[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 107 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE BEIJING OLYMPICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
=======================================================================
ROUNDTABLE
before the
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 18, 2002
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CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
Senate
House
MAX BAUCUS, Montana, Chairman DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska, Co-
CARL LEVIN, Michigan Chairman
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California JIM LEACH, Iowa
BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota DAVID DREIER, California
EVAN BAYH, Indiana FRANK WOLF, Virginia
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOE PITTS, Pennsylvania
BOB SMITH, New Hampshire SANDER LEVIN, Michigan
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
JIM DAVIS, Florida
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
PAULA DOBRIANSKY, Department of State
GRANT ALDONAS, Department of Commerce
D. CAMERON FINDLAY, Department of Labor
LORNE CRANER, Department of State
JAMES KELLY, Department of State
Ira Wolf, Staff Director
John Foarde, Deputy Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
Wamsley, Kevin, sports historian and expert on the Olympic Games,
director, the International Centre for Olympic Studies,
University of Western Ontario, London, ON, Canada.............. 2
Oberdorfer, Don, journalist-in-residence, School of Advanced
International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC 5
Beer, Lauryn, director, Human Rights and Business Roundtable, the
Fund for Peace, Washington, DC................................. 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements
Wamsley, Kevin................................................... 30
Beer, Lauryn..................................................... 32
THE BEIJING OLYMPICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
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MONDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 2002
Congressional-Executive
Commission on China,
Washington, DC.
The roundtable was convened, pursuant to notice, at 2:30
p.m. in room SD-215, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Ira Wolf
(staff director of the Commission) presiding.
Also present: John Foarde, deputy staff director; Chris
Billing, director of communications; Tiffany McCullen, U.S.
Department of Commerce; Matt Tuchow, office of Representative
Sander Levin; J.J. Piskadlo, office of Representative Jim
Davis; and Karin Finkler, office of Representative Joseph
Pitts.
Mr. Wolf. All right. Let us get started.
I would like to welcome everyone today to this staff
roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China.
Today our topic is ``Human Rights and the Beijing Olympics
2008.''
There has been a lot of discussion about the Beijing
Olympics and its relationship with the human rights situation
in China. We have three people today who we hope will provide
some enlightenment to us.
Kevin Wamsley, who is an expert on Olympic sociology and
sports history, is director of the International Centre for
Olympic Studies at the University of Western Ontario. We really
appreciate you coming all the way to Washington, Kevin.
Don Oberdorfer is Journalist-in-Residence at Johns Hopkins
School of Advanced International Studies and a long-time
Washington Post foreign correspondent, with long expertise in
Asia.
Finally, Lauryn Beer is director of the Human Rights and
Business Roundtable at the Fund for Peace.
I just want to mention that we did invite representatives
from the International Olympic Committee [IOC] and from the
U.S. Olympic Committee to join us today in this roundtable
discussion, but they respectfully declined our invitation. I
just want to note that for the record.
We hope that perhaps at a future roundtable or hearing on
this issue, as we get closer to 2008, perhaps they will be
interested in giving us their views.
I am Ira Wolf, staff director of the Commission. John
Foarde is the deputy staff director. Chris Billing is the
communications director of the Commission and has the
substantive responsibility for Olympics issues on the
Commission staff. Karin Finkler works for Congressman Joe
Pitts, one of our commissioners, and Tiffany McCullen works for
Grant Aldonas, the Under Secretary of Commerce, who is also one
of the commissioners.
So, Kevin, why do we not start with you? Please go ahead.
STATEMENT OF KEVIN WAMSLEY, SPORTS HISTORIAN AND EXPERT ON THE
OLYMPIC GAMES, AND DIRECTOR, THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR
OLYMPIC STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO, LONDON, ON,
CANADA
Mr. Wamsley. Thank you.
First, permit me to thank you for inviting me to be here
today. Our point of departure for these proceedings is to
discuss the potential influences of the process of hosting the
Olympic Games in China in 2008. Of course, we have to
acknowledge that our ideas and ruminations are purely
speculative today.
With that being said, I think we can offer some comments on
these issues from my perspective, based on our knowledge of
China's history, its current political policies and practices
and its
cultural connections to the Olympic Games in the past and
present, and, perhaps most importantly, some of the extant
perceptions about the role of the modern Olympics in
facilitating social and
political change.
China's sporting relations with other countries extend back
almost a century, including post-World War I correspondence
with the International Olympic Committee, and participation in
the games of 1932, 1936, and 1948.
China's return to competition in 1984, indeed the fervor of
its bidding strategies for 2000 and 2008, signal that the
Olympics have become a significant component of Chinese
domestic and
foreign policy.
If the unofficial financial estimates and cost projections
in the proclamations of social preparation may be positioned as
indicators, we must conclude that not only are the games of
2008 a serious commitment for China, they are being positioned
as one of the most important events in Chinese history.
With this in mind, we may draw some speculative conclusions
on what sort of strategies may be adopted and employed by the
Chinese Government, like all other Olympic governments, to
render a public face to the international community, and
further, how the Chinese people will participate in projecting
favorable images of a modern China to a global audience.
In the post-1978 era of the commercialized Olympic Games,
host cities have employed deliberate strategies to represent
themselves as world class, stable, intriguing, vibrant, and
successful. Beijing will be no different.
Indeed, to date, Beijing's public proclamations respecting
citizen behavior in hosting protocols entitled ``Urban Civility
and Building Citizen Morality,'' I would characterize as overt
and threatening.
Arguably, it is fair to say that the Chinese Government
will ensure that far beyond the level of the Olympics
volunteer, average Beijing citizens will adhere to a code of
conduct for the games, including the pre- and post-Olympic
periods. This is not unusual for host cities; rather, it
remains a matter of degree.
When one considers that the Olympic Games have long been a
site for political expression alongside a more recently fervent
civic and national boosterism by host cities, juxtaposed with
intense media scrutiny, it follows that citizen behavior and
political protests are matters of significant concern for
organizing committees and national governments.
Assurances from host countries are implied in official
doctrine. Indeed, if you read the Olympic charter, you will
find that ``there will be no kind of demonstration, or
political, religious, or racial propaganda permitted in the
Olympic areas.''
Further, many bidding cities and host cities from around
the world have taken steps to remove what are perceived to be
unsightly individuals and groups in core areas and to ensure
that political groups are not given opportunities to distribute
information or capitalize upon media opportunities.
It is fair to assume that Beijing will implement some
strategies of urban cleansing, perhaps in the form of
relocating unregistered citizens in Beijing, shutting down
their businesses, or even
detaining them.
One of the most significant factors to be considered in
Beijing's hosting of the Olympics is the potential influence of
the idea of
nationalism in China, stemming mainly from a common sense of
historic and current marginalization among Chinese people in
various forms of international relations, and consequently, the
galvanization of public sentiment that hosting the Olympic
Games has already inspired and will continue to escalate.
This, of course, has direct bearing on the behavior of
citizens, their support of overall government initiatives, and
the reluctance of even some dissidents to jeopardize China's
moment of
international recognition.
This nationalist sentiment should not be underestimated,
particularly when one is attempting to gauge how Chinese
citizens will react to government crackdowns, urban policy
initiatives dealing with dissidents, and how they may or may
not reveal information about their lives to outsiders, and how
they will actively participate in the Olympic Games and related
festivities.
Just as significantly, it is likely that the Chinese
Government will take advantage of such cultural solidarities as
it launches and conducts its programs of cultural
representation for Beijing.
In addition to the period of time leading up to the games,
the potential influences of an influx of some 20,000-plus
journalists and sport tourists during the games must be
debated.
However, any suggestions that such social contacts between
Chinese citizens in Beijing and other parts of China and the
so-called Westerners will have an immediate influence on social
activism or a long-term effect on government policies are
erroneously simplistic.
Certainly, the issue of human rights in China has become a
focal point for the Western media, and journalists will be
interested in both controversy and crisis. Any immediate
matters of human rights will no doubt be dealt with
expeditiously.
But with respect to long-term effects of the games, there
are many factors to consider in the hosting process which tend
to polarize media interpretations of local and national events,
and limit the influence of what might be perceived as
contradictory or destabilizing ideologies.
First and foremost, the Olympics are a brief and intense
media spectacle. Second, the Chinese Government may refuse
entry to any media personnel who have proven to be unfriendly
in the past. Third, the IOC maintains the rights to internal
access for members of the media.
Fourth, a glimpse at Olympic history demonstrates that
serious local or national problems may be focal points of
international interest through media scrutiny both before and
during an Olympics, or during the bidding process, but such
stories tend to fade quickly when the Olympic caravan has
departed.
Take, for example, aboriginal issues in Sydney, Calgary,
Salt Lake City, homelessness in Toronto and Atlanta. The
Olympic process that includes bidding and hosting, and of
course the attendant ideological forays into peace, brotherhood
and equity, have had little impact beyond limited media
exposure to such issues, and inspiring perhaps a greater
solidarity toward local resistance to mega-events.
Finally, the sheer intensity of the Olympic Games as a
media construction tends to shift focus away from national
issues that may have received significant attention before the
games, effectively marginalizing the plights of individuals or
groups who may have once been central to journalistic
interests.
Other international interest groups are integral components
of the legitimizing process perpetuated through the Olympic
Games. Currently, and increasingly as the games draw near,
corporations, consulting firms, specialists, and academics will
trade on the economic opportunities presented by the hosting of
the next games.
Groups in Sydney, for example, are now lobbying to assist
China in developing its infrastructure and Olympic programs,
from buildings and facilities to cultural programs, academic
exchange, and Olympic education.
Corporations that already have a significant multi-million
dollar interest in the success of the games and those that are
currently seeking contracts are not likely to endorse any
systematic critiques that focus negative attention toward the
host nation.
Indeed, they have diverse financial interest in Chinese
markets, but also the larger corporations that trade on Olympic
symbolism and ideology have a stake in promoting an image of
China as an exotic, historically stable, vital nation through
which sensible and interesting cultural links can enhance their
products and the flow of global capital.
Intellectuals who depend upon access to even limited
information, travel, and financial aid for publications and
educational liaisons are not likely to seriously raise issues
of human rights for fear of jeopardizing their positions of
privilege.
Historically, the Olympic process has tended to provide
legitimacy to host governments and their policies, endorsements
to their success in hosting the games, and furthering the so-
called spirit of the Olympic Games as opposed to drawing
attention to shortfalls and political controversies.
Well-documented examples include the economic crises of
Antwerp in 1920, London in 1948, the Great Depression in 1932,
Los Angeles, Hitler's fascism in 1936, Mexico's slaughter of
innocent citizens in 1968.
Serious tragedies and atrocities have become subsidiary to
the more glamorous immediacies of the Olympic spectacle. On the
other hand, members of the international sporting community,
Olympic officials specifically, were able to exert remarkable
influence through several decades over the issue of apartheid
in South Africa. These pressures, however, had more broad-based
political support and diplomatic attention.
In summary, the Olympic Games have done far more to sustain
and reproduce extant domestic policies, to reproduce
mythologies about race and equality, economic and social
opportunity, and world peace than to subvert the inequalities
of the world.
In the short-term, it is likely that the Olympic process,
ensconced with its traditional diplomacies, hyperbole, and
rhetoric, indeed, the political exigencies of a host nation,
will negatively affect human rights in China. Further, the
solidarities created through extensive preparations to host the
world should not be underestimated.
International initiatives that question China's social and
political prerogatives in the years leading up the 2008
Olympics might be viewed, even by average citizens, as efforts
to undermine what is being celebrated widely as the arrival of
a modern China. International advocates for political change in
China should proceed with caution.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wamsley appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Wolf. Thanks very much.
We have been joined up here by Matt Tuchow, who works for
Congressman Sander Levin, one of our commissioners, and J.J.
Piskadlo, who works for Congressman Jim Davis, also a
commissioner.
Don Oberdorfer, please.
STATEMENT OF DON OBERDORFER, JOURNALIST-IN-RESIDENCE, SCHOOL OF
ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Oberdorfer. Well, thanks for inviting me to come. I am
not an expert on Olympics. I am a former journalist, as Ira
said, for the Washington Post for 25 years, and an historian of
sorts about Korea, including this book, ``The Two Koreas,''
which covered, among other things, the impact of the 1988
Olympics in Seoul on Korea.
There are certain parallels with China. It is another Asian
country. Korea, at the time, was a fairly authoritarian
government. After the assassination of Park Chung Hee in 1979,
a group of generals took over, headed by Chun Doo Hwan, who was
in office at the time leading up to the Olympics.
The 1988 Olympics in Seoul had two very powerful,
beneficial, and historical effects in South Korea. One of them
is probably applicable to China; the other one, I do not think,
is.
The first one was that it broke the isolation of South
Korea by various Communist countries, imposed in sympathy with
North Korea. Of 160 nations participating in the Seoul games,
24 had no diplomatic relations whatever with South Korea prior
to the Olympics, including the Soviet Union, China, and most of
the Eastern European countries.
The Olympics provided an opportunity for those people from
those countries to come to Korea for Koreans to interact with
them, and it led, really rather rapidly, to the development of
diplomatic relations with quite a number of those countries. As
I said, I do not think that is particularly applicable to
China.
The second effect, however, may be applicable to China. The
fact of the coming of the Olympics, more than the Olympic Games
themselves, had a powerful political effect within South Korea.
The designation of Korea for the 1988 games was done 7
years before. But, as the date neared, there were increasingly
important domestic effects. There had been political turbulence
in South Korea following the assassination of Park Chung Hee in
1979, and it was an authoritarian government under General Chun
that was in power as the Olympics neared.
For several years, and especially in 1987, the year prior
to the Olympics, which happened to be a presidential election
year in South Korea, there were periodic protests about opening
the election to serious competition, ending in mass protests
early in 1987.
Juan Antonio Samaranch, then the president of the IOC, made
it known that the games might be moved elsewhere in case of
massive disorders in South Korea. There was also the threat of
non-participation by a number of countries, following on the
precedent of the Moscow Olympics of 1980.
As I said, particularly in the summer of 1987, there were
very large protests demanding direct election of the president
rather than being elected by an easily controlled electoral
college body.
This came to a head in June 1987. General Chun was
considering declaring martial law, putting down the
demonstrations with guns and bullets. The United States played
an important role in persuading him not to do so, especially a
letter written by President Reagan that was delivered by James
Lilley, who was then the Ambassador of the United States to
South Korea.
But there is no doubt in my mind, or I think anybody's mind
who was following those events, that a very major factor was
concern about the possibility of losing the Olympic Games or
having them severely downgraded by the non-participation of
major countries.
This would have been, in Korean terms, a blot on all of
South Korea. The Olympics were seen as a national festival of
towering importance to all Koreans.
It was only one factor, but it was a major factor in the
decision by President Chun not to declare martial law, to agree
to the holding of the elections which most of the people in
South Korea wanted, and opening up the political system. June
1987 was the point at which South Korea became the democratic
country that it is today.
The elections were opened. There was a free and fair
election and the President took office with complete approval
of the people.
North Korea, by the way, did not participate in the
Olympics, tried to stop it, and particularly arranged to have
an airliner blown up in an attempt to try to persuade people
not to participate, which did not work.
Now, in the Sydney Olympics in 2000, North and South Korea
marched together into the stadium, one of the most dramatic
moments in those games.
What I just said, I think, is the record. I have covered
some of it in the book that I wrote. Other articles I wrote at
the time were my own observation.
What follows now is speculation about China. My view, is
the coming of the Olympics will help China to open up. The
pressures not to do drastic things, the pressures to conform
with international standards, I think, will be there.
I do not know the extent to which they will be heeded, but
I think those pressures, particularly in the several years
closer to the Olympics, will be strong.
I might add that I have been in China 15 times since 1974
when I first made my first trip to China with Secretary
Kissinger. I have seen tremendous changes in that country,
enormous changes that I never would have guessed would have
happened in 1974, or even in the early 1980s.
China certainly does not meet all the standards that I
would like to see, but considering where China has come from,
it has made enormous improvements in almost every part of
Chinese life.
I personally think that the coming of the Olympics is going
to assist further in having the Chinese Government,
institutions, and even people meet international standards.
Thank you.
Mr. Wolf. Thanks a lot, Don.
Lauryn.
STATEMENT OF LAURYN BEER, DIRECTOR, HUMAN RIGHTS AND BUSINESS
ROUNDTABLE, THE FUND FOR PEACE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Beer. Thank you very much for allowing me the
opportunity to speak to you today on behalf of the Fund for
Peace. As you stated in your introduction, I am the director of
the Human Rights and Business Roundtable. I would just like to
say a few words about what we do and why it is applicable to
the topic at hand here.
The mission of the Fund for Peace is to prevent war and to
alleviate the conditions that cause war. Our programmatic focus
is to strengthen the capacity of the United States and the
international community to respond to global internal conflicts
in five key areas: early warning, military intervention
criteria, arms
control, policy integration, and constituency building.
It is this last area, constituency and consensus building,
that the Human Rights and Business Roundtable has excelled in.
It is also the focus of what I wish to speak to you about
today.
The Beijing Olympics affords a timely opportunity for
creative partnering between the business and human rights
communities, both here in the United States and in China, to
both improve human rights and the climate for international
businesses investing in China.
The Roundtable was launched in 1997 with the goal of
bringing together two communities that have been traditional
adversaries: multinational business and human rights advocates.
Yet, they represent two of the most important Cold War
constituencies in the United States. In its 5 years of
operation, the Roundtable has developed procedures, principles,
formats, and policies to ensure the smooth working of the
Roundtable, including a set of operational ground rules.
They stipulate that members of the Roundtable participate
in their individual capacities and not as representatives of
the organizations with which they are affiliated, so they do
not need to obtain clearance from their organizations to
express views and reach
consensus.
All discussions are off the record and by invitation only,
and records of the meetings are on a non-attribution basis,
except when speakers indicate otherwise.
The Roundtable offers a way to discuss hard issues in a
spirit of cooperation rather than confrontation. It has thus
far convened over 50 meetings that have engaged more than 150
individuals from the human rights and business communities.
Over 20 multinational corporations and 30 human rights
groups have collaborated under the Roundtable's leadership to
work in partnership on the problems and opportunities of
economic globalization.
Now, it is no secret that the success of China's bid for
the 2008 Olympics has garnered much criticism from human rights
advocates. The scrutiny of the human rights community will make
it likely that businesses supporting the Olympics will be
expected to do more than simply pay for advertising space in
Beijing.
Already, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and
others have stated publicly that they expect sponsoring
businesses to take a proactive role in advancing democracy in
China leading up to, and during, the games.
U.S. corporations sponsoring the Olympics are tendering
bids for preparatory infrastructure development could face
considerable challenges. Sponsors could find themselves tainted
by association should the China authorities commit human rights
abuses during the games.
For example, the Olympic Committee's mandate states that
there must be unfettered access to the press during the games.
But what will the Chinese authorities do in the face of
potential protests around the games? What might be the
repercussions for business if human rights abuses are being
seen committed under corporate banners?
Further, corporations doing business in China, not just
those sponsoring the games, have an interest in promoting the
rule of law, since predictability is crucial to sustainable
business.
Businesses ignore the human rights aspects of the rule of
law at their own peril, as has been borne out by the
experiences of some companies in countries such as Nigeria,
Colombia, Indonesia, India, and, yes, China.
The new leadership in China will no doubt wish to
capitalize on the publicity and income the games generate.
There are 6 years between now and the summer games in 2008,
during which business, government, and NGOs can engage in
meaningful and action-oriented dialog on human rights and
business issues surrounding the games.
Our recommendations are these: The Congressional-Executive
Commission on China is charged with monitoring human rights and
the development of the rule of law in China, and with
submission of an annual report to the President and Congress.
In its 2002 annual report, the Commission made one of its
priority recommendations that the administration ``facilitate
meetings of United States, Chinese, and third country companies
doing business in a specific locality and industry in China to
identify systemic worker rights abuses, develop recommendations
for appropriate Chinese Government entities, and discuss these
recommendations with Chinese officials, with the goal of
developing a long-term, collaborative relationship between
government and business to assist in improving China's
implementation of internationally recognized labor standards.''
The Fund for Peace believes that human rights organizations
and multinational business form two of the key constituencies
affecting U.S. foreign policy today. The Fund, therefore,
proposes that the Commission's recommendation on business/
government collaboration be broadened to include U.S. and
international NGOs.
We further recommendation that the focus of collaboration
between business, NGOs, and government be widened to cover not
only labor issues in China, but a broad range of human rights
and rule of law issues that relate to the success of the
Beijing Olympics.
These would include freedom of association and assembly,
freedom of expression, security concerns, due process, and
transparency.
The Human Rights and Business Roundtable offers a useful
and practical model for engagement between businesses and human
rights organizations and their partners in China.
We would propose that the goals of a dialog on the Beijing
Olympics be as follows: (1) to develop a preventative strategy
that would assist businesses in avoiding being implicated in
potential human rights abuses surrounding the games; (2) to
engage a broad cross-section of civil society and businesses
and frank discussions of Chinese and Western perspectives on
human rights and the rule of law; (3) to involve the private
sector in ongoing conversation and education on security and
human rights issues in a cooperative spirit of corporate social
responsibility; (4) to educate both constituencies and increase
their knowledge of human rights and security issues; (5) to
support civil society capacity by promoting groups to act in a
collective setting and encourage collaboration where
possibly; (6) to find areas of common ground, explore channels
of potential cooperation between communities; and (7) to create
practical actions to attain mutual goals, and to use the
Beijing Olympics as a means to establish a best practices model
for future international events.
Finally, we would invite the Commission to report on such a
dialog's progress in its future annual reports.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Beer appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Wolf. Thanks very much.
What we will do now is we will go around one by and one and
just ask you some questions, and hopefully engage in some
discussion. To discipline ourselves, we will give ourselves
about 5 minutes each to engage you.
It is a very interesting set of presentations. I think,
Don, your discussion of how the Olympics acted as one input
into systemic change in Korea was fascinating.
It is an interesting contrast, Kevin, to your approach,
which I take as saying that Olympics come and go, a lot of news
coverage during the Olympics itself, and then it is life as
normal. Lauryn, you are saying that may be true. But how do we
make it so that it is not life as normal?
I wonder, Kevin. You have looked at the Korean Olympic
Games as well. I wonder how--and I realize you are not a Korea
expert--you react to Don's description of the Olympics has
having this kind of systemic impact on a system, as in Korea?
Mr. Wamsley. Well, I do not necessarily disagree with him,
but it is very difficult to discern what political and social
change has been wrought by the Olympics directly and what
source of other, broader changes were taking place at the same
time, what parts of the Olympic Games process actually had an
impact on facilitating these social, political, even economic,
changes.
I know in economic studies, for example, if we can draw a
parallel, it is very difficult to discern what directly impacts
on a specific result, and having to discern which variables we
can isolate when it comes to looking at direct impacts caused
by the Olympic Games.
It is really a network of factors and forces which happen
before, during, and after the Olympic Games. So from my
standpoint, some of the points that were raised about
diplomatic relations, you could pinpoint those very easily.
But with respect to human rights, to current local, even
national issues, they are so wrapped up with other things,
domestic issues and international issues, that it is hard to
separate them.
Mr. Oberdorfer. I agree with that. As I said, it was one
factor. There were other factors, including the rise of the
Korean middle class demanding, basically, more of a say in
their government, pressures from the United States, other
things that took place. But it was, in my view, anyway, as an
historian of those events, one of the more important factors.
Mr. Wolf. This is more of a comment than a question. Feel
free to respond if you have any thoughts. The human rights
groups, today, looking at the Olympics are looking for ways
that action could be taken so there will be an impact from the
Olympics. It is quite different than Don's description of
Korea, where it was reality and it is simply part of the flow
of events.
Trying to look at how to have an impact, how to leverage
the Olympics for human rights goals, is a much different
question, and much more difficult.
Mr. Oberdorfer. In the case of Korea, it was the fact that
there was a perception that it might not happen if Korea
cracked down hard on its people, or if there was massive
martial law, shooting of people, any of these things. I think
it helped persuade the government not to do that.
Ms. Beer. Yes. I do not think that that is the fear now. I
do not think anybody seriously thinks that the Beijing Olympic
Games are not going to happen. I think that it is very
different now. We have the Internet, which was not really
around and kicking when Seoul happened.
There are also going to be a profound number of satellite
broadcast journalists present at the games, and increasingly
human rights activists have taken advantage of these two
factors in other areas.
So I think that for many of them, simply the opportunity to
have all this press attention will make it likely that a lot of
them will turn out at the Olympics themselves.
I think, obviously, you have already seen comments--I made
reference to two of them--from leading human rights
organizations that have already criticized this and stated
unequivocally that they expect business to take a proactive
role.
So, I think from our perspective, what we would like to see
is some creative, proactive thinking about how to utilize this
to advance human rights, but as we found in our Roundtable, the
advancing of the rule of law and the advancing of human rights
are part of the same process, they are not mutually exclusive
by any stretch of the mind.
In fact, you cannot really have transparency in business
with a corrupt government, and a whole host of other human
rights problems will make it impossible for you to function
well as a business.
Mr. Wolf. Are some of the members of your business
Roundtable included among the major sponsors of the Olympics?
Ms. Beer. No. We have a couple of companies that have some
serious investments in China. Mostly, we now have a focus that
has changed from a sort of broad array of companies to those in
the extractive industries.
But what I would suggest would be that any company that has
a serious interest, not just in sponsoring the games but in
long-term investment in China, ought to be thinking
strategically like this, because it is not just that the
Olympics will provide scrutiny during the events, there is
already scrutiny now and that will
increase, in my view.
In the run-up as we get closer and closer to 2008, there
will be more and more expectations, I think, particularly if
something adverse happens where the Chinese authorities are
seen bulldozing thousands of people out of their homes, for
instance.
Mr. Wolf. Thanks.
John.
Mr. Foarde. This question is principally for Kevin, but
also for Don and Lauryn, if you want to step up to it.
Kevin, what is your understanding of the specific
commitments that the Chinese Government made in the bid process
with respect to such human rights as freedom of association and
freedom of the press? The actual documents do not seem to be
available publicly. At least, I have not been able to find
them.
I wonder if you have any sense of what specific things they
made commitments on to be able to win the bid.
Mr. Wamsley. There are some standard commitments that are
available publicly, and that includes some of the things that
have been mentioned today, freedom for the press to move around
reasonably in the city, and to report, and freedom of travelers
to move within the realm of Chinese law.
The people who are allowed to get in the country should get
in the country, and that includes journalists and members of
the press. But, like you, the information is no more made
available to me, so I do not have much more insight than you do
on that issue.
Mr. Foarde. What about freedom of religious practice for
athletes and visitors? Do you know anything about commitments
with respect to that?
Mr. Wamsley. The Olympic Village is supposed to be a free
zone for people to practice their normal cultural practices,
including religion. So, it is supposed to be set up to
accommodate these things with respect to prayers, and with
respect to food, et cetera. This is supposed to be a part of
the hosting process.
Mr. Foarde. You said in your presentation that the
expectations there would be somewhere in the vicinity of 20,000
athletes and visitors. Did I get that number wrong? I mean, is
it more than that?
Mr. Wamsley. It will be more visitors. I mentioned 20,000
journalists.
Mr. Foarde. Oh, 20,000 journalists.
Mr. Wamsley. Yes. Media personnel, television, radio.
Mr. Foarde. And, roughly, what is the prediction on
visitors, any sense?
Mr. Wamsley. Should be roughly around the same as Sydney.
It would be, perhaps, an influx of 10,000 to 15,000. The only
problem with comparing to Sydney, was that was tourist time for
Sydney as well, so it is very difficult to discern who were
Olympic tourists and who were the regular tourists.
Mr. Foarde. Don Oberdorfer, do you have a recollection of
how many foreign visitors, roughly, there were for the games in
1988?
Mr. Oberdorfer. I have no idea. I cannot keep those kind of
numbers in my head. But there were a lot, I can tell you that.
Mr. Foarde. Thank you.
Mr. Wolf. Chris.
Mr. Billing. This is for you, Don. As a former journalist,
I was wondering, first of all, if you could give us a sense of
what kind of restrictions you were up against in Seoul as far
as what they allowed you as free access for reporting, and what
you might expect in China for reporters.
Mr. Oberdorfer. I did not actually cover the Olympics
themselves. I was not a sports writer, so I did not go over
there for that purpose. I do know that they had extensive
facilities for journalists. I was there with Secretary Shultz
some time before the Olympics when he inspected the facilities
and all that kind of stuff.
But I do not recall any big problem for journalists in
covering the games. The South Korean Government, I think, and
the Olympics Committee, made very extensive preparations for
coverage.
The only problem, and I guess it will be the same with
China, is that the time zone was such that the major events
took place in the middle of the night over here, which was
something that did not bother the journalists, but it bothered
the advertisers. But I do not think there was a big
journalistic problem, that I remember, anyway.
Mr. Billing. Do you know, Kevin, as far as the unfettered
access for journalists, is that restricted only to Beijing or
does that mean throughout all of China, that they can travel
freely?
Mr. Wamsley. Presumably, once in the country, they can
travel freely. The access I spoke specifically about was
governed by the IOC to Olympic sites.
One thing I might note, is that since the scandal the IOC
has been considerably embarrassed by restricting access to any
journalists. I think that that has improved so that certain
journalists who have written unfavorable things in the past
might be granted
access to Olympic sites.
Mr. Billing. Would you expect China to follow through on
that commitment to allow reporters to run around freely?
Mr. Wamsley. I do not think that reporters will be allowed
to run around freely, necessarily. I would not be surprised if
there is not a certain resistance to speak to reporters. I
would not be surprised if people are instructed to only say
certain things.
The other thing I would argue is that there may be a
certain
resistance on behalf of the people who are in favor of putting
on a good show in Beijing, who would be reluctant to speak
about
certain things during the games.
Mr. Wolf. Thanks.
Tiffany.
Ms. McCullen. My question is for Lauryn. Lauryn, do you
think that International Olympic Committee sponsors can
effectively
influence China to improve upon its human rights?
Ms. Beer. Yes. I do not think you can look at this in an
isolated way. I do not think that companies can, themselves,
effect all the change that needs to happen. Obviously that has
to be done by the government.
But I think that, yes, I do believe that corporations,
particularly if they have a big investment in China, have a lot
of influence, as they have had in many other countries. I do
not know what the extent of that influence is. For a lot of the
companies that are sponsoring, they are not actually invested
in China outside the games.
So it is not like, because your name appears at the Olympic
Games, that that means that all of a sudden your investments in
China will be put at risk if something happens. What it does
for those sponsors, obviously, if something happens, is the
potential of association with an event that has gone wrong. So,
it is a kind of twofold set of corporate activities there that
I am envisioning.
The other is also for businesses, though, who do have the
long-term investments who are not necessarily sponsors, but who
certainly have an interest in seeing that the Beijing games do
not backfire.
So if the implication of your question is, well, how do
they do it----
Ms. McCullen. Yes. Yes.
Ms. Beer. Well, this is why I proposed engagement, because
I do not think there are easy answers to that question. I think
that there is a potential for things to change a lot between
now and 2008, but that is why we think it is a good idea to
start the kind of dialog that brings to the fore questions of,
well, what are you going to do about security if there are
problems? What are you going to do about potential gag orders?
What are you going to do if there is protester crackdown in a
violent way outside of the Olympics site when there are 20,000
reporters with microphones in your face? How are you going to
handle it?
I think that the experience of a lot of corporations, in
the midst of violent protests, trying to say, ``Well, nothing
to do with us, mate,'' is not really a successful strategy any
more.
Ms. McCullen. When you say ``engagement,'' do you mean with
NGOs or engagement with the Chinese Government? Who should the
engagement be with?
Ms. Beer. I think it could take a number of different
forms. Initially, I would say for businesses and NGOs to come
up with a set of issues that they would like to take, both to
our government, and then have our government take to the
Chinese. That, to me, is the strategy that personally makes
most sense.
I think that bringing in governments, whether it is ours or
the Chinese, too early on, can make both corporations and human
rights people nervous. The idea is to foster a frank dialog,
which is why we do things the way we do, that is, always off
the record and it is on a non-attribution basis, because we
want the frank
exchange of ideas.
But I think at that point, once you have got some common
ground established, that is when you bring in the United States
Government and you invite them into the dialog as well, with a
view to influencing the Chinese Government.
Ms. McCullen. So you invite other NGOs to your roundtable
discussions?
Ms. Beer. Yes.
Ms. McCullen. Which ones, if you do not mind me asking? Or
can you say?
Ms. Beer. I was wondering whether anybody would ask me
that. I do have a list of everybody that has participated. We
have had, over the 5 years, people coming and going for all
sorts of reasons.
But just to give you a sampling, on the NGO side, we have
had Ashoka, the Asian Society, Brookings, Business for Social
Responsibility, The Carnegie Endowment, The Carter Center, The
Coalition for International Justice, Amnesty, The Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights, The International Human Rights Law
Group, Human Rights Watch, Freedom House, First Peoples
Worldwide, The Fair Labor Association, Minnesota Advocates for
Human Rights, the RFK Center for Human Rights, The U.S.-China
Business Council, Transparency International, and World
Monitors.
Ms. McCullen. All right. Thank you.
Ms. Beer. Sure.
Mr. Wolf. Karin.
Ms. Finkler. Thank you. In earlier testimony, witnesses
referred to how the International Olympic Committee was willing
to possibly cancel and withdraw the games from Korea.
Do you believe there is a willingness to do that now if
something happens in Beijing or somewhere in China? If not, why
not? If so, what type of horrible situation would it take for
the committee to remove the games from China?
Mr. Oberdorfer. Somebody is probably more of an authority
than I am on this. But just the possibility that that could
happen was enough to fix the minds of the Korean authorities.
Samaranch alluded to that possibility.
You had at that time, of course, the example of the 1980
games and the 1984 games where there was not full
participation, and nobody wanted that to spoil, in effect, the
Olympics in 1988.
So I do not know what the International Committee would do
under the current circumstances. But I think, just the
possibility that something could be drastically done would fix
the mind of the people in China. I do not know how far the
Olympics Committee would go.
Mr. Wamsley. I think it would have to be pretty major. The
Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979. The United States called
for the removal of the Olympic Games from Moscow to another
country. That did not happen. We have a different IOC regime in
place right now. President Jacques Rogge has been fairly silent
about the issue of human rights.
I think it would have to be a fairly major incident before
the Olympic Games were removed, and I think that would only
occur after some very serious diplomatic efforts to smooth
things over, because the IOC has a long history of wishing to
smooth things over before the show comes to town.
Ms. Finkler. All right. Thank you.
We have heard some excellent suggestions of how businesses
and human rights groups can work together to press the Chinese
Government for more openness and support for human rights.
What would you recommend to Members of Congress, both as
individuals or groups, that go over for inter-parliamentary
exchanges, and to the administration, et cetera, in terms of
pressing for more change?
Ms. Beer. Well, first, I think, to start encouraging this
sort of dialog amongst themselves, to join in with businesses
and human rights organizations here, and then to bring that
experience with them when they meet with their counterparts in
China, I think, is very helpful.
I mean, we actually ask some of our business members to do
just that in their own spheres because they have a lot of
contact with government officials in the parts of the world
that they do business in. We find that that kind of quiet
diplomacy is often very effective.
Ms. Finkler. Thank you.
Mr. Wamsley. Well, if something is to be done that is going
to be effective, I think it would be a mistake to go it alone.
I think that China has many trade partners in the world. The
United States is one of them. I think it would be a mistake for
it to be completely a United States initiative.
I think that any lobbying efforts to this end should go to
the major corporations who are the Olympic Program [TOP]
sponsors who have paid some, between $50 and $65 million over 4
years to be official sponsors of the Olympic symbols worldwide.
So I think the most effect could possibly come from these
companies who are finding themselves walking a tightrope now.
They have a major investment in the games. Right now they are
spending their time thinking about how interesting their
commercials will be for 2008. So, I think this would be a bit
of a burr in their side, these sorts of things. I think it is a
difficult enterprise. If the United States goes it alone, I
think that they run the risk of being criticized for being
show-stoppers.
In other words, China has been waiting for this kind of
event for a long, long time, and they felt marginalized as a
country, internationally, for decades and decades. I think, for
anything to be an effective form of criticism, it is going to
have to come from a number of major trade partners for it to be
effective.
Ms. Finkler. Thanks.
Mr. Wolf. Thanks.
Matt.
Mr. Tuchow. What is the status of Taiwan? Is Taiwan going
to participate in the Olympics in Beijing? Are they allowed to?
Mr. Wamsley. To my knowledge, they will compete as Chinese
Taipei because they have a National Olympic Committee, and
China, as a country, is not entitled to prevent them from
participating.
Mr. Tuchow. Are there any countries that will not be
participating now because of a political situation?
Mr. Wamsley. I do not know at this point.
Mr. Tuchow. My second question is also to you, Kevin
Wamsley. It is your conclusion, which I just wanted to probe a
little further. You were just talking about it to some extent.
But you write that ``international lobbying initiatives
that question China's social and political prerogatives in the
years leading up to the 2008 Olympics might be viewed, even by
average citizens, as efforts to undermine what has been
celebrated widely as the arrival of a modern China.
International advocates for political change in China should
proceed with caution.''
So can you explain a little further what you are saying
there? Are you disagreeing with the types of suggestions that
Lauryn Beer is making about having engagement, or what exactly
is the point you are making there?
Mr. Wamsley. Well, I think it is a complicated issue. I
think we cannot just say that, if we are going to go in there
and improve things in China, we are going to do it by
participating in these kinds of events and these kinds of
lobbying activities, because I think the outcome is very
unpredictable.
I think it is fair to say that a majority of Chinese people
have already voiced their support for the Olympic Games. I
think that there is a relationship between the Chinese people
and the Chinese Government, and the Chinese Government will be
aware of any solidarity that exists for the promotion of the
Olympic Games.
I think that if people are lobbying intensively against
Chinese law, or detaining prisoners, et cetera, at the time of
the Olympic Games, and any kinds of threats are made, I think
that there is going to be a reaction in China that is very
negative. I do not think there would be widespread support for
that kind of intense initiative. So, my suggestion is to be
more subtle.
I think, for example, if there were a boycott, that would
be the most effective tool of shutting things down and getting
people's attention. But, on the other hand, you may throw back
social change another three decades if you do something like
that.
So, I am suggesting that we do not know how much popular
support there is going to be in China during the Olympic Games,
but if you look at every other nation that hosts the Olympics,
for that 2 weeks we do not see any dark side of the nation, all
we see is people celebrating and being proud of themselves, and
inviting the world in front of unprecedented satellite
television stations. So, I say tread softly, or you might not
get the reaction you expect from the Chinese people for these
initiatives.
Mr. Tuchow. And Lauryn Beer, do you agree with that? Do you
think that the approach should be a subtle one, and that
nationalism will play a role here, and efforts by NGOs, or even
companies that are exercising corporate social responsibility
in a very overt fashion, would backfire?
Ms. Beer. No. I do not think that what Kevin has said and
what I am suggesting are incompatible. I do not want to say
that I have, personally, a strategy for how to do this. I am
suggesting a way to arrive at that point.
I do think that companies and people with an interest in
human rights, and eventually government officials, sitting down
and trying to agree on how to go about doing this in a way that
will potentially avoid pitfalls should they arise, is simply
common sense. I think the more you engage communities that do
not necessarily speak to each other, the better, for one thing.
Second, I would also suggest that at some point in this
dialog that Chinese businesses and human rights advocates are
also brought in to express their views.
One of our recommendations is just that, that there should
be a frank discussion about both Chinese and western
perspectives on human rights and on the games themselves, and
what the implications for both business and human rights are.
I do not think it is up to United States businesses and
NGOs, for instance, to say to China, ``This is what you should
be doing.'' I would agree that if that is what happened, that
that would backfire. But what I am suggesting, is something
that is more inclusive.
I think it needs to be done gradually. I do not think that
you get a group like I am suggesting together, and the next
week everybody is in agreement that we should have a platform
that says this, that, and the other thing.
I guarantee you, from our own experience, the landscape
always changes anyway. But what you hope to arrive at at the
end of the day, is some common agreement on how to go about
your business that makes sense to both communities.
Mr. Wamsley. Could I add a little bit to that?
Mr. Tuchow. Sure.
Mr. Wamsley. What you said just triggered my memory. Some
of the Chinese businesses that are being asked to come forward
during this process, there is sort of a bidding war going on in
China now for companies that will be allowed to set up in
particular places for the Olympic Games.
In fact, they have to follow correct business and behavior
protocols in order to get the right to set up in those places,
like the airports and downtown Beijing, et cetera. The question
then becomes, well, how transparent really are these businesses
practices, and what sorts of behavior is the government
watching for when they allow certain businesses to set up and
not others?
Mr. Wolf. J.J.
Mr. Piskadlo. Thank you.
My question is focused at Lauryn. I would appreciate your
comments on this. I have always been a strong believer that
businesses can, and do, play a role in changing policies with
any one country.
With regard to China, I supported awarding PNTR status to
China with the belief that China would operate within a rules-
based system, the WTO system, that would give businesses more
of a foothold there and be able to try and work for change,
obviously within their own best interests.
We hear a lot about the coming Olympics, which I thought
was a good thing. We are talking about what businesses can do
and how they can work together. As you pointed out, there were
some recommendations in the Commission's report.
But one thing that is disturbing to me, I have many
organizations come to my office and, with particular reference
to China, they say businesses have not done anything. We are
looking in the future, but currently, how active have
businesses been? They cannot be the only source of change, but
they can play a part within the whole dynamic within China.
So how active, to date, have businesses been in trying to
influence China's policies? You had mentioned that there are
other countries where businesses have played a role. Is there
one particular model that could be used and applied to China?
Ms. Beer. I do not think that there is one particular
model. You have to, first of all, remember that corporate
social responsibility, as a kind of active movement, if you
like, is a fairly new thing.
So, there is not a whole lot of anything other than
anecdotal evidence to suggest where it has had an effect and
where it has not. I can only go by the experiences that I come
across with the companies that I deal with and know what has
been done and what has not.
I am not an expert on China. Probably, Bob Kapp is the
person to ask about United States-China business. But I accept
the fact that probably businesses have not been as vocal in
China because it is a huge market and nobody wants to risk
losing it. Also, it is a new market compared to some of the
countries that I mentioned.
Whether companies can do more, I obviously believe that
they can. I suggest that some form of dialog--again, I have
given you the example of our Roundtable because I do think it
is successful in this respect. We have been going for 5 years
without anybody throwing anything at each other, and we have
actually come to some action items that have been agreed upon
by both camps.
I think that that is the key to any form of successful
dialog, is that you have to build trust. I think that is the
fundamental premise upon which any corporate social activity is
going to change any part of the world, is there has to be
engagement between the relevant stakeholders, there has to be
proper relationships built.
They have to be mutually powerful in any dialog, which is,
again, one thing that I would stress. I probably have not
answered your question directly.
I think more can be done, and I hope the fact that there is
going to be so much attention 6 years from now would focus
people on the fact that we have significant time now to do
something. I think that if companies stick their head in the
sand, again, they do so at their own risk.
Mr. Piskadlo. I had one more question for Don. You had
talked about how South Korea was very concerned about losing
the Olympics, and they were responsive to pressure not to crack
down and do something violent, so to speak.
Do you believe that the Chinese Government would be that
responsive? I am no expert on China, but sometimes they seem
to, maybe more so than other countries, not really care. Do you
believe that they would be responsive to outside pressures?
Mr. Oberdorfer. Well, it is only a guess, obviously. I
think they are very responsive. By that, I mean I think they
are very much aware, not necessarily that they are going to
follow the lead of outside countries. They have their own
internal politics. It is a much bigger country than South
Korea. South Korea had suffered a deviation from an earlier, at
least quasi-democratic regime, so it is not totally comparable.
I was in China on occasions when they were bidding
unsuccessfully for the Olympics. You could see how the
government made a big thing out of the bid. Every cab you got
into, the cab driver would say to you in some kind of quasi-
English something about the Olympics. It was a matter of
incredible national interest and pride. I do not know, if it
comes down to a threat, what they would do. They probably would
not respond very well.
But I do think that, clearly, the Chinese Government and
the Chinese people are going to be looking outside to a greater
degree probably than they ever have before as the Olympics
approach.
As I said before, and I think has been said earlier, it
probably is going to be mostly, in the couple years approaching
the Olympics, when this is very much on people's minds.
Whether it is going to mean an automatic action to
liberalize from the government, I am sure, is probably not
true. But I do think that they will be looking to their
reputation, and that would probably have some effect.
Mr. Piskadlo. Thank you.
Mr. Wolf. Kevin, you referred to rules for businesses
setting up in relation to the Olympics in Beijing at the
airport, and so on. Are you are talking about things like China
Telecom setting up cell phone rental facilities? Are you
talking about the ice cream vendors on the street, or both?
Mr. Wamsley. All of those sorts of things. Any kind of a
national program. Well, first of all, any kind of a sponsorship
program, and second of all, who is allowed to actually have a
hot dog stand, if there is such a thing, in the airport, those
kinds of things.
So, there is actually a movement by the government to make
sure that Beijing is clean and has the right sort of businesses
that are representing proper Chinese character to the world
when they come.
Mr. Wolf. Lauryn, are you chairing or running a process,
have you begun a process that includes the business community
or business members and human rights groups to specifically be
brainstorming about this question of what may be done leading
up to the Olympics?
Ms. Beer. Yes. We actually had a meeting, which Chris
Billing came to, not long ago where we had a kind of cross-
section of China experts and businesses that had an interest in
China to talk about how we might do this. This is why I am
proposing the sort of dialog I am, because I want us to
continue trying to sort our way through this.
One thing that we had not done in that dialog, though, was
figure out what role government should play, which is why I
would like to have some government members, whether the Members
of Congress and/or the administration, actually participate in
some of these meetings.
I think it is also important, though, for the businesses
and the human rights organizations to meet separately as well,
so they can simply agree on what the agenda should be because
they are the only ones who really know what their concerns are.
But after that point, then I think it is useful to bring in
government. Yes. I mean, we have had these sorts of dialogs,
not just on China, but on other issues over the years. But this
is definitely one of our focuses now.
Mr. Wolf. Kevin, you mentioned that the current president
of the IOC has been very quiet on human rights issues. Is that
different than IOC in the past?
Mr. Wamsley. Not necessarily. We found that after a while
it was fairly easy to predict the kind of response that
President Samaranch would have to certain issues. From my
experience, I do not know President Rogge enough to effectively
predict how he reacts and how he addresses issues. But so far,
he seems to be a little more thorough in this interest with
issues than President Samaranch was.
Mr. Wolf. Do you have any sense whether, let us assume that
Lauryn's process succeeds and the business community and the
human rights groups can come up with a set of realistic,
practical things that one could do over a several-year period.
They begin to engage the United States and other
governments. Is this something that the IOC bureaucracy or the
IOC politics would be interested in participating in, or is
this simply something that is untouchable as far as they are
concerned?
Mr. Wamsley. Well, it was the IOC that first said, and said
for three, four decades, that sports and politics do not mix,
even though all of their actions were deeply politicized. I
would be surprised if the IOC is willing to tread in these
sorts of waters at this point, unless something very serious
happens.
The IOC is predominantly a European-based organization,
recognizing that it is primarily funded by United States money.
However, the power structure still sits in Europe, and they
also have a number of votes from other countries that support
the European vote.
Perhaps if you had some European companies on board and
some European interests represented in these sorts of things,
then they would be more likely to take notice.
Mr. Wolf. What about looking at the U.S. Olympic Committee
with the same kind of question? Have there been human rights
concerns? Would you think they might be interested in
participating as a dialog partner with Lauryn and her group?
Mr. Wamsley. That would be a very difficult position for
the United States Olympic Committee, given its relationship to
the International Olympic Committee. That might be one that
they, too, are unwilling to address to a great extent, other
than providing maybe some support.
The interests of the United States Olympic Committee in the
last decade have been primarily financial. They have been
spending a lot of effort trying to get a greater percentage of
the television revenues and TOP sponsorship, and not so much
interested in the
necessarily human factors of the Olympic Games.
Mr. Wolf. Thanks.
John.
Mr. Foarde. Don, your presentation was admirable in
separating what is fact from speculation. I am going to ask all
three of you to speculate on the following. But before I do, I
would say that I was in Mexico City in 1968 for the Olympics,
and also in Beijing in 1990 for the Asian Games.
So my question is really to ask you to speculate a bit
about the long-term effects, if any, of the Olympic Games on
both the economy of China, but also on human rights and the
rule of law.
Given what we know about the results of the Olympic Games
in developing countries since Mexico, 1968, what do you think
the impact of the games are going to be on both the economy,
and then the polity of China after 2008? Total speculation, I
understand. So, go ahead.
Mr. Oberdorfer. Well, the first thing I have to say, is I
do not know. The belief, whether it is true or not, is that the
Japanese Olympic Games sort of launched Japan into becoming a
world economic power. That was something very much in the minds
of the Koreans when they wanted the games.
I do not think it had that much effect on the economics of
Korea. They spent a whole lot of money getting prepared with
these various venues; whether they came out ahead or not, I do
not know. It did have an effect on the political development of
the country, but as I said, it was one among several factors.
I would guess that it will have some effect in China, just
because, as I said before, the Chinese people's vision will be
broadened and the government will be very conscious of the
world
watching.
Whether that will be permanent or not, I have no idea. I
think a lot depends on how the outside world deals with it, and
on things, at the moment, which we basically cannot predict
today.
Ms. Beer. I would pretty much second that, but with the
caveat that I do not think that simply by opening a market or
by having an event you necessarily democratize a country.
I think that unless proactive steps are taken by those who
have influence, then probably there will not be any major
changes,
either for the economy or for human rights and the rule of law.
To make changes like that, you need significant input. You
need a lot of planning, you need a lot of dedication. When the
games are over in 2008, clearly, even if the kind of dialog I
am proposing has happened, and happened successfully, it does
not mean that all of the problems all of a sudden cease.
So I think that sort of dialog would need to continue. I
think that there will always be room for improvement in any of
the countries in which U.S. businesses are invested. But I
think what this does do, is provide a focal point more than
anything else.
Mr. Wamsley. I see the Olympic Games as sort of an empty
cylinder. It gets filled up with something new every once in a
while, particular to the country that is hosting, or any kind
of a movement that happens through it, political or otherwise.
I think, with the case of places like Sydney and Salt Lake
City, you will see some short-term gains in tourism and local
economic development. But that was paid for by the people's
money, essentially, these infrastructure developments.
I think you will see the same thing in Beijing, is some
short-term economic kick-starts. But probably the most
important thing that an Olympics does, is it kick-starts
governments and people and it really does rationalize
government programs.
I do not think it necessarily creates new ones, but, good
or bad, governments use the Olympic Games to brand themselves
for a period of time after the games. It also will provide you
with some sort of reputation.
But even in the case of Sydney, what are considered to be,
in spite of the massive debt, a widely successful Olympic
Games, but what has that reputation done for them economically
and socially? Has it gotten rid of the crisis they have in
their government's relationship to Aboriginal peoples? Not at
all.
Mr. Wolf. Chris.
Mr. Billing. I would like to turn our attention to the
environment in Beijing for a moment. Kevin, I wonder if you
have a sense of what kind of commitments Beijing has made to
the IOC as far as cleaning up the air and other pollution
problems in Beijing, and how effective you think they could be.
Mr. Wamsley. I cannot speak specifically because I have not
seen their extended bid book. But I know that, as part of
official bidding, the IOC is now interested in the environment
because people have told them that it is important, not because
they have been proactive.
They are very interested in bids that show environmental
clean-up and that promise not to create too much environmental
damage. Now, we have seen, in spite of this, that the damages
happened anyway.
A lot of times, as part of the clean-up process in other
nations, has included getting rid of low-income housing because
it is, in effect, cleaning up the vision of the city. That is
not necessarily an environmentally good thing for the people
who live there.
I know they are building some new road infrastructure that
is getting rid of some of their traffic problems, but it has
also increased some of their noise problems among the buildings
because they are putting up super-highways very close to
buildings. Other than that, I cannot give you any more
specifics on the environment in Beijing.
Mr. Billing. Have you seen any instances where Beijing is
tearing down low-income housing, those sorts of things?
Mr. Wamsley. I have not yet, no.
Mr. Billing. Do any of the rest of you have any comments on
the environment in Beijing and what the games might mean to
that?
Ms. Beer. No. But if it is true that the IOC is taking the
environment into account, I find it hard to believe that that
is somehow not politicized and that human rights is.
Mr. Billing. All right.
Don, I was going to ask you, you mentioned that one of the
most dramatic moments in the Seoul games was when North and
South Korea walked in together.
Mr. Oberdorfer. This was not in Seoul.
Mr. Billing. I am sorry.
Mr. Oberdorfer. This was in Sydney.
Mr. Billing. All right. Of course.
Mr. Oberdorfer. North Korea did not participate in the
Seoul games.
Mr. Billing. Along those same lines, I wonder if you could
speculate on what the Beijing games might mean to cross-straits
relations between China and Taiwan.
Mr. Oberdorfer. I do not know. You know that there is a lot
of cross-straits activity between China and Taiwan, especially
economic activity. A tremendous amount. And the people moving
back and forth, there is a very large amount of that, despite
the political difficulties.
So my guess is that there will be the athletes there, and
they will participate and China will treat them well. They will
go back home. It is like the businessmen. They will go back
home and it is probably unlikely to have a very big effect.
But I am sure that they are going to participate, and there
is going to be people going back and forth. But, as I say,
there are a lot of people going back and forth already.
Mr. Billing. I wonder if you would have a sense that,
perhaps, in the years leading up to the games, whether
hostilities between the two sides would be kept at a minimum.
Mr. Oberdorfer. Are you talking about Taiwan?
Mr. Billing. Correct.
Mr. Oberdorfer. I think it will depend on other factors
more than the games. But who knows?
Mr. Wolf. Thanks. Tiffany.
Ms. McCullen. Lauryn, I just wanted to go back to the
Olympic Roundtable that your group is, I guess, sponsoring. How
many meetings have you all had so far, and how is that planned?
Who plans the agenda, and do you plan on inviting government
officials at some point in time?
Ms. Beer. We are fairly early in the process. We have had
two meetings so far. We have not fixed the agenda. Basically,
our members fix the agenda themselves.
Ms. McCullen. All right.
Ms. Beer. We do everything by consensus. All I do when I
chair is try to guide the discussion to conclusions, but it is
up to them to choose what they think the important issues are
to them.
At the point that they have arrived at that kind of
agreement, then we have got at least a skeletal outline of the
issues we think are crucial to work on. I think that is the
point at which I would want to bring government in.
Ms. McCullen. And how do you determine which business
groups to bring in? Just business groups that are already doing
business in China?
Ms. Beer. We do a fair bit of research on who is invested
in China and we look at who is likely to be investing in China.
Most of the businesses that we have done outreach to in this
respect are those who already have a big stake. Clearly, all
the big-name Olympic sponsors would have to be included.
Ms. McCullen. Thank you.
Mr. Wolf. Karin.
Ms. Finkler. Chinese nationalism was mentioned a number of
times this afternoon. What do you see that looking like in the
lead-up to the games, in contrast to possibly the expression of
it after the accidental bombing in Belgrade? How do you think
it will grow or what will it look like?
Mr. Oberdorfer. Well, I was in China right after the
accidental bombing. I would have to say that the reaction to
that, I found
appalling, both from the point of view of the United States
Government, which I do not think did nearly enough to explain
to the Chinese people what had happened, so the Chinese
Government line just won the day.
The Americans sent over a delegation to talk to the Chinese
leadership, which got very little attention in the Chinese
media, and I think gave up too easily to try to explain the
American point of view to the Chinese Government.
Some elements of the Chinese Communist Party and Government
took advantage of it to try to paint the United States as a
deliberate attacker of China, something that I'm afraid a lot
of Chinese people still believe, and are going to believe
forever because we, the United States, was not effective in
getting our story out.
I would hope that no such incident is going to happen
again, but I hope that if it ever does, the U.S. Government
will go a lot better job of getting its story out.
Ms. Finkler. Do you have a response?
Ms. Beer. I do not really know how to respond to this,
except to say that I think nationalism is a factor that should
be taken into account.
Therefore, it is important to involve Chinese businesses
and Chinese activists, to the extent that it is possible, in a
dialog about human rights and rule of law concerns.
Mr. Wamsley. The Olympic Games are often a mystifying
process. That may be stating it too simply, but I would say
that with respect to nationalism, something like the Olympic
Games can energize people in strange kinds of ways. People who
have different advantages in their own societies seem to
forget, through different kinds of nationalism and
nationalistic celebrations in all countries, the things that
make people different economically or socially, or people who
have different rights in society.
That is why I think, when you are looking at hard issues
that are very important, you have to see through mystifying
processes like the Olympic Games and stay the course. I made
the comment today that people forget, because the Olympic Games
are such a media spectacle, the real important things that are
going on in a place, at a time.
I encourage people not to forget and to keep things that
are important to them in the forefront and not to be caught up.
Well, it is all right to be caught up in the revelry, I
suppose, and celebrate, but at the expense of some more
important things, I think that is a mistake.
Ms. Finkler. Thanks.
Mr. Wolf. Thanks.
Matt.
Mr. Tuchow. Lauryn Beer gave us one potential
recommendation for the Commission, but I am wondering if the
panelists have other thoughts about recommendations this
Commission might make to Congress or to the President about how
to use, or how to promote human rights and rule of law in China
as a result of the upcoming 2008 Olympics.
Mr. Oberdorfer. While I was a journalist for 38 years, I
kind of shy away from making recommendations to governments. I
do not think they necessarily would take them, and I am not
sure I am qualified to give them.
I just have kind of my own points of view. I have been
asked by government officials over the years, what would you
do. My stock answer is, ``That is your problem.'' [Laughter.]
Mr. Wamsley. I am in the same sort of situation. I tend to,
by my profession, watch what people do and to analyze it, to
criticize it, and to understand it. I guess you could ask me a
question that would be, well, if you could predict what you
would criticize the least, what would that be?
That would be some sort of an effort to talk about human
rights as an international concern and to go with a group, such
as the United Nations, or whatever group you would decide.
If it came from the United States president alone, that
would be problematic, I think. I think if it came from 15 or 20
other world leaders, interested parties, I think that would be
something that would require more action.
Mr. Tuchow. Let me ask a more specific question then. Juan
Samaranch worked with the ILO, did he not? Is that pure
serendipity, or do you think there may be some effect as a
result of that on labor conditions in China? The IOC may be
able to somehow utilize that in a way that others could not
because of his past experience with the Olympic Committee?
Mr. Wamsley. Boy, that is a difficult question. It is hard
to know what Samaranch is going to do in his retirement. But I
have certainly seen what he did when he was in office, and a
lot of it had to do with self-interest. [Laughter.]
So, I am very skeptical, first of all, from the amount of
power that he now wields, which is very little, he does have a
reputation. But before he was IOC president, he also had a
reputation in the Spanish Government that was not too
favorable.
I do not know how effective he will be, how good his health
is, and how really interested he is in actually making things
happen or continuing to keep his name in the press.
Mr. Tuchow. In terms of rule of law, I assume there are
Olympic mascots and logos whose intellectual property rights,
you would think, would be protected. Is there going to be an
issue with that in China as a result of the fact that there are
problems along these lines in China, and could that lead to
some progress in terms of protecting intellectual property
rights?
Ms. Beer. I do not know. Intellectual property has, as you
know, been a big problem for a lot of businesses. Whether the
Olympics are going to make any difference to that I think will
depend, in part, whether those businesses who are affected make
a real kind of public push about it. I do not know that I think
the Olympics itself is going to make any difference to that
kind of rule of law question.
Mr. Wamsley. There are rules and regulations for the
Olympic symbols and mascots, and all those sorts of things that
must apply in China, or anywhere else. Only the TOP sponsors,
for example, may use the Olympic symbols exclusively worldwide.
But there are companies in China who could, for example, pay to
use Olympic symbols.
I think that there have been some improvements with respect
to the sorts of things that are permitted in China, but it
certainly is an issue for Chinese law and the Olympic Games are
not going to affect that, I do not think.
Mr. Tuchow. You do not think they will try to enforce it,
and therefore strengthen the intellectual property rights?
Mr. Wamsley. I think that one thing the Olympics does, on
the other hand, is to promote ambush marketing. This could
happen in China as well. I mean, we see it everywhere. American
Express has done it, when it did not have the rights, against
Visa.
The Olympic Games provide an opportunity for people to make
money. That would tell me that there would be a lot of
underground pin making that is not approved of in China, like
every other country. The unethical or illegal practices tend to
win the day when money is on the table, so I would say it may
go in the other direction.
Mr. Wolf. J.J.
Mr. Piskadlo. I have no questions.
Mr. Wolf. All right. It is 4 o'clock. This has been a very
interesting session. This is actually totally different than
every other roundtable we have had. We have had about 15 of
these sessions.
They have all been on issues that have been around for a
long time. There are people with very passionate or very
dispassionate views, but very well-developed views. We have got
the issue of corporate social responsibility, which as you
said, Lauryn, has just been around for a short period of time.
It is one of the issues that our commissioners have
committed themselves to look into very closely to make some
clear recommendations and try to take some actions in the
Congress over the next year.
But the first thing they are going to have to do, is come
up with some definitions and some understanding of exactly what
it is, and we have mixed it in with the Olympics today where,
for what may be the first time, the human rights issues are
starting to come
together, at least in terms of what the human rights NGO
community is concerned about.
I did not think we were going to come up with an agenda and
conclusions today. I think the Commission, our bosses, will be
looking at this over literally the next couple of years, as is
your group, Lauryn, and a number of others, Kevin, to see, are
there ways in which the Olympics may be used to improve human
rights and rule of law in China.
I think this was a good base to start from and we
appreciate the three of you coming and giving your time to us.
So, thanks very much.
We will post, by tomorrow, the written statements that
Kevin and Lauryn had. In about 5 weeks, on our web site, we
will post the full transcript of the session today. So, thanks
a lot, and especially to you, Kevin, for coming so far.
[Whereupon, at 4 p.m. the roundtable was concluded.]
A P P E N D I X
=======================================================================
Prepared Statements
------
Prepared Statement of Kevin Wamsley
november 18, 2002
First, permit me to thank you for inviting me to testify before
this commission. Our point of departure for these proceedings is to
discuss the potential influences of the process of hosting the Olympic
Games in 2008 on human rights in China. First of all we must
acknowledge of course that our ruminations are purely speculative. But,
that being said, we may offer some comments on these issues based on
our knowledge of China's history, its current political policies and
practices, its cultural connections to the Olympic Games in the past
and present and, perhaps most importantly, some of the extant
perceptions about the role of the modern Olympics in facilitating
social and political change.
China's sporting relations with other countries extend back almost
a century, including post World War I correspondence with the
International Olympic Committee (IOC) and participation in the Games of
1932, 1936, and 1948.\1\ China's return to competition in 1984, indeed
the fervor of its bidding strategies for the Games of 2000 and 2008,
signaled that the Olympics had become a significant component of
Chinese domestic and foreign policy. If the unofficial financial
estimates, cost projections, and the official proclamations of social
preparation may be positioned as indicators, then we must conclude that
not only are the Games of 2008 a serious
commitment for China, they are being positioned as one of the most
important events in Chinese history. With this in mind, we may draw
some speculative conclusions on what sort of strategies may be adopted
and employed by the Chinese
government to render a public face of success to the international
community and, further, how the Chinese people will participate in
projecting favorable images of a modern China to a global audience.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Dongguang Pei, ``A question of names: The Two Chinas Issue and
the People's Republic of China in the Modern Olympic Movement,''
unpublished Master's thesis, The University of Western Ontario, 1995,
pp. iii-iv.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the post 1984 era of the commercialized Olympic Games, host
cities have
employed deliberate strategies to represent themselves as world class
cities--stable, intriguing, vibrant, and successful.\2\ Beijing will be
no different. Indeed, to date,
Beijing's public proclamations respecting citizen behavior and hosting
protocols, entitled Urban Civility and Building Citizen Morality, I
would characterize as overt and threatening.\3\ Arguably, it is fair to
say that the Chinese government will ensure that, far beyond the level
of the Olympic volunteer, average Beijing citizens will adhere to a
code of conduct for the Games, including pre- and post periods. This is
not unusual for host cities. Rather, it remains a matter of degree.
When one considers that the Olympic Games have long been a site for
political expression, alongside a more recently fervent civic and
national boosterism by host cities, juxtaposed with intense media
scrutiny, it follows that citizen behavior and political protests are
matters of significant concern for organizing committees and national
governments. Assurances from host countries are implied in official
doctrine. Indeed, it has been the expressed interest of the IOC through
its published Olympic Charter, that there be ``no kind of demonstration
or political, religious or racial propaganda . . . permitted in the
Olympic areas.'' \4\ Further, many bidding cities and host cities from
around the world have taken steps to remove what are perceived to be
unsightly individuals and groups in core areas and to ensure that
political groups are not given opportunities to distribute information
or capitalize upon media opportunities.\5\ It is fair to assume that
Beijing will implement some strategies of urban cleansing, perhaps in
the form of relocating unregistered citizens in Beijing, shutting down
their businesses, or even detaining them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See, for example, Kevin B. Wamsley, ``What Price For World
Class?'' Canadian Issues, Autumn 1999, pp. 14-15; ``Policy Implications
For Hosting the Olympics,'' Policy Options, Vol. 18, No. 3, May, pp.
13-15, 1997; ``Tradition, Modernity, and the Construction of Civic
Identity: The Calgary Olympics,'' Olympika, V, pp. 81-90 with Michael
K. Heine, 1996.
\3\ See the official website: http://www.beijing-2008.org/new--
olympic/eolympic/1009--e/5.htm
\4\ Olympic Charter, International Olympic Committee, September
2001, p. 85.
\5\ See, for example, Helen Lenskyj, The Best Olympics Ever? The
Social Impacts of Sydney 2000. New York: SUNY, 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One of the most significant factors to be considered in Beijing's
hosting of the 2008 Olympics is the potential influence of the idea of
nationalism in China, stemming mainly from a common sense of historic
and current marginalization among Chinese people, in various forms of
international relations and, consequently, the galvanization of public
sentiment that hosting the Olympic Games has already inspired and will
continue to escalate.\6\ This of course has direct bearing on the
behavior of citizens, their support of overall government initiatives,
and the reluctance of even some dissidents to jeopardize China's moment
of international recognition. This nationalist sentiment should not be
underestimated, particularly when one is attempting to gauge how
Chinese citizens will react to government crackdowns, urban policy
initiatives, dealing with dissidents, how they may or may not reveal
information about their lives to outsiders, and how they will actively
participate in the Olympic Games and related festivities. Just as
significantly, it is likely that the Chinese government will take
advantage of such cultural solidarities as it launches and conducts its
programs of cultural representation for Beijing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ While not necessarily representative of popular opinion in
China, see Dave Sheng, ``Who lost China?''--the resurgence of Chinese
nationalism,'' Chinese Community Forum, 1996, to provide some context
for the discussion of these issues. http://www.rider.edu/phanc/courses/
countrys/asia/china/Cnatlsm/Sheng.htm
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the period of time leading up to the Games, the
potential influences of an influx of some 20,000 plus journalists and
sport tourists during the Olympic Games must be debated. However, any
suggestions that such social contacts between Chinese citizens in
Beijing and other parts of China and so-called westerners will have an
immediate influence on social activism or a long-term effect on
government policies are erroneously simplistic. Certainly the issue of
human rights in China has become a focal point for the western media,
and journalists will be interested in both controversy and crisis. Any
immediate matters of human rights will, without doubt, be dealt with
expeditiously. But with respect to term effects of the Games, there are
many factors to consider in the hosting process, which tend to polarize
media interpretations of local and national events and limit the
influence of what might be perceived as contradictory or destabilizing
ideologies. First and foremost, the Olympics are a brief and intense
media spectacle. Second, the Chinese government may refuse entry to any
media personnel who have proven to be 'unfriendly' in the past. Third,
the IOC maintains the rights to internal access for members of the
media. Fourth, a glimpse at Olympic history demonstrates that serious
local or national problems may be focal points of international
interest through media scrutiny before and during an Olympics or the
bidding process; but such stories tend to fade quickly, when the
Olympic caravan has departed. Take, for example, Aboriginal issues in
Sydney, Calgary, Salt Lake City, homelessness in Toronto and Atlanta.
The Olympic process, bidding, hosting, and the attendant ideological
forays into peace, brotherhood, and equity have had little direct
impact beyond limited media exposure to such issues and inspiring a
greater solidarity toward local resistance to mega events. And,
finally, the sheer intensity of the Olympic Games as a media
construction tends to shift focus away from national issues that may
have received significant attention before the Games, effectively
marginalizing the plights of individuals or groups who may have once
been central to journalistic
interests.
Other international interest groups are integral components of the
legitimizing process perpetuated through the Olympic Games. Currently,
and increasingly as the Games draw near, corporations, consulting
firms, specialists, and academics will trade on the economic
opportunities presented by the hosting of the next Games. Groups in
Sydney, for example, are lobbying to assist China in developing its
infrastructure and Olympic programs, from buildings and facilities to
cultural programs, academic exchange, and Olympic education.
Corporations that already have a significant multi-million dollar
interest in the success of the Games, and those that are currently
seeking contracts, are not likely to endorse any systematic critiques
that focus negative attention toward the host nation. Indeed, they have
diverse financial interests in Chinese markets but also, the larger
corporations that trade on Olympic symbolism and ideology have a stake
in promoting an image of China as an exotic, historically stable, vital
Nation through which sensible and interesting cultural links can
enhance their products and the flow of global capital. Intellectuals
who depend upon access to even limited information, travel, and
financial aid for publications and educational liaisons are not likely
to seriously raise issues of human rights, for fear of jeopardizing
their positions of privilege.
Historically, the Olympic process has tended to provide legitimacy
to host governments and their policies, endorsements to their success
in hosting the Games, and furthering the 'spirit' of the Olympic Games,
as opposed to drawing attention to shortfalls and political
controversies. Well-documented examples include the economic crises of
Antwerp in 1920 and London in 1948, the Great Depression in 1932 Los
Angeles, Hitler's fascism in 1936, Mexico's slaughter of innocent
citizens in 1968.\7\ Serious tragedies and atrocities have become
subsidiary to the more
glamorous immediacies of the Olympic spectacle. On the other hand,
members of the international sporting community, Olympic officials
specifically, were able to exert remarkable influence through several
decades over the issue of apartheid in South Africa. These pressures,
however, had more broad-based political support and diplomatic
attention.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ See the following sources for both general and specific
information on these Games: Alan Tomlinson and Garry Whannel, eds,
``Five Ring Circus: Money Power and Politics at the Olympic Games,''
London: Pluto 1984; Richard D. Mandell, ``The Nazi Olympics,'' New
York: MacMillan 1971; Arnd Kruger, ``The Ministry of Popular
Enlightenment and Propaganda and the Nazi Olympics of 1936,'' in Robert
K. Barney, Kevin B. Wamsley, Scott G. Martyn, Gordon H. MacDonald, eds,
``Global and Cultural Critique: Problematizing the Olympic Games,''
London: International Centre for Olympic Studies 1998, 33-48; Allen
Guttmann, ``The Games Must Go On: Avery Brundage and the Olympic
Movement,'' New York: Columbia University Press 1984; Kevin B. Wamsley,
``The Global Sport Monopoly: a synopsis of 20th century Olympic
politics,'' International Journal, Vol. LVII, 3, pp. 395-410.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In summary, the Olympic Games have done far more to sustain and
reproduce extant domestic policies, to reproduce mythologies about race
and equality, economic and social opportunity, and world peace, than to
subvert the inequalities of the world.\8\ In the short term, it is
likely that the Olympic process ensconced with its traditional
diplomacies, hyperbole, and rhetoric, indeed the political exigencies
of host nation, will negatively affect human rights in China. Further,
the solidarities created through extensive preparations to host the
world should not be underestimated. International lobbying initiatives
that question China's social and political prerogatives in the years
leading up to the 2008 Olympics might be viewed, even by average
citizens, as efforts to undermine what is being celebrated widely as
the arrival of a modern China. International advocates for political
change in China should proceed with caution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Kevin B. Wamsley, ``Laying Olympism to Rest,'' in Post-
Olympism? Questioning Sport in the Twenty-First Century, ed. John Bale,
Berg, 2004, forthcoming.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
______
Prepared Statement of Lauryn Beer
november 18, 2002
introduction
Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to speak to you on behalf
of the Fund for Peace. My name is Lauryn Beer and I am the Director of
the Fund's Human Rights and Business Roundtable.
The mission of The Fund for Peace is to prevent war and alleviate
the conditions that cause war. Our programmatic focus is to strengthen
the capacity of the U.S. and the international community to respond to
global internal conflicts in 5 key areas: Early Warning, Military
Intervention Criteria, Arms Control, Policy Integration and
Constituency Building.
It is this last area--constituency and consensus building--that the
Human Rights and Business Roundtable has excelled. It is also the focus
of what I wish to speak to you about today. The Beijing Olympics
affords a timely opportunity for creative partnering between the
business and human rights communities both in the U.S. and in China to
both improve human rights and the climate for international businesses
investing in China.
The Human Rights and Business Roundtable was launched in 1997 with
the goal of bringing together two communities that have been
traditional adversaries: multinational business and human rights
advocates. Yet they represent two of the most important post-cold war
constituencies in the United States. In its 5 years of operation, the
Roundtable has developed procedures, principles, formats and policies
to ensure the smooth working of the Roundtable, including a set of
operational ground rules. They stipulate that members of the Roundtable
participate in their individual capacity and not as representatives of
the organizations with which they are affiliated, so that they do not
need to obtain clearance from their organizations to
express views and reach consensus. All discussions are off-the-record
and by invitation only, and records of the meetings are on a non-
attribution basis, except when speakers indicate otherwise. The
Roundtable offers a way to discuss hard issues in a spirit of
cooperation rather than confrontation. It has thus far convened over 50
meetings that have engaged more than 150 individuals from the human
rights and business communities. Over 20 multinational corporations and
30 human rights groups have collaborated under the Roundtable's
leadership to work in partnership on the problems and opportunities of
economic globalization.
the potential impacts of the beijing olympics on human rights and
business
It is no secret that the success of China's bid for the 2008
Olympic Games has garnered much criticism from human rights advocates.
The scrutiny of the human rights community will make it likely that
businesses supporting the Olympics will be expected to do more than
simply pay for advertising space in Beijing. Already, Human Rights
Watch, Amnesty International and others have stated publicly they
expect sponsoring businesses to take a proactive role in advancing
democracy in China in the lead up to, and during, the Games. U.S.
corporations sponsoring the Olympics or tendering bids for preparatory
infrastructure development could face considerable challenges. Sponsors
could find themselves tainted by association, should the Chinese
authorities commit human rights abuses during the Games. For example,
the Olympic Committee's mandate states that there must be unfettered
access to the Press during the Games. But what will the Chinese
authorities do in the face of potential protests around the Games? What
might be the repercussions for business if human rights abuses are
being seen committed under corporate
banners?
Further, corporations doing business in China--not just those
sponsoring the Games--have an interest in promoting the rule of law,
since predictability is crucial to sustainable business. Businesses
ignore the human rights aspects of the rule of law at their own peril,
as has been borne out by the experiences of some companies in countries
such as Nigeria, Colombia, Indonesia, India and, yes, China.
The new leadership in China will no doubt wish to capitalize on the
publicity and income the Games generate. There are 6 years between now
and the Summer Games in 2008, during which business, government and
NGOs can engage in a meaningful and action-oriented dialog on human
rights and business issues
surrounding the Games.
recommendations
The Congressional-Executive Commission on China is charged with
monitoring human rights and the development of the rule of law in
China, and with submission of an annual report to the President and the
Congress. In its 2002 Annual Report, the Committee made one of its
priority recommendations that the Administration ``. . . facilitate
meetings of U.S., Chinese, and third-country companies doing business
in a specific locality and industry in China to identify systemic
worker rights abuses, develop recommendations for appropriate Chinese
government entities, and discuss these recommendations with Chinese
officials, with the goal of developing a long-term collaborative
relationship between government and business to assist in improving
China's implementation of internationally recognized labor standards.''
1. The Fund for Peace believes that human rights
organizations and multinational business form two of the key
constituencies affecting U.S. foreign
policy today. The Fund proposes that the Committee's
recommendation on business-government collaboration be
broadened to include U.S. and international NGOs;
2. We further recommend that the focus of collaboration
between business, NGOs and government be widened to cover not
only labor issues in China but a broad range of human rights
and rule of law issues that relate to the success of the
Beijing Olympics. These would include freedom of association
and assembly, freedom of expression, security concerns, due
process and transparency;
3. The Human Rights and Business Roundtable offers a useful
and practical model for engagement between businesses and human
rights organizations and their partners in China; and
4. We propose that the goals of a dialog on the Beijing
Olympics be as follows:
To develop a preventative strategy that
would assist businesses in avoiding being implicated in
potential human rights abuses surrounding the Games;
To engage a broad cross section of civil
society and businesses in frank discussions of Chinese
and Western perspectives on human rights and the rule
of law;
To involve the private sector in ongoing
conversation and education on security and human rights
issues in a cooperative spirit of corporate social
responsibility;
To educate both constituencies and increase
their knowledge of human rights and security issues;
To support civil society capacity building
by promoting groups to act in a collective setting and
encourage collaboration, where possible;
To find areas of common ground, explore
channels of potential cooperation between communities,
and create practical actions to attain mutual goals;
and
To use the Beijing Olympics as a means to
establish a ``best practices'' model for future
international events.
5. We invite the Committee to report on the dialog's progress
in its future
Annual Reports.
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