[Senate Hearing 107-]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
EFFECTIVE IMMIGRATION CONTROLS TO DETER TERRORISM
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION
of the
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 17, 2001
__________
Serial No. J-107-45
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
81-651 WASHINGTON : 2002
___________________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin JON KYL, Arizona
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York MIKE DeWINE, Ohio
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky
Bruce A. Cohen, Majority Chief Counsel and Staff Director
Sharon Prost, Minority Chief Counsel
Makan Delrahim, Minority Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Immigration
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts, Chairman
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JON KYL, Arizona
JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina MIKE DeWINE, Ohio
Melody Barnes, Majority Chief Counsel
Stuart Anderson, Minority Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS
Brownback, Hon. Sam, a U.S. Senator from the State of Kansas..... 7
Cantwell, Hon. Maria, a U.S. Senator from the State of Washington 9
DeWine, Hon. Mike, a U.S. Senator from the State of Ohio......... 72
Grassley, Hon. Charles E., a U.S. Senator from the State of Iowa. 75
Kennedy, Hon. Edward M., a U.S. Senator from the State of
Massachusetts.................................................. 1
WITNESSES
Butterfield, Jeanne A., Executive Director, American Immigration
Lawyers Association, Washington, D.C........................... 41
Gutierrez, Lino, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Western
Hemisphere Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C....... 19
Norton, Richard E., Executive Director, International Biometric
Industry Association, Fairfax, Virginia........................ 64
Papademitriou, Demetrios G., Co-Director, Migration Policy
Institute, Washington, D.C..................................... 53
Ryan, Mary A., Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs,
Department of State, Washington, D.C........................... 11
Ziglar, James W., Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization
Service, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C................ 24
EFFECTIVE IMMIGRATION CONTROLS TO DETER TERRORISM
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WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 17, 2001
United States Senate,
Subcommittee on Immigration,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:36 a.m., in
Room SD-226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Edward M.
Kennedy, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Kennedy, Cantwell, Brownback, Grassley,
and DeWine.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD M. KENNEDY, A U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS
Chairman Kennedy. We will come to order. We know that there
has been some news affecting exposures to anthrax to some of
the staff in our buildings and that is being dealt with very
effectively by the Sergeant at Arms and by the health
professionals that have been assigned to deal with that job. We
feel strongly, since immigration issues have important
implications in terms of national security and also to
terrorism, that it was important that we move ahead.
We have legislation that Senator Brownback and I have been
working on which we intend to introduce shortly. We have been
getting some good suggestions and recommendations from the
administration and from other groups. But we are very strongly
committed to moving in this area. There are many aspects we
must address. There are our combat troops, there is money
laundering, and also the development of effective bioterrorist
abilities. We are dealing as well with the challenges of
immigration as well as the challenges in the intelligence
community. So all of these make up very important aspects in
dealing with terrorism. It was our judgment that we ought to
move ahead with this hearing, and we are very grateful to all
of our witnesses here this morning.
It is a privilege to chair this hearing today on the
critical issue of border security and its critical importance
in preventing terrorism. And I welcome all our distinguished
witnesses and commend them for their commitment to this
important issue. I look forward to hearing from them today and
working with my colleagues to protect our borders effectively
and fairly.
Strengthening the security of our borders is an
indispensable part of this Nation's effort to prevent future
terrorist attacks. We must develop policies and enact laws that
meet the serious security threats we face from abroad, and we
must do so without obstructing the entry of the more than 31
million foreign nationals who legally enter the United States
each year.
Clearly, the screening of foreign nationals who seek entry
into the United States must be improved. To do so, we must make
better use of intelligence information to identify high-risk
individuals who are potential terrorists and make sure that the
information is in the hands of the proper authorities in time
to act.
Accurate and timely intelligence is critical. Federal
intelligence and law enforcement agencies maintain lookout
lists containing the names of foreign nationals who pose a
threat to our safety and security. To keep these persons out of
the United States, intelligence agencies and law enforcement
agencies must be able to share and update this critical
information with the Department of State and the Immigration
and Naturalization Service as quickly as possible.
The Office of Homeland Security should coordinate the
implementation of a comprehensive data-sharing system to
provide these front-line agencies with the critical information
that they need.
Weaknesses exist in the lookout system. Potential
terrorists often use aliases and obtain false or stolen
identification. Biometric identification technology can be used
to improve the reliability of the lookout lists and enhance
border security. Their use should be significantly expanded,
for inclusion in passports, visas, and other travel papers.
Biometric technology should also be used to screen incoming
travelers. Automated systems, such as INSPASS, should be
expanded where practical to screen low-risk travelers.
The United States, Canada, and Mexico can clearly do more
to coordinate border efforts against terrorists. Efforts to
share lookout lists, develop and improve joint inspection
regimes and facilities, and train intelligence and other
enforcement personnel should be expanded.
Yesterday, Senator Brownback and I met with our two
Ambassadors from Canada and Mexico who made good
recommendations, and today earlier we met with the Deputy Prime
Minister of Canada, who also had useful suggestions.
In addition, we should work more closely with our European
allies and other countries to develop agreements to share
intelligence databases and collect information on persons who
have engaged in terrorist activity or who may be a threat. And
up until the law which has just passed the Senate, there was a
prohibition of sharing that information, both for the United
States and also in gaining that information. We have made
progress on that in the legislation which is pending action now
in the conference.
We should also expand the number of pre-clearance sites
abroad. Currently, most foreign nationals are inspected by
immigration officers upon arrival at U.S. ports of entry. Use
of pre-clearance sites allows more time for thorough
inspections and can lead to the apprehension of suspected
terrorists before they arrive in the U.S.
Many airlines transmit their passenger lists to the
destination airports, enabling U.S. authorities to investigate
the list while the planes are en route. Transmittal of these
lists is currently being used in 75 to 80 percent of all cases,
but it should be used for all international flights.
In addition, full implementation of an automated exit/entry
system will enable the INS to monitor foreign nationals in the
U.S. more effectively. Implementation of this system has been
delayed because the INS has lacked the technology to implement
this measure at all ports of entry, especially at the land
borders.
I know Mr. Ziglar has made this case appearing before other
Committees about the importance of getting the resources. We
support those requests, and they should be given a high
priority.
Federal funding is also needed to implement and effectively
operate the electronic foreign student tracking system enacted
in 1996.
A related issue is the large number of U.S. educational
institutions authorized to enroll foreign students. Periodic
review is needed to ensure that these institutions are
professional and competent. That hasn't been done in the past.
It will be done in the future.
The implementation of all these tracking systems will
enable the INS to determine whether foreign nationals have
complied with the terms of their visas and help to enhance our
security and safety by identifying possible threats. We can
protect our Nation's security, without undermining our history
and heritage as a Nation of immigrants.
[The prepared statement and an attachment of Senator
Kennedy follow.]
Statement of Hon. Edward M. Kennedy, a U.S. Senator from the State of
Massachusetts
It's a privilege to chair this hearing today on the critical issue
of border security and its critical importance in preventing terrorism.
I welcome all our distinguished witnesses and I commend them for their
commitment to this important issue. I look forward to hearing from them
today and to working with my colleagues to protect our borders
effectively and fairly.
Strengthening the security of our borders is an indispensable part
of the nation's effort to prevent future terrorist attacks. We must
develop policies and enact laws that meet the serious security threats
we face from abroad, and we must do so without obstructing the entry of
the more than 31 million foreign nationals who legally enter the United
States each year.
Clearly, the screening of foreign nationals who seek entry into the
U.S. must be improved. To do so, we must make better use of
intelligence information to identify high risk individuals who are
potential terrorists, and make sure that the information is in the
hands of the proper authorities in time to act.
Accurate and timely intelligence is critical. Federal intelligence
and law enforcement agencies maintain ``lookout lists'' containing the
names of foreign nationals who pose a threat to our safety and
security. To keep these persons out of the United States, intelligence
agencies and law enforcement agencies must be able to share and update
this critical information with the Department of State and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service as quickly as possible.
The Office of Homeland Security should coordinate the
implementation of a comprehensive data sharing system to provide these
front line agencies with the critical information they need.
Weaknesses exist in the lookout systems. Potential terrorists often
use aliases and obtain false or stolen identification. Biometric
identification technology can be used to improve the reliability of the
lookout lists and enhance border security. Their use should be
significantly expanded, for inclusion in passports, visas and other
travel papers.
Biometric technology should also be used to screen incoming
travelers. Automated systems, such as INPASS, should be expanded where
practicable to screen low-risk travelers.
The United States, Canada, and Mexico can clearly do more to
coordinate border efforts against terrorists. Efforts to share lookout
lists, develop and improve joint inspection regimes and facilities, and
train intelligence and other enforcement personnel should be expanded.
In addition, we should work more closely with our European allies
and other countries to develop agreements to share intelligence
databases and collect information on persons who have engaged in
terrorist activity or who may be a threat.
We should also expand the number of pre-clearance sites abroad.
Currently, most foreign nationals are inspected by immigration officers
upon arrival at U.S. ports of entry. Use of pre-clearance sites allows
more time for thorough inspections, and can lead to the apprehension of
suspected terrorists before they arrive in the U. S.
Many airlines transmit their passenger lists to the destination
airports, enabling U.S. authorities to investigate the list while the
planes are en route. Transmittal of these lists is currently being used
in 75-80% of all cases, but it should be used for all international
flights.
In addition, full implementation of an automated exit/entry system
will enable the INS to monitor foreign nationals in the U.S. more
effectively. Implementation of this system has been delayed because the
INS has lacked the technology to implement this measure at all ports of
entry, especially at the land borders.
Federal funding is also needed to implement and effectively operate
the electronic foreign student tracking system enacted in 1996.
A related issue is the large number of U.S. educational
institutions authorized to enroll foreign students. Periodic review is
needed to ensure that these institutions are professional and
competent.
The implementation of all of these tracking systems will enable the
INS to determine whether foreign nationals have complied with the terms
of their visas, and help to enhance our safety and security by
identifying possible threats. We can protect our nation's security,
without undermining our history and heritage as a nation of immigrants.
Again I thank the witnesses for being here, and I look forward to
their testimony.
Effective Immigration Controls to Deter Terrorism
october 17, 2001
The terrorist attacks on September 11 made clear that the United
States current intelligence and terrorism prevention net leaves us
vulnerable to serious security dangers. Strengthening immigration laws
should be an indispensable part of the nation's efforts to prevent
future terrorist attacks. Effective immigration and border controls can
have a significant impact on our national security.
This week, Senator Edward M. Kennedy, joined by Senator Sam
Brownback (R-KS), is introducing legislation that will institute new
procedures and dedicate new resources to increase the likelihood that
potential terrorists can be detected and apprehended before they act.
This legislation will significantly improve the screening of foreign
nationals seeking entry into the U.S. and better secure the nation's
borders. By making better use of intelligence information to identify
high risk individuals who seek to harm us, and ensuring that timely
information is in the hands of the proper authorities, this legislation
will help the nation meet the serious security threats we face from
abroad, without obstructing the free flow of goods across our borders
or the entry of the more than 31 million foreign nationals who legally
enter the U.S. each year as visitors, students, and temporary workers.
This legislation will increase the development and implementation
of effective immigration controls to deter terrorism.
intelligence. technology, and cooperation
Accurate and Timely Intelligence Is Critical
Federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies maintain
``lookout lists'' containing the names of foreign nationals who should
not be admitted to the U.S. These are individuals who have criminal
records, who have been denied visas or previously deported, who are
suspected terrorists, or who require serious scrutiny for other
reasons. To successfully prevent the admission of these persons into
the U.S., all intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies,
including the CIA, DIA, NSA, and FBI, must share this critical
information with the Department of State and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service in a timely manner.
Currently, some of this information is not shared with these two
agencies, which are responsible for making determinations about who is
granted a visa or is admitted to the U.S. Legislation is now pending
which will provide the Department of State and INS with electronic
access to the FBI's criminal history databases. The Department of State
and the INS should also have electronic access to all lookout lists
maintained by the CIA, DIA, NSA and FBI. The new Office of Homeland
Security should coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive data
sharing system to provide these front line agencies with the critical
information they need Senator Kennedy's legislation will require the
prompt development and implementation of a plan to provide the State
Department and the INS with timely electronic access to all lookout
lists maintained by the CIA, DIA, NSA and FBI.
Biometric Technology Can Improve Security
Weaknesses exist in the lookout systems in terms of identifying
terrorists seeking visas. Potential terrorists often use aliases and
obtain false or stolen identification. Biometric identification
technology can improve the reliability of the lookout lists and enhance
border security. The most common biometric data include fingerprint and
hand imaging, iris and retina scans, and facial recognition. These data
cannot be borrowed, or stolen, and forging them is extremely difficult.
These new technologies can match a unique identifying characteristic of
an individual with a name, and they need to be used effectively.
Machine-readable passports and visas are becoming more prevalent
and more difficult to counterfeit. Biometric data are currently being
incorporated into some immigration documents, and their use should be
significantly expanded, for inclusion in passports, visas and other
travel documents. With such technology, a traveler's identity can be
quickly and definitively verified by matching the identity with
biometric data incorporated in their documents.
Biometric technology should also be used to screen incoming
travelers. Systems, such as INPASS, which use biometric imaging, have
proven successful in screening frequent low-risk travelers. Such
systems should be expanded where practicable, since they enable more
resources to be allocated to anti-terrorist and security activities.
This legislation will authorize funding to study, develop and
implement the use of biometric identifiers in passports, visas and
other immigration documents, and the use of biometric technologies to
screen incoming travelers to the U.S.
A North American System
The U.S., Canada, and Mexico can clearly do more to coordinate
border efforts against terrorists. Cooperation between our countries
can be strengthened, taking into account each other's security
concerns, while still facilitating the movement of goods and persons.
Efforts to share lookout lists, develop and improve joint inspection
regimes and facilities, and train intelligence and other enforcement
personnel should be expanded.
Criminal smuggling rings, with knowledge of the weaknesses in our
border security, have developed into multi-billion-dollar-a-year
operations, and potential terrorists could use these smuggling
operations to cross the border. Detecting and shutting down smuggling
operations requires close cross-border cooperation, and these border
security efforts must be strengthened.
In addition, we should work more closely with our European allies
and other countries, to develop reciprocal agreements to share
intelligence databases and collect information on persons who may be a
potential threat or who have engaged in terrorist activity.
This legislation authorizes the Department of State and INS, in
conjunction with the Office of Homeland Security, to study the costs,
procedures and implementation of a Perimeter National Security Program
for the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. It will also authorize a substantial
increase in staffing and resources for the INS and Department of State
to enhance security along the nation's borders.
screening individuals before they arrive in the u.s.
Consular Offices: The First Line of Defense
Most foreign nationals traveling to the United States must apply
for visas from U.S. consulates abroad. Consular officers, who tend to
be junior personnel with little job experience, interview applicants to
determine whether they are eligible for visas. Until now, consular
screening has focused primarily on detecting visa overstayers,
examining indicators such as bank accounts, which have no bearing on
whether the applicant is a security risk. Although this focus is
important, more emphasis is needed on issues of security. We should
build a corps of knowledgeable and experienced consular officers,
skilled in screening for security threats.
This legislation will require the Department of State to provide
specialized training for consular officers in the effective screening
of visa applicants who pose a potential threat to the U.S.
Immigration Checks at Airports Abroad:
Foreign nationals are generally inspected by immigration officers
upon arrival at U.S. ports of entry. In some high-volume airports
abroad, U.S. immigration checks are performed at pre-clearance sites at
the point of departure, where travel documents are inspected before an
individual boards a U.S.-bound plane. Pre-clearance sites should be
expanded. They allow more time for thorough inspection. While a U.S.
inspector has no authority to arrest a suspected terrorist at a pre-
clearance site, the U.S. could cooperate with authorities who do have
the power to apprehend suspects.
This legislation will examine the expansion of pre-flight
inspection sites abroad, including the number, location, cost,
staffing, and training of personnel.
Sharing Passenger Lists:
Once travelers have boarded, many airlines voluntarily transmit the
passenger manifest to the destination airports. Passenger lists are
investigated while the planes are enroute. Once the planes have landed,
authorities can intercept passengers who are on the lookout lists.
Transmittal of airline manifests is currently being used in 75-80% of
all cases, but it should be used for all international flights. The
State Department should also transmit electronic versions of its visa
files to inspectors, so they are available at the time of inspection.
This legislation will require all international commercial air
carriers to provide passenger manifest information in advance of
arrival.
monitoring foreign nationals in the u.s.
Automated Exit/Entry System
Upon arriving in the U.S., non-citizens, including permanent
residents and temporary foreign visitors, workers, and students,
complete a form, called the I-94 form, which they are supposed to
return when they leave the country. Upon departure, travelers are
required to return the I-94 forms to airline representatives, who are
supposed to turn them over to the INS. Compliance is inconsistent, as
not all carriers return the I-94 forms to the INS.
Persons leaving the country at land borders are also supposed to
turn in I-94 forms, but many do not. These forms are currently
completed by hand, and cannot be used to track the departure of
specific persons until entered into a computer.
In 1996, Congress enacted legislation mandating the development of
an automated entry/exit control system to record the entry of every
non-citizen arriving in the U.S. and match it with a record of
departure. The INS lacked the technology to implement this needed
measure at all ports of entry, especially at the land borders, without
serious disruptions. Last year, Congress enacted legislation to
establish reasonable implementation deadlines. The Attorney General is
required to implement the integrated system by December 31, 2003 at all
air and sea ports. For the 50 busiest land border ports of entry, the
system would be implemented by December 31, 2004, and for all other
land border ports, by December 31, 2005.
Technology is available to implement electronic entry/exit controls
at all air and sea ports, but it is costly. Other countries utilize
electronic controls that could be models for a similar U.S. program.
For example, Australia has an electronic visa that is incorporated into
the airline ticket. Implementation should be funded by the federal
government, and airline compliance should be mandatory.
Since implementation at land borders is more difficult and has the
potential of disrupting commerce, additional time and resources will be
needed to establish effective exit controls at these borders. In the
meantime, other steps can be taken. The U.S. has experimented with
commuter lanes that permit officials to pre-screen applicants, and to
issue more secure documentation and devices for automobiles, to
expedite crossings without sacrificing security. Such programs should
be expanded to permit rapid crossings of low-risk commuters and enable
the INS to concentrate its resources on those who have not been pre-
screened.
This legislation will authorize funding to implement an automated
entry/exit system at all ports of entry, using technology standards,
biometric identifiers, and machine readable documents to confirm and
record identity. It will also expand the use of existing automated
systems at land ports of entry to screen low-risk travelers.
Monitoring Foreign Students. In 1996, Congress established a
program to collect information on non-immigrant foreign students and
exchange program participants. The CIPRIS program was designed to apply
to non-immigrants with F (student), J (exchange visitor), or M
(vocational) visas. Information collected includes name and current
address, major field of study, termination date and reason for
termination, the number of credits completed per year, and any
disciplinary action taken against the student.
A pilot phase of this program ended in 1999, but the system has not
been implemented nationwide. Universities and colleges expressed
serious concerns about the costs and administrative burdens of the
tracking program. Some of these concerns were addressed in legislation
last year, but other problems persist. They include lack of adequate
funding for State Department consular operations and INS monitoring
systems; gaps in reporting systems that make it impossible for the INS
to know when foreign students leave, or when they fail to show up for
their programs; and inadequate support for university officials
responsible for ensuring compliance with visa requirements.
Federal funding is critical to implement and effectively operate
the this tracking system. The INS has estimated that the cost of
implementation is approximately $32 million over the next three years.
Gaps in the tracking program should be closed by requiring the INS to
notify institutions of a student's entry into the U.S., and requiring
institutions to report to the INS the non-appearance of any student
reported and any student who heaves the program.
A related problem is the large number of U.S. educational
institutions authorized to issue forms to allow foreign students to
obtain visas. Currently, more than 26,000 institutions are authorized
to enroll foreign students. Periodic review is warranted to ensure that
these institutions are professional and competent. They should certify
that they agree to comply with the reporting and recordkeeping
responsibilities or risk losing their authority to enroll foreign
students.
This legislation will authorize funding to implement the automated
student tracking system, expand the types of schools covered by the
system to into include flight, language, and other vocational schools,
close gaps in record keeping and reporting requirements, and require a
review of institutions authorized to enroll foreign students.
An Integrated Approach
The implementation of an automated entry/exit system and the
student tracking system will notify authorities whether foreign
nationals have left the country under the terms of their visas, and
whether foreign students are properly maintaining their status.
But, it is important to remember that foreign students represent
less than two percent of the 30 million temporary visitors admitted
annually to the U.S. And the vast majority of foreign visitors,
students and workers who may overstay their visas are not criminals or
terrorists.
Focusing INS resources on those who fail to comply with the terms
of their visas will do little to enhance our national security. Linking
these tracking systems to lookout systems and law enforcement
databases, however, will enable the INS and law enforcement agencies to
screen foreign nationals more closely and identify and apprehend those
who do present a threat to our national security.
This legislation will authorize the development of a cross-agency,
cost-effective electronic system to enable tracking systems to be
interfaced with intelligence and law enforcement data systems.
Again, I want to thank our witnesses for being here, and I
will recognize Senator Brownback for his comments.
STATEMENT OF HON. SAM BROWNBACK, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
OF KANSAS
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate that and I appreciate our witnesses, and I think
this is a most timely and pressing topic in our combating
terrorism and our protection of our people and our way of life.
First, let me applaud the efforts of this Congress to react
promptly to the terrorist threats that face us. In only a
month's time, our represented officials came together and
passed an extensive anti-terrorist package, a tough,
thoughtful, bipartisan piece of legislation, along with a
number of other pieces of legislation, to allow us, to help us
to combat this war on terrorism. That will arm our Government
well in the fight against terrorism.
I also applaud several of our colleagues, Senators
Feinstein and Kyl, for their insightful hearing last week on
technology and terrorism and this Subcommittee for today's
hearing on effective immigration controls to deter terrorism.
Personally, I find the commitment and patriotism that echoes
through these halls to be truly inspirational. United we do
stand.
Nonetheless, the terrorist attacks of September 11th have
unsettled the public's confidence in our Nation's security and
have raised questions about whether our institutions are up to
the task of intercepting and thwarting would-be terrorists.
Given that the persons responsible for the attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon came from overseas, our citizens
understandably ask how these people entered the United States
and what can be done to prevent their kind from doing so again.
Clearly, our immigration laws and policies are instrumental
to the war on terrorism. While the battle may be waged on many
fronts, for the man and woman on the streets immigration is the
front line.
Of course, we must be vigilant not to punish the innocent
in our efforts to ferret out the criminal, nor should we allow
our values or out economy to be compromised. But we have a duty
to the American people to take measured steps to keep
terrorists from reaching our shores.
At this stage we must get a clear lay of the land. We must
assess precisely where our immigration laws and practices are
succeeding and where they must be improved.
The war against terrorism is a war won by information. The
more information we have, the better our chances of winning.
The more information our defenders can share, the stronger our
line of defenses. The better grasp we have on our immigration
procedures and practices, the better we can secure our borders
and our safety.
Mr. Chairman, I am hopeful that this hearing will bring to
light how best to utilize our immigration laws and resources to
deter terrorism. I look forward to hearing the insights and
recommendations of our officials from the Immigration and
Naturalization Service and from the Department of State. I
welcome the testimony of our learned witnesses from the public
sector.
I might add my comments as well to the comments that
Senator Kennedy put forward about we are working together on a
bipartisan piece of legislation to try to address specific
areas where there may be difficulties, where we need to tighten
up overall on our immigration system. People in this country
deserve a system that allows people into the country that want
to be helpful to America, but keeps people from the country who
want to harm this country. And I think that is all of our goals
and our objectives. And we have put forward, as Senator Kennedy
has articulated, several ideas already that we think would be
useful in pressing this forward to secure our borders in the
front-line war, and that front line in this war on terrorism
being the immigration policies and procedures that we practice
as a country. I look forward to your comments.
Chairman Kennedy. Thank you very much.
Senator Cantwell has been very much involved in the
development of our legislation on immigration policy issues,
and we welcome her, if she would say a word.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
OF WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank Senator
Kennedy for holding this hearing on what I consider to be one
of the most important issues in the fight against terrorism.
How can we effectively secure our borders from terrorists? By
improving the quality and sharing of identity information;
improving the screening of foreign nationals seeking entry on
U.S. visas; improving the awareness of comings and goings of
these foreign nationals as they enter and exit our country; and
increasing the number of Border Patrol and immigration
personnel at our borders.
Mr. Chairman, we must strengthen the security at our
border. Last week, we passed a major anti-terrorism bill that
contained a number of provisions that will enable law
enforcement and the community of intelligence gatherers to
obtain and share vital information regarding persons who are a
threat to the U.S.
One of the most important new tools I was pleased to have
included in this legislation is the requirement that State and
Justice develop a visa technology standard based on biometrics
to help secure our border and make certain each individual who
seeks entry into our country on a visa is the person he or she
claims to be and that there is no reason to keep that person
out of the country.
American citizens and the citizenship that they get comes
with a deeply valued privilege, and that is the right to
privacy. But to require a fingerprint or digital photograph of
an alien seeking to enter our country is a reasonable and
effective way to improve our ability to keep terrorists out of
the country while still welcoming a vibrant flow of legal
aliens.
Aliens seeking to visit, to go to school, work, engage in
business will provide the consular office considering that visa
application with some type of biometrics, most likely
fingerprint and digital photograph, so that we can compare the
identity information with that of persons who are unwelcome in
the United States. With this technology, we will be able to
confirm the person presenting a visa at the border with the
information that they need.
The technology standard is not prescriptive, and I am well
aware that there are many different types of technologies
available here and in Canada and in other places. And I have
left it to the agencies to determine what type of information
sharing should be required as part of the visa program.
Let me note that I recognize that technology will be only
as good as the information system which it is put into, and,
therefore, facilitating a technology that compels cooperation
between agencies will be very important. I hope to aid in
changing the non-technology barriers to data sharing.
Further, I am willing to work with the chairman and Senator
Brownback and my other colleagues to assure that uniform
practices that will feed the system with critical information
on the State Department and INS need to be also working on an
international basis with our allies so that our northern
perimeter will be as good as that technology standard.
Mr. Chairman, again, I look forward to hearing the comments
from the witness, and thank you for holding this very important
meeting.
Chairman Kennedy. Thank you.
We have been joined by Senator Grassley.
Senator Grassley. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I think that we need to better share information. The INS
needs all relevant information at its disposal that will
identify and track down immigrants who are on watch lists of
other countries.
The second point I would make is that we should implement
technologies needed to prevent illegal or criminal aliens from
entering. We need to create tamper-resistant visas and
passports. We need to invest in an effective biometric system
and provide the scanners to read the information on border
crossing cards. I know that Mr. Ziglar is going to lay out
about that testimony and has instructed his staff to expedite
database improvements. He specifically mentions the Student
Exchange Visitor Information System.
Unfortunately, delay in the implementation of this system
has and may continue to have detrimental effects on our
Nation's security, and that is very unacceptable. We want to
help the colleges and universities, and in turn, I believe that
colleges will want to help us in our war on terrorism.
Pursuant to this, I wrote Attorney General John Ashcroft
and requested immediate consideration of Federal funding to
speed up implementation of the student tracking system. I
propose that the Justice Department use a portion of the
emergency anti-terrorism funds approved by Congress to fund the
start-up of the student tracking system. Additionally, the
Department should clearly outline the responsibilities of
schools who wish to retain foreign students.
Finally, I realize that the Immigration Service does not
have the enforcement tools to go after every foreign student
whose visa expires. And even if Federal agencies are sharing
data and using the best technology we can create, the INS will
still face problems in catching the bad guys.
These are situations in which we can enlist State and local
support. By implementing Section 133 of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, the Department of
Justice can enter into agreements with local law enforcement
agencies in order to allow qualified officers to help in the
investigation, apprehension, and detention of illegal aliens.
The enemy could be among us, and the threat certainly
remains before us. Now is the time to act on what we know are
problems. I already identified a number of problems and
concrete solutions. We need to move forward with the proposals
that we have discussed since September the 11th.
I thank you, Chairman Kennedy.
Chairman Kennedy. Thank you very much.
It is an honor to introduce our first panel: Assistant
Secretary of State Mary Ryan; Acting Assistant Secretary Lino
Gutierrez; and INS Commissioner James Ziglar.
Ambassador Ryan has been a distinguished leader at the
State Department since she joined the Foreign Service in 1966.
She became Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs in
1993. Before that, she had served as Deputy Assistant Secretary
in the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, as Ambassador
to Swaziland, and in numerous embassies and positions in the
State Department.
Ambassador Gutierrez has also had a distinguished career in
the State Department, where he is now Acting Assistant
Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs. He has served as
Ambassador to Nicaragua and has also been posted to the
Dominican Republic, Portugal, France, and the Bahamas, and has
extensive knowledge on border security issues.
Commissioner Ziglar is well respected by all of us in the
Senate who know him well, and I am honored to welcome him back
to this Committee in his new position as the Commissioner of
Immigration and Naturalization Service. Mr. Ziglar worked
closely with all of us in the Senate in his outstanding years
as the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms. He has also served as a
managing director of Paine Webber and Drexel Burnham Lambert,
as Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Water and Science.
He had also practiced law for many years and was a clerk on the
U.S. Supreme Court for Justice Harry Blackmun.
I thank all of you for being here. We will recognize Ms.
Ryan.
STATEMENT OF MARY A. RYAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
CONSULAR AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Ms. Ryan. Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you
for the opportunity to appear before you today to explain the
role of the Bureau of Consular Affairs, and most particularly
our visa processing system, in our country's border security
program. I have a much longer statement, Mr. Chairman, which I
would like your permission to submit for the record.
Mr. Chairman, the resolve of the Department of State and
the Bureau of Consular Affairs to be full partners in the war
against terrorism is stronger than ever. In my testimony today,
Mr. Chairman, I will describe what we have been doing to make
our consular name check systems the best in the world and our
plans to make them even better in the future. I will also
address the procedures for visa issuance and the scope of the
Department's data sharing with intelligence and law enforcement
communities.
I can say with confidence that we are using today a state-
of-the-art visa name check system, and we continue to seek and
explore new technologies to expand our capabilities. If there
is one thought that I can leave with the Subcommittee today, it
is that any name check system is and will be only as good as
the information we receive to put into it.
Let me begin by noting that all visa cases are processed
using the automated name check system, which prompts the name
check through the Department of State's centralized lookout
system known as CLASS. A consular officer must review all hits
before the case can be formally approved for printing. There is
no override to this procedure. Simply stated, it is not
possible to issue a visa unless the name check has been
completed and reviewed by an officer.
The Department also has in place special headquarters
clearance procedures for nationals of certain countries,
including students, such as those on the State Sponsors of
Terrorism list, as well as for those whose planned travel
raises concerns about unauthorized access to sensitive
technologies.
Once approved, a visa containing numerous safety features
and a digitized photo is placed in the alien's passport. I
should point out that the period of visa validity has nothing
to do with the period for which the alien may remain in the
United States. A visa permits the alien to apply for entry to
the United States. Only INS may authorize such entry and
determine the alien's length of stay.
Now, let me briefly describe our visa name check database.
CLASS, which stands for Consular Lookout and Support System,
contains about 5.7 million names concerning foreigners, most of
which originate with visa applications at our consulates and
embassies abroad. INS, DEA, the Department of Justice, and
other Federal agencies also contribute to our system. We in
turn have provided approximately 500,000 lookout records to
other agencies through real-time electronic links to the
Interagency Border Inspection System, known as IBIS.
In the aftermath of the World Trade Center bombing in 1993,
the Bureau of Consular Affairs funded a counterterrorism tool
known as TIPOFF. This utilizes sensitive intelligence and law
enforcement information from the CIA, the NSA, FBI, and our
overseas posts concerning known or suspected terrorists.
The TIPOFF staff screens all incoming intelligence reports
and other sources of information for the names and biographic
data of known and suspected terrorists. Permission is obtained
from the relevant agencies to declassify identifying data of
suspected terrorists, and then that data is entered into CLASS
at IBIS.
The Visas Viper program is another integral part of TIPOFF.
The Visas Viper staff, in close coordination with the Bureau of
Consular Affairs, solicits information on suspected terrorists
from overseas posts for inclusion into the database. Beginning
in 1996, with the help of Congress through retained machine-
readable visa fees, Consular Affairs undertook a major
modernization of our systems. By 2001, all visa data collected
abroad, including photographs of the applicants, is being
replicated to the Consular Consolidated Database and is made
available to posts abroad. This year we deployed a pilot
program to share limited non-immigrant visa data with INS
inspectors at the port of entry at Newark, and we are very
pleased that INS will soon expand use of this replicated data
to all ports of entry. This will provide each INS inspector
with a photo to compare with the person in front of them, a
system cheaper than fingerprints and just as effective.
The Consular Lookout and Support System is modern and
extendable. Our name check system remains robust because we
continue to upgrade it. Allow me to outline a few of the
initiatives that we have underway right now.
For many years, we have sought access to FBI criminal data
on aliens applying for non-immigrant visas. I am very grateful
to Members of Congress that legislation has been introduced
that would provide us this data. I particularly want to thank
you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Brownback, and others on the
Subcommittee for introducing S. 1452 on September 21st.
I realize that my time is almost out, and--
Chairman Kennedy. This is very important.
Ms. Ryan. Should I just continue?
Chairman Kennedy. Please.
Ms. Ryan. I don't want to take too long.
We will also soon introduce improved field backup name
check systems for use when telecommunication links are
interrupted, and by summer 2002, every visa-issuing post will
have a local backup that closely approaches the abilities of
the CLASS mainframe.
Photographs are key to our exploration of biometrics.
Because every visa application already contains a photograph,
we capture a biometric identifier on all applicants right now.
For this reason, we have for some time been investigating the
use of facial recognition technology for identification
purposes.
Pilots at our posts in India and Nigeria have proved very
promising, and in late August, we launched a pilot at the
Kentucky Consular Center aimed at detecting invalid diversity
visa applications. We will soon test the abilities of facial
recognition software to compare visa applicants to a sample
database of photographs of suspected terrorists. We seek to
expand the pool of such photographs through liaison with other
Government agencies. We are also consulting with private sector
users of facial recognition technology.
We will also soon complete field-testing a new, more secure
non-immigrant visa and design a machine-readable, secure
immigrant visa that will, in conjunction with the data-share
program, virtually eliminate photo substitution. We are also
planning to develop a forensic documents lab to give us an
independent capability to detect and counter fraudulent or
counterfeit U.S. and foreign visas and passports.
Mr. Chairman, all of these initiatives, past, present, and
future, have been made possible because of a very wise decision
by the Congress a few years ago to permit us to retain machine-
readable visa fees. Since 1994, when we were given the
authorization to charge and retain these fees, we have spent
every penny sensibly and judiciously. We continue to rely on
MRV fees, as we call the machine-readable visa fees, to finance
the salary and basic benefits of virtually all American
employees who provide consular services. Permanent and uncapped
MRV fees are essential to continuing our efforts to enhance our
border security program.
Mr. Chairman, in our free society, we must continue to
improve the security of our borders while keeping our hearts,
our minds, and our economy open to new ideas, new people, and
new markets. CA has been and will continue to be a full partner
in the battle against terrorism.
I close with the point that I made at the outset. We cannot
be the effective outer ring of border security if we don't get
information on people who seek to harm our country from
intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Information sharing
is key to the protection of our Nation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee for
allowing me to appear before you today. I will be pleased to
try to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Ryan follows:]
Statement of Mary A. Ryan, Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs,
Department of State
Mister Chairman and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to explain
the role of the Bureau of Consular Affairs, and most particularly our
visa processing system, in this country's border security program. I
only wish, Mr. Chairman, that the context for this hearing could be
different. In that case I could open these remarks by saying how happy
I am to appear before you, because I am proud of the systems we have
developed over the past several years and that we work very hard to
improve each and every day. I would convey again my appreciation for
the help that the Congress has given the Department to improve our
consular systems by allowing us to retain machine-readable visa (MRV)
fees. However, I appear before you today keenly aware of the terrible
tragedy that befell our country and all civilized countries on
September 11.
In my testimony, Mr. Chairman, I will outline for you what we have
been doing to make our consular systems the best in the world and our
plans to make those systems even better in the future. During my tenure
as Assistant Secretary, the Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA) has been
continually engaged in efforts to design, deploy, and improve the
systems that help flag for our consular officers terrorists and
criminals among visa applicants. I can say with confidence that ours is
a state-of-the-art system that functions as it was designed. At the
same time, we continue to seek and exploit new technologies to
strengthen our capabilities. If there is any single point I can leave
with the Committee, it is that that any namecheck system is and will be
only as good as the information we receive to put in it.
Visa Processing
I will first focus on non-immigrant visa processing and explain
briefly how applicants are processed so that you will understand the
environment in which out systems operate. Applicants for non-immigrant
visas submit a written application, with a passport and photo, for
adjudication by a commissioned consular officer or other designated
U.S. citizen. Locally engaged staff assist in visa processing but are
not authorized to approve and issue visas.
Visa applications are processed using sophisticated automated
systems. Data entry automatically prompts a namecheck through the
Department of State's centralized lookout system (CLASS, the details of
which I will discuss later in my testimony). A consular officer must
review all hits before the case can be formally approved for printing.
There is no override for this feature; it is not possible to print a
visa unless a namecheck has been completed and reviewed by an officer.
Consular officers evaluate applications by looking at the full
range of criteria established by U.S. immigration law. They review the
credibility of professed plans for travel to the U.S. For most visas,
applicants must establish that they intend to visit the U.S. only
temporarily, are qualified for the visa classification sought, and will
undertake only activities consistent with the particular visa status.
Applicants must also establish that they are not otherwise ineligible
to receive a visa under one of the specific grounds of ineligibility in
the Immigration and Nationality Act, including terrorism, drug
trafficking and alien smuggling.
In addition to namecheck results, consular officers use a
combination of experience, knowledge of local economic, political and
cultural conditions, and common sense to evaluate applications.
Supporting documentation may be solicited and reviewed as needed. When
there are specific signs of fraud or deception, an investigation may be
conducted using consular anti-fraud resources.
The ever-growing numbers of visa applications has meant that
consular officers must reach decisions in individual cases rapidly. To
assist them in doing so, our namecheck technology provides results in
real-time. We have used outside linguistic experts to make our search
criteria for ``hits'' as helpful as possible. We have instituted
sophisticated Arabic and Russian/Slavic algorithms to identify names
regardless of transliteration variations, and are presently developing
a similar algorithm for Hispanic names.
Once approved, a visa containing numerous security features and a
digitized photo is placed in the alien's passport. The maximum period
of visa validity is ten years for multiple entries. The validities of
different types of non-immigrant visas are determined on the basis of
reciprocity with each foreign government. I should point out, Mr.
Chairman, that the period of visa validity has nothing to do with the
period for which an alien may remain in the United States. A visa
permits an alien to apply for entry to the U.S., but only the INS may
authorize such entry and determine the alien's length of stay.
Visa data, including photos and pertinent biographic data, is
electronically forwarded to the Consolidated Consular Database
maintained in Washington. This database also contains information on
refused applications.
Immigrant visas are for persons intending to reside permanently in
the United States. U.S. citizens and legal permanent resident aliens,
as well as prospective employers, file with the INS petitions on behalf
of certain relatives and employees. A special element of U.S.
immigration law is the Diversity Visa (DV) for which ``winners'' are
chosen by lottery. Like non-immigrant visa applicants, immigrant visa
and DV applicants must undergo namechecks. In addition, an FBI employee
at the National Visa Center does a National Criminal Information Center
(NCIC) criminal history check of these applicants.
I should note that, while immigrants are covered by NCIC screening,
nonimmigrants are not. I'll return to the solution to this problem,
which I hope is imminent, in the context of our namecheck system.
The Namecheck System
Integral to visa processing is the namecheck system. CA is well
aware of the importance of sharing and receiving critical intelligence
and criminal data from intelligence and law enforcement agencies. In
addition to ensuring that no visa is issued without a namecheck, we
have worked hard over the past decade to deliver more information from
other agencies to our visa officers via the namecheck system.
Our lookout database, the Consular Lookout and Support System
(CLASS), contains about 5.7 million records on foreigners, most of
which originate with the visa application process at our consulates and
embassies overseas. A variety of federal agencies contribute lookouts
to our system. INS has provided over one million records, and DEA about
330,000. Customs is working with us to provide 20,000 or more lookouts
from its serious drug violator records by the end of this year. We in
turn provide Customs, INS and other agencies using the Interagency
Border Inspection System (IBIS) with approximately 500,000 lookout
records through a real-time electronic link.
We also provide our officers, and the INS, with data on lost and
stolen foreign passports to prevent the use of such passports by
impostors.
TIPOFF and Visas Viper
In the aftermath of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the Bureau
of Consular Affairs--as part of the Department of State's border
security program--funded a border security and counterterrorism tool
known as TIPOFF. It was developed, and is managed, by the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research (INR), utilizing sensitive intelligence and
law enforcement information from the CIA, NSA, FBI and our overseas
posts concerning known or suspected terrorists. TIPOFF's objective is
to detect these individuals either as they apply for visas overseas, or
as they attempt to pass through U.S., Canadian, and Australian border
entry posts. (Data-sharing programs were implemented with Canada in
1997, and with Australia in 2000.)
The TIPOFF staff in INR screens all incoming intelligence reports,
embassy cables and other sources of information for those documents
containing the names and biographic data of known or suspected
terrorists. Following strict procedures approved by the respective
intelligence and law enforcement agencies, permission is obtained to
declassify names, nationalities, passport numbers and dates of birth of
suspected terrorists. This data is then entered into CLASS and the INS
and Custom Service's IBIS system. Consular officers overseas encounter
``hits'' based on TIPOFF data in the regular course of their work. The
CLASS database contains over 48,000 such records. TIPOFF has passed
approximately 23,000 records to INS and other inspection services at
ports of entry via IBIS, which uses a higher standard of biographic
data for its entries.
The Visas Viper program is an integral part of TIPOFF. The TIPOFF/
Viper staff works in close coordination with CA to solicit information
about suspected terrorists from overseas posts. This data is included
in the TIPOFF database and watchlisted in CLASS and IBIS. A procedural
adjunct to the Visas Viper program, called TIPPIX, incorporates
terrorists' photographs into the TIPOFF and IBIS databases.
TIPOFF performs the following important functions:
t helps preclude the inadvertent issuance of visas to
terrorists whose names are known to intelligence and law
enforcement agencies;
It warns embassies and consulates that certain
applicants may pose a security risk;
It alerts intelligence and law enforcement agencies
that a suspected terrorist is applying for a visa;
It provides a means for informed decisions to be made
on whether to issue a visa for operational or other policy
considerations, or deny the application;
It enables INS and Customs to detect suspected
terrorists who may have obtained a visa prior to being
watchlisted in CLASS, or who are attempting to enter the U.S.
through the Visa Waiver Program (VWP);
And it provides operational opportunities at border
entry points through use of ``silent hits'' or other handling
codes.
We are also comparing new TIPOFF hits in the Consular Lookout and
Support System with visa issuance information in the Consolidated
Consular Database, to determine if a subject of derogatory information
was issued a visa before the hit was created.
Security Advisory Opinions
We also address cases posing potential security threats using
Security Advisory Opinion procedures. We have concluded a series of
agreements with law enforcement and national security agencies
concerning categories of individuals of concern. Such persons are the
subjects of a cable prepared by a consular officer and disseminated
electronically to all appropriate agencies for an in-depth clearance.
The Department of State has designated Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya,
North Korea, Sudan, and Syria as state sponsors of terrorism. Visa
applications by officials and diplomats of these countries for the most
part must be submitted to the Visa Office for review and an advisory
opinion as to ineligibility before a visa can be issued. (This
requirement does not presently extend to diplomatic/official visa
applicants from Syria.) Non-official visa applicants from these
countries are also subject to a wide range of special clearance
procedures based on their background, the nature of their proposed
visit, and the type of visa they are seeking.
Based on agreements with the FBI, we also maintain a variety of
special clearance procedures--beyond the regular CLASS namecheck--for
numerous other nationalities, including Afghanistan. The reasons for
these special clearance procedures vary, but include concerns related
to espionage, technology transfer, economic sanctions, and human rights
violations.
In addition to these nationality-specific clearance requirements,
we universally require special clearance for applicants of any
nationality who are the subject of the most serious CLASS lookouts. We
similarly require special clearance for applicants whose planned travel
to the United States raises concerns about unauthorized access to
sensitive technologies, even if there is no lookout entry for the
individual. Consular officers are also asked to submit for a security
advisory opinion any other cases that they feel raise security
concerns, regardless of namecheck results.
The Consular Consolidated Database
Our data-sharing efforts are not, however, limited to the namecheck
system. We are now delivering more information to our visa officers via
a globalized database of visa records. Beginning in 1996, thanks to the
help of Congress with retained MRV fees, Consular Affairs undertook
major modernization of our systems. By March 2001, all visa data
collected abroad was being replicated to the Consular Consolidated
Database. In May 2001, we made the Consular Consolidated Database
available to all our visa officers abroad. The photo and details of
visa issuance, once only available locally to the post taking action,
are now available in real-time to all visa offices worldwide. Visas can
be checked at any point in the issuance process against all issued and
refused visas worldwide, and consular management in Washington now has
access to up-to-the-minute information about visa and passport issuance
around the world.
Data-Sharing with the INS and Other Federal Inspection Services
We are working to widen the flow of information to relevant Federal
Inspection Services. We are mindful of the challenges that INS faces in
inspecting millions of foreign visitors at ports of entry. We have a
number of initiatives underway to share additional information with INS
in order to improve border security. As I mentioned earlier, the
Consolidated Consular Database allows us to make visa information,
including digital non-immigrant visa photographs, immediately available
both in Washington and at all consular sections worldwide. We want INS
to be able to make good use of this data, in particular photos of each
individual who has been issued a visa.
Since the mid-1990's, State and INS have had a cooperative program
which has resulted in State forwarding to INS, for use at ports of
entry, electronic data on 55% of all immigrant visa recipients. The two
agencies have cooperated in exchanging information at all stages of the
immigrant visa process, from approving petitions to issuing legal
permanent residence cards. We are about to make certain software
changes that should allow complete sharing of immigrant visa
information with INS within the next year.
The Department is prepared to share all of its replicated non-
immigrant visa files with INS as soon as the Service is ready to
receive it. Towards that end, in July 2001, we deployed a pilot program
to share limited non-immigrant visa data with INS inspectors at Newark
and with the INS forensic document lab. The program was expanded to
Miami in September, and INS plans to make the data available to all
ports of entry over the next several months. We look forward to the
time when we can share all of our replicated files with all INS ports
of entry, as they will give INS inspectors near real-time access to
data that will allow them to better detect fraud and facilitate
legitimate travelers. In the meantime, INS inspectors have access to
our electronic visa data via telephone contact with the Visa Office.
Looking Ahead: Improving and Extending our Systems
The Bureau of Consular Affairs has staff specifically dedicated to
technical development to ensure we maintain state-of-the-art tools for
adjudicating visas. The Consular Lookout and Support System is modern
and extendible. Our namecheck system remains robust because we continue
to upgrade it. We are committed and are actively working to expand
datasharing with INS, other federal inspection services and law
enforcement agencies.
a. gaining access to fbi ncic iii data
We need access to FBI criminal record data (NCIC III) on aliens to
assist consular officers in their adjudication of visa applications and
have been seeking authority for such access for many years. We already
screen our immigrant applicants using FBI information and want to do
the same for non-immigrant applicants. We envision a system of index
records on aliens (excluding all U.S. citizens and legal permanent
residents) that is added directly to the CLASS lookout system and that
will signal there may be derogatory FBI information on an applicant. I
am grateful to Members of Congress that this legislation, which would
also ensure INS access to such information, is included in the counter-
terrorism measures now moving through Congress. Mr. Chairman, I also
want to thank you, Senator Brownback, and others for introducing S.
1452, which would provide NCIC III access to us and INS.
b. short-term improvements to visa systems
This winter we will introduce improved field backup namecheck
systems. By summer 2002 we plan to deploy a ``real time update''
feature for these systems that will give every visa processing post a
local back-up that closely approaches the abilities of the mainframe
CLASS system.
Before the end of this year, we will modify our existing database
of lost and stolen blank foreign passports to accommodate entries by
Foreign Service posts of individual, foreign passports that are
reported as lost or stolen. Lost and stolen passport data will continue
to be shared with federal inspection agencies through IBIS.
Specific enhancements aimed at giving visa officers more detailed
lookout information have been in the works over the past year. By
spring 2002, we will deploy features in our nonimmigrant visa system
that will increase the scope of data associated with our lookout
entries. Using scanning, we will begin augmenting the lookouts with
global, electronic access to refusal files (and photos) now kept at
individual Foreign Service posts.
c. facial recognition
As I have said, Mr. Chairman, every visa application contains a
photograph, which means we already capture a biometric indicator for
every applicant. Accordingly, we have been investigating the use of
emerging facial recognition technology in the consular business
process.
Evaluations comparing non-immigrant visa photos at posts in India
and Nigeria proved promising in identifying impostors presenting
fraudulent applications. In late August, we launched a pilot at the
Kentucky Consular Center for Diversity Visas aimed at detecting invalid
applications from persons working around our procedures. We will soon
test the capability of facial recognition software to compare a sample
database of photographs of suspected terrorists to those of visa
applicants. We seek to expand the pool of photographs available for
this use through efforts with other USG agencies.
d. document security
We soon will complete field-testing a new, more secure non-
immigrant visa. Laboratory tests have shown that it is much more
tamper-resistant than the current version. We will also complete design
of a machine-readable, secure immigrant visa that will, in conjunction
with the data-share program, virtually eliminate photo-substitution. We
will provide our consulates with special secure ink with which to
cancel visas, so that efforts to ``wash'' or ``recycle'' genuine visas
will be much more difficult.
We are planning to develop within the Bureau of Consular Affairs an
independent capacity to detect and counter fraudulent or counterfeit
U.S. and foreign visas and passports by creating a new office built
around a forensic document laboratory. This office also would
coordinate all Bureau efforts to assess biometrics technologies.
e. human resources
Using MRV fees, the Department currently funds the salaries and
benefits of 2,130 full-time positions. MRV funds will also be required
to increase consular staffing worldwide, to address growing demands in
the visa adjudication process. We are committed to an effective
training program for consular employees, including an intensive one-
week training course for consular field officers on namecheck systems
and linguistic concepts.
Machine-Readable Visa Fees Provide the Means for Improvements
Mr. Chairman, all of these initiatives--past, present and future--
have been made possible because of a very wise decision by Congress a
few years ago to permit us to retain machine-readable visa (MRV) fees.
Since 1994, we have spent every penny of these fees sensibly and
judiciously. As I mentioned, the Bureau of Consular Affairs relies upon
MRV fees to finance the salary and basic benefits of virtually all
American employees who provide worldwide consular services as well as
to make improvements to our systems. Permanent and uncapped MRV fees
are essential to continuing our efforts to enhance the nation's Border
Security Program. With this funding authority, we can ensure we have
sufficient personnel to cover staffing and training gaps and to help
meet peak season workloads. We can also adjust staffing to compensate
for additional anticipated steps in the visa adjudication process and
other changes to increase security.
This funding allowed us to modernize our consular systems, and some
of our future proceeds will go into further system upgrades, such as
the scanning of our refusal files to augment lookout information. Other
major expenditures looming include establishing additional back-up
capabilities for the sophisticated automated systems that support both
CLASS and the Consolidated Consular Database.
The level of resources available to federal border agencies greatly
affects our progress, particularly in interagency sharing of visa
information. We must continue to work closely with other agencies on
data-sharing to ensure full access to information for consular
officers. We are anxious to provide visa data to federal inspection
services and would like to see more rapid progress. Modernization of
other agencies' systems--including more modern protocols in data
exchange and more secure, flexible connectivity--is key to significant
progress. We actively participate in the Border Agency Partnership
(formerly IBIS), which aims to tackle these problems.
Closing
Mr. Chairman, we live in a free and open society. These
characteristics, so precious to all Americans, make our country a
magnet to those who seek greater political, economic and social
opportunities, as well as a target for those who hate us and seek to do
us harm. We must continue improving the security of our borders while
keeping our hearts and our economy open to new people, ideas and
markets. CA has been and will continue to be a full partner in the
battle against terrorism. Although the freedom and openness we value so
much make totally foolproof systems virtually impossible, I am
confident that our current system is state-of-the-art and functions as
it was designed. I am also confident that we are on the right track
with our efforts to find new technologies and institute data-sharing
arrangements with other agencies.
I close, Mr. Chairman, with the point I made at the outset of these
remarks--the effectiveness and success of our systems rely not only on
the quantity, but also on the quality and timeliness of the information
that goes into it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee, for
permitting me to share my thoughts with you today. I would now be
pleased to answer any questions you have for me.
Chairman Kennedy. Very good, very helpful.
Ambassador?
STATEMENT OF LINO GUTIERREZ, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. Gutierrez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for
the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the areas of
cooperation between the United States and the countries of the
Western Hemisphere, in particular Canada and Mexico, in
strengthening and securing our mutual borders.
The Western Hemisphere, perhaps more than any region in the
world, has benefited from the free flow of trade, people, and
ideas, and the U.S. has been a natural focus of that flow. What
the U.S. Government has discovered in the past month, however,
is that this flow, in addition to creating a natural
commonality of interest, has also created a need to work
closely together to better secure our mutual borders against
terrorists and other criminals. We agree that strengthening the
security of our borders has become an indispensable part of the
Nation's efforts to prevent future terrorist attacks.
Most importantly, our shared border with Canada to the
North and Mexico to the South represents our greatest
challenge: how to effectively guard against terrorism. Both
Mexico and Canada are working closely with the United States to
address these challenges. Our cooperation with Mexico on border
security has been a priority for many years. Even before the
September 11th attacks, our efforts at working together on
border security this year had intensified following the
President's February trip to Mexico to meet with President Fox.
Border security and safety are one of the pillars of the High
Level Working Group on Migration, and both Secretary Powell and
Attorney General Ashcroft have been closely engaged in the
issue with their Mexican counterparts since April. Their
efforts products renewed vigor in bilateral cooperation at
identifying and dismantling alien smuggling rings in Mexico,
increased intelligence sharing at the border between the U.S.
and Mexican law enforcement agencies, and by means of the
border liaison mechanism, resulted in improved cooperation
through increased personal contact by officials on both sides
of the border. The Fox administration has shown consistently a
willingness to work with us in ways not imagined as possible
just a couple of years ago. The Government of Mexico responded
immediately to the September 11th terrorist attacks with
concrete actions to tighten border security and to cooperate
with U.S. law enforcement officials.
I have submitted a written statement to the Committee for
the record which includes examples of Mexican cooperation.
Right now I'll mention a couple of examples.
The Government of Mexico offered full cooperation with FAA
authorities to survey all international airports in Mexico. The
Mexican Government instituted special visa screening procedures
for nationals of over 50 countries. No visa can be issued
without advance approval from officials in Mexico City.
The cooperation from Mexican agencies has been active and
outstanding. Every law enforcement, military, and intelligence
entity has worked tirelessly with us. There have been dozens of
leads initiated by Mexican authorities. An embassy agency head
described the level of cooperation as ``extraordinary.''
We had been working with Mexican authorities prior to
September 11th to encourage them to review and tighten their
policies in the transit of third-country nationals through
Mexico. The Mexicans have made progress in certain areas,
particularly on their southern border, with stemming the flow
of immigrants transiting Mexico to the U.S. While the
overwhelming majority of those who attempt to enter the U.S. do
so for economic reasons, we have insisted that Mexico do more
in this area to ensure that potential malafide migrants do not
take advantage of alien smuggling networks to the U.S.
Since September 11th, Canada has become a key partner in
the war on terrorism. On the day of the attacks, Canada allowed
some 245 international flights headed for the United States to
land at its airports. The upwards of 27,000 passengers,
including many American citizens, were cared for by the
Canadian officials and the Canadian people for several days.
Currently, significant Canadian military assets, including a
four-ship task force, are being folded into our military
response. Canada has been a staunch and forthcoming ally.
Again, my written statement lists a number of examples of
Canadian cooperation. I will mention a few.
On October 15th, the Canadian Government introduced in
parliament sweeping anti-terrorism legislation which gives
police more authority to crack down on terrorists and cut off
fundraising for suspected terrorist groups.
On October 12th, the Canadian Government announced a $55
million (Canadian dollars) boos in the budget of the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police to create new border and national
security teams, update forensic technology and databases, and
increase protection of key sites.
Another $49 million package was announced in Ottawa last
week that will provide for 100 additional immigration officers
at border points, increased efforts to deport illegal entrants,
and new fraud-resistant identity cards for legal immigrants.
Our cooperation with Canada on shared border security is
extensive and in-depth. There are six bilateral fora currently,
including Border Vision, the Shared Border Accord, the Canada-
U.S. Partnership, the Cross-Border Crime Forum, the Bilateral
Consultative Group on Counter-Terrorism. All these will be
meeting in the near future to discuss additional steps.
We interact daily with Canadian ministries, parliament, the
media, and the Canadian people. We have redoubled our efforts
since September 11th, and those efforts are paying dividends.
The countries of the Western Hemisphere have demonstrated
that they are important allies in the effort to condemn and
combat terrorism. Many countries of the hemisphere--most
importantly Canada and Mexico, who share our physical borders--
are working cooperatively with the U.S. to examine policies and
develop efforts to strengthen border security. More needs to be
done throughout the hemisphere to adopt modern investigative
techniques, improve airport security, encourage a sharing of
information, cooperate in law enforcement and financial
investigation efforts, and monitor and suppress money
laundering and alien smuggling, which are criminal activities
that also provide resources for the terrorists. We are urging
all countries of the hemisphere to sign and ratify the 12
international conventions that address terrorist threats and to
implement fully the terms of the UN Security Council Resolution
1373 with respect to blocking terrorists' access to fund. We
are a party to ten of these conventions and have signed two:
the 1998 Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings,
and the 1999 Convention on the Suppression of Financing of
Terrorism Crimes. We are pleased that the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee is receiving testimony on these two
remaining convention on Thursday, and we urge the Senate to
review and ratify them expeditiously.
Our hemispheric commitment to confront terrorism will be
demonstrated by the concrete measures we take as sovereign
governments and as a community of governments to arm ourselves
against this worldwide threat. We will continue to call on our
hemispheric neighbors to join us in our counterterrorism
efforts and in sending a unified message that these criminal
activities are not welcome in our neighborhood.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gutierrez follows:]
Statement of Lino Gutierrez, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
Western Hemisphere Affairs
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
the areas of cooperation between the United States and the countries of
the Western Hemisphere--in particular Canada and Mexico--in
strengthening and securing mutual borders.
In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the
countries of the Americas have responded strongly and positively
against international terrorism and in solidarity with the United
States, and have supported our efforts to construct an international
counterterrorism coalition. A tragic testimony of the degree to which
our fates are linked is the list of thirty of the Hemisphere's thirty-
four nations which lost citizens in the September 11 events--among
those nations directly affected, El Salvador counts 121 dead and
missing, the Dominican Republic 42, Canada 24, and Mexico 18.
The Western Hemisphere, perhaps more than any region in the world,
has benefited from the free flow of trade, people and ideas, and the
U.S. has been a natural focus of that flow. What the USG has discovered
in the past month however, is that this flow--in addition to creating a
natural commonality of interest--has also created a need to work
closely together to better secure our mutual borders against terrorists
and other criminals. We agree that strengthening the security of our
borders has become an indispensable part of the nation's efforts to
prevent future terrorist attacks.
Expressions of solidarity and sympathy are being matched by
concrete actions by the nations of the hemisphere. Hemispheric
governments are beefing up security measures, sharing intelligence, and
looking at ways to improve border security. For example, on October 12,
the Caribbean (CARICOM) heads of state issued an anti-terrorism
declaration pledging to put in place the ``necessary measures to comply
with new international safety regulations on planes, at airports arid
sea ports.'' Additionally, the OAS Inter-American Committee Against
Terrorism (CICTE), which met in a special session on Monday, October
15, is coordinating OAS member states' efforts to reduce the ability of
terrorist groups to operate in the hemisphere, including enhancing
border cooperation and travel document security measures. As part of
this cooperation, CICTE member states have been briefed by top U.S. and
Canadian government experts in the areas of counterterrorism, terrorist
financing, and border controls.
Most importantly, our shared border with Canada to the north and
Mexico to the south, which covers a distance of over 6,000 miles,
facilitates--under normal conditions--the legal crossing of
approximately 1.6 million people and almost 2 billion U.S. dollars per
day in trade with Canada and Mexico. Although this impressive level of
activity demonstrates the positive effects of trade and globalization,
it also represents our greatest challenge: how to effectively guard
against terrorism. Both Mexico and Canada are working closely with the
U.S. to address these challenges.
mexico
Our cooperation with Mexico on border security has been a priority
issue for many years. Even before the September 11 attacks, our efforts
at working together on border security this year had intensified
following the President's February trip to Mexico to meet with
President Fox. Border security and safety are one of the pillars of the
High Level Working Group on Migration, and both Secretary Powell and
Attorney General Ashcroft have been closely engaged in the issue with
their Mexican counterparts since April. Their efforts produced renewed
vigor in bilateral cooperation at identifying and dismantling alien
smuggling rings in Mexico, increased intelligence sharing at the border
between U.S. and Mexican law enforcement agencies, and, by means of the
Border Liaison Mechanisms, resulted in improved cooperation through
increased personal contact by officials on both sides of the border.
The Fox administration has shown consistently a willingness to work
with us in ways not imagined as possible just a couple of years ago.
The government of Mexico responded immediately to the September 11
terrorist attacks with concrete actions to tighten border security and
to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement officials.
Some examples:
Mexican authorities stopped two U.S. residents on
September 12 entering at Mexicali with suspicious documents.
Mexican immigration picked up 30 individuals in
Tijuana and sent them to Mexico City for questioning.
An additional four people were picked up September 17
in Durango for questioning.
Mexican authorities worked closely with their U.S.
government counterparts inside Mexico to investigate
evidentiary leads such as an ice pick on a plane from the U.S.,
a suspicious piece of luggage with Arabic tapes and documents,
and reports of suspicious crop dusters near the U.S. border.
The government of Mexico offered full cooperation with
FAA authorities to survey all international airports in Mexico.
The Mexican government instituted special visa
issuance screening procedures for nationals of over 50
countries. No visas can be issued without advance approval from
officials in Mexico City.
The cooperation from Mexican agencies has been active and
outstanding. Every law enforcement, military and intelligence entity
has worked tirelessly with us. There have been dozens of leads
initiated by Mexican authorities. An Embassy agency head described the
level of cooperation as ``extraordinary.''
We had been working with Mexican authorities prior to September 11
to encourage them to review and tighten their policies on the transit
of ``third country'' nationals through Mexico. The Mexicans have made
progress in certain areas, particularly on their southern border, with
stemming the flow of immigrants transiting Mexico to the U.S. While the
overwhelming majority of those who attempt to enter the U.S. do so for
economic reasons, we have insisted that Mexico do more in this area to
ensure that potential malafide migrants do not take advantage of alien
smuggling networks to enter the U.S.
As part of this effort, the Government of Mexico has been proactive
in identifying and disrupting rings of alien smugglers on the U.S.
border and throughout Mexico.
canada
Since September 11, Canada has become a key partner in the war on
terrorism. On the day of the attacks, Canada allowed some 245
international flights, headed for the United States, to land at its
airports. The upwards of 27,000 thousand passengers, including many
American citizens, were cared for by the Canadian government and the
Canadian people for several days. On the Friday following the attack,
some 100,000 Canadians attended an official memorial ceremony on
Ottawa's Parliament Hill to pay tribute to the victims. Currently,
significant Canadian military assets, including a four-ship task force,
are being folded into our military response. Canada has been a staunch
and forthcoming ally.
Other examples of Canadian cooperation include:
Working hand in hand with us on investigating
literally thousands of leads in the wake of the September 11
terrorism attacks.
On September 12, Canadian border guards arrested a man
carrying several bogus pilot licenses as he tried to enter
Canada from the U.S. Canadian officials immediately handed him
over to U.S. authorities.
Canadian authorities detained and turned over to us a
passenger on a flight diverted from the U.S. to Canada on
September 11 after he was found to be in the possession of
several airline uniforms.
Canadian officials are also working closely with their
U.S. counterparts to investigate the discovery of box-cutter
knives found aboard an Air Canada flight scheduled to fly from
Toronto to New York, but grounded at the last minute on
September 11.
In-depth security interviews were imposed for refugee
claimants in the weeks after September 11.
On October 12, the Canadian Government announced a S55
million (Canadian dollars) boost in the budget of the Royal
Canadian :Mounted Police to create new border and national
security teams, update forensic technology and databases, and
increase protection of key sites.
Another $49 million package announced in Ottawa last
week will provide for 100 additional immigration officers at
border points, increased efforts to deport illegal entrants,
and new fraud-resistant identity cards for legal immigrants.
Canada has announced airport improvements worth USDS60
million for more bomb detectors, staff, and modernized computer
systems.
The Canadian Government has also introduced in
Parliament new anti-terrorism legislation giving police more
authority to crack down on terrorists and cut off fundraising
for suspected terrorist groups.
Our cooperation with Canada on shared border security is extensive
and in-depth. Coordination is based in six bilateral fora--Border
Vision. whose overall goal is a bilateral, strategic approach to
migration which will strengthen the integrity of the border through
information and intelligence sharing, policy coordination, joint
overseas operations and border cooperation; the Shared Border Accord,
whose goal is to develop new and innovative programs that will
facilitate bilateral trade and the movement of people; the Canada-U.S.
Partnership, announced by the two countries' heads of government in
1999 to look at cross-border issues and provide a framework for non-
federal stakeholders to air their views; the Cross-Border Crime Forum
to address crime issues; the Bilateral Consultative Group on Counter-
Terrorism to bring both countries' top counter-terrorism experts
together annually; and the Integrated Border Enforcement Team, a
bilateral, multi-agency law enforcement group of police, customs and
immigration officials.
In all of these areas, the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs'
most appropriate role is advocating and coordinating policy with the
highest levels of Canadian political and policy decision-making. We
advocate forcefully for U.S. government policies through our Embassy in
Ottawa and our seven consulates across Canada. We interact daily with
Canadian ministries, Parliament, the media, and the Canadian people. We
have redoubled our efforts since September 11. And those efforts are
paying dividends. Our Canadian friends have recognized that there are
some weaknesses in their immigration law and have introduced
legislation to, among other provisions, make refugee/asylum claimants
excludable even if they are merely suspected of terrorist ties, and
given Canadian law enforcement increased access to advance passenger
information on incoming flights. And, on October 15, the Canadian
government introduced in Parliament sweeping anti-terrorist
legislation, which includes giving police authority to tap phones and
electronic mail, and makes it a crime to harbor a terrorist. It also
takes the step of making it a crime to raise funds or participate in
activities of terrorist groups.
The ability of the Canadian government to secure its homeland will
only help us in securing our homeland. A higher level of confidence
about who Canada is admitting at its ports of entry would assist us
greatly in allowing us to focus our northern border resources where and
how they will do the most good. Canada feels the same way about us.
Even greater information and intelligence sharing, and the development
and sharing of new technologies, will allow both countries to focus
more on the commonality of our immigration efforts. With 1.2 billion
dollars in trade crossing our mutual border daily and 200 million
people annually, the goal should be to foster this invaluable flow of
people and goods while also increasing safeguards against threats. We
are confident that our Canadian partners share this goal, and stand
ready to work with us to make it happen.
Conclusion
The countries of the Western Hemisphere have demonstrated that they
are important allies in the effort to condemn and combat terrorism. In
addition to the numerous expressions of condolence and solidarity,
events in Washington (including the invocation of the Rio Treaty by
States Parties at the OAS on September 19 and the extraordinary
convocation of OAS foreign ministers on September 21) were important
measures of our support within the hemisphere.
In addition. many countries in the hemisphere--most importantly
Canada and Mexico who share our physical borders--are working
cooperatively with the U.S. to examine policies and develop efforts to
strengthen border security. More needs to be done throughout the
hemisphere to adopt modern investigative techniques, improve airport
security, encourage countries of the region to work among themselves to
share information, cooperate in law enforcement and financial
investigation efforts, and monitor and suppress money laundering and
alien smuggling, which are criminal activities that also provide
resources and logistic support for terrorists and other malefactors. We
are urging all the countries of the hemisphere to sign and ratify the
12 international conventions that address terrorist threats and to
implement fully the terms of UNSC Resolution 1373 with respect to
blocking terrorists' access to funds. We are a party to ten of these
conventions and have signed two: the 1998 Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings and the 1999 Convention on the
Suppression of Financing of Terrorism Crimes. We are pleased that the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee is receiving testimony on these two
remaining Conventions on Thursday and we urge the Senate to review and
ratify them expeditiously.
Our hemispheric commitment to confront terrorism will be
demonstrated by the concrete measures we take as sovereign governments
and as a community of governments to arm ourselves against this
worldwide threat. We will continue to call on our hemispheric neighbors
to join us in our counterterrorism efforts and in sending a unified
message that these criminal activities are not welcome in our
neighborhood.
Chairman Kennedy. Thank you.
Mr. Ziglar?
STATEMENT OF JAMES W. ZIGLAR, COMMISSIONER, IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. Ziglar. Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I
appreciate the opportunity to appear today to talk about border
control issues in the context of the anti-terrorist effort.
Needless to say, Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to be before
this Committee. As you know, historically I have a great
affection for this Committee, as you well know, going back to
the 1960s when I worked up here in this Committee, and I am
obviously, for other reasons, very interested in your work in
my new role.
Chairman Kennedy. It goes back to the 1965 Act of the
elimination of the national origin quota system, the Asian
Pacific triangle.
Mr. Ziglar. That is right.
Chairman Kennedy. I remember. A very important piece of
immigration legislation eliminating discrimination.
Mr. Ziglar. Exactly.
Chairman Kennedy. We know that you have been interested in
these issues for a long time.
Mr. Ziglar. Obviously, Mr. Chairman, I also was very
pleased to be the Sergeant at Arms and am forever grateful for
that opportunity.
I had a couple of questions this morning from the press
that prompt me to say something that is not in my notes, but I
think it is important to remember, particularly in the context
of this Committee, this Subcommittee, and that is that the
issue that we are facing in the country here is not an issue
about immigration. It is an issue about evil. Immigrants are
not terrorists. Immigrants are people who want to come to this
country to share in this country and to contribute.
The people that we are talking about, the hijackers, they
weren't immigrants. They were non-immigrants. They were people
who were coming trying to visit our country to do damage. There
are millions and millions and millions of people who want to
come to this country not as immigrants but as visitors. And we
have to control our borders to make sure that those kinds of
people, obviously an immigrant, somebody who wants to emigrate
to do harm, we obviously need to know who they are, too. But we
need to keep this in the context that immigration is not a bad
thing, that immigrants are not terrorists. There may be some
among their groups, but we don't need to lump all immigrants
into this, and I think that is an attitude that I see
developing, at least among the press, based on the questions I
am hearing. And I just think we need to keep that in context.
When I started this job 2 months ago, I was looking for a
big challenge, but I had no idea that I was going to get the
challenge that I face, the turn that has come. When the
President gave me a goal or gave me some goals for this
agency--and I think I talked to each one of you about taking
this job--there were three things that really needed to be
done: one was to restructure the organization in a way that it
could fulfill its enforcement and service missions more
appropriately and more efficiently; secondly was to modernize
the management processes and structures so that it could carry
out those missions; and thirdly was to modernize and
synchronize the technology infrastructure of the INS so that it
also could do a better job at carrying out its missions.
Well, I have to tell you, from my point of view the mission
that was set before me before September 11th is exactly the
same mission today, and that is, the only way we are going to
help protect the American people from the kind of evil that we
saw on September the 11th is to have a more efficient and
effective government and to have a more efficient and
efficiency Immigration and Naturalization Service.
I think it is worth noting that the INS bears a very heavy
burden that most Americans don't realize. We share a
responsibility at the ports of entry with the Custom Service
and vetting people and things that come across those borders.
But between those ports of entry, the 6,000 miles of border
that we have, land border that we have in this country, the INS
has sole responsibility for patrolling that.
People don't realize that we have more than 500 million--I
think it was 530 million people cross our borders every year.
That is a staggering number. And, frankly, about 350 million of
them are non-U.S. citizens, so there are another 175 million
U.S. citizens that cross. But 350 million non-U.S. citizens
cross our borders every year. And most of the people come over
here through visa waiver programs or other exemptions. So they
never have shown up at one of Mary Ryan's places to get a visa.
They come under other programs.
Most Americans don't realize that we have got less than
5,000 inspectors throughout the entire world in the INS to
process these hundreds of millions of people who want to come
to this country. Most people don't realize that we have about
2,000 intelligence officers and investigators who are charged
with the responsibility around the world of dealing with
undocumented aliens, overstays, smuggling, human smuggling
rings, and criminal aliens that are among us. That is 2,000 for
a huge number of people.
As I noted, this is a very heavy burden to bear.
Without a doubt, the tragic events of September 11th have
focused the Nation and the Congress on the management of our
borders. I have got to tell you, Mr. Chairman, that the INS is
a willing, enthusiastic, and cooperative partner in this fight
against terrorism. I believe that we have the will, we have got
the determination, and with your help we will have the human
and other resources necessary to meet that challenge. But we
are moving ahead. We are not waiting for people to tell us what
to do.
For one thing, let me tell you that, first, we are going to
present to you probably next week a reorganization plan at the
INS. I am moving forward with those goals, notwithstanding what
occurred on September 11th, and we are going to present to you
a reorganization plan that has now been approved by the
Attorney General personally. It is in the process of being
approved at OMB, and it is substantial and it is significant in
terms of the way we will do our business at the INS.
In the technology area, we are moving very rapidly to
engage force multipliers so that we can do our job better. We
are developing an enterprise architecture plan that is based
upon a study and a design that we worked out with GAO. I might
add that the GAO used us as a guinea pig to design and approach
the enterprise architecture throughout the Government. We are
the original organization that will be using this structure to
design the enterprise architecture.
But we are not waiting for that plan to be in place in
terms of developing our technology. We are presently going
forward using an investment review board process, an interim
technology enterprise architecture structure to start building
our technology that will fit on this platform, that will be
hopefully interrelated with all the other Government agencies.
Mr. Chairman, with your support--and you talked about the
SEVIS system, and I know that is important to everyone on this
panel. The SEVIS system is the student tracking system which I
think was also known as CIPRIS at one point. It has been the
product of a lot of controversy up until recently. There was a
lot of opposition to it from the academic establishment. There
was opposition in Congress because of the fees and that sort of
thing. That is a system that, with your help, with some
appropriations, we can get started moving that system forward,
and we can beat the deadline or meet the deadline, certainly,
that the Congress set originally of 2003.
Mr. Chairman, you mentioned in your opening remarks the
number of institutions that are involved in that system or that
can issue I-20s for students. That is a huge issue. There are
almost 74,000 institutions in this country that can issue I-
20s, and we have never really screened them out or done
anything like to see who is it that is actually issuing I-20s
and bringing students in.
I can tell you, last week I started the information-
gathering process that we can start screening and qualifying
these people. I think that is a huge issue, and it is something
that we are very focused on.
Mr. Chairman, we are integrating our various enforcement
databases into something called the ENFORCE system. One of the
criticisms, and a legitimate criticism, of the INS and other
institutions in our Government is that we have databases all
over the place, but nobody knows what data the other people
have, a bunch of stovepipes. That is true in the INS. There is
no question about it.
We are in the process of developing an overall database, if
you will, called ENFORCE where all of this information we have
lodged in all these different places will go into that ENFORCE
system.
We already have integrated that with our IDENT system,
which is a biometric identification system. People get IDENT
and other things confused. They think IDENT is a database. It
is not. It is an identification system that tells us who this
person is that we have in front of us; then what you need to
know once you figure out who the person is, what do you know
about that person. And that is what we have done. We have
integrated those, and we are trying to integrate all of our
database systems, and we are making a lot of progress at doing
that.
The so-called IAFIS system, which is the FBI system, which
is a ten-print I.D. system, is also being integrated with the
IDENT system pursuant to the instructions of the Congress. We
are making some pretty good progress on that. We are going to
be rolling out our first transitional work station on the
IDENT/IAFIS system. We will be doing that very shortly, and
that will take us ultimately to an integration of those two
systems.
The entry/exit system that you mentioned that I have been
very interested in, again, we are on track to have that system
up and running by the congressionally mandated 2003, and we are
going to use the IBIS system, which Mary Ryan referred to, as
our platform for the entry/exit system. That will be a very
good tool for us in terms of tracking people who are in
overstay status.
As I have mentioned a number of times, the idea that people
that overstay, that we can somehow track them, given the number
of people that come into this country, is pretty hard to do
unless we want to put somebody on everybody who is in the
country or if we want to plant a chip in their or something
like that. That is not possible. But we do need better
information about who these people are and the fact that they
have overstayed, and that is what the entry/exit system will
do.
With your help, we can complete the border crossing card
system, and with your help, we can expand the IDENT system
which has been stalled since the year 2000 because of some
moratorium and some other things that have been imposed upon
us.
Mary Ryan mentioned, Mr. Chairman, that we came to an
agreement last week to deploy the Consolidated Consular
Database to all of our ports of entry out of the State
Department system. This is a good example of working together.
That system, which is a facial recognition system or a digital
photographic system, is going to be deployed, and it is going
to be deployed within the next 3 months to all of our ports of
entry. It will substantially enhance our ability to detect
fraud and to figure out if the people we have in front of us
are really the people who they say they are.
Mr. Chairman, just a couple of other things. I know my time
has long since run out. We need to do some other things, and I
have included a bunch of them in my testimony. But some of them
are to substantially increase the number of our Border Patrol
agents, our intelligence officers, and our investigators and
our inspectors. We have got to have more of those people if we
are going to do our job.
We need to require air carriers--and you mentioned this--to
provide us with advance passenger information so that even
before somebody boards, we know who is getting on that plane,
or at least from the name point of view we know who is getting
on that plane; and then after the plane takes off, to confirm
who is on that plane so that by the time they get to a port of
entry, we have some information that we can gather on those
folks.
Finally--and this is extremely important, and Senator
Cantwell mentioned this, and I can't emphasize it enough
because I know Mary Ryan and I feel very strongly about this,
and that is, cooperation among Government agencies,
intelligence agencies, information-gathering agencies, and
those kinds of agencies. The sharing of data and making that
data available to all people interested in this process is
absolutely critical for us to have a good line of defense
against people who are coming into this country who want to do
harm to our country.
Mr. Chairman, we have got to increase security. There is no
question about that. But in doing that, we must not forget
those things that made our country truly great. It is our
openness to new ideas and to new people, a commitment to
individual civil liberties, shared values, innovation, and the
free market. If in response to the events of September 11th we
sacrifice those things in search of security, the terrorists
will have won. And in the end, we will be left with neither
security nor freedom.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ziglar follows:]
Statement of James W. Ziglar, Commissioner, Immigration and
Naturalization Service
Chairman and Members of the Committee, I want to thank you for the
opportunity to testify on the topic of ``Effective Immigration Controls
to Deter Terrorism.'' I am always pleased to return to the Senate. I
shall always be grateful for the opportunity I had to serve as the
Senate Sergeant at Arms from November 1998 to August 2001.
Although I have served as Commissioner for only two months, I have
not viewed that as a liability in responding to the tragic events of
September 11, primarily because of the highly professional career
public servants who have provided me with mature advice and assistance.
These tragic events, however, have provided an opportunity for me to
examine, with a fresh eye, the management, personnel, technology, and
policy capabilities of the INS.
Steps to Improve Security
Even before September 11, we were examining how we can improve the
INS, at all levels, and especially in the area of technology. We
recognize that technology is a huge ``force multiplier'' that we must
employ effectively at the INS if we are to accomplish our mission.
Pursuant to the mandates of the Clinger-Cohen legislation, in
response to the recommendations of the General Accounting Office (GAO),
and because it makes good business sense, the INS is currently in the
process of developing its Enterprise Architecture. This project
represents our long-term, strategically-oriented approach to
accomplishing the information driven aspects of the INS mission. We
began the planning for this project in October 2000 and I expect the
final delivery of this project, the transition plan to our target
architecture, to be ready at the beginning of the 3rd quarter of FY
2002. In addition, as part of our overall restructuring initiative, I
encouraged our employees at all levels to think ``outside the box'' as
to how we can better accomplish our mission. They responded with a
number of creative ideas, some of which we are still evaluating.
However, within the context of what is already known to be ``doable''
and effective, we are considering a series of measures that would
strengthen our enforcement capabilities. We are working within the
Administration to determine how to implement these measures. Some of
our ideas are as follows:
Border Patrol
As requested in the President's budget, increase the
number of Border Patrol agents and support staff along the northern
border, while not neglecting the continuing needs along the southwest
border. Such increases should also include necessary facilities,
infrastructure and vehicles.
Provide additional agent support equipment and technology
enhancements. Unfortunately, neither the Senate nor the House currently
is funding the President's request at $20 million for ``force
multiplying technology.''
Expand access to biometric identification systems, such as
IDENT.
Inspections
In the Inspections area, as we proposed in our FY 2002
budget, we believe we should increase the number of Inspectors at our
Ports of Entry.
Require inspection of all International-to-International
Transit Passengers (ITI) so that all travelers who arrive in the United
States are inspected.
Informatton and Technology Initiatives
Require carriers to submit Advance Passenger Information before
boarding passengers (whether the passenger is heading to the United
States or attempting to depart the United States) to assist in
preventing known or suspected terrorists, criminals, and inadmissible
passengers from boarding.
Make Advance Passenger Information data widely available to law
enforcement agencies, enhancing the ability to identify potential
threats prior to departure from or arrival in the United States, as
well as to prevent the departure of individuals who may have committed
crimes while in the United States.
Implement the National Crime Information Center Interstate
Identification Index (NCIC III) at all ports of entry so that aliens
with criminal histories can be identified prior to or upon arrival in
the United States. NCIC III should also be available at all consular
posts, INS service centers and adjudication offices to help identify
aliens who pose a potential threat.
Improve lookout system checks for the adjudications of applications
at INS service centers.
Improve INS infrastructure and integration of all data systems so
that data from all sources on aliens is accessible to inspectors,
special agents, adjudicators, and other appropriate law enforcement
agencies. This initiative is ongoing.
Personnel Issues
Waive the calendar-year overtime cap for INS employees to increase
the number of staff-hours available by increasing the overtime hours
people can work. This proposal is included in the Administration's
Anti-Terrorism Bill.
Other Initiatives
Re-examine and potentially eliminate the Transit Without Visa
Program (TWOV) and Progressive Clearance to prevent inadmissible
international passengers from entering the United States.
Reassess the designation of specific countries in the Visa Waiver
Program to ensure that proper passport policies are in place. This
initiative will require the concurrence of and joint participation by
the Department of State.
Explore alternative inspection systems that allow for facilitation
of low risk travelers while focusing on high-risk travelers.
And review the present listing of designated ports of entry, in
concert with the U.S. Customs Service, to eliminate unnecessary ports.
This will allow the INS to deploy more inspectors to fewer locations
making for a more efficient use of resources.
Database Improvements
In addition to the measures cited above, I have instructed my staff
to move forward expeditiously on two database improvement projects
mandated by Congress. While neither is a panacea, both would be an
improvement over the status quo. First, there has been much attention
paid to student visas in recent weeks. Today, the INS maintains limited
records on foreign students and is able to access that information on
demand. However, the information is on old technology platforms that
are insufficient for today's need for rapid access. That is why we are
moving forward with the Student Exchange Visitor Information System
(SEVIS), formerly known as CIPRIS. Objections, primarily by the
academic establishment, have delayed its development and deployment.
However, with the events of September 11, that objection has virtually
disappeared. INS, with your help, will meet the Congress' date of
January 2003 to start implementation of SEVIS with respect to all
foreign nationals holding student visas. I hasten to add that there is
a critical need to concurrently review and revise the process by which
foreign students gain admission to the United States through the I-20
certification process as we build the system.
Second, substantial attention also has been paid to entry and exit
data. Currently, the INS collects data on the entry and exit of certain
visitors. The data, most of which is provided to the INS in paper form
to meet our manifest requirements, first must be transferred by hand
from paper to an electronic database. This is an extremely inefficient
way of processing data which delays access to the data by weeks and
months. Knowing who has entered and who has departed our country in
real time is an important element in enforcing our laws. The Data
Management Improvement Act, passed in 2000, requires the INS to develop
a fully-automated integrated entry-exit data collection system and
deploy this system at airports and seaports by the end of 2003, the 50
largest land ports of entry by the end of 2004, and completing the
deployment to all other ports of entry by the end of 2005. The
legislation also requires a private sector role to ensure that any
systems developed to collect data do not harm tourism or trade.
The INS already uses limited airline and cruise line data that is
now provided voluntarily as an integral part of the inspection process
at airports and seaports. We will work closely with Congress, other
agencies, and the travel industry in the coming months to expand our
access to needed data and to enhance our use of that data to ensure
border security and more complete tracking of arrivals and departures.
There has also been a great deal of focus on the databases used to
identify persons who are inadmissible to the United States or who pose
a threat to our country. The INS, the Customs Service, and the
Department of State's Bureau of Consular Affairs have worked diligently
over the past decade to provide our ports of entry and consular posts
with access to data needed by our officers. The data contained in the
National Automated Immigration Lookout System (NAILS), the Treasury
Enforcement Communications System (TECS II), and the Consular Lookout
and Support System (CLASS) are uniformly available to our ports of
entry through a shared database called the Interagency Border
Inspection System (IBIS) that is maintained on the U.S. Customs Service
mainframe computer. Last week, I announced that INS and the Department
of State have agreed to aggressively deploy the Consolidated Consular
Database to INS ports-of-entry within the next three months. This will
provide inspectors with the capability to verify rapidly and
definitively the identity of visa-holders seeking admission to the
United States. This new functionality will be provided to inspectors at
ports-of-entry through the IBIS system.
Through IBIS, the officers at our ports of entry can also access
limited data from the National Crime Information Center (NCIC).
Immigration and Customs officers have long had the capability to check
NCIC wanted persons data on a limited basis. Only recently have
immigration inspectors been authorized to routinely use NCIC criminal
history data (NCIC III) to identify criminal aliens in advance of their
arrival. This capacity now exists at two ports of entry. Before
September 11, the INS was working to expand the availability of this
valuable data source to additional locations. Legislation is being
considered to ensure this expansion is successful. I strongly support
this legislation.
Many people who cross our land borders do so with a Border Crossing
Card (BCC). The INS and State Department have been working aggressively
over the past several years to replace the old Border Crossing Cards
with the new biometric ``laser visa.'' Based on the statutory deadline,
holders of the old BCC can no longer enter the country. The new BCC has
many security features that make it a much more secure entry document.
Both at and between our ports of entry, the INS has used a
fingerprint identification system known as IDENT to track immigration
violators. This system has provided the INS with a significant capacity
to identify recidivists and impostors. Congress has directed the
Department of Justice to integrate IDENT with access to the FBI's
automated fingerprint system, IAFIS, and we have been proceeding toward
that objective with the FBI and under the Department's direction.
The Limits of Technology
There is no quick fix, technological or otherwise, to the problems
we face. We must work with advanced technology and do all we can to
improve our systems. But we should not mislead ourselves into thinking
that technology alone can solve our problems. Technology must be
coupled with a strong intelligence and information-gathering and
distribution system if we are to leverage our resources and maximize
our capabilities. That will require the seamless cooperation among the
many government agencies involved.
It should be noted that more than five hundred million inspections
are conducted at our ports of entry every year, and hundreds of
millions of people enter the United States without visas, either
because they are U.S. citizens, through visa waiver programs, or other
exemptions from the normal visa process; the INS has only 4,775
Inspectors to process these hundreds of millions of visitors and
approximately 2,000 investigators and intelligence agents throughout
the country who are available to deal with persons who have entered
illegally, are criminal aliens, or have overstayed their visas or
otherwise have violated the terms of their status as visitors in the
United States.
If we are to meet the challenges of the future, we need to make
changes at the INS and we are in the process of making those changes.
The structure of the organization and the management systems that we
have in place are outdated and, in many respects, inadequate for the
challenges we face. Our information technology systems and related
processes must be improved in order to ensure timely and accurate
determinations with respect to those who wish to enter our country and
those who wish to apply for benefits under our immigrations laws. The
management restructuring of the INS is on its way--a mandate the
President and the Congress have given me--and the improvement of our
information technology systems is moving ahead and can be accomplished
with the help and support of Congress.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to say one word about INS employees and
the events of September 11. Within hours of the attacks, the INS was
working closely with the FBI to help determine who perpetrated these
crimes and to bring those people to justice. Within 24 hours, under
``Operation Safe Passage,'' The INS deployed several hundred Border
Patrol agents to eight major U.S. airports to increase security,
prevent further terrorist incidents and restore a sense of trust to the
traveling public. At America's ports of entry, INS inspectors continue
to work tirelessly to inspect arriving visitors, while ensuring the
flow of legitimate commerce and tourism. Meanwhile, despite the
tragedies and the disruptions, our service operations have managed to
complete over 35,000 naturalizations nationwide and process thousands
of other applications since September 11. America should be proud of
the extraordinary effort of these men and women.
Looking Ahead
It has been said that after September 11 ``everything has
changed.'' I hope that is not true. America must remain America, a
symbol of freedom and a beacon of hope to those who seek a better life
for themselves and their children. We must increase our security and
improve our systems but in doing so we must not forget what has made
this nation great--our openness to new ideas and new people, and a
commitment to individual freedom, shared values, innovation and the
free market. If, in response to the events of September 11, we engage
in excess and shut out what has made America great, then we will have
given the terrorists a far greater victory than they could have hoped
to achieve.
Thank you for this opportunity to appear, Mr. Chairman. I look
forward to your questions.
Chairman Kennedy. Thank you very much, Mr. Ziglar, for your
very comprehensive testimony.
We have a very important and interesting panel that will be
following this panel, so we will use 7-minute rounds in this
time.
Mr. Ziglar, the media has reported that hundreds of foreign
nationals have been detained by the INS and FBI since the
morning of September 11th, and many are suspected of having
ties to Al Qaeda or other terrorist organizations. Others are
described as material witnesses. But the category includes
people who may have been neighbors of the hijackers or have
other possible associations that may well be innocent.
What can you tell us about the cautions the INS and
Department of Justice are taking to ensure that the basic
rights of innocent persons swept up in the early stages of the
investigation are being adequately protected?
Mr. Ziglar. Mr. Chairman, we have been--let me back into
the answer. We have been releasing a number of people based
upon the information provided us by the FBI and based upon
investigations and that sort of thing. And the number of people
that we have in detention roughly is about 146, I think as we
speak today, and that has, of course, come down from the
numbers that you may have seen in the past.
That is the INS custody. I can't speak for the warrants and
the other part of the process which we are not involved in.
We have a process that we have to charge somebody within 48
hours, and so that we have given notice to the court that we
have someone and we charge them, and they are then entitled to
a bond hearing. Those people that have gone forward on bond
hearings, in some cases it has been continued. In some cases,
judges have allowed us to continue to detain people.
There are reasons for detention of somebody who is out of
status. You have to remember that these people, all these
people, are out of status. They are not here legally at the
moment.
One of the reasons for continuing detention is to--
Chairman Kennedy. All the people, then, that the INS has
detained are not here legally?
Mr. Ziglar. To my knowledge, everyone is out of status. If
that is not true, I will let you know, but that is my
knowledge.
One of the issues, of course, in whether you detain
somebody is whether there is a flight risk, and way before
September 11th, flight risk was always a big problem if you had
somebody out of status and they were trying to stay here. So
that is one of the grounds for staying. If they are a potential
harm to the community, that is another ground. Obviously if
they are aggravated felons under the 1996 Act, that is yet
another ground.
Mr. Chairman, you know about me. I am big on due process
and I am big on civil liberties and that sort of things. And
certainly under my administration here, I am doing my best to
make sure that people's civil liberties are not violated and,
more importantly, that the process is honored, even though we
have a crisis on our hands.
To my knowledge, we are going through the process, and we
are keeping people in the process from the INS perspective. I
can't talk about the rest of what is going on elsewhere because
I don't know.
Chairman Kennedy. So your answer, as I understand it, is
that they are out of status, that they are here illegally, and
that you are following the same kinds of procedures with
regards to them that were in place prior to September 11th.
Mr. Ziglar. Absolutely.
Chairman Kennedy. Let me come back to Mary Ryan. In the
time I have available, there are a number of items, so I will
try and ask the questions quickly, and if we get the response
as well.
I am interested in your reaction to the development of a
consular corps. I think many of us have known that those that
have been in the area of that responsibility have been
wonderfully dedicated people, in many instances younger members
of the corps. It is a very, very tough, demanding job, and it
is not one that has offered great opportunities for career
advancement and otherwise. And one of the suggestions from one
of our colleagues that has been thought about, Senator Bob
Graham of Florida talked about the development of a consular
corps that would not be greatly dissimilar from the Corps of
Engineers in the military. It is a separate career, and there
is a lot of professionalism, and there is a good deal of
satisfaction developed through there, and esprit as well.
I wanted to get your reaction.
Ms. Ryan. Senator, I would argue with you that that is
probably not the best way to go. I think what we have now in
the Foreign Service is a generalist corps. We have four
specializations, one of which is consular, and the people who
are doing that work are proud of being Foreign Service officers
and proud of being consular cone officers.
I think that if you went to a consular corps, in fact, you
would even further limit career opportunities for those people
in the corps. Right now we are getting more--not quite yet our
share, I would argue, but more of the opportunities to serve as
ambassadors and as assistant Secretaries, as deputy chiefs of
mission, and as principal officers. And I think to take us out
of the State Department and the Foreign Service and put us into
another area would limit those opportunities considerably. You
would not be able to hope for an ambassadorial assignment if
you were in the consular corps separate from the State
Department and separate from the Foreign Service.
I hear a lot of talk about how our newer officers, our
younger officers don't like the work, and I am sure that that
is one of the concerns that you have and others have. But I
would say to you, Senator, that they do the work with
dedication and commitment. And they are proud to do the work.
They are patriots. We don't talk about Government employees
very much anymore as patriots, and I think we have to start
talking about it again.
It has been a long time since President Kennedy challenged
my generation about the nobility of public service, and still
we get really talented, really wonderful people to come into
our Government and to come into the Foreign Service, into the
civil service. And they don't come for the money. As you well
know, the salaries are very low, and particularly at the lower
grades, and a lot of these people have very big student loans
to repay. And they don't come for prestige because, frankly,
Senator, Mr. Chairman, there is no more prestige in serving in
the Government, unfortunately. It has been a long time since
anybody talked about public service and the need to serve our
country and give something back to our country, which has
nurtured us and supported us and protected us. And I hope that
out of this tragedy of September 11th we start hearing more
call for people to join the Government and join in the fight
against terrorism.
Chairman Kennedy. Well, I think that is a wonderful
expression, and I think you deserve great credit, 35 years in
the service of our country. We have had a good opportunity to
work with you over a long period of that time. I personally
have high regard for you and for the work that you have done.
The real question is how we get support for the consular
corps, obviously in intelligence, which you have raised, and
all the rest. But this is an issue about how we can make sure,
in this process to use all our assets--our experience, the best
in technology, and our intelligence. Out of that 550 million,
we are talking about those handful of people that are out
there, and we want and need the best in terms of technology to
be able to use intelligence and experience to
protect our nation. And we need to examine all of these issues
to do that. But I appreciate your references.
My time is up, but I am still going to ask the question. On
the time for adopting the machine-readable passports, I want to
get your answer quickly on that. Then I had a question for Mr.
Ziglar, we collect resources to be able to use from the fees of
immigrants, and we are using those fees for our new technology.
Is that the way we want to try and fund it? With the challenge
that we are facing now, should we depend upon those fees to be
able to bring your agency up to the kind of full speed ahead in
terms of the newer technologies? I would just ask those two
questions. I will hear from Mary Ryan first.
Ms. Ryan. Senator, on the first question about machine-
readable passports, I think you mean in connection with the
visa waiver program. Is that right, sir?
Chairman Kennedy. Yes.
Ms. Ryan. Every country that is in the visa waiver program
has a machine-readable passport now, except for Switzerland,
which is going to introduce the machine-readable passport in
2003. But all the others have machine-readable passports, and
they are issuing them now to their citizens.
The other question on visa fees, Mr. Chairman, I am
enormously grateful to the Congress for giving us the
authorization in fiscal year 1994 to charge a fee and to keep
the money, because that has made all the difference in how we
are able to do our work, a tremendous boost for us in consular
operations.
We would have collapsed in the 1990s without that money,
and this is money that the alien pays to apply for a non-
immigrant visa. So all the money--and it is now a fortune; it
is about $400 million a year--comes from aliens paying for the
privilege of applying for a visa. And that means no taxpayer
money has been used for our improvements. And we have automated
the world. We are online. Every visa post has online
connectivity to our CLASS database in real-time. And we can get
instant information from it. As long as the information is in
there, we can provide the consular officer in the field, no
matter where he or she is, with this information instantly. And
it is thanks to the wisdom of the Congress in giving us this
authorization to charge and keep this money and our ability to
spend it wisely.
Chairman Kennedy. You don't want to talk about it too much
because someone will try and get their hands on it.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Ziglar. Mr. Chairman, I am really glad you asked that
question, and I can talk about it for a long time, but the
answer is that if we want to develop our technology base,
whether it is the SEVIS system or anything else, we simply have
got to have the money up front to do it. Paying it on a pay-as-
you-go basis, a revenue-as-you-go basis is very, very difficult
because, as you know, you have got to have the money in the
bank before you can commit under the Federal rules.
So if we don't have the money, we can't commit, and that
means that we drag these projects out over a very long time.
Appropriated money up front and preferably no-year money so
that we can make these commitments beyond one year would be
extremely helpful to expediting the process. And even if you
want us to pay it back, I mean, make us a loan, but we need the
money to get going.
Chairman Kennedy. Very good. Thank you.
Senator Brownback?
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I find so many
statements here that I agree with and a lot of questions that I
have at the same time.
I want to thank you for your comments, Ms. Ryan, about the
nobility of public service. I met with my staff this morning
and mentioned to them that the terrorism war on the United
States, if I could put it that way, has been going on for 10
years and the front line has been our diplomatic corps and our
men and women overseas. And on September 11th it reached our
shores, and right now the front line is the Hart Office
Building and in places here that it is taking place. There is a
true beauty and nobility of that service, and I appreciate your
mentioning that.
I also want to say to Mr. Ziglar, I appreciate his comments
about the problem here, and not to cast all immigrants into
this stew, we had a few people, non-immigrant visas that were
issued here, that sought to do us harm and, unfortunately,
accomplished that. But let's not compromise our values or our
economy in a process of dealing with this. So that is why the
issue becomes, I guess, far trickier and more difficult to hone
in on.
But that is what I want to try to do, and that is what we
are working on in the legislation that we have here. And I
would invite all of your input to us, as we try to craft this
and get this out in a quick fashion, as to what is it that we
need to do and what we need to be putting forward.
On a primary note, first and foremost, you talk about
information sharing and the stovepipes that are currently in
place. Are each of you confident that we are getting those
stovepipes broken down and the information being shared in a
timely fashion? And if not, what are the problems?
Mr. Ziglar. Senator, I would have to say this: You have got
to remember, I haven't been down there but 2 months. I did have
a month's experience before all of this happened. It was clear
to me that there was a lot of information holding and not
sharing among a lot of agencies. That has gotten a whole lot
better since September the 11th on what I would have to regard
as a patchwork basis, and Mary can certainly speak for herself
as to how she feels about it.
I think there is a slow but inevitable cultural change
going on that says that we can't have this happen again, and if
sharing of information--or lack of sharing of information was
one of the problems, we have got to get over it and quit
playing bureaucratic games with information.
I think we are getting there, but I think there is a long
way to go. Certainly at the ports of entry and at the consular
offices around the world, we need a lot more information from
intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies that we can
access on a real-time basis to determine whether the person
standing in front of us is somebody who should not be here, is
inadmissible to the United States.
I think Ambassador Ryan certainly made that point in her
testimony. I couldn't endorse what she said more strongly.
Senator Brownback. Ambassador Ryan, are the stovepipes
being broke down?
Ms. Ryan. I hope that the Commissioner is right about the
stovepipes are being broken down. I am not completely confident
that they are. I think that there is still a very great concern
among the intelligence and law enforcement agencies about
protection of sources and methods, which I would think after
September 11th has to give way to concern for protection of
lives.
We are the front lines. The consular officer overseas is
the front line of defense of this Nation. We are the outer ring
of border security, and we have been trying, for example, for
quite a long time to get FBI NCIC III access. And we were
denied over and over again because we are not a law enforcement
agency. I think that has to change. I think there has to be a
recognition that we are on the front lines, that we have a
responsibility to protect our Nation just as they do, and that
they have to give us the information. I don't really care how
they do it or what sort of code system they want to use to
protect the information, but they have to give us the
information.
Senator Brownback. Did we know about these gentlemen that
were involved in the terrorist activities from some of our
intelligence community information that wasn't shared with
State or INS?
Ms. Ryan. Senator, I don't know that. What I do know is
that we had no information whatsoever on those 19. I don't know
whether--
Senator Brownback. The State Department did not.
Ms. Ryan. The State Department had no information. In our
CLASS lookout--
Senator Brownback. Do we have it in other places in the
Government--
Ms. Ryan. --we had nothing on them. I don't know whether
that means there was no information or whether the information
was not shared with us. I just know we had nothing on any of
the 19.
Senator Brownback. Mr. Ziglar?
Mr. Ziglar. The same is true with us. Now, whether there
was other information someplace else, I don't know the answer
to that either, like Ambassador Ryan. But we didn't.
Senator Brownback. It seems like that is something that--
Chairman Kennedy. If the Senator would yield, does the
Central Intelligence Agency give you names of terrorists?
Ms. Ryan. The Intelligence Agency does give us names
through the Visas Viper program and through TIPOFF, which is
run by our intelligence and research bureau. And, in fact, they
have given us thousands of names over the years, since we set
up that program. But they don't give us--in my opinion, we do
not get all the information.
Senator Brownback. Well, if I could interrupt you as well,
as I understand, Ambassador Ryan, they give you information but
it is on a haphazard basis. It is not necessarily a timely
basis. You may get it a month or 2 months after it is acquired.
And so there is no system, and it really is a patchwork and
almost kind of a ``who do you know'' type of system that has
been in place. Is that correct?
Ms. Ryan. It is not as effective as I think it should be.
For example, on a couple of the terrorists, we were given names
in August and asked to revoke visas. And when we looked at what
they gave us, we had no information on one, one had been
refused a visa, and two had been issued. One visa had already
expired. And that was in August.
I don't know when they had that information. I don't know
when they got that information. But you do wonder, if they knew
it in August, when they might have known it earlier than
August.
Senator Brownback. My point in this--and I am sensing your
frustration, having been around this for some period of time--
is that with the front line of the war on terrorism being on
our shores here, in New York City and Washington and Nevada, in
places all across this country, the issue of protection of
sources and methods within the intelligence community, which I
fully support and I think is appropriate, but we have got to be
able to design some system that, if the terrorist is the person
that tries to move in amongst us and blow themselves up along
with a number of us at the same time, then we have got to try
and find that needle and have all the information absolutely
available.
Mr. Ziglar's point about we have 350 million entrants, non-
U.S. citizens, across our border every year and that we are
looking for a dozen, 50, something like that, seeking to do us
harm, that is more than the proverbial needle in a haystack.
And so the information sharing that we have to have is probably
the most critical component of our protection of ourselves in
this war on terrorism.
Mr. Ziglar. Senator, let me make one point. There is no
silver bullet. A lot of these folks that were involved in this
thing were young, had no records; there was no intelligence to
gather on them. They had been recruited at very young ages.
They had never been in trouble. So there may never be any
information on them because there is no information to gather.
So you are faced with a faceless enemy sometimes.
Now, obviously there are other situations where you may be
able to gather information about people. So it is not a silver
bullet. If we shared every piece of information we had with
every Government agency everywhere, we might still not be able
to detect everybody who intends to come here and do harm to us.
Senator Brownback. But we could do a lot better.
Mr. Ziglar. We can do a lot better, absolutely, and we need
to. But I just want to make sure that people don't think that
there is a silver bullet that will absolutely protect us.
Senator Brownback. I think I am more looking for a magnet
for that needle in the haystack.
A couple quick comments, and then I will pass along. One is
on this biometrics system for people coming into the country,
which I think is very important and I hope we can speed its
implementation. You gave some time lines on that which I might
want to discuss with you.
We just had the Deputy Prime Minister of Canada in, and we
were talking about standardizing how we would do the biometrics
testing, because apparently different countries are looking at
different ways, in particular as we look at a North American
perimeter in all probability, that we need to be working
closely with the Canadians and Mexicans, the Mexican
Government, at least on establishing that standardization and
doing so in a quick fashion.
I applaud your looking at the number of schools that can
authorize student visas and their standard reviews. At
Pittsburg State University in my State of Kansas over the
weekend, the President was talking about the international
students there, a wonderful gift to the school, really, because
it really helps them and it is a diverse population that they
really like. But then also I hear of stories of other places,
and I am really questioning that. So I am glad you are looking
into that.
Finally, God bless you all. This is a tough task, but you
are all up to it, and I really appreciate your coming forth
here. You help inspire confidence in us, and I think in the
people, that we are on top of this and we are hardening our
targets here at home at the front line, the programs we are
doing of who gets into the United States, and yet still not
compromising our values or our economy.
Ms. Ryan. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Kennedy. Senator Grassley?
Senator Grassley. Yes, thank you very much.
This talk about a silver bullet--and I don't disagree with
what Mr. Ziglar said, but it reminds me of a certain lethargy
we have in Government of willingness to share information. And
I think the terrorist attack just surfaced a problem that
permeates Government over a long period of time, that somehow,
you know, the CIA or any agency this could apply to, but the
CIA, it is our work and we have got certain information. It is
almost like we have got a proprietary right to it, and some
other agency has got their work and their proprietary interest
in it. And instead of having an attitude we ought to have--and
I think we are getting this attitude now along the lines of
what Ms. Ryan says, that there is an attitude of cooperation
and patriotism and public service, that this isn't this
agency's work and our property and this agency's property, but
it is the property of the American people, and we are all in
this boat together. And under the circumstances we are in right
now, we might sink or swim together. So I guess we have got to
change the bureaucratic attitude that has been there for a long
period of time.
Along this line, I want to ask my first question of Mr.
Ziglar, and I go back to your confirmation hearing. I asked
about the information sharing between the Immigration Service
and the Internal Revenue Service. I was told that your agency
does not verify tax information from immigrants with the IRS,
particularly the matter of whether the immigrants are paying
taxes. The INS needs to work with the IRS, I believe, in regard
to immigrants who come to this country on work visas. The INS
should work with the IRS to verify an immigrant is actually
working. If the immigrant on a work visa is not working, the
INS needs to have him tracked down, just like we track down
foreign students who don't show up at their designated school.
The Internal Revenue Service has certain data that can be
extremely useful to all law enforcement, particularly the INS,
in its efforts to track down violators. So I am asking you
today to make sure that the appropriate information from the
IRS is being pursued by the INS. No one knows if any of this
would have stopped the attacks of September the 11th. They are
obviously not a silver bullet. But we need to make sure that we
work to prevent terrorism with every weapon that we have.
So I would like to know whether you agree with me on this
matter and what you can do with the IRS information to better
make use of it and what limitations there are that might
prevent you from getting the IRS information you need, assuming
that you don't have to change law--or maybe you do have to
change law.
Mr. Ziglar. Well, Senator, I couldn't agree with you more
that the exchange of information and that particular kind of
information could very well be very valuable in a law
enforcement or immigration law enforcement context.
At the time of my confirmation hearing, you and I know
Senator Kennedy and a number of other members of the Committee
asked me to look into a number of things, which I was doing
during the course of my first month there, and September 11th
came along and I have not focused on some of those questions.
But I can tell you this: In terms of this investigation, I have
noted the presence of the Treasury Department, the IRS in that
context. And it is something that I believe that going forward,
certainly from our perspective, will be valuable information
for us to know, particularly as hopefully we ramp up our
efforts to identify those people who are overstaying their
visas, for example,, or overstaying their welcome, if you will,
and identifying them and using that potentially as a way of--I
hate to use the words ``tracking them down,'' but tracking them
down.
Senator Grassley. Would you be able to maybe look into my
specific questions and then give me an answer in writing, maybe
in 5 days? Would that be--
Mr. Ziglar. Yes, I will do my best, sir.
Senator Grassley. Thank you.
Also, in your testimony before the House Subcommittee on
Immigration, you mentioned the database system called ENFORCE,
which draws on other databases that the INS has. Could you give
us more detail about that technology and if the database would
improve data sharing within the agency?
Mr. Ziglar. I would be happy to talk to you about that
because I am excited about what we are doing. ENFORCE is, for
lack of a better technical terms, is a consolidating program, a
consolidating database that draws from the many databases we
have in the enforcement side of the INS. But, more importantly,
or as importantly, it also has the capacity to reach out and
access the databases of other Government agencies. For example,
we could reach out and get data from the Department of State
and bring it into our system so that we have one place where we
can go and find out information about whoever it is.
That system, the ENFORCE system, which is, you know,
cutting-edge from our point of view, it is trying to deal with
the stovepipe effect of having all this information in one--
getting it in one place instead of having it in a hundred
different places. It has also been integrated with our IDENT
system. Now, the IDENT system is one that--it is a fingerprint
system, a biometric system, and as we pick up people or in
certain circumstances we get their fingerprints, it goes into
this electronic database. Somebody can show up in front of us.
We put their fingers into this reader. It tells us who they
are. That doesn't necessarily tell us anything about them.
We then go to ENFORCE through this same system, and that
gathers the information from all of our databases as well as
reaching outside.
Now, is it fully functional yet? No, it is not. We are
taking our different stovepipe modules, if you will, and
integrating them into ENFORCE as we speak. We were doing that
before September the 11th. This is not something that we are
hurrying up and trying to get done as a result of September
11th. It is something the INS was doing before.
And if I could just make one point, I know the INS has
taken a lot of heat for a lot of things and a lot of criticism,
and a lot of it has been justified, and the people there will
tell you it has been justified. But an awful lot of real
progress has been made at that organization to address the
technology, to address the information issue, to address the
management issues there. And I found the organization a much
better organization than was painted to me as I was going
through the confirmation and the people there are very
dedicated. They want to do the right thing, and they have done
the right thing, in my view, certainly since September 11th.
They have performed superbly, magnificently.
Senator Grassley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Kennedy. Thank you. Thank you very much.
We appreciate all of your testimony and responses to
questions. We will be continuing. We look forward to working
with you.
Mr. Ziglar. Thank you.
Ms. Ryan. Thank you.
Mr. Gutierrez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Kennedy. It is a privilege to introduce our second
panel: Jeanne Butterfield, executive director, American
Immigration Lawyers Association, an American immigration law
foundation; Demetrios Papademetriou, who is co-director and co-
founder of the Migration Policy Institute; and Richard Norton,
who is executive director of the International Biometric
Industry Association.
Jeanne Butterfield has been a strong advocate for fair and
efficient immigration laws for many years. Before joining the
American Immigration Lawyers, she served as legal director of
Centro Presente, a Central American refugee center in Boston,
and worked in private immigration law practice. She is an
expert in a wide range of immigration challenges, including
family- and employment-based immigration issues, and refugee
and asylum issues. She has extensive experience working with
government agencies to ensure the fair and effective
implementation of our immigration laws and regulations.
Dr. Papademetriou helped establish the Migration Policy
Institute. Before that, he was a Senior Associate at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he directed
the International Migration Policy Program. He has impressive
experience dealing with North American border issues, migration
management, and many other major immigrant issues. He recently
co-authored a book entitled, ``Caught in the Middle: Border
Communities in an Era of Globalization.'' In addition the
Migration Policy Institute has recently published an extensive
paper called ``Immigration and National Security'' discussing
immigration reforms in light of the terrorist attacks.
Richard Norton founded the International Biometric Industry
Association in 1998 to represent the interests industry
manufacturers in the use of biometric technology; executive
vice president of Identification Technology Partners;
previously a consultant on border control technology, served 19
years at the Immigration and Naturalization Service, been a
leader on border control for many years, advising airlines,
airports, governments, and technology providers on biometric
technologies.
I thank all of you for being here. Ms. Butterfield, we look
forward to your testimony.
STATEMENT OF JEANNE A. BUTTERFIELD, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Ms. Butterfield. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
distinguished members of the Subcommittee. I really appreciate
this opportunity to present my views on current U.S.
immigration policy, and I hope that my written testimony
provides some useful perspectives on how we can develop--
Chairman Kennedy. We will include all of the testimony. The
written testimony will be made a part of the record.
Ms. Butterfield. All right. Thank you. To develop
immigration controls that are effective in deterring terrorism
and enhancing our Nation's security. We need to undertake these
reforms to our immigration system with a very fundamental
understanding, which I know you all share: that we are a Nation
of immigrants, that immigration remains central to who we are
as a country and helps explain our success as a people and a
Nation. We have to take on this task as well with the clear
understanding that it is precisely in times of danger that we
must fiercely defend our Constitution and the protections and
liberties that distinguish us from other nations.
My testimony overviews some of the current measures and
powers that the INS and Department of State already have that
can be used more effectively, I believe, if properly
coordinated with good intelligence information to deter
terrorism. And you have heard about that already this morning.
I will also include here some proposals about new measures
that Congress could and should consider that would add perhaps
to our deterrence capabilities. So let me just touch on briefly
to remind us what our current powers and procedures are that
really don't require enhancement in terms of new laws, but
perhaps require more effective integration with intelligence
data.
Current immigration law provides the Government with
extraordinary powers to deny admission to any person who we
believe might be intending to come to the United States to
violate our laws and endanger our safety. You have heard from
Ms. Ryan earlier that consular officers, as you know, around
the world have virtually unreviewable discretion to deny a visa
to any person for any number of reasons listed in our statutes.
And I enumerate those in my written testimony. But let me just
call one to your attention.
A person who a consular officer or the INS has reasonable
grounds to believe seeks to enter the United States to engage
even incidentally in any unlawful activity is simply
inadmissible. So I think we have the tools in our statutes. The
question is how do we apply them and how do we make those
determinations. And I know you are being very thoughtful about
the many thorny questions that poses.
Unfortunately, our laws are only as good as the information
available to those who are enforcing our laws, and we have yet
to devise a system that will allow a consular officer in an
overseas post to gaze into a person's heart or mind and somehow
divine their intentions. Stricter scrutiny I think can deter
the casual criminal, but it is unlikely to deter those who have
no known criminal record, no evidence of association with any
known terrorist organization or activity, and yet whose heart
is intent on committing a heinous crime amongst us, sometimes
years hence.
We have in our laws, secondly, extensively grounds of
deportability which give the Government the power to deport
anyone who has engaged in any terrorist activity, including
planning, material support, harboring, and all of these grounds
are listed, again, in my written testimony.
Again, in this instance, the Government has the full power
to deport anyone who presents a danger here on terrorism
grounds, but deportation, as we know, is no deterrence for
those who fully intend to end their lives while committing a
heinous terrorist act.
The third set of powers that we currently have which you
talked earlier with Mr. Ziglar about are the detention powers.
We currently have the powers at our disposal to detain someone
pending and continuing through their deportation hearing and
any subsequent appeal. And it is those existing powers which
have allowed the INS to detain, as Mr. Ziglar said this
morning, I think currently some 146 persons on suspected
immigration violations. And those powers are also being
contemplated to be expanded in the legislation that the Senate
enacted last week, which would give the Attorney General new
power to certify someone as a suspected terrorist or somehow
involved in terrorist activity, and would trigger a mandatory
detention power.
I appreciate the work that you, Senators, and your staffs
have done to really ensure that these new powers, when enacted,
will not be abused and that there will be some safeguards and
court review and protections to make sure that detention is
necessary to protect national security and does not go on
indefinitely.
I would just remind us all in passing--and, again, more
elaborated in my written testimony--that we also have at our
disposal the Alien Terrorist Removal Court, an extraordinary
set of justices put together to hear secret evidence cases that
was created in our 1996 law, which has not yet been convened or
used, but that is at the Government's disposal should they need
it.
We have expedited removal, which allows the INS o turn
people back right at the port of entry, and screen people,
again, it is the second point of review, really, after the
consular visa issuance decision where, again people are subject
to all the grounds of inadmissibility and can be put through an
expedited hearing.
We have extensive reporting requirements. You have already
talked about the SEVIS system for student reporting and the
current procedures in place to verify departures, so I will not
elaborate on those.
Let me turn just briefly to other new measures that we
should be considering, some of which you have already heard
about. I want to add my voice to those of Mr. Ziglar and others
who say, first and foremost, with all of these measures, we
need increased funding for the INS and the Department of State.
In order to effectively fight terrorism by enhancing our
intelligence capabilities, DOS and INS need to upgrade their
technological infrastructures. These new databases we are
talking about and all of the real-time shared information are
not inexpensive, and I don't believe that that funding can come
strictly from user fees. I think it needs direct Federal
appropriations, and I urge the Senate to address that concern.
There are several new technologies that are very promising,
and I know that you heard about some of them, the face
recognition from Ms. Ryan earlier today, the lookout lists and
the need to integrate and make all of the Federal law
enforcement agency and intelligence agency lists available one
to the other. And I will not elaborate there.
Pre-inspection I think is one area that perhaps hasn't been
touched on and I would urge you all to consider expanding. We
do have pre-inspection at foreign airports currently in five
countries in the world, and this is a procedure that allows a
more calm and considered, perhaps, review of a person's
admissibility before they even board an airplane. I think that
program is a really useful one and could be expanded in several
places in the world and would be very promising in creating
some of those layers of security, perimeter layers, starting
with the U.S. consuls abroad, then pre-inspection at the
foreign airports, then the transmittal of the passenger list
that Mr. Ziglar talked about; and finally, upon arrival in
North America, increased cooperation amongst North American
nations to create this kind of perimeter safety zone. And I
know my colleague Demetri is going to address that further.
I want to conclude with just two concerns as we consider
all of this, including the exit/entry control system. I know
that the Senate heard testimony a couple of years ago about the
exit/entry control system at the land borders, and I want to
just urge your review of that information that was provided at
the time.
I am from Michigan originally, and the Ambassador Bridge in
Detroit is one that I have crossed many times. And in that
testimony that you all heard some years ago, many experts
pointed out that the Ambassador Bridge has 30,000 vehicle
passings every day. And if we could design a very efficient and
fast system and could determine that only half of those
vehicles needed to be entered into our exit/entry control
system and that process only took 30 seconds, you would have
basically 4 or 5 days of backlog traffic simply to implement
that system at that one land border. And I think that addresses
the concern that Mr. Brownback shared earlier about we can't
take measures that are going to undermine our economy and hurt
our cross-border commerce. And that is a very real concern
here.
The final two points. In all of these measures, we have to
be mindful of the continued needs of asylum seekers and our
international and domestic obligations to afford protection to
those fleeing persecution. Pre-inspection at foreign airports
is well and good, but in that process we are going to need to
provide trained asylum officers so that those seeking our
protection are not merely excluded somewhere overseas where we
never then hear about them. There is a challenge there, I
think, that is a very real one that we need to take to heart.
Finally, all of this data collection and recordkeeping is
only as useful as the correlation with good intelligence
information. I think we keep coming back full circle to
intelligence. If we were able to document the entry and exit of
all of the 30 million non-immigrants who come in and out each
year to this country, and that created some big giant database.
What would that tell us? Would that tell us that the person who
overstayed their visa for a week or two weeks or even a month
did so to spend an extra week at Disney World, or because
Grandma had a sinus infection and couldn't fly on the airplane,
or for some other purely innocent reason? Or does it tell us
that the person overstayed and is intending somehow to commit a
heinous crime amongst us? That is where all of the data
collection in the world is not going to make us any more secure
or safe unless we find a way efficiently and in a focused
manner to correlate it with good intelligence, intelligence,
intelligence.
As the current situation calls out for change in the
direction of more effective means of deterring terrorism, we
can't lost sight of these fundamental values of this Nation of
immigrants. As we seek to create new means to isolate
terrorists, we must take care not to isolate America in the
process.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Butterfield follows:]
Statement of Jeanne A. Butterfield, American Immigration Lawyers
Association
Mr. Chairman and Distinguished Members of the Subcommittee:
My name is Jeanne A. Butterfield and I am the Executive Director of
the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA). I appear today as
an observer and participant in the development of U.S. immigration
policy for nearly twenty years, eight of those years with AILA. AILA is
the national bar association of nearly 8,000 attorneys and law
professors who represent the entire spectrum of applicants for
immigration adjudications.
I appreciate this opportunity to present our views on current U.S.
immigration policy and I hope to provide some useful perspectives on
how we can develop immigration controls that are effective in deterring
terrorism and enhancing our nation's security. We need to undertake
this task on several fronts, with immigration reform being one
important aspect of the effort. As we develop reforms in this area, we
need to make sure that they are effective. We cannot allow false
solutions to real problems to lull us into a degree of security we have
not achieved.
We need to undertake reforms to our immigration system with this
important understanding: that we are a nation of immigrants, that
immigration remains central to who we are as a country and helps
explain our success as a people and a nation. Furthermore, we must take
on this task with the clear understanding that it is precisely in times
of danger that we must fiercely defend our Constitution and the
protections and liberties that distinguish us from other nations.
We must recognize that existing laws and procedures offer us
significant protections and pose certain problems. I thus will begin
with an overview of current measures and powers that the Immigration
and Naturalization Service and Department of State already have that
can be used more effectively, if properly coordinated with good
intelligence information, to deter terrorism. I will conclude with some
proposals about new measures that Congress could mandate that would add
to our deterrence capabilities.
CURRENT POWERS AND PROCEDURES
1. grounds of inadmissibility
Current immigration law provides the government with extraordinary
powers to deny admission to any person we believe might be intending to
come to the United States to violate our laws and endanger our safety.
Consular officers in posts around the world have virtually
unreviewable discretion to deny a visa to any person for any number of
reasons listed in our statutes. Further, as a second layer of
deterrence and protection, anyone who is issued a visa abroad is
subject a second time to these same grounds of inadmissibility when
they present themselves to an INS inspector for inspection and entry at
any U.S. port of entry (airport or land border). A person can be denied
admission on either of these two occasions denied a visa in the first
instance, or denied entry in the second.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides several broad
national security-related grounds upon which any person can be denied a
visa to enter the United States:
a) a person who a consular officer or INS has ``reasonable ground
to believe'' seeks to enter the U.S. to engage, even incidentally, in
any unlawful activity is inadmissible (INA Section 212(a)(3)(A)(ii));
b) a person who has engaged in terrorist activity is inadmissible
(INA Section 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(I)); terrorist activity is broadly defined
and includes, among the more commonly identified activities such as
hijackings, the following range of activities (INA Section
212(a)(3)(B)(ii) and (iii))
1) the use of any firearm with the intent to endanger the
safety of even one individual;
2) the solicitation of funds for terrorist activity or
terrorist organization;
3) the solicitation for membership to engage in terrorist
activity or in an terrorist organization;
4) the provision of any type of material support for terrorist
activity or for any person who plans to commit a terrorist
activity;
5) the gathering of information on potential targets, or any
preparation or planning of a terrorist activity;
c) a person who a consular officer or INS has ``reasonable ground
to believe'' is likely to engage after entry in any terrorist activity
is inadmissible (INA Section 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(II));
d) a person whose entry or activities in the U.S. the Secretary of
State has reasonable ground to believe would have potentially serious
adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States is
inadmissible (INA Section 212(a)(C)).
These extensive grounds of inadmissibility make it clear that the
United States has extensive power and grounds to deny a visa or entry
to anyone it has reason to believe may endanger the national security.
The question properly before the INS, Department of State and U.S.
Congress is how the various agencies that implement and enforce these
laws can be provided with the necessary and timely intelligence
information they need to properly apply these grounds of
inadmissibility and prevent those who intend to commit terrorist acts
from entering the country.
Unfortunately, our immigration admissions and visa issuance systems
and laws are only as good as the information available to those
enforcing them. We have yet to devise a system that will allow a U.S.
consular officer or an INS inspector to gaze into a person's heart or
mind and divine their intentions. Stricter scrutiny may deter the
casual criminal, but it is unlikely to deter those who have no known
criminal record, no evidence of association with an terrorist activity
or organization, yet whose heart is intent on committing a heinous
crime some months or years hence.
2. grounds of deportability
Once in the United States, any temporary non-immigrant (visitors,
students, temporary workers) or lawful permanent resident can be
detained and deported if they engage in terrorist activity.
Again, the grounds for deportability are broad, and give the
government the power to deport anyone who has engaged in terrorist
activities, including all of the activities enumerated above: planning,
fundraising, soliciting for membership, providing material support for
an organization's terrorist activity (INA Section 237((a)(4)(B).
A person is also deportable if he has engaged in ``any other
criminal activity which endangers public safety or national security
(INA Section 237(a)(4)(A)(ii)). This ground of deportability does not
require any criminal conviction.
If the government only later learns that a person was involved
overseas in a foreign terrorist organization, or had otherwise engaged
in a terrorist activity, that person too is later deportable, on the
grounds that he was ``inadmissible at time of entry''.
Finally, an immigration judge has the power to deny asylum or other
relief from deportation to a person who is otherwise eligible for that
relief, if the person represents a threat to national security.
Specifically, the statute includes mandatory bars to asylum relief for:
(a) anyone who ``there are reasonable grounds for regarding. .
.as a danger to the security of the United States (INA Section
208(b)(2)(A)(iv)); or
(b) the alien is inadmissible or deportable under several of
the terrorism-related grounds of inadmissibility or
deportability (INA Section 208(b)(2)(A)(v)).
In short, the government currently has broad and sufficient powers
to deport anyone who presents a danger to the United States on
terrorism grounds. Of course, deportation is no deterrence for those
who fully intend to end their lives while committing a terrorist act.
3. detention powers
The INS currently has very broad powers to detain someone pending
and continuing through their deportation hearing and any subsequent
appeal. Under current law, immigrants charged with deportability for
terrorist activity or certain violent crimes have been found ineligible
to even apply for release from custody (INA Section 236(c). For those
immigrants who have the right to seek release on bond before an
immigration judge, that request can be, and is often, denied if the
person is deemed to be a threat to national security, a danger to the
community or otherwise present a risk of flight.
The current regulations, recently amended and republished as an
interim final regulation in the Federal Register by Attorney General
Ashcroft (8 CFR Part 287, amending Section 287.3(d), provide further
that a person may be detained without a warrant of arrest under the
authority contained in Section 287(a)(2) of the INA. Under the
regulation, as currently in force, a determination about whether actual
immigration violation charges will be brought against a person will be
made within 48 hours of the arrest, except in the event of an emergency
or other extraordinary circumstance in which case a determination will
be made within an additional reasonable period of time, whether the
alien will be continued in custody or released on bond or recognizance
and whether a notice to appear and warrant of arrest as prescribed in 8
CFR parts 236 and 239 will be issued. `` (emphasis added)
It is these already extraordinary powers of detention that have
allowed the Attorney General to detain some reported 165 persons on
suspected technical immigration violations in recent weeks, with no
determination being made to date for many about whether they will in
fact be charged or not. The question must be posed here: what is ``an
additional reasonable period of time'' under the regulations? Is two
weeks reasonable in current circumstances? Is five weeks unreasonable?
Those being detained, the press, the advocacy community and the
Congress surely deserve an answer to this question.
In new powers contemplated in the pending ``USA'' Act (S. 15 10),
the Attorney General will be given the power to implement mandatory
detention of anyone he ``certifies'' that he has reasonable grounds to
believe fall within the definition of ``terrorist'' or ``terrorist
activity'' as outlined above. This new power will prevent a person so
``certified'' from seeking release on bond, whether or not the person
is charged with deportability based on terrorist grounds or is simply
charged with a technical visa violation.
These broad new powers, when enacted, must be used carefully and
not be used to detain individuals indefinitely without proving that
their detention is necessary to protect national security or the
public.
4. alien terrorist removal court
Congress in 1996 created the new Alien Terrorist Removal Procedures
(INA Section 501 through 507). These procedures were designed to allow
the government to conduct deportation hearings with the use of secret
evidence. While the new court was to be composed of 5 district court
justices appointed by the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, a
single justice is empowered to consider classified information
presented ex pane and in camera.
In recognition of the extraordinary nature of such proceedings,
certain protections were provided, including the right to be informed
of the nature of the charges and a ``general account'' of the basis for
the charges (the secret evidence), and the right to be represented by
assigned counsel at government expense. (INA Section 504(b) and (c).
To date, this new Alien Terrorist Removal Court has not been
convened. The government has, however, used ``secret evidence'' in
regular deportation hearings, primarily in the context of bond
determinations and in opposing applications for discretionary relief,
such as political asylum or adjustment of status. (See, for more
details about past secret evidence cases, Akram, Susan, Scheherezade
Meets Kafka: Two Dozen Sordid Tales of Ideological Exclusion,
Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, Fall, 1999; 14 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 5
1)
The use of secret evidence is anathema to a democracy. Its use, in
the rare instances where the government strongly believes it is
necessary to protect the life of confidential sources, should be
confined to proceedings in the ``Alien Terrorist Removal Court''. The
law governing these special proceedings, in recognition of their
extraordinary nature, at least mandates certain protections, such as
appointed counsel, for the accused.
5. expedited removal
The 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility
Act (IIRAIRA) also provides the government with extraordinary new
powers at U.S. ports of entry to deny admission and summarily remove
any person who the INS inspector believes is presenting fraudulent
documents, including a facially valid visa if there is some reason to
believe that the visa was obtained through fraud or misrepresentation,
or if the person is believed to be attempting to enter the U.S. for a
purpose inconsistent with the terms of the visa.
The new expedited removal provisions have been scrutinized
extensively because they run the danger of sweeping into their orbit
legitimate asylum seekers who are most likely to be fleeing their
persecutors without having first obtained proper travel documents. We
must be careful not 'to create a process that a terrorist with adequate
funding, education and documents can penetrate, but which turns away
legitimate asylum seekers who have no documents and who are too scared
or traumatized by abuse to adequately make their claim at the border.
However, the expedited removal powers contained in our immigration
statutes give INS inspectors sweeping and unreviewable power to deny
entry to suspected terrorists and return them on the next flight out. A
person so excluded cannot obtain a visa to enter the U.S. for at least
five years.
Clearly such powers must be used carefully and with adequate
protections. The hapless visitor with entirely legitimate business
purposes who is returned on the next plane to Singapore and denied a
visa for the next five years has little recourse. There must be a means
to challenge such mistakes, and to obtain a waiver of the five-year
ban. In previous times, such a person could request a hearing before an
immigration judge and present evidence to prove that their intent was
legitimate. No more, under the terms of the 1996 laws.
However sweeping and subject to abuse, these powers do provide
another existing means to deter terrorists. But, as outlined above,
these powers to deny admission and summarily exclude are only as
effective as the intelligence information provided to the INS inspector
at the port of entry. What we do not want to see as a result is
thousands of legitimate visitors and even refugees being summarily
excluded, while international criminals and terrorists, who have the
means to purchase or otherwise obtain valid documents, slip through
undetected. That unfortunately may be the result of these expanded
powers.
6. reporting requirements:
The operation of current reporting requirements for foreign
students and the arrival and departure of passengers both are areas
needing significant improvements.
a. Student Reporting
More than 500,000 foreign students last year were enrolled in
colleges and universities around the country. These students are a
vital part of our higher education system. In California, the state
with the greatest number of international students, just over 66,000
students from 19992000 brought $1.6 billion dollars into the state's
economy. Foreign students have made enormous contributions in the
advancement of technology and science, and graduates from American
colleges and universities have gone on to lead nations and shape
history.
We have long understood that the opportunity to study in this
country comes with rules and responsibilities that affect both the
students and the institutions. All foreign students must apply for a
visa and must be able to prove that they are not inadmissible to the
United States. Since at least 1985, colleges and universities approved
to receive foreign students are required to gather and report
information about foreign students to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service.
This information includes the student's current address, date of
commencement of studies, the student's written application for
admission and other supporting documents the school uses to determine
eligibility, the date and reason for termination of a student, and any
academic disciplinary actions taken against the student due to any
criminal convictions.
In the aftermath of the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the
INS created the Coordinated Interagency Partnership for Regulating
International Students (CIPRIS) as a pilot program to provide for the
electronic transfer of student information between institutions and the
INS. In 1996, IIRAIRA mandated that INS fully implement the CIPRIS
system by 2001. After 1996, the INS found that it could not address all
the technical problems and asked Congress for an extension of 2001
deadline.
Although the program to provide for the electronic transfer of the
information collected on foreign students has yet to be implemented,
colleges and universities are still required to collect and report the
data to INS, and an INS officer can request access to it at any time.
At intervals specified by the INS, but not more frequently than
once a term or session, the Service's processing center is required to
send each school a list of all foreign students who, according to
Service records, are attending that school. A designated school
official at the school must note on the list whether or not each
student on the list is pursuing a full course of study and give the
names and current addresses of all student visa holders not listed,
attending the school and other information specified by the Service as
necessary to identify the students and to determine their immigration
status.
The designated school official must comply with the request, sign
the list, state his or her title, and return the list to the Service's
processing center within sixty days of the date of the request. Failure
to follow any of the procedures and regulations will result in the
withdrawal of the schools approval to receive non-immigrant students.
The INS is working with colleges and universities to develop this
system electronically. The electronic system is only beginning to be
implemented as an operational prototype with 21 educational
institutions. The failure, if any, of the student tracking system is
not the absence of laws, but the lack of resources. Congress needs to
provide funding to get this system up and running and maintained in
those schools authorized to enroll foreign students.
As the prototype is expanded, the INS needs to assess and report to
Congress on the feasibility of this system, and whether it can improve
the security of the U.S. relative to implementation costs, and do so in
a way that does not intrude excessively on the privacy rights and civil
liberties of students.
b. Verifying Departures
Requiring airlines and other passenger carriers to identify
passengers' arrivals and departures has been a part of our laws for
many years. Passenger carriers are required by law to deliver to the
immigration officers at the port of arrival and departure a list or
manifest of the persons on board such vessel or aircraft. According to
the law, ``such lists or manifests shall be prepared at such time, be
in such form and shall contain such information as the Attorney General
shall prescribe by regulation as being necessary for the identification
of the persons transported and for the enforcement of the immigration
laws. ``
This language grants broad power to the Attorney General to decide
when and how an airline identifies its passengers. The problems we now
have with identifying who is coming and going from our shores are
technological, not legal. In 1997, the Office of the Inspector General
found that the principal INS record-keeping system for tracking
nonimmigrant overstays, the Nonimmigrant Information System (NIIS),
does not produce reliable data.
Normally, passengers arriving in the United States fill out an I-94
form and present it to the INS inspector upon arrival. The inspector
collects the arrival portion of the form and returns the departure
portion to the passenger. The arrival portion is sent to an INS
contractor, who inputs the data into NIIS. When the person leaves the
United States, the airlines are supposed to collect the departure
portion of the I-94 form and provide it to the INS for input into NIIS.
The data is then matched by MIS to identify nonimmigrant overstays.
The OIG report found that the MIS data is incomplete and unreliable
due to missing departure records and errors in records processing. MIS
does not contain departure records for a large number of aliens, most
of whom the INS assumes have left the United States. The INS believes
that many of these unrecorded departures result from airlines failing
to collect departure forms, aliens departing through land borders, data
entry errors, records being lost through electronic transmission or
tape-loading problems, and the failure of the system to match arrival
and departure records.
The question that Congress must ask, as it considers the possible
expansion of procedures to verify departures, is what use can be made
of the extraordinary amount of data that would be collected under such
procedures. The U.S. admits over 30 million non-immigrant visitors per
year. If data regarding departures shows that just five percent of
these visitors fail to depart at the end of their authorized stay, that
information still does not inherently make us safer as a nation, nor
does it deter terrorism.
NEW DETERRANCE MEASURES
What do we need to further enhance our nation's security? Enhancing
this country's intelligence capacity is key. Any changes that we make
to our immigration policy will work to the degree that they interface
with, and take advantage of, enhanced intelligence information. Any
such reforms must meet our due process and civil liberties concerns and
standards.
There is much Congress and the Administration can do. Needed
reforms include increased funding for the DOS and INS, increased access
to lookout lists, reforms at our consulates, the use of new
technologies, direct government funding of these technologies, more
pre-inspections abroad, mandated in-flight transmittal of passenger
lists, the creation of a North American Perimeter Safety Zone, and a
workable entry-exit control system. These measures will help us to
increase the layers of protection that stand between us and any
potential adversaries from abroad.
We need to remember that our best protection derives from keeping
targeted people from entering the U.S. Such measures are more effective
and easier to implement than measures that focus on persons after they
enter the United States. In all cases, we need to make sure that we
keep out people who want to do us harm, not those seeking to come to
our country for the reasons that people have always come here,
including reuniting with their families, working or escaping
persecution. The following new measures to increase security and
deterrence should be carefully considered:
1. increased funding for dos and ins
It is important to increase funding and data access for the
Department of State (DOS) and the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS). At present, both agencies' computer systems are
technologically obsolete, with different offices often unable to share
information with the other, and some offices, especially those
overseas, not even having computer capacity. In order to effectively
fight terrorism by enhancing our intelligence capabilities and
improving our border security, both the DOS and the INS need increased
funding to upgrade their technological infrastructures. Such funding
needs to come from direct federal appropriations. INS and DOS increased
technological capacities cannot be supported through user fees. This
enhanced capacity to meet our security needs is a national function
best supported through the federal government.
2. the use of new technologies
Given the complexities of gathering, sharing and making accessible
a great range of information about individuals and their identities, it
is critical to make use of existing and emerging technologies to
achieve the most reliable means of verifying identity. Traditionally,
fingerprinting has served this function. However, any standard based on
fingerprinting has significant limitations that new technologies can
overcome. Lookout systems and other data networks can be further
improved by the use of new technologies that can match a unique
identifying characteristic of an individual with a name. One of these
new, unintrusive technologies is a face recognition system that uses
cameras to scan a person's face and compare the picture with a database
containing the photos of persons about whom the authorities are
interested. The database for this technology would contain only the
images of persons the authorities are looking for and is relatively
inexpensive.
The federal government needs to fund the development and use of
these new technologies and make sure the various federal agencies
coordinate compatible efforts in this area.
3. access to lookout lists
U.S. federal agencies, as well as international law enforcement
officials, need direct access to the various lookout lists maintained
by different agencies. These lookout lists include the names of people
who should not be admitted to the U.S. or should be pulled aside for
questioning should the authorities come into contact with them.
Increased funding would allow the agencies to build up their
technological capacities so that, for example, DOS and INS. would be
able to directly access the FBI and other agencies' databases to review
information that would help them determine whether someone should be
allowed to enter the U.S. or be granted a positive response to an
application or petition. Such direct access would enable law
enforcement agencies to act immediately to identify those high-risk
individuals who seek to enter the U.S. or receive other immigration
benefits. These lists need to be integrated and accessible, with the
information updated in a timely manner.
We also must include safeguards against potential abuse of this
data that would limit the redissemination of such information, ensure
the security and confidentiality of such information, protect privacy
rights of individuals who are subject to such information, and
establish procedures that determine who stays on and is removed from
these lists. Such safeguards will become even more necessary as the
lists increase in size and unfamiliar names from various regions of the
world may be incorrectly keyed in. We must make every effort to ensure
the accuracy of the names on the list so that the wrong individual is
not targeted.
4. consulate reforms
Our intelligence gathering can be further improved by changing some
of the operations of our consulates. As noted above, consulate staff
cannot do their job if they have neither the necessary intelligence
information nor the technological capacity to access, upload, and
download this intelligence information in a timely manner. In addition,
we need to upgrade the status of the consulate officer who interviews
an applicant to assess whether the applicant is allowed to enter the
U.S. Currently, this function tends to be performed by more junior
personnel with less experience. In the future, each post should be
required to have a core of civil service specialists who would remain
at certain posts or be rotated between posts to increase the level of
experience of the person who is making the important decision about who
is given a visa to come to the U.S.
Furthermore, this decision needs to be reviewable. In these times
of heightened scrutiny such review is vital to ensure the integrity of
the system. We should welcome such a review as part of the checks and
balances that are central to our democracy and vital to our system of
protections. We recommend providing any applicant for entry or a visa,
in writing, the reason for the denial of entry and an avenue for review
of any denial based on this information. In those cases where the
adverse decision is affirmed, the applicant should be provided with a
means of appeal to the U.S. District Court in the District of Columbia
5. pre-inspection
U.S. pre-inspection programs are in effect in only S countries in
the world--Canada, Ireland, Bermuda, the Bahamas, and Aruba. In these
locations, passengers are in effect ``pre-inspected'' for admission to
the U.S. before ever boarding a plane--passports are checked and names
are run against the lookout list. This pre-inspection process allows
more time for inspection and increases the likelihood of a more
thorough check.
This procedure would move our system from one that focuses on a
person's point of entry into the U.S. to one that focuses on their
point of origin. The INS and DOS together would need to recommend where
such pre-inspections should take place, as it would be impossible to
undertake this procedure at every airport in the world. It also would
be important to deal with host countries about any sovereignty issues
that might arise when someone is to be arrested, with U.S. officials
working cooperatively with authorities at the pre-clearance site who
have the power to arrest and detain. Such cooperation should include
assurances that suspected terrorists are not released because the host
country authorities do not view the threat as seriously as does the
U.S.
Congress needs to carefully examine and weigh the costs of such a
pre-inspection program. As with other programs to increase security and
deterrence, the federal government will need to find ways to fund such
initiatives. The cost of setting up and maintaining an overseas INS
inspections staff is not an insignificant one.
Furthermore, any pre-inspections system must provide for
mechanisms, including specially trained personnel, to assure that
legitimate asylum seekers are afforded a meaningful opportunity to seek
protection. The balancing of increased security needs and strengthened
deterrence measures against terrorists with the obligation under U.S.
and international law to protect those fleeing persecution must be
maintained in a way that does not exclude asylum seekers from
protection. Stringent pre-inspection at foreign airports much be
accompanied by expanded asylum determination or ``credible fear''
screening, so that asylum seekers can continue to the U.S. to pursue
their compelling and legitimate claims.
6. in-flight transmittal of passenger lists
Mandating at the time of take off that all airlines transmit
passengers' names to the destination airport to be checked against the
look out list is another important security tool. Through their
reservation systems, airlines know in advance who will be flying to the
U.S. Transmitting the list in advance would give U.S. authorities the
opportunity to compare the passenger list to the lookout lists, thereby
preventing from entering or apprehending those who should not be
permitted to enter the U.S. Currently, about 75% of airlines transmit
these lists.
The effectiveness of such a system also depends on the INS having
adequate technology and personnel on the receiving end to make swift
and efficient use of the incoming information.
If pre-inspection is conducted with meaningful safeguards to
guarantee protection for asylum seekers, then the transmission of
passenger lists should not compromise the safety of asylum seekers who
may be en route to the U.S. Again, however, as Congress considers
measures to strengthen and mandate such data collection and
transmission, it must include explicit safeguards to assure meaningful
access to asylum protection for those who truly need and deserve it.
7. north american perimeter safety zone
To further enhance our intelligence, the U.S. needs to employ
multilateral strategies with Canada and Mexico to enhance the security
of all three countries to create a North American perimeter.
Such a North American perimeter will bolster security through law
enforcement coordination, intelligence sharing, and better joint use of
enforcement resources. Such coordination and cooperation would reduce
the chance that someone wishing to do harm to the U.S. would travel to
one of our neighboring countries and then cross by land into the U.S.
Beyond our immediate neighbors, the U.S. needs to more closely
cooperate with our European allies in particular and share information
that each of our intelligence services have collected. Consistent with
the need to protect the privacy of innocent persons, we should have
access to their version of the lookout lists, and reciprocate by
sharing our information.
Any cooperation among governments in the region in immigration
enforcement should include a plan to ensure that asylum seekers have
meaningful access to protection. While Mexico has recently acceded to
the refugee convention, access to asylum remains problematic,
particularly for migrants intercepted at Mexico's southern border.
Access to asylum procedures in Central American countries is even less
assured.
On the other hand, Canada should not be pressured into diminishing
protections for refugees. All countries in the region can and should
strengthen security measures. However, none should be required to lower
their protections for refugees to the ``lowest common denominator.''
As North American security cooperation also addresses the issues of
smuggling and trafficking, the European experience is particularly
relevant regarding protection for asylum seekers. UNHCR commissioned a
report that concluded that the majority of asylum seekers arriving in
the European Union have been smuggled or trafficked. The report also
states that in the European Union ``the effects of blanket enforcement
measures, such as common visa policies, readmission treaties, carrier
sanctions, and airline liaison officers (pre-inspection personnel) act
to deny refugees the possibility of illegal exit from the regions of
their persecution.''
The report recommends that European nations review their migration
and asylum policies to open other channels to people fleeing
persecution in their native countries. This includes incorporating the
right to seek asylum and the responsibility of non-refoulment into
antitrafficking and anti-smuggling policy, recognizing that trafficking
and smuggling are both ``inherently abusive'' and that both trafficked
and smuggled persons can be refugees, improving reception conditions,
and increasing family reunification.
Our government, while working with Canada, Mexico, and other
partners in the region to eradicate terrorism, should also ensure that
meeting the protection needs of asylum seekers is included as part of
any plan.
8. entry-exit controls
Congress needs to ensure adequate personnel and technological
improvements at and between our ports of entry. The August 2001 GAO
Report, ``INS Southwest Border Strategy: Resource and Impact Issues
Remain After Seven Years,'' clearly identifies that our security risks
apply to both our borders.
To that end, it would be helpful to enhance our data gathering at
airports by mandating an entry/exit system that would collect and
correlate data about arrivals and departures. Certain airlines
currently collect such information on a voluntary basis. This important
security function should be government-mandated and funded. The data
collected will only be useful if correlated -with better intelligence
data.
An entry-exit system has been discussed for land border points of
entry into the U.S. Such a system would be difficult to implement,
would be exceedingly disruptive to commerce, and most importantly,
would contribute little to the security of the U.S. A June 1998 report
from the Senate Judiciary Committee, then chaired by Senator Orin Hatch
(R-UT), noted the catastrophic delays that would accompany the
implementation of a Section 110 entry-exit system at land borders. For
example, the report cited testimony from an earlier hearing of a
witness who estimated that ``assuming the most efficient and remarkable
entry and exit procedures in the world that will take only 30 seconds
per vehicle, and making the equally optimistic assumption that only
half the vehicles have to go through the procedures, that would amount
to an extra 3,750 minutes of additional processing time each day'' at
the Ambassador Bridge in Detroit. The witness then pointed out that
there are only 1,440 minutes to a day, which means that implementing a
Section 110 entry-exit system at that land border port of entry would
lead to a delay of more than 2 \1/2\ days.
Importantly, the report also notes that it is highly questionable
if implementing Section 110 would ultimately provide any assistance in
prosecuting individual visa overstayers, and has nothing to do with
stopping terrorists or traffickers. An automated entry-exit control
system's database will in no way provide information as to which
individuals might be engaging in terrorism or other unlawful
activities. We must not fool ourselves into believing that implementing
an entry-exit control system at land borders will increase our
security: It is a false solution that will hurt our commerce and trade
and not contribute to our safety.
Again, as in most forms of data collection and record keeping, the
usefulness of the data is very dependent on the quality of the
intelligence information with which it is correlated. Did the vast
majority of these people who failed to depart on time do so for
innocent reasons? Did they stay an extra week at Disney World? Did they
delay departure to attend a friend's wedding, or because Grandma could
not fly on account of an ear infection? Did they eventually depart, one
week or two weeks or even a month late? Or are they the tiny, even
miniscule minority who intend to stay to commit some heinous act of
terrorism in the United States?
How do we make sense of this data that we can and will collect? Who
looks at it? Who runs the cross checks, against what data bases? What
do we know about someone, or what can we learn from our overseas
intelligence sources that was not available when the visa was issued
that will tell us whether the person is someone we should seek out and
investigate? How do we find the person anyway, even if we have verified
that he has not departed the United States in a timely fashion? All of
these complexities must be carefully considered before Congress rushes
to implement additional reporting and departure information collection
or a new exit/entry control system.
AFFIRMATION OF THIS NATION'S DIVERSITY
In the current environment, it is especially important to reaffirm
that this nation's strength and future reside in our unity as a nation,
the diversity from which we draw our strength, and the democratic
principles on which our country is based. President Bush, the Congress,
and individual members of Congress, and many members of the general
public all have condemned the violence directed against Arab-Americans,
Muslim-Americans, and Asian-American communities by misguided people
who wrongly blame these communities for the terrorists' heinous acts.
We must continue to support diversity and condemn violence and hate
crimes.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, let us remember that U.S. immigration policy is
based on a number of values that relate to the core social and economic
principles on which our nation was founded. These values are
complementary and interweave to create the rich fabric that is
beneficial to all Americans. Among the most important values are:
The unification of American families;
Employment related immigration to keep America strong in a
global economy;
Asylum protection for refugees fleeing persecution;
Naturalization based on allegiance to the principles contained
in our Constitution and laws;
Immigration policy that is implemented through a well-regulated
system based on law, with fair, uniform, and predictable
requirements.
As the current situation calls out for change in the direction of
more effective means of deterring terrorism, we must not lose sight of
these fundamental values of this nation of immigrants. As we seek to
create new means to isolate terrorists, we must take care not to
isolate America in the process.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for this opportunity to share my
thoughts and perspectives with the Committee. I and other members of
AILA remain available to discuss these matters with you at any future
time. We look forward to working closely with you on legislative
efforts to enact these policy proposals.
Chairman Kennedy. Very fine.
Senator Brownback. Well, said.
Chairman Kennedy. Dr. Papademetriou?
STATEMENT OF DEMETRIOS G. PAPADEMETRIOU, CO-DIRECTOR, MIGRATION
POLICY INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. Papademetriou. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good to see you
again, Mr. Brownback.
I must say that I find myself in a bit of a peculiar
position because your opening statement and the comments of my
colleagues so far have pretty much covered most of the things
that I might have said. I guess I should start with a general
point which I hope that we are going to keep in the front part
of our heads as we move forward with legislation and its
implementation, which is that whatever it is that we opt for,
it should not be policies that make us feel good; rather, they
should be policies that are smart and hard-headed and can be
implemented in a way that really advances our security
interests. And I think an awful lot of the discussion about
databases and intelligence cooperation and stovepipes and
horizontal kinds of cooperation are very, very important, but I
hope that we will apply this kind of a test before we would
move forward with any initiatives.
As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, most of my testimony deals
with the findings and recommendations that come out of a book
to be formally released at the end of this month, on the 30th.
It is called ``Caught in the Middle: Border Communities in an
Era of Globalization.'' Needless to say, the research for that
book was done almost in a different era, back in 1998 and 1999.
It was written in the year 2000. It just happens to be released
now because that it is when it came back from the publisher's.
But as we were reviewing the book, my colleague and I,
Deborah Meyers, who is also my co-author, we found that there
is an awful lot in that book that actually makes sense after
September 11th, even more so perhaps than it made sense before
the 11th.
If I were to sort of break the pattern here in my testimony
and talk about an overall insight that we got from many weeks
of field research, both along the U.S.-Canada border and along
the U.S.-Mexico border, there is a certain resistance on the
part of bureaucracies to basically ask some of the questions
that I hope we need to ask them, and we will, and ask for
greater accountability. In other words, we saw a certain
mindlessness in a certain way of doing things simply because
that was the way that they had always done things. And I think
that this may indeed be the very time for us to ask ourselves
how we might do things more smartly rather than how much more
money can we throw at these bureaucracies.
I was very impressed with the fact that this was a major
conclusion of the book, and yet that happened before the 11th
of September.
I will go through about two or three out of ten major
findings of the book, and I will be happy to explain those
during the Q and A. But basically what we tried to find out
were the answers to the following three questions: How do the
NAFTA partners perceive and conduct their border inspection
responsibilities? Are such inspections done in the most
effective and manner--and consistent with other important
public policy priorities? And what are the effects of these
actions on the life of the communities that straddle NAFTA's
international borders? Because, as you mentioned, Mr.
Brownback, we shouldn't forget that there are other national
priorities. We must protect ourselves, but we must also not
sink our economy or ignore the lives of people who live in
communities that straddle these borders.
Among the general findings, one is that national government
policies toward border control tend to be inconsistent, even
erratic, with patterns often ranging from inattention to the
wrong kind of attention. And we found this to be the truth
along a single border, across both borders, and sometimes
simply from one port of entry to another port of entry. I hope
that the events of the last month or so may focus the mind of
the managers of these processes in order to at least increase
consistency in the way in which we deliver those functions.
Another general finding was that the adoption of a model of
tight controls and the empowerment of border officials to
exclude people with little accountability have become breeding
grounds for arbitrary behavior by national government
personnel. They also create more opportunities for corruption
and encourage the growth of market forces designed to defeat
border controls.
Simply put, what this suggests is that when we come up with
additional policies and when we come up with new systems that
we wish to fund, we should be mindful that they are indeed the
right systems and they are applied consistently and, indeed, do
not defy other national priorities, which is what we found.
And a third, and I believe the last, general finding that I
want to talk about is that there is a remarkable degree of
community-devised cross-border cooperation on issues such as
public health, access to education, environmental protection,
joint regional planning, and, yes, law enforcement and
security. So I hope that as we, in our capital here, are
beginning to develop ways for doing things differently at the
border, that somebody also is communicating with the interests
within the local communities and taking their recommendations
and their concerns into account, because they have many
interesting ideas that may actually make us better at what it
is that we are trying to do.
I wanted to quickly go through three major recommendations.
First, I think that border control should be conceptualized
as a means to an end rather than as the ultimate policy goal as
sometimes reflected in political rhetoric and bureaucratic
initiatives. I was very pleased to hear your comments, Mr.
Kennedy, because they relate precisely to this recommendation.
The second one is that all three national governments must
show uncharacteristic adeptness in adapting their border
management and enforcement practices to local conditions.
Again, it is very, very disturbing to see using a single set of
practices, a single methodology, across an entire border or,
for that matter, two borders.
And the third recommendation stems from the second one,
that there should not be a one-size-fits-all approach to the
issues at hand, and this is an important recommendation.
Then we talk about what kinds of things we might perhaps do
differently, jointly, initially with our friends in Canada and
then over time, and after we test the possibility, with Mexico.
And these perhaps fall a bit outside of the box. This is really
thinking prospectively as to how we might do things better that
serve the multiple interests that a border inspection regime
must serve, not just about refugees but also about economic
interests and what have you. And we have about ten or so
recommendations, and we are asking for the customs agencies to
try to see whether they need to perform all the functions they
are performing where it is that they are performing them
currently. In other words, there is now technology, a lot of it
off-the-shelf technology, that can be used to seal cargos and
to actually send along all the information along a variety of
passageways so we don't really have to do some of those things
at the border.
We should consider employing risk management strategies.
The science is very well developed, and there are great
opportunities for us to allow more of the resources, the
limited resources that we have to be focused on bad practices
and bad people rather than inconveniencing everyone, without
any loss in security.
The third one involves possibly thinking about how we might
do things together with our NAFTA partners, in this instance,
again, Canada. Is it possible that some of the functions that
the customs or the immigration agencies have to perform could
be perhaps performed jointly, but performed only once, perhaps?
With the right technology, the right suggestions or
legislation, and the right kinds of agreements between the
United States and Canada, we can be much more efficient and at
least as effective in terms of our primary responsibilities and
concerns. And this can, again, apply both to Immigration and to
Customs.
We should also consider whether we need to staff borders
with agents from different agencies like we do now between the
Customs and the Immigration Service. The Canadians have as the
primary inspection agency the customs agency. I am not saying
whether it should be Customs or Immigration. But if you want
consistent delivery in terms of the priorities that we set, why
not have a single agency do the primary function, primary
inspection, and then have the other agencies to do backup,
secondary inspections?
Why not use the private sector--
Chairman Kennedy. I will give you another minute or two
because I want to hear from Mr. Norton, and then we will have
some questions.
Mr. Papademetriou. Okay. Why not use the private sector? We
have an extensive system of customs brokers and private
bondsmen. We can give them an additional responsibility and
force them to be more accountable than they have been to date.
And as my colleagues have mentioned, let's try to use to the
fullest extent possible pre-clearance and intelligence
cooperation with our colleagues in Canada and Mexico. In fact,
even a common visa regime which allows each country to issue
visas along the same criteria on the maximum, the largest
number of countries, where that can be possible, while
identifying the few areas in which we must continue to
disagree, may actually provide much greater security for us
than the status quo.
I will stop here, and I hope to be able to answer some of
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Papademetriou follows:]
Statement of Dr. Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Co-Director and Deborah
Waller Meyers, Policy Analyst, Migration Policy Institute
I. INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for asking me
to testify today regarding border security issues and options. My name
is Demetrios Papademetriou, and I am the Co-Director of the Migration
Policy Institute. I am testifying on behalf of myself and my colleague
Deborah Meyers.
Our testimony is based on the research and recommendations in our
book, Caught in the Middle: Border Communities in an Era of
Globalization. This book will be publicly released on October
30th, and is the culmination of three years of work in a
comparative project studying border communities and border management
issues along five different international borders U.S.-Canada, U.S.-
Mexico, Germany-Poland, Russia-China, Russia-Kazakh. My remarks today,
however, will focus on immigration and border issues that relate
specifically to the U.S.'s neighbors and NAFTA partners, Canada and
Mexico.
Clearly, our book was written well before the tragic events of
September 11 and report on research conceived about three years ago,
carried out primarily in 1999, and completed last year. Yet, our
insights and conclusions seem to us to be remarkably relevant today. We
found a troubling lack of interest in applying even the most modest
``effectiveness'' test to our border management methodologies. In fact,
we identified no particular effort, really, not particular interest, in
the independent evaluation of the dominant control methodology. More
tellingly, perhaps, we identified no attempt to think systematically
about whether alternative responses to the challenge might have a
greater or lesser chance of success. This slavish adherence to doing
``more of the same'' has had several perverse effects, including
papering over the human effects of the new enforcement status quo and
disregarding a policy's effects on the communities in which people live
and through which goods and people pass--communities that have become
the terrain where the manifestations of numerous conflicting
perspectives play themselves out.
It is indeed the residents, businesses, and public and private
institutions of border communities who most directly absorb the costs
and benefits from both freer movement and greater controls. How do
these communities navigate these issues, conflicting aims and all? What
is life like for those who live and work at the interface of two
countries? What is the local perspective on the movement of people and
goods that pass through a community; does anyone else care about it?
Does the perspective vary from one community, or one border, to
another, and what accounts for any variance? What input, if any, do
local communities have into national policies that ultimately affect
them? What creative solutions have they found to address the challenge
of such policies? Our effort attempted to shed some light on all of
these questions.
Two points of departure dominated our conceptualization of the
research project. The first was a clear sense that, left on their own,
national governments and bureaucracies would do what comes most
naturally to them: national governments will reassert control
(particularly when feeling a degree of threat) and the relevant
agencies will seek to convert such fears into additional resources,
growing in size and influence. The effectiveness of the effort,
however, seems to have only an uncertain association with the resources
committed to border controls. Somewhat paradoxically, saturation
policing and other forms of vigorous control seem to produce numerous
perverse by-products, including a boom in official corruption and the
growth in powerful black markets in virtually all aspects relating to
the defeat of the control effort-from false documents to sophisticated
smuggling networks. (Notwithstanding that tendency, our research found
local cross-border initiatives continue to occur, even flourish, under
all of these scenarios.)
The second was an idea that many border communities had become
concerned
with the fact that decisions that affect them directly on issues of
borders and their management were being made without their
participation. In an era of pronounced devolution, much of it
admittedly more rhetorical than real, that decision locus exclusively
in the national capitals, with little pretense of consultation with
local communities-struck us as worthy of further investigation. We
suspected that the continuing function of borders as the physical
location where real and symbolic expressions of state sovereignty meet
probably explained why domestic decisions about them are seemingly made
``unilaterally'' by central governments.
Our overall conclusion? Unless the politics make it absolutely
impossible, governments are better off working cooperatively and with
the market to expand the legal means for the entry of their nationals
in other states' territories. Acknowledging the economic and social
facts on the ground and regulating a practice thoughtfully, stand a
much better chance of achieving important public-policy goals than
denying the legitimacy of some of the reasons for the practice's
existence and trying to stamp it out through force.
II. RESEARCH AIMS AND FINDINGS
A state performs an array of inspection functions at the border,
many of which are clearly essential to good government and all which
serve some public interest. This fact, however, does not obviate the
need to ask whether the functions are all essential, whether they can
be done only at the border, whether the manner in which they are done
is the most appropriate one, and how the lives of border communities
are affected by how functions are delivered. Most importantly, perhaps,
and like most governmental functions that are both very costly and
intrusive, the delivery of the functions itself demands that the
relevant agencies meet stringent effectiveness and accountability
standards. The research considered three broad policy questions:
1. How do the NAFTA partners perceive and conduct their border
``inspection'' responsibilities?
2. Are such inspections done in the most effective and
efficient manner (and consistent with other important public
policy priorities)?
3. What are the effects of these actions on the life of
communities that straddle NAFTA's international borders?
Maintaining a focus on border community life as a consistent
priority across all research sites, we focused on three outcomes.
1. Cataloguing and understanding existing local initiatives
toward greater cooperation between border communities located
on different sides of an international border;
2. uunderstanding better the similarities and differences in
that regard among such communities; and
3. Extracting and contextualizing ``best practices'' in local
self-management with regard to cross-border matters.
Field research results were then used to assess and develop a
perspective on the state of integration within North America, and
particularly within the North American Free Trade Agreement space, and
to articulate a vision for such integration in fifteen or twenty years.
The project's principal research hypothesis was that at the local
level, communities on both sides of a common border were thinking (and
when allowed, acting) creatively and often collaboratively in response
to common problems and in pursuit of common interests. Although the
degree of cooperation and the motives for cooperation vary
significantly across borders and border regions, in almost all
instances examples of cooperation were found to exist-thus validating
the hypothesis.
The following are among the most robust general findings of the
research.
1. The interests of border regions typically receive inadequate and
at times unwelcome attention from national governments. This is
typically due to the fact that central governments think of their
responsibilities toward borders within the framework of ``reasons of
state.'' The post-September 1 I environment makes this point more
starkly than we could have hypothesized. Such thinking, especially when
``security'' concerns enter the mix, reinforces the tendency of
bureaucracies to make decisions unilaterally and leads to the
devaluation of local dynamics and preferences. For instance, along the
U.S.Mexico border, anxiety about drugs and unauthorized immigration has
led to fortifications and an active policing framework that gives short
shrift to the border's other principal function: facilitation of legal
traffic and trade.
2. National government policies toward border control tend to be
inconsistent, even erratic, with patterns often ranging,from
inattention to the ``wrong kind'' of attention. Both extremes kindle
discontent and, except in emergencies, both can generate calls for more
autonomy on transborder issues of greatest concern to a locality or
region. Communities along many of the borders we studied desire greater
autonomy. In many instances, however, communities make fundamentally
contradictory demands. For instance, along the U.S. southwest border,
many U.S. communities, while calling for greater order and security,
simultaneously call for easier commercial access to consumers and to
workers from across the border.
3. Most central governments use symbols and language that reinforce
the imagery of borders as ``zones of exclusion. `` One is often struck
by the lengths to which some governments go to establish and demarcate
their state's distinctness and identity-from the display of massive
flags to the creation of a no-man's-land and the building of actual
fortifications. Such views, however, often contrast sharply with those
of the locals, who are much more likely to consider the border a place
of commercial, social, and cultural interface, part of an often single
community-some of which just happens to be in a foreign political
jurisdiction. Many communities along both U.S. borders feel (and act)
this way.
4. The adoption of a model of tight controls and the empowerment of
border officials to exclude people with little accountability have
become breeding grounds for arbitrary behavior by national government
personnel; they also create more opportunities for corruption and
encourage the growth of market forces designed to defeat border
controls. Nowhere is this phenomenon more evident than along the U.S.
southwest border, although behavior at other borders follows the same
general rule. As an example of arbitrariness, U.S. immigration
officials at different crossings seem to interpret their authority to
exclude inadmissible entrants quite differently, resulting in
dramatically different outcomes. With regard to official corruption,
international smuggling networks are now widely thought to be able to
corrupt government officials virtually anywhere.
5. Border communities typically approach both the challenges and
the opportunities of deeper cross-border relations in a remarkably
pragmatic fashion. Communities along the U.S.-Canada border typify this
behavior, although below the radar screen of newspaper headlines and
the rhetoric of politicians this is now a nearly universal phenomenon
along uncontested borders. In fact, as cross-border contacts increase,
local officials from both sides, in partnership with business
interests, religious organizations, and community-based and other
nongovernmental actors, seek to play increasingly significant roles in
the ongoing discussions about and the making and implementation of
policies that affect their lives. Clearly, not all communities are
equally active in this regard and few are successful in influencing
their fate in measurable ways. However, the existence of institutional
frameworks that encourage and formalize input, can make a significant
difference in outcomes. Two other factors also facilitate better cross-
border understanding: the growth in cross-border civil society
contacts, and official efforts to consider local perspectives along
borders.
6. Business and commercial interests are the drivers of better
cross-border relations across all research sites. In fact, some
observers argue that many border communities share a single business
culture in what often amounts to symbiotic, even single, markets. This
holds true regardless of the degree to which business contacts are
formal or informal. Not everyone shares the enthusiasm of commercial
interests for more 5 cross-border openness, however, and, as a result,
the vision of cross-border relations promoted by business interests can
complicate matters when it is in conflict either with that of other
local interests or with national priorities and regulations. Such
conflicts are further exacerbated when national regulations, and/or the
way in which they are implemented by representatives of national
bureaucracies at the border, are internally contradictory or are
thought to be at significant variance with the broader local economic
life. At times, local communities seek to take initiatives to redress
the perceived imbalance.
7. There is a remarkable degree of community-devised cross-border
cooperation on issues such as public health, access to education,
environmental protection, joint regional planning, and law enforcement.
In most instances, such cooperation seems to be unaffected by the ups
and downs of the national conversation on borders and, more precisely,
the conversation within the national capital. Local concerns about the
tone and flavor of these conversations have been heightened by a
growing appreciation that discussions about borders inside national
capitals seem always either to over- or under react to the real issues.
Community views, on the other hand, are typically closer to the facts
on the ground than is political rhetoric, and are better attuned to
local needs and nuances. These range from a finer sense of increasingly
common destinies and, perhaps to a lesser degree, human and ethnic
solidarity.
8. Investments in the economic and social development of border
regions and cities are at best an intermittent affair and tend to be
inadequate even in the best of circumstances. Models of how to invest
in a border region include the distribution of significant funds
through supranational institutions (the EU ``Euro-regions'' model) and
the potentially very significant U.S. investments in transportation
corridors which allow investments in Canada and Mexico. A third
potential model is the embryonic U.S. development efforts at its
southwest border by the Interagency Task Force for the Economic
Development of the Southwest Border, impaneled by the Clinton
Administration. A final model comes from the Pacific Northwest, where
remarkably well-organized cross-border public/private efforts have been
able to make considerable progress in securing funding from state,
local, and U.S. federal sources to pursue the objective of adapting
national policies to the region's unique requirements and
opportunities.
9. There is an increasing array of experiments with a variety of
``extraterritorial'' arrangements designed to facilitate commercial and
socio-cultural interests. For instance, the United States has
experimented with permitting Mexican border inspection functions to be
performed deep within U.S. territory during the Christmas season (in
order to reduce delays at the border as large numbers of Mexicans
return home for the holidays). The United States and Mexico have
reciprocally expanded the zone for the less restricted movement of
Mexicans in Arizona to 65 miles (and for Americans into Sonora for 100
kilometers), mostly as a means of encouraging access by Mexican
nationals to U.S. commercial establishments. Finally, in most major
Canadian airports, the United States has a deeply institutionalized
pre-clearance system for customs, immigration, and associated agencies
for travelers to the United States, and together with Canada it is
taking the first tentative steps toward sharing inspection facilities
and related items.
10. Next to being given short shrift by national authorities and
the lack of resources, lack of ``capacity'' may be the border
communities' greatest problem. It may be difficult to overemphasize
this point. The capacity gap spans the gamut of activities along
borders. It is clearly more pronounced in poorer countries, in remote
border communities, and in the communities most recently delegated
political power. It also exists, however, in communities lacking
sufficient physical capacity to handle the ever expanding traffic. The
need for capacity building goes beyond governance and beyond the public
sector, including the fields of education and health services and the
development of a culture of civil society that can hold the government
accountable for its decisions and can play a part in the development of
a broader base of social activism.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
The rich and intricate tapestry of complex interdependence stitched
together by the case studies in this volume makes clear that
generalizations and, ultimately, policy recommendations need to
exercise extreme care not to oversimplify. The case studies also make
clear, however, that there is a great deal more going with cross-border
communities than many analysts have suspected and, more to the point,
than either national leaders or the national press have bothered to
recognize.
What, then, might one recommend that is consistent with and moves
toward the more open and cooperative future the research results
discussed in this volume imply? We are making three overall
recommendations.
1. Border controls should be conceptualized as a means to an end,
rather than as the ultimate policy goal portrayed in political rhetoric
and reflected in bureaucratic initiatives. Put differently, the
explicit end-goal of regulatory and enforcement efforts at the border
should be to manage the border effectively enough to prepare the ground
for the serious conversation about how best jointly to accomplish each
neighbor's principal public policy priorities while allowing more
organic forms of integration to proceed at a reasonable pace. One
implication of this recommendation is that the current set of
discussions and initiatives regarding the NAFTA partners' internal
borders should continue to proceed roughly along the paths they have
been following in the last year or so; this must be accompanied,
however, by an explicit reconceptualization and articulation of the
desirable endpoint. Focusing squarely on the greater use of technology
and on management innovations that improve both facilitation and
regulation and control must be part and parcel of this process-but,
again, they must not be the end points of the NAFTA relationships.
For the U.S.-Canada border, continuing along the path of the last
year or so but with a re-conceptualization of the end point means ever-
closer and more organic cooperation, a more explicit focus on
understanding and addressing differences, and far greater
experimentation. For the U.S.-Mexico border, this means that Mexico's
deeper engagement of the United States over the last year or so must
not just continue in earnest but in fact must accelerate further, and
it must shift gears. This bilateral relationship is too important for
either country to become distracted by the differences between them.
Although that engagement's centerpiece is the migration
relationship, the border cannot be left too far behind-if for no other
reason than that it is deeply intertwined with the migration issue.
2. All three national governments must show uncharacteristic
adeptness in
adapting their border management and enforcement practices to local
conditions. While in the U.S. context this recommendation may raise
important field-management concerns about the U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service (which has proven unable to rein in its field
managers and deliver many of its functions with consistency), the
principle nonetheless remains a powerful one. Whenever possible, field
managers should be encouraged to work in tandem with local communities
to deliver the various components of the immigration function in a
manner that is sensitive to and builds upon the particular
circumstances of an area.
Currently, hardly any border communities have either a strategy or
a mechanism for building their capacity to aggregate and articulate
their interests. (The U.S.-Canada border may be the only near-
exception.) Developing such strategies and investing in mechanisms-such
as a regular annual or biennial meeting of public and private-sector
interests along and across a single border-could address this weakness.
Such a regular forum would institutionalize the exchange of views,
facilitate the process of learning about each other's interests,
priorities, successes, and failures, and offer an opportunity to build
relationships and impanel issue-focused groups, as appropriate, to
promote common interests.
Central governments also should initiate regular, systematic
opportunities for local interests to be brought into the decision-
making process about issues that affect them. Such an initiative would
address a second systemic weakness of the status quo the lack of a
formal mechanism for communities to convey their interests to the
appropriate central government policy-making bodies in a manner that is
timely and thus enhances the prospects of a fair hearing.
3. There should not be a one-size-fits-all approach to the issues
at hand not even along a single border. History, topography, economy,
and the level of local engagement with the issue (both that of the
public sector and that of the for-profit and not-for-profit private
sectors), lead to enormous variability in the delivery of border
inspection functions, as do differences in outlooks and management and
the personal skills of the local managers of national bureaucracies.
These differences demand, and sometimes in fact result in, sensitive
and thoughtful approaches that respect and take advantage of
differences. These approaches, however, still need to be informed by a
single policy frame of reference and must reflect the levels of shared
goals and objectives between the two countries-that is, building upon,
rather than undermining, the increasingly seamless cooperation between
the two countries in a vast array of policy areas.
The importance of policy clarity and, more importantly, of policies
that have a real purpose-an end-goal or a vision-cannot be
overemphasized, nor can its absence, from virtually every border this
project has studied, be more pronounced. It is, in our view, the most
fundamental explanation for the relative state of confusion about the
management of borders, and for the inconsistency with which it is
proceeding. As a result of this failure of imagination, states do not
seem able to learn from and successfully incorporate innovations in
managing borders, or in testing different management models and
alternative methodologies.
IV. THE VOLUME'S NORTH AMERICAN VISION
We call on the three NAFTA partners to commence initially domestic
processes to develop a strategic plan for changing the terms of the
debate about the border relationship with their immediate neighbors.
Whatever is agreed to must proceed from the assumption that if
negotiations are to succeed, they must recommend activities that are
gradual and evolutionary, and in each instance take into account the
interests of the affected communities. This implies much deeper levels
of national government/state (provincial) and local government
cooperation. It also implies far greater and more systematic
consultations with local stakeholders than any of the three national
governments is either familiar with or perhaps comfortable in
undertaking.
Our vision imagines the NAFTA's internal borders gradually (and in
temporal and substantive terms, unevenly) becoming irrelevant to the
point where their abolition could proceed without any measurable losses
in any of the important security, revenue collection, and even
``identity'' priorities of each partner, at least relative to the
results of the present course of action. The vision also imagines small
actual additional losses in ``sovereignty'' for any of the partners.
Any such ``losses,'' in fact, would in our view be offset by
substantial democratic surpluses for all three NAFTA partners.
Such a vision could be best approached from two distinct, yet
ultimately converging, tracks. Both require greater vertical and
horizontal consciousness-raising and greater and more systematic input
by local communities and their institutions-public and private. The
first track focuses on continuing the multiplicity of contacts, the
deepening of bilateral engagement, and the focus on pragmatic problem-
solving that has been the operational model for the past few years-if
intermittently so. The second track should focus on the kind of North
America the citizens of the three countries have a legitimate right to
expect in the not-too-distant future-and on how best to achieve it.
Some of this latter track's required elements will of necessity be
``defensive'' in nature; that is, they must ``protect'' citizens from
unwanted activities, practices, and products. Other elements will be
forward-looking and will be advancing broader citizen interests in
terms of prosperity, adherence to rules, protection of rights, and
fundamental conformity with the principles of humanitarianism. In its
totality, the proposed vision should hold the promise for doing better
by most people in each of the NAFTA partners along most of these goals.
Such a vision should include the following among its main elements:
1. Greater security from illegal activities and unwanted
products from outside the NAFTA space-including terrorism,
illegal immigration, drugs, and more;
2. Protection from illegal activities and undesirable products
that may be found inside the NAFTA region that will be no less
reliable than what each NAFTA partner enjoys now;
3. The nearly seamless movement of legitimate goods and people
seeking to cross internal NAFTA borders; and
4. Protection from the political ups and downs (the political
``mood swings,'' as it were) of one NAFTA partner or another
and, perhaps more importantly, from bureaucratic ``ad-hocism,''
affecting the vital interests of the other partners.
Is our vision realistic-particularly in the post-September 11
environment? We think so. Will critics think that it is realistic?
Probably not. In many ways, there are few things easier than shooting
down a vision. The three NAFTA capitals are full of people who know how
to say ``no'' a million ways. (Bureaucracies of all types are
particularly adept at saying ``no'' to changes in their mission or
culture. Ultimately, since it is bureaucracies that will implement any
vision, working with them will bear more fruit than working against
them.) Getting to ``yes,'' however, requires great political courage
and uncommon qualities of leadership. Nor can a vision of a different
future immediately provide fully satisfactory answers to all the
questions-legitimate or not-that one may pose. Realizing the vision
proposed here will be rocky and the outcome frequently will seem
uncertain. Furthermore, as with the early stages of any ambitious new
initiative, there will be winners and losers-and each NAFTA partner
will have to give priority to developing and implementing, policies
that address the concerns of those who will likely lose at the
beginning.
V. SOME INITIATIVES THAT CANADA AND THE U.S. CAN BEGIN TO IMPLEMENT AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE
Integration is a gradual process involving a myriad of incremental
steps and the building of trust. To begin, we suggest that each border
inspection agency be required to analyze each one of the functions it
performs at the border along four lines: First, must each of its
functions be done only at the border? Second, what are the costs and
benefits of doing that function at the border versus doing it
elsewhere? Third, can any of its functions be performed by an inspector
from a sister agency? Fourth, can any of the functions in question be
performed (after proper negotiations, training, etc.) by an inspector
from the other country?
We list below some concrete steps in the process of rethinking
border management. We expect these initiatives to be tested first with
Canada but expect that, over time, those that pass the tests, would be
gradually ``exported'' to the U.S.-Mexico border.
Customs could perform many of its inspections and collect
all applicable duties at the point where the cargo is loaded in North
America, employing available technology to ``seal'' the containers) and
transferring all the relevant information about the cargo
electronically to any other inspection point.
Customs could employ ``risk-management'' methodologies for
performing inspection functions and re-deploy some of the newly
``released'' personnel to joint investigative task forces with sister
agencies from either side of the border in order to uncover violations
of various types.
One NAFTA partner could handle inspections and the
collection of tariffs on behalf of the others or could do so jointly-
but always once-at the initial point in which a cargo from a non-NAFTA
country enters NAFTA space. Similarly, progress should be made on the
``unified port management'' concept for its potential to use resources
most efficiently while improving both service and the quality of
inspections.
Border customs inspections could be done only once-by
either national customs service-so as to accommodate variances in
staffing, physical infrastructure, and topographical idiosyncrasies.
The United States could copy the Canadian model of having
only one agency staff the primary inspection lanes, rather than having
both Customs and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. All
necessary inspection agencies would still retain a presence at the
border to perform secondary inspections.
Existing systems of customs brokers and private bondsmen
could be utilized to a far greater extent and given both greater power
and greater responsibility-and, by extension, made more accountable
(and penalized more severely) for failures - of either omission or
commission.
The private sector could be relied upon even more
consequentially in areas ranging from technology to the building of
better infrastructure wherever it might be needed, through liberalized
public-private partnerships and pay-as-you-go projects.
The INS could handle all third-country (non-NAFTA)
immigration controls at an individual's first point of entry into NAFTA
space. Pre-clearance technology and intelligence cooperation are in
many instances already significant enough to expect that this method
can be accelerated without any loss of control relative to 11 the
status quo. In fact, airport inspections are more accurate and can be
more efficient than virtually any system of inspections at land
borders, where visa and identity checks, even after September 11.
Canada and the United States could agree to a common visa
regime for the widest band of countries each country could accommodate
and exercise much greater care in the issuance of visas for the
citizens of countries for which visa-free entry could not be agreed to
by the other country.
Canada and the United States initially, the U.S. and
Mexico at a later point, and, eventually, all three NAFTA partners and
contiguous neighbors, could gradually liberalize the movement of each
other's nationals, thus freeing their inspection resources to focus
more on non-NAFTA nationals. (It is worth noting that despite having
reached absolute freedom of movement, intra-EU migration by EU citizens
is minuscule, at between seven and eight million persons, or about two
percent of the EU's population.) Potential exploitation of a country's
social support systems by nationals of another NAFTA country can be
addressed up front in a variety of ways, including requiring departure
within a specific time period if a job or other means of support hasn't
been found or by continuing the social protection mechanisms of the
country of origin for the initial few months after entry.
These recommendations are not made in a vacuum. Some tentative
steps toward the directions recommended here are already being taken,
the technology is readily available, and the large business sector that
accounts for most of the transborder initiatives and energy is thought
to be fully primed for cooperating in return for more timely and
predictable results. A vision, and political will, seem to be the major
missing ingredients.
We must also note that our vision has no room for supranational
bureaucracies a la Brussels. We believe instead in an integration
process that is organic and is thus built from the bottom up-and from
the periphery to the center, that is, from border regions to capital
cities, differing dramatically from the top-down approach the EU
practices even today. Europe's experience nonetheless reminds us that
progress on even the most intractable issues comes down to creativity,
leadership, local input, an overarching vision, - liberal amounts of
common sense, and a willingness to experiment and learn from others.
VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Few issues in the international system are as complex as those
surrounding borders. As this volume demonstrates, the roots of that
complexity include but go beyond the reality that borders are the most
direct physical manifestation of ``statehood'' and sovereignty. They
also are inextricably linked with competing policy priorities that
simultaneously expect border inspection systems to allow the swift and
efficient passage of legitimate people and products while unerringly
stopping illegitimate traffic and undesirable products. At their very
root, however, borders and their ``management'' or ``protection,''
however much these last functions may have changed in recent years, are
first and foremost political concepts, and can only be addressed
politically.
What relationships, then, might one anticipate within the NAFTA-
space in the years ahead? Canada's understandable preoccupation with
its U.S. relationship will continue to motivate that country to ensure
by any means necessary that the economic relationship continues to grow
in ways that guarantee the prosperity of its people. It is in fact our
contention that, substantively at least, the U.S.-Canada border is
likely to disappear before any politician finds the political courage
to negotiate its removal. Symbolic issues, of course, will need to be
addressed, as will the significant strengthening of police functions
both along the outside perimeter of North America and-an important
policy development-in the interior of each country, an intensification
that is already occurring.
Mexico, buoyed by and ready to draw on the democratic dividend
created by Mr. Fox's defeat of the candidate of the Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI) in the 2000 presidential elections, has found
the confidence to enter into bilateral negotiations with the United
States about a tough binational ``bargain'' on migration and border
issues. That bargain, whenever the post-September 11 climate allows it
to move forward, would offer Mexicans much greater access to the part
of the U.S. economy and labor markets in which it is already a major
player in return for far greater and much more active cooperation in
addressing the primarily ``law-and-order'' issues of concern to the
United States. Mexico's ability to deliver on the responsibilities it
would undertake under such a bargain would in turn determine the pace
at which it may begin to catch up with the U.S. treatment of the U.S.-
Canada border.
Finally, U.S. interest in the North American ``project'' envisioned
here (``acceptance'' may be a more appropriate term than ``interest '')
is likely to be tepid until it is convinced that it can accomplish its
own policy priorities less expensively, more efficiently, and much more
effectively than under the status quo. In that regard, it is the limits
of thicker and infinitely more expensive unilateral controls that may
persuade the United States to consider truly alternative ways of
dealing with these issues.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee: Ensuring our safety
requires a comprehensive, system-wide response that goes well beyond
the jurisdiction of this Subcommittee and includes not only the INS but
each and every public agency with which foreign entrants interact. Our
nation's security from foreign nationals who may wish us ill in the
months and years ahead rests on the simultaneous and sustained pursuit
of several initiatives.
This is an extraordinary task under any circumstances; it becomes
even more so, however, given our record as a people of a generally low
attention span on matters large and small. This tendency makes it all
the more important that we resist the twin impulsions of (1) throwing
money at the problem (this problem is too large and it can ``break the
bank'' rather quickly) and (2) rushing to create new and cumbersome
data 13 systems that may offer only marginal benefits to the common
objective of making our country more secure while having enormous long
term costs on who we are as a nation.
Based on our research, we believe that, over time, we can achieve
many more of our goals working together with the intelligence gathering
and law-enforcement agencies of our allies in this ``war on
terrorism,'' and particularly with those of our North American
partners-Canada and Mexico than we can do unilaterally. Seamless
cooperation in protecting our common North American space, what some
people now call ``perimeter defense,'' is a goal worth pursuing at a
pace and with as much vigor as prudence and the capabilities of each of
our partners allow.
Ultimately, Mr. Chairman, we can protect ourselves better through
``external'' controls, that is, actions that we might take before an
undesirable alien gains entry into our country than ``internal''
controls, that is, measures taken once one has been admitted. Put
differently, keeping undesirable individuals out of the US through
``front gate controls'' (that is, the visa issuance and border
inspection regimes), is both easier and more effective than attempting
to catch up with such persons after they enter the US. Focusing most of
our additional resources on prevention measures demands that we treat
our contiguous neighbors as the assets that they are (and can be) than
as the liabilities that some seek to make them.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to appear before you
and the Subcommittee.
Chairman Kennedy. Thank you very much.
Mr. Norton?
STATEMENT OF RICHARD E. NORTON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
INTERNATIONAL BIOMETRIC INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA
Mr. Norton. Mr. Chairman, Senator Brownback, thanks for the
opportunity to appear here today before this panel.
We are pleased to note the consensus we have seen today on
the need for greater use of biometrics and understand the
crucial role they can play. In the past, we think the
biometrics have been largely misconstrued as perhaps invasive
technologies that would be compromising privacy when, in fact,
the opposite is the case, and we are seeing a broad recognition
of that--really the only way to offer a technological silver
bullet here, to coin a phrase used by Mr. Ziglar, that can
offer security, that can offer convenience, and also protect
privacy at the same time.
The reason is that biometrics are stored as encrypted
digital information. They are not stored as an image, with rare
exception, and they can't be reverse-engineered to reveal
anything about the holder. They don't say anything about the
sex, the age, the race of the person's identity, and they can
truly place a lock and key on this information and protect it
from prying eyes.
Our message is simple: The U.S. has the tools to
immediately implement several important biometric-based
programs and make a difference right away. By consolidating
information, placing the proper equipment in the field, and
enabling real-time checks of the data, valid document holders
can be identified at any stage of the process, from application
at a consular post to departure from the United States.
Our recommendations are to do the following now:
First, deploy readers at the border that can verify the
identity of any holder of an alien resident card or border
crossing card. By the end of next year, there will be nearly 20
million of these documents in circulation, and all have
biometric information securely embedded in them. This
information can be relied on to determine if a holder is
properly linked to the document at the time they apply for
admission to the United States.
Second, we strongly urge the consolidation of all photo
images from all U.S. travel documents into the Interagency
Border Inspection System. Right now we have access to visa
information that is slowly coming on at several ports of entry,
and we are pleased to hear that this information may be
available more broadly in the future. However, U.S. passport
information is not in this database, nor is information
reliably accessed on ARC holders, that is, alien resident card
holders, and border crosser card holders. Doing so would give
the U.S. authorities the immediate ability to verify the
identity of any document holder.
And, third, we would like to recommend something that
perhaps wouldn't be seen as a replacement for the pre-
inspection program, but could certainly be made available
universally, which pre-inspection never will be, and that is to
add the images of suspected terrorists to this database that we
are talking about to the Interagency Border Inspection System
and make this a real-time system, driven by facial recognition
technology that can be used to verify the validity of a
document and the identity of the holder before the travelers
board the flight to the United States. Making the Advance
Passenger Information program universal is a good step, but it
does nothing to stop a terrorist at the airline gate.
Real-time access using facial recognition technology can
accomplish this goal while offering convenience, privacy, and
security to the traveler and without resorting to something so
dramatic as a national I.D. card.
There are additional steps underway. The FBI is looking at
how it can improve its automated fingerprint identification
system to provide the sorts of checks that are envisioned in S.
1452, introduced by the chairman last month. The U.S.
Government and other governments, along with airlines,
airports, and technology providers, are cooperating with the
Simplifying Passenger Travel program to try to rope in as many
bona fide travelers into a system of biometric identification
as possible and do this on an international basis.
Third, the International Civil Aviation Organization is
also trying to improve the documentation, being able to use
biometrics in a passport to validate who a traveler is, again,
deterring fraud, enabling us to identify people who shouldn't
be in the system, and facilitating the people who should be
allowed to pass freely.
Finally, we would like to add we have heard much here today
about the concern about privacy. As we explained, biometric
technologies do offer the ability to retain privacy without
eroding security. Ultimately, the citizens' trust is going to
have to be acquired by assurances that these systems are
properly regulated and properly maintained. The biometric
industry has been very aggressive about this and has advocated
controls for several years that would enable this sort of
system to be implemented with full confidence of the citizens
of the United States.
Our recommendations are completely detailed in our written
testimony, Senator, and we would be happy to answer any
questions about them. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Norton follows:]
Statement of Richard E. Norton, Executive Director, International
Biometric Industry Association
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
inviting the biometric industry to offer its views at this important
proceeding. My name is Richard E. Norton, and I am the Executive
Director of the International Biometric Industry Association (IBIA).
IBIA is based in Washington, D.C. and represents the collective
interests of manufacturers and developers of biometric technology.
Biometric Technology
Biometrics are defined as the automatic identification or identity
verification of an individual based on physiological or behavioral
characteristics. The authentication of identity is accomplished by
using computer technology in a noninvasive way to match patterns of
live individuals in real time against enrolled records. Examples of the
patterns used for biometric identification include those made from a
finger image, the geometry of the hand, an iris, voice, signature, or
face. It is important to note that most biometric applications do not
store the actual image of the feature being measured. Instead,
biometrics secure systems and protect an individual's identity by
converting the measurement into an encrypted file. This biometric
record cannot be reverse engineered to determine a person's age, sex,
race or other sensitive information. Likewise, it cannot be used to
steal someone's identity.
With these characteristics, biometrics are the only technologies
that can offer both increased security and greater convenience. The
U.S. Government has been an early adopter of biometrics, first using
the devices to control access to highly sensitive facilities such as
nuclear power plants and weapons facilities. Now biometrics are
routinely employed to protect networks against intrusion by hackers, to
secure records from identity theft, to ensure benefits are disbursed to
the lawful recipient, and to protect borders.
Biometrics and Border Clearance
The U.S. has nearly a decade of experience with this latter
application. The Immigration & Naturalization Service has experimented
with biometric technologies at land and air ports of entry, and has
deployed its INSPASS automated kiosks at a number of major airports in
the U.S. and at immigration pre-clearance sites in Canada. While the
INSPASS system has not been implemented on a broad enough scale to
reduce the burden on the INS inspection mission, it is widely regarded
as a successful experiment that has worked as planned--in complete
security--for over eight years. Other countries have had similar
results: Canada, the Netherlands, Singapore, and Israel have
implemented biometrics in this demanding national security role and
found them to be robust and effective.
The question is how we take these low volume trials and efficiently
convert the lessons learned into a comprehensive system of controls
that tighten our border without causing service levels to deteriorate
to unacceptable levels. Fortunately, the tools are in place to
accomplish this goal: not only are the technologies reliable and
standards in place, but in several significant areas the U.S. has taken
preliminary steps that will enable us to make a measurable difference
at a reasonable cost. Furthermore, we are convinced there are ways to
accomplish our objectives at the border without having to resort to a
national identity card.
Elements of a Solution
In many respects the U.S. has the key elements of biometric-based
systems in place, ready to be converted into information that can be
tapped to identify travelers at ports of entry, applicants at visa
issuance posts overseas, and potential threats to national security as
they attempt to enter or move about the country.
First, INS has issued over five million of its highly secure Alien
Resident Cards (ARC) to permanent residents of the U.S. The Department
of State has used the same technology on nearly five million Border
Grosser Cards (BCC) that have been issued to Mexican citizens since
1999. By the end of 2002, over 20 million such cards will be in
circulation; by 2007, all ARCS will have been converted to the new
format. Both cards contain an image of the bearer's fingerprint that is
encoded in the optical zone of the card--a feature analogous to the
appearance and storage capacity of a CD-ROM, but with strong built-in
encryption that has effectively prevented forgery.
Second, all U.S. visas are produced from a digital file that
includes an image of the bearer. This image is now retained in State
Department files and, as with the image of the ARC or BCC holder, can
be used to help verify the identity of the person presenting the visa
through face recognition technology.
Third, border agencies have established a nearly universal system
for checking on the identity of passengers as they travel to the U.S.
The Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) calls for airlines to
forward biographical information to the Interagency Border Inspection
System, where lookouts are run and ports notified if U.S. authorities
want to closely examine a particular passenger. IBIS, if it is
converted to a real time, two-way communication system and expanded to
include automated links to ARC, BCC and passport data, can be used to
validate the identity of travelers before they board their flight to
the U.S. (see ``Recommendations'' below).
Fourth, the biometric industry has worked diligently to establish
the standards needed for true interoperability. In cooperation with the
National Institute of Standards & Technology, IBIA has created a
registry that enables any biometric device to be recognized on a
network. The industry and government also have worked together to
publish rules on how biometrics are to be integrated into computer
operating systems. . This is an exceptionally important advancement for
several reasons:
It allows multiple biometrics to be accommodated;
It allows the quick adoption of new biometric
technologies as they are developed in the future;
It permits the rapid exchange of information for
record checks; and
It enables the use of biometric information that has
been acquired by other sources, such as employers, airlines,
and government agencies.
Recommendations
With these pieces in place, there are a number of steps that can be
taken immediately to improve our capacity to properly identify people
who are arriving at U.S. borders:
deploy optical card and finger image readers.
ARCS and BCCs contain a finger image of the bearer. This image can
be extracted from the card by an optical card reader, and compared to
the ``live'' image of the person applying for admission to the U.S. by
using a low-cost finger image reader. The card is virtually immune to
compromise, and the process can be conducted without having to
establish a network connection to a central database.
standardize the retention of, and centralize, digital images for all
u.s. documents.
U.S. visa, ARC and BCC records contain digital images of the bearer
that, if centralized, can be used to verify the identity of the
traveler. The same process could be used to link U.S. passports to
their holders if the Department of State updates its system to include
the digital image of bearers of that document. If this information is
made available through IBIS, U.S. border authorities can have real-time
access to images of all applicants for admission, with the exception of
travelers entering under the Visa Waiver Program.
apply the use of face recognition technology to automate the
identification of u.s. document holders.
As an extension of the centralization process described above, any
image that is stored in the system can be used to generate a face
recognition template. This template can be compared to the template
that is produced by scanning the image on a travel document, or by
using an image from a video camera.
extend the document verification process to the airline check-in
counter.
Any system of border control and terrorist interdiction requires
airlines to be an intrinsic and effective-part of the process.
Currently, airlines have little to go on to determine if a traveler may
be improperly documented, or if a passenger poses a danger to the
aircraft. Being able to verify the identity of a U.S. document holder--
or compare a suspect against a terrorist database--will enable
resources to be focused on identifying those who cannot be quickly
verified against accurate records. Such improvements to our current
screening processes can be made by centralizing data and images in
IBIS, upgrading that system to enable near-real-time interactive
messaging between government and airlines, and by expanding the use of
advanced, ``full field of view'' document readers that can
automatically scan all of the information on the travel document data
page.
Other Initiatives
Other programs are certain to follow these first steps in building
an effective system for screening visa applicants and streamlining the
admission of bona fide visitors, U.S. citizens and returning residents.
Improvements to the Federal Bureau of Investigation Automated
Fingerprint Identification System can expedite the kind of record
checks envisioned in Senate Bill 1452, which was introduced by the
Chairman of this Subcommittee on September 21, 2001; cooperative
efforts such as the multi-stakeholder Simplifying Passenger Travel
initiative, sponsored by the International Air Transport Association,
will help the U.S. to identify a broader range of bona fide travelers
who have been vetted through biometric control systems implemented in
other countries; and further standardization on the use and storage of
biometrics on passports under the auspices of the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) will make counterfeiting, identity theft,
and imposter fraud more difficult for those with ill intent.
In closing, the industry would like to mention its efforts to
pursue these innovations without eroding the privacy and civil
liberties of American citizens, and without disrupting international
commerce. Biometric data is inherently secure and serves as a digital
lock and key on personal information; but ultimately the success of
these systems will depend on a traveler's trust that they will be
administered responsibly. The industry's policies and guidelines on how
to implement biometrics without diminishing public confidence is
described in detail at our website, www.ibia.org.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to participate
in this distinguished panel. I would be pleased to answer any questions
you have about these recommendations, or about biometric applications
in general.
Chairman Kennedy. Just before coming to other questions, on
this issue of privacy could you just elaborate on that? What
are you talking about in terms of people having a sense that in
the biometric system their privacy issues are going to be
preserved or protected?
Mr. Norton. Well, as we explained, biometrics do protect
privacy by their nature because they are an encrypted file and
they can serve as a lock and key on personal information.
That being said, people still are concerned about biometric
information being stored. To say don't worry, trust technology
that it is taking care of you is an irresponsible statement to
make.
So an industry, what we say is that even if these
technologies have these inherent securities, then you should
have a system by which they are administered. You should have
careful controls over the access to the database. You should
let people know what the data is being used for. They should
know how it is being shared. They should have control over its
sharing if it is not for the explicit purpose of these
controls. And there should be careful regulation of how they
are administered, penalties imposed if people abuse this
information.
Chairman Kennedy. Okay. Could you provide some examples of
the technology that is currently available and could be
implemented by the INS? What are the costs involved in
implementing this system? You discussed applying facial
recognition technology to automate the identification of
documents. What is the cost and what is the time and what are
the principal sort of elements if the country was to make a
judgment to go in this direction?
Mr. Norton. There are many biometric technologies that can
be used, and many are very effective at solving this problem.
There is iris recognition, voice recognition, face/hand
geometry, finger imaging. But we have focused today
specifically on facial recognition and what it could offer
because it is--
Chairman Kennedy. Let me ask you just to back up. Do you
think it is advisable to try and get some international
standards so that we are all operating on the same plane, so to
speak? Is that advantageous?
Mr. Norton. Well, that is the direction that the
International Civil Aviation Organization is headed, is to look
at--they recommended, made a preliminary recommendation that
facial recognition be one of the primary biometric
technologies. The reason is speed and simplicity. We have
passports with photos in them. We issue documents and we are
now digitizing those photos and keeping them in records.
By applying a facial recognition template to these stored
images, you can very quickly validate who somebody is through
automated means. You don't have to have an officer standing
there comparing a document to a stored image. The system does
it automatically when you use a facial recognition template.
All of our documents have photos. It is the quickest way to
get to where we need to be.
Chairman Kennedy. Well, let me ask you, what is involved in
this? You know, if we are to move in that direction now, what
generally is the--what do you think is the cost, public-private
time frame? What is your own ballpark estimate?
Mr. Norton. Well, we have been consulting with the
officials who do manage the Interagency Border Inspection
System on a number of initiatives involving this sort of effort
and how the airlines, in fact, might even figure into this of
being sort of a second line of defense after the consulates.
And really what is required is to take this information that is
already available and pull it together, a fairly simple
administrative exercise. Apply facial recognition templates,
which is a very reasonable cost to do, just simply digitize
these images and make them referenceable by facial recognition
technology.
I think the biggest challenge is to make this system real-
time, to invest in the telecommunications infrastructure to
make it a reliable two-way system that can be instantly
accessed anywhere around the world. That will be the challenge.
I think that our agencies are up to that challenge and already
looking into those costs.
Chairman Kennedy. How far along are we in terms of the
technology in this? It is a constantly evolving technology. I
am familiar with some of it in my own State of Massachusetts,
which has done some of this and is working with the military,
primarily, in security areas. But what is your sense? How far
along are we in terms of the technology and what is your own
assessment on this?
Mr. Norton. Biometrics have been under development for
nearly 20 years, and the U.S. Government was an early adopter
of the technologies. They used them to protect very secure
national security facilities, nuclear weapons facilities,
nuclear power plants. And through the course of this sort of
evolution of the technology, they have been made very robust.
Working well and being low cost and easy to implement is
another question. But over the past 4 or 5 years, we have also
seen the prices drop dramatically, and we have seen the
standards put in place that enables these technologies to
seamlessly work within a system.
Briefly put, the technologies are robust, they work
reliably in many difficult environments, and the standards are
in place to move ahead now.
Chairman Kennedy. How would you compare it to the current
I-94 system in terms of integrity and accuracy, speed and
improving national security?
Mr. Norton. Well, the current I-94 system is really a mixed
bag. It is very difficult to track somebody out of the country,
especially, and it is a laborious process to automate this
information.
Proceeding with IBIS along the lines that we discussed--and
as Mr. Ziglar recommended--I think is an important first step.
The Interagency Border Inspection System has this information
already in it that is used to front-load the I-94 system. But
it not being taken advantage of. I think now that they have
established this link and realized that the Advance Passenger
Information program and IBIS and the I-94 program can all
operate together is a very important step, and I am glad to see
that it is being taken by INS. It will save money and it will
help solve the problem of identifying people in the country.
Chairman Kennedy. You mentioned that the International
Air--what is the organization that you mentioned trying to work
out a standard process in terms of--
Mr. Norton. There are actually two. The International Air
Transport Association is working on an effort with governments,
airports, airlines, and technology providers, and the
International Civil Aviation Organization is looking at
standardization of travel documents.
Chairman Kennedy. But they are consistent with their
objectives, are they? Is there a consistency with where they
are coming out?
Mr. Norton. Not only a consistency but a synergy. The IATA
effort in particular is looking at ways in which biometric
information can be voluntarily shared to enable people to move
seamlessly through the system, be carefully identified without
necessarily being slowed down. People have tended to forget in
this debate that we can't slow down commerce and we can't
inconvenience the traveler to the point where the industry is
disrupted and commerce is disrupted to the United States. We
feel these efforts, if carefully coordinated, can make progress
in the security area without diminishing commerce,
international commerce to the United States.
Chairman Kennedy. Mr. Papademetriou, let me just ask you
your reaction for developing a Northern American perimeter
strategy to combat terrorism.
Mr. Papademetriou. This is certainly one of the areas that
we must explore systematically with our Canadian friends
initially, and gradually, as the capabilities of our Mexican
friends develop further, with the Mexicans, too.
This is really all about adding an additional bite at the
apple in terms of defending ourselves. The outside--the real
first line of defense, as we heard earlier, is, of course, the
visa issuance process.
I think what Mr. Norton is suggesting, we have recommended
the same thing, but a pre-inspection system becomes a second
line of defense.
The third one becomes trying to really keep people outside
of the perimeter.
Our neighbors, both Canada and Mexico, are assets and they
can be made into far greater assets if we work with them rather
than being liabilities, which is what some people perhaps might
try to do. So, fundamentally, we are going to be building, if
we adopt some sort of a perimeter defense or a defense of the
North American space, we will be adding an additional and
welcome redundancy to protecting ourselves. And it makes sense
both in terms of defense but also in terms of protecting and
advancing our economic interests.
Chairman Kennedy. Thank you.
Dr. Butterfield, your view about the national
identification system for U.S. citizens and foreign nationals
in the U.S.?
Ms. Butterfield. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think that that is a
line that this Nation has not crossed until now, and I would
urge us to approach the question with a lot of cautions and
concerns about civil liberties, and with the question that my
colleague asked earlier about would it really do anything to
make us safer and more secure. If I were to have to carry a
national I.D. card and everyone else did and every immigrant
coming in had some kind of card, then the question is, again,
what does that tell us? Do I have to show it every time I buy
groceries, every time I make a bank transaction, every time I
rent an apartment?
What would its use be? What would a valid use be? What
would an overreaching use be? I think those are all questions I
would want to see considered before taking that step forward.
Chairman Kennedy. What about foreign nationals?
Ms. Butterfield. Well, again, I think that the perimeter
strategy, the layers of security and defense are the most
effective ones. I think, again, we have a problem with interior
verification. How do INS officials or employers, for that
matter, know to ask, you know, me for my I.D. or not, because I
am a U.S. citizen, but yet ask an immigrant to show some kind
of authorization. And I venture to say that Mr. Papademetriou
would be asked more often than Ms. Butterfield would. And so
then we get into issues about profiling and discrimination.
Chairman Kennedy. Maybe not in Boston.
[Laughter.]
Senator Kennedy. Senator DeWine?
Senator DeWine. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Let me first thank
you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. It is a very
important hearing, and I appreciate you doing it very much.
I have, Mr. Chairman, a statement which I would ask just to
be made a part of the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator DeWine follows:]
Statement of Hon. Mike DeWine, a U.S. Senator from the State of Ohio
Chairman Kennedy, thank you for agreeing to hold this important
hearing on our efforts to deter terrorism through immigration controls.
I thank our witnesses for coming to testify today, as well.
Before I say anything else, I want to make it perfectly clear that
I am not here to discourage legal immigration into our country. We
are--and always have been--a nation of immigrants. However, following
the tragic events of September 11th, we awoke to a whole new
world. We now are rethinking many of our nation's policies--from
national security measures and intelligence gathering to domestic law
enforcement and public health emergency procedures. Our immigration
policies are also at the a significant part of the debate on anti-
terrorism controls.
In examining current immigration policy and the terrorist threat,
we are presented with many questions: Do we focus on trying to keep
track of aliens we allow into the United States? Or, do we focus our
limited resources on screening those who have asked permission to enter
our country? The reality is that we must do both. We must do a better
job of screening aliens who enter the country, while at the same time
keep track of when and where those aliens enter and exit, and where
they are while they are here.
Let me talk for a moment about the scope of what we're facing. Last
year, the INS performed 529.6 million inspections of individuals who
crossed our borders either by land, sea, or air. As Commissioner Ziglar
noted in congressional testimony last week, over a half-billion
personal contacts were made with INS inspectors at our ports-of-entry.
After deducting American citizens who were inspected, 352 million
aliens were inspected in 2000. A little less than a third of those
aliens are permanent residents. That leaves 255 million inspections of
temporary ``nonimmigrant'' aliens who are crossing at U.S. ports-of-
entry.
It appears that this is the pool of entries in which we are
searching to find terrorists and others who are coming into the United
States for illicit purposes. Out of 255 million inspections, how on
earth are our law enforcement and other agencies responsible for these
individuals' entry supposed to identify 19 terrorists?
That's certainly a vast and overwhelming challenge. But, at the
same time, it is a challenge that we must meet. Congress expects it.
The American people expect it. Today, we want to know what needs to be
done meet this daunting task.
While I believe we can meet the challenges we face, I also believe
that it can be done only with the help of technology. I would like to
hear our panelists' ideas about how technology can be used to lessen
the terrorist threat with regard to immigration controls and
technology. What is your plan for using all available technology to
address immigration concerns?
Let me tell you what I have been thinking. In the Senate's recently
passed anti-terrorism package, I asked the Attorney General, in
consultation with appropriate agencies, to report to Congress on how we
can use our national biometric systems, such as the FBI's Integrated
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), to better identify
potential terrorists. Specifically, I asked how we can use the
automated fingerprint system to identify a person who holds a foreign
passport or a visa and may be wanted in connection with a criminal or
intelligence investigation in the United States or abroad. The idea is
that we would use the automated system to gather this information
before the issuance of a visa or entry into--or exit out of--the United
States.
I recognize that current INS technology is outdated and
insufficient to meet the new demands. We should leverage the
substantial investment taxpayers have made in the IAFIS system to
create a system of identification and verification that is fully
integrated with all relevant federal, state, and local agencies--all in
real-time. Currently, IAFIS has more than 48 million images and
exchanges information with almost all federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies. I am not saying that this system is perfect, but
I am saying that we should use all of our available resources at our
disposal.
Again, thank you for participating today. I am looking forward to
hearing from our witnesses.
Senator DeWine. Mr. Norton, I am very interested in the use
of biometric technology to enhance security at our borders. I
think we are going to have to find a way to quickly implement
this type of technology. Over the last couple weeks, I have
attended a number of hearings here at the Capitol where
biometric technology has been discussed, and discussed at
length.
Witnesses have testified regarding the prospects for
biometric technology and have given examples of where that
technology is already in use. It has really, though, become
clear to me that there are two distinct uses for biometric
technology. Biometric technology can be used to verify the
identity of an alien who is holding a visa, or biometric
technology could be used to establish the identity of an alien
who applies for a visa or entry in the United States.
Most of the examples I have heard are applications of
biometric technology to verify identity. The State Department
cites the new laser visas or border crossing cards which
incorporate biometric technology. The biometric technology in
these so-called smart cards is really just to verify if the
person holding the card is the person to which the visa was
originally issued. There is no biometric search done by the
State Department when that individual is initially issued that
visa.
Now, when the State Department issues the original visa, it
relies on the information provided by the individual and the
name check process described by Ambassador Ryan. If the
individual provides false information to the State Department,
biometric verification and a laser visa doesn't really tell us
anything very useful.
I think we have a similar situation with the INS INSPASS
system, and in that case, the hand scan and the accompanying
card merely verify the identity of the card holder.
Now, I understand that the IDENT system could be used, can
be used to establish the identity of individuals who have been
entered into the system because they have been repeatedly
caught entering into the country illegally.
Now, aside from that limited use, are there any biometric
systems that are currently in use to establish the identity of
aliens who want to enter the United States? And a related
question is: If we want to positively establish the identity of
aliens entering the United States, don't we really need a
biometric system in place at our consular offices overseas? And
don't we need a real-time biometric identification system at
our ports of entry for aliens who have not gone through the
normal visa application process?
A long question and I apologize, but I am sure you can
handle it.
Mr. Norton. You raised a number of issues. First of all,
you are right. Verification is great technology once you know
who somebody is and you can verify who they are, link them to
an identity and a document. From that point forward,
verification operates very smoothly and effectively. INSPASS
has done so in complete security for 8 years, and other
countries have had similar success.
But you do have to make sure that you know who you are
dealing with, and that is why the criteria so far have been
strict as to who is enrolled in the INSPASS system. But how do
we bridge that and actually move into visa issuance and know
who we are dealing with?
There are a number of technologies that can be used. You
can streamline the interface between IDENT and the FBI IAFIS
system to do criminal record checks during the application
process for a visa. It will require some investment to do that,
but it would enable finger images to be checked against the law
enforcement database held by the FBI.
Another technology--
Senator DeWine. Excuse me. How big a deal is that as far as
a cost? Do you have any idea?
Mr. Norton. Well, I think the Department of Justice is
looking into that now, and investment is fairly significant. It
is about several hundred million dollars, I believe, to bring
it into--
Senator DeWine. But clearly doable.
Mr. Norton. But it is clearly doable.
Senator DeWine. Yes.
Mr. Norton. The second technology that can be used, another
very highly accurate technology, is iris recognition, but there
is no database of iris recognition enrollees. So once you have
identified somebody that way or start a record with iris
recognition, it is very effective at identifying a person at a
later stage in a one-to-many sort of search.
The third technology that can be used and the one that we
spoke to earlier was facial recognition. It may not be able to
automate that process, but it can be used very effectively to
call up a list of possibilities. If a consular official who
acquires a digital image from an applicant for a visa checks
against a database of images with that same image that they are
acquiring, they should be able to ascertain whether or not that
person may be wanted, may be known to intelligence authorities
as a possible terrorist. So it can be used as an effective one-
to-many search as long as there is human participation in that
determination.
You talked about real-time access to biometric information,
and that is precisely what we were recommending, and that is
that we take the images that we are currently containing in
separate databases, images of U.S. passport holders, of alien
resident card holders, border crosser card holders, visa
holders, and consolidate that information so that we can make
quick, real-time checks, even at the airline counter as people
try to board their flight to the United States. It does us no
good to know that person is already on the flight and headed
here, not only from a legal standpoint but from a terrorist
threat. And by making IBIS real-time and enabling those checks
using facial recognition, at least initially--because we have
that data, we have that information, we can use it to automate
the process quickly--we can make real progress.
Senator DeWine. Well, your testimony has been very helpful,
and I think your answer was very helpful. And I appreciate it
very much.
Let me ask Dr. Butterfield a question which maybe is a
little--I don't know if it is out of line, but I know that it
is in your area. It has to do with one of the U.S. Supreme
Court decisions from June of this year relating to the
detention of aliens, the Davis case.
My understanding of that case is that in some circumstances
the U.S. Government must release aliens who are supposed to be
deported. Let me give the example.
Say, for example, we have an alien who has entered the
country with forged or false documents. That person has come
into the U.S. and at some point we catch him and determine that
he is deportable. But we find out that he is a citizen of a
country that we don't have diplomatic relations with, Cuba, for
example.
My understanding is that the Supreme Court has said that we
cannot hold that individual in detention for more than 6
months.
Now, my question is: What happens with these deportable
aliens? Do we just let them go in the United States? Or are
they put on some form of probation? What actually happens?
Ms. Butterfield. Mr. DeWine, I think that you are correct
to a certain point. The Zadvydas decision said basically that
we can't just impose life sentences to imprisonment on someone
merely because their home country won't take them back.
But I think it really left open the question and said the
Government has to weigh and balance. If the person is truly a
danger to national security or to the community, then that is a
legitimate Government interest that will be balanced with the
individual's liberty interest. And so it merely mandated, I
think, the Department of Justice to make that determination on
an ongoing basis. And it urged them to look at, yes, could
conditions of release be imposed that would guarantee safety
and security and balance those needs.
I think to date--I was just told this morning, as a matter
of fact--that of the some 3,500 people detained in that very
situation, only about 300 have been released. But I think the
Court tried to strike a balance there.
Senator DeWine. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Kennedy. We thank all of you very much. We will be
keeping in touch with you. It was very, very interesting
testimony, and we are very grateful for it.
The Committee stands in recess.
[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
[A submission for the record follows.]
SUBMISSION FOR THE RECORD
Statement of Hon. Charles E. Grassley, a U.S. Senator from the State of
Iowa
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This hearing is simply one of many that our Committee will have in
order to focus on ways to deter terrorism. Terrorists are taking
advantage of our immigration system. They roam freely within our
borders under the radar screen of the INS, the State Department, and
other law enforcement agencies. There is unanimous agreement that we
must secure our borders, and more closely monitor those we have let in.
First, federal agencies need to better share information. The INS
needs all relevant information at its disposal to identify and track
down immigrants who are on the ``watch lists'' of other agencies.
Second, we should implement the technologies needed to prevent
illegal or criminal aliens from entering. We need to create tamper-
resistant visas and passports. We need to invest in an effective
biometric system, and provide the scanners to read the information on
border crossing cards. Mr. Ziglar lays out a number of technology
initiatives in his testimony, and has instructed his staff to expedite
database improvements. He specifically mentions the Student Exchange
Visitor Information System.
Unfortunately, delay in the implementation of this system has and
may continue to have detrimental effects on our nation's security. I
find this delay unacceptable. We want to help the colleges and
universities, and in turn, I believe that the colleges and universities
will want to help us in our war on terrorism.
Last week, I wrote Attorney General John Ashcroft and requested
immediate consideration of federal funding to speed up implementation
of the student tracking system. I propose that the Department of
Justice use a portion of the emergency antiterrorism funds approved by
Congress to fund the start-up of the student tracking system.
Additionally, the Department should clearly outline the
responsibilities of schools who wish to retain foreign students.
Finally, I realize that the INS does not have the enforcement tools
to go after every foreign student whose visa expires. And, even if
Federal agencies are sharing data and using the best technology we can
create, the INS will still face problems in ``catching the bad guys.''
These are situations in which we can enlist state and local
support. By implementing Section 133 of the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act, the Department of Justice can enter
into agreements with local law enforcement agencies in order to allow
qualified officers to help in the investigation, apprehension, or
detention of illegal aliens.
The enemy could be among us and the threat certainly remains on our
soil. Now is the time to stop talking and start acting. We've already
identified a number of problems and concrete solutions. We need to move
forward with the proposals that we've discussed since September 11.
I thank the Chair and look forward to the testimony from our
witnesses.
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