



# SPECIAL REPORT

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## ABOUT THE REPORT

In December 1998, at a meeting at the United States Institute of Peace, Montenegrin government and parliamentary representatives expressed their concerns regarding the possibility of a Serbian crackdown on Montenegro's democracy movement and discussed with Balkans Working Group participants possible options for avoiding a crisis. At an earlier meeting on October 14, 1998 the working group had discussed the growing threat to Montenegro from Serbia and recommended preventive measures to be taken by the international community and the Montenegrins themselves. This report is a summary by senior fellow Daniel Serwer, program officer Lauren Van Metre, and research assistant James Rae of the working group's discussion and the presentation by Montenegrin officials.

The Balkans Working Group is composed of representatives from government agencies, think tanks, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) who are expert on Balkan matters. Chaired by John Menzies, former U.S. ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina and USIP Senior Fellow, the group met periodically throughout 1997 and 1998 to discuss threats to and support for Balkan stability and implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords. The objective is not to reach consensus within the group but to explore issues and options.

**The views expressed in the report do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate particular policies.**

January 11, 1999

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## Montenegro—And More—At Risk

### Briefly...

- The threat of an attack on Montenegro by President Slobodan Milosević's regime is increasingly likely and may take any form ranging from an indirect "constitutional" coup to a more direct attempt to enlist pro-Milosevic forces in Montenegro in acts of violence against the democratic regime.
- Although Montenegro remains a politically divided society, it is making great strides toward establishing inclusive political and social institutions.
- Montenegro's democratic government threatens Milosević's legitimacy as FRY president and weakens his authoritarian political base. A respite in Kosovo may provide him an opportunity to reverse Montenegro's democratic consolidation by removing the Djukanovic government.
- Montenegro does not seek *de jure* independence from the FRY, but the *de facto* independence it does enjoy represents a loss of control by Milosevic.
- Although Montenegro is a small country it plays a significant role in the Balkans. It is an example of successful transition from communism to democratic pluralism and economic liberalism. Montenegro's actions and policies relating to the Kosovo crisis and the prospects for a democratic transition in Serbia are pivotal.
- Given its regional significance the international community must consider programs to ensure Montenegro's democratic consolidation and autonomy from Belgrade. These might include stationing an OSCE observer mission in Montenegro, continued Western support for democratization, and establishing relations with Western governments separate from Belgrade through military-to-military contact programs and national drug interdiction and anti-crime organizations such as the U.S. Federal Bureau Investigation (FBI).
- Such efforts would not support Montenegrin independence—a stance that is not advocated by the Djukanovic government—but encourage cooperation with the West, discourage the spread of violence in the FRY, and increase prospects for Serbia's democratic transition.

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## Introduction

Montenegro's growing commitment to economic reform and democratic consolidation threatens the autocratic regime in Serbia in a number of ways: (1) Montenegrin political parties are reaching out to opposition leaders of like mind in Serbia, Vojvodina, and the Sandjak; (2) Montenegrin representatives serving on federal institutions have consistently blocked President Slobodan Milosevic's most egregious efforts to use state structures to consolidate his personal power, especially in ways harmful to Montenegro; (3) Montenegro no longer recognizes the federal government and parliament, which are key institutions of the state Milosevic claims to head; (4) if economic and political reform is successful in Montenegro, it will present a serious challenge to Belgrade, either as a model for Serbia or because President Milo Djukanovic will emerge as a serious political contender in Serbia.

Montenegro walks a fine line as it continues to pursue a better, more democratic life for its citizens under the umbrella of a regime that consistently violates human and civil rights to maintain its autocratic hold on power. Montenegro's ability to successfully balance its mandate for democratic reform with Belgrade's attempts to maintain centralized control depends on the support of the international community, the eventual democratization of Serbia, and President Djukanovic's steady but determined support for democratic and economic reforms.

On December 18, 1998, the United State Institute of Peace hosted representatives of the government, parliament, and non governmental organizations to discuss the current situation in the region and specifically in Montenegro. Speakers at the meeting included deputy prime minister Dragisa Burzan, parliamentary representatives Milica Pejanovic-Djurisic and Ferhat Dinosa, and Milan Popovic of the Center for Democracy and Human Rights—a Podgorica-based NGO. Their message was temperate but attention grabbing: Montenegro is not currently seeking independence from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), but may be driven in that direction if Belgrade exerts illegitimate authority.

What follows is a summary of the remarks by regional representatives and discussion by the Balkans Working Group regarding Montenegro's current situation. For information on the current situation in Serbia and the prospects for a nonviolent, democratic transition, refer to the USIP Special Report *Serbia: Democratic Alternatives*, published in June 1998.

## Moving Forward

The current multiparty, multiethnic government of Milo Djukanovic has emphasized democratic progress, economic reform, respect for minorities, and observance of the rule of law. Once one of the more conservative and backward elements of the former Yugoslavia, Montenegro has emerged as a vibrant and liberalizing force within the federation and a potential role model for democratic reform throughout the region. In fact, as government and parliamentary representatives noted, Montenegro has successfully undergone democratic transition and is attempting to consolidate its political gains. The development of civil society—including the increasing proliferation of NGOs, and open and free media—is evidence of serious commitment to political change. Furthermore, Montenegro is committed to the rule of law as laid out in its constitution and has adopted European standards for human and minority rights legislation. Montenegro protects its minorities by emphasizing the separation of church and state, respect for the constitution, and recognition of the

multiethnic and multireligious nature of Montenegro and the region at large. Government representatives said that they believe Montenegrin society can transcend ethnic differences while providing formal and legal rights to all citizens.

The Djukanovic government also has sought to integrate minority leaders into government institutions. Seven percent of Montenegrins are ethnic Albanian (about 50,000 people) and are represented by two national Albanian parties, both of which have members in parliament. Minority political parties in general (minorities make up 23 percent of the population of Montenegro) have sought to form alliances with the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) and President Djukanovic. Their representatives serve as a minister and assistant ministers in the current government, which has established a Ministry for Minority Rights.

Although the government is building a stable foundation for democracy, representatives acknowledged that the transition is not yet complete. Social and political progress must be underwritten with economic and financial development. Montenegro is committed to further privatization and the creation of a market economy. This commitment has pushed Montenegro toward greater autonomy within the FRY regarding its economic affairs. Montenegro is actively seeking foreign investment, an increase in tourism, and increased investment in infrastructure.

### **Internal Barriers to Progress**

Speakers at the December 18 meeting described Montenegrin society at various times as polarized, fractured, and deeply split in its relationship with Belgrade. In the May election, the Socialist People's Party (SNP) won 36 percent of the vote, showing itself to be a strong and viable political party, albeit one dependent on the support of Belgrade. The SNP supports Milosevic and vigorously resists democratic developments in Montenegro.

Independence, while favored by some democratic forces in Montenegro, is not in the government's program. Speakers at the December 18 meeting expressed their government's willingness to remain in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, absent a threat from Belgrade. They seek not independence, but support for peace and stability within the FRY.

Yet Montenegro has already achieved *de facto* independence in many aspects of its government and economy, with the notable exception of the military. Customs revenues, for example, are retained in Podgorica because Belgrade has stopped paying pensions to Montenegrins. Belgrade also has blocked exports from Montenegro to Serbia and has been reluctant to open trade between Montenegro and Croatia. Further efforts of this sort by Belgrade to hinder Montenegro's trade and economic development can only strengthen separatist sentiment in Montenegro.

Participants emphasized the importance of economic progress to cultivate social support for the democratic regime. With an improved standard of living, Podgorica would be able to offer a clear alternative to Belgrade, where the economy continues to spiral downward as a result of international economic sanctions and domestic corruption. However, Montenegro's efforts to jump-start its economy are challenged by the current sanctions regime, which harms the economy. The outer wall of sanctions imposed by the international community against Yugoslavia prohibits most direct foreign investment in Montenegro as well as in Serbia. Furthermore, unemployment, low wages, and the threat of violent conflict do not improve conditions for economic growth. Refugees, most recently from the crisis in Kosovo, create additional strains and further inhibit economic progress.

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## The External Threat

Although Montenegro faces many internal challenges, none directly threaten the stability of the government unless they are exacerbated by an overt or surreptitious offensive by Belgrade. The Milosevic regime has already made one attempt to topple the current government in Podgorica when it supported protests just before President Djukanovic's inauguration in January 1998. Milosevic's attempts to destabilize the new regime were undercut when high-level military and security officials, most notably head of the state security service Jovica Stanisic and military chief of staff Momcilo Perisic, refused to use military force to put down the January 14 demonstration. Montenegrin officials noted, however, that Milosevic's recent dismissal of Perisic and Stanisic, as well as his moves against Serbian universities and independent media, have increased Montenegro's insecurity.

Milosevic continues to undermine the federal constitution, disregard the results of the elections in Montenegro, and devalue the human rights of all citizens in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Is Serbia preparing for a more direct attack against the Djukanovic regime? If the current cease-fire in Kosovo holds, Milosevic might well turn his attention to breaking the back of the more peaceful rebellion Djukanovic is leading in Montenegro. Representatives of the government and parliament believe that some form of attack by Belgrade is imminent. Milosevic may try to unseat the Djukanovic government through a "constitutional" coup or organize chaos in the form of demonstrations and riots as an excuse to send in troops to maintain crowd control. Milosevic can rely on the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) in Montenegro, even though the army is not entirely loyal to him. Djukanovic, however, controls the Montenegrin police. A JNA move to repress Montenegro would entail major effort and expenses that Milosevic can ill afford, but would likely win. Representatives of the Montenegrin government agreed that Milosevic has many opportunities to order a crackdown, although some scenarios are more likely than others. The Montenegrins themselves are committed to responses that limit the possibility of violence and bloodshed.

Although the current struggle among competing factions is confined primarily to the political arena, the possibility of violent confrontation exists. The Montenegrin delegation expressed concern about the future loyalties and activities of pro-Milosevic forces, both within Montenegro and in Belgrade. In response to questioning, the Montenegrins indicated that they thought security forces available to Montenegro would be sufficient to deter any attempt by Belgrade to use force. The unsettled situation in Kosovo makes it unlikely that Belgrade will use armed force in Montenegro. Unless there is a conflict with Serbia, the Montenegrins think that current political differences are manageable in the context of a successful democratic consolidation and economic transition.

*Is Serbia preparing for a more direct attack against the Djukanovic regime?*



## Montenegro is a Regional Issue

In a region marked by recent violence, the potential for conflict in Montenegro may not appear to have the same urgency as, for example, the current crisis in Kosovo. Yet it should. As with Kosovo, the potential for a spillover of violence from Montenegro to other Balkan countries is quite real. In this case, the spread of violence may occur in Serbia, where Montenegrins are well integrated throughout its territory and within its power structures, such as the army and the police. A Serbian attack could push Montenegrins loyal to Belgrade and those who support Podgorica toward conflict; how the minority communities in Montenegro respond

would also have a broader regional impact. In such an uncertain atmosphere, people in Kosovo, Vojvodina, and the Sandjak will have to quickly assess their positions and responses.

A violent end to the current Belgrade-Podgorica political struggle would represent a lost opportunity for the region—a potential island of stability and reform will have disappeared. Montenegro, Slovenia, and Macedonia are becoming positive examples of what Balkan countries can achieve if they focus on becoming inclusive, democratic societies. Constitutional protections for minority and individual rights, support for minority political parties and their inclusion in the political process, and healthy relations with neighboring states have proved to be effective antidotes to ethnic and social tensions in these countries. The continued success of these three countries in the area of democratic consolidation disproves the notion that the Balkans is an inherently violent and war-prone region.

A stable, violence-free Montenegro could also be an integral player in resolving the Kosovo crisis. Although representatives differed in their solutions to Kosovo, all made it clear that Montenegro will continue to play a constructive role and remain firmly outside the conflict. Montenegro's parliament has recently passed resolutions supporting conscripts who do not wish to serve with the JNA in Kosovo and refusing to allow attacks on Kosovo from its territory. A Montenegrin Albanian parliamentary representative advocated Kosovar independence as the best solution to the current crisis; others ruled out the possibility of Kosovo as a third republic within the FRY unless the decision is put before the people of Montenegro in a referendum. All agreed that if the United States sought third republic status for Kosovo in the current negotiations, Montenegro must be consulted.

### **What If Belgrade Moves Against Podgorica?**

Because the development of political and economic reform in Podgorica represents a serious threat to the autocracy in Belgrade, there is a possibility that Milosevic will move against Djukanovic, despite apparent assurances to the contrary. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) would probably seek to exploit such a move. What should the international community do if Belgrade moves against Podgorica?

A Belgrade move of this sort would eliminate the last shreds of legitimacy clinging to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Its claims to a United Nations seat, to being a successor to the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), to SFRY assets, and to sovereignty in general (including sovereignty over Kosovo) would no longer be viable. The international community would have to be prepared to support a Montenegrin government with a clear claim to democratic legitimacy. Although there appears to be little stomach for decisive military intervention on the ground, the international community should be prepared to undertake limited military action to force Belgrade to respect Montenegro's claims to self-determination. It would also be necessary to isolate Serbia for the long term, until the autocratic Belgrade regime is replaced by democratic forces, and consider support to those resisting illegitimate authority in Vojvodina and the Sandjak.

### **Recommendations**

A Belgrade crackdown in Montenegro would pose serious problems for U.S. policy. The United States is unlikely to react in Podgorica's military defense and should therefore be cautious in appearing to support any moves toward independence. The

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***Continuing support for reform in Montenegro is crucial. This support should not focus on prominent individuals, but on democratic institutions.***

***Staging a civilian disaster relief or maritime rescue exercise with Montenegrin defense forces through the Partnership for Peace would send a strong message to Milosevic regarding Western interests.***

Montenegrins should be in the lead, as it is they who will have to suffer any consequences. At the same time, continuing support for reform in Montenegro is crucial. This support should not focus on prominent individuals, but on democratic institutions: political parties, NGOs, open media, an independent judiciary, and a police force that meets Western standards. Democracy in Montenegro is still young and fragile. Djukanovic's election reflected strong anti-Milosevic sentiment and is clearly now on the right track. Action is needed to make this progress irreversible.

The establishment of an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission in Montenegro would provide an early warning or preventive diplomacy system, thereby increasing Montenegrin security. The Montenegrin delegation reported that its government has requested such a mission from the OSCE as a result of positive experiences with the organization. The OSCE has monitored Montenegrin elections and sent delegations to advise on various aspects of the democratic transition. Montenegro is waiting for a positive response from the OSCE before it discusses mission specifics and size, which are less important for Podgorica than the mission's symbolic presence.

The Montenegrins emphasized the importance of Western economic support to further the country's democratic consolidation and increase citizen support for reform. In an earlier working group meeting, participants had suggested encouragement by the West for civil aviation links to Podgorica to promote international contacts and facilitate business development. The West might also consider allowing the World Bank to begin work in Montenegro, at least on designing economic reforms (and some thought even on a new currency or on infrastructure projects).

Finally, with the possibility of an imminent threat from Belgrade, working group participants suggested that the Pentagon and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) consider immediate bilateral programs with Montenegro. Staging a civilian disaster relief or maritime rescue exercise with Montenegrin defense forces through the Partnership for Peace would send a strong message to Milosevic regarding Western interests and would help Montenegro establish contacts with international institutions independent of Belgrade. Similar programs might be considered with the FBI in the area of drug interdiction and coastal defense against smugglers. As such exercises would be oriented toward civilian (rather than military) operations, they would not constitute a threat to Serbia and would help Montenegro strengthen its capacities in these important areas.

## **Conclusion**

With all the turbulence in the Balkans this decade, why is tiny and relatively quiet Montenegro such an important issue? First, the Montenegrins themselves are at tremendous risk from Belgrade. They have effectively managed political and social diversity and strived to build a strong government and society through careful economic and democratic progress. As one of the constituent republics, Montenegro's success threatens Milosevic's authority within the FRY. Fierce competition among political parties and political and social divisions in Montenegro remain potential sources of violent conflict if exploited by Milosevic. The security of the Montenegrin people increasingly depends on international support to bolster the domestic gains made by the coalition government of Milo Djukanovic and the growing development of a progressive civil society.

Why should the West be concerned? Montenegro is a prototype for regional development. The international community's abandonment of Montenegro would create uncertainty for those still fragile areas of the Balkans that have chosen the path of economic and political progress. International support for Montenegro does

not mean support for its secession from the FRY—a move that would certainly jeopardize any interim agreement in Kosovo. Montenegrin government officials are firm that they are not seeking independence, but rather protection for the current autonomy that allows them to build a democratic, pluralistic state. In fact, international support for a democratic Montenegro within the FRY is perhaps one of the best guarantees for a peaceful resolution to Kosovo and long-term stability for the region: (1) democratic Montenegro would increasingly act as a conduit for democratic thinking into Serbia, (2) Montenegrin alliances with democratic politicians in Serbia have the potential of transforming the federal government as well as the current regime in Belgrade, (3) democracy in Serbia will ultimately open an opportunity for peace between Belgrade and Pristina regardless of the outcome to the current negotiations, (4) a democratic transition in Serbia will go a long way to preventing potential violence in Vojvodina, the Sandjak, and Montenegro and encouraging political and ethnic integration. If Montenegro succeeds with international help in preserving its democratic progress, it will be a source of stability for the Yugoslav Federation and the Balkan region. It will also be a success story for the international community, which, with minimal acts of preventive diplomacy, as described above, can help Montenegro emerge as a substantial force for Balkan stability and democracy.

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## Other Resources

Listed below are links to resources providing information on Montenegro. These links can be found online at: <http://www.usip.org/library/regions/montenegro.html>

### GENERAL RESOURCES

The web sites listed below compile links to Internet resources which describe the background, history, and politics of Montenegro.

**INCORE guide to Internet sources on conflict and ethnicity in Serbia and Montenegro** – <http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/countries/serbia.html>

Annotated links to selected sources, news, articles, NGOs, maps, etc. from the Initiative on Conflict Resolution & Ethnicity. Includes information from groups such as the Balkan Institute and International Crisis Group.

**International Cultural Center (ICC) Library—Eastern Europe Links: Montenegro** – <http://www.lib.ttu.edu/ICC/eeulist.htm#mont>

From Texas Tech University, annotated links to government, internet search tools, and other useful general resources.

**Montenegrin Association of America** – <http://www.montenegro.org/>

Links to information on Montenegro covering geography, history, religion, politics and other topics.

**Sources on the Balkan Peninsula: Yugoslavia** – <http://www.hri.org/nodes/balkans.html#Yugoslavia>

Links compiled by the Hellenic Resources Institute covering news sources, agencies, organizations, political parties, and lists of links from commercial search engines.

### GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

#### FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

**Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia** — [http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Facts/laws/const\\_yu\\_e.html](http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Facts/laws/const_yu_e.html)

Text of the Constitution from the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, FRY.

**Constitution of the Republic of Montenegro** – [http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Facts/laws/const\\_cg\\_e.html](http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Facts/laws/const_cg_e.html)

Text of the Constitution from the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, FRY.

**Facts about Montenegro** – [http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Facts/facts\\_cg\\_e.html](http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Facts/facts_cg_e.html)

Information on the assembly, president and government of the Republic of Montenegro from the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, FRY.

**Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Official Web Site** – <http://www.gov.yu/>

News, information and press statements from the Secretariat of Information, FRY.

#### UNITED NATIONS

**United Nations Resolution 1207 (1998)** – [http://www.un.org/plweb/cgi/idoc2.pl?316+unix+\\_free\\_user\\_+www.un.org.80+un+un+scres+scres++](http://www.un.org/plweb/cgi/idoc2.pl?316+unix+_free_user_+www.un.org.80+un+un+scres+scres++)

Security Council Resolution 1207 (1998) on the Letters from the President of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to the Presi-

dent of the Security Council, adopted by Security Council at its 3944th meeting, on 17 November 1998.

#### UNITED STATES

**Serbia and Montenegro** – [http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/serbia\\_montenegro\\_hp.html](http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/serbia_montenegro_hp.html)

U.S. Department of State's site of official statements and press briefings on Serbia and Montenegro, with a specific statement on the situation in Montenegro, January 15, 1998.

**Letter to Congress on State of Emergency with Serbia** – [http://www.eucom.mil/europe/serbia\\_and\\_montenegro/index.htm](http://www.eucom.mil/europe/serbia_and_montenegro/index.htm)

United States European Command web site has reposted this letter from President Clinton, date Jan 5 1999, with permission of the United States Information Service.

**Serbia and Montenegro** – [http://www.eucom.mil/europe/serbia\\_and\\_montenegro/index.htm](http://www.eucom.mil/europe/serbia_and_montenegro/index.htm)

United States European Command links to country information, briefings from the Dept. of State, the White House, NATO, and other groups, and a link to the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade, among others.

#### **HUMAN RIGHTS AND REFUGEES**

**Annual Report 1998: Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)** – <http://www.ihf-hr.org/reports/ar98/ar98yug.htm>

From the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, this comprehensive report focuses on Serbia, Kosovo and Montenegro, with sections on independence of the judiciary, protection of minorities and accountability for war crimes.

**Montenegrin Helsinki Committee for Human Rights** – <http://www.ihf-hr.org/monthc.htm>

From the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, this web page provides background information, contacts and a description of current projects.

**Refugees in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia** – <http://www.gov.yu/refugees/>

Contains statements from the Secretariat of Information, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the refugee problem in the FRY with reference to Annex VII of the Dayton Agreement.

**Serbia-Montenegro Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997** – [http://www.state.gov/www/global/human\\_rights/1997\\_hrp\\_report/serbiamo.html](http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1997_hrp_report/serbiamo.html)

Extensive report from the U.S. Department of State.

**Yugoslavia Human Rights** – <http://www.gov.yu/rights/index.html>

Contains statements from the Secretariat of Information, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the rights of the members of national minorities, the constitutional and legal regulations, and international treaties, with reference to the Constitution of the FRY.

#### **MAPS AND GUIDES**

**Balkans Regional Atlas** – <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/balkan/regter.html>

Maps detailing political, ethnic, economic, etc. terrain in the Balkan states of the former Yugoslavia, prepared by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

**Political Map of Serbia** – <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/balkan/serbia1.html>

Maps detailing political, ethnic, economic, etc. terrain in Serbia, prepared by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

**Serbia and Montenegro** – <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/sr.html>

Basic facts on Serbia and Montenegro prepared by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, from the CIA Factbook 1997.

**Serbia Maps** – [http://www.lib.utexas.edu/Libs/PCL/Map\\_collection/serbia.html](http://www.lib.utexas.edu/Libs/PCL/Map_collection/serbia.html)

Maps from the Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection of the University of Texas at Austin.

#### **MEDIA AND NEWS SOURCES**

**B92 Open Yugoslavia** – <http://b92eng.opennet.org/>

Radio B92's web site (this is the English version) with daily news reports and archives in Real Audio, HTML text and PDF format.

**Balkan Media & Policy Monitor** – <http://MediaFilter.org/Monitor/>

A digest of articles from other publications with links to full text in cited publications.

**Eurasia Research Center Balkan News Page: Montenegro** – <http://www.eurasianews.com/erc/balkan.htm#montenegro>

Links to news sources and search engines which perform a automated search for news stories on Montenegro.

**Montenegro Journal of Foreign Policy** – <http://www.diplomacy.cg.yu/mjfp.htm>

Published by the Association for the Study of Foreign Policy in Kotor, Montenegro, coverage includes foreign policy research on Southeastern Europe, with links to full text articles.

**Radio Antena M** – <http://www.antenam.org/>

Radio Antena M, independent radio network and described as "the free voice of Montenegro." Requires Real Player.

**Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty** – <http://www.rferl.org/>

The RFE/RL Newsline for Southeastern Europe, a daily report of developments in the region, contains news covering Montenegro – <http://www.rferl.org/newsline/4-see.html> Subscription through e-mail is also available.

**REECA Web: Electronic Resources on the Balkans** – <http://www.library.wisc.edu/guides/REECA/balknet.htm#serbnews>

Links to Serbian and Montenegrin newspapers, journal and magazines.

#### **BOSNIA IN THE BALKANS INITIATIVE**

The Bosnia in the Balkans Initiative (BIB) of the United States Institute of Peace uses the efforts of various Institute programs to support the peace implementation process in Bosnia. The Institute has conducted training programs for staff of international and local NGOs working in Bosnia to help them in their relief and reconciliation work in the aftermath of this intense conflict. The Institute's Religion, Ethics, and Human Rights Program has supported the efforts of top religious leaders in Bosnia to form an Inter-Religious Council to work "together to replace hostility with cooperation and respect" and to acknowledge their shared moral commitment. It is also working with other members within the religious communities to support their efforts at reconciliation. The Institute also recognizes that, if any measure of reconciliation is to occur for Bosnia, war victims, regardless of ethnic affiliation, must have access to fair hearings and due process. To support citizen participation in the justice process, the Institute's Rule of Law Program has begun to work with a variety of Bosnian officials on a number of initiatives, including establishing protection for trial witnesses, more effective police screening procedures, and programs to improve the efficiency of the International War Crimes Tribunal at The Hague. It is also advising Bosnians on the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Bosnia in response to requests from the country's judicial officials and community leaders. The Institute's Grant Program funds a variety of scholarly investigations of the Bosnian conflict and conflict-resolution projects for NGO and other practitioners in the country. Through these and other efforts, the Institute seeks to fulfill its mandate to find and explore creative solutions to international crises and conflict.

The BIB Initiative is under the direction of Harriet Hentges, executive vice president of the Institute.