's plans to overhaul how security
personnel are hired and trained to make sure that the security
deficiencies are corrected?
Answer. With the assumption of direct federal responsibility for
the screening of passengers, baggage, and cargo, the screening
personnel working for the TSA will be better trained, better paid, and
subject to thorough background checks.
general aviation
Question. The FAA's shutdown of all flights last week has been
having a major effect on general aviation companies. In states such as
Colorado, small businesses that provide sight-seeing flights, crop
dusting, and shuttle aircraft are experiencing enormous financial
losses with no end in sight. What steps are you taking to ensure that
general aviation companies and small business that depend on access to
our skies are included in any possible aid packages while ensuring that
these airports and aircraft meet increased national security
regulations?
Answer. We understand that the terrorist attacks of September 11
have put a strain on general aviation companies. The Air Transportation
Safety and System Stabilization Act, Public Law 107-42, which directs
the President to provide compensation to air carriers, does not apply
to general aviation companies. However, a financially healthy airline
industry is a powerful engine for generating economic growth and
prosperity. As air carriers are able to recover financially from the
effects of the terrorist attacks, we are confident that other segments
of the industry, including general aviation, will recover as well. The
U.S. Department of Transportation has been working diligently to
provide payment relief under the Act, and to date, the Department has
already disbursed almost $4 billion to more than 300 air carriers.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy
airport security measures
Question. Press reports indicated that two of the suspected
terrorists were on an FBI watch list. Does the FBI or the Department of
Justice supply these watch lists to the FAA? Does the FAA supply that
list to airline carriers?
Answer. Specific information on current procedures with respect to
the use of intelligence and investigative ``watch list'' information is
sensitive and may be provided in closed session. Prior to September 11,
2001, as a matter of routine, FAA was not provided comprehensive watch
lists from the FBI and other agencies on individuals of interest to
those agencies. As of September 11, 2001, the FBI and other entities
provide information on a case-specific basis to the FAA concerning
individuals who pose a threat to civil aviation. To the extent such
information is authorized for public release, it is used by the FAA to
alert air carriers to such individuals.
Question. Were American Airlines and United Airlines provided these
names before this attack?
Answer. No. American Airlines and United Airlines were not provided
these names before this attack?
Question. Is it routine for airlines to match up passenger lists
with potential threat lists? And if these names were not provided, is
this a procedure that should now be put in place?
Answer. When the FAA provides names and other identifying
information with respect to individuals thought to pose a credible
threat to civil aviation, most airlines on a voluntary basis search
reservation systems for possible matches. And in some instances where
the information is sufficiently specific, they would be directed by FAA
to take action to prevent such persons from flying.
Specific measures to make more effective use of law enforcement and
intelligence information are themselves sensitive and can be provided
as appropriate in closed testimony.
Question. The criminal investigation into last week's terrorist
attacks is on going. Attorney General Ashcroft announced last week that
new armed, plainclothes federal agents will begin flying on domestic
commercial flights, augmenting the Federal Air Marshal Program. Putting
armed marshals on the thousands of commercial flights every day will
surely be expensive. And even with the promised new agents, it will be
virtually impossible to patrol every flight. What additional steps are
the Department of Transportation and the Federal Aviation
Administration taking to ensure passenger safety?
Answer. The Federal Air Marshal program has been greatly expanded
since September 11. Details of this expansion and related activities
are classified or sensitive security information. In addition, air
carriers have strengthened cockpit doors, modified procedures to be
followed in the event of an attempted hijacking, and taken other steps,
some of which we would prefer to discuss in closed testimony. Some
measures can be discussed in open testimony. The FAA and the TSA have
reviewed a range of options that will contribute to increase security
including, but not limited to: Hardening the flight deck door and
associated bulkhead; continuous operation of the transponder; emergency
alerting systems; video/audio surveillance on-board the aircraft; and
arming the flight crews with non-lethal weapons and physical defensive
tactics.
With regard to these options, the FAA issued rules for hardening
the cockpit doors, first mandating a ``quick fix'' within 45 days,
followed by a permanent fix later.
In addition, FAA formed a working group consisting of members from
FAA, TSA, industry groups, Federal law enforcement agencies, and
regulated Part 108 air carriers. The group's purpose was to update the
``Crew Training Common Strategy'' to deal with new threats against
civil aviation security. The Aviation and Transportation Act required
the FAA to develop guidance for a new ``Common Strategy''. After
significant participation from the groups mentioned above, the ``Crew
Training Common Strategy--Detailed Guidance'' document was completed
and distributed to regulated Part 108 air carriers on January 18, 2002.
Question. The FAA has implemented strict new rules designed to make
aviation travel safer. Many small airports in my State, however, have
implemented emergency stopgap measures that will have to be replaced
with expensive security service long-term. What will the Department of
Transportation and the Federal Aviation Administration do to make sure
that airports can afford these security measures?
Answer. As you know, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
made many aspects of aviation security the direct responsibility of the
Federal government. This includes direct supervision of passenger,
baggage, and cargo screening and various law enforcement measures. It
also created a mechanism for airports to obtain relief from the 300-
foot standoff distance (anti-car bomb) measures by substituting other
equivalent, but less costly measures. The new TSA is committed to
assisting airports of all sizes to have the most effective security
possible that is commensurate with the threat and that is most cost
effective. However, aside from costs to be borne by the TSA, other
increased security costs, especially physical improvements, will have
to be borne by the individual airports.
Question. The airlines are reporting losses of $330 million a day
due to decreased passengers and schedules. Also, many major airlines
and airplane manufacturers have announced plans to cut back at least 20
percent of their operations and lay off employees. All this will
inevitably lead to airlines cutting service to some areas of the
country. What are the Department of Transportation and the Federal
Aviation Administration doing to ensure that air service will be
maintained at small and rural airports?
Answer. Following the attacks of September 11, airlines reduced
service across the country. Based on an analysis the Department of
Transportation (DOT) did in November, the service reductions among
communities of different sizes were relatively proportional across the
spectrum from large-hub airports to the nonhub airports to which you
referred. That is, carriers have reduced service at the small, nonhub
communities in approximately the same percentage as at medium and large
hubs. Of course, individual communities may have suffered more or less
than the average of the group. In addition, the Department's Essential
Air Service (EAS) program provides a safety net to all eligible
communities by guaranteeing them that they will maintain at least some
level of air service that will link them to the national air
transportation system.
Question. How long will the airline bailout package of $15 billion
keep the airlines going?
Answer. The terrorist attacks of September 11th had a profound
effect on the financial position of the airline industry. The DOT has
disbursed nearly $4 billion of the $5 billion in compensation to
airlines provided by the Air Transportation Safety and System
Stabilization Act. In addition, America West was granted a loan
guarantee in accordance with procedures established by the Act.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that quick action under the Stabilization
Act has had the intended effect of stabilizing the industry and
restoring the confidence of the financial markets in the airline
industry. We are beginning to see some encouraging signs in airline
traffic due to increasing consumer confidence in the safety and
security of air travel as a result of government initiatives to enhance
airline security. Airline stocks are steadily improving as travelers
head back to the skies and as analysts boost airline stock valuations.
Question. What additional steps must Congress take to ensure the
long-term viability of our nation's airlines?
Answer. Though the financial condition of most carriers is
improving, it is too early to tell how far the recovery process will go
and how long it will take. It is premature to speculate about the need
for additional steps that Congress might take to ensure the long-term
viability of the airline industry. However, the DOT will continue to
closely monitor developments in the airline industry and will take
whatever steps we believe necessary to secure a safe, financially
sound, and competitive airline industry.
Question. A great emphasis has been placed on upgrading security
measures at airports around the country. At this same time, though,
ridership on trains and buses has increased dramatically over the past
week. Press reports indicate that ID's and bags are not being checked
at train stations and bus terminals around the country. What measures
are being taken by the Department of Transportation to ensure security
at these transportation terminals?
Answer. The DOT has not taken any direct measure to ensure security
at train stations around the country. However, Amtrak has increased its
security immensely, placing surveillance in critical infrastructure
areas such as bridges and overpasses. Amtrak has also tightened
procedures for checking and confirming passenger identification when
purchasing and obtaining train tickets. Additionally, it has instituted
numerous other security measures to heighten security throughout the
Amtrak system.
The nation's transit systems are inherently ``open'' environments.
They are designed to move people quickly to their destinations, and
therefore must provide quick, easy access for passengers. In addition,
they are intended to make low-cost transportation alternatives
available for everyone. Unlike airports, where it is appropriate to
check all bags being taken onto a plane, posting security checkpoints
at every bus stop or subway station entrance would raise costs and
reduce personal mobility to the point where public transportation would
no longer be viable. The ``three-legged stool'' of security, personal
mobility, and economic vitality is one that requires careful adjustment
to ensure an appropriate balance. Recognizing this, the Federal Transit
Administration's (FTA) security focus is on helping public transit
agencies prioritize risks, manage risks to acceptable levels, and
mitigate the impact of potential incidents.
The FTA has undertaken a five-part security initiative to help
enhance the security of the nation's public transportation systems.
This is not a ``one-size-fits-all'' undertaking, as every transit
system has different requirements. The five parts of the FTA's security
initiative are: assessment, planning, testing, training, and
technology. First, enhancing transit security must begin with an in-
depth, professional assessment of the threats to and vulnerabilities of
each transit system. The FTA deployed expert security assessment teams
to the 30 largest transit agencies to assess the security gaps in the
agencies' high-consequence assets, including terminals, and to make
specific recommendations to reduce the threats to acceptable levels.
The second component is planning. The FTA is providing hands-on
assistance to transit agencies as they develop and refine their
security and emergency management plans in light of the security
assessment findings and heightened terrorist threats. Third, The FTA is
working with local transit agencies to conduct full-scale emergency
drills to test their plans and equipment. Fourth, the FTA is offering
additional security training and workshops. It is imperative that we
have a transit workforce that understands security issues and is fully
prepared to respond should a security incident occur. Transit workers
are, after all, the ``eyes and ears'' of transit agencies, and they are
in the best position to protect customers from potentially harmful
situations. The final component involves technology and research. The
FTA is identifying technologies that show promise in a transit
environment and enhance security of our transit terminals.
______
Question Submitted by Congressman Ed Pastor
airline industry and related businesses emergency aid
Question. Secretary Mineta, and Administrator Garvey, as a longtime
supporter of the airline industry, this is an issue that is of major
concern to me. I agree that this attack has had a disastrous impact
upon the airlines, and Congress must act to save the industry. This is
why I support your request for an emergency aid package.
However, not only have I been an advocate for the airlines, but I
have also been a supporter of the entire airline industry. As you know,
this industry includes not just the major carriers, but the thousands
of small businesses across the country that provide essential parts and
services to the airlines as well. These supplies include women and
minority-owned small businesses, many of which depend upon the airlines
as a major or sole source of revenue. They not only lack the ability to
survive a major downtown in airline travel, but also lack the clout and
financial backing of other major creditors to the airlines carriers. I
want to make sure that these establishments are not left to perish when
we move to support the airline industry simply because their voices are
not as loud as the major Wall Street players.
If the Federal government appropriates direct aid to the major
airline carriers, how could they be compelled to prioritize their
financial responsibilities in a manner that is fair and equitable to
all of those in the industry that have been financially injured?
Answer. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the
Department of Transportation (DOT) have a strong commitment to
American's small businesses. As markets adjust to the impact of the
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the
strong working relationships between these businesses and the airlines
will insure their survival.
To further encourage economic recovery, DOT provided direct
compensation under Public Law 107-42 to over two hundred air carriers,
many of them small businesses. Funds paid to date total almost $4
billion of the $5 billion that was authorized. Unlike the loan
guarantee program also authorized by Public Law 107-42, compensation
was mandated for those carriers who were eligible under the statutory
criteria.
In addition, DOT construed the legislation as permitting smaller
carriers to receive payments even though they did not report financial
and operating data. We also undertook several initiatives to lessen the
regulatory burden for small businesses applicants: a separate
application form was adopted for air taxi operators, and we are now
considering methods to simplify for them the independent audit
procedures that are required prior to final payment.
Also, the Small Business Administration now has an ``Expanded
Economic Injury Disaster Loan Program'' to provide low-interest loans
to small businesses across the Nation that are having trouble meeting
their ordinary and necessary operating expenses due to the terrorist
attacks or Federal actions in response to the attacks.
Taken together, we believe that these programs will provide
sufficient relief to the industry and no further action at this time is
necessary.
conclusion of hearing
Senator Murray. Mr. Chairman, if there are no further
questions for this panel, we will recess the session and move
to the closed session as quickly as possible in Hart 219. We
ask members to move there quickly and we will resume the
hearing as quickly as possible.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 4:55 p.m., Thursday, September 20, the
hearing was concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]
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