

Stand 4

American Preparations

Directions: Retrace the route on Russell Avenue back to South Avenue. Turn right on South Avenue and drive approximately 0.6 miles and turn left to enter Hickam Air Force Base through Porter Gate (this gate is usually unmanned and open during normal duty hours). Once through the gate, immediately turn right on Porter Avenue. After .1 mile you will have to go 180 degrees around the water tower and turn onto Julian Avenue. Julian Avenue will turn into Worthington Avenue. Turn right on 1st Street and then turn right on Vickers Avenue. Vickers Avenue will turn to the left where it becomes Fort Kam Road. Take Fort Kam Road and turn right on Harbor Drive. Travel until you see a black seacoast artillery position on the right. Park in the lot behind the battery. This is Battery Hawkins (the Air Force uses the battery for storage).

Orientation: You are standing at Battery Hawkins. Battery Hawkins was named for US Army Brigadier General (BG) Hamilton Smith Hawkins, a West Point graduate (1855) and Commandant of Cadets at West Point (1888-1892). Hawkins took part in the Battle of San Juan Hill (Cuba, 1898), leading the Sixth and Seventh Regiments in the famous charge up the hill. The battery was completed in 1914 and mounted two 3-inch rapid-fire cannons that were meant to cover the minefield guarding the entrance to Pearl Harbor. The entrance to Pearl Harbor is just to your front. Ford Island is to the north.

Description: The Kingdom of Hawaii granted coaling rights to the US Navy in 1887, beginning a long association for the Navy in Hawaii. In 1898 the United States annexed Hawaii, and it became a US territory in 1900. The United States used the Honolulu Harbor until 1912, when Pearl Harbor was opened as a major forward operating base.

As the Navy started using Pearl Harbor as a major base, the US Army began stationing troops in Hawaii to defend the port. The first contingent of troops was small; some infantry with field artillery and engineers were assigned at Schofield Barracks. As the Navy presence grew, the Army's requirement for defensive organization concurrently grew. The Army established a board of officers to determine requirements, and it recommended a significant array of coastal artillery positions for defending Pearl Harbor and other important facilities in Hawaii. By 1915 the Army had established Fort Ruger, Fort Kamehameha, Fort Armstrong, and Fort DeRussey as facilities to house coastal artillery positions. In all the Army constructed 15 batteries, housing 54 guns (14-inch and 12-inch guns, 12-inch mortars,

and smaller rapid-fire weapons like the 3-inch guns at Battery Hawkins as shown in figure 56). The Army also set up mine defenses for the Pearl Harbor entrance by constructing mine wharfs, casemates, and warehouses at Fort Armstrong.

The 1920s saw a drastic increase in the Army's presence in Hawaii. In 1921 the Army organized the Hawaiian Division, consisting of two brigades of two infantry regiments, three field artillery regiments, an engineer regiment, a tank company, and assorted support troops. The division consisted of 13,000 men, with a requirement for expansion to 20,000 during wartime. The Hawaiian National Guard was reorganized at this time and allotted two infantry regiments, the 298th and 299th (900 men each in peacetime but would expand to 3,000 each in wartime).



National Archives

Figure 56. Battery Hawkins, early 1920s.

As the mobile defenses improved, so did the coastal defenses. In 1921 two mobile regiments, the 41st Coast Artillery Regiment (Railway) and the 55th Coast Artillery (Towed), arrived in Hawaii. The 41st moved its weapons (originally 12-inch mortars but later changed to 8-inch guns) around on railcars on the Oahu Railroad and Land Company's lines and provided 360-degree coastal defense for Oahu. The 55th was armed with 155mm mobile guns pulled by Caterpillar tractors. The 14 existing fixed coast defense batteries were organized into the 15th and 16th Coast Artillery Regiments (Harbor Defense) in 1924. With the advent of the airplane as a major weapon, the arrival in 1921 of the 64th Coast Artillery Regiment (Antiaircraft [AA]) and its 28 3-inch AA guns marked a milestone in Hawaii's defense. In 1925, to provide improved command and control, all of the coast artillery regiments were brigaded under the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade.

The next major change for Army ground units came in 1940 when the 251st Coast Artillery Regiment (California National Guard) arrived with 20 mobile 3-inch AA guns to supplement the island's air defense. Additionally, in July 1941 the 97th and 98th Coast Artillery Regiments (AA) were organized on Oahu and armed with 20 3-inch AA guns each. Hawaii now had four AA regiments, so the 53d Coast Artillery Brigade (AA) was organized to provide them with command and control.

By 1941 the coast artillery of Hawaii had grown to eight regiments—four coastal defense and four AA. To improve command and control, the Hawaiian Department added the Hawaiian Seacoast Defense Command as a "brigade" headquarters for the coastal defenses and converted the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade to the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command, commanded by Major General (MG) Henry T. Burgin.

Also in 1941 the ground force organization changed. The Hawaiian Division was broken up and converted into the 24th and 25th Divisions. Each division had two active duty regiments and a "round out" regiment from the Hawaiian National Guard. With the change in organization came a change in mission. The 24th Infantry Division (-) would defend the northern half of Oahu, and the 25th Infantry Division (-) would defend the southern half of the island, including critical site security (Pearl Harbor oil tanks, Honolulu water and electric plants, etc.). The 298th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division, was responsible for defending Koko Head, and the 299th Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division, would defend Maui, the Island of Hawaii, Kauai, and Molokai.




Figure 57.




Figure 58.

The Army Air Forces became a member of the military organization of Hawaii in 1917 when the 6th Aero Squadron arrived. For the next 23 years, the air corps expanded as aircraft became more prevalent and as




Figure 59.

assets became more available. In August 1919 the 5th Composite Group—consisting of an observation squadron, two pursuit squadrons, and two bombardment squadrons—was organized on Oahu at Wheeler Army Airfield (AAF). In 1927 the air corps increased its pursuit squadrons to five and created the 18th Pursuit Group. In 1931 the 5th and 18th Groups were combined and formed the 18th Composite Wing (which later would be redesignated the 18th Bombardment Wing). In November 1940 the air corps significantly increased its capability by adding the 15th Pursuit Group, 11th Bombardment Group, and 14th Pursuit Wing (composed of the 15th and 18th Pursuit Groups). To provide overall command and control for all air corps elements, the Hawaiian Air Force was organized on 2 November 1940. It consisted of the 14th Pursuit Wing (Wheeler AAF/18th Air Base Group) and the 18th Bombardment Wing (at the newly constructed Hickam AAF/17th Air Base Group).

In December 1941 the US Army had 42,857 men assigned to the Hawaiian Department, commanded by LTG Walter C. Short. The Army's mission was to defend the Pearl Harbor Naval Base (and the fleet berthed there), the City of Honolulu and its harbor, and other installations. The Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command was at or near full strength. The Hawaiian Seacoast Defense Command had more than 100 guns in 33 fixed battery positions, the men were well trained, and ammunition was stored at the batteries. The 53d Coast Artillery Brigade had two regiments at half strength and two at full strength, they were short equipment (they had 86 of

98 3-inch guns, 20 of 120 37mm guns, and 113 of 246 .50-caliber machine guns), and only the 64th Coast Artillery Regiment had ammunition at its battery locations (the assumption was there would be enough notice of an attack to issue ammunition). The two infantry divisions were at about 85 to 90 percent of their authorized strength, but many of the junior enlisted personnel were recent draftees while many of the junior officers were activated reservists who recently arrived from CONUS. The Army Air Forces were near authorized personnel strength and had 152 pursuit aircraft (99 modern P-40s and 53 P-36/26s) and 45 bombers (12 modern B-17s and 33 obsolete B-18s) based at three airfields with a few auxiliary airfields used only for training. Ammunition was not readily available when they were parked at their home fields.

(The staff ride leader may want to move to the edge of the water in front of the battery to discuss naval preparations.)

The Navy had used Pearl Harbor as a forward operating base since 1912, but it did not assign capital ships there until 1939 when the Hawaiian Detachment, consisting of an aircraft carrier, eight cruisers, and 16 destroyers, was based there. The Pacific Fleet was home ported on the west coast (its main base was San Diego) until May 1940, when after completing naval maneuvers, President Roosevelt ordered the Pacific Fleet to remain at Pearl Harbor as a deterrent to Japanese expansion. The facilities at Pearl Harbor were inadequate and required extensive improvement and expansion to service the fleet. Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Commander, Pacific Fleet, constantly requested reinforcing ships to increase the size and capability of his forward-deployed fleet. Instead, Washington determined that the Atlantic (where the Navy was supporting the convoy effort) was the main effort and ordered Kimmel to send 25 percent of his fleet to the Atlantic—the carrier *Yorktown*; the battleships *Mississippi*, *Idaho*, and *New Mexico*; four cruisers; 17 destroyers; and some auxiliary and supply ships. By December 1941 the Pacific Fleet consisted of three aircraft carriers (one of which was on the west coast undergoing overhaul), nine battleships (one of which was on the west coast undergoing overhaul), 22 cruisers, 53 destroyers, 69 submarines, and 78 PBY aircraft.

The Pacific Fleet's mission was to conduct decisive naval combat operations against an enemy fleet, and as such, it spent most its time at sea training for this mission. In port, ships only took basic self-security measures because naval responsibility for defense fell on the 14th Naval District (Task Force 4), commanded by Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch. Bloch had a difficult mission because he had no major assets assigned to him for this mission. He had to “borrow” ships to defend the harbor and PBYs for

reconnaissance. Any ship defending the harbor was not preparing for war, and the PBYs were the fleet's long-range aerial reconnaissance asset that had few flying hours available for harbor security. In December 1941 the Pacific Fleet was a well-manned, well-trained naval force prepared for maritime combat. When in port the ships were not immediately prepared to engage in combat.

The US Marine Corps had a small complement of troops and equipment on Oahu. Ewa Field was home to Marine Air Group 21, consisting of VMB-232, VMJ-252, VMF-211 (Rear Echelon), and VMB-231 (Rear Echelon). The marines had 10 fighters, 29 bombers, and eight other aircraft at Ewa on 7 December. A complement of 652 marines were assigned at Pearl Harbor in the 1st Defense Battalion (-), 2d Engineer Battalion, 3d Defense Battalion, and 4th Defense Battalion. These marines had four 5-inch AA guns, eight 3-inch AA guns, 20 .50-caliber machine guns, and 16 .30-caliber machine guns. Additionally, 16 ships—eight battleships, two heavy cruisers, four light cruisers and two auxiliaries—had Marine Corps detachments embarked. In December 1941 the marine ground elements were well trained and prepared for combat with ammunition readily available. The Marine Corps aircraft had well-trained pilots but did not have ammunition readily available for the planes.

Vignette: Both Kimmel and Short were concerned about having enough assets to defend Pearl Harbor. In May 1941 Kimmel wrote the CNO:

The defense of the Fleet base at Pearl Harbor is a matter of considerable concern. We should continue to bring pressure to bear on the Army to get more antiaircraft guns, airplanes, and RADAR equipment to Hawaii and to insure [sic] priority for this over Continental and expanding Army needs.

The naval forces available to Commandant are meager to the point of nonexistence. A Fleet base is a place of rest, recreation, and resustinance and must afford protection of the Fleet at anchor and during entrance and egress independent of the units of the Fleet. If units of a fleet must be employed for its own defense, in its base, its freedom of action for offensive operations is seriously curtailed—possibly to the point where it is tied to the base by the necessities for defense of that base. (*IPHA*, part 22, 364).

Teaching point 1. Combat readiness. Does any US military unit have

enough equipment, personnel, training, or money to be completely prepared for war?

The staff ride leader should have the students discuss things that prevent their military units from being 100-percent combat ready. Some of these issues (not a comprehensive list) are training time; personnel shortages; training distracters; training assets, such as fuel, ammunition, and training areas; and equipment shortages. Once you determine that a unit is rarely 100-percent combat ready, lead the group to discuss what units can do to mitigate the dilemma.

Teaching point 2. Preparedness. Most of the units in Hawaii on 7 December 1941 did not have ammunition readily available, believing there would be enough notice to issue ammunition. Does this problem exist today?

The staff ride leader can have the students discuss how really ready their units are today to engage in combat immediately. Did any military unit have the ability to defend on 11 September? Have them talk about where their wartime ammunition is and how long it would take to have their asset (ship, airplane, tank, soldier, marine) ready to respond to a threat. Once this is determined, ask them if in this time of possible surprise terrorist attack this practice is wise. Another possible issue to explore is why we do not have ammunition readily available (safety, ammunition maintenance, accountability).

Stand 5

“Joint” Defenses

Directions: Retrace your route back on Harbor Drive. Turn left on Fort Kam Road. Travel a short distance and turn left on Seaman Avenue. Turn into the dirt parking lot on the left just after the turn. Park and walk to the large battery. This is Battery Hasbrouck.

Orientation: You are standing at Battery Hasbrouck. Battery Hasbrouck was named for BG Henry C. Hasbrouck, West Point class of 1860, who as an artillery officer, served in the Civil War and the Modoc War. The battery was completed in 1914. It housed eight 12-inch M1908 mortars that were housed four to a pit (you can see the steel base rings embedded in the concrete). These breech-loading seacoast mortars could fire a 700-pound projectile 15,200 yards. The entrance to Pearl Harbor is in front of the battery (to the south), and Ford Island is to the north.

Description: General Marshall wrote LTG Short with guidance when Short assumed command of the Hawaiian Department: “The fullest protection of the Fleet is *the* rather than *a* major consideration for us, there can be little question about that. . . . Please keep in mind in all of your negotiations that our mission is to protect the base and the Naval concentrations, and that purpose should be made clearly apparent to Admiral Kimmel.” Marshall had clearly communicated Short’s mission and Short understood. It is important to remember that the first common link in the chain of command between Kimmel and Short was President Roosevelt. Kimmel



National Archives

Figure 60. Battery Hasbrouck, early 1920s.

and Short would have to work out any joint plan as a “gentleman’s agreement.”

Twelve days after assuming command, Short wrote to Marshall to explain his first impressions of the Hawaiian Department. He described his meetings with Kimmel and Bloch and provided a positive impression about the ability to work jointly. Short went on to detail his eight priorities for Hawaii’s defense; cooperation with the Navy was number one on the list. Short understood his mission and was working to improve Army-Navy cooperation and the defense of Hawaii.

Air Corps Commander MG Frederick L. Martin and Commander, Patrol Wing 2 (Task Force 9, etc.) Rear Admiral Patrick Bellinger developed the first joint agreement between the Navy and Army. Published on 31 March 1941, the Martin-Bellinger Report, as it has come to be known, described their estimate of the Japanese threat to Hawaii. Prophetically, they wrote in the Possible Enemy Action paragraph:

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
2. A surprise attack on Oahu including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.
3. A combination of these two.

(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred mile.

* * * * *

(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start.

To prevent the Japanese surprise attack that they described, Martin and Bellinger, cognizant of the shortage of long-range reconnaissance aircraft, described the action open to them: “Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable

measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits.”

The report went on to detail how the two branches would locate and attack any fleet (using both Navy and Army long-range aircraft under Navy control) and defend against any air attack using all fighters on the island—Army, Navy, and Marine Corps under Army control. Additionally, the aviators detailed an aircraft readiness system that identified percentages of aircraft prepared for combat and a time limit for launching the aircraft.

On 11 April 1941 Short and Bloch (acting for Kimmel) published the most comprehensive joint plan for defending Hawaii, the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (JCFDP). This gentleman’s agreement between the Army and Navy detailed the delimitation of areas, established a Joint Planning Committee to continue joint planning, listed tasks for each service, required each service to write supporting defensive plans, and obligated further agreements on allocating supplies and services. The plan’s joint task was “to hold Oahu as a main outlying naval base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.” The Army was tasked “to hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land, and air forces and against hostile sympathizers; to support the naval forces.” The Army had 16 requirements to accomplish the task (defending Oahu, bomber support for naval aircraft in major offensive sea operations, etc.), including establishing an Aircraft Warning Service (AWS).

In the plan the Navy was tasked “to patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support Army forces.” The 16 requirements spelled out how the Navy would accomplish its task; the most important was “distant reconnaissance.” The Army had only 12 aircraft capable of conducting long-distance patrols, and the Navy had 72 PBYS, so the Navy assumed responsibility for distant reconnaissance.

The two services now had good joint plans for defending Pearl Harbor and the other critical installations in Hawaii. They delineated responsibilities, attempted to overcome shortages and weaknesses of the other service, and tried to use the particular strengths of each service. However, the plans had two flaws—their success depended on advance notice and good intelligence.

In October and November 1941 the Navy and Army discussed establishing a joint headquarters for both commanders, but Kimmel thought the disadvantages outweighed the advantages and decided not to collocate. However, the services did create the Joint Harbor Control Post, which had elements from the Coast Artillery, Air Corps, Fleet Air Arm, Submarine

Force, and the Naval District to command and control the water around the port. The commanders thought this facility could accomplish the same thing as a joint headquarters.

Part of the JCFDP called for the Army to establish the AWS, a service consisting of radar stations, observation posts, and an air-warning center for command and control. By December 1941 the Army had six SCR-270 mobile radar stations and three SCR-271 fixed radar sites. Locations had been found and coordinated for the six mobile locations, and they were operational in December 1941. The three fixed sets lacked some equipment, and no terrain was coordinated for their emplacement. Some of the locations selected were on US Park Service property, and the War Department was having difficulty getting Interior Department permission to emplace the radars on their property because they would be an eyesore.

The radar sets were under the Army Signal Corps' control, much to the chagrin of the Air Corps, which thought the radars should be under its control. The radar operators had gone to sea with Navy ships equipped with radar to learn how the radar worked and to train on the systems, which were similar to the ground stations. All of the radars and observation posts were connected by telephone to the Air Warning Center at Fort Shafter. There plotters marked the flight paths of located targets so the center's director, with assistance from Navy and Air Corps liaisons, could determine




Figure 61.

if the planes were friendly or an enemy. If the planes were enemy or undetermined, the director could ask the pursuit liaison to launch aircraft.

To maximize the radar's potential, the Hawaiian Department decided to create the Interceptor Command based on a model the British were using. BG Howard C. Davidson, Commander, 14th Pursuit Wing, would command the Interceptor Command. The command would consist of AWS (under Air Corps control), the 14th Pursuit Wing, the 53d Coast Artillery Brigade (AA) (with control of Marine Corps AA), and a liaison section from the Navy to control Navy and Marine Corps fighters. The key for the Interceptor Command was the Air Warning Center at Fort Shafter, where aircraft were tracked and determined to be an enemy or a friend. If determined to be an enemy, the director could launch fighters (Army, Navy, or Marine Corps) and coordinate AA protection. During a joint exercise on 12 November 1941, US Navy aircraft launched from a carrier 80 miles from Oahu were seen by the radars, and within 6 minutes, fighters were launched and intercepted the "aggressors" 30 miles from Oahu. The Army and Navy now had tested a reliable system for defending Oahu from the air and planned to activate the Interceptor Command in late December 1941.

Vignette: Shortly after assuming command, Short wrote of his impressions of the Navy commanders and his thoughts on jointness: "Since assuming command, I have had two conferences with Admiral Kimmel and two with Admiral Bloch. I have found them both most approachable and cooperative in every way. I have told them that from my point of view there will be no hair splitting, but that the one thing that would affect any decision where there is an apparent conflict between the Army and the Navy in the use of facilities would be the question of what could produce the greatest combined effort of the two forces. They have assured me that they will take exactly the same view. From my brief intercourse with them I feel that our relations should be extremely cordial." (*IPHA*, part 24, 1,835.)

Teaching point 1. Joint command. Did Kimmel and Short have an effective joint command?

The staff ride leader should have the students discuss the joint command structure's effectiveness and weaknesses. Items to consider during the discussion include the command arrangement (there was no formal joint command and no joint doctrine), colocating the commanders (Did the two have to be together, or could they communicate via phone?), and delineating tasks. (All like task units such as bombers, fighters, and AA

units worked for a single commander.) Once the students have discussed this, ask them if today, with factors like Goldwater-Nichols, we are better at being joint. Items to consider here include sharing assets (How much do the marines like to “share” their aircraft with the air component commander and the Army like to “share” Patriot missiles?), communications (How well do the individual service’s communications interface with the others?), cultural difference, and doctrinal differences.

Teaching point 2. Dependence on early warning. Were the joint plans too dependent on having enough early warning?

The staff ride leader can have the students discuss how dependent the JCFDP (of which the Martin-Bellinger Report became an annex) was on having early warning. It was a good plan, but to be effective, the United States had to conduct reconnaissance in a 360-degree fan around the island. Due to assets, this was impractical. When the discussion on the JCFDP wanes, ask the students if today’s planners are too dependent on having “enough notice.” Ask them if the assumptions in today’s plans allow for a “buildup” phase or time to get ready (condition setting). Ask the students if transformation (units of action, composite wings, etc.) is the answer.

Stand 6

Preparedness and Early Warning

Directions: Drive back up Seaman Avenue and turn left on Fort Kam Road. After a short distance, pull into the parking lot on the left (you can see Pearl Harbor inlet from the road). Park and walk to the water.

Orientation: Standing at the entrance to Pearl Harbor. Every ship entering or departing the harbor has to pass through here. Pearl Harbor anchorage is to the north. Fort Kamehameha is to the southeast.

Description: The Army and Navy each had a system of alerts that numbered 1 through 3. Unfortunately, the Army's system had 1 as the most minor alert, and 3 was full alert. The Navy did the opposite; 3 was the minor alert, and 1 was full alert. This difference was not known to either service and would lead to problems later in the year.

Throughout 1941 the US forces in Hawaii spent their time training and standing alerts to defend the island, based on warnings from Washington. Various levels of joint exercises were conducted on 26 February, 3-5 March, 24 March, 19 May, 12-24 May, 13 October, 27 October, 10 November, and 12 November. All through the year, alerts were called that required the services to exhibit different levels of preparedness and curtailed training. The first alert of the year was on 3 March, and the next was conducted 25-30 July.

On 26 November the Japanese government rejected a US proposal that would have calmed the situation between the two nations. Washington decided that war was closer than ever and on 27 November sent warnings out to all subordinate commanders around the world. Kimmel received his message that started with, "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning." The message went on to detail how negotiations had broken down and that Japan would strike somewhere within the next few days (the Philippines, Thai Peninsula, Kra Peninsula, and Borneo were mentioned in the message). It ordered the naval commanders to "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out tasks assigned in [Navy war plans]." Kimmel pondered the message but assumed the message meant the Japanese would attack somewhere other than Pearl Harbor. To continue his training regimen, his only action was to authorize the depth charging of any submerged submarine detected around Oahu.

Short also received a warning from the War Department informing him that negotiations with Japan had terminated and that hostile action could occur at any moment. He was told that the United States desired Japan


to make the first overt act but that this should not restrict his defensive preparations. He was told to take measures to prepare, but not to alarm, the civilian populace and to report the actions he had taken. The Navy had told Short that the Japanese carriers were in home waters, and he knew that Japan did not have aircraft with sufficient range to reach Hawaii from any of the Mandate Islands, so he determined that sabotage was his greatest danger. He therefore ordered alert 1, which called for protection against sabotage. Each coastal battery, AA position, and key facility was guarded 24 hours a day, and aircraft were lined up wingtip to wingtip for easier guarding. If Short had selected alert 2 or 3, he would have had to issue ammunition to all of his positions, and he was sure this action would alarm the civilian population, a direct violation of his orders.

Once he decided on alert 1, Short sent a message to the War Department, "RURD [Reference your radiogram] 472 report department alerted to prevent sabotage liaison with Navy." The next day, 28 November, Short received a reply from Army Adjutant General MG Emory S. Adams: "critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities . . . initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide protection of your establishments, property, and equipment against sabotage." As a precaution, Short also ordered the AWS to be in full operation from 0400-0700 everyday. (It was also in operation from 0700-1100 and 1200-1600 Monday through Friday for training.) Short informed Kimmel that he had gone to alert 1, but Kimmel thought alert 1 was the highest alert.

After Kimmel gave his antisubmarine instructions, reports of suspected submarines were so numerous that the sightings became routine. Additionally, a few ships even dropped depth charges on suspected sightings. From 27 November until 7 December the Navy inshore patrol maintained vigilance while the Army defended against saboteurs.

Early on the morning of 7 December, five Japanese fleet submarines launched the midget submarines they had carried from Japan. Concurrently, minesweepers *Condor* and *Crossbill* were sweeping the entrance of Pearl Harbor for any mines (Japanese submarines were able to plant mines). At 0342 *Condor's* crewmembers spotted a periscope in the restricted area just outside the entrance to Pearl Harbor and blinked a message to the USS *Ward*, the destroyer on inshore patrol. Lieutenant William W. Outerbridge had just assumed command of the *Ward* two days prior, but he did not hesitate to take his ship to general quarters and hunt for the submarine. Outerbridge searched for the submarine for the next 38 minutes but gave up and secured from general quarters at 0453.

At 0630 the USS *Antares*, a supply ship, was entering Pearl Harbor with a lighter in tow when its captain noticed a conning tower of a semi-submerged submarine following them. *Ward* was again notified and went to general quarters at 0640. Outerbridge maneuvered his old four-stack destroyer within 50 meters of the submarine and opened fire with 4-inch guns. The second shot hit the submarine where the conning tower joined the hull of the submarine. *Ward* immediately dropped a full pattern of depth charges on the sinking submarine. A PBY on patrol also dropped depth charges on the target. Outerbridge immediately reported to the Naval District watch officer: "We have attacked, fired upon, and dropped depth charges upon submarine operating in defensive sea area." The report worked its way up the chain until it reached Kimmel, who also received a report from Patrol Wing 2, reporting their attack on the submarine. Kimmel was not certain this was a real attack because of all the reports of submarines earlier in the week, but he ordered the ready-duty destroyer to the area. The Navy never informed the Army of the sighting.



Naval Historical Center

Figure 62. USS *Ward*.

The AWS had gone into operation at 0400, 7 December and was scheduled to shut down at 0700. At the Opana Radar Station, Private Joseph Lockard had been instructing Private George Elliot on operating the radar. When the two learned that their transportation would be late, Lockard decided to keep the station operating to continue training. At 0702 Elliot observed a large formation of airplanes approaching Oahu from the north (the first Japanese attack wave), which puzzled the two soldiers as they discussed what to do.

Finally, Lockard and Elliot decided to call the Air Warning Center at Fort Shafter. The operator at the center told Elliot that everyone had already departed but then noticed Lieutenant Kermit Tyler, the pursuit




Figure 63. Radar track from Opana Radar Site, 7 December 1941.

officer who had been on duty that morning. Elliot explained that his station was tracking the biggest sighting they had ever seen and gave Tyler all of the pertinent information. A friend had told Tyler that a flight of 12 B-17 bombers was scheduled to arrive from the north that morning (Opana was

in fact tracking them, too), so he told Elliot not to worry about the sighting. Elliot and Tyler continued to track the Japanese planes approaching Oahu for the next 19 minutes, and with the Japanese planes 20 miles away, the men shut down at 0739 when their transportation arrived. Tyler did not inform anyone of the report, so the Navy did not know of the sighting.

At 0740 Commander Fuchida, the Japanese air commander, ordered his planes that were approaching Oahu “undetected” to form into attack formations.

Vignette: Lieutenant Tyler was on duty at the Air Warning Center for only the second time on 7 December and was only there as the center’s pursuit officer, not as director or aircraft controller. While being questioned for the Roberts Commission (an investigative commission convened after the attack), Tyler reflected on the moment: “Well, perhaps I should have done something. I don’t know, but it seemed to me that there was still nothing irregular, that they probably might be friendly craft. So I thought about it for a moment and said, ‘Well don’t worry about it,’ and went back awaiting the hour and time until the next relief.” (*IPHA*, part 22, 221.)

Teaching point. Reporting. With two very significant events occurring before the attack, why were the Army and Navy surprised?

There are many approaches the staff ride leader can use for this discussion. One approach is to discuss “crying wolf.” Ask the students how natural it is to not say anything because you are afraid people will think you are crying wolf. Ask the students how you can prepare and train your soldiers/sailors/airmen/marines to report anything that they think is suspicious. Are we better at this today? Read the students the following transcript between the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) headquarters (HQ) and one of its command centers (CC) on 11 September 2001 at 0949. They are discussing United Flight 93 that ultimately crashed in Pennsylvania at 1003 (this is after two planes had hit the World Trade Center and one had hit the Pentagon):

FAA HQ: They’re pulling Jeff away to go talk about United 93.

CC: Uh, do we want to think, uh, about scrambling aircraft?

FAA HQ: Oh, God, I don’t know.

CC: Uh, that’s a decision somebody’s gonna have to make probably in the next 10 minutes.

FAA HQ: Uh, ya know everybody just left the room.

Another approach is talking about information sharing. Query the students: “The Navy had one piece of information and the Army had another. If one commander had both pieces of information, would he have been better prepared for the attack?”

Stand 7

Japanese Air Superiority

Directions: Leave the parking lot and turn left on Fort Kam Road. When the road bends to the right, it becomes Vickers Avenue. Take Vickers Avenue for approximately 0.8 mile until you see a large white building—Pacific Air Force (PACAF) HQ—on the right. Parking is difficult at this location. First, attempt to park in the parking lot before reaching the building (west of the building). You may have to drive past it, turn left onto Atterbury Circle, and park by the 15th Air Base Wing HQ. Once you are parked, walk to PACAF HQ and conduct the stand in the grass by the building (there are numerous locations on the building where damage from 7 December is still visible).

Orientation: We are now going to transition to the attack on Pearl Harbor itself. It is important that we look at the results of when we fail. This building is home to the PACAF HQ. In December 1941 it was the Hale Makai (“House by the Sea” in Hawaiian) Barracks. Completed on 30 September 1941 (but troops had been occupying parts of it since January 1940), the barracks housed 3,200 soldiers and was the largest barracks in the Army. Besides housing 3,200 soldiers, it had a large mess hall in the center that the troop wings all connected to, two barbershops, a dispensary, a tailor shop, a laundry, and a PX shoppette.

Description: At 0530, 7 December 1941 the Japanese 1st Air Fleet was 230 miles north of Oahu when the cruisers *Tone* and *Chickuma* launched seaplanes for reconnaissance missions. One airplane was tasked to observe Pearl Harbor while the other was to see if there were any ships in the Lahaina Bay anchorage, which the Pacific Fleet sometimes used. The aircraft over Lahaina Bay reported it was empty; the Pearl Harbor aircraft reported nine battleships, a heavy cruiser, and six light cruisers in the harbor. Its pilot also provided a weather report of the area (the winds were 14 meters from the east, and the ceiling was 1,700 meters with 70-percent cover).

At 0600 the Japanese started launching their first-wave airplanes, of which 183 of the planned 189 successfully launched. Japanese Air Commander Fuchida formed his aircraft with the high-level bombers leading at 9,800 feet, the dive bombers to their left at 11,000 feet, the torpedo bombers to the right at 9,200 feet, and the fighters dispersed throughout. As soon as the first wave was gone, the Japanese fleet continued sailing to the south while the second-wave aircraft were brought up from the hangar decks to prepare for launch. At 0715 167 of the planned 171 planes for the second



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Figure 64. Japanese planes prepare for takeoff, 7 December 1941.

wave took off for Oahu. A total of 350 Japanese planes would attack US ships and facilities.

The Japanese had many contingency plans for the attack, including plans for complete surprise and plans if they were detected. If they achieved surprise, the slow and vulnerable torpedo planes would lead the attack, but if surprise was lost, the dive bombers would lead so the American AA gunners would be firing high into the sky when the torpedo planes approached. At 0740 Fuchida determined that the Japanese had achieved complete surprise and fired a single signal flare to indicate that. All of the planes moved into position except one group of fighters. Fuchida assumed that group had not seen the flare, so he fired another one. Seeing the second flare, the dive bombers assumed that the Japanese had not achieved surprise and they were to lead the attack. The torpedo planes did not see the second flare and still assumed that they would lead the attack. After months of planning, the plan was unraveling because of a simple signal error.

The 40 torpedo bombers with fighter escort broke off from the formation north of Oahu to fly down the western side of the Waianae Range, where they divided into two groups. One group would attack from the northeast, and one would attack from the southeast. Twenty-five dive bombers with fighters departed the formation to attack Wheeler AAF from two directions. Twenty-six dive bombers with fighter escort would attack Hickam AAF and Pearl Harbor NAS. With Fuchida in the lead, the 49



Figure 66. Wheeler AAF under attack, 7 December.

badly damaging 26 aircraft in short time.

The aircraft of the 18th Bombardment Wing at Hickam were, for the most part, parked wing to wing when the Japanese arrived at 0800. Seventeen Val dive bombers and eight Zero fighters attacked the vulnerable aircraft, the hangars, and the barracks, killing 25 men in the barracks mess hall. Hickam was in flames when the Japanese planes departed. In short time the Japanese had crippled the American air capability and ensured that enemy aircraft would not hinder the planes tasked to attack Pearl Harbor.

Vignette: The Japanese caught the Americans “flat-footed” on the morning of 7 December. There are many accounts of service members being initially shocked by the attack but quickly overcoming it to do their duty. MG Frederick L. Martin, Commander, Hawaiian Air Force remembered his reaction to the attack: “This was about—this bombing was occurring probably less than a mile from my position. I saw the red circle on the wing tip of this airplane as it pulled out, and I knew it was Japanese. I rushed back to the telephone, called General Davidson, who was in charge of the intercept command, to tell him to get his pursuit ships in the air just as fast as he could, and he said they were being attacked at the same time and that they were struggling to get their ships in position so they could get them off.” (*IPHA*, part 22, 194.)

Teaching point. Air superiority. Ninety-four of 183 planes of the first wave were dedicated to the air superiority role. Did the Japanese dedicate too many assets to this mission?

Air superiority always makes for a good discussion, and the staff ride leader can take full advantage of this while leading the discussion by being the “devil’s advocate.” If students say the air superiority mission was key, remind them that the extensive fuel tank farm on Pearl Harbor was never attacked and ask if 51 dive bombers could have caused that key installation any damage. If they say the Japanese dedicated too many assets to air superiority, remind them that only 14 American planes got into the air that day, but they shot down 11 Japanese planes. Once this discussion fades, ask them if air superiority is the most important operation today. Compare and contrast using aircraft in support of ground forces versus using the planes to gain and maintain air superiority. Again, being the devil’s advocate will work for this part of the discussion.

Stand 8

Japanese Torpedo Attack

Directions: Travel west on Boquet Boulevard. Turn right on Moore Street and immediately turn right on Julian Avenue. Go 180 degrees around the water tower and go northeast on Porter Avenue. Enter Pearl Harbor through the Porter Avenue gate and turn right on South Avenue. After 1 mile, at the stop sign, bear to the left on North Street. After 0.4 mile, turn right on Makalapa Road and exit Pearl Harbor. Turn left on State Route 99 (Kamehameha Highway), drive 1.2 miles, and turn left to enter Ford Island on Ford Island Boulevard. You will have to stop at the security gate (just like when you entered Pearl Harbor the first time). From the security checkpoint, drive 1.1 miles and turn right on Saratoga Boulevard. Drive 0.5 mile and park in the lot by the water. Dismount and move to the monument with the flagpole.

Orientation: Standing at the USS *Utah* memorial. On 7 December the USS *Utah* was berthed here, a space often occupied by aircraft carriers. The USS *Utah* was a Florida-class battleship commissioned in 1911 that saw service at Vera Cruz, Mexico in 1914 and in the Atlantic during World War I. Due to the limits of the Washington Naval Treaty, it was converted to a radio-controlled target ship in 1931. The Navy also used the *Utah* as an AA training ship by adding the requisite guns/machine guns and instructors.



Figure 67. Pearl Harbor at 0757, 7 December 1941.



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Figure 68. Torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor. A geyser rises from the USS *West Virginia* after it has been hit by a torpedo. The USS *Utah* and USS *Raleigh* have also been hit.

On 7 December the *Utah* was moored here at berth F-11. The USS *Raleigh*, a light cruiser, was moored in front of it, and the USS *Tangier*, a seaplane tender, was moored aft of it. Across Ford Island to the east was Battleship Row where all of the battleships moored.

Description: At 0757, 7 December 1941 the Japanese began their attack on the ships in the harbor. Sixteen “Kate” torpedo planes approached the west side of Ford Island where aircraft carriers usually moored when in port. Despite warning not to waste their torpedoes on small or noncombatant ships, two planes’ torpedoes slammed into the USS *Utah*, and one torpedo hit the USS *Raleigh*. In 13 short minutes, the *Utah* capsized, trapping 58 sailors who are still entombed to this day. The USS *Raleigh* started to list heavily and was in great danger of rolling over, but Herculean efforts by the crew and other sailors saved it from overturning. Some of the Japanese torpedo pilots attacking from the west realized these were poor targets and flew over Ford Island to attack ships on the other side. One torpedo the Japanese dropped passed under the minelayer USS *Oglala* and hit the USS *Helena*, a light cruiser. The concussion from the explosion on the *Helena* holed the *Oglala*, and it capsized at 1000.

While the attack was going on to the west, 24 Kate torpedo bombers approached Battleship Row from the east. Using Southeast Loch as a

guide (described by someone as a “bowling alley leading right to Battleship Row”), the planes approached Battleship Row where the USS *Oklahoma* and USS *West Virginia* were centered in their windshields. Within 5 minutes, five torpedoes had opened the port side of the *Oklahoma*, and it began to roll over. Soon, “Abandon ship!” was ordered, and the sailors tried to escape as the *Oklahoma* continued to roll over, only stopping when its superstructure stuck in the mud. The *Oklahoma* lost 429 men that day. Seven torpedoes in rapid succession hit the *West Virginia*, and only the counterflooding the captain ordered saved it from the same fate as the *Oklahoma*. It settled to the bottom with the deck barely awash with 106 of the crew killed, including the captain, Mervyn Bennion, who earned the Medal of Honor. Subsequent torpedo pilots sought other targets to hit, and two torpedoes hit the USS *California*. Prepared for an inspection the next day, all of its hatches were open, so the ship quickly flooded and eventually sank with her deck awash, 98 of the crew perishing. One of the last planes slammed a torpedo into the USS *Nevada*, causing damage but not a fatal blow.

Forty torpedo planes attacked that morning and hit with 19 torpedoes—48-percent hit rate—sinking battleships *Oklahoma*, *West Virginia*, and *California*. Torpedoes sank the target ship *Utah* and minelayer *Oglala*, and the cruisers *Raleigh* and *Helena* were badly damaged. Five of the 40 torpedo planes were shot down and 10 were damaged.

Vignette: Commander Jesse Kenworthy, Jr. was the executive officer of the USS *Oklahoma* and the senior officer aboard (the captain was ashore on authorized pass). In his official report, he recalled how quickly his ship was doomed:

As I attempted to get to the Conning tower over the decks slippery with oil and water, I felt the shock of another very heavy explosion on the port side. By this time the ship was listing from 25 to 35 degrees and was continuing to list further. It was now obvious that the ship was going to continue to roll over and I climbed over the boat deck toward the starboard side. Men were beginning to come up from below through hatches and gun ports and from them it was learned that the ship was filling with water in many spaces below. As I reached the starboard side, I met Lieutenant Commander Hobby, the First Lieutenant, and with him concluded that the ship was fast becoming untenable and that an effort should be made to save as many men as possible. The word was passed for all hands

to abandon ship, and the men were directed to leave over the starboard side and to walk and climb over the ship's side and onto the bottom as it rolled over. At about this time another heavy explosion was felt on the port side and the ship began to roll over rapidly. The men went over the starboard side, climbing over the side and bottom and many went into the water to swim to the *Maryland*. (Enclosure E to CINCPAC action report, Serial 0479, 15 February 1942, World War II Action Reports, Modern Military Branch, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.)

Teaching point. Persistence. Why was the Japanese torpedo attack so incredibly successful?

The staff ride leader can let the students discuss this as they see fit, but one area should be emphasized. Fuchida knew there was a problem with using torpedoes at Pearl Harbor, but he solved the problem from the bottom up by gathering the best torpedo plane crews and giving them the latitude to solve the problem the way they saw fit. Let the students discuss this, and ask them how the US military solves difficult problems today. Ask them if it solves problems from the bottom up or from the top down.

Stand 9

Japanese High-Level Attack

Directions: Retrace your route back on Saratoga Boulevard. At the traffic circle, go 180 degrees around and continue on Saratoga Boulevard to the yield sign. Continue straight and park in the parking lot. Dismount the vehicle and walk to the water.

Orientation: The mooring pylon to the front is where the USS *Tennessee* was tied up on 7 December. The USS *Arizona* Memorial rests over the middle of the *Arizona*, and the white buoy marks the front of the ship. Southeast Loch is directly to your front. The rest of the battleships were moored to the south.


Description: As the torpedo planes ravaged the Pacific Fleet, Fuchida personally led the high-level bombers from the southwest toward Battleship Row. The high-level bombers were in 10 triangle groups of five planes each (one group only had four planes because one high-level bomber aborted on takeoff), and each group had a battleship as its target. As established during training, the planes were flying at 11,000 feet, and when the experienced lead aircraft dropped its bomb, the entire group released its 1,750-pound bombs. Fuchida had briefed his high-level pilots to go around for a second pass if their target was obscured, and some groups had to make two or more passes. Fuchida led the first group toward his target, the USS *Nevada*, but it was obscured and they went around.

The next three groups and the sixth group dropped their bombs on the *Tennessee* and *West Virginia*. Two bombs hit the *Tennessee*, but the bombs had a low-order detonation. The first bomb hit turret 2 and rendered all three guns inoperable, and the second bomb penetrated turret 3 and damaged one of the guns. Two bombs also hit the sinking *West Virginia* but did not explode. The first bomb pierced turret 3 but did no damage. The second bomb penetrated the deck and was later found on the second deck. The fifth and ninth groups aimed their bombs for the *Arizona*. Two bombs hit the USS *Vestal*, a repair ship tied off next to the *Arizona*. One bomb penetrated three decks and exploded, causing fires and flooding. The second bomb passed completely through the ship without exploding and caused more flooding. Four bombs hit the *Arizona*. One bomb hit turret 4, and two more bombs hit the aft portion of the deck. A fourth bomb hit the deck near turret 2 and passed through two decks before exploding. The explosion punctured an oil tank and caused an intense fire that ignited a small powder magazine (1,000 pounds of propellant used to launch the ship's observation aircraft), causing the 14-inch and 5-inch



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Figure 69. Battleship Row as seen from a Japanese high-level bomber.




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Figure 70. The USS *Arizona* exploding after being hit by a high-level bomb.

magazines to explode. Ninety-nine tons of powder was in those magazines, and when they exploded they demolished the ship's bow. Along with Rear Admiral Isaac Kidd, commander of Battleship Division One, and Captain Franklin Van Valkenburgh, 1,177 of the *Arizona*'s 1,700-man crew were killed.

The seventh, eighth, and Fucida's groups dropped their bombs on the USS *Maryland*, which was hit by two bombs that only had low-level detonations. One of the small explosions however, caused extensive flooding. The last group was tasked to bomb the USS *California*, but smoke from the furiously burning *Arizona* blanketed Battleship Row, and all of the bombs missed their targets. Twelve of 49 bombs from the high-level bombers hit their targets (a 24-percent hit rate), and in six of those hits, the bombs malfunctioned. However, one bomb found a "lucky" spot, destroyed a battleship, and killed more than 1,000 men. None of the high-level bombers was shot down, but eight were damaged.

Vignette: Lieutenant Commander Samuel G. Fuqua, Damage Control Officer of the USS *Arizona*, was the senior surviving crew member. He was awarded the Medal of Honor for his coolness, leadership, and concern for his sailors on 7 December. He remembered 7 December:



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Figure 71. Battleship Row after the first wave; the USS *Arizona* is burning, and the USS *Oklahoma* has capsized.

I glanced up. I saw a bomb dropping which appeared to me was going to land on me or close by. The next thing I remember I came to on deck in a position about six feet aft of the starboard gangway. I got to my feet and looked around to see what it was that had knocked me down. Then I saw I was lying about six feet from a bomb hole in the deck. . . . I would judge about 8:15 or 8:20 I saw a tremendous mass of flames, the height of 300 feet, rise in the air forward, and shook the ship aft as if it would fall apart like a pack of cards. . . . Being that the ship was no longer in fighting condition, I ordered the remaining people in the after turrets to abandon ship . . . at about 0845, I made a thorough search of the after part of the ship, which was accessible, for wounded and injured personnel. . . . I finally left the ship myself at 0915, and proceeded to the receiving barracks at Pearl Harbor to report in.

Fuqua returned to the *Arizona* two days later after the fires were out and continued the story: "We found the admiral's body on the boat deck, or we found a body which I believe to be the admiral's body on the boat deck, just at the foot of the flag bridge ladder. The captain's body was never found. However, the captain's ring and some coat buttons were found on the flag bridge." Rear Admiral Kidd and Captain Van Valkenburgh were also awarded the Medal of Honor. (*IPHA*, part 23, 634-36.)

Teaching point. Dealing with disaster. How did Lieutenant Commander Fuqua, after being knocked unconscious by a bomb and seeing his ship destroyed and most of the crew killed or horribly wounded, remain calm, provide leadership, and take care of his sailors?



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Figure 72.
Lieutenant Commander Samuel G. Fuqua.

Fuqua was an inspiration to all who saw him that day; men commented on how his coolness inspired them and how they listened to his every instruction, even in the chaos that was the USS *Arizona*. His ship had blown up around him and was burning furiously; dead lay everywhere and horribly burned and wounded men begged for assistance. Many men's lives were saved because of his actions that day. On 11 September there were numerous instances of Americans dealing with disaster and trying to bring order from chaos (Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld went to the site of the Pentagon attack and assisted with casualty evacuation). The staff ride leader should have the students discuss how today's military "makes" leaders who can remain calm in the worst possible scenario and continue to provide leadership to ensure that critical tasks and missions are accomplished.

Stand 10

Japanese Second Wave

Directions: Retrace your route back to the traffic circle and drive $\frac{3}{4}$ of the way around. Drive southwest on Ford Island Boulevard. After 0.8 miles (when the road starts to bear to the right), turn left into the large parking lot and park at the water's edge.

Orientation: Standing at the southern part of Ford Island. The sea-plane ramp and base were just to the southwest where the modern building on the edge of the water now stands. The flagpole and monument across the water are on Hospital Point and mark the USS *Nevada* Memorial. The dry dock where the USS *Pennsylvania*, USS *Downes*, and USS *Cassin* were berthed on 7 December is due east across the loch (there will probably be ships in the dry dock when you are there).

Description: At 0829 the aircraft of the first wave formed up and started back for their carriers, but Fuchida remained to observe the second wave. As he waited, he took stock of the first wave's attack. He had complete control of the air, the *Arizona* was furiously burning, the *Oklahoma* and *Utah* were capsized, the *West Virginia* and *California* were badly damaged and sinking, and some other smaller ships were damaged. Fuchida had only had eight planes go down, but 52 were damaged. At 0840 Fuchida spotted the second wave arriving.

Lieutenant Commander Shigekazu Shimazaki led the second wave, and at 0854 he ordered the attack. The plan for the second wave was considerably different from the first wave. There were no torpedo bombers in the second wave because the planners considered their use too risky without the element of surprise. The dive bombers and high-level bombers changed missions; the high-level bombers attacked the airfields, and the dive bombers attacked the ships in Pearl Harbor. For the second wave, the Japanese had 54 Kate high-level bombers armed with two 550-pound bombs (some had combinations of 550 pound and 132 pound bombs), 78 Val dive bombers armed with a 550-pound bomb, and 35 Zero fighters.

The aircraft of the second wave started their attack by hitting the airfields again. Nine Kates and 18 Zeros attacked Kaneohe at 0900, and when they departed, 33 of the 36 assigned PBYs were destroyed or badly damaged (three PBYs were on patrol during the attack). Nine of the Zeros attacked Bellows Field when they were finished at Kaneohe and destroyed 10 of the 21 planes there. The other nine Zeros headed to strafe Wheeler, but the Army Air Forces had planes in the air now, and six P-40s jumped




Figure 73. Second-wave plan.

the Zeros heading for Wheeler, destroying four of them and dispersing the rest. Twenty-seven Kates and 18 Zeros attacked Hickam AAF during the second wave, and when they departed, 18 aircraft were destroyed and many more were damaged. Many of the facilities at Hickam were destroyed and damaged. Ewa Field was not a specific target for the second wave but was the location where the Japanese airplanes would rendezvous before heading back to the carriers. Many planes, while waiting for the others, strafed the field, and 33 of the 51 assigned aircraft were destroyed or seriously damaged. Nine Kates continued the attack on Ford Island NAS, and by the end of the day, 26 of the 35 assigned PBVs were destroyed or damaged, as well as many of the hangars and other facilities.

At 0900 the Val dive bombers arrived over Pearl Harbor and started to attack ships. Near misses near the cruisers *St Louis* and *Honolulu*, the destroyers *Cummings* and *Helm*, and the repair ship *Regal* caused different degrees of damage to these ships. In Dry Dock 1, the USS *Pennsylvania* was berthed aft of destroyers USS *Cassin* and USS *Downes*. One bomb hit the *Pennsylvania*, causing minor damage and killing 15 men, but that was the only damage that ship suffered. The *Cassin* was hit twice and the *Downes* was hit once (these may have been bombs aimed at the *Pennsylvania*), which started massive fires. In an effort to extinguish the fires, the dry dock was flooded, causing the *Cassin* to fall over onto the *Downes* and destroying both ships.

The USS *Raleigh* was trying to prevent capsizing from the torpedo hits sustained during the first wave when a dive bomber hit it during the second wave, causing serious damage. A Val was shot down after releasing its bomb at the USS *Curtiss*, a seaplane tender. Both the bomb and the plane hit the *Curtiss* and caused extensive damage. The USS *Shaw*, a destroyer in floating Dry Dock 2, was hit by three bombs, starting an immense fire. The fire ignited the forward magazine, blowing off the bow of the ship and causing a massive explosion that was seen all over Pearl Harbor. Miraculously, the *Shaw* did not sink.



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Figure 74. The USS *Cassin* resting on the USS *Downes* after the attack. The USS *Pennsylvania* is in the foreground.



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Figure 75. The USS *Shaw* explodes on 7 December.

In port, ships kept one boiler lit to provide power for electricity for the ship. The USS *Nevada* was switching boilers the morning of 7 December, and by 0850 it had enough power from the two boilers to get under way. It backed out of its berth aft of the blazing *Arizona* and dashed to get out of the harbor to search for the Japanese fleet. The Japanese dive bomber pilots spotted the *Nevada* and concentrated their attack on it, hoping to sink it in the harbor's channel so the harbor would be blocked. Five bombs crashed into the *Nevada*, causing fires and extensive damage. Fearful of it sinking, the Naval District ordered the *Nevada* to beach itself at Hospital Point. Against the protests of the crew that wanted to find the Japanese, the *Nevada* beached just after 0900 (at the spot marked by the flag across the water).



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Figure 76. The USS *Nevada* on fire and trying to head to sea.
Picture taken just north of where you are standing.

At 1000 the second wave formed up and headed back to the carriers. The second wave was not nearly as successful as the first wave, destroying only three destroyers and damaging some other ships. The Japanese had lost six Zeros and 14 Vals and had 16 Kates, 41 Vals, and eight Zeros damaged. When Fuchida landed on his carrier, he debriefed his commanders and tallied the attack. He believed he had sunk five battleships and damaged four more, and he also thought he had destroyed or seriously damaged three cruisers and four destroyers. He did not know specifically how many aircraft his crews had destroyed, but he knew he had control of the skies. He had lost five Kates, 15 Vals, and nine Zeros, and 34 Kates, 58 Vals, and 19 Zeros were damaged.

With reports in hand, Fuchida went to see Commander Minoru Genda, the 1st Air Fleet Air Staff Officer, and Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, the commander. He presented his information and recommended another attack on Pearl Harbor's ships and facilities. Once his briefing was complete, he was dismissed, and Genda and Nagumo considered another strike. Genda recommended staying in the area and launching another strike in the morning, using the night to plan and repair aircraft. However, Nagumo was concerned for his fleet. He remembered what happened during the exercise in September when US planes located his carriers and "sank" one because he lingered in the area. He also did not know the location of the American carriers and was concerned that some of his fleet's smaller ships were low on fuel. Additionally, Nagumo had accomplished his mission, and not one of his ships had suffered a scratch. Nagumo made his decision; he ordered the fleet to set sail for home.

Vignette: On 31 December Rear Admiral Patrick Bellinger, Commander, Patrol Wing 2 (Task Force 9, et al.), expressed his surprise that the Japanese did not return for another attack: "I talked to Admiral Kimmel on the telephone on Sunday about noon, I think, and I said to him then I expected another attack at any time . . . they would refuel and come back; and as they didn't do that—I don't know why because they had a great opportunity." (*IPHA*, part 22, 584.)

Admiral Kimmel gave his assessment of what would have happened if the Japanese had destroyed the fleet's oil tanks and facilities: "if there had not been a ship in port, they could have done serious damage, and if they destroyed the oil which was all above ground at the time and which could have been destroyed, it would have forced the withdrawal of the fleet to the coast because there wasn't any oil anywhere else out there to keep the fleet operating . . . if they had destroyed the base and the facilities in the base and destroyed the oil there it might have been even worse than it was." (*IPHA*, part 6, 2,812.)

Teaching point. Culmination. Did Nagumo miss an opportunity for a decisive victory by not attacking a third time, or did he accomplish his mission?

Again, this is an opportunity in which the staff ride leader can play "devil's advocate." Let the students discuss this for a little while, and if the group is leaning toward Nagumo striking again, remind them:

- The fleet's destroyers and cruisers were very low on fuel.
- One hundred eleven (111) airplanes had been damaged.
- The mission was accomplished; the US Pacific Fleet was crippled for six months.

If the group says Nagumo was right for leaving, remind them:

- Japan had air superiority.
- The fuel tanks and facilities were large area targets that required minimal planning.
- The chance to locate and sink a US carrier was there, and Nagumo had six carriers.

Stand 11

Aftermath

Directions: The staff ride leader has numerous options on where to conduct this stand (the USS *Arizona* Memorial or USS *Missouri* Memorial). The Park Service “may” allow a special trip for military groups (you have to be in uniform) to the USS *Arizona* Memorial at the end of the day, but it must be coordinated well in advance. The Navy also allows military groups to go to the memorial during nonvisiting hours, but this must be coordinated with the Navy well in advance, too.

To get to the USS *Arizona* Memorial, return to Ford Island Boulevard, drive northeast, and leave the island over the bridge. At the traffic light, turn right onto Highway 99 (Kamehameha Highway). At the next light, turn right and park (parking is very crowded here). Conduct the stand down by the water before entering the USS *Arizona* Memorial Visitor’s Center where there is a museum, bookstore, and the entrance to where you get on the boat to visit the USS *Arizona* Memorial.

To get to the USS *Missouri* Memorial, return to Ford Island Boulevard and drive northeast. At the traffic circle, go 90 degrees and turn onto Saratoga Boulevard. Follow Saratoga Boulevard and the signs to the USS *Missouri*. There is an entrance fee but there is a military discount. You can conduct the stand on the ship at any place overlooking Pearl Harbor or at the Surrender Plaque on board.

Orientation: If conducted at the water at the USS *Arizona* Memorial Visitor’s Center: Standing at the USS *Arizona* Memorial Visitor’s Center. The USS *Arizona* Memorial is across the water on Battleship Row on Ford Island. The Navy yard where the USS *Pennsylvania*, USS *Shaw*, etc., were berthed is to the southwest.

If conducted on the USS *Missouri* overlooking Pearl Harbor: Standing on the deck of the USS *Missouri*. The USS *Arizona* Memorial is just northeast. The Navy yard where the USS *Pennsylvania*, USS *Shaw*, etc., were berthed is to the southeast. Ford Island is to the west. Hospital Point is to the south.

Description: The US Pacific Fleet was devastated by the Japanese attack. Four battleships were sunk—the *Arizona*, *Oklahoma*, *West Virginia*, and *California*—three battleships were damaged—the *Nevada*, *Maryland*, and *Tennessee*—four other ships were sunk—the *Utah*, *Cassin*, *Downes*, and *Oglala*—and nine others were damaged—the *Honolulu*, *Helena*, *St Louis*, *Raleigh*, *Vestal*, *Curtiss*, *Shaw*, *Cummings*, and *Helm*. Additionally,

other ships, like the *Pennsylvania*, suffered minor damage, and some facilities (Floating Dry Dock 2 and Dry Dock 1) were destroyed or badly damaged. The Army Air Forces lost 165 aircraft and their airfields were a shambles. More than 2,400 servicemen died that day, and another 1,178 were wounded. The civilians of Oahu also suffered casualties; 68 were killed and 35 were wounded. Foretelling 11 September, the Honolulu Fire Department responded to the fires on Hickam AAF; three civilian firefighters were killed in the raid and six were injured.

The services immediately started cleaning up from the attack, and the primary priority became generating combat power for any eventuality. The Navy immediately started repairing its ships. The *Pennsylvania*, *Tennessee*, and *Maryland* were quickly repaired and returned to the fleet on 20 December 1941. The *Nevada* was refloated and entered Dry Dock 2 on 12 February 1942 where repairs were made so it could sail to the West Coast. It departed Pearl Harbor on 15 March 1942 for Puget Sound Naval Station where it was completely repaired and modernized. The *Nevada* rejoined the fleet in December 1942 and participated in the Aleutians Campaign, the Normandy invasion, the invasion of Southern France, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa.

The *West Virginia* was raised on 17 May 1942 and moved to Dry Dock 1 where temporary repairs were made. It took almost 1 year to make enough temporary repairs for it to sail to the West Coast, but it departed under its own power in April 1943 for Puget Sound where it was fixed and modernized. On 4 July 1944 the *West Virginia* returned to the fleet and participated in numerous campaigns in the Pacific. It was present in Tokyo Bay on 2 September 1945 when the Japanese surrendered. The *California* was raised on 24 March 1942 and entered Dry Dock 2 for repairs. It departed Pearl Harbor for Puget Sound on 10 October 1942 and was returned to the fleet in September 1943. It earned seven battle stars in the Pacific during the war.

The *Shaw*, whose entire bow had been blown off, was fitted with a temporary bow, sailed to the West Coast, and returned to the fleet in October 1943. The *Cassin* and *Downes* were destroyed, but serviceable equipment and machinery were removed from the ships and placed in newly constructed destroyers with the same names, so the *Cassin* and *Downes* “returned” to the fleet. The *Raleigh*, *Honolulu*, *Helena*, *St Louis*, *Vestal*, *Curtiss*, *Oglala*, *Cummings*, and *Helm* were all repaired and returned to the fleet.

Only three ships that were in Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 never

returned to the fleet. The *Oklahoma* was a total loss, and in March 1943 the Navy used 21 electric winches on Ford Island to right her. It was decommissioned on 1 September 1944 and sold for scrap for \$46,000. On 17 May 1947, while being towed to the West Coast, the *Oklahoma* sank during a storm 500 miles northeast of Hawaii.



Figure 77. Twenty-one winches right the USS *Oklahoma*.

Once the *Oklahoma* was righted, the Navy moved the winches to the other side of Ford Island to use on the *Utah*. Because the *Utah* was only a target ship, the Navy decided to just temporarily roll it out of the shipping lane and salvage it later. In 1950, when the Navy realized that the *Utah* would never be salvaged, the Navy placed a plaque on it to honor the men still entombed in it. On 27 May 1972 the government dedicated the USS *Utah* Memorial in honor of the ship and its brave crew. Each day the Navy raises the American flag at the memorial as a tribute to the 58 men who are still entombed there.

In July 1942 the Navy conducted a survey on the *Arizona* and decided it could not be salvaged. An attempt was made to remove the dead, but after recovering about 100 bodies, the effort was abandoned. The superstructure was removed, and the guns from turrets three and four were removed and given to the Army to use in Coast Artillery batteries (one battery was completed and one was under construction when the war ended). On 1 December 1942 the *Arizona* was stricken from the list of

commissioned ships. In 1950, Admiral Arthur Radford, Commander, Pacific Fleet, ordered that the American flag be flown from the *Arizona* and that a small platform be built. In 1958 the US Congress approved a bill that authorized the construction of a memorial, and after raising the required funds, the USS *Arizona* Memorial was dedicated on Memorial Day 1962. Today, the memorial commemorates all the men who died during the attack on 7 December 1941.

On 16 December 1941 Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short were relieved of their commands. They were never court-martialed, but they did appear before eight official government investigations of the attack, one of which blamed them for “dereliction of duty.” For the rest of their lives, these two men tried to clear their names.

The 30 ships that comprised the Japanese fleet that went to Hawaii returned to Japan. By the end of the war, all but one had been sunk; a tanker was the sole survivor. The architect of the plan, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, was killed on 18 April 1943 when his aircraft was shot down by US Army planes that learned his location from code breakers. Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, who commanded the 1st Air Fleet on 7 December 1941, killed himself on Saipan on 7 July 1944, two days before the island’s capture by US troops. Minoru Genda, the air staff officer who planned the attack, and Mitsuo Fuchida, air commander, both survived the war. Genda entered politics, and Fuchida became a Christian evangelist.

Vignette: Admiral Yamamoto, on being told of the success of the attack on Pearl Harbor, reportedly replied: “We have awakened a sleeping giant and instilled in him a terrible resolve.” After the attacks of 11 September 2001, President George W. Bush reported to Congress the feeling of the nation—the same feeling the nation had after Pearl Harbor: “Tonight we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom. Our grief has turned to anger and anger to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies to justice or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done.” (President George W. Bush, address to Congress, 20 September 2001.)

Discussion point: The staff ride leader should tell the students to think about what they have contemplated, thought about, and learned during the staff ride. Have them take some time by themselves for self-reflection and deliberation before gathering for the integration phase.

IV. Integration Phase for the Attack on Pearl Harbor

The integration phase is the most important phase, and no staff ride is complete without it. The integration phase allows students to understand what happened, why it happened, and most important, what can be learned from studying the battle. Integration is the “so what” of the staff ride. The staff ride leader should give the students sufficient time for self-reflection and thought before bringing them together for the integration phase.

The staff ride leader has numerous options on how to conduct the integration phase, but the most important thing is that the students should do most of the talking. One technique is to run the integration phase similarly to a military after-action review: consider what happened, why it happened, and how to fix what was broken. Another technique is to let the students freely express what thoughts they have in their mind after their period of self-reflection. Once a student provides a topic, the staff ride leader can keep the discussion going to get every bit of learning out of each topic.

On 11 September 2001 the United States was again a victim of a surprise attack that damaged the nation and thrust it into a global war. Are there comparisons between 11 September and 7 December? In *The 9/11 Commission Report*, Pearl Harbor is mentioned five times in the conclusion chapter. The similarities are startling and worthy of study and discussion to prevent anything like it from ever happening to the nation again.

As you conduct the integration phase, judge the people and judge their actions, but do so with compassion. The 9/11 Commission cautioned in its conclusion that it was writing with the benefit of hindsight and quoted Roberta Wohlstetter, who in her book *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* wrote, “it is much easier after the event to sort the relevant from the irrelevant signals. After the event, of course, a signal is always crystal clear; we can see what disaster it was signaling since the disaster has occurred. But before the event it is obscure and pregnant with conflicting meanings.” The following are possible topics to discuss during the integration phase of the Attack on Pearl Harbor Staff Ride.

Intelligence. Intelligence was arguably the most significant factor in the failures of Pearl Harbor and on 11 September. There are a few areas of intelligence the staff ride leader can explore:

- a. How can we best gather information about our possible enemies? There were many agencies collecting information on Japan before the attack

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- a. How can we best gather information about our possible enemies? There were many agencies collecting information on Japan before the attack

on Pearl Harbor. The Army and Navy were each intercepting different Japanese codes, both diplomatic and military. Many different agencies knew Japanese agents were conducting espionage on Oahu and worked to prevent it. Before 11 September there were at least 14 different agencies gathering information on al-Qaeda. As the 9/11 Commission pointed out, each agency concentrated on its specialized mission. The problem, both in 1941 and in 2001, was that there was no one agency responsible for synchronizing the efforts and analyzing all the information from the varied sources. The 9/11 Commission recommended: “The current position of Director Central Intelligence should be replaced by a National Intelligence Director with two main areas of responsibility: (1) to oversee national intelligence centers on specific subjects of interest across U.S. government and (2) to manage the national intelligence program and oversee the agencies that contribute to it.” Ask the students if this is the answer. Have them discuss the advantages and disadvantages of this recommendation.

b. What good is having intelligence if you cannot share it with your subordinate commanders? Before Pearl Harbor, the United States had very good information on Japan’s intentions through “Magic,” but the list of people cleared to see Magic was extremely limited. The 9/11 Commission observed that the US agencies before 11 September also had good information but were again reluctant to share it. Means and sources need to be protected, but how do we exploit the excellent intelligence that we gather? The 9/11 Commission recommended: “Information procedures should provide incentives for sharing, to restore better balance between security and shared knowledge.” Ask the students if this is a realistic solution and if it isn’t, how do we get intelligence to the commanders who need it.

Joint. How does the United States best organize itself to detect threats and prepare to deal with an enemy? In Hawaii before the attack on Pearl Harbor there were many agencies that needed to work together to accomplish the mission, “To hold Oahu as a main outlying naval base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.” The Army and Navy needed to work together to accomplish this, and within each of the services, subordinate organizations needed to work together. The Army had ground forces, air forces, AA forces, and coast artillery forces, and the Navy had the fleet, the district, air forces, and marines. There was no order that required all the services and organizations to work together; instead, they relied on their professionalism to work toward the common goal.

The 9/11 Commission found problems with interagency coordination that hindered our ability to defend against al-Qaeda. Players included the CIA, FBI, Department of Defense, and Department of State. Now this list

also includes the Department of Homeland Security. The commission went on to mention three reasons for joint action: the virtue of joint planning, unity of command, and to simplify the shortage of experts with sufficient skills. The third reason, the shortage of experts, has been a problem since before Pearl Harbor. Recall how long it took the limited number of code breakers to decipher a message and how long it took the limited number of linguists to translate the message. To defend against a terrorist threat on the United States, the 9/11 Commission recommended: “We recommend the establishment of a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), built on the foundation of the existing Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). Breaking the older mold of national government organization, this NCTC should be a center for joint operational planning *and* joint intelligence, staffed by personnel from the various agencies.”

Have students discuss if this goes far enough into solving the joint and interagency problems. If not, what needs to be done? The US Northern Command was established in 2002 with the mission to “Conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States . . . provide military assistance to civil authorities.” The Department of Homeland Security was also created in 2002 with the mission to “prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to threats and hazards to the nation.” Ask students how critical it is for these two agencies to work together.

Prioritization. How should the United States set defensive priorities for the global war on terrorism? The forces in Hawaii in 1941 were not the priority for the United States. The ongoing campaign in the Atlantic was the Navy’s and Army’s main concern, and the forces in the Philippines had priority over Hawaii. Ask students if US leaders had set the correct priorities in 1941. The 9/11 Commission identifies that the Department of Homeland Security now has to set priorities in allocating limited resources. The commission recommended: “Homeland security assistance should be based strictly on an assessment of risks and vulnerabilities. Now, in 2004, Washington D.C. and New York City are certainly at the top of any such list. . . . It should supplement state and local resources based on the risks and vulnerabilities that merit additional support. Congress should not use this money as a pork barrel.” Ask students if this is realistic in this day and age. Also ask them what the best way to prioritize limited resources is. Ask them how units can best prepare if they are not the priority.

Travel. Is it too easy for the United States’ enemies to freely travel within its boundaries? Japanese spies assigned to the consulate in Honolulu were free to roam around the country to gather information on military

installations and assets, and there was no way to stop them because they were not breaking the law. Before the 11 September attacks, the terrorists were also free to roam around the country to gather information and to prepare for their attack. The 9/11 Commission recommended: “Targeting travel is at least as powerful of a weapon against terrorists as targeting their money. The United States should combine terrorist travel intelligence, operations and law enforcement in a strategy to intercept terrorists, find terrorist travel facilitators, and constrain terrorist mobility.” Ask students how best to prevent foreign nationals who have legally entered this country from being able to freely move around to conduct operations against us.

Civil liberties versus security. How do we protect our nation and our civil liberties simultaneously? The very laws that keep us free also make us less secure in our own homeland. Counterespionage agents were prevented from gathering critical information on Japanese spies by such laws as the Federal Communications Act of 1934, which prohibited messages to and from a foreign country from being intercepted. In the aftermath of 11 September, Congress passed the Patriot Act that gave more power to investigative agencies of the government but many fear erodes our civil liberties. As some powers of the Patriot Act are scheduled to expire, the 9/11 Commission recommended: “The burden of proof for retaining a particular government power should be on the executive, to explain (a) that the power actually materially enhances security and (b) that there is adequate supervision of the executive’s use of the powers to ensure protection of civil liberties. If the power is granted, there must be adequate guidelines and oversight to properly confine its use.” Ask students if the loss of certain civil liberties is worth it if it makes the nation safer. Also ask them if they feel the country trusts its government enough to have these powers.

Vulnerability. How do we mitigate the vulnerability of our facilities and assets? Both the installations on Oahu and the assets and targets on 11 September were vulnerable. Information was easy to obtain because maps and photos were easy to acquire. Organizations became predictable, and unchanging security measures were overcome. Ask the students how the military can mitigate the inherent vulnerabilities of its installations and assets. Areas that students should consider include periodic, randomly scheduled changes to security precautions and constantly changing schedules and timetables to be unpredictable.

Early warning. How do we ensure that people report possible attacks, no matter how improbable they seem? On 7 December the United States

had at least two incidents in which the attackers' intentions were shown. In each case, the American personnel involved concluded that there was no possible way that an attack was under way. On 11 September we again had some early warning, and even after airplanes started crashing into buildings, some people could not believe that we were under attack. Have the students discuss how we can ensure personnel report things, no matter how improbable, to the proper authorities. Is the "zero defect" mentality part of the problem? Are people afraid they will be accused of "crying wolf?"

Failures. In what areas did the United States fail before 7 December and 11 September? The 9/11 Commission found four types of failures before the 11 September attack that were also failures before 7 December: imagination, policy, capabilities, and management. The commission believed the United States failed because it did not have the imagination to understand the dangers and did not listen to those who imagined the "impossible." It believed that the United States must make the exercise of imagination routine. Ask the students how well we listen to those who imagine what could happen.

The commission believed that the nation's weak policies toward al-Qaeda were a major failing, just as before December 1941 the nation let Japan get away with actions that went against its policies. Ask the students if weakness and weak policies endanger the nation. Before 11 September the nation had opportunities to destroy al-Qaeda command and control cells, but it did not have the ability to do so (we tried with missiles). Ask the students if preemptive strikes are ever a possibility for the United States. Finally, the commission reported that failures in management helped result in the 11 September attacks. Different agencies did not share information and had conflicting and dissimilar missions. Recall the different missions of the Army and Navy in Hawaii in 1941. Ask the students how management can assist in defending the nation.

Battle command. Was it justifiable to lay the blame for Pearl Harbor on Kimmel and Short? The staff ride leader should consider saving this topic for the end because many different opinions will be expressed. Consider Short and Kimmel not being on the Magic distribution list, the numerous messages and warnings they received and the ones they did not receive, the actions they took before the attack (joint planning or exercises), their reactions to different warnings, and their communications with Washington. This is a great opportunity for students to discuss leadership and responsibility.

V. Support for a Staff Ride to Pearl Harbor

1. Information and assistance. This staff ride was designed primarily for military groups, but with modifications and extensive coordination, civilian organizations can use it as well.

a. The Staff Ride Team, Combat Studies Institute (CSI), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has conducted Pearl Harbor staff rides and can provide advice and assistance on every aspect of the staff ride. The Staff Ride Team can also provide staff ride facilitators to lead a Pearl Harbor staff ride. Visit the CSI Web site for information on obtaining staff ride assistance and/or leadership. Staff Ride Team support includes background information, detailed knowledge of the battle and battlefield, and familiarity with Pearl Harbor and surrounding areas.

Address: Combat Studies Institute
US Army Combined Arms Center
ATZL-CSH
201 Sedgwick Avenue
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

Telephone: DSN 552-2078
Commercial (913) 684-2078

Web site: <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/CSI/staff_ride/staffridehome.asp>

b. Most of this staff ride occurs on active military bases—Naval Station Pearl Harbor and Hickam Air Force Base. In this time of increased security and awareness, it is imperative to coordinate with each installation's military police. Staff ride leaders can take a few steps to make the Pearl Harbor staff ride easier:

(1) Use military vehicles or privately owned vehicles with Department of Defense stickers (registered on base/post).

(2) Every member of the staff ride needs to carry his or her military identification so he or she can enter the installations.

(3) Coordinate at least one working day before with each installation's military police:

(a) Naval Station Pearl Harbor:
NAVSTA Pearl Harbor Security Office
370 Fuller Way
Pearl Harbor, HI 96860
(808) 474-6755

(b) Hickam Air Force Base:
15th Security Forces Squadron
505 Hanger Ave
Hickam AFB, HI 96853
(808) 449-2392

b. The National Park Service, which maintains the USS *Arizona* Memorial, can provide advice and assistance to any group desiring to visit the USS *Arizona*. The Visitor's Center includes a small museum with a film on the battle, a bookstore, and restrooms. The Park Service does not usually coordinate special trips to the *Arizona*, and lines can be up to 3 hours. However, the Park Service may be willing to arrange a special visit for military groups in uniform. Coordinate with the memorial's headquarters well before your visit.

Address: 1. Arizona Memorial Place
Honolulu, HI 96818

Telephone: (808) 422-2771, ext 125

Web site: <<http://www.nps.gov/usar/>>

2. Logistics.

a. Meals. There are many fast food restaurants on Pearl Harbor and Hickam AFB, but these may be crowded during meal times. Groups may consider packing a lunch and eating at one of the base parks.

b. Lodging. Each base has limited on-base lodging. The US military runs the Hale Koa Hotel, a resort on Waikiki, which accepts service members who are TDY. The phone number is 1-800-367-6027, or e-mail is <<http://www.halekoa.com>>.

c. Medical. Each base has a hospital and clinics that are well marked.

3. Other considerations.

a. Most of this staff ride is on active duty military installations. Staff Ride leaders should be extremely careful not to venture into off-limits areas. Prior reconnaissance of the route is imperative for a successful staff ride.

b. Ensure every member of the group has water. Additionally, some rest rooms are available on the route, but this should be a consideration.

Appendix A

Order of Battle, Japanese Forces

1st Air Fleet: Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo

1st Carrier Division: Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo

Akagi: Captain Hasegawa Kiichi

Kaga: Captain Okada Jisaku

2d Carrier Division: Rear Admiral Yamaguchi Tamon

Soryu: Captain Yanagimoto Ryusaku

Hiryu: Captain Kaku Tomeo

5th Carrier Division: Rear Admiral Hara Chuichi

Zuikaku: Captain Yokokawa Ichibei

Shokaku: Captain Jojima Takatsugu

Support Force: Vice Admiral Mikawa Gunichi

3d Battleship Division: Vice Admiral Mikawa Gunichi

Hiei: Captain Nishida Masuo

Kirishma: Captain Yamaguchi Jihei

8th Cruiser Division: Captain Komura Keizo

Chikuma: Captain Komura Keizo

Tone: Captain Okada Tarueji

1st Destroyer Squadron: Rear Admiral Omori Sentaro

Abukuma: Captain Murayama Seitoku

Akigumo: Commander Arimoto Terumichi

17th Destroyer Division: Commander Orita Tsuneo

Hamakaze: Commander Orita Tsuneo

Isokaze: Commander Toyoshima Shunichi

Tanikaze: Commander Katsumi Motoi

Urakaze: Commander Shiraishi Nagayoshi

18th Destroyer Division: Commander Ogata Tomie

Arare: Commander Ogata Tomie

Kagero: Commander Yokoi Minoru

Kasumi: Commander Tomura Kiyoshi

Shiranuhi: Commander Akazawa Shizuo

Supply Group 1: Captain Oto Masanao

Kyokuto Maru: Captain Oto Masanao

Kanemasu Maru: Captain Kanemasu Yoshio

Kokuyu Maru: Captain Hidai Toraji

Shinkoku Maru: Captain Ito Tokutaka

Supply Group 2: Captain Niimi Kazutaka

Toho Maru: Captain Niimi Kazutaka

Nippon Maru: Captain Ueda Konoskae

Toei Maru: Captain Kusakawa Kiyoshi

Submarine Patrol Formation: Captain Imaizumi Kijiro

I-19: Commander Narahara Shogo

I-21: Commander Matsumura Kanji

I-23: Commander Shibata Genichi

1st Submarine Group: Rear Admiral Tsutome Sato

I-9: Commander Fujii Akiyoshi

I-15: Commander Ishikawa Nobuo

I-17: Commander Nishino Kozo

I-25: Commander Tayami Meiji

2d Submarine Group: Rear Admiral Yamazaki Shigeaki

I-1: Lieutenant Commander Sakamoto Eichi

I-2: Commander Inoida Hiroshi

I-3: Commander Tonosuka Kinzo

I-4: Commander Nakagawa Hajime

I-5: Commander Shichiji Tsuneo

I-6: Commander Inaba Michimune

I-7: Commander Koizumi Ki'ichi

3d Submarine Group: Rear Admiral Miwa Shigeyoshi

I-8: Commander Emi Tetsushiro

I-68: Commander Nakamuro Otoji

I-69: Commander Watanabe Katsuji

I-70: Commander Sano Takahi

I-71: Commander Kawasaki Mutsuo

I-72: Commander Togami Ichiro

I-73: Commander Isobe Akira

I-74: Commander Ikezawa Masayuki

I-75: Commander Inoue Chikanori

Special Attack Force (Midget Submarine Carriers):

Commander Yamada Kaoru

I-16: Commander Yamada Kaoru

I-18: Commander Otani Kiyonori

I-20: Commander Yasuda Takashi

I-22: Commander Agata Kiyo

I-24: Commander Hanabasa Hiroshi

Carrier Air Group: Commander Fuchida Mitsuo

1st Attack Force: Commander Fuchida Mitsuo

1st Group (high-level and torpedo bombers):

Commander Fuchida Mitsuo

(High-level bombers carried an 800-kilogram [KG] bomb.)

(Torpedo bombers carried an 800 KG torpedo.)

1st Attack Unit: Commander Fuchida Mitsuo (15 Kates from the *Akagi*)

2d Attack Unit: Commander Hashiguchi Takashi (15* Kates from the *Kaga*)

3d Attack Unit: Lieutenant Abe Heijiro (10 Kates from the *Soryu*)

4th Attack Unit: Lieutenant Commander Kusumi Tadashi (10 Kates from the *Hiryu*)

1st Torpedo Attack Unit: Lieutenant Commander Murata Shigeharu (12 Kates from the *Akagi*) (Shigeharu was the torpedo plane leader.)

2d Torpedo Attack Unit: Lieutenant Kitajima Ichiryo (12 Kates from the *Kaga*)

3d Torpedo Attack Unit: Lieutenant Nagai Tsuyoshi (8 Kates from the *Soryu*)

4th Torpedo Attack Unit: Lieutenant Matsumura Heita (8 Kates from the *Hiryu*)

2d Group (dive bombers):

Lieutenant Commander Takahashi Kakuchui

(Dive bombers carried a 250 KG bomb.)

15th Attack Unit: Lieutenant Commander Takahashi Kakuchui (27* Vals from the *Shokaku*)

16th Attack Unit: Lieutenant Ema Tomatsu (27** Vals from the *Zuikaku*)

3d Group (fighters): Lieutenant Commander Itaya Shigeru

1st Fighter Combat Unit: Lieutenant Shiga Yoshio (9 Zeros from the *Kaga*)

2d Fighter Combat Unit: Lieutenant Commander Itaya Shigeru (9 Zeros from the *Akagi*)

3d Fighter Combat Unit: Lieutenant Suganami Masaharu (9* Zeros from the *Soryu*)

4th Fighter Combat Unit: Lieutenant Okajima Kiyokuma (6 Zeros from the *Hiryu*)

5th Fighter Combat Unit: Lieutenant Kaneko Tadashi (6* Zeros from the *Shokaku*)

6th Fighter Combat Unit: Lieutenant Sato Masxao (6 Zeros from the *Zuikaku*)

2d Attack Force: Lieutenant Commander Shimazaki Shigekazu

1st Group (high-level bombers):

Lieutenant Commander Shimazaki Shigekazu

(High-level bombers carried either two 250 KG bombs or 1 250 KG bomb and six 60 KG bombs.)

5th Attack Unit: Lieutenant Ichihara Tatsuo (27 Kates from the *Shokaku*)

6th Attack Unit: Lieutenant Commander Shimazaki Shigekazu (27 Kates from the *Zuikaku*)

2d Group (dive bomber): Lieutenant Commander Egusa Takehige

(Dive bombers carried a 250 KG bomb.)

11th Attack Unit: Lieutenant Chihaya Takehiko (18 Vals from the *Akagi*)

12th Attack Unit: Lieutenant Makino Saburo (27* Vals from the *Kaga*)

13th Attack Unit: Lieutenant Commander Egusa Takehige (18* Vals from the *Soryu*)

14th Attack Unit: Lieutenant Kobayashi Michio (18* Vals from the *Hiryu*)

3d Group (fighters): Lieutenant Shindo Saburo

1st Fighter Combat Unit: Lieutenant Shindo Saburo (9 Zeros from the *Akagi*)

2d Fighter Combat Unit: Lieutenant Nikaido Yasushi (9 Zeros from the *Kaga*)

3d Fighter Combat Unit: Lieutenant Iida Fusata (9 Zeros from the *Soryu*)

4th Fighter Combat Unit: Lieutenant Nono Sumio (9* Zeros from the *Hiryu*)

* One aircraft aborted/crashed during takeoff.

** Two aircraft aborted during takeoff.

Aircraft Compilation

(Number of Aircraft Planned/Number of Aircraft Launched)

1st Attack Force

	Kate	Kate High-Level	Val Torpedo	Zero
<i>Akagi</i>	15/15	12/12		9/9
<i>Kaga</i>	15/14	12/12		9/9
<i>Soryu</i>	10/10	8/8		9/8
<i>Hiryu</i>	10/10	8/8		6/6
<i>Shokaku</i>			27/26	6/5
<i>Zuikaku</i>			27/25	6/6
Subtotal	50/49	40/40	54/51	45/43

1st Attack Force total 189/183

2d Attack Force

	Kate High-Level	Val	Zero
<i>Akagi</i>		18/18	9/9
<i>Kaga</i>		27/26	9/9
<i>Soryu</i>		18/17	9/9
<i>Hiryu</i>		18/17	9/8
<i>Shokaku</i>	27/27		
<i>Zuikaku</i>	27/27		
Subtotal	54/54	81/78	36/35

2d Attack Force total 171/167

Carrier Air Group Total 360/350

Appendix B

Order of Battle, US Forces

US Navy

US Pacific Fleet: Admiral Husband E. Kimmel

On 7 December 1941 there were 207 ships in the Pacific Fleet, organized into three main task forces. There were 103 ships in Pearl Harbor that morning, and the other 104 ships were out to sea. Following are the ships that were in Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941:

Battle Force (Task Force 1)

Vice Admiral William S. Pye

Battleships, Battle Force

Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson

Battleship Division 1

Rear Admiral Isaac C. Kidd

BB-36 *Nevada* (Nevada class)—Captain Francis W. Scanland

BB-38 *Pennsylvania* (Pennsylvania class)—Captain Charles M. “Saavy” Cooke, Jr.

BB-39 *Arizona* (Pennsylvania class)—Captain Franklin Van Valkenburg

Battleship Division 2

RADM D.W. Bagley

BB-37 *Oklahoma* (Nevada class)—Captain Howard D. “Ping” Bode

BB-43 *Tennessee* (Tennessee class)—Captain C. E. Reordan

BB-44 *California* (Tennessee class)—Captain Joel W. Bunkley

Battleship Division 4

RADM Walter S. Anderson

BB-46 *Maryland* (Colorado class)—Captain D.C. Godwin

BB-48 *West Virginia* (Colorado class)—Captain Mervyn Bennion

Cruisers, Battle Force

Rear Admiral H. Fairfax Leary

Cruiser Division 6 (Partial)

CA-32 *New Orleans* (New Orleans class)—J.G. Atkins

CA-38 *San Francisco* (New Orleans class)—D.J. Callaghan

Cruiser Division 9

Rear Admiral H. Fairfax Leary

CL-46 *Phoenix* (Brooklyn class)—H.E. Fischer

CL-48 *Honolulu* (Brooklyn class)—H. Dodd

CL-49 *St. Louis* (St. Louis class)—G.A. Rood
CL-50 *Helena* (St. Louis class)—R.H. English

Destroyers, Battle Force

Rear Admiral Milo F. Draemel

Destroyer Flotilla 1

CL-7 *Raleigh* (Omaha class)—R.B. Simons

Destroyer Squadron One

DD-360 *Phelps* (Porter class)—E.L. Beck

Destroyer Division One

DD-349 *Dewey* (Farragut class)—A.J. Detzer

DD-350 *Hull* (Farragut class)—R.F. Stout

DD-351 *MacDonough* (Farragut class)—J. M. McIsaac

DD-352 *Worden* (Farragut class)—W.C. Pogue

Destroyer Division Two

DD-348 *Farragut* (Farragut class)—G.P. Hunter

DD-353 *Dale* (Farragut class)—A.L. Rorschach

DD-354 *Monaghan* (Farragut class)—W.P. Burford

DD-355 *Aylwin* (Farragut class)—R.H. Rodgers

Destroyer Squadron Three

DD-357 *Selfridge* (Porter class)—W. Craig

Destroyer Division Five

DD-369 *Reid* (Mahan class)—H.F. Pullen

DD-371 *Conyngham* (Mahan class)—H.C. Daniels

DD-372 *Cassin* (Mahan class)—D.F. Shea

DD-375 *Downes* (Mahan class)—W.R. Thayer

Destroyer Division Six

DD-365 *Cummings* (Mahan class)—G.D. Cooper

DD-370 *Case* (Mahan class)—R. W. Bedilion

DD-373 *Shaw* (Mahan class)—W. Glenn Jones

DD-374 *Tucker* (Mahan class)—W.R. Terrlell

Destroyer Flotilla 2

CL-8 *Detroit* (Omaha class)—L.J. Wiltse

DD-386 *Bagley* (Bagley class)—G.A. Sinclair

DD-387 *Blue* (Bagley class)—H.N. Williams

DD-388 *Helm* (Bagley class)—C.E. Carroll

DD-389 *Mugford* (Bagley class)—E.W. Young

DD-390 *Ralph Talbot* (Bagley class)—R. Earle, Jr.

DD-391 *Henley* (Bagley class)—R.H. Smith
DD-392 *Patterson* (Bagley class)—F.R. Walker
DD-393 *Jarvis* (Bagley class)—J.R. Topper

Other Destroyers

DD-66 *Allen* (Sampson class)—D.B. Miller
DD-103 *Schley* (Wickes class)
DD-106 *Chew* (Wickes class)—H.R. Hummer, Jr.
DD-139 *Ward* (Wickes class)—W.W. Outerbridge

Submarines

SS-167 *Narwhal*—G.W. Wilkins
SS-169 *Dolphin*—G.B. Rainer
SS-170 *Cachalot*—W.N. Christensen
SS-199 *Tautog*—J.H. Willingham, Jr.

Minelayer

CM-4 *Oglala*—E.P. Speight

Minesweepers

AM-13 *Turkey*—T.F. Fowler
AM-20 *Bobolink*—J.L. Foley
AM-26 *Rail*—F.W. Beard
AM-31 *Tern*—W.B. Pendleton
AM-43 *Grebe*
AM-52 *Vireo*—F.J. Ilseman

Coastal Minesweepers

AMC-8 *Cockatoo*
AMC-9 *Crossbill*
AMC-14 *Condor*
AMC-30 *Reedbird*

Destroyer Minelayers

DM-15 *Gamble*—D.A. Crandell
DM-16 *Ramsay*—G.C. Simms
DM-17 *Montgomery*—R.A. Guthrie
DM-18 *Breese*—H.F. Stout
DM-19 *Tracy*—G.R. Phelan
DM-20 *Preble*—H.D. Johnston
DM-21 *Sicard*—W.C. Shultz
DM-22 *Pruitt*—E.W. Herron

Destroyer Minesweepers

DMS-14 *Zane*—L.M. LeHardy
DMS-15 *Wasmuth*—J.L. Wilfong
DMS-16 *Trever*—D.M. Agnew
DMS-17 *Perry*—L.H. Miller

Patrol Gunboat

PG-19 *Sacramento*—A.L. Warburton

Destroyer Tenders

AD-3 *Dobbin*—H.E. Paddock
AD-4 *Whitney*—N.M. Pigman

Seaplane Tenders

AV-4 *Curtiss*—H.S. Kendall
AV-8 *Tangier*—C.A. Sprague

Small Seaplane Tenders

AVP-4 *Avocet*—W.C. Johnson, Jr.
AVP-7 *Swan*—F.E. Hall

Seaplane Tenders (Converted Destroyer)

AVD-6 *Hulbert*—J.M. Lane
AVD-11 *Thornton*—W.F. Kline

Ammunition Ship

AE-1 *Pyro*—N. Vytacil

Oilers

AO-12 *Ramapo*—D. Curry, Jr.
AO-23 *Neosho*—J.S. Phillips

Repair Ships

AR-1 *Medusa*—A.E. Schrader
AR-4 *Vestal*—C. Young
AR-11 *Rigel*—R. Dudley

Submarine Tender

AS-14 *Pelias*—W. Wakefield

Submarine Rescue Ship

ASR-1 *Widgeon*—J.A. Flenniken

Hospital Ship

AH-5 *Solace*—B. Perlman

Cargo Ship

AK-17 *Vega* (at Honolulu)

Stores Issue Ships

AKS-1 *Castor*—H.J. Wright

AKS-3 *Antares*—L.C. Grannis

Ocean Tugs

AT-13 *Ontario*—E.C. Mayer

AT-28 *Sunnadin*

AT-38 *Keosanqua*

AT-64 *Navajo* (12 miles outside the Pearl Harbor entrance)

Miscellaneous Auxiliaries

AG-16 *Utah* (target ship)—J.M. Steele

AG-31 *Argonne*—F.W. Connor

AG-32 *Sumner*—I.M. Truitt

CM-1 (ex C-3) *Baltimore* (out of commission)

14th Naval District: Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch

Commander, Hawaiian Patrol Wing (also Commander, Task Force 9):

Rear Admiral Patrick N.L. Bellinger

US Marine Corps

Marine Air Group 1: Lieutenant Colonel Claude A. Larkin (Ewa MCAS)

VMB-232

VMJ-252

VMF-211 (rear echelon)

VMB-231 (rear echelon)

Marine Barracks, Pearl Harbor: COL Gilder D. Jackson

1st Defense Battalion (-)

2d Engineer Battalion

3d Defense Battalion

4th Defense Battalion

Company A(-), 2d Service Battalion

Sixteen ships (eight battleships, two heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, and two auxiliaries) had US Marine Corps detachments embarked.

US Army

Hawaiian Department: LTG Walter C. Short (Fort Shafter)

24th Division: BG Durward S. Wilson (Schofield Barracks)

25th Division: MG Maxwell Murray (Schofield Barracks)

Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command: MG Henry T. Burgin (Fort Ruger)

Hawaiian Army Air Force: MG Frederick L. Martin (Hickam Field)

18th Bombardment Wing: BG J.H. Rudolph (Hickam Field)

14th Pursuit Wing : BG H.C. Davidson (Wheeler Field)

Appendix C

Biographical Sketches

US Leaders and Commanders



White House

Franklin Delano Roosevelt—President of the United States. Roosevelt was born 30 January 1882 in Hyde Park, New York, the fifth cousin of President Theodore Roosevelt. He graduated from Harvard in 1903 with a degree in history before studying law at Columbia University. He passed the bar before graduating from law school and never earned his law degree. In 1910 he entered local politics as a Democrat. There he earned the attention of Woodrow Wilson, who appointed him as Assistant Secretary of the Navy in 1913. In 1920 he was the Democratic nominee for vice president for James. M. Cox, but when Warren G. Harding won the election, Roosevelt returned to private life. In 1921 he contracted polio, and despite his valiant efforts, he lost the use of his legs. In 1928 Roosevelt returned to public life, being elected governor of New York and reelected in 1930.

In 1932 he was elected President of the United States. Roosevelt's aggressive actions helped bring the nation out of the Great Depression, and he was reelected in 1936 and 1940. Roosevelt wanted the United States to be neutral in the war that had started in Europe, but actions like the Lend-Lease Act allied the United States with the French and British (et al.). Roosevelt became a wartime president on 8 December 1941. After calling the Japanese attack "a date which will live in infamy," he asked Congress for its approval and declared war. Roosevelt led the nation as it continued to mobilize and slowly enter the war. Roosevelt was elected to a fourth term in 1944. The Allies had almost won the war when, on 12 April 1945, Roosevelt suffered a stroke and died at Warm Springs, Georgia. He is buried at his family estate in Hyde Park, New York.



Combat Studies Institute

George C. Marshall—Chief of Staff, US Army. Marshall was born on 31 December 1880 in Uniontown, Pennsylvania. He attended the Virginia Military Institute and graduated in 1901 as the Senior First Captain of Cadets. Commissioned in the infantry, Marshall served on numerous posts in the United States and Philippines before attending the Army Staff College in 1908. Marshall was appointed to the General Staff and served during World War I, where many noticed his achievements. After the war, he served in continually significant positions. He served as aide de camp to General John. J. Pershing; was an instructor at the US Army War College; commanded the 8th Infantry Regiment; and after promotion to brigadier general, commanded the 5th Infantry Brigade. In 1938 Marshall was posted to the General Staff in Washington, where he was appointed as Chief of Staff, US Army in 1939. He was Chief of Staff on 7 December 1941 but received no blame for the attack. During World War II, he supervised the training, armament, and mobilization of 8 million soldiers. When the war ended, Marshall retired, but President Truman asked him to again serve, first as an envoy to China, and then as Secretary of State from 1947-49. As Secretary of State, he developed a plan for Europe's economic recovery that was named after him. He served as Secretary of Defense in 1950-51 before retiring for good. In 1953 he was awarded the Nobel Prize for the Marshall Plan. Marshall died in Walter Reed Hospital on 16 October 1959 and is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.



Naval Historical Center

Harold R. Stark—Chief of Naval Operations. Starke was born on 12 November 1880 in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. He graduated from the US Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1903. His initial service included tours on the battleship *Minnesota*, followed by duty with torpedo boats and destroyers. During World War I, Starke served on the staff of the Commander, US Naval Forces Europe. After the war, Starke served as the executive officer on two battleships, attended the Naval War College, and commanded an ammunition ship. Promoted to captain, he commanded the battleship *West Virginia*, Cruiser Division 3, and Battle Force cruisers. Starke had made friends with Roosevelt when Roosevelt was the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and Starke was appointed as Chief of Naval Operations in 1939. After Pearl Harbor, Starke was replaced as the Chief of Naval Operations and assigned to the 12th Fleet in England, where he oversaw preparations for and executed the landings at Normandy in 1944. He retired in 1946 and died on 21 August 1972 at his home in Washington, DC.



Naval Historical Center

Husband E. Kimmel—Commander, Pacific Fleet. Kimmel was born in Henderson, Kentucky on 26 February 1882. Upon graduation from the US Naval Academy, Kimmel served on numerous ships, including battleships, and in 1933 he commanded the battleship *New York*. In November 1937 Kimmel was promoted to vice admiral and became Commander, Cruiser Division 7. In 1939 he was commander, Battle Force Cruisers. In February 1941 Kimmel was selected over 32 officers to replace Admiral James Richardson as Commander, Pacific Fleet. Kimmel was relieved of command on 16 December 1941, but he was allowed to retire in March 1942. Kimmel was never court-martialed but was found lacking by numerous commissions that investigated the attacks. Kimmel spent the rest of his life trying to clear his name. He died at Groton, Connecticut on 14 May 1958.



Military History Institute

Walter C. Short—Commander, Hawaiian Department. Short was born on 30 March 1880 in Fillmore, Illinois. He graduated from the University of Illinois in 1902 and received a direct commission in the infantry. His early postings were to Texas, the Presidio of San Francisco, the Philippines, and Alaska. He served with the 16th Infantry during the punitive expedition in Mexico. During World War I he observed French and British troops and then organized training for Americans. After the war he went to the Army School of the Line, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and was also an instructor at Leavenworth. He commanded the 1st Infantry Division and I Corps. He assumed command of the Hawaiian Department on 7 February 1941. He was relieved of his command on 16 December 1941 and allowed to retire in March 1942. Short took a job with the Ford Motor Company. He died on 3 September 1949 and was buried with full military honors in Arlington National Cemetery. Only his wife, son, daughter-in-law, and a few close friends attended.

Japanese Leaders and Commanders



Military History Institute

Hideki Tojo—Prime Minister. Tojo was born in Tokyo on 30 December 1884, the son of an army general. He graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1905. In 1915 he graduated from the war college and went to work in the mobilization section of the War Ministry where he developed his thoughts on total war as a doctrine for Japan. Tojo wanted to reorganize the army and wanted Japan to expand its borders. Tojo served in China as Chief of Police Affairs and Chief of Staff of the army in China. He was appointed Vice Minister of War in 1938 and Minister of War in 1940. As Minister of War, his mobilization plans increased tensions between Japan and the United States. On 16 October 1941 Tojo became premier when the government was broken up. He was the Prime Minister of Japan as well War Minister and Army Chief of Staff, which basically made him Japan's dictator. He remained in this position until he resigned on 19 July 1944 because of serious setbacks in the war. After Japan surrendered, Tojo attempted suicide by shooting himself in the chest, but American doctors saved his life. The International Military Tribunal found him guilty of war crimes, and he was hanged in Tokyo on 23 December 1948.



National Park Service

Isoroku Yamamoto—Commander, Combined Fleet. Yamamoto was born on 4 April 1884, adopted by the Yamamoto family, and took their name. He graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1904 and was assigned as an ensign on a cruiser during the Battle of Tshushima in 1905, where he was wounded and lost two fingers. After recovering from his wound, he continued his naval career and continued to progress. From 1919-21 Yamamoto studied in the United States at Harvard. In 1923 Yamamoto was commander of the air training base at Kasumiguara, where he became an aviation advocate. In 1926 he started a two-year tour as the naval attaché in Washington, and in 1930 he was the Japanese navy's representative to the London Naval Conference. While head of Japanese naval aviation, Yamamoto championed aviation and was instrumental in developing the Zero fighter and torpedo attack doctrine. He commanded an aircraft carrier division from 1933-35, where he impressed many and was then appointed as Vice Minister of the Navy. In 1939 Yamamoto was named Commander, Combined Fleet. Yamamoto opposed war with the United States, but when war became inevitable, he oversaw the Pearl Harbor attack plan. In June 1942 Yamamoto led the Combined Fleet at Midway where he lost four aircraft carriers. In April 1943 US intelligence personnel decoded Japanese radio traffic and learned that Yamamoto was flying to the Solomon Islands for an inspection. The Army Air Forces organized an attack, and on 18 April 1943 shot down Yamamoto's plane, killing him.



Naval Historical Center

Chuichi Nagumo—Commander, 1st Air Fleet. Nagumo was born in Northern Honshu on 25 March 1887. He graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1908 followed by service on battleships, cruisers, and destroyers. After a teaching assignment at the Naval Staff College, he was promoted to captain and given command of a light cruiser followed by command of a destroyer division. In 1934 he commanded the battleship *Yamashiro*. Nagumo was promoted to admiral, and at the start of World War II, he became Commander, 3d Battleship Division. In 1939 he was promoted to vice admiral and served as President of the Naval Staff College. When Japan formed the 1st Air Fleet, Nagumo was given command based mainly on seniority and despite his lack of aviation experience. Nagumo led the 1st Air Fleet as it prepared for and executed the attack on Pearl Harbor. Nagumo survived the Battle of Midway but lost his command when the United States sank four Japanese carriers. Nagumo was given minor commands after Midway, including command of a backwater fleet in Vietnam. In July 1944 Nagumo was the commander of the naval detachment on Saipan. On 7 July 1944, just two days before the island fell to the Americans, Nagumo killed himself.



Naval Historical Center

Minoru Genda—Air Staff Officer, 1st Air Fleet. Genda was born on 16 August 1904 in Hiroshima. He graduated from the Japanese Military Academy with his friend Fuchida in 1924. He graduated from flight training and became a fighter pilot, earning a reputation as the best fighter pilot in the Japanese navy. He also commanded an aerobatic group named “Genda’s Flying Circus” that flew demonstrations all around Japan. His operational assignments included tours on the carriers *Ryujo* and *Akagi*, combat duty in China, and instructor duty at flight school. While Genda attended the staff college, he wrote extensively on carrier-based air power, and his controversial thoughts alienated him from many of his peers. He was the assistant naval attaché in London during the blitz. He was appointed as the Air Staff Officer, 1st Air Fleet in February 1941 and was the primary planner for the attack on Pearl Harbor. Genda remained in this post until the Battle of Midway cost the Japanese the carriers of the 1st Air Fleet. Genda became the senior air staff officer of the General Staff and remained in this post until December 1944 when Japan formed Air Group 343, the most experienced pilots flying the best aircraft, which Genda led until the end of the war. From 1959-62 Genda served as the Chief of Staff, Japanese Air Force. When he retired from the air force, Genda entered politics and served in Parliament until 1986. He died in Tokyo on 15 August 1989, one day short of his 85th birthday.



Naval Historical Center

Mitsuo Fuchida—Air Group Commander, 1st Air Fleet. Fuchida was born on 2 December 1902. In 1921 he entered the Japanese Military Academy where he became friends with Genda. Fuchida fell in love with flying while at the academy and entered flight school in 1927. Fuchida was the Japanese “ace” of high-level bombing and taught it at the flight school. He wrote extensively on air tactics while attending the Naval Staff College. In 1939 he was the flight commander of the *Akagi* where he met Yamamoto, whom he greatly respected. Fuchida next was the Air Officer, 3d Carrier Division, but he was soon recalled to the *Akagi* for combat action in China. In August 1941 he was named Commander, Air Group, 1st Air Fleet. In this position he supervised the training and led the attack on Pearl Harbor. During Midway, Fuchida was recovering from appendicitis and could not lead any flights. He was badly injured while evacuating the sinking *Akagi*. Fuchida convalesced until June 1943, and during this time, he wrote analyses of major battles, including Coral Sea and Midway. In June 1943 he joined the staff of the now land-based 1st Air Fleet. For the rest of the war, Fuchida served as an air staff officer, coordinating the land-based Japanese naval air arm. After Japan’s surrender, Fuchida converted to Christianity and became an evangelist. He wrote of his wartime service and was interviewed numerous times about Pearl Harbor. He died 30 May 1976.

Appendix D

Medal of Honor Conferrals for the Attack on Pearl Harbor

The United States awarded 15 Medals of Honor, 51 Navy Crosses, five Distinguished Service Crosses, and 69 Silver Stars in recognition of valorous service during the attack on Pearl Harbor. The following are the names of and citations for the Medals of Honor earned on 7 December 1941. Asterisks indicate posthumous awards.

***Bennion, Mervyn Sharp.** Rank and organization: Captain, US Navy. Born: 5 May 1887, Vernon, UT. Appointed from Utah. Citation: For conspicuous devotion to duty, extraordinary courage, and complete disregard of his own life, above and beyond the call of duty, during the attack on the Fleet in Pearl Harbor by Japanese forces on 7 December 1941. As Commanding Officer of the USS *West Virginia*, after being mortally wounded, Captain Bennion evidenced apparent concern only in fighting and saving his ship and strongly protested against being carried from the bridge.

Finn, John William. Rank and organization: Lieutenant, US Navy. Place and date: Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, territory of Hawaii, 7 December 1941. Entered service in California. Born: 23 July 1909, Los Angeles, CA. Citation: For extraordinary heroism, distinguished service, and devotion above and beyond the call of duty. During the first attack by Japanese airplanes on the Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, on 7 December 1941, Lieutenant Finn promptly secured and manned a .50-caliber machine gun mounted on an instruction stand in a completely exposed section of the parking ramp, which was under heavy enemy machine gun strafing fire. Although painfully wounded many times, he continued to man this gun and to return the enemy's fire vigorously and with telling effect throughout the enemy strafing and bombing attacks and with complete disregard for his own personal safety. It was only by specific orders that he was persuaded to leave his post to seek medical attention. Following first aid treatment, although obviously suffering much pain and moving with great difficulty, he returned to the squadron area and actively supervised the rearming of returning planes. His extraordinary heroism and conduct in this action were in keeping with the highest traditions of the US Naval Service.

***Flaherty, Francis C.** Rank and organization: Ensign, US Naval Reserve. Born: 15 March 1919, Charlotte, MI. Accredited to Michigan. Citation: For conspicuous devotion to duty and extraordinary courage and complete disregard of his own life, above and beyond the call of duty, during the attack on the Fleet in Pearl Harbor by Japanese forces on 7 December

1941. When it was seen that the USS *Oklahoma* was going to capsize and the order was given to abandon ship, Ensign Flaherty remained in a turret, holding a flashlight so the remainder of the turret crew could see to escape, thereby sacrificing his own life.

Fuqua, Samuel Glenn. Rank and organization: Lieutenant Commander (LCDR), US Navy, USS *Arizona*. Place and date: Pearl Harbor, territory of Hawaii, 7 December 1941. Entered service in Laddonia, MO. Born: 15 October 1899, Laddonia, MO. Citation: For distinguished conduct in action, outstanding heroism, and utter disregard of his own safety above and beyond the call of duty during the attack on the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, by Japanese forces on 7 December 1941. Upon the commencement of the attack, LCDR Fuqua rushed to the quarterdeck of the USS *Arizona* to which he was attached where he was stunned and knocked down by the explosion of a large bomb which hit the quarterdeck, penetrated several decks, and started a severe fire. Upon regaining consciousness, he began to direct the fighting of the fire and the rescue of wounded and injured personnel. Almost immediately there was a tremendous explosion forward, which made the ship appear to rise out of the water, shudder, and settle down by the bow rapidly. The whole forward part of the ship was enveloped in flames which were spreading rapidly, and wounded and burned men were pouring out of the ship to the quarterdeck. Despite these conditions, his harrowing experience, and severe enemy bombing and strafing, at the time, LCDR Fuqua continued to direct the fighting of fires to check them while the wounded and burned could be taken from the ship and supervised the rescue of these men in such an amazingly calm and cool manner and with such excellent judgment that it inspired everyone who saw him and undoubtedly resulted in the saving of many lives. After realizing the ship could not be saved and that he was the senior surviving officer aboard, he directed it to be abandoned but continued to remain on the quarterdeck and directed abandoning ship and rescue of personnel until satisfied that all personnel that could be had been saved, after which he left his ship with the last boatload. The conduct of LCDR Fuqua was not only in keeping with the highest traditions of the US Naval Service but characterizes him as an outstanding leader of men.

***Hill, Edwin Joseph.** Rank and organization: Chief Boatswain, US Navy. Born: 4 October 1894, Philadelphia, PA. Accredited to Pennsylvania. Citation: For distinguished conduct in the line of his profession, extraordinary courage, and disregard of his own safety during the attack on the Fleet in Pearl Harbor by Japanese forces on 7 December 1941. During the height of the strafing and bombing, Chief Boatswain Hill led his men

of the line handling details of the USS *Nevada* to the quays, cast off the lines, and swam back to his ship. Later, while on the forecastle, attempting to let go the anchors, he was blown overboard and killed by the explosion of several bombs.

***Jones, Herbert Charpoit.** Rank and organization: Ensign, US Naval Reserve. Born: 1 December 1918, Los Angeles, CA. Accredited to California. Citation: For conspicuous devotion to duty, extraordinary courage, and complete disregard of his own life, above and beyond the call of duty, during the attack on the Fleet in Pearl Harbor by Japanese forces on 7 December 1941. Ensign Jones organized and led a party, which was supplying ammunition to the antiaircraft battery of the USS *California*, after the mechanical hoists were put out of action when he was fatally wounded by a bomb explosion. When two men attempted to take him from the area which was on fire, he refused to let them do so, saying in words to the effect, "Leave me alone! I am done for. Get out of here before the magazines go off."

***Kidd, Isaac Campbell.** Rank and organization: Rear Admiral, US Navy. Born: 26 March 1884, Cleveland, OH. Appointed from Ohio. Citation: For conspicuous devotion to duty, extraordinary courage, and complete disregard of his own life, during the attack on the Fleet in Pearl Harbor by Japanese forces on 7 December 1941. Rear Admiral Kidd immediately went to the bridge and, as Commander, Battleship Division One, courageously discharged his duties as Senior Officer Present Afloat until the USS *Arizona*, his flagship, blew up from magazine explosions and a direct bomb hit on the bridge which resulted in the loss of his life.

Pharris, Jackson Charles. Rank and organization: Lieutenant, US Navy, USS *California*. Place and date: Pearl Harbor, territory of Hawaii, 7 December 1941. Entered service in California. Born: 26 June 1912, Columbus, GA. Citation: For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while attached to the USS *California* during the surprise enemy Japanese aerial attack on Pearl Harbor, territory of Hawaii, 7 December 1941. In charge of the ordnance repair party on the third deck when the first Japanese torpedo struck almost directly under his station, Lieutenant (then Gunner) Pharris was stunned and severely injured by the concussion that hurled him to the overhead and back to the deck. Quickly recovering, he acted on his own initiative to set up a hand-supply ammunition train for the antiaircraft guns. With water and oil rushing in where the port bulkhead had been torn up from the deck, with many of the remaining crewmembers overcome by oil fumes, and the ship without power and listing heavily to port as a result of a second

torpedo hit, Lieutenant Pharris ordered the shipfitters to counterflood. Twice rendered unconscious by the nauseous fumes and handicapped by his painful injuries, he persisted in his desperate efforts to speed up the supply of ammunition and at the same time repeatedly risked his life to enter flooding compartments and drag to safety unconscious shipmates who were gradually being submerged in oil. By his inspiring leadership, his valiant efforts and his extreme loyalty to his ship and its crew, he saved many of his shipmates from death and was largely responsible for keeping the *California* in action during the attack. His heroic conduct throughout this first eventful engagement of World War II reflects the highest credit upon Lieutenant Pharris and enhances the finest traditions of the US Naval Service.

***Reeves, Thomas James.** Rank and organization: Radio Electrician (Warrant Officer), US Navy. Born: 9 December 1895, Thomaston, CT. Accredited to Connecticut. Citation: For distinguished conduct in the line of his profession, extraordinary courage, and disregard of his own safety during the attack on the Fleet in Pearl Harbor by Japanese forces on 7 December 1941. After the mechanized ammunition hoists were put out of action on the USS *California*, Reeves, on his own initiative, in a burning passageway, assisted in the maintenance of an ammunition supply by hand to the anti-aircraft guns until he was overcome by smoke and fire, which resulted in his death.

Ross, Donald Kirby. Rank and organization: Machinist, US Navy, USS *Nevada*. Place and date: Pearl Harbor, territory of Hawaii, 7 December 1941. Entered service in Denver, CO. Born: 8 December 1910, Beverly, KS. Citation: For distinguished conduct in the line of his profession, extraordinary courage, and disregard of his own life during the attack on the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, territory of Hawaii, by Japanese forces on 7 December 1941. When his station in the forward dynamo room of the USS *Nevada* became almost untenable due to smoke, steam, and heat, Machinist Ross forced his men to leave that station and performed all the duties himself until blinded and unconscious. Upon being rescued and resuscitated, he returned and secured the forward dynamo room and proceeded to the after dynamo room where he was later again rendered unconscious by exhaustion. Again recovering consciousness he returned to his station where he remained until directed to abandon it.

***Scott, Robert R.** Rank and organization: Machinist's Mate First Class, U.S. Navy. Born: 13 July 1915, Massillon, OH. Accredited to Ohio. Citation: For conspicuous devotion to duty, extraordinary courage, and complete disregard of his own life, above and beyond the call of duty,

during the attack on the Fleet in Pearl Harbor by Japanese forces on 7 December 1941. The compartment in the USS *California* in which the air compressor, to which Scott was assigned as his battle station, was flooded as the result of a torpedo hit. The remainder of the personnel evacuated that compartment but Scott refused to leave, saying words to the effect, "This is my station and I will stay and give them air as long as the guns are going."

***Tomich, Peter.** Rank and organization: Chief Watertender, US Navy. Born: 3 June 1893, Prolog, Austria. Accredited to New Jersey. Citation: For distinguished conduct in the line of his profession, extraordinary courage, and disregard of his own safety during the attack on the Fleet in Pearl Harbor by the Japanese forces on 7 December 1941. Although realizing that the ship was capsizing as a result of enemy bombing and torpedoing, Tomich remained at his post in the engineering plant of the USS *Utah* until he saw that all boilers were secured and all fire room personnel had left their stations, and by so doing lost his own life.

***Van Valkenburgh, Franklin.** Rank and organization: Captain, US Navy. Born: 5 April 1888, Minneapolis, MN. Appointed from Wisconsin. Citation: For conspicuous devotion to duty, extraordinary courage, and complete disregard of his own life during the attack on the Fleet in Pearl Harbor by Japanese forces on 7 December 1941. As commanding officer of the USS *Arizona*, Captain Van Valkenburgh gallantly fought his ship until the USS *Arizona* blew up from magazine explosions and a direct bomb hit on the bridge that resulted in the loss of his life.

***Ward, James Richard.** Rank and organization: Seaman First Class, US Navy. Born: 10 September 1921, Springfield, OH. Entered service in Springfield, OH. Citation: For conspicuous devotion to duty, extraordinary courage, and complete disregard of his life, above and beyond the call of duty, during the attack on the Fleet in Pearl Harbor by Japanese forces on 7 December 1941. When it was seen that the USS *Oklahoma* was going to capsize and the order was given to abandon ship, Ward remained in a turret holding a flashlight so the remainder of the turret crew could see to escape, thereby sacrificing his own life.

Young, Cassin. Rank and organization: Commander, US Navy. Born: 6 March 1894, Washington, DC. Appointed from Wisconsin. Other Navy award: Navy Cross. Citation: For distinguished conduct in action, outstanding heroism, and utter disregard of his own safety, above and beyond the call of duty, as commanding officer of the USS *Vestal*, during the attack on the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, territory of Hawaii, by enemy Japanese forces

on 7 December 1941. Commander Young proceeded to the bridge and later took personal command of the 3-inch antiaircraft gun. When blown overboard by the blast of the forward magazine explosion of the USS *Arizona*, to which the USS *Vestal* was moored, he swam back to his ship. The entire forward part of the USS *Arizona* was a blazing inferno with oil afire on the water between the two ships; as a result of several bomb hits, the USS *Vestal* was afire in several places, was settling, and taking on a list. Despite severe enemy bombing and strafing at the time and his shocking experience of having been blown overboard, Commander Young, with extreme coolness and calmness, moved his ship to an anchorage distant from the USS *Arizona* and subsequently beached the USS *Vestal* upon determining that such action was required to save his ship.

Another hero from Pearl Harbor was **Mess Attendant Second Class Doris Miller**. Miller was a cook on the USS *West Virginia*, and during the attack, he was assisting the wounded when he was told to assist the mortally wounded captain. After the captain died, Miller manned a machine gun and fired at the Japanese planes. Miller had never fired a machine gun before but was able to hit one of the attacking planes. Miller was the first African-American to be awarded the Navy Cross. Rank and organization: Mess Attendant Second Class, US Navy. Born: 12 October 1919, Waco, TX. Appointed from Texas. Citation: For distinguished devotion to duty, extraordinary courage, and disregard for his own personal safety during the attack on the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, territory of Hawaii, by Japanese forces on 7 December 1941. While at the side of his captain on the bridge, Miller, despite enemy strafing and bombing and in the face of a serious fire, assisted in moving his captain, who had been mortally wounded, to a place of greater safety, and later manned and operated a machine gun directed at enemy Japanese attacking aircraft until ordered to leave the bridge.

Bibliography

While not comprehensive, this bibliography provides a list of publications that will be useful for staff ride preparation.

I. Conducting a Staff Ride

Robertson, William G. *The Staff Ride*. Washington DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1987.

This book is the US Army's "doctrine" for conducting staff rides and offers information on organizing and conducting staff rides.

II. Battle

Barkley, Alben W. *Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1946.

Between December 1941 and June 1946 the government conducted official inquiries—the Roberts Commission, Hart Inquiry, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry, Clark Investigation, Clausen Investigation, Hewitt Inquiry—into the Pearl Harbor attack. These investigations gathered numerous valuable documents that the Seventy-Ninth Congress compiled during its investigation. The 40 volumes provide valuable information about the attack.

Burlingame, Burl. *Advance Force Pearl Harbor*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992.

A detailed history of the Japanese submarine operations during the attack.

Cohen, Stan. *Attack on Pearl Harbor: A Pictorial History*. Missoula, MT: Pictorial Histories Publishing Co., Inc., 2001.

A superb collection of photos from the attack.

Farago, Ladislav. *The Broken Seal*. New York: Random House, 1967.

An excellent book on "Operation Magic" before the attack.

Goldstein, Donald M. and Katherine V. Dillon, eds. *The Pearl Harbor Papers*. New York: Brassey's, 1993.

A first-rate collection of original Japanese documents about the attack.

Kimmet, Larry and Margaret Regis. *The Attack on Pearl Harbor*. Seattle, WA: Navigator Publishing, 1991.

This oversized paperback, available from the US Park Service Web site, is an outstanding illustrated (many valuable pictures) volume on the attack.

Lambert, John W. and Norman Polmar. *Defenseless: Command Failure at Pearl Harbor*. St. Paul, MN: Motorbooks International, 2003.

This book investigates the culpability of Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short.

Prange, Gordon W. *At Dawn We Slept*. New York: Penguin Books, 1981.

Arguably, the best single volume for a detailed study of both sides' preparations, the attack, and the aftermath.

Smith, Stanley H., ed. *Investigations of the Attack on Pearl Harbor—Index to Government Hearings*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1990.

Smith's index of the 40 volumes the Seventy-Ninth Congress gathered is a valuable tool in navigating the exhibits of the investigations. See *Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*.

Van Der Vat, Dan. *Pearl Harbor: The Day of Infamy—An Illustrated History*. Toronto: Madison Press Books, 2001.

Another illustrated book on the attack and its aftermath.

Willmott, H.P. *Pearl Harbor*. London: Cassell & Co., 2001.

This is an excellent recent publication that covers the attack from all perspectives. Do not let the coffee table book look deceive you; this is an excellent source.

Wohlstetter, Roberta. *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962.

This excellent book details all of the warnings the United States had before Pearl Harbor and discusses how it must be able to "filter" the many reports to separate the good from the bad to prevent a future attack.

III. Biographies

Roosevelt

Freidel, Frank. *Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Rendezvous With Destiny*. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, & Co., 1990.

Good biographies of Franklin abound, but this is an excellent one-volume biography.

Kimmel

Beach, Edward L. *Scapegoats: A Defense of Kimmel and Short at Pearl Harbor*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995.

A modern-day defense of Kimmel and Short.

Brownlow, Donald G. *The Accused: The Ordeal of Rear Admiral Husband Edward Kimmel, U.S.N.* New York: Vantage, 1968.

A good, general biography of Kimmel.

Kimmel, Husband Edward. *Admiral Kimmel's Story*. Chicago: Regnery, 1955.

Kimmel's defense of his actions concerning the attack.

Short

Anderson, Charles R. *Day of Lightning, Years of Scorn: Walter C. Short and the Attack on Pearl Harbor*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004.

A brand new biography on a soldier who has been ignored for too long.

Tojo

Butow, Robert J.C. *Tojo and the Coming of the War*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1961.

The definitive biography of Tojo.

Yamamoto

Hoyt, Edwin B. *Yamamoto: The Man Who Planned Pearl Harbor*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990.

A very good biography of Yamamoto.

Fuchida

Prange, Gordon. *God's Samurai: Lead Pilot at Pearl Harbor*. New York: Brassey's, 1990.

Gordon Prange interviewed Fuchida extensively for his book *At Dawn We Slept*. He wrote this biography based on those interviews.

Other

Kean, Thomas H., chairman. *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2004.

About the Author

Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey J. “Benny” Gudmens was born in Cincinnati, Ohio. He received a B.A. in history from the University of Dayton and an M.A. in Civil War studies from American Military University. His assignments include platoon leader and company executive officer, 82d Airborne Division; airborne company command, 6th Division; assistant G3 air, XVIII Airborne Corps during Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM; observer/controller, Joint Readiness Training Center; battalion operations officer, 5-20 Infantry, Fort Lewis, Washington; operations officer, Battle Command Training Program, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and operations adviser to the Royal Saudi Land Forces. He is currently Chief, Staff Ride Team, Combat Studies Institute, US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.