

Joint Publication 3-35



Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations



7 September 1999



PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides overarching guidance and principles governing the deployment and redeployment of the Armed Forces of the United States in response to mission taskings. It explains the deployment and redeployment process, deployment and redeployment phases, and planning and execution considerations that may impact US force projection operations. In addition, it discusses the responsibilities and command relationships for supported and supporting combatant commands and Services, as well as their interaction with Defense agencies, host nations, and multinational and interagency components. Finally, this publication discusses deployment and redeployment enablers and the importance of incorporating aspects of deployment and redeployment operations in all joint force training and exercise programs.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides

military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the joint force commander (JFC) from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application


a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command

should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the

United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "C.W. Fulford, Jr.", with a stylized flourish at the end.

C. W. FULFORD, JR.

Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps
Director, Joint Staff

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- **Provides Guidance for the Deployment and Redeployment of the Armed Forces**
 - **Details the Deployment and Redeployment Process Including its Phases, Planning, and Execution**
 - **Discusses Combatant Command and Service Responsibilities and Relationships**
 - **Considers Incorporating Deployment and Redeployment Operations in Training and Exercise Programs**
-

Fundamentals of Deployment and Redeployment

Deployment and redeployment operations support the full range of military operations and are a function of the joint force mission.

Joint force operations must have the capability to deploy or project forces and materiel from the home station to the crisis area in response to mission taskings. The deployment of forces and materiel means they must be relocated to subsequent operational areas, or returned to home or their point of origin upon completion of the mission. **Deployment and redeployment operations support the full range of military operations.** Since both operations have several stakeholders, commands, agencies, and functional processes, unity of effort is critical. As with deployment operations, redeployment operations are characterized by timely and efficient recovery, reconstitution, and relocation of forces and materiel to the home and/or demobilization station, to their point of origin, or subsequent operational areas.

The National Security Strategy of the United States is supported by the Armed Forces with a National Military Strategy which has two military objectives; promote peace and stability and, when necessary, defeat adversaries. This is done through power projection and force projection. **Power projection is the ability of a nation to apply all or some of its elements of national power — political, economic, informational, or military — to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability.** Force projection is the military element of national power that systematically and rapidly moves military forces in response to requirements of war or military operations other than war. Enabled by forward

presence and rapid global mobility, it allows a joint force commander (JFC) to position forces and materiel for mission success.

Deployment and redeployment operations are critical to the mobilization process.

Mobilization involves the preparation of personnel and materiel to a state of readiness for war and other national emergencies. Timely response to crisis situations is critical to US success in military operations. This timeliness is a function of rapid global mobility and adequate operational and intratheater mobility assets and overseas presence.

The **joint deployment process** begins when planning is initiated for force projection operations, in response to an action or event that requires protection of US national interests. **Redeployment process** involves the transfer of individuals, units, and/or materiel, but is not necessarily the reversal of the deployment process. Redeployment may include movement of forces or materiel from one area to another, or to another location in the same area, or to the zone of interior for further employment, or home.

Responsibilities

Articulating responsibilities is the first step in fully synchronized and coordinated deployment and redeployment operations.

The deployment and redeployment of the joint force involves numerous commands and agencies that have several roles and responsibilities in these operations. **The Secretary of Defense** is responsible for the assignment of forces and lift resources to the combatant commands to perform missions assigned to those commands and also for strategic interagency coordination at the national level. **The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff** has supervisory and joint operation planning responsibilities in the areas of strategic direction, strategic planning, and joint operation planning. **The geographic combatant commanders** are responsible for the development and production of joint operation plans and operation plans in concept format. They deter war and prepare for war during peacetime, and plan and conduct campaigns and military operations during war.

Deployment

During deployment operations, supported combatant commanders must build and validate requirements, determine predeployment standards, and balance and regulate the transportation flow.

Deployment operations involve four phases: predeployment activities; movement to and activities at port of embarkation (POE); movement to port of debarkation (POD); and joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI) activities. These phases are the major deployment activities of a joint force. Planning for and execution of these phases is based primarily on mission requirements and the time available to accomplish the mission.

The primary objective of deployment is to provide personnel, equipment, and materiel when and where required by the JFC's concept of operations. In terms of execution, movement requirements developed during deployment planning must be validated prior to deployment execution. Intertheater air, land, and sea transportation is then scheduled to support the approved concept of operations. Force tracking throughout the deployment process is necessary and made possible by the innovative and integrated use of command and control systems and information technology.

Redeployment

Redeployment operations are dependent on the supported combatant commander's defined end state, concept for redeployment, or requirement to support another joint force commander's concept of operations.

Redeployment operations encompass four phases. Recovery and reconstitution and preredeployment activities, movement to and activities at POE, movement to POD, and JRSOI describe the major activities inherent in moving deployed forces and materiel. Redeployments are planned and executed based on mission requirements and are conducted to reposture forces and materiel in the same theater, to transfer forces and materiel to support another JFC's operational requirements, or to return personnel, equipment, and materiel to the home and/or demobilization station upon completion of the mission. One difference between deployment and redeployment is that **redeployment operations focus on reestablishing joint force readiness in addition to redeployment mission requirements.** Force protection is important during redeployment operations, and the operational environment is a key indicator in determining the level of force protection measures required for an uninterrupted redeployment flow.

Training

To focus joint training, joint operational tasks — including deployment, redeployment, and supporting tasks — are listed in the universal joint task list.

Effective deployment and redeployment of personnel, equipment, and materiel to support joint operations depends on the ability to train and exercise the way the United States intends to employ a joint military force. **The universal joint task list provides a common frame of reference** and outlines basic mission tasks for training combatant commands and joint force components. Joint exercises offer an opportunity for joint forces personnel to plan and execute deployment and redeployment operations. Assessment is a vital component of joint force training and exercise programs.

CONCLUSION

This publication establishes a detailed understanding of deployment and redeployment operations. It provides doctrine, principles and concepts on the fundamentals of deployment and redeployment of the Armed Forces of the United States in response to mission taskings. The concepts of the deployment and redeployment process are extensively addressed, with emphasis on planning and execution. It discusses the responsibilities and command relationships for supported and supporting combatant commands and Services with regards to these operations. Finally, consideration is given to the importance of incorporating aspects of deployment and redeployment operations in all joint force training and exercise programs.

CHAPTER I

OVERVIEW

DEPLOYMENT: DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM

“Although deployment of US forces in the operation ultimately was successful, it identified several weaknesses in US rapid deployment capabilities. As the US moves to implement a national security strategy based on the projection of power from the United States and forward bases, these deficiencies must be addressed. Deployment planning systems must be reviewed in light of changing priorities in response to regional contingencies; the need for structured, but flexible deployment schedules; and the requirements for transportation feasibility studies to ensure assets are sufficient and able to accommodate unit requirements. Equally important is the continued emphasis on improving worldwide mobility — airlift, sealift, land movement, and pre-positioning — necessary to ensure that the United States can deploy and project power credibly.”

**SOURCE: DOD Final Report to Congress,
Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, April 1992**

1. Introduction

The focus of this publication is the **deployment and redeployment of a joint force to support joint operations**. Deployment and redeployment is an operational imperative planned and executed by the supported commander. Fundamental to joint force operations is the capability **to deploy or project forces and materiel from origin or home station to the crisis area** in response to mission taskings. Inherent in the deployment of forces and materiel is the requirement to relocate forces and materiel to subsequent operational areas or return them to their home and/or demobilization stations or points of origin upon completion of the mission. Deployment and redeployment operations support the full range of military operations and are functions of the joint force mission. Mission requirements define the scope, duration, and scale of both deployment and redeployment operations. Both operations have **several stakeholders** and involve **numerous commands, agencies, and functional processes**. **Unity of effort is paramount**. Redeployment planning and

execution requires the same focused preparation and intensity as deployment and employment operations. Successful **redeployment operations** are characterized by the **timely and efficient recovery, reconstitution, and relocation of forces and materiel** to their home and/or demobilization station, point of origin, or subsequent operational area.

2. National Security Strategy and Force Projection

a. **National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy (NMS)**. The National Security Strategy of the United States calls for advancing the interests of the United States through an integrated strategic approach embodied by the terms **“shape,” “respond,” and “prepare now.”** The United States will endeavor to shape the international environment and respond to a wide range of military operations while it also prepares now for an uncertain future. The Armed Forces of the United States support the National Security Strategy with an NMS that describes their critical role in achieving US objectives.

It establishes two national military objectives; **promote peace and stability** and, when necessary, **defeat adversaries**. The Armed Forces of the United States **promote peace and stability** through **deterrence, peacetime engagement, regional cooperation, and constructive interaction**. Adversaries are defeated by **applying military power** as directed to overwhelm the adversary, **establishing new military conditions**, and **achieving a political solution favorable to US national interests**. Four strategic concepts support these objectives: **strategic agility, overseas presence, power projection, and decisive force**. Strategic agility, overseas presence, and rapid power projection provide the means to quickly and decisively respond to crisis situations and achieve national objectives.

“ . . . America's Armed Forces are organized, trained, equipped, maintained, and deployed primarily to ensure that our Nation is able to defeat aggression against our country and to protect our national interest. . . Terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, illegal drug-trafficking, and other threats at home and abroad may exceed the capacity of other agencies and require the use of military forces, depending upon applicable law, the direction of the NCA, and the national interest involved. In addition, military resources will continue to support civil authorities in executing missions such as civil works, disaster relief, and domestic crisis.”

Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era

b. Power Projection. Power projection is the ability of a nation to apply all or some of its elements of national power — political, economic, informational, or military — to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain US forces in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability. Peacetime engagement of US military forces



Intertheater deployment and redeployment of the joint force enables the United States to remain globally engaged to protect and promote its vital interests.

could require the deployment of forces and materiel to provide security assistance and foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), or to respond to natural disasters or other peacetime emergencies. On occasion, rapid projection of US military forces may be required to deter threats and prevent conflict. When deterrence fails, US military forces may be deployed to defeat its adversaries. All of these circumstances require a credible US military capability to rapidly project forces and materiel to provide for the common good, demonstrate US resolve, impose US will, or protect US interests.

c. Force Projection. Force projection is the military element of national power that systematically and rapidly moves military forces in response to requirements of war or military operations other than war

(MOOTW). Force projection allows a joint force commander (JFC) to strategically concentrate forces and materiel to set the conditions for mission success. Force projection, enabled by **forward presence** and **rapid global mobility**, is critical to US deterrence and warfighting capabilities. The National Command Authorities (NCA) could direct combatant commanders to resolve a crisis quickly by employing immediately available forward-presence forces. However, when this response is not enough, the rapid projection of forces from the continental United States (CONUS) or outside the continental United States (OCONUS) may be necessary. Alternatively, responding to the range of military operations may involve the movement of forces and materiel within CONUS or OCONUS for humanitarian or disaster relief purposes. Normally on a smaller but no less important scale than strategic deployment, the requirement remains to provide US forces and materiel in a timely and efficient manner consistent with the joint force mission.

3. Projecting the Joint Force

Operations to project the joint force encompass a range of processes, as shown in Figure I-1. The scope of these processes is

dependent upon the joint force mission. Planning for and execution of these processes normally occurs in a **continuous, overlapping, and iterative sequence** for the duration of the joint force mission. However, each joint operation or campaign usually differs in both sequence and scale. The following paragraphs briefly describe each process.

a. **Mobilization.** Mobilization is the process of **assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives** in time of war (and for MOOTW) or other emergencies. Each Service is responsible for maintaining its own mobilization plan and planning system. Mobilization includes bringing all or part of the industrial base and the Armed Forces of the United States to the necessary state of readiness to meet the requirements of the specific contingency. Mobilization may include activation of all, or part, of the Reserve Components (RCs), as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel. Once assembled, personnel will undergo predeployment checks and training as needed.

See JP 4-05.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Manpower Mobilization



Force projection operations are sustained through flexible, assured sealift.

PROCESSES FOR PROJECTING THE JOINT FORCE




Figure I-1. Processes for Projecting the Joint Force

and Demobilization Operations: Reserve Component (RC) Callup.”

b. **Deployment.** Deployment is **movement of forces** and their sustainment from their **point of origin to a specific operational area** to conduct joint operations outlined in a given plan or order. The type and nature of deployments vary widely according to scenario and circumstances. Occasionally, strategic deployment may involve the intertheater movement of forces and materiel using national and allied and/or coalition deployment capabilities. Deployment will be described more fully later in this chapter.

c. **Employment.** Employment prescribes **how to apply force and/or forces to attain specified national strategic objectives**. Employment concepts are developed by JFCs and their component commands during the planning process. These concepts provide the foundation and determine the scope of mobilization, deployment, sustainment, and redeployment processes. Employment

encompasses a wide array of operations including but not limited to, entry operations (opposed or non opposed), decisive operations (combat or support), and postconflict operations (prepare for redeployment or for follow-on mission).

d. **Sustainment.** Sustainment is directed toward **providing and maintaining levels of personnel and materiel** required to sustain the levels of combat or mission activity for the appropriate duration and at the desired level of intensity. Sustainment is ongoing throughout the entire process of deployment and redeployment. Key decisions made early in force projection operations concern basing and sustaining the force. Force projection operations may involve the establishment of support facilities in multiple sites OCONUS, including the crisis area. Logistic support will almost always be split-based between several theaters and CONUS. **The location and size of the base or bases supporting the operation is a key factor in operational reach.** CONUS bases supporting a deployment or redeployment will normally be



Employment of the joint force may include foreign humanitarian assistance missions or peacekeeping operations in austere, underdeveloped countries outside normal operational areas.

selected or designated by the Services and Defense agencies participating in the operation in consultation with United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) or its component commands. Supporting combatant commanders will select bases within their theaters to support a specific operation. The supported combatant commander will select or designate theater bases to support the joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI) of arriving forces.

e. **Redeployment.** Redeployment involves the **transfer of units, individuals, or supplies deployed in one area to another**, to another location within the area, to the zone of interior for the purpose of further employment, or to CONUS and/or OCONUS home and/or demobilization stations for the purpose of further operational employment or demobilization. Postconflict missions may affect the redeployment flow. Commanders must plan and execute redeployment in a manner that optimizes readiness of redeploying forces and materiel to meet new contingencies or crises. Redeployment will be described more fully later in this chapter.

4. The Role of Mobilization

Deployment and redeployment operations are integral to the mobilization process because they are the **vital link between national resources and national objectives**. Deployment and redeployment operations allow the JFC to meet the requirements of a specific contingency and set the conditions for mission success (see Figure I-2).

a. **Graduated Response (GR).** A flexible decision making process referred to as GR **controls the pace and extent of mobilization**. GR **triggers readiness and response actions incrementally** to provide timely, yet reversible, steps that increase the US national security emergency preparedness posture. The levels of mobilization response include: selective mobilization; Presidential Selected Reserve Callup; partial mobilization; full mobilization; and total mobilization. When planning, commanders should understand that while levels of mobilization are progressive in nature, the process does not always progress from a lower level to a higher level.




Figure I-2. Mobilization and Deployment and/or Redeployment

See JP 4-05, “Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning.”

b. **Support Planning.** Supported combatant commanders are tasked in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), or by other joint operation planning authority, to **prepare specific plans in their respective areas of responsibility (AORs)**. They **specify the level of mobilization needed** to support the plan and they **identify time-phased requirements** for RC forces. They also **identify the RC forces needed** for deployment in operational and support roles, and for backfill of deployed units. This planning establishes the requirements for forces and sustainment upon which supporting mobilization plans are based. Supporting combatant commanders, Services, and defense agencies are tasked in the JSCP, or by other joint planning authority, to provide

augmentation forces and other support to a designated supported combatant commander or commanders. In this role, they may also require mobilized assets to accomplish their respective support missions; their supporting plans include appropriate mobilization requirements. Detailed coordination is required to ensure the timely arrival of forces and materiel essential to the JFC’s concept of operation. Mobilization and sustainment continue until the joint force completes its mission and redeploys as directed.

c. **Resource Areas.** Joint force operations require assured capability to support and sustain the nation’s military forces. Deployment operations **support the initial projection of forces** and, once they are deployed, **link the deployed force with their home station and the CONUS sustainment base**. Ready supplies are stocks available

for issue pending additional procurement or expansion of the industrial base to support anticipated requirements. Military mobilization requires the assembly and organization of resources in 12 interdependent resource areas (see Figure I-3). Planners and commanders should understand that mobilization decisions occurring in any one area may have an influence on each of the other areas.

d. **Demobilization.** The personnel, equipment, and industrial infrastructure mobilized to support an operation will be demobilized **when they are no longer needed to support the mission.**

Demobilization usually results in **redeployment requirements** for getting personnel and equipment back to home station. **Demobilization planning, if required, must occur concurrently with redeployment planning.** Demobilization plans must reflect joint force post-operations mission requirements and be synchronized with plans for recovery and redeployment. Although the overall focus of demobilization generally is on units and individuals, the demobilization of logistics also requires significant resources such as materiel and support activities.

5. Mobility Options

Rapid force projection with robust strategic mobility is the keystone to US NMS. **Timely response to crisis situations** is critical to US deterrent and warfighting capabilities. The timeliness of US response is a function of **rapid global mobility augmented by adequate intratheater lift assets and overseas presence.** Overseas presence, tailored to regional requirements, facilitates force projection by providing needed flexibility through prepositioning of assets and infrastructure to support strategic mobility operations. The combination of **rapid lift and prepositioned assets** provides the supported combatant commander with **flexible mobility options that can be tailored to meet any crisis situation.** Transportation and mobility assets are not a limitless resource. Supported combatant commanders must make prudent use of transportation and mobility assets apportioned or allocated for their use because wasted lift is an opportunity lost forever. Squandering finite transportation and mobility resources including intertheater and intratheater lift assets may lead to ineffective employment of the joint force and mission failure.

For additional information, see JP 4-01, "Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System."



Figure I-3. Mobilization Resource Areas

a. **The Strategic Mobility Triad.** Deployment and redeployment operations normally involve a combination of land (road and rail), sea, and air movement augmented, as necessary, by prepositioned assets. Successful response to the range of military operations depends on the availability of **sufficient mobility assets to rapidly deploy combat forces, sustain them** in an operational area as long as necessary to meet US military objectives, and **reconstitute and redeploy them** to meet changing mission requirements **or to return to home and/or demobilization stations** upon completion of their mission. To meet this challenge, USTRANSCOM's transportation component commands (TCCs) (Air Mobility Command [AMC], Military Sealift Command [MSC], and Military Traffic Management Command [MTMCM]), exercise operational control (OPCON) of government-owned or -chartered transportation assets for use by all Department of Defense (DOD) elements and, as authorized, other agencies of the US Government or other approved users.

Common-user airlift, sealift, and prepositioned force, equipment, or supplies (PREPO) constitute the strategic mobility triad shown in Figure I-4.

- **Common-User Airlift.** The pool of common-user airlift consists of **designated airlift assets** from some or all of the following sources: active military forces; RC military forces (Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, and Naval Reserve); civil air carriers under contract to AMC; the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), when activated; contracted commercial assets; and multinational contributions and foreign civil carriers, either donated or under contract.

For additional information, see JP 3-17, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Airlift Operations," and JP 4-01.1, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airlift Support to Joint Operations."




Figure I-4. The Strategic Mobility Triad

- **Common-User Sealift.** The pool of common-user sealift is composed of **designated shipping assets** from some or all of the following sources: active government-owned or controlled shipping; government-owned reserve or inactive shipping; US privately owned and operated commercial shipping; Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement, when activated; US privately owned, approved foreign flag commercial shipping; and approved foreign-owned and operated commercial shipping.

For additional information, see JP 4-01.2, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Sealift Support to Joint Operations.”

- **Prepositioned Force, Equipment, or Supplies.** To augment the deployment of forces, prepositioned equipment for combat and logistics units are **stored aboard large ships or positioned in storage facilities ashore**. These PREPO programs may **accelerate deployments by reducing closure times of combat and support forces** needed in the early stages of a crisis. The afloat prepositioning force consists of the maritime prepositioned ships and afloat prepositioned ships to support the needs of all four Services. Afloat PREPO, which involves the forward deploying of equipment and supplies aboard ships, improves response time in a crisis while adding flexibility and security. Shore-based PREPO, along with afloat prepositioning, is critical to reducing wartime demands on the Defense Transportation System (DTS). The DTS is the portion of the nation’s transportation infrastructure that supports DOD common-user transportation needs across the range of military operations. Several war reserve stockage sites with unit equipment sets are available to

support the rapid deployment of forces in response to crisis situations.

b. **Other Lift Sources.** The strategic mobility triad may be augmented by other transportation and mobility sources when required by mission requirements. **Airlift sources** include: **strategic transportation assets that are not designated as common-user**, such as theater airlift forces under the combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) of designated geographic combatant commanders; **organic airlift forces providing specialized lift to specific users**; and **donated or contracted third-party airlift assets**. **Surface transportation sources** include: **combat ships** made available for transport of ground and air forces; strategic applications of **road, rail, and inland waterway transportation** where open land routes between theaters are available for use; and **donated or contracted third-party surface transportation assets**. Normally, the additional military airlift forces exist as elements of Service or component aviation arms and are assigned directly to their primary user organizations. Additional military airlift forces not designated as common-user, if assigned to a combatant command, usually operate under the COCOM of that combatant commander.

See JP 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).”

c. **Operational and Tactical Mobility.** There are numerous transportation and mobility resources available to a JFC to support deployment and redeployment operations within the AOR and/or joint operations area (JOA). The type and number of sources vary by theater and by missions. Normally, operational and tactical mobility is **provided through a combination of resources** including: **organic assets** assigned to the commander of a unified command for common transportation service; **host-nation**

support (HNS) negotiated through bilateral or multilateral agreements; **multinational civil transportation support organizations**; or **third-party logistics operations**. When needed, theater airlift forces may be augmented by either assigning or attaching additional airlift assets or, on an as needed basis, under an appropriate tactical control or support relationship. Theater common-user land transportation is normally available through the combatant commander's Army Service component command.

6. Deployment

The joint deployment process begins when planning is initiated for force projection operations. Normally, joint force deployment is in **response to an action or event** that happens in the world requiring the United States to respond by deploying forces and materiel to **protect US national interests**. Actions or events which could trigger the deployment process include **natural disasters, civil support, FHA, United Nations (UN) actions and support** to regional organizations (e.g., North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] operations), or joint force deployments in response to **threats to national interests** such as Operation DESERT SHIELD. Some elements of the joint force can conduct deployment operations with organic or attached lift, and self-deploy in support of the joint force mission. The majority of the joint force, however, requires a combination of organic and common-user transportation assets to deploy in response to mission requirements.

a. **Operational Environment.** Deployments are a combination of dynamic directed activities to support the JFC's concept of operations for employment of the joint force. Employment and deployment planning decisions are based on the anticipated operational environment to be encountered in the AOR or JOA. The operational environment is a composite of the **conditions,**

circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the JFC. The anticipated operational environment dictates the type of **entry operations, deployment concept, and mobility options** needed to support employment of the joint force. The operational environment is generally described by three conditions; **permissive, uncertain, or hostile**.

- **Permissive Environment.** A permissive environment is an operational environment in which **host country military and law enforcement agencies have control** and have the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct. In this situation, entry operations during deployment are unopposed and the **host country is supporting the deployment**.
- **Uncertain Environment.** An uncertain environment is an operational environment in which **host government forces**, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, **do not have totally effective control of the territory and population** in the intended area of operations. In this situation, entry operations during deployment are **generally unopposed but could be opposed at any point** during the deployment by forces or individuals not under host government control.
- **Hostile Environment.** A hostile environment is an operational environment in which **hostile forces have control** and the intent and **capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations** that a unit intends to conduct. In this situation, the **deploying force must conduct forcible entry operations** to secure a lodgment for deployment of the joint force to ensure the continuous landing of forces and

materiel and provide space for subsequent operations.

b. Scope of Deployment Operations.

Deployment operations can generally be classified as either **movement** (operations to move forces and materiel from one point to another) or **maneuver** (operations to gain a positional advantage with respect to an enemy force) **conducted at the strategic and operational levels of warfare.**

- **Movement.** During strategic deployments to support movement of the joint force, **operational as well as tactical considerations** should be analyzed relative to mission requirements and movement efficiencies.
- **Maneuver.** Deployments supporting maneuver of the joint force focus on the **strategic, operational, or tactical considerations** necessary to **gain a positional advantage** with respect to the enemy to accomplish the joint force mission. Planning for these deployments is based primarily on the **commander's concept of operations** for employment of the force in the AOR and/or JOA, the **threat**, and the **anticipated operational environment**. These factors help determine the entry operations, deployment concept, and mobility options required to successfully posture a joint force to accomplish the assigned mission. **Strategic maneuver** could include the **deployment of forward presence forces** from one theater for employment in another theater to create or exploit a strategic advantage. Deployments supporting **operational maneuver** could include **operations to envelop an enemy force**, to compromise their current operational disposition, and place the enemy force at a positional disadvantage.

c. **The Deployment Process.** The deployment process **begins when force projection planning is initiated**, often with the NCA's directive to accomplish a mission requiring deployment of forces, and **ends when an integrated force arrives at the prescribed destination ready to conduct operations** (see Figure I-5). In simple form, the deployment process encompasses **four primary nodes** (point of origin, port of embarkation [POE], port of debarkation [POD], and destination) and **three major movement "legs"** (point of origin to POE, POE to POD, POD to destination).

- Joint force deployment is a dynamic and complicated process with **numerous process stakeholders and process seams**, resulting from the multitude of organizations and functional processes involved in deployment planning and execution. Deployment **stakeholders include** the **supported commander** responsible for mission accomplishment, **operational commanders** of forces deploying to execute a joint force mission, and **supporting commanders** of forces and organizations supporting the deployment portion of a force projection mission. Ideally, all process stakeholders should endeavor to **strike a balance between operational effectiveness** (defined by successful mission accomplishment consistent with the supported commander's force protection concerns) **and deployment efficiency** (optimal and economical use of deployment resources). Operational effectiveness, however, will normally take priority over deployment efficiency.
- Process seams may occur at functional or organizational interfaces when physical resources or information is transferred. **Friction between operational and supporting stakeholders or**




Figure I-5. The Deployment Process

process seams reduces the operational effectiveness and efficiency of the deployment process. More importantly, friction impedes overall mission accomplishment. Supported commanders **reduce the impact of deployment friction** by: fully understanding the deployment process; coordinating effectively with other process stakeholders; ensuring that subordinate organizations maintain current and accurate movement data; controlling changes to validated force deployment data; and following established deployment procedures during training exercises, contingencies, or war.

d. **Deployment Phases.** For joint force operations, **four major phases** comprise the deployment process: **predeployment activities; movement to and activities at POE; movement to POD; and JRSOI.** These phases describe the major activities of a joint force from point of origin (post, base, fort, home port, or camp) to a prescribed destination (intermediate staging base [ISB], forward operating base, or tactical assembly area [TAA] in theater). These phases are continuous and iterative and are dependent on the JFC's concept for employment and changes in mission (see Figure I-6).

- **Predeployment Activities.** Predeployment activities include planning for and




Figure I-6. Strategic Deployment Planning and Execution

preparation of forces to meet a mission need. Predeployment activities are those actions taken at home station or point of origin to **prepare individuals, units, and materiel for deployment**. Predeployment activities must be **coordinated among the supported combatant command** responsible for accomplishment of the assigned mission, **the Services**, and **the supporting combatant commands providing forces** for the joint force mission. Normally, supported combatant commanders, their subordinate commanders, and their Service components are responsible for providing mission statements, theater support parameters, strategic lift allocations, applicable host nation (HN)

environmental standards, and prepositioned equipment planning guidance during predeployment activities.

- Supported combatant commanders must **identify specific predeployment standards** necessary to meet mission requirements. The Services are responsible to recruit, organize, train, and equip interoperable forces for assignment to combatant commands and to prepare plans for their mobilization when required (see DOD Directive 5100.1, “Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Subordinate Components”). Supporting combatant commanders are responsible for providing **trained and mission-ready**

forces to the supported combatant command. Service predeployment activities should be coordinated with supporting combatant command predeployment activities to **ensure that predeployment standards** specified by the supported combatant commander **are achieved**, supporting **personnel and forces arrive in the supported theater fully prepared** to perform their mission, and **deployment delays** caused by duplication of predeployment efforts are eliminated.

- Predeployment activities could include: continued refinement of unit operation plans (OPLANs); preparation of personnel and equipment for movement; preparation of unitized loads of ammunition, supplies, and equipment; establishment of command relationships based on the supported combatant commander's organization of forces; rehearsal of mission-essential tasks; conduct of mission-specific training; establishment of sustainment requirements; time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) refinement and sourcing; and focused awareness of the impact of threat, climate, and geography in the AOR or JOA on planned joint force activities.

- Normally during predeployment, commanders echelon their units based on **operational considerations, movement schedules**, and the **type of strategic lift projected**. This process organizes and prioritizes movement within the joint force to accommodate the available lift. For example, the movement plan may echelon units into an advance party, main body, and rear party.

- **Movement to and Activities at POE.** POEs include **seaports of embarkation (SPOEs)** and **aerial ports of embarkation (APOEs)**. USTRANSCOM

is the **DOD-designated single worldwide manager** for common-user ports of embarkation and debarkation.

- Because CONUS deploying units generally require a **combination of organic and common-user** (including commercial and allied and/or coalition assets) **transportation assets** to move required personnel and equipment to POEs, movement to POEs within CONUS is a **shared responsibility** between the Services, other supporting combatant commands (e.g., United States Special Operations Command [USSOCOM]), and USTRANSCOM. Organic lift movements are normally executed under unit control and coordinated by the deploying unit's transportation managers with designated movement control agencies. Commercial movement to a POE within CONUS is arranged by a unit's installation transportation officer (ITO) or transportation management office (TMO) under the authority of the Defense Travel Regulation (as coordinated through USTRANSCOM's MTMC) to meet the timelines in the POE call forward message.

- Movement to **OCONUS POEs** is the responsibility of the **geographic combatant commander** whose theater POEs are being used to support the deployment operation. In the event theater movement requirements exceed theater capability, theater airlift assets can be **augmented with USTRANSCOM common-user assets** at the request of the geographic combatant commander.

- Activities at POEs focus on **staging, marshalling, and loading individuals, units, equipment, and materiel on designated transportation assets** prior to movement to PODs. Load planning is driven by the deployment concept and

lift assets supporting deployment, the anticipated operational environment, and the anticipated situation at the POD to receive, offload, and reassemble mission capable organizations. Forces and materiel may be **combat loaded, unit loaded, or administratively loaded** for deployment. Combat loading arranges personnel and equipment in a manner designed to conform to the anticipated tactical situation and is significantly less efficient than unit or administrative loading. Unit loading allows troop units to move with their equipment and accompanying supplies on the same conveyance. It is more efficient than combat loading and maintains unit integrity better than administrative loading. Administrative loading gives primary consideration to achieving maximum utilization of troop and cargo space without regard to tactical considerations. Equipment and accompanying supplies must be sorted before they can be used.

- During deployment, units are echeloned, configured, and scheduled for

movement based on TPFDD that **synchronizes arriving personnel, equipment, and materiel with mission needs. Time phasing allows for rapid theater reception and onward movement** of arriving personnel, equipment, and materiel.

- In a typical deployment, commanders **temporarily lose direct control of unit personnel and equipment** when they embark on common-user transportation assets at the POE and while in transit. USTRANSCOM, through its subordinate TCCs, **assumes transportation and reporting responsibilities** (but not command authority) for embarked personnel, equipment, and materiel until they arrive at the POD and unload from common-user transportation. Transportation and reporting responsibilities include transporting, accounting for, tracking, and guiding deploying personnel, equipment, and materiel from the POE to the POD. Accounting for and tracking of personnel and cargo is accomplished using the **current and accurate**



Detailed coordination is required between strategic and theater movement systems to facilitate the expeditious reception and onward movement of forces and materiel arriving at ports of debarkation.

movement data using allocated space systems and assets provided by the forces being moved. Joint total asset visibility (TAV) is critical to command and control (C2) of equipment and personnel deployment operations. Commanders of the deploying force have the inherent command responsibility to reassemble their forces after movement consistent with their mission requirements and task organization.

- **Movement to POD.** PODs include seaports of debarkation (SPODs) and aerial ports of debarkation (APODs). Movement to PODs can be conducted using common-user and organic or assigned and/or attached lift assets.

- Movement to PODs on **common-user transportation is planned and executed by USTRANSCOM** in consultation with the supported and supporting combatant commanders. USTRANSCOM's primary responsibility is to **ensure operational effectiveness** in support of the JFC's deployment requirements while striving to attain the most efficient utilization of transportation resources. Alternatively, movement to PODs on **organic or assigned and/or attached lift is the responsibility of the deploying unit commander**, in response to mission guidance from the supported JFC.

- Successful deployments are characterized by **careful planning and flexible execution**. Careful and detailed planning ensures that only required personnel, equipment, and materiel are scheduled for movement, unit movement changes are minimized, and the flow of personnel, equipment, and materiel into theater does not exceed lift availability and the theater reception capability.

- USTRANSCOM coordinates en route support, such as refueling, escort, and clearances, based on mutual support agreements and foreign clearance guides.

- **JRSOI.** The last phase of deployment, in-theater JRSOI, is the **responsibility of the supported combatant commander**. Deployment is not complete until the deploying unit is a functioning part of the joint force in theater.

- Based on the supported combatant commander's movement control and JRSOI plan, transportation and reporting responsibilities for deploying unit personnel, equipment, and materiel are initially provided by designated theater support personnel. Complete control is returned to the deploying unit commander when personnel, equipment, and materiel arrive at and transition through the marshalling area.

- Units deploying on organic or external lift assets must coordinate in-theater arrival with the supported combatant command to facilitate terrain management and in-theater reception. Again, in the event additional lift assets are needed in theater to support onward movement of arriving forces and materiel, theater lift assets may be augmented by various means as coordinated by the supported combatant commander's movement control element with supporting commands or the HN.

- **JRSOI is the critical link between deployment and employment of the joint forces in the AOR or JOA.** The time between the initial arrival of the deploying unit and its operational employment is potentially the period of its greatest vulnerability. During this



The objective of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration is the expeditious assembly of mission-capable forces.

transition period, the deploying unit may not fully sustain itself, defend itself, or contribute to mission accomplishment because some of its elements have not attained required mission capability. **JRSOI planning is focused on the rapid integration of deploying units** to quickly make them functioning and contributing members of the joint force. The JRSOI objective is to create a **seamless flow of personnel, equipment, and materiel** from offload at PODs through employment as reassembled, mission-capable forces.

For additional information on JRSOI see JP 4-01.8, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration.”

7. Redeployment

Redeployment activities are directed at the **transfer of individuals, units, and/or materiel** and can **begin at any point** during joint force operations. For this reason, **redeployment planning should occur early**

in the joint operation planning process so planned redeployment operations reflect exit or transition strategy concerns developed during mission analysis. **Redeployment is not merely reversing the deployment process.** Redeployments are planned and executed as discrete, mission-based operations within the overall context of the joint force mission. Redeployment may include movement of individuals, units, and/or materiel deployed in one area to another, to another location within the same area, to the zone of interior for the purpose of further employment, or to CONUS and/or OCONUS home and/or demobilization stations for reintegration and/or out-processing. Some elements of the joint force may conduct redeployment operations with organic or assigned and/or attached lift and redeploy on their own without external assistance. The majority of the joint force, however, **requires a combination of organic and common-user transportation assets to redeploy.** Force protection is as important during redeployment as during any other stage of the joint operation. The time between redeployment preparation and operational employment at the new destination or return



Redeployment may occur at any point during joint force operations.

to the home and/or demobilization station is potentially a period of great vulnerability for the redeploying unit. During this transition period, the redeploying unit may not be able to fully sustain or defend itself because some or all of its elements are configured for movement and may not have full mission capability. Equally important in the redeployment process is a complete review of the environmental considerations applicable in the HN environment. Failure to take the HN requirements for environmental compliance into account may delay the efficient redeployment of units to a follow-on location while substantially increasing the cost of the deployment.

a. **Operational Environment.** Redeployment operations are normally conducted to **reposture forces and materiel in the same theater**, to **transfer forces and materiel** to support another JFC's concept of operations for employment, or to **return personnel and materiel to home station and/or demobilization stations** upon completion of their mission. Similar to deployment operations, redeployment planning decisions to reposture, transfer, or return forces and materiel are based on the operational environment in the AOR or JOA at the time of redeployment. **The operational**

environment dictates the level of force protection measures required to ensure an uninterrupted redeployment flow, the redeployment policy of the supported combatant commander, and the mobility options needed to support the redeployment.

- **Permissive Environment.** A permissive environment for redeployment operations is generally characterized by a **cessation of hostilities and minimum threat or risk**. The host country military and law enforcement agencies have control and the intent and capability to assist unit transition and redeployment operations.
- **Uncertain Environment.** In an uncertain environment **redeployment operations are generally unopposed, but could be opposed at any point** during the redeployment by forces or individuals not under host government control. Typical redeployment operations in this situation could include the retrograde of personnel and materiel to reshape the force (e.g., exchanging an armored force for a light infantry force because of changing mission requirements), or unit and/or individual rotations (exchange of same type RC

units, volunteers or individual ready reserves) out of theater.

- **Hostile Environment.** Redeployment operations may have to be executed while hostile forces have control and the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations conducted by the joint force. In this environment, the redeploying force can **conduct the same redeployment missions** outlined above but may have to do so **while actively engaged with the enemy, while facing an imminent threat, or while operating in a high risk environment.**

b. Scope of Redeployment Operations.

Redeployment operations can generally be classified as the movement of forces and materiel either from a theater back to home station or to another location within the area for the purpose of further employment.

- **Movement.** During redeployments to support movement of the joint force, tactical considerations may be sacrificed for speed, control, and efficiency during movement. These redeployments are: conducted when little or no threat is anticipated that could impede or interdict the transportation flow; seeking the most expeditious means to rapidly move forces and materiel; and focused on the simple movement from one location to another of forces and materiel in support of the joint force mission. **Tactical redeployment** could include **movement of a force from a sector in the JOA not in contact with the enemy to the joint rear area** for later deployment as part of an operational maneuver. Movement at the **strategic or operational level** could include **redeployment of the joint force upon completion of its mission** within the AOR and/or JOA.

c. **Redeployment Process.** Like deployment, the redeployment process

encompasses **four primary nodes** (point of origin, POE, POD, and destination) and **three major movements** (point of origin to POE, POE to POD, POD to destination). The redeployment process has the same process stakeholders and seams as the deployment process. Again, friction between operational and supporting stakeholders or process seams reduces the operational effectiveness and efficiency of the redeployment process and could impede overall mission accomplishment. Supported commanders reduce redeployment friction through the same means used during deployment.

d. **Redeployment Phases.** For joint force operations, **four major phases comprise the redeployment process:** recovery and reconstitution and preredeployment activities; movement to and activities at POE; movement to POD; and JRSOI activities. **These phases describe the major activities of the joint force from point of origin** (tactical location) **to a staging area in another theater or home and/or demobilization station** and are dependent on the supported combatant commander's defined end state, concept for redeployment, or requirement to support another JFC's concept of operations.

- **Recovery and reconstitution and preredeployment activities.** After completion of or a change in operational requirements, forces recover and reconstitute for redeployment. Recovery and reconstitution is a Service responsibility and should be based on Service doctrine and procedures for restoring combat capability.

- Units move to designated staging areas (SAs) to assemble personnel, equipment, and materiel and focus on accounting for, assuring readiness of, and preparing individuals, units, and materiel for redeployment. Operational requirements may have necessitated alteration to the organization of some



Redeployment operations focus on the expeditious return of personnel and equipment to restore unit readiness and maintain mission capability.

units after their arrival in the AOR and/or JOA. These units should be reunited prior to redeployment to facilitate optimal readiness and deconflict predeployment activities.

•• **Preredeployment activities** are those actions redeploying units must execute to **prepare for movement and departure from their current location.**

These activities are generally a unit or Service responsibility, but may involve coordination with theater staff elements or the joint force headquarters. The supported combatant commander is responsible for the redeployment TPFDD. Redeployment activities could include the following: refinement of unit redeployment plans; preparation of personnel and equipment for return to CONUS (e.g., US Customs and/or US Department of Agriculture inspections) or other movement; settlement of HNS accounts; spill response and site clean-up; proper disposal of hazardous and other wastes; validation of movement requirements and priorities for backhaul of combat forces and materiel; and accountability and turn-in of PREPO equipment and materiel.

• **Movement to and activities at POE.** Movement to a POE within the theater is the **responsibility of the supported geographic combatant commander.**

Redeploying units will comply with the supported combatant commander's policy for redeployment, movement control plan, and the orders provided by theater movement control agencies.

•• Some units may conduct movement to POE with organic lift assets. However, the majority of redeploying units generally require a **combination of organic and theater transportation assets** to assemble the required personnel and equipment at POE. Organic lift movements are normally coordinated by the redeploying unit's transportation managers and controlled by the established theater control architecture. Again, theater lift assets to support assembly of a joint force at POEs may be augmented by various means as coordinated by the supported combatant commander's movement control element with supporting commands or the HN.

•• **Redeployment planning and execution is also based on a TPFDD.**

TPFDD development and movement scheduling should optimize the available cargo capacity in allocated lift assets and the reception capacity of the POD. During strategic movement to another AOR, the TPFDD will be developed by the gaining combatant commander.

- USTRANSCOM is responsible for management of common-user POEs. Activities at the **POE focus on marshalling, capturing in-transit visibility (ITV) data, and loading** individuals, units, equipment, and materiel on designated transportation assets prior to movement to the POD. Again, commanders temporarily lose direct control of unit personnel and equipment when they embark on common-user transportation assets at the POE and while in transit. USTRANSCOM's TCCs assume transportation and reporting responsibilities for in-transit personnel, equipment, and materiel until they arrive at the POD and unload from common-user transportation.
- **Movement to POD.** Movement to PODs can be conducted using **common-user and organic or assigned and/or attached lift assets**. Movement by organic or assigned and/or attached lift is the responsibility of the redeploying unit commander in accordance with mission guidance from the supported JFC.
 - Tactical cross-loading and echeloning of forces is required for redeployment to support the mission of employment of a joint force in another operational area.
 - Again, USTRANSCOM's primary responsibility in supporting movement to the POD is to ensure effective support for the JFC's redeployment requirements, while striving to attain the most efficient

utilization of transportation resources. USTRANSCOM coordinates en route support, such as refueling, escort, and clearances, based on mutual support agreements and foreign clearance guides.

- **JRSOI. JRSOI is the final phase of redeployment.** Responsibility for reception, staging, onward movement, and integration from a POD during redeployment operations is determined by the post-redeployment mission of the redeploying force and the mode of transportation. Redeployment for further employment will involve JRSOI in the new AOR and/or JOA. Redeployment to the home and/or demobilization station or point of origin for return to peacetime positioning or demobilization will involve POD JRSOI coordinated and executed by the Services and USTRANSCOM for common-user PODs and by the respective Service or unit for forces redeploying by organic assets to non common-user PODs.
 - Onward movement by common-user or commercial lift from a common-user surface POD to the home and/or demobilization station or point of origin is arranged by MTMC in conjunction with Service and/or the force-designated movement control center (MCC). Onward movement from AMC APODs is the responsibility of AMC, and from commercial and/or non-AMC military APODs onward movement is the responsibility of the personnel assistance points or ITO and/or TMO responsible for the geographic area of those ports.
 - Recovery and reconstitution activities not completed in theater before redeployment may continue at an intermediate staging site, either en route to the next theater or after the unit's arrival at the home and/or demobilization station. Materiel stockage levels must

satisfy war reserve materiel requirements. Immediate recovery and reconstitution of forces and materiel parallels integration efforts by ensuring that the Armed Forces of the United States are prepared for the next action or event requiring deployment of US resources.

•• Demobilization of RC forces, if required, is considered during redeployment planning and should provide for the expeditious return, reintegration, and outprocessing of RC personnel based on Service demobilization plans and policies. However, **consideration must be given to the supported commander's immediate post operations requirements.** The supported commander's post operations mission and priorities should take precedence over all other redeployment planning.

•• When units or individuals redeploy, reintegration processing must be done prior to returning active duty Service members to their permanent duty stations or demobilizing RC Service members. Reintegration includes medical and security debriefs, clothing and equipment turn-in, and update of personnel and finance records.

"Operation DESERT SHIELD was the fastest build up and movement of combat power across greater distances in less time than at any other time in history. It was an absolutely gigantic accomplishment, and I can't give credit enough to the logisticians and transporters who were able to pull this off."

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf
Commander in Chief, US Central
Command

CHAPTER II

RESPONSIBILITIES

"All over the ship the tension that had been slowly building up since our departure was now approaching its climax. Even the Yellow Sea rushing past the ship's sides seemed to bespeak the urgency of our mission. That night, about half past two, I took a turn around the deck. The ship was blacked out from stem to stern. At their posts and battle stations the crew members were alert and silent, no longer exchanging the customary banter. At the bow I stood listening to the rush of the sea and watched the fiery sparklets of phosphorescence as the dark ship plowed toward the target, the armada of other craft converging on the same area, all now past the point of no return. Within five hours, 40,000 men would act boldly, in hope that 100,000 others manning the thin defense lines in South Korea would not die. I alone was responsible for tomorrow, and if I failed, the dreadful results would rest on judgment day against my soul."

Thoughts of General Douglas MacArthur in the predawn hours prior to the Inchon landings, Reminiscences, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur

1. General

a. The strategic deployment and redeployment of the joint force involves numerous commands and agencies, the process stakeholders discussed earlier. This chapter identifies the **responsibilities, roles, and relationships of the primary commands and agencies** involved in deployment and redeployment operations. Force projection can not occur without well-planned, fully coordinated, and well executed deployment and redeployment operations.

b. Basic responsibilities for JFCs and other supporting agencies are outlined in JP 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)," JP 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," and JP 4-01, "Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System." Clearly articulating responsibilities is the first step in fully synchronized and coordinated deployment and redeployment operations supporting the full spectrum of joint force missions.

2. Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of Defense is responsible for the **assignment of forces and lift resources to the combatant commands to perform missions assigned to those commands and for strategic interagency coordination at the national level**. In addition, the Secretary of Defense is responsible for **transportation planning and operations within the Department of Defense**. The Secretary of Defense has designated the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics) to establish policies and provide guidance to DOD components concerning the effective and efficient use of the DTS. The Secretary of Defense has designated the Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command (USCINCTrans) as the DOD single manager for transportation (other than for Service-unique or theater-assigned transportation assets) during times of peace and war.



The Secretary of Defense has designated the USCINCTrans as the DOD single manager for transportation during peace and war.

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

a. As the principal military advisor to the President, National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is assigned specific **supervisory and joint operation planning responsibilities in the areas of strategic direction, strategic planning, and joint operation planning**. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsibilities most directly related to deployment and redeployment operations include the following.

- Prepares joint logistics and mobility plans to support strategic plans and recommends the assignment of logistics and mobility responsibilities to the Military Services in accordance with those plans.
- Provides for the preparation and review of joint OPLANs that conform to policy guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense.
- Prepares joint logistics and mobility plans to support joint OPLANs, recommends the assignment of logistics and mobility responsibilities to the Armed Forces in accordance with those logistics and mobility plans, and ascertains the logistic support available to execute the general war and joint OPLANs of the combatant commanders. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also will review and recommend to the Secretary of Defense appropriate logistics guidance for the Military Services that, if implemented, will result in logistics readiness consistent with approved plans.
- Advises the Secretary of Defense on critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities (including manpower, logistics, and mobility support) identified during the preparation and review of OPLANs and assesses the effect of noted deficiencies and strengths on meeting national security objectives, policies, and strategic plans.
- Prepares integrated plans for military mobilization.



The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for monitoring the capability of common-user transportation to ensure it meets the requirements of DOD components.

- Participates, as directed, in the preparation of multinational plans for military action in conjunction with the armed forces of other nations.
 - Oversees the activities of the combatant commands.
 - Reviews the plans and programs of combatant commanders to determine their adequacy, consistency, acceptability, and feasibility for the performance of assigned missions.
 - Provides guidance and direction to the combatant commanders on aspects of C2 that relate to the conduct of operations.
- b. For deployment and redeployment operations, as part of joint operation planning and execution, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for the following.
- Provides oversight management of deployment systems used in the deployment process.
 - Develops a standardized joint deployment planning and execution process, with common data elements and terms, supported by clearly delineated procedures for implementation throughout the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC).
 - Establishes procedures (in coordination with the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense [Transportation Policy], the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the Defense Logistics Agency [DLA]) for the submission of movement requirements by DOD user components to USTRANSCOM and for the submission of evaluated requirements and capabilities by USTRANSCOM and the TCCs to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
 - Prescribes a movement priority system in agreement with Uniform Material Movement and Issue Priority System that will ensure responsiveness to meet the needs of the using forces.
 - Monitors the capabilities of USTRANSCOM common-user transportation resources to provide airlift, sealift, CONUS land transportation,



Military Traffic Management Command coordinates all common-user land transportation for forces based in the continental United States.

common-user ocean terminal service, and aerial port service based upon the requirements of DOD components.

- Monitors the capabilities of United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) to provide military, civil, commercial, and international space systems support to deployment and redeployment operations.
- Assigns movement priorities in support of DOD components based upon capabilities reported by USTRANSCOM.
- Apportions strategic lift assets through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3110.01A, "Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)," and CJCSI 3110.11B, "Mobility Supplement to Strategic Capabilities Plan."
- Allocates strategic lift assets through the CJCS execute order to the supported combatant commander.
- If required, acts on the recommendations of the Theater-Joint Transportation Board (T-JTB) with respect to the establishment of priorities and apportionment for the use of airlift, sealift, and surface transportation capability.

The T-JTB monitors the balance between DOD transportation requirements and capabilities through close liaison with the combatant commanders and USTRANSCOM. Once armed with CJCS priorities, USTRANSCOM closely collaborates with the combatant commander(s) and other CJCS-designated agencies to meet NCA objectives while keeping Joint Staff directorates informed. Service participation and considerations in transportation decision making are appropriately raised through supported Service components to the combatant commander. USCINCTrans refers problems with recommended courses of action (COAs) to the T-JTB for resolution or adjudication if a balance of transportation requirements and capabilities cannot be maintained.

- Develops, implements, monitors, and assesses joint education and training programs to improve deployment and redeployment planning and execution.
- Ensures that deployment and redeployment planning and execution is

assessed during all joint force operations as well as CJCS and combatant command-sponsored joint exercises.

c. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff **issues deployment preparation orders, deployment orders, and redeployment orders** for execution of deployment and redeployment operations **after authorization by the Secretary of Defense**.

See Appendix D, “Deployment Preparation Orders, Deployment Orders, Redeployment Orders, and Request for Forces,” and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.01, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures),” for examples.

4. Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command

a. USCINCTRANS responsibilities are assigned by the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and include the following.

- Provide air, land, and sea transportation and common-user port management at air and sea POE and/or POD for the Department of Defense across the range of military operations. Also provide air transportation to numerous non-DOD agencies at the direction of the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- Exercise COCOM of all assigned forces. (RC forces only when mobilized or ordered to active duty for other than training. This includes CRAF and National Defense Reserve Fleet lift assets).
- Exercise responsibility for global air, land, and sea transportation planning (deliberate and crisis action).

- Act as the DOD focal point for items in the transportation pipeline. Continue development and integration of the global transportation network (GTN) into the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) and the Global Combat Support System (GCSS).

- Exercise responsibility for strategic (non-theater assigned) aeromedical evacuation.

b. Further, USCINCTRANS will oversee the following.

- Provide geographic combatant commanders with coordinated transportation planning expertise required during the deliberate planning process. This includes reviewing the JSCP tasking, analyzing supported combatant commander requirements registered in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) for transportation feasibility, and advising the combatant commander of changes required to produce a sustainable force deployment concept. In addition, provide plan maintenance support to the supported combatant commander as required or directed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- Provide deployment estimates and total lift asset availability to the NCA and supported combatant commanders for development of alternative COAs and optimal flow of forces during crisis action planning (CAP). USTRANSCOM will also advise supported combatant commanders and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning use of or changes to lift allocations.
- Assist the supported combatant commander and ensure that validated movement requirements are routed and scheduled for maximum support during



In addition to common-user transportation, the Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command is responsible for strategic aeromedical evacuation.

deployment, sustainment, and redeployment. This will ensure the most efficient use of strategic lift resources. USTRANSCOM will assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by recommending reallocation of strategic lift assets to optimize their use and support plan execution during deployment, employment, sustainment, reconstitution, and redeployment.

5. Geographic Combatant Commands

a. Combatant commanders are responsible for the **development and production of joint OPLANs, OPLANs in concept format (CONPLANs), and functional plans (FUNCPLANs).** During peacetime, they act to **deter war and prepare for war by planning for the transition to and from war and MOOTW.** During war, combatant commanders **plan and conduct campaigns and military operations to accomplish assigned missions.** Their joint operation planning responsibilities are described in the UCP, JP 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF),” and JP 5-0, “Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations,” and include conducting deployment and redeployment

operations within assigned geographic or functional areas. Commanders of geographic combatant commands are responsible for coordinating with USTRANSCOM and supporting combatant commanders to provide an integrated transportation system from origin to destination during deployment and redeployment operations.

b. **Responsibilities of Supported Combatant Commanders.** Supported combatant commanders are responsible for **deployment and redeployment operations planned and executed during joint force missions in their AOR.** This responsibility includes identification of the movement, timing, and sequence of deploying forces in TPFDD, reception and integration of supporting units and materiel arriving in theater to support the operation, and assisting these units in recovery and reconstitution prior to redeployment. Working through the US Department of State, supported combatant commanders negotiate HN diplomatic clearances and reception POD access for all deploying forces. For air movements, supported combatant commanders must ensure that overflight and landing clearances are secured prior to the departure of forces from POEs. Supported combatant

commanders have **four major responsibilities relative to deployment and redeployment operations**: build and validate movement requirements; determine predeployment standards; balance and regulate the transportation flow; and manage effectively (see Figure II-1).

- **Build and Validate Movement Requirements.** Supported combatant commanders must ensure that USTRANSCOM and its TCCs clearly understand the strategic and theater transportation requirements to support the commander in chief's (CINC's) strategic concept. Understanding begins with supporting commands and agencies providing **accurate** (unit verified) **movement data for use in planning and execution**. To facilitate this process, the supported combatant commander publishes a letter of instruction (LOI) providing specific guidance for supporting combatant commanders, Services, and agencies. **The supported combatant commander validates**

movement requirements for all forces and agencies deploying or redeploying in support of an operation. Expeditious and thorough validation of joint force movement requirements requires comprehensive and coordinated validation procedures that are continuously evaluated and refined with component commands and supporting agencies during training. **The supported combatant commander provides validated movement requirements to USTRANSCOM for planning and execution of strategic movement.** In addition, supported geographic combatant commanders also designate latest arrival dates and required delivery dates to USTRANSCOM. The supported combatant commander specifies key employment information regarding when, where, and how forces will be employed. Service component commanders play a key role in advising the supported combatant commander regarding the appropriate types of and missions for forces in theater.




Figure II-1. Responsibilities of Supported Combatant Commanders

PREDEPLOYMENT PREPARATION: TWO PERSPECTIVES

“Prior to a unit’s initial deployment, there was usually time for some final training and organization, but not always. Haste often undermined a unit’s readiness. . . Although the 1st Cavalry [Division] had been training for two years as the 11th Air Assault Division at Fort Benning, its members had received no jungle training and the division was issued M16 rifles only ten days prior to its departure, resulting in a hurried familiarization program.”

“Marines, prior to shipping out to ‘WestPac,’ returned from leave to a staging battalion. Staging battalions provided a final bit of pre-Vietnam refresher training and was a catchall for shots and paperwork before departure. Even Marines who had previously been to Vietnam went through a staging battalion before returning for another tour. . . Marine replacements went through a staging regimen that included three weeks of refresher infantry training, instruction in topics relating to Vietnam — such as booby traps — and the bureaucratic paper-pushing that accompanies all military moves.”

SOURCE: A Life in a Year: The American Infantryman in Vietnam 1965 - 1972 by James R. Ebert

Employment information provided by the supported combatant commander helps to ensure that USTRANSCOM planners schedule movement consistent with the concept of operations.

- **Determine Predeployment Standards.** Supported combatant commanders establish predeployment standards for augmentation or replacement personnel and forces supporting their operations. **Predeployment standards outline the basic command policies, training, and equipment requirements necessary to prepare supporting personnel and forces for the tactical, environmental, and/or medical conditions in theater.** The Services’ and Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command’s role is to ensure that designated forces for combatant commands are trained, maintained, and ready in accordance with these predeployment standards. Predeployment standards help ensure that all supporting personnel and forces arrive in theater fully prepared to perform their mission.

•• **Preparation for Overseas Movement.** Preparation for overseas movement is a Service responsibility. Specific responsibility for preparation for overseas movement rests with the deploying unit or losing organization in the case of individual augmentees or replacements. Preparation for overseas movement can include review of personal Service records and legal documents, medical processing to include updating inoculations, receipt of theater-specific organizational clothing and equipment, theater-specific cultural or environmental protection training, and refresher weapons training prior to movement. **Conducting this training prior to deployment movement normally facilitates rapid assimilation and integration of arriving forces and personnel in theater.** Usually, the deploying unit commander must acknowledge completion of specified preparation for overseas movement requirements to the supported command during predeployment activities. In some instances, legal constraints may be

in place that affect personnel readiness if specific training requirements have not been completed.

•• **Predeployment Training.** In addition to preparation for overseas movement activities, supported combatant commanders may identify **mission-specific training requirements** that supporting individuals or units must complete before operational employment. This training may be conducted at home station prior to deployment or en route to the operational area, depending upon the supported combatant commander's deployment concept. The supported combatant commander should, at a minimum, specify theater-unique clothing and equipment requirements and mission-essential tasks to be trained prior to arrival in theater.

- **Balance and Regulate the Transportation Flow.** While developing requirements and priorities, supported geographic combatant commanders coordinate with USTRANSCOM to **ensure that the planned theater movement control system will be ready to manage the throughput from strategic movement.** At a minimum, the theater reception capability must accommodate joint force mission requirements. Ideally, the theater reception capability will accommodate mission requirements and provide the supported combatant commanders with some operational flexibility for mission execution. Often, force protection concerns cause the supported combatant commander to accelerate the deployment of combat units ahead of support elements. This situation may degrade actual combat effectiveness. To preclude this, supported combatant commanders should **balance and regulate the transportation flow of forces and**

materiel into theater with mission requirements.

"Decisions made on the front end concerning what to send will directly affect fighting effectiveness on the other end. Not enough stevedores and ship-handling equipment forward early enough in building the theater might delay the unloading of combat vehicles and ultimately defeat the intended purpose of putting the vehicles on the ground first."

Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War by Brigadier General Robert H. Scales

•• **Supported combatant commanders balance the transportation flow of the joint force through effective employment planning.** Balance is primarily a function of force composition and transportation flow but must also consider planned theater distribution (TD) and JRSOI capabilities. Force composition and transportation flow must accommodate mission requirements providing the supported combatant commander with the operational flexibility and freedom of action required for successful mission execution. Operational environment, available infrastructure, force protection risk assessment considerations, and the concept of operations are major factors in determining how to balance the transportation flow and sequence of theater arrival of combat and support forces.

•• **Supported combatant commanders regulate the transportation flow by ensuring that adequate support and reception assets, effectively coordinated through a theater reception plan, are either available at the POD or deployed early in the movement schedule to facilitate TD and JRSOI.**

This will expedite the reception of combat unit personnel and materiel in the operational area. Effective control of theater reception operations includes establishment of a theater movement control organization with adequate communications capability and priority to coordinate strategic movement and establishment of POD support activities. POD support activities may include arrival/departure airfield control groups (A/DACGs), port support activity (PSA), port operations group (POG), or other movement control activities that receive and manage the onward movement of forces and materiel. To further eliminate movement flow problems, transportation nodes should not be used as joint force staging areas and POD support activities should not be responsible for life support of transient forces.

- **Manage Effectively.** In order to more efficiently manage and control logistics and transportation support at the theater level, combatant commanders may organize **functional boards or centers to centrally manage critical assets and more effectively react to unforeseen circumstances**. The overall objective is to effectively support joint force operations while striving to attain efficient support operations.

See JP 4-0, “Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations,” for further information.

The following functional boards or centers may have key roles in the planning and execution of deployment and redeployment operations:

- **Use of T-JTB and/or Joint Movement Center (JMC).** Transportation is a critical asset in any operation requiring the movement of military forces. Combatant and subordinate commands

need the capability to rapidly change transportation resource allocation to adjust to changing circumstances or immediately react to emergency or unanticipated situations. One recommendation for effective control of theater transportation assets is the establishment of a T-JTB. Procedures for establishing the T-JTB are developed during peacetime to facilitate rapid stand-up and execution under emergency or wartime conditions. The T-JTB’s role is to **resolve contentious transportation issues within their command**, such as allocating transportation apportionment among components for unit movement, non-unit movement, and resupply. Another effective transportation control option is the establishment of a JMC. The JMC is responsible for **coordinating the employment of all modes of theater transportation** (including that which is provided by allies, coalition partners, or the HN) **to support the theater concept of operations**. When used, the JMC should be the single coordinator for all movement into, through, and out of the theater. Specifically, it is the supported combatant commander’s focal point for strategic movements and should oversee the execution of theater transportation priorities.

For additional information on the JMC and theater movement control, refer to JP 4-01.3, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control,” Appendix A, “Joint Movement Center Organization.”

- **Logistics Readiness Center (LRC).** Combatant commanders and subordinate commands may form LRCs to monitor and coordinate the theater logistics effort. At the theater level, the LRC is operated by the combatant command logistics staff to **monitor the overall logistics status by commodity in**

theater. The LRC receives reports from Service components and external sources, distills information for presentation to the combatant commander, and responds to questions. Within the LRC, the combatant command logistics staff performs **four key functions:** monitors current and evolving theater logistics capabilities; coordinates logistic support with upcoming operations; advises the combatant commander on the logistics supportability of proposed operations or COAs; and acts as the combatant commander's agent and advocate to non-theater logistics organizations.

•• **Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR).** The DIRMOBFOR works directly for the Air Force component commander or joint force air component commander as the designated coordinating authority for air mobility with all commands and/or agencies, both internal and external to the combatant command. The DIRMOBFOR **provides direction to the air mobility division in the air operations center** and will normally be a senior officer with extensive air mobility expertise and familiarity with the AOR. The DIRMOBFOR may be sourced by the theater Air Force component commander or nominated by USCINCTRANS; when USTRANSCOM intertheater air mobility forces are employed in support of a JFC, the DIRMOBFOR should have experience in intertheater air mobility operations.

- **Environmental Stewardship.** Supported commanders are ultimately the environmental steward to their theater. As such, they are entrusted with the responsible protection of resources in their theaters. Environmental stewardship is embodied in the prevention of pollution, compliance with

applicable laws, regulations, executive orders, and policy, and conservation of natural, cultural, and historic resources.

c. **Responsibilities of Supporting Combatant Commanders.** Certain situations may require that one combatant commander support another combatant commander. Support is a command relationship obligating the supporting organization to **aid, protect, complement, or sustain the supported organization.** Supporting missions during deployment and redeployment of the joint force could include: the deployment or redeployment of forces to or from a supporting combatant command; sponsorship of en route basing or in-transit staging areas; or providing sustainment from theater stocks. Regardless of the supporting mission, the **primary task for supporting combatant commands is to ensure that the supported combatant commander tasked to achieve national objectives receives the timely and complete support needed to accomplish the mission.** Among many requirements, supporting combatant commanders have **three major deployment and/or redeployment responsibilities:** verify supporting unit movement data; regulate the support flow; and coordinate effectively (see Figure II-2).

- **Verify Supporting Unit Movement Data.** Supporting combatant commanders are responsible to the supported combatant commander for the **accurate reporting of their movement requirement data.** Unit verification of movement data must begin at the deploying unit level since the deploying unit is most familiar with what it is deploying for the operation. Verified movement requirement data and ITV data in electronic format is compiled at each successive level of command until received by the combatant command from its components. Verified movement requirement data is then provided to the

RESPONSIBILITIES OF SUPPORTING COMBATANT COMMANDERS

Verify Supporting Unit Movement Data

Regulate the Support Flow

Coordinate Effectively



Figure II-2. Responsibilities of Supporting Combatant Commanders

supported combatant command for planning and execution.

NOTE: TPFDD validation is only performed by the supported combatant commander. Verified data from supporting commands, supporting agencies, and subordinate joint task forces (JTFs) is officially validated for USTRANSCOM movement scheduling by the supported combatant commander.

- **Regulate the Support Flow.** Supporting combatant commanders should establish a movement control system capable of interfacing with USTRANSCOM's and the supported combatant commander's movement control systems. The supporting combatant commander's movement control system should **regulate the transportation flow of support personnel, forces, equipment, and materiel** originating in the AOR and **facilitate the flow of transient forces** by securing overflight and landing diplomatic clearances and en route basing rights and support (aircraft

services, fuel). Supporting combatant command movement control systems must be able to **respond to changes or unforeseen circumstances** that develop during mission execution. For deployments to another theater, the supporting combatant commander should also establish POE support activities, which could include A/DACG, PSA or POG, or other movement control organizations to facilitate the deployment.

- **Coordinate Effectively.** The key to success in supporting operations is **effective and responsive coordination**. Supporting combatant commands must remain cognizant of the needs of the supported combatant commander. Situational awareness is accomplished by supporting combatant commands maintaining a broad operational focus, anticipating requirements, and resolving support issues before they negatively impact joint force operations. Successful coordination by supporting combatant

commands **facilitates the supported combatant commander's requirement to synchronize deployment and employment needs of the operational mission.**

d. **United States Atlantic Command (USACOM).** USACOM is one of five geographic combatant commands and is the everyday facilitator for building joint capabilities on the existing Service structures. In addition to combatant functions in its AOR and its mission to provide assistance to civil authorities within CONUS when needed, USACOM is heavily involved in deployment and redeployment operations under its charter to **provide trained and ready CONUS-based joint force assets to forward-deployed geographic combatant commanders** as they require them. USACOM fulfills this responsibility by performing three distinct functions with its assigned CONUS-based forces. USACOM is the **joint force trainer, integrator, and force provider** for JTFs organized from these assets.

- As the joint force trainer for CONUS based forces, USACOM **provides JTF staff training** through joint operations staff training programs and simulation-driven JTF command post exercises.
- USACOM serves as an **integrator of capabilities** from the five Services, RC, and interagency sources. Additionally, USACOM's integration effort is primarily focused on developing and maintaining technological interoperability among Service systems employed by joint headquarters and staffs.
- USACOM also serves as the **CONUS-based joint force provider**. Joint force assets needed to support forward-deployed geographic combatant commands are provided by USACOM's four component commands, US Army

Forces Command (FORSCOM), Marine Forces, Atlantic, US Atlantic Fleet, and Air Combat Command.

6. Functional Combatant Commands

Supported combatant commanders capitalize on the power inherent in joint operations by **synchronizing the complementary warfighting capabilities** of all the Services and supporting commands **into a unified effort**. Moreover, CINCs are responsible for unified actions that are synchronized in time, space, and purpose with actions of other military forces and nonmilitary organizations. Because of the numerous process stakeholders, successful deployment and redeployment operations require unity of effort. Normally, **several functional combatant commands are involved in every phase of a joint operation**. Four functional combatant commands could be involved in deployment and redeployment of the joint force; **USSOCOM, USSPACECOM, US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), and USTRANSCOM**.

a. **United States Special Operations Command.** USSOCOM is responsible for **providing trained and ready special operations forces (SOF) in response to mission taskings**. These forces are organized, trained, and equipped specifically to **accomplish nine principal missions**: direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, combatting terrorism, psychological operations (PSYOP), civil affairs (CA), counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and information operations (IO). In addition, SOF frequently conduct the following collateral activities: coalition support, combat search and rescue, counterdrug activities, countermining activities, FHA, security assistance, and special activities.



Special operations forces possess unique capabilities to help set the conditions for entry operations or provide special reconnaissance during joint force deployments.

See JP 3-05, “Doctrine for Joint Special Operations,” for additional information.


- **USSOCOM and Deployment and/or Redeployment.** USSOCOM involvement in deployment and redeployment operations is two-fold: USSOCOM-assigned assets may be **deployed or redeployed as a result of SOF mission taskings** or USSOCOM may **provide SOF mission support to conventional joint force deployment and redeployment operations**. On occasion, USSOCOM may require common-user transportation assets to deploy or redeploy SOF forces. Compared to conventional force operations, SOF deployment and redeployment operations are relatively small in scale. However, given the nature of most SOF

missions, either time constraints, planning considerations, or special mission requirements may place unique demands on common-user transportation assets utilized for deployment and redeployment of SOF forces.

- **SOF Mission Support.** Several SOF missions areas could directly support joint force deployment and redeployment operations. Based on mission requirements and operational environment, SOF could provide the JFC with the capability to set the conditions for entry operations, conduct direct actions to support deployment or redeployment of the force, or provide increased battlespace awareness through special reconnaissance. PSYOP can be a significant force multiplier through the conduct of mass communication activities that reduce the efficiency of adversary forces and create disaffection within adversary ranks. Use of CA assets can mitigate the extent to which civilian matters negatively impact military operations, provide the JFC with a sensing of HN attitudes and capabilities, and enhance economy of force by reducing the need to divert combat forces from essential duties by planning for and using local resources.

b. **United States Space Command.** USSPACECOM is responsible for **providing space operations forces trained and ready to support joint force operations**. Space forces provide a means to exploit and, if required, control space to assist in the successful execution of joint force operations.

- **Space Support to Deployment and/or Redeployment Operations.** The Commander in Chief, USSPACECOM serves as the **single point of contact for military space operational matters**. Accordingly, during strategic and theater deployment, sustainment, or redeployment



Space support teams provide the supported combatant commander with ready access to space based assets to support the joint force mission.

operations, **USSPACECOM employs its assets to provide force enhancement to supported combatant commands.**

These enhancements include theater ballistic missile warning, weather support, satellite communications support, and positive navigation support. Space operations are vital to the combatant commander's battlespace awareness, TAV, and precision engagement. Space control operations serve to ensure the combatant commander's access to such support, while denying it to the enemy. USSPACECOM, as a supporting CINC, will conduct a review of space assets necessary to support deployment and redeployment operations. Generally space assets are continuously deployed, but prioritization of effort may change their support.

- **Deployable Space Support Forces.** USSPACECOM provides joint space support teams comprised of several space operations specialists whose mission is to support the range of military operations. These teams provide tailored space support to JFC operations. A range of other deployable space support

assets are also available to the supported commander upon request, usually pertaining to a specific force enhancement mission.

c. **United States Strategic Command**

- **USSTRATCOM** is responsible for posturing strategic forces in a manner to deter a military attack on the United States, US forces, or its allies. Should deterrence fail, strategic forces will be employed when directed by the NCA and authorized by the President. The posturing or employment of strategic forces may require the redeployment of forces from a theater to CONUS locations to prepare for future operations.
- **Deployable Nuclear Support Forces.** The USSTRATCOM theater planning response cell (TPRC) provides advisors for the supported combatant commander or their designated joint force air component commander. The TPRC will be provided by USSTRATCOM upon supported CINC request and will report as designated by the geographic CINC. The geographic CINC or designated planning authority should rely on this

team to assist in the preparation of nuclear request and execution messages, unique targeting, and consequence analysis of military options. The TPRC coordinates with the mission-planning facilities of USSTRATCOM for the utilization of nuclear weapons.

d. United States Transportation Command. USTRANSCOM is the functional combatant command responsible for **common-user air, land, and sea transportation, as well as port management for the Department of Defense across the range of military operations.** It has COCOM of the three TCCs, AMC, MSC, and MTMC. In addition to DOD customers, USTRANSCOM provides air transportation to numerous non-DOD agencies at the direction of the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

For additional information on USTRANSCOM see JP 4-01, “Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System.”

- **Single Port Management.** In addition to its other responsibilities, USTRANSCOM was designated by the Secretary of Defense as the single **worldwide manager for common-user POE and POD.** Recent operational experience has shown that the single port manager (SPM) is necessary to improve the planning and execution of port management operations and ensure the seamless transfer of cargo and equipment in any given theater. **Development of the SPM concept is an effort to eliminate the reduced efficiencies and confusion that characterized recent joint force deployment and redeployment operations.** Under the SPM concept USTRANSCOM, through AMC, operates strategic aerial ports in theaters where forces and infrastructure are permanent and in theaters where

forces and infrastructure are temporary. Additionally USTRANSCOM, through MTMC, manages seaports of embarkation and debarkation in any given theater. Key aspects of the SPM concept are that MTMC will: provide planners to supported combatant commands to develop seaport management and operations requirements; at the request of the supported combatant commander, conduct seaport assessments, establish contact with local seaport authorities, and determine availability of HNS; and deploy a seaport management cell into theater, when required, to act as seaport manager throughout the operation.

- **Liaison.** USTRANSCOM provides liaison officers to all geographic combatant commanders to **assist in coordination of strategic mobility issues** that may arise. USTRANSCOM and its components may provide additional technical experts to facilitate planning and execution on an as needed basis as requested by the supported combatant commander.
- **Joint Mobility Control Group (JMCG).** The JMCG serves as the focal point to **orchestrate and optimize DTS operations** in support of the combatant commanders and other customers. The JMCG provides visibility of movement requirements and C2 of global mobility forces and other assets.
 - The JMCG consists of **eight elements:** USTRANSCOM’s MCC; command center elements of the three TCCs; the MTMC Joint Traffic Management Office; the Joint Intelligence Center for Transportation (JICTRANS); the Global Patient Movement Requirements Center; and the Joint Operational Support Airlift Center. The JMCG provides improved customer

support through teaming of USTRANSCOM and the TCCs organized to support specific combatant command clients.

- **The MCC**, organized under the Operations Directorate and Logistics Directorate (J-4) of USTRANSCOM, **is the nucleus of the JMCg**. The MCC is the single focal point for all combatant command and major shipper customers, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Army and Air Force Exchange Service, DLA, and the Services. **The MCC monitors the status of planned and ongoing movements in the DTS through GTN**. GTN provides the central data base for all scheduled transportation movements. The central data base for all transportation requirements is the TPFDD. Once a mission is allocated to a validated TPFDD requirement, GTN will post this mission number into the TPFDD. USTRANSCOM uses several systems (discussed in Chapter V, “Enablers,”) to provide the decision support tools needed to determine the best way to move requirements.
- **Joint Intelligence Center for Transportation**. The mission of JICTRANS is to **provide decisive transportation and operational intelligence to enhance planning, movement, and force protection**. It provides transportation intelligence products and services to USTRANSCOM, its subordinate component commands, supported combatant commanders, and other operational organizations. JICTRANS **supports the JMCg** by receiving intelligence production requirements, providing assessments of the current military and political situation at en route and destination countries, and providing

USCINTRANS, supported combatant commanders, and other operational organizations with transportation infrastructure information (e.g., capabilities of foreign airfields, ports, rail, road, and inland waterways) that may be used to support routine, crisis, or contingency operations. JICTRANS intelligence products assess threats to ongoing, scheduled, and projected strategic air, land, and sea movements and provide basic transportation planning information on the physical features and operational status of foreign transportation infrastructures. These analyses factor facility, country, and throughput data to help determine the modes and required weights of effort of strategic lift forces allocated to accomplish USTRANSCOM global missions.

7. Joint Task Forces

- a. **Forming a JTF**. A JTF is a joint force constituted and designated by a JTF establishing authority. The JTF establishing authority may be the Secretary of Defense or the commander of a combatant command, subordinate unified command, or existing JTF. In most situations, the **JTF establishing authority will be a combatant commander**. JTFs are **established on a geographical area or functional basis** when the mission has a specific limited objective. Normally, a JTF is dissolved by the proper authority when the purpose for which it was created has been achieved or when it is no longer required. Some recent JTFs have evolved into semi-permanent forces that stay behind to maintain end state conditions or accomplish a specific follow-on or modified mission for an undetermined period.

See JP 5-00.2, “Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures” for additional information.

b. **JTF Deployment and/or Redeployment Planning Responsibilities.** Formation of a JTF may complicate deployment and redeployment planning and execution because of the **diverse elements** that may come together to form the JTF. A significant challenge in JTF deployment and redeployment operations is in **building the TPFDD**. This is particularly true during **crisis action situations** when limited planning time prompts the development of a fully coordinated deliberate plan with TPFDD or time-phased force and deployment list (TPFDL). For effective management of change, JTFs should have the authority and capability to make TPFDD adjustments on site at the point of execution. See Appendix A, “Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning Processes,” for information on the joint planning process.

- **Deliberate Planning Responsibilities.**

If sufficient planning time is available prior to mission execution, the JFC and staff should determine **specific force requirements, logistics requirements, and personnel replacements** with recommended time-phasing based on their concept of operation developed during mission analysis. Once the

concept of operation is approved, planning can continue with the **development of the TPFDD or TPFDL** as required, supporting JTF operations based on subordinate unit verified movement requirements received from the Service and functional component commands. JTF-verified TPFDD requirements are provided to the JTF establishing authority or supported combatant command for **sourcing of shortfalls, validation, and forwarding to USTRANSCOM for transportation feasibility analysis and movement scheduling**. Movement information is continually evaluated and updated to ensure that the JTF establishing authority or supported combatant command planners and USTRANSCOM transportation planners are using the most current and accurate TPFDD information for scheduling transportation resources. Redeployment planning should begin early in the JTF planning process and focus on defining the end state conditions, drafting the transition considerations, and developing the redeployment TPFDD necessary to begin redeployment of the force when authorized.



When sufficient time is available prior to mission execution, the JFC and staff should determine specific force requirements and time-phasing.

- **CAP Responsibilities.** For crisis action situations, the JTF establishing authority (normally a combatant command) is usually required to **initiate development of the TPFDD supporting JTF operations**. The JTF establishing authority **provides forces for planning** while the JFC, supported by the JTF component commanders, determines the concept of operation and outlines the sequence of arrival for deploying units. The commands sourcing the JTF components are responsible for inputting unit deployment data in the supporting TPFDD. This is necessary because either the JTF headquarters and/or the deploying JTF components may not have access to the GCCS to provide unit deployment data input or the JTF headquarters and/or the deploying JTF components may not have time to make TPFDD adjustments because **operational time constraints have caused the JTF to focus on immediate mission execution**. In some instances, combatant command planners may have to build the initial TPFDD supporting JTF operations based on their best assessment of JTF needs to support the mission for the first several days of the operation. This initial increment of forces and support should allow the JTF to perform its mission for a period of time, until the JFC and staff arrive at the crisis scene and can assess the situation more thoroughly and begin making TPFDD adjustments based on actual requirements. In this situation, the JFC must understand that during the first several days of the deployment the JTF must work within the constraints of the initial TPFDD forces and support increment planned by the combatant command. **JTF planners should limit adjustments to this initial TPFDD increment because TPFDD adjustments may have an operational impact by slowing or interrupting the**

deployment flow. Instead, JTF planners should focus on making adjustments to the TPFDD beginning with the day after the initial combatant command-planned TPFDD increment. During the early days of the operation, combatant command planners must **focus on coordinating for uninterrupted support to the JTF** until it is ready to assume full planning responsibility for the operation.

8. Military Departments and Defense Agencies

The Military Departments retain the responsibility for **organizing, training, equipping, and providing logistic support** (including Service-unique transportation) for their respective forces. These forces and other Defense agencies must **depend on common-user military transportation services** for unit and individual deployment and redeployment operations between POEs and PODs. In the role of common-user military transportation services, the Army, Navy (including US Coast Guard when appropriate), Air Force, Marine Corps, DLA, and other Defense agencies are all generically called **shipper services**. Each Service is responsible for administrative support and performance of transportation operations assigned by combatant commanders at either their local shipping installations or throughout the theater. The Services are also responsible for maintaining **personnel trained in joint operation planning** that can participate in joint planning and provide JOPES inputs. In addition to these responsibilities, logistics elements of the Services that provide key support and enable the operations staff to execute the commander's requirements for deployment and redeployment operations are noted below.

- a. **US Army.** The Department of the Army (DA) is responsible for the **assignment, preparation, and support of land forces**

necessary for employment across the range of military operations. For deployment and redeployment operations, DA is responsible for **training, mobilizing, modernizing, administering, organizing, and demobilizing Army forces**. DA also **establishes policy and procedures** for reconstitution of the Army and is the **DOD executive agent for repatriation operations**. OCONUS, DA is responsible for making land transportation available in overseas areas (normally under the combatant command's Army Service component commander) for the other Military Services and for coordinating all planning and requirements for the use of DOD-controlled land transportation equipment and facilities. In some overseas areas, the Army Service component has been assigned common-user land transportation (CULT) responsibility for peacetime land transportation. Wartime CULT requirements are the responsibility of the combatant commander, and normally the JMC or the component assigned the mission will consolidate planned wartime movement requirements of all component commands.

- **Secretary of the Army.** The Secretary of the Army is responsible for the **daily affairs of DA**. In addition to **heading the Army**, the Secretary of the Army also serves as the **DOD executive agent for military support to civil authorities (MSCA)**. As executive agent for MSCA, the Secretary of the Army exercises OPCON over all DOD component forces provided for MSCA, including the Services and Defense agencies. Specific responsibilities include developing planning guidance, plans, and procedures for military support; tasking components to plan for and commit resources in response to requests from civil authorities; and developing (and tasking DOD components to develop) generic and incident-specific support plans. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Logistics, and Environment

is responsible for oversight of MSCA. The Director of Military Support (DOMS) is the DOD action agent for planning and coordinating this support on behalf of the Secretary of the Army.

- DOMS is led by the Army general officer who is also the Director of Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Headquarters, DA. DOMS and its designated staff element, the Military Support Division, may function as a joint staff when conducting MSCA response. The DOMS staff has the responsibility to plan, coordinate, and manage the full range of MSCA operations. The DOMS routinely coordinates with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the other Federal departments and agencies and also participates in interagency disaster relief exercises.

- The executive agent has designated the combatant commanders of USACOM, United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), and United States Southern Command as the DOD operating agents for MSCA for states, territories, and possessions in their AORs. USACOM assigns lead operational authority to its Army component, FORSCOM, which accordingly can task other USACOM component commands. Moreover, in coordination with DOMS and the Joint Staff, it can task supporting combatant commands such as USTRANSCOM and supporting Defense agencies.

- Both USPACOM and FORSCOM have designated defense coordinating officers (DCOs) for states and territories in USPACOM's and USACOM's AORs. When deployed, the DCOs are the DOD representatives on the ground with the



Defense coordinating officers can authorize the deployment of military resources in support of civil authorities when disaster strikes.

authority to validate all requests for military support. They forward validated requests to either a JTF or response task force, if constituted, or to higher headquarters. DOMS will then staff the request and, if appropriate, task a defense element to provide the support.

- All requirements approved by DOMS will then be passed to the designated combatant commander for sourcing and building of a TPFDD. The combatant commanders or their component will build force elements in the proper format for this requirement once it is sourced and pass this validated requirement to USTRANSCOM for scheduling and movement.
- **US Army Theater Support.** Within the Army component, the **Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM) is the key logistics operator** and is routinely involved in deployment or redeployment operations occurring in a theater. The TAACOM functions as a major subordinate command under the Numbered Army. A TAACOM is organized to provide **direct support to units located in, or transiting through,**

its assigned area. Additionally, when directed by the Theater Army commander, it can provide specified general and direct support to all Army and other units in the theater. For movement control in theater the Army relies on a movement control agency.

- b. **US Marine Corps.** For deployment and redeployment operations, the Marine Corps component has a **strategic mobility officer (SMO)** and an **embarkation officer organic to their Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) staffs.** SMOs coordinate Marine Corps movement requirements with the supported geographic combatant command, the theater JMC, and USTRANSCOM. The Marine Corps activates a **force movement control center (FMCC)** within theater to **coordinate and provide transportation services** to all land-based elements of the MAGTF. As the Marine Corps primary movement control agency within the theater, the FMCC is responsible for establishing liaison and communications with and forwarding all transportation shortfalls to the theater JMC or its equivalent, or to the component commander. If Marine Corps forces are afloat and part of an amphibious task force, the command relationships

established between the commander, amphibious task force and the commander, landing force take precedence.

c. **US Navy.** The majority of Navy combat assets **self-deploy in support of joint force operations**. However, Navy sustainment stocks, shore-based logistic support augmentation personnel, fleet hospital personnel and equipment, and engineering personnel and equipment must be time-phased to support Navy component operations. These sustainment, equipment, and personnel requirements will be entered on the joint force TPFDD by supported combatant command planners for scheduling of common-user transportation assets. The **Navy component commanders** for the geographic combatant commands (Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, Commander in Chief, Naval Forces Europe, and Commander in Chief, Naval Forces Central Command) are responsible for **Navy theater deployment and logistics**. Within the Navy component, in large mobilization scenarios, **naval advanced logistic support sites (NALSSs)** may serve as the **primary shore-based reception and transshipment points** for personnel, equipment, and materiel. In lesser mobilization scenarios, the Navy component commander may designate another established naval activity to act in this capacity. In either scenario, the Navy component commander will coordinate and monitor personnel deployment and redeployment activities for units and individuals. They have full capability to receive, consolidate, transfer and stow supplies and equipment. The **naval forward logistic sites (NFLSSs)** in theater **receive personnel, equipment, and materiel** transhipped through the NALSS for final delivery to the supported forces. The NALSS coordinates with NFLSSs, which are positioned as far forward in the operating area as possible to support Navy forces. NALSSs and NFLSSs also support shore-based aviation units, fleet hospitals, air and surface cargo

handlers, naval mobile construction battalions, and other shore-based logistic units. The size and composition of NALSSs and NFLSSs are dependent upon the support required and are tailored by Navy logistic planners for the specific operation or contingency. The Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanographic Center (FNMOC) at Monterey, California, can produce the majority of centralized weather products and data to support planning for deployment and redeployment of US forces. Related products, including climatological data, are available through the Air Force Weather Agency (AFWA) at Offutt Air Force Base (AFB), Nebraska.

d. **US Air Force.** Deployment and redeployment of **Air Force combat assets primarily occurs through self-deployment**. However, the Air Force has a requirement for **common-user transportation** to move support forces and sustainment. Within the Air Force forces (AFFOR) component, the **numbered air force is the principal coordinator of Air Force logistics**. The **director of logistics is responsible for providing logistics expertise and support**, to include contracting, maintenance, munitions, supply, fuel, and transportation services. The director of logistics ensures that AFFOR component forces are sustained to meet the capability tasked by the JFC. The director of logistics ensures the adequacy of supplies, storage, and bed-down facilities in the operational area and interfaces with the air operations center, through the AFFOR LRC, to provide analysis of logistics requirements in support of the daily air tasking order. The director of logistics directs the **formation of an AFFOR LRC**, when required, and ensures that the director of the AFFOR LRC (who works directly for the director of logistics) **provides centralized direction and control of deployment, reception, employment, and redeployment of logistics and support assets**. Through the theater LRC, the director of logistics is the

Air Force component commander's advocate with the JFC, the J-4 staff, the Joint Petroleum Office, and JMC to ensure that priorities are surfaced and accommodated within the JFC's capability and force objectives. The AFWA at Offutt AFB, Nebraska, can produce the majority of weather products, including climatological products, and data to support planning for deployment and redeployment of US forces. Related products are available through the FNMOC at Monterey, California.

e. **Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).** The mission of the DIA is to **satisfy the full range of foreign military and military-related intelligence requirements in support of joint military operations** in peacetime, crisis, contingency, and war. In addition, DIA provides **intelligence support for Service weapons acquisition**; defense policy making; and the full range of current and long term military intelligence products. DIA provides military intelligence for counterintelligence, manages and operates the Defense Human Intelligence Service (including the Defense Attaché System), manages all-source DOD collection requirements, serves as national functional manager for measurement and signature intelligence and provides functional management of military intelligence throughout the Defense Intelligence Community.

f. **Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA).** DISA is responsible for **planning, developing and supporting command, control, communications (C3) and information systems** that serve the needs of the NCA under all conditions of peace and war. It provides guidance and support on technical and operational C3 and information systems issues affecting the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the unified and specified commands, and the Defense agencies. DISA ensures the interoperability

of the GCCS, the defense communications system, theater and tactical C2 systems, NATO and/or allied C3 systems, and those national and/or international commercial systems that affect the DISA mission. In addition, DISA supports **national security emergency preparedness telecommunications functions** of the National Communications System.

g. **Defense Logistics Agency.** DLA is a **combat support agency of the Department of Defense** and is controlled and directed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology. DLA provides **worldwide logistic support** to the Military Services, combatant commands, other DOD components, Federal agencies, foreign governments, and international organizations. DLA responsibilities are enabled by **joint total asset visibility (JTAV) initiatives**. JTAV will provide users with timely and accurate information on the location, movement, status, and identity of units, personnel, equipment, and supplies during force projection operations. DLA controls over 80% of existing stockage of military equipment and nearly all of the fuel and petroleum products for military usage. During deployment and redeployment of the joint force, DLA requires common-user transportation to move, stage, and recover its logistics resources in support of joint force operations. Supported combatant command planners are responsible for validating and entering DLA movement requirements into the TPFDD for scheduling by USTRANSCOM. DLA has the logistics responsibilities shown in Figure II-3.

h. **National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA).** NIMA, a DOD combat support agency, is a **source for imagery intelligence and geospatial information** during planning and execution of deployment and redeployment operations. NIMA provides geospatial information and services support (including safety of navigation and

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES

Integrate materiel management and supply support for subsistence; clothing and textiles; petroleum, oils, and lubricants; construction materials; medical materials; repair parts; and map distribution

Property and hazardous waste disposal

Contract administration services

Deploy Defense Logistic Agency (DLA) Contingency Support Team for command and control of DLA personnel and streamline customer support to supported combatant commander

Additional support, as required

Figure II-3. Defense Logistics Agency Responsibilities

safety of flight information), imagery and geospatial system technical guidance, and staff assistance to the Military Services, combatant commands, and other DOD components and is the focal point for **imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information**.

9. Other Federal Agencies

a. **Department of Health.** During **natural disasters or civil emergencies**, the Department of Health **assists FEMA and other national agencies in caring for the affected personnel**. Department of Health movement requirements and deployment and/or redeployment support will be coordinated by FEMA.

b. **Department of State (DOS).** The DOS and Department of Defense are responsible for the operation of the **noncombatant evacuation program**. Deployments and redeployments executed as part of a noncombatant evacuation will require coordination with DOS representatives. DOS

representatives may have access to embassy evacuation, marshalling, and security plans for the objective country. DOS embassy personnel should have an estimate of the number of US citizens in the country and their locations for noncombatant evacuation redeployment planning. Additionally, DOS coordinates OCONUS overflight and landing rights, diplomatic clearances, and visa and/or passport requirements for all deployment and redeployment operations.

c. **Department of Transportation (DOT).** During national defense emergencies, the Secretary of Transportation has a wide range of delegated responsibilities, including **executive management of the nation's transportation resources in periods of crisis**. The Office of Emergency Transportation is the Secretary's peacetime staff element responsible for emergency transportation planning. Additionally, DOT manages, through the Federal Aviation Administration, the Wartime Air Service Program. The Maritime Administration is

also managed by the DOT. Under national defense emergency conditions and in coordination with DOD agencies and commands, DOT:

- Develops systems for control of priorities and allocations for moving passengers and materiel by civil transportation;
- Provides clearance authority for moving out-sized, over-sized, and hazardous military cargo;
- Apportions militarily planned and required civil transportation resources;
- Ensures through the US Coast Guard the safety, security, and control of US ports; and
- Transfers the operational control of the Coast Guard to the Department of the Navy upon declaration of war by NCA direction.

d. **US Coast Guard (USCG).** The USCG is the primary US maritime agency for **waterway safety and security**. The USCG, a branch of the Armed Forces of the United

States, supports the geographic combatant commands in **implementing the NMS**. The USCG is unique among US military forces because it has **statutory law enforcement authority**. The USCG core competencies include national defense, maritime safety, maritime law enforcement, and maritime environmental protection. During deployment and redeployment operations supporting joint force operations, the USCG protects military shipping at US SPOEs and OCONUS PODs by conducting **port security** and **harbor defense operations**. Major USCG cutters may be deployed to participate in maritime interception operations, enforce sanctions against other nations, and to conduct peacetime engagement activities. The major cutters of the USCG, like Navy combatants, are self-sustaining during deployments in support of joint force operations. However, deploying port security units and stocks for sustainment must be time-phased to support Navy component operations and scheduled for movement on common-user transportation assets. Movement data from port security units and sustainment stocks is validated by supported combatant command planners and entered on the joint force TPFDD. Port safety responsibilities in CONUS include the



The US Coast Guard, part of the Department of Transportation in peace and the Department of Defense during war, is the US maritime agency primarily responsible for port security and safety.



The Federal Emergency Management Agency coordinates all military support for disaster relief.

establishment, certification, and supervision of ammunition loading operations. In addition, the USCG's role in licensing additional merchant mariners to serve expanded defense shipping needs is integral to the mobilization process.

e. **Federal Emergency Management Agency.** FEMA coordinates the execution of **emergency preparedness actions of all Federal agencies**, including deployment and redeployment of military support for MSCA missions. It is the key agency for **emergency assistance to civil authorities** and coordinates all military support directly with the Military Support Division in DOMS. The modern authorization for Federal support to civil authorities is based on the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Public Law 93-288) and the Economy Act. By executive order, the President appointed FEMA as the lead Federal agency for disaster and emergency assistance and as the proponent for the Federal Response Plan published in 1992.

f. **National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).** The NOAA has

worldwide aeronautical data available and is capable of providing backup weather services in the event that both the FNMOC and AFWA are out of service.

g. **US Customs Service.** US Customs Service is responsible for maintaining **surveillance of illegal goods** entering the United States through DTS PODs. All forces and materiel redeploying to CONUS will require US Customs inspection.

" . . . at long last, and after months of struggle . . . we are all definitely committed to one concept of fighting! If we can agree on major purposes and objectives, our efforts will begin to fall in line and we won't just be thrashing around in the dark."

General Dwight D. Eisenhower, then Chief, Operations Division, War Department General Staff commenting on the success of General George C. Marshall and Mr. Harry Hopkins in obtaining British concurrence for a "Germany first" strategy during World War II.

h. **United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).** USDA is responsible for **maintaining surveillance of agricultural products** and **guarding against potential plant or animal infestations** entering the United States through DTS PODs. All forces and materiel redeploying to CONUS will require USDA inspection.

i. **US Postal Service (USPS).** The USPS supports joint force operations through **movement of essential military mail**, including small class IX repair parts. Depending on the scope of the deployment, USPS may require a significant amount of common-user airlift to support forward-deployed forces.

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CHAPTER III DEPLOYMENT

"We must be the world's premier deployer!"

General John M. Shalikashvili
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Introduction

Deployment operations involve **four phases**: predeployment activities; movement to and activities at POE; movement to POD; and JRSOI activities. These phases describe the **major activities of a joint force** from point of origin to a prescribed destination in theater and are dependent on the JFC's concept for employment. Planning for and execution of the four phases of deployment is based primarily on **mission requirements** and the **time available** to accomplish the mission. During deployment operations, supported combatant commanders are responsible for building and validating requirements, determining predeployment standards, and balancing, regulating, and effectively managing the transportation flow. Supporting combatant commands and agencies source requirements not available to the supported combatant commander and are responsible for: verifying supporting unit movement data; regulating the support deployment flow; and coordinating effectively during deployment operations. This chapter discusses several other factors that may impact deployment planning and execution. Section A outlines deployment planning considerations and Section B discusses factors impacting deployment execution.

SECTION A. PLANNING

2. Mission Requirements

The primary objective of deployment planning is to **provide personnel, equipment, and materiel when and where required by the JFC's concept of**

operations. Planning for joint force operations is guided by the procedures in the joint planning process (see Appendix A, "Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning Processes"). Both **deliberate and CAP procedures require detailed analysis** of the assigned mission to determine mission requirements for employment of the joint force. **Employment planning considerations that directly impact deployment operations** include: identification of force requirements; commander's intent for deployment; time-phasing of personnel, equipment, and materiel to support the mission; and closure of the forces required to execute decisive operations. These factors guide deployment planning and help determine mission requirements.

a. **Identification of Force Requirements.** Force requirements are initially **identified in the planning process** during mission analysis and COA development. Normal planning procedures should be used by the staff in analyzing the deployment mission. An example of a staff planning procedure that the Army and Marine Corps use to help them in mission analysis is one that looks at **mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available** (METT-T). Force composition is derived from the troops available for employment and the JFC's need for a particular unit capability or function to accomplish the joint force mission.

- The supported combatant commander begins preparation of COAs as required. Normally commanders receive NCA guidance through the **CJCS warning order or other type directive** issued by



The primary objective of deployment planning is to provide forces and materiel when and where required by the JFC's concept of operations.

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The directive **establishes command relationships, identifies the mission, and provides any planning constraints.** In addition, this directive will either identify forces and strategic mobility resources and establish tentative timing for execution, or request the supported combatant commander to develop these factors.

- **Force requirements are the joint force capabilities required to accomplish a particular mission.** COAs outline the general ways (scheme of employment) and means (force requirements) to accomplish the assigned mission. As force requirements are identified, TPFDD development commences for each COA (time permitting). USTRANSCOM reviews proposed COAs and, in coordination with the supported combatant commander, prepares deployment estimates. The Services monitor development of COAs and begin planning for support forces, sustainment, and mobilization, if required. The supported combatant commander analyzes the COAs and submits the combatant commander's

estimate to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and NCA. This ends the COA development phase of CAP.

- Initially, selection of forces for COA development is done in a very general and unconstrained manner. As detailed planning continues after COA selection, force refinement begins **with consideration of the forces and time available, identification of needed unsourced force capabilities, understanding of the anticipated operational environment, and consideration of the actual constraints** (e.g., political, geographic, or resource) imposed as part of the assigned mission.

b. Commander's Intent for Deployment.

The supported combatant commander's intent for deployment may be detailed in the OPLAN, deployment preparation order, deployment order, or operation order (OPORD). The supported combatant commander's intent for deployment may direct the sequence for deployment of units, individuals, and materiel; identify immediate force protection concerns; articulate specific force disposition requirements to support future operations; or identify general

deployment timeline requirements needed for operational success. The supported commander's intent for deployment should, at a minimum, **clearly articulate the JFC's vision** for how the deployment can best posture the joint force for decisive operations or operational success.

c. **Time-Phasing of Forces.** Once force requirements are identified, selected forces must be **organized and time-phased** to support the concept of operations.

- Time-phasing is the **sequencing of the deployment and arrival and employment of forces** based on the organization of forces to accomplish the mission, the commander's intent, the estimated time required to deploy forces from their point of origin to the operational area, and actual lift availability and port throughput for deployment. In addition to forces, **support personnel, equipment, and materiel are time-phased** to support the continuous operation of the joint force until the mission is accomplished.
- Finding the **proper balance between projecting the force rapidly and projecting the right mix of combat power and materiel** for the ultimate mission is critical. The commander must seek a balance that provides **protection, efficient deployment, adequate support, and a range of response options** to enemy activity. The availability of mobility assets is most often a constraining factor, so difficult trade-off decisions continuously challenge supported commanders.
- All **movement priorities and phasing** are based on the supported combatant commander's **required date for the deploying force capability**. Movement data on the required delivery date, time-phasing of forces, and materiel is

documented in the TPFDD. Ideally, forces and supporting materiel are time-phased in a manner that allows the JFC to conduct decisive operations as quickly as possible. Closure of the minimum essential force required to accomplish the mission is a major factor in determining when decisive operations can be conducted.

d. **Force Tracking.** Force tracking is the process of **gathering and maintaining information on the location, status, and predicted movement of each element of a unit** (including the unit's command element, personnel, and unit-related supplies and equipment) while in transit to the specified operational area. Force tracking is fundamental to effective force employment and C2 (see Figure III-1). It provides information on transportation closure or physical moves of forces. JFCs must be able to continuously monitor execution of the joint force deployment operation and quickly respond to changing situations and unforeseen circumstances. Timely JFC response is a function of informed decision making and effective control. Once basic mission requirements have been decided, joint force planners must review force tracking options to provide the supported combatant commander with the requisite C2 means to monitor and control execution of the joint force deployment.

e. **Force Closure.** Force closure is the point in time when a supported JFC determines **sufficient personnel and equipment resources are in the assigned operational area** to carry out assigned tasks. As a planning factor, force closure is important because decisive operations can not begin until sufficient personnel, equipment, and materiel is available to execute the mission. Force closure includes force tracking, risk assessments, force readiness, and METT-T. The supported commander's force closure decision must take into account the above




Figure III-1. Force Tracking is Part of Force Closure

factors and the commander's ability to integrate forces. Force closure is a function of several elements, most notably lift capacity, C2, POE and/or POD transshipment capability, port capacity, transit time for strategic lift, receipt of overflight and landing diplomatic clearances, and the effectiveness of theater JRSOI execution. Decisions affecting transportation mode or routing made prior to and during the early stages of a deployment may have a dramatic impact on joint force closure timelines. For this reason, planners must give careful consideration to the selection of POE and/or POD, scheduling of strategic lift modes, movement control, and JRSOI planning. Inherent in this complex process is the management of change and the

ability to respond with accuracy and flexibility to dynamic mission conditions.

3. Preparation for Deployment

Preparation for deployment includes **tailoring, task organizing, and echeloning** forces and materiel for deployment as well as **documenting the sequence** of deployment and movement requirements on the appropriate TPFDD. Tailoring focuses on the vertical integration of the force, ensuring that capabilities are matched in the proper combinations and sequence at the various echelons of command. Task-organizing addresses horizontal integration, distributing combat, support, and C2 capabilities to the



Sealift closure is an important planning factor because over 90% of all joint force materiel will move by sealift during most deployment operations.

components of the force. Generally, commanders tailor a subordinate force and task-organize their own force. Echeloning organizes the force for movement.

a. **Tailoring.** Tailoring is the process of **matching the force mix and sequence of deployment to the supported combatant commander's operational requirements.** The factors of mission analysis drive the initial tailoring of the force. The tailoring process replaces the predicted conditions used during OPLAN development in the OPLAN TPFDD with actual, up-to-date information to produce a more accurate TPFDD. The purpose of force tailoring is to generate effective, timely capability, given mission requirements and lift constraints. When done properly, force tailoring promotes deployment efficiency.

- **Tailoring** includes **force allocation, augmentation, and refinement.** Tailoring begins with the allocation of basic force capabilities to the combatant commander. Basic force capabilities may be augmented with additional capabilities not normally assigned to the basic force and based on mission requirements. Commanders not only tailor units, they also tailor staffs. The standard peacetime

staff may undergo significant changes, both in size and organization, in order to meet the mission requirements of a contingency. Once this is complete, the basic force and general augmentation must be refined to reflect the multiple constraints and realities of the projected operation.

- **Force refinement** is an **iterative, continuous process of adjustment** conducted by supported and supporting combatant commanders as well as Service component commanders. The objective is for the resulting tailored force to represent the best possible **balance between missions, optimum force, actual forces available, time and lift available, and theater supportability.**

b. **Task Organizing.** Force tailoring allocates and sequences capabilities for a mission. **Task organizing distributes those capabilities at each C2 echelon.** The commander's purpose in task organization is to **optimize subordinate commanders' abilities to generate appropriate mission capability** consistent with the concept of operations to meet the stated needs.

- Commanders and staffs work to ensure that the appropriate combat, support, and C2 capabilities are distributed to the appropriate components of the force. The relationship between units within a task-organized force is described in terms of command relationships. Command relationships define command responsibilities and authority. Support is a command authority. Support relationships are defined in an establishing directive that is normally issued to specify the purpose of the support relationship, the effect desired, and the scope of the action to be taken.

- Task organizing is the process of **forming an operating force of specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission**. For most joint force missions, task organization is centered around combat units and is a predeployment activity. However, for some MOOTW, disaster relief, or humanitarian assistance missions, joint force capabilities are task-organized around support forces. If sufficient time is available prior to mission execution, task-organized forces will conduct interoperability training to facilitate deployment and employment.

c. **Echelonning.** Echelonning is organizing units for movement. Like task organizing, echelonning is a predeployment activity that **establishes a priority for movement within the deploying force to meet operational requirements and maximize available lift**. For example, echelons may be divided into advance parties, main bodies, and rear parties.

d. **Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development.** TPFDD development is based on **three main processes**: force planning, support planning, and transportation planning. The resulting TPFDD is both a **force requirements document** and a **prioritized transportation movement document**. It is the supported combatant

commander's statement of requirements by unit type, time period, and priority for arrival. Further, the TPFDD **defines the supported combatant commander's time-phased lift requirements** for supplies, equipment, and replacement personnel needed to sustain the forces specified during force planning. The supported combatant commander decides on the phasing, prioritization, and validation of all movement requirements documented in the TPFDD.

For additional information on crisis action time-phased force and deployment data development, see CJCSM 3122.01, "Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures)," CJCSM 3122.02, "Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution," and CJCSM 3122.03, "Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning Formats and Guidance)."

- **The ultimate objective of deployment operations is the arrival of the right force at the right place and at the right time.** The supported combatant commander's required date to have forces at their destinations is the end goal from which all transportation must be planned. The supported combatant commander must resolve the sequence in which units deploy in relation to the other deploying forces and alliance and/or coalition forces as early as possible. This sequence is the basis for the prioritized transportation movement outlined in the TPFDD. Early resolution of the sequencing of forces into the theater will facilitate determining force closure and provide the basis for initiating the theater distribution plan.
- Following their evaluation of the supported combatant commander's concept of operation, supporting combatant commands and agencies must **clearly and quickly articulate their**



The railroad is the preferred means of moving equipment that must move more than one day's driving distance to and from POEs and PODs.

mobility requirements. Concurrently, supporting combatant commands and agencies establish milestones for loading and transporting units and their accompanying supplies to the POE, embarking them aboard strategic lift, and transiting them to the POD to arrive in theater by the supported combatant commander's required date. Proper sequencing of forces into the AOR and/or JOA promotes the rapid buildup of capabilities that permit the supported combatant commander to seize the initiative and conduct successful decisive operations as early as possible.

e. Time-Phased Force and Deployment List Development. The TPFDL is to serve as a list which identifies types and/or actual units required to support the OPLAN and indicate origin and ports of debarkation or ocean area. Typically this list is provided to aid the CAP that occurs when a deliberate plan is executed. The early identification of the units required aids in the ability of the supporting combatant commanders and agencies in responding to the supported combatant commanders' requirements.

f. Assignment and Transfer of Forces. All Service forces (except as noted in title 10, Section 162, US Code) are assigned to combatant commands by the Secretary of Defense "Forces for Unified Commands" memorandum (see Figure III-2). A force assigned or attached to a combatant command may be **transferred from that command only as directed by the Secretary of Defense, and under procedures prescribed by the Secretary of Defense and approved by the President.** Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands and JTFs may direct the assignment or attachment of their forces to those subordinate commands as appropriate. OPCON of assigned forces is inherent in COCOM and may be delegated within the combatant command by the commander in chief of the combatant command or between combatant commands by the Secretary of Defense.

For additional information see JP 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)".

- Except as otherwise directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, all forces operating within the geographic

ASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER OF FORCES TO A JOINT FORCE

- Forces, not command relationships, are transferred between commands. When forces are transferred, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over those forces must be specified.
- When the transfer of forces to a joint force will be permanent (or for an unknown but long period of time) the forces should be reassigned. Combatant commanders will exercise combatant command (command authority) and subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) will exercise operational control (OPCON) over reassigned forces.
- When transfer of forces to a joint force will be temporary, the forces will be attached to the gaining command and JFCs will exercise OPCON or tactical control, as appropriate, over the attached forces.
- Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands and joint task forces direct the assignment or attachment of their forces to those subordinate commands as appropriate.

Figure III-2. Assignment and Transfer of Forces to a Joint Force

area assigned to a combatant commander shall be assigned or attached to and under the command of that combatant commander. Forces directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense may conduct operations from or within any geographic area as required for accomplishing assigned tasks, as mutually agreed by the commanders concerned or as directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense.

- Transient forces do not come under the chain of command of the area commander solely by their movement across AOR and/or JOA boundaries.

During deployment operations, USTRANSCOM intertheater mobility forces operating within the geographic area assigned to a combatant commander are not transferred from USTRANSCOM to the OPCON of that combatant commander. For example, supporting aircraft and crews, tanker airlift control elements (TALCEs) and air mobility elements remain OPCON to USTRANSCOM. However, transient forces within the assigned AOR of a combatant commander are subject to the area commander's orders in some instances, e.g., coordination for emergency defense or allocation of local facilities.

4. Deployment Concept

Mission analysis determines the requirements for joint force employment to achieve the stated military objectives. The deployment concept to support employment of the joint force is initially outlined during COA development as deployment estimates to support various COAs during the joint planning process. The following paragraphs explain several **planning considerations** that can impact the deployment concept to support joint force operations.

a. **Lines of Communications.** Lines of communications (LOCs) are the **land, water, and air routes which connect an operating military force with a base of operations** and along which supplies and military forces move to support operations. LOCs must be **identified early in the planning process** because the associated links (e.g., land, sea, or air routes) and nodes (e.g., home station, ports, staging areas, destination) impact every aspect of deployment planning. The number of LOCs needed to support deployment operations varies with the scope and scale of mission requirements. Large scale strategic deployments can have three LOC segments

(CONUS or OCONUS [based on the point of origin for deploying forces and materiel], strategic [i.e., air and sea LOCs], and theater), with numerous POEs and/or PODs supporting deployment of the joint force. Conversely, smaller scale humanitarian assistance or disaster relief deployments could involve maintaining only a single LOC from one POE to a POD in the crisis area. Diplomatic clearances and HN agreements have a major impact on LOCs and the ability to deploy forces.

b. **Ports.** The **most critical nodes** supporting most deployment operations are the **air and seaports of embarkation and debarkation**. Port selection decisions made during planning determine the force closure timeline for execution. Port efficiency or throughput is a function of the operational environment, capability of the port workforce (stevedores, cargo handlers, and PSA [Army] and/or POG [Marine Corps]), and the level of port modernization (fully developed, marginally developed, or undeveloped). In some instances, the existence of no port facilities (e.g., bare beach or austere landing strip) will significantly hinder deployment and sustainment operations until temporary or fixed infrastructure can be constructed. **Joint**



Port efficiency and throughput are the primary factors affecting force closure.

logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS) operations provide the capability to establish port facilities over bare beach to begin deployment operations or to augment existing port facilities with insufficient throughput. The worst case deployment scenario for deployment planners is conducting forcible entry operations in an area of the world with undeveloped or nonexistent port facilities.

See JP 3-18, “Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations” for additional information on forcible entry operations.

- **Port Operations.** Successful port operations require **detailed planning, disciplined adherence to procedures, and purposeful execution of individual and unit responsibilities.** When possible, port operations responsibilities should be articulated in **command arrangement agreements (CAAs)** between supported and supporting combatant commands to clearly fix responsibility for specific functions within the port. For example, functional aspects of port operations that may be outlined in CAAs include: command arrangements, command relationships,

and reporting requirements for port support operations; responsibilities for life support of transient units; crisis action policies and procedures for port operation; and frustrated cargo procedures. **Deploying units must be made aware of and comply with all local policies and port operation procedures.** In general, large port operations have terrain management plans with designated local dispersal, staging, marshalling, and call forward areas as well as restricted traffic patterns to regulate the movement in, around, and through the port. However, everyone involved in the port operation must remember that the deploying unit is the supported unit in port operations. Units and organizations that support port operations are supporting units. Detailed coordination with the agency responsible for port management will ensure that deploying units are in compliance with local port operating procedures.

- **Aerial Ports of Embarkation and/or Debarkation.** Aerial port squadrons (APSs) and TALCEs, provided by AMC, **furnish the airlift interface for operation of APOEs and APODs.**



Normally aerial port squadrons and tanker airlift control elements provide facilities support and airlift interface for deploying forces.



Supported and supporting combatant commanders have several options for the operation of common-user seaport operations outside the continental United States.

Navy Overseas Air Cargo Terminal (NOACT) units are employed by the Navy to load and unload aircraft and operate air cargo and passenger airheads. A/DACGs are used by the Army and the Marine Corps for the same function. **Both NOACTs and A/DACGs may supplement APS and TALCE capabilities**, or perform stand-alone APOE and APOD operations. Air terminal movement control teams (ATMCTs), when deployed, provide movement control and the airport management interface for Army units at APOEs and APODs. A/DACGs may be used for specified periods of time (until ATMCTs arrive) or for specified missions (when ATMCTs are not available). Movement control for Marine Corps units at APOEs and APODs is provided by the logistics movement control center (LMCC), a standing organization of the force service support group. Normally, deploying units coordinate their movements directly with the ATMCT (Army) or LMCC (Marine Corps). Both the ATMCT and A/DACG (Marine Corps) coordinate facilities support for deploying units with the APS and call forward times, airlift schedules, cargo

documentation, and passenger manifests with the TALCE representatives.

- **Seaports of Embarkation and/or Debarkation.** USTRANSCOM, through MTMC, is the DOD-designated SPM for all common-user seaports worldwide. As SPM, MTMC performs those functions necessary to support the strategic flow of the deployment forces' equipment and sustainment supply from SPOEs through SPODs. MTMC is also responsible for providing strategic deployment status information to the combatant commander and to workload the SPOD port operator based on the combatant commander's priorities and/or guidance. MTMC has management responsibility through all phases of the theater port operations continuum, from a bare beach (i.e., JLOTS) deployment to a commercial contract fixed-port supported deployment. Regarding designation of a port operator, the geographic combatant commander has several options available including use of a deployable active component transportation group or a RC transportation terminal group. The geographic combatant commander may



Forcible entry operations over bare beach is the worst case deployment scenario for joint force planners.

also opt to enter into a CAA with USTRANSCOM to allow MTMC to operate some or all water terminals in the theater.

- **Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore.** JLOTS are **operations in which Navy and Army logistics over-the-shore (LOTS) forces conduct LOTS operations together under a JFC.** JLOTS operations can be conducted over unimproved shorelines, through fixed-ports not accessible to deep draft shipping, or through fixed-ports that are inadequate without the use of JLOTS capabilities. For this reason, JLOTS operations should be considered when port throughput, capacity, or reception capability is inadequate to support planned joint force operations or to augment port reception capability to

handle the surge of major combat formations during the early stages of large force deployments.

For additional information of JLOTS operations, see JP 4-01.6, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS).”

c. **Staging.** Staging is the process of concentrating troop units, transient personnel, and materiel between movements over LOCs for mission-related purposes. Purposes for staging may include, but are not limited to, any of the following mission related activities: operational pause for rest, reorganization, or reconstitution of the force; reconfiguration of unit loads or movement echelons for employment; predeployment training; rehearsal of unit missions; marshalling of forces; or to change the mode of transportation. **The staging process may occur** in various areas along the LOCs. Marshalling areas, staging areas, and intermediate staging bases are all used to stage units. Use of these areas during deployment **increases the operations security (OPSEC) indicators of deploying units.** The OPSEC risk associated with the use of SAs during deployment should be examined during COA analysis and development of the deployment concept. If SAs are used, OPSEC considerations must be addressed in force protection and IO planning.

d. **Mobility Considerations.** Mobility considerations for deployment planning begins with an **assessment of the mobility assets** available for employment. Tactical or operational deployment operations normally require a combination of organic unit, CULT, HN, and/or theater-assigned mobility assets to fulfill all movement requirements. **For strategic deployment, the capabilities provided by the strategic mobility triad form the basis of any deployment plan.** In addition, several mission variables drive the

STAGING IN WORLD WAR II

“Logistic considerations heavily favored both the general strategy of concentration against Germany and the specific plan of invading northwestern Europe from a base in the British Isles. Because the target area was close to the main sources of British and American power, two to three times as many forces could be hurled against northwestern Europe, with a given amount of shipping, as could be supported in operations against Japan. Britain itself was a highly industrialized country, fully mobilized after two and a half years of war, and well shielded by air and naval power — a ready made base for a land invasion and air attacks on Germany’s vitals. While invasion forces were assembling, moreover, they could garrison the British Isles. Finally, an attack across the English Channel would use the only short water crossing to the Continent from a base already available and would thrust directly at the heart of Fortress Europe by the main historic invasion routes.”

SOURCE: American Military History, Army Historical Series

type and quantity of mobility assets needed to support the deployment effort and can impact the concept of operations for employment of the joint force.

- Several planning variables quantify the scale of the deployment in terms of the gross quantity of strategic mobility assets that may be required to deploy and sustain the joint force within the time available for execution. Other variables impact the deployment concept and/or

the concept of operation. The concept of operations integrates these variables with other mission requirements to produce a coherent employment plan with supporting deployment concept. These **planning variables** include: warning time; mobilization level; forces and materiel to be deployed (may include RC and sustainment); enemy forces to be encountered in the operational area; delivery schedules and distances involved in the deployment; options for



Staging locations include intermediate staging bases, forward operating bases, and tactical assembly areas.

HNS or assistance; the potential for combined operations; and national will and political risk.

- Deployment planners will be continuously challenged to project the **proper balance of combat forces, support forces, and materiel within the time constraints imposed by the mission and with the mobility assets provided for deployment execution.** This is particularly true for large scale strategic deployments. Moreover, after the initial deployment of forces, sustainment begins to require an increasing amount of mobility assets. After the initial deployment surge, the JFC must continue to monitor the deployment flow and recognize the opportunity costs associated with strategic lift operations. As the operation progresses, requirements for sustainment lift to support the joint force begin to compete with initial deployment lift requirements for movement priority. For this reason, the JFC must continue to monitor the deployment and sustainment of the force to **ensure that the utilization of strategic mobility assets is consistent**

with the current tactical or operational situation, the overall concept of operations, and mission objectives.

e. **Container and Pallet Management and/or Recycling.** Increasingly, deployment concepts include **intermodal shipping as the means for timely and efficient deployment operations.** Intermodal shipping operations refers to the efficient interchange of standardized shipping containers between ocean and land carriers, sophisticated systems of container handling and storage in marine terminals or container freight stations, and computerized tracking of shipments. In addition, **pallets, nets, and cargo tie-down equipment are crucial components of airlift operations.** Pallets maximize available airlift capability and reduce aircraft ground time by allowing for load planning and pallet buildup prior to aircraft arrival. The advantages realized from intermodal operations and pallet use in airlift operations during deployments are expedited transit times and, often, reduced delivery costs. **Container and pallet management is critical to effective intermodal and airlift operations.** Container and pallet control becomes



Container and pallet accountability is critical to effective and efficient deployment operations.

increasingly difficult as deployment operations progress. The tendency of receiving units and the Services to retain containers and pallets negates the advantages of intermodal operations, increases requirements for chassis or trailers to move containers, significantly reduces airlift effectiveness and efficiency, and causes increased deployment costs through replacement of “lost” containers and pallets. In addition, in-theater container movement and handling assets are normally not sufficient to accommodate excess containers and pallets. To avoid such costs or container and pallet misuse, a system must be established during all phases of employment to **report, account for, and retrograde the containers and pallets in use by the deploying force.**

For additional information, see JP 4-01.7, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Use of Intermodal Containers in Joint Operations.”

f. **Environmental Considerations.** The potential impact of national, HN, and international environmental laws, regulations, conventions, and treaties on deployment operations should be considered early in the planning process. The requirements may have an impact on POE and/or POD selection and operation, selection and management of SAs, and other deployment decisions.

For detailed information on environmental considerations during operations, refer to JP 4-04, “Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support.”

5. Intelligence Preparation

Deployment planning and execution, like all operations, is **guided by joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace (JIPB)** for the full range of military operations. The impact of the operational environment and the adversary must be assessed in relation to the assigned mission. For deployment

operations, JIPB must answer several fundamental questions. Is there a potential threat that can disrupt, interdict, or block the deployment of the joint force at any point in the deployment process? What infrastructure is available en route to and inside of the host country to support deployment of the joint force? What is the throughput capacity of various ports and airfields to support deployment operations? As discussed earlier in this publication, JICTRANS provides ready resources and information data bases to assist JIPB for deployment operations.

a. **Threat Assessment.** JIPB consists of **four basic steps**; define the total battlespace environment, describe the battlespace’s effects, evaluate the adversary, and determine and describe probable adversary COAs. This process is used to **systematically analyze the environment and adversary in a specific geographic area.** The JIPB process is **continuous and cyclic**, with the most current information available regarding the adversary situation and the battlespace environment integrated into the JIPB cycle. JIPB supports mission analysis by enabling the JFC and joint force staff to **visualize the full extent of the battlespace, to distinguish the known from the unknown, and to establish working assumptions** regarding how adversary and friendly forces will interact within the constraints of the battlespace environment. JIPB assists the JFC in formulating planning guidance by identifying significant adversary capabilities and by pointing out critical battlespace factors, such as the locations of key geography, attitudes of indigenous populations, and potential land, air, and sea avenues of approach.

For more information on JIPB see JP 2-01.3, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace.”

- JIPB analysis for deployment operations includes a broader geographic

perspective than normal because this analysis must consider the threat to deployment operations from each point of origin to each TAA. More specifically, JIPB analysis must include the **four primary nodes** and **three movement links of the deployment process** as well as all supporting nodes and links. Assessment begins with the determination of the local threat to CONUS or OCONUS home station locations, transportation links from home stations to POEs, and the individual POEs selected for marshalling forces and materiel alerted for deployment. Assessment continues with consideration of the threat to the selected mode and route for strategic lift and in-theater PODs. Intelligence collection, production, and assessment for a specific deployment operation is a collaborative effort between JICTRANS, the defense intelligence organizations, Services, and the supported and supporting combatant command joint intelligence centers (JICs). JICTRANS is responsible for intelligence collection and production for TCC strategic lift route planning outside of CONUS to the POD. Supported and supporting combatant command JICs are responsible for intelligence collection and production for in-theater POEs, PODs, assembly or staging areas, and movement planning for the deploying force.

- Each node and link in the deployment process represents a potential target for an adversary. Deployment nodes represent particularly lucrative targets for WMD or terrorist activity because of the large concentrations of forces and materiel. Based on the assessed threat, the JFC must determine where to accept risk, where to focus force protection efforts, and how much of the deploying force should be dedicated, at least initially, to force protection. **Effective**

threat assessment is the first step in understanding the operational risk to deployment operations and developing risk controls to mitigate or reduce the perceived threat and execute the deployment without interference.

b. **Infrastructure Assessment.** JICTRANS and the geographic combatant command JICs maintain infrastructure data for various geographic areas of the world. **Specific and current infrastructure data is critical to deployment planning.** Infrastructure data includes, for example, detailed information regarding air and seaports, road networks, railroads, sea lanes, and storage facilities to support operations planning.

- **Infrastructure assessment is key to understanding deployment throughput.** Throughput is the average quantity of cargo and passengers that can pass through a port or airfield on a daily basis. Moreover, deployment throughput may be limited by reception and storage capacity at any node or by other restrictions such as the availability of materials handling equipment (MHE), stevedores, or cranes. Depending upon the scope, scale, and geographic location of the operational area, throughput capacity can become a significant operational constraint, impacting closure of the force and, ultimately, mission accomplishment. Careful analysis of available deployment nodes or planned augmentation to offset port and airfield shortcomings by deployment planners will ensure that the selected modes and nodes have the capacities required for timely deployment of the joint force to meet mission requirements.
- **Collection of infrastructure information is a continuous intelligence effort.** JICTRANS is responsible for developing distributed functional data bases for access by deployment planners and for

coordinating collection and production priorities within the intelligence community.

6. Force Protection

Force protection is a critical element of all joint force operations. It is an inherent command responsibility. Fluid battlefields and the potential ability of adversaries to orchestrate asymmetric threats against US forces require that every means be sought to protect those forces. **Commanders are responsible for ensuring that requisite force protection measures are enforced consistent with the threat.** Early warning systems must be part of all plans. They must be known by all personnel, tested, and used. A thorough intelligence estimate will assist the commander in providing force protection against known threats. The threat of enemy interdiction during deployment operations, particularly for forward presence forces, presents a special challenge to the JFC. The challenge is to **protect geographically-dispersed deploying forces** (which will have limited self-protection capability while configured for deployment) **and materiel** transiting the various links and nodes of the deployment process. Risk must be assessed and comprehensive force protection plans developed to address vulnerabilities and counter potential threats to forces, materiel, infrastructure, and information systems. Comprehensive force protection requires the employment of a full array of active and passive measures and the integration and coordination of intelligence and security programs, IO, risk management (RM) techniques, and safety programs to increase individual awareness of potential threats. Planning for WMD threats should also be considered. In addition, it is also critical to include preparations protection for the civilian work force and/or HNS workers.

See DOD Directive 2000.12, "DOD Combating Terrorism Program," CJCS

Handbook 5260, "Commander's Handbook for Antiterrorism Readiness," and JP 3-07.2, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism" for additional information.

"When invading an enemy's country, men should always be confident in spirit, but they should fear, too, and take measures of precaution; and thus they will be at once most valorous in attack and impregnable in defense."

Archidamus of Sparta: Speech to the Lacaedaemonian expeditionary forces departing against Athens, 431 B.C.

a. **Local Security.** Local security is never a given, even in CONUS. From alert notification to redeployment to home station, unit commanders at all levels must never assume they are operating in a secure environment. **The JFC's foremost force protection concern should be maintaining local security to preserve tactical and operational flexibility and freedom of action.** Force protection begins with assured local security.

b. **Information Operations.** IO are those **actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems, while defending one's own information and information systems.** Joint force deployment operations must be coordinated with planned IO, which are conducted through the integration of many capabilities and related activities. Major IO capabilities include, but are not limited to, OPSEC, PSYOP, military deception, electronic warfare, physical attack and/or destruction, and computer network attack. IO-related activities include, but are not limited to, public affairs (PA) and CA activities. Planned improvements in deployment planning and execution are focused on the integration and development of robust information systems and automated data processing (ADP) equipment. This



Asymmetric threats against our forces require constant vigilance.

increasing dependence on information systems and ADP equipment **presents potentially enormous vulnerabilities** that may be exploited by adversaries intent on disrupting US force projection.

For additional information, see JP 3-13, “Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.”

Typical IO capabilities and related activities addressed during a deployment are as follows.

- **Information Assurance.** Information assurance is defined as IO that **protect and defend information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation**. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating detection, protection, and reaction capabilities. **Planning and execution of deployment operations is heavily dependent upon assured information systems.** Corruption of deployment movement data, transportation scheduling, or C2 systems would have a major, and potentially mission threatening, impact on deployment operations.
- **Military Deception.** Military deception is a tool used by JFCs to assist them in accomplishing their missions. Military deception may be employed during all phases of military operations to assist the JFC in attaining **surprise, security, mass, and economy of force**. Military deception supports military operations by **causing adversaries to misallocate resources in time, place, quantity, or effectiveness**. Deceptions during deployment operations are intended to **increase the potential for successful initiation of friendly operations** by misleading the adversary as to the time and location of the introduction of forces into the operational area, the location of the main effort, and the command’s operational objectives.

For additional information, see JP 3-58, “Joint Doctrine for Military Deception.”
- **Psychological Operations.** PSYOP influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimate behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in such a way as to support achievement

of the overall joint force mission. PSYOP can be a **significant force multiplier** through the conduct of mass communication activities that **reduce the efficiency of adversary forces and create disaffection within adversary ranks**. Properly planned and executed, PSYOP can be an extremely **effective population control measure**. PSYOP efforts in support of deployment operations may include activities emphasizing noninterference by noncombatants, providing critical information to noncombatants or US citizens in the AOR and/or JOA, assisting in deception operations, or inducing desertion and surrender within enemy units.

See JP 3-53, “Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.”

- **Operations Security.** OPSEC is concerned with **denying critical information about friendly forces to the adversary**. Deployments, particularly strategic deployment operations, generally have large, distinct signatures. This fact makes masking the movement (or purpose of the movement) of forces and materiel to staging bases or to the AOR and/or JOA a critical piece of the OPSEC plan. Deployment signatures probably cannot be totally hidden; however, US OPSEC may conceal such details as the composition of the forces or the time and location of the introduction of forces into a theater.

For additional information see JP 3-54, “Joint Doctrine for Operations Security.”

- **Public Affairs.** PA are **public information and community relations activities directed toward the general public by the various elements of the**

Department of Defense to expedite the flow of accurate and timely information to internal (own organization) and **external** (the public) **audiences**. PA activities create an **awareness of the military goals** during a campaign or operation and satisfy the desires of the internal and external audiences to be kept informed about the campaign or operation. The intent for PA activities is to **encourage a favorable attitude** about the campaign or operation and inform internal and external audiences of significant developments affecting them. During deployment operations, PA activities allow a JFC to influence an adversary’s (or a potential adversary’s) perception about the friendly force’s intent, capability, and vulnerability. At the same time, PA activities will not be used as a military deception capability or to provide disinformation to either internal or external audiences.

See JP 3-61, “Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations,” for further details.

- **Civil Affairs.** Lessons learned from recent operational deployments have highlighted that timely and complementary use of CA assets can mitigate the extent to which civilian matters impact military operations as well as identify and coordinate the use of in-country facilities and resources. **CA elements can provide liaison to local agencies and civilian authorities, provide information on the political, cultural, and economic situation in the AOR and/or JOA, and advise the JFC on cultural and moral considerations.**

See JP 3-57, “Doctrine for Joint Civil-Military Operations,” for additional information.

c. **Risk Management.** Uncertainty and risk are a fundamental part of all military operations including deployment operations. A time-tested tenet of successful joint operations is taking bold, decisive action accompanied by the willingness to accept the associated risk. Risk is the probability and severity of loss linked to various hazards. Carefully determining the risks, analyzing and controlling as many hazards as possible, and executing a supervised plan that accounts for those hazards contributes to the successful application of military force during joint force operations. RM is a process that **assists decision makers in reducing or offsetting risk**. The RM process provides leaders with a **systematic mechanism to aid in identifying and choosing the optimum COA based upon risk for any situation**.

For additional information on RM, see JP 5-00.2, “Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.”

d. **Safety.** JFCs make safety an **integral part of all joint training and operations**. Sustained, high-tempo operations put personnel at risk. Command emphasis, discipline, and training lessen those risks. Safety in **training, planning, and operations** is crucial to successful joint force operations and the preservation of combat power.

e. **Force Health Protection (FHP)** is the strategy that provides focus for a unity of effort for the entire military health system to provide health service support to US forces. This is accomplished in part by a proactive health surveillance and preventative medicine program. The desired outcome is a healthy and fit force that provides maximum protection to Service members across the full range of military operations.

Refer to JP 4-02, “Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations,” for more information.

- **Deployment Health Surveillance.** A robust health surveillance system is a critical component of FHP. Deployment health surveillance includes identifying the population at risk (through, but not limited to, pre- and post-deployment health assessments), recognizing and assessing hazardous exposures (medical, environmental, and occupational), employing specific countermeasures, and monitoring health outcomes (through weekly disease and non-battle injury reporting).
- **Individual Health Readiness.** Soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines are the most valuable, most complex weapon systems in the US military field. To ensure their readiness from a health perspective, the Joint Staff has developed individual deployment readiness requirements.

Specific baseline requirements for deployment health surveillance and individual health readiness are detailed in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum, “Deployment Health Surveillance and Readiness.”

SECTION B. EXECUTION

7. Requirements Validation

Movement requirements developed during deployment planning must be **validated prior to deployment execution**. Validation confirms the need for the movement requirement, shipment configuration, dimensions, and routing and ensures that all parties, including the chain of command, are cognizant of the requirement. Movement requirements are **validated during execution planning by the supported combatant commander** who validates all joint force movement requirements for USTRANSCOM movement scheduling. During execution planning, the NCA approved COA or



All movement requirements, including all changes to the time-phased force and deployment data, must be validated by the supported combatant commander prior to movement scheduling.

OPLAN is transformed into an OPORD by the supported combatant commander. Actual forces, sustainment, and strategic mobility resources are identified and the concept of operations is described in OPORD format. TPFDD refinement that began during deployment planning continues with updated information entered into JOPES. Concurrently, the supported combatant commander directs supporting combatant commanders, component commanders, and providing organizations to source applicable force requirements and verify personnel and cargo details to ensure that the TPFDD reflects accurate OPORD movement requirements. Changes to joint force movement requirements occurring after the supported combatant commander validates the TPFDD must be coordinated through the supported combatant commander, who revalidates the approved changes prior to any action by USTRANSCOM.

a. **TPFDD Refinement.** The TPFDD is a dynamic document that supported combatant command planners must **continuously refine through the entire deployment process** to reflect current deployment information and monitor achievement of deployment

objectives. TPFDD adjustments become necessary for a **variety of compelling and valid reasons**. Managing changes to the TPFDD is critical to maintaining control of the deployment. Some factors that may generate TPFDD adjustments include:

- Changes to mission requirements based on changes to the overall joint force mission, mission objectives, or the threat;
- Nonvalidated forces and/or sustainment added to the deployment flow;
- Validated forces that have a new latest arrival date;
- Available-to-load date or ready-to-load date adjustments to deploying forces;
- Delayed POE and/or POD arrivals and departures that affect subsequent strategic lift;
- Airlift rerouting or delays resulting from denial of overflight diplomatic clearances or natural or manmade disasters; and

- Emergency needs for forces or sustainment in the theater.

b. **TPFDD Letter of Instruction.** The TPFDD LOI provides planning and execution instructions to the supported combatant command's components, supporting combatant commands, and supporting agencies as they refine, verify, and manifest their portion of the joint force TPFDD. The intent of the supported combatant commander's TPFDD LOI is to **eliminate confusion, facilitate parallel planning, and expedite TPFDD refinement** by providing component commands, supporting commands, and agencies with a single set of instructions for TPFDD input and management. Prudent use of the TPFDD LOI ensures that actual OPORD movement requirements are properly documented and validated for transportation scheduling.

For additional information see CJCSM 3122.01, "Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning, Policies, and Procedures)." This manual outlines the standard TPFDD LOI that will be used by the joint planning and execution community for all planning and execution scenarios. Supported combatant commanders provide additional supplemental guidance for their AOR.

c. **Actions of the Supported Combatant Commander.** Firm force **requirements and priorities are identified** during planning following COA selection. Once this occurs, the supported combatant commander notifies the JPEC and supporting commands and agencies to source the unsourced force requirements. This signals force-providing organizations and supporting commands and agencies to **provide or update specific unit movement data** in JOPES for the first increment of movement (normally, the first 7 days of air movement and the first 30 days of sea movement). It also prompts Service logistics and personnel offices to **adjust and**

update sustainment requirements based on the latest and most accurate staff estimates. During this process, the supported combatant commander also requests that the Joint Staff and supporting commands and agencies assist in **resolving any critical sourcing or resource shortfalls or limitations**. When the above actions have been completed, the supported combatant commander **reviews and validates the lift requirements** within the specific TPFDD movement window and notifies USTRANSCOM that the movement requirements are ready for lift scheduling. USTRANSCOM develops transportation schedules to accommodate these requirements after verifying transportation feasibility. **Accuracy of TPFDD movement requirements and data is critical to the lift scheduling process** because it directly impacts force closure. Errors in lift scheduling or late changes to the validated TPFDD requiring a change in transportation mode (e.g., airlift to sealift) could significantly reduce the supported combatant commander's operational capability or flexibility.

d. **Actions of Supporting Combatant and Service Component Commanders.** Supporting commanders providing forces will identify and task specific units for employment and provide unit movement requirements in JOPES to allow lift scheduling for all elements involved in the deployment. **Accuracy is imperative to ensure effective support and to optimize efficiency of lift.** It is also very important during this process that supporting combatant and Service component commanders ensure the **timely coordination of hazardous materiel data** with USTRANSCOM. Supporting commanders should also develop OPORDs to support the approved COA and minimize the confusion inherent in rapid deployments. Service component commanders continue working with their Service and major commands to identify and update estimated sustainment requirements. Service components and supporting

combatant commands also schedule movements for self-deploying forces (organic moves) so that the JFC has visibility of all deploying forces.

The Invasion of Sicily - World War II

"Perhaps the most difficult problem which faced the subordinate formations of the Army arose from continually varying estimates of availability of craft and shipping."

**Field Marshal Viscount
Montgomery of Alamein (on
planning for the invasion of
Sicily July 1943)**

8. Movement Scheduling

USTRANSCOM schedules **intertheater air, land, and sea transportation** to support the approved concept of operations after validation of movement requirements by the supported combatant commander. USTRANSCOM **applies all available common-user transportation assets required** to execute these movement requirements. Feasible airlift and sealift transportation schedules are prepared by USTRANSCOM in the sequence requested and validated by the supported combatant commander. The level of detail in the movement schedule will correspond with the availability of detailed information regarding movement requirements and the time available for planning. In extremely time-sensitive situations, USTRANSCOM will focus its entire planning effort on the first increment of the movement requirement. Additionally, USTRANSCOM establishes air and sea channels for movement of nonunit personnel and sustainment.

9. Movement Control

Successful employment of military forces depends on assured and timely deployment and support. Movement control **coordinates transportation resources to enhance**

combat effectiveness and meet the deployment and support priorities of the supported combatant commander (see Figure III-3). Effective movement control during deployment operations **provides the JFC with the capability to monitor and manage deployment execution and adjust the deployment flow** as necessary. USTRANSCOM facilitates this effort by providing movement summaries of TCC and organic movements from departure to arrival in theater. USTRANSCOM also maintains the JOPES data base and provides analysis of deployment execution to the Joint Staff, supported combatant commands, and supporting commands and agencies. This analysis includes progress reports, status, problems, force closure, port workloads, daily movement statistics, and resolution of problems encountered with common-user transportation means. In addition, movement control **must be coordinated and synchronized with JRSOI and a TD plan** that describes the in-theater network and system for logistics distribution management. JRSOI focuses on building mission-capable forces as quickly as possible. TD focuses on establishing a distribution management structure and battlefield architecture to maintain visibility and control over forces and materiel arriving for employment in-theater. Effective JRSOI and TD eliminates bottlenecks and provides mission-capable forces and a seamless distribution system responsive to the needs of the JFC.

For further information on movement control, see JP 4-01.3, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control." For additional information on TD, see JP 4-01.4, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Distribution in Joint Operations."

a. **Organization for Movement Control.** Movement control involves **planning, routing, scheduling, and controlling common-user assets and maintaining ITV**




Figure III-3. Joint Movement Control Architecture

of forces and materiel moving through the deployment process. Properly resourced and executed movement control will assist commanders in force tracking. It also enhances JRSOI of personnel, equipment, and supplies moving over LOCs in accordance with command directives and responsibilities. The supported geographic combatant commander has a wide range of options for performing movement control. These options include directing subordinate JFCs and Service components to perform their own movement control or creating a fully integrated joint organization. Regardless of the movement control option selected, the geographic combatant commander should **task organize the movement control function commensurate with the mission, scope of operations, and geography of the operational area**. Normally, the geographic combatant commander delegates OPCON of

the various parts of the transportation system to the most-capable Service components but retains the authority to set priorities and apportion and allocate resources. The geographic combatant commander exercises this authority through a T-JTB, JMC, or assigns the responsibility to a staff element (normally the command's senior logistics staff officer) who coordinates closely with the operations staff.

b. Strategic Movement Control. Effective strategic movement control requires the coordinated efforts of USTRANSCOM, supporting combatant commanders, and the supported geographic combatant commander. Strategic movement control begins with **identifying total joint force movement requirements and translating those requirements into logistics terms** (e.g., barrels, short tons, square feet, passengers).

Logistically-described movement requirements are documented on the appropriate TPFDD and scheduled for strategic deployment using common-user transportation in the sequence and priority validated by the supported geographic combatant commander. **Deliberate planning focuses on time-phasing movements and assigning transportation resources** to support initial deployments for a set period. **Crisis action strategic movement control follows the basic process of deliberate planning.** The fundamental difference is the **reduced amount of time available** to reach allocation, scheduling, identification of threats to transportation assets en route to the debarkation ports, en route access or overflight status, and other execution decisions. Early identification of the force and its movement requirements are key to rapid crisis action movement planning and execution.

- USTRANSCOM uses the TPFDD to analyze the flow of forces and cargo from their points of origin to arrival in theater. They distribute the apportioned strategic transportation resources and make adjustments, as necessary, to ensure the unimpeded flow of forces and materiel into theater. During this process, USCINTRANS follows CJCS guidance and coordinates all major decisions with the supported combatant commander.
- Upon initial execution of an OPORD's TPFDD, and until the situation stabilizes or the theater matures, USCINTRANS and the supported geographic combatant commander may have to exercise direct control of movement operations. Repetitive or cyclic validations of projected movement requirements (both mode and destination) may be necessary. In addition, ascertaining transportation asset availability through an accurate TPFDD is critical to optimizing strategic mobility resources and keeping the chain

of command appraised of deployment progress.

c. **Intertheater and Intratheater Interface.** The integration of intertheater and intratheater movement control systems is also the **joint responsibility of USTRANSCOM and the supported combatant command.** USTRANSCOM normally establishes forward elements within theater to coordinate intertheater transportation information with supported combatant command agencies. However, **intertheater movement information exchange occurs primarily among USTRANSCOM, Defense agencies, Service activities, and supporting combatant commanders.** These commanders have the responsibility for keeping the supported combatant commander informed of issues that require joint attention. USTRANSCOM may place elements from each of its subordinate TCCs in a theater to provide management of intertheater mobility operations into and out of the theater in coordination with the geographic combatant commander's movement control element.

d. **Theater Movement Control.** The supported geographic combatant commander controls intratheater movement. Theater movement control plans should provide the supported geographic combatant commander with the **highest practicable degree of influence or control over movement into, within, and out of theater.** The same movement control options used for strategic movement control should be applied to perform theater movement control. Regardless of the option selected, the theater movement control system must allow the supported geographic combatant commander to **plan, apportion, allocate, coordinate, and deconflict transportation requirements and track the forces and materiel in theater.** Moreover, the theater movement control plan must **coordinate incoming strategic movements** with the TD plan and theater JRSOI operations.

e. **Theater Distribution.** TD is the act of **receiving supplies and equipment in a theater and subsequently forwarding that cargo to a designated point of need.** Effective TD calls for a comprehensive in-theater distribution system for deployment that is seamlessly integrated with strategic, operational, and tactical logistics systems. The intent of TD is to **deliver critical supplies**, under positive control and **through a highly visible distribution pipeline, from source to ultimate user.** The transition from supply to distribution-based sustainment reduces the need for layered stockpiles, reduces logistics management personnel in theater, and provides more effective and responsive support to deployed forces. The end result is **reduced costs and efficiencies realized** in the areas of transportation utilization, supply requisitioning, and theater stockage.

f. **CONUS Peacetime Movement Control.** Peacetime movement control and execution procedures for deployment operations are the same as those in wartime. Each Service coordinates its CONUS DTS movements with the appropriate TCC. USCINCTrans and the supported combatant commander monitor and manage the system to ensure that it meets their priorities.

- Organic convoy operations are an important mode of transportation. They are not visible to USTRANSCOM during peacetime movement. CONUS convoy movements are the responsibility of the respective Service and must be scheduled consistent with MTMC call forward instructions or AMC published strategic lift schedules to ensure correct arrival times at assigned ports.
- AMC is responsible for providing all intertheater air movements. Users submit non-TPFDD requirements for airlift to AMC through their Service or

combatant command air clearance authority.

- MSC is responsible for providing all intertheater sealift movements. Users submit requests for common-user sealift through their Service component to MTMC, who in turn coordinates with MSC for the requisite lift capability.
- CONUS commercial surface movements are arranged by shipper services. CONUS commercial air movements outside ITO or TMO authority are arranged by AMC. A routing authority is delegated by MTMC to ITO or TMO based on shipment weight and mode. Depending on shipment weight and mode, the ITO or TMO may arrange for the movement or may request and receive routing and rating from MTMC.

10. Force Tracking

Innovative and integrated use of C2 systems and information technology makes force tracking through the entire deployment process possible. Visibility of deploying forces and materiel is established through the logistics management concept of JTAV and the GCCS common operational picture (COP). **JTAV is an evolving capability that provides origin-to-destination force tracking and industry-to-end user, in-theater asset visibility.** JTAV is possible through integration of the capabilities provided by automatic identification technology (AIT), ITV, and the information systems and decision support tools comprising the GTN and GCSS. Control of the deployment process is exercised through the C2 capabilities of GTN and GCSS.

For additional information on the COP see CJCSI 3151.01, "Global Command and Control System Common Operational Picture Reporting Requirements."

a. **Unit Movements.** Unit moves involve various combinations of assets to transport personnel, unit-related supplies, and equipment. Except for very small units, it is usual for a unit to be transported as several separate shipments. Force tracking is focused on maintaining visibility of separate unit shipments from origin to destination. Force tracking includes monitoring the elements of a unit until they are reassembled under the commander's control as a mission-capable force and continues until all units that constitute the specified force assemble and transfer of authority to the supported commander is effected.

b. **Joint Total Asset Visibility.** JTAV, when fully functional, will provide users with **“one stop shopping” for timely and accurate information on the location, movement, status, and identity of units, personnel, equipment, and supplies during force projection operations.** It also will include the capability to act upon that information to improve the overall performance of the Department of Defense's logistics practices supporting operations. **JTAV is the foundation upon which DOD-wide asset visibility is based,** requiring horizontal integration of supply and transportation activities and one-time data capture. JTAV includes in-process, in-storage, and in-transit asset visibility. Through JTAV, commanders and staffs can determine whether specific items of supply are readily available in the logistics system or must be deployed with the unit. Total visibility results **from integration of requirements and information systems from four areas:** requisition tracking, visibility of assets in-storage or in-process, visibility of assets in-transit, and asset management within the theater of operations. In each case, a specified “data repository” serves as a central hub for asset information and visibility.

- **Requisition Tracking.** The logistics on-line tracking system will provide

visibility over the status of requisitions. This system also provides status information to GTN to enable it to provide accurate status information when a requisition is in-transit.

- **Assets In-Storage or In-Process.** The automated information system of each inventory control point (ICP) will provide visibility of assets that are in-storage or in-process (defined as assets being procured or repaired). Asset visibility includes the following inventory levels, as described in DOD Regulation 4140.1-R “DOD Material Management Regulation.”
 - **US Army.** Direct support authorized stockage lists.
 - **US Marine Corps.** Installation supply and Marine expeditionary force support activities.
 - **US Navy.** Shipboard and major shore station allowances.
 - **US Air Force.** Base supply.
- **In-Transit Visibility.** ITV refers to the capability to **track the identity, status, and location of DOD unit and nonunit cargo, passengers, and medical patients as part of the JTAV initiative.** USTRANSCOM is the functional proponent for ITV. ITV is a shared responsibility among the deploying force, supporting commands and agencies, USTRANSCOM, and the supported combatant commander. Accurate, disciplined adherence to force validation and manifesting is essential for unit tracking. Accurate reporting begins with the deploying force. Deploying forces are responsible, through their appropriate component chains of command, to the supported combatant commander and USTRANSCOM for

confirming accurate force data. The supported combatant commander validates the force flow and data to USTRANSCOM. USTRANSCOM is responsible for tracking forces and equipment embarked on strategic lift using unit line numbers and transportation control numbers. GTN is the central repository for visibility of assets in-transit from origin to destination, including all military, government, and vendor documented shipments. GTN's data base will contain shipment status information, booking information, passenger reservation information, aircraft and ship manifests, personal property data, medical patients information, and vessel and aircraft scheduling data. GTN integrates the automated movement control systems used by the Services, Defense agencies, and USTRANSCOM, providing the capability to track unit movements and sustainment operations globally.

- **In-Theater Asset Visibility.** JTA V in-theater, when fully developed, will **provide geographic combatant commanders, subordinate JFCs, and deploying forces with materiel and personnel asset visibility.** The in-theater system will interface with Service logistics data bases (to capture visibility of assets held by theater component forces) and with theater transportation information systems (to provide visibility of shipments within a theater). This system will use the Defense Automatic Addressing System to exchange information with the logistics on-line tracking system and ICPs on assets inbound to the theater and available in CONUS. It will also obtain in-transit data directly from GTN.
- **Joint Personnel Asset Visibility (JPAV).** JPAV gives users access to an

integrated data base containing information on units and individuals. JPAV, an integral part of JTA V, will provide **cross-Service integration of various Service personnel data bases,** giving the supported combatant command access to and visibility of personnel resource data for individuals deploying to, employed in, or leaving the AOR and/or JOA, through the use of C2 systems, satellite communications (SATCOM), and information technology. The data base contains basic identifying information on individuals, such as name, rank, social security number, and Service component. Military skill identifiers, qualifications, and other personnel resource data needed to support personnel tracking and readiness assessments is also contained in the data base. The integrated JPAV data base is updated frequently from various sources, including TPFDD, Service component personnel systems, transportation manifesting systems, and casualty reporting and tracking systems.

c. **Automatic Identification Technology.** AIT enables the **capture of current and accurate source data** through the use of bar codes for individual items, optical memory cards for multipacks and containers, radio frequency tags for containers and pallets, and a movement tracking capability using satellite links for convoys, trains, and barges. AIT integration with logistics information systems is key to the JTA V effort.

11. Management of Change

Effective deployment execution involves successfully coping with change. More specifically, **timely and responsive deployment operations are a direct function of the executing command's ability to manage changes** in joint force organization, phasing, employment sequence,

or circumstance and maintain control of deployment execution. Whenever possible, efficient use of scarce resources should be the goal. Optimizing the deployment process is a combat multiplier that enhances joint force effectiveness.

a. **Deployment Changes.** TPFDD and movement schedule changes during deployment execution are inevitable. **Changes in mission requirements, operating environment, or unanticipated circumstances** may cause the JFC to modify the organization of forces, command relationships, phasing, or sequence of force employment. More likely, changes during deployment execution are the result of **incomplete or erroneous movement data in the TPFDD**. In general, the quantity of deployment TPFDD and movement schedule changes is in direct relation to the quality of JOPES movement data inputs and the accuracy of validation, manifesting, and scheduling procedures. Changes may also occur because of **deployment planning decisions**. Late decisions or changes regarding transportation modes or routing, LOCs, or POEs and/or PODs supporting deployment may have a significant negative impact on the operation, and may cause delayed satisfaction of requirements, delayed movements, bottlenecks at deployment nodes, and increased transportation costs. More importantly, an impeded deployment process may jeopardize mission success.

b. **Managing the Impact.** Since changes during deployment execution are inevitable, **planners must anticipate adjustments and manage the impact of changes** to avoid disrupting or impeding the deployment flow. **Prior planning is the key.** Management of change is possible if changes are held to a minimum and require supported combatant command approval. Planners must also:

- Provide resources at critical sites to ensure timely reporting of changes;
- Develop flexible, responsive steps, at all levels, to capture and properly document changes;
- Synchronize all aspects of the required change (e.g., adjusted deployment flow may require different staging or support); and
- Ensure that requested changes are consistent with the commander's intent and concept of operations.

12. Sustainment Considerations

Sustainment is directed at providing and maintaining levels of personnel and materiel required to **sustain planned joint force activity at the desired level of intensity** for the duration of the operation. It involves the movement of replacement supplies, equipment, personnel, and units. The supported commander establishes the policy, procedures, priorities, and LOCs for sustainment activities. The commander will immediately begin to submit demand-based or "pull" sustainment requirements for Services to resupply their forces in theater. In the absence of the commander's specific guidance and requirements, each of the Services will sustain their forces using Service methodologies, which may include initially "pushing" sustainment to its forces. Sustainment supplies do not always follow the designated deployment LOCs since some supplies (petroleum, oils and lubricants [POL] and ammunition) require special handling facilities and could result in significant disruption of port activities. Optimizing port throughput will be a primary factor in balancing pull and push sustainment procedures.

- Understand and anticipate changes;

OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR

“For the first few weeks of the deployment, the TPFDD changed an average of 14 times per day. The result was confusion about what was to be loaded on the aircraft at the aerial ports of embarkation. . . Army units showed up unexpectedly at the APOE for air transportation, and aircraft arrived at airfields for units that were not there.”

**SOURCE: Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR —
Description and Lessons Learned
(Planning and Deployment Phases)**

a. **Sustainment Movement.** Sustainment intertheater lift is handled differently than deployment intertheater lift. Time-phased deployment requirements are developed, sourced, refined, and validated in JOPES for USTRANSCOM movement scheduling. Intertheater airlift for the deployment phase of an operation is **requested through the JOPES process**. Normally, some **sustainment is planned as part of the deployment TPFDD developed in JOPES**. However, as the operation progresses, intertheater sustainment airlift becomes more requirements-based. USTRANSCOM normally supports strategic sustainment airlift for high priority shipments through channel service or express service. Priority sustainment requirements will be moved on predetermined channels validated by the Service or supported combatant commander, as appropriate, and USTRANSCOM. Critical cargo with definite delivery times might be picked up by express carriers at depots or installations, moved by the carriers to either a commercial or military hub, and loaded on AMC organic, CRAF, or commercial airlift missions for delivery to the AOR and/or JOA. Routine sustainment is accomplished by sealift and normally occurs at C+30. Intertheater sealift sustainment is generally provided by the US flagged merchant fleet and MSC-controlled ships, augmented as necessary by ships from the Ready Reserve Force (RRF). The US flagged merchant fleet contains many container ships capable of efficiently transporting and discharging large

quantities of cargo. RRF augmentation is often required to meet specific requirements for vessels with particular features or capabilities. The priority for the movement of sustainment, once deployment has finished, is handled in accordance with the DOD Uniform Material Movement and Issue Priority System.

For additional information see JP 4-01, “Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System,” JP 4-01.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airlift Support to Joint Operations,” and JP 4-01.2, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Sealift Support to Joint Operations.”

b. **Unit-Related and Non-unit-Related Supplies and Equipment.** Supply and support requirements of deploying forces consist of two major categories: unit-related supplies and equipment and non-unit-related supplies and equipment. Unit-related supplies and equipment include a unit’s **organic equipment, basic load, and accompanying supplies**. Unit-related supplies and equipment are **configured** (palletized or containerized) and **documented for deployment by the unit**. Unit planners enter movement data for unit-related supplies and equipment in the TPFDD. Non-unit-related supplies and equipment include **all supply sustainment support requirements that are not identified for a specific unit**. They include prepositioned war reserve stock,

sustaining supplies, and resupply. Non-unit-related supplies and equipment are configured and documented as cargo increment numbers (CINs) for deployment by the sourcing organization and provided for distribution in theater by the supported combatant command's logistics agencies. AMC uses CINs to allocate non-unit-related supplies and equipment sustainment lift.

c. **Non-unit-related Personnel (NRP).** NRP are any **active duty personnel from any Service** (including RC Service members accessed onto active duty), DOD civilians, contract civilians, and Red Cross personnel who **deploy as individuals or as a small group of individuals without a unit**. NRP consists of individual military manpower alerted for deployment to serve as **individual unit fillers** to bring undermanned units to authorized manning levels and casualty replacements in theater. NRP are normally **moved via commercial transportation** from losing organizations to designated CONUS replacement centers. Service personnel commands coordinate strategic lift requirements with USTRANSCOM for movement of NRP from CONUS into theater based on deployment shelf requirements incorporated into the TPFDD during planning. Shelf requirements are integrated into

transportation and reception plans and used to determine the number and location of CONUS replacement centers and APOEs required to support the deployment.

d. **Ammunition.** MTMC provides routing instructions for movement of all classes of ammunition entering the DTS. In a contingency operation, select units may be designated to deploy through select commercial ports with their ammunition basic load. A potential deployment constraint (particularly in HN ports) related to movement of ammunition is net explosive weight. Port safety requirements may restrict the amount of ammunition or other hazardous materials that may move through the port at any given time. **Discharge of ammunition at the foreign PODs requires prior coordination with HN authorities** to certify the port for ammunition handling and storage, or to **obtain the necessary waivers** to discharge ammunition through commercial ports. Similar authorization may be necessary for **storage of ammunition** at ISBs.

- For CONUS ports, MTMC will process necessary DOD explosives safety waivers and coordinate other required permits or clearances. For OCONUS ports, the geographic combatant



Deployment of ammunition requires special handling and documentation.

commander will assign waiver and clearance responsibilities to one of the combatant command's component commands.

- For CONUS deployment situations, if a unit is scheduled to move through a commercial seaport with basic load munitions, MTMC must be notified early on to process the necessary DOD explosive safety waivers and USCG permits. The following information must be provided for waiver and permit purposes: DOD Identification Code; National Stock Number; DOT proper shipping name; hazard class, storage compatibility, and fragment distance; UN identification number; round count; net explosive weight; and shipping configuration (e.g., vehicle upload,

containerized). MTMC must also activate DOT Exemption 3498 before actual movement of uploaded vehicles can commence. Additionally, all hazardous materials (including ammunition) shipments must be prepared and documented in accordance with DOD Regulation 4500.9-R, "Defense Transportation Regulation, Parts II and III" and other governing regulations.

13. Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration

JRSOI is the **last deployment phase** and completes the end-to-end deployment process. JRSOI forms the **critical link between strategic deployment and operational and/**

DEPLOYMENT: WORLD WAR II

"To deploy these forces overseas was another great matter. Although the US merchant marine ranked second only to Great Britain's and the country possessed an immense shipbuilding capacity, the process of chartering, assembling, and preparing shipping for the movement of troops and military cargo took time. Time was also needed to schedule and organize convoys, and owing to the desperate shortage of escort vessels, troop movement had to be widely spaced. Convoying and evasive routing, in themselves, greatly reduced the effective capacity of shipping. Moreover, vast distances separated US ports from the areas threatened by Japan, and to these areas went the bulk of forces deployed overseas during the months immediately following Pearl Harbor. Through March 1942, as a result, the outflow of troops to overseas bases averaged only about 50,000 per month, as compared with upwards of 250,000 during 1944, when shipping was fully mobilized and plentiful and the sea lanes were secure.

There seemed a real danger early in 1942, however, that German U-boats might succeed in reducing transatlantic deployment to a trickle — not so much by attacking troop transports, most of which could outrun their attackers, as by sinking the slow cargo ships on which the forces overseas depended for support. Soon after Germany's declaration of war, the U-boats struck at the virtually unprotected shipping lanes in the western Atlantic, and subsequently extended their attacks to the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean areas and the mouth of the St. Lawrence. During the spring of 1942 tankers and freighters were torpedoed in plain view of vacationers on east coast beaches. . . ."

SOURCE: American Military History, Army Historical Series

or tactical employment of joint and multinational forces in the operational area. JRSOI is **reassembling unit personnel and materiel** deploying to an operational area into mission-capable forces. The overall objective of JRSOI is to **build mission-capable forces as quickly as possible** and

is the responsibility of the supported combatant commander receiving augmenting forces. The goal of JRSOI is to **synchronize the seamless flow of separately deployed personnel and materiel** from offload at PODs to employment destinations as reassembled, mission-capable forces.

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CHAPTER IV

REDEPLOYMENT

"Wars never end cleanly and this one was no exception. The cease-fire occurred more quickly than anyone had expected. The postwar process that had existed only in concept was now imminent. . . Even before Schwarzkopf and the Iraqi delegation had finished at Safwan on March 3, troops had begun 'smelling the barn,' while the media, politicians, and loved ones in the United States picked up the drumbeat to return soldiers home."

Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War
by Brigadier General Robert H. Scales

1. Introduction

Redeployment operations encompass four phases: recovery and reconstitution and preredeployment activities; movement to and activities at POE; movement to POD; and JRSOI. These phases describe the **major activities inherent in moving deployed forces and materiel from their current deployed location through integration into another theater or to the home and/or demobilization station.** Redeployment operations are dependent on the supported combatant commander's defined end state, concept for redeployment, or requirement to support another JFC's concept of operations. This chapter discusses several other factors that may impact redeployment planning and execution. Section A outlines redeployment planning and Section B discusses redeployment execution.

SECTION A. PLANNING

2. Mission Requirements

Redeployment of joint force assets may be required at any point during mission execution. Redeployments are planned and executed based on mission requirements and are normally conducted to reposition forces and materiel in the same theater, to transfer forces and materiel to support another JFC's operational requirements or, most often, to return personnel, equipment, and materiel to

the home and/or demobilization station upon completion of the mission. All systems and procedures used during deployment operations apply to redeployment operations. One key difference is that redeployment operations focus on **reestablishing joint force readiness in addition to redeployment mission requirements.** Redeployment planning to return a joint force to that home and/or demobilization station upon completion of its mission must be an **integral and early part of joint force employment planning and should be coordinated with mission termination or transition plans.** Moreover, redeployments must be planned and executed in a manner that provides for the timely and efficient return of individuals, units, and materiel to facilitate their use in new contingencies. Recovery and reconstitution should begin immediately after operational employment in order to restore force readiness to the highest state possible prior to redeployment. This ensures that the joint force is fully prepared for the next crisis situation following redeployment.

a. **Identifying Redeployment Requirements.** Force redeployment requirements, like deployment operations, are mission based and developed during the joint operation planning process. The supported combatant commander adjusts the basic TPFDD LOI as necessary to plan and execute redeployment operations and determines redeployment movement priorities. Forces and materiel



Redeployment operations are planned based on mission requirements that may develop at any point during the joint force mission.

most often may not redeploy in the order used for deployment because of continuing operational missions or transition requirements. Generally, unit movement requirements for redeployment to the home and/or demobilization station are based on **actual deployment movements minus those items of equipment that were destroyed, captured, lost, or transferred to in-theater war reserve materiel (WRM) stockage**. Specific movement requirements are determined through the validation process.

b. Termination or Transition Considerations. Operational employment normally ends with termination or transition of the joint force mission. **Operations terminate when stated national strategic end state conditions or objectives are achieved.** Transition occurs when **control of the ongoing mission is transferred** to another organization or when a change of mission is brought about by **changing circumstances or objectives**. Regardless of the circumstance, deployed forces begin recovery and reconstitution to prepare personnel and materiel for redeployment after completion of operational requirements. Transition from operational employment to redeployment requires detailed planning and

coordination. Deployed forces should **strive to complete recovery and reconstitution on-site prior to redeployment**, since the redeployment mission may involve support of another JFC's operational requirements or other contingencies. Cessation of hostilities or operations rarely occurs instantaneously. Either as part of the **cease-fire** or as a result of **political negotiations**, decisions made concerning the termination of operations, separation of belligerents, withdrawal timetable, and/or residual forces and reserve stocks to remain in the host country will shape the pace and nature of the redeployment.

- Transition considerations are based on the **current political and military situation** when the JFC orders redeployment. Preparation for redeployment is influenced by transition decisions concerning:
 - Requirements for a residual force or response capability;
 - Follow-on occupation, nation-building, or humanitarian missions;
 - Protection of the force;

- Alliance and/or coalition force considerations;
 - Availability of intertheater and intratheater mobility assets; and
 - Applicable HN environmental standards.
- After completion of operational requirements, **forces move to designated staging areas or APOEs and/or SPOEs** to begin recovery and reconstitution and to prepare for redeployment. The priority for redeployment preparation is **returning the force to optimal readiness while preparing for redeployment**. Redeployment preparation includes reorganizing and configuring personnel, equipment, and materiel for movement, including reestablishing unit integrity and accountability of individuals and equipment prior to redeployment. Operational changes to unit organizations after arrival in the AOR and/or JOA should be undone prior to redeployment to facilitate return to peacetime activities. Redeploying units, or their parent

commands, are responsible for actions at, and support of, redeployment staging areas. Staging area or APOE and/or SPOE actions include:

- Identifying and separating excess supply stockage;
- Turning-in excess supply stockage and PREPO;
- Reconstituting and cross-leveling supplies and equipment for movement; and
- Repacking and loading containers for movement.

c. **Commander's Intent for Redeployment.** The commander's intent for redeployment is normally detailed in the **redeployment OPLAN**. Additionally, all or part of the supported combatant commander's intent may also be articulated in the **command redeployment policy**. The supported combatant commander's redeployment policy may direct the sequence for redeployment of units, individuals, and materiel and provide guidance on responsibilities and priorities for



Movement of forces to designated staging areas to begin recovery and reconstitution and prepare for redeployment begins after the completion of operational requirements.

recovery activities. The redeployment policy may also provide guidance on transition requirements, personnel actions, or HNS.

d. **Identification of Support Activities.** In order to conduct effective and efficient redeployment operations, **specific individuals, units, equipment, and supplies must be identified and allocated** to support the redeployment operation. Additionally, the supported combatant commander must **identify an organizational structure** early in the planning process to control and execute the redeployment. Medical care, life support, and other services, as well as supplies and materiel, must be provided to redeploying units and organizations until redeployment is completed. **HN and contract support** play a vital role in redeployment operations. **Coordination must be made for various support functions**, to include convoy support centers, communications, MHE, POE support, and other key support functions. As the redeployment operation progresses, support is incrementally scaled down as the size of the force awaiting redeployment gets smaller. Once all redeploying equipment has been processed, the designated senior logistic support element ceases operations and redeplays by strategic airlift.

- Units redeploy in echelons; advance party, main body, and trail party. The size of the unit, the requirement to support sustainment operations, the requirement for equipment movement support actions, and transportation assets help determine the number of redeployment echelons. The advance party prepares for the arrival of the redeploying force at PODs, demobilization sites, or final destination. The main body contains the bulk of personnel and equipment redeploying with the unit.
- Trail parties or rear detachments are often ad hoc port support teams provided by

redeploying units to conduct final preparation and loading of unit vehicles and equipment. Trail parties or rear detachments remain in theater to:

- Maintain property accountability;
- Perform unit maintenance;
- Oversee supply support and reconciliation; and
- Interface with the designated theater movement control agency and redeployment support group as the balance of unit equipment is processed for strategic lift.

3. Preparation for Redeployment

Preparation for redeployment is the first step in **returning deployed forces to full operational readiness**. Recovery and reconstitution prepares the force for the next crisis and begins in theater, immediately upon completion of operational requirements, during redeployment preparation. Preparation for redeployment includes performing all required **personnel, supply, and inspection activities necessary to redeploy personnel, equipment, and materiel** and restore the joint force's capability to conduct future operations.

a. **Redeployment Personnel Actions.** **After completion of operational requirements, personnel actions are initiated.** Required individual personnel actions may include: medical screening; processing decorations and awards; processing fitness or evaluation reports; and updating or completing personnel and finance records. Reservists who have a medical condition noted on their medical records, during their tour in theater may require administrative and/or legal actions based upon Service policies and procedures. Particular attention should be paid to NRP, such as

individual augmentees and replacements. Personnel actions for these individuals should be completed prior to their departure from their serving organization to ensure that their job performance is properly documented and/or recognized. At the organizational level, **units may have to reorganize** to increase their combat effectiveness until adequate resources are provided to return the unit to full operational capability. Reorganization may include, for example, cross-leveling of equipment and personnel, matching operational weapons systems with crews, and/or forming composite units or organizations from attrited units or organizations. Completion of these actions must be planned and coordinated with ongoing redeployment activities and **executed in an expeditious and thorough manner** because of their impact on morale and unit readiness.

b. Redistributing Supplies and Materiel.

Redistribution is a key factor in redeploying and reconstituting supplies and materiel for future operations. Significant national resources are invested in supplies and materiel to support joint operations. Therefore, **redistributing supplies and materiel during recovery and reconstitution is a critical effort**. Non-unit redeployed equipment and supplies are redistributed according to plans developed by the Joint Staff and the Services with input from the combatant commanders. Priority of effort is generally for forces committed to Joint Chiefs of Staff-approved OPLANs. However, political agreements or commitments in a combined operation may alter redistribution efforts. Other recipients may include host countries, Service materiel commands, DLA, and Government Services Administration distribution centers. In the redistribution process, equipment may be available for foreign military sales or grant programs, such as Excess Defense Articles, to support national interests and policies. During this process, procedures should be established for the proper management of hazardous and other waste products.

c. Terminating Sustainment. At the conclusion of operations, **materiel is both on requisition and en route in the supply distribution system**. Units continue to require supplies, but some categories of supplies will not be required in the quantities requisitioned. Forces waiting redeployment should consume theater stocks, and materiel management centers should cease requisitioning from the CONUS base. The senior theater logistics management center, in coordination with DLA and the Service materiel commands, determines when the supply pipeline for the joint force should be reduced and eventually stopped or redirected.

d. Documenting Retrograde Cargo. Commanders must ensure that **cargo documentation, accountability, and accuracy is as thorough as possible**. The rush to return to the home and/or demobilization station will bring about severe problems unless command emphasis is placed on accurately marking and documenting retrograde cargo. Of particular concern are the accurate identification, labeling, and handling of hazardous material. Unit movement data provided to TCCs must be correct in order to properly document cargo to prepare ship manifests for redeployment. Maintaining unit integrity during redeployment is as critical to readiness as it is during deployment. When possible, containerized unit shipments should be shipped with noncontainerized unit equipment. If this is not practical, containerized unit equipment should be scheduled (and managed) to arrive at the POD or final destination on the same required delivery date as the noncontainerized equipment. In either case, ITV of the cargo must be maintained to facilitate diversion en route, if required.

e. Conducting Required Inspections. Supported combatant commanders are responsible for establishing a **military customs inspection program (MCIP)** to



Equipment returning from outside the United States will require US Department of Agriculture and US Customs inspections prior to redeployment.

ensure that redeploying personnel, equipment, and materiel are **in compliance with customs and agricultural requirements** for their redeployment destination. US Customs clearance and USDA inspection and wash-down of all personnel, equipment, vehicles, and retrograde cargo redeploying to the United States is in accordance with DOD Directive 5030.49-R, "Customs Inspections," dated 27 May 1977. Foreign requirements for forward presence forces returning to the home station must be determined and inspections coordinated with the HN. An approved MCIP must be in place prior to redeployment to clear not only redeployment personnel and cargo but also battle-damaged equipment returning to the United States for repair.

f. **Retrograde of NBC-Contaminated Equipment.** The safe retrograde and long-term disposition of equipment with residual contamination requires a **thorough understanding of the associated risks and the minimum requirements necessary to mitigate those risks**. Following thorough decontamination, residual contamination risks may remain on equipment and materiel scheduled for redeployment. This contamination risk could include **potential**

vapor hazards and contact hazards. These risks increase as residually contaminated equipment is consolidated and personnel work around this equipment for prolonged periods of time, particularly in areas with limited air circulation. Risks may also increase as equipment is disassembled for maintenance or is containerized for shipment. Unit commanders are responsible for ensuring that their personnel are protected against gross and residual contamination hazards while preparing equipment and materiel for redeployment. During redeployment planning, unit commanders will **provide detailed listings of any contaminated equipment and any suspect equipment** through their chain of command to the joint rear area coordinator. This information allows detailed planning for equipment consolidation sites and decontamination assets required by the NBC retrograde support element. The safety of Service members and transport personnel is of foremost concern during the CONUS retrograde of equipment with potential residual or low-level NBC contamination.

For additional information, see JP 3-11, "Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense."

g. **Time-phased Force and Deployment Data.** Redeployment operations are executed using the TPFDD process. Normally, redeployment TPFDDs are developed with the redeployment OPLAN during force employment planning and updated and refined during redeployment preparations. Redeploying forces are tailored and prioritized for redeployment based on the supported combatant commander's intent expressed in the OPLAN or redeployment policy. During redeployment preparation, unit movement data is updated to reflect changes to the automated unit equipment lists caused by combat, maintenance, or supply losses. Unit-accountable officers should thoroughly document supply adjustments to unit-related equipment and materiel prior to departure from the theater. Subordinate organizations and component commands must verify unit movement data to the supported combatant commander for redeployment TPFDD validation. USTRANSCOM develops the redeployment strategic movement schedule after receiving the validated TPFDD from the supported combatant commander.

4. Redeployment Concept

The concept for redeployment is based on the **supported combatant commander's intent for redeployment, mission termination or transition requirements, and the post-redeployment mission of the joint force.** The redeployment concept for return of the joint force to the home and/or demobilization station should be **developed during employment planning** to ensure that end state conditions and transition concerns are addressed during the planning process. In addition, the following paragraphs explain several other planning considerations that may impact the redeployment concept.

a. **Priority and Guidance for Recovery Activities.** Priorities and guidance for recovery activities are outlined in the redeployment OPLAN or in the supported combatant commander's redeployment policy. Recovery activities are focused on **returning the joint force to full readiness while preparing for redeployment and returning control of HN territory and infrastructure to civil or other authorities.**



Recovery activities include assembling unit elements of the joint force for accountability and maintenance.

Recovery activities may include: assembling unit elements of the joint force for accountability and maintenance; down-loading and repackaging ammunition and WRM; disposal operations, such as recovery of battle-damaged equipment; decontamination; marking, recovering, and disposing of battlefield hazards, such as unexploded ordnance; proper disposal of JTF-generated hazardous wastes; or repairing critical HN life support infrastructure (e.g., water purification, sewage treatment, electrical power, or medical). The supported combatant commander establishes priorities and provides guidance to accomplish these tasks as expeditiously as possible, consistent with other joint force mission requirements.

b. **Mission Handover.** Mission handover occurs **prior to redeployment** and is based on termination or transition plans developed during the joint operation planning process. Termination of joint force military operations may involve handover of continuing humanitarian or nation-building operations to civil authorities or other organizations. Alternatively, transition of military operations may involve transferring control of the ongoing mission to another organization or a change of mission brought about by changing circumstances or objectives. Regardless of the circumstance, mission handover should provide for the **seamless transfer of responsibilities to the appropriate authorities or organizations prior to redeployment**. Effective mission handover requires **detailed planning, coordination, and rehearsals**. Once handover is complete, the priority of effort is on recovery and reconstitution in preparation for redeployment and the next joint force mission.

c. **Movement Sequence.** The sequence of movement for redeploying personnel, equipment, and materiel is determined based on the following operational factors: the redeployment mission; the operational environment and associated force protection

concerns; the supported combatant commander's intent or redeployment policy; and mission handover or recovery requirements. Effective joint operation planning melds these factors into the redeployment concept to develop a movement sequence that is **operationally sound, transportation feasible, and meets the commander's intent**.

d. **Environmental Considerations.** The potential impact of national, HN, and international environmental laws, regulations, conventions, and treaties on redeployment operations should be considered early in the planning process. The requirements may have an impact on the priority of recovery activities, mission handover procedures, movement sequencing, and other redeployment decisions.

For detailed information on environmental considerations during operations, refer to JP 4-04, "Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support."

5. Intelligence Preparation

Intelligence preparation for redeployment should follow the **same JIPB process** used during deployment planning and execution. Identification of the threats to forces as they assemble and stage for redeployment and redeployment infrastructure are the immediate intelligence concerns. The JTF joint intelligence support element and the theater JIC are ready sources of intelligence information for redeployment planning.

a. **Threat Assessment.** The primary intelligence objective during redeployment planning is to **determine the threat to redeploying forces**. Again, the nodes and links in the redeployment process represent numerous potential targets for an adversary. In addition, perceived threats to the redeployment mission must be evaluated in terms of the existing operational environment

and the results of any cease-fire or political negotiations. These factors shape the pace and nature of the redeployment. Based on the assessed threat, the JFC must determine **where to accept risk, where to focus force protection efforts, and how many joint force assets must be dedicated** to the force protection mission.

b. Infrastructure Assessment. Depending upon the LOCs, ports, and airfields selected to support redeployment, infrastructure information such as **detailed port and airfield facilities and throughput information** should be readily available. This information **must be updated** to reflect any changes to or loss of port or airfield facilities or throughput capacity based on acts of war, terrorism, or vandalism occurring during operations.

6. Force Protection

Force protection is as important during redeployment operations as during any other stage of a joint operation. The **operational environment** is a key indicator in determining the level of force protection measures required to ensure an uninterrupted redeployment flow. The time between redeployment preparation and operational employment at the new destination or return to the home and/or demobilization station is potentially a period of great vulnerability for the redeploying unit. Commanders should **closely evaluate force protection measures during redeployment planning** to provide for the security of the command and reduce the vulnerability of redeploying elements to acts of violence, terrorism, or war.

a. Local Security. Local security remains the **foremost force protection concern**. As the joint force assembles for redeployment, commanders must continuously enforce active and passive force protection measures until the redeployment mission is complete.

b. Information Operations. Several IO capabilities and related activities may be **required to support redeployment**. Typical IO capabilities and related activities addressed during a redeployment are as follows.

- **Operations Security.** Redeployments, like deployments, have large, distinct signatures. This fact makes **masking the movement** (or purpose of the movement) **of forces and materiel to staging bases in the AOR and/or JOA a critical piece of the OPSEC plan**. Redeployment signatures probably cannot be totally hidden; however, for force protection reasons, such details as force composition, movement schedules, troop and equipment concentration sites, and the time and location of destination arrival may be concealed.
- **Military Deception (if required).** Deception operations may be required to support redeployment, depending upon the nature of the current operational mission or the post-redeployment mission. Deceptions during redeployment operations may be intended to **disguise the purpose of recent joint force operations** or to increase the potential for successful friendly operations by **misleading the adversary as to the time and location of the relocation of forces** in theater or their introduction into another theater.
- **Public Affairs.** PA activities provide the means for the JFC to keep **Service members, their families, and the American public informed about joint force operations**, particularly as redeployment and demobilization draws near. Previous experience has shown that the Armed Forces of the United States often receive great pressure from Congress, families of deployed Service members, and the American public at



Units receive call forward messages directing movement to aerial ports of embarkation in designated time windows.

large at the completion of operations to rapidly return deployed Service members to their home and/or demobilization stations. Redeployment and demobilization are a public relations and Service member information challenge that requires creative planning and execution. PA activities targeted at the appropriate audiences will reduce Service member frustrations and public relations problems.

- **Civil Affairs.** CA elements facilitate redeployment operations by **minimizing civilian interference with US military operations and planning** and coordinating with local civilian authorities for the use of in-country facilities and resources. CA elements may **support force protection operations by planning for and using civil police** to augment security forces or to provide a conduit for information of intelligence value from the local populace.

c. **Force Health Protection.** The FHP construct provides life-cycle health support to Service members throughout their military service, to include comprehensive health

surveillance and services during the redeployment phase of operations.

Standardized procedures for conducting redeployment health surveillance are detailed in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum, “Deployment Health Surveillance and Readiness.”

SECTION B: EXECUTION

7. Requirements Validation

Requirements validation for redeployment is conducted using the same process used during deployment operations. **Redeploying units confirm readiness, movement available dates, passengers, and cargo details to their higher commands who verify total unit movement requirements to the supported combatant commander.** The supported combatant commander receives component redeployment data, merges this data into the redeployment TPFDD, and makes adjustments to the redeployment flow as necessary. Once adjustments are complete, the supported combatant commander **validates the lift requirements within the specific TPFDD movement window for USTRANSCOM**

movement scheduling by confirming that the TPFDD accurately reflects current movement requirements. USTRANSCOM conducts a transportation feasibility review and coordinates unresolved transportation conflicts with the supported combatant commander for resolution. The end result of this process is a supported combatant commander approved TPFDD that redeploying units use to prepare for movement. Changes occurring during redeployment or incremental changes affecting units are implemented as required.

8. Movement Scheduling

Movement scheduling is an iterative process conducted at every level of command with the objective of **getting the right personnel, equipment, and materiel to the right place at the right time**. Once validated TPFDD requirements are received from the supported combatant commander, strategic lift assets are scheduled and registered in JOPES. These movement schedules are also utilized by commands supporting redeployment operations for **movement planning, coordination, and execution**. After strategic lift schedules are developed, units and/or installations receive call forward messages directing movement to APOEs and SPOEs in designated time windows. Redeploying commands assess their ability to meet strategic lift schedules, make adjustments, and plan unit moves accordingly. Lift shortfalls and available lift are identified to the TCCs. Prior to redeployment, movement control elements confirm movement clearances with HN, state, and governmental agencies.

9. Force Tracking

Force tracking during redeployment operations is **vital to joint force readiness**. Reconstitution is not complete until the joint force has completed movement through the redeployment pipeline and emerged at the prescribed destination as a fully mission-capable force. Unit integrity should be maintained, to the extent possible, and commanders must have the capability to determine the exact location of unit personnel, equipment, and materiel in the event the redeploying force has to be diverted en route for another mission. Redeployment force tracking uses the same systems and procedures discussed for deployment operations. Again, **GTN and GCSS provide the information systems and decision support tools** necessary to track the force during the redeployment process.

"After Germany's surrender in May the United States embarked upon a huge logistical effort to redeploy more than a million troops from Europe, the United States, and other inactive theaters to the Pacific. The aim was to complete the redeployment in time to launch an invasion of Japan on November 1, and the task had to be undertaken in the face of competing shipping demands for demobilization of long-service troops, British redeployment, and civil relief in Europe."

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CHAPTER V

ENABLERS

"In the future we must continue to review and refine our planning methods to make sure that they enable us to adapt to unforeseen contingencies as quickly and as effectively as possible. General Eisenhower once remarked that while plans may not be important, planning is. The actual plans that are devised ahead of time may not fit precisely the circumstances that eventually arise, but the experience of preparing them is essential preparation for those who will have to act when the unforeseen occurs. If we take this maxim seriously, as our recent experience suggests we should, then several consequences seem to flow. Training must emphasize the speed with which these types of plans must be drawn up, as that is likely to be vital in an actual crisis. Management systems, such as those which support deployment and logistics, must be automated with this need for flexibility in mind. Overall, planning systems must increasingly adapt rapidly to changing situations, with forces tailored to meet unexpected contingencies."

**Overview comments provided by Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney
DOD Final Report to Congress, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, April 1992**

1. Introduction

Enablers are processes, systems, and equipment that facilitate accomplishment of the assigned mission. Rapid force projection operations require enablers that improve deployment and redeployment planning and execution, thereby improving overall mission response time, and also possess the necessary flexibility to adapt to changing situations. Deployment and redeployment enablers required to support joint force operations include interoperable joint and Service systems and procedures, robust supporting facilities and infrastructure, and agile information management and communications systems.

2. Interoperability

Joint and Service systems and procedures supporting deployment and redeployment operations must possess the interoperability necessary to ensure success. Interoperability is the condition achieved when **information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between user systems and**

equipment. Forces must employ command, control, communications, and computers (C4) systems that are capable of supporting the entire range of military operations for joint and combined operations. In addition, standardization of C4 equipment and operational procedures will facilitate the rapid installation, operation, and maintenance of the joint C4 systems network.

See JP 6-0, "Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations" for additional information on interoperability.

a. **Systems.** Deployment and redeployment of C4 systems must be **compatible, interoperable, integrated, or standardized.** Compatibility is the capability of two or more items or components of equipment or material to exist or function in the same system or environment without mutual interference. Standardization of C4 equipment and systems installation, operation, and maintenance procedures necessitates close cooperation between Services and Defense agencies

during the requirements generation system process and the development of all joint tactics, techniques, and procedures.

b. **Procedures. Standardized procedures facilitate interoperability.** Inherent in planning and execution is the requirement to develop common policies, procedures, terms, and data elements to facilitate rapid and timely deployment and redeployment of the joint force to support the range of military operations. Standardized procedures and common data elements facilitate **expeditious information flow and ultimately promote effective and efficient operations.** As a companion to the joint standardization effort, the Services must develop comprehensive and coordinated procedures to improve the overall effectiveness, timeliness, efficiency, and affordability of deployment and redeployment operations. Priority should be given to integrating Service procedures that address reporting and verifying deployment and redeployment movement data. Erroneous or missing movement data, resulting from lack of standardized input or poor operator training, hampers effective TPFDD development, refinement, and validation, which negatively impacts deployment and redeployment planning and execution. Reporting and verification upgrades and integration must be coordinated among the Service staffs, combatant commands, and the Joint Staff to achieve the effectiveness and responsiveness required to support the national security strategy. Service procedures and automation systems must effectively interface with joint C4 systems to prevent deployment and redeployment problems experienced in the past.

3. Force Projection Facilities and Infrastructure

Force projection operations benefit from robust facilities and supporting infrastructure to support deployment and redeployment of the joint force. However, the **capabilities of**

US forces must be sufficient to provide force projection and forward presence worldwide, regardless of existing facilities.

Facilities and infrastructure to support force projection operations routinely include the use of both military and civilian commercial assets. The immediate nature of force projection operations dictates that **facilities and infrastructure to support the operation are those existing at the time the operation commences.** Quick expansion of facility and infrastructure capacity for force projection operations may be possible through the use of preengineered building systems or other rapidly erectable, temporary military structures and commercial services contracting.

a. **CONUS Facilities and Infrastructure.** CONUS military installations must have the **facilities and infrastructure to house, feed, train, deploy, and redeploy forces and their required supporting materiel.** **Facilities include** the real estate and physical plant, such as buildings, equipment, and information management systems to support operations. **Supporting infrastructure**, including roads, airfields, railroads and railheads, warehousing, and staging areas, are also vital to force projection operations. Additionally, planners must identify commercial transportation support required and work closely with the commercial transportation industry to ensure such support is available. Ongoing efforts to reengineer infrastructure through outsourcing and privatization must be closely evaluated to determine the potential impact these initiatives may have on force projection operations.

b. **OCONUS Facilities and Infrastructure.** Forward presence forces benefit from access to facilities and infrastructure comparable to that available to CONUS-based forces. However, US forces are capable of worldwide deployment and limited operations under austere conditions. Normally, **land-based forward presence**



Force projection operations benefit from world-class support facilities and infrastructure.

forces must rely on HN resources to successfully execute deployment and redeployment operations. HN agreements, such as status-of-forces agreements and multinational and/or bilateral agreements negotiated before crisis situations arise, facilitate needed access to HN resources. **HNs may provide a variety of services through their national agencies in support of deployment and redeployment execution.** Clearance for road convoys, air and rail movement, hazardous materiel, and diplomatic purposes may be required and should be coordinated in advance, if possible, of anticipated operations. US forward presence forces must be considerate of HN sensitivities in the areas of sovereignty, neutrality, timeliness, environmental protection, and public opinion while executing force projection operations on foreign soil. HN may become sensitive to, and place

restrictions on, military activities in their territory. The JFC should **address all HN sensitivity issues** as early as practicable to ensure that joint force operations are not adversely affected.

4. Systems and Communications

Management of force projection operations requires the integration of movement control, ADP, SATCOMs, and information management system enablers that facilitate execution. While execution is decentralized, centralized management and integration of systems permits effective and efficient strategic mobility operations by providing DOD users with the capability to make timely and accurate execution decisions. The rapid advance of **web-based technology provides combatant and component commands with potential worldwide access to various references and information** to enhance deployment and redeployment operations. Information system development and interoperability is guided by the visions articulated in the **GCCS, GCSS, and GTN development efforts.** To provide full functionality, these planning and execution systems must have a **modeling and simulation capability** for exercises and training to enable forces to train as they will fight.

a. **Global Command and Control System.** GCCS is a comprehensive **automated command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) system designed to improve the JFC's ability to manage and execute joint operations.** GCCS is the primary means of C2 for the NCA over all military forces. GCCS interoperates with Service and agency C4I systems, providing a global network of military and commercial communications systems that the JFC simply "plugs in" to send and obtain critical information. **GCCS supports the exchange of information from**



Supported and supporting commanders and staffs need robust and interoperable communications systems to effectively plan, deploy, sustain, employ, and redeploy forces. SATCOM systems can assist in providing these systems.

the NCA to combatant commanders and their components. GCCS, SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network and the Defense Information Infrastructure Common Operating Environment form an information grid that incorporates procedures, reporting structures, automated information processing systems, and communications connectivity to provide the information necessary to effectively plan, deploy, sustain, employ, and redeploy forces. As with any automated system, **the quality of the output directly corresponds to the accuracy of the data on file.**

- GCCS provides combatant and subordinate commands with the ability to rapidly provide military information to the NCA as well as to supporting commands.
- **The COP is a graphical display of friendly, hostile, and neutral units, assets, overlays, and/or tracks pertinent to operations, and is a key tool for commanders in planning and conducting joint operations.** The GCCS COP may include relevant information from the tactical to the

strategic level of command. The system currently includes geographically-oriented data with planning data from JOPES and readiness data from the Status of Resources and Training System envisioned for future inclusion.

- b. **Global Combat Support System.** The goal of GCSS is to provide **universal secure access to information and interoperability of that information** across combat support and C2 functions. The GCSS vision encompasses **six essential attributes**: any box; any user; one net; one picture; common services; and robust communications services. The end state is a secure, intranet environment allowing DOD users to access shared data and applications, regardless of location, supported by a robust information infrastructure. This will result in near real time C2 of the logistics pipeline; one fused picture of combat support to the warfighter; and a closed link between C2 and combat support during critical execution of an operation. **A host of logistics information systems enablers are critical to GCSS.** Some of the major joint programs include **JTAV, AIT, and Joint Decision Support System.**

c. **Global Transportation Network.** GTN is an **automated C2 information system** that supports the family of transportation users and providers (both DOD and commercial) by providing an **integrated system of ITV information and C2 capabilities** (see Figure V-1). GTN collects and integrates transportation information from selected transportation systems. The resulting information is provided to the NCA, combatant commanders, USTRANSCOM and its component commands, and to other DOD customers to **support transportation planning and decision making** during peace and war. **The three major functional areas provided by GTN are ITV, C2 operations, and C2 planning and analysis.**

- **In-Transit Visibility.** ITV permits **visibility into transportation movements** by obtaining visibility of a requirement when it is first initiated and continuing that visibility as the

requirement is satisfied through movement in the transportation pipeline. GTN collects, integrates, and distributes transportation information to the NCA, combatant commanders, USTRANSCOM and its component commands, and other transportation information customers. GTN provides the schedules and actual transportation movement information (itineraries and manifests) about units, forces, cargo, air refueling, passengers, and patients. In general, GTN satisfies a user's ITV requirements through **user-controlled views of the integrated transportation data**, which includes combinations of mode, locations, dates, and status with a variety of unit, force, cargo, passenger, and patient identifiers.

- **C2 Operations.** The C2 module of GTN **organizes and displays vital transportation asset and resource information** that assists USTRANSCOM




Figure V-1. Global Transportation Network

to understand, identify, and implement various transportation options and COAs. Assets and resources include anything used to move or support movement of cargo and passengers.

- **C2 Planning and Analysis.** The C2 planning and analysis module provides **information and simulation models to improve transportation feasibility determination, plan refinement, and replanning.** Through a set of coordinated strategic transportation models and related tools, planning support provides capabilities to: develop and analyze various transportation options; forecast total DOD movement requirements; determine the best modes, channels, and shipment quantities; compare planned versus actual movements; determine limiting constraints; and identify potential resource shortfalls.

d. Transportation Coordinator's Automated Information for Movement System II (TC-AIMS II). TC-AIMS II is a joint automated information system and selected DOD migration system for unit move and ITO or TMO functionality. TC-AIMS II will integrate fielded Service-unique systems and select functions from systems to **provide day-to-day traffic management capabilities and to support deployment, redeployment, and sustainment of US forces from within (and to) CONUS installations and overseas theaters of operations.** Functionality from various systems will be combined to produce the target TC-AIMS II system. Integration of systems for TC-AIMS II include: the Marine Corps MAGTF Deployment Support System II and TC-AIMS; the Air Force Cargo Movement Operations System; and the Army Transportation Coordinator-Automated Command and Control Information System, Management System-Redesign and Department of the Army Movements Management System-Redesign.

e. Global Decision Support System (GDSS). GDSS is the worldwide C2 system for execution of strategic airlift and air refueling during peacetime, contingencies, and war. The only change in the system from peace to war is the level of activity. GDSS contains essential **information used to monitor and manage all operational DOD air mobility missions in progress throughout the world,** including all active duty, Air Force Reserves, Air National Guard, and commercial airline aircraft on AMC airlift missions, plus all operational DOD air refueling missions. During operations, the system directly supports force-level management. GDSS provides **automated tools to track aircraft and aircrew movement and aid the decision making process.** In addition, the system provides the tanker airlift control center with C2 information from the AMC Deployment Analysis System (ADANS) and Command and Control Information Processing System, the wing-level C2 planning and execution system. GDSS provides the capability to view mission information and, if required, to update or modify the information.

f. Integrated Command, Control, and Communications (IC3) System. Sealift transportation management consists of effectively providing SPOE to SPOD transportation. IC3 is the MSC C2 system to efficiently manage this mission and to provide USCINCTrans, the Chief of Naval Operations, and other customers with reliable, comprehensive, and timely information. **IC3 supports MSC's requirements for C2 and tracking of sealift assets, cargo, and POL.** Additionally, it interfaces with other key information systems, such as GTN, GDSS, and GCCS, to support the overall DTS and USTRANSCOM mission during deployment operations.

g. Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation (JFAST). JFAST is a subsystem of the GTN future operations

module and is an **analytical tool for making detailed estimates of resources required to transport military forces** (including cargo, personnel, and sustainment) during various scenarios and situations. JFAST is used by the combatant commands as a **planning and forecasting tool for deliberate planning and CAP**. The system determines the transportation feasibility of the TPFDD (from origin through arrival at the POD) and generates summary data via charts, tables, maps, and other visual aids for use by senior leaders. JFAST determines closure dates, congestion points, lift utilization, and shortfalls. JFAST products include delivery profiles and lateness analysis, required lift by day versus lift available, and port workload by level of activity based on capacity.

- The notional requirements generator portion of JFAST provides the capability to create notional movement requirements when no plan currently exists. Force selection and concept of operations can be recorded along with expected levels of activity, climate, and days of supply. This functional capability allows a planner to execute ad hoc queries and perform “what if” analysis.
- The transportation analysis function of JFAST includes model setup, execution, and output analysis for land, air, and sea modes of military transportation. The JFAST model contains separate air, land, and sea schedulers and operates in either a stand-alone or networked environment.

h. Enhanced Logistics Intratheater Support Tool (ELIST). ELIST is a **feasibility planning and modeling system** fielded by MTMC for deployment analysis. ELIST performs **detailed intratheater deployment studies** to analyze effects of force modernization and new force structures and changes to the DTS and to check transportation feasibility of contingency

operations. ELIST enables planners to explore and model the impact of theater infrastructure limitations (through combat loss, weather, or limited HN access) and make adjustments to infrastructure and assets at any point in time in the flow. Through ELIST, planners now have the ability to accurately define the infrastructure and consider the throughput capability that will be available for a specific plan.

i. Consolidated Air Mobility Planning System (CAMPS). CAMPS is an AMC modernization program supporting AMC planners with an integrated system to support airlift and tanker planning, scheduling, analysis, allocation, and development of mission support requirements. CAMPS provides capabilities for **deliberate and crisis action planning, allocation management, and mission support**. CAMPS integrates two existing systems, ADANS and the Combined Mating And Ranging Planning System, into a seamless planning, scheduling, analyzing, and allocating capability serving both the airlift and tanker communities.

j. Asset Management System (AMS). MTMC has the mission of managing the Defense Freight Railway Interchange Fleet railcars, the Army-owned Containerized Ammunition Distribution System fleet of containers, and the tracking of commercially leased containers. AMS is the information system that supports this mission by providing an **automated capability for the control, utilization, maintenance, inventory, and reporting to optimize the use of these assets**.

k. Transportation Analysis, Modeling and Simulation (TAMS). TAMS provides **oversight and direction of transportation modeling and simulation (M&S) capabilities** that support end-to-end transportation M&S. TAMS ensures integrated end-to-end M&S capability for the entire DTS, to include support for execution, exercises, analysis, wargaming,

and training. TAMS provides an integrated transportation feasibility analysis, programmatic source-to-destination capability for analysis, and wargaming.

LIMITS OF JOPES

“However, in the initial Operation DESERT SHIELD deployment phases, three factors prevented full use of JOPES. First, information necessary for deployment was not loaded into the TPFDD. Second, operational considerations in the area of responsibility required CENTCOM [US Central Command] to repeatedly change the priority and the scheduling of unit movements midstream. Given its current level of development, JOPES cannot react quickly enough to changes of such frequency and magnitude. Third, the infrequent use of JOPES in peacetime resulted in a shortage of JOPES-capable operators during the early days of Operation DESERT SHIELD.”

**SOURCE: DOD Final Report to Congress,
Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, April 1992**

CHAPTER VI

OTHER DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS (EXPANDED MILITARY MISSIONS)

“Our forces, therefore must fulfill a broader role — as a complement to our diplomacy — as an arm of our diplomacy — as a deterrent to our adversaries and as a symbol to our allies of our determination to support them.”

**President John F. Kennedy to the United States
Air Force Academy graduating class of 1962**

1. Introduction

Participation of the Armed Forces of the United States with organizations and agencies outside of the Department of Defense requires special planning considerations in multinational operations, MOOTW, and interagency operations. Expanded military missions will be used to refer to “other deployment and/or redeployment considerations”. In general, when factoring these into operational planning it is important to be sensitive to the political considerations and the reality that the US military may not be the primary player. Deployment and/or redeployment and execution planning is fundamentally the same for most military operations. However, participation of various military forces, organizations, and agencies outside of the Department of Defense may increase the complexity and reduce the operational flexibility normally found in US deployment and redeployment operations.

2. Multinational Operations

The United States has often shared common security interests and participated in operations with other nations. Combatant commanders may confront a variety of factors that challenge the stability of countries and regions within their AORs, necessitating multinational response. Multinational operations is a collective term to describe **military actions conducted by forces of two**

or more nations, typically within the structure of a coalition or alliance. Much of the information, guidance, and doctrine provided for US joint operations is applicable to multinational operations. However, differences in allied doctrine, organization, weapons, equipment, terminology, culture, politics, religion, and language must always be considered when organizing a multinational force. These **differences and the legal restrictions on providing logistic support to foreign forces may increase the complexity and reduce the operational flexibility** normally found in unilateral US deployment and redeployment operations. **Success hinges on achieving unity of effort.** Each participating nation must be willing to provide the commander of the alliance or coalition sufficient authority to achieve unity of effort in all operations.

For additional information on multinational operations, see JP 3-16, “Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations.”

a. **Theater Engagement Planning (TEP).** TEP is a **planning process used by geographic combatant commands to translate National Security Strategy objectives and NMS objectives into theater strategy.** The products of this process are a clearly articulated theater strategy with supporting country, regional, and theater campaign plans, supporting annexes outlining strategic activities, and preparedness guidance documents.



Success in multinational operations hinges on achieving unity of effort.

For additional information, see CJCSM 3113.01, “Theater Engagement Planning.”

- **Campaign Plans.** Theater campaign plans are based on country and regional campaign plans. Each campaign plan focuses the **combatant commander’s guidance and approved theater strategy, prioritizes activities, and allocates resources** for a given country or region. **Plan development is guided by** a geographic focus, the combatant commander’s vision, theater goals and priorities, an assessment of the local environment, and allocation of strategic activities and resources. Joint force operations conducted in a given country or region (including deployment and redeployment operations) will normally be based on the applicable campaign plan.

- **Preparedness Guidance Documents.** Preparedness guidance documents are developed based on the theater strategy and combatant commander’s guidance for the following areas: RC, logistics, C4, personnel readiness, operation planning, training, medical, and force protection. These documents are the source documents that **guide component**

commanders in the preparation and training of their forces to meet theater contingencies. Deployment and redeployment training must be incorporated into component command training objectives to ensure preparedness in executing the theater strategy.

- **Assessments.** Execution of the campaign plans and preparedness guidance documents provide the means to **assess joint force readiness and theater strategy**. Feedback received from execution is reentered into the TEP process to refine theater strategy, campaign plans, and preparedness documents.

“We learned — and relearned — a lot of lessons from this partnership. The first was that life is a lot easier when you’re not alone.”

Senior DESERT STORM participant, DOD Final Report to Congress, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, April 1992

- b. **Mission Analysis and Assignment of Tasks.** One of the most important tasks when planning multinational operations is to **conduct a detailed mission analysis**. This



Tasks assigned to multinational components must be relevant, clearly understood, and within their mission capability.

analysis should result in a mission statement for the multinational force as a whole and a restated mission for the US element of the force. In addition to normal **METT-T analysis**, this analysis should include the respective **capabilities, political will, and national interests** of the multinational force components. After determining the tasks necessary to achieve the objectives that support mission accomplishment, the multinational force commander (MNFC) should assign a specific task to the element of the multinational force most capable of completing that task. If several elements can complete the task, the MNFC should consider assigning that task in a manner that ensures all elements can make meaningful contributions to the desired end state. The basic challenge in multinational operations is the **effective integration and employment of all assets provided toward the achievement of a common objective**. This goal may be achieved through unity of effort despite disparate and occasionally incompatible capabilities, rules of engagement, equipment, and procedures. The MNFC must be aware of the differences in the political constraints and capabilities of the forces of various nations and consider them

when assigning missions and conducting operations.

c. **Deployment and/or Redeployment Considerations.** Many US alliance partners have standardization agreements or treaties that outline general multinational operational procedures. However, **many potential coalition partners do not have established standardization agreements or treaties with the United States**. Because of this, differences in procedures and capabilities may complicate multinational deployment and redeployment planning and execution. Among the disparities that supported and supporting commanders may have to reconcile are dissimilar tactical methods and operating procedures, varying organizations and capabilities, and differences in equipment. Liaison, equipment exchanges, and training may offset some of these problems. Movement control, operation of ports and airfields, logistics communications, and specific supply and services functions are significant matters often coordinated above the level of national participants. **To assure coordination and prevent duplication, commanders of multinational forces need to establish clear responsibilities for such**

functions. Very often, multinationals partnered with US forces will have little or no strategic or intratheater lift. Depending on the length of the multinational force LOCs, US forces may be forced to shoulder the majority of strategic or intratheater lift requirements to deploy, sustain, and redeploy the multinational force. This places additional burdens on already finite US lift assets. Each multinational operation is unique, and key considerations involved in planning and conducting multinational operations vary with the international situation and perspectives of the participants. **The following factors should also be considered during multinational deployment and redeployment operations**(see Figure VI-1).

- **Standardization of Information Requirements.** The first priority for planners is **establishment of standardized procedures and reporting formats** for the multinational force to begin development, refinement, and verification of force modules and movement requirements. Lift scheduling cannot occur until transportation planners have accurate and detailed information

concerning the availability and capability of multinational lift assets, passenger data and cargo descriptions for multinational force modules and materiel, and total multinational component force movement and sustainment requirements. As discussed earlier in this publication, accuracy of movement requirements and data is critical to meeting force closure timelines.

- **Determination of Movement Requirements.** Since US forces normally provide the majority of the strategic lift assets and information management systems, the US TPFDD process will be used to manage deployment and redeployment of all personnel, equipment, forces, and materiel involved in US multinational operations. **Determining movement requirements for multinational partners may complicate deployment and redeployment planning because movement data for allied nations may not be described in logistics terms compatible with US TPFDD management systems.** Coordination required for TPFDD refinement and verification may impede multinational deployment and redeployment operations unless particular attention is paid to liaison, C2, and information management arrangements supporting the operation. Communications and information exchange with multinational partners may be hampered by a limited quantity of compatible ADP systems. **Manual procedures may have to be implemented to properly document the movement requirements of multinational force elements without adequate automation support.** Identification, documentation, and scheduling movement requirements for the multinational force remains the responsibility of the supported multinational commander. Capturing




Figure VI-1. Multinational Deployment and Redeployment Considerations

multinational movement data will require detailed coordination with multinational partners to ensure the arrival of forces and materiel consistent with the MNFC's concept of operations. Integration of a variety of data and systems will require flexible and dynamic attention to detail.

- **Liaison Considerations.** During multinational operations, US forces should **establish liaison early with each member nation of the alliance or coalition**. This fosters understanding of missions and tactics, facilitates transfer of vital information, and enhances mutual trust and confidence. If the nations are very similar in culture, doctrine, training, and equipment or if extensive cooperative experience exists, combined supporting organizations and headquarters may be effective operational alternatives.

d. **Logistics Considerations.** Generally, **the responsibility for logistic support** (including transportation support) to national components **remains with their nations**. However, the concept that logistics is primarily a national responsibility cannot supplant detailed multinational logistics

planning. Varying degrees of mutual logistic support are prevalent in multinational operations. Logistics plans must address mutual capabilities and ensure that weaknesses are minimized. MNFCs may have directive logistics authority if coordinated in plan development or when consent is provided by participating national commands. Requests will be made to national commanders to assume organizational missions in support of multinational forces. In some cases, the MNFC may exercise control over the various national logistics units. In other cases, the MNFC may have only coordinating authority. **The degree of authority will depend upon existing agreements and ad hoc arrangements negotiated with participating nations.** Funding guidance to support multinational forces should be identified as early as possible. Once funding guidance is determined, procedures should be developed to ensure there will be no adverse impact on operations. Transportation, construction services, medical support, and some classes of supply may be available from the HN. Additionally, US forces may rely upon HNS to supplement or substitute for US services, supplies, and facilities. **Utilization of some or all of the following sources of support may help**



Effective liaison fosters mutual trust and confidence between multinational partners.

reduce the multinational force logistics footprint and promote effective and efficient operations in an international environment (see Figure VI-2).

- **Available HN Infrastructure.** Analysis of the physical infrastructure in the HN is critical to understanding force sustainability. **Physical infrastructure in the HN should be evaluated** both in terms of what is there and what the multinational force will be allowed to use (e.g., government; law enforcement; sanitation; power, fuel, and medical support; and environmental protection requirements). First, assess the ability of the available HN infrastructure to receive US and/or multinational force personnel and equipment (e.g., ports and airfields). Second, determine the capability of available transportation systems to move forces once they arrive in theater. Third, evaluate availability of logistic support. Quick evaluation of these three items will determine the extent to which HN infrastructure can be

used to support planned operations. HNS may dramatically increase the timeliness of response to a developing situation and reduce the strategic airlift and sealift requirements necessary to deploy forces to the AOR and/or JOA.

- **Acquisition Cross-Service Agreements (ACSAs).** The United States often supplies allied and coalition forces with materiel and receives support and services in exchange. The Secretary of Defense is authorized to **negotiate mutual logistic support agreements or ACSAs with friendly nations** in which US forces are deployed. ACSAs permit the **reciprocal transfer of logistic support, supplies, and services between the Armed Forces of the United States and designated multinational partners**. Since this can lead to significant economies of force and effort, US forces continually seek such support agreements in multinational operations. Under ACSAs, logistic support includes a broad range of goods

MULTINATIONAL LOGISTICS CONSIDERATIONS

Available Host Nation Infrastructure

Acquisition Cross-Service Agreements

Contingency Contracting

Civil Augmentation Program

Third-Party Logistics




Figure VI-2. Multinational Logistics Considerations

and services to include food, water, billeting, transportation (including airlift), port services, communications services, storage services, base operations support, waste management services, and construction incident to base operations support.

- **Contingency Contracting.** Contingency contracting is the process of **contracting for locally available supplies, services, and construction in immediate support of deploying units**, either at staging locations or a TAA, during a contingency. Properly used, contingency contracting is an **effective force multiplier**. Contingency contracts may be used for supplies, services, engineering, construction, and real estate. Satisfying requirements for supplies and services by contracting may improve response time, free transportation assets for other important missions, and serve to reduce dependence on the CONUS-based logistics system. Contingency contracting **should not replace HNS or the existing supply systems** where these systems are available or operational. However, deployed forces may augment their existing logistic support capability through contingency contracting to provide an additional source for critically required supplies and services. Deployments most suitable for employment of contingency contracting support are those likely to occur in areas of the world where there are few, if any, HNS agreements.

- **Civil Augmentation Program.** **Civil augmentation programs are separate Military Department contracting options most often used when HNS is insufficient or unavailable.** They employ pre-existing contracts with US and other vendors to provide support in many areas including facilities, supplies, services, maintenance, and transportation.

The Army, Navy, and Air Force each have separate civil augmentation programs. The Army's program is the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, the Navy's program utilizes the Construction Capabilities contract, and the Air Force's program is the Air Force Contract Augmentation Program. The goals of all Civil Augmentation Programs are to:

- Plan during peacetime for the effective use of contractor support in a contingency or crisis;
 - Leverage global and/or regional corporate resources as facility and logistics force multipliers;
 - Provide an alternative augmentation capability to meet facility and logistics services shortfalls; and
 - Provide a quick reaction to contingency or crisis requirements.
- **Third-Party Logistics.** Third-party logistic operations may also provide **additional resources to MNFCs when they are properly coordinated with intratheater transportation policies, requirements, and contingency procedures.** C2 of the movement of nonmilitary material arriving in, and departing from, a theater of operations on civilian contractor assets must be fully integrated into the MNFC's operation plan to ensure that transportation requirements are met and to offset transportation force structure shortfalls. Fully integrated OPLANs should ensure third-party contractual compliance with DOD policies regarding CRAF participation, contingency validation procedures, TPFDD procedures, ITV, and coordination of civilian operations within the DTS. Proper third-party logistics integration will ensure timely

movement coordination, transportation assets validation, and required ITV of vital support requirements while easing demands on normally limited port space and essential cargo or MHE.

See JP 3-16, “Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations,” for further information on multinational logistics.

3. Military Operations Other Than War

MOOTW encompass those **operations on the range of military operations short of war such as combatting terrorism, peace operations, MSCA, or FHA**. One significant difference that distinguishes these operations from other military operations is the **increased involvement of government agencies outside the Department of Defense, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private voluntary organizations (PVOs)**. Increased involvement of these agencies and organizations results because the capacity to respond to crisis situations in this area of the range of military operations seldom, if ever, resides within the capability of just one agency, organization, or military

force. These operations present **two significant challenges to military organizations attempting to execute supporting deployment and/or redeployment operations**. The challenges are defining the relationship among participating agencies and organizations (which may impact determination of movement priorities and validation of movement requirements) and determining their support and movement requirements in compatible military terms (which may impact the timeliness and effectiveness of military support). Relationships with these agencies and organizations are more correctly described as associations or partnerships, since they are not subject to the military chain of command. Determination of support and movement requirements for these agencies and organizations is often complex because procedures to refine and validate their requirements may not exist or are not compatible with military automated deployment systems.

For more information on MOOTW, see JP 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.”



Military operations other than war normally involve numerous agencies outside the Department of Defense with varied agendas, disparate needs, and different expectations.

a. **MOOTW.** MOOTW encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These operations can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power. MOOTW focus on **detering war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities** in response to domestic crises. MOOTW may involve elements of both combat and noncombat operations in peace, conflict, and war. All military operations are **driven by political considerations**. However, **MOOTW are more sensitive to such considerations** due to the overriding goal to prevent, preempt, or limit potential hostilities. In MOOTW, political considerations permeate all levels and the military may not be the primary player. These operations usually involve interagency coordination and may also involve NGO or PVOs. Although MOOTW are generally conducted OCONUS, some types may be conducted within the United States in support of civil authorities consistent with established law.

b. **Deployment and/or Redeployment Considerations.** Deployment and redeployment planning and execution considerations for MOOTW are fundamentally the same as those for any other military operation. Deployment and redeployment operations supporting MOOTW generally **differ from other joint force operations** in that they may involve more logistics and combat support forces than combat forces, and they normally involve more nonmilitary organizations than other operations. In general, logistics or combat support elements may play a more prominent role than combat forces in MOOTW because of the **unique mission requirements of these operations**. In many instances, logistics and combat support forces will provide the base force for deployment. Moreover, they **may be employed in nonstandard tasks or in**

quantities disproportionate to their normal military roles. In some instances, logistics or combat support elements may precede other military forces, may be the only military forces deployed, or may remain after the departure of combat forces to assess the ongoing situation and coordinate any additional US military operations.

- The immediate need for the supported combatant commander is to establish effective coordination procedures with the other supporting agencies and organizations to facilitate execution of the proposed operation. The primary challenge for commands executing deployment or redeployment in support of MOOTW or interagency support is **development of the TPFDD to control execution of the operation**; specifically, the effort to **refine, validate, and coordinate movement requirements for the total force**. Once a requirement is validated, the supported combatant commander must put this valid requirement in proper format, enter it into JOPES, and validate the requirement to USTRANSCOM before lift will be scheduled.
- In all circumstances, the supported combatant commander will validate movement requirements and priorities for military support. In CONUS support scenarios, TPFDD validation of DOD and non-DOD requirements rest with FORSCOM in its role as lead operating agent for USACOM. Non-DOD movement requirements and priorities for US domestic disaster relief operations will be forwarded through the FEMA-appointed federal coordinating officer to the appropriate DCO. The responsibility for validation of OCONUS non-DOD movement requirements and priorities requiring military strategic lift support may be less clearly defined.



Capturing movement requirements in compatible military terms is often difficult for planners.

- OCONUS non-DOD movement requirements and priorities may be validated by the appointed lead agency representative, may be articulated in interdepartmental memorandums of agreement or, in a worst case situation, may have to be coordinated among the individual participants. Quantifying OCONUS movement and sustainment requirements may be difficult since most agencies outside of the Department of Defense may not have deployment data bases and do not practice deployment operations on a regular basis. Capturing passenger data and cargo descriptions may require extraordinary effort on the part of military transportation planners to maintain accountability of deploying or redeploying passengers and equipment. **Close coordination between military transportation planners and nonmilitary agencies is critical.** Cooperation is key, since nonmilitary organizations are normally under no legal obligation to comply with military directives.

“...America's forces must in the future be capable of operating in, and contributing toward, three distinct policy environments: joint military, or inter-Service, operations; the interagency process; and multinational efforts.”

Admiral Paul David Miller
former Commander in Chief, US
Atlantic Command

4. Interagency Support Operations

Throughout the range of military operations, the common thread during most major operations today is the broad range of agencies, many with indispensable practical competencies and major legal responsibilities, that interact with the Armed Forces of the United States. Interagency support operations normally occur during MOOTW (i.e., humanitarian assistance), but can also occur in war. Increased involvement of military forces in civil activity at home and abroad is matched, in part, by an increase in situations (primarily overseas) in which

civil agencies face emerging post-Cold War factors and military threats not previously confronted. These organizations are drawn closer to military forces by necessity, because their missions may fail without military support or protection. Because the solution to a crisis seldom, if ever, resides within the capability of just one agency or organization, campaign or operation plans must be crafted to leverage the core competencies of myriad agencies, synchronizing their efforts with military capabilities toward a single objective. Often during interagency support operations, the military plays a supporting role to other national agencies. For this reason, military objectives need to be coordinated with

associated diplomatic, economic, and informational objectives. Again, much of the information, guidance, and doctrine provided for US joint operations are applicable to interagency support operations. However, each organization brings its own culture, philosophy, goals, practices, and skills to the interagency table. This diversity is the strength of the interagency process, providing a cross-section of expertise, skills, and abilities in response to any crisis situation.

For additional information, see JP 3-08, "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations," Volumes I and II.

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CHAPTER VII

JOINT TRAINING, EXERCISES, AND ASSESSMENTS

“Joint and combined exercises, security assistance, and military-to-military contacts produced valuable relationships and infrastructure within the region that contributed to the creation of a militarily effective coalition.”

**SOURCE: DOD Final Report to Congress,
Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, April 1992**

1. General

The NMS establishes **two national military objectives; promote peace and stability** and, when necessary, **defeat adversaries**. Fulfilling these objectives requires the Armed Forces of the United States to possess a robust capability to deploy and redeploy in response to mission taskings. Effective deployment and redeployment of personnel, equipment, and materiel to support joint operations depends on the **ability to train and exercise the way the United States intends to employ a joint military force**. Strategic mobility is an ongoing CJCS Commended Training Issue (CCTI). To further focus joint training, joint operational tasks (including deployment, redeployment, and supporting tasks) are listed in the

universal joint task list (UJTL). This task listing provides a **common frame of reference and outlines basic mission tasks for training multiple combatant commands and joint force components**. Combatant commanders are responsible for ensuring that personnel responsible for deployment and redeployment planning and execution, receive appropriate training, are regularly exercised, and are formally assessed on their ability to provide the required resources at the appropriate place and time to support joint operations.

For additional information, see CJCSM 3500.03, “Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States,” CJCSM 3500.04A, “Universal Joint Task List Version 3.0,” and CJCSI 3500.2A, “Joint Training Master Plan.”



Joint training and exercises provide the foundation to improved joint force mission capability.

2. Core Competencies and CJCS Commended Training Issues

Joint force operations meld the “core competencies” of the Services to best accomplish the assigned mission. Combatant commanders have the responsibility to ensure that assigned, attached, and supporting forces are prepared to execute and accomplish assigned mission taskings in their AOR. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff oversees activities of the combatant commanders and advises the NCA on joint force capability and readiness. As part of this oversight, the **Chairman’s Readiness System (CRS) prioritizes training issues by identifying CCTIs** and provides a means to focus resources to fix joint force deficiencies through the Joint Training Master Plan (JTMP).

a. **Core Competencies.** Roles and functions provide the basis for the unique core competencies each Service brings to joint force operations. Each of the Military Departments and Services, coordinating as appropriate with the other Departments and Services and with the combatant commands, has the responsibility for organizing, training, equipping, and providing forces to fulfill

certain specific roles and for administering and supporting these forces. This responsibility includes the formulation of Service doctrine for the functions involved, the internal structure and composition of forces, unit and individual training, and the types and quantities of equipment and supplies to be developed and procured. This responsibility, however, is subject to the combatant commander’s authority to organize assigned forces and ensure their preparedness as necessary to accomplish a specific mission. **Combatant commanders evaluate and focus joint force preparedness through mission-tailored joint training and exercise programs.**

b. **CJCS Commended Training Issues.** CCTIs are **special-interest items developed from all-source lessons learned, readiness reports, and operational assessments.** These issues are incorporated into the JTMP to ensure appropriate visibility by the combatant commands in developing their joint training plans. Each command should consider CCTIs for special emphasis in the upcoming training cycle and assess the prescribed CCTIs in relation to their theater conditions as a key joint training readiness indicator. CCTIs are identified for immediate and ongoing action. Strategic mobility is one



Each Service brings unique core competencies to joint force operations.

of the eight current ongoing actions to improve long-term interoperability and enhance joint operations.

3. Joint Training

The primary purpose of **joint training is to prepare US forces to conduct joint and multinational operations**. Above all, the joint training system is designed to ensure that the Armed Forces of the United States are trained to fight and win our nation's wars. The joint training system provides an **integrated, requirements-based methodology for tailoring training programs** to the assigned missions consistent with command priorities and available resources. This system emphasizes a direct linkage between the NMS, combatant command mission requirements, and training. The ultimate result is trained and ready personnel able to effectively execute joint and multinational operations.

a. **Individual Training.** Individual training is a Service responsibility. The goal of individual training is to **train those personnel responsible for planning and executing deployment and redeployment operations** consistent with current joint deployment and redeployment doctrine. Classroom training for JOPES operators is available through USTRANSCOM's JOPES Basic Operators Course and the GTN User's Course at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. Course information and scheduling is available through the JOPES Training Organization.

b. **Universal Joint Task List.** The **UJTL outlines joint force collective training tasks**. CJCSM 3500.04A, "Universal Joint Task List Version 3.0," contains a comprehensive hierarchical listing of the tasks that may be performed by a joint military force. The UJTL also contains a common language of conditions that is used to describe the operational context in which tasks are performed. Additionally, the UJTL lists the

measures of performance for each UJTL task. These measures are used to develop standards of performance consistent with mission requirements. The UJTL does not address "how a task is performed" (found in joint doctrine) or "who performs the task" (found in the concept of operations). **The UJTL helps identify "what" is to be performed in standardized joint warfare terms.** The UJTL outlines deployment and redeployment tasks and supporting tasks at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare for mission-essential task list development.

c. **Categories of Training Programs.** Joint Service interoperability is critical to warfighting. Rather than focusing on one specific Service, combatant commanders are now capabilities-centered, which often requires blending the unique skills and capabilities individual Services have to offer to accomplish the mission. To prepare airmen, sailors, soldiers, and Marines to meet the needs of combatant commanders facing contingencies around the world, joint force training is organized **into categories of training**. A broad spectrum of training and exercise events are sponsored at various command levels. Military training spans those events that fall within the following categories.

- **Category 1: Service Training (US Only).** Military training based on Service policy and doctrine to prepare individuals and interoperable units. Service training includes basic, technical, operational, and component-sponsored interoperability training in response to operational requirements deemed necessary by the combatant commands in order to execute assigned missions.
- **Category 2: Component Interoperability Training (US Only).** Operational training based on joint doctrine or joint tactics, techniques, and procedures in which more than one Service component participates. This training normally

includes CINC or Service initiatives to improve responsiveness of assigned forces to combatant commanders. Conducted under the auspices of a component commander, the purpose is to ensure interoperability of combat, combat support services, and military equipment between two or more Service components.

- **Category 3: Joint Training (US Only).** Military training based on joint doctrine to prepare joint forces and joint staffs to respond to operational requirements deemed necessary by combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions.
- **Category 4: Multinational Interoperability Training.** Military training based on multinational, joint, and Service doctrine, as applicable, to prepare units in response to NCA-approved mandates. The purpose is to ensure interoperability of combat, combat support forces, and military equipment between US Service component(s) and other nation(s) forces.
- **Category 5: Joint and/or Multinational Training.** Military training based on multinational, joint, and Service doctrine, as applicable, to prepare units in response to NCA-approved mandates. The purpose is to prepare joint forces under a multinational command arrangement.
- **Category 6: Interagency and/or Intergovernmental Training.** Military training based on NCA-derived standard operating procedures, as applicable, to prepare interagency and/or international decision makers and staffs in response to NCA-approved mandates.

4. Joint and Multinational Exercises

Joint exercises offer an opportunity for joint force personnel to plan and execute deployment and redeployment operations. Exercises involving multinational forces offer an opportunity for US forces to **demonstrate their proficiency at deployment and redeployment operations to support concepts of operation involving multinational partners**, while affording US planners the opportunity to benefit from learning allied and/or coalition capabilities and limitations. Joint and multinational exercises are conducted as part of the CJCS Joint Exercise and Training Program.

a. **CJCS Joint Exercise and Training Program.** The CJCS Joint Exercise and Training Program is the **Chairman's principal vehicle for achieving joint and multinational training**. The exercises within the program provide an opportunity to utilize strategic transportation and C4I systems and evaluate their readiness and supportability across the full range of military operations. Additionally, exercises and training events demonstrate US resolve and capability to project military presence anywhere in the world in support of US national interests and commitments to its allies. **The CJCS Joint Exercise and Training Program has three components:** CJCS-Sponsored Exercises; USACOM and/or USSOCOM Common Joint Task Training Programs; and CINC-Sponsored Joint Training Programs.

b. **CJCS Exercise Program Funding.** Instructions for the funding of the CJCS Joint Exercise and Training Program are contained in CJCSI 3511.01, "CJCS Exercise Program Funding." In accordance with this instruction, exercises conducted by combatant



Joint training programs must incorporate deployment and redeployment training objectives to improve strategic mobility.

commanders using joint transportation funds will ensure that deployment and/or redeployment issues are addressed throughout the exercise.

c. Exercise Planning Considerations. When conducting deployment or redeployment operations in exercises, fundamental considerations must be given to the items shown in Figure VII-1.

d. Use of Modeling and Simulation. Conduct of computer assisted exercises using modern M&S systems and techniques to simulate execution of real world TPFDDs may be used to identify deficiencies in real world deployment concepts and TPFDD. Deployment exercises can also provide **valuable training to joint and Service staffs** and can be conducted during exercises sponsored by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commands, or Services.

5. Assessments

Joint operation planning prepares for the use of existing capabilities to achieve objectives defined in the NMS. Execution of

the resultant plans during contingencies, joint training, and exercises provides a **measurement of the nation's ability to successfully prosecute the NMS** within the constraints of available forces and resources.

This measurement provides a means of assessing the balance between strategy and capabilities, assessing joint force readiness, and focusing the acquisition of additional resources and capabilities. **Assessment is a vital component of joint force training and exercise programs.** M&S systems and techniques can significantly enhance assessment capability during deployment planning and exercises during which deployment staffs actually execute transportation plans and associated TPFDDs.

a. Preparedness and Capability. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has the responsibility to **monitor and assess the readiness of US military forces to fight and meet the demands of the NMS.** The CRS supports the Chairman in meeting this responsibility. **UJTLs provide the foundation for joint force exercise assessment.** Joint operation plans provide the foundation for the CRS because they are the

EXERCISE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS


- 
- ✓ Developing specific, measurable, and attainable deployment and/or redeployment exercise objectives.
 - ✓ Providing for sufficient deployment or redeployment actions to support the objectives of the exercise.
 - ✓ Creating as realistic a deployment or redeployment exercise environment as possible.
 - ✓ Assessing and evaluating deployment or redeployment operation planning and execution.
 - ✓ Exercising intelligence support to deployment and redeployment operations.

Figure VII-1. Exercise Planning Considerations

standards against which readiness is measured in the joint monthly readiness review. This senior forum is designed to assess both unit readiness, as reported by the Services, and joint readiness, as reported by the combatant commanders.

b. **Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate, Joint Staff (J-7), Evaluation and Analysis Division (EAD).** The J-7, EAD conducts formal assessments of CJCS-sponsored exercises for the CRS. Observations and issues are provided to the Chairman for assessing national warfighting capabilities and programming improvement. The Joint After Action Reports System and

Joint Universal Lessons Learned System archive key joint operational issues for future exercise and operation planning.

c. **Deployment and Redeployment Exercise Assessment.** Deployment and redeployment evaluation criteria should be measurable and compatible with the overall exercise constraints. The exercise sponsor should establish broad objectives that can be translated into more specific objectives during exercise planning conferences and reflected within the exercise schedule. At a minimum, the following aspects of exercise deployment and redeployment operations should be evaluated.

- Intelligence support for deployment and redeployment operations.
- Movement management plans to include C2, battlespace management, and mechanism for enforcement of the combatant commander's priorities at nodes.
- Proper use of all available planning products and support.
- Use of TPFDDs to exercise JOPES operators and planners.
- Optimal use of all available component and allied and/or coalition lift assets.
- Force protection measures employed during deployment and redeployment operations.

"INTERNAL LOOK was a joint exercise with all Services and component commands represented and thoroughly integrated. . . [Exercise] INTERNAL LOOK provided an essential common framework to participants during the war. When actual deployments began during [Operation] DESERT SHIELD, planners would routinely remark, "We did this on [Exercise] INTERNAL LOOK."

Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War, by Brigadier General Robert H. Scales

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APPENDIX A

DELIBERATE AND CRISIS ACTION PLANNING PROCESSES

1. Introduction

Deployment and redeployment planning is an integral part of joint operation planning. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmits the orders of the President and Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders and oversees the activities of the combatant commands. The Services and their major logistics agencies participate in joint operation planning through execution of their responsibilities to organize, train, equip, and provide forces for assignment to the combatant commands; administer and support

those forces; and prepare plans implementing joint strategic mobility, logistics, and mobilization plans. However, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders have primary responsibility for planning the employment of forces, including deployment and redeployment operations.

2. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

JOPES is the integrated joint C2 system used to plan and execute all military operations (see Figure A-1). It is the system




Figure A-1. JOPES Deliberate Planning Process and Crisis Action Planning Process Functional Alignment

used by the JPEC to conduct joint operation planning. The process of force projection is an integral part of the JOPEs. JOPEs is used to track requirements, departures, and arrivals in the scheduling and movement subsystem of JOPEs. Additionally, JOPEs provides users with an ordered and comprehensive set of procedures for resolving complex strategic mobility force deployment and sustainment problems. It includes an operation planning process, an ADP support system, and procedures to support the planning process. Currently the joint community is working towards standardized, functionally integrated processes and automation tools to support deployment execution and management. This effort is tied to three critical goals for 21st century power projection: increase the speed of deployment; decrease the logistics footprint of deployed forces; and improve information management to provide full dimensional awareness. The primary JOPEs reference document for deployment and redeployment execution is CJCSM 3122.02, "Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution."

3. Joint Operation Planning

Joint operation planning (see Figure A-2) is directed toward the employment of military forces within the context of a military strategy to attain specified objectives. In peacetime, the process is deliberate planning. In crisis situations, it is CAP.

For a more detailed explanation of the joint planning process, its components, and their functions, see JP 5-0, "Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations," CJCSM 3122.01, "Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures)," and CJCSM 3122.03, "Joint Operations Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning Formats and Guidance)."

a. Deliberate Planning. Deliberate planning is designed as a cyclic process during

peacetime conditions and provides to the JPEC an opportunity to develop and refine plans to be used in wartime (see Figure A-3). It is the process used when time permits the total participation of the commanders and staffs of the JPEC. The plan is based on predicted conditions that will be countered with resources available during the planning cycle. Results of the deliberate planning process are documented in OPLANs, CONPLANs, FUNCPLANs, and the supporting TPFDD and/or TPFDL for each plan. OPLANs, CONPLANs, and FUNCPLANs are developed by the combatant commanders in response to CJCS requirements, JSCP tasking, and self-determined contingencies. FUNCPLANs are used for military operations in a peacetime or permissive environment for specific functions or discrete tasks. They may also be prepared for peacetime operations (e.g., disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, or counterdrug operations). Forces and sustainment requirements are developed by the supported combatant commander during the TPFDL development. FUNCPLANs are sourced by the Services, supporting combatant commanders, and defense agencies. Transportation feasibility analysis is conducted by USTRANSCOM in conjunction with the supported combatant commander during the deliberate planning process. Analysis is conducted using models, simulations, and transportation expertise. Dependable transportation feasibility analysis is contingent on accurate combatant command analysis of theater transportability.

b. Crisis Action Planning. CAP procedures provide for the transition from planning of military operations to their execution. Deliberate planning supports CAP by anticipating potential crises and developing joint OPLANs that facilitate the rapid development and selection of a COA and execution planning during crises. CAP includes the consideration and exploitation of deliberate joint operation planning whenever possible. An adequate and feasible military




Figure A-2. Joint Planning Summary

| COMPARING CRISIS ACTION PROCEDURES WITH DELIBERATE PLANNING PROCEDURES | | |
|--|--|--|
| | CRISIS ACTION PLANNING | DELIBERATE PLANNING |
| Time available to plan | Hours or days | 18-24 months |
| JPEC involvement | For security reasons, possibly very limited to close-hold procedures | Participates fully |
| Phases | 6 Phases from situation development to execution | 5 Phases from initiation to supporting plans |
| Document assigning task | Warning order to combatant commander, who assigns tasks with evaluation request message | JSCP to combatant commander, who assigns tasks with planning or other written directive |
| Forces for Planning | Allocated in the Warning, Planning, Alert, or Execute order | Apportioned in JSCP |
| Early planning guidance to staff | Warning order from Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; combatant commander's evaluation request | Planning Directive issued by combatant commander after planning guidance step of concept development phase |
| Commander's estimates | Communicates recommendations of combatant commander to the CJCS-NCA | Communicates the combatant commander's decision to staff and subordinate commanders |
| Decision of COA | NCA decide COA | Combatant commander decides COA with CJCS review |
| Execution Document | Execute order | When operation plan is implemented, it is converted to an OPORD, and executed with an Execute order |
| Products | Campaign Plan (if reqd) with supporting OPORDs or OPORD with supporting TPFDD | OPLAN with supporting TPFDD or CONPLAN with or without supporting TPFDD |

Figure A-3. Comparing Crisis Action Procedures With Deliberate Planning Procedures

response to a crisis demands a flexible adaptation of the basic planning process that emphasizes the time available, rapid and effective communications, and the use of previously accomplished joint operation planning whenever possible. In crisis situations, the JPEC follows formally established CAP procedures to adjust and implement previously prepared joint deliberate plans or to develop and execute

OPORDs where no useful joint deliberate plan exists for the evolving crisis. A campaign plan may also be developed if warranted by the scope of contemplated operations. CAP procedures provide for the rapid and effective exchange of information and analysis, the timely preparation of military COAs for consideration by the NCA, and the prompt transmission of NCA decisions to supported commanders.

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APPENDIX B

JOINT DEPLOYMENT, REDEPLOYMENT, AND JRSOI PROCESS MAP DESCRIPTION

- Annex A Joint Deployment Process Map Description
 B Joint Redeployment Process Map Description
 C JRSOI Process Map Description

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ANNEX A TO APPENDIX B

JOINT DEPLOYMENT PROCESS MAP DESCRIPTION

See Figure B-A-1.

1. Analyze Mission

Military operations begin with an event that requires movement of forces to somewhere in the world. This can be a planned or no-notice movement. The process begins with development of COAs, includes selection of the desired COA, and ends with the development of orders and their transmission.

a. **Receive Initial Notification.** Units receive informal notification of impending operations via any communication means.

b. **Conduct Initial Mission Analysis.** Based on early information acquired, planners assess potential scenario developments, mission requirements, and COAs.

- **Evaluate Deployed Location Requirements, Capabilities, and Available WRM.** Planners collect intelligence on theater terrain, weather, infrastructure, and prepositioned equipment and/or supplies.
- **Review Installation Capabilities and Support Requirements.** Deployment installations assess the operational tempo, movement requirements, facilities, equipment, and deploying force support requirements.

c. **Receive Warning Order.** Formal notification is received which directs deployment planning and preparation.

d. **Receive TPFDD Guidance.** Supported combatant commander tailors basic TPFDD LOI as necessary to plan and execute specific mission. Force providers add guidance to subordinate headquarters as necessary.

2. Structure Forces

A critical step in planning military operations is to identify all forces required to meet the mission. Force structuring includes establishing the command structure, tasking assigned forces (including active component and RC or other assigned forces) and ends with a defined force to accomplish mission objectives.

a. **Source, Tailor, and Prioritize Force Structure.** Deploying units are sourced and task-organized to meet mission requirements and to fill supported combatant command, JTF, or component force requirements. Combatant commanders, JTFs, or components prioritize force flow within the overall structure based on operational needs and strategic lift limitations.

- **Develop Deployment Data.** Deploying units provide passengers (PAX) and/or equipment lists for TPFDD refinement.
- **Verify Accompanying Supplies.** Ensure that units identify planned accompanying supplies.

b. **Establish Command Relationships.** Joint Staff confirms supported command, supporting combatant command, and agency relationships by message for a given operation.

3. Validate Deployment Data

Execution procedures are used by combatant command components, supporting combatant commanders, and providing organizations to confirm to the supported commander and USTRANSCOM that all information records in a TPFDD are not only error-free for automation purposes, but also




Figure B-A-1. Joint Force Deployment Process

accurately reflect the current status, attributes, and availability of units and requirements. Unit readiness, movement dates, passengers, and cargo details should be confirmed with the unit before validation occurs.

a. Refine and Submit Deployment Data.

Force structure must be further described in terms of deployment data to facilitate logistics planning, movement, and sustainment. The result of this process is the development of the TPFDD. The TPFDD translates operational requirements into logistics terms (i.e., how much, when, and where) in order to deploy, prioritize, and schedule the flow of the force into the theater.

b. Receive Supported Combatant Commander-Approved TPFDD. Supported combatant commander receives Service component force requirement and deployment data and merges this data into its TPFDD. The supported combatant commander then reviews, analyzes, and prioritizes flow as necessary and sends the end product to USTRANSCOM for a transportation feasibility review. The completed review is coordinated with the supported combatant commander for resolution of transportation conflicts. The end result of this process is the supported combatant commander-approved TPFDD. Deploying units prepare for movement based on this TPFDD. Changes may occur during deployment, and incremental changes affecting units are implemented as required.

4. Prepare the Force (Personnel, Supplies and Equipment)

Multiple actions, events, and activities must be accomplished to get the force ready to deploy. Planned requirements (represented by the TPFDD) are communicated to tasked units and supporting agencies, which take actions to prepare and organize the actual people, supplies, and equipment for movement. This process also includes getting

support organizations prepared to conduct deployment operations.

a. Activate Deployment C2 and Support Organizations. Task organize to support requirements for movement control elements (e.g., A/DACG, MCCs, POGs, TALCE).

b. Identify Containers, Flat Racks, MHE, Cargo Handling Equipment (CHE), Pallets, and Local Transportation Requirements. Supporting activities receive container and/or 463L pallet requirements from units, assess capability to meet these requirements, and determine MHE and/or CHE requirements to move containers and pallets from storage sites to unit areas.

c. Identify and Resolve Shortfalls and/or Limitations. Units identify personnel and/or equipment shortfalls against authorizations or mission requirements. Force providers take necessary actions.

d. Conduct Movement Coordination and Support Meeting. Commands at all levels review planning and execution status and assign tasks to resolve support issues.

e. Develop Initial Load and/or Stow Plans. Based on anticipated types of lift, units develop initial load and/or stow plans.

5. Schedule Movement

Movement scheduling is an iterative process at every level of supported and supporting commands in order to get the right people, supplies, and equipment to the right place at the right time.

a. Receive Strategic Movement Schedule. As received from validated TPFDD requirements, strategic lift assets are scheduled and registered in JOPES. These movement schedules are utilized by commands in support of movement planning, coordination, and execution.

b. **Receive MTMC Port Call.** As strategic sealift schedules are being developed, units and/or installations receive MTMC Deployment Support Command call forward messages directing movement to SPOEs in designated windows. For amphibious operations, MTMC port calls do not apply.

c. **Assess Lift Schedule.** Commands assess ability to meet strategic lift schedules. Allocation of unit line numbers (ULNs) to carriers is accomplished in JOPES. ULN lift shortfalls and available lift are identified to the TCCs.

d. **Build and Publish Schedule of Events.** Movement instructions are published in accordance with JOPES carrier schedules and priority of force movement.

e. **Confirm Movement Clearances.** Movement control elements confirm movement clearances with HN, state, and governmental agencies.

6. Assemble and Marshal Forces

Assembly and marshalling involves bringing together people, supplies, and equipment in preparation for final movement. Support functions are established and positioned to expedite and control the movement and throughput of the force through the deployment pipeline.

a. **Assemble Personnel and Cargo.** Conducted within home and/or intermediate marshalling areas in support of movement preparations.

b. **Conduct Unit Inspection, Load Equipment, and Process Documentation.** Preparations and inspections for movement operations are completed. Documentation is married up with cargo and equipment.

c. **Sequence Loads.** Loads are staged and sequenced in support of movement to POEs based upon priority of force movement schedules.

d. **Establish Support Organizations at POE.** POEs deployment support organizations, identified in par 4.a. above, are established in support of movement operations.

e. **Move to POE.** Movement to the designated POEs is conducted in accordance with movement instructions.

f. **Conduct Movement Control Operations.** Movement control elements coordinate, monitor, and report movement in accordance with movement instructions.

7. Conduct POE Operations

Port operations begin the strategic leg of the deployment pipeline. Essential actions are accomplished at the POE to complete and finalize all unit movement responsibilities. The result is the load and launch of the strategic conveyance. Critical information is provided to C2 and forward support elements to facilitate efficient onward movement of the force to the POD.

a. **Arrive and Report Status.** Arrival of forces and equipment at the designated departure POEs. Arrival reporting is done by the deployment support organizations and unit as directed.

b. **Assemble and Sequence Loads.** Personnel, cargo, and equipment are staged and sequenced in the established departure POE unit marshalling areas.

c. **Conduct POE Inspections and Complete Final PAX and/or Cargo Documentation.** These inspections are

conducted within the departure POE alert holding area and/or call forward areas in accordance with the Defense Transportation regulations and joint procedures and policies.

d. **Load Lift and Report Status are** conducted within the departure POE loading ramp areas. Load lift reports are submitted

as directed between the POE support agencies, unit, and component forces.

e. **Submit Departure Reports.** Departure Status reports are submitted by the deployment support organizations in accordance with Service guidance to the command element(s) in support of JOPES reporting requirements.

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ANNEX B TO APPENDIX B

JOINT REDEPLOYMENT PROCESS MAP DESCRIPTION

See Figure B-B-1.

1. Analyze Mission

Redeployment operations will normally begin when the unit is notified that its mission is complete or when it has received orders to redeploy to another theater in support of other missions.

a. **Receive Initial Notification.** Units receive informal notification of impending redeployment via any communication means.

b. **Conduct Initial Mission Analysis.** Based on early information acquired, planners assess current tactical situation and unit status and conduct preliminary analysis of redeployment mission requirements.

c. **Receive Warning Order and TPFDD Guidance.** Formal notification received which directs redeployment planning and preparation. The supported combatant commander tailors basic TPFDD LOI as necessary to plan and execute redeployment operations. Unit commanders provide additional guidance to subordinate headquarters as necessary.

d. **Identify HN, Contract, Command Capabilities, and Support Requirements.** Commanders at all levels assess HN, contract, command capabilities, and support requirements for movement, to include facilities, security, supply and services, and equipment processing and turn-in. Additionally, the requirements for customs, environmental protection, and agricultural inspections are reviewed.

2. Structure Forces

A critical step in planning is to identify all forces selected to redeploy, as well as the forces that will support the operation. Redeploying forces receive guidance on reconstitution and reorganization, including equipment disposition. Support force structuring includes establishing the command structure and assigning redeployment tasks to forces, and ends with a defined force to accomplish redeployment mission objectives.

a. **Move to TAA.** Upon completion of tactical operations and based on combatant command guidance, the unit will move to designated TAA.

- **Conduct Reconstitution and Reorganize.** Upon arrival in the TAA, units conduct recovery and reconstitution; reorganization; and await movement instructions from their supporting movement control element or higher headquarters.

- **Process Personnel and Equipment.** Units account for and process personnel, identify and process excess equipment, clean, decontaminate, pack and load unit equipment in accordance with customs and/or agriculture guidance, and develop initial unit movement data.

b. **Tailor and Prioritize Force Structure.** Redeploying and supporting units are task-organized to meet redeployment mission requirements and to fill combatant command, JTF, or component force requirements. Combatant commands, JTFs, or components




Figure B-B-1. Joint Force Redeployment Process

prioritize force flow within the overall structure based on operational needs and strategic lift limitations.

c. Develop Redeployment Data. Redeploying units provide PAX and/or equipment lists for TPFDD refinement.

d. Identify Equipment Status to Include WRM and Excess Materiel. Redeploying units must assess equipment status and coordinate the turn-in of WRM and excess equipment in accordance with Service headquarters turn-in or disposition instructions.

3. Refine Redeployment Data

Units confirm readiness, movement available dates, PAX, and cargo details to higher commands. Combatant command components and supporting commanders provide confirmation to the supported commander, who validates to USTRANSCOM that the data in the TPFDD is error-free and accurately reflects the current status, attributes, and availability of units and requirements.

a. Refine and Submit Redeployment Data. The redeployment force structure must be further described in terms of redeployment data to facilitate logistics planning, movement, and sustainment. The result of this process is the development of the TPFDD. The TPFDD translates operational requirements into logistics terms (i.e., how much, when, and where) in order to deploy, prioritize, and schedule the flow of the force out of the theater to home station or to another operational location.

b. Receive Supported Combatant Commander-Approved TPFDD. The supported combatant commander receives Service component force requirements and/or redeployment data and merges this data into its TPFDD. The supported combatant

commander then reviews, analyzes, and re-prioritizes flow as necessary and sends the end product to USTRANSCOM for a transportation feasibility review. The completed review is coordinated with the supported combatant commander for resolution of transportation conflicts. The end result of this process is the supported combatant commander-approved TPFDD. Redeploying units prepare for movement based on this TPFDD. Changes may occur during redeployment and incremental changes affecting units are implemented as required.

4. Prepare the Force (Personnel, Supplies, and Equipment)

Multiple actions, events, and activities must be accomplished to get the force ready to redeploy. Planned requirements (represented by the TPFDD) are communicated to tasked units and supporting agencies, who take action to prepare and organize the actual people, supplies, and equipment for movement. This process also includes getting support organizations prepared to conduct redeployment operations. Preparations are made to process WRM and excess materiel.

a. Establish Support Organizations. Task organize to support requirements for movement control elements (e.g., A/DACG, MCCs, POGs, TALCE).

b. Conduct Movement Coordination and Support Meeting. Commands at all levels review planning and execution status and assign tasks to resolve support issues.

c. Identify Containers, Flat Racks, MHE, CHE, Pallets, and Local Transportation Requirements. Supporting activities receive container and/or 463L pallet requirements from units, assess capability to meet these requirements, and determine MHE and/or CHE requirements to move containers and pallets from storage sites to unit areas.

d. **Coordinate HN and Contract Support Requirements.** HN and contract support play a vital role in redeployment operations. Coordination must be made for various functions to include convoy support centers, communications, MHE, POE support, and other key support functions.

e. **Turn-in WRM and Excess Materiel.** Units must clean, process, and turn-in WRM and excess materiel in accordance with Service disposition instructions.

f. **Develop Initial Load and/or Stow Plans.** Based on anticipated types of lift, units develop initial load and/or stow plans.

5. Schedule Movement

Movement scheduling is an iterative process at every level of supported and supporting commands in order to get the right people, supplies, and equipment to the right place at the right time.

a. **Receive Strategic Movement Schedule.** As received from validated TPFDD requirements, strategic lift assets are scheduled and registered in JOPES. These movement schedules are utilized by commands in support of movement planning, coordination, and execution.

b. **Receive MTMC Port Call.** As strategic sealift schedules are being developed, units and/or installations receive MTMC Area Command call forward messages directing movement to SPOEs in designated windows. For amphibious operations, MTMC port calls do not apply.

c. **Assess Lift Schedule.** Commands assess ability to meet strategic lift schedules. Allocation of ULN(s) to carriers is accomplished in JOPES. ULN lift shortfalls and available lift are identified to the TCCs.

d. **Build and Publish Schedule of Events.** Movement instructions are published in support of JOPES carrier schedules and priority of force movement.

e. **Confirm Movement Clearances.** Movement control elements confirm movement clearances with HN, state, and governmental agencies.

6. Assemble and Marshal Forces

Assembly and marshalling involves bringing together people, supplies and equipment in preparation for movement. Support functions are established and positioned to expedite and control the movement from TAA to SAs and throughput of the force through the redeployment pipeline.

a. **Move to SA.** Upon receipt of movement instructions from higher headquarters and the supporting movement control element, forces are moved to the SA.

b. **Assemble Personnel and Cargo.** Personnel and cargo assembly is conducted within the SA and/or intermediate marshalling areas in support of movement preparations.

c. **Conduct Unit Inspection, Load Equipment, and Prepare Documentation.** Preparations and inspections for movement operations are completed. In preparation for agricultural inspections, units wash down equipment either in the SA or at the POE. Documentation is prepared and attached to cargo and equipment.

d. **Sequence Loads.** Loads are staged and sequenced in support of movement to POEs based upon priority of force movement schedules.

e. **Establish Support Organizations at POE.** POE redeployment support organizations, identified in par 4.a. above, are established in support of movement operations.

f. **Move to POEs.** Movement to the designated POEs is conducted in accordance with movement instructions.

g. **Conduct Movement Control Operations.** Movement control elements coordinate, monitor, and report movement in accordance with movement instructions.

7. Conduct POE Operations

Port operations begin the strategic leg of the redeployment process. Essential actions are accomplished at the POE to complete and finalize all unit movement responsibilities. The result is the load and launch of the strategic conveyance. Critical information is provided to C2 and forward support elements to facilitate efficient onward movement of the force to the POE.

a. **Arrive and Report Status.** Arrival of forces and equipment at the designated POEs. Arrival reporting is completed in accordance with Service guidance.

b. **Assemble and Sequence Loads.** Personnel, cargo, and equipment are staged and sequenced in the established departure POE unit marshalling areas.

c. **Conduct Inspections and Complete Final PAX and/or Cargo Documentation (Safety, Customs, and Agricultural).** Inspections are conducted within the departure POE alert holding area and/or call forward areas in accordance with the Defense Transportation regulations and joint procedures and policies. This includes safety, customs, and agricultural inspections and equipment wash down.

d. **Load Lift, Report Status, and Submit Departure Reports.** Cargo and personnel are loaded on lift. Reports are provided with status of units, cargo, personnel, lift, terminals, and loading operations. Additionally, reports are submitted to track the departure of individual lift and associated loads.

8. Conduct POD Operations

POD operations include all actions taken to download and process unit personnel and equipment at an aerial or SPOD and may include customs and agricultural inspections.

a. **Receive Personnel and Cargo.** Passengers, unit equipment, and cargo are downloaded, moved to temporary holding areas, and consolidated for movement to final destination. Units may assist with download and movement of equipment. Customs and agricultural inspections may be conducted if they were not conducted at the POE, were considered inadequate, or to meet other requirements.

- **Submit Arrival Reports.** Redeployment support organizations submit arrival reports.

- **Conduct Unit Reception.** Unit reception will normally include a formal welcome by a flag officer or designated representative, a reception with band, and other morale-boosting activities for returning units.

b. **Coordinate Transportation for Onward Movement.** Support organizations arrange transportation of personnel and equipment from POD to installation and support non-commercial movements.

c. **Process Personnel and Equipment for Movement.** Support organizations process and coordinate movement documentation

(e.g., manifests, government bills of lading) for the materiel and equipment that flows through the POD.

d. Complete Unit Inspections and Process Movement Documents. Unit personnel moving organic vehicles, helicopters, or other unit cargo perform required maintenance, repairs, and safety inspections. Units also coordinate required movement clearances.

e. Report Status and Submit Departure Reports. Units provide higher headquarters and the Service component with unit status and departure reports.

9. Conduct Destination Reception

Destination reception includes all actions necessary to fully recover the unit to include its assigned personnel and equipment. Reserve components return to demobilization stations. Locations are designated by receiving commands.

a. Arrive Destination. Receiving installations provide assistance, as required, to include personal property assistance, equipment processing and storage, and providing MHE and commercial transportation assets.

b. Conduct Unit Reception. Unit reception may include a formal or informal ceremony which may be a follow-on to the reception at the POD.

c. Process Personnel and Equipment. Installations and units conduct personnel and equipment processing operations.

d. Demobilization of Reserves. Reserve units and individuals are demobilized and return to home station.

e. Prepare for Future Missions. Upon complete recovery of unit personnel and equipment, units can begin preparation for future missions.

ANNEX C TO APPENDIX B

JRSOI PROCESS MAP DESCRIPTION

See Figure B-C-1.

1. Conduct POD Operations

The deploying force will arrive in the theater at APODs and SPODs. Reception is the process of expeditiously offloading, marshalling, and transporting equipment, personnel, and materiel to complete the strategic deployment phase to a sea, air, or surface transportation POD. Reception operations at the POD include all those functions necessary to receive and clear unit personnel and equipment through the POD.

a. Receive Personnel and Cargo. Personnel and cargo are offloaded at terminals. The support organization analyzes ITV data to determine how and where the arriving personnel and cargo are to be moved to appropriate holding areas. Status reports are provided to higher headquarters. The units are advised of the general situation and may be tasked for personnel to work on various work parties (i.e., drivers for off-loading, PSA, security, cargo off-load).

b. Process Personnel and Cargo for Movement and Prepare Documentation. Personnel and cargo are received and processed for movement. Unit personnel and cargo may move on unit equipment and/or common-user transportation. Appropriate documentation is prepared for subsequent movement.

c. Move to SA. Unit personnel and cargo will usually move to an SA. In some situations, unit personnel and cargo may move directly to the TAA. If movement is to an SA, preparations begin there for onward movement to the TAA. In certain instances, the POD, SA, and TAA may be collocated; however, this is not recommended.

d. Conduct Movement Control Operations. Movement control elements coordinate, monitor, and report movement in accordance with movement instructions. The movement control system also establishes procedures with HN, commercial contractors, and allied forces on the use of available transportation resources.

2. Prepare the Force (Personnel, Supplies, and Equipment)

Units arrive at the SA and begin preparations for movement to the TAA. Staging is the assembling, temporary holding, and organization of arriving personnel and materiel into units and forces, followed by preparation for onward movement and tactical operations. Support activities in the SA provide life support until units become self-sustaining. In the SA, C2 organizations are stood up to monitor status, receive reports, prioritize movement, provide local security, monitor throughput of subordinate units, and forward status to higher headquarters. The force is prepared for movement to the TAA. Equipment and cargo, including WRM, are received, accounted for, and distributed. Units prepare for onward movement by assembling, processing, and accounting for personnel; performing maintenance and operations checks on equipment; and verifying and/or modifying load plans for movement from the SA to TAA. When the unit has received its movement mission, adequate intelligence, and is task-organized in accordance with command guidance, it makes final movement preparations and departs the SA.

a. Establish C2, Security and Unit Area. C2 and command post operations are established and liaison elements are sent to higher, adjacent, external, and subordinate organizations as the mission requires. C2 is




Figure B-C-1. Force JRSOI Process

established with higher headquarters and units maintain close coordination with higher headquarters as they make final preparations. Units ensure that security operations are established in accordance with the security plan.

b. Report Status. Units continuously monitor the status of preparation in key operational and logistic areas as they prepare for the mission and report status to higher headquarters. Movements and the status of units and forces should be reported from all nodes where JRSOI operations are being conducted.

c. Coordinate Support Requirements. Coordination is established with the SA support activities to provide logistic support and services.

d. Assemble and Process Personnel. Units prepare for onward movement by assembling, processing, and accounting for personnel. Personnel are accounted for and processed in accordance with command guidance, JRSOI directives, and unit standing operating procedure. Units are task-organized to execute the mission based on combatant command guidance and the operational environment.

e. Receive Equipment, WRM, and Supplies. Units receive their equipment, equipment augmentation, WRM, and supplies as required. Equipment, cargo, and supplies are received, accounted for, and distributed in accordance with logistics guidance. Units perform maintenance and operational checks on equipment.

f. Conduct Training and Perform Equipment Operability Checks. Training is conducted in key mission-essential tasks. Equipment is checked to ensure that it is combat ready and mission capable.

3. Assemble and Marshal Forces

Assembly and marshalling involves bringing together people, supplies, and equipment in preparation for onward movement. Onward movement is the process of moving units and accompanying materiel from reception facilities and marshalling or staging areas to TAAs or other theater destinations, moving arriving non-unit personnel to gaining commands, and moving arriving sustainment materiel from reception facilities to distribution sites. Support functions are established and positioned to expedite and control the onward movement of the force to the TAA.

a. Process Personnel and Cargo for Movement and Prepare Documentation. Load plans are developed and checked to ensure that essential equipment and supplies can be transported. External movement requirements are identified and movement requests are submitted.

b. Sequence Loads. Loads are sequenced to ensure the most efficient use of available transportation assets. Safety and security of the force are also considered when making decisions during sequence planning.

c. Coordinate Movement Security Requirements. Units ensure that security operations are established in accordance with the security plan and monitor the movement.

4. Onward Movement

The unit moves to the TAA in accordance with movement and security instructions.

a. Move to TAA. Units depart SAs for the TAA.

b. Conduct Movement Control Operations. A movement control element coordinates movement requirements with the security force and confirms that movement clearances have been approved. Departure, en route, and arrival status are monitored and reported.

5. Conduct TAA Operations

The TAA is a location designated by the combatant commander where units will transfer authority to their gaining commands and from which they can be integrated into the force and be tactically employed. Units arrive at the TAA and continuously monitor the status of preparation in key operational and logistic areas as they prepare for the mission. Coordination is also made for TAA security operations. Unit reports to higher headquarters ready for operations when JRSOI operations are completed.

a. Establish C2, Security, and Unit Area. C2 or command post operations are established and liaison elements are sent to higher, adjacent, external, and subordinate organizations as the mission requires. C2 is established with higher headquarters, and units maintain close coordination with higher headquarters as they make final preparations.

b. Report Status. Units continuously monitor the status of preparation in key operational and logistic areas as they prepare for the mission and report status to higher headquarters. Movements and the status of units and forces should be reported from all nodes where JRSOI operations are being conducted.

c. Coordinate Support Requirements. Coordination is established with the TAA support activities to provide logistic support and services.

d. Conduct Force Assembly and Accountability. Units perform a final unit assembly accountability of equipment, supplies, and personnel and report status to the gaining and losing command.

6. Complete Force Integration

Integration is the process of establishing force projection units into coherent operational units under the C2 of the supported combatant commander. The JRSOI process ends when the unit commander has reported ready for operations and the unit integrates with its higher headquarters. The unit is integrated with logistics and operational components of the gaining command and completes any final command directed training and activities before being committed to operational missions.

a. Integrate C4 with Gaining Command. C4 is completely integrated between the gaining command, supporting commands, units, JRSOI organizations, and commanders at all levels to facilitate the timely and accurate exchange of critical information. The receiving commander must establish positive C2 over the arriving unit in the TAA.

b. Integrate with Combat Service Support (CSS). The unit establishes direct support relationships with various support elements in the CSS structure to include supply, services, maintenance, and medical.

c. Conduct Field Training Exercises (FTX) and Rehearsals. Units conduct FTXs and rehearsals as part of final training preparation.

d. Confirm Mission Readiness. Commanders report their units status in accordance with the readiness criteria established by the supported combatant commander and confirm when ready to execute their assigned missions.

APPENDIX C

TIME-PHASED FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT DATA REFINEMENT

1. TPFDD Refinement

The supported combatant commander, in coordination with supporting commanders and Services, establishes joint force movement requirements. This is accomplished by developing a deployment and/or redeployment data base in JOPEs. The data base can be developed from an existing or modified OPLAN TPFDD, or a totally new data base can be built in a no-plan situation. The supporting and supported commanders, along with appropriate Service operations, logistics, and personnel staffs, review this data base, source the various requirements, and then refine or establish detailed transportation requirements. When completed, USTRANSCOM TCCs extract supported combatant commander-validated requirements incrementally for scheduling into JOPEs. Forces and resources are normally refined during TPFDD refinement conferences during the deliberate planning process. The refined portion of the TPFDD will be submitted as Appendix 1, “Time-Phased Force and Deployment List”, to Annex A, “Planning Guidance - Task Organization” of the OPLAN.

For detailed information on TPFDD refinement, see CJCSM 3122.01, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures).”

a. The TPFDD refinement process consists of several discrete steps that may be conducted sequentially or concurrently, in whole or in part. These steps support the other elements of the plan development phase of the joint planning process, forces planning, support planning, transportation planning, and shortfall identification, and are collectively

referred to as TPFDD refinement. The normal TPFDD refinement process consists of sequentially refining forces (to include non-unit personnel), logistics (to include both accompanying supplies and non-unit resupply), and transportation data to develop a TPFDD file that supports a feasible and adequate OPLAN. Data base size and time constraints may cause overlap of several refinement phases.

b. The TPFDD file for regional plans will normally be refined using two refinement conferences, a combined forces and logistics conference, and a transportation conference. The TPFDD files for global planning will normally be refined at three separate conferences (forces, logistics, and transportation conferences) because of the number of plans undergoing concurrent refinement to meet a common planning task. Refinement conferences may be combined together or omitted as required to allow for the best refinement of a single OPLAN or a family of OPLANs established for a common planning task.

- Forces refinement is conducted in coordination with supported and supporting commanders, Services, the Joint Staff, and other supporting agencies. USTRANSCOM will normally host forces refinement conferences at the request of the supported combatant commander. The purpose of forces refinement is to confirm that forces are sourced and tailored within JSCP, Joint Staff, and Service guidance and to assess the adequacy of combat support and CSS force apportionment and resolve shortfalls. USTRANSCOM provides sealift and airlift capability estimates

based on lift apportionment throughout the process to ensure transportation feasibility.

- Logistics refinement is primarily conducted by the Service sourcing agencies, DLA, and combatant command components under the overall direction of the Joint Staff and/or the supported commander. USTRANSCOM will normally host logistics refinement conferences for the Joint Staff and the supported combatant commander. The purpose of logistics refinement is to confirm sourcing of logistics requirements in accordance with JSCP, Joint Staff, and Service guidance and to assess (by the Joint Staff and the supported combatant commander) the adequacy of resources provided by support planning, including complete medical and civil engineering planning. Since logistics sourcing is computed against a force structure, a frozen forces baseline is a prerequisite to calculating sustainment requirements.
- Transportation refinement is conducted by USTRANSCOM in coordination with the Joint Staff, Services, and supported and supporting combatant commands. USTRANSCOM will normally host transportation refinement conferences. The purpose of transportation refinement is to adjust the flow of OPLANs to ensure that they are transportation feasible and consistent with JSCP, Joint Staff, and Service guidance. Transportation refinement simulates the planned movement resources to ensure that the plan is transportation feasible. USTRANSCOM uses transportation expertise and computer simulation to determine transportation feasibility. In turn, the supported commander adjusts TPFDD requirements as necessary to remain within lift capability.

- Following TPFDD refinement, the supported commander completes the documentation of the plan and coordinates distribution of the TPFDD within the JOPES network as appropriate. The supported CINC then submits the OPLAN with the TPFDD file to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review.

c. Upon completion of force and logistics TPFDD refinement, USTRANSCOM will assess the gross transportation feasibility of the OPLAN. If grossly transportation feasible at that stage, the Joint Staff, in coordination with the supported commander, may deem the OPLAN “effective for planning.” The term “effective for planning” recognizes that the work to date is valid and current and could be used for execution prior to submission of the final OPLAN for CJCS approval. Designation is predicated on the fact that the combatant commander’s strategic concept for the plan has received CJCS approval, current forces have been sourced and approved, sustainment requirements have been generated, and the gross transportation feasibility check indicated the plan was transportation-feasible.

2. TPFDD Maintenance

The objective of TPFDD maintenance is to systematically and effectively incorporate required changes to TPFDD files and strategic lift apportionment in a standardized manner at defined intervals after the TPFDD becomes effective for execution. By performing TPFDD maintenance at standard intervals, the supported commander’s TPFDD remains a viable data base that is as up to date as possible throughout the JSCP effective period. Keeping the TPFDD viable will support a smooth transition to the next JSCP period and potentially save valuable time should execution planning be directed during a crisis. Supported combatant commanders will ensure that TPFDD changes are loaded at scheduled

intervals coordinated and published by the Joint Staff J-7. The Joint Staff JOPES Network Operations Control Center will monitor the update process and report problems and noncompliance to the Joint Staff J-7.

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APPENDIX D

DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDERS, DEPLOYMENT ORDERS, REDEPLOYMENT ORDERS, AND REQUEST FOR FORCES

- Annex A Sample Format for CJCS Deployment Preparation Order
 B Sample Format for CJCS Deployment Order
 C Sample Format for CJCS Redeployment Order
 D Sample Format for Request for Forces Message

DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDERS, DEPLOYMENT ORDERS, REDEPLOYMENT ORDERS, AND REQUEST FOR FORCES

1. Purpose

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff can issue a deployment preparation order, deployment order, or redeployment order after authorization by the Secretary of Defense. These orders are used to increase the deployability posture of units, decrease deployability posture of units, deploy forces, redeploy forces, and direct any other action that would signal planned US military action or its termination in response to a particular crisis event or incident.

2. Use of Order

The deployment preparation, deployment order, or request for forces will be issued upon decision of the NCA to commence preparations for the conduct of a military

operation (see Figure D-1). These orders may be issued at any point in the CAP development process. Deployment preparation, deployment orders, and request for forces may be incorporated within warning orders, planning orders, and alert orders, if appropriate, and approved by the NCA. A deployment preparation order can be used to propose C-day and L-hour or to indicate the CJCS-established C-day and L-hour. A redeployment order is or will be issued upon decision to redeploy forces to home station or another location.

3. Transmission of Orders

The deployment preparation order, deployment order, redeployment order, and request for forces are normally issued by record communication using a precedence of

| DEPLOYMENT ORDER MATRIX | | |
|---|---------------------------|--|
| INTENDED ACTION | DEPLOYMENT ORDER REQUIRED | SECRETARY OF DEFENSE APPROVAL REQUIRED |
| COMBATANT COMMAND REQUIRES ADDITIONAL FORCES (I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE TO US CENTRAL COMMAND) | YES | YES |
| DEPLOY PART(S) OF UNIT(S) (SQUAD TO US CENTRAL COMMAND) | YES | YES |
| INDIVIDUAL PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT | NO* | NO* |
| RESUPPLY, SUSTAINMENT, NON-UNIT RELATED PERSONNEL AND/OR EQUIPMENT (BEANS, BULLETS, ETC) | NO | NO |
| NOTE: * Unless directed by the Secretary of Defense, e.g., counterdrugs | | |

Figure D-1. Deployment Order Matrix

IMMEDIATE or FLASH. If the situation is sufficiently time-sensitive, voice communication or electronic teleconferences can be used first to pass information. A record communication will be forwarded as soon as practicable.

4. Addressees

An addressee indicator group (AIG) will normally be used in CAP messages. Action addressees in the AIG are combatant commanders and the Director, National Security Agency. The C2 paragraph will designate supported and supporting commanders. Information addressees will include the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, the White House Situation Room, Defense agencies, and others as appropriate. Interested commanders, heads of Defense agencies, and component commanders may be included as information addressees to speed dissemination and facilitate planning. Action recipients of the implementing order should include the same addressees as the implementer in their responses to ensure that appropriate agencies are kept informed.

5. Contents

When prior execution planning has been accomplished through adaptation of an existing plan or the development of an emergency OPORD, most of the guidance necessary for deployment preparations will have already been passed to implementing commands in the warning order, planning order, or alert order. If a crisis situation requires an increase in deployability posture, movement of forces, or establishment of a JTF (not addressed in warning orders, planning orders, alert orders, or execute orders), the deployment or deployment preparation order must pass all essential guidance to effect these actions. This order will, in the first paragraph, include the appropriate authority (e.g., “The Secretary of Defense has authorized the movement of forces....”).

See Annex A, “Sample Format for CJCS Deployment Preparation Order,” Annex B, “Sample Format for CJCS Deployment Order,” Annex C, “Sample Format for CJCS Redeployment Order,” and Annex D, “Sample Format for Request for Forces Message.”

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ANNEX A TO APPENDIX D
SAMPLE FORMAT FOR CJCS DEPLOYMENT
PREPARATION ORDER

(PRECEDENCE)

FROM: CJCS WASHINGTON DC

TO: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
CDRFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USCINCSpace PETERSON AFB CO
USCINCSO MIAMI FL
USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
USCINCSSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE
USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
INFO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP-CH/ASD:PA//

DISTR: SJS-N/CJCS:PA/J1/J3/J4/J5/J6/J6Z/J7/J8/NMCC:DDO/NIDS/DOCDIV
CSA WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CSAF WASHINGTON DC
CMC WASHINGTON DC
CDRUSELNORAD PETERSON AFB CO
HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//CC//
DISA WASHINGTON DC
DIA WASHINGTON DC
DLA CAMERON STATION VA
HQ DMA FAIRFAX VA
CIA WASHINGTON DC
NIMA WASHINGTON DC
CDRMTMC FALLS CHURCH VA
COMSC WASHINGTON DC
COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC//G-OP/G-OPD//
COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA
USCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//CC//
COMUSNAVCENT
CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
CG FMFLANT
USTRANSCOM LO MACDILL AFB FL
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
COMPACAF HICKAM AFB HI

CG FMFPAC
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
ACC LANGLEY AFB VA
CDRJCSE MACDILL AFB FL
JOINT STAFF ICP MANAGER MACDILL AFB FL

CLASSIFICATION

OPER/BLUENOSE//
MSGID/ORDER/CJCS//
AMPN/SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS//
REF/A/ORDER/CJCS/211742ZNOV__/-/NOTAL//
REF/B/MSG/USCINCCENT/242100ZNOV__/-/NOTAL//
REF/C/ORDER/CJCS/270300ZNOV__/-/NOTAL//

NARR/CJCS WARNING ORDER, COMMANDERS ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION
ALERT ORDER//
ORDTYP/OTR/CJCS//
AMPN/DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDER//
TIMEZONE/Z//

NARR/() THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS AUTHORIZED THE ALERTING OF
FORCES IN ANTICIPATION OF DEPLOYMENT.//

GENTEXT/SITUATION/

1. () SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.//
GENTEXT/MISSION/

2. () SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.//
GENTEXT/EXECUTION/

3. () USCINCCENT PREPARE TO EXECUTE DEPLOYMENT IN ACCORDANCE
WITH USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.

4. () USCINCTrans IS AUTHORIZED TO MOVE AIRCRAFT AND STAGE
CREWS TO SUPPORT ALERT STATUS STATED ABOVE.

5. () OPSEC GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

6. () PSYOP GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

7. () CIVIL AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

8. () COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

A. () PROPOSED C-DAY, L-HOUR, 290001Z NOV __.

B. () ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATION. IN EXCESS OF 30 DAYS.

C. () USTRANSCOM WILL COORDINATE AND MONITOR DEPLOYMENTS AS REQUIRED BY THE SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING COMMANDER.

D. () DEFCON AND DEPLOYABILITY POSTURE. AS DETERMINED BY USCINCCENT.

E. () DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED.//
GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

9. () AIRLIFT MOVEMENT PRIORITY.

10. () TRANSPORTATION FUNDING.

11. () THE USE OF JOPES IS DIRECTED.

12. () FORCE ACTIVITY DESIGNATOR (FAD) WILL BE ISSUED BY APPROPRIATE SERVICES.

13. () KNOWN LOGISTIC CONSTRAINTS.

14. () REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. NORMAL OPERATIONAL REPORTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH CJCSM 3150.05 JOINT REPORTING STRUCTURE, SITUATION MONITORING MANUAL. AFTER-ACTION REPORTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH CJCSI 3150.25 JOINT AFTER-ACTION REPORTING SYSTEM.

15. () CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. IN ACCORDANCE WITH USCCINCENT OPLAN..XXXX.

16. () PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE.//
GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/

17. () STATE SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING CINCS, SERVICES, AND DEFENSE AGENCIES, AS APPROPRIATE. ALSO LIST THE NCA-APPROVED (OR THOSE PROPOSED FOR APPROVAL) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS THE GAINING COMMANDER WILL EXERCISE OVER TRANSFERRED FORCES AND THE LOCATIONS WHERE THE TRANSFER WILL BE EFFECTIVE (NORMALLY THE AOR BOUNDARY).//

AKNLDG/Y//

DECL/OADR//

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ANNEX B TO APPENDIX D

SAMPLE FORMAT FOR CJCS DEPLOYMENT ORDER

(PRECEDENCE)

FROM: CJCS WASHINGTON DC

TO: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL*
CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
CDRFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USCINCSpace PETERSON AFB CO
USCINCSO MIAMI FL
USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
USCINCSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE
USCINCTrans SCOTT AFB IL
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
ACC LANGLEY AFB VA
INFO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP-CH/ASD:PA//

DISTR: SJS-N/CJCS:PA/J1/J3/J4/J5/J6Z/J7/J8/NMCC:DDO/NIDS/DOCDIV
CSA WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CSAF WASHINGTON DC
CMC WASHINGTON DC
CDRUSELNORAD PETERSON AFB CO
HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//CC//
DISA WASHINGTON DC
DIA WASHINGTON DC
DLA CAMERON STATION VA
HQ DMA FAIRFAX VA
CIA WASHINGTON DC
NIMA WASHINGTON DC
CDRMTMC FALLS CHURCH VA
COMSC WASHINGTON DC
COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC//G-OP/G-OPD//
COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA
USCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//CC//
COMUSNAVCENT
CG FMFLANT
USTRANSCOM LO MACDILL AFB FL
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
COMPACAF HICKAM AFB HI
CG FMFPAC

CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
CDRJCSE MACDILL AFB FL
JOINT STAFF ICP MANAGER MACDILL AFB FL

CLASSIFICATION

OPER/BLUENOSE//
MSGID/ORDER/CJCS//
AMPN/SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS//
REF/A/ORDER/CJCS/211742ZNOV__/-/NOTAL//
REF/B/MSG/USCINCCENT/242100ZNOV__/-/NOTAL//
REF/C/ORDER/CJCS/270300ZNOV__/-/NOTAL//

NARR/CJCS WARNING ORDER, COMMANDERS ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION,
ALERT ORDER//
ORDTYP/DEPLOYORD/CJCS//
TIMEZONE/Z//

NARR/() THIS IS A DEPLOYMENT ORDER. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS
AUTHORIZED THE DEPLOYMENT OF US FORCES TO BLUELAND IN
ANTICIPATION (OR SUPPORT) OF MILITARY OPERATIONS.//

GENTEXT/SITUATION/

1. () SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.//
GENTEXT/MISSION/

2. () SEE CJCS WARNING ORDER, PLANNING ORDER, OR, IF REQUIRED,
WRITE A SHORT, CONCISE MISSION STATEMENT.//
GENTEXT/EXECUTION/

3. () USCINCCENT. BEGIN DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES AS DEFINED IN
USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX. EMPLOYMENT OF US FORCES OUTSIDE OF
BLUELAND IS WITHHELD PENDING NCA DECISION.

4. () USCINCTrans. PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.
PROVIDE AIR REFUELING SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.

5. () COMACC. AS A RESOURCE MANAGER AND WITH THE CONCURRENCE
OF THE FORCES FOR OWNING AND GAINING COMMAND, SOURCE THE FORCES
LISTED BELOW TO MEET USCINCCENT REQUIREMENTS.

6. () OPSEC GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

7. () PSYOP GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

8. () CIVIL AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

9. () COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

A. () C-DAY, L-HOUR, 290001Z NOV __.

B. () ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATION. IN EXCESS OF 30 DAYS.

C. () USTRANSCOM WILL COORDINATE AND/OR MONITOR DEPLOYMENTS AS REQUIRED BY THE SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING COMMANDER.

D. () RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

E. () UNIT MOVE WITH APPROPRIATE MISSION-ORIENTED PROTECTIVE POSTURE (MOPP) GEAR.

F. () DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED.//
GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

10. () AIRLIFT MOVEMENT PRIORITY.

11. () FUNDING FOR TRANSPORTATION COSTS.

12. () FORCE ACTIVITY DESIGNATOR (FAD) WILL BE ISSUED BY APPROPRIATE SERVICES.

13. () PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT CRITERIA. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

14. () REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. IN ACCORDANCE WITH CJCSM 3150.05 JOINT REPORTING STRUCTURE, SITUATION MONITORING MANUAL . AFTER-ACTION REPORTING IN ACCORDANCE CJCSI 3150.25 JOINT AFTER-ACTION REPORTING SYSTEM.

15. () CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

16. () PUBLIC AFFAIRS. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

17. () THE USE OF JOPES IS DIRECTED.

18. () KNOWN LOGISTIC CONSTRAINTS.//

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/

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ANNEX C TO APPENDIX D

SAMPLE FORMAT FOR CJCS REDEPLOYMENT ORDER

(PRECEDENCE)

FROM: CJCS WASHINGTON DC

TO: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL*
CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
CDRFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USCINCSpace PETERSON AFB CO
USCINCSO MIAMI FL
USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
USCINCSSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE
USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
ACC LANGLEY AFB VA
DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SEC WASHINGTON DC
CDRJCS MACDILL AFB FL
INFO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC

DISTR: SJS-N/CJCS:PA/J1/J3/J4/J5/J6/J6Z/J7/J8/NMCC:DDO/NIDS/DOCDIV
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CLASSIFICATION

OPER/BLUENOSE//
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AMPN/SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS//
REF/A/ORDER/CJCS/211742ZNOV__/-/NOTAL//
REF/B/MSG/USCINCCENT/242100ZNOV__/-/NOTAL//
REF/C/ORDER/CJCS/270300ZNOV__/-/NOTAL//

NARR/CJCS WARNING ORDER, COMMANDERS ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION,
ALERT ORDER//
ORDTYP/OTR/CJCS//
TIMEZONE/Z//

NARR/() THIS IS A REDEPLOYMENT ORDER. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
HAS AUTHORIZED THE REDEPLOYMENT AND/OR REASSIGNMENT OF US
FORCES DEPLOYED IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION BLUENOSE.//

GENTEXT/SITUATION/

1. () THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND REDUCED THREAT IN THE AOR
PERMIT THE REDEPLOYMENT AND/OR REASSIGNMENT OF US FORCES
DEPLOYED IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION BLUENOSE.//

GENTEXT/MISSION

2. () /REDEPLOY FORCES RETURNING TO ORIGINALLY PROVIDING
COMMANDS, HOME STATIONS, AND PORTS ACCORDING TO THE TIMETABLE
DETERMINED BY USCINCCENT. MAINTAIN A DEFENSIVE COMBAT POSTURE
FOR PHASED DRAWDOWN.//

GENTEXT/EXECUTION/

3. () USCINCCENT. REDEPLOY FORCES TO ORIGINALLY PROVIDING
COMMANDS, HOME STATIONS, AND PORTS AS DEEMED APPROPRIATE.
PROVIDE REDEPLOYMENT PLAN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

4. () USCINCEUR, USCINCLANT, USCINCPAC, USCINCSO, USCINCSOC,
USCINCTrans, CINCFOR, COMACC, CDRJCSE, AND SECTRANS. BE PREPARED
TO RECEIVE REDEPLOYING FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 3
ABOVE.

5. () USCINCTrans. PROVIDE AIR REFUELING AND STRATEGIC AIRLIFT
SUPPORT AS REQUIRED. TAKE ACTION AS NECESSARY TO REESTABLISH AIR

BRIDGE TO PROVIDE REQUIRED TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT. ENSURE MAXIMUM USE OF ORGANIC STRATEGIC AIRLIFT. PRESENT CRAF AUTHORITIES REMAIN IN EFFECT.

6. () OPSEC AND DECEPTION GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

7. () PSYOP GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

8. () CIVIL AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

9. () COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

A. () R-DAY, L-HOUR, 250001Z FEB ____.

B. () ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATION. IN EXCESS OF 30 DAYS.

C. () RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

D. () UNIT MOVE WITH APPROPRIATE MISSION-ORIENTED PROTECTIVE POSTURE (MOPP) GEAR.

E. () KNOWN OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

F. () DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED.//
GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

10. () AIRLIFT MOVEMENT PRIORITY.

11. () FUNDING FOR TRANSPORTATION COSTS.

12. () FORCE ACTIVITY DESIGNATOR (FAD) WILL BE ISSUED BY APPROPRIATE SERVICES.

13. () REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. REPORT INTENDED MOVEMENTS IN DAILY SITREP IN ACCORDANCE WITH CJCSM 3150.05 JOINT REPORTING STRUCTURE, SITUATION MONITORING MANUAL. AFTER-ACTION REPORTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH CJCSI 3150.25 JOINT AFTER-ACTION REPORTING SYSTEM.

14. () THE USE OF JOPES IS DIRECTED.

15. () CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

16. () PUBLIC AFFAIRS. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.//GENTEXT/
COMMAND AND SIGNAL/

17. () COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

18. () COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. STATE SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING CINCS, RESOURCE MANAGERS, AND SUPPORTING AGENCIES, AS APPROPRIATE. ALSO STATE THAT THE COMMAND RELATIONSHIP(S) THAT THE GAINING COMMANDER WAS AUTHORIZED TO EXERCISE ARE TERMINATED AND THAT REDEPLOYING FORCES ARE TRANSFERRED BACK (NORMALLY AT THE AOR BOUNDARY) TO THE PROVIDING COMMANDER(S) WHO WILL EXERCISE THEIR ORIGINALLY AUTHORIZED COMMAND RELATIONSHIP.//

AKNLDG/Y//

DECL/OADR//

ANNEX D TO APPENDIX D

SAMPLE FORMAT FOR REQUEST FOR FORCES MESSAGE

FROM: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3-JOD//

INFO: SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//

CSA WASHINGTON DC

CNO WASHINGTON DC

CSAF WASHINGTON DC

CMC WASHINGTON DC

COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC//G-OP/G-OPD//

JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J1/J3/J3-JOD/J4/J4-LRC//

USCINTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//TCJ1/TCJ3/TCJ4//

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ1/ECJ3/ECJ35/ETCC//

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J1/J3/J30/J31/J4/J5

USCINCSO MIAMI FL//SCJ1/SCJ3//

USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL//SOJ3/SOJ5/7//

CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J1/J3/J33/J54/J4LRC//

USCINCSpace PETERSON AFB CO//J1/J3//

CLASSIFICATION

EXER/EXERCISE NAME//

OPER/OPERATION NAME//

MSGID/GENADMIN/ORIGINATOR/MESSAGE SERIAL#//

SUBJ/REQUEST FOR FORCES (U)

REF/A/TYPE OF REF/ORIGINATOR/DATE OR DTG/SER#/SPECIAL NOTATION//

AMPN/FREE TEXT TO EXPLAIN PRECEDING REF SET//

POC/NAME/RANK/OFFICE/LOCATION/PHONE//

NARR/THIS IS A REQUEST FOR FORCES. SUPPORTED CINC HAS DETERMINED THE DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL FORCES TO (SPECIFY COMMAND) AOR MAY BE REQUIRED. REQUEST NCA AUTHORITY TO DEPLOY ADDITIONAL FORCES TO THE (SPECIFY COMMAND) AOR.//

GENTEXT/SITUATION/

1. () PROVIDE BACKGROUND INFORMATION AS AVAILABLE.//

GENTEXT/MISSION/

2. () PROVIDE BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MISSION WHICH DEPLOYING FORCES WILL BE REQUIRED TO PERFORM.//
GENTEXT/FORCE REQUIREMENTS/
3. () DESCRIPTION. FOR FORCES WHICH WILL DEPLOY AS A UNIT, PROVIDE BASIC UNIT IDENTIFICATION (E.G., 1 X INFANTRY BATTALION) OR DESCRIPTION OF THE CAPABILITIES REQUIRED (E.G., 6 X HARM CAPABLE AIRCRAFT). USE UNIVERSAL JOINT TASK LIST (UJTL) (CJCSM 3500.04) TERMINOLOGY AS APPROPRIATE TO DESCRIBE REQUIRED CAPABILITIES. IN THE CASE OF NON-UNIT DEPLOYMENTS (E.G., INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEES OR AD-HOC GROUPS OF PERSONNEL) PROVIDE TOTAL NUMBER OF PERSONNEL AND A BRIEF DESCRIPTION WHICH SUMMARIZES THE NATURE OF THE DEPLOYING PERSONNEL (E.G., 35 SUPPORT PERSONNEL INCLUDING MOTOR TRANSPORT OPERATORS, VEHICLE MECHANICS, PETROLEUM SUPPLY SPECIALISTS, POWER GENERATION EQUIPMENT OPERATORS, ETC).
4. () DESTINATION. ULTIMATE DESTINATION OF DEPLOYING FORCES WITHIN THE AOR.
5. () DATE REQUIRED. DATE FORCES ARE REQUIRED TO BE MISSION CAPABLE AT DESTINATION. DESCRIBE MILESTONES WHICH MAY IMPACT THE TIMELINE FOR FORCE DEPARTURE, ARRIVAL IN THEATER, INTRA-THEATER MOVEMENT, TRAINING, ETC.
6. () DURATION. ESTIMATE THE MINIMUM AND MAXIMUM LENGTH OF THE DEPLOYMENT.
7. () TRAINING. PROVIDE REQUIREMENTS FOR ADDITIONAL SERVICE TRAINING OR JOINT INTEROPERABILITY TRAINING PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT.
8. () OTHER. SUPPORTED CINC PREFERENCES AND PRIORITIES. IF A PARTICULAR SOURCE FOR FORCES IS REQUESTED, PROVIDE RATIONALE. SPECIFY WHETHER ANY REQUESTED FORCES ARE LD/HD ASSETS AND SUBJECT TO GLOBAL MILITARY FORCE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS. DISCUSS CONSTRAINTS REGARDING THE USE OF RESERVES TO MEET THE TASKING. INDICATE WHETHER SPECIAL EQUIPMENT IS REQUIRED BY DEPLOYING PERSONNEL, ETC. INDICATE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THOSE IN EXISTENCE.
9. () FORCE DEPLOYMENT DATA TO SUPPORT THIS DEPLOYMENT WILL BE CONTAINED IN PLAN ID (PID) XXXX, FORCE MODULE (FM) XXX. REDEPLOYMENT PID IS XXXXX. NEWSGROUP XXX.XXX.XXX WILL BE USED TO COORDINATE THIS DEPLOYMENT.
10. () IN ORDER TO MEET DEPLOYMENT TIMELINE, REQUEST SUPPORTING CINCS PROVIDE SOURCING VERIFICATION NO LATER THAN DTG TO SUPPORT

IMMEDIATE TPFDD VALIDATION UPON RELEASE OF DEPLOYMENT/EXECUTE
ORDER.//
GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

11. () ESTIMATED LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS. INCLUDE LOGISTICS ESTIMATES FOR DEPLOYMENT DRAWN FROM PRELIMINARY COORDINATION AND RESEARCH. INCLUDE NEED FOR INTERMEDIATE STAGING BASES OR OPENING OF OTHER SUPPORT FACILITIES OUTSIDE THE SUPPORTED CINC AOR. INCLUDE FUNDING SOURCE RECOMMENDATIONS. INCLUDE TRANSPORTATION PRIORITY CODE RECOMMENDATIONS.

12. () DEPLOYMENT AND TRAVEL TO HIGH-TERRORIST THREAT AREAS. INCLUDE A DESCRIPTION OF LEGAL STATUS OF DEPLOYING PERSONNEL AND IDENTIFICATION OR DESCRIPTION OF THE DOCUMENT OR AGREEMENT THAT DEFINES THAT STATUS, IF ANY. INCLUDE ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION GUIDANCE. REQUESTING CINC MUST CERTIFY THE FOLLOWING: "THE TERRORIST THREAT FOR AREAS IN WHICH INDIVIDUALS AND UNITS WILL DEPLOY HAS BEEN REVIEWED. DEPLOYMENT OF THESE PERSONNEL IS CERTIFIED TO BE NECESSARY FOR MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT." THIS PARA IS REQUIRED.

13. () PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. PRELIMINARY GUIDANCE AS APPROPRIATE.

14. () COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. IDENTIFY ANTICIPATED COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS IF DETERMINED.

15. () COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS. IDENTIFY PERTINENT COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS.

16. () POINTS OF CONTACT. LIST SUPPORTED CINC POCS TO INCLUDE: PUBLIC AFFAIRS, OPERATIONS, LOGISTICS, AND JOPES AS A MINIMUM.

CLBY

REASON

DECLON

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APPENDIX E

REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-35 is based upon the following primary references.

1. Title 10 United States Code.
2. DOD Directive 2000.12, “DOD Combating Terrorism Program.”
3. DOD Directive 5030.49-R, “Customs Inspections.”
4. DOD Directive 5100.1, “Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Subordinate Components.”
5. DOD Regulation 4140.1-R, “DOD Material Management Regulation.”
6. DOD Regulation 4500.9-R, “Defense Transportation Regulation Part I, Passenger Movement.”
7. DOD Regulation 4500.9-R, “Defense Transportation Regulation Part II, Cargo Movement.”
8. DOD Regulation 4500.9-R, “Defense Transportation Regulation Part III, Mobility.”
9. DOD 4500.9-R-1, “Management and Control of the DOD Intermodal Container System.”
10. CJCS Handbook 5260, “Commander’s Handbook for Antiterrorism Readiness.”
11. CJCSI 3110.01A, “Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).”
12. CJCSI 3110.11B, “Mobility Supplement to Strategic Capabilities Plan.”
13. CJCSI 3150.25, “Joint After-Action Reporting System.”
14. CJCSI 3151.01, “Global Command and Control System Common Operational Picture Reporting Requirements.”
15. CJCSI 3500.2A, “Joint Training Master Plan.”
16. CJCSI 3511.01, “CJCSI Exercise Program Funding.”
17. CJCSM 3113.01, “Theater Engagement Planning.”
18. CJCSM 3122.01, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures).”

19. CJCSM 3122.02, “Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution.”
20. CJCSM 3122.03, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning Formats and Guidance).”
21. CJCSM 3150.05, “Joint Reporting Structure, Situation Monitoring Manual.”
22. CJCSM 3500.03, “Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States.”
23. CJCSM 3500.04A, “Universal Joint Task List Version 3.0.”
24. JP 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).”
25. JP 1-02, “DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.”
26. JP 2-0, “Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.”
27. JP 2-01.3, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace.”
28. JP 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations.”
29. JP 3-05, “Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.”
30. JP 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.”
31. JP 3-07.2, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism.”
32. JP 3-08, “Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations,” Volumes I and II.
33. JP 3-11, “Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense.”
34. JP 3-13, “Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.”
35. JP 3-16, “Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations.”
36. JP 3-17, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Airlift Operations.”
37. JP 3-18, “Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations.”
38. JP 3-33, “Joint Force Capabilities.”
39. JP 3-53, “Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.”
40. JP 3-54, “Joint Doctrine for Operations Security.”
41. JP 3-57, “Doctrine for Joint Civil-Military Operations.”

42. JP 3-58, "Joint Doctrine for Military Deception."
43. JP 3-61, "Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations."
44. JP 4-0, "Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations."
45. JP 4-01, "Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System."
46. JP 4-01.1, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airlift Support to Joint Operations."
47. JP 4-01.2, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Sealift Support to Joint Operations."
48. JP 4-01.3, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control."
49. JP 4-01.4, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Distribution in Joint Operations."
50. JP 4-01.5, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Water Terminal Operations."
51. JP 4-01.6, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS)."
52. JP 4-01.7, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and for Use of Intermodal Containers in Joint Operations."
53. JP 4-01.8, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration."
54. JP 4-02, "Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations."
55. JP 4-04, "Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support."
56. JP 4-05, "Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning."
57. JP 4-05.1, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Manpower Mobilization and Demobilization Operations: Reserve Component (RC) Callup."
58. JP 5-0, "Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations."
59. JP 5-00.2, "Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures."
60. JP 6-0, "Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations."
61. FM 55-1, "Army Transportation Services in a Theater of Operations."

62. FM 55-10, "Movement Control in a Theater of Operations."
63. FM 55-60, "Army Terminal Operations."
64. FM 55-65, "Strategic Deployment."
65. FM 55-80, "Army Container Operations."
66. FM 100-17, "Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization."
67. FM 100-17-1, "Army Prepositioned Afloat Operations."
68. FM 100-17-3, "Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration."
69. FM 100-17-4, "Deployment: Fort to Port."
70. AFDD 2-4, "Combat Support."
71. AFDD 2-6, "Air Mobility."
72. AFDD 2-6.1, "Airlift Operations."
73. AFI 10-403, "Deployment Planning."
74. AFPAM 10-417, "USAF Deployment Management."
75. FMFM 1-5, "Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Operations."
76. H-2E-3119, "Joint Maritime Prepositioning Force Staff Planning."
77. MCO P3000.17, "Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Planning and Policy Manual."
78. OH 4-11, "Maritime Prepositioned Deployment."
79. NDP 4, "Naval Logistics."
80. NDP 5, "Naval Planning."
81. NWP 3-02.3, "Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Operations."
82. NWP 4-01, "Naval Transportation."
83. NWP 4-01.1, "Navy Expeditionary Shore Based Logistics Support & RSOI Operations."
84. Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), "US Army Transportation School Force Deployment Rock Drill - Read Ahead," Nov 1996.

85. Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC), “JTF Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations.”
86. Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum, “Deployment Health Surveillance and Readiness,” 4 December 1998.
87. Lidy, A. Martin, Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), “Recommendations for Improving Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI).”

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APPENDIX F

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to the United States Atlantic Command Joint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division, Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the United States Transportation Command. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Logistics (J-4).

3. Change Recommendations

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TO: USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//TCJ5-S//
INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J4-JDD/J7-JDD//

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| Navy: | CO, Naval Inventory Control Point 700 Robbins Avenue Bldg 1, Customer Service Philadelphia, PA 19111-5099 |
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| Coast Guard: | Coast Guard Headquarters, COMDT (G-OPD) 2100 2nd Street, SW Washington, DC 20593-0001 |

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GLOSSARY

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

| | |
|---------|--|
| ACSA | acquisition cross-Service agreement |
| A/DACG | arrival/departure airfield control group |
| ADANS | AMC Deployment Analysis System |
| ADP | automated data processing |
| AFB | Air Force Base |
| AFFOR | Air Force forces |
| AFWA | Air Force Weather Agency |
| AIG | addressee indicator group |
| AIT | automatic identification technology |
| AMC | Air Mobility Command |
| AMS | Asset Management System |
| AOR | area of responsibility |
| APOD | aerial port of debarkation |
| APOE | aerial port of embarkation |
| APS | aerial port squadron |
| ATMCT | air terminal movement control team |
| | |
| C2 | command and control |
| C3 | command, control, and communications |
| C4 | command, control, communications, and computers |
| C4I | command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence |
| CA | civil affairs |
| CAA | command arrangement agreement |
| CAMPS | Consolidated Air Mobility Planning System |
| CAP | crisis action planning |
| CCTI | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Commended Training Issue |
| CHE | cargo handling equipment |
| CIN | cargo increment number |
| CINC | commander in chief |
| CJCS | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff |
| CJCSI | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction |
| CJCSM | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual |
| COA | course of action |
| COCOM | combatant command (command authority) |
| CONPLAN | operation plan in concept format |
| CONUS | continental United States |
| COP | common operational picture |
| CRAF | Civil Reserve Air Fleet |
| CRS | Chairman's Readiness System |
| CSS | combat service support |
| CULT | common-user land transportation |

| | |
|-----------|---|
| DA | Department of the Army |
| DCO | defense coordinating officer |
| DIA | Defense Intelligence Agency |
| DIRMOBFOR | Director of Mobility Forces |
| DISA | Defense Information Systems Agency |
| DLA | Defense Logistics Agency |
| DOD | Department of Defense |
| DOMS | Director of Military Support |
| DOS | Department of State |
| DOT | Department of Transportation |
| DTS | Defense Transportation System |
| | |
| EAD | Evaluation and Analysis Division |
| ELIST | enhanced logistics intratheater support tool |
| | |
| FEMA | Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| FHA | foreign humanitarian assistance |
| FHP | force health protection |
| FMCC | force movement control center (USMC) |
| FNMOC | Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanographic Center |
| FORSCOM | United States Army Forces Command |
| FTX | field training exercise |
| FUNCPLAN | functional plan |
| | |
| GCCS | Global Command and Control System |
| GCSS | Global Combat Support System |
| GDSS | Global Decision Support System |
| GR | graduated response |
| GTN | global transportation network |
| | |
| HN | host nation |
| HNS | host-nation support |
| | |
| IC3 | integrated command, control, and communications |
| ICP | inventory control point |
| IO | information operations |
| ISB | intermediate staging base |
| ITO | installation transportation officer |
| ITV | in-transit visibility |
| | |
| J-4 | Logistics Directorate of a joint staff |
| J-7 | Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate of a joint staff |
| JFAST | Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation |
| JFC | joint force commander |
| JIC | joint intelligence center |
| JICTRANS | Joint Intelligence Center for Transportation |

| | |
|--------|--|
| JIPB | joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace |
| JLOTS | joint logistics over-the-shore |
| JMC | joint movement center |
| JMCG | Joint Mobility Control Group |
| JOA | joint operations area |
| JOPEs | Joint Operation Planning and Execution System |
| JP | joint publication |
| JPAV | joint personnel asset visibility |
| JPEC | Joint Planning and Execution Community |
| JRSOI | joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration |
| JSCP | Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan |
| JTAV | joint total asset visibility |
| JTF | joint task force |
| JTMP | Joint Training Master Plan |
| | |
| LMCC | logistics movement control center |
| LOC | line of communications |
| LOI | letter of instruction |
| LOTS | logistics over-the-shore |
| LRC | logistics readiness center |
| | |
| M&S | modeling and simulation |
| MAGTF | Marine air-ground task force |
| MCC | movement control center |
| MCIP | military command inspection program |
| METT-T | mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available |
| MHE | materials handling equipment |
| MNFC | multinational force commander |
| MOOTW | military operations other than war |
| MSC | Military Sealift Command |
| MSCA | military support to civil authorities |
| MTMC | Military Traffic Management Command |
| | |
| NALSS | naval advanced logistic support site |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NBC | nuclear, biological, and chemical |
| NCA | National Command Authorities |
| NFLS | naval forward logistic site |
| NGO | nongovernmental organization |
| NIMA | National Imagery and Mapping Agency |
| NMS | National Military Strategy |
| NOAA | National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration |
| NOACT | Navy Overseas Air Cargo Terminal |
| NRP | non-unit-related personnel |
| | |
| OCONUS | outside the continental United States |
| OPCON | operational control |

| | |
|------------|---|
| OPLAN | operation plan |
| OPORD | operation order |
| OPSEC | operations security |
| PA | public affairs |
| PAX | passengers |
| POD | port of debarkation |
| POE | port of embarkation |
| POG | port operations group |
| POL | petroleum, oils, and lubricants |
| PREPO | prepositioned force, equipment, or supplies |
| PSA | port support activity |
| PSYOP | psychological operations |
| PVO | private voluntary organization |
| RC | Reserve component |
| RM | risk management |
| RRF | Ready Reserve Force |
| SA | staging area |
| SATCOM | satellite communications |
| SMO | strategic mobility officer |
| SOF | special operations forces |
| SPM | single port manager |
| SPOD | seaport of debarkation |
| SPOE | seaport of embarkation |
| TAA | tactical assembly area |
| TAACOM | Theater Army Area Command |
| TALCE | tanker airlift control element |
| TAMS | transportation analysis, modeling, and simulation |
| TAV | total asset visibility |
| TC-AIMS II | Transportation Coordinator's Automated Information for Movement System II |
| TCC | transportation component command |
| TD | theater distribution |
| TEP | theater engagement planning |
| T-JTB | Theater-Joint Transportation Board |
| TMO | transportation management office |
| TPFDD | time-phased force and deployment data |
| TPFDL | time-phased force and deployment list |
| TPRC | theater planning response cell |
| UCP | Unified Command Plan |
| UJTL | universal joint task list |
| ULN | unit line number |
| UN | United Nations |
| USACOM | United States Atlantic Command |

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|-------------|--|
| USCG | United States Coast Guard |
| USCINCTRANS | Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command |
| USDA | United States Department of Agriculture |
| USPACOM | United States Pacific Command |
| USPS | United States Postal Service |
| USSOCOM | United States Special Operations Command |
| USSPACECOM | United States Space Command |
| USSTRATCOM | United States Strategic Command |
| USTRANSCOM | United States Transportation Command |
| WMD | weapons of mass destruction |
| WRM | war reserve materiel |

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

aerial port. An airfield that has been designated for the sustained air movement of personnel and materiel, and to serve as an authorized port for entrance into or departure from the country in which located. (JP 1-02)

alert order. 1. A crisis-action planning directive from the Secretary of Defense, issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that provides essential guidance for planning and directs the initiation of execution planning for the selected course of action authorized by the Secretary of Defense. 2. A planning directive that provides essential planning guidance and directs the initiation of execution planning after the directing authority approves a military course of action. An alert order does not authorize execution of the approved course of action. (JP 1-02)

alliance. An alliance is the result of formal agreements (i.e., treaties) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives which further the common interests of the members. (JP 1-02)

allocation. In a general sense, distribution of limited resources among competing requirements for employment. Specific allocations (e.g., air sorties, nuclear weapons, forces, and transportation) are described as allocation of air sorties, nuclear weapons, etc. (JP 1-02)

antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. Also called AT. (JP 1-02)

apportionment. In the general sense, distribution for planning of limited resources among competing requirements. Specific apportionments (e.g., air sorties

and forces for planning) are described as apportionment of air sorties and forces for planning, etc. (JP 1-02)

area of operations. An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Also called AO. (JP 1-02)

area of responsibility. 1. The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. 2. In naval usage, a predefined area of enemy terrain for which supporting ships are responsible for covering by fire on known targets or targets of opportunity and by observation. Also called AOR. (JP 1-02)

assembly area. 1. An area in which a command is assembled preparatory to further action. 2. In a supply installation, the gross area used for collecting and combining components into complete units, kits, or assemblies. (JP 1-02)

augmentation forces. Forces to be transferred from a supporting commander to the combatant command (command authority) or operational control of a supported commander during the execution of an operation order approved by the National Command Authorities. (JP 1-02)

available-to-load date. A day, relative to C-day in a time-phased force and deployment data, that unit and nonunit equipment and forces can begin loading on an aircraft or ship at the port of embarkation. Also called ALD. (JP 1-02)

battlespace. The environment, factors, and conditions which must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes the air, land, sea, space, and the included enemy and friendly forces, facilities, weather, terrain, the electromagnetic spectrum, and information environment within the operational areas and areas of interest. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

CINC's required date. The original date relative to C-day, specified by the combatant commander for arrival of forces or cargo at the destination; shown in the time-phased force and deployment data to assess the impact of later arrival. Also called CRD. (JP 1-02)

CINC's Strategic Concept. Final document produced in Step 5 of the concept development phase of the deliberate planning process. The CINC's strategic concept is used as the vehicle to distribute the CINC's decision and planning guidance for accomplishing joint strategic capabilities plan or other Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) taskings. CJCS approval of the strategic concept becomes the basis of the plan for development into an operation plan or operation plan in concept format. Formerly called "the concept of operations." Also called CSC. (JP 1-02)

closure. In transportation, the process of a unit arriving at a specified location. It begins when the first element arrives at a designated location, e.g., port of entry/port of departure, intermediate stops, or final destination, and ends when the last element does likewise. For the purposes of studies and command post exercises, a unit is considered essentially closed after 95 percent of its movement requirements for personnel and equipment are completed. (JP 1-02)

coalition. An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JP 1-02)

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 ("Armed Forces"), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. (JP 1-02)

combatant commander. A commander in chief of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. (JP 1-02)

commander's estimate of the situation. A logical process of reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives

at a decision as to a course of action to be taken to accomplish the mission. A commander's estimate which considers a military situation so far in the future as to require major assumptions is called a commander's long-range estimate of the situation. (JP 1-02)

common user airlift service. The airlift service provided on a common basis for all DOD agencies and, as authorized, for other agencies of the US Government. (JP 1-02)

common-user military land transportation. Point-to-point land transportation service operated by a single Service for common use by two or more Services. (JP 1-02)

common-user ocean terminals. A military installation, part of a military installation, or a commercial facility operated under contract or arrangement by the Military Traffic Management Command which regularly provides for two or more Services terminal functions of receipt, transit storage or staging, processing, and loading and unloading of passengers or cargo aboard ships. (JP 1-02)

common-user sealift. The sealift services provided on a common basis for all Department of Defense agencies and, as authorized, for other agencies of the US Government. The Military Sealift Command, a transportation component command of the US Transportation Command, provides common-user sealift for which users reimburse the transportation accounts of the Transportation Working Capital Fund. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02)

common-user transportation. Transportation and transportation services provided on a common basis for two or more Department of Defense agencies and, as authorized,

non-DOD agencies. Common-user assets are under the combatant command (command authority) of USCINCTRANS, excluding Service-unique or theater-assigned transportation assets. (JP 1-02)

concept of operations. A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a commander's assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or series of operations. The concept of operations frequently is embodied in campaign plans and operation plans; in the latter case, particularly when the plans cover a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose. (JP 1-02)

concept plan. An operation plan in concept format. Also called CONPLAN. (JP 1-02)

contingency. An emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require plans, rapid response, and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, installations, and equipment. (JP 1-02)

course of action. 1. A plan that would accomplish, or is related to, the accomplishment of a mission. 2. The scheme adopted to accomplish a task or mission. It is a product of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System concept development phase. The supported commander will include a recommended course of action in the commander's estimate. The recommended course of action will include the concept of operations, evaluation of supportability estimates of supporting organizations, and an integrated time-phased data base of combat, combat support, and combat

service support forces and sustainment. Refinement of this data base will be contingent on the time available for course of action development. When approved, the course of action becomes the basis for the development of an operation plan or operation order. Also called COA. (JP 1-02)

course of action development. The phase of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System within the crisis action planning process that provides for the development of military responses and includes, within the limits of the time allowed: establishing force and sustainment requirements with actual units; evaluating force, logistic, and transportation feasibility; identifying and resolving resource shortfalls; recommending resource allocations; and producing a course of action via a commander's estimate that contains a concept of operations, employment concept, risk assessments, prioritized courses of action, and supporting data bases. (JP 1-02)

crisis. An incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. (JP 1-02)

crisis action planning. 1. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process involving the time-sensitive development of joint operation plans and orders in response to an imminent crisis. Crisis action planning follows prescribed crisis action procedures to formulate and implement an effective response within the time frame permitted by the crisis. 2. The time-sensitive planning for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned

and allocated forces and resources that occurs in response to a situation that may result in actual military operations. Crisis action planners base their plan on the circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. Also called CAP. (JP 1-02)

deliberate planning. 1. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process involving the development of joint operation plans for contingencies identified in joint strategic planning documents. Conducted principally in peacetime, deliberate planning is accomplished in prescribed cycles that complement other Department of Defense planning cycles in accordance with the formally established Joint Strategic Planning System. 2. A planning process for the deployment and employment of apportioned forces and resources that occurs in response to a hypothetical situation. Deliberate planners rely heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances that will exist when the plan is executed. (JP 1-02)

demobilization. The process of transitioning a conflict or wartime military establishment and defense-based civilian economy to a peacetime configuration while maintaining national security and economic vitality. (JP 1-02)

deployability posture. The state or stage of a unit's preparedness for deployment to participate in a military operation, defined in five levels as follows: a. normal deployability posture. The unit is conducting normal activities. Commanders are monitoring the situation in any area of tension and reviewing plans. No visible overt actions are being taken to increase deployability posture. Units not at home station report their scheduled closure time at home station or the time required to return to home station if ordered to return before scheduled time and desired mode of transportation are available. b. increased

deployability posture. The unit is relieved from commitments not pertaining to the mission. Personnel are recalled from training areas, pass, and leave, as required, to meet the deployment schedule. Preparation for deployment of equipment and supplies is initiated. Pre-deployment personnel actions are completed. Essential equipment and supplies located at continental United States (CONUS) or overseas installations are identified. c. advanced deployability posture. All essential personnel, mobility equipment, and accompanying supplies are checked, packed, rigged for deployment, and positioned with deploying unit. The unit remains at home station. Movement requirements are confirmed. Airlift, sealift, and intra-CONUS transportation resources are identified, and initial movement schedules are completed by the Transportation Component Commands. d. marshaled deployability posture. The first increment of deploying personnel, mobility equipment, and accompanying supplies is marshaled at designated ports of embarkation but not loaded. Sufficient aircraft or sealift assets are positioned at, or en route to, the port of embarkation, either to load the first increment or to sustain a flow, as required by the plan or directive being considered for execution. Supporting airlift control elements (ALCEs), stage crews (if required), and support personnel adequate to sustain the airlift flow at onload, en route, and offload locations will be positioned, as required. e. loaded deployability posture. All first increment equipment and accompanying supplies are loaded aboard ships and prepared for departure to the designated objective area. Personnel are prepared for loading on minimum notice. Follow-on increments of cargo and personnel are en route or available to meet projected ship loading schedules. Sufficient airlift is positioned and loaded at the port of embarkation to

move the first increment or to initiate and sustain a flow, as required by the plan or directive being considered for execution. Supporting ALCEs, stage aircrews (if required), and support personnel adequate to sustain the airlift flow at onload, en route, and offload locations are positioned, as required. (JP 1-02)

deployment. 1. In naval usage, the change from a cruising approach or contact disposition to a disposition for battle. 2. The movement of forces within areas of operation. 3. The positioning of forces into a formation for battle. 4. The relocation of forces and materiel to desired areas of operations. Deployment encompasses all activities from origin or home station through destination, specifically including intra-continental United States, intertheater, and intratheater movement legs, staging, and holding areas. (JP 1-02)

deployment data base. The JOPES (Joint Operation Planning and Execution System) data base containing the necessary information on forces, materiel, and filler and replacement personnel movement requirements to support execution. The data base reflects information contained in the refined time-phased force and deployment data from the deliberate planning process or developed during the various phases of the crisis action planning process, and the movement schedules or tables developed by the transportation component commands to support the deployment of required forces, personnel, and materiel. (JP 1-02)

deployment order. A planning directive from the Secretary of Defense, issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that authorizes and directs the transfer of forces between combatant commands by reassignment or attachment. A deployment order normally specifies the authority that

the gaining combatant commander will exercise over the transferred forces. (JP 1-02)

deployment planning. Operational planning directed toward the movement of forces and sustainment resources from their original locations to a specific operational area for conducting the joint operations contemplated in a given plan. Encompasses all activities from origin or home station through destination, specifically including intra-continental United States, intertheater, and intratheater movement legs, staging areas, and holding areas. (JP 1-02)

deployment preparation order. An order issued by competent authority to move forces or prepare forces for movement (e.g., increase deployability posture of units). (JP 1-02)

earliest arrival date. A day, relative to C-day, that is specified by a planner as the earliest date when a unit, a resupply shipment, or replacement personnel can be accepted at a port of debarkation during a deployment. Used with the latest arrival data, it defines a delivery window for transportation planning. Also called EAD. (JP 1-02)

employment. The strategic, operational, or tactical use of forces. (JP 1-02)

employment planning. Planning that prescribes how to apply force/forces to attain specified military objectives. Employment planning concepts are developed by combatant commanders through their component commanders. (JP 1-02)

execute order. 1. An order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the authority and at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, to implement a National Command Authorities decision to

initiate military operations. 2. An order to initiate military operations as directed. (JP 1-02)

execution planning. The phase of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System crisis action planning process that provides for the translation of an approved course of action into an executable plan of action through the preparation of a complete operation plan or operation order. Execution planning is detailed planning for the commitment of specified forces and resources. During crisis action planning, an approved operation plan or other National Command Authorities-approved course of action is adjusted, refined, and translated into an operation order. Execution planning can proceed on the basis of prior deliberate planning, or it can take place in the absence of prior planning. (JP 1-02)

feasibility. Operation plan review criterion. The determination of whether the assigned tasks could be accomplished by using available resources. (JP 1-02)

force closure. The point in time when a supported joint force commander determines that sufficient personnel and equipment resources are in the assigned operational area to carry out assigned tasks. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

force planning. Planning associated with the creation and maintenance of military capabilities. It is primarily the responsibility of the Military Departments and Services and is conducted under the administrative control that runs from the Secretary of Defense to the Military Departments and Services. (JP 1-02)

force projection. The ability to project the military element of national power from the

continental United States (CONUS) or another theater, in response to requirements for military operations. Force projection operations extend from mobilization and deployment of forces to redeployment to CONUS or home theater. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

force protection. Security program designed to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combatting terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs. units, their origins, ports of embarkation, and movement characteristics to satisfy the time-phased force requirements of a supported commander. (JP 1-02)

force tracking. The identification of units and their specific modes of transport during movement to an objective area. (JP 1-02)

functional plans. Plans involving the conduct of military operations in a peacetime or permissive environment developed by combatant commanders to address requirements such as disaster relief, nation assistance, logistics, communications, surveillance, protection of US citizens, nuclear weapon recovery and evacuation, and continuity of operations, or similar discrete tasks. They may be developed in response to the requirements of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, at the initiative of the CINC, or as tasked by the supported combatant commander, Joint Staff, Service, or Defense agency. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff review of CINC-initiated plans is not normally required. (JP 1-02)

international organization. Organizations with global influence, such as the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross. (JP 1-02)

interoperability. 1. The ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. 2. The condition achieved among communications-electronics systems or items of communications-electronics equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users. The degree of interoperability should be defined when referring to specific cases. (JP 1-02)

joint deployment community. Those headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in the training, preparation, movement, reception, employment, support, and sustainment of military forces assigned or committed to a theater of operations or objective area. The joint deployment community usually consists of the Joint Staff, Services, certain Service major commands (including the Service wholesale logistic commands), unified and specified commands (and their Service component commands), transportation operating agencies, joint task forces (as applicable), Defense Logistics Agency, and other Defense agencies (e.g., Defense Intelligence Agency) as may be appropriate to a given scenario. Also called JDC. (JP 1-02)

joint deployment system. A system that consists of personnel, procedures, directives, communications systems, and electronic data processing systems to directly support time-sensitive planning and execution, and to complement peacetime

deliberate planning. Also called JDS. (JP 1-02)

joint force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander. (JP 1-02)

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (JP 1-02)

joint operation planning. Planning for contingencies which can reasonably be anticipated in an area of responsibility or joint operations area of the command. Planning activities exclusively associated with the preparation of operation plans, operation plans in concept format, campaign plans, and operation orders (other than the single integrated operation plan) for the conduct of military operations by the combatant commanders in response to requirements established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint operation planning is coordinated at the national level to support Secretary of Defense Contingency Planning Guidance, strategic requirements in the National Military Strategy, and emerging crises. As such, joint operation planning includes mobilization planning, deployment planning, employment planning, sustainment planning, and redeployment planning procedures. Joint operation planning is performed in accordance with formally established planning and execution procedures. (JP 1-02)

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. A continuously evolving system that is being developed through the integration and enhancement of earlier

planning and execution systems: Joint Operation Planning System and Joint Deployment System. It provides the foundation for conventional command and control by national- and theater-level commanders and their staffs. It is designed to satisfy their information needs in the conduct of joint planning and operations. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) includes joint operation planning policies, procedures, and reporting structures supported by communications and automated data processing systems. JOPES is used to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities associated with joint operations. Also called JOPES. (JP 1-02)

joint operation planning process. A coordinated Joint Staff procedure used by a commander to determine the best method of accomplishing assigned tasks and to direct the action necessary to accomplish the mission. (JP 1-02)

joint operations. A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces, or by Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority), which, of themselves, do not create joint forces. (JP 1-02)

joint operations area. An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. Joint operations areas are particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and geographic area or when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters. Also called JOA. (JP 1-02)

joint planning and execution community. Those headquarters, commands, and

agencies involved in the training, preparation, movement, reception, employment, support, and sustainment of military forces assigned or committed to a theater of operations or objective area. It usually consists of the Joint Staff, Services, Service major commands (including the Service wholesale logistics commands), unified commands (and their certain Service component commands), subunified commands, transportation component commands, joint task forces (as applicable), Defense Logistics Agency, and other Defense agencies (e.g., Defense Intelligence Agency) as may be appropriate to a given scenario. Also called JPEC. (JP 1-02)

Joint Strategic Planning System. The primary means by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, carries out his statutory responsibilities to assist the President and Secretary of Defense in providing strategic direction to the Armed Forces; prepares strategic plans; prepares and reviews contingency plans; advises the President and Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs, and budgets; and provides net assessment on the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies as compared with those of their potential adversaries. Also called JSPS. (JP 1-02)

latest arrival date. A day, relative to C-day, that is specified by a planner as the latest date when a unit, a resupply shipment, or replacement personnel can arrive and complete unloading at the port of debarkation and support the concept of operations. Also called LAD. (JP 1-02)

marshalling. 1. The process by which units participating in an amphibious or airborne operation group together or assemble when feasible or move to temporary camps in the

vicinity of embarkation points, complete preparations for combat, or prepare for loading. 2. The process of assembling, holding, and organizing supplies and/or equipment, especially vehicles of transportation, for onward movement. (JP 1-02)

marshalling area. A location in the vicinity of a reception terminal or prepositioned equipment storage site where arriving unit personnel, equipment, material, and accompanying supplies are reassembled, returned to the control of the unit commander, and prepared for outward movement. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

mobilization. 1. The act of assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in time of war or other emergencies. 2. The process by which the Armed Forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes activating all or part of the Reserve Components as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel. Mobilization of the Armed Forces includes but is not limited to the following categories: a. selective mobilization—Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and/or the President to mobilize Reserve Component units, individual ready reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a domestic emergency that is not the result of an enemy attack. b. partial mobilization—Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress (up to full mobilization) or by the President (not more than 1,000,000 for not more than 24 consecutive months) to mobilize Ready Reserve Component units, individual reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national

emergency involving an external threat to the national security. c. full mobilization—Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to mobilize all Reserve Component units in the existing approved force structure, all individual reservists, retired military personnel, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security. Reserve personnel can be placed on active duty for the duration of the emergency plus six months. d. total mobilization—Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to organize and/or generate additional units or personnel, beyond the existing force structure, and the resources needed for their support, to meet the total requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security. (JP 1-02)

movement schedule. A schedule developed to monitor or track a separate entity whether it is a force requirement, cargo or personnel increment, or lift asset. The schedule reflects the assignment of specific lift resources (such as an aircraft or ship) that will be used to move the personnel and cargo included in a specific movement increment. Arrival and departure times at ports of embarkation, etc., are detailed to show a flow and workload at each location. Movement schedules are detailed enough to support plan implementation. (JP 1-02)

multinational operations. A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, typically organized within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 1-02)

National Command Authorities. The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Also called NCA. (JP 1-02)

naval advanced logistic support site. An overseas location used as the primary transshipment point in the theater of operations for logistic support. A naval advanced logistic support site possesses full capabilities for storage, consolidation, and transfer of supplies and for support of forward-deployed units (including replacements units) during major contingency and wartime periods. Naval advanced logistic support sites, with port and airfield facilities in close proximity, are located within the theater of operations but not near the main battle areas, and must possess the throughput capacity required to accommodate incoming and outgoing intertheater airlift and sealift. When fully activated, the naval advanced logistic support site should consist of facilities and services provided by the host nation, augmented by support personnel located in the theater of operations, or both. Also called NALSS. See also naval forward logistic site. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

naval forward logistic site. An overseas location, with port and airfield facilities nearby, which provides logistic support to naval forces within the theater of operations during major contingency and wartime periods. Naval forward logistic sites may be located in close proximity to main battle areas to permit forward staging of services, throughput of high priority cargo, advanced maintenance, and battle damage repair. Naval forward logistic sites are lined to in-theater naval advanced logistic support sites by intratheater airlift and sealift, but may also serve as transshipment points for intertheater movement of high-priority cargo into areas of direct combat. In providing fleet logistic support, naval forward logistic site capabilities may range from very austere to near those of a naval advanced logistic support site. Also called

NFLS. See also naval advanced logistic support site. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

nongovernmental organizations.

Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). “Nongovernmental organizations” is a term normally used by non-United States organizations. Also called NGO. See also private voluntary organizations. (JP 1-02)

operation. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. (JP 1-02)

operational control. Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations.

Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (JP 1-02)

operation order. A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. Also called OPORD. (JP 1-02)

operation plan. Any plan, except for the Single Integrated Operation Plan, for the conduct of military operations. Plans are prepared by combatant commanders in response to requirements established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by commanders of subordinate commands in response to requirements tasked by the establishing unified commander. Operation plans are prepared in either a complete format (OPLAN) or as a concept plan (CONPLAN). The CONPLAN can be published with or without a time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) file.

a. OPLAN—An operation plan for the conduct of joint operations that can be used as a basis for development of an operation order (OPORD). An OPLAN identifies the forces and supplies required to execute the CINC’s Strategic Concept and a movement schedule of these resources to the theater of operations. The forces and supplies are identified in TPFDD files. OPLANs will include all phases of the tasked operation. The plan is prepared with the appropriate annexes, appendixes, and TPFDD files as described in the Joint Operation Planning

and Execution System manuals containing planning policies, procedures, and formats. Also called OPLAN. b. CONPLAN—An operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPOD. A CONPLAN contains the CINC's Strategic Concept and those annexes and appendixes deemed necessary by the combatant commander to complete planning. Generally, detailed support requirements are not calculated and TPFDD files are not prepared. Also called CONPLAN. c. CONPLAN with TPFDD—A CONPLAN with TPFDD is the same as a CONPLAN except that it requires more detailed planning for phased deployment of forces. (JP 1-02)

planning order. 1. An order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to initiate execution planning. The planning order will normally follow a commander's estimate and a planning order will normally take the place of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff alert order. National Command Authorities approval of a selected course of action is not required before issuing a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff planning order. 2. A planning directive that provides essential planning guidance and directs the initiation of execution planning before the directing authority approves a military course of action. (JP 1-02)

port of debarkation. The geographic point at which cargo or personnel are discharged. May be a seaport or aerial port of debarkation. For unit requirements, it may or may not coincide with the destination. Also called POD. (JP 1-02)

port of embarkation. The geographic point in a routing scheme from which cargo or personnel depart. May be a seaport or aerial port from which personnel and equipment

flow to port of debarkation. For unit and nonunit requirements, it may or may not coincide with the origin. Also called POE. (JP 1-02)

power projection. The ability of a nation to apply all or some of its elements of national power — political, economic, informational, or military — to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

private voluntary organizations. Private, nonprofit humanitarian assistance organizations involved in development and relief activities. Private voluntary organizations are normally United States-based. "Private voluntary organization" is often used synonymously with the term "nongovernmental organizations." Also called PVO. (JP 1-02)

ready-to-load date. The day, relative to C-day, in a time-phased force and deployment data when the unit, nonunit equipment, and forces are prepared to depart their origin on organic transportation or are prepared to begin loading on US Transportation Command-provided transportation. Also called RLD. (JP 1-02)

recovery and reconstitution. (1) Those actions taken by one nation prior to, during, and following an attack by an enemy nation to minimize the effects of the attack, rehabilitate the national economy, provide for the welfare of the populace, and maximize the combat potential of remaining forces and supporting activities. (2) Those actions taken by a military force during or after operational employment to restore its combat capability to full operational readiness. (This term and its

definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

redeployment. The transfer of forces and materiel to support another joint force commander's operational requirements, or to return personnel, equipment, and materiel to the home and/or demobilization stations for reintegration and/or out-processing. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

required delivery date. A date, relative to C-day, when a unit must arrive at its destination and complete offloading to properly support the concept of operations. Also called RDD. (JP 1-02)

scheduled arrival date. The projected arrival date of a specified movement requirement at a specified location. (JP 1-02)

security. 1. Measures taken by a military unit, an activity or installation to protect itself against all acts designed to, or which may, impair its effectiveness. 2. A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences. 3. With respect to classified matter, it is the condition that prevents unauthorized persons from having access to official information that is safeguarded in the interests of national security. (JP 1-02)

shortfall. The lack of forces, equipment, personnel, materiel, or capability, reflected as the difference between the resources identified as a plan requirement and those apportioned to a combatant commander for planning, that would adversely affect the command's ability to accomplish its mission. (JP 1-02)

stage. 1. An element of the missile or propulsion system that generally separates from the missile at burnout or cut-off. Stages are numbered chronologically in order of burning. 2. To process, in a specified area, troops which are in transit from one locality to another. (JP 1-02)

staging. Assembling, holding and organizing arriving personnel, equipment, and sustaining materiel in preparation for onward movement. The organizing and preparation for movement of personnel, equipment, and materiel at designated areas to incrementally build forces capable of meeting the operational commander's requirements. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

staging area. 1. Amphibious or airborne—A general locality between the mounting area and the objective of an amphibious or airborne expedition, through which the expedition or parts thereof pass after mounting, for refueling, regrouping of ships, and/or exercise, inspection, and redistribution of troops. 2. Other movements—A general locality established for the concentration of troop units and transient personnel between movements over the lines of communications. Also called SA. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02)

strategic airlift. The common-user airlift linking theaters to the continental United States (CONUS) and to other theaters as well as the airlift within CONUS. These airlift assets are assigned to the Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command. Due to the intertheater ranges usually involved, strategic airlift is normally comprised of the heavy, longer range, intercontinental airlift assets but may be

augmented with shorter range aircraft when required. (JP 1-02)

strategic mobility. The capability to deploy and sustain military forces worldwide in support of national strategy. (JP 1-02)

support. 1. The action of a force which aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit which helps another unit in battle. Aviation, artillery, or naval gunfire may be used as a support for infantry. 3. A part of any unit held back at the beginning of an attack as a reserve. 4. An element of a command which assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat. (JP 1-02)

supported commander. The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (JP 1-02)

supporting commander. A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. Includes the designated combatant commands and Defense agencies as appropriate. (JP 1-02)

supporting plan. An operation plan prepared by a supporting commander or a subordinate commander to satisfy the requests or requirements of the supported commander's plan. (JP 1-02)

sustainment. The provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision

of the mission or of the national objective. (JP 1-02)

tactical assembly area. An area that is generally out of the reach of light artillery and the location where units make final preparations (pre-combat checks and inspections) and rest, prior to moving to the line of departure. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02)

theater airlift. That airlift assigned or attached to a combatant commander other than Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command, which provides air movement and delivery of personnel and equipment directly into objective areas through air landing, airdrop, extraction, or other delivery techniques; and the air logistic support of all theater forces, including those engaged in combat operations, to meet specific theater objectives and requirements. (JP 1-02)

time-phased force and deployment data.

The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System data base portion of an operation plan; it contains time-phased force data, non-unit-related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan, including: a. In-place units. b. Units to be deployed to support the operation plan with a priority indicating the desired sequence for their arrival at the port of debarkation. c. Routing of forces to be deployed. d. Movement data associated with deploying forces. e. Estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnel movements to be conducted concurrently with the deployment of forces. f. Estimate

of transportation requirements that must be fulfilled by common-user lift resources as well as those requirements that can be fulfilled by assigned or attached transportation resources. Also called TPFDD. (JP 1-02)

time-phased force and deployment list. A Joint Operation Planning and Execution System data base located at Appendix 1 to Annex A of deliberate plans. It identifies types and/or actual units required to support the operation plan and indicates origin and ports of debarkation or ocean area. This listing is to include both a. In-place units; and b. Units to be deployed to support the deliberate plan. Also called TPFDL. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

transportation closure. The actual arrival date of a specified movement requirement at port of debarkation. (JP 1-02)


transportation feasibility. Operation plans and operation plans in concept format are considered transportation feasible when the capability to move forces, equipment, and supplies exists from the point of origin to the final destination according to the plan. Transportation feasibility determination will require concurrent analysis and assessment of available strategic and theater lift assets, transportation infrastructure, and competing demands and restrictions. a. The supported commander of a combatant command (CINC) will analyze deployment, joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI), and theater distribution of forces, equipment, and supplies to final destination. b. Supporting CINC's will provide an assessment on movement of forces from point of origin

to aerial port of embarkation and/or seaport of embarkation. c. The Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command will assess the strategic leg of the time-phased force and deployment data for transportation feasibility, indicating to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and supported CINC that movements arrive at the port of debarkation consistent with the supported CINC's assessment of JRSOI and theater distribution. d. Following analysis of all inputs, the supported CINC is responsible for declaring a plan end-to-end executable. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

validate. Execution procedure used by combatant command components, supporting combatant commanders, and providing organizations to confirm to the supported commander and US Transportation Command that all the information records in a time-phased force and deployment data not only are error-free for automation purposes, but also accurately reflect the current status, attributes, and availability of units and requirements. Unit readiness, movement dates, passengers, and cargo details should be confirmed with the unit before validation occurs. (JP 1-02)

warning order. 1. A preliminary notice of an order or action which is to follow. 2. A crisis action planning directive issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that initiates the development and evaluation of courses of action by a supported commander and requests that a commander's estimate be submitted. 3. A planning directive that describes the situation, allocates forces and resources, establishes command relationships, provides other initial planning guidance, and initiates subordinate unit mission planning. (JP 1-02)

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Publication (JP) 3-35** is in the **Operations** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

