[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS FRAUD AND THE IMPLICATION FOR HOMELAND
SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 1, 2003
__________
Serial No. 108-28
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Homeland Security
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
house
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Christopher Cox, California, Chairman
Jennifer Dunn, Washington Jim Turner, Texas, Ranking Member
C.W. Bill Young, Florida Bennie G. Thompson, Mississppi
Don Young, Alaska Loretta Sanchez, California
F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Wisconsin Norman D. Dicks, Washington
W.J. (Billy) Tauzin, Louisiana Barney Frank, Massachusetts
David Dreier, California Jane Harman, California
Duncan Hunter, California Benjamin L. Cardin, Maryland
Harold Rogers, Kentucky Louise McIntosh Slaughter, New
Sherwood Boehlert, New York York
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Nita M. Lowey, New York
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey
Porter J. Goss, Florida Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Dave Camp, Michigan Columbia
Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Florida Zoe Lofgren, California
Bob Goodlatte, Virginia Karen McCarthy, Missouri
Ernest J. Istook, Jr., Oklahoma Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Peter T. King, New York Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
John Linder, Georgia Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
John B. Shadegg, Arizona Islands
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Mac Thornberry, Texas Charles Gonzalez, Texas
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Ken Lucas, Kentucky
Kay Granger, Texas James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Pete Sessions, Texas Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
John E. Sweeney, New York
John Gannon, Chief of Staff
Uttam Dhillon, Chief Counsel and Deputy Staff Director
David H. Schanzer, Democrat Staff Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
(II)
C O N T E N T S
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Christopher Cox, Chairman, Select Committee on
Homeland Security
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Robert E. Andrews, a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey................................... 58
The Honorable Dave Camp, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Michigan.............................................. 49
The Honorable Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Oregon............................................ 45
The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress From
the State of North Carolina.................................... 64
The Honorable Duncan Hunter, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California........................................ 74
The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas........................................ 8
The Honorable Kendrick B. Meek, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Florida........................................... 70
The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton, a Representative in Congress
From the District of Columbia.................................. 51
The Honorable John B. Shadegg, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Arizona........................................... 54
The Honorable Christopher Shays, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Connecticut.................................. 60
The Honorable Louise McIntosh Slaughter, a Representative in
Congress From the State of New York............................ 74
The Honorable Lamar S. Smith, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas............................................. 7
The Honorable Jim Turner, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas................................................. 5
Witnesses
The Honorable C. Stewart Verdery, Jr., Assistant Secretary,
Border and Transportation Security Policy Directorate,
Department of Homeland Security
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Mr. Joseph R. Carico, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Commonwealth
of Virginia
Oral Statement................................................. 29
Prepared Statement............................................. 30
Mr. Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., United States Attorney for the
District of Columbia, Department of Justice
Oral Statement................................................. 26
Prepared Statement............................................. 27
Mr. Keith M. Kiser, Chairman, American Association of Motor
Vehicle Administrators
Oral Statement................................................. 35
Prepared Statement............................................. 37
Mr. Ronald D. Malfi, Director, Office of Special Investigations,
General Accounting Office
Oral Statement................................................. 32
Prepared Statement............................................. 34
(III)
?
Mr. Paul J. McNulty, United States Attorney, Eastern District of
Virginia Department of Justice
Oral Statement................................................. 21
Prepared Statement............................................. 22
Mr. John Pistole, Assistant Director for Counterrorism, Federal
Bureau of Investigation
Oral Statement................................................. 16
Prepared Statement............................................. 18
Material submitted for the Record
Questions and Responses for the Record........................... 76
(IV)
HEARING ON IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS FRAUD AND THE IMPLICATION FOR
HOMELAND SECURITY
----------
Wednesday, October 1, 2003
U.S. House of Representatives,
Select Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:15 p.m., in room
2318, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Cox
[chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Cox, Smith, Shays, Camp, Diaz-
Balart, Linder, Shadegg, Gibbons, Sessions, Hunter, Turner,
Sanchez, Markey, Slaughter, DeFazio, Andrews, Norton, McCarthy,
Jackson Lee, Christensen, Etheridge, Lucas of Kentucky and
Meek.
Chairman Cox. [Presiding.] Good afternoon, a quorum being
present, the Select Committee on Homeland Security will come to
order.
The committee is meeting today to consider how lax
government policies toward the issuance of official
identification documents, such as driver's licenses, are
becoming a dangerously weak link in the war on terrorism. On
September 11th, 2001, Al Qaeda slipped into airports in Boston,
Newark, and Washington, D.C. undetected. No less than seven of
these terrorists used authentic Virginia identification cards
obtained from the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles.
The terrorists used Virginia identification cards for a
reason. Although not a single one of these terrorists was
actually a lawful resident of Virginia, they knew the
weaknesses of Virginia's identification process and they
exploited those weaknesses in their plot to kill thousands of
Americans.
Here is how they did it. In August 2001, Hani Hanjour,
whose picture is on the screen, went to the DMV in Springfield,
Virginia where he used a false address to obtain an
identification card. And that false address of course, among
other things, falsified his state of residence. Hanjour would
wind up flying into the Pentagon.
The same day, Khalid Almihdhar went to the same Virginia
DMV and likewise used false information to obtain his Virginia
license. The next day, Hanjour and Almihdhar used their new
cards to attest that a third 9/11 hijacker, Majed Moqed, lived
in Virginia. That allowed him to get an identification card.
That same day they got an I.D. for a fourth hijacker, Salem
Alhazmi in exactly the same way. Later in August, Hanjour
signed a DMV form for Ziad Samir Jarrah. He would eventually be
one of the hijackers on United Flight 93 headed for Washington
which crashed in Pennsylvania.
Abdulaziz Alomari, who crashed into the World Trade Center,
also had obtained an illegal Virginia I.D. card. And so did
Ahmed Alghamdi. He used his Virginia identification card to
board one of the planes that hit the World Trade Center.
Although none of us thought that the horrors of that day would
or could ever happen, we vowed as a nation on 9/11, ``Never
again.''
To the credit of the Commonwealth of Virginia, the
governor, the attorney general and the legislature acted
quickly and they changed their laws. They tightened the rules
for the issuance of driver's licenses and I.D. cards to prevent
further abuse and to protect their citizens. But according to a
recent General Accounting Office report, even as Virginia has
moved to protect the integrity of its identification system,
several other states continue to administer loophole-ridden
systems.
In these states, the Department of Motor Vehicles invites
terrorists and criminals to create multiple fraudulent
identities. And one state, California, has actually amended its
laws to make things worse, introducing the very problems that
Virginia had before 9/11.
In August, our friend and colleague, Representative Eleanor
Holmes Norton, wrote to me and to the ranking member to request
this hearing into the dangers of fraudulent I.D. cards. This is
a problem she has seen first-hand in the District of Columbia
and that plagues too many other jurisdictions in our nation. In
particular, she stressed the problems that laxity in government
identification cards creates for homeland security, and I
agree.
Thank you, Eleanor, for your vigilance on this important
issue.
We all know that a driver's license is the most commonly
used form of identification in America. We use it to board
airplanes, to buy weapons, to enter secured government
facilities, to open bank accounts, to cash checks and to cross
international borders. A driver's license carries a presumption
of authenticity that establishes legitimacy; that is why Al
Qaeda operatives here in the United States wanted them and why
they still want them.
Some of the 9/11 terrorists used their true identities,
others used false names. In each case, however, the pattern was
the same: the terrorists found it simple to obtain genuine
government-issued I.D. cards by submitting false information to
a DMV. As I said, Virginia has moved swiftly to close these
loopholes; California has moved to widen them.
Recently, the GAO sent three undercover agents into
separate offices of the California DMV, each with false
identification, purportedly from Texas, which they had
manufactured themselves on a desktop computer using PhotoShop.
According to the GAO, the documents should have been easily
identified as forgeries. To make it especially easy for the
California DMV to stop the fraud each of the three undercover
agents used the same fake name. Yet California cheerfully
issued California's driver's license to all three of them; all
based on the same poor-quality forged documents and all using
exactly the same name.
According to the GAO, California has no systems in place to
detect attempts by terrorists or criminals to obtain driver's
licenses, yet the DMV employees have no training in what to do
with false documents when they see them. And there is nothing
to stop an Al Qaeda member or a drug runner or a common
criminal from doing just what their undercover agents did to
obtain a California driver's license with no legitimate backup
identification.
And all of this was true before California changed its law
a few weeks ago to make identity theft and fraudulent license
issuance easier than ever. California's new law actually allows
an individual to obtain a driver's license using documents that
we know, to a certainty, are not and cannot be secure. In
California, an Al Qaeda operative may now obtain a driver's
license with a taxpayer identification number issued by the
IRS, but the IRS has repeatedly stated that this taxpayer
identification is not a reliable means to identify a person and
should not be used for identification purposes.
In fact, a taxpayer identification number can be obtained
by a third party; that is, you can obtain a taxpayer
identification number for someone else, or someone else can
obtain one in your name. And it can be obtained by mail, an
applicant need not even appear in person.
For all of these reasons, the IRS has posted a warning on
its website that taxpayer identification numbers do not prove
identity outside the tax system and should not be offered or
accepted as identification for non-tax purposes. So says the
IRS, yet the state of California has now changed its law to do
exactly that. It is as if 9/11 never happened.
Likewise, both the Department of Homeland Security and the
FBI have stated that they have serious concerns regarding the
reliability for identification purposes of the matricular
consular, a sort of, ``I.D. on the fly'' issued by Mexican
consulates in the United States. It too, is acceptable
documentation to obtain a driver's license in California under
the new law.
Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge has said that states
and financial institutions that rely upon the matricular
consular do so at their own risk. California has decided to
incur that risk on behalf of its 30 million people so that,
ironically, the state of California now accepts as secure a
document that most Mexican provincial governments do not.
This is hardly a sign of post-9/11 progress in the area of
securing us against the dangers of document fraud. To meet the
terrorist threat, we need to get better, more reliable
identification information to our customs and immigration
inspectors, to state DMVs, to the TSA, and to the law
enforcement security personnel and civilians who need it to
ensure our safety. The Congress and this committee must
consider whether it is not time for uniform minimum standards
for identification to board aircraft and to purchase dangerous
weapons.
Our 50 states, territories and the District of Columbia
need direction from the Department of Homeland Security about
the best way to defend against document fraud and identity
theft. We need to continue the development of technology to
help ensure more reliable identification, and we need to
provide training for our local, state and Federal officers and
civilian employees who check I.D.s everyday at airports, DMVs,
gun shops, banks and on our borders.
In short, we need to ensure that the DHS and the Congress
are doing all we can to prevent document fraud and identity
theft, so that we can keep our bi-partisan promise in the
crucible of 9/11, ``Never again.''
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER COX, CHAIRMAN SELECT
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
On September 11, 2001 al Qaeda slipped into airports in Boston,
Newark, and Washington, DC undetected. No less than 7 of these
terrorists used authentic Virginia identification cards obtained from
the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles.
The terrorists used Virginia identification cards for a reason.
Although not a single one of these terrorists was actually a lawful
resident of Virginia, they knew the weaknesses of Virginia's
identification process; and they exploited those weaknesses in their
plot to kill thousand of Americans.
Here is how they did it. In August 2001, Hani Hanjour went to the
DMV in Springfield, VA, where he used a false address to obtain an
identification card. Hanjour would wind up flying into the Pentagon.
The same day, Khalid Almihdhar went to the same Virginia DMV and
likewise used false information to obtain his Virginia's license. The
next day, Hanjour and Almihdhar used their new cards to attest that a
third 9-11 hijacker, Majed Moqess, lived in Virgina. That allowed him
to get an identification card. That same day, they got an ID for a 4th
hijacker, Salem Alhamzi, in exactly the same way. Later in August,
Hanjour signed a DMV form for Ziad Samir Jarrah. He would eventually be
one of the hijackers on United Flight 93, headed for Washington, DC,
which crashed in Pennsylvania. Abdulaziz Alomari, who crashed into the
World Trade Center, also had obtained an illegal Virginia ID card. And
so did Ahmed Alghamdi; he used his Virginia identification card to
board one of the planes that hit the World Trade Center.
Almost none of us thought that the horrors of that day would or
could ever happen. But in the wake of 9-11, we vowed, as a nation,
``never again.'' To the credit of the Commonwealth of Virginia, the
governor, the attorney general, and the legislature acted quickly to
change their laws. They tightened the rules for the issuance of
driver's licenses and ID cards to prevent further abuse, and to protect
their citizens. But according to a recent General Accounting Office
report, even as Virginia has moved to protect the integrity of its
identification system, several other states continue to administer
loophole-ridden systems. In these states, the Department of Motor
Vehicles invites terrorists and criminals to create multiple fraudulent
identities. And one state, California, has actually amended its laws to
make things worse, and to introduce the very problems that Virginia had
before 9-11.
In August, our friend and colleague, Eleanor Holmes Norton, wrote
to me and the Ranking Member to request this hearing into the dangers
of fraudulent ID cards. This is a problem she has seen first-hand in
the District of Columbia, and that plagues too many other jurisdictions
in our nation. In particular, she stressed the problems that laxity in
government identification cards create for homeland security, and I
agree. Thank you, Eleanor, for your vigilance on this important issue.
We all know that a driver's license is the most commonly used form
of identification in America. We use it to board airplanes, to buy
weapons, to enter secure government facilities, to open bank accounts,
to cash checks, and to cross international borders. A driver's license
carries a presumption of authenticity. It establishes legitimacy.
That is why al Qaeda operatives here in the United States wanted
them--and why they still want them. Some of the 9-11 terrorists used
their true identities. Other used false names. In each case, however,
the pattern was the same. The terrorists found it simplicity itself to
obtain genuine government-issued identification cards by submitting
false information to the DMV.
While Virginia moved swiftly to close the loopholes that made this
possible, California has moved to widen them. Recently, the GAO sent
three undercover agents into separate offices of the California DMV--
each with false identification, purportedly from Texas, which they had
manufactured themselves on a desktop computer using PhotoShop.
According to the GAO, the documents should have been easily identified
as forgeries. To make it especially easy for the California DMV to stop
the fraud, each of the three undercover agents used the same fake name.
Yet California cheerfully issued California driver's licenses to all
three of them--all based on the same poor quality forged documents, and
all using exactly the same name.
According to the GAO, California has no systems in place to detect
attempts by terrorists or criminals to obtain drivers' licenses; its
DMV employees have no training in what to do with false documents when
they see them; and there is nothing to stop an al Qaeda member, or a
drug runner, or a common criminal from doing just what their undercover
agents did to obtain a California driver's license with no legitimate
backup identification.
And all of this was true before California changed its law a few
weeks ago to make identity theft and fraudulent license issuance easier
than ever. California's new law actually allows an individual to obtain
a driver's license using documents that we know to a certainty are not,
and cannot, be secure.
In California, an al Qaeda operative may now obtain a driver's
license with a Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN) issued by the IRS.
But the IRS has repeatedly stated that the TIN is not a reliable means
to identify a person, and should not be used for identification
purposes. In fact, a TIN can be obtained by a third party; that is, you
can obtain a TIN for someone else, or someone can obtain a TIN in your
name. And it can be obtained by mail. An applicant need not even appear
in person. For all of these reasons, the IRS has posted this warning on
its website:
Since [Taxpayer Indentification Numbers] are strictly for tax
processing, we do not need to apply the same standards as
agencies that provide genuine identify certification. ITIN
applicants are not required to apply in person; third parties
can apply on their behalf; and we do not conduct background
checks or further validate the authenticity of identity
documents. ITINs do not prove identity outside the tax system,
and should not be offered or accepted as identification for
non-tax purposes.
Yet, the State of California has now changed its law, to do exactly
that. It is as if 9-11 never happened. Likewise, both DHS and the FBI
have stated that they have serious concerns regarding the reliability
for identification purposes of the matricula consular, a sort of ID-on-
the-fly issued by Mexican consulates in the United States. But it, too,
is acceptable documentation to obtain a driver's license in California
under the new law. Homeland Security Secretary Ridge has said that
states and financial institutions that rely upon the matricula consular
do so ``at their own risk.'' California has decided to incur that risk
on behalf of its 30 million people; so that, ironically, the State of
California now accepts as secure a document that most Mexican
provincial governments do not.
This is hardly a sign of post 9-11 progress in the area of securing
us against the dangers of document fraud. To meet the terrorist threat,
we need to get better, more reliable identification information to our
Customs and Immigration inspectors, to state DMVs, to the TSA, and to
the law enforcement, security personnel, and civilians who need it to
ensure our safety. The Congress, and this Committee, must consider
whether it is not time for uniform minimum standards for identification
to board aircraft, and to purchase dangerous weapons.
Our 50 states, territories, and the District of Columbia need
direction from the Department of Homeland Security about the best way
to defend against document fraud and identity theft. We need to
continue the development of technology to help ensure more reliable
identification. And we need to provide training for our local, state
and federal officers and civilian employees who check identifications
every day at airports, DMVs, gun shops, banks, and on our borders.
In short, we need to ensure that the DHS and the Congress are doing
all we can to prevent document fraud and identity theft, so that we can
keep our bipartisan promise in the crucible of 9-11, ``Never Again.''
The chair now recognizes Mr. Turner, the ranking Democrat
member, for any statement that he may have.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As you stated, we all saw the results of Al Qaeda's ability
to obtain driver's licenses in at least five different states
through fraudulent means and the consequences that flowed from
that. We were all surprised, as you stated, Mr. Chairman, when
the General Accounting Office did its investigation and was
able to have several undercover agents enter the United States
with counterfeit documents with few questions asked.
So it is clear to us, I think, that today we must move
faster and we must be much stronger, in terms of our effort, to
end the use of fraudulent documents, particularly those that
are used to cross our borders and enter our country. We know
that the forgers can produce high-quality birth certificates
and driver's licenses with off-the-shelf software. It is
certainly very difficult for our border agents to be able to
deal with the problem when there are over 240 different types
of valid driver's licenses issued in the United States today
and more than 50,000 different versions of birth certificates
issued by states and counties and cities.
It is unlikely that these officers and inspectors can
become with familiar with these valid forms of identification
without spending years and years on the job. Past attempts to
reduce fraudulent documents have met with mixed results. Some
years ago, the Congress made an effort to develop a more secure
social security card but, after several different types of
cards were proposed, no action was taken.
Clearly, the Congress and the American people have had an
aversion to any form of uniform identification. It does seem
incumbent upon us, however, to revisit the issue, to look more
carefully at providing uniform standards for at least state
driver licenses so that we can begin to make some inroads upon
a very serious problem that places our nation at risk.
We hope we can learn from the testimony today whether there
are sufficient programs in place for our Federal border
officers and state and local law enforcement to detect document
fraud, whether planned programs such as the U.S. VISIT Entry-
Exit System will truly help to deter and eliminate the use of
fraudulent documents at our borders, and whether legislative
remedies, perhaps expanding criminal penalties for document
use, will be appropriate in fighting this very difficult
problem.
We also need to consider whether the Federal Government
should provide more direction and/or assistance to the states
in developing more secure official identification documents.
Hopefully, these issues and others will be addressed by our
distinguished panel today.
I would also like to join the Chairman in thanking Eleanor
Holmes Norton for her suggestion that this Committee conduct a
hearing on this very critical issue. I appreciate Eleanor's
leadership in this area and her work on the issue.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cox. I thank the gentleman.
Under Committee Rule Three, members who waive an opening
statement can add 3 minutes to their time for questioning. Does
any member wish to make an opening statement?
Ms. Norton?
Ms. Norton. Mr. Chairman, may I thank you and our ranking
member for today's hearing in response to illegal document
buying and selling in the nation's capital, this region, and in
the country post-9/11.
The District of Columbia may be the last place to expect
open and notorious hawking of counterfeit birth certificates,
driver's licenses and social security cards. Such activities
have long been associated with the Southwest and border
communities because of the presence of large numbers of
undocumented immigrants.
In the District, the sale of illegal documents has been
concentrated in Adams Morgan, a neighborhood with many
immigrants from El Salvador, Guatemala and all Latin and
Central American countries. D.C. Councilmember Jim Graham, who
first brought this matter to my attention, and neighborhood
residents complained of constant street corner harassment and
compared the effect on residents to harassment by drug
peddlers. However, it doesn't take much imagination after
September the 11th to see how illegal activities directed
toward immigrants seeking identification papers necessary to
find work in this country could become a conduit for people
seeking identification documents to enable them to carry out
terrorist activities.
We know that several of the 9/11 terrorists had driver's
licenses, they were from Saudi Arabia, not Latin America. The
lesson of 9/11 is to read the handwriting on the wall, not to
wait until, to quote, the moving finger, having writ, writes
and moves on. We need a hearing from officials from the
national capital region where the vulnerability that carries
elements is perhaps, the most calming effect.
Our particular report shows the efforts of our U.S.
Attorney Roscoe Howard, whose office has been chosen to
prosecute cases. The ways the document-producing mills have
lined up the street corner puddles have apparently limited
three of the four recent document readings. Nevertheless, I
will not be surprised to find illegal document sales still
occurring this afternoon in Adams Morgan. The councilman tells
me that that process is continuing.
I don't blame the states. Get them pressures and
empowerments occur in the States, and we can expect that they
would have different approaches. Particularly, this issue cries
out for National Homeland Security leadership.
One of the problems may be that we are over-independent on
two 9/11 memos; blanketing the area with agents, rough and the
like. Much of that cries for priority, so our particular
problems in the nation's capital. I recognize that there may
never be enough agents to eliminate the problem on a retail
basis. This problem is national in scope, and therefore, needs
new national approaches. Perhaps, for example, increasing
penalties and the use of jail term, plus deportation; penalties
have been used in prosecutions here, instead of deportation
only.
Today the issue is not pre-9/11 document selling to
immigrants, but post-9/11 violations that carry great homeland
security risks. We, therefore, need new thinking and remedies.
And I hope we can use today's hearing to encourage new
approaches of new thinking outside the box to get a tightening
around the issues before it emerges in a new and lethal form.
May I thank you again, Mr. Chairman, and our own ranking
member as well.
Chairman Cox. Thank you.
The gentleman from Texas?
Mr. Smith. Mr. Chairman, I will be brief, but I also want
to just mention a couple things because I am going to have to
leave at 2 o'clock for a conference and I may not be able for
questions.
First of all, I want to thank you for convening this
hearing, and I particularly want to thank you for a very tough
statement. I hope our friends in the administration in fact,
listen to your statement, and perhaps will act on it. We had
the unfortunate situation recently where the Department of
Treasury has encouraged individuals and banks and organizations
to rely upon one of those documents that you identified as
unreliable, the matricular cards. And they do so, in my
judgment, at great danger to the American people. So I hope the
administration will reconsider what they have chosen to do with
those matricular cards.
That decision was made, by the way, against the advice of
the Department of Justice and the Homeland Security Committee
and many of us in Congress. So I hope the administration, as I
say, will reconsider. But I appreciate the hearing today and
yield back.
Chairman Cox. Does any other member wish to be recognized?
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON-LEE
we are living in a high-tech world. It is tempting to believe that
the problem of fraudulent documents can be solved with technology, but
two recent government reports indicate that the human factor must be
addressed first. On January 30, 2003, the General Accounting Office
(GAO) reported the results of an investigation it had performed at the
request of the Senate Committee on Finance. The Finance Committee was
concerned about the illegal transportation of currency through our
borders, especially counterfeit money and terrorism funds. It asked the
agents of the Office of Special Investigations at GAO to attempt to
enter the United States as United States citizens from Canada, Mexico,
and Jamaica at land, air, and sea ports of entry using fictitious
identities and counterfeit identification documents.
the GAO agents encountered no difficulty entering the United
States. From September 2002, through May 2003, they used counterfeit
documentation, including counterfeit driver's licenses and fictitious
names, to enter the United States from Jamaica, Barbados, Mexico, and
Canada. Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE) staff
never questioned the authenticity of the counterfeit documents.
In other tests, GAO agents obtained Social Security numbers for
fictitious children when investigators posed as parents of newborns and
submitted counterfeit birth certificates and baptismal certificates.
GAO agents breached the security of airports and Federal office
buildings because no one questioned the authenticity of their
counterfeit identification. In still another test, GAO agents used
counterfeit driver's licenses with fictitious identifiers to purchase
firearms from Federal firearm licensees in five states. The weapons
purchased included (1) a 9mm stainless semiautomatic pistol, (2) a .380
semiautomatic pistol, (3) a 7.62mm Russian-manufactured rifle, (4) a
.22 caliber semiautomatic rifle, (5) a 9mm semiautomatic pistol, and
(6) a .25 caliber semiautomatic pistol.
In February of 2003, the Inspector General (IG) of the Justice
Department issued a similar report which sheds additional light on the
reason for the difficulties identified by the GAO study. The only part
of the IG's report that can be discussed in public is the Executive
Summary. According to the Executive Summary, the capability of
immigration inspectors to analyze advance passenger information to
identify high-risk and inadmissible travelers is limited by a lack of
adequate resources. The lookout system for spotting high-risk and
inadmissible travelers does not always provide primary inspectors with
available, critical information. Primary inspectors were not always
querying lookout databases as required, and controls were not
sufficient to ensure that all primary inspectors and supervisors could
access backup information in the event of system outages.
The report also mentions the fact that INS invested more than $19
million in Fiscal Year 2002 to provide basic training for approximately
1,000 new immigration inspectors. The IG found that the training
provided a good foundation for newly hired inspectors, but it was
insufficient in two important areas, on the use of computer systems
that provide lookouts and other critical information and on awareness
of current terrorist tactics used to enter the United States.
I know from personal experience that there is a serious problem
with the recruitment and retention of immigration inspectors. It is
common for the immigration inspection stations at Houston's
international airport to be understaffed. Making matters worse, many of
the inspectors are inexperienced. In Fiscal Year 2002, approximately 26
percent of all inspectors at air, land, and sea ports of entry were
newly hired.
I hope that today's hearing will lead to the development of new,
more effective ways to train and equip the security personnel in our
country who are charged with the responsibility of detecting fraudulent
documents. Thank you.
Chairman Cox. If not, we have a very distinguished panel of
witnesses today. I would ask each of our witnesses to summarize
your testimony as you see fit because you were good enough to
provide us with your written statements in advance of this
hearing and members have your written statements, and they will
be included in the record.
I will introduce our first witness. He is the assistant
secretary of the Department of Homeland Security for Border and
Transportation Security Policy, Hon. C. Stewart Verdery, Jr.
Mr. Verdery?
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE C. STEWART VERDERY, JR., ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, BORDER AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY POLICY
DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Verdery. Chairman Cox, ranking committee member and
other distinguished members of the committee, I am pleased to
be here today to testify about homeland security and the
potential threat of terrorism imposed by document fraud,
identity theft, and the misuse of social security numbers.
The Department of Homeland Security and the Border and
Transportation Security Directorate, Directorate in particular,
are actively working to address these critical issues. As you
mentioned, I am the assistant secretary for policy and planning
within BTS. BTS is responsible for maintaining the security of
our nation's borders and transportation systems.
My office supervises and coordinates policy development for
all the BTS agencies which includes the Transportation Security
Administration, the Bureaus of Customs and Border Protection
and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center and the Office of Domestic
Preparedness, and we work closely with the Secret Service and
the Coast Guard within DHS.
Let me detail briefly some of the steps that DHS and BTS
are taking to address document fraud and identity theft. First
and foremost, DHS deploys first-rate people at our ports of
entry. They do a terrific job at detecting the use of
fraudulent documents and conducting the resulting
investigations.
Through early September of this fiscal year which ended
yesterday, our officers at the Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection, CBP, had intercepted over 60,000 fraudulent
documents at over 300 ports of entry.
As Secretary Ridge has announced, DHS is unifying the
border inspection process by establishing the CBP officer, an
officer who will be cross-trained to handle immigration,
customs and agricultural inspection needs. All CBP inspectors
will receive our most current training in identifying
fraudulent and altered documents.
DHS and BTS are leveraging its expertise overseas as well.
Officials at the Bureau of Immigration and Custom Enforcement,
or ICE, their Forensic Document Lab, have trained over 6,400
law enforcement officials around the world on how to detect
fraudulent documents this fiscal year, and we have published
over 120 Document Alerts, a 50-percent increase from last year.
These short, easy-to-understand document alerts are sent to
the field overseas so that inspectors and law enforcement
authorities can concentrate on one or two known features of an
identity document that criminals are trying to exploit. And I
brought one example to my right of one such alert concerning
the misuse of the Iraqi ``N'' Series passports, and these
passports were available for purchase in Turkey for about $500.
Second, the Department employs first-class investigators at
ICE and at the Secret Service who investigate cases of document
fraud and identity theft. As you will hear today from the
United States Attorneys for the District of Columbia and for
the Eastern District of Virginia, ICE and Secret Service agents
have played and will play a key role in the interagency process
and task forces that have been formed to investigate and
prosecute these types of cases.
ICE investigators have logged hundreds of thousands of
hours working on counterfeit document related investigations.
The primary focus in these cases is to detect, deter, disrupt
and dismantle major criminal enterprises operating not only in
the United States, but around the world as well. These cases
often entail long-term, complex investigations that involve our
international partners.
I would like to share briefly the preliminary results of
one of ICE's ongoing investigations, the Operation Card Shark
investigation mentioned in the testimony, and I will leave the
details to U.S. Attorney Howard, who will be after me in a
couple of minutes.
With the investigation continuing today, four document
mills have already been closed, close to 2,000 documents have
been seized, 50 aliens have been arrested, 30 have been removed
from the United States and 15 have been prosecuted.
The Secret Service is also demonstrating success in this
area. This fiscal year, the Secret Service has made 209 arrests
in cases involving identity theft. These cases reflect actual
losses to consumers of about $5 million and a potential loss of
$23 million.
This summer the Secret Service developed and distributed to
state and local law enforcement agencies throughout the United
States an Identity Crime Video in CD-ROM. This CD-ROM contains
over 50 investigative and victim assistance resources that
state and local law enforcement officers can use with combating
identity crime. They have authorized that as many copies to be
made of this as possible to get the word out as broadly as we
can.
And just to give credit where credit is due, this CD-ROM
was made in collaboration with the Postal Inspection Service,
the Federal Trade Commission and our partners at the
International Association of Chiefs of Police.
Third, in responding to Congressman Turner's point, the
U.S. VISIT Program, we will be changing--
Chairman Cox. If I could ask you to summarize.
Mr. Verdery. Sure, of course.
Chairman Cox. Because your 5 minutes has expired.
Mr. Verdery. Sure.
We are changing the way we do business at our ports of
entry. This critical tool will capture point of entry and exit
information by visitors to the United States using biometrics.
We will be locking in people's identity when they arrive for
the first time and when they exit. We will also know when they
return.
And with that, I will lastly like to mention we are working
closely with representatives from the Social Security
Administration to discuss issues of mutual concern; how to
reduce instances of misuse of social security numbers.
On behalf of Secretary Ridge and Undersecretary Hutchinson,
I look forward to questions you might have.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Verdery follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. STEWART VERDERY, JR.,
Chairman Cox, Ranking Member Turner, and other distinguished
members, I am pleased to be here today to testify about homeland
security and the potential threat of terrorism presented by document
fraud, identity theft, and the misuse of Social Security Numbers.
As you know from Congressional hearings, GAO investigations, and
press reports, it is certainly possible today to produce or acquire
false documents and gain entry into the United States. The Department
of Homeland Security and the Directorate of Border and Transportation
Security are working actively to address this problem in a number of
ways, as I will detail in my testimony.
Despite all these good efforts, we, and the Congress, must be
realistic about the results to expect. While we can, over time, reduce
the instances when false or fraudulent documents are used to enter the
U.S. or to obtain some governmental benefit, there is no easy fix
available, and this is a long-term issue for the Congress, the
Administration, and DHS to work through together.
DHS is working diligently on all these issues. My staff has had
several meetings with the Social Security Administration (SSA) to
discuss issues of mutual concern and potential ways to reduce the
instances where Social Security Numbers are misused.
We are also working with State and Local government authorities,
and non-government entities like the American Association of Motor
Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) on issues of mutual concern.
Description of the Problem
Document Fraud
Fraudulent documents, and, equally as important for the purposes of
this hearing and our enforcement efforts, legitimate documents issued
as a result of the use of fraudulent ``breeder'' documents can and are
likely used to gain entry into the U.S. and to obtain federal and state
governmental benefits each and every day.
As a general rule, the Immigration and Nationality Act requires all
U.S. citizens to present a valid U.S. passport to enter or leave the
U.S. There are several exceptions to this general rule. The most
important applies to travel to and from the U.S. involving ``any
country, territory, or island adjacent [to the U.S.] in North, South,
or Central America excluding Cuba.'' Thus, as a matter of law, U.S.
citizens do not typically need to present a single document--a
passport--to reenter the U.S. for any travel in the Western Hemisphere.
As a U.S. citizen is not required to present a passport for
reentry, federal regulations do not detail what is necessary to
validate a person's claim to citizenship in a manner equivalent to that
of a passport.
The law requires that a person claiming to be a U.S. citizen ``must
establish that fact to the examining officer's satisfaction.'' [8
C.F.R. 235.1(b).]
In operational practice, our inspectors, now called ``officers,''
from the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) examine any
document that may establish identity and place of birth, such as a U.S.
birth certificate, driver's license, or whatever else the person's
basis for claiming citizenship might be, including baptismal
certificates, Certificate of Naturalization, Report of Birth Abroad of
U.S. Citizen, or Certificate of Citizenship.
No law or regulation prevents an oral claim of U.S. citizenship in
these circumstances. An inspector may, and often does, ask for
documentation to support a claim, but this is not currently required.
Thus, even if an individual lacks any documentary identification or the
person presents counterfeit documents, inspectors must let the
individual back into the U.S. if the inspector is satisfied that the
individual really is a U.S. citizen.
Although the government may be able to prosecute the individual for
using a counterfeit document, the use of the counterfeit document by a
U.S. citizen, in and of itself, is not a sufficient ground for
preventing the U.S. citizen from lawfully reentering.
Let me be clear about one thing. CBP officers do not accept or rely
on a State-issued driver's license as sufficient proof of legal
presence in the U.S even though a person will often present his or her
license as an identity document. But, it is also true, that officers
consider a validly issued driver's license as one piece of information
in the total information the officer considers in making a judgment
about a person's right to have a legal basis to reenter the U.S.
The 21 States that currently issue driver's licenses without
requiring proof of legal status in the U.S. thus complicate the work of
our officers who examine some \1/2\ billion identity documents each and
every year. The officers who review these licenses must ask for
additional information or pose additional questions to the person
presenting the license since the fact of holding the driver's license
does not confer on the license holder a legal basis for being present
in the U.S.
By law and practice, CBP officers cannot focus their detection
efforts on a single document, such as the passport, and concentrate
their expertise on recognizing and blocking the fraudulent use of this
one document or type of document. As other witnesses have testified
before Congress, there are more than 240 different types of valid
driver's licenses issued within the United States, and more than 50,000
different versions of birth certificates issued by U.S. States,
counties, and municipalities.
Even excluding baptismal records, it would not be easy for CBP
officers to have a passing familiarity with, let alone a working
knowledge of, each of these documents. While advances in technology
allow our dedicated and hardworking CBP officers to examine and
validate documents presented for reentry, that same technology also
enables the perpetrators of fraud to produce, relatively inexpensively,
high-quality fraudulent documents. Forgers and counterfeiters can
produce high-quality fake birth certificates and driver's licenses with
off-the-shelf software programs and materials that are difficult to
detect without sensitive instruments and sufficient time to examine
them.
Our inspectors are also charged with detecting look-a-likes or
impostors who attempt to use valid documents which belong to another
person. This is one of the fastest growing phenomena in travel document
abuse. Document vendors solicit genuine, unaltered documents and match
them up with ``look-a-likes.'' The Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) and CBP have developed a training program to detect
impostors, which it has conducted for both U.S. and foreign immigration
and border officers around the world.
Equipment costs money, and taking the time to examine thoroughly
and in-depth every one of the approximately 460 million identity
documents presented at our over 300 land, sea, and air ports of entry
would be an enormous undertaking with potentially serious secondary
effects. And, even were we to do this, this effort would only permit us
to detect fraudulent documents, not, as I will discuss now,
legitimately issued documents that are based on identity theft.
Identity Theft
Identity crime is the theft or misuse of an individual's personal
or financial identifiers in order to facilitate other criminal activity
or to gain something of value. Types of identity crime include identity
theft, credit card fraud, bank fraud, check fraud, false identification
fraud, and passport/visa fraud. Identity crimes are frequently
associated with other crimes such as narcotics and weapons trafficking,
organized crime, mail theft and fraud, money laundering, immigration
fraud, and terrorism.
The topic of identity theft is intimately connected with document
fraud. As the GAO and others have shown, it is quite easy today either
to obtain or produce using sophisticated software and equipment
fraudulent identification documents, such as a driver's license or
birth certificate, or to obtain valid documents issued by the
appropriate authority (again, driver's licenses, social security cards,
etc.) on the basis of false or fraudulent information. For example, it
would be relatively easy for an individual to obtain a properly-issued
State driver's license in the name of Asa Hutchinson if the individual
could establish on the basis of false documents that their name was Asa
Hutchinson.
Advances in technology and the explosion of e-commerce have
produced enormous advantages for people around the world, and have also
conferred benefits on criminals. Information collection has become a
common byproduct of e-commerce transactions. Internet purchases, credit
card sales, and other forms of electronic transactions are being
captured, stored, and analyzed by businesses seeking to find the best
customers for their products. This wealth of available personal
information creates a target-rich environment for today's sophisticated
criminals, many of whom are organized and operate across international
borders and include both domestic and international organized criminal
groups, street gangs, convicted felons, and terrorists.
The personal identifiers most often sought by criminals are those
generally required to obtain goods and services on credit. These are
primarily social security numbers, names, and dates of birth. Identity
crimes also involve the theft or misuse of an individual's financial
identifiers such as credit card numbers, bank account numbers and
personal identification numbers.
Many identity thieves use information obtained from company
databases and web sites. One case investigated by the United States
Secret Service, the primary DHS agency with jurisdiction over ID theft
matters, involved an identity criminal accessing public documents to
obtain the social security numbers of military officers. In some cases,
the information obtained is in the public domain while in others it is
proprietary and is obtained by means of a computer intrusion.
The method that may be most difficult to prevent is theft by a
collusive employee. Individuals or groups who wish to obtain personal
or financial identifiers for a large-scale fraud ring will often pay or
extort an employee who has access to this information through their
employment at workplaces such as a financial institution, medical
office, or government agency.
Another case, investigated primarily by ICE and the Secret Service
demonstrates the nexus between identity theft and document fraud. In
this Greenville, South Carolina case, male foreign nationals from
Pakistan, India, and Tunisia already in the U.S. traveled to South
Carolina to participate in arranged marriages, for the purpose of
acquiring legal permanent residence. The ``brides'' and ``grooms''
fraudulently obtained South Carolina State and/or immigration
identification documents utilizing breeder documents in order to
substantiate their marriage. The ``brides'' were paid between $1,000
and $6,000 to enter into the ``marriage.'' Nearly all the brides
arrested signed, sworn statements admitting to their involvement in
sham marriages. This case is ongoing and has resulted in over 100
arrests.
The Secret Service, ICE, the U.S. Marshal's Service, the U.S.
Postal Inspection Service, the Social Security Administration's Office
of Inspector General, and the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division
(SLED) have all participated in this investigation.
Identity crime affects all types of Americans, regardless of age,
gender, national origin, or race. Victims include restaurant workers,
telephone repair technicians and police officers, to corporate and
government executives, celebrities and high-ranking military officers.
Of course, and of most relevance to this hearing, fraudulent
``breeder'' documents obtained through identity theft can then be used
to obtain genuine documents from Departments of Motor Vehicles, the
Social Security Administration, and elsewhere. These legitimately
issued documents can--and are--subsequently used to obtain government
services and benefits and to gain reentry into the United States. There
is no technology available to CBP officers--and none that I am aware of
that exists anywhere--that would enable an inspector to determine that
a legitimately issued document was actually based on a false breeder
document presented to another government agency.
How DHS is Addressing the Problem
DHS is actively addressing these issues to make it harder for
individuals--especially terrorists--to slip into the U.S. using
fraudulent documents and to pursue identity thieves and those who use
false breeder documents. We also vigorously investigate cases involving
the use of fraudulent documents and cooperate with other federal,
state, and local governmental entities, as well as the private sector,
to heighten awareness and to reduce our vulnerabilities.
DHS uses a combination of advance information about individuals
entering the U.S., pre-screening, registration systems such as the
National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS), and will use
advanced technology, including the use of biometric information that
will be incorporated into our US VISIT entry-exit system.
One Face at the Border
Training CBP officers to recognize fraudulent documents is another
important step, and one that BTS takes very seriously.
Last month, Secretary Ridge announced that DHS will unify the
border inspection process under one Customs and Border Protection
Officer, an officer cross-trained to address immigration, customs, and
agricultural inspection needs. We will have one face in one uniform--a
single officer trained for primary inspection as well as how to
determine who needs to go through secondary inspections.
And since we know that Al Qaeda is interested in entering our ports
illegally, this officer--now trained in all three areas of inspection
and armed with the best intelligence we have--improves our ability to
spot and stop terrorists quickly and keep them out. We have already
recruited our first group of CBP officers, who will be trained
throughout this fall. For DHS, this is another significant step toward
our efforts to retool where it makes sense and create efficiencies and
unity around a single mission.
All CBP officers will receive our most current training on
identifying fraudulent and altered documents. CBP secondary officers
will receive more advanced training, and BTS will continue to maintain
the world-class excellence of the ICE Forensic Document Lab (FDL), that
was previously housed at the INS.
Our CBP officers are doing a good job on this issue, and will
continue to improve. As of early September, CBP officers had
intercepted over 60,000 fraudulent documents at our over 300 ports of
entry in Fiscal Year 2003.
ICE Resources
The sole mission of the FDL, a fully-accredited crime laboratory,
is to detect and deter domestic and international travel and identity
document fraud, and the FDL has developed an unparalleled expertise in
the area of domestic and international travel and identity fraud.
The ICE FDL maintains a collection of exemplar documents, including
birth certificates, passports, and driver's licenses to differentiate
valid documents from fraudulent ones. The FDL provides real-time
assistance to field personnel in identifying fraudulent documents,
produces and broadly distributes Document Intelligence Alerts (high
quality photographic bulletins), develops and presents training
programs in the detection of fraudulent documents, and works with other
Federal, state, local agencies, and foreign governments to promote
common efforts to combat international document fraud.
I want to mention two such samples of these ICE FDL alerts which I
commend to the Members of this Committee. These alerts present, in a
clear and simple format, particular features to look for in order to
determine whether particular types of documents are fraudulent or
counterfeit.
One alert discusses stolen blank Philippine Passports and the other
concerns counterfeit Iraqi ``N'' series passports that were available
for purchase in Turkey for about $500. The alerts highlight how to
distinguish immediately between the genuine and counterfeit document.
The FDL has on file intelligence reports of over 100,000 stolen
blank, genuine, passports. These passports pose a serious potential
threat to national security since they are genuine documents. The FDL
has developed a reference guide that contains very precise information
on the issuance process of passports and country specific intelligence
information. The guide is extremely useful in identifying individuals
in possession of these stolen passports.
DHS is leveraging this expertise overseas, as well. In 2003, FDL
officials trained over 6,400 enforcement officials around the world how
to detect fraudulent documents this fiscal year, and published over 120
Document Alerts, a 50 percent increase over last year.
ICE also operates a Law Enforcement Support Center in Vermont to
assist state and local law enforcement officers who have questions
about identification assessments during traffic stops. In addition, ICE
operates units to link enforcement and intelligence resources with
adjudication officers from the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration
Services (CIS) who must make determinations about documents that they
are presented for adjudication.
In addition to the work of the FDL, ICE law enforcement agents
investigate cases of documents and benefits fraud. ICE has joined the
U.S. Attorney's Office in the Eastern District of Virginia in a pilot
project to investigate and prosecute large immigration, visa, and
identification document frauds. The task force includes the
participation of the Secret Service, CIS, FBI, Social Security
Administration's Office of Inspector General, IRS-Criminal
Investigation, Department of State, Department of Labor, U.S. Postal
Inspection Service, Virginia DMV, and the Fairfax County Police
Department.
ICE investigators have logged hundreds of thousands of hours
working on counterfeit document related investigations. The primary
focus of these cases is to deter, disrupt, and dismantle major criminal
enterprises operating not only in the United States, but in source and
transit countries as well. The cases often entail long-term, complex
investigations that frequently involve our international partners.
Operation Card SharkI would also like to share the preliminary
results of ICE's ongoing investigation, here in Washington, D.C., known
as Operation Card Shark. Card Shark focuses on the street sale of
counterfeit documents in the Adams Morgan area. Although the
investigation continues, four document mills have already been closed
resulting in the seizure of close to 2,000 documents with an estimated
total street value of $155,000. 50 aliens have been taken into
custody--30 have been removed from the U.S. and 15 have been
prosecuted.
On July 15th, one of the primary targets of this operation was
sentenced in U.S. District Court to a total of 52 months in prison for
his role as a kingpin in the counterfeit document-manufacturing ring.
Card Shark has disrupted the activity of three significant
organizations that operate on the North side of Columbia Road and the
return of Pigeon Park to the residents of Adams Morgan.
I look forward to sharing more such successes with you in the
months ahead.
US-VISIT
US-VISIT is a crucial new border security and enforcement tool that
will capture point of Entry and Exit information by visitors to the
United States. This system will be capable of using information, that
may be coupled with biometric identifiers, such as photographs and
fingerprints--to create an electronic check-in/check-out system for
people who come to the United States to work or to study or visit. US-
VISIT will also provide a useful tool to law enforcement to find those
visitors who overstay or otherwise violate the terms of their visas and
will allow us to lock-in an individual's identity, what those in the
field call ``positive identification'' when the individual registers
with US-VISIT.
By January 1, 2004, when a foreign visitor flies into one of our
international airports or arrives at a U.S. seaport, the visitor's
travel documents will be scanned.
Through US-VISIT, all border officers at air and some sea ports of
entry will have the capability to access and review the visa
information, including the photograph, during a visa holder's entry
into the United States. This will enable the border officers to verify
the visa photograph with the passport photograph and the individual of
the visa holder during their inspection for entry into the United
States. Additionally, border officers will capture biometric data to
verify and lock-in select visa holders identities. The US-VISIT system
will be able to compare the captured fingerprint against a fingerprint
watch list. This will be an enhancement to the existing name check or
biographical lookout check.
This information will become part of a foreign visitor's ongoing
travel record, so their correct information can follow them wherever
they go. The information will be made available to inspectors, agents,
consular officials and others with a true need to know.
Mr. Chairman, we should all be clear on my next point. Good
information does not threaten immigration. Quite the contrary. The more
certain we are about someone's status, the less likely we are to make a
mistake that would jeopardize their status--or our safety.
NSEERS
The NSEERS program requires certain nonimmigrant aliens from
designated countries to be fingerprinted, interviewed, and photographed
by CBP at our ports of entry at the time they are applying for
admission to the United States. In addition, other aliens who are
identified from intelligence sources or who match certain pre-existing
criteria may also be enrolled in NSEERS.
NSEERS helps to secure our borders, by intercepting terrorists and
criminals at our ports of entry, identifying aliens who deviate from
their stated purposes once they enter the U.S., and identifying aliens
who have overstayed their visas and are in the country illegally. DHS
officers have made every effort to minimize the inconvenience for those
individuals required to register, with an average processing time of
just 18 minutes.
During the enrollment process, specific biographic information,
itineraries and addresses are collected. If aliens remain in the U.S.
for longer than 30 days, they must return to a DHS office to confirm
their address and activities in the United States. Registrants must
also complete a departure check when they leave the country and
register with NSEERS if they are subject to registration and have not
already registered.
The NSEERS registration process enables DHS to verify that an alien
is living where he said he would live, and doing what he said he would
do while in the United States, and to ensure that he is not violating
our immigration laws.
Identity Theft
DHS is also working hard to reduce the incidence of identity theft,
and the Secret Service is leading this effort on behalf of the
Department.
This summer, the Secret Service developed and distributed to state
and local law enforcement agencies throughout the United States an
Identity Crime Video/CD-ROM. The CD-ROM I am holding contains over 50
investigative and victim assistance resources that local and state law
enforcement officers can use when combating identity crime. This CD-ROM
contains a short video that can be shown to police officers at their
roll call meetings and discusses why identity crime is important, what
other departments are doing to combat identity crime, and what tools
and resources are available to officers. The Identity Crime CD-ROM is
an interactive resource guide that was made in collaboration with the
U.S. Postal Inspection Service, the Federal Trade Commission and the
International Association of Chiefs of Police.
The Secret Service has authorized law enforcement agencies to make
as many copies of the CD-ROM as they wish so that the agencies can
distribute this resource to their officers to use in identity crime
investigations.
The Secret Service is also training state and local law enforcement
agencies to prevent identity theft the old fashioned way. In a joint
effort with the Department of Justice, the U.S. Postal Inspection
Service, the Federal Trade Commission and the International Association
of Chiefs of Police, the Secret Service has hosted Identity Crime
training seminars for law enforcement officers in New York, Chicago,
Seattle, Dallas, Las Vegas, Washington D.C., Phoenix, Richmond, and
Iowa, Mr. Chairman. The Secret Service has additional seminars planned
for San Antonio, Texas next month, Orlando, Florida in November, and
San Diego, California. These training seminars focus on providing local
and state law enforcement officers with tools and resources that they
can immediately put to use in their investigations of identity crime.
Additionally, officers are provided resources that they can pass on to
members of their community who are victims of identity crime.
Collaboration
DHS is also collaborating with others in both the government and in
the private sector to combat and address these important issues. We
have worked closely with the Department of State on visa issuance
issues and obtaining access to the Consolidated Consular Database. My
staff has met several times with representatives of the Social Security
Administration (SSA) to discuss issues of mutual concern and to explore
how to reduce the instances of the misuse of social security numbers.
ICE and CIS has also worked cooperatively with the SSA for a number
of years through the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements
(SAVE) Program. The SAVE program enables Federal, state, and local
government agencies to obtain immigration status information to
determine an applicant or recipient's eligibility for many public
benefits. The SAVE Program also administers employment verification
pilot programs that enable employers quickly and easily to verify the
work authorization of newly hired employees.
Current SAVE participants include the SSA; National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA); the Department of Defense Manpower Data
Center; Arizona County Health Care Cost Containment; the California and
Wyoming Departments of Motor Vehicles; the New Jersey Department of Law
and Public Safety, Division of Gaming Enforcement; the Mohegan Tribal
Gaming Commission; and the Texas Department of Health, Asbestos
Licensing Program.
The Secret Service has worked closely with the American Association
of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) to support AAMVA's efforts to
develop minimum and uniform standards for U.S. driver's licenses. I
understand, for example, Mr. Chairman, that there are still four states
that do not require a photograph on their state's driver's license,
which, obviously, makes that document easier to use in a fraudulent
manner.
Secret Service representatives work closely with the private sector
on a number of efforts, and, together with the private sector, formed
the Document Security Alliance as an ad hoc working group of law
enforcement and industry focused on developing standards for the
improving the security and traceability of plastic identification
cards.
Conclusion
In sum, Mr. Chairman, DHS recognizes the enormity of the problems
that we face, and we are working actively to improve our ability to
detect fraudulent identification documents and to keep criminals and
potential terrorists from obtaining these documents in the first place.
Chairman Cox. Thank you, Mr. Verdery.
Our next witness is Mr. John Pistole, who is the Assistant
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for
Counterterrorism. We appreciate you being with us today and
look forward to your testimony.
STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN PISTOLE, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Chairman Cox.
Good afternoon, Ranking Member Turner, and other members of
the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today
and represent the FBI in this hearing today.
As the committee is well aware, the top priority for the
FBI is the prevention of the next terrorist act here in the
U.S. or against U.S. interests overseas in connection with our
overseas partners. More than 29,000 employees of the FBI are
working toward that goal on a daily basis. The identification
of sleeper cells here in the U.S. is one of the key aspects to
the success in this ongoing war against terrorism. And for
that, we need strong authentication procedures for issuing
identifications across the country.
As we know, identity fraud is not a new problem. For those
who are familiar with either the book or the movie, ``Catch Me
if You Can,'' starring Tom Hanks, as the FBI agent, of course,
the good guy, we went back 40 years. We have a history of
individuals who have either as a fugitive or as a fraudster
used false identities to further their own goals.
The significance today, of course, is the application and
the use of fraudulent I.D. by a terrorist. The use of false or
stolen identity enhances its chances of success in commission
of almost all crimes, especially financial crimes. The identity
provides a cloak of anonymity for the subject while the
groundwork is laid to commit the crime. This includes the
rental of mail post offices boxes, apartments, office spaces,
vehicles, and storage lockers, as well as the activation of
pagers, cellular telephones and various utility services.
The crucial element in the acceptance of any form of
identification is the ability to verify the true identity of
the bearer of the identification, which is honestly more
important in this post-9/11 world to determine whether an
individual is who he purports to be. This is essential in our
mission to identify potential terrorists.
The FBI is concerned about the issuance of driver's
licenses without adequate verification of identity. The
criminal threats and terrorist threats stem from this fact that
the driver's license can be a perfect breeder document for
establishing a false identity.
Since 9/11, the FBI has investigated numerous incidents
where terrorists have utilized false identifications. I have
outlined some of those in my written testimony and won't go
into detail here other than to mention there are cited five
examples of international terrorists who have used false travel
documents, false identification to attempt to travel around the
world.
And we have also had several examples here in the U.S.,
one, in particular, that stands out from the 1995 Oklahoma City
bombing, Timothy McVeigh, who had nine different forms of
identification. A couple of other domestic examples are cited
in my written testimony. I won't take time to go into those at
this point.
The FBI has implemented, in conjunction with our domestic
law enforcement partners, and some in the intelligence
community, to address the various fraud schemes being utilized
by terrorists to fund their terrorist activities through the
use of fraudulent identification. And those, again, are
outlined in my written testimony.
One I would like to highlight is a project with the Office
of the Inspector General for the Social Security
Administration, which is a multi-phase project to identify
either fraudulent numbers, fictitious numbers, or those being
used by individuals whose name does not match to that. And this
is being handled by the Terrorism Financing Operations Section,
or TFOS, of the FBI Counterterrorism Division.
We are also working on several joint interagency working
groups involving bank regulators of the state, local and
Federal Government regulatory agencies as part of the financial
services industry trying to bring together a two-part national
identify theft assistance and investigative referral system.
The law enforcement component will work in conjunction with
a victim/witness assistance center to be operated by the
financial service industry and will receive complaints,
collect, aggregate and analyze data and refer cases to identity
task forces nationwide to target terrorists or organized groups
perpetrating identify theft.
In conclusion, I want to thank you again for the invitation
to be here to speak to you today. One of the keys is the
nation's reliance on paper documents, and until we move to some
type of standardized biometrics approach, we will be struggling
with the same issues we have.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement of Mr. Pistole follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN S. PISTOLE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, COUNTERTERRORISM DIVISION
Good morning Chairman Cox, Ranking Member Turner, and members of
the Committee. On behalf of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
I would like to thank the Committee for affording us the opportunity to
participate in this forum and comment on the use of fraudulent
identification documents and the implications for homeland security.
As this Committee is well aware, the FBI, along with other federal
law enforcement agencies, investigates and prosecutes individuals who
use false identities, or the identities of others, to carry out
violations of federal criminal law. These violations include bank
fraud, credit card fraud, wire fraud, mail fraud, money laundering,
bankruptcy fraud, computer crimes, and fugitive cases. When these
crimes are carried out using a false or stolen identity, investigation
of the offenses becomes much more complicated. The use of a false or
stolen identity enhances the chances of success in the commission of
almost all financial crimes. The identity provides a cloak of anonymity
for the subject, while the groundwork is laid to carry out the crime.
This includes the rental of mail drops, post office boxes, apartments,
office space, vehicles, and storage lockers, as well as the activation
of pagers, cellular telephones, and various utility services.
Identity theft, and the use of false identities, is not new to law
enforcement. For decades fugitives have changed identities to avoid
capture and check forgers have assumed the identity of others to
negotiate stolen or counterfeit checks. What is new today is the
pervasiveness of the problem. The Federal Bureau of Investigation does
not view the use of false identities and identity theft as a separate
and distinct crime problem. Rather, it sees this issue as a component
of many types of crimes, which we investigate.
Advances in computer hardware and software, along with the growth
of the Internet, have significantly increased the role that identity
theft and false identities play in crime. For example, the skill and
time needed to produce high-quality counterfeit documents has been
reduced to the point that nearly anyone can become an expert. Criminals
and terrorists are now using the same multimedia software used by
professional graphic artists. Today's software allows novices to easily
manipulate images and fonts, allowing them to produce high-quality
counterfeit documents. The tremendous growth of the Internet, the
access it provides to such an immense audience and the anonymity it
allows users result in otherwise traditional fraud schemes becoming
magnified when the Internet is utilized as part of the scheme. This is
particularly true with identity theft related crimes. Computer
intrusions into the databases of credit card companies, financial
institutions, on-line businesses, etc. to obtain credit card or other
identification information for individuals have launched countless
identity theft related crimes.
The impact is greater than just the loss of money or property. As
the victims of identity theft well know, it is a particularly invasive
crime that causes immeasurable damage to the victim's good name and
reputation in the community; damage that is not easily remedied.
Today, the threat is made graver by the fact that terrorists can
utilize identity theft as well as Social Security Number fraud to
enable them to obtain such things as cover employment and access to
secure locations. These and similar means can be utilized by terrorists
to obtain Driver's Licenses, and bank and credit card accounts through
which terrorism financing is facilitated. Terrorists and terrorist
groups require funding to perpetrate their terrorist agendas. The
methods used to finance terrorism range from the highly sophisticated
to the most basic. There is virtually no financing method that has not
at some level been exploited by these groups. Identity theft is a key
catalyst fueling many of these methods.
The crucial element in the acceptance of any form of identification
is the ability to verify the actual true identity of the bearer of the
identification. In today's post-9/11 world, this element is all the
more important because, in order to protect the American people, we
must be able to determine whether an individual is who they purport to
be. This is essential in our mission to identify potential terrorists,
locate their means of financial support, and prevent acts of terrorism
from occurring.
Foreign nationals who are present in the U.S. legally have the
ability to use various alternative forms of identification, most
notably a passport, for the purposes of opening bank accounts, gaining
access to federal facilities, boarding airplanes, and obtaining a state
driver's license. In addition, foreign nationals who are present in the
United States, either legally or illegally, have the ability to obtain
a passport from their own country's embassy or consular office.
The FBI is concerned about the issuance of driver's licenses by
states without adequate verification of identity. The criminal threats
stem from the fact that the driver's license can be a perfect "breeder"
document for establishing a false identity. The use of a false identity
can facilitate a variety of crimes, from money laundering to check
fraud. And of course, the false identity serves to conceal a criminal
who is already being sought by law enforcement. Such false identities
are particularly useful to facilitate the crime of money laundering, as
the criminal is able to establish one or more bank accounts under
completely fictitious names. Accounts based upon such fraudulent
premises greatly hamper money-laundering investigations once the
criminal activity is discovered. As the Committee is well aware, the
FBI is particularly concerned about fraudulent financial transactions
in the post 9/11 environment, given the fact that foreign terrorists
often rely on money transferred from within the United States.
The ability of an individual to create a well-documented, but
fictitious, identity in the United States provides an opportunity for
terrorists to move freely within the United States without triggering
name-based watch lists that are disseminated to federal, state and
local police officers. It also allows them to board planes without
revealing their true identity and in some cases purchase firearms. All
of these threats are in addition to the transfer of terrorist funds,
mentioned earlier.
The FBI, since 9/11/2001, has investigated numerous incidents where
terrorists have utilized false or stolen identifications. For example,
an Al-Qa'ida terrorist cell in Spain used stolen credit cards in
fictitious sales scams and for numerous other purchases for the cell.
They kept purchases below amounts where identification would be
presented. They also used stolen telephone and credit cards for
communications back to Pakistan, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and other
countries. Extensive use of false passports and travel documents were
used to open bank accounts where money for the mujahadin movement was
sent to and from countries such as Pakistan and Afghanistan.
While the 9/11 hijackers did not utilize fraudulent identification,
they did obtain US identification cards in their true names. These are
"legitimate" identification cards, but they are not issued by any state
or federal agency. Some of the vendors the hijackers received these
cards from were involved in fraudulent identification cases--they were
subsequently charged and arrested. In Virginia, some of the hijackers
used a loophole to apply for, and receive, legitimate state
identification cards and Driver's Licenses.
Investigation and interviews of detainees have included the
following instances of fraudulent documents and use of false
identification related to terrorism matters: (1) A Pakistani detainee
who served as a doctor and guard for the Taliban was detained at JFK
for attempting to enter the US on a forged passport; (2) An Iraqi
detainee purchased a false Moroccan passport for approximately $150.00
in US currency, and used it to enter Turkey where he was arrested; (3)
An Algerian detainee requested asylum in Canada after entering that
country on a false passport; (4) A Yemeni detainee acquired a false
Yemeni passport and was able to get a Pakistani visa; and (5) An
Algerian detainee obtained a French passport in an alias name and used
it to travel to London. The cost for this false passport was 3,000
French Francs (about $530 US, according to the Council of Economic
Advisors).
The FBI has seen other examples of document and identification
fraud in our investigations related to terrorism, to include: (1) the
April 2003 arrest of William Joseph Krar in Tyler, Texas. Krar is the
subject of a fraudulent identification matter, which was initiated in
August 2002 based upon information developed following the delivery of
a package of fake identification cards to the wrong address. The
package, which contained numerous false identifications, had been
mailed from Krar in Tyler, Texas to an individual in New Jersey, an
admitted member of the New Jersey Militia. The identities included a
Defense Intelligence Agency identification, a United Nations Observer
Badge and a Federal concealed weapons permit; (2) former Top Ten Most
Wanted fugitive Clayton Lee Waagner was found to have in his possession
fraudulent US Marshal's badges and a significant amount of equipment
for making fraudulent identification cards, in addition to bomb making
materials and large amounts of currency; and (3) The investigation of
the bombing of the Oklahoma City Murrah Federal Building was a
collaborative effort between by the FBI and many other federal, state,
and local law enforcement agencies. The evidence developed and
presented in court led to the convictions of both Timothy McVeigh and
Terry Nichols by two separate juries of their peers. McVeigh and
Nichols, like others planning to commit criminal acts, utilized
aliases. McVeigh was also known to utilize fraudulent identification.
The FBI has implemented a number of initiatives to address the
various fraud schemes being utilized by terrorists to fund their
terrorist activities. One involves targeting fraud schemes being
committed by loosely organized groups to conduct criminal activity with
a nexus to terrorist financing. The FBI has identified a number of such
groups made up of members of varying ethnic backgrounds, which are
engaged in widespread fraud activity. Members of these groups may not
themselves be terrorists, but proceeds from their criminal fraud
schemes have directly or indirectly been used to fund terrorist
activity and/or terrorist groups. By way of example, the terrorist
groups have siphoned off portions of proceeds being sent back to the
country from which members of the particular group emigrated. We
believe that targeting this type of activity and pursuing the links to
terrorist financing will likely result in the identification and
dismantlement of previously unknown terrorist cells. Prior to 9/11,
this type of terrorist financing often avoided law enforcement
scrutiny. No longer. The FBI will leave no stone unturned in our
mission to cut off the financial lifeblood of terrorists.
Another initiative has been the development of a multi-phase
project that seeks to identify potential terrorist related individuals
through Social Security Number misusage analysis. The Terrorist
Financing Operations Section of the FBI works with the Social Security
Administration's Office of the Inspector General for SSN verification.
Once the validity or non-validity of the number has been established,
investigators look for misuse of the SSNs by checking immigration
records, Department of Motor Vehicles records, and other military,
government and fee-based data sources. Incidents of suspect SSN
misusage are then separated according to type. Predicated investigative
packages are then forwarded to the appropriate investigative and
prosecutive entity for follow-up.
The events of 9/11 forever changed our world. As unpleasant as it
may be, we must face the realities of our current world as they relate
to protecting the people of the United States. This requires continual
vigilance, particularly when it comes to being able to detect and deter
those who might abuse the system to directly cause harm, or those who
might aid and abet the financing of terrorist operations.
I again want to thank you for your invitation to speak here today,
and on behalf of the FBI, look forward to working with you on this very
important topic.
Chairman Cox. Thank you very much for your statement.
Next, we have with us the United States Attorneys, both for
the Eastern District of Virginia and the District of Columbia,
who are exceptionally familiar with the problems that we are
discussing in the nation's capital area.
Welcome to both of you.
Mr. McNulty, you are recognized for your statement.
STATEMENT OF MR. PAUL J. McNULTY, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. McNulty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Turner. It is
great to be back in the House.
As I look at the cases that we are working on in my office,
the investigations, the prosecutions, I think it is clear that
terrorists need three things to operate: first, they need to
conceal or establish their identity; second, they need money to
operate and; third, they need an opportunity to strike.
So if we are going to prevent terrorism, if we are going to
disrupt, if we are going to try to be proactive rather than
just investigate cases after they occur, we need to focus
resources on those three areas. And that has to do with, again,
strengthening the integrity of our identification system,
making sure that funding doesn't flow to the terrorists or
scams by credit card bust-out schemes or other things aren't
used to support terrorists here.
And then third, we have to harden our targets. We have to
make sure that our airports, our military bases or ports are
not vulnerable and an opportunity to strike is not there. That
is how we have kind of organized our efforts in the Eastern
District of Virginia on the prevention side.
As has already been said, identification fraud and document
fraud is an enormous problem. Identification is on sale in the
streets of America. They can be purchased by criminals,
terrorists, anybody that wants to pose as someone else.
Thousands upon thousands of government identification
documents are produced or sold by fraud every month, including
state driver's licenses, identification cards, social security,
green cards, birth certificates, and U.S. passports. Some of
them are counterfeit; others are genuine government documents
that have been obtained through corruption or false statements.
All of them enable the holders to conceal their true
identity, or, as in the case of the hijackers to establish
themselves in a way that gives them more legitimacy.
For some reason, Virginia has become a hub of
identification and document fraud. We have more cases than we
could ever hope to prosecute; the problem is so widespread. We
have had a number of big cases recently.
We recently prosecuted an individual who was responsible
for acquiring labor certificates, certificates issued from the
Department of Labor that he would turn around and sell to
individuals for anywhere from $7,000 to $20,000 per
application. He sold over 2,700 fraudulent certificates. This
individual was convicted on 57 accounts of conspiracy, labor
certificate fraud, immigration fraud, and money laundering.
We had another case involving the Virginia Department of
Motor Vehicles and driver's license corruption and fraud. And
we had recently a large case where we prosecuted someone for
selling over one thousand per month false Virginia driver's
license and identification cards.
Recently we arrested and are in the process of prosecuting
another scheme involving labor certification, and in this case,
we have over 150 false applications and the charges there--two
of the applicants are anywhere from $10,000 to $50,000 per
application. That is just a small sample of the kinds of cases
that we are seeing and that we are trying to pursue.
And again, there is a lot of money in this. In the case of
Mr. Kooritzky with the nearly three thousand false labor
certifications there was more than $6 million seized and
forfeited in that case. We found over one million dollars in
cash under his bed.
Now, the question is, ``What are we doing about this,'' as
far as trying to get at the problem on a large-scale basis. And
in the Eastern District of Virginia we have formed a task
force, an Immigration and Visa Fraud Task Force, to try to
bring together the resources from many different agencies,
because the problem is so great, that no one agency has the
authority or the resources to take on the problem.
And in my testimony I have all of the agencies who are
involved in our task force. We meet about once a month in the
office and we identify the cases that are the most important
ones to pursue and we try to pull together the combined efforts
to be most effective.
And so, I am happy to discuss in more detail this task
force approach, which I think, is a model for how we can be
effective in this area across the country.
And I thank you for your time.
[The statement of Mr. McNulty follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. PAUL J. McNULTY, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: As the United States
Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, I am privileged to serve
the public and to lead a talented staff in a district on the front
lines of the war against terrorism. It is also my privilege to appear
before you today to discuss the significant problem identification
document fraud poses for our national security.
I. Scope of the Problem
Identification document fraud is a serious, national problem.
Simply put, identities are for sale on America's streets--to criminals,
to terrorists, to anyone who wants to pose as someone else. Thousands
upon thousands of government identification documents are produced or
sold by fraud every month, including state drivers licenses and
identification cards, Social Security cards, green cards, birth
certificates, and U.S. passports. Some of these documents are
counterfeit; others are genuine government documents that have been
obtained through corruption or false statements. All of them enable
holders to conceal their real identity and where they really come from.
Unfortunately, identification document fraud has become widespread
in Northern Virginia. People from all over the United States come here
to obtain fraudulent identification. In just the past three years, my
office has investigated and prosecuted a string of identification
document frauds of a size we rarely, if ever, saw before. To give a few
examples:
Samuel G. Kooritzky of Vienna, Virginia, was convicted in
March on 57 counts of conspiracy, labor certification fraud,
immigration fraud and money laundering. Mr. Kooritzky, who practiced
law in Virginia, Maryland and the District of Columbia, filed false
applications for alien employment certificates with the U.S. Department
of Labor. These certificates allow immigrants to apply for a green card
to live and work in the United States. Mr. Kooritzky filed over 2,700
fraudulent applications within an 18 month time frame. He charged
between $7,000 and $20,000 per application.
Jennifer Wrenn, a notary public and owner of a realty
company in Northern Virginia, was convicted in August 2001 for selling
fraudulent Virginia drivers licenses and identification cards to
illegal immigrants from all over the United States. At its height, this
operation sold fraudulent documents to over 1,000 aliens a month. After
a year-long investigation, Ms. Wrenn and thirteen of her associates,
including a lawyer, were convicted of various crimes, including
identification document fraud, money laundering, and encouraging
illegal immigration. Several of the defendants, including Ms. Wrenn,
her husband, and the lawyer, were sent to prison; many of the rest were
deported.
Most recently, Steven Y. Lee, Jordan N. Baker, and Byung
Chul Kim were charged in August with filing fraudulent applications for
alien employment certifications with the United States Department of
Labor. Lee and Baker are alleged to have prepared and submitted
applications they knew contained false information and forgeries on
behalf of many different employers and immigrants. In particular, they
are suspected of colluding with local employers--one of whom was Kim--
to file applications seeking immigrant workers for jobs the employers
did not have and did not intend to fill. Lee and Baker sold these
applications to Korean immigrants who would then use the approved
applications to obtain employment authorizations but would never work
for the sponsoring employer. Lee and Baker charged the illegal
immigrants between $10,000 and $50,000 per application, a portion of
which fee Lee and Baker paid as a kickback to the cooperating employer.
Of the 150 applications known to have been submitted by these
defendants, the vast majority are believed to be fraudulent.
Our Office's prosecution of Ousmane Sow and Aboubakar
Doumbia for Social Security fraud illustrates how easily Social
Security cards are obtained by fraud and how widespread the abuse is.
Sow and Doumbia were caught at Reagan National Airport in transit from
New York to Miami. They were traveling on tickets paid for with stolen
credit cards and were found to be carrying a dozen foreign passports
and two dozen stolen immigration forms. Both men were charged with
immigration fraud and pled guilty prior to trial. Interestingly, both
had fraudulent Virginia identification cards even though they lived in
New York.
One of the two men agreed to cooperate with the government and
revealed the purpose of their trip to Miami. He and his accomplice were
part of a West African criminal syndicate based in New York City. This
syndicate specialized in the fraudulent procurement of Social Security
cards and, to a lesser extent, the fraudulent procurement of Virginia
drivers licenses and identification cards. Members of the syndicate
repeatedly traveled from New York to major cities in the United States
on tickets paid for with stolen credit cards. The purpose of the trips
was to apply for Social Security cards by fraud at the Social Security
Administration offices in each city. At each office, the members of the
syndicate would apply for a card using a passport and an INS form.\1\
The members of the syndicate altered the passports by substituting
their own photographs so that they could apply in person for a Social
Security card in the name of one of the syndicate's clients (to whom
the passport actually belonged). They further placed doctored INS forms
in the client's passport to make it appear that they, the applicants,
were lawfully in the United States and had the right to work. In fact,
their clients were illegal immigrants in New York and New Jersey who
paid the syndicate between $700 and $1,500 for a Social Security card.
Members of the syndicate obtained well over a thousand fraudulent
Social Security cards.
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\1\ The form used was an INS form I-94, which is a record of
authorized entry.
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airport Security Task Force: After September 11, 2001, the
Department of Transportation (DOT) became concerned that large numbers
of employees at National and Dulles airports had obtained their airport
secure area access badges by fraud or misrepresentation. A task force
was convened to investigate all 28,000 badge holders. In the end,
approximately 120 of them were charged with various crimes, including
making false statements, Social Security fraud, and immigration fraud.
Another twenty badge holders were arrested by INS (now part of DHS's
Bureau of Immigrations and Customs Enforcement) on administrative
charges.
These cases, and many others like them, demonstrate that
identification document fraud is pervasive. If a person is willing to
pay the price, he or she can obtain fraudulent identification for any
purpose, no questions asked. These cases also reveal that
identification document fraud is big business. Kooritzky made no less
than $6,300,000 in the space of eighteen months, including $1,000,000
in cash seized from a suitcase under a co-conspirators's bed. It is
also easy: many defendants have told us that they bought their Social
Security cards and green cards on the street for as little as $50.
II. Relevance to Homeland Security
Identification document fraud directly undermines our homeland
security. It also creates huge holes in our immigration and
naturalization controls; it enables terrorists to enter and remain in
our country; and it facilitates crime--crime such as credit card fraud,
mortgage fraud, and bank fraud, the proceeds of which can be used to
support sleeper cells or finance large-scale terrorist attacks in this
country.
Fraud involving state drivers licenses is of a particular concern.
Drivers licenses are a primary source of identification and a mainstay
of daily life in this country. With a drivers license, you may drive a
car, board an airplane, and purchase a handgun. You may open bank
accounts, buy alcohol, and obtain credit cards. In addition, although a
driver's license is not evidence of lawful residence in the United
States, it may be perceived as such. In short, the integrity of state
drivers licenses is critical to our commerce and our national security.
Given the importance of drivers licenses and other government
identification documents, we cannot afford to ignore serious
identification fraud. Widespread fraud in government programs is simply
bad government and should be vigorously fought as a matter of
principle. No one benefits when state and federal programs are
routinely abused. In addition, identification document fraud undermines
public confidence in government, particularly our ability to protect
the national security. We cannot restore public trust in our
immigration and border controls if fraudulent green cards, drivers
licenses, and Social Security cards remain available to anyone with
cash to buy them. This sort of fraud presents terrorists and other
serious criminals with an easy way to gain entry to the United States.
Most important, identification document fraud facilitates
terrorism. Seven of the September 11th hijackers \2\ obtained genuine
Virginia drivers licenses by submitting false proof of Virginia
residency to the DMV.\3\ One of the seven was involved in the failed
attempt to fly Flight 93 into a target here in the Washington, D.C.,
area; two were aboard the airplanes that crashed into the World Trade
Center; and four were aboard Flight 77 when it was flown into the
Pentagon. None of the seven lived in Virginia. Rather, they made a
special trip to Virginia, because they knew they could get a genuine
drivers license in one day for approximately $100 in cash with no
questions asked. And although we will never know for sure, we strongly
suspect that these seven hijackers intentionally used their Virginia
drivers licenses to board the flights they hijacked to avoid the
scrutiny a foreign passport would bring.
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\2\ The seven were Hani Hanjour, Khalid Almihdhar, Majed Moqed,
Salem Alhazmi, Abdulaziz Alomari, Ahmed Alghamdi, and Ziad Jarrah.
\3\ Since September 11, 2001, this Office has prosecuted four
individuals who helped the hijackers complete fraudulent forms and
submit them to the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles (``DMV''). All
four were charged with and pled guilty to identification document
fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1028. In addition, this Office
has used 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1028 to prosecute several people who came to
our attention through the 9/11 investigation, either due to their
contacts with the hijackers or because of their presence near Dulles
airport on September 11th with flight manuals. We also prosecuted two
men who ran a checkpoint at the Pentagon in a tow truck in February of
this year. In each of these cases, the defendant submitted false
information to the Virginia DMV to obtain a Virginia identification
card or license for himself or another by fraud.
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II. Challenges Law Enforcement Faces in Combating the Problem
The Administration is working to address identity theft on a
collaborative basis. The Departments of Justice and Homeland Security,
the Federal Trade Commission, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, and
other agencies are all working hard to combat this problem.
Unfortunately, however, as the last few years have shown,
immigration and identification fraud is flourishing in this country.
First, there are simply too many large-scale frauds to investigate all
of them. Second, we have recognized the need for improved coordination
among the agencies with jurisdiction to investigate document fraud
offenses. Many different federal and state agencies have authority to
investigate these crimes, but they rarely coordinate their efforts
beyond a given case.
There are a number of additional steps we can take to fight
identification document fraud more effectively and to improve our
homeland security. First, we can ensure that federal law enforcement
agencies have the authority to investigate all forms of identification
document fraud, from Social Security cards to employment authorizations
to airport security badges. Together with state law enforcement,
federal agencies could pursue a truly national effort to combat
identification document fraud.
Second, we must improve coordination among the many federal and
state agencies with authority to investigate the various forms of
identification document fraud. Given the extent of the fraud we face,
no one federal agency can be expected to tackle the problem alone. As a
preliminary matter, the number and scale of the frauds are simply too
much for one agency. Furthermore, most of the large frauds involve
multiple government programs and cut across agency jurisdictions and
state lines. For example, we often find that the same document vendor
who sells fraudulent state drivers licenses also sells fraudulent
Social Security cards and green cards. In such a case, it is essential
that the investigation involve agents from the state motor vehicle
agency, the Social Security Administration's Office of the Inspector
General, and the Department of Homeland Security.
Third, we should review our procedures that govern the issuance of
identification documents to ensure they are effective. Our prosecutions
of large immigration and identification document frauds have revealed
that the underlying regulatory and adjudicatory processes invite much
of the abuse. There are too many unintended loopholes and too few
efforts to identify and deter fraudulent applications. In short, our
own procedures may sometimes make it easy for the unscrupulous to
defraud the government. As a result, we must place as much emphasis on
reviewing the underlying programs as we do on prosecuting crimes
against those programs.
To be effective, the steps I have just outlined will need to be
pursued at a national level, but the same principles work at the local
level. In my district, for example, we quickly realized that
identification document fraud was one of the most significant threats
to our homeland security in the wake of September 11. We also realized
that the conventional model of investigating and prosecuting these
cases was not capable of dealing with the problem. In response, we
created the Immigration and Visa Task Force early this year
specifically to address immigration and identification document fraud.
The purpose of the task force is to create a standing group of
agents and prosecutors to identify, investigate, and prosecute large
immigration, visa, and identification document frauds. The primary aims
of the task force are (1) to restore integrity to the nation's
immigration and identification document controls and (2) to prevent
terrorists and criminals from entering and residing in the United
States.
The basic idea behind the task force is to bring agents from the
various agencies with the relevant enforcement powers together with
prosecutors to target and prosecute the bigger frauds in our area for
maximum effect. These frauds require substantial resources and time,
but provide great deterrence because of the publicity and length of
sentences they generate. The task force also pursues forfeiture as a
further deterrent. This too requires a good deal of investigation, but
is well worth the effort (e.g., the government obtained $6.3 million in
forfeiture in the Kooritzky case).
The task force meets approximately once a month at the United
States Attorney's Office and is chaired by an Assistant United States
Attorney. At each meeting, the members of the task force review the
status of existing cases, examine new leads, and discuss practices or
problems that deserve investigation. The members of the task force are
(1) United States Attorney's Office;
(2) Department of Homeland Security--U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement;
(3) Department of Homeland Security--Secret Service;
(4) Department of Homeland Security--U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services ;
(5) DOJ--FBI;
(6) DOJ--Office of Inspector General;
(7) Department of Labor;
(8) Department of State;
(9) Social Security Administration, Office of the Inspector
General;
(10) IRS;
(11) US Postal Inspection Service;
(12) Virginia DMV;
(13) Fairfax County Police Department; and,
(14) Metropolitan Washington Area Airport Police.
The participating agencies have worked well together, and the task
force has already brought two large frauds to a close.
That concludes my testimony, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to answer
any question you may have.
Chairman Cox. Thank you very much.
Roscoe C. Howard, Jr. is the United States attorney for the
District of Columbia, also exceptionally familiar with the
things that were described by the National Capital area. Thank
you very much for being here.
I know, in fact, that your work has come to the attention
of Representative Eleanor Holmes Norton, and is one of the
reasons that we are having this hearing. So I appreciate your
being here today.
STATEMENT OF MR. ROSCOE HOWARD, JR., U.S. ATTORNEY FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Mr. Howard. I appreciate the opportunity to come and
testify. And I am also thanking members of the committee, and I
would especially like to thank Representative Eleanor Holmes
Norton, not only for her leadership, but focusing all of our
efforts on this problem.
D.C. is like a lot of cities where there is a high
concentration of illegal immigrants. The business of
counterfeit identification documents just thrives here.
Since 1998, our office has been working aggressively with a
number of law enforcement offices. The Bureau of Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, MPD, the FBI, Social Security
Administration, the U.S. Postal Service, IRS, the Secret
Service, the Diplomatic Security Service, out of the Department
of State and the Department of Labor.
We get together to try to figure out exactly how we are
going to fight this menace posed by the manufacturing and
distribution of false and fraudulent documents. Now what we
have done is our office has conducted four major operations
focusing primarily on the Adams Morgan section of the city,
where we probably have our most diverse population.
These investigations have resulted in dozens of convictions
of manufacturers and distributors of false documents. One of
our most recent that you have heard referred to, Operation Card
Shark, was actually in response to complaints from the
community. These gentlemen that were operating, women and
gentlemen, was basically an open-air market up in the Northwest
section. We used Federal agents and MPD agents to make
observations, to secure warrants and then we executed those
warrants.
And what we recovered were just a number of blank documents
for making green cards and social security cards, as well as
equipment for laminating. We also were able to identify the
kingpin, a gentleman by the name of Soloman Gonzalez-Gonzalez.
We identified him as the owner of the equipment and the owner
of the mills. What we do know is a lot of the documents that he
was getting were actually being imported from California, where
they were made. We ended up with a number of sentences that
ranged from about 27 months up to Mr. Gonzalez's 52 months that
he received on July 15th.
In another recent case, Calvin McCants, the owner of a
false document-making factory in the 2100 block of P Street
N.W. recently entered a guilty plea to possession of false
document-making implements. And depending on the court's
decision on the monetary loss, Mr. McCants is facing somewhere
between 27 months and 63 months and he will be sentenced later
this month in October.
But in executing search warrants, while what we found in
the defendants' offices and storage facilities in Washington
and throughout this area were a wide variety of document-making
equipment, including blank and finished passports, military
identification, driver's licenses from almost all 50 states,
birth certificates, access devices, other official
documentation and pamphlets such as ``New I.D.s in America''
and ``How to Make Driver's Licenses and Other I.D.s.'' These
are just a couple of examples of what our office is doing, as
many of the offices, including Mr. McNulty's, are doing across
the country.
This year alone, we have initiated about 40 false document
cases involving a huge number of defendants. Now as we address
these--when we first started addressing this well before 9/11,
our office was addressing them, they started off as identity
and theft issues, but after 9/11, it is clear that they also
become critical to looking at the terrorism issue.
Often in terrorism what we are doing is looking for a
needle in a haystack, but that is what our jobs are and that is
what we intend to. Our efforts will continue, we will work with
law enforcement to get this, but one thing that is clear, as I
go through these cases, is that law enforcement alone cannot
accomplish of reducing the probability that there could be
another terrorist attack.
I think that we as a government need to think
constructively about not only how we design our identification
documents, but how we issue those identification documents. And
in addition, our office and certainly the Department of Justice
is keenly interested in exploring legislative improvements in
this area. For example, the department strongly supports H.R.
1731, the Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act, which is
pending before the Judiciary Committee.
I want to again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today, and as everybody else, I will be
glad to answer questions.
[The statement of Mr. Howard follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROSCOE C. HOWARD, JR.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I appreciate the
opportunity testify today on the threat to national security posed by
false and fraudulent identification documents. I would like to express
my appreciation to Representative Eleanor Holmes Norton, who has
focused attention on this important issue and continues to seek
resources to help combat this problem at the local level.
The District of Columbia is a diverse city of over 570,000
residents. We have people from countries all over the world who bring a
rich diversity to our communities and neighborhoods. Many of our
residents emigrate here legally, following in the footsteps of our
forefathers. However, many others, in the District and across the
country, are not here lawfully or have allowed their legal status to
lapse. In cities where there is a high concentration of illegal
immigrants, the business of counterfeit identification documents
thrives. The District of Columbia is no exception. Illegal ``document
mills'' provide a variety of identification documents to their
customers, including green cards, social security cards, driver's
licenses, and passports.
Since 1998, the United States Attorney's Office for the District of
Columbia has been working aggressively with our local and federal law
enforcement partners to combat the menace posed by the manufacture and
distribution of false and fraudulent identification documents. We have
conducted four major operations focusing primarily on document mills in
the Adams Morgan section of the city, which have resulted in the
conviction of dozens of manufacturers and distributors of false alien
registration cards and social security cards. The most recent of these
is Operation Card Shark,\1\ which resulted in the sentencing on July 15
of kingpin Salomon Gonzalez-Gonzalez, (aka Angel Marques, aka El Virus)
to an aggregate of 52 months in prison for conspiracy to distribute
false documents, distribution of false documents, possession of
document-making implements, possession with intent to distribute more
than five documents, and re-entering the country illegally after
deportation. Aspects of this investigation are on-going.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The earlier operations were named Southside (1998-2000),
Operation Mica Maker (2000-2001) Identity Crisise (2000-2001). ``Mica''
is a Spanish word for a government-issued identification card.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operation Card Shark started in response to complaints from the
community about document vendors in the area of Columbia Road, N.W.
between 16th and 18th Streets. Agents from the Bureau of Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (BICE) conducted surveillance, obtained search
warrants, and seized hundreds of blank documents as well as equipment
for making false cards. Forensic examination of these items revealed
Gonzalez-Gonzalez's fingerprints at several locations. Further
investigation revealed that Gonzalez-Gonzalez purchased and owned the
equipment in the document mills, hired other illegal aliens to sell
counterfeit documents, and paid them and the workers in the mills based
on the number of sales. Consequently, he was regarded as the boss and
was sentenced accordingly.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Six other members of the conspiracy were sentenced to periods
of incarceration of up to 27 months. Related cases against eight co-
conspirators are pending.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In another recent case, Calvin McCants, the owner of a false
document-making factory in the 2100 block of P Street, N.W., entered a
guilty plea to possession of false document-making implements.
Depending on the court's decision on the monetary loss attributable to
the defendant, he could face up to 27 months or 63 months when he is
sentenced later this month. The defendant's plea followed the execution
of three search warrants at defendant's offices and storage facilities.
In the first, the U.S. Secret Service's Financial Crimes Task Force
found: a scanner; a lamination machine and laminated sheets; a corner
rounder (for cutting corners off cards); a color laser-printer; a
cutting board; metal seal presses (used to emboss raised seals on
official documents for several jurisdictions, including the District of
Columbia); computers; computer discs containing templates for official
identification documents (such as passports, military identifications,
driver's licenses, and birth certificates); driver's licenses from
several states and the District; access devices in the same names as
the driver's licenses; and other finished and unfinished identification
documents. The second and third searches, at different locations,
netted a number of documents bearing McCant's photograph but other
names, along with other equipment and documents. Pamphlets entitled
``New ID's in America,'' ``How to make driver's licenses and other ID's
on your home computer,'' and ``2000 ID checking guide'' were also
found.
These are two examples of the efforts that we have been undertaking
to curb trafficking in false and fraudulent identification documents.
Other initiatives include prosecuting those who commit passport and
visa fraud, arrange sham marriages for immigration purposes, obtain
false labor certificates, and use false social security numbers on
employment documents. In 2003, we have had over 40 cases of this nature
involving a larger number of defendants. We have worked closely with
BICE and its predecessor, the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
the Metropolitan Police Department, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Social Security Administration, the U.S. Postal
Inspection Service, the Internal Revenue Service, the United States
Secret Service, and the Departments of State and Labor.
What we used to address only as immigration or identity theft
issues has become critically more important as a terrorism issue. Those
who are bent on undermining our society and destroying our government
are adept at using false and fraudulent identification documents that
allow them to move easily across borders and within our country.
So the efforts we have undertaken--and will continue to undertake--
to combat counterfeit identification documents need to be doubled and
re-doubled. Law enforcement alone, however, cannot accomplish the goal
of reducing the probability that terrorists can obtain and use false
identification documents to advance their cause. We need to think
constructively about how we design and issue identification documents
that are less susceptible to counterfeiting. We have made changes in
our currency in recent years for this purpose, and we may need to make
changes in other official documents. It is a more complicated task, I
know.
The federal government has a leadership role to play in developing
and promoting new technology and in assisting the states and the
District of Columbia to use such technology to reduce the probability
that identification documents can be created in illegal document mills.
In addition, we are very interested in exploring legislative
improvements in this area. For example, the Department strongly
supports H.R. 1731, the ``Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act,''
which is pending in the Judiciary Committee. I note that the Senate
passed an identical bill, S. 153, by unanimous vote on March 19, 2003.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I would be pleased
to answer any questions you might have.
Chairman Cox. Thank you very much for that testimony.
Our next witness is Joseph R. Carico, who is the Chief
Deputy Attorney General from the Commonwealth of Virginia.
Thank you very much for joining us, and as I said in our
opening statement, thank you, the attorney general, the
governor and the legislature of Virginia for moving so swiftly
to correct the problems that we identified.
STATEMENT OF MR. JOSEPH CARICO, CHIEF DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Mr. Carico. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member,
members of the committee, thank you for allowing us to be here
today.
I represent the Attorney General of Virginia, Jerry
Kilgore, and he sends his greetings and thanks for letting our
office be represented as you discuss these important security
and safety concerns of all Americans.
The hijackers of 9/11 had many different things in common;
one of the main things is that they had an intense hatred for
America and everything that we stand for. Seven of those
terrorists as has been pointed out today also shared another
characteristic; seven of those terrorists had Virginia driver's
licenses or identification.
It is a sad fact that our Commonwealth had become known in
the terrorist community as an easy place to obtain state
driver's licenses or state identification cards. And this is a
lapse in security in Virginia that we sought to rectify.
A valid driver's license, as you all know, is a passport to
all sorts of places and behavior, including of course, boarding
airplanes. Attorney General Kilgore recognized that fact and
set out to rectify that with members of our General Assembly
and they sought legislation that tightens the controls on the
issuance of Virginia driver's licenses. Now, in order to obtain
a Virginia driver's license, a person must show proof that they
are either a United States citizen or that they have legal
presence in this country.
There are provisions that have been made for individuals
who have immigration situations pending. United States
citizens, green card holders, resident aliens or others, such
as individuals who sought political or religious asylum may
still obtain Virginia driver's licenses. They must simply
document their lawful status now.
In addition, if a person is in this country with a legal
immigration document, his driver's license issued will expire
on the same day as the applicant's authorization to be in the
United States. We recognize that it made no sense at all to
issue a Virginia driver's license for 5 years if that person's
authorization to be in this country was for only 2 years.
The new law also says that if you illegally obtained a
driver's license then you are guilty of a Class Six felony,
which in our state, brings a prison term of 5 years and a $2500
fine. Of course, identity must also be proven still in Virginia
to receive a Virginia driver's license.
Every 16 year old who goes and gets their license now has
to still prove that they are who they say they are. We have
experienced firsthand, in Virginia, what could happen when
people are not held to high standards and required to show
proof of identity and legal presence in this country.
Other states may have taken different actions, but in
Virginia we suffered one of those attacks on that dark day in
September.
We are proud to be working with Congressman Eric Cantor of
the 7th District of Virginia. He has been carrying legislation
that is very similar to ours here in Congress, and clearly
recognizes the public's safety concerns that we all share.
On another front of identity theft, Attorney General
Kilgore passed another law, known as the Identity Theft
Protection Act which cracks down on the crime of identity
theft.
Now there are also the financial costs associated with the
crime of identity theft, but in the worst cases of identity
theft people are arrested for crimes committed by others who
have stolen their identities. In drafting the legislation we
started a state-wide Identity Theft Task Force and the U.S.
Attorney Paul McNulty was a member of that task force.
One of the worst stories we heard was from a Virginia
resident from Southeast Virginia named Angel Gonzalez, Jr. Mr.
Gonzalez had his identity stolen by an illegal immigrant who
then went on a multi-state crime spree committing crimes in his
name; his nightmare culminating when he was arrested in front
of his children for crimes that he did not commit.
General Kilgore and the General Assembly sought to rectify
this and they created Identity Theft Passport Program, which I
can go into further if I am asked about that by any of the
members of the committee. The law also makes it a crime to
steal an identity of a dead person or to impersonate a law
enforcement officer for the purpose of stealing an identity.
The law also requires that credit bureaus take notice that
someone who was a victim of identity theft has filed a report
with the police.
Finally, and importantly, the legislation limits the
availability of social security numbers on state documents in a
variety of ways, including removing the numbers from state
employee I.D. cards, or student I.D. cards, and removing the
numbers from the outside of state mailings like tax forms. It
also allows the clerks of our circuit courts to refuse accept
documents for public recordation that unnecessarily contain
social security numbers.
In these ways we can better protect our consumers, provide
greater security and go after the criminals who would commit
these crimes. Now, would it have changed the events of 9/11 if
we had had these laws in place then? We have no way to know
that; we will never know that. But we do know that we would
have now made it harder and more difficult for those to board
airplanes and turn them into guided missiles.
We are pleased the Virginia General Assembly sought to pass
these pieces of legislation and we believe we have made our
driver's licenses more secure and building greater protection
against the security threat of identity theft.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to be here today.
[The statement of Mr. Carico follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. JOSEPH R. CARICO
Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ranking Member. Members of the
Committee.
Thank you for allowing me to be here with you this morning. My name
is Joseph R. Carico, and I am the Chief Deputy Attorney General for the
Commonwealth of Virginia.
I represent the Attorney General of Virginia, Jerry Kilgore. He is
unable to be here this afternoon, but sends his greetings and his
thanks for allowing our office to be represented as this committee
discusses what I believe to be very important ideas for the safety of
Americans everywhere.
On the morning of September 11, 2001, nineteen hijackers boarded
four airplanes with the intent of flying them into buildings and
killing as many Americans as possible. The nineteen men had many things
in common, among them an intense hatred for America and everything it
stands for.
But seven of the terrorists also shared one other characteristic--
hey all possessed Virginia Driver' Licenses or ID cards.
It is a sad fact that our Commonwealth had become known in the
terrorist community as a place you could go to easily obtain a valid
driver' license or official state Identification card as a foreign
national.
This was a lapse in security that we in Virginia vowed we would
never allow to happen again.
A valid driver' license is a passport to all sorts of places and
behaviors--including, of course, boarding airplanes.
Attorney General Kilgore recognized this fact and set out to do
something about it. With two members of the Virginia General Assembly
as patrons--Senator Jay O'Brien of Fairfax and Delegate Dave Albo of
Springfield--General Kilgore sponsored legislation that tightens the
controls on the issuance of Virginia driver's licenses.
Now, in order to obtain a driver's license, a person must provide
appropriate documentation that he is either a United States citizen, or
is otherwise legally present in this country. There are provisions made
for those individuals who have immigration situations pending, such as
in the case of someone with a pending application for asylum or
protected status.
United States citizens, green card holders, resident aliens, or
others, such as individuals who have sought political or religious
asylum may all obtain Virginia driver's licenses. They must simply
document their lawful status.
In addition, if a person is in this country with a legal
immigration document, the driver's license issued will expire on the
same day as the applicant's authorization to be in the United States.
We recognized that it made no sense at all to issue driver's
licenses that are valid for five years, while the applicant might only
be authorized to be in the country for two years.
The new law says that if you illegally obtain a driver's license,
you are guilty of a class 6 felony, which carries a penalty of up to
five years in prison and a fine of up to $2,500.
The fact of the matter is, identity must be proven routinely at our
DMV offices. Every sixteen year old in Virginia, when he gets his first
driver's license, must show that he is who he says he is--with a birth
certificate or a passport.
We have experienced first hand what can happen when people are not
held to high standards and required to show proof of legal presence in
this country.
Other states may have taken different action, but in Virginia, we
suffered one of the attacks of that dark day more than two years ago.
Simply put, in Virginia, we learned our lesson . . . and we do not
feel that it is too much to ask for people to obey the laws of our
society before they take advantage of what our society has to offer.
We are proud to have been working with Congressman Eric Cantor of
the 7th District of Virginia.
He has been carrying legislation that is very similar to ours here
in Congress and clearly recognizes the public safety concerns that we
address here today.
Identity Theft
Attorney General Kilgore pushed another new law, known as the
Identity Theft Protection Act, which cracks down on the crime of
Identity Theft.
There are, of course, financial costs to Identity Theft, as the
crime costs merchants, banks, credit card companies and others billions
of dollars a year nationwide. Many times victims have spent as many as
400 hours cleaning up the mess in their credit histories. In the worst
cases, people were arrested for crimes committed by others who had
stolen their identities.
In drafting the legislation, we launched a statewide Identity Theft
Task Force. One of the worst stories we heard was from a man in
Southeast Virginia named Angel Gonzalez.
Mr. Gonzalez had his identity stolen by an illegal immigrant who
then went on a multi-state crime spree--committing crimes in his name.
Mr. Gonzalez's nightmare culminated when he was arrested in front
of his children for crimes committed by the Identity thief.
Also in the Tidewater area of Virginia, police have broken up a
major crime gang because the Norfolk police made a routine Identity
Theft check.
Twenty-three people have no been arrested across the country as
part of the crime ring, which is based in Los Angeles, but is spread
throughout many states.
These are stories that involve theft, fraud and other crimes. But
it is easy to imagine that someone who wanted to slip through the
cracks in this country could easily just commandeer someone else's good
name.
That's why we created an Identity Theft Passport Program within the
Attorney General's Office. These Passports will be issued to people who
have documented that they are victims of Identity Theft--to shield them
from false arrest and to tell creditors that they did not ring up the
bogus charges.
The bill also tightens the laws regarding Identity Theft by making
it a crime to steal the identity of a dead person . . . or to
impersonate a law enforcement officer for the purpose of stealing an
identity. The bill also requires that credit bureaus take note that
someone who is a victim has filed a police report.
Finally, the legislation limits the availability of Social Security
Numbers on state documents in a variety of ways--including, removing
the numbers from state employee IDs or student IDs . . . and removing
the numbers from the outside of state mailings, such as tax forms. It
also allows the Clerks of Circuit Courts to refuse to accept documents
for public recordation that unnecessarily contain Social Security
Numbers.
In these ways we can better protect our consumers . . . provide
greater security . . . and go after the criminals who would commit
these crimes.
Now, if we had had these laws in place two years ago, would we have
prevented the events of September 11, 2001?
There is no way to know that.
We know these were determined men . . . determined to kill
Americans and strike a blow for their cause.
No, we will never know if we could have completely prevented it.
But we do know that we may have made it more difficult for them to
board those airplanes and turn them into guided missiles.
I am pleased that the General Assembly saw fit to pass our two
pieces legislation. I believe we have made our driver's licenses more
secure . . . and built in greater protection against the security
threat of Identity Theft.
Thank you for allowing me to be here today.
Chairman Cox. Thank you for that testimony.
Mr. Malfi is here representing the General Accounting
Office.
In fact, GAO's work in this area which has come to the
attention of this committee and to Congress as one of the bases
for this hearing. We are very concerned about what GAO has
discovered nationwide as part of, if not a 50 state pattern,
then a too-often repeating pattern. And we look forward to your
testimony.
STATEMENT OF MR. RONALD MALFI, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SPECIAL
INVESTIGATIONS, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Mr. Malfi. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for
the opportunity to testify today about how homeland security is
vulnerable to identity fraud.
Today, counterfeit identification is easily produced and
used to create fraudulent identities. Tests we have performed
over the past 3 years demonstrate that counterfeit
identification documents can be used to enter the United
States, purchase firearms, gain access to government buildings
and other facilities, obtain genuine identification for both
fictitious and stolen identities and obtain social security
numbers for fictitious identities.
In conducting these tests we created fictitious identities
and counterfeit identification documents such as driver's
licenses, birth certificates and social security cards. We did
this using inexpensive computer software and hardware that are
readily available to any purchaser.
Our work shows how security vulnerabilities can be
exploited. From July 2002 to May 2003 we counterfeited state
driver's licenses and birth certificates with fictitious names
and used them to enter the United States from the Western
hemispheres, countries including Jamaica, Barbados, Mexico and
Canada. Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement staff
never questioned the authenticity of the counterfeit documents
and our investigators encountered no difficult entering the
country using them.
Second, counterfeit drivers' licenses can be used to
purchase firearms. Between October 2000 and February 2001 we
used counterfeit driver's licenses with fictitious identifiers
to purchase firearms from licensed dealers in five states:
Virginia, West Virginia, Montana, New Mexico and Arizona.
When we purchased these firearms, the majority of the
firearms dealers we dealt with complied with the laws governing
such purchases, including instant background checks required by
Federal law. However, an instant background check only
discloses whether the prospective purchaser is a person whose
possession of a firearm would be unlawful. Consequently, if the
prospective purchaser is using a fictitious identity, as we
did, an instant background check is not effective.
Third, counterfeit identification can be used to gain
access to Federal buildings and other facilities. In March 2002
we breached the security of four Federal office buildings in
the Atlanta area using counterfeit law enforcement credentials
to obtain genuine building passes, which we then counterfeited.
We were also able to obtain building passes that authorized
us to carry firearms in the building. As a result, several
investigators, including one carrying a briefcase suitable for
carrying firearms, bypassed the magnetometers and x-ray
machines using the counterfeit building passes. Then they were
able to move freely throughout the buildings during the day and
evening hours. In April and May of 2000, we similarly gained
access to numerous Federal buildings in Washington D.C. that
contained the offices of cabinet secretaries or agency heads.
Finally, we easily obtained social security numbers for
fictitious names. We used counterfeit identification documents
to obtain valid social security numbers from the Social
Security Administration for two fictitious infants. In
addition, we visited two states and obtained authentic but
fraudulent driver's licenses using the names, social security
numbers and date of birth of individuals listed on the Social
Security's publicly available master death file.
The master death file contains the names, social security
numbers and dates of birth of deceased individuals. The motor
vehicle departments in two of the states we visited are among
those that rely solely on visual verification of identification
documents and do not compare the information on licenses
applications with the Social Security Agency's master death
file.
Our work leads us to three basic conclusions. One:
government officials and others generally did not recognize
that documents we presented were counterfeit. Two: that many
government officials were not alert to the possibility of
identity fraud and some failed to follow security procedures.
And three: identity verification procedures are inadequate.
While some of the problems revealed in our tests have been
addressed by the responsible agencies, much remains to be done.
The driver's license is the most commonly accepted document
used for identification. The weaknesses we found during this
investigation clearly shows that border inspectors, motor
vehicle departments and firearm dealers need to have a means to
verify the identity and authenticate the driver's licenses that
are presented to them.
In addition, government officials who review identification
need additional training in recognizing counterfeit documents.
Further, those officials also need to be more vigilant when
searching for identification fraud.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Malfi follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. RONALD D. MALFI
Identification Documents Fraud and the Implications for Homeland
Security
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today about how homeland
security is vulnerable to identity fraud. Today, counterfeit
identification is easily produced and used to create fraudulent
identities. Tests we have performed over the past 3 years demonstrate
that counterfeit identification documents can be used to
enter the United States,
purchase firearms,
gain access to government buildings and other facilities,
obtain genuine identification for both fictitious and
stolen identities, and
obtain social security numbers for fictitious identities.
In conducting these tests, we created fictitious identities and
counterfeit identification documents, such as driver's licenses, birth
certificates, and social security cards. We did this using inexpensive
computer software and hardware that are readily available to any
purchaser.
Our work shows how security vulnerabilities can be exploited. From
July, 2002, through May, 2003, we counterfeited state driver's licenses
and birth certificates, with fictitious names and used them to enter
the United States from Western Hemisphere countries, including Jamaica,
Barbados, Mexico, and Canada. Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement staff never questioned the authenticity of the counterfeit
documents, and our investigators encountered no difficulty entering the
country using them.\1\
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\1\ U.S. General Accounting Office, Counterfeit Documents Used to
Enter the United States from Certain Western Hemisphere Countries Not
Detected, GAO-03-713T (Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2003).
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Second, counterfeit driver's licenses can be used to purchase
firearms. Between October, 2000, and February, 2001, used counterfeit
driver's licenses with fictitious identifiers to purchase firearms from
license dealers in five states--Virginia, West Virginia, Montana, New
Mexico, and Arizona. When we purchased the firearms, the majority of
the firearms dealers we dealt with complied with laws governing such
purchases, including instant background checks required by federal
law.\2\ However, an instant background check only discloses whether the
prospective purchaser is a person whose possession of a firearm would
be unlawful. Consequently, if the prospective purchaser is using a
fictitious identity, as we did, an instant background check is not
effective.\3\
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\2\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(t).
\3\ U.S. General Accounting Office, Firearms: Purchased from
Federal Firearm Licensees Using Bogus Identification, GAO-01-427T
(Washington, D.C.: March 19, 2001).
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Third, counterfeit identification can be used to gain access to
federal buildings and other facilities. In March, 2002, we breached the
security of four federal office buildings in the Atlanta area using
counterfeit law enforcement credentials to obtain genuine building
passes, which we then counterfeited. We were also able to obtain
building passes that authorized us to carry firearms in the buildings.
As a result, several investigators, including one carrying a briefcase
suitable for carrying firearms, bypassed the magnetometers and x-ray
machines using the counterfeited building passes. They then were able
to move freely throughout the buildings during day and evening
hours.\4\ In April and May, 2000, we similarly gained access to
numerous federal buildings in Washington, D.C., that contained the
offices of cabinet secretaries or agency heads.\5\
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\4\ U.S. General Accounting Office, Security Breaches at Federal
Buildings in Atlanta, Georgia, GAO-02-668T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30,
2002).
\5\ U.S. General Accounting Office, Security: Breaches at Federal
Agencies and Airports, GAO/T-OSI-00-10 (Washington, D.C.: May 25,
2000).
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Finally, we easily obtained Social Security Numbers (SSN) for
fictitious names. We used counterfeit identification documents to
obtain valid SSNs from the Social Security Administration (SSA) for two
fictitious infants. In addition, we visited two states and obtained
authentic but fraudulent driver's licenses using the names, SSNs, and
dates of birth of individuals listed on SSA's publicly available Master
Death file. The Master Death file contains the names, SSNs, and dates
of birth of deceased individuals. The motor vehicle departments in two
of the states we visited are among those that rely solely on visual
verification of identification documents and do not compare the
information on license applications with SSA's Master Death file.\6\
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\6\ U.S. General Accounting Office, Social Security Numbers:
Ensuring the Integrity of the SSN, GAO-03-941T (Washington, D.C.: July
10, 2003).
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Our work leads us to three basic conclusions: (1) government
officials and others generally did not recognize that the documents we
presented were counterfeit; (2) many government officials were not
alert to the possibility of identity fraud and some failed to follow
security procedures and (3) identity verification procedures are
inadequate. While some of the problems revealed in our tests have been
addressed by the responsible agencies, much remains to be done. A
driver's license is the most commonly accepted document used for
identifications. The weaknesses we found during this investigation
clearly show that border inspectors, motor vehicle departments, and
firearms dealers need to have the means to verify the identity and
authenticity of the driver's licenses that are presented to them. In
addition, government officials who review identification need
additional training in recognizing counterfeit documents. Further,
these officials also need to be more vigilant when searching for
identification fraud.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions you or other members of the committee may
have.
Chairman Cox. Thank you, Mr. Malfi. And thank you for your
leadership of the Office of Special Investigations.
That is hair curling testimony. We were sorry to receive
it, but we intend to act upon it.
Our next, and final, witness is Keith M. Kiser, who is the
chair of the American Association of Motor Vehicle
Administrators, an organization of the departments of motor
vehicles in all 50 states.
Mr. Kiser, welcome.
STATEMENT OF MR. KEITH KISER, CHAIR, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF
MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATORS
Mr. Kiser. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee.
I am Keith Kiser, Chair of the Board of the American
Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, or AAMVA. AAMVA
represents motor vehicle and law enforcement officials who are
responsible for administering motor vehicle laws, driver
credentialing and highway safety enforcement.
The state-issued driver's license is the most widely used
and accepted form of I.D. in America. It is at the heart of our
identification infrastructure and homeland security.
Unfortunately, homeland security is threatened because
licensing procedures are outdated.
Many states are taking piecemeal steps to improve the
licensing process, and that includes California, despite
passage of S.B.60. However, California's situation is not
unique. Other states' policy makers have weakened driver's
license I.D. procedures by allowing undocumented aliens to
obtain a license. This further compromises our nation's
security.
A valid license opens doors and allows freedom of movement
within society. It serves as identification to purchase
firearms and to obtain benefits, credit, employment, and other
federally-issued documents and potentially voting rights.
Unfortunately, until we implement uniform practices to verify
the validity of documents and the identity of the person
holding them, the process will remain fragmented and vulnerable
to fraud.
Recently, the AAMVA board passed two resolutions. One
discourages the issuance of a photo driver's license to
undocumented aliens. The other recommends it is premature to
accept foreign consular cards for I.D. purposes.
``Why did the board take these actions?'' Our mission is to
serve those who are lawfully in this country. We have a
responsibility and an obligation to preserve public safety and
national security. As issuers of this document we must verify
the identity of the license holder and ensure lawful residence
to maintain reciprocity among the states.
Since October 2001, AAMVA has joined with numerous
industry, advocacy and law enforcement experts to strengthen
the licensing process.
As a result of this comprehensive approach, we recommend
tightening application requirements; electronic verification of
an applicant's driver's record and breeder documents; improved
issuance procedures including internal audits and training for
employees; increased penalties for those who commit fraud, and
to ensure compliance with these activities participation by all
states in the Driver's License Agreement, an interstate compact
developed to address these issues.
Because DMVs do not have a real-time verification system,
individuals apply for and obtain a license in more than one
state. The findings of the recent GAO investigations are
evidence of this weakness. To remedy this, we need an
information system to ensure each driver has only one license,
only one driver record, and only one identity.
In addition, the use of false breeder documents within the
application process continues to grow. We must adopt a uniform
list of acceptable I.D. documents relied on for license
issuance; provide training to be a DMV employee so they can
recognize and appropriately handle fraudulent documents; and
ensure motor vehicle agencies have the ability to
electronically verify the validity of breeder documents.
We also have a problem with fake licenses and I.D.s. They
are easily altered or counterfeited. There are more than 240
valid license formats, all lacking uniform security features.
To combat this problem, we need minimum uniform card design and
security features for the license and then train other end-
users to identify fraudulent documents.
The last problem we would like to address is people. We
cannot legislate morality, but we can fight fraud on both sides
of the DMV counter. AAMVA recently developed model internal
controls of compliance procedures for states to adopt. In
addition, Federal and state policy makers must partner with law
enforcement and the courts to implement and enforce stiffer
penalties.
Over the last 2 years, AAMVA has discussed these problems
with Congress and our Federal partners. The evidence is clear,
it is time to implement the solution; a solution that is a
comprehensive package and not a piecemeal fix; a solution that
reduces identity theft and enhances homeland security; a
solution that protects an individual's privacy by first
verifying their identity.
In closing, two GAO investigations began with a different
focus, but ended with the same recommendation: the Senate
Finance Committee studied the facts and agreed with AAMVA that
states need a driver's license information system to share
driver records, exchange digital photos and verify birth and
death records with vital statistics agencies.
The states cannot go it alone. The solution requires a
state-Federal partnership that includes funding and political
will. We need Congress's help.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to be here.
On behalf of all the AAMVA members we look forward to working
with you.
[The statement of Mr. Kiser follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. KEITH M. KISER
Good Morning, Chairman and distinguished Members of the House
Select Committee on Homeland Security. My name is Keith Kiser and I am
the Director of the Motor Vehicle Division of the North Dakota
Department of Transportation (NDDOT) and Chair of the Board of
Directors for the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators
(AAMVA). Thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of AAMVA to
discuss the vulnerabilities in the driver's license application process
and the document itself, its impact on national security and a
comprehensive approach needed to fix the driver's licensing system.
AAMVA is a state-based, non-profit association representing motor
vehicle agency administrators, senior law enforcement officials and
industry in the United States and Canada. Our members are the
recognized experts who administer the laws governing motor vehicle
operation, driver credentialing, and highway safety enforcement. AAMVA
plays an integral role in the development, deployment and monitoring of
both the commercial driver's license (CDL) and motor carrier safety
programs. The Association's members are responsible for administering
these programs at the state and provincial levels.
We believe this hearing will generate critical public discourse
about the urgent public policy issue of building more integrity into
the driver licensing process.
BACKGROUND
AAMVA commends the House Select Committee on Homeland Security, for
its focus on defining and showing the vulnerabilities with the driver's
license and identification card. The state-issued driver's license is
the most widely used and accepted form of ID in America. It's at the
heart of our identification infrastructure and homeland security.
Unfortunately, homeland security is threatened because of
vulnerabilities in the driver's license system.
Why is this happening? Our current licensing structure and the
credential that we issue were designed for another time and today's
system is, at best, antiquated. The U.S. has more than 240 different,
valid forms of passenger car driver's licenses and ID cards in
circulation. Each state and D.C. has different practices for issuing
licenses and reporting convictions. Individuals looking to undermine
the system, whether a problem drinker, underage drinker, identity thief
or terrorist shop around for licenses in those states with the weakest
practices. Unfortunately, over-the-counter computer software and
hardware is making it easier for individuals to produce counterfeit
licenses and fraudulent breeder documents.
In addition, the lack of standard security features on a license
allows individuals to exploit the system. This makes it difficult for
law enforcement to verify the validity of a license from another
state--not to mention the identity of the person holding it. This
situation is worsened by the availability of counterfeit licenses and
fraudulent breeder documents over the Internet and sold on the
underground market.
Many states are taking steps to improve the licensing process. And,
that includes California, despite passage of Senate Bill 60. However,
California's situation is not unique. Other state policymakers have
weakened driver's license ID procedures by allowing undocumented aliens
to obtain a license through use of the IRS Individual Taxpayer
Identification number, acceptance of foreign consular cards and non-
secure ``breeder'' documents. This further compromises our nation's
security. A valid license opens doors and allows freedom of movement
within society. It serves as identification to purchase firearms and to
obtain benefits, credit, employment, other federally issued documents,
and potentially, voting rights.
Taking away the privilege to drive in this country is often viewed
by both the federal and state legislative branches of government as an
option to punish those who break the law. U.S. citizens can have their
privilege to drive withdrawn for, among other reasons, poor driving
behavior, failure to provide court-ordered child support--even failure
to pay library fines. If DMVs are required to license undocumented
aliens (who have by definition violated federal law) the illegals are
in a sense receiving preferential treatment.
Also, such action places a state government agency as being
essentially complicit in the violation of federal immigration laws.
Once an undocumented alien obtains a driver's license, essentially that
individual has no need for valid, federally issued immigration
documents.
Recently, the AAMVA Board passed two resolutions.\1\ One
discourages the issuance of a photo driver license to undocumented
aliens. The other recommends it is premature to accept foreign consular
cards for ID purposes. Why did the Board take these positions? Our
mission is to serve those who are lawfully in this country. We have a
responsibility and an obligation to preserve public safety and national
security. As issuers of this document, we must verify the identity of
the license holder and ensure lawful presence to maintain license
reciprocity among the states.
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\1\ See Attachment 1 and 2.
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However, until we all share uniform practices to verify the
validity of documents and the identity of the person holding them, the
process will remain fragmented and vulnerable to fraud. As a result, we
increase the opportunities for identity theft and put at risk our
nation's national security and highway safety.
Shortly after September 11th, AAMVA members came together to
develop a comprehensive solution to enhancing the licensing process.
This comprehensive approach addresses:
tightened application requirements for obtaining a
driver's license,
real-time verification of an applicant's driver
history and breeder documents,\2\
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\2\ Breeder documents are defined as those documents used to
confirm identity such as birth certificates, Social Security cards or
immigration documents.
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improved processes and procedures for issuance,
including internal audit controls and training for employees,
and
increased penalties for those that commit credential
fraud.
Vulnerabilities & Comprehensive Approach
The events of September 11th, caused a radical shift in the
perception of risk and the use of a driver license or ID card. In
October 2001, the AAMVA Executive Committee developed and passed a
resolution establishing the Special Task Force on Identification
Security. The Task Force concluded that there were a number of common
issues needing to be addressed: administrative processing,
verification/information exchange, the need for a unique identifier,
the format of the driver's license/ID card, fraud prevention and
detection, residency, and enforcement and control of standards. Based
on the recommendations of the Task Force, AAMVA brought together
knowledge, experience and expertise from across jurisdictional
boundaries, federal agencies and stakeholder organizations to establish
uniform identification practices and procedures to aid in the
prevention of fraudulently issued driver licenses and identification
cards.
The objective, with participation and recommendations from states
and provinces, was to provide a guide to jurisdictions that would help
standardize the process of identifying applicants in the 21st century.
AAMVA divided the issues surrounding identification security into 14
subtopics, each subtopic being addressed by a task group.
AAMVA has identified and targeted the areas to fix what we believe
are the problems with the current system. Let's look at the
vulnerabilities in driver licensing. And more importantly, the steps
needed to tighten the system.
First, individuals can apply for and obtain a license in more than
one state, which the GAO investigators illustrated by using the same
fictitious name and fraudulent documents in seven of the eight states.
At this time, DMVs do not have an electronic method to verify whether a
person has been issued a license in another state. We need to establish
an information system that will ensure each driver has only one
driver's license, only one driver record and only one identity. The
findings of the GAO investigations are evidence of this weakness.
In the mid-1990s, AAMVA began exploring the possibility of having a
system similar to the Commercial Drivers License Information System
(CDLIS) for all drivers within the United States in order to better
monitor the problem driver population. States need more effective tools
to manage the driving records we already maintain. Problem drivers, who
obtain multiple licenses, spread their bad driving history across the
states. As a result, they avoid detection, penalties and punishment. By
1998, Congress recognized the potential benefits of such an information
system and directed NHTSA and FMCSA to study the IT issues and costs
associated with developing and operating this system. The report
concluded an all-driver pointer system is feasible.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in conjunction
with Federal Motor Carrier and AAMVA, ``Report to Congress: Evaluation
of Driver Licensing Information Program and Assessment of
Technologies,'' 2001. (http://www.aamva.org/drivers/drv--
AutomatedSystemsDRIVerS.asp#TechAssessment)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We have witnessed the success of such a system through the use of
CDLIS, which kept more than 871,000 potential dangerous truck drivers
from obtaining a commercial driver's license between 1992 and 1996.\4\
CDLIS is designed as a pointer system for commercial drivers. CDLIS
limits commercial drivers to one and only one commercial driver's
license and it has worked well for this purpose. Before CDLIS, it was
possible for a commercial driver to apply for and obtain a commercial
driver's license in a new state without acknowledging having an
existing license in another state. This had serious implications for
highway safety, since hiding the existence of another license could
also hide a dangerous driving record. We need an all-driver pointer
system that will direct one state where to find and accurately verify
someone's driving histories in other states for all drivers, commercial
and non-commercial. DMVs already exchange driver history on commercial
vehicle drivers through CDLIS. An all-driver pointer system will help
prevent identity theft and strengthen national security by limiting a
driver to one license and one driving history.
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\4\ Federal Highway Administration, Office of Motor Carrier
Research & Standards Driver Division, ``Commercial Driver License
Effectiveness Study,'' page 11, September 1998.
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Second, the use of false breeder documents to obtain an
authenticate driver's license or identification card runs rampant
within the application process. DMVs must adopt a uniform resource list
for acceptable identification documents, which will narrow the numerous
documents, relied on for issuing a license or identification card.
After much research, AAMVA has recently concluded and issued the
Acceptable Verifiable ID Resource List and Administrative
Procedures.\5\ By utilizing the lists, its procedures and future
fraudulent document recognition training, motor vehicle employees
should be able to verify that the applicant in front of them is who
they are claiming to be and that documents presented are reliable. The
use of the resource lists also promotes uniformity, identification
reciprocity between jurisdictions, and helps protect the customer's
personal information.
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\5\ American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, Status
Report to AAMVA Membership--Attachment 1 Acceptable Verifiable Resource
Lists and Procedures, July 2003,( http://www.aamva.org/Documents/
idsAttach1StatReportJuly03.pdf).
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In addition, DMVs must provide adequate fraudulent document
training to their employees. We need to give them the tools to
recognize and appropriately handle fraudulent documents. The use of
fraudulent documents has caused enormous economic losses in both the
U.S. and Canada. The use of fraudulent documents to obtain driver's
licenses/identification cards has grown exponentially in recent years.
AAMVA in conjunction with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration (FMCSA), the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA), the U.S. Secret Service (USSS), the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Canadian Council of Motor
Transport Administrators (CCMTA) has developed a comprehensive model
training program for Fraudulent Document Recognition (FDR).
The three-level FDR program is designed to assist states and
provinces with the formal training of motor vehicle and law enforcement
personnel in the recognition/detection of fraudulent identification
documents. Level I address basic training needs for frontline employees
and law enforcement officials. Level II addresses advanced training
needs for motor vehicle supervisors, document examiners, law
enforcement officials and fraud investigators. Level III addresses
training at a forensic level and is slated for future development, if
deemed necessary. Level I and Level II training materials were
showcased during the 2003 AAMVA regional meetings. Formal Level I and
Level II train-the-trainer sessions, designed to train jurisdictional
fraud trainers, will be held between October 2003 and February 2004 in
Rhode Island, Missouri and Utah. Based on available funding, future
development may include training videos, educational brochures, self-
study materials and computer-based and/or Web-based training. AAMVA
will establish a maintenance program to update the materials on a
regular basis. We invite members of the committee to attend any of the
upcoming training sessions.
Furthermore, we must ensure motor vehicle agencies have the
ability, preferably electronically, to verify the validity of source
documents with issuing agencies, such as the Social Security
Administration, Immigration and Naturalization Services, vital records
agencies and other DMVs. Currently, 25 states are electronically
verifying Social Security Numbers with the Social Security
Administration. But that verification process needs improvement, which
the GAO concluded in another report to Congres.\6\ Too frequently SSA's
automated system indicates that a number does not match, when in
reality, after manual investigation, it is a match. This situation is
deterring other states from using the SSA system. Congress must direct
the Social Security Administration to improve their system so that this
unnecessary, labor-intensive process can be eliminated. Each check of
the system should also reference SSA's death records to ensure that a
state does not issue a driver's license or identification card to an
individual presenting personal information of a deceased person.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ General Accounting Office, Improved SSN Verification and
Exchange of States' Driver Records Would Enhance Identity Verification,
GAO-03-920, September 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
AAMVA is working cooperatively with the states and the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) to pilot test three on-line
verification systems:
Online Verification of Driver Licenses--this allows states
and third parties, such as airports and banks, to electronically query
and verify that a license presented to them was actually issued by the
state shown on the face of the license. Once rolled out nationwide,
this effort will greatly inhibit a criminal's ability to use
counterfeit driver licenses.
Interstate Digital Image Exchange--this allows states to
exchange digital driver photos so that they can compare the picture to
the individual standing in front of the clerk applying for a license.
Once rolled-out nationwide, this will inhibit imposters from obtaining
licenses and ID cards under another person's identity.
Online Verification of Birth Certificates--this allows the
states to electronically interact with the National Association for
Public Health Statistics and Information Systems (NAPHSIS) to check
state vital statistics records to determine the validity of a birth
certificate being used to establish identity as part of the driver
licensing program. Once rolled-out nationwide, this will inhibit the
criminal's ability to use counterfeit birth certificates to obtain a
driver license or ID card.
These are very worthy efforts and, on behalf of the states, AAMVA
thanks Congress and FMCSA for providing the seed money to get them
going. But they are not fully effective unless all of the data is
available and all of the states are participating. The states need the
help and support of Congress to get these programs rolled-out
nationwide.
Third, the driver's license document is easily counterfeited. The
current variety of documents and lack of uniform security features
makes it easy for criminals to alter a real document or create a
counterfeit. We must provide fraudulent document training to not only
DMV employees but stakeholders to thwart acceptance of fake documents.
The GAO investigators showed how easy it was to create and alter a
driver's license and breeder documents using inexpensive commercially
available software and hardware. Also, motor vehicle agencies must
establish better procedures for removing fraudulent documents when an
employee realizes the documents are fraudulent. We cannot afford to
give the fraudulent documents back to the perpetrator and law
enforcement needs to be notified without endangering the DMV employee.
However in some instances, DMV employees inform individuals that
produce fraudulent documents to obtain a driver's license or ID card
the correct procedure to apply for a document. There is a delicate
balance between customer service, safety and security.
Additionally, motor vehicle agencies need to adopt minimum, uniform
card design and security specifications for the driver license
document. To secure jurisdiction-issued driver's license/ID card
credentials, the association examined card functionality, visible data
and card layout, machine-readable data elements, machine-readable
technology (MRT), document security features, and other card design
elements and considerations. AAMVA, working with a wide variety of
stakeholders, has developed those minimum specifications and they are
now available for use by the states.
The fourth problem relates to people. For some, this comes with the
vulnerability to criminal behavior, which can result in stolen DMV
equipment and inventory and the acceptance of bribes. Individuals are
breaking into DMV's, stealing equipment and inventory to produce
documents. AAMVA is developing model procedures for security and
inventory controls. DMVs and all identity issuing agencies need an
information system to post alerts when equipment or inventory is
stolen. Currently, through AAMVA's Web site, the association posts
alerts regarding official federal, international or state documents and
equipment that is stolen.
We must provide online verification of the driver license and ID
card. This will render stolen equipment and inventory useless. Any
driver licenses or ID cards created on stolen equipment would be
rejected in the verification process because the state's database would
not contain information pertaining to those cards.
Unfortunately, individuals bribe DMV clerks to issue driver's
license or ID cards. It is a lucrative business. We cannot legislate
moral behavior, but we can fight fraud on both sides of the counter.
However, we need to implement stronger internal controls and auditing
procedures that detect this behavior and prevent it from spreading.
And, we must implement stiffer penalties and enforcement for those who
choose to break the law.
Fifth, we must protect an individual's privacy while trying to
bring the driver's license system into the 21st century. DMVs adhere to
some of the strongest privacy laws on the books--the Driver's Privacy
Protection Act. DPPA prohibits DMVs from selling your driver record
information for commercial purposes without your prior consent. We'd
like to make them stronger. The AAMVA Board of Directors passed a
resolution stating that the association does not support the practice
of collecting people's personal information from a driver's license for
the purposes of marketing or building customer databases--without the
full knowledge and consent of the license holder. We advocate that
people or organizations scan the driver's license only to verify and
not to capture information. Furthermore, in May 2003, the AAMVA Board
endorsed eight privacy principles based on the Global Privacy Design
Principles.\7\ The principles address openness, individual
participation, collection limitation, data quality, use, disclosure
limitation, security, and accountability. Therefore, AAMVA is assessing
the impact of DL/ID security improvement on personal privacy and will
develop best practices and model guidelines for motor vehicle agencies
to inform citizens of personal information protection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, Status
Report to AAMVA Membership--Attachment 4 Privacy Principles, July 2003,
(http://www.aamva.org/Documents/idsAttach4StatReportJuly03.pdf)American
Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators
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CONCLUSION
These problems exist and are interstate in nature. The only way to
ensure that the proper fixes have been applied is for all states to
follow the same roadmap. Inconsistent remedies from state to state will
leave open the loopholes that exist today. The solution:
must be implemented as a package and not as a
piecemeal fix.
will reduce identity theft and enhance homeland
security and highway safety.
can be accomplished without sacrificing an
individual's privacy by verifying their identity.
can only be achieved with a federal-state partnership.
Without a federal-state partnership to implement the solutions,
this comprehensive approach is little more than a best
practice.
First hand you have witnessed the vulnerabilities of the current
process. Two GAO investigations began with a different focus but ended
with the same recommendation. The Senate Finance Committee studied the
facts and agreed with AAMVA that states need a driver's license
information system to share driver records, exchange digital photos,
and verify birth and death records with vital statistics agencies.
AAMVA seeks funding for the Birth and Death Records Verification
Program, and Digital Image Exchange program discussed in my testimony,
to improve the states drivers licensing system. We are grateful that
the Treasury-Transportation appropriations subcommittee included
critical Report language in the FY04 transportation appropriations bill
related to the funding of these programs. We commend Chairman Istook
for recognizing their importance and his willingness to take action.
However, we are hoping that the language can be strengthened in
Conference to ensure these pilot programs stay on track. There is a
real concern that if the funding is not provided, fraudulent driver's
licenses and ID's will continue to be issued to potentially dangerous
individuals.
Additionally, we seek funding in the TEA--21 reauthorization bill
to improve the Commercial Drivers license information system and to
build toward a nationwide all drivers license information system. We
would ask for your help in securing this authority and funding in the
highway bill.The states cannot go it alone. The solution requires a
state-federal partnership that includes funding and political will. We
need Congress' help.
Thank you. I've concluded my testimony and welcome any questions
from the subcommittee.
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATORS (AAMVA) BOARD OF
DIRECTORS RESOLUTION 03-08 USE OF FOREIGN CONSULAR CARDS FOR
IDENTIFICATION PURPOSES
WHEREAS, the Association has developed an Acceptable Verifiable ID
Resources List that includes documents issued by the U.S. and Canadian
agencies and organizations that are recommended for use by DMV
employees to verify that a person applying for a driver's license or ID
card is who he/she is purporting to be; and
WHEREAS, the verifiability of the documents by the issuing agencies
was an important factor in considering documents for inclusion on the
Acceptable Verifiable ID Resources List: and
WHEREAS, many member jurisdictions have expressed concerns that
foreign consular IDs, including Mexico's matricula consular card, lack
standardized issuance procedures, uniform security features, and a
secure database for verification purposes; and
WHEREAS, the AAMVA Board of Directors recommends the continued use
of the foreign passport as an official identification document, and
WHEREAS, AAMVA is in the process of gathering information on other
foreign consular ID documents and their possible use for identification
purposes; and
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVE, that the AAMVA Board of Directors believes
that it is premature to recommend the use of any foreign consular ID,
including Mexico's matricular consular card, at this time, as more
information is needed to assess the verifiability of these documents.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that legal and diplomatic issues also
warrant further review and consultation with the United States
Department of State as they relate to possible conflicts with the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocols of 1963.
RESOLVED FURTHER, that the AAMVA Board of Directors accepts and
endorses as an AAMVA standard that no other foreign documents be
allowed to provide specific data for identification purposes other than
foreign passports. A foreign passport in conjunction with the proper
immigration documents (i.e. I-95 for the U.S. is necessary if used to
validate legal presence.
Board of Directors Resolution No. 03-O8 was passed at a meeting
duly held on May 17, 2003.
Betty L. Serian
Chair of the Board
Stacev K Stanton
Chair of the Board
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATORS (AAMVA) BOARD OF
DIRECTORS RESOLUTION 03-08 POSITION ON ISSUING DRIVER'S LICENSES TO
UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS
WHEREAS, in order to strengthen the security of the photo driver's
license and the issuance process associated with it, it will be
necessary to tighten the standards proving one's identity in order to
obtain a license; and
WHEREAS, the Board of Directors approved a minimum list of
Acceptable Verifiable Identification Resources for verifying an
applicant's residence, identity and legal presence; and the documents
included are required to be original or certified copies from the
issuing agency.
THEREFORE RE IT RESOLVED, that raising the bar of proof regarding
the validity of source documents for everyone strengthens uniformity
and encourages reciprocity in motor vehicle administration and enhances
highway safety enforcement; and
BE IT RESOLVED FURTHER that it is the recommendation of the Board
of Directors of the American Association of Vehicle Administrators that
jurisdictions not grant a photo driver's license or photo ID card to
undocumented aliens.
Board of Directors Resolution No. 03-09 was passed at a meeting
duly held on September 4-5, 2003.
Betty L Serian
Chair of the Board
Stacey K Stanton
Secretary of the Board
Chairman Cox. I thank each of the witnesses for your
outstanding testimony.
the bells that you heard ring are a recess on the floor,
subject to call the chair, so we expect that we will not have a
floor votes for another hour or so. And that is good news;
these hearings are often interrupted by work on the floor, and
that will not happen to us just yet.
I would like to recognize myself for 5 minutes of
questions. And begin where we just ended up, Mr. Kiser, with
you.
You are recommending that the Federal Government take
action in an area that has traditionally been one of state
jurisdiction. I think most members of Congress want to be very,
very careful about the federalism implications here.
We do not want to do what is not Congress's business, we
don't want to take over state DMVs, we don't want to tell them
exactly how and what they may do. On the other hand, we have a
national system, in which, for example, in the Western
hemisphere, any U.S. citizen can cross our border going out or
coming in merely by showing a driver's license, which is
supposed to be prima facie evidence of--not just prima facie,
but satisfactory evidence of citizenship, or at least the right
to be legally in the country. So we have a lot riding on this.
We have also got, by the GAO's estimate--correct me, Mr.
Malfi if I am wrong--about 240 different variations of driver's
licenses and I.D. cards issued by jurisdictions within the
United States, so that for border guards this is a very
difficult job.
Likewise, we heard about the gun shows and gun dealers; we
heard about entrance to Federal buildings; we heard about all
manner of uses of these driver's licenses, and in each case the
security workers, the Federal or state employees of the
civilians, whose job it is to assess the validity of this I.D.
are relying on an imperfect computer between their ears that
supposed to keep straight these 240 different forms of
identity.
Aren't we just riding for a fall here?
Aren't we in great need of using technology to help sort
this out? And isn't standardization, uniformity and objectivity
the aim, so that, for example, biometric identification will be
part of matching the person to the I.D.
And I am going to address this question to you, but let any
member of the panel join in.
Mr. Kiser. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In my testimony I mentioned that we need a state and
Federal partnership. It is clear to me in talking to my
counterparts in the administration of driver's license laws
that there is a clear recognition that there is a problem. And
the problem is growing and is massive.
It is also clear that it is in the administrative area that
we don't have the authority to really fix that, that is a
legislative decision.
Chairman Cox. When you say that you don't have the
authority, you mean AAMVA?
Mr. Kiser. We mean AAMVA, but also as a jurisdictional
member, it takes legislation in my jurisdiction and in each
jurisdiction to create the changes, such as those described in
Virginia. So it takes a political will to do that. And it also
takes--
Chairman Cox. Let me just interject.
When the Federal Government very explicitly says, ``Don't
use the taxpayer identification number for any identification
purpose outside the tax system, because it is not reliable,''
and when a state then passes a law that does exactly that, what
should be the response of the Federal Government, assuming we
want to be sensitive on the federalism point?
Mr. Kiser. Mr. Chairman, I wouldn't try to speak to what
the response of federal government.
Chairman Cox. But given the existing partnership between
the states, who are your members, and the Federal Government,
we want to be sensitive to the separate allocation
responsibilities. What happens when a state so miserably fails?
Mr. Kiser. I think, Mr. Chairman, if that state miserably
fails it may be appropriate for the Federal Government to take
some level of action. What that is, I am not sure.
I do think that it is important that we recognize--as I
believe someone said earlier--that different jurisdictions,
different states have different levels of response to their own
situations. Again, AAMVA's position is that you should not
honor those documents that don't have security. We are not a
regulatory agency, we don't have the ability to impose our will
or the will of The AAMVA organization, onto a particular
jurisdiction.
Chairman Cox. Mr. Carico, you mentioned that the law
changed in Virginia, requiring people to show proof that they
were who they said they were, that they were legitimately in
the country so that the 9/11 hijacker scheme couldn't be
repeated.
In California, we have changed our law to go in the
opposite direction, so you explicitly do not have to provide
such information. What do you believe the Federal Government
should do? You represent a state; can the Federal Government be
aggressive in this area, do we have to be supine, or are we
just going to let it happen? What can be done?
Mr. Carico. I think the main thing the Federal Government
can do is help in the information sharing process between the
states. In Virginia, we also have the Federalist concerns that
you do, but the Federal Government has a bigger repository for
a lot of different kinds of information. And I know in the
criminal area, like that National Crime Information Center, the
NCIC, has a lot of information that is available to the states.
If someone comes up on criminal charges or something in the
states--I was a former prosecutor--we often used that vehicle
of information in order to more effectively go after criminals.
The same can be done by the Federal Government. But I think
we have to be careful, like Mr. Cox was saying, we need a
Federal-state partnership, not only in the information sharing
arena, but the Federal Government can encourage these states in
the dangers of using the tax identification numbers. The
Federal Government has a responsibility to educate the states
as to the dangers of using these numbers. These numbers are
rotten.
Chairman Cox. And do you think the Federal Government has
failed in its responsibility? I mean who in the world could not
know this, it is posted on the website; I mean there is no
question about this.
Mr. Carico. I don't think that the Federal Government has
failed, I think the states have failed to listen and failed to
heed the dictates from the Federal Government when it comes to
saying, ``Hey, we don't think you should use these numbers, you
need to use more reliable numbers.'' And the states who are
going in the opposite way have failed to learn the lessons of
9/11.
Chairman Cox. And therefore?
Mr. Carico. And therefore--again I think the Federal
Government just needs to help educate and reiterate to the
states and help to facilitate information sharing between the
states when it comes to these types of issues.
Chairman Cox. Well my time has expired. I think we are
beginning a discussion on this and other members can carry it
forward.
In order of appearance, Ms. Holmes Norton is next.
Mr. DeFazio. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. I was here before any
other member was in the room and sat here. So how could that
be?
There was no other member in the room. I asked if the
hearing was really at one o'clock because there was no one else
here.
Chairman Cox. I am sorry, we were just using the list that
was provided by the minority for order of recognition of
members.
Mr. DeFazio. Nope, they are shaking their head.
Chairman Cox. I am happy to recognize the gentleman if
there is no objection.
Mr. DeFazio. Well, I know I was here and there was no other
member here, Mr. Chairman. The minority is shaking its head. I
am just curious.
Ms. Norton. Rather than have this deducted from the
gentleman's time, I would be very pleased to defer to the
gentleman.
Chairman Cox. OK.
Mr. DeFazio. Thanks.
Chairman Cox. The time belongs to the gentleman from
Oregon, Mr. DeFazio is recognized.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Not on my time, but I
have raised this issue previously with the minority side and
they are now--it is just if you want members to come and be
here on time, it is helpful.
Mr.--is it Pistole, Pistole, how do you pronounce it?
Mr. Pistole. It is Pistole, the ``e'' is silent, sir.
Mr. DeFazio. OK. All right. OK. So when I pronounce it, it
will be right anyway.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you.
Mr. DeFazio. You raised an interesting point: who people
purport they are. If I give you--if I apply, you are a private
sector, I come to you, I apply for a job. I give you my name, I
give you my social security number, you say, ``I am going to
run a background check.'' You put it into NCIC or a credit
report, what do you get out of that?
Mr. Pistole. You get whatever records are in there,
obviously, but it depends on the legitimacy and the validity of
those underlying documents.
Mr. DeFazio. Or, whether that person has--how do you know I
am that person?
Mr. Pistole. Exactly. So even though the name may be
legitimate, how do we match it up with the person who has
presented it to them? That is the underlying issue from our
perspective.
Mr. DeFazio. OK. So then to Mr. Verdery, do you fly
commercially as a passenger?
Mr. Verdery. Yes I do.
Mr. DeFazio. OK, I see. Because your portfolio is the
Transportation Security Policy, OK?
Mr. Verdery. Yes, sir.
Mr. DeFazio. Do you go through the security?
Mr. Verdery. Yes.
Mr. DeFazio. OK, so you go through the screening?
Mr. Verdery. Yes.
Mr. DeFazio. OK. Do you think that it is necessary that we
should be putting people through that screening at airports?
Mr. Verdery. Of course.
Mr. DeFazio. OK.
Now do you think we should be putting people through that
screening regardless of whether we know who they are or not?
For instance, if I--if you don't know who I am, I should go
through the screening even if we knew you were that person you
should go through the screening. That is correct?
Mr. Verdery. Well, yes. Of course the point of the
screening, primarily, is to make sure that the person who is
going to be getting on the plane is not a threat to the plane
itself.
Mr. DeFazio. OK. Or on the plane, or is the idea of keeping
those materials out of the airplane terminal where passengers,
once they have gone through screening could accept something
from someone else.
Mr. Verdery. Right. And that is why the screening
checkpoints are set up before the gates.
Mr. DeFazio. That is correct. OK.
Now we just heard from Mr. Pistole that if I give someone
my social security number and a name, or a social security and
a name, that is a meaningless background check. Would you agree
with that, since we don't know whether that is really--we
didn't check fingerprints, we didn't go to that point.
Mr. Verdery. ``Garbage in, garbage out.''
Mr. DeFazio. OK. Are you aware that currently TSA exempts,
at many airports has made it optional, that employees of
vendors, that is people who work at McDonald's, Borders, once
they have undergone a so-called ``background check'' that is,
they gave their name and their social security to McDonald's or
Borders is allowed to enter the terminal freely without going
through security?
Are you aware of that policy?
Mr. Verdery. Yes.
Mr. DeFazio. Well, how does that make sense with what you
just told me? We know you are from the TSA, you know I am a
member of Congress, I have got to have everything searched.
We don't know who this person is; we know they work at
McDonald's. We don't know if they are the person who said they
are at McDonald's, he has already told us, you said, ``Garbage
in, garbage out.'' He told us there is a real problem here, but
we are allowing those people wearing coats, carrying things, to
go freely in--how secure is this system?
Now, what I have heard from TSA before is, ``Well they are
not getting on planes, congressman.'' A: they might have an e-
ticket in their pocket, so we don't know that. B: they could be
bringing something in to another person who went through
security, who is a problem, who is getting on a plane.
Now how can you justify that? Isn't this a little bit of a
loophole?
Mr. Verdery. Well it is clearly a weakness in the system.
As you know, TSA, working with DHS, is working on a broader
initiative, the TWIC, the Transportation Worker Identification
Card.
Mr. DeFazio. But today, several hundred thousand people,
who we don't know, we don't know if they are the person they
said they are, will file into secure areas of airports in the
United States of America without even walking through the
magnetometer, which of course wouldn't find explosives or--
doesn't find a whole lot of other things--without putting what
they are carrying on a belt. They just walk through.
They flash their McDonald's worker I.D. card at someone and
they walk in. And you are saying this is a little bit of a
problem. Don't you think this is a huge problem? Isn't the
whole thing a lie for the traveling public? We are harassing
the pilots, we are the harassing the flight attendants, we are
checking every other passenger, we are checking you, working
for TSA, head of transportation policy, we are checking members
of Congress.
But the McDonald's employee, who may or may not have given
a fake name and I.D. is allowed to carry whatever they want in
or out of the airport and we are not concerned and we are not
going to do anything about it. Or if we might get them a TWIC
someday; how long has it been that this has been going on?
Mr. Verdery. Well the TWIC has been underway for several
months.
Mr. DeFazio. Right. But I mean how long have these people
been going in and out of the airport without going through
security?
Mr. Verdery. I am not aware of the duration of that
regulation.
Mr. DeFazio. Well why does that regulation exist? Why would
we not want the McDonald's employees to go through the same
security as the airline pilot when going to a secure part of
the airport where they could be carrying contraband that could
be used to take over a plane or blow up a plane? Why don't we
want them to go through the same screening as an airline pilot?
Mr. Verdery. Well, as you mentioned, they are going through
a background check.
Mr. DeFazio. The background check, as you just admitted,
``Garbage in, garbage out'' and Mr. Pistole told us it was
meaningless. All they do is give a name and a social security
number.
Mr. Verdery. If the assumption is that the data that is
being provided in inaccurate.
Mr. DeFazio. Well the assumption--do you think McDonald's
is taking fingerprints and checking these people, really doing
a real background check on these people?
If they don't have a real background check, why don't they
go through security?
The pilots, we know who they are, they have been
fingerprinted. We know who they are, don't we? We really know
they are that person with that I.D., that is actually a pilot
for United Airlines, who has been doing this for 25 years.
Everything on him and everything in his carry-on has to go
through security. There is a McDonald's worker, we don't know
who they are, we haven't fingerprinted them, we don't have the
slightest idea of their identity, ``Hey welcome to the
airport!''
Now what sense does this system make? I have been trying to
get TSA to pay attention--''Oh, we are working on a TWIC,
congressman.'' Today four hundred thousand people will file in
and out of the airport, we don't know who the heck they are or
what they are carrying, but we are working on a bureaucratic
solution here.
Mr. Verdery. If I am wrong, and I would be happy to get
back to you, my assumption is that the background checks are
not being performed by McDonald's or by Borders, they are
performed by the airport.
Mr. DeFazio. They are performed by commercial vendors who--
what do they check? Do you know what they check?
Mr. Verdery. I don't know.
Mr. DeFazio. They check the name and the social security
number which Mr. Pistole and you just admitted is worthless if
we don't know that is really the person with that name and that
social security number, isn't it?
Mr. Verdery. I mean the broader issue is that we don't have
confidence in the document, say a driver's license because we
are not sure.
Mr. DeFazio. But the broader point is, we don't even have
to have, we don't even need a counterfeit document. You go to
the death list, you get a legitimate name of a person and a
legitimate social security number and you would adopt that,
with approximately the same age as you.
We are never going to, McDonald's is not going to get to,
the airport isn't going to get to whether or not that is really
that person. So shouldn't that person go through security?
Shouldn't all these four or five hundred thousand a day go
through security, just like the pilots and the flight
attendants and the frequent fliers and the TSA guy and the
members of Congress? Isn't this an incredible loophole? Don't
just tell me, ``Oh, it is a little problem.'' It is a big
problem. We don't know who they are.
I am not even talking about the other side of the airport,
which is everybody who has access to the planes, of course we
did find a few box cutters in the seats on planes after 9/11
probably put in there by cleaners. We are doing the same
background check on cleaners, which is, ``We got your name and
social security number. We will run it through the system, if
it comes back clean, if you didn't happen to steal the name and
social security number or misappropriate it of a felon, you are
fine.''
Chairman Cox. The gentleman's time has expired.
But you are certainly eligible to answer the question.
Mr. Verdery. Obviously congressman, it sounds like you have
had interaction with TSA on this directly, I am not privy to
that, but I would be more than happy to go back and work with
them on this. It is not an issue I have worked with them
directly on in my few months on the job.
But just more broadly, if I could just take a second, if we
don't have confidence in a driver's license or another document
because there are no security features, there is no check on
what it takes to get a document, then we go back and revise
what the driver's license is used for. Basically, if there is
no security then we have to assume that a driver's license only
proves that you went and took a driving test and maybe that you
proved that you have car insurance, but nothing else. And that
would implicate quite a bit, whether it is Federal buildings,
getting on a plane, gun shows, whatever. I mean the whole
reliance on driver's license--the example you raised a fairly
legitimate one--but it is one of many that is caused by the
weakness in the driver's license system.
Chairman Cox. Thank you, gentlemen.
And I would note, that in some senses these are solvable
problems and that today's hearing is focused on the ability,
for example, of a known terrorist who acquired, not just a fake
I.D., but one issued by the government that has the perfect
imprimatur of legitimacy. And then to use it to freely gain
access to places that he or she ought not to be.
The separate question of people who undergo background
checks and who work within secure perimeters are beating our
chests, is certainly one worthy of consideration by this
committee and I think we ought to pursue it.
Next in order of questions, we will go to the gentleman
from Michigan, Mr. Camp is recognized for 8 minutes.
Mr. Camp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Verdery, you in your
written testimony talk at some length about the driver's
license and that 21 states don't require any proof of legal
status. And it seems to me that that is an area we have a real
concern, and particularly with the recent California law
allowing people that are known non-citizens to acquire driver's
licenses, which then has access to many other identifying
documents.
Do you have any recommendations about changing what should
occur in those sorts of identifying documents?
Mr. Verdery. There are a couple things I would say in
response to your question.
The administration is looking carefully at a whole range of
document issues. I testified a few months ago at another
committee at this body regarding the matricular consular, which
is an issue which I would maybe raise today. In light of that
issue and others, we are looking carefully at how the Federal
Government should be encouraging states and others to come up
with more secure documents. One area I would like to mention
though, which hasn't come up particularly in the Q and A, or in
the testimonies, is the positive things that are going on in
terms of foreign documents.
In terms of foreign governments with their passports, in
terms of the United States government issuing visas, in terms
of the United States government issuing passports to U.S.
citizens, those are all going to be biometrically enhanced over
the next couple of years as a result of legislation that
Congress passed and that we are implementing.
And so a lot of the problems, in terms of foreign
documents, are going to be addressed; we will be able to lock
in people's identities as biometrics, whether foreigners come
in this country or a U.S. citizen.
So there is positive news here. Clearly on the driver's
license front there is a lot of work to be done and I think one
thing that should be considered is, rather than trying to come
up with a one-size-fits-all, we ought to have one feature of a
card that is secure that could be worked across all the various
states that is secure and gives us some ability to believe that
the person is who they say they are.
Mr. Camp. Well, my concern too, is in your written
testimony, also outlined at some length, how you get into this
country from Canada or Mexico, and it is simply a verbal
declaration that you are a resident is sufficient under the
rules to allow admission.
Mr. Verdery. That is correct.
Mr. Camp. Do you have any recommendation in terms of
changing that or making that more secure. Because it would seem
to me that, yes, I understand in your testimony that the agent
at the border will have an opportunity to go deeper and ask for
written documents, but for the most part, that doesn't happen.
What should be done there? You lay out the current
situation, but I wonder what you think we ought to do to
tighten it up, to make sure that we don't have terrorists that
come into this country by simply declaring they are citizens
and being allowed to pass through.
Mr. Verdery. We are looking very carefully at both the
requirements, or relative lack of requirements on U.S. citizens
that are returning to the country and also the Canadians and
others who are coming into the country. As you know, any types
of change, in terms of the Canadians, would raise some serious
foreign policy considerations that need to be factored in.
We are working on that as part of the U.S.-VISIT System,
which was mentioned previously. There will be tracking at land
borders down the road, we have to work with the Canadians and
the Mexicans who are coming in across the country to try to
figure out how they fit into U.S. VISIT. So there is work being
done. The current situation of an oral declaration is clearly a
problem, notwithstanding the good efforts of our CBP inspectors
in trying to enforce it.
Mr. Camp. Obviously, we have a lot of back and forth across
the border and we obviously want to facilitate legitimate
travel, but I wondered what direction you see these discussions
taking. I appreciate you are working on it, but I wondered
where do you see this going or can you report to this committee
the direction that you see these sorts of discussions going.
Mr. Verdery. Well as we implement the VISIT System, I think
we are headed towards a situation of tighter documentary
requirements. I can't sit here today and promise you exactly
what that is going to be, that is going to be decided by
negotiations with our foreign partners, by an interagency
process that is not yet complete.
We are headed in a direction where there will be more
security, but we are not there today.
Mr. Camp. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Pistole, you touched on some of the reasons and
consequences of identity theft and fraud and I know of, in
June, Steve McGrath from the FBI testified before the Judiciary
Committee about the consular I.D. cards and the security
implications. And I wondered if you could update the committee.
Anything the FBI is doing to inform other agencies and state
and local governments about those security implications and
just sort of, what the status is of that particular issue.
Mr. Pistole. U.S. Congressman the FBI is working through
the interagency process to assess the vulnerabilities that are
associated with those particular cards, based on the lack of
verifiable underlying data for the recipient to obtain the
card. We are working with state and of course, the DHS, to try
to identify those cards that are out there now that may pose a
risk from previously issued, and then trying to move forward on
a perspective move to see if there is a consensus to change
that policy.
Mr. Camp. Is there a Federal working group or task force on
this issue?
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Mr. Camp. And is the FBI involved in that?
Mr. Pistole. Yes, with the Department of Justice.
Mr. Camp. And tell me how that is going.
Mr. Pistole. We are making progress in general terms, but
again, there is a government-wide decision that has been made
that we dealing with from a threat-assessment perspective, and
the FBI is one small part of that as representative to DOJ.
Mr. Camp. OK. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cox. Thank you, gentlemen.
The gentle lady from Washington, Ms. Holmes Norton.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I am interested in prosecutions and enhanced penalties. I
compliment Mr. Howard for the 50 arrests, the prosecutions we
have had here. I recognize they are given with documents to
look like in your and other offices across the country. The
model from the country is often used, of course we know that if
you are talking about undocumented immigrants, they don't have
a lot to lose. They go across and they come right back. They of
course, are not the people I am most interested in. I am
interested in potential terrorists.
I sent for the statute you testified to, Mr. Howard, and I
in certain parts of that statute I fully endorse the Identity
Theft Penalty and Enhancement Act, but to refresh my
recollection, I sent for a summary and I don't--either we need
a new statute in order to deal with the problem we are talking
about in this hearing, or we would seriously need to rework it.
The first problem I noted was that it deals with means--it
really is an identity theft statute and it deals with
identification using a means of identification of another
person; whereas in the matter before the committee, we are
dealing with probably fictitious persons altogether.
Now they call for 5 years imprisonment for specified felony
violations, I have got a question for you. First of all, what
is the jail penalty, the prison penalty today that you are
working with and under what statute? Is all identity activity a
felony, or is some of it considered to be misdemeanor activity?
I ask you these questions on the matter of fact that I think
this committee may need to work on an entirely separate
statute, now pending before Judiciary, may not even be able to
be fixed to meet our concerns.
Yes, sir.
Mr. Howard. The statute we are working with now has 20 year
penalties. The proposed statute has penalty enhancements of up
to five years.
Ms. Norton. You are working with a statute that has 20
years felonies?
Mr. Howard. Twenty year felonies.
Ms. Norton. What is it?
Mr. Howard. That would be either 18 USC 1546, which is
``Use of false I.D. documents.''
Ms. Norton. But these are all felonies?
Mr. Howard. Everything we are talking about is a felony.
And the proposed statute has a five year enhancement. As I
said, we would be glad to work with Congress. Certainly one of
the things we see is might be more of a sentencing commission
concern, in that some of the statutes have base levels that
only provide penalties of 24 months, 2 years.
Ms. Norton. What is the maximum we have been able to get
here in the District of Columbia.
Mr. Howard. So far, Mr. Gonzalez-Gonzalez's 52 months,
which is about four and a half years, but that was not based on
the statute itself, he had prior convictions, which allowed us
under the sentencing guidelines to move that penalty up to the
total of 52 months.
Ms. Norton. Would you like to see enhancement--I mean you
would rather have 20 years, but I am trying to figure out.
Mr. Howard. I think the government would. Clearly one of
the issues that we have when we are looking at these cases are
individuals who come in and there is other information we want
from them. For instance, if they are, as Mr. Gonzalez-Gonzalez
was doing, importing documents from other states, we want to
know who that person is.
Clearly, if they are willing to do the jail time, they are
willing to take the penalty we have no leverage, in terms of
trying to get them to cooperate with us.
Ms. Norton. I would like very much to look into that.
I have a final question for all of you. It as a very
controversial question, a very controversial issue. The chair
spoke about 240 different kinds of I.D. and I frankly think,
thinking about what you do. We are asking you to do something
close to the impossible, and you are trying to somehow conform
all of this. And ultimately it can all become circular as you
probe deeper and deeper to find the ultimate document, the
ultimate identification.
And I think part of the problem is we are dealing with
retail remedies, after all it was undocumented immigrants
looking for work before. If you are dealing with terrorists, it
seems to me, we have got to get beyond the retail. And we have
got to get beyond the state-by-state.
Now I am a card-carrying civil libertarian, I practice
civil liberties in the courts, and kind of had a gut reaction
against the national I.D. card. There are many people like me,
libertarians and civil libertarians, who have begun to rethink
that matter, because there are much more intrusive actions that
the government is using in order to discern identity and
because--I will give you an example, ultimately what we are
using is racial profiling finally, when we can't think of
anything else to do.
I don't know if the national I.D. card would finally get to
the root of the problem or not. You can counterfeit those
although probably less easily than counterfeiting all of these
birth certificates and 240 other documents.
I am really looking for something beyond the retail that
produces less intrusion into the privacy of the American people
and greater security. So I am forced to ask the question about
a national I.D. card and ask whether you think that would in
fact, eliminate some of these problems or whether we would
still have a problem even with a national I.D. card?
Chairman Cox. The gentle lady's time has expired. But you
have put such a predicament on the table here that I am sure we
can allow at least 20 minutes for response.
Mr. Howard. I would be glad to give you two. It is
certainly a--I think you hit it on the head congresswoman--it
is a huge problem.
And it is one that the Justice Department is certainly
studying and trying to get a hold of. Certainly as I go through
a lot of our cases, the people that we are finding are simply
opportunists and they are working with people, getting money
from folks who are looking for opportunities in this country. I
think the whole Justice Department, and certainly my office,
and I know Mr. McNulty's office is very cognizant of issues of
racial profiling and we want people who belong here, who are
here legally and who are residents to enjoy that freedom. By
the same token, we try to get through some mechanism of
identifying those who don't.
But it is not an easy question, I know the Justice
Department struggles with it and we are trying to come up with
some answers in terms of a national I.D. And I believe a proper
answer would probably come from someone who is on that group,
who is looking at a national I.D. card.
Ms. Norton. I am just looking for anyone on the panel that
could tell how--I understand there is no policy yet and I don't
expect you to endorse such a policy--I am trying to look for
how effective this would be and whether it would eliminate more
intrusive ways of trying to see if we are dealing with a
legitimate party.
Mr. Howard. Congressman, I would be willing to answer part
of that.
Obviously, as long as the government whether that is the
state or Federal Government, is relying on paper documents
which can be easily fabricated and fraudulent documents, it is
problematic that we rely on those for authenticity of the
person. And that is where the biometrics come in. Whether you
relate that to a national I.D. card or some other type of
identification that has either fingerprints or something else
on it that allows for a match-up of that person to the card
with that print on it goes a long way.
One analogy is the FBI's National Crime Information Center,
NCIC, which runs millions of requests, of records checks if you
will, both criminally and civilly from around the country,
around the world, every year. There is a standardized protocol
for submission to fingerprints to NCIC, so in other words, if
your fingerprints aren't submitted properly, they won't go in
the database. So there is a benefit of having standardized,
uniform policy and protocol for submission of information on a
national basis, and as an analogy, there is a benefit from
doing that.
Mr. Kiser. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cox. Mr. Kiser.
Mr. Kiser. Congresswoman, AAMVA's perspective is that the
national I.D. is probably not needed. One of the by-products of
a national I.D. is the creation of an infrastructure to
actually issue one. And we believe that the infrastructure to
issue I.D.s is in place in the state DMVs.
As we said earlier, there are loopholes and weaknesses in
that process and we think that the appropriate approach is to
strengthen what is already there and build on what is there and
enhance it for the 21st century.
Chairman Cox. I would also add that I wrestle with these
same problems like all members, it may be that the Federal
system is our strength here because one of the great fears that
people have about the national I.D. card is that it will become
the means and the basis for a central government repository of
all information about you as an individual. Whereas if we
decentralize the issuance of identification, that is less
likely to happen. It is a big question and happily not the
topic of today's hearing. Mr. Shadegg is recognized next, the
gentleman from Arizona, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Shadegg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think it is a perfect segue for some of the questions I
want to ask. I am fascinated that the last answer says, ``Well,
we don't really need a national ID card because we have all
these different DMVs and that is the vehicle to use,'' except
that at least two states have already decided now to issue
driver's licenses to noncitizens.
Both California and New Mexico are taking that step. It is
being voted in my home state of Arizona. And I think there is
legislation about to be introduced here in the Congress
addressing that issue from a national perspective.
And I guess my first reaction was, well, it is none of the
Federal Government's business to tell a state that they can't
issue a driver's license to whomever they want except when I
listened to the testimony as it was presented here today,
talking about the importance of identification document fraud
and then fraud involving state driver's licenses, it seems to
me maybe it is the function of Federal Government.
And I introduced and was successful in passing the first
Federal identity theft legislation. And I think this is a
critically important topic. But to focus on homeland security,
Mr. McNulty, if you were advising, say, the governor of
Virginia on the issue of issuing driver's licenses to
noncitizens, would you advise him against that for homeland
security reasons or for it, or is it a mixed bag?
Chairman Cox. Would the gentleman yield for just a moment,
because there is some space in between the question and the
answer for further refinement.
Does the gentleman have in mind noncitizens or people who
are in the country illegally?
Mr. Shadegg. Well, my thought is about people who are in
the country illegally. But I assume we are already issuing some
to noncitizens who are resident aliens with proper
identification.
Mr. McNulty. Right. Right. That is an important
distinction. I think that identification cards in Virginia and
driver's licenses can be issued. But I would defer to my
Virginia colleague here on that. I am pretty sure that they can
be issued under the right circumstances. And, obviously, to get
into the question then of issuance of identification to
individuals who are undocumented, that is a whole other story
and certainly creates new problems from the law enforcement
perspective and an opportunity for individuals to, as I said,
my testimony establish, legitimize their presence here for
whatever purpose there might be.
So I probably should defer to Mr. Carico, whose office
actually would find itself advising the governor of Virginia,
as opposed to the U.S. Attorney. But I will say this just
before I defer.
Our perspective that the validity of this form of
identification, driver's license or identification card, is so
critical to so many things. It just becomes the instrument by
which people move about in the Commonwealth of Virginia, that
our concern, of course, is that it is a very secure form of
identification and that it is only given to those who have the
proper place, that is, they are permitted to be doing the
things they are doing with it.
We don't know what the hijackers did with their Virginia
identification cards. But presumably, they used it to just
establish their presence better. And that becomes a problem
whether it is in the hands of individuals whose presence is not
even legitimate or lawful in the first place. But let me defer
to my Virginia colleague on that.
Mr. Carico. Congressman Shadegg, in Virginia right now,
under the new laws that we just passed in the wake of 9/11, we
added a legal presence requirement in our laws so that people
who want Virginia driver's licenses or state identification
cards have to prove legal presence as well.
Now, there are many different statuses of people who are in
the country who are not necessarily citizens but, like you
said, resident aliens, there're people here under refugee
status, temporary protective status, they are here on visas and
the like, and with the Virginia law right now, those people can
be issued Virginia driver's licenses or state identification
cards if they have documentation that proves that they are here
legally in the country.
Mr. Shadegg. And Mr. Verdery, from the homeland security
perspective, what happens to the validity of the driver's
license if, in fact, the states can make differential
determinations as to who gets them and if Virginia requires
some proof of legal status and the states of California and New
Mexico do not, for example.
Mr. Verdery. The concern we have is more on the security
side in terms of do you believe that the person who is getting
the document is who they say they are, and then can that
document be used for various purposes to gain access to
something that they are not qualified to do?
I do not believe the administration has a position point
square on the issue of should illegal aliens be given driver's
licenses by any particular state.
Our concern at Homeland is: Does anybody have access to an
ID card that they should not have either because they are not
qualified for it, or because they are an impostor, and that
does lead them into situations that we would be concerned
about, whether it is access to Federal buildings, access to
airplanes, you can go down on the list.
Mr. Shadegg. I just want to make sure I understand.
The Department of Homeland Security and in your view the
entire administration has no view on whether or not the states
should issue driver's licenses to people in the country
illegally? Homeland Security has no opinion on that?
Mr. Verdery. I am not aware that either the Department or
the administration has taken a particular position on that
exact question.
Mr. Shadegg. It seems to me the Department's going to have
to take a position pretty quick. Because, as my colleague from
the District of Columbia pointed out, we all struggle with this
issue of a national identification card.
I think surely that, as the testimony here today suggested,
the American driver's license issued by one of the 50 states is
what we are using now in lieu of a national identification
card.
I have grave reservations about a national identification
card. But if the standards for issuance of a driver's license
can vary as greatly as the state of Virginia require proof of
legal presence in the United States to get a driver's license,
but the states of New Mexico and California do not require even
proof that you are legally in the country for the issuance of a
driver's license, it seems to me the driver's license then
becomes not what it has been as a standard for identification
in this country, and particularly if you look at what it is it
takes in different states to get a driver's license.
My time has expired. But I think you are asking the same
question I am in a different form. The way of making the
driver's license secure, it appears to me, in most states has
now been substantially differentiated from in at least two
states where we no longer have control of the documents in even
basic sense over what it takes to get a driver's license.
Chairman Cox. Before I yield to Mr. Andrews for questions,
I just want to understand the answer that the Department just
gave concerning whether or not states should issue driver's
licenses to person who are in the country illegally.
The Department of Homeland Security is responsible for,
among other things, the Border Patrol. As we discussed earlier
in this hearing, under United States law, citizens traveling in
the Western Hemisphere can enter and exit our country by
displaying a driver's license.
If the Department has not any view on whether or not people
can be issued a driver's license when they are not legally
allowed in the country, then what in the world are we doing
accepting this at the borders?
Mr. Verdery. Well, I am not even sure it is actually
accepted at the borders as proof of U.S. Citizenship. I mean, I
understand the legal test that the inspector that somebody
would run into at a point of entry has to be convinced that the
person in front of them deserves entry to the country. They do
not have to show any ID. It is entirety of the circumstances
kind of test. A driver's license currently is seen as a good
indicator that the person should be allowed back in the
country.
Chairman Cox. And if in fact, that is the practice, how is
it that we can be completely without a view on whether people
should be able to enter the country with a driver's license
that we know is issued to people who aren't allowed in the
country?
Mr. Verdery. I think it depends on the totality of what we
think the states are doing in terms of driver's licenses. As
was mentioned in the testimony, some states such as Virginia,
have tightened up their security features that are necessary.
Chairman Cox. Will the department not accept California
driver's licenses for California citizens across the border any
longer?
Mr. Verdery. I don't believe there has been a position
taken on that.
Chairman Cox. Well, this is all, it seems to me laid deeply
at the feed of the Department. We hope to have some answers
very soon on this.
Mr. Shadegg. Will the chairman yield?
Chairman Cox. Well, the time belongs to Mr. Andrews. With
unanimous consent, I would extend the gentleman additional
time.
Mr. Shadegg. Mr. Chairman, can I just elaborate on one
point just very quickly.
Chairman Cox. Yes.
Mr. Shadegg. A reminder that technically under the law, the
driver's license is not proof of citizenship, and that Customs
and Border Protection does not treat it as such.
Chairman Cox. So technically those seven hijackers who
obtained the driver's licenses from the State of Virginia
before they attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon,
and so on, weren't supposed to get them either.
But that is the purpose of today's hearing.
Mr. Shadegg. Now, Mr. Chairman, in light of that followup,
I would like unanimous consent for about 20 seconds to just
follow up on the point that was just made.
Chairman Cox. By all means, without objection.
Mr. Shadegg. You just said that technically it is not
allowed as proof of citizenship? I crossed the border into
Canada twice this summer, and it was the identification I was
required to produce, as was every member of my family.
So in theory it may not be accepted as admission, or as
proof of citizenship to get in and out of this country, in
practice it happened to me less than two months ago.
Chairman Cox. Well, I think to be fair to the witness, what
he said is that it is discretionary. 8 CFR 235.1 (b) says that
you have to establish to the examining officer's satisfaction
that you are a citizen and have a right to enter the country,
and it is the case in practice that that test is being met by
presentation of a driver's license.
Hence today's hearing. You have been very patient. Mr.
Andrews has the time for 8 minutes.
Mr. Andrews. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I thank the witnesses
for their participation of testimony today. The record before
us is overwhelming that it is relatively easy for a terrorist
to pose as someone else, and the impact of that is that the
Integrated Watch List, other databases that the department is
collecting and sharing with various agencies, is ineffective if
we are not identifying the person who claims to be the person.
It is my assumption that biometric technology has
progressed to the point where at least in most cases it would
solve that problem. You can't use someone else's iris, you
can't use someone else's fingerprint, you can't use someone
else's biometric characteristics.
Does anyone on the panel disagree with the proposition?
Putting aside for a minute the question of which agency should
administer this, and how it should be paid for and by whom,
does anyone disagree with the proposition that every driver's
license and similar document in the country should have a
biometric identification feature to it? Does anybody disagree
with that proposition? Mr. Kiser?
Mr. Kiser. Congressman, I don't disagree with that. A
biometric identifier is a great place to be and we should be
trying to get there, and in AAMVA we are trying to get there.
But we have had a two-year study of biometrics, and our
conclusion at this point is that although biometrics works
great on a one-to-one match, it is awfully hard to find the
technology that works on an one-to-300 million match, which is
really what we need to do to have an effective biometric
identifier at this point.
Mr. Andrews. But doesn't that really get to the point that
biometrics are not yet perfect, but they are clearly better
than the piece of paper with your name typed on it. I mean, is
there any serious dispute about that?
Mr. Kiser. Not from AAMVA's perspective, no.
Mr. Andrews. I am not a professional the way you folks are
on this, but I look at the situation this way. You have all
told us, and I was particularly impressed by Mr. Malfi's report
about how easy it was to get into Federal buildings and across
the border with these fraudulent documents.
You have made it quite easy for a terrorist to pose as
someone else. We have developing technologies that would make
it a lot harder to pose as someone else. You could still do it,
but it would make it a lot harder to do.
That seems like a no-brainer to me, that it should become
the law somehow, whether it is by requiring states to meet this
standard, or having one national entity that takes care of
this, but we ought to do this.
I mean, am I wrong? Am I missing something here?
All right.
[Laughter.]
Assuming I am right, which I occasionally am, what
recommendation would you make to the committee as to how we
should implement such a change? Should we create uniform
standards that each state jurisdiction must meet and then
subsidize the states rising to that standard? I don't think
this cost should be visited upon the taxpayers of the states.
Or should we adopt a national system where driver's
licenses and birth certificates and such documents are issued
by the Federal Government? Which of those two should we pursue?
And if there are other options, what are they?
And I would open that to the panel.
Mr. Howard. I will just make an observation. Obviously, the
Justice Department will have a position. But I think one of the
observations is, certainly as a citizen, is that, you know,
when I was starting to drive, they went from a state being able
to set its own speed limits to having everybody drive 55.
And what the Federal Government did at that point was that
if you comply with the 55-mile-an-hour speed limit, then you
can opt in to certain Federal funds. And if you didn't, you
didn't get it.
I mean, money is always an incentive. I think there is
certainly a concern in some quarters about a national
identification card, but the comment was made earlier about
having something like a driver's license, having certain
information, certain qualities to it that would make it sound,
make it something you could trust. And maybe a money incentive
is one way to do it.
Mr. Andrews. Mr. Howard, as the chairman alluded to
earlier, I think we are all instinctively reluctant to impose
mandates, and we prefer incentives and suggestions. But this is
one area where I would be for a mandate. It is inconceivable to
me if we have the technology to make it more difficult to pose
as someone else, that we don't require a way to do it. Again, I
think it shouldn't be federally mandated and state funded. I
would be in favor of us paying for it, if we are going to
mandate it.
Mr. Howard. Again, Congressman, mine is just an
observation.
Mr. Andrews. Yes. Anybody else care to recommend how we go
about doing this?
Mr. Verdery. One thing to keep in mind is that there is not
necessarily the requirement that it be one size fits all, or
that we have to have one master form for how documents might
look. The trick is to have some type of security feature that
we feel confident in, that is acceptable across the board.
The driver's licenses themselves or IDs don't have to look
alike or have the same information. It is the fact that we want
to have confidence that the issuing party, the DMV usually, has
verified in some way that this person is who they say they are.
Mr. Andrews. I also understand that we don't want to freeze
the technology in 2003. We want to be able to build in
continuous improvements in biometric technology so it works
better and better and better.
But, you know, I am as much of a civil libertarian as
anyone here, and I don't want the government spying my affairs
and knowing things it ought not know. But it seems to me that
if I want the privilege of driving down the roads, or availing
myself of other public services, requiring me to show that I am
who I say am is not at all an intrusion upon one's liberties
and it is something that we ought to just make happen.
Not to say this in any accusatory tone to the Secretary,
but I think it is disheartening that we are 25 months now away
from this calamity and this situation still exists.
And I respect our Federalist traditions. I understand that
this is expensive. I understand we shouldn't rush into a
solution without understanding the technology of it, but we
have to get on the stick here.
And I commend the chairman for calling the hearing. I think
that we need to get the best minds in the country, which you
represent, together and tell us how to fix this problem. I
think we have spent $74 billion on homeland security since
September 11th of 2001. Some of that should have gone to this,
and the next piece of it will certainly go to this as well.
So I thank the witnesses for their testimony and the
chairman for his wisdom in calling the hearing.
Chairman Cox. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Shays?
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am somewhat reluctant sometimes to get into the issue of
illegal immigration, because sometimes it has a connotation to
people.
But I wrestle with this, like probably all of you do. It is
illegal to be in this country, but we find every way to
accommodate people who are here illegally. We give them
driver's licenses. We allow them to register with banks. We
know they are here illegally, and we turn the other way.
I would double legal immigration, but we have about 8
million people who are here illegally and we don't seem to know
how to address it. And what I am wrestling with right now are
the rules done by Treasury, and I want to know each of your
opinion about it.
And what we did in the PATRIOT Act was we basically said we
wanted Treasury to establish verification so that we could get
at money laundering, et cetera.
So they basically came out with their rules and they came
out with their rules in July, and there was such an uproar in
Congress that they did an inquiry and decided that they would
look at it again, and then when there was the storm and the
government was closed down, they came down and reaffirmed that
they were going to keep the same rules.
And the same rules basically say the final rule provides
that for non-U.S. persons a bank must obtain one of the
following, a taxpayer identification number, Social Security
number, individual taxpayer identification number, or employer
identification number, passport number and country of issuance,
alien identification card or number, and country of issuance of
any other government-issued document evidencing nationality or
residence, and bearing a photograph or similar safeguard.
First off, I would like to ask each of you, can you have a
fraudulent taxpayer identification number?
Let us start with Homeland Security.
Mr. Verdery. I am not sure I understand the question.
Mr. Shays. All right, let me give you an easy one first.
Chairman Cox. Actually, if you would let that question hang
out there and be answered, and let me just qualify it. If I
understand your question, it is is the taxpayer identification
number a reliable basis for the issuance of identification? Or
is it a reliable basis for anything?
We have covered this in this hearing already. I think that
is a pretty easy answer. Hopefully, you don't have any question
about it on the panel.
Mr. Shays. Well, let us go right down.
Mr. Verdery. Well, I think the Treasury Department and
their regulation says that it is for purposes of these banking
issues.
Mr. Shays. I don't care what they think. I want to know
what you think. Let me say to preface, you are in charge of
homeland security. They have a perspective, you have a
perspective. And I want to know your perspective. And having
had 5 years of hearings on this kind of stuff, it is hard for
me to smile anymore about it.
Mr. Verdery. Well, as the chairman mentioned, I believe, in
his remarks earlier--
Mr. Shays. I don't want to know what the chairman said; I
want to know what you think.
Mr. Verdery. Well, there are concerns about requirements or
identification criteria such as the ITN that we are not sure
that the person who has it is who they say they are, but the
Treasury regulations make clear that--
Mr. Shays. Why are you taking the time telling me--I just
want to know what you think. Is it a reliable document? It is,
yes or no?
Mr. Verdery. It is reliable in some cases.
Mr. Shays. And in other cases it is not.
Chairman Cox. Will the gentleman yield? I mean, you know,
the people who manufacture these numbers, the IRS, have the
following to say about it: ``Taxpayer identification numbers
are strictly for tax processing. We do not apply the same
standards as agencies that provide genuine identity
certification. ITN applicants are not required to apply in
person. Third parties can apply on their behalf. We do not
conduct background checks or further validate the authenticity
of identity documents. ITN's do not prove identity outside the
tax system and should not be offered or accepted as
identification for non-tax purposes.''
I can't imagine anything more clearer than that. That is
what the IRS says and they are the ones who manufacture the
numbers. So to have the Department of Homeland Security say
maybe they will be good sometimes, then I think we have a big
problem here.
Mr. Shays. I would like you to respond to what you just
heard.
Mr. Verdery. Again, this has gone through an interagency
process. The Treasury Department has issued regulations that
have been approved by the administration and--
Mr. Shays. You know what you are saying to me? You are
telling me how it happened. I have been in Congress 16 years,
and I want to know what my Department of Homeland Security
thinks, and the reason I want to know that is I helped
establish this organization because I thought you might be a
counter to some of the junk that we have seen come out of other
departments.
I thought you might be focused on homeland security and
protecting our citizens. So I want to know what you think and
what your head thinks. I want to know what you think. I don't
want to know what you think someone else thinks.
Mr. Verdery. The Department weighed in on this during the
interagency process.
Mr. Shays. And said?
Mr. Verdery. And expressed concerns about the regulation in
general. And the administration made a decision that the
Treasury regulation would go forward.
Mr. Shays. Right. But the answer to it is, the Department
disagreed with the decision. There is nothing wrong with saying
that. You heighten, frankly, and make me feel a little better
about the department. The position was you opposed it, correct?
Mr. Verdery. There were certain things about the proposed
regulation we had concerns about, yes.
Mr. Shays. And wouldn't one of them have been based on the
very explanation you heard from our chairman?
Mr. Verdery. About the parts of the regulation that we
thought were not as--the documents that would be accepted that
weren't as secure as we might like.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Pistole, how many times have you met with
Mr. Verdery?
Mr. Pistole. None.
Mr. Shays. None?
Mr. Pistole. None.
Mr. Shays. This is the first time you two have met?
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Mr. Shays. Why?
Mr. Verdy. Well, I was just confirmed a few months ago.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Mr. Pistole. If that answers the question.
Mr. Shays. How many months ago?
Mr. Verdery. I guess three, two or three.
Mr. Shays. So this is the first time you all have sat and
talked about this issue?
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Mr. Shays. What do you think about a taxpayer
identification number?
Mr. Pistole. Really, it is an unreliable form of
identification for verifying the authenticity of the person.
And by way of analogy, several of the 19 hijackers when asked
to provide a Social Security number simply wrote a number in a
document form that was not verified. So anybody can fabricate a
number if it is not verified for authenticity.
So we have concerns, have expressed those concerns both in
that regard and also from the standpoint of the perhaps
inconsistencies in the way that they may be scrutinized. So
even if there is a legitimate taxpayer identification number,
or Social Security number, if the entity, whether it is a
financial institution or otherwise, is not exercising due
diligence in scrutinizing that number, then it is to no avail.
Mr. Shays. How about, if you would respond to this, the
number and country of issuance that any other government issued
document evidencing nationality or residence and bearing a
photograph or similar safeguard?
What do you think of that, Mr. McNulty? Mr. McNulty, I am--
excuse me, Mr. Pistole, I am sorry.
I am sorry. I am so eager to go through this. Why don't we
take the first one and just do--I think we kind of know the
taxpayer number, but why don't you respond, if both attorneys
would respond?
Mr. McNulty. All I can say as a Federal prosecutor in
Virginia is I have prosecuted people for using a stolen
taxpayer identification number, or a bogus tax identification
number. So, obviously, it is another form of identification
that is subject to theft and fraud, and it is not reliable
therefore in some kind of means for establishing positive
identification in the way we are discussing today.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Howard?
Mr. Howard. I would agree with that. I think that unless
you are going to do the background to it to find out who
actually filed the taxes, where they were filed from, verify a
signature, if all you are going to do is present the number, it
is certainly our experience that almost any number can be
fraudulently obtained or manufactured.
Mr. Carico. Sir, in Virginia, we do not see the tax
identification numbers as being reliable enough to allow for
someone to, like, get a driver's license or state
identification card. So my answer to you would be that we in
Virginia do not find that it is reliable enough to get those
sorts of identifications.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Malfi. From the operations that we conducted, part of
the problem is that cards or pieces of identification that are
issued by the government, or by the state, gives people that
are examining them a false sense of security and almost a
complacency for the fact that if you have one of these cards,
which they really have no way to validate the authenticity of
them, it lets their guard down because they feel that because
you are a bearer of this instrument, or this document or this
card that is issued by a state or a government, that you are
who you are.
And the important part in regards to all of these types of
documents is that, one, they are issued for different reasons,
and we can't have a document that is being used for something
other than what the original purpose to issue that is.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Very helpful, gentlemen.
And, Mr. Chairman, I know my--I realize, but let me just
proceed.
Yes, sir?
Mr. Kiser. Congressman, we believe that the ITIN, or the
taxpayer identification number should not be used as a breeder
document in the issuance of a driver's license.
Mr. Shays. So I guess we conclude, Mr. Verdery, you are
supposed to be the champion of homeland security, you are
supposed to be the one organization we turn to. And when we go
right down the line, no hesitation, no qualification, no BS,
just the realities of circumstance for members of Congress to
then make a judgment. I would like to think that I could get
that same precision from you and, frankly, from the Department.
Chairman Cox. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Etheridge, is
recognized for 8 minutes.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me also join my colleagues in thanking you for this
hearing and for all of you for being here. This is an important
hearing today, and I hope that from this hearing we will find a
way to find some legislation to deal with an issue.
I couldn't help but think as the dialogue was going on
about how we use a driver's license. If I go out today to
National Airport, or to Dulles, and decide I am going outside
the United States, I am going to present a passport or I am not
going. Now, I realize this is a little different. Even if I am
flying to most any place, Canada, Mexico, otherwise, I have to
present a passport and when I get there, they are going to ask
to see it.
Now, I am not sure I am going to get that far with a
driver's license, but the point is that if we do that for air
travelers, then we don't deal with it on the people who get on
our roads and drive from point to point, we would never have
worried about if we hadn't had 9/11. This is a serious matter.
One other point I will make and then I want to ask a series
of questions. You know, we have a lot of Federal, state and
local partnerships. We do it through transportation systems, we
provide monies for highway transportation, the interstate
system, secondary roads, et cetera. That's a partnership.
And to get that money, you have to meet a certain standard.
I know. I served as a state legislator and as a county
commissioner and as a statewide elected official. You do not
get that money until you meet that standard.
And yet, here we are talking about an issue that is
critical to our national defense and the security of our
people, and we cannot seem to agree that we ought to have a
standard from state to state.
So with that, let me ask a couple of questions.
How is the Federal Government working with state and local
officials to provide information about identity theft?
And I guess I ought to start with you, Mr. Verdery, since
you are Homeland Security.
What are we doing to help with this issue? Because it is
obviously quite serious.
Mr. Verdery. Well, as I mentioned in my prepared testimony,
there is a number of different things going on. And I suppose
it would be nice if they were all centralized in one place.
But there are a number of agencies that have responsibility
in this area. The Secret Service is working quite a bit with
state and locals in terms of trying to get out the word on
identity theft, how to prevent it.
You have the Secret Service working with AAMVA on driver's
license issues, trying to develop security standards. We agree
with them that there should be a unified standard for the
issuance of cards in the security standards.
You obviously have the prosecutions for identity theft both
by our Federal agents at ICE and Secret Service but also down
at the local level with our prosecutors. Not to mention the
efforts more on the civil side with the Federal Trade
Commission, which has a huge outreach effort to combat identity
theft under Chairman Muris.
I mean, there is a lot going on. Is it as much as we should
be doing? Perhaps not. But there is a lot of work going on to
try to develop security standards in this area.
And again, I would not want the record to close today
without returning just briefly to the work we are doing on
passports and foreigners trying to come to this country on
passports and visas. Over the next couple of years, things are
going to change quite a bit in terms of biometrics being
incorporated in those documents.
If we are worried about terrorists coming in, especially on
airplanes, it is going to be a lot harder for them to find a
way into this country without being checked with various watch
lists and the like.
Mr. Etheridge. Well, that was not the point of my statement
as it related to passports. The point of my statement with
passports was the fact that we have pretty good security if I
am going to fly. The question is, we are talking about identity
theft and we are allowing our driver's license to be one of
those issues that opens the door for a lot of opportunities.
That being said, let me follow up with this question--and I
am not trying to pick on you, Mr. Carico from Virginia. It just
happens other states are doing some of the same things.
But it deals with the whole issue of having an
identification number on a driver's license. And in the case of
Virginia, obviously, I believe you indicated they use the
Social Security number on the driver's license. Is that
correct?
Mr. Carico. No, sir. No longer.
Mr. Etheridge. No longer. You did do it, OK. +
I think there are some states that still do, so let me
follow that up and get you to respond to that. Because the
Social Security Administration and others have indicated that
that is one of the issues that they are concerned about, and
they discourage that as much as possibly simply because that
opens up a whole new avenue of identity theft.
That being the case, did Virginia go to the random numbers
in using the ID number?
Mr. Carico. Yes, sir. We now have driver's license numbers
that are assigned once you go and request a driver's license.
Mr. Etheridge. Do you know how many states now use that
system?
Mr. Carico. I do not, sir.
Mr. Etheridge. Can you enlighten us?
Mr. Kiser. Congressman, my understanding is that all states
now offer citizens the option to use some other number than
their Social Security number on their driver's license.
I know that in my state, some citizens have chosen not to
change their number, but they do have that option and are
offered that option at the time they renew or at the time they
raise the question.
Mr. Etheridge. Well, let me follow that up, if I may.
So it is an option on the part of every state, or most
states?
Mr. Kiser. All states, as far as I know, sir.
Mr. Etheridge. It's an option.
Mr. Kiser. Yes.
Mr. Etheridge. So if we want to prevent identity theft, it
seems to me that that would be one way to execute that.
Mr. Kiser. Congressman, I think you are absolutely correct.
And again, in the case of my own state's experience, most
citizens have chosen to take a randomly issued number. But some
have in fact asked to have their Social Security number left on
their driver's license, for whatever reason.
Mr. Etheridge. Mr. Verdery, let me come back to you then,
we are talking about identity theft, we are talking about
homeland security, helping to protect the homeland, and this
being one of those areas that can open up a lot of Pandora's
Box.
What is the Department doing to discourage the use of
Social Security numbers on driver's licenses? It would seem to
me this is an area that we can have some impact.
Mr. Verdery. Well, I am not aware of particular efforts in
terms of our discouraging states from using the numbers
themselves. I know we are working closely with the Social
Security Administration generally to try to figure out ways to
tighten up the use of those numbers across the board.
But I am not aware of particular efforts in terms of trying
to get the numbers off the ID cards themselves. But perhaps
that is something that should be looked into.
Mr. Etheridge. It would seem to me that is part of what
homeland security is all about. If you are getting it off
public documents, you are saving an awful lot of time for the
rest of the folks sitting on this panel and the American public
at large.
So I would hope that would be something you would take away
from here today, and spend some time on. It seems to be a good
use of time.
Mr. Kiser, what training are state DMV workers receiving at
the present time to help identify false documents? And how
should, or could, this training be improved to reduce the
issuance rate and the problems we now face to validate and get
the identification right?
I know we have talked about a lot of the issues. It seems
to me the first issue is training until we get some legislation
to deal with the other two, to save some of the problems we are
having in identity theft.
Mr. Kiser. Congressman, AAMVA's worked on a couple of
fronts in that area. One is we have developed a standardized
list of acceptable documents that should be used for
identification purposes, or breeder documents, in generating a
driver's license.
Beyond that, we have developed a fraudulent document
recognition training program that we unrolled to our membership
on a limited basis over this past summer, that we now have
scheduled training for at least one representative from each
jurisdiction over the next several months where they will get a
five-day training course on fraudulent document recognition.
And how can that be helped? There is a cost to doing that.
And so, you know, those costs are being shared now with AAMVA.
I think we are getting some assistance from NHTSA, I believe,
but to continue to fund that the effort is to train at least
one person in each jurisdiction who can then go home and train
additional DMV employees in the jurisdiction.
So that program is up and running. The reviews from its
initial pilot were very good. It was expanded from three days
to five days to address some additional issues.
Mr. Etheridge. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I know my time has
expired, but what you are talking about is train the trainer.
Mr. Kiser. That is correct.
Mr. Etheridge. And the key is how well that first trainer
is trained. And I would hope, having had a little bit of
experience in education, that we would use the issue of rewards
in terms of a level of certification, because I know it takes
money to get that to some point, but sometimes, given the
challenge in this country that would be a great way to do it in
terms of without a lot of additional resources.
Mr. Kiser. Congressman, we are looking at a certification
program that may enhance that employee's self-esteem, maybe
their status within their jurisdiction.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cox. Thank the gentleman. The distinguished
ranking member, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Turner, is
recognized.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Verdery, I want to
follow up on some of the sentiment that was expressed by
Congressman Shays. It seems that we really need your department
to be an advocate for greater security.
You know, we consider it our responsibility in oversight to
try to close these security gaps, but it is disturbing when we
learn about some of these and that the Department hasn't
stepped forward and urged that these gaps be closed.
In your opening statement, the written version of it, on
page one, you reference about one problem, that the current law
allows a U.S. citizen to leave the United States and travel to
any country in the Western Hemisphere, except Cuba, and return
to the country without, showing a passport.
Now, it seems to me that if we are going to control who is
coming in and out, the problem is simplified if we know who the
good guys are. In this instance, if we knew that we were
dealing with a U.S. citizen, if they had a passport that was
presented upon leaving and re-entering, then that would help
close the gap and solve the problem that you went to great
lengths to describe in the first page and a half of your
testimony. And yet, nowhere in that presentation do I see that
you suggest that the Congress ought to close that potential
gap.
These are the kind of suggestions and the kind of advocacy
that I think we need from the Department. If you have a
position on that, it wasn't expressed in this presentation. But
it just seems like common sense would tell us that if it
requires a passport to travel in and out of the country as an
American citizen to go other places, that if we don't require
it in the Western Hemisphere, that a terrorist can fly into
Brazil and then into Houston and assert that they are a U.S.
citizen. And they walk right in.
So there are some common sense things here that the
department ought to be advocating to the Congress to it. You
ought to be out front. You ought to be the leader. If it turns
out it is too restrictive, that Congress rejects it or somebody
thinks it is too burdensome on the American people and we want
to leave that gap open, well, we made the choice.
But why is it we don't have the Department coming up here
and telling us we ought to deal with this issue that you so
clearly articulate there in your own testimony?
Mr. Verdery. Well, we are looking pretty carefully at the
requirements for U.S. citizens as they return back into the
country as we are working on the implementation of the U.S.
Visit system which I mentioned earlier. Now, clearly, it is a
problem as I outlined in the testimony.
Now, I think if you talked to colleagues on the northern
border especially, people who are U.S. citizens who are used to
going back and forth, out of the country to Canada, asking them
to have a passport for each trip back and forth is something
they are going to be very interested in.
But we are trying to weigh the equities here and try to
figure out balance of security needs versus the economic needs.
And it is something we are definitely focused on. At this point
today sitting here today, I can't tell you that we are
recommending solution X or Y. But it is something we are
closely examining along with the State Department.
And in terms of your hypothetical about the person flying
in from Brazil, that person has to go through a CBP inspector.
Presumably, if he is from Brazil, the inspector hopefully is
going to recognize that he is probably not a U.S. citizen and
will require the type of passport control that you would need
at an international airport. That is what they are there for.
That is why we have gone 18,000 of them to try to distinguish
between those people who need that kind of entry document and
those who don't.
And while I have the floor, I realized from your remarks
that my conversation with Congressman Shays may have left an
unclear impression. The Department agrees that the ITIN does
not in and of itself prove identity. The Treasury Department
has decided, for purposes of banking regulations, that it can
be used or can be accepted by financial institutions for
opening up a bank account. But beyond that, we agree with you
concerning other utility to establish identity with that kind
of document.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cox. The Treasury was implementing changes that
were occasioned by the Patriot Act. I mean, it is just sort of
remarkable that legislation that was meant to make it easier to
get after terrorist money was implemented in such a fashion
that it opened up possibilities for people to fraudulently open
bank accounts. Don't you agree?
Mr. Verdery. As I have mentioned, we had various concerns
with the regulation. It is now final. And we raised those
concerns.
Chairman Cox. Well, if it is a final regulation, it is
certainly not final in the Capitol. And we are going to be
after this.
We have heard today the full spectrum of crimes that are
facilitated by document fraud and identity theft. I wonder,
what about abuse and waste in, for example, government benefit
systems?
We have two U.S. attorneys here. Possibly you can tell us
whether the kind of document fraud that we have been hearing
about today contributes to abuses such as Social Security
benefit fraud or Medicare of Medicaid fraud?
Mr. McNulty? Mr. Howard?
Mr. McNulty. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman.
These frauds sort of are layered, and they begin with
fraudulent acquisition of some form of documentation. But it
just takes off from there.
And the vendors of fraudulent documents are skillful at
providing a variety of documents that will allow a person to
engage in a whole fraudulent scheme or enterprise that they
might need in order to achieve whatever fraudulent goals they
have.
And so you have a terrible waste of resources at agencies
spending time issuing these fraudulent documents.
Consider the Department of Labor alone, issuing thousands
of fraudulent certificates for acquiring a job in the United
States and the waste that is.
The amount of abuse of the proper role of these various
agencies and what they are doing, through all of the different
fraudulent schemes, is just staggering to consider.
So I think that from an abuse perspective, this whole
problem of document fraud in trying to deal not only with the
prosecution of the crime but reforming procedures so that the
agencies issuing various forms of documentation and
identification are really looking at how they are going about
their business and how they are screening and analyzing the
applications and other things that they are receiving would be
an enormous benefit to our government.
If you could improve that, I think we could reduce this
problem substantially.
Chairman Cox. Mr. Howard?
Mr. Howard. Although you are talking about fraudulent
documents, some people want to steal your identity. They want
to be you. They want to take your credit, they want to be able
get the great benefits of being a Congressman from California,
so they want to be able to buy a house, buy a car, get credit
cards, take vacations.
It is a different sort of issue, but if you talk about
fraudulent activity, we estimate that people in this country
are the victims of identity theft, probably about 33 million
people, and certainly a number of them are here in Washington.
And it is a really a life-style change. You have got people
who literally can't get their lives back. They can't, in their
own good name, get credit because of what other people are
doing.
So it is a huge issue. I think it is one of the reasons
that the Postal Service has kicked off their Operation:
Identity Crisis.
And one of the things we have learned, I think all the U.S.
Attorneys have learned, is it is something we have to work
together with on all law enforcement.
One of the things we are going to do in the U.S. Attorney's
Office in the District of Columbia is just have training on,
one, how to recognize it.
Certainly one of the areas I think that legislation can be
used is, often the victims find that once they find they are
the victims of identity theft, banks and other institutions
make it up to them to prove in fact that they did not commit
these crimes. It really kind of turns it backwards, especially
for someone who is going through one heck of a time trying to
gather their good name back.
But it is a huge, huge problem in the District of Columbia
and the country in general.
Chairman Cox. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Meek, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Meek. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I thank our panel for being here today. I just want to
say as it relates to this identity theft and fraud and
enforcement that is needed, I don't believe that the country is
ready to do what it has to do for a national identification
card. I really don't honestly believe that.
I for one am a past law enforcement person as it relates to
Florida State Highway Patrol. I have been dealing with driver's
license for a very long time now and I can tell you we can go,
we can change the driver's license every 3 years. There is
always going to be a way to get a counterfeit one.
As it relates to a national identification card, we talk
about the Patriot Act I, there were those voices that were
saying that we needed a Patriot Act I, once upon a time. Right
now those same voices are saying we need to do away with
Patriot Act I and definitely not do Patriot Act II if it is
going to be the intrusion of civil liberties and individual
right. And it is interesting to hear those voices say that.
I do believe if something does happen, God forbid, in the
very near future in our country as it relates to safety or an
event takes place in our country, an identification theft or
fraud or something has something to do with that, then maybe we
will be able to move some legislation at that time. But
unfortunately that is going back to the traffic light situation
of saying that we have to have X amount of lives lost before we
put a traffic light there.
I want to know what is going on as it relates to the
community that is sitting at the table. Obviously if each one
of you individually don't get together under the light of
Homeland Security, people in your agencies do. And how does
that bubble up and bubble out and get up here on the Hill
through the Department of Homeland Security, through the
Justice Department, need it be through the FBI of
recommendations on what we should do?
I have been a part of panels and I have seen it, I have
watched C-SPAN, I hear folks talking about what we need to do
and what we ought to do. But when the bottom line, the final
analysis, there has to be a horrific event before we get down
to moving the ball down the field.
And when we move in haste, these sort of things happen as
it relates to banking, as it relates to what is going on with
individuals that are not going through screenings and all of
these things. So we need to be able to move forth.
The purpose of this hearing today, getting back to it, was
about hopefully moving the Department in the direction of
making sure that we are more aggressive, of moving in a
direction that we need to move in. I
mean, I said it the last hearing that we got together, and
the chairman is fully aware of it--and we have a vote coming up
right now--the fact that this time of calm waters that we are
experiencing right now is not a time for me to say, ``Are you
OK, law enforcement community?''
``Well, I am OK.''
``Well then fine, let's go have lunch.'' No, it is time for
us to make sure that we continue to stay ahead of these
individuals that are trying to hurt us.
I want to ask anyone on the panel as it relates to the
carrot-and-stick approach. We talk about federalism, we are
talking about states that are not following what the Federal
guidelines are set out for. People around here are driving 55
and 65 because the Federal Government says they are going to
cut highway funds.
Any discussion as it relates to what we can do to make sure
that we move forth as a union, not as a half a union, but as a
union toward these United States that I am talking about,
towards safety of our homeland as it relates to our subject
matter, distributing driver's licenses, not having that
information that we need, any discussion on that or any
thoughts or ideas? Anyone may add.
Mr. Kiser. Congressman, there was an earlier conversation
about the issue of state's rights and the carrot-and-stick
approach. And I think it is a fine balance.
It is clear to me that the Congress, the governors, the
legislators in the jurisdictions have to work together to come
up with a solution that will work. We never believe that we
have a large piece of that solution ready to roll out. It is
not in our authority to do it. We need the Congress to advocate
that there in fact is a problem and that there is a huge
problem and to be an advocate for saying there needs to be
better integrity.
You can tie that to the carrot-and-stick approach. That
obviously has worked in highway funds and speed limits and all
sorts of things in the past. And that certainly gets the
attention of state legislatures and governors, for that matter.
And so, we believe we can solve some of these problems. As
someone said earlier, and they are correct, that you will
probably never prevent all of the fraud that occurs, but I do
think there are things that we can do to bring the driver's
license process into the 21st century. I think that the state
administrators and DMV are ready and willing to do that.
Mr. Meek. When you say bring it into the 21st century, are
you talking about some sort of national seal on a driver's
license? Are you talking about one particular driver's license?
What are we talking about here, because I can tell you that the
Treasury Department, as it relates to seals and paper and all
of these things, they are switching to every 3 years. They are
regenerating themselves, but they are finding counterfeiting is
pretty prevalent.
Mr. Kiser. We believe that in order to move to the 21st
century, you have to have unified standards. The document may
not look exactly the same from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,
but it should have a set of standard security features. It
should have placement of data in a particular position so that
it is recognized by a law enforcement officer or an airport
worker or whoever that might be. And so, yes, we do think that
there needs to be a great deal more standardization of the
document itself and the contents of the document in order to
enhance that security.
Mr. Meek. Last question, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cox. I see the gentleman's time has expired. And I
really need to be punctilious about this because we have two
members on the Democratic side and we are running out of time
on the floor.
And I don't know who I am supposed to recognize next.
Ms. Jackson Lee, the gentlelady from Texas, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the chairman very much and
apologize to the witnesses, overlapping hearings that have been
occurring, that I did not get a chance to hear all of your
testimony, but I certainly have perused a good deal of it.
I served as a ranking member on the Immigration Committee,
on the Judiciary Committee, so some of these issues we have
dealt with, particularly the issues dealing with the use of the
biometric card or the use of various identities as it relates
to immigrants. And, of course, we have had hearings on the
matricular card as well.
But let me focus on where I would like to go with this, is
the question as to what would be the best vehicle to ensure
that you have the tools to make sure that America's homeland is
safe. I think you are entrusted the responsibilities of law
enforcement, but you are also prevention as well, because when
laws are passed, when they know that there are strong oversight
provisions and oversight institutions, then people are hesitant
to engage.
First, I would like to say that I am on record for being
opposed to a national identification card. I don't think that
it is going to be advantageous, because any unified document is
subjected to even more opportunities for fraud because you
become familiar with it. And it becomes a document that you can
then make more perfect--the ones who are perpetrating fraud.
The tax ID numbers have been fraudulent as well.
So let me raise these questions. And I would appreciate it
if you all would answer it.
What would more training do, more staffing do and more
technology do for all of your work? Is that where we are going?
I know there is a bill, Paul--if I might the U.S. attorney
that, having served with him on the Judiciary Committee.
There is a H.R 1731. And if you recall, I am not sure if
you had left the Judiciary Committee. We did something on
identity fraud when we had that horrible experience of FBI
agents going into the Department of Justice about, maybe, 2 or
3 years ago with false documents. I guess that was part of the
overall study. We had hearings in Judiciary. And it wasn't
dealing with terror and immigration as much as it was dealing
with people violating the sanctity of secure areas.
So would we and could we do a better job if we said to the
various U.S. Attorneys' offices that are represented, Mr.
Howard and Mr. McNulty, that we gave you more resources and a
separate unit that dealt only with ID fraud? And then others
may want to pipe in as well in your respective areas. But if I
can to my two U.S. Attorneys on that, I would appreciate.
Training--because I know I need to give more training to my
immigration inspectors, clearly need to give more training to
them.
How would that help in your preventive and prosecution
work?
Let me finish my sentence by saying even as I am supporting
us doing a better job with determining identity fraud because I
know that helps secure the homeland, know that I am also facing
every day the insults and confrontations by those with Muslim
backgrounds or Arabic last names, individuals who come to this
country repeatedly to do nothing but good or to use our medical
services and are treated in a horrific way. And they have good
documentation. So I want to make sure that I am on record for
balancing, protecting the homeland and respecting the dignity
of individuals coming into this country.
I would ask the two U.S. Attorneys and then others, if they
would, if we have the time.
And thank you.
Mr. McNulty. Thanks for the question.
There are two things I would identify that would help a
lot. First, authority to enforce various provisions of Federal
law. One of the problems we run into is that among the various
Federal law enforcement agencies, they have jurisdiction for
particular statutes, particular types of identification fraud.
And unless you have them together in a task force, you have a
problem of identifying one category of fraud that leads to
others but not having the right law enforcement agency present.
So one of the things that I think would help, especially
with homeland security if I could speak for Mr. Verdery, is
that as they stand up and organize the jurisdiction and the
responsibilities of ICE and the other entities, that the
authority they have to go after identification fraud be
expanded so that they can address various frauds at the same
time.
For example, Social Security fraud is connected closely to
various forms of immigration fraud. Now, the Social Security
Administration has jurisdiction over Social Security fraud. I
am sure they would welcome the help of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, ICE, in investigating those kinds of offenses.
second, when it comes to resources, while I am not in a
position to be able to go around OMB and ask for more money for
the administration, I will say this: that the more immigration
investigators we have, the more we can do in this area. Our
task force has brought together 14 or so agencies, including
local police departments, to go after immigration and visa
fraud. It has been very effective to pool those resources.
But we certainly depend particularly and primarily on ICE.
That is the agency that has the lead in this area of
immigration fraud investigations. And to the extent they have
the resources to match them up with U.S. Attorneys' offices and
the task forces that we are creating, we will be in much better
shape.
Mr. Howard. And I will echo that, Congresswoman. And, you
know, if I can take them in order, first of all with training,
I can't agree with you more. One of the things we do in our
office is we have a bias crimes task force for some of the
issues that you have. A lot of times I think AUSAs, as
honorable as we are and as hard as work, sometimes we don't
understand the issues that an immigrant community may be seeing
that we don't. And so what we have asked them to do is, we have
asked them to come into our office and educate us.
One of the ways that has helped us is we have actually been
able to recruit some AUSAs off of that, so it has really helped
us. But we in turn use that as a vehicle to go out into the
community and then educate the community about what the issues
are, sometimes what we are doing out there, and then who it is
you call.
And so training very, very important. But that is something
we pull out of our budget, and clearly when we pull that out of
our budget, then, you know, I am taking away from something
else that we think is important.
Resources. Certainly resources, I am like all AUSAs, if
somebody suggests resources, yes, you know, we can do more with
more U.S. Attorneys, assistant U.S. Attorneys, but also for, as
Paul said, INS and the FBI.
Clearly, the FBI is being asked to do an awful lot in
terrorism, and I think that more agents in both areas would
allow them to dedicate resources. One of the issues we find in
the Adams Morgan area is that we can go in and we can take out
these mills, but we can't be up there 24 hours a day, seven
days a week. They simply have other duties. As soon as we move
away, my guess is it takes them a good 15 minutes to have
somebody fill that void.
We are back there. We have to do surveillance. It takes us
a while to build the case and we identify who exactly the
cancer is so we can pull it all out. But we pull them out in
groups of 15, 20 and 25, and somebody is back in there. And so
resources just to address the problem is very helpful.
And then you said equipment. And a lot of times--
Chairman Cox. I wonder if I could ask you to summarize--
Mr. Howard. Sure.
Chairman Cox. --because we really do want Ms. Slaughter to
be able to ask her questions and we do have a vote on the floor
with just a very few minutes left.
Mr. Hunter. With equipment, I say ditto. How's that?
[Laughter.]
Chairman Cox. That was an outstanding summary, if ever I
have heard one.
Chairman Cox. The gentlelady from New York.
Mr. Verdery. Mr. Chairman, if I could have 20 seconds in
response to the Congresswoman's question about the training?
Chairman Cox. I just want to make sure that Ms. Slaughter
gets a chance to ask her questions, and then there will be
endless time for you all to speak for the record.
Ms. Slaughter. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is really
important to me to do this.
Gentlemen, I represent 100 miles of the U.S.-Canadian
border, and we are very concerned up there with the fact that
we are not getting what we need for first responders.
And since I am not going to have much time, Mr. Verdery, I
want to really address this to you, and I am going to cut right
to the most important part, although everything I am doing is
important.
Now, I know this is not within your purview, but you are
the assistant director there and I want you to get the answer
for this and get it back to me. OK? All right.
Niagara Falls, New York, applied for one of the DOJ grants
for overtime for police. And Niagara Falls, New York, as you
know, not only represents one of the largest power plants on
the face of the Earth, one of the seven wonders of the world,
but towers and all kinds of trestles to carry the electricity
across the state of New York, international railway
infrastructure and over 5 million visitors a year, and they
didn't get one.
Now, one of the reasons maybe why they didn't get one is
New York got 13, 13 of those grants.
Chairman Cox. If the gentlelady would yield, I just want to
let her know that there is less than a minute left in the vote
on the floor.
Ms. Slaughter. All right, thank you. You all go vote, this
is more important to me, I think, than this vote.
Chairman Cox. Except that I have got to adjourn the hearing
before I can go vote.
Ms. Slaughter. Oh.
Chairman Cox. So what I would suggest is that you put your
entire question on the record, and then we will get it answered
for the record.
Ms. Slaughter. All right. I have a couple more questions
and I will put them in as well. But anyway, New York State, as
I was saying, got 13, Puerto Rico got 155.
Now, there is no earthly reason why Niagara Falls, whose
costs have more than tripled, would be, this is a case of
really rural counties, farm counties, in the State of New York
that got these overtime grants on homeland security.
I agree with the GAO. This grant idea really has got to be
reformed. It doesn't make any sense.
We do not have unlimited resources here, and unless there
were political considerations involved, I cannot for the life
of me understand why a place as strategic as Niagara Falls, one
of the most important border crossings in the country, with
everything else that I have mentioned, and in addition numbers
of chemical plants and remnants of the Manhattan Project, I
almost hesitate to mention the targets that are there in that
one small area.
But to not get any attention at all, and certainly not to
get any help when they were paying overtime, it absolutely
makes no sense to me.
As their representative, I am as mad as I can be about it.
And I want an answer, and I want it as soon as I can get it,
and I want to see what we can do to remedy this, because there
is no way they are going to be able to try to even continue
what they are doing if their costs are tripling and
quadrupling.
And there is no help, and those costs are incurred because
of what they are trying to do to guard those borders and those
strategic points of crossing.
And I will let it go at that. I have a couple of other
things I want to ask you, but I will send those to you. But I
really want you to get me an answer that I can take back to
Niagara Falls that is going to make some sense to them up there
as to why Livingston County, a rural dairy county, which is
quite beautiful, and we love it to pieces, why did they get
overtime COPS grants, and Niagara Falls didn't?
And if it is a political issue, I cannot tell you how angry
I am going to be. Thank you.
Mr. Verdery. Well, I can hear your concerns. I will take
them back and report back as promptly as we can.
Chairman Cox. And we will leave the hearing record open so
that we can have that answer expressed fully in the record. I
want to thank all of our witnesses for bearing with us through
several hours.
This was an extremely informative and constructive hearing.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Questions for the Record for Mr. Joseph R. Carico from the Honorable
Christopher Cox
Question: What happens if the application is denied before the
expiration of the driver's license?
Answer: Virginia's new legal presence law provides that DMV is not
to issue a driver's license or identification card to an applicant who
is the subject of a notification from a federal, state or local federal
government agency indicating that the individual is not lawfully
present in the United States pursuant to Sec. 46.2-328.1(c) of the Code
of Virginia. In order for such an applicant to obtain a subsequent
document, the individual must provide DMV with documentation that
proves they are in the United States lawfully. As currently written,
the law does not require DMV to obtain immigration application status
updates for these DMV document bearers, but will require DMV to take
action if the agency is notified by law enforcement that such an
applicant is no longer lawfully present in the United States.
Question: Are DMV offices notified that they have someone out there
who shouldn't have a driver's license?
Answer: In Virginia's new legal presence law, provision has been
made for DMV to receive notice from local, state and federal agencies
that a licensed driver or identification card holder is no longer
lawfully present in the United States.
Question: How about when BCIS take more time than they expected,
are states updated so that these people that deserve a driver's license
are not driving around with expired licenses?
Answer: We are not aware of any notification system that may have
been implemented by BCIS that would provide states with automatic
updates concerning pending applications. Once the new law is
implemented, we anticipate that individuals who have pending
applications on file with BCIS and whose driver's license is about to
expire will take measures to apply for a new driver's license. DMV is
planning to use specialists to address such situations. The specialists
will consider an applicant's situation and attempt to determine whether
the applicant is eligible for another driver's license. It is likely
that the determination of whether the applicant is eligible to receive
a new driver's license will include an inquiry to BCIS.
Questions for the Record to the Honorable Stewart Verdery from the
Honorable Lincoln Diaz-Balart
Question: Currently, BCIS provides immigration applicants a receipt
indicating that BCIS is processing their application and the estimated
time it will take to approve or deny the application. States then issue
a drivers license for that period of time, even though it usually takes
more time for BCIS to process the applications because of their large
application backlog. What happens if the application is denied before
the expiration of the driver's license? Are DMV offices notified that
they have someone out there who shouldn't have a driver's license? How
about when BCIS take more time than they expected, are states updated
so that these people that deserve a driver's license are not driving
around with expired licenses.
Answer: State Departments of Motor Vehicles (DMVs) can participate
in the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) Program in
order to electronically obtain immigration status information when an
individual applies for a driver's license or state-issued
identification card. DHS/USCIS will verify the immigration status of
the applicant, but will not make any recommendation to the state DMV
whether to issue a driver's license or state-issued identification
card.
The SAVE Program is responsible for administering DHS/USCIS
programs involving customer access to the Alien Status Verification
Index (ASVI) database. Access to ASVI enables federal, state, and local
government agencies to obtain immigration status information needed to
determine an applicant's eligibility for many public benefits. Several
state DMVs participate in the SAVE Program. At the present time,
California, Florida, New Jersey, New York, Virginia, and Wyoming have
signed a Memorandum of Understanding to participate. In FY 2003 over
674,000 queries were performed by these states. Indiana and Colorado
have also expressed interest in participating.
A personal computer with modem and software is used to access the
information. In most cases, immigration status information will be
provided electronically within seconds of the request. When the system
cannot provide the immigration status immediately, the inquiring state
DMV must enter additional information and electronically send the query
to DHS. That query is transmitted to an immigration status verifier
(ISV) for an additional verification check. The response to queries
requiring additional verification is usually provided within 3
workdays. Federal, state, and local government agencies are charged a
fee for queries conducted -- 24 cents for an initial query, and 24
cents for an ISV verification.
USCIS issues receipt notices when an application or petition is
filed for immigration benefits. The receipt notice establishes that an
application/petition was filed and usually indicates the estimated
amount of time it will take to process that application. When the
application is adjudicated, only the petitioner/applicant or their
attorney is notified in writing of the decision. Recently USCIS began
posting processing times on the Internet for all form types at all
District Offices, Service Centers, and at the National Benefits Center.
The dates are moving dates and indicate the receipt date of the work
currently being adjudicated. You can find more about this on the USCIS
website at www.uscis.gov.
Questions for the Record to the Honorable Stewart Verdery from the
Honorable Louise M. Slaughter
Question: Moving beyond the current debate over the first responder
grant system, would he agree that we need to create a method to
identify and provide what cities, counties, and states need in order to
be prepared to handle a terrorist attack?
Answer: The Department of Homeland Security firmly believes that it
is essential to provide states and localities the support they need to
enhance their security against terrorist attacks, and to provide them
the resources to identify vulnerabilities and needs. To this end, the
Department, through ODP, administered the State Homeland Security
Assessment and Strategy Process (SHSAS). This process allowed states
and local jurisdictions to update their needs and vulnerabilities
assessment to reflect post-September 11, 2001, realities, as well as to
identify progress on the priorities outlined their initial homeland
security strategies, which were initially conducted in 1999. The SHSAS
process allows states to make prudent and informed decisions on how
best to allocate and distribute funds they receive from ODP and DHS to
enhance their security.
In addition, ODP is continuing its efforts to develop preparedness
standards and to establish clear methods for assessing State and local
preparedness levels and progress. On December 17, 2003, the President
issued ``Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-8.'' Through
HSPD-8, the President tasked Secretary Ridge, in coordination with
other Federal departments and State and local jurisdictions, to develop
national preparedness goals, improve delivery of federal preparedness
assistance to State and local jurisdictions, and strengthen the
preparedness capabilities of Federal, State, territorial, tribal, and
local governments.
Earlier this year, the Secretary delegated to ODP the lead for the
implementation of HSPD-8. This designation by the Secretary is
consistent with ODP's mission, as provided under the provisions of the
Homeland Security Act, to be the primary federal agency responsible for
the preparedness of the United States for acts of terrorism. HSPD-8 is
consistent with the broader goals and objectives established in the
President's National Strategy for Homeland Security issued in July,
2002, which discussed the creation of a fully-integrated national
emergency response capability. Inherent to the successful
implementation of HSPD-8 is the development of clear and measurable
standards for State and local preparedness capabilities.
The standards that will result from HSPD-8 implementation build on
an existing body of standards and guidelines developed by ODP and other
Federal agencies to guide and inform State and local preparedness
efforts. Since its inception ODP has worked with Federal agencies and
State and local jurisdictions to develop and disseminate information to
State and local agencies to assist them in making more informed
preparedness decisions, including capability assessments, preparedness
planning and strategies, and choices relating to training, equipment,
and exercises.
Question: As the Council on Foreign Relations Task Force recently
stated, ``The absence of a functioning methodology to determine
national requirements for emergency preparedness constitutes a public
policy crisis. Establishing national standards that define levels of
preparedness is a critical first step toward determining the nature and
extent of additional requirements and the human and financial resources
needed to fulfill them.'' Does he agree with this assessment?
Answer: The Secretary firmly supports the need to establish
national standards and preparedness levels. Through HSPD-8, the
Department is developing of clear and measurable standards for State
and local preparedness capabilities. This process will result in the
development of national preparedness goals, and will improve delivery
of federal preparedness assistance to State and local jurisdictions.
The work completed under HSPD-8 will also strengthen the preparedness
capabilities of Federal, State, territorial, tribal, and local
governments.
The standards that will result from HSPD-8 implementation build on
an existing body of standards and guidelines developed by ODP and other
Federal agencies to guide and inform State and local preparedness
efforts. Since its inception ODP has worked with Federal agencies and
State and local jurisdictions to develop and disseminate information to
State and local agencies to assist them in making more informed
preparedness decisions, including capability assessments, preparedness
planning and strategies, and choices relating to training, equipment,
and exercises.
Question: What is DHS doing internally to develop such a criteria?
Answer: On December 17, 2003, the President issued ``Homeland
Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-8.'' Through HSPD-8, the
President tasked Secretary Ridge, in coordination with other Federal
departments and State and local jurisdictions, to develop national
preparedness goals, improve delivery of federal preparedness assistance
to State and local jurisdictions, and strengthen the preparedness
capabilities of Federal, State, territorial, tribal, and local
governments.
Earlier this year, the Secretary delegated to ODP the lead for the
implementation of HSPD-8. This designation by the Secretary is
consistent with ODP's mission, as provided under the provisions of the
Homeland Security Act, to be the primary federal agency responsible for
the preparedness of the United States for acts of terrorism. HSPD-8 is
consistent with the broader goals and objectives established in the
President's National Strategy for Homeland Security issued in July,
2002, which discussed the creation of a fully-integrated national
emergency response capability. Inherent to the successful
implementation of HSPD-8 is the development of a national preparedness
goal that will include clear and measurable standards for State and
local preparedness capabilities.
The standards that will result from HSPD-8 implementation build on
an existing body of standards and guidelines developed by ODP and other
Federal agencies to guide and inform State and local preparedness
efforts. Since its inception ODP has worked with Federal agencies and
State and local jurisdictions to develop and disseminate information to
State and local agencies to assist them in making more informed
preparedness decisions, including capability assessments, preparedness
planning and strategies, and choices relating to training, equipment,
and exercises.
Question: Would he agree that such a risk criteria be the basis for
first responder grant allocations?
Answer: The language in the President's Fiscal Year (FY) 2005
request for the Department of Homeland Security recognizes that factors
other than a minimum formula and population should be considered in
making overall funding allocations. The language further states that
the Secretary should have the latitude to and discretion to make this
determination based on a number of factors, including population
concentrations, critical infrastructure, and other significant
terrorism risk factors.
Terrorism and the threat of terrorist acts are not static, as is
the current formula included in the USA PATRIOT Act. Instead, threats,
risks, and vulnerabilities are fluid and can change based on a number
of factors. The Department of Homeland Security should not be
constrained by a formula and distribution method that does not change
to meet current and future security needs. As you know, each state has
submitted an updated homeland security strategy as a requirement of
receiving and distributing FY 2004 Office for Domestic Preparedness
grant funds. It is the Department's expectation that these strategies,
and periodically updated strategies, will provide invaluable
information to determine appropriate funding levels for all states--
large and small, urban and rural.
The Administration and Congress share the goal of enhancing the
nation's ability to deter, prevent, respond to, and recover from acts
of terrorism. The Administration firmly supports the notion that
security needs to be improved across the nation. The Administration
strongly supports a change in the USA PATRIOT Act formula so that we
can apply more factors than just population to distributing and
expending limited homeland security resources.
Questions for the Record for Mr. Paul J. McNulty, United States
Attorney from the Honorable Lincoln Diaz-Balart
Question: Currently, BCIS provides immigration applicants a receipt
indicating that BCIS is processing their application and the estimated
time it will take to approve or deny the application. States then issue
a drivers license for that period of time, even though it usually takes
more time for BCIS to process the applications because of their large
application backlog. What happens if the application is denied before
the expiration of the driver's license? Are DMV offices notified that
they have someone out there who shouldn't have a driver's license? How
about when BCIS take more time than they expected, are states updated
so that these people that deserve a driver's license are not driving
around with expired licenses.
Answer: It is my understanding that the Department of Homeland
Security's Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (``BCIS'') is
required by law to provide an application receipt, I-797C, when an
immigrant applicant submits an application to them. The I-797C
indicates that the BCIS has received an application and that the
application is being processed. The I-797C also provides an estimated
time that will be required to process the application. It is also my
understanding that BCIS does not issue this document for it to be used
as a form of identification to assist the immigrant applicant in
obtaining a valid driver's license from the state in which he or she
lives. As I stated previously, this document simply acknowledges that
BCIS is in receipt of an immigrant application and that it will be
processed in the future.
State law determines whether a valid driver's license will be
issued based on a presentation of an I-797C. I am told that some
states, such as Congressman Diaz-Balart's home state of Florida, do in
fact issue immigrant applicants valid driver's licenses based on the
presentation of the I-797C. In the Commonwealth of Virginia, the I-797C
is accepted as a secondary document in support of proof of identity.
In Virginia, an applicant for a driver's license is required to
present two forms of identification, a primary document and a secondary
document to the Department of Motor Vehicles (``DMV'') in order to
obtain a driver's license. If the applicant meets the additional proof
of residency requirement, he is issued a valid Virginia license. This
license is issued for an approximately five-year time period. It is not
issued to correspond with the estimated time of adjudication of the
immigrant application. Thus, the adjudication of the immigrant
application does not have any affect on the validity of the Virginia
license. If the immigrant application is denied after the license has
been issued, that individual still has a valid license until it
expires. It is my understanding that BCIS does not inform the DMV of
the denial, nor does DMV inquire with BCIS to determine the status of
the application. No communication exists between the BCIS and the DMV.
In Virginia, the adjudication of the immigrant application does not
affect the validity of the individual's license.
Finally, I want to compliment the Virginia legislature for its new
legal presence law, which will be effective on January 1,2004. hi my
judgment, this law is a step in the right direction towards ensuring
the integrity of the documents produced and issued by the Virginia DMV.
As I understand it, the legal presence law will require an individual
applying for a driver's license or identification card for the first
time to prove that he is either a United States citizen or is legally
authorized to be in the United States.
Question for the Record for Mr. John Pistole from Congressman Lincoln
Diaz-Balart
Currently, BCIS provides immigration applicants a receipt
indicating that BCIS is processing their application and the estimated
time it will take to approve or deny the application. States then issue
a drivers license for that period of time, even though it usually takes
more time for BCIS to process the applications because of their large
application backlog. What happens if the application is denied before
the expiration of the driver's license? Are DMV offices notified that
they have someone out there who shouldn't have a driver's license? How
about when BCIS take more time than they expected, are states updated
so that these people that deserve a driver's license are not driving
around with expired licenses.
[No Response was received.]
Question for the Record for Mr. Ronald D. Malfi from the Honorable
Lincoln Diaz-Balart
Currently, BCIS provides immigration applicants a receipt
indicating that BCIS is processing their application and the estimated
time it will take to approve or deny the application. States then issue
a drivers license for that period of time, even though it usually takes
more time for BCIS to process the applications because of their large
application backlog. What happens if the application is denied before
the expiration of the driver's license? Are DMV offices notified that
they have someone out there who shouldn't have a driver's license? How
about when BCIS take more time than they expected, are states updated
so that these people that deserve a driver's license are not driving
around with expired licenses.
[No Response was received.]
Question for the Record for Mr. Roscoe C. Howard, Jr. from the
Honorable Christopher Cox
Currently, BCIS provides immigration applicants a receipt
indicating that BCIS is processing their application and the estimated
time it will take to approve or deny the application. States then issue
a drivers license for that period of time, even though it usually takes
more time for BCIS to process the applications because of their large
application backlog. What happens if the application is denied before
the expiration of the driver's license? Are DMV offices notified that
they have someone out there who shouldn't have a driver's license? How
about when BCIS take more time than they expected, are states updated
so that these people that deserve a driver's license are not driving
around with expired licenses.
[No Response was received.]
Questions for the Record for Mr. Keith Kiser from the Honorable Lincoln
Diaz-Balart
AAMVA submitted Representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart's questions to
our membership through the Driver's Licensing Yahoo Group. We received
33 responses back, which are attached. AAMVA has summarized the answers
to respond to the Committee's questions.
Question: 1. Does your jurisdiction tie the expiration date of the
driver's license to immigration documents?
Answer: Approximately 15 states tie the expiration date of the
driver's license to the expiration date of immigration documents.
Question: 2. Will your jurisdiction issue a driver's license for
individuals possessing a receipt of application from the Bureau of
Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS)?
Answer: A majority of motor vehicle agencies will not issue a
driver's license to an individual possessing a receipt of application
from BCIS. For those motor vehicle agencies that do accept a receipt,
they usually require the individual to submit other documentation from
the agency's list of approved documents.
Question: 3. What happens if the application submitted to BCIS is
denied before the expiration of the driver's license issued?
Answer: MVA's usually do nothing if the BCIS application is denied
before the expiration of the driver's license. A majority will allow
the driver's license to expire. However, a few of the motor vehicle
agencies cancel or revoke the driver's license.
Question: 4. Are you linked in any way to the BCIS with regard to
the denial or approval of applicants? If yes, please indicate the
manner in which you receive this information.
Answer: A majority of motor vehicle agencies are not linked
electronically to BCIS so they have no way of knowing whether an
application has been denied or approved. A few of the states are linked
to BCIS SAVE system (e.g., Florida) but a majority attempt to call
their local BCIS to obtain information for special situations.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Will your
jurisdiction issue a Are you linked in
Does your driver's license for What happens if the any way to the BCIS
jurisdiction tie the individuals application submitted with regard to the
expiration date of possessing a receipt to BCIS is denied denial or approval
States the driver's license of application from before the expiration of applicants? If
to immigration the Bureau of of the driver's yes, please indicate
documents? Citizenship and license issued? the manner in which
Immigration Services you receive this
(BCIS)? information.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alabama
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alaska Alaska does not tie NO N/A NO, but if any
the expiration of document is
immigrant docs to questionable we
the DL call and verify
validity.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Arizona YES. YES. EXPIRATION DATE LICENSE WILL NOT BE NO.
IS TIED TO THE EXTENDED.
RECEIPT.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Arkansas No. No. N/A. No
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
California
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Colorado YES NOT JUST WITH THE THE LICENSE WOULD NOT YET
RECEIPT REMAIN VALID UNTIL
THE EXPIRATION DATE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Connecticut No. Legislation was We require a receipt The license is valid We run a check
proposed during our or Notice of Action until expiration. through NLETS to
last session to do for adjustment of the BCIS Law
so. It passed the status to legal Enforcement Support
Senate by a very permanent resident Center using
narrow margin and from applicants who information from
never came to a vote hold a Bi or B2 visa the identity
in the House. because we do not documents presented
issue a license or and wait for a
ID card to visitors response.
or illegal aliens.
If the applicant has
a valid passport and
an employment
authorization card,
we will issue as
long as they provide
the receipt
indicating they have
applied for the
adjustment of
status.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Delaware No No, Delaware does not No No
accept applications
as proof of being
legally in this
Country.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
District of Columbia
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Florida Yes. In most cases. Yes. First, they will have We are connected to
If there is an been issued a the SAVE system
expiration date on license as a non- both for individual
the document immigrant. Hence queries and for
presented for non- they can only have batch verification.
immigrants, such as it for 2 years. They When the response
an Employment have to produce to a secondary
Authorization Card, evidence of lawful verification comes
1-20, etc., then presence every time back unverified,
license expiration they need a service then our procedures
will coincide with and this will lay will prevent the
that date. When them open to being continuance of the
documents are under rejected. Where we license. There are
process and hence no are not notified at possibilities that
expiry date is all, the 2-year some will get
available but the duration will be the through the cracks
customer is in the determinant, and have validity
country lawfully, for 2 years.
all non-immigrants
will be issued a
license for not more
than 2 years. All
Permanent Residents
(with a green card
or an ADIT stamp on
their passport/I-94)
will be issued a
normal duration
license/ID card. The
only expiration date
not considered by us
is the date on the 1-
551/151, the
Resident Alien Card
or the ADIT stamp on
the passport/I-94.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Georgia
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Guam
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hawaii No. No. Not applicable. DMV calls the duty
officer for
verification
whenever they
suspect the
applicant possesses
illegal documents.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Idaho Idaho no. Idaho no. Idaho N/A Idaho no.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Illinois No No. We will, however, N/A No
accept
identification from
the Department of
Justice indicating
the applicant's
refugee status (this
document often has a
photo and a metal
grommet affixed to
the document). We
will accept this
document for proof
of date of birth in
these cases.
Regardless, the
applicant must still
provide a SSN card
and a proof of
residency document.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Indiana No Yes, but only with Licensed revoked. No direct electronic
INS verification link . However, we
that legal status is can call if we need
pending. to.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iowa Yes Yes, providing the We limit the renewal No. However, we have
petition to adjust to a term of 120 used the federal
or amend status was days (Iowa statute immigration court
made before the caps it at two system number and
original status years). If the have checked via
expired. petition is denied, the A# for those
we could cancel the persons who are
license or ID if the scheduled to appear
denial became know before an
to us. However, we immigration judge.
do not track them. That number is 1-
Since a ruling on a 800-898-7180. We
petition often takes have also verified
a long time, we are petitions and
under pressure from Notices of Action
advocates of with the LIN
immigrants to issue receipt number via
for the period of the 1-800-375-5283
time the ruling is number. Our
pending. We seem to agency's motor
get mixed responses vehicle
when we consult with investigators have
federal immigration local contacts with
officials, Those in BCIS, who are
the investigation/ helpful also.
enforcement side of
things, say a person
has no benefits when
a petition is
pending and if the
original status is
expired, we should
not issue.
Immigration
officials on the
benefits side of
things, seem to
suggest that since
they are allowed to
stay in the country
unti the petition is
ruled on, we should
issue. We really
have no clear
direction.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kansas No, except on non- No N/A The only link we
resident CDL's (by have is direct
Kansas statute). contact with agents
in the Kansas City
and Wichita
offices. We use
these contacts for
special situations
regarding
legitimacy of
documents that are
in applicant's
possession.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kentucky Yes No. We will allow a The current license No
one year license for remains valid until
individuals applying the end of the one
to extend or change year period. At that
their status point the individual
provided they have is not allowed to
an official notice renew.
of action from BCIS.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Louisiana Louisiana is Louisiana uses AAMVA No connectivity to
currently working on list of the BCIS.
a Next Generation identification
Motor Vehicle system documents. The
that will address applicant is
many issues. required to submit
Currently, Louisiana proof of legal
does require proof presence, not just
of legal presence in application for
order to issue a legal presence.
license or ID card.
However, the current
computer system
still issues a 4
year license. This
will not be the case
with the NGMV
system. The
expiration date of
the license
credential will be
tied in with the
immigration
documents. At this
point, it is not.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maine No As secondary See #2 See #2
documentation only.
Additional INS
documents, or
passport/visa and 1-
94 required.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maryland No Yes, it would have no Nothing No
bearing on their
application. They
would be required to
be an Maryland
resident, show
proper
identification and
meet all other
application
requirements such as
passing any required
tests and paying
fees.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Massachusetts
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michigan
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Minnesota Yes, if the applicant Yes, if they are able If the applicant Minnesota has a
presents temporary to also submit submits a receipt contact that we
legal presence documentation for with no Duration of call to find out
documents, the date our list of approved Status or expiration approval or denial
the documents expire Primary and date on it, the of applicants. That
is shown as a Secondary Documents, Status Check on the information is then
``status check or they submit a driver's license or noted as a memo on
date'' on the variance request and Identification card the application.
driver's license or through that request would expire in 6
identification card. can provide adequate months and the
information to prove cardholder's
their identity and privileges would be
legal residency. cancelled. To
prevent
cancellation, the
cardholder would
need to present
updated information
to prove that BCIS
had approved the
application by
submitting the
document itself for
review.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mississippi
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Missouri No, not at this time. No, Missouri does not N/A Not in our field
accept a receipt of offices. Our
application as central office has
acceptable proof of a system in place
identity. for exception
processing.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Montana
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nebraska No. No, N/A. No.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nevada Effective January 1, We do not issue a Not applicable No
2004, we will tie license until the
the expiration dates BCIS has approved
of the immigration the application
documents to both
driver's licenses
and identification
cards.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New Hampshire
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New Jersey
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New Mexico
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New York No. New York State No. We require N/A We will shortly be
has implemented a original valid INS commencing a pilot
temporary visitor documents that have of the SAVE program
program which places been issued for at to verify INS
in bold letters a least a one-year documents on line
legend on the face stay with at least with the BCIS.
of the document six months of legal
indicating that the status remaining.
individuals legal
status is temporary
and also places the
expiration date of
their legal status
in the United States
on the document.
Additionally, any
further transaction
processing is
prohibited once the
legal status has
expired.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
North Carolina Not at this time. We North Carolina does Not applicable, given No. Occasionally we
would consider it if not require proof of that we don't may call them to
there was an easy legal presence for require proof of verify documents
(i.e. online) issuance of a DL or legal presence. presented to us,
process for ID card. Any but it can be
verifying document issued by extremely difficult
information. But BCIS could be used to get through to
given the complexity as a form o them (they have the
of immigration identification to same understaffing
documentation, we meet the state's problem most DMVs
hesitate to attempt requirements. have).
that at this time.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
North Dakota No No Not Applicable No
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ohio YES YES CANCEL THE LICENSE NO
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oklahoma YES THERE ARE TWO TYPES IT IS OUR OUR ONLY LINK WITH
OF RECEIPTS WE ARE UNDERSTANDING THAT BCIS IS THROUGH A
AWARE OF: ONE SIMPLY SINCE WE ONLY ISSUE VERY GOOD DIALOGUE
SHOWING PAYMENT LICENSES BASED ON WITH BCIS OFFICIALS
RECEIVED AND ANOTHER THE RECEIPT WITH 1- IN THIS STATE. AS
HAS A EMPORARY 1-94 94 THAT THE DENIAL YOU KNOW WE DO NOT
ON IT. WE DO NOT OF THE INDIVIDUAL HAVE ANY ELECTRONIC
ACCEPT THE RECEIPT WOULD BE EXTREMELY INTERFACE WITH BCIS
SHOWING UNLIKELY AS THE BCIS AT THIS TIME TO
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF SCREENING PROCESS IMMEDIATELY CHECK
APPLICATION AND HAS ALREADY BEEN STATUS NOR RECEIVE
FEES. WE DO ACCEPT, COMPLETED. CHANGES IN STATUS.
HOWEVER, THE RECEIPT
THAT CONTAINS THE 1-
94. WERE TOLD THAT
THE ONLY CASES WHERE
THE 1-94 RECEIPTS
ARE ISSUED IS WHEN
THE BACKGROUND CHECK
HAS BEEN COMPLETED
AND THE OFFICIAL
PERMANENT DOCUMENT
IS ALL BUT ISSUED.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oregon No Yes, it would have no Nothing No
bearing on their
application. They
would be required to
be an Oregon
resident, show
proper
identification and
meet all other
application
requirements such as
passing any required
tests and paying
fees.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pennsylvania
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Puerto Rico
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rhode Island
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
South Carolina
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
South Dakota Yes. No N/A We do some verbal/
phone verification
of documents. We
also access NLETS
to verify INS
documents.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tennessee
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Texas No Our rule requires If the applicant is No
that the applicant issued a DL/ID based
have valid BCIS on that document in
documentation, If conjunction with
this application other acceptable
extends the validity documentation, the
period of those applicant would be
documents, it would allowed to keep the
be acceptable. DLIID.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Utah No Yes, if they have N/A No
other acceptable ID
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vermont No No N/A No, the exception is
some phone contact
to vertify
documents.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Virgin Islands
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Virginia Virginia will No N/A Not in customer
effective 1/1/04, service centers. We
the following are considering
responses apply having SAVE acess
after 1/1/04 for only a very few
persons, just to
assist in
exceptional
situations.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Washington
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
West Virginia Yes, effective July Not currently N/A No
1, 2003
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wisconsin No Person must show one Document remains No.
document that valid for period of
verifies name and issuance.
date of birth
(passport, U.S. or
foreign birth
certificate, 1-151
or 1551, 1-181, 1-94
Refugee/Parolee,
etc.) and proof of
ID which is a
document with either
a photo or
signature.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wyoming
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------