[House Document 108-158]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
108th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 108-
158
REPORT RELATING TO THE INTERDICTION OF AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN ILLICIT DRUG
TRAFFICKING
__________
COMMUNICATION
from
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
transmitting
REPORT INCLUDING MATTERS RELATING TO THE INTERDICTION OF AIRCRAFT
ENGAGED IN ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING, PURSUANT TO PUB. L. 107-108 22
U.S.C. 2291-4
February 24, 2004.--Referred to the Committee on International
Relations and ordered to be printed
The White House,
Washington, February 19, 2004.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: Consistent with the authorities relating
to official immunity in the interdiction of aircraft engaged in
illicit drug trafficking, (Public Law 107-108, 22 U.S.C. 2291-
4), and in order to keep the Congress fully informed, I am
providing a report prepared by my Administration. This report
includes matters relating to the interdiction of aircraft
engaged in illicit drug trafficking.
Sincerely,
George W. Bush.
United States Assistance for the Interdiction of Aircraft Engaged in
Illicit Drug Trafficking
(A) Colombia is the only country for which the President
made a certification under 22 U.S.C. 2291-4 in calendar year
2003. The President signed Presidential Determination 2003-32
on August 18, 2003, certifying with respect to Colombia that:
(1) interdiction of aircraft reasonably suspected to be
primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking in Colombia's
airspace is necessary because of the extraordinary threat posed
by illicit drug trafficking to the national security of
Colombia; and (2) Colombia has appropriate procedures in place
to protect against innocent loss of life in the air and on the
ground in connection with such interdiction, which shall at a
minimum include effective means to identify and warn an
aircraft before the use of force is directed against the
aircraft.
On August 21, 2003, the Airbridge Denial (ABD) Program in
Colombia began operations. In making a certification for
Colombia, the President determined that narcotrafficking posed
an extraordinary threat to Colombia's national security on the
basis of several factors. These factors include the fact that
Colombia is the world's largest producer of cocaine and a
supplier of high quality heroin; that Colombia faces a growing
cocaine abuse problem; that Colombian drug trafficking
officials suborn Colombian officials and pay illegal armed
groups to protect their organizations; that illegal revenue
from the Colombian drug trade disrupts the licit Colombian
economy; and that narcotrafficking presents a corrosive threat
to the democratic institutions of government and law
enforcement. Significantly, drug trafficking also serves as the
primary source of funding for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) and an important source of funding for the
Colombian United Self-Defense Forces (AUC) and the Colombian
National Liberation Army (ELN).
As is indicated in section (D) below, the Government of
Colombia (GOC) observed over 200 unidentified flights in its
airspace in the 4 months of 2003 in which the program operated.
(About 40 of these flights were later determined to be legal.)
This aerial activity further supports the concerns raised in
the President's determination for Colombia.
(B) The ABD Program in Colombia is based upon an approved
set of procedures and United States safety oversight. The
United States Government safety oversight of the ABD program
includes approved ABD procedures, as outlined in a Bilateral
Letter of Agreement signed April 28, 2003; a safety checklist;
and three primary United States Government safety monitors: a
ground safety monitor (GSM), an air safety monitor (ASM), and a
Joint Interagency Task Force--South (JIATF-S) and ABD watch
officer. These three safety monitors are known as the ABD
safety triad. All three entities in the safety triad must be
involved in all events in which Phase I, II, and III actions
(as described below) are taken against an unidentified assumed
suspect (UAS) flight in the air. The basic procedures for
intercepting as UAS flight are as follows:
Detection, Sorting, and Identification
When the GOC detects or is informed of an aircraft
operating in a defined zone of control that is a candidate for
possible ABD action (a track of interest), information on that
aircraft shall be gathered by the GOC from all reasonably
available sources, including radar systems, radio and visual
contract with the aircraft, electronic systems (which help
determine whether the plane is traveling on a filed flight plan
and what type of plane it is), and relevant air traffic control
centers to begin to determine whether the aircraft is
reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in illicit drug
trafficking. That determination shall be made by the Battle
Commander Officer (BCO) in the Colombian Air Force's Command
and Control Center, based upon certain factors set out
elsewhere in the Agreement, in conjunction with other
information provided to GOC and United States Government
participants in the ongoing action.
Monitoring
If the GOC determines or has preliminary reasons to believe
that an aircraft is primarily engaged in illicit drug
trafficking, that aircraft shall be traced and monitored. If
tracking is intermittent, positive re-identification shall be
made with reasonable certainty before the ABD event may
continue. If the GOC has been unable to identify the track of
interest as a legitimate track, the aircraft shall be
considered suspect by the Colombian Air Force (CAF) under CAF
procedures and may be intercepted.
Phase I--Interception. The interception
phase (Phase I) includes attempts to contact the
intercepted aircraft by radio and, if necessary, by
visual signals in order to determine the identify of
the pilot or intercepted aircraft. If, during this
Phase, the GOC determines thatthe aircraft is
reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in illicit drug
trafficking (on the basis of several considered factors), the CAF may
order the intercepted aircraft to land at a designated place suitable
for a safe landing. If, after being intercepted, the aircraft does not
comply with the procedures and instructions given by the CAF, the pilot
may request permission to proceed to Phase II.
Phase II--Use of Warning Shots. Phase II
consists of the firing of warning shots, using
ammunition containing tracer rounds, in order to
demonstrate to the pilot of the intercepted aircraft
that he must comply with the interceptor's order. If
all of the procedures required under the Agreement have
been followed, if the information gathered continues to
indicate that an aircraft is suspect, and if the
aircraft fails to respond to the interceptor's order to
land, the GOC may, in accordance with the following,
move to Phase III.
Phase III--Firing of Weapons at Intercepted
Aircraft in the Air. If, after warning shots are fired
under Phase II, the intercepted aircraft does not
acknowledge or follow the interceptor's directions, the
Colombian interceptor aircraft may only fire weapons at
the intercepted aircraft if he requests and receives
permission to do so (Phase III). The Commander of the
Colombian Air Force (COCAF) must review all such
requests. The COCAF may approve such requests after
verifying that all procedures required under the
Agreement have been followed. Upon receipt of the
authorization, the interceptor aircraft shall warn the
intercepted aircraft, using ICAO radio communications
procedures and using the appropriate frequencies, that
it will be fired upon if it refuses to comply.
The interceptor shall use reasonable force to disable the
intercepted aircraft, starting with a minimum level of fire in
an attempt to persuade the intercepted aircraft to land as
directed. The intercepted aircraft shall be given a reasonable
opportunity to obey the previously issued orders to land before
the interceptor uses additional force. Levels of force may be
increased if the intercepted aircraft continues to refuse to
follow the interceptor's directions. It is acknowledged that
even the minimum level of force could result in loss of life.
If the intercepted aircraft has landed or been shot down, the
interceptor aircraft or tracker aircraft shall give immediate
notice to the Colombia Air Force Command and Control Center of
the location of the intercepted aircraft.
The Agreement requires similar identification and warning
procedures when a suspected narcotrafficking aircraft has been
located on the ground. Further, the Agreement contains
additional strictures on the use of force, including a
prohibition on the use of force against state or commercial
aircraft, aircraft that have filed and are not significantly
deviating from a flight plan, aircraft whose pilots appear to
be incapacitated, and aircraft whose pilots genuinely appear to
be under duress.
The United States Government initially trained the GOC's
pilots and sensor operators to operate the Citation aircraft
involved in the program. Pilot and crew refresher training as
well as training of new Colombian personnel are on-going as the
program matures. Semi-annual reviews of the program will
address any issues that have arisen in the program's
implementation. Further, the United States Government receives
weekly and monthly reports on program events.
(C) United States Government assistance to the ABD Program
in Colombia consists of the following:
The United States Government provides a number of positions
to Colombia's ABD program. These positions include a DOD
JIATF-S Tactical Commander and Command Duty Officer; a Ground
Safety Monitor in the Colombian Air Force Command and Control
Center (CAFCCC); Air Safety Monitors on board GOC tracking
aircraft; and a Host Nation Rider Assistant on board United
States tracking and detection/monitoring aircraft. Both
Monitors and the Host Nation Rider Assistant are fluent in
Spanish.
JIATF-S, as United States Tactical Commander, exercises
command and control of United States ABD assets through JIATF-
S's Joint Operations Center (JOC). The JIATF-S Command Duty
Officer is the Tactical Commander's senior watch officer at the
JOC. The Ground Safety Monitor is the U.S. representative at
the CAFCCC during ABD operations. The Air Safety Monitor is the
U.S. representative on GOC tracking aircraft and is available
to observe decisions made by GOC personnel, communicate with
the U.S. Ground Safety Monitor and the JIATF-S Command Duty
Officer, and report to them whether the agreed-upon procedures
are being followed. The Host Nation Rider Assistant is a U.S.
representative who assists the Host Nation Rider. The Counter
Drug Operation and Coordination Center, which is located in the
CAFCCC, will assist in coordination, information exchange, and
analysis between JIATF-S and CAFCCC. An employee of the
Narcotics Affairs Section in the U.S. Embassy in Bogota is
devoted exclusively to overseeing implementation of this
program.
The United States Government has provided three Citation
aircraft to the GOC on a no-cost loan basis for use in the ABD
program, and provides ongoing radar information and
intelligence.
Additional United States Government assets (both aircraft
and personnel) from the Department of Defense and the Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement can provide support for
this program under the conditions contained in the Agreement.
In addition, the GOC has agreed that the six United States
Government-supported ground-based radars and the Peace Panorama
System (which is the airspace management system linking ground-
based radars in Colombia to a central radar picture)
constitutes United States Government support for ABD.
(D) From August 21, 2003 until December 21, 2003, the GOC,
with the assistance of the United States Government as
described in section (C), identified over 200 unidentified
assumed suspect (UAS) flights within Colombian airspace. Over
40 of these flights were determined to be legal flights. The
GOC was in a position to act upon approximately 85 of these UAS
flights. The GOC forced down six (6) suspect drug trafficking
aircraft, destroyed four (4) of those aircraft on the ground,
and seized 5.9 metric tons of cocaine. The United States
Government is unaware of any deaths or injuries resulting from
these actions.