HomeEducation and TrainingGrants and FellowshipsPolicy ResearchLibrary and LinksPublicationsNews and Media
United States Institute of Peace
logo
SitemapSearch

Complete List of Institute Reports

Release Date:
August 1998



CONTENTS

A Better Future Ahead

What's Next

Democratic Consolidation

The View From The Neighborhood

Conclusions

About This Report

The USIP Bosnia in the Balkans Initiative

SPECIAL REPORT 36

Croatia After Tudjman

Key Points

  • Croatia under Franjo Tudjman has survived the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, consolidated control over its own its own territory and begun the process of postwar recovery.

  • Even opposition leaders appreciate Croatia's newly gained independence, the strength and unity of the new Croatian state, and the emergence of elements of democracy.

  • Croatia's development as a democracy and open society appears likely, although most agreed that the next stages in the transition will occur after the Tudjman regime. Until then Zagreb remains a hybrid state with an autocratic leader dominating a rudimentary and struggling democratic society. What comes after Tudjman? Working group participants expect a split in the ruling party, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), after the upcoming parliamentary election, but before the next presidential elections. The liberal wing of the HDZ will likely join with the democratic opposition and be stronger than the more moderate HDZ nationalists. "Tudjman" nationalists -- those who believe in the dismemberment of Bosnia to form a greater Croatian state -- are expected to represent a minor faction in a post-Tudjman Croatia.

  • The post-Tudjman regime will inherit a weak economic and democratic system. The formation of independent media, a civil society, and a multiparty system has been consistently undermined by the policies and actions of the current government. Economic reform has stalled and privatization has "gone bad," with large chunks of state property transferred to private hands without transparent or competitive procedures, allowing the HDZ and the Tudjman family to gain unfair advantage.

  • Political and economic problems will likely force a successor to remain focused on internal issues, changing significantly current dynamics in the Balkan region. Croatian ambitions in Bosnia and Herzegovina will become less important. Almost any future government will raise the priority of economic and especially social issues.

  • Tudjman's departure from political power will have an important impact on Bosnia's future: (1) the Mostar-Zagreb axis will likely weaken; (2) with moderate leaders such as Kresimir Zubak advocating a future within the Federation, Bosnian Croats will have a serious alternative to hardline nationalism; (3) Tudjman's successors will be less amenable to continued allocation of political and economic benefits to Herzeg-Bosnia. Isolated from Zagreb, economically backward, and small in population, Herzegovina may have no choice but governance by Sarajevo.

  • Relations between Zagreb and Belgrade will become increasingly remote as each country embraces distinct postwar futures.

  • As Zagreb turns to Europe and the West to achieve its national agenda, the United States and Europe will gain leverage on issues of democratization and open markets.

  • Working group participants encouraged the United States to use its leverage to effect change in Croatia in the following areas:
    • repatriation of Serb refugees
    • establishment and tolerance of open and independent media
    • improvement of the electoral process under multiparty supervision
    • ending the Mostar-Zagreb axis, including elimination of diaspora voting and representation in the Croatian Parliament
    • adoption of measures to weaken the presidency while bolstering the parliament and judiciary
    • fostering equitable and transparent privatization programs

A Better Future Ahead

Franjo Tudjman: His Time Has Come, and Gone

The political scene of the former Yugoslavia has been dominated by two leaders whose autocratic personal styles and political strategies have appeared similar even while they have been occasional allies, sworn enemies, and now ambivalent neighbors. Yet Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman have emerged from the war to lead their countries in different directions. While Serbia appears poised to continue aggressive moves, with disastrous results for its own political transition, Croatia has consolidated control over its own territory and begun the process of postwar recovery, opening the prospect of a very different political and economic future, provided it accepts Western human rights standards.

While Tudjman remains the dominant national politician in Croatia, preparations for transition are increasingly visible. Post-Tudjman leaders and the government they establish will face dramatically different problems from those the current regime, which is so closely identified with the Tudjman persona, has successfully resolved. Working group participants likened the regime in Zagreb today to France under de Gaulle, who, during his tenure in office, came to personify the French nation and people. They noted that such regimes are unique and often exist during times of national upheaval, following wars or political revolutions. Croatia has emerged from the breakup of the former Yugoslavia with its territorial integrity ensured and its sovereignty internationally recognized. Participants agreed that Tudjman's special brand of nationalism will not survive him because there is neither political need nor popular support for his idiosyncratic policies towards Bosnia. Croatia's future lies with Europe -- a future that is best secured by establishing a democratic government and ensuring economic stability and growth, and leaving the Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina to define their future without Zagreb's constant intervention.


What's Next

The HDZ that Tudjman leads is a self-identified movement for Croatian independence. The HDZ is not a unified political party, having under its umbrella assorted groups of liberals, modernizers, and right-wingers, who share one interest -- the establishment of a Croatian state. This goal has been achieved. The elections of 1997 demonstrated declining popular support for the HDZ; recent fractures among the elite suggest it may also be weakening from within. After Tudjman, the HDZ is expected to split, with nationalists going in one direction and democrats in another, joined by the democratic opposition. The HDZ has achieved a great deal in its short existence: an independent and internationally recognized Croatian state; control over all Croatian territory; success in the Bosnian war; and continued influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Croatia now needs to focus on issues that matter more and more to citizens: social and economic security, including more secure pensions and an increased standard of living for all. Croatia today enjoys a stable currency and little inflation, but unemployment is very high and continues to rise. The social safety net has disintegrated. The strength of the economy is based on Adriatic coast tourism and remittances from the diaspora community. Economic restructuring has not taken place and the privatization process has "gone bad," with significant chunks of state property now in private hands, including those of the HDZ and the Tudjman family.

How Big Is Croatia?

At stake in the post-Tudjman transition process is not only a smooth change of administration but a fundamental shift in national objectives. Who will lead Croatia after Tudjman, and what kind of Croatia will it be? Working group participants saw the political debate on Croatia's future apportioned in the following three ways:

Greater Greater Croatia: The nationalism of Franjo Tudjman at its most expansive envisioned a Croatia that would extend from the Dalmation coast through central Bosnia, including Banja Luka, which would be acquired by trading Tuzla to the Serbs. With half of Bosnia incorporated into Croatia proper, the new state would be ethnically heterogeneous (unless the Bosnian Muslims were to accept Tudjman's frequent assertions that they are really Croats) and dominated by Zagreb. This vision will not survive the Tudjman regime, which has been prepared to retreat from it repeatedly.

Lesser Greater Croatia: A well-known proponent of this view was Goyko Susak, who believed that over the long run Croatia is better served by controlling de facto if not de jure the Croatian regions of Bosnia, specifically Herzegovina. Proponents of this view are willing to abandon designs on Sarajevo and central Bosnia in order to ensure an ethnically homogeneous Croat state. This program will survive Tudjman and be pursued by the nationalist remnant of the HDZ.

Smaller Croatia: Proponents of this view, including the five parties of the democratic opposition, prefer a state within its currently recognized international boundaries, small and stable enough to undergo a significant political transition to achieve a functioning democracy. Irredentist sentiments are dismissed as harmful to the state. This group believes that a larger Croatia would foster regional instability and be unable to join European institutions. For them the costs of absorbing Herzeg- Bosna -- an impoverished and unstable region -- cannot compare to the benefits of regional and larger European integration and an assured democratic transition.

Croatia is on the verge of entering the next phase of political transition. Working group participants thought that as support for "Greater Greater Croatia" disappears with Tudjman, future succession struggles will occur between the "Smaller Croatia" and "Lesser Greater Croatia" factions. Leaders of these factions are focused more on the need for internal reform and institution building, however, than on the nationalistic aspirations that diverted their attention in recent years and delayed constructive democracy building. Although support for a more technocratic leadership -- expert in matters of economic development and efficient government -- is growing, working group participants cautioned that democratic society in Croatia is still tenuous and needs much nurturing and attention before a successful transition will occur.


Democratic Consolidation

The Foundation Exists

Political life in Zagreb is not as open as it should be. Participants noted small steps in the development of independent media. Through their organization, Forum 22, mainstream journalists lobbied for an independent media after the wide-scale manipulation of media coverage during the 1997 presidential elections. Despite their efforts to expand the scope and number of independent media organizations, government resistance has effectively blocked the growth of this sector, which in turn negatively affects the electoral process. Voting in Croatia is generally free from tampering and fraud, but biased and limited media coverage of opposition candidates results in grossly unfair electoral campaigns.

An active civil society is also developing in Croatia in the form of nongovernmental organizations, citizens' groups, and human rights monitoring organizations. These organizations were seen by the working group as energetic and resourceful; they have had to be. The Croatian government openly and consistently impedes the work and development of these independent civic institutions.

In the working group discussion, many attributed the continued existence of a small civic sector to the courage of its leaders and the policies of the United States and Europe. Western pressure on the Croatian government to establish its democratic credentials for potential integration with Europe has helped to mitigate the worst inclinations of the government. Unfortunately for Croatia, government interference has created the "worst of both political worlds." As one participant described, "Croatia is not prepared to be sufficiently ruthless in the perpetuation of authoritarian power, but not sufficiently democratic to enter the community of nations."

A New Legal Framework Is Needed

Antidemocratic measures are not simply government harassment. They are codified in a body of law that prohibits criticism of Franjo Tudjman and his policies. Libel law and criminal law combine to control the media; attacks on nongovernmental organizations and democratic opposition parties supported by statutes in the criminal law help to perpetuate government control. Some participants noted that the judiciary has played a constructive role. Sentences are often light, and occasionally government cases are dismissed and judicial "decency" prevails. Everyone agreed, however, that the courts, no matter how bold, cannot be free to administer justice if the laws are partial and biased in favor of the government. Legal and perhaps constitutional reform, therefore, are the keys to Croatia's democratic development. According to opposition candidates, the executive branch is too powerful and autocratic in its current form. Its reach must be limited and the other branches of government strengthened if two all-important components of democratic governance -- political and civil society -- are to grow and mature in Croatia.

See the complete list of Institute reports. The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policies.

 


Publications Homepage  |  Peacewatch  |  Reports  |  Complete Catalog  |  New Books  |  Order Books


Institute Home  |  Education & Training  |  Grants & Fellowships  |  Policy Research  |  Library & Links
Publications   |  News & Media  |  About Us  |  Events | Resources  |  Jobs  |  Contact Us
Site Map


United States Institute of Peace  --  1200 17th Street NW  -- Washington, DC 20036
(202) 457-1700 (phone)  --  (202) 429-6063 (fax)
Send Feedback