[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
STRENGTH THROUGH KNOWLEDGE: HOMELAND SECURITY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
SETTING AND STEERING A STRONG COURSE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY,
SCIENCE, AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
of the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 30, 2003
__________
Serial No. 108-33
__________
Printed for the use of the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science, and
Research and Development, and the Select Committee on Homeland Security
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
house
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
97-415 WASHINGTON : 2004
____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�0900012004
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
CHRISTOPHER COX, California, Chairman
JENNIFER DUNN, Washington JIM TURNER, Texas, Ranking Member
C.W. BILL YOUNG, Florida BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi
DON YOUNG, Alaska LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Wisconsin NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington
W.J. (BILLY) TAUZIN, Louisiana BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts
DAVID DREIER, California JANE HARMAN, California
DUNCAN HUNTER, California BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER,
SHERWOOD BOEHLERT, New York New York
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania NITA M. LOWEY, New York
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
PORTER J. GOSS, Florida ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON,
DAVE CAMP, Michigan District of Columbia
LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, Florida ZOE LOFGREN, California
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia KAREN McCARTHY, Missouri
ERNEST J. ISTOOK, JR., Oklahoma SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas
PETER T. KING, New York BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey
JOHN LINDER, Georgia DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN,
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona U.S. Virgin Islands
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas CHARLES GONZALEZ, Texas
JIM GIBBONS, Nevada KEN LUCAS, Kentucky
KAY GRANGER, Texas JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
PETE SESSIONS, Texas KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida
JOHN E. SWEENEY, New York
JOHN GANNON, Chief of Staff
UTTAM DHILLON, Chief Counsel and Deputy Staff Director
DAVID H. SCHANZER, Democrat Staff Director
MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk
.........................................................
______
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science, and Research & Development
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman
PETE SESSIONS, Texas, Vice Chairman ZOE LOFGREN, California
SHERWOOD BOEHLERT, New York LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
LAMAR SMITH, Texas ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas
DAVE CAMP, Michigan DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin
ROBERT W. GOODLATTE, Virginia Islands
PETER KING, New York BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina
JOHN LINDER Georgia CHARLES GONZALEZ, Texas
MARK SOUDER, Indiana KEN LUCAS, Kentucky
JIM GIBBONS, Nevada JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
KAY GRANGER, Texas KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida
CHRISTOPHER COX, California, ex JIM TURNER, Texas, ex officio
officio
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Mac Thornberry, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Cybersecurity, Science, and Research and Development, and a
Representative in Congress From the State of Texas............. 1
The Honorable Christopher Cox, Chairman, Select Committee on
Homeland Security, and a Representative in Congress for the
State of California............................................ 14
The Honorable Robert E. Andrews, a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey
Oral Statement................................................. 19
Prepared Statement............................................. 1
The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress From
the State of North Carolina.................................... 21
The Honorable Jim Gibbons, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Nevada
Prepared Statement............................................. 1
The Honorable Zoe Lofgren, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Cybersecurity, Science, and Research and Development
Oral Statement................................................. 2
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Pete Sessions, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas............................................. 19
WITNESS
Dr. Penrose Abright, Assistant Secretary for Science and
Technology Department of Homeland Security
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
APPENDIX
Materials Submitted for the Hearing Record
Questions and Responses from Dr. Penrose Albright................ 32
(III)
STRENGTH THROUGH KNOWLEDGE: HOMELAND SECURITY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
SETTING AND STEERING A STRONG COURSE
----------
Thursday, October 30, 2003
U.S. House of Representatives,
Select Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science, and Research and
Development
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:15 p.m., in
Room 210, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Mac Thornberry
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Thornberry, Sessions, Linder,
Granger, Cox (ex officio), Lofgren, Andrews, Etheridge, Lucas,
Meek, and Turner (ex officio).
Mr. Thornberry. The subcommittee will come to order.
And let me thank you first, Doctor, for your patience with
our unpredictable schedule around here.
I want to ask unanimous consent that all Members be able to
offer opening statements into the record.
[The information follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT E. ANDREWS, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
The government has a history of driving technology innovations,
including the essential software development conducted with Defense
Department funding that laid a foundation for today's Internet. It
would be very unfortunate-indeed, counterproductive-if companies were
reluctant to adopt promising security technologies produced by federal
research. As you move forward with your research agenda, I hope you
will support technology transfer licensing models that empower the
private sector to improve upon the government's work and to
commercialize the resulting technology.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JIM GIBBONS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEVADA
Chairman Thornberry, thank you for bringing us together today for
this hearing on the long-term research and development plans of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Thank you, Dr. Albright for
coming to testify before the Committee.
The ability to bring together the brightest minds in America to
work on the common cause of securing our homeland is one of the most
important tasks that face us as a nation. We are in a war, not only
with terrorists and terrorist organizations, but with states who would
seek to profit off of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
In that vein, our technologies and brightest minds need to be able to
defeat the most advanced WMD technologies while at the same time, we
need to be able to defeat a single fanatic carrying box-cutters or a
deadly disease. This is a daunting task, but the consequences of
failure are too great.
As we saw on 9-11, our enemies will go after our vulnerabilities in
any way they can. While these threats will be hard to predict and
difficult to prioritize, I wanted to take this opportunity to mention a
serious potential threat that I see on the horizon that I do not
believe is being adequately planned for.
Currently, our nuclear plants and facilities have increased
security in order to protect against a catastrophic attack against our
nuclear facilities and infrastructure. However, in the not-so-distant
future we will be confronted with a new nuclear security dilemma.
Unless we change our course, we will soon have the additional
burden of protecting against attacks on the shipment of highly
radioactive spent nuclear fuel from points across this country to Yucca
Mountain. I think that bears repeating: We will be taking this highly
radioactive nuclear fuel out of secure locations, putting it on trucks
and trains and moving it cross-country through populated areas across
America. As long as these shipments are an attractive target for
terrorists, they will be vulnerable to an attack.
The key way to protect against this threat, from my perspective, is
to not make these shipments in the first place . However, the
Department of Energy continues to push forward with the Yucca Mountain
license at any cost, so it is my responsibility to make sure we are
prepared for this eventuality. As a result, at the very least, we need
to make sure that the nuclear waste casks they will be shipped in are
so ?hardened? that they will not make an attractive target.
The design for the Spent Fuel Packages that will be used to
transport this waste is currently being reviewed by Sandia National
Labs for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. If this study is properly
performed, it can provide us with important information on the safety
of these shipments and their vulnerabilities. However, I?m very
concerned that the ?Package Performance Study? will not take into
consideration the effects of deliberate acts of sabotage and terrorism.
The consequences of a successful attack on one of these canisters
would be horrific. It is very clear to me that this is an issue that
the Department of Homeland Security must address immediately, since now
is the time to weigh in, while the Spent Fuel Packages are still being
reviewed.
Thank you again Mr. Chairman and Dr. Albright. I look forward to
working with you both to see that our homeland security science and
technology needs are met.
Mr. Thornberry. I simply want to say that we had before
this subcommittee Dr. McQueary back in May to talk to us about
the beginning of the Science and Technology Directorate. We
have subsequently had several sessions to try to understand
better some of the key technologies dealing with homeland
security, namely nuclear and radiological detection, first
responder communications, and things like that. And we are
interested today to get an update and status report both on how
the Department is shaping up and conducting its business, but
also Members may well want to explore some particular areas of
technology.
And so with that, I also want to again thank Eric Fisher
and his team from the Congressional Research Service for their
support of this subcommittee, as well as my partner Ms.
Lofgren. And I will yield to her at this point for any opening.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you. I have an opening statement that I
will submit for the record. But I just wanted to note that it
has been about 6 months since Dr. McQueary appeared before us,
and he at that time mentioned seven specific areas for emphasis
of the Directorate, and I am hoping that you can give us an
update of where we are on all seven of those. I also hope that
we can find out the progress of the MOU with NIST, how that is
working.
Also, when Dr. McQueary appeared before us, I had an
interest in what we were doing in terms of standards-setting on
biometrics, and I am still interested in that and would like to
be more knowledgeable about our efforts there.
Finally, I would just like to--I don't know how many more
hearings we will have before we recess, but I would like to
thank Mac Thornberry for his leadership of his subcommittee
this year. I think you have done a terrific job, and I think
you have led the subcommittee well and with great fairness, and
I really appreciate the work we have done together.
I also want to thank the staff of the subcommittee for
their work during our inaugural year, and in particular Kim
Kotlar and Margie Gilbert on your staff who are really very
able, and on the Democratic side Jessica Herrera, and David
Grannis and Dan Prieto, who have also done a very good job. And
I think really this subcommittee is an example of what can
happen when we work, and not on a bipartisan but really a
nonpartisan basis. So it has been a pleasure being a part of
that. And I yield back.
Mr. Thornberry. I thank the gentlelady for her comments,
and certainly share them with regard to the staff.
[The information follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ZOE LOFGREN, RANKING MEMBER,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY, SCIENCE, AND RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT
Thank you Chairman Thornberry.
Almost 6 months ago, Under Secretary Dr. Charles E. McQueary of the
Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate
testified before this subcommittee. It was the first hearing held by
this subcommittee and it marked the beginning of our look into the work
being done at the Department of Homeland Security.
At that time, Dr. McQueary was new to the job, and he spoke about
his priorities for the S&T Directorate.
In his testimony, Dr. McQueary said ``The most important mission
for the Science and Technology Directorate is to develop and deploy
cutting edge technologies and new capabilities, so that the dedicated
men and women who have the awesome responsibility to secure our
homeland could perform their jobs more effectively and efficiently.''
He also mentioned 7 specific areas of emphasis for the Directorate.
These included the following:
1. Develop and deploy state-of-the art, high-performance, low
operating-cost systems to prevent the illicit traffic of
radiological/nuclear materials and weapons into and within the
United States.
2. Provide state-of-the art, high-performance, low operating-
cost systems to rapidly detect and mitigate the consequences of
the release of biological and chemical agents.
3. Provide state-of-the art, high-performance, low operating-
cost systems to detect and prevent illicit high explosives
transit into and within the United States
4. Enhance missions of all Department operational units through
targeted research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E),
and systems engineering and development.
5. Develop and provide capabilities for protecting cyber and
other critical infrastructures.
6. Develop capabilities to prevent new-technology as a surprise
weapon by anticipating emerging threats.
7. Develop, coordinate and implement technical standards for
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) non-
medical countermeasures.
Mr. Chairman, Dr. McQueary proposed an ambitious agenda at that
first hearing and the Members of this subcommittee were willing to give
the Directorate some time to organize.
Now that the Directorate has had 6 months to get up and running, I
think this is an appropriate time to review what has been accomplished
thus far, and what has yet to be done.
Today we will hear from Dr. Penrose (Parney) C. Albright, Assistant
Secretary for Plans, Programs, and Budget within the Science and
Technology Directorate.
Dr. Albright, I look forward to hearing about the progress that has
been made since we heard from Dr. McQueary.
I hope you will take some time today to discuss the status of Dr.
McQueary's seven areas of emphasis.
In addition, I would like you to address some other issues that I
addressed to Dr. McQueary last spring and I hope you will take some
time today to discuss the following:
1. How is the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the
Department of Commerce's Technology Administration's National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) working? Do we
need to be looking at any particular issues that have arisen
out of this agreement, particurly in the area of ensuring that
the funding needed to engage in some of this new cooperation is
available?.
2. What steps have been undertaken and or being undertaken to
engage the private sector in the development of new
technologies and strategies we will need in the future, both
short-term and long-term?
3. What has the Department of Homeland Security been doing in
the area of biometrics? Should we being doing more and are
there any challenges that you have encountered thus far that
this subcommittee should be aware of?
Before I conclude, I want to note that this is likely to be the
last hearing this subcommittee will hold before Congress adjourns for
the year. I want to take just a minute to thank my colleague Mac
Thornberry for his leadership of this subcommittee this year. Mac is a
smart and able public servant, and he has led this subcommittee in a
fair and bipartisan manner. I greatly look forward to continuing our
work in 2004.
I also want to thank the staff of the Cybersecurity subcommittee
for their work throughout our inaugural year. They have done terrific
work getting this subcommittee up and running. In particular, let me
mention Kim Kotlar and Margie Gilbert on Mr. Thornberry's staff. And on
the Democratic staff, let me thank Jessica Herrera, David Grannis and
Dan Preito.
Mr. Thornberry. Dr. Albright, thank you for being with us.
I would like to now turn to you for your statement. Again, our
witness is Dr. Parney Albright, Assistant Secretary for Plans,
Programs, and Budget in the Science and Technology Directorate
of the Department of Homeland Security. You are recognized for
your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF PENROSE (PARNEY) C. ALBRIGHT, PH.D., ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR PLANS, PROGRAMS AND BUDGET, SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Albright. Good afternoon, Chairman Thornberry,
Congresswoman Lofgren, and other members of the subcommittee. I
am pleased to be here with you today to report on the progress
of the Science and Technology Directorate of the Department of
Homeland Security, and report on the progress we are making in
implementing Title III of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
As you noted, Chuck McQueary, the Under Secretary for
Science and Technology, did appear before this subcommittee on
May 21st, and I am here to update you on the status of our
efforts to build out the Directorate.
In its planning, the Science and Technology Directorate has
been guided by the Homeland Security Act, current threat
assessments, our understanding of existing capabilities or
those that can be anticipated in the near term, and by the
priorities outlined in the President's National Strategy for
Homeland Security.
The Directorate's key missions are to address chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, cyber and other emerging
threats; to support the R&D needs of the Department; to
organize and engage and sustain the resources of the national
research and development community, private industry, academia,
national and Federal laboratories in protecting the homeland.
Let me first talk about the progress we have made in
operating some of our key offices within the Directorate. All
the key offices of the Science and Technology Directorate
needed to execute the missions that I just articulated are, in
fact, operational. Directors with strong credentials have been
appointed to each office, and we continue to add highly skilled
technical, professional, and support staff.
The Office of Plans, Programs and Budgets, which is the
office I direct, is, in fact, operating. I have organized this
office into several portfolios that are in line with the scope
of the Directorate's missions. These portfolios focus on
countermeasures for chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, cyber, and high-explosive threats, meeting the needs
of our Federal, State, and local customers, and also developing
standards to help Federal, State, and local agencies become
smart buyers of homeland security technologies.
Directors are now in place for each of these portfolios,
and we are continuing to build out our staff. The staff of each
portfolio, their job is to serve as experts in their particular
area and understand the activities and capabilities that exist
in Federal agencies and across the broad research and
development community, and to develop a strategic plan for
their particular portfolio with near, mid, and long-range
research and development activities.
In addition, I have staff that understands the threat from
a technical perspective and is tasked with integrating the
various portfolios into a coherent overall plan, with develop a
corresponding budget, and monitoring its financial execution.
Finally, I am responsible for directing and executing the
Directorate's implementation responsibilities for the SAFETY
Act.
It is our good fortune to have Dr. David Bolka, who joined
us last month as the Director of the Homeland Security Advanced
Research Projects Agency, known as HSARPA. Dr. Bolka made
significant contributions in advancing technical and scientific
projects in his prior work with Lucent Technologies and Bell
Labs.
HSARPA is the key external research funding arm of the S&T
Directorate. Its office is engaged in private sector and
research and development activities in support of our mission
and our customers. HSARPA also conducts rapid prototyping
efforts aimed at taking nearly off-the-shelf technologies and
adapting them for rapid fielding of new capabilities.
HSARPA's first priority has been to initiate the
development of the next generation of chemical and biological
sensors and systems to meet anticipated threats under existing
conditions. They have engaged the private sector in its first
solicitations, seeking detection systems for chem and bio
countermeasures. The interest and response from the private
sector has been strong. We recently held a bidders' conference
in Washington on September 29th that drew approximately 400
participants, and we have received more than 500 white papers
as a result of the solicitation. We are now selecting the
finalists who will be invited to submit full proposals, and
expect to begin contract negotiations in January.
HSARPA also plans to issue shortly a series of
solicitations to address radiological, nuclear, and high-
explosive threats. These and other solicitations will seek to
engage our Nation's research and development community,
including academia FFRDCs, nonprofits, and industry.
In fiscal year 2004, about 60 percent of our appropriation
will go directly to the private sector through HSARPA or other
S&T entities, with about 90 percent of these funds dedicated to
near-term technologies that can be quickly developed.
In addition, we also are pleased to have Dr. Maureen
McCarthy on board as a Director of Science and Technology's
Office of Research and Development. Dr. McCarthy has served as
chief scientist for the National Nuclear Security
Administration and the Department of Energy, and was DOE's
senior representative to the Homeland Security Transition
Planning Office. In fact, she was my deputy as the Transition
Planning Office was stood up. She leads the office as it
strives to provide the Nation with an enduring capability in
research, development, demonstration, testing and evaluation of
technologies to protect the homeland.
The activities within the Office of Research and
Development address the resources that can be brought to bear
to better secure the homeland through the participation of
universities, national labs, and Federal research centers.
Directors have been appointed to lead efforts in each of these
areas, and staff is being added rapidly.
We also have asked John Kubricky, and he is to join Science
and Technology, and he arrived earlier this month as the
Director of the Office of Systems Engineering and Development.
Mr. Kubricky previously served as the advanced program
development manager for Northrop Grumman, and he is leading the
implementation and transition of large-scale or pilot systems
to the field through a rapid, efficient, and disciplined
systems engineering approach.
One of our key challenges in S&T is to evaluate a wide
spectrum of military and commercial technologies so that rapid,
effective, and affordable solutions can be transitioned to the
Department's customers, to include first responders and Federal
agencies. In some cases, for example, military technologies
could be candidates for commercialization, but rigorous system
engineering processes need to be applied to ensure a successful
transition.
An example of this is our 2-year effort to reengineer
technologies developed in the military so that they can be used
for protecting civilian aircraft against a shoulder-fired
missile threat.
Our Systems Engineering Office will identify and retire in
a disciplined and efficient manner those risks associated with
developing and fielding such technologies. In doing so, the
office must view each technology through the prism of
affordability, performance, and supportability, all critical to
our end users. Products must be user-friendly, require little
or no training, and consistently provide accurate results. So
our Office of Systems Engineering will demonstrate and test
solutions before they are released to the field, and will
validate those solutions to assure that they meet user
expectations.
Now, as I indicated earlier, a key mission of ours is to
support the research and development needs of the operational
directorates within the Department. Let me say a little bit
about how we support, as an example, the Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection Directorate. The Department is
very aware that our critical cyberinfrastructure is an
attractive target for our adversaries. In support of the IA&IP
activities in this area, S&T is creating a robust cybersecurity
research and development capability aimed at addressing our
cyber vulnerabilities and engaging, for example, in efforts
that develop tools to make it easier to perform software
patches or detect the insider threat. This effort will be
executed through a cyber R&D center managed through HSARPA. A
center director has been selected along with a deputy director,
who is from, in fact, our IA&IP Directorate.
A draft research agenda has been developed, and we are now
soliciting for a contractor to support the center's operation.
The contractor will host the necessary public and private
discussions on technical issues, and will further develop the
research agenda around the issues identified.
We also support the IA&IP Directorate with research,
assessments and guidance in evaluating threats and areas of
vulnerability. We provide the technical understanding of the
current and evolving threat and cutting-edge tools to help
intelligence analysts organize and query their data and to
connect the dots. We strive to better understand the
vulnerabilities and risks to our infrastructure while providing
policymakers with the information they need to efficiently
allocate resources for their protection.
We have also established a National Biodefense Analysis and
Countermeasure Center in support of our Title III
responsibilities. The National Biodefense Analysis and
Countermeasure Center, based at Fort Detrick, Maryland, is the
hub within Homeland Security for research and operational
capabilities to anticipate, prevent, respond to, and recover
from current and next-generation biological threats to the
American people and our agricultural system. It has three
programmatic thrusts: Biodefense characterization,
bioforensics, and agricultural security. And these are executed
through five research and operations center. An interim
capability is currently operational today at Fort Detrick with
spoke operations at our national labs.
DHS is also contributing to a governmentwide effort to
build U.S. leadership in science and technology. We are
reaching out to the academic community to provide students with
opportunities to pursue career paths in sectors of science and
technology that are vital to our national security. Two
examples of this are the Homeland Security Centers of
Excellence Program and our Scholars and Fellows Program.
Within the Centers of Excellence Program, the Department
plans to establish a network of university-based homeland
security centers, each with a different area of focus in
research and development. The first center will examine the
Nation's resiliency to various acts of terrorism in terms of
impact and consequences, using risk-based economic modeling.
Seventy universities submitted white papers, and of these, 12
were invited to submit full proposals. We plan to announce the
first Center of Excellence in late November.
Also, the first 100 awardees of the Homeland Security
Scholars and Fellows Program began their studies this fall.
These men and women will study in areas aligned to our mission,
such as the life sciences, engineering, computers, information
sciences, social sciences, and psychology.
And while the Science and Technology Directorate is ramping
up, we have also been very hard at work delivering capability.
My statement for the record that I am submitting today includes
several examples of the Directorate's current accomplishments
as well as capabilities that will be available within the next
few months, in the very near term.
Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Lofgren, and members of the
subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I am happy
to address any questions you have.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Dr. Albright. And let me just
compliment you on your written statement. It was certainly more
thorough and more direct than a lot that we get up here, and it
was very helpful, and I want to compliment you on that.
[The statement of Dr. Albright follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. PENROSE ALBRIGHT
Good afternoon Chairman Thornberry, Congresswoman Lofgren, and
Members of the Subcommittee. I am pleased to appear before you today to
report on the progress the Science and Technology Directorate of the
Department of Homeland Security is making in implementing Title III of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Dr. Charles McQueary, Under
Secretary for Science & Technology, appeared before this Subcommittee
on May 21, 2003 and I am pleased to have the opportunity to update you
on the status of our efforts to build out the Directorate. In its
planning, the S&T Directorate has been guided by the Homeland Security
Act, current threat assessments, our understanding of existing
capabilities or those that can be anticipated in the near term, and by
the priorities outlined in the President's National Strategy for
Homeland Security. In short, we are shaping the Directorate to serve as
the Department's hub for research and development for exposing and
countering chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, high-explosive
and cyber threats against the United States and its people.
Progress in Operations of Key Offices
I am pleased to report that all key offices of the Science &
Technology Directorate are operational. Directors with strong
credentials have been appointed to each office and we continue to
strategically add highly skilled technical, professional and support
staff. The offices originally planned are up and running and include:
Plans, Programs and Budgets; Research and Development; Homeland
Security Advanced Research Projects Agency; and Systems Engineering and
Development.
The Science and Technology Directorate is implementing its
activities through focused portfolios that address chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear and cyber threats; support the
research and development needs of the operational units of the
Department; and receive valuable input from private industry and
academia as well as national and Federal laboratories.
Office of Plans, Programs and Budgets
The Office of Plans, Programs and Budgets (PPB) is operating under
my supervision. I have organized this office into several portfolios,
each of which is focused on a particular discipline or activity; taken
together, these portfolios span the Directorate's mission space. A key
mission for the S&T Directorate is to act as the Department's focal
point and advocate for countermeasures to weapons of mass destruction.
Thus, there are portfolios that address countermeasures for chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, cyber, and high-explosives threats.
A further key mission for the Directorate is to provide the research,
development, test and evaluation for our customers in the other
directorates. Thus, there are portfolios focused on borders and
transportation security, intelligence analysis and critical
infrastructure, and emergency preparedness and response. Finally, there
is a portfolio dedicated to developing standards for technologies for
homeland security to better aid Federal, State, and local agencies in
being smart buyers of homeland security technologies.
Directors are now in place for each of the portfolios and we are
continuing to build out our staff. The staff of each portfolio is
charged with being expert in their particular area, with understanding
the activities and capabilities extant in Federal agencies and across
the broad research and development community; and with developing a
strategic plan for their particular portfolio, to include near-, mid-,
and long-range research and development activities. In addition, I have
staff that is charged with understanding the threat from a technical
perspective, with integrating the various portfolios into a coherent
overall plan, with developing the corresponding budget, and monitoring
its financial execution. Finally, I am responsible for executing the
Directorate's implementation responsibilities for the SAFETY Act.
Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency
It is our good fortune that Dr. David Bolka joined us last month as
director of the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency,
known as HSARPA. Dr. Bolka made significant contributions in advancing
technical and scientific projects in his prior work with Lucent
Technologies and Bell Laboratories, following a notable Naval career.
HSARPA's Chemical/Biological Technical Office is fully operational.
Other offices will address the technical aspects of countering
radiological, nuclear, high explosives and cyber threats. Still others
will have informational analysis, rapid prototyping/testbeds and
conventional R&D as a focus. In addition, an area of special interest
for this office will be the role that human psychology plays in terror
threats and attacks.
HSARPA is the external research-funding arm of the S&T Directorate.
It has at its disposal the full range of contracting vehicles and the
authority under the Homeland Security Act to engage businesses,
federally funded research centers, universities and other government
partners in an effort to gather and develop viable concepts for
advanced technologies to protect the homeland.
HSARPA's mission is to identify and develop revolutionary
technologies, satisfy DHS customers' operational needs for advanced
technology, and quickly produce prototypes that lend themselves to
commercial applications. Its customers are State and local first
responders and Federal agencies that are allied with homeland security
such as the Coast Guard, Secret Service, Citizenship and Immigration,
the Federal Emergency Management Agency and others.
HSARPA's first priority is to seed the development of the next
generation of chemical/biological sensors and systems to meet
anticipated threats under existing conditions. We are interested in a
timeline of 6 to 24 months for taking a technology from concept to
prototype. HSARPA has engaged the private sector in its first
solicitation [HSARPA RA 03-01], seeking detection systems for chemical
and biological weapons and associated materials. Interest and response
from the private sector has been strong. S&T held a bidders' conference
in Washington on September 29 that drew approximately 400 participants
and we have received more than 500 white papers as a result. The next
step is to select the finalists who will be invited to submit full
proposals. We expect to begin contract negotiations in late January.
HSARPA plans to issue a series of solicitations to address
radiological, nuclear and high-explosives threats shortly. These and
other solicitations will seek to engage our Nation's research and
development community, including academia, FFRDC's, non-profits, and
industry.
In fiscal year 2004, HSARPA will execute about 40 percent of
appropriations for S&T. Nearly 23 percent of the directorate's R&D
budget of $874 million will go to biological countermeasures while
about 6 percent is for chemical countermeasures. In addition, 10
percent of these funds are dedicated for revolutionary, long-range
research for breakthrough technologies and systems, while the rest is
dedicated to improving existing technologies that can be developed more
quickly.
Office of Research and Development
We are pleased to have Dr. Maureen McCarthy on board as Director of
Science and Technology's Office of Research and Development (OR&D). Dr.
McCarthy has served as Chief Scientist for the National Nuclear
Security Administration and the Department of Energy and was previously
DOE's senior representative to the Homeland Security Transition
Planning Office. She will lead the office as it strives to provide the
nation with an enduring capability in research, development,
demonstration, testing and evaluation of technologies to protect the
homeland. This office also plans to provide stewardship to the
scientific community and to preserve and broaden the leadership of the
United States in science and technology.
Activities within OR&D address the resources that can be brought to
bear to better secure the homeland through the participation of
universities, national laboratories, Federal laboratories and research
centers. Directors have been appointed to lead efforts in each of these
areas and staff is being added rapidly.
Office of Systems Engineering and Development
John Kubricky joined S&T earlier this month as Director of the
Office of Systems Engineering and Development (SE&D). He is tasked with
leading the implementation and transition of large-scale or pilot
systems to the field through a rapid, efficient and disciplined
approach to project management. Mr. Kubricky previously served as
Advanced Program Development Manager for Northrop Grumman and has held
senior positions with California Microwave, Westinghouse Defense and
with the U.S. Army Ninth Infantry Division.
One of S&T's challenges is to evaluate a wide spectrum of military
and commercial technologies so rapid, effective and affordable
solutions can be transitioned to Department's customers that include
first responders and Federal agencies. In some cases, military
technologies could be candidates for commercialization, but rigorous
systems engineering processes need to be applied to ensure a successful
transition. SE&D's role is to identify and then in a disciplined manner
retire risks associated with such technologies to ready them for
deployment to the field. In doing so, the office must view each
technology through the prism of affordability, performance and
supportability--all critical to end-users. SE&D must weigh
considerations such as the urgency for a solution, consequences of the
threat, safety of the product, lifecycle support and other factors as
new products are introduced. Products must be user friendly, have a
minimum of false alarms, require little or no training and consistently
provide accurate results. SE&D will demonstrate and test solutions
before they are released to the field, and will validate that those
solutions meet user expectations.
Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Office of Incident
Management
Under Secretary McQueary created this office to serve as S&T's arm
for crisis response. The office assists and provides scientific advice
to the Office of the Secretary of Homeland Security in assessing and
responding to threats against the homeland. Activities of this office,
which is focused on the biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear
threats, revolve around response coordination, providing scientific and
technical expertise in developing operational plans and assessment of
threats, and continuity of operations.
Collaborative Efforts in Critical Infrastructure Protection
America's critical infrastructure is a web that connects virtually
every aspect of modern society. The Department's efforts in this area
span 14 sectors and assets that are in need of particular attention.
These include agriculture, food, water, public health, information and
telecommunications, energy, hazardous materials, and national
monuments, among others. A major disruption to any of these sectors
will impact others and could have far-reaching implications in terms of
quality of life for large numbers of Americans.
Acts of terrorism are not solely about loss of life. Acts can also
occur that are aimed at creating widespread panic among our citizens,
and disrupting our financial markets and economic well being. The
Department's role here is prevention, protection, response and
recovery. Adding to the complexity of our job is the fact that much of
the nation's critical infrastructure is privately held and not
controlled by the Federal government. This underscores the need for
strategic collaborations among DHS and other agencies in local, State
and Federal government, in academia and the private sector--and I am
pleased to say we continue to make strong progress in this area.
S&T supports the Department's Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection Directorate with research, assessments and
guidance in evaluating threats and areas of vulnerability. We provide
the technical understanding of the current and evolving threat, such as
those posed by biological pathogens and improvised nuclear or
radiological weapons. We are providing cutting edge tools to better
enable intelligence analysts to organize and query their data, and to
better ``connect the dots''. We are developing decision tools to better
understand the vulnerabilities and risks to our infrastructure, so that
policy makers can efficiently allocate resources to its protection.
The Department is very aware that our critical cyber infrastructure
is an attractive target for our adversaries. DHS has created the
National Cyber Security Division under its Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection Directorate. NCSD operates around the clock
to conduct cyberspace analysis, issue alerts and warnings and improve
information sharing and stands ready to respond to major incidents and
aid in national-level recovery efforts. S&T is, in coordination with
IA&IP, creating a robust cybersecurity research and development
activity aimed at better understanding our cyber vulnerabilities, and
developing tools that make it easier to perform software patches, or
detect the insider threat.
National Laboratories, Federally Funded Research Centers and
Universities
National Labs
The Science and Technology directorate has created the Homeland
Security National Laboratory System. The System, which is comprised of
laboratories across the nation, provides the Department with a vigorous
internal research component. Directorate staff members work closely
with personnel from each of the national laboratories to promote
innovative homeland security solutions. S&T is presently exploring ways
for the national laboratories to participate in HSARPA activities.
Homeland Security Institute
The Homeland Security Act requires that DHS establish a federally
funded research and development center known as the Homeland Security
Institute to assist the Office of the Secretary and the S&T Directorate
in addressing important homeland security issues that require
scientific, technical and analytical expertise. To start the process,
DHS, working with the Army's U.S. Medical Research Acquisition Agency
Activity (USAMRAA) issued an early notice on September 10 seeking
expressions of interest and qualifications, which are due today,
October 30. The results of this effort will assist DHS and USAMRAA in
developing a major solicitation for this activity. Plans call for the
staffing of the office to begin November 1 and the formal solicitation
to be issued in December.
Among other functions, the Homeland Security Institute may be
tasked with designing metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of homeland
security programs throughout the Federal government including the
national laboratories.
Universities
Through the Office of Research and Development, DHS is contributing
to a government-wide effort to build U.S. leadership in science and
technology. The office is reaching out to the academic community in an
effort to provide students with opportunities to pursue career paths in
sectors of science and technology that are vital to our national
security. Two examples of this are the Homeland Security Centers of
Excellence program and our Scholars and Fellows program.
With the Centers of Excellence program, the Department plans to
establish a network of university-based Homeland Security centers, each
with a different area of focus in research and development. The first
Center will examine the nation's resiliency to various acts of
terrorism, in terms of impact and consequences, using risk-based
economic modeling. The Department's call for white papers regarding the
initial Center drew over 70 responses. S&T narrowed the field to 12
universities that submitted full proposals earlier this month and plan
to announce the first Center of Excellence in late November.
The Homeland Security Scholars and Fellows Program provide
scholarships for undergraduate and graduate students pursuing degrees
in areas that are already aligned with our mission. The first 100
awardees of this program began their studies this fall. These men and
women will study in areas such as life sciences, engineering,
computers, information sciences, mathematics, physical sciences, social
sciences and psychology.
National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasure Center
The National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasure Center (NBACC),
based at Fort Detrick in Maryland, is the hub within homeland security
for research and operational capabilities to anticipate, prevent,
respond to, and recover from current and next-generation biological
threats to the American people and our agricultural system. NBACC is
dedicated to protecting human health and agriculture by advancing the
scientific community's knowledge of potential bioterrorism. NBACC aims
to achieve efficient interagency and private sector cooperation with a
structure that integrates facilities and technical expertise in
biodefense and involves Plum Island Animal Disease Center, national and
DHS laboratories, universities, the private sector and other government
agencies. Biodefense characterization, bioforensics and agricultural
security are the key programmatic thrusts of NBACC that are executed
through these five research and operations centers: Biothreat
Assessment Support Center; Biodefense Knowledge Center; Bioforensics
Analysis Center; Bio-Countermeasures Testing and Evaluation Center; and
the Plum Island Animal Disease Center.
Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee
The Homeland Security Act required the S&T Directorate to put
together a committee of 20 prominent individuals with expertise
spanning the Directorate's activities. They are to act, in essence, as
our board of directors, advising the Under Secretary on the best ways
S&T can deliver to the American people the technology and cutting edge
capabilities that are a fundamental strength in the war on terrorism.
We have decided on the people we would like to serve on that Committee,
and are contacting them now. I expect the Committee to meet for the
first time early in December.
Accomplishments
While, the Science and Technology Directorate has organized itself,
is rapidly staffing up, it also has been at work delivering capability.
I would like to mention some examples of current accomplishments as
well as capabilities that will be available within the next few months.
Biological and Chemical Defense Programs:
The Biowatch program has been established and deployed
to numerous cities across the nation. The program, developed,
funded, and managed by the S&T Directorate, is executed in
cooperation with EPA and CDC. It employs environmental sampling
devices to quickly detect terrorist agents, such as anthrax, in
time to distribute life-saving pharmaceuticals to affected
citizens. The Science and Technology directorate is now
focusing its efforts on piloting the next generation of
environmental samplers which will reduce the amount of labor
required and response time needed for devices while keeping the
detection probability high and false alarm rates low.
The S&T Directorate and the Washington Metropolitan
Area Transit Authority (WMATA), recently completed PROTECT
(Program for Response Options and Technology Enhancements for
Chemical/Biological Terrorism). PROTECT, which is an
operational chemical agent detection and response capability
program, is deployed in more than six stations and operated by
the WMATA. Upon completion, the system will be totally owned
and operated by WMATA and expanded to approximately 20
stations. The information gleaned from PROTECT will have direct
applications to similar facility protection and response
efforts across the nation.
In June 2003, the Science and Technology directorate,
in coordination with the Department of Defense's Defense Threat
Reduction Agency, Department of Energy, and University of
Oklahoma sponsored a month-long atmospheric dispersion study in
Oklahoma City, OK. Nearly 150 scientists, engineers, and
student assistants were dedicated to this study, which tracked
the air movement of safe, non-toxic tracer gases in and around
city buildings. The resulting data is being used to enhance and
develop urban specific computer models that will allow
emergency management, law enforcement and other personnel to
train for and respond to potential chemical, biological, and
radiological terrorist attacks.
Interoperability of Communications:
The Department is taking steps to boost the ability of
44,000 local, tribal and State entities and 100 federal
agencies engaged in public safety to communicate effectively
with one another, particularly during an emergency. SAFECOM is
a Federal umbrella program under S&T that is dedicated to
improving public safety response through enhanced interoperable
wireless communications. The goal is to enable public safety
agencies to talk across disciplines and jurisdictions via radio
communications systems, exchanging voice or data with one
another on demand and in real time. SAFECOM is providing seed
money for the Department of Justice's Integrated Wireless
Network program which will create interoperability among local,
State and Federal public safety agencies in 25 cities. In
addition, technical guidance for interoperable communications
that was developed under SAFECOM will be included in this
year's Office of Domestic Preparedness grants.
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Programs:
Analysts from S&T built and delivered a prototype
system to IAIP to perform Graphical Information System (GIS)
based computer assisted threat and vulnerability mapping of the
oil and gas infrastructure in the American Southwest. S&T is
also in the process of delivering to IAIP cutting edge
visualization, data searching, data correlation, and all-source
analytic aids to provide IAIP advanced analytic capabilities
integrated with vulnerability information.
The Nuclear Assessment Program is engaged in ongoing
assessments and analysis of communicated nuclear threats and
claims of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. This
program also inaugurated a new capability to rapidly analyze
gamma and neutron spectroscopy in support of Customs and Border
Patrol officers to quickly resolve radiation anomalies at the
borders. This capability is in the process of being expanded,
through the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures
Center, to the biological domain.
Border and Transportation Security Programs:
The Science and Technology directorate has initiated
the Border Safe Integrated Feasibility Experiment. This
experiment creates an infrastructure in the Southwest United
States for data sharing between the Department's Border and
Transportation Security directorate and local and State law
enforcement officials. The resulting system will identify
individuals who have already entered our country, either
legally or not, and who engage in hostile behavior after
crossing the border. The system will particularly focus on
individuals who attempt to change their identity or borrow
someone else's identity.
S&T has deployed to sites in the New York metropolitan
area (tunnels, bridges, ports and airports) various nuclear
radiation technologies. This demonstration effort involves
transition of state of the art, new detection technologies
available at the National Labs to the field, the development of
operational concepts and technical reach back procedures, and
on-site alarm resolution. It will serve as a model for
deployment of these technologies to the interior of the Nation,
around major urban centers, and at ports and airports.
Portable Air Defense Systems:
The Department of Homeland Security has developed and
submitted to Congress a program plan for countermeasures
against the shoulder-fired missile threat to commercial
aircraft, known as MAN-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS).
Based on this report, the Science and Technology Directorate
established a program office to oversee the Department's
MANPADS efforts. These actions are aimed at leveraging existing
military research and development programs, and re-engineering
those capabilities so that they are consistent with airport
operations and commercial air carrier maintenance, support, and
logistics schemes.
In September, S&T released a solicitation announcing a
program to address the potential threat posed by MANPADS. The
solicitation is the first step in the Department's two-phase
systems development and demonstration program for anti-missile
devices for commercial aircraft. Phase I will provide an
analysis of the economic, manufacturing and maintenance issues
needed to support a system that will be effective in the
commercial aviation environment. Phase II will include
development of prototypes using existing technology which will
be subjected to a rigorous test and evaluation process. The
Department held an Industry Day in Washington, DC on October 15
to brief contractors about the program. White papers responding
to the counter-MANPADS program solicitation are currently being
reviewed. Respondents receiving favorable reviews will be
encouraged to submit full proposals.
Maritime Security:
The Science and Technology directorate's Homeland
Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) has joined
with the U.S. Coast Guard to build a prototype integrated
maritime surveillance facility covering Port Everglades, Miami
and Key West. The $3.7 million, 24-month program will integrate
existing facilities and upgrade equipment to detect, track, and
identify vessel traffic around ports, in the near-shore zones
around ports, and over the horizon. This evolutionary testing
will provide an immediate coastal surveillance capability in a
high priority area; offer the U.S. Coast Guard and other
Departmental organizations the means to develop operational
concepts; and implement and test interoperability among
Homeland Security and Department of Defense systems and
networks.
SAFETY Act:
On October 10, 2003, Secretary Ridge signed an interim
final rule implementing the Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering
Effective Technologies (SAFETY) Act of 2002. The SAFETY Act is
designed to encourage the development and rapid deployment of
life-saving, anti-terrorism technologies by providing
manufacturers and sellers with limited liability risks. The
Department is now accepting applications for designation under
the Act.
In October, the Science and Technology directorate led
a series of nation-wide seminars (Dallas, Los Angeles, Atlanta,
Chicago and Washington) to introduce the process to implement
the SAFETY Act. The seminars provided general information about
the Act, introduced the pre-application process, and provided a
forum for questions about the Department's implementation
processes.
Standards:
Staff members of the Science and Technology
directorate are working with the emergency responder community,
and other federal partners such as NIST, to develop standards.
Initial guidelines for radiation detection technology have
already been made available, with formal standards nearing
completion. Standards are also under development for detectors
of biological hazards. Guidelines have been published for
interoperable communications gear.
The Science and Technology directorate is working with
other Federal partners to develop a set of standards for
cleanup after a biological or radiation incident. By providing
states and localities with cleanup guidelines, potential
hazardous impacts can be significantly decreased.
Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Lofgren and Members of the
Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I am happy to
address any questions you may have.
Mr. Thornberry. I would be happy to yield my time to the
chairman of the full committee, if he would like to ask
questions at this point.
Mr. Cox. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome again, Dr. Albright. Two of the things in your
prepared testimony prompt me to ask for additional detail. One
is the experiment that you have initiated for Border and
Transportation Security. It is described in your written
testimony briefly as the creation of an infrastructure in the
Southwest for data-sharing between DHS and Border and
Transportation Security Directorate on one hand, and State and
local law enforcement on the other hand. The aim is to identify
people who are doing bad things once they cross the border and
perhaps in the process also swapping identities.
How is this going to work? How is it working already?
Mr. Albright. Well, it is set up in, I believe, a couple
locations. I believe it is set up in southern Arizona, along
the Arizona border, and it is also set up in southern
California. And in essence, you have described the program to a
T. What it is is that as people who--the State and local people
who--the State and local people will tell our border people who
they have a particular interest in. And as these people
cross--.
Mr. Cox. How do they do that? How do they tell DHS?
Mr. Albright. Sir, I would have to get back to you on the
actual details of that, but my understanding is they have
basically created a watch list of individuals and names that
they are interested in seeing cross the border. But the actual
mechanical details of that I would have to get back to you on.
Mr. Cox. And the brief description that you provided states
that you are going to identify individuals who have already
entered the country, either legally or not. Is there any
coordination between the Border and Transportation Security
Directorate and immigration?
Mr. Albright. Sir, yes, I believe there is. We have been
working--as we have been implementing this program, we have
been working closely with the senior staff.
Mr. Cox. What I mean to ask is in addition to inputs from
State and local law enforcement, are we attempting to match up
information that we have already collected within this
Directorate and within DHS, for example, from US-VISIT or from
anything else that we are running?
Mr. Albright. Well, it is my understanding that the answer
in general is, yes; that basically we are matching up
information. To the degree that we have those databases
integrated today, that information is being matched up. Of
course, US-VISIT itself isn't up and running yet, so that
hasn't been happening yet.
Mr. Cox. But neither is this program. It is an experiment.
Mr. Albright. No. Right now there are no experiments either
from US-VISIT. There is obviously--in southern California, for
example, there is a sentry program, but that only applies to
preapproved individuals when they cross the border, and those
tend to be fairly low-threat people.
Mr. Cox. I wanted to ask you also about your efforts to
focus on communications interoperability. SAFECOM is focused on
both voice and data. You have also apparently been connected
somehow fundingwise to DOJ and the 25 cities that they are
working in. What exactly are we doing, apart from that DOJ
project, in DHS on interoperability with SAFECOM?
Mr. Albright. Okay. As you know, SAFECOM is a DHS-managed
activity, but it is part of the--it is a Presidential
management initiative that actually relies on contributions
from across the Federal sector. So you are quite right, DOJ is
a player in this, DOD is a player in this, although DHS is
managing it and does do the bulk of the funding, I might add.
Sort of the 25 cities that are within the public wireless
network program within SAFECOM are the key testbeds for
interoperability. However, we are also conducting additional
activities. For example, what SAFECOM is doing is sort of its
key role is developing technical standards for
interoperability. And what we have recently done, and this is
the first time this has happened, is the guidance associated
with those standards has been included in the suite of grants
that have been issued by ODP, by FEMA, and also by the COTS
program. So what we are starting to see now is a uniform set of
technical standards that are being issued across all the grants
programs that DHS is involved with.
Mr. Cox. In addition to a standard setting, is there any
other aspect of the program?
Mr. Albright. There is certainly a lot of issues. Clearly,
there is--as you said, there are testbeds occurring in multiple
cities that we are leveraging. There are a lot of issues, as
you are, I am sure, aware of, especially with spectrum
management that we are concerned about. There is technology
issues. But those are the key--the two activities which are the
testbeds and the standard setting are the key activities within
the program.
Mr. Cox. The last thing I want to ask you about is IP and
our focus on, for example, the grid and recent demonstration of
the problems with the New York blackout. How has the S&T
Directorate collaborated with IA&IP to mitigate this
vulnerability? How have you leveraged industry, if you have, to
be a key partner in providing tools? What other tools are you
bringing to bear?
Mr. Albright. Well, there is a couple of things we have
been doing with respect to the electrical blackout, the
specifics of that. The first is--is, yes, in fact, we are--we
have been engaging in industry to understand better these sorts
of tools and predictive tools that may be available to--as you
say, to help us do a better job of modeling the infrastructure
and understanding where some of the key vulnerabilities are
under the sets of circumstances that we saw occur in that
particular blackout.
We are also working closely with Bob Viskowsky and his
people in the analysis of the data that has come out, that is
coming out of this blackout. I mean, the blackout was a--it was
obviously not a terrorism event; but from the perspective of
the Department of Homeland Security, it is a wonderful
opportunity to learn better some of the issues that are
associated with, for example, interdependencies among
infrastructures that so far have been primarily the subject of
speculation, or, frankly, people sitting around a room kind of
making lists up. This is an opportunity for us to actually put
some facts on the table and understand that if an electrical
power system goes out in Cincinnati, what effect it has, say,
in Alabama, you know, on some industry because the supply chain
got broken.
So those kinds of analytical--that kind of analytical
support is something we are providing directly to--as part of
our systems engineering responsibilities, within the
Department, to the IA&IP folks.
Mr. Cox. I thank you very much.
And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, on that last point. You
know, whether it is transportation or food supplies or energy
reactors, the threat that links all of these together is the
our cybernetwork; and obviously focusing on the grid and on
blackouts is vitally important and a big responsibility of this
subcommittee.
Mr. Thornberry. I thank the Chairman.
Ms. Lofgren.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am wondering. We are about 6 months into this, and we are
basically--this part of the Department was being built from
scratch, so I am wondering if you can tell me how many full-
time employees the Directorate has on staff, and then how many
additional people you have in detailees and contractors, and
then what the final level will likely be.
Mr. Albright. Okay. I will try to give you an answer that
was good as of this morning.
Ms. Lofgren. That would be fine.
Mr. Albright. Because it changes rapidly.
I believe that the number of full-time employees that we
have on board in the S&T Directorate--within the headquarters
activity, I think, is 110. It is roughly 110. We have on top of
that another 30 or 40 contractors who are called SETA support
contractors or detailees from other agencies. For example, we
have a detailee from NIST who supports us. Actually we have a
couple from NIST. So the net result is about 150, 160 people.
Our full-time staffing level in terms of government
employees, we expect to be fully staffed in the headquarters
activity around 180 or so, with another additional 50 or 60
contractors or detailees. We have got three AAAS fellows, you
know, people like that on board.
Ms. Lofgren. Along those lines, I have had some people
express concern, and I don't know if it is--whether we should
be concerned, so it is a question, about the depth or breadth
of the science experience in the leadership. I believe you are
a physicist, and Dr. McQueary is an engineer, and Dr. Bolka is
a physicist, and Dr. McCarthy is a nuclear chemist, all of
which, I mean, is pretty impressive. But there isn't anyone
from the biology part of our science world. And is that
something that we are going to address as we move forward? Do
you think it needs to be addressed?
Mr. Albright. We have--in terms of the senior leadership,
you are quite right. But I have to tell you, I don't actually
do a lot of physics in my job anymore. I guess I could have
been glib and say that physicists think all science is a branch
of physics.
Ms. Lofgren. I have heard that.
Mr. Albright. Right. But actually we have several people
with biological training on board. I have a portfolio that is
the bio--and I have got the chemical threat also in there as
well, mainly because that is how I am staffed up right now. And
I have got a number of--I have got a veterinary--I have got
people who do veterinary research in that group. I have
research people with biological degrees, immunologists,
virologists. So we have access to that kind of talent where we
need to have it.
Ms. Lofgren. And you don't feel that it is a problem in
terms of prioritizing the issues?
Mr. Albright. Not at all.
Ms. Lofgren. All right.
I am interested in the--I call it ``SARPA,'' not HSARPA,
because DARPA is easy, it flows from the tongue; ``SARPA''
flows from the tongue.
Mr. Cox. If the gentlelady would yield. The H should be
silent; don't you think?
Ms. Lofgren. Yeah. It is ``SARPA.'' And that way we will
live and flourish and grow.
As I understand it, HSARPA is now focused on more near-
term, immediate type of needs. But DARPA really has been--that
has been so successful over the years, and we have benefitted
so much as a Nation from DARPA, really has a longer-range
agenda. Do you see HSARPA morphing into that DARPA model down
the road? And, if so, when? And, if not, how are we going to
get those long-range functions accomplished?
Mr. Albright. That is an excellent question, and I will try
to call it ``SARPA'' from here on out. It is about the third
thing we have tried, so we will try that.
DARPA--first, let me say that HSARPA is always going to
have a long-range research component, you know, a piece of it
that is always looking at sort of crazy ideas, you know, things
that, you know, no one else might be thinking about. And I
certainly see that growing. But I think the name HSARPA is an
unfortunate one for the Department of Homeland Security because
it does bring to mind DARPA, and there are some very distinct
differences between the environment which DARPA operates in and
the environment that we operate in.
If you look at DARPA, DARPA exists in an environment where
there are already significant service acquisition activities
within each of the military services. So, for example, for a
lot of the directed research that you get in the military and
the Pentagon, that directed research--if I needed a new surface
air-to-air missile, I tend not to go to DARPA for that, I tend
to go to Wright-Patterson for that, for example. If I need a
new submarine, I don't go to DARPA for that typically. And the
reason for that, of course, is you have these very robust
evolutionary capabilities within the respective services as
they fulfill their Title X responsibilities.
So DARPA is in a sense a very needed but additional piece
onto that infrastructure that allows the Pentagon to often--and
focus solely on those kinds of things that don't pop up through
the evolutionary acquisition chain.
In the Homeland Security Department, in S&T, HSARPA is it.
That is our acquisition chain. And so to the degree which we
have to--so it becomes--what you are really saying is that
there is a management challenge that we are always going to
have, which is to make sure that we always reserve funds in our
budget to assure that HSARPA does have the wherewithal to
conduct that DARPA-like activity within its overall
responsibilities. And the way we have chosen to do that is we
have created a portfolio and a budget line that we call
emerging threats, and this year in 2004 I believe it is around
$25 million, and that money is there for exactly that purpose,
to allow HSARPA, without any direction from anybody else, from
any of the other portfolios, to basically have the Director go
off and try out those things that we didn't think are good
ideas, but he thinks are good ideas and ought to explore. And
that is what that is all about.
Mr. Albright. And that is what that is all about.
Ms. Lofgren. I have only a moment left on my time, but we
have asked a variety of witnesses, including the Secretary
himself, whether we can provide technical assistance to the
immigration function so that they can deploy technology; and I
am so frustrated with this. I mean, in my other job as a member
of the Immigration Subcommittee in Judiciary, we have been
beating them up for years to deploy technology, and I do not
see anything happening.
Have you been able to assist them? Is that on your to-do
list? Could you give us a report on it?
Mr. Albright. That is very much on my to-do list, and the
Secretary has put it on our to-do list.
A lot of the activities, of course, are focused with the
US-VISIT program that Mr. Cox was referring to earlier. There
is a statutory requirement to deploy machine-readable documents
at the border, so we have been looking closely with the US-
VISIT program and with the BTS people to help them sort through
what needs to be done there.
As I am sure you are well aware, the NIST has a very large
activity associated mainly with setting standards for
fingerprints. That is sort of what they tend to focus on, but
on other areas, in particular in the areas associated with
fusing different kinds of biometrics, we have been very
actively engaged on that. In fact, we have a research program
designed to explore those issues; we are working jointly with
NIST to create a database that allows us to perform that work,
and so, yes, we are pushing forward on that.
Ms. Lofgren. Just one final remark: That sounds good, but
they are still creating paper files in Immigration.
Mr. Albright. I know, I know, and that is a separate issue
entirely about whether or not--you are absolutely right. They
create paper files and those paper files sit in archives in
Pennsylvania for 100 years.
That also is being worked, not so much by us, but by the
people in Immigration, who do immigration, who are pushing for
a modernization program along those lines.
Mr. Thornberry. I thank the gentlelady for some excellent
questions.
The vice chairman of the subcommittee, Mr. Sessions.
Mr. Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Dr.
Albright, for being with us today. I will be very quick in my
question to you so that it will allow you time before we go
vote.
I notice on page 7 of your report to us, Accomplishments,
the Biowatch program. I would like to have you discuss that,
but my tee-up is: You talk about going all around the country,
being prepared for things that are ahead--SARS, anthrax, these
sorts of things. Can you please tell me about those successes?
And how prepared are we, how much better prepared are we than
what we were for the things that we have been through; and in
your opinion, what do we have to look forward to and what can
this committee do--subcommittee and committee do to help you
further?
Mr. Albright. Thank you.
Let me first talk about Biowatch.
As you know, Biowatch is an environmental sampling program
that we have in place in 31 cities across the country, and what
we have done is deploy environmental samplers that suck air
continuously and the results from that sampling are then taken
to the CDC's Laboratory Response network labs for analysis; and
this is done in full coordination with CDC and EPA, and the
idea basically is to provide sufficient warning of, for
example, an aerosolized anthrax attack in a time sufficient for
us to be able to deploy the stockpile and to treat the people
who have been affected.
We also have significantly improved our plume modeling
capabilities at the NARAC facility out at Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, which allows us to understand where the
contaminant plume has gone, to help us better focus our
efforts; and we are working closely with HHS and CDC, not just
on the Biowatch program, but also in the development of medical
surveillance capabilities to also help warn us if an event has
occurred and to help HHS and the National Institute for
Infectious Diseases--Allergies and Infectious Diseases to help
prioritize their program.
Almost certainly the first procurement out of the bioshield
program, should the bill be signed, would be the RPA vaccine
for anthrax, which, if deployed and if we are able--certainly
it would be deployed to first responders and may, if we can get
it right, be deployed nationally. That will take anthrax off
the table entirely.
Mr. Sessions [Presiding.] I thank the gentleman for his
response.
Chairman Thornberry has left to go vote. We are going to
continue on with this hearing for your being so gracious to
stick with us when we were in trouble; and I will now yield the
time to Mr.ndrews from New Jersey.
Mr. Andrews. Thank you, Doctor, for your excellent
testimony.
On page 2, you talk about the directorate or the portfolio
dedicated to developing standards for technology for homeland
security, and Federal and State and local agencies and being
smart buyers of homeland security technologies. I think this is
a crucial issue. I think we were wise in decentralizing
responsibilities for homeland security to those who know their
turf best. But that strategy will work only if people do not
buy junk, and I am very concerned that we have standards in
place so that local buyers are given a lot of guidance into
what they ought to buy and not buy.
The specific question I have for you is whether you
anticipate the standards that your group will develop being
incorporated into grant contracts with local grantees, or will
they simply be suggestions?
Mr. Albright. We haven't gotten that far yet. So far, the
thinking has been that it would be in the grant guidance, so we
would tell people that this is something they certainly ought
to do. I do not know if we will require it or not; and to be
honest with you, I think it will matter a lot on what the
equipment is. There is certainly a kind of equipment where, I
would imagine, we might be very--pretty insistent on that,
because when an alarm goes off, we are the ones who get called.
Mr. Andrews. Right.
Mr. Albright. On the other hand, for other sorts of things,
we may just leave it up to the guidance.
Mr. Andrews. I would strongly urge you to consider
incorporating standards into the actual contract documents.
You know, port authorities and airport authorities are
creatures of local politics, and one of the benefits of that
is, they are very responsive to their local community, but one
of the risks is that a technology is going to be purchased
because someone's brother-in-law is selling it or someone's
contributor is developing it. It has been known to happen in
American politics.
I think it would be, at best, a waste of taxpayers' money
and, at worst, a disaster if a technology that purports to
protect against a biological or chemical attack fails because
it doesn't meet standards. I think it is imperative that an
operation like yours, that has the credibility and the
scientific expertise, develop these standards and require they
be applied in these contracts.
The second point that I would make is about the role of the
private sector, which I know you acknowledged in your written
statement. You have a difficult balancing act, but I trust that
you will be able to follow it; and that balancing act is, I
think you need to reach out to the very best in the private,
university and nonprofit sectors but do so in a way that
doesn't prejudice your standard of development that benefits
their particular proprietary product.
It is an easy thing to say, but a hard thing to do.
Have we given you the legal tools necessary for you to
accomplish that mission, or do you need other legal tools?
Mr. Albright. Right now, I think we are in great shape. The
point you brought up is something we do talk about quite a bit,
and that is--as you know, when you do consensus standards, you
have to be very, very mindful of the fact that someone might be
trying to, you know, wax the alleys. And so what we do is--we
are dealing with some pretty experienced people out at NIST,
and they understand the issues--and what we do is we
certainly--it is very important that we get industry to buy
into what we do, but at the end of the day, the standard is
issued by us.
Mr. Andrews. The reason I feel so passionately about the
inclusion of the standards as a condition of the contract is,
since September 11, I could do nothing but sit in my office and
meet with people who purport to have homeland security
technologies that will save the world.
Now, many of them are very well-intentioned, eager people.
Some of them are wackos, frankly, and I do not really have the
technological expertise to distinguish between the two, and I
do not think a lot of local decision-makers do either. I
respect them and I respect their local prerogative, but I think
it is very important that we not send Federal taxpayers' money
to local people that would buy--in good faith, buy products and
technologies that would not work.
I thank you for your testimony.
Mr. Sessions. I thank the gentleman.
I would advise us, at this time, that despite what I
previously said, we have now been given the information that
there are a series of votes, at least one additional vote; and
so, as a result of that, we would ask if you could please stand
by.
Mr. Albright. Sure, no problem.
Mr. Sessions. Dr. Albright, it is our intent to come back
in just a few minutes after the vote, so at this time, the
subcommittee will be in recess.
[Recess.]
Mr. Thornberry. [Presiding.] We sure appreciate your
flexibility. It is a little difficult for us to even figure out
what is happening next, and I am not sure it is going to
improve tremendously, but in the meantime, we will do the best
we can.
I yield to the distinguished gentleman from North Carolina
at this point.
Mr. Etheridge. Mr. Chairman, and to our witness, Dr.
Albright I thank Dr. Albright for your flexibility today.
We find ourselves a lot like you, where you talked earlier
today--and let me return to that--as relates to HSARPA's
mission to identify developing revolutionary technologies to
satisfy the operational needs.
I guess all of us have some major research capacity in our
districts, but we have an awful lot in North Carolina as
relates to the Research Triangle and our world class
universities; they are very interested in the work that HSARPA
is going to be doing. These universities, as you well know,
have a long history of experience with rapid prototyping of new
technologies, and that is what we are talking about and what
you had talked about, and it is in your testimony.
My question is: What is the director's intent for the $45
million of additional research and development funds
appropriated for rapid prototyping?
And let me get my second one in so maybe you can combine
your answers: How is the director planning to select products
for rapid prototyping? And how will you go about producing and
testing the prototyping?
Mr. Albright. Okay.
Okay. First, obviously, by rapid prototyping, what we mean
is technologies that are commercial off-the-shelf or government
off-the-shelf technologies that may have been used for some
purpose or another mode and maybe need to be commercialized and
perhaps adapted to homeland security purposes; and the way we
have chosen to do that, up to now, has been to basically go to
our user communities--EP&R, B&TS, IAIP--as well as within our
own equities with S&T.
As you know, we have a mission to be service advocates for
the chem-bio-rad-nuke weapons of mass destruction issues. So
what we do is, we ask ourselves what are the kinds of things we
can have that would change the way we do business right now;
and what we do is, we put together a broad agency announcement.
It is very similar to a small business, innovative research
kind of booklet, if you are familiar with those sorts of
things. We publish that and we ask people to respond, and we
try to have a very friendly way of doing that, where people
will respond in stages.
They send us maybe a chart with just a single sheet of
paper and we encourage maybe some of those to respond with a
white paper and maybe some of those to respond with a proposal;
and this is all aimed at making sure that small businesses in
particular do not have to make an extraordinary investment in
running a full proposal before they get things in to us, and
then we evaluate those for our immediate needs and fund them.
That is how we do it.
The advantage to doing it that way, of course, is that you
have the buy-in from the very beginning with the user
community, the people who actually are going to deploy this. We
are asking them specifically, If we make this for you, will you
deploy it? And if the answer comes back, no, then we tend to be
not too interested in doing anything with it.
So that is, in essence, the philosophy.
With the extra $45 million that was appropriated to us,
clearly we can do more of that. We did that with the $30
million solicitation just last--just a few months ago. There
are some additional, perhaps more focused solicitations that we
could do in particular areas, and that is one of the options we
are considering now.
In some of the IAIP areas, in some of the EP&R areas in
particular--and we haven't really settled down yet as to how we
are going to spend that, and we are going to have a broad-based
solicitation like we did before, but have more money in it, but
we are going to do that for part of the money and then have
more focused solicitations.
The other thing we need to do, and we need to use a portion
of that money for that, is to provide the rest of the
clearinghouse function that you all asked for in Section 313 of
the act; and that is to take some of that rapid prototyping
capability and some of that commercial and off-the-shelf
governmental technology and put it into a database that State
and local people can address and look at and get some insights
as to whether or not this is something they ought to be
thinking about buying.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you.
Let me move to the agroterrorism piece, because as you
know, most of that has been delegated to the Department of
Agriculture, but as you know, the DHS Science and Technology
Directorate is supposed to address countermeasures for
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and cyber high-
explosive threats.
Can you describe the research efforts that relate to
agroterrorism on the agriculture side; and secondly, is DHS
coordinating with the Department of Agriculture in this area;
and finally, I hope you will share with us what DHS is doing to
address the security problem that GAO has just released, as
relates to Plum Island Animal Disease Center.
It is important to a lot of States, but it is particularly
important to this country with Plum Island. And you might want
to talk about what Plum Island is, so I will not use all my
time on that.
Mr. Albright. Okay. Let me first talk about--let me first
talk about our agricultural bioterrorism work.
Most of our focus is on the catastrophic terrorism end of
this and so, frankly, our focus has been on foot and mouth
disease. That is the one that, if that gets out, that is--all
the models pretty much show the same thing. There is no disease
more infectious than foot and mouth disease, and so what we
have been focused on has been to look at what USDA has been
doing; and I will tell you, we are looking very closely with
them.
I spend a lot of time with their leadership and my staff
spends quite a bit of time with them, as well, crafting out a
joint strategy that addresses--their main concerns tend to be
focused on natural outbreaks, and natural outbreaks have a
certain set of protocols and issues attached to them that are
fairly well understood, and they have led to a certain kind of
infrastructure. For example, right now, if we have a foot and
mouth disease sample, it always gets shipped back up to Plum
Island for analysis because they are able to constrain the
outbreak in the meantime, the local veterinary people can do
that.
If we had a delivered introduction, it is not at all clear
you can do that, so that leads you to think about the
development of new diagnostic tools that we can, in fact, put
out into the field in the State veterinary facilities, so that
they can actually perform a more robust identification of the
disease in situ. So that is certainly an example of the sorts
of things we are talking about.
We obviously are also involved heavily with them on
modeling and simulation activities, but basically what we are
in the process of now--and this is actually, this is a report
to Congress that is requested in early January--is crafting a
joint strategy that allows them to continue to do the things
they have been doing for a very long time and then allows us to
address the infrastructure issues associated with terrorism
attacks.
With regard to Plum Island, well, as you know, we took it
over, I believe it was June 1; and what we immediately did was,
we did a site survey as you would when you are buying a house.
For example, you go do a look, and we determined that the smart
thing to do at that point was to do a 60-day study across the
board of all the various issues associated with Plum. So we
looked at infrastructure, we looked at compliance with the
bioterrorism rules and regulations, we looked at security quite
a bit, and we published that 60-day study, we completed it, and
we are now undertaking remedial action on some of the top
issues.
The GAO report--we actually feel the GAO report was fairly
accurate; I mean, it, I think, reflects the state of affairs
when we took the facility over; and all I can tell you is that
we are working very, very hard to bring a cultural change to
the place--and I should tell you, it has been fairly successful
so far, not completely, but fairly successful so far--to get
people to think about the fact that, yeah, there is a
bioterrorism act out there, and they do have to be cleared to
handle some of the pathogens and we do have to be solicitous of
what the rules and regulations are.
We have also changed the site contractor as well, so we are
doing the best we can to get that site on-line.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Dr. Albright.
Mr. Chairman, as you well know, that Plum Island is an
important place in this country, one of the few places that we
can do the testing that needs to be done in this country, and
it is critical that that security be there.
Let me say, even though my time has expired, that we did a
simulation in North Carolina, with the help of people here in
Washington and the State folks, on hoof and mouth disease; and
I can tell you, without exaggeration, it was frightening what
it could do in this country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Thornberry. I thank the gentleman and I have
participated in such exercises as well.
Let me kind of take, I guess, a next step from Mr.
Etheridge's questions, Dr. Albright; I want to ask about
coordination of R&D--first question, within the Department, and
secondly, among departments. It is my understanding that there
are various elements of the Department of Homeland Security
that continue to have their own R&D budgets. TSA, for example,
the Coast Guard, possibly FEMA, IP, perhaps.
I would be interested to know what other elements of the
Department have an R&D budget, and how it is that you or
somebody fits all of those pieces together to make sure that we
are not duplicating and we are doing the right thing.
Mr. Albright. Okay. First, let me make a distinction
between having an R&D budget and having R&D activities.
There are a number of agencies with the Department that
historically conducted research and development activities out
of operations, of support funds, okay; so they are not
identifiably R&D funds. And just the short answer to your
question is, the agencies within DHS that do that--other than
ourselves, of course--are, let's see, TSA, DCP, former Customs
people, INS has a very small 400K budget, Coast Guard, security
services, and IAIP picked up several activities as well when
they were put together; and I believe that is the list, without
having it in front of me.
When we were planning the transition to the new department
last year, the decision was made at the time that we would
leave well enough alone in 2003, we would exert an oversight
function--``we'' being S&T--in 2004, and the idea would be to
integrate these capabilities within S&T in the 2005 time frame,
and that was just a matter of what we thought was the logical
thing, the expedient thing to do at the time.
Secretary Ridge made it clear last summer that he expects
that integration to occur; and as you are probably aware, in
our appropriations language for the 2004 budget, there is a
requirement that we present a combined R&D budget in 2005; and,
in fact, we are due a report to Congress this December 15 on
how we are going to actually do that. So there has been for
some time an activity within our CFO shop that has been looking
at identifying the R&D activities and then working toward some
sort of integration.
Now, there are a couple of caveats I should give you. One,
of course, is the Coast Guard, which does have an R&D activity.
The Homeland Security Act keeps them as an independent entity,
so they would remain that way unless, of course, they
specifically decided that they wanted to divest themselves of
R&D activity and they got statutory relief.
There are other issues, for example, the U.S. secret
Service. There are certain R&D activities they do that it is
not clear that it would make a lot of sense to actually,
literally bring into our budget process. For example, the R&D
on the President's limousine may not make sense.
And so we are looking at all of that, so at least in terms
of the internal piece of this, we expect to have a combined
budget and have everything integrated within S&T, to the degree
it makes sense to do so, certainly within the next couple of
months.
We certainly, as I said, have to have that report to the
Congress in the next couple of months.
Mr. Thornberry. Let me ask--and I understand, for example,
the example you gave of the Secret Service. They have some
unique responsibilities doing their own research in those
areas, and it makes sense, but for example--and that may well
be true with Coast Guard, too. But what is then the
communication between the S&T Directorate and the Coast Guard
for things that may well be overlapping, for example, related
to port security in some way.
Mr. Albright. Okay. What I have in--what I have done
within--as we created the S&T Directorate, as I mentioned in
the beginning, we have these portfolios; and several of these
portfolios are focused on our CBRN missions, so I have, for
example, someone who does bio-chem--I mentioned that earlier--
we have someone who does rad-nuke, and there were experts in
that area.
In order to make sure that we had this kind of
coordination, we also created portfolios at the beginning of
the--when the Department stood up for EP&R, for IA, for IP, and
for BTS, and the person in those portfolios, their job--and we
also have one for the Coast Guard and one for the Secret
Service--their job is to make sure that we understand the R&D
needs associated with those particular entities. It is their
job to work with the user community to make sure that we know
what is going on over there, and that they know what is going
on over here, and frankly, so that we can help them out.
Because, as you know, for a lot of these agencies, their R&D
efforts are sitting in an environment where they are constantly
competing for operations and support dollars, and, therefore,
they have never had the kind of investment in long-range R&D
that, frankly, their missions probably demand that they do
have.
And so what we took on was also the idea and we submitted
this in the President's budget to, in fact, enhance those
activities for Coast Guard, for example, for Secret Service, to
enable them to do some of those things that might be 3 or 4
years out, that maybe we would never have budgeted for. The
people who staff these positions tend to be detailees of the
home organization, so they understand the culture and who to
talk to and that sort of thing.
Mr. Thornberry. That is helpful.
If, at some point, you see an impediment in the statute to
that coordination, I trust you will tell us, because that is
something, obviously, that we are interested in.
Now, let me get to Mr. Etheridge's point: How do you
coordinate with other departments, for example, Agriculture, on
some of these diseases--but there are a lot of others, too.
Some of the information, or estimates, we have is that
homeland security R&D is about one-third of that conducted by
the Federal Government as a whole; so how do you do that and
how is that working at this point?
Mr. Albright. Okay. There are a couple of ways it happens.
The first and the simplest to explain is, there are formal
processes that exist for interagency coordination. The White
House has a couple of activities that do that. One is, the
Office of Science and Technology Policy runs something called
the National Science and Technology Council. It is a Cabinet
level post that actually reports to the President and its
primary job is to, in fact, in a variety of areas, to ensure
coordination, not just in homeland security, of course, but
across the spectrum of science and technology activities in the
Federal Government.
Jack Marburger, over at OSTP, has been extraordinarily
active in the homeland security arena; in fact, he--you know,
before the Department stood up, I think the nearest thing we
had to a homeland security science and technology office was
OSTP; and so he has created several working groups that
formalize this kind of interaction in the homeland security
arena.
I happen--Chuck McQueary actually cochairs that with Mike
Wynne, over in the Pentagon, and they have a number of working
groups which I am heavily involved in. And so there is a formal
structure.
There is also a similar structure within the Homeland
Security Council in a few specific areas, but perhaps more
importantly, there is an informal mechanism, and that is that
we have, for example, MOUs with USDA that are formal.
We have MOUs with HHS that establish working relationships
that are often required by statute; for example, USDA, we have
a statutory relationship that comes about because of the Plum
Island language that was in the bill. The HHS, we clearly have
statutory responsibilities.
We also have responsibilities that are implied with places
like NIST, we created MOUs with them.
There are also informal relationships. I happen to know all
the players, and we make it our business to know each other.
And Chuck McQueary, we spend time every other month over at the
Pentagon; and we have shared with them our plans, they share
with us their plans, and then we try to coordinate in that
manner.
But having said that, can I guarantee there will never be
any duplication? I cannot tell you that.
Mr. Thornberry. But at this stage, you feel pretty good
about the level of coordination, particularly at this stage of
development of the Department and your Directorate?
Mr. Albright. Absolutely.
Mr. Thornberry. All right.
Let me turn to a slightly different question, but I think
one that is very important, and that is the issue of metrics.
How do we measure whether we are improving, or not?
Obviously, this is something that you have to worry about
to run your section of the Department. It is also something we
have to worry about as we try to oversee the work of the
Department, but also evaluate how taxpayer dollars are being
spent.
It seems to me that particularly in the R&D world,
measuring progress is a very difficult thing, so I am very--I
would be very interested in suggestions you have for us and, of
course, your own management on what are the sorts of ways that
we can measure progress and advancement in homeland security
R&D.
Mr. Albright. That is a really interesting question.
Metrics, first of all, applied to the homeland security
enterprise, writ large, are extraordinarily difficult to come
up with. If you look at what our measures of effectiveness are,
they tend to start with the words ``prevent,'' ``protect,'' and
so you are proving a negative in a sense. How do you know that
something hasn't happened? How is that a measure of success?
So it is extraordinarily difficult for homeland security as
a whole; and as you correctly pointed out, research and
development metrics are something the Federal Government has
been wrestling with for a very long time.
There are ways to measure performance that are not
particularly satisfying, but are perhaps better than nothing.
And the first one I would offer up is--in some areas, for
example, we can just count things; so, for example, we can say
that we are going to issue standards, three sets of standards,
standards in three areas by the end of fiscal year 2005, so we
can count how many standards we have done.
The problem with that, of course, is that you start getting
into counting games and what do you mean by a ``count'' and
those sort of things.
I think the more preferred way to do it is to actually show
our detailed program plans to Congress, which I like to do, and
to show you the milestones we expect to achieve, both
programmatic and technical in terms of performance, and when we
expect to achieve them; and then I think we ought to be held
accountable to those milestones. If I tell you we are going to
develop a detector with this kind of performance and this kind
of operation by a certain date and here is the milestone and we
are going to demonstrate it, I think you have every right and
should ask us, Did you, in fact, take it out to the field and
demonstrate it; and what did you find out. And that is sort of
the way you do it, because what that does is, it forces on us a
very disciplined developmental process.
I think it is good for us that we have those kinds of way-
points put in our path; and at the same time, I think it helps
you feel some sense that the dollars that we are spending--
which, after all, for those particular purposes, we are saying
that is why we are spending them in the first place--that, in
fact, some kind of progress is being made.
Mr. Thornberry. I think that is a good point.
I guess the only thing I would say is, I do not want you to
be reluctant to set milestones and goals for fear of what
happens from us if you do not meet them. I mean,
understandably, there are things that happen, particularly in
your line of work, but as long as we have that communication
going back and forth, it seems to me it ought to work. But I
think that is very helpful.
Does the gentleman from North Carolina wish to interject on
this?
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I would.
As it relates to this--and I think it is a great question--
how does the Department determine the distribution of funds
among the various R&D portfolios? And I know that has got to be
difficult, as you are getting--going up and in that line, in
the 2004 Homeland Security Appropriations Act, bio-
countermeasures receive roughly four times the S&T funding as
chemical countermeasures.
Is that because the Department views the bio-threat is four
times as great, or is it based on threat? How do we determine
the threat and the distribution?
Mr. Albright. That is an excellent question, and that is--
it depends on a number of things, and obviously threat is one
of them.
You know, from our perspective, the threat from an anthrax
attack or from a nuclear weapon is far greater than the threat
from other potential things that you could imagine. So threat
clearly determines a portion of our investment.
But the way we operate is--we tend to do bottoms-up
budgeting, so to give you a sense of what the process is, we
look at, first, the threat, and we ask ourselves, you know,
what are the threats that are, you know, for example, easy to
do by the bad guys and yet very catastrophic. That is probably
where you want to put most of your money, okay?
So we tend to sort the threat. And then we ask ourselves,
what are the activities, what are the capabilities we need to
counteract that kind of threat; and we write that down, we
create a strategic plan, and we, in fact, publish that. And
then we ask ourselves, what program do we need to, in fact,
execute that planning guidance, okay?
And that is, then, where the budget comes in and the budget
constraints come in, and we sort from there. So it is a
bottoms-up sort of process, and it is not correct to say that,
for example, the fact that I have four times the amount in bio
that I have in chem, that that is necessarily some reflection
on the relative priorities, although it may be. Partially, that
is true, but it is also driven by what is the right investment
we need to make in each of these areas to achieve some level of
performance.
What you find, for example, is, in some areas, like the bio
area, there has been almost no investment in the things we need
to invest in, while in the chemical area, to use your example,
there has been a lot of investment made by the Defense
Department over time and we are further along.
So that is how it is done, in effect.
Mr. Etheridge. In light of that, the Technical Working
Group has conducted a number of solicitations since 9/11 for
homeland security technology proposals for those solicitations
and especially the ones that were jointly done by DHS.
How many projects have been funded, if you know, and how
many technologies have been fielded?
Mr. Albright. Okay. The answer is, I do not know right now.
There were several thousand proposals that we got.
Mr. Etheridge. If you can just get that to us later, that
will be fine.
Mr. Albright. I will, but I do know the contracts are being
let as vetted we speak.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
And before I forget it, without objection, all members will
have the opportunity to submit written questions to Dr.
Albright, and so we may want to follow up on some of these
things, as well as, of course, present opening statements.
Mr. Thornberry. Let me follow up on that point, because it
is, I think, a matter of interest to all Members of Congress,
because we all have somebody in our district who wants to sell
something. The staff had presented me with what is--as I
understand, is an automated response that vendors are getting
from the Department, which basically says, Go look at the
Federal regulations and come back to us.
I guess I would be interested in your assessment of, number
one, how this interaction with the private sector is going. And
it is a very tough thing, it seems to me, because you could use
all of your 150 people doing nothing but meeting with folks all
day, and there may not be any of those meetings that really
help the country be safer.
The other side of it is, there may be a jewel out there,
and that is part of the risk I know you take; but I would be
interested in how you think that communication, that contact
with the private sector, is going.
I would also be interested--I think it related in TSWG and
how their activities are going. Do you foresee them being a
primary screening mechanism for the indefinite future?
Mr. Albright. Okay. Let me--there are several questions in
there.
Let me start with what our process is in dealing with the
private sector, because that is an important point.
When we first started up the Science and Technology
Directorate, there was no process within the Department at all;
and so, as you recall from the May testimony, Dr. McQueary
actually at that point announced, I believe, the
science.technology e-mail site; and so we stood that up. And
that was the--and that has gotten a lot of press, so we have
got a lot of people sending material into that site.
And what we created was a process at our end for dealing
with that, where we look at the submissions that come into that
site--and they run the gamut, including Nigerian financial
scams--we get it all in there, and we look at the kind of
material we get; and truth be told, some of this--some think
the queries we get there have very little detail associated
with them. There is not much there to do an evaluation. Even if
we had the time to do it, we cannot deal with anything.
So what we do is, we send them back actually a nice letter,
telling them that there is not sufficient information here,
that we will hold the application for what they have sent to
us, and if they want to, you know, provide more detail, we will
be happy--they should look at other samples for what a detailed
solicitation would look like.
And, by the way, everything I am talking about is
unsolicited proposals, okay? If somebody brings something in
that does have sufficient detail, we take them over to TSWG,
okay, because they have this evaluative process in place, these
groups of people who can examine and evaluate these things.
They have several working groups set up. And we will inform the
person who sent that thing to us that that is what we are
doing, we are sending it to TSWG; and furthermore, we have a
process whereby we get back to them in 30 days.
So that is the process we have set up in the Science and
Technology Directorate.
So, of course, what has happened since then is, a lot of
other offices, CIO shop, for example, within DHS, they too are
getting hit by a lot of inquiries from the private sector, and
they have created their own processes. And I guess what I am
hearing from you is that we probably ought to work with those
guys to try to get them the kind of robust process we have
within the S&T Directorate, so that the private sector can feel
they are better engaged.
How are we interacting with the private sector? I think--as
I said, I think we have as good a process as you can have that
balances our ability to get our jobs done while at the same
time scouting and making sure that those gems do not just fall
through the cracks in the pavement.
The--will the TSWG be our continued evaluative group? That
is actually an open question. They may, but you have to
remember, when the TSWG was formed up, it was a DOD-State
entity that included Secret Service, Customs, TSA; and you sort
of look at the list of agencies that comprise the TSWG, and
about 90 percent of them are in the Department of Homeland
Security. So one of the questions we are asking ourselves is
whether or not we just want to go ahead and create, you know,
our own process and, you know, work--synergize with TSWG, but
at the same time not necessarily trouble DOD, for example, and
trouble our working groups with, you know, technologies that
have to do with new tank armor or things like that.
Mr. Thornberry. You may have referred to this earlier, but
have you sent people over to places like DARPA, to see what
they have, what plans they have that may be of interest for the
Department?
Mr. Albright. Well, yes.
Mr. Thornberry. Or are you waiting for them to come and
say, look what we got for you.
Mr. Albright. Well, there has been a little bit of that. I
mean, I came from DARPA, as you know. That was a few years ago.
As a matter of fact, our program managers within HSARPA have
recently departed DARPA, very recently in many cases, so we are
fairly familiar with what goes on over at DARPA.
Our interaction with the Pentagon, though, is through Paul
McHale's office almost exclusively, so to the degree--I would
say there is no formal interaction between us and DARPA, but we
are--again, we are aware of it, but it is all through informal
mechanisms.
Mr. Thornberry. Well, I am a little concerned, in that, for
example, I have been told--and I do not know, and I need to go
ask--that DARPA has done some work on designing a 21st century
airport security system, using primarily off-the-shelf
technology. I do not know if that is true.
I would be interested in it, but there may--not only DARPA,
of course, but the Federal laboratories and other places with
which you are very familiar. Sometimes it is kind of hard to
root around and find some things, but there are some jewels out
there, and I know none of us want them to fall through the
cracks in the pavement.
Mr. Albright. Well, I think if there is a new airport
security system at DARPA, I will definitely look into that,
because that is an area obviously of concern to the Department
and to S&T.
As I said, there are a lot of informal mechanisms we have
for dealing with DARPA in particular. There are a lot of formal
mechanisms as well that deal with the Federal laboratories, and
I think I mentioned those earlier.
We do work through Paul McHale in the Pentagon, and to the
degree they believe the things in DARPA over at Dale Klein's
shop, over at DTRA, for example, they certainly let us know.
To date, there hasn't--I have got--the airport security one
is a new one on me, so--
Mr. Thornberry. I think it is something maybe for both of
us to go check out--
Mr. Albright. Okay.
Mr. Thornberry.--and I hope there is something useful for
us there.
Dr. Albright, I think we continue to have a vote on the
floor. I think, in light of our comings and goings, maybe we
will end here.
Mr. Albright. Okay.
Mr. Thornberry. But I do appreciate your willingness to
provide written answers to further questions that members of
the subcommittee may have, and I am very grateful for all of
the communication which you and your folks have had with
members of the subcommittee staff and members.
In addition to that, I want to thank the Budget Committee
for letting us use their committee room and the staff for
helping us hold this hearing.
Thank you. We will look forward to our continued work
together to try to help the country be safer, okay?
Mr. Albright. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 5:42 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES FOR THE RECORD
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO DR. PENROSE ALBRIGHT FROM THE HONORABLE JIM
TURNER
1. Dr. Albright, you testified that the directorate makes resource
allocations based on an assessment of the threat, and in particular the
potential impact, likelihood of success, and ease of carrying out
different terrorist attacks. What input do you receive from the
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate
in carrying out this assessment? Are you communicating with IAIP
officials to get better tailored analyses?
Response: We are working closely at multiple levels with the IAIP
Directorate to understand threats and vulnerabilities. This is a
particularly strong connection because S&T people and capabilities are
engaged in active support of the assessment functions of the Assistant
Secretary for Information Analysis, particularly with regard to
technical issues surrounding the threat. A joint project with the
Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis is currently underway to
have intelligence community resources at the national laboratories
assess the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities of known
terrorist organizations, and to identify information gaps that can help
prioritize future analysis and information gathering. In another
example, S&T was guided on longer term RDT&E priorities in counter-
Bioterrorism RDT&E by working with IAIP staff in a recent workshop to
determine gaps in counter-BW capabilities.
In addition, regular senior level interactions at the under secretary
and chief of staff level have provided assurance since the Department's
formation that threat and vulnerability related priorities are shared
across DHS directorates.
2. Please provide details on the results of the Broad Agency
Announcements and other solicitations conducted since 9/11 as regards
homeland security and combating terrorism technologies? In particular,
please indicate the number of proposals submitted to the solicitations,
the number of requests from DHS and TSWG for more detailed proposals,
the number of proposals ultimately accepted, the number and amounts of
funds distributed to accepted proposals, and the number and names of
technologies that have been fielded as a result of these processes.
Response: May 14, 2003: The Department and the Technical Support
Working Group (TSWG) issued the first Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) S&T Broad Agency Announcement (BAA), entitled ``Combating
Terrorism Technology Support Office,'' DAAD 05-03-T-0024, closed June
13, 2003. This BAA listed 50 requirements, sought quad-chart
submissions in the first phase, and will down-select to winning
proposals. There were 3,344 quad chart responses received. There were
237 white papers requested from those submitting quad charts. As of 20
November, 2003, 93 white papers have been rejected; 34 have been
reviewed favorably and full proposals requested. The remaining 110 are
still under evaluation. Efforts will be awarded to both private
companies and government laboratories. DHS provided $30M to TSWG for
awards in FY-03 and anticipates that another $30M will be available in
FY-04 for this BAA. These funds are sufficient to fund the proposals
already accepted and those which may be selected as the evaluation
continues.
September 23, 2003: First Research Announcement (RA-03-01) for the
Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) was
issued, entitled ``Detection Systems for Biological and Chemical
Countermeasures Program.'' Its purpose is to develop, field-test, and
transition to commercial production the next generation of biological
and chemical detectors and systems. It addresses two areas in
biological countermeasures and three areas in chemical countermeasures.
The white paper deadline was October 24, 2003, and, by that deadline,
518 white papers were received. They are now entrained in an evaluation
process that is on schedule to conclude by November 21, 2003. Authors
of selected white papers (and other sponsors wishing to submit full
proposals) will be asked to submit full proposals, which will be due
December 19, 2003. Following evaluation of all proposals received,
HSARPA expects to enter negotiations with selected proposers by the end
of January 2004. The total amount of funds committed to this effort
depends entirely on the number and cost of the proposals selected for
execution.
October 3, 2003: The S&T Directorate released a solicitation (HSSCST-
04-R-AR001) requesting white papers and proposals for an aggressive
two-phase Systems Development and Demonstration (SD&D) program for
antimissile devices for commercial aircraft. DHS will investigate
directed infrared countermeasures (DIRCM) and other technologies to
provide protection against man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS).
DHS does not intend for this program to develop new technologies, but
rather to migrate existing technologies to the commercial airline
industry. Twenty-four white papers were received and evaluated. Five
teams have been asked to submit full proposals and each has been given
a date during the week of December 8, 2003 to present their oral
submissions. The Government anticipates selecting at least two teams
for negotiation and award in early January 2004. The total amount of
funds committed to this effort depends entirely on the number and cost
of the proposals selected for execution.
November 13, 2003: HSARPA issued a Small Business Innovation Research
(SBIR) Program Solicitation. The purpose of this solicitation is to
invite small businesses to submit innovative research proposals that
address eight high priority DHS requirements:
New system/ technologies to detect low vapor pressure
chemicals (e.g., Toxic Industrial Chemicals)
Chem-bio sensors employing novel receptor scaffolds
Advanced low cost aerosol collectors for surveillance
sensors and personal monitoring
Computer modeling tool for vulnerability assessment of
US infrastructure
Marine asset tag tracking system
AIS tracking and collision avoidance equipment for
small boats
Ship compartment inspection device
Advanced secure supervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA) and related distributed control systems.
The deadline for receipt of proposals is December 15, 2003. The total
amount of funds committed to this effort depends entirely on the number
and cost of the proposals selected for execution.
November 13, 2003: HSARPA released a Request for Information (RFI) on
Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures System Architectures Analysis
(RNCSAA) Draft Statement of Work for comment (DSWC 04-01). The RFI
lists four tasks:
Develop a framework for evaluating system
architectures
Study systems effectiveness and vulnerability studies
Define and evaluate novel architectures, and
approaches for countermeasures
Identify additional studies to support these tasks.
This RFI will lead directly to a future solicitation based on the
responses to this RFI and related topics.
To date, no technologies resulting from these solicitations have been
fielded.
3. What was the level of interest generated by DHS' solicitation
for comments on the Homeland Security Institute RFP? What do you see as
the impact on the applicant pool of the three-year sunset provision,
and do you have any recommendations for changing that provision? When
will the Department issue a final RFP for the Institute, and when will
a decision be made on awarding a contract? Considering that the
Institute is required to have expertise beyond the jurisdiction of the
S&T Directorate, how will you ensure that the Institute meets the
requirements set forth in the law?
What was the level of interest generated by DHS? solicitation for
comments on the Homeland Security Institute RFP?
Response: The interest from all sectors--not-for-profit organizations,
for-profit companies, universities, consortia, and single
investigators--was high. Approximately 70 responses were received.
What do you see as the impact on the applicant pool of the three-
year sunset provision, and do you have any recommendations for changing
that provision?
Response: Sec 312 of the Act provides for the formation of the Homeland
Security Institute, with the capability for systems analysis, risk
analysis and modeling and simulation, policy analysis, support for
exercises and simulations, and other activities that are traditionally
performed by an FFRDC. These capabilities are in fact enduring needs
for the Department that require specialized and dedicated staff focused
on the broad range of issues confronting homeland security and the
Department. The three year sunset clause, unfortunately, serves to
discourage the acquisition of permanent staff, and the investment in
resources, an organization would need to make to compete for and
conduct such an enterprise. It is worth noting that Sec 305 of the Act
provides also for the establishment of FFRDCs, without the three year
sunset clause. Several of the more qualified potential bidders have
informally indicated that they have no interest in pursuing this
contract if the three-year sunset provision is not removed. They view
it as impractical to ask talented scientists and engineers and other
analysts to pursue an alternative career path that will only last for a
year or two. They also view it as bad business strategy to commit their
own organization's resources (facilities, infrastructure, etc.) for
such a short-lived commitment. In light of this, I would be happy to
work with Congress to (1) remove this sunset provision entirely and
allow the FFRDC to function according to normal laws and regulations
that apply to FFRDCs, or (2) extend the sunset provision to 10 years,
or (3) to put into effect a solution that allows the Department to
overcome the difficulties created by this provision.
When will the Department issue a final RFP for the Institute, and
when will a decision be made on awarding a contract?Sec.
Response: The RFP is scheduled to be released in early December, with a
subsequent award in late spring/early summer.
Considering that the Institute is required to have expertise beyond the
jurisdiction of the S&T Directorate, how will you ensure that the
Institute meets the requirements set forth in the law?
Response: The ultimate sponsor of the Institute is Secretary Ridge and,
therefore, it is viewed as a resource that will be available to the
Department as a whole, although it will be managed by the S&T
Directorate. The core functions--a necessary component of any FFRDC--
have been carefully crafted to ensure capabilities that extend beyond
just science and technology (and meet the legislative requirements).
This will be one of the criteria for evaluating the proposals.
4. The PREPARE Act (H.R. 3158) has a provision that would require
the Directorate to within six months identify first responder equipment
and training standards that don't currently exist, and work with the
standards and first responder communities to complete work on those
standards within a year after that. What are the Department's plans in
this regard?
Response: The S&T Standards Portfolio is working with the emergency
responder organizations--Memorial Institute for Prevention of Terrorism
(MIPT), and National Technology Transfer Center (NTTC), as well as the
InterAgency Board for Equipment Standardization (IAB) which has a co-
chair from the emergency responder community--to identify needs for
standards of the emergency responders. The Standards Portfolio is also
working with the Homeland Security Standards Panel (HSSP), which has
been set up by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), to
coordinate development of homeland security standards among 280
standards development organizations. Work has been initiated with the
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) on radiation
detector standards, with AOAC International on standards for anthrax
detectors, with the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH) on personal protective equipment and with ANSI on
development of a database of homeland security related standards. The
Standards Portfolio is engaged with the principal Departmental elements
involved in training for emergency responders--the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP),
and the Coast Guard--to develop common metrics for curricula for
emergency responder training.
5. The Project Bioshield plan commits NIH with doing the basic
research that is necessary and obligates BioShield funds to purchase
the final product from the private sector. What is the Science and
Technology Directorates role in conducting the middle part of
countermeasure development where research findings are converted to
effective medicines. In light of the Homeland Security Act requirements
that DHS and HHS will collaborate on setting priorities, goals,
objectives, and policies and develop a coordinated strategy for R&D
relating to medical countermeasures for terrorist threats:
How often does Directorate staff meet with NIH officials to discuss
their research and development efforts? Who attends these meetings?
Response: In accordance with Section 302 (4) of the Homeland Security
Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296, the Secretary, acting through the
Under Secretary of Science and Technology, ``shall have the
responsibility for conducting basic and applied research, development,
demonstration, testing, and evaluation activities that are relevant to
any or all elements of the Department, through both intramural and
extramural programs, except that such responsibility does not extend to
human health-related research and development activities.''
Accordingly, the S&T Directorate, in coordination with other DHS
Directorates, identifies biosecurity threats and conducts vulnerability
assessments as a basis for defining medical countermeasure priorities.
The Under Secretary for S&T, or his designees, participates on the
Weapons of Mass Destruction Medical Countermeasures Working Group, co-
chaired by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of
the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency and Response
(OASPHEP) and the Department of Defense, Assistant Secretary, Health
Affairs. Three subgroups focus on Research and Development,
Acquisition, and Requirements. The Assistant Secretary for S&T co-
chairs the Acquisition Subgroup. The working group and subgroups
provide the organizational structure to assure effective inter-agency
coordination in setting medical countermeasure priorities.
In bio, chemical, and radiological defense, NIH have expanded their
R&D effort to include middle and late stage development of medical
products. Is the S+T directorate consulted in these programs? How is
the directorate updated on what specific countermeasures NIH is
actively developing and the progress of that research?
Response: In addition to the formal working groups and subgroups
described in the response to the question above, the Under Secretary
for S&T, or his designees, also participates in monthly risk management
meetings coordinated and chaired by the HHS/OASPHEP. Representatives
from the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIH/
NIAID), the Centers of Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA), as well as DHS/EP&R and S&T are active
participants. Meetings are held currently on the subject of anthrax,
smallpox and Botulinum toxin medical preparedness. These risk
management meetings provide a forum for status reports on the progress
and development of priority medical countermeasures.
How is threat assessment or the needs of first responders, as
determined by DHS, being integrated into prioritization for medical
countermeasures R&D?
Response: The S&T Directorate has chartered and is working very closely
with the HHS, as one of a number of federal organizations, to conduct
of technical threat assessments of current and future biothreat agents
and to develop processes to conduct systematic vulnerability
assessments. The results of periodic threat and vulnerability
assessments will be communicated to the Weapons of Mass Destruction
Medical Countermeasures Working Group and additional agencies as
appropriate.
I understand that Dr. Michael Ascher is the Directorate's senior
medical advisor. What is his role? To whom does he report?
Response: Dr. Michael Ascher was the Senior Medical Advisor for the
Biological Countermeasures Portfolio until his return to California
this summer. Dr. Peter Estacio is in the process of joining us to fill
this role. The Senior Medical Advisor reports directly to the Portfolio
Manager for Biological and Chemical Countermeasures (Dr. John Vitko)
and is responsible for interacting with the biomedical countermeasures
community, assessing the current status and any gaps as they pertain to
overall biodefense, and guiding the Portfolio and DHS S&T activities
appropriately.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO DR. PENROSE ALBRIGHT BY CHAIRMAN THORNBERRY AND
THE HON. ZOE LOFGREN OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Questions from Representative Dunn
1. In your testimony, you explain that the S&T Directorate is
helping the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IA&IP)
Directorate develop the technological ability to map vulnerabilities
within the oil and gas infrastructure in the Southwest states. I am
particularly interested in this issue because of a pipeline explosion
in 1999 that killed three children in my home state of Washington. Is
this mapping going to be done in other regions--in addition to the
Southwest? Have you had success working with the private sector on this
project so far?
Is this mapping going to be done in other regions--in addition to the
Southwest?
Yes. Our Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Decision Support
System (DSS) project supports the IAIP Directorate to understand the
functions and vulnerabilities of all of the nation's 14 critical
infrastructure sectors and key assets as well as the interdependencies
among them. We have developed modeling and simulation capabilities at
the national level as well as at the regional and metropolitan level.
Have you had success working with the private sector on this project so
far?
Yes. The team of Department of Energy (DOE) laboratories that is
developing the CIP-DSS for us has collaborated and worked for years
with most of the major oil and gas associations in addition to numerous
private companies and utilities. The associations include the American
Gas Association (AGA), Interstate Natural Gas Association of America
(INGAA), American Petroleum Institute (API), and the Gas Technology
Institute (GTI). They have also worked with Olympic Pipeline (BP),
Kinder Morgan (an integrated liquids pipeline and storage company),
Conoco, and many of the largest natural gas utilities in the US.
2. I was pleased to read in your prepared statement about how much
the S&T Directorate has achieved--and I am also pleased that you
believe long-term research must be a priority as we move forward. Do
you feel you have the resources you need to carry out your mission on a
day to day basis? Are there specific areas that you would like this
committee to focus in on in the future that have not, in your opinion,
received the attention they deserve?
The Science and Technology Directorate has reviewed its authorized
fiscal year 2004 funding and its proposed fiscal year 2005 funding and
presently believes the current and proposed funding is adequate.
However, we continue to assess our research and development plans. If
we determine that the proposed amount of our funding is not sufficient
to meet requirements, we would bring that information forward for
consideration through the appropriate mechanisms. Additionally, in
order to accurately determine what level of funding is needed for our
research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E) activities, we
will continue to work with other agencies with R&D responsibilities to
identify requirements and gaps in funding. This coordinated approach
will assist in making the right investments while preventing
unnecessary and wasteful duplication.
The Science and Technology Directorate recognizes there are some
technology needs that require immediate attention. However, some
homeland security issues require basic research to solve. Our long-term
portfolio plans will address basic research needs.
3. I have spent a considerable amount of time learning about a
variety of homeland security-related technology being developed by some
of my constituent companies in Washington State and I?m sure most of
the other members of this committee have done the same.
I am wondering how your directorate is working with other
directorates to ensure that the technologies being used for different
functions within the Department are the best we can get, and will be
most effective in waging the war on terror here at home, and will lead
to greater coordination among directorates?
Coordination among directorates is a top priority of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). We have regular senior level management
meetings to identify issues and share information that cross-cuts the
Department. Once a week, a teleconference is held with representatives
from all the components of the Department. This meeting ensures that
personnel from each of the Directorates become familiar with personnel
from the other Directorates to facilitate intradepartmental
communication. In addition, a number of Science and Technology (S&T)
Directorate staff sit on interagency working groups with staff from
other directorates. Within the S&T Directorate, we have portfolio
managers for Border and Transportation Security, Emergency Preparedness
and Response, United States Secret Service and United States Coast
Guard. These portfolio managers serve as liaisons to the other
components of the Department and ensure that we are supporting their
operational needs. The S&T Directorate is also responsible for
developing standards related to technologies that DHS is creating or
applying, and, through this function, the S&T Directorate makes sure
that equipment and technologies are as effective as possible.
What is the best way for a business to bring an idea to the
attention of your office? How are those proposals currently being
evaluated?
The best method is to read carefully DHS solicitations for technology
concepts and ideas that are posted at http://www.fedbizopps.gov and on
the DHS public website, http://www.dhs.gov. DHS is interested in
pursuing technologies posted in these formal, public, competitive
solicitations and has budgeted funds for awards to the most meritorious
submissions.
If a business has an idea or concept that does not addresses a specific
requirement in one of our active solicitations, we invite them to
contact the appropriate Program Manager (PM) within our Homeland
Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) by telephone or e-
mail for an initial discussion of their idea. Contact information for
these managers will be listed on the DHS public website (www.dhs.gov)
shortly. If the proposed idea seems to match a DHS need, the HSARPA PM
will ask them to submit a brief white paper. If after review of the
white paper, the approach still looks good, the Program Manager will
suggest that the business consider submitting a complete proposal. A
brief listing of the HSARPA Program Managers and their contact
information is attached for information.
White papers should contain a top level summary of the concept; a clear
description of the underlying principles and concept of operations; the
current state of development of the key technologies proposed;
identification of critical path technologies and the approach to
ensuring that these will be sufficiently mature to meet development
deadlines; an estimate of the funding level required in each year; a
summary of related technologies and/or systems previously developed by
the proposed team; and a brief description of the qualifications of
principal team members. White papers are typically 5-10 pages in
length.
The address for submitting the information is:
Department of Homeland Security
Attn: Science & Technology Directorate/Program Manager's Name/
Room
Washington D.C. 20528
or, they may be submitted electronically to:
http://[email protected]
If businesses so choose (especially with those applications they think
are nearest term and most useful), they may submit a complete
unsolicited proposal.
Part 15.6 of the Federal Acquisition Regulations, available on-line at
http://www.arnet.gov/far, specifies the few criteria and a nominal
submission format for unsolicited proposals. If this format is
followed, all the required information will be at hand to evaluate the
proposal. These unsolicited proposals should be submitted to the
addresses listed above.
In evaluating responses to published solicitations, the evaluation
criteria are always published in the solicitation. The proposing
business should always read the solicitation carefully and match their
proposal to the content and format requirements.
4. I would like you to expand on the subject of Man Portable Air
Defense System (MANPADS)--you included in your testimony a brief
description of your directorate's R&D program to understand both the
threat posed by man-portable missiles and the technology that is
available to address the threat. What is the department doing to
analyze the threat from other ground-based weapons to the commercial
aviation system--such as non-Infared (IR) guided missiles and propelled
grenades, for example? Is the department taking a systematic and risk-
based approach to create a comprehensive, efficient response to ALL of
these threats?
The Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology
Directorate maintains close coordination with the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) and Department of State (DoS)
representatives to remain abreast of all current and emerging ground-
based threats to commercial aviation. After reviewing intelligence
analyses from agencies such as DIA's Missile and Space Intelligence
Center (MSIC), a systematic, end-to-end countermeasures strategy is
formulated, and a program is implemented to mitigate risks from the
threats. The strategy focuses on three areas. DoS is mitigating risks
from these terrorist threats through proliferation control and threat
reduction. TSA is utilizing tactical measures to address airport
vulnerability, perimeter security and other countermeasures working
with law enforcement agencies. Based on these assessments, the S&T
Directorate identifies the critical threats, analyzes the
susceptibility and vulnerability of civilian aircraft to them, and
formulates technical solutions necessary to counter these threats.
Questions from Representative Weldon
1. The adoption of standards and certification criteria for
training, equipment and protective clothing should be one of the
highest priorities for DHS. The reason for this importance is that
manufacturers are hesitant to invest in the development of new
technologies due to a fear that the government may subsequently find
that they do not meet desired needs or specifications. Furthermore,
public safety agencies are hesitant to acquire new technologies due to
a fear that they will be denied compensation with homeland security
funds. Meanwhile, valuable solutions to homeland security obstacles are
available with no clear vision of when they will be taken advantage of.
For these reasons, the desires of the Department must be made clear in
the form of standards. Can you please explain the Department's plan and
timeframe for the eventual adoption or creation of standards and
certification criteria?
We agree that adoption of standards and certification criteria for
training, equipment and protective clothing for emergency responders is
one of the highest priorities of the Department. The responsibility for
DHS standards is assigned to the Science & Technology Directorate. An
Office of Standards has been set up that reports to the Assistant
Secretary, S&T Directorate, and this office is working with the
emergency responder communities and the private sector consensus
standards development organizations to adopt existing standards that
are appropriate, to identify needs for new standards, and to set up
writing groups of experts drawing on the existing standards efforts at
the Federal, state, and local levels and in the private sector. The S&T
Directorate is working closely with the American National Standards
Institute (ANSI) in support of their Homeland Security Standards Panel.
ANSI is proving to be an effective partner with DHS in identifying
appropriate standards development organizations in different homeland
security technologies. The adoption of existing standards has already
begun and certification criteria for laboratories are being developed
that will leverage existing public and private sector laboratory
accreditation organizations.
2. Many believe that the government should not be the entity that
writes standards. Instead, they favor the government shaping them and
even adopting them, however the actual drafting should be left to the
industry and voluntary consensus process that has worked so well for
first responders for many years. The National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA) is a noticeable leader in the creation of codes for
training and technology, which have been in place for many years. In
addition, the voluntary consensus standard process is an effective and
quick process involving the private industry, agencies, users and code
writers, which is ever evolving and used successfully in the Assistance
to Firefighters Grant Program. Does the Department intend to draft new
standards or does it intend to adopt those already in existence by the
private sector and first responders?
The Department supports use of the Voluntary Consensus Process. The
Department recognizes both the need and the value in developing
voluntary consensus standards as required by the National Technology
Transfer and Advancement Act (PL 104-113). The emergency responder
communities--fire fighters, HAZMAT and EMS teams--must be directly
involved in the standards development process. The Department is
supporting the excellent standards development for fire fighting
equipment and training by the National Fire Protection Association
(NFPA). The S&T Directorate is working with NFPA and the Congressional
Fire Services Caucus to announce five NFPA standards that will be
immediately adopted by DHS for homeland security applications. DHS is
also supporting standards development at the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) as well as research to develop
next generation protective equipment at the North Carolina State
University. Both NFPA and NIOSH will be involved in developing DHS
standards for this next generation of personal protective equipment.
Questions from Representative Gibbons
1. Part of the S&T Directorate's responsibility is to unify and
coordinate much of the federal government's scientific efforts
including national laboratories and academic institutions. While
scientific research in academic settings can be used to thwart attacks
by our enemies, it can also be used by our enemies to attack us, since
much of the information is published openly. In January of this year,
you spoke about ``scientific Openness and National Security.'' One of
the problems you noted in your speech was that the scientific community
has not established any real, unified criteria for the open publication
of sensitive scientific research. You specifically referenced the
public release of a Mouse Pox study and a Polio Virus study and how
those could have harmed our national security. Could you briefly
discuss--- first, how you now view this tradeoff between scientific
openness and national security and--- second, while you have stated
that you believe the federal government should not be setting
limitations on openly published scientific works, I wonder how you
would view a coordinated effort by the National Academies or similar
entity to set the standards.
The tradeoff between scientific openness and national security is, and
will continue to be, a delicate balance for all federal agencies that
support scientific research at our nation's universities and national
laboratories. Similar concerns exist within the private sector. The
Department of Homeland Security remains committed to preserving the
academic freedom and integrity that have made our nation's higher
education system the envy of the world. However, the nation cannot risk
the protection of our homeland under any circumstance, including the
publication of sensitive homeland security information. The balance
between scientific openness and national security can only occur
through open and ongoing communication between the federal entities
that support federally-funded research and development and the
performers. I continue to encourage the scientific community to
establish unified criteria for open publication of sensitive scientific
research and I am committed to engaging with all the scientific
community as we address this issue.
DHS would welcome the continued, thoughtful participation of the
National Academies in formulating guidelines to assist federally-
sponsored research organizations in the determination of how best to
safeguard sensitive homeland security information. The recent National
Academies report, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism,
considered the question of scientific openness and national security in
the realm of biotechnology research. The report is extremely valuable
and had several worthy recommendations, including the need for the
education and involvement of the national and international scientific
societies and associations in this important issue. In addition, the
report recommended that scientific societies that publish research
results establish a system for effective self-monitoring of information
that may be considered sensitive to our national security.
2. You mentioned that the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) and the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency
(HSARPA) have different missions and responsibilities. However, I can
imagine several areas of research that could be mutually beneficial to
both homeland security and defense. Do you believe that HSARPA and
DARPA are in a good position to work together to take full advantage of
each others' work? If so, what is the formal mechanism for this co-
operation?
DARPA and HSARPA are well positioned to work together. They share
mutual interests in technologies related to Homeland Security missions.
For example, they are now collaborating on a $10 million joint
radiological decontamination research effort under the terms of a
formal Memorandum of Agreement signed by both Directors. Some of the
original HSARPA Program Managers are DARPA alumnae and maintain their
professional ties and relationships. The Directors of the two
organizations are in frequent contact and the immediate past Deputy
Director at DARPA is HSARPA's current Deputy Director. At this time,
DHS does not feel the need for a formal agreement to further structure
this close working relationship.
Questions from Representative Langevin
1. I know the University of Rhode Island is putting together a
white paper on its vision of what a DHS Federally Funded Research and
Development Center (FFRDC) should be and how it should be organized.
How will the FFRDCs fit into DHS's overall research framework and
goals? Can you tell us if the Directorate is anywhere near a decision
on what their purpose and goals will be? Since the call for white
papers is ending, when do you anticipate a request for proposals to be
made? Will you ask Congress to increase the authorization period for
this FFRDC (currently only 3 years), especially since it has taken so
long to start the process of establishing it?
The Homeland Security Institute (HIS), a Federally Funded Research and
Development Center, is being established under the authority of Sec.
312 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to provide research, studies,
analyses, analytic and computational models, simulations, and other
technical and analytical support to the Department. The HSI will adopt
an integrated systems approach to evaluating homeland security systems
and technologies at all stages of development, deployment, and use.
A request for proposals was issued on December 3, 2003, with proposals
due on January 28, 2004. The expected award date is May 1, 2004. The
initial award will be $8.5 million in fiscal year 2004 followed by four
additional option years projected at $30 million per year. However,
legislation calls for the HSI to terminate November 2005. Although the
contract will be designed to accommodate work beyond that date, either
legislative authorization (the most desirable approach) or a completely
new FFRDC justification will be needed to extend the operations beyond
November 2005.
2. I recently conducted a survey in my district of local officials
and first responders, asking their opinion on homeland security
concerns. Overwhelmingly, they have said that there is far too little
information being shared by DHS with local officials, and this is
hampering their efforts. I know they aren't alone, and I am sure that
this is a concern every Member shares. What progress has been made on
the information sharing standards that the Directorate was charged with
developing? I know a big part of the concern revolved around security,
so I?m curious to know if the work has been passed to National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), or is it being handled by
DHS? Is there a timeline that is being followed or a deadline for
adoption and implementation?
The Department of Homeland Security believes that this request requires
several responses to understand the Department's initiatives to assist
the first responders regarding access to information, intelligence, and
standards.
DHS has several programs in place to aid in the identification,
selection, and implementation of equipment and technology for first
responders:
Through the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT),
the Department has engaged in a research effort designed to improve
local, state and federal emergency responders' capabilities to deter or
mitigate terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
or explosive/incendiary (CBRNE) devices and emerging threats. This
effort has two major components:
1. The development of the architecture for an automated
knowledgebase that provides responders and planners information
about what technologies are already available, the extent to
which they have been tested, the standards they meet, their
consistency with the Interagency Board's Standardized Equipment
List, and reviews from other responders that have used them.
The Responder Knowledge Base became accessible this fall and
although it has limited information it has been well recived by
the community and new products are being added reqularly.
2. The development of a national technology planning process
that:
Identifies and prioritizes the capabilities emergency
responders need.
Identifies what technologies are required to enable
those capabilities, and characterizes the extent to which these
are already available.
Establishes technology objectives and roadmaps by
which Federal RDT&E investments can be focused towards the
needs of responders.
In addition to the MIPT programs, DHS in response to Section 313 of
Public Law 107-296 of its authorizing language is developing a
technology clearinghouse, the Public Safety and Security Institute for
Technology (PSITEC). The mission of PSITEC is to enhance public safety
and security through the identification, development, and distribution
of integrated technology, programs, and information. PSITEC will serve
as the single point of entry to relevant public safety information such
as:
access to and dissemination of information regarding
commercially available products and innovative technologies
including performance capabilities, training requirements to
implement and sustain the equipment, and the availability of
grant programs to facilitate the acquisition, deployment, and
maintenance of the equipment,
provide support to individuals seeking guidance on how
to pursue proposals to develop or deploy technologies that
would enhance homeland security,
collect information about critical incident response
training programs and develop a searchable data base that will
aid responders in identifying, comparing and selecting the
appropriate training courses, and
development of expert/mentoring systems and
information retrieval and analysis programs to coach first
responders through their online searches of existing databases
for clear and comprehensive information about equipment,
programs, training, and funding.
Information sharing with state and local officials is also a top
priority for the Department. In particular, both our Office of State
and Local Government Coordination (OSLGC) and the IAIP Directorate are
focused primarily on finding ways to improve information sharing.
State and local homeland security officials already have a seat at the
table, and are both providers and recipients of homeland security
information. For example, the Administration's Homeland Security
Advisory Council has a State and Local Senior Advisory Committee and a
First Responder Senior Advisory Committee, which facilitate
communication among states and localities on homeland security issues.
In addition, we regularly form ad hoc state and local advisory groups
to assist in the development and implementation of homeland security
policies. Finally, the Office of State and Local Government
Coordination regularly consults with state and local officials as well
as the major associations that represent them through publications such
as DHS Today, Fact Sheets and Press Releases. Feedback from our state
and local constituency indicates that these improvements are making a
difference.
The OSLGC in conjunction with the rest of DHS has made major strides,
since its creation, to share information with states and localities.
The OSLGC is responsible for sending out homeland security information
bulletins and alerts, including a daily Homeland Security Operations
Morning Brief. The OSLGC also coordinates bi-weekly conference calls
with all of the Homeland Security Advisors in all the states and
territories to help relay important departmental information as well as
respond to queries from the advisors.
Through the coordination of the OSLGC, the Department has paid for and
established secure communication channels to all of our state and
territorial governors and their state emergency operations centers.
This investment in communication equipment included secure video
teleconferencing equipment along with STU/STE telephones. In addition,
we have worked to ensure every governor has been cleared to receive
classified information and are working with the Governors and their
Homeland Security Advisors to provide security clearances for five
additional people who support the Governors? Homeland Security mission.
Finally, OSLGC coordinates resource deployment to state and local
governments, including BioWatch, air assets and radiological detection
pagers, to name just a few.
To address first responder requirements regarding communications
interoperability, SAFECOM serves as the umbrella program within the
federal government to help local, tribal, state, and federal public
safety agencies improve public safety response through more effective
and efficient interoperable wireless communications. To successfully
achieve its vision, SAFECOM is working with existing federal
communications initiatives and key public safety stakeholders to
address the need to develop better technologies and processes for the
cross-jurisdictional and cross-disciplinary coordination of existing
systems and future networks.
SAFECOM is a public safety practitioner driven program, and as such,
solicited information from representatives of public safety from the
local, state, and Federal level in establishing the program's short and
long-term initiatives. Two of the top priority initiatives that this
diverse group emphasized to SAFECOM include 1) the need for an
``information clearinghouse'' to enable two-way communication with
public safety and 2) the development of a process to advance
communications equipment standards. The portal, which is scheduled for
release in the summer of 2004 and which will be accessible at
www.safecomprogram.gov, will provide public safety practitioners with
planning and management applications, collaborative tools, and relevant
and timely wireless information. SAFECOM's activities in terms of
standards will be to identify, test, and, where necessary, develop
standards in coordination with the public safety community and ongoing
standards activities.
Finally, the Department has implemented a standards development
program. Working with the private sector through the American National
Standards Institute (ANSI) and its Homeland Security Standards Panel
(HSSP), DHS is identifying existing standards that can be adapted for
homeland security needs. The HSSP is working to mobilize the resources
of 280 standards-development organizations that develop voluntary
consensus standards for products and processes. The Department is also
working directly with the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) on development of new standards for personal
protective equipment for first responders, as well as standards for
detectors for weapons of mass destruction and information technology
standards for cyber security and for biometrics. To compliment it's
standards development program, DHS plans to implement a standards based
test and evaluation process to ensure that commercially available
equipment performs as intended and meets the operational requirements
of the first responders.
3. From all indications, identification of critical infrastructure
seems to be taking far more time than was anticipated. Does DHS have
sufficient capability to accomplish this task? Are you actively working
on new methodology to enhance and speed-up this process?
Does DHS have sufficient capability to accomplish this task?
Yes, but it is important to put this task into perspective. The
National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical
Infrastructures and Key Assets (Feb 2003) identifies 14 critical
infrastructure sectors and key assets. The National Strategy also
provides a sense of the magnitude of the task of identifying what is
really critical from the following example sites; the United States
has:
1,912,000 Farms
87,000 food-processing plants
1,800 federal water reservoirs
1,600 municipal waste water facilities
5,800 registered hospitals
87,000 emergency services entities
250,000 firms in the Defense Industrial Base
2,000,000,000 miles of telecomm cable
2,800 electric power plants
104 commercial nuclear power plants
300,000 producing oil and natural gas sites
5,000 public airports
120,000 miles of major railroads
590,000 highway bridges
2,000,000 miles of pipelines
500 major urban public transit systems
26,600 FDIC-insured banks and financial institutions
66,000 chemical plants
137,000,000 postal and shipping delivery sites
5,800 historic buildings
80,000 dams
13,300 federal government owned/operated facilities
460 skyscrapers
The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP)
Directorate is working very hard with the infrastructure owners and
operators to identify the most critical sites and reduce their
vulnerabilities. Progress has already been made in identifying
nationally critical assets. For example, for the approximately 590,000
highway bridges, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), the Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA), and the American Association of State Highway
and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) compiled ``short lists'' after
September 11, 2001. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
then used these ``short lists'' as starting points for applying the
criticality model. To date, the criticality model has been applied to
approximately 15% of the nation's transportation infrastructure.
Are you actively working on new methodology to enhance and speed-up
this process?
Yes. Our Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Decision Support
System (DSS) project supports the IAIP Directorate to understand the
functions of all of the nation's 14 critical infrastructure sectors and
key assets as well as the interdependencies among the sectors. We are
developing modeling and simulation capabilities for the analysis of
threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences (risk) at the national level
as well as at the regional and metropolitan level. This capability will
help us more rapidly set risk-based priorities, identify critical
nodes, and understand interdependencies that may change the priorities.
In addition, we have initiated a university-based research and
development center at the University of Southern California that will
help DHS better understand and manage risk and the economic impacts of
our actions and policies.
4. DHS was given broad research capabilities by the Homeland
Security Act, how much are those assets being utilized?
The two most prominent research capabilities granted to HSARPA were the
ability to use Other Transactions Authority for Research and Prototypes
(OTA) to facilitate award of contracts, and the Section 1101
Experimental Personnel Management Program to hire skilled program
managers.
HSARPA's first major solicitation to private industry sought ideas,
concepts and technologies for the next generation of chemical and
biological sensors. As was the explicit intent, HSARPA expects to award
winners of this solicitation using OTA. This powerful tool allows
companies that have never done business with the government before the
opportunity to participate with an absolute minimum of red tape. OTA
will be used to create an appropriately flexible program management
structure tailored to program development needs.
The Section 1101 Experimental Personnel Management Program authority
has been used to hire three program managers and is the preferred
method for a fourth prospect. The authority was essential to recruiting
and hiring these experienced technical program managers. Section 1101
completes the toolkit for HSARPA hiring of program managers. With four
methods available to secure services of qualified and experienced
program managers, (i.e., direct government hire, detail from another
government agency, Inter-Governmental Personnel Act hiring authority
and Section 1101), HSARPA has the flexibility and authority it needs to
hire, retain, and rotate excellent personnel. Under the provisions of
the law, HSARPA is required to report to the Congress annually on its
use and progress using this authority. The first report was submitted
16 October, 2003.
How close is DHS in choosing a National Laboratory to carry on a
good deal of its pure research initiatives? What about the selection of
the University Centers, what is the plan for their selection? What
focuses do you envision them having?
The homeland security capabilities at all the Department of Energy
national laboratories, technology centers, and sites are important and
vital resources to the S&T Directorate. It is essential that the
nation's best and brightest scientific and technological expertise be
engaged in the homeland security mission. The S&T Directorate is
committed to utilizing the extensive capabilities of all DOE national
laboratories to protect the homeland.
We are implementing separate mechanisms to access the capability base
at the DOE national laboratories to guard against organizational
conflicts of interest and inappropriate use of inside information in
responding to competitive private sector solicitations. The S&T
Directorate has designated five national laboratories (Lawrence
Livermore, Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, Pacific Northwest and Sandia) as
intramural laboratories; all other DOE laboratories, sites and
technology centers are designated as extramural laboratories. The DOE
national laboratories designated as intramural labs will help the S&T
Directorate set research goals and requirements and formulate research
and development road maps; this level of engagement gives the
intramural labs unfair advantage, were they able to compete for funding
awarded through open solicitations. All extramural laboratories can
compete for open solicitations from the S&T Directorate..
5. If DHS is focusing far more on near-term projects than long-term
research, shouldn't there be better utilization of the TSWG, focusing
more of DHS' research funding there?
The S&T Directorate does not focus on the concept of near-term and far-
term research as categories; rather, we seek to place the priority
emphasis on meeting the technology requirements of first responders and
DHS operational users in the field. Our work here must be first rate
and get the technology out to the users as rapidly as possible. This
effort involves improvements, modifications, cost reductions, rapid
prototyping and other development work that is innately of shorter
duration. We place a parallel, but necessarily smaller, emphasis on
revolutionary technology and longer term directed research.
Revolutionary technology, if successful, upsets asymmetric advantages
of the terrorists, re-writes technological rules of engagement
substantially in our favor, or provides an individual, breakthrough
capability that creates new, major operational advantages for our
people. Revolutionary research provides opportunities to explore novel
solutions, try multiple technical approaches to a problem, revisit
abandoned techniques in light of new progress in other areas, and is
the only opportunity to ``swing for the fences.'' It is not
``curiosity-based'' research, it is mission-based research, but with
adequate resources and opportunity to conceive new ideas, stretch
existing concepts, and cut new paths toward a solution. These clearly
are the efforts that permit breakthrough capabilities to emerge, and
every dollar spent in this pursuit is worth it.
DHS provided $30 million in fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004 to
the interagency Technology Support Working Group (TSWG) to fund awards
from our first joint Broad Agency Announcement. This Announcement
contained 50 requirements in which both DHS and TSWG had interest.
Because HSARPA Program Managers are members of the TSWG working groups
and the Director of HSARPA sits on the TSWG Executive Committee, we are
closely allied and understand their operations, funding, evaluation
criteria, and management.
However, there continue to be areas where DHS requirements and TSWG
requirements differ substantially. Where our interests coincide, we
will be active funders and participants in the TSWG processes and
solicitations. Where our requirements and theirs diverge, we retain the
ability to solicit and develop precisely what our clients have
requested. Specifically, the requirements for volume commercial
manufacture and application at affordable cost often differ from
requirements typically given TWSG by their sponsoring organizations.
6. What is the status of the HSARPA? If its goal of near-term
projects is similar or identical to TSWG's, why are we funding a
duplication of efforts? How much project money has gone into HSARPA
this year, and how does that compare to TSWG?
HSARPA was established effective March 1, 2003, with the other
components of the S&T Directorate and the Department. It is active and
growing. Congress established HSARPA to ``promote revolutionary changes
in technologies that promote homeland security,'' to advance those
technologies which are ``critical,'' and to ``accelerate the
prototyping and deployment of technologies'' that reduce homeland
vulnerabilities. HSARPA performs these three functions by awarding
procurement contracts, grants, cooperative agreements, or other
transactions for research or prototypes to public or private entities,
businesses, federally funded research and development centers, and
universities. HSARPA is an external funding arm for the Department of
Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate.
TSWG focuses on short-term projects of interest to multiple agencies.
Staff members from HSARPA, other S&T Directorate personnel, and
representatives from other parts of DHS participate in the TSWG
requirements setting process.
However, because TSWG's core funding comes from DoD, and its staff are
DoD personnel or contractors, their requirements list is heavily
weighted with projects of multiple agency interest that are also of DoD
interest. Many topics of interest to DHS do not rank highly in the TSWG
process. In other areas, there may be interagency interest in general,
but a specific requirement of DHS (e.g., cost of ownership, time of
delivery) necessitates that HSARPA create and manage a project to
accomplish that goal. The TSWG process allows DHS to leverage its money
in those areas that are appropriate for interagency work. In other
areas, it is appropriate for HSARPA to compete proposals to satisfy DHS
requirements. A final control on preventing inappropriate duplication
of efforts is that the Director, HSARPA sits on TSWG's Executive
Committee and is thus able to identify and resolve potential areas of
overlap between HSARPA and TSWG.
Using fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004 funds, HSARPA expects to
award contracts exceeding a total value of $300 million to perform and
support its research activities. TSWG receives a core budget from the
Department of Defense of approximately $50M. When member contributions
are included, as well as other participating support from the
Department of Energy and Department of State, TSWG projects that its
annual fiscal year 2004 budget will reach $160M.
Questions from Representative Thornberry
1. The intent of the SAFETY Act is to remove liability and risk
barriers to the deployment of anti-terrorism technologies so such
technologies can be much more widely used to protect our citizens. Even
companies that have obtained some insurance to cover liabilities
associated with their anti-terrorism technologies may be prevented by
liability and risk barriers from obtaining additional insurance and
deploying such technologies as widely as they and potential additional
customers would like. Is it the Department's understanding designation
and certification under the SAFETY Act can be granted to entities that
were able to obtain limited insurance (thus allowing a limited
distribution of their anti-terrorism technology) but whose global
liability exposure prevented that entity from obtaining additional
insurance (thus limiting the distribution of its anti-terrorism
technology to less than all who might benefit from it)?
Yes, it is the Department's understanding that, if all of the criteria
set forth in the Act for Designation and Certification are met by a
Seller's technology, and if the price of the liability insurance can be
shown to be preventing the technology from reaching the appropriate
market, then the ability of a Seller to obtain insurance at the higher
level will not prevent the Department from granting a Designation.
2. How are technical standards being established and enforced
across the Department for cybersecurity, law enforcement or
counterterrorism? Who set the requirements and how are they
communicated to the technology developer or purveyor? Will there be a
test bed(s) established to assure that technologies meet the standards
as claimed?
Technical standards for products, services and systems are being
developed in the Office of Standards in the DHS S&T Directorate. Many
of the 22 agencies that were combined into the new Department have
standards programs for products and services. These included cyber
security requirements for which agencies follow regulations in the
Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA). These component
agencies continue to use Federal Information Processing Standards
(FIPS) as well as National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
guides for computer security (NIST 800 series guides). A common policy
for standards for cyber security is being developed by the S&T
Directorate, the other three directorates, and the office of the Chief
Information Officer In the area of technical standards to support law
enforcement, DHS is focusing on the technology requirements of
emergency responders--including law enforcement personnel--in several
areas including detectors for CBRNE agents, personal protective
equipment, urban search and rescue robotics, and interoperable
communications equipment. Performance specifications are being
developed by consensus committees who include emergency personnel as
well as equipment manufacturers. The Department is also establishing
performance specifications for CBRNE detectors for use by federal,
state and local personnel. Manufacturers are involved in the working
groups to develop these performance standards.
In each of these areas, test beds are being established for Test &
Evaluation (T&E) against the performance specifications developed by
the S&T Office of Standards. T&E protocols are being developed for use
at these test beds. T&E protocols will be provided to both private
sector and federal test beds. Federal test beds are being established
to allow specialized T&E for select agents and for other T&E that must
be conducted in a secure environment.
3. How can the certification process as required by the SAFETY Act
be accomplished when standards have not yet been set for technologies
seeking certification? How will these two processes be integrated? Will
technologies that may be certified, have to be recertified if new
standards substantially affect product acceptability?
The Department will use any existing standards that are directly
relevant to that anti-terrorism technology, as deployed in a mass loss
scenario, to assist in assessing the merit of any technology regarding
SAFETY Act Certification. However, the Department anticipates that many
of the technologies that the nation would most benefit from granting
SAFETY Act protections will be cutting-edge, high-risk, high-benefit
anti-terrorism technologies. Also, the term ``technology'' as used in
the SAFETY Act is extremely broad. It includes not only devices, but
also systems and services. As such, it is unlikely that applicable
standards will yet exist. However, these technologies may address
critical and time-sensitive needs. Therefore, we will be using
additional methods to assess technology performance.
Certification as required by the SAFETY Act relies on the ability of a
technology to meet all of the seven criteria required for Designation,
as well as the additional criteria for Certification. Surrogates for
meeting a standard are interpreted as those Designation criteria set
forth in the Act as:
``Prior US government use or demonstrated substantial
utility and effectiveness,'' and
``Evaluation of scientific studies that can be
feasibly conducted in order to assess the capability of the
technology to substantially reduce risks of harm''
For Certification, a technology also must be shown to:
Perform as intended
Conform to the Seller's specifications, and
Be safe for use as intended
SAFETY Act technical review teams will rely on existing technology
performance tests and analyses provided by the Seller. The teams will
also draw on their own expertise and any similar evaluation information
to evalute the information provided. The Office of Standards within the
S&T Directorate will work with SAFETY Act teams to identify appropriate
standards and Testing and Evaluation capabilities as needs are
identified. As accredited certification laboratoriess are established,
the SAFETY Act Office will direct those Sellers with insufficient
evidence of performance to those labs as one alternative to addressing
the criteria
4. After we make the investment in R&D for new technologies and
follow-on test and evaluation, how is the Directorate going to assure
the technologies are going to be used?
The Science and Technology Directorate will assist industry in getting
their technologies (as long as they meet DHS standards) in front of
operational users, including first responders. However, it is outside
the scope of the S&T Directorate to guarantee that particular
technologies will be selected and procured by operational users.