[Senate Hearing 109-351]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-351
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
On
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
__________
NOVEMBER 15, 2005
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
______
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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico, Chairman
LARRY E. CRAIG, Idaho JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska RON WYDEN, Oregon
RICHARD M. BURR, North Carolina, TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
CONRAD BURNS, Montana MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey
GORDON SMITH, Oregon KEN SALAZAR, Colorado
JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
Alex Flint, Staff Director
Judith K. Pensabene, Chief Counsel
Bob Simon, Democratic Staff Director
Sam Fowler, Democratic Chief Counsel
Clint Williamson, Professional Staff Member
Jonathan Epstein, Democratic Legislative Fellow
C O N T E N T S
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STATEMENTS
Page
Allard, Hon. Wayne, U.S. Senator from Colorado................... 3
Domenici, Hon. Pete V., U.S. Senator from New Mexico............. 1
Rispoli, James A., Assistant Secretary for Environmental
Management, Depart of Energy................................... 12
Salazar, Hon. Ken, U.S. Senator from Colorado.................... 8
Smith, Hon. Gordon, U.S. Senator from Oregon..................... 2
Tuor, Nancy, President and CEO, Kaiser-Hill Company, LLC,
Broomfield, CO................................................. 6
APPENDIX
Responses to additional questions................................ 33
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
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TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room
SD-366, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Pete V. Domenici,
chairman, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PETE V. DOMENICI,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO
The Chairman. The hearing will please come to order.
Senator Bingaman has advised me that he's attending a
Finance Committee hearing, which is urgent, on the tax matters,
and that he will come soon. There are two additional Senators
that have matters in their State that are similar, who have
indicated they're going to come, but we have seven stacked
votes at 10:45, so it's important that we start.
I have a statement that I was going to give, but I'm going
to put it in the record and abbreviate my remarks.
Today, we're going to hear from those who were involved in
the cleanup at Rocky Flats. We're going to hear from Senator
Allard and Assistant Secretary Rispoli. And we're going to hear
from Ms. Tuor. They're going to talk about the success story.
Then we're going to proceed with testimony regarding the other
activities regarding cleanup.
Suffice it to say that, aside from the statement which
recaps all of this, one of the success stories--real success
stories--with reference to environmental cleanup has been the
Rocky Flats story, the Rocky Flats event, and I am very pleased
to hold it up, because it does set forth that something can be
done, and we can get to the end of the line. We don't have to
continue for year upon year with a project that is in the
nature of cleanup. I'm hopeful that we're going to, by
analyzing all this, get to the bottom of the difference between
one cleanup project and another. I'm not sure we can do that,
but I have a surmise about one of the differences. But let's
proceed.
Senator Allard, we'd like to hear from you first.
[The prepared statements of Senators Domenici and Smith
follow:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Pete V. Domenici, U.S. Senator
From New Mexico
This hearing of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee on the
Office of Environmental Management at the Department of Energy shall
come to order.
The purpose of this hearing is to evaluate progress in the
Environmental Management (EM) Program of the Department of Energy (DOE)
and to learn about the recent success story at the former DOE weapons
facility at Rocky Flats in Colorado.
The EM program inherited the responsibility for the cleanup of 114
sites involved with past nuclear weapons activities. Those sites cover
a vast area, over 2 million acres--the equivalent land area of Rhode
Island and Delaware combined.
This program is the largest single function within the Department,
the Congress has funded this program at $6.66 billion in FY 06, $116
million more than the Administration's budget proposal. This represents
nearly one-third of the Departments total budget.
In addition to a progress report on the overall EM programs, I look
forward to learning from our witnesses today about the success at Rocky
Flats and the issues associated with cost overruns and project delays
at the Hanford Site and other current issues.
Specifically on Rocky Flats, I am hopeful that this monumental
achievement is not discounted as a one-time miracle. The Department
faces numerous challenges in the management of operations and the
cleanup of liabilities from legacy sites. It would be an unacceptable
outcome if we did not apply the successful lessons learned during the
clean-up at Rocky Flats.
I understand the desire to impose greater rigor in the management
of the Department's projects. When you look at the Waste Treatment
Plant and the Yucca Mountain Project, clearly there is a need to impose
fundamental principles of project management. However, I want to
caution the Department not to forget the wonderful result from daring
to accelerate and overachieve. We have the perfect example of these
lofty goals before us today.
I would ask the Department not to learn the wrong lesson from its
present challenges. The American public does not want you to default to
decade's long schedules and unfathomable budgets. We want you to look
for constant improvement and acceleration.
I hope that our witnesses today can tell us some good news and
address these complex issues so that we can all better understand the
status of clean-up of our facilities from the Cold War.
Testifying today are:
My friend and colleague, Senator Wayne Allard from the great State
of Colorado.
The Honorable Jim Rispoli, Assistant Secretary of Energy for
Environmental Management of the Department of Energy.
And finally, Nancy Tour, President and CEO of Kaiser-Hill Company
in Colorado. Welcome.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Gordon Smith, U.S. Senator From Oregon
Chairman Domenici, thank you for convening this hearing on the
Environmental Management Programs of the Department of Energy. We all
understand the importance of following through on the cleanup of the
extensive environmental problems resulting from our nuclear weapons
research, development, and production programs of the past half
century. Congress and the Administration share the responsibility for
ensuring that cleanup programs are scientifically sound and efficient.
Hearings such as this are essential to our successful collaboration in
carrying out that cleanup responsibility.
I also want to thank Mr. Rispoli for testifying on behalf of the
Department of Energy to share information concerning the Department's
Environmental Programs, and Ms. Tuor for reporting on Kaiser-Hill's
progress on the cleanup of Rocky Flats.
I want to congratulate the Department and its contractors on the
completion of the cleanup at the Rock Flats nuclear site in Colorado.
The closure of Rocky Flats represents a noteworthy success in this
nuclear complex cleanup campaign. Because of Senator Allard's
commitment to putting this milestone ``in our rear view mirror,'' I
appreciate his comments here to highlight this accomplishment in his
home state.
Of course, we're not nearly done with this overall cleanup
campaign. This celebration of a major victory also must serve as a
point of redoubled commitment to planning and implementing the best
nuclear complex cleanup that we can deliver to the American people. It
needs to be carefully planned--with changes in plans as appropriate--
reflecting new science or technology as those become available. It must
also be implemented by the most capable team that we can access for the
task. And, Mr. Rispoli, I commend your commitment to application of
systematic and thorough project management practices throughout this
campaign.
I do want to raise several specific issues of particular concern to
me and to my constituents. These all relate to the cleanup of the
Hanford site, just across the Columbia River from Oregon in our
neighboring State of Washington. My most immediate concern has to do
with the safety of the Columbia River itself. As you know, 67 of the
177 large waste storage tanks at Hanford have been identified as
``leakers.'' According to the Oregon Department of Energy, some of that
leaking waste has already reached groundwater. While I understand that
the level of contamination detected thus far doesn't represent a threat
to humans or other species, it is vital that we take whatever actions
are necessary to make sure we don't end up with a safety issue in the
Columbia River.
My second concern relates to a potential project management issue.
We all understand that emptying or stabilizing the wastes in those 177
tanks in a benign state is a critical element in the cleanup of
Hanford. In 2003, CH2MHill estimated that all of the wastes from one of
the earliest tank fields, the C-tank field, could be removed by
September 2006, for a total of $90 million. However, a recent Inspector
General report states that the schedule won't be met, and the budget is
likely to be $215 million. I would like a clear explanation, please, of
why we are seeing this schedule delay along with this substantial cost
increase. Is some of this due to unforeseeable events or technological
issues? How much is attributed to contractor performance issues, and
how much of this reflects inadequate project management? Most
importantly, what is the real schedule for emptying these tanks, and
what does it tell us about the plan for emptying all of the rest of the
tanks?
Finally, while we've achieved an important milestone in the closure
of the Rocky Flats cleanup project, we still have a long way to go. We
are still facing decades of cleanup efforts at Hanford alone, costing
hundreds of millions of dollars. I am committed to doing my best to
ensure that the federal government fulfills this national cleanup
responsibility. We need to be able to assure the residents of the
Pacific Northwest that we'll follow through. In this context, I ask you
to be sure that the Department is recommending an appropriate and
adequate plan and budget for continuing the Hanford cleanup. I also
urge you to identify and implement mechanisms to strengthen this
cleanup effort.
Thank you, again, for appearing before the Committee today and for
sharing your thoughts on carrying out this nuclear weapons complex
cleanup campaign.
STATEMENT OF HON. WAYNE ALLARD, U.S. SENATOR
FROM COLORADO
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And, like many of
your committee members, I have another committee. We'll have
Dr. Bernanke, Federal Reserve chairman, in the other committee.
So, as soon as I've made my testimony, I would like to be
dismissed.
Mr. Chairman, I'm pleased to testify before this committee
and discuss one of the Department of Energy's greatest
achievements, and that is the cleanup of Rocky Flats, the
largest site in the 25-year history of Superfund that has been
cleaned up.
As you know, Rocky Flats is located just a few miles
northwest of Denver, Colorado. For over 4 decades, this
facility was the Department of Energy's dedicated site for
manufacturing plutonium pits for the U.S. nuclear weapons
stockpile. This highly classified production facility was run
by over 8,000 Coloradans, who worked day and night for most of
the cold war. These Coloradans were cold-war heroes who kept
America's nuclear deterrence strong and helped protect our
country.
When plutonium-pit production ended in 1991, the cleanup of
Rocky Flats was uncertain, at best. No one knew quite how to
proceed. The cleanup of a site this contaminated had never been
considered before. Tons of weapons-grade plutonium, plutonium
compounds, uranium, and other radioactive metallic residues
remained. Significant volumes of hazardous and radioactive
waste generated during the decades of production would need to
be removed. Building 771, in particular, was so contaminated
that it was dubbed by the national media as ``the most
dangerous building in America.''
In 1995, the expected cleanup of Rocky Flats was estimated
to cost approximately $35 billion and take over 70 years to
complete. Few believed that they would be alive when the site
was finally cleaned up. Yet, 5 years after that date, the
cleanup agreement was signed. The contractor, Kaiser-Hill, has
done something few of us have believed possible. On October 13
of this year, Kaiser-Hill declared the cleanup of Rocky Flats
complete.
Mr. Chairman, as you see in these photos, you won't find
any buildings or structures on Rocky Flats. You won't find any
radioactive materials that exceeded natural background levels.
Even the roads have been torn up and removed. The site has been
returned to the way it was before plutonium production at Rocky
Flats began. It is now a beautiful open space that we can all
enjoy.
Although much has been achieved over the last 5 years, it
was not easy, and a number of challenges had to be overcome.
Let me share a couple of lessons learned, which, from my
perspective, were key to the successful cleanup of Rocky Flats.
First, we discovered what we should have always known. We
discovered that those who are appropriately incentivized can,
and will, achieve incredibly difficult goals. Kaiser-Hill, the
Rocky Flats cleanup prime contractor, agreed to a tough cleanup
timetable for the cleanup of the site without fully knowing the
extent of the contamination or the level of cleanup that would
be required. It was a risk on the company's part. But the
incentives for success made the risk worthwhile.
I applaud the Department of Energy for its creativity in
negotiating the Rocky Flats cleanup contract. And I commend
Nancy Tuor, Bob Card, Jesse Roberson, and the many others who
worked hard for Kaiser-Hill to meet and exceed the goals of the
cleanup contract.
Second, we learned the value of State and local support. We
were fortunate in Rocky Flats to have a number of local, city
and county governments who embraced accelerated cleanup and did
everything they could to support it. The Rocky Flats coalition
of local governments, in particular, played a pivotal role in
ensuring the cleanup was done right the first time.
The State of Colorado also deserves tremendous credit for
agreeing to an accelerated cleanup plan that allowed the
Department of Energy to move forward without a formal record of
decision prior to cleanup activities. In an unusual
partnership, the State of Colorado joined with the
Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Energy in
an effort to work together to verify and monitor proposed
cleanup remedies. This collaboration allowed these parties to
solve problems and deal with issues before they got out of
hand.
Community organizations, like the Rocky Flat Citizens
Advisory Board and the Rocky Mountain Peace and Justice Center,
also played an important role. These organizations demanded
that Department of Energy live up to its cleanup commitments,
and refused to allow the Department to take shortcuts.
The third lesson that I took away from the Rocky Flats
cleanup is that the workers must buy into the cleanup. The
workers can make or break the cleanup. If they work hard, as
they did in Rocky Flats, then I believe even the most difficult
cleanup becomes possible. However, if the workers are not
appropriately incentivized, or if the workers see their jobs as
lifetime employment, then the broad project can quickly fall
behind schedule and experience enormous cost growth.
The workers at Rocky Flats believed in the cleanup and did
everything they could to meet the goals set for them. They
learned new jobs. They wore extremely uncomfortable respiratory
gear. They removed some of the most dangerous radioactive waste
known to man. And they did this knowing that their job was
going to come to an end.
I cannot fully express the respect and admiration I have
for the workers at Rocky Flats. They made the impossible
possible, and deserve the lion's share of credit for completing
the Rocky Flats cleanup a year and 3 months ahead of schedule.
Their actions saved the American people over $500 million in
fiscal year 2007, alone.
And last, Mr. Chairman, I would be remiss if I did not
express my gratitude and thanks to you, Ranking Member
Bingaman, and the other members of this committee for the
support you've provided for the accelerated cleanup of Rocky
Flats. Your leadership, Mr. Chairman, in particular, was key to
ensuring that we had the necessary funding and particular
support to get this project done ahead of schedule and under
cost.
As the Department of Energy turns its focus on other
cleanup sites, it is my hope that the lessons learned at Rocky
Flats will not be forgotten. The accelerated cleanups are
possible, and the savings to the American taxpayer can be very
significant. We need to do everything we can to encourage
accelerated cleanups, and you can count on my continued support
in that effort.
Mr. Chairman, I encourage you and other members of the
committee to tour Rocky Flats when you're in Colorado next. I
agree that you will be impressed by how we've turned a highly
contaminated nuclear-weapons production facility into a natural
wildlife refuge.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony, and thank you
for the opportunity to share my thoughts with the committee.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator, I might also add--I know you intended this--the
Appropriations Subcommittee, of which you now serve, that I
have been privileged to chair, is the one that appropriates the
money for this. And this is the only shining light we have as
we annually struggle with how in the world Americans are going
to be able to pay for the cleanup as it's occurring. And I want
to express, in the record, not only my appreciation, but my
genuine admiration for the contractor, the Department, the
State and local entities, and the regulatory groups, because I
believe this is not only unique in its conclusion, but it's
unique in its inception. It started in a way that the other
cleanup around the country did not, and probably would not,
have started, because this was not started with rancor among
the participants, but, rather, with the willingness to join
together and get it done. And, second, I think it was probably
clear from the beginning that the employees would not be there
forever, this would not be a constant, continual forever-source
of payroll checks for the area. Before we're finished, I'm
going to ask about that. But, you know, what we hear most, or
as much as anything, about the other projects, is, ``If you cut
it, so many people lose their jobs,'' or, ``If you get less
money, so many people will be unemployed.'' It's very
difficult, we know. But, frankly, these were not intended to be
hundred-year laboratories. They were intended to be something
else.
So, thanks for your interest, and for what you've done. And
to those who I have just mentioned, my--did I mention the
Department of Energy? If I didn't, I should, because this is
one of their real flags, that they decided that they could get
a start here and try to do it right, from the beginning. And
they did.
So, thank you, Senator.
Senator Allard. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your
comments. It was a pleasure to deal with people who kept their
commitments in this project.
The Chairman. Now, we're going to move quickly, because of
time, as the Senator indicated, as I indicated. We have seven
stacked votes starting soon. Not enough time to hear everybody.
But we're going to move to you and ask if you'd please handle
your statement as expeditious as you can so I can get to
Secretary Rispoli, and then ask a few questions.
Please proceed.
Ms. Tuor. Thank you. I will, sir.
STATEMENT OF NANCY TUOR, PRESIDENT AND CEO, KAISER-HILL
COMPANY, LLC, BROOMFIELD, CO
Ms. Tuor. Chairman Domenici, Senator Bingaman, committee
members, I am pleased to be here today. And I am even more
pleased to report to you the safe completion of the accelerated
closure of Rocky Flats. On behalf of the entire project team,
please accept our sincere appreciation for your leadership over
the years.
It is a pleasure to be here with Senator Allard, who has
dedicated a significant portion of his Senate career to
ensuring the successful completion of this project.
I'm also happy to join Assistant Secretary Jim Rispoli
today. He represents so many people in the Environmental
Management Program who have provided leadership and support for
the Rocky Flats project.
I would also like to recognize the work Senator Salazar has
done in Congress and, previously, as our attorney general in
Colorado.
The closure of Rocky Flats is a monumental accomplishment
that could not have been possible without the support of this
committee and without the commitment, efforts and dedication of
the entire Colorado congressional delegation, the U.S.
Department of Energy from the Rocky Flats project office, all
the way to DOE headquarters, and, ultimately, Secretary of
Energy Sam Bodman. This vision, support and commitment spanned
three administrations and involved the collaborative efforts of
many DOE sites across the country.
On October 13, 2005, this vision became a reality. At 9:15
that day, Kaiser-Hill declared to DOE the physical completion
of the Rocky Flats closure project, culminating a 10-year, $7
billion project, making Rocky Flats the largest nuclear
decommissioning project to be completed anywhere in the world.
Moreover, it was done through a consultative process with the
community and our regulators, using risk-based methods to
ensure that real threats to public health and the environment
received the highest priority.
When Kaiser-Hill took on the job of the Rocky Flats cleanup
in 1995, official reports estimated that the cleanup would take
7 decades and cost $37 billion. When Kaiser-Kill and DOE signed
the follow-on closure contract in January 2000, many thought
accelerated cleanup was just a pipe dream. The Government's own
General Accounting Office questioned the viability of the
project; not once, but twice issuing reports calling closure,
even by 2006, unlikely. Yet today I report to you that the
Rocky Flats closure was completed more than a year ahead of the
aggressive 2006 schedule, ultimately delivering nearly $30
billion in taxpayer savings and taking a $600 million-a-year
liability off the DOE books forever.
This was a monumental effort that included the remediation
of the toxic legacy from 4 decades of nuclear weapons
production. It has literally turned from an environmental
liability to an asset for the community.
Highlights of the accomplishment include the removal of 21
tons of weapons-usable plutonium and highly enriched uranium,
the disposition of 106 metric tons of high-content plutonium
residues, the remediation and/or closure of more than 360 areas
of potential environmental contamination, the demolition of
more than 3.6 million square feet of buildings, including more
than 1 million square feet of highly contaminated nuclear
production facilities, and the off-site shipment and disposal
of more than 600,000 cubic meters of radioactive waste.
Many, many factors contributed to the success of this
project, from the day-to-day involvement and support of DOE at
all levels to the efforts and innovation of our workforce.
A few of the most important success factors included the
establishment of a clear vision for a closure and a sense of
urgency for the mission; strong bipartisan support; stable
project funding; dramatic improvements in safety; the unique
nature of the incentive-based closure contract; effective
technology funding and deployment; innovations in regulatory
processes embedded in the unique Rocky Flats cleanup agreement,
coupled with strong leadership from the Colorado State
government; and finally, a dedicated and talented workforce
that got in there each and every day and came up with the best
way to safely get the job done.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today and to join
Senator Allard, Assistant Secretary Rispoli, and the entire
committee in celebrating this shared success.
I look forward to answering your questions about the
accelerated closure of Rocky Flats.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Secretary, we're going to wait just a moment for your
testimony.
Senator Salazar, you were mentioned by our witness as part
of not only the Senate team that worked on this, but the
Colorado team, when you were in your job as attorney general.
Would you like to just make a few observations? I would tell
you, at 10:45, we must vote on seven consecutive votes, but
we're going to try to get the next witness in, and some
questions.
With that, I'd yield to you.
STATEMENT OF HON. KEN SALAZAR, U.S. SENATOR
FROM COLORADO
Senator Salazar. Thank you very much, Senator Domenici. Let
me just, first, say that I'm proud of the work of the Senate
and this committee in making sure that the funds were, in fact,
available for the completion of the cleanup at Rocky Flats,
proud of the work of the Department of Energy and Kaiser-Hill,
in this very successful effort.
I have a prepared statement, Mr. Chairman, that I will
submit for the record. But I would like to say a couple of
things about this project, because I think it's a very
important template.
First, this was a project which transcended
administrations, Republicans and Democrats, but really showed
us a way in which, when we can work together, things can, in
fact, happen. You know, I remember well, in 1995, when the
process was just beginning, that we were in the middle of the
Clinton administration. And the project has now been completed
during the Bush administration. And I think what it has shown
is, when you have the kind of effort, with the local
governments and communities involved, and the employees of the
Department of Energy, along with a company that had a vision
and a willingness to take a risk to get the job done on time,
that we, in fact, accomplished something which was miraculous.
And, at the end of the day, what this means for Colorado, and
for America, is, one, we're a more secure Nation, because this
plutonium factory has been dismantled appropriately, and,
second, we have been able to do it in a manner that has saved
the taxpayer billions and billions of dollars.
So, I think it is a kind of template that we can continue
to look at as we look at other sites around the country which,
seemingly, appear to be intractable, in terms of their cost and
how we're going to ultimately deal with their cleanup.
And so, I appreciate this being a model. I appreciate the
work of my colleagues, including Senator Allard and others who
have worked on this project over the years, Senator Campbell,
and, on the House side, Representative Skaggs, who did a lot of
work on this.
And, Senator Domenici, thank you, again, for your personal
interest in this very important project for our Nation.
[The prepared statement of Senator Salazar follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ken Salazar, U.S. Senator From Colorado
Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am delighted to welcome my
friend and colleague, Senator Allard, to our committee meeting today,
as well as Assistant Secretary Rispoli, whom I met in this same room
just a few months ago, and Ms. Tuor, whom I know from our efforts
together on the Rocky Flats cleanup. Thank you all for being here.
As Colorado's Attorney General, I spent a lot of time and energy
working on the many issues presented by Rocky Flats. I am happy today
to point to the clean up of Rocky Flats as a shining example of what
the government, private industry and American workers can do when we
work together.
We will soon celebrate the successful completion of the clean up of
one of the most contaminated sites on earth. This cleanup will protect
human health and our environment, and--we don't get to say this very
often--it was completed under budget and more than a year ahead of
schedule.
Things at Rocky Flats didn't always look so rosy, so it's important
to look back and understand how we arrived at this day. There were
years of tension between the federal government and the State of
Colorado over the operations and the clean up at Rocky Flats. Finally,
the Department of Energy, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and
the State came together to establish standards and processes to assure
that this former nuclear weapons facility can one day become a National
Wildlife Refuge. As Colorado's Attorney General, I worked with
Colorado's Governor, Bill Owens, and the Colorado legislature to enact
a state law to ensure the long term safety of former Superfund sites
like Rocky Flats by permanently restricting future development on the
site. I am proud to see the Department of Energy working with the State
of Colorado to use that same state law to create permanent protections
for Rocky Flats.
The officials of the Department of Energy and the representatives
of Kaiser-Hill negotiated a contract with appropriate targets,
incentives, standards and flexibility, and Kaiser-Hill, under your
guidance, Ms. Tuor, skillfully managed a very complex project.
Congress, with the strong support of Colorado's Congressional
delegation and the leadership of this Committee, gave the necessary
authorization for this new approach and, when necessary, gave the
parties a good push in the right direction. As I said, the clean up at
Rocky Flats is a model of what we can accomplish when government and
private industry work hand in hand.
Finally, let me offer my thanks and my admiration to the hard-
working men and women whose ingenuity and dedication made this happen.
Many of the same men and women who worked at Rocky Flats to produce the
nuclear weapons that helped end the Cold War later worked just as hard
to clean up this Cold War site so that it can become a National
Wildlife Refuge, a place for recreation and spiritual renewal. Many of
these patriotic Cold War veterans have died and many more are suffering
today from illnesses caused by exposure to radiation at Rocky Flats. As
we celebrate our successes, let us remember those who paid dearly to
bring us to this day. And let us also remember that it was their
innovation and their committed efforts that played a very large role in
completing this project under budget and ahead of schedule. The Rocky
Flats workers are the real heroes of this story.
As we look ahead to more successful cleanups at other former
nuclear sites, we should remember that, at all these sites, it will be
American working men and women who bear the risks and who get the job
done. Let's make sure we treat them with fairness and with respect.
Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Bingaman. And thank you,
Assistant Secretary Rispoli and Ms. Tuor for your presence today.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Ms. Tuor, could you, for the record, tell us how the
environmental regulatory aspects of this were ``innovative''?
You used that word. I'd like to have you tell us--not now,
because we don't have enough time--how they were agreed upon.
I'm not going to say ``changed,'' because some people think
that means we cut corners, but much of the delay in other
projects is the inability to come to grips with regulations and
regulatory problems, and they become intractable, to borrow
your word, and then litigation ensues and everything ends up
taking forever. So, would you do that for us? Whatever help you
need. And would you help with that, Mr. Secretary, so we could
have that? I assume we agreed on some regulatory approaches
that were unique and different here, did we not?
Ms. Tuor. Yes, we did, sir. We used efforts that were
already in the Superfund law--the accelerated action methods
that are in the law, but not often used. So, we would be glad
to give you a white paper on how we believe that came together
and what it accomplished.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, before you testify, would it
be fair to say that the Department is aware of those kinds of
initiatives and their positive effect on getting this done?
Mr. Rispoli. Yes, Mr. Chairman, it is fair to say that. In
fact, I think, because of the tremendous working arrangement in
the State of Colorado, there were--there was much more focus on
accomplishment rather than specific milestones. And that gave
the contractor much more flexibility in keeping the momentum up
and working on things that had to be worked on.
The Chairman. Let's stay on this line of questioning, if we
could.
Mr. Rispoli. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Now, when you ended up here--either or both
of you--we had this site--when we ended up, we have this site,
as you've depicted it. I wish it would get a lot more notoriety
in the country, because all we hear about is that, ``We can't
clean up radiation; therefore, we ought to give up.'' What is
that site now, as far as human use? Can I go out there and walk
on it?
Ms. Tuor. Not today, sir. It is currently locked up----
The Chairman. Why?
Ms. Tuor [continuing]. Finishing the paperwork----
The Chairman. Okay.
Ms. Tuor [continuing]. That will de-list it from the
Superfund site. Then, Mr. Chairman, once that de-listing has
occurred, it will formally be turned over to the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, under the Department of the Interior, and
they will then manage it as a national wildlife refuge. They
have not yet announced when it will be open for public access.
The Chairman. But maybe my question, following on that,
would be: Is it currently, in terms of the adequacy of the
formerly contaminated site--does it qualify for wilderness, if
all these processes are finished?
Ms. Tuor. Yes, Mr. Chairman, it does. It has been cleaned
up to a public health standard that will allow public access.
And, indeed, the most restrictive use was to look at the
wildlife refuge workers, since they would be spending 40 hours
a week on the site. And it is adequate for their protection.
The Chairman. That's truly a remarkable achievement.
One last question. I was being very honest a while ago when
I said that in the Appropriations Committee--incidentally,
that's where the money comes from, and I happen to be on that--
every year, we have to appropriate all the money for all the
cleanup projects. It's beginning to be one of the largest
components of this appropriations bill. It comes out of the
Department of Defense, incidentally, Senator. It's transferred
from them to this subcommittee, that is not Defense, to be
spent. So, to the extent that we spend it, it diminishes the
Defense budget for other things.
But what we always hear is, ``You've got to fund it fully,
because we've got to keep these jobs that are there.'' Now,
we've been at that, in some instances--and I don't--I mean,
it's clear that--at Savannah River, in South Carolina. But
what's the difference between yours and theirs? How do the
people accommodate to the realistic idea that their jobs are
going to end, pretty--you know, probably while they're still
working, and--still working people and still wanting jobs? How
is that done?
Ms. Tuor. I think, Mr. Chairman, there were two points I
would make. First, it was very difficult, and a real leadership
challenge, to convince the people, who had gone to work at
Rocky Flats thinking they would retire there, that there was a
benefit to them working themselves out of their jobs. The two
key assets were incentives that we did share with the employees
out of our earnings, and rekindling the pride they had in the
role they had played in, they believed, winning the cold war,
and having the opportunity to bring that full circle and turn a
liability in the community back to an asset to the community.
But, second, I would tell you, we did benefit from the fact
that Rocky Flats is part of a larger regional economy, which,
when we proposed the accelerated cleanup, was quite robust.
In short, I think it's fair to say that the community
viewed Rocky Flats as a greater asset gone than it did as a job
provider. And that was a key benefit to us in our political
efforts.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, we've been speaking and using
the word here regularly, ``incentives.'' What does that mean,
in terms of Rocky Flats? And how is it applied in other
cleanups, if it is?
Mr. Rispoli. Mr. Chairman, the way that incentives are
used, in this contract and in others, is that incentives are
basically a profit pool, if you will, a set-aside amount of
money in the contract that's available for superior performance
on schedule and cost containment. And the Department has
generally gone to that type of a format in all of our
contracts. It worked particularly well at Rocky Flats, because
there was a finite end date in the near term, as a few of our
other sites also have. The end dates were well known. Again, as
has been stated, the cooperative environment in the State of
Colorado was very, very supportive. And we had a good
commitment to funding. And so, with all of that said, it
enabled the contractor to keep up with the momentum. If they
ran into a problem in one area, they could move the workforce
to another to keep the forward motion going and keep on
schedule. And all of that just worked amazingly well at Rocky
Flats.
We have learned from this. We have applied the same types
of incentives for schedule and cost control to other contracts.
Obviously, when you have those that have a more near-term
closure and a well-known end date, it is more straightforward,
you might say, to apply. It's a little more difficult at very
large sites, where you have to pick out segments of the work
and apply those incentives to each segment individually.
The Chairman. Let me follow up there, and then I'll ask the
Senator if he has some questions.
Would it be correct to assume that, in your case, the time
you started entering into the agreements with the contractor,
Kaiser-Hill, that those were brand new? You didn't have any
contracts that extended over a long period of time that had
covenants and agreements between local units and the
government? They were all done when this project started? Do
you understand what I'm getting at?
Mr. Rispoli. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I do--I believe I do. This
contract was clearly the flagship in being innovative in this
approach. As was mentioned by both Senator Allard and Nancy
Tuor, it took a great deal of commitment and innovative
approach on both the part of the company and on the part of DOE
to set this contract in place. And I do believe we've learned
greatly from the accomplishments, and, therefore, the format,
of the contract and the way that it was incentivized.
The Chairman. Do you have any questions at this point,
Senator?
Senator Salazar. Keep going. I----
The Chairman. I was going to ask Mr. Rispoli if he'd take 3
or 4 minutes to give us his statement.
Your statement will be made a part of the record. But let's
ask you, Mr. Secretary, to abbreviate your statement. Then
we'll ask some more questions.
Mr. Rispoli. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
STATEMENT OF JAMES A. RISPOLI, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. Rispoli. Chairman Domenici and members of the
committee, I'm pleased to be here today to discuss the
Department of Energy's Environmental Management program.
I would like to particularly thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
this committee, for your strong support of the EM program. In
particular, I'd like to recognize not only your efforts, but
also those of Senator Allard, with respect to the cleanup of
the Rocky Flats site. I would also like to thank Senator
Salazar for your work on Rocky Flats at the State level and
since coming to Congress. And certainly I would like to
acknowledge the remarkable performance by Nancy Tuor and the
entire Kaiser-Hill organization.
Since I first appeared before you in July, during my
confirmation hearing, and since being sworn in on August 10,
I've been familiarizing myself with the program, the issues,
and the people. I have visited ten of our sites since then.
It's clear to me we have a driven workforce that's making
immense headway in some of the Nation's most crucial
environmental actions.
We've made significant progress, as you have obviously
recognized, in the last 4 years, shifting focus from risk
management to risk reduction and cleanup and completion. Most
notably, not only do we have Rocky Flats as an example, but
we're on schedule to clean up Fernald and Mound and a number of
other sites during fiscal year 2006.
My written statement has specific accomplishments, and
they're in the record, but I'd like to say that all those who
contributed to those successes should be proud to have played a
part, and we thank this committee, in particular, for your
support.
As you know, this is not an easy mission. The most visible
example is the waste treatment plant at Hanford. It's arguably
the largest, most complex construction project in the Nation,
equivalent to building two nuclear reactors. As you know, that
project is encountering design and construction setbacks. I
would like you to know that Secretary Bodman and the Department
have remained absolutely committed to fix the problems
correctly. We are working with the Corps of Engineers and our
contractors, taking several major actions to ensure that we
fully understand what is required to complete construction and
begin operations.
I'd like to briefly mention safety, because I know that's
of interest to you, and to this committee. It affects everyone
involved--the employees, the Federal employees, the contractor
employees, the site, and the community. I have told our field
managers, everywhere I go, that safety must be our first
priority. No schedule, no milestone, is worth any injury to the
workforce.
It's vital that we acquire the best services and attract
the best contractors, including small business. Obviously, we
must sharpen our reliability and be unambiguous meeting
deadlines, and be responsive to bidders. And my goal is to have
a high-performing organization in which at least 90 percent of
our projects will perform on, or better than, cost and schedule
targets. So, with that in mind, I'm taking steps to upgrade
Environment Management's project-management systems to be best
in class in project execution.
I firmly believe that an organization is never better than
its people. Our employees, Federal and contractor, hold the key
to success. I'm committed to partnering with all the affected
communities, States, tribal nations, contractors to achieve
success, because I truly believe that we succeed or we fail
together.
The continued support of this committee and the Congress is
very much appreciated, and it's crucial to maintain the
momentum that we have achieved.
Thank you for your confidence in confirming me, confirming
my nomination as Assistant Secretary this past summer. I'll be
happy to answer any questions you may have.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rispoli follows:]
Prepared Statement of James A. Rispoli, Assistant Secretary for
Environmental Management, Department of Energy
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am pleased to be here
today to answer your questions on the status of the Department of
Energy's Environmental Management (EM) program I would like to thank
Chairman Domenici and this committee for your support for the EM
program. In particular, I would like to recognize the efforts of
Chairman Domenici and Senator Allard with respect to the impending
cleanup of the Rocky Flats site. I would also like to thank Senator
Salazar for his work on Rocky Flats at the state level and since coming
to Congress. As you are aware, the Department is currently verifying
the physical completion of Rocky Flats cleanup.
Since I first appeared before you in July, I have been
familiarizing myself with the program, the issues and the people that
are responsible for cleaning up the environmental legacy of the Cold
War. From my visits to Paducah, the Idaho National Laboratory, Hanford,
West Valley, Savannah River Site, Oak Ridge Reservation, Ohio Field
Office and the Consolidated Business Center and interactions with our
personnel throughout the complex, I can say we have a driven workforce
that is making immense headway in some of the nation's most crucial
environmental actions. As I have become more informed on the sheer
immensity of the challenges that face the program, I have a greater
understanding of the progress we have made and the significant issues
that lie before us.
The program has made significant progress in the last four years in
shifting focus from risk management to risk reduction and cleanup
completion We are on schedule to complete cleanup at Rocky Flats,
Fernald, and Mound. We have moved and secured nuclear material and
spent fuel to reduce risk and prepare them for ultimate disposition. We
have disposed of huge amounts of radioactive waste and remediated many
of the contaminated areas at our sites. These accomplishments add up to
an impressive amount of cleanup and risk reduction Some highlights
include:
Rocky Flats has concluded the physical cleanup of the site
and the Department is in the process of verifying completion.
All buildings at Mound planned for demolition have been
taken down.
Fernald completed the largest waste shipping campaign in DOE
history as the 154th train of waste pit material was shipped
off site for disposal. The remediation of the waste pits
eliminated a direct source of contamination to the Great Miami
Aquifer.
The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant continues to play a major
role in completing cleanup throughout the EM complex--in the
spring the site received the final transuranic waste shipment
from Rocky Flats.
Richland completed removal of plutonium ``hold up'' from the
Plutonium Finishing Plant more than a year ahead of schedule,
significantly reducing a security, worker, and community risk.
The Savannah River Site completed construction of the M Area
Dynamic Underground Stripping System. After 2 months of
operation, 14,200 pounds of volatile organic compounds have
been removed from the soil and ground water.
The Idaho National Laboratory emptied a Category 1 Material
Access Area four years ahead of plan, reducing a security
threat and mortgage costs.
All those who contributed to these successes should be proud to
have played a part and we thank this committee in particular for your
support.
As you are fully aware, the mission is not an easy one---the most
visible example being the Waste Treatment Plant at Hanford. The Waste
Treatment Plant project is arguably the largest, most complex
construction project in the nation. As you know, the Waste Treatment
Plant is encountering design and construction setbacks. The Department
has remained committed to fix the problems correctly. Because of the
size and complexity of the plant, fully understanding all the facts
will take a few more months. The Department, along with the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers and our contractor, is currently undertaking several
major activities to ensure we fully understand what is required to
complete construction and begin operations. While some may characterize
our effort to validate the cost and timeline for the project as overly
cautious, it is responsible management---responsible management that is
key to the successful completion of our mission.
Just as importantly, for us to be successful, we must have:
credible project baselines,
effective identification and management of risks,
selection of the most appropriate contract type and fee
earning method corresponding to the scope of work and
uncertainties,
realistic schedules,
early and frequent communication with regulators,
communities, stakeholders, Congress, and contractors,
improvements and training on the source selection process,
an integrated human capital management program stressing an
experienced acquisition and project management staff, and
strong technical staff, especially for nuclear related issues,
and
constant real-time feedback of lessons learned.
Paramount to our success is safety--it is our top priority. Safety
affects all involved----federal employees, contractors, the site and
the community. We will continue to maintain and demand the highest
safety performance in all that we do. Every worker deserves to go home
as healthy as she or he was when they came to the job in the morning. I
have told all our field managers that no schedule, no milestone, is
worth any injury to our work force.
Such a multi-faceted approach is central to superior performance
and improved accountability.
Clearly, opportunities exist to improve our acquisition practices.
We are an ``Acquisition'' agency with a capital A--in terms of both
procurement and project execution. It is vital that EM acquire the best
services and attract the best the contractor community, including small
business, has to offer. In order to do that we must be reliable, clear,
meet deadlines and be responsive to our prospective bidders. We must
ensure that we have highly skilled employees dedicated to this process.
For us, we are acquiring an end state----a site that has completed
cleanup or attained closure. We will sharpen our skills and refocus our
enterprise to reflect our acquisition responsibilities. The
organizational structure must support the emphasis of technical
excellence, integration of project management and contract acquisition/
administration in order to meet this goal. It must also incorporate
effective incentives for the federal and contractor workforce for
superior performance, and accountability for field office and
headquarters managers, project managers, and contracting officers for
meeting cost, schedule and performance expectations.
It is my goal to lead EM as a results-driven high performance
organization. We will instill a strict project management mindset that
will be ingrained in all projects. Our performance on many key projects
has not been acceptable. My goal is that at least 90 percent of our
projectized portfolio will perform on or better than our cost and
schedule targets. We have taken major strides in integrating safety;
now we must do the same with project management. Project management
must not be viewed as a burden or an extra step that we have to take.
It is the very backbone of our project planning and execution. This
includes reporting and oversight as well. The management tools used to
manage cost and schedules must be used to manage and provide oversight
integrally. Our success will depend on our ability to build in this
rigor. I am taking immediate steps to upgrade EM's project management
systems and initiate remedies to be a best-in-class project execution
organization. We will target the shortcomings in our project management
by using both DOE and industry standard project management and business
management processes. I will personally conduct Quarterly Reviews of
all EM projects and have directed that my senior staff carry out
monthly reviews. This includes fully implementing our management
systems through the use of earned value management, following through
on corrective actions, and better applying risk management principals--
that is identifying project uncertainties, developing mitigation
measures and contingency and holding action officers accountable for
their resolution. I believe that this is the key to our success with
strong and effective project management.
Complementing these refinements, we must ensure that our projects
are managed by highly skilled, competent and dedicated leaders and
staff workers, both Federal and contractor. Our managers and staff must
have the appropriate skills to perform their functions. We are
currently doing a skills gap analysis to determine where we may need to
provide additional help to our existing staffs training or adding to
staff We have instigated a certification program for our project
managers. Our goal is, by May 2006, all EM Federal project managers
will be certified. We want to assure ourselves that we have the right
skills mix to get the job done. We are assuring that our employees are
provided career development, rewards, and support in the appropriate
way. I firmly believe that an organization is never better than its
employees. Our employees, federal and contractor, hold the key to our
success.
Just as importantly, these managers and their staff, skilled in the
competencies to do their job, will have the responsibility and the
authority to meet the program's objectives. We will streamline the
relationship between the field and headquarters to enable the program
to be more effective in its oversight role. I believe that if you have
the right people in the right job with the right skills, they should be
empowered to execute their responsibilities and be accountable for
their decisions and outcomes.
Our desire is that at Headquarters and each site, our key
acquisition and technical personnel, including contracting officers,
have knowledge of technical issues, project management, business
management at an equivalent level of expertise as their contractor
counterparts to promote meaningful, and cogent dialogue on substantive
issues. Our job as a federal agency is management and oversight, to be
responsible envoys and stewards of the public's trust and resources.
Therefore, we must have a highly qualified and technically proficient
management team. Ultimately, my aim is to have a high performing
organization, sustained by a career oriented workforce, driven to
produce results that are important now and into the future.
I believe that by taking these steps we will be in a position to
address the challenges that lie before us. I am committed to work with
all interested parties to resolve issues and will work with this
committee and the Congress to address any of your concerns or
interests. DOE, our regulators, the communities and our contractors are
partners in this effort. This partnership goes far beyond the limits of
a contract or an agreement. Our success relies on this partnership. We
are in this together--we all succeed or we all fail together. Your
continued support is crucial to maintain the momentum that has so
painstakingly been achieved. Thank you for your confidence in
confirming my nomination as Assistant Secretary this past summer.
I look forward to continuing dialog with you and your staff.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Again, I was telling you about the time. I'm very concerned
that we're not going to have time to do enough oversight. We
don't need oversight on Rocky Flats. We need to know about
these other sites. We're not going to get that done today. I'm
hopeful we can find time during the year, during the Congress,
to do one on some of the troubled sites.
So, let me ask you about Hanford.
Mr. Rispoli. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. After 5 years of work, as I understand it,
this particular waste treatment facility, the Hanford Waste
Treatment Plant, you've discovered that the plant was being
built on an inadequate seismic requirement base. As far back as
2002, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board cautioned
about the plant design and said that it might be inadequate on
seismic requirements. Were you aware of that?
Mr. Rispoli. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I was.
The Chairman. Construction on the plant continued, using
these standards. Recently, the Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory concluded that the standards were inadequate by
today's seismic requirements. As a result, the plant design may
have to be reworked on the partially built waste treatment
facility, and that will obviously add a significant additional
cost.
How do things like this happen? And why did it take so long
to find out about this inadequacy? And how are we going to
improve the oversight so we don't have this?
Mr. Rispoli. Mr. Chairman, let me begin by stating that, in
my very first meeting with Secretary Bodman, in his third week
on the job, this plant was the exclusive subject of discussion.
And I'd like to begin my answer by telling you that the
Secretary's commitment to this plant has been unwavering and
strong since that day. It, obviously, is a very complex
project. As I mentioned, it's over $5 billion. Clearly, we know
there are going to be cost increases to that figure. What we
are doing now, with the Secretary's full support, is we are
going over all the seismic issues. We are reevaluating the
seismic conditions in that part of the country to ensure that
we have it right.
I should tell you that we do not expect any future rework
related to the seismic conditions. In addition, we have the
Corps of Engineers reviewing all of the seismic design that the
contractor has done to be absolutely certain that when we
recommence work on those portions that are affected by the
seismic issues, that we will have no difficulty going forward.
We have also initiated other specific management
improvements on this project, in the area of project
management, with the intention that we apply a more rigorous
project-management discipline going forward to avoid the types
of problems that you have mentioned.
The Chairman. I'm going to yield now to Senator Salazar.
Senator Salazar.
Senator Salazar. Yes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to ask a question on Rocky Flats with respect to the
environmental covenants law that was passed in Colorado on a
bipartisan basis, which I helped author and the Governor
signed, I think, last year.
The institutional controls that are contemplated by that
law will allow us to regulate the activity on what is probably
400 to 500 acres of the area that may not have been cleaned up
to the highest theoretical standards. That law has now been
adopted as part of the uniform covenant laws for the States
across the country. And I was wondering, Secretary Rispoli,
whether or not we ought to take a look at that kind of an
institutional control law as a model for a Federal law that
might help us, in terms of the cleanup efforts that we have at
some of the other, I think, 113 sites that we must still work
on.
Mr. Rispoli. We understand the purpose of the new--of the
institutional control law in the State of Colorado. At the
present time, the Department is actually in dialog with the
State to develop the covenants by which to go forward, and we
expect that to be completed by 2006. I do believe that this may
be the first instance where we are doing that, and we certainly
will look at the applicability in other examples, in other
States.
Senator Salazar. I would ask you just to keep me informed
as you move forward with the progress on that issue.
Let me ask a second question. I know we're running short on
time here.
The transition of this area, this 6,000 acres, from a Rocky
Flats DOE facility over to the wildlife refuge under the
Department of the Interior, is something that we all expect to
happen. It's something that the legislation says will happen.
Can you let me--can you give us a quick summary of where we are
on that transition now and the timing for getting the
memorandum of understanding signed between the Department of
the Interior and the Department of Energy so the baton can be
taken from DOE over to DOI?
Mr. Rispoli. Senator Salazar, we have been in dialog with
the Department of the Interior. In fact, we have obviously
begun, and are working on, that memorandum of understanding as
to how to go forward. We expect to complete that within the
near future, and have the framework established for the path
forward to transfer the site to the Department of the Interior.
Senator Salazar. I would also ask you, Mr. Secretary, to
keep both Senator Allard and myself informed about the progress
being made with respect to the transition and the negotiations
on the MOU.
The Chairman. Senator, let me just say, it's preferable
that you ask that the committee be advised, rather than the
Senators.
Senator Salazar. Absolutely. If you----
The Chairman. You get advised that way, but he should
advise the committee on both those issues that you asked about.
Senator Salazar. Absolutely.
The Chairman. If that's all right with you, that's what it
should be.
Senator Salazar. Absolutely. And so, with that amendment,
please, Mr. Secretary, advise us as to the progress on both of
those two issues.
I guess this is a question. Let me ask it to DOE. At the
end of the day, the incentives here were monetary. That's what
sped this thing up to create a model for what we may be able to
do in other places in the country. Can you give us a
quantification of what those bonuses have been to Kaiser-Hill?
Mr. Rispoli. Senator Salazar, I think that, obviously, the
monetary aspects were a significant part of the equation. I
would offer that, in my having visited the site and talked with
contractor personnel, both the site workers, as well as
management, I really do believe that, for them, it became even
more than just the monetary aspects. I think the keys to
success were not only the financial incentives to the company,
but, as Nancy Tuor has mentioned, the individual employees were
also----
Senator Salazar. I understand that very much, Mr.
Secretary, and I applaud the workers, and I applaud the
leadership of Kaiser-Hill, but get back to just the money
question. The incentive there was a financial incentive for a
private-sector company to come and do a good job and,
ultimately, it ended up saving the taxpayers billions and
billions of dollars and lots of time. What was that quantum at
Rocky Flats?
Mr. Rispoli. Nancy, that was, I believe--can you answer
that?
Ms. Tuor. I can, sir.
Senator Salazar, the way the contract worked, if we were to
accomplish the closure by the end of 2006 for $3.9 billion, our
earnings would be $340 million. For every dollar we saved after
that point, for our first portion, we earned 30 cents on the
dollar, the Government got 70 cents. And then, after that, we
earned 20 cents on the dollar and the Government got 80 cents.
So, the total earnings for the project over the lifetime were
$510 million, based on our being able to deliver $3.9 billion
worth of work for about $3.3 billion.
The Chairman. Terrific.
Senator Salazar. Just one other quick question, if I may,
Mr. Secretary--Nancy and Mr. Secretary. Again, part of the
great success here is that we were able to avoid litigation
that stopped this thing in its tracks. How did we do that in
Colorado?
Mr. Rispoli. I believe the answer was that, in the State of
Colorado, there was tremendous support at all levels--both the
State level and community level. And, as I mentioned earlier,
the regulatory approach provided more flexibility than you
would normally find, in that instead of--we have some
situations, for example, where we have over 1,000 interim
milestones. And you can either be measured against each interim
milestone or the contractor can have more flexibility to keep
up that forward momentum. But that takes a--I would say, a
certain amount of trust on the part of the Federal Government,
on the part of the regulator, and a contractor that obviously
has performed superbly in this case. I think all of that,
combined, is what helped us to achieve the success that we did.
And, again, perhaps Nancy Tuor would like to add more to that.
Ms. Tuor. Just briefly, sir, I would comment that, in 1995,
the regulatory and stakeholder relationships at Rocky Flats
were as difficult and contentious as they are probably anywhere
in the complex today. Under the Governor's leadership, by
appointing Lieutenant Governor Schoettler to lead the
negotiation of the new regulatory agreement between EPA, the
Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment, and the
DOE, she came into that process and said, ``Before we can
decide how, we must know what.'' And we reached agreement and
an alignment between the regulators and the community on what
the outcome would be, which then allowed us to deal with the
details of its implementation. That alignment, I believe, and
the working agreements that resulted from that, the long-term
trust and coordination, really were a key--in fact, probably
the largest single attribute of the success.
Mr. Rispoli. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, once again,
thank you for holding this hearing.
The Chairman. Let's see, we have Senator Cantwell here, but
let me just ask, before we get to you, did you get as much in
here as you would like for today's session? We have your
statement, you've answered some questions, but is there
something else that we didn't ask you, on short notice here,
that you want to tell the committee?
Mr. Rispoli. Mr. Chairman, I think that--given the time and
the tone, I think that we have conveyed what we would like to
convey, but, of course, we remain available for any questions
you or the committee may have.
The Chairman. I would ask a couple of questions before
yielding to the Senator.
Senator Salazar mentioned delays caused by regulatory
confrontations elsewhere. Were any lawsuits filed in this case
that delayed the matter, from the time you entered into the
agreements until your completion? And could you briefly
describe that overall situation?
Ms. Tuor. There were no lawsuits filed. And, indeed, in the
last 2 years of the project, we received a letter from the
State saying they were not going to establish any further
milestones because we were so far ahead of their expectations
that there was no longer a need for interim milestones.
The Chairman. Could you tell me, either now or for the
record, pick the other sites around the country, any one that
comes to mind, and then, for the record, do them all, and tell
us how many lawsuits have been filed on each of them, and about
what, just in a kind of a record summary?
Mr. Rispoli. Mr. Chairman, I certainly will give a for-the-
record summary. I will tell you that at a number of sites,
obviously, we have had litigation, or we have other ongoing
issues, but I think, in fairness, it would be better for me to
give you a recap for the record.
[The information follows:]
Given the context in which this issue came up, the U.S. Department
of Energy has interpreted the question to include administrative
actions and lawsuits brought by states, their political subdivisions,
or Indian tribes, alleging violations of environmental cleanup
obligations. The specific cases are as follows:
Energy Technology and Engineering Center (ETEC): In October
2004, two environmental groups and the City of Los Angeles
filed a lawsuit alleging that the Department's cleanup
decisions and activities at ETEC fail to comply with the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA), including a 1995 Joint DOE and U.S.
Environmental Policy Act Policy on Decommissioning, the
Endangered Species Act, and the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA).
Fernald Closure Project (FCP): The Department remains
involved in a lawsuit filed by the State of Ohio in 1986
originally alleging that the Department failed to comply with
requirements of various environmental laws, including CERCLA
and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act at the FCP. Most
of the State's claims have been settled under a consent decree,
but the State's natural resource damages claims remain pending.
Hanford Nuclear Reservation: There is a two-part lawsuit in
Federal court in which the State of Washington is suing the
Department. The first part addresses the applicability of the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Land Withdrawal Act Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act storage exemptions for
transuranic (TRU) mixed waste stored at DOE sites. The second
part (i.e., the NEPA Case), challenges the sufficiency of NEPA
analysis related to bringing off-site waste to Hanford;
specifically the State challenges the groundwater impacts
analysis in the Hanford Solid Waste Environmental Impact
Statement. Finally, Washington Initiative 297, passed by voters
in November 2004 and subsequently enacted into law, seeks to
bar DOE from importing any waste to Hanford ``until cleanup is
complete.'' DOE challenged the law in Federal District Court
and the Court granted a stay of the implementation of the
initiative until full resolution in court. In addition to the
above, the State of Washington has threatened to sue DOE
concerning alleged violations of Tri-Party Agreement milestones
associated with the Waste Treatment Plant. Those milestones
include starting operations in 2011 and disposal of all tank
wastes by 2028.
Idaho National Laboratory (INL): The Department remains
involved in a lawsuit filed by the State of Idaho in April
2002, alleging that the 1995 Settlement Agreement in this case
required the Department to dig up all of the buried TRU waste
from the Subsurface Disposal Area at INL. The Department
disagrees with the State's interpretation of the Settlement
Agreement.
Savannah River Site: The U.S. Department of Energy is
involved in one case filed by a South Carolina county, Aiken
County v. Bodman. Aiken County, filed on September 21, 2005, is
an Administrative Procedure Act case in which the county
alleges that the Department has violated section 3182 of the
2003 Defense Appropriations Act by failing to meet the
notification requirement of that Act concerning progress on the
Savannah River Site Mixed Oxide facility.
INL, Savannah River, and Richland. The Department appealed
the Idaho District Court's ruling in NRDC v. Abraham, that the
provisions of DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management,
governing the Department's management of radioactive waste are
invalid insofar as they enable the Department to determine that
some waste associated with reprocessing spent fuel is not high-
level waste. The court of appeals previously decided that the
plaintiffs' claims are not ripe for review and, therefore, it
vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case
with directions that it be dismissed. The court of appeals held
that any challenge to DOE's Waste Incidental to Reprocessing
criteria and process should be framed as a challenge to an
actual application of those criteria and that process, not in
the abstract. The original lawsuit was brought by the Natural
Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and the Snake River Alliance.
The States of Idaho, South Carolina and Washington supported
the plaintiffs as amici (friends of the court).
Mr. Rispoli. I would say that it does not have to be the
norm to have litigation or difficult issues. If we're in a
partnership, as I stated, we should work together, because
that's what we all want is a successful cleanup. But, for the
record, I will answer your question.
The Chairman. Well, Mr. Secretary, you're new at this, and
that wonderful statement that you just made just happens to be
a wish, not a reality, that what you just said should happen.
It doesn't happen, because some people don't want it to happen.
But, in any event, my last observation and question would
be, if the delays are not by litigation, as I am going to ask
you--just asked you to tell us about, could you list each site
and tell us what delays have occurred--and this could be a
tough job, but, nonetheless, what delays have occurred, and
why, so we will know, on each site what's happened?
Mr. Rispoli. I will do that, Mr. Chairman.
[The information follows:]
DELAYED BY LITIGATION
Idaho National Laboratory and Savannah River Site: The planned
closure of liquid radioactive waste tanks was delayed due to litigation
regarding DOE authority to determine whether residual waste in tanks
storing reprocessing wastes could be classified as other than high-
level waste under DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management. This
issue was addressed by
FY 2005 National Defense Authorization Act section 3116 which
established procedures for completing waste determinations in
consultation with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Delays will
continue until waste determinations are completed in accordance with
section 3116.
DELAYED FOR OTHER REASONS
Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, CA: The planned completion date
for this project was originally FY 2006 based on the assumption that no
further physical work was required beyond that date. A recent regulator
decision has added soil and groundwater cleanup scope which has moved
the completion date to FY 2010.
Savannah River Site: The construction of the Salt Waste Processing
Facility has been delayed due to the redesign of the facility based on
DOE's implementation of a Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
recommendation that more stringent seismic criteria be used. A delay of
approximately 26 months is projected at this time.
Hanford Site: The decontamination and decommissioning of the
Plutonium Finishing Plant has been delayed by uncertainties regarding
off-site consolidation of special nuclear material. This delay will
continue until either the material is transferred off site or a new
storage facility is constructed at Hanford.
The decontamination and decommissioning of the K Reactor Basins has
been delayed by technical obstacles and performance issues. The project
is currently being re-baselined with an expected three or more year
delay in completion from FY 2008 to FY 2011 or beyond.
River Protection: The construction of the Waste Treatment Plant has
been delayed due to the redesign of critical portions of the facility
to determine whether increased protection against a potential seismic
event is needed. Cost increases and schedule delays are anticipated.
Also delays in the emptying of tanks have occurred due to technical
obstacles in conditioning the waste for removal. The Bulk Vitrification
Demonstration Project is also experiencing delays in subcontract
procurements. The impact on the project life-cycle from these delays in
undetermined at this point.
Idaho National Laboratory: The Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment
Facility missed a December 2005 milestone for shipment of transuranic
waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. The plant initially
experienced startup delays, exacerbated by maintenance problems left
from the previous operating contractor, as well as other issues
associated with the availability of waste to ship. There were also
delays associated with suspension of shipping authorization due to
issues relating to drum characterization data. Good progress has been
made recently, and the delay in meeting the milestone is expected to be
by approximately two months.
Energy Technology Engineering Center, CA: Completion date for this
project is expected to extend from FY 2007 to FY 2009. Delay is due to
ongoing negotiation with the performance contractor and site owner
regarding cleanup work scope to be performed and the site end state at
completion.
Columbus, OH: This project is experiencing a minor delay in
completion due to the discovery of higher contaminated soil volumes
than expected. The projected delay is approximately three months, from
December 2005 to March 2006.
Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Project, KY and OH. In August 2002;
the Department awarded a contract to UDS with an estimated date to
complete construction in August 2005. Due to delays in awarding the
contract, the Department changed the construction completion date to
March 2006. The 2006 completion date was based on the contractor's
estimate without detailed design or independent review. Following
completion of the detailed design and development of a validated
project performance baseline, the current estimated date to complete
construction is November 2007. The change in construction schedule
reflects contractor design and procurement delays, design delays
associated with increased safety features for seismic protection and
containment of hazardous chemicals, and addition of DOE schedule
contingency to increase confidence that the project's major milestones
will be met.
Amchitka, AK: The original completion date for this site was
planned for FY 2005. Delay in finalizing the site closure strategy and
documents have slipped expected completion to the end of FY 2006.
Mound Plant, OH: The Mound project experienced an increase in scope
when additional contaminated soil volumes were identified. The original
estimate of 4.3 million cubic feet of contaminated soil requiring
remediation has risen to 8.3 million cubic feet. The original
completion date of March 2006 has been extended to an anticipated
September 2006 completion date to accommodate the increase in soil
volume.
The additional soil volumes identified above do not include the
planned remediation of Operable Unit 1. The Department and the
Miamisburg Mound Community Improvement Corporation are currently in
discussions to define the scope of work to be accomplished with the
additional $30 million Congress appropriated in Fiscal Year 2006.
The Chairman. And let me move now to the most difficult
one, which Senator Cantwell will certainly talk about.
You have told us that the Secretary's--is on the site that
you have talked about in detail, the Hanford site, and he told
me the same thing, that he understands this is one that we've
got to get to the bottom of, and it's very tough. Could you
tell me, now, have you made some changes in how this is going
to be done? And do you need any help from Congress? You don't
have to tell me that today, you can look into it, what we might
do to make this a more forthright and expeditious cleanup. I
think it's very important. The people there think it's just a
matter of pushing a whole bunch more money in, which we try to
do, but something seems to be missing that we have to get to
the bottom of, on Hanford. Could you just address that for me,
for a minute?
Mr. Rispoli. Mr. Chairman, what I will tell you is that
this project in the State of Washington is, in fact, the
Department's largest capital project.
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Rispoli. And, as I mentioned, it may very well be the
largest publicly funded project in the Nation, equal to
building two nuclear power plants. The Secretary, himself,
directed certain actions to be taken when we recognized the
potential impact of what was happening. For example, he had us
appoint an oversight team that now has full-time, dedicated
oversight to this project, from the headquarters level.
Additionally, he has directed that we reevaluate all the
seismic concerns at the two facilities that are affected--the
high-level waste facility and the pre-treatment facility--to
ensure that when we build this plant, it is built safely for
the workers, for the community, and for the people in the State
of Washington.
I, myself, upon being briefed by the after-action review
team, took a number of actions. For example, we realized that
we needed to have more people at that site with certain types
of expertise, so we've assigned them. We've brought in the
Corps of Engineers, as I mentioned earlier in passing, to help
us with the seismic criteria--that is, the shaking-of-the-earth
part--so we could get that right, as well as oversight over the
contractor's engineering, to be sure that the contractor gets
the engineering right.
We have taken a number of actions already, based upon what
we have learned from our after-action review team, to get this
project back on track.
And you're right, it's not--it's a very, very expensive
project, but it's a very technically complex project, and we
want to be sure that, going forward, we're doing it the right
way to deliver the right product for the people of the State
and our Nation.
The Chairman. All right.
Senator Cantwell.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing and for your diligent
questions about the Hanford site. While, in fact, it is in
Washington State, it is a Federal project and a Federal
responsibility, and I appreciate all my colleagues' attention
to what is the largest nuclear cleanup project, I believe, in
the entire world.
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Cantwell. And we certainly are spending billions of
dollars doing it. And to meet milestones, I think, is very
important.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here. And I have a
couple of questions for you, following on what the chairman was
asking; specifically, about the projects and where we are,
going forward.
I guess my first question is, when you take into
consideration--I mean, we're talking about seismic issues, but
the seismic issues have been related to the vit plant; would
you agree?
Mr. Rispoli. Senator Cantwell, the seismic issues relate to
two of the structures. One is the vit--the high-level
vitrification plant--there's actually a low-activity and a
high-level vit plant--and also a part of the project called a
pre-treatment facility. Those are the two that have the impact
from the change in the seismic criteria.
Senator Cantwell. But if I look at my budget numbers
correctly from what the President proposed and what the
conference committee came out with, and if you include the
President's rescission, we're talking about over $400 million
in cuts from the 2005 level. And if I look at that, I look at
over $200 million of that coming from the Office of River
Protection and the tank waste project, not related to the vit
plant. So, I look at a big chunk of that coming from something
that I don't think has anything to do with seismic issues. Am I
wrong there?
Mr. Rispoli. Senator, my understanding of the appropriation
side of the House is that, overall, the site--with the of the
waste treatment plant, the site was actually plussed up by
conference, by the Congress. This particular project, called
the waste treatment plant, the conference language basically
says that they will fund $526 million, instead of $626 million,
with the expectation that the prior year balance--that is, the
rescission--would be available for expenditure during fiscal
year 2006.
My belief is that, at the moment, we are waiting to see how
that rescission plays out. The conference action has been
completed, although not voted on by the full Congress, but we
are still waiting to determine whether or not the rescission
will be in effect.
Senator Cantwell. I guess my question is, what does the
$194 million and the cut from the 2005 level from the Office of
River Protection, and the $35 million cut from the 2005 level
of tank waste have to do with seismic issues? Do they have
anything to do with seismic issues?
Mr. Rispoli. Addressing the waste treatment plant, the $100
million cut is related to the same project that is having the
seismic issues. The other projects on this site are not.
Senator Cantwell. The Office of River Protection dollars or
the tank waste are related to seismic?
Mr. Rispoli. The tank waste portion of the Office of River
Protection, that work is not related, or does not have seismic
implications. Only the waste treatment plant does.
Senator Cantwell. Okay. So, my point is the $194.2 million
that is a cut from the 2005 level of Office of River
Protection, and the $35 million that is related to cuts from
tank waste program have nothing to do with seismic issues. You
just said that. So, I appreciate that.
So, my question is, why are we seeing such significant cuts
in these programs, which is--I'm saying it's going to be $200
million of the $400 million that the administration is
recommending in this area--when a lot of people are saying,
``Well, there's a seismic problem''? I get the seismic problem
at the vit plant, but what I don't understand is the additional
$200 million in cuts to a project that has particular
milestones to meet.
Mr. Rispoli. Senator, let me answer your question, if I
may, this way, in two parts. One is that within the Department
and within Environment Management, it is clear to me that this
project and this site are the most significant in the
Department. This site receives nearly 30 percent of the
Environment Management annual budget, nearly 30 percent to this
one site. Clearly, it is our highest, most complex--highest-
priority, most complex site with all the issues that----
Senator Cantwell. But it's receiving a 25 percent budget
cut, when it has milestones to meet and an Inspector General
report that said you were even shortchanging the accelerated
cleanup that you were doing on the tank waste anyway, and now
it's going to come in at a higher amount than what you
anticipated. So, how do you take something that's your highest
priority and give it a 25 percent budget cut and threaten the
ability to make the milestones that you've agreed to in a Tri-
Party Agreement?
And I understand the--if you hear frustration in my voice,
it's the frustration of every new Energy Secretary that comes
along wakes up to the Hanford problem and realizes that it's a
huge obligation. We, in Washington State, know it's a huge
obligation. We want the financial commitment to meet the
milestones.
Mr. Rispoli. Senator Cantwell, I appreciate your
frustration. I guarantee you, I'm frustrated, as well. As I
said, this is--in my book, it's the most significant project in
Environment Management--the most complex and the most
significant. Obviously, as I stated, the conference committee
took $100 million off the budget request, followed by which, or
about the same time as which, the rescission recommendation was
made. As I indicated earlier, we don't know, at this point in
time, whether that second amount, the rescission amount, will,
in fact, stand, or whether it will not stand. We expect the
conference language to stand, but we just don't know, at this
point in time today----
Senator Cantwell. Well, I would like a response. If you can
look into the specific reasons why the $200 million for two
different programs were cut, and we can get--you can give me
specifics on that.
What is your outlook for--I mean, do you think that this
budget cut means that the administration might not meet the
milestones laid out in the Tri-Party Agreement?
Mr. Rispoli. We have already, on October 6, notified the
State, and, I believe, your offices, as well as others in the
Washington delegation, that we know that there are three
interim milestones that will not be met. I would point out that
the Department has already met 900 milestones, interim
milestones, at the Hanford site, and there are 300 milestones
to go. So, when we talked earlier about interim milestones,
this site has a huge number of interim milestones.
We notified the State that three of those interim
milestones, in the near term, are not achievable. And we also
notified the State that there are three other interim
milestones which we believe are in jeopardy, although we do not
yet know whether or not they will be missed.
Senator Cantwell. I would like to see that document, as
well, because I think the document that we saw earlier says
that they ``might be missed.'' That was--there's a difference
between saying something ``might be missed ''and ``will be
missed.'' And if--again, if my concern sounds very--you know, a
level of frustration, yesterday our attorney general and
Governor held a press conference basically saying that they'll
threaten lawsuits if milestones for completion aren't met, and
that they think that the budget cuts are already a violation of
the Federal Government's legal obligation. So, the State of
Washington is very concerned on that.
So, I think--I'd love to see the document that you--that
they will--that the milestones were articulated that they would
be missing.
[The information follows:]
Complete Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant hot
commissioning by January 31, 2011 (Milestone-62-10)
Complete K East Basin sludge removal by January 31, 2006
(Milestone-34-34)
Containerize K West Basin Sludge by June 30, 2006
(Milestone-34-35)
Complete four limited retrieval demonstrations and all tank
waste in Waste Management Area-C (WMA-C) by September 30, 2006
(Milestone-45-00B)
Submit supplemental treatment technologies report, by June
30, 2006 (Milestone-62-08)
Submit final waste treatment baseline by June 30, 2007
(Milestone-62-11)
Senator Cantwell. How are you looking at the 2007 level of
funding for this site? Are you looking at further cuts? Are you
looking to make up what this 25 percent reduction has been? How
are you looking at that, as it relates to attainment of future
milestones?
Mr. Rispoli. Senator Cantwell, there's--obviously, we know
that that overall budget is not available, but I will tell you
that if you look at the Hanford site as a whole, the amount of
EM's budget it has represented year after year has been in the
range of 28 to 30 percent. We do not see any significant change
to that share for the Hanford site, although the exact numbers
are not known to me today. But I do know that it's been in that
range, and we intend for it to continue in that range.
I'll also point out that, in the particular contract for
the waste treatment plant, the contract itself assumes, and
provides for, $690 million per year, for a period of time, to
get that plant built. So, there are two indicators, you might
say, that both go to answer your question.
Senator Cantwell. But if you had--again, I'm sorry to keep
focusing on these different numbers, but, to me, they're what's
available, knowing what projections have been and what the IG
report has said. So, if you've had a 25 percent reduction, and
we've missed some milestones, and we could miss more, you would
assume that if you're not going to make up for some of that in,
particularly, the tank waste site, which the IG report, again,
is just scathing on the fact that the plan missed by--I can't
remember, but I think it's $100 or $200 million, the estimates
of what it was going to take for cleanup. So, if you're not
making a commitment today to try to make up for some of the
reductions that we're seeing right now, then you'd have to draw
a conclusion that you're going to miss a lot more milestones.
Mr. Rispoli. Obviously, Senator, it is our intention to
meet all of our regulatory requirements. At the present time,
given the news on the 2006 budget picture and the rescission
that we've recently learned of, obviously we need to go back
now and reassess schedule and cost for the overall project. I
don't have that information for you today.
Senator Cantwell. If I could, Mr. Chairman, just ask
another question about the tanks--the tank waste?
The Chairman. Please.
Senator Cantwell. Are you willing to acknowledge, today,
that you're going to miss the milestones on the tanks?
Mr. Rispoli. We believe that one milestone on the tanks is
in jeopardy. It has to do with Tank Farm C. What I will tell
you is that we have actually emptied three tanks from Tank Farm
C--three single-shell tanks from Tank Farm C--and, at the
present time, even as we're here today, we are currently
retrieving waste from two more tanks in that tank farm, plus
two tanks in Tank Farm F, which is not part of that same
interim milestone. So, you see, it's not as though we have
stopped making progress; we are working where we can to
retrieve tank waste. And so, in addition to the three in Tank
Farm C that are tied to that milestone that is in jeopardy,
we're working two more in that tank farm and two other tanks in
Tank Farm F; additionally, getting ready another tank in Tank
Farm C to have the retrieval operations begin.
I'd like to also point out that this past summer we also
brought many of the other tanks into compliance with
environmental regulation by upgrades to the piping and other
parts of the components of the system to, again, reduce the
risk in that area. So, although we have one milestone that
deals solely with Tank Farm C, and we are making progress in
Tank Farm C, again there are many other areas that we are
pressing forward with tank waste outside of that milestone.
Senator Cantwell. How should the State of Washington, the
attorney general and the Governor, who are looking at the
previous Tri-Party Agreement document, view what you just said
as it relates to the deadlines for tank waste? I mean, are you
saying you want to set new deadlines? Are you saying----
Mr. Rispoli. I understand the frustration with the current
situation with funding, and the technical problems at the
plant, which cannot be minimized. Obviously, we have had, and
are having, significant issues, and need to improve our
management of that project. What I can assure you is that we
are keeping forward momentum going. We intend to meet all those
interim milestones. Again, you've picked one that is in
jeopardy, but we're working on not only those tanks, but other
tanks. But it is our intent to continue with forward momentum
at that site to fulfill our responsibilities to the people of
the State of Washington.
The Chairman. Senator, I'll be happy to do a little
changing of time here. Do you have one more?
Senator Cantwell. Go ahead, Mr. Chairman. Go ahead.
The Chairman. Do one more. Because we're going to leave
here shortly. I want you to get your last question in.
Senator Cantwell. Yes. I think that I've asked for a couple
of things that I hope, Mr. Chairman, that we can follow up with
the Assistant Secretary on. And I hope that----
The Chairman. Whatever you need, get--you ask the
questions, they'll submit answers quickly.
Senator Cantwell. Yes. I think the--on documentation, about
why $200 million was cut from this budget when it has nothing
to do with seismic obligations, or seismic studies, what
additional milestones--why the original milestones--the
document that basically said milestones were missed, because I
think that was a--more of an alert than a declarative and this
process moving forward.
Mr. Rispoli. We will get you that information.
[The information follows:]
During the course of Congressional deliberations on the FY 2006
President's Budget request for the Waste Treatment and Immobilization
Plant (WTP) at the Hanford site, the Department had been asked by other
committees for the impact of a $100 million, $200 million, and $300
million funding reduction from the $626 million request. The Department
responded with those impacts.
The Congress appropriated $526 million for WTP for FY 2006, which
was a reduction of $100 million. In the Appropriations conference
report, (accompanying H.R. 2419), the following language was included
concerning this reduction.
``Office of River Protection--The conference agreement provides
$329,471,000 for Tank Farm activities, and $526,000,000 for
construction project 01-D-416, the Waste Treatment and Immobilization
Plant. The high-level waste vitrification program at Hanford has had a
long history of failure--more than $9,000,000,000 has been spent over
the last 15 years. Based on a report by the Corps of Engineers, the
estimated cost of the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP),
originally $4,300,000,000, may rise to as much as $9,300,000,000, and
the schedule may slip four more years to 2015. Reasons for these
increases include: contractor estimating problems, technical problems,
and insufficient project contingency.
``It is unclear what steps DOE will take to better ensure effective
management and oversight of the project in the longer term. Based on
this troubled history, the conferees provide $526,000,000, for the
Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant, a reduction of $99,893,000
from the request. The conferees understand that $98,000,000 remains
available from fiscal year 2005 to be used in fiscal year 2006 for this
project. The Department needs better control and oversight of the
scope, cost and schedule of this project, and the conferees direct the
Department to report to the House and Senate Committees on
Appropriations on the actions taken to rectify the management failures
of this project, and to report quarterly on the activities and
financial status of each of the subprojects within WTP.''
As part of the deliberations by the Administration for the response
to the Katrina Disaster, the Administration had proposed a $100 million
reduction for the FY 2005 funding as part of an overall Administration
rescission package. However, the FY 2006 Defense Appropriations
Conference Report H.R. 2863 indicated that the Administration's
proposed $100 million offset from EM's WTP project as part of the
Katrina Supplemental was dropped. As a result, no DOE funding will be
used as a funding source to offset the Katrina Supplemental.
The Department remains committed to the Tri-Party Agreement (TPA)
and to meeting all objectives for completing the cleanup of tank waste
at Hanford. However, because of difficulties, such as sludge removal
issues at the K Basins and WTP issues, some of these milestones are not
achievable. The Department informed the State of Washington, members of
the Washington Congressional delegation, and committees of
jurisdiction, including the Senate Energy and Natural Resources
Committee, on October 6, 2005, when it knew that milestones would be
missed. In that notification, the Department stated its belief that
three near-term interim TPA milestones, one for the WTP and two for K
Basins, are not achievable:
Complete Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant hot
commissioning by January 31, 2011 (Milestone-62-10)
Complete K East Basin sludge removal by January 31, 2006
(Milestone-34-34)
Containerize K West Basin Sludge by June 30, 2006
(Milestone-34-35)
The Department also believes three near-term milestones associated
with the commissioning of the WTP, the treatment of tank waste, and
certain tank retrieval related activities are in jeopardy:
Complete four limited retrieval demonstrations and all tank
waste in Waste Management Area-C (WMA-C) by September 30, 2006
(Milestone-45-00B)
Submit supplemental treatment technologies report, by June
30, 2006 (Milestone-62-08)
Submit final waste treatment baseline by June 30, 2007
(Milestone-62-11)
The Department will notify Congress and the State of Washington
should other milestones be in jeopardy.
Senator Cantwell. But I guess, Mr. Chairman, I don't have
any further questions, as much as I would like to say, for the
record--and I know that my colleagues have seen a copy of this
IG's report--that Hanford cannot keep just getting the short
end of the stick just because it's the largest cleanup project.
We can't keep missing milestones, and we can't keep spending--
not millions, or hundreds of millions, but billions of dollars,
and just have new Assistant Secretaries come through. The
reason we got to the Tri-Party Agreement was because of missed
plans and obligations. And so, I think we're at a conclusion
now that if the administration isn't stepping up to a reversal
in the 2007 budget of some of these cuts to the tank waste, as
the inspector general is saying is a major problem with product
flow of contamination, then the State of Washington will have
to take action on this. And so, I hope that you will look at
those numbers, particularly as it relates to the Office of
River Protection and tank waste cleanup, and make a commitment
for the 2007 budget that reflects the milestones that have been
agreed to in the past.
I hope, Mr. Chairman, that this committee could help in the
discussion of that as we move forward. I understand that
anytime you can look for hundreds of millions of dollars to cut
in a budget, it's a big target, but this is a critical project
for the country, to clean up and to move forward, and not to
continue to push out for many years new proposals and new
programs.
So, I hope, Mr. Chairman, that the committee will, in its
process of oversight, take an aggressive role, on the Hanford
issue particularly. Even thought it resides in the State of
Washington, as I said, it affects an entire region and the
entire country. And the fact that we have almost 70 tanks that
have been confirmed having suspected leaks, and that there are
a million gallons of waste being discharged into the soil, that
that becomes a national priority, and not just having the two
Senators of Washington constantly pushing for. Mr. Chairman, I
hope that the fervor, of which you fought for Los Alamos, will
help in shining some light on the challenges we have with this
particular budget moving forward.
So, I thank the Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, let me say, we're getting close to
adjournment here, and, Senator Cantwell, any questions you
submit will be answered. What would be a--is 10 days adequate?
You're very busy. Let's say 2 weeks.
Mr. Rispoli. Mr. Chairman, that's--yes, sir.
The Chairman. Because there'll be questions for both of
you. I will submit some also.
Let me ask, am I correct--if you know; if not, you can find
out--what is the total budget? The total amount--if I'm correct
here, the total amount appropriated--this is for year 2006--for
cleanup is $6,659,000,000. That's the largest line item in the
appropriation bill that covers the Corps of Engineers, all of
the Defense nuclear work. No, I'm not talking about Washington;
I'm talking about all of them. So, the record should reflect
that, you know, it's not like this U.S. Government isn't
spending a lot of money. The problem is, we don't get any
success, we don't achieve. That's why we are so pleased to have
you up here.
Senator Cantwell, I want to suggest--and this is from a
Senator that is very concerned and wants to get this done, and
wants to fund it, you know--maybe all the leadership at the
State level, all the regulatory entities, the National
Government, maybe they all ought to sit down and think about
another agreement. Something's wrong with the way this project
has to be managed by those who manage it. It's not all-those-
who-manage-it's fault. Some of it is that the requirements are
so difficult, the way we have done it, and nobody wants to
change, because, you know, when somebody suggests change, it is
violating the environmental concerns of those involved. You
heard, Colorado doesn't even have any milestones. It's
incredible. All we talk about is milestones, hundreds of them.
They didn't have any. Is that correct, Senator? Written-in
milestones. Is that right?
Ms. Tuor. That is correct, in the later years of the
project.
The Chairman. None. So, in the early years--so, I don't--
I'm not trying to con anybody here. Tell us about the
milestones in the early part of the project.
Ms. Tuor. Mr. Chairman, in the early part of the project,
we did have milestones that were similar to those at other
sites, but once we agreed with the regulators on our baseline
plan, starting in 2000, under the closure contract, the
regulators agreed to dispense with individual milestones and
measure us based on the percentage of the work that was planned
each year that we actually accomplished. So, we set an
agreement on how much environmental remediation work, how much
building demolition, and if we accomplished a certain
percentage of that, then we were in compliance. What that did
was give us the flexibility, if we ran into technical problems
in one place to move assets and resources and to continue the
forward progress on the project.
The Chairman. Let me ask another question, Mr. Secretary.
There were incentives built in. We even had the representative
of the company tell us what they were, in dollars. Are there
incentives built into the contract in Washington?
Mr. Rispoli. Yes, Mr. Chairman, there are incentives. In
fact, with some of our contracts there, there have been
significant, you might say, deductions from the available
incentive because of these types of things.
The Chairman. Right.
Mr. Rispoli. I think your suggestion is certainly a valid
one, in that, as I mentioned, we have met 900 milestones at
Hanford, and you don't see a lot of celebration of the ones
we've met. But there are 300 to go, and we're talking about
missing three, and another number--a small number in jeopardy.
But I think the approach was so different that it gave the
contractor the flexibility to keep forward momentum; even if
you encounter a roadblock here, you can redeploy workforce
there to keep forward momentum.
The Chairman. And my last question. How many workers are
employed, in total, for the project that we're talking about in
Senator Cantwell's State? Do you know? Maybe the Senator knows.
Mr. Rispoli. Well, I can answer specifically for the
Hanford Waste Treatment Plant. At the present time, the Hanford
Waste Treatment Plant has 2,600--approximately 2,600 workers
onsite.
The Chairman. Now, you said ``treatment plant.'' Is there
something else besides that?
Mr. Rispoli. Yes. That is the one significant capital
project that has been most of the discussion. But yes, sir,
there are far more workers there at the site that are working
on tank farms, K basins, soil and groundwater remediation----
The Chairman. How many?
Mr. Rispoli. I'll get that back to you for the record.
The Chairman. Right. Is it four times as much?
Mr. Rispoli. Oh, I'm sure. Yes, sir.
[The information follows:]
In November 2005, there were approximately 9,600 contractor
employees at the Hanford Site, excluding the Waste Treatment Plant
workers.
The Chairman. Does anybody know? If you don't, can you put
in the record how many employees there were when this project
was not a cleanup site, but was an ongoing site, where we were
actually doing a--where we had nuclear reactors producing the
substances for the Defense Department? Can you get us the
number of how many were employed then?
Mr. Rispoli. I will do that, yes, sir.
[The information follows:]
Prior to the transfer of the Hanford Site landlord responsibilities
to the Office of Environmental Management in 1992, the site employed
approximately 15,000 contractor employees.
The Chairman. Let me say, when I suggested here, for the
record, and was addressing--in a sense, perhaps I should not
have to--but when I said maybe we should all sit down and see
if we couldn't have a more operative agreement, I want
everybody to know I'm not an expert in the field. All I know is
that there are going to be constant concerns about funding. And
I don't know how to do it. I mean, nobody is giving the
Congress enough money, and the budgets don't have it. No matter
who is the President, they can't--they don't put in their
budget what's requested. So, we have to find some way to do
this more reasonably priced and still get it done. We can't
just continue to say we can't achieve under it. There ought to
be some human capacity to enter into a--in a knowledgeable way
to something better. And that's all this Senator is suggesting.
But actually, it's the Appropriations that puts up the
money. The Senator knows that. And we get a limited amount for
all the things we have to do. And we can't go out and say,
``You've got to abolish the Corps of Engineers.'' We have to
allocate the money. And so, people out there in the West ought
to know, it's a big problem. And those who oppose and argue and
insist and litigate--you know, they all ought to say, ``Let's
sit down and see what in the world can be done.'' Now, maybe
there's nothing.
I'm going to ask the Secretary, personally, whether he
could see some leeway that that might help with the situation.
I may be totally wrong.
With that, Senators----
Senator Cantwell. Mr. Chairman, could I just add, for the
record, that it is 11,000 workers at the Hanford, 11,000. And
I'm well aware of your dual role, and that's as an appropriator
and an authorizer. That's why I'm hoping that I can get you
more engaged in the creative issues on this----
The Chairman. Senator, I'm about as engaged as somebody who
doesn't live there can be.
[Laughter.]
Senator Cantwell. Good. Well, I'm happy to hear that,
because I think the history is just as you've described, a role
of getting people involved. Again, it's the enormity of the
project. So, I look forward to working with you on it.
Mr. Rispoli. Mr. Chairman, if I may, for the record, just
state that the Secretary has met with Governor Gregoire, and
has had several discussions by phone with her, and we are
working to try to normalize relations in the State. And I
believe that the relationship has been quite productive in that
regard.
The Chairman. Yes, well, I want to state for the record
here--and there may be some press from out there; it looks like
the only ones here must be interested in this issue and that's
why they came--if the State is looking for a Secretary that
understands and is capable of putting something together--no,
I'm not in any way being pejorative about any other
Secretaries, but this man can do it, if they will just sit down
and work with him. He is extremely talented in matters of
science and engineering, and has been an executive and knows
how to do it. He's committed to this one. And I would hope that
people would think maybe this is time to start anew. And I urge
that.
With that, I thank the Senators for coming, particularly
Senator Salazar, you've devoted a great deal of time here, and
you are proud of that project out there in front of us, and you
should be.
[Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
Responses to Additional Questions
----------
Department of Energy,
Department of Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs,
Washington, DC, February 9, 2006.
Hon. Pete V. Domenici,
Chairman, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: On November 15, 2005, James Rispoli, Assistant
Secretary, Office of Environmental Management, testified regarding the
evaluation and receipt of a status report on Environmental Management
programs of the Department of Energy.
Enclosed are the answers to 61 questions that were submitted by
you, Senators Alexander, Smith, Bunning, Bingaman, Cantwell, and
Salazar.
Also, enclosed are the four remaining inserts that you and Senator
Cantwell requested to complete the hearing record.
If we can be of further assistance, please have your staff contact
our Congressional Hearing Coordinator, Lillian Owen, at (202) 586-2031.
Sincerely,
Jill L. Sigal,
Assistant Secretary.
[Enclosures.]
Questions From Senator Domenici
Question 1. With the cleanup and closure of the Rocky Flats site an
apparent success, how does EM plan on incorporating the lessons learned
from that experience into future contracts for site closures?
Answer. Lessons learned from the accelerated closure of Rocky Flats
will be used by at least four different methods. First, the Department
has established a Consolidate Business Center (CBC) and is transferring
``closure cadre''--EM staff who lived through Rocky Flats closure--to
the CBC to support closure of other sites.
Second, the Rocky Flats Project Office is developing a lessons
learned seminar for managers at other cleanup sites. Top-level
discussions such as contract and project management, regulator and
stakeholder interactions, and Federal staff management will be framed
in a presentation format and sent to other cleanup sites. EM
Headquarters will consider this in development of acquisition
strategies for new contracts.
Third, the Department also is preparing a lessons learned document
entitled The Rocky Flats Closure Legacy. The document takes a two-
tiered approach at describing the lessons learned. The first tier
addresses strategic planning issues, and their convergence during the
early stages of the project. Successes, failures, and key learning
points are described and analyzed. The second tier of discussions
addresses lessons learned related to implementation of the project. The
chapters describe in detail some of the most relevant technical and
management challenges that were faced throughout implementation of the
ten-year closure project. This will be used in formulating strategy for
new contracts.
Lastly, a digital video disk (DVD) and 30-page brochure are being
produced that synopsizes the cleanup effort and key challenges.
Question 2. When do closure contracts make sense for the
department, and what are the risks and benefits associated with such an
approach?
Answer. Closure contracts make sense when the Department has
clearly defined end states. The Rocky Flats site is a prime example of
this. The Department's mission to support national defense at that site
was over and the environmental cleanup mission had a finite life.
Additionally, a clear scope could be developed since the end point was
defined in accordance with regulations. From this scope, a relatively
high-confidence baseline that described the remaining work could be
developed. Therefore, a closure contract was appropriate to complete
the work and close the site.
There are several benefits associated with this type of contract,
which is a cost-plus-incentive fee contract. These include establishing
site-wide incentives instead of individual incentives for subprojects,
establishing total project cost incentives with a negotiated Federal
government and contractor share for any savings realized, establishing
project schedule incentives, and an increased focus on project
management. This emphasis on total site performance allows the
contractor to manage all of the work and allows the Department to focus
on project and contract management oversight.
The risks associated with a closure contract revolve around the
effectiveness of the Department's and the contractor's project and
contract management systems and the ability to manage project risk. It
is essential that effective systems be in place to monitor the progress
of the work. For example, there must be a baseline with a high degree
of confidence established to describe and track the project's cost and
schedule. Uncertainties (i.e., project risks that include a validated
earned value management system) must continually be identified,
assessed, and mitigated. Also, regular progress reports must be
developed and analyzed to verify contract performance and any potential
savings.
Question 3. With the closure of the DOE EM sites, there has been
much interest in the Department's plans for administering retiree
pension and medical systems. As I noted in a letter to Secretary Bodman
earlier this year, the U.S. taxpayer is entirely responsible for this
obligation. I also expressed concern that the Department's actions on
the disposition of these programs could have a significant impact on
drawing the best employees and best contractors to do this important
work.
Answer. DOE officials briefed Senate and House staff members on the
Department's general approach regarding the provision of pension
benefits to facility management contractor employees. Pursuant to this
approach, incumbent employees who are employed by a contractor under a
new contract(s) will remain in their existing pension plan(s) pursuant
to plan eligibility requirements and applicable law; that is, ``if
you're in, you're in.'' However, contractors selected for award of a
new contract(s) will be required to provide market-based pension plans
for new, non-incumbent employees hired after contract award. DOE
believes this is a fair approach that reflects current best commercial
practices and will enable the Department to continue to attract the
best employees and contractors. With respect to medical benefits for
contractor employees, the Department is currently assessing its
approach.
Question 4. What actions has the Department taken since my
communication to implement a workable program for the future?
Answer. As explained in Question 3, recently the Department has
been briefing House and Senate staff on the Department's general
approach to the provision of pension benefits for contractor employees
and is currently assessing its approach with respect to medical
benefits. The Department anticipates completing a formal policy
statement concerning contractor employee benefits in the late winter
timeframe.
Question 5. GAO recently reported that DOE was unlikely to achieve
the $50 billion in savings originally attributed to implementing the
accelerated cleanup strategy. Given significant potential project cost
increases--such as those associated with Hanford's Waste Treatment
Plant--does DOE still believe it will achieve any savings? If so, what
savings does DOE believe it can achieve and how?
Answer. Some of the assumptions upon which the Department's
estimate of $50 billion in cost savings have not materialized. In
addition, changing circumstances and emerging requirements have led to
an increase in the scope and thus cost of the Environmental Management
program. However, the Department still believes that focusing on risk
reduction rather than risk management is fundamentally sound and based
on the independent audit of the Department's financial statement,
should result in life-cycle savings.
Question 6. Under the accelerated plan, DOE's project risk has
become significantly greater than under DOE's prior cleanup strategy.
What implications does the higher project risk have on DOE's ability to
reduce environmental risk and realize cost and schedule savings
expected under the accelerated strategy?
Answer. While an accelerated cleanup strategy may result in higher
project risk on certain projects because of more aggressive schedules,
environmental and safety risk are, in fact, decreased. The accelerated
cleanup strategy has demonstrated significantly decreased long-term
public, worker and environmental risk and cost by cleaning up, closing
out, treating, or disposing of radioactive wastes much earlier, rather
than later when the potential costs for remediation, environmental and
human exposure risks are much greater. However, the Department still
believes that focusing on risk reduction rather than risk management is
fundamentally sound and based on the independent audit of the
Department's financial statement, should result in life-cycle savings.
Question 7. Recently, the Department has been criticized for
attempting to reduce overall costs and schedule by accelerating its
cleanup work but at the same time increasing operational risks and
risks to worker safety. What steps do you think could be taken to avoid
increasing these risks and to ensure that the work is performed timely
and in a safe and reliable manner?
Answer. The Department of Energy and its contractors emphasize the
overriding priority of safety. This is done through proven methods,
including oversight by contractor staff and DOE safety specialists and
facility representatives; incentivizing safety by tying contract award
fees to safety performance (48 CFR 9705215-3, Conditional payment of
fee, profit, or incentives contract clause); expanding job-specific
training opportunities, including mockups of complex activities; and
frequent jobsite walkthroughs by senior managers.
The Department integrates the protection of the environment, safety
and health into the way it does work. This integration is implemented
through the 48 CFR 970.5223-1, Integration of environment, safety, and
health into work planning and execution contract clause. The core
functions of the DOE Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) require
contractors to: 1) define the scope of work; 2) identify and analyze
the hazards; 3) develop and implement hazard controls; 4) perform work
within the controls; and, 5) provide feedback and continuous
improvement. These functions ensure safety and health are integral
considerations as work is planned and conducted. Contractor ISMSs are
verified as effective by DOE, and contractors and field element
managers are required to provide an annual declaration to the adequacy
of their programs to the Assistant Secretary for Environmental
Management. The Environmental Management (EM) ISMS worker safety
performance has been good and compares very favorably to private
industry. For calendar year 2004, the total recordable injury rate for
EM activities was 1.4 injuries per 200,000 work hours as compared to
the overall private industry rate of 4.8. While the EM program has
demonstrated good safety performance doing hazardous cleanup work, the
program has recently initiated a DOE-wide effort to further enhance
ISMS. This effort includes development of site action plans to improve
work planning and feedback and improvement, and to provide increased
Headquarters' oversight of the ISMS annual verification process.
Question 8. Over several decades, the Department has had mixed
results in developing and implementing new technologies as part of its
nuclear waste cleanup efforts. Several of its technology failures have
been costly and have hampered cleanup progress. The Department's
current accelerated cleanup approach and schedule assumes that several
technologies currently under development (such as those for the Hanford
waste treatment project) will be successfully developed and deployed
under-very aggressive time frames for treating portions of the waste.
What steps are you taking to ensure that the Department has identified
and fully tested and demonstrated the best available technology to use
in treating the waste?
Answer. Annually, the Office of Environmental Management (EM)
requests funding for technology development activities to provide
innovative and better technologies to support the EM cleanup mission
priorities. Identifying and assessing the EM complex technology gaps in
site baselines is the responsibility of EM Headquarters and is the
first step. This assessment is conducted for the entire life-cycle of
the EM cleanup program. The next step is establishing the priority of
candidate technology areas for each site. This is done collaboratively
with the respective field site contacts, and is an iterative and
integrated process. Following this assessment, a recommended list of
technology needs for new funding is completed, and acquisition plan(s)
developed and approved by EM Headquarters. The acquisition plan
describes the appropriate contract type and duration of work (Phases).
Subsequently, competitive Requests For Proposals are issued by EM
Headquarters to solicit proposals from the private sector. A Source
Selection Board, comprising Federal experts in specific technology
areas, is assembled to conduct a technical evaluation of the proposals
and to submit recommendation(s) to the Source Selecting Official.
Finally, selection of the proposed technology(s) is completed and
the contract(s) is awarded. The technology development, testing, and
deployment are carried out via the contract requirements.
Question 9. In the past couple of years, DOE has incurred several
bid protests after making contract awards--for example, the Hanford
River Corridor Contract received two bid protests. These protests waste
time and resources. What is DOE doing to ensure that future bid
protests are minimized?
Answer. The Department of Energy cannot prevent protests from being
filed by offerors who disagree with the Department's procurement
selections or its solicitations. The Competition in Contracting Act
clearly provides them with the right to file such challenges, and the
robust competition for DOE contracts means that there are offerors who
do not win competitions.
DOE takes a number of actions to minimize the incidence of protests
and to efficiently deploy the resources needed to address protests. DOE
does extensive planning for debriefing unsuccessful offerors and
continues to collect and implement lessons learned. Because the
proposals submitted by the offerors and the details of DOE's evaluation
are not public information, unsuccessful offerors frequently cannot
obtain the information they would like to see about their competitors
in order to decide whether a protest would be well-founded. However,
DOE attempts to provide the maximum information in debriefings to
enable companies to decide that a protest is not warranted. In
addition, DOE has pioneered the use of early, electronic document
production in protests where the U.S. Government Accountability Office
has issued a protective order that permits attorneys for the parties to
review proposal and source selection information. This facilitates
protesters deciding early to withdraw or refine their protests, and
reduces the amount of effort needed to provide the documents.
In order to strengthen the procurement process, the Department is
conducting a review to identify improvements to the process. The Office
of Environmental Management (EM) is developing an improved acquisition
model to streamline the process using lessons learned from past
procurements. EM will create a Deputy Assistant Secretary position
specifically for acquisition and project management to oversee
implementation of the results of the Department's procurement review.
This Deputy Assistant Secretary will be responsible for incorporation
of ``real time'' lessons learned and for ensuring that procurements are
consistent, defensible, reproducible and completed on a reasonable
schedule. EM is also planning to hire and train employees to enhance
its staffs procurement capabilities.
Question 10. What oversight steps does DOE plan to implement to
ensure that its contractors develop reliable cost estimates, including
contingency funding, for completing environmental cleanup projects? It
is important to our national energy security and economic
competitiveness that the Department support efforts to bring the next
generation uranium enrichment facility utilizing domestic enrichment
technology to the commercial marketplace. In order to meet the schedule
for constructing such a facility in Piketon, the Gaseous Centrifuge
Enrichment Plant (GCEP) buildings must be cleaned up, the waste stored
in the buildings must be removed and they must be turned over by the
Department on or before September 30, 2006. Congress specifically
appropriated money to accomplish this in order to make the buildings
available for the construction of a new enrichment facility. Can you
assure this Committee that the Department is on track to remove all of
the waste, clean up the GCEP buildings and turn them over on or before
September 30, 2006 for construction to commence on time?
Answer. The Department typically requires a scope, cost, and
schedule baseline be developed within 60 days of contract award. The
contractor's baseline is reviewed by site personnel and approved by the
Contracting Officer. This baseline is then placed under Office of
Environmental Management (EM) Headquarters' configuration control by
the cognizant Departmental field manager. Any changes require
submission of a baseline change proposal. Scope, cost and schedule
baselines are reviewed periodically by EM Headquarters. The Department
has determined that an improved acquisition and contract administration
strategy is needed to incorporate lessons learned and to integrate
fundamental project management principles that may be lacking in some
instances. This includes more effective implementation of project
management principles and discipline in accordance with both industry
practices and the Department's own project management directives, which
have been reviewed by the National Academy of Sciences.
With respect to the Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Plant (GCEP), the
project has experienced delays and will not meet all of the activities
to complete the September 30, 2006, milestone. Issues that have delayed
the schedule include obtaining the necessary security clearance levels
for the workforce, obtaining an approved security plan for the
disassembly operations, and obtaining cleared drivers for transporting
classified waste. In addition, DOE identified a small amount of waste
that does not have a current disposition path and may require on-site
treatment. The Department has made every effort to mitigate the
schedule delays to accommodate the GCEP turnover. DOE has daily and
weekly project status meetings, monthly project reviews, and conducts
surveillances/assessments to ensure contractor performance.
The Department is continuing efforts to make facilities available
to the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) to support its
development needs. In a June 2002 Agreement between DOE and USEC, both
parties agreed to make long-term commitments to support the further
development of gas centrifuge technology. As a result, the February 17,
2004 Agreement between DOE and USEC for Lead Cascade activities at
Portsmouth was negotiated and signed. Accordingly, all facilities and
areas identified in the February 17, 2004 Agreement have been leased to
USEC to support its Lead Cascade construction activities. To further
support USEC's activities, DOE entered into negotiations for a new
lease arrangement with USEC. Currently, these negotiations have not
been completed, and a schedule for turnover of the GCEP facilities is
still being negotiated with USEC in accordance with its actual
requirements. The turnover schedule being negotiated identifies a
sequence of target turnover dates for several GCEP facilities and
systems. In accordance with this schedule, many facilities have already
been leased to USEC, and more will be leased as late as December 2006
and a few in 2007. Our plan focuses on the need and schedule for each
area of the GCEP facilities in sequence.
Question 11. After nearly five years of construction work on the
largest, most complex waste treatment plant in the country, Hanford's
Waste Treatment Plant, DOE discovered the plant was being built based
on inadequate seismic requirements. As far back as 2002, the Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board cautioned that the plant design was
based on inadequate seismic requirements, yet construction of the plant
using the inadequate standards went forward. In a recent study, the
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory concluded that the standards were
inadequate by today's seismic requirements. As a result, the plant
design may have to be reworked on the partially built waste treatment
facility at a significant additional cost. How did this fundamental
miscalculation happen?
Answer. The seismic design requirements for the Waste Treatment
Plant (WTP) site were changed in early 2005 due to extensive
recalculation of the effects of uncertainty in soil properties in the
mudstone and siltstone layers located 350 to 1,200 feet underneath the
WTP site. The effect of these layers was estimated in 1993 through 1996
design basis calculations developed by Geomatrix, Inc., Westinghouse
Hanford, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, and Fluor Hanford.
Between 1996 and 1999 the design basis calculations were technically
reviewed by British Nuclear Fuels Limited, Bechtel National Inc.,
nationally recognized independent expert consultants, Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE). In 1999, DOE accepted their recommendations and adopted the
seismic design basis for the WTP.
The seismic ground motion criteria changed in 2005, principally due
to incorporating a much greater range of these potential soil
properties than heretofore. The extensive calculation of the effects of
variable layer properties was not required (or performed) when the
plant design was commenced in 1997. The Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board (the Board) identified three specific concerns in its July
30, 2002, letter to DOE: the probability of tectonic activity of the
anticlines and associated faults for the Yakima Fold belts; the
spectral amplification associated with the attenuation relationship;
and the amplified floor and equipment response of the superstructure.
On September 18, 2002, DOE issued an extensive response to the Board's
July 2002 letter (ORP/OSR 2002-2 Office of River Protection Position
Concerning Assumed Probability of Tectonic Activity and Adequacy of
Ground Motion Attenuation Model Used in the Design of the Waste
Treatment Plant). This response, which included a variety of new
analyses using improved calculational methodology, concluded that the
existing design basis was adequately conservative. In January 2003, the
Board agreed that most of these issues had been resolved
satisfactorily, but the Board indicated that the site ground response
modeling was still not considered sufficiently conservative. In
response in 2003, to further confirm the calculated basis, DOE began a
program to acquire additional data regarding the site. The data
acquired was limited due to difficulties acquiring it (for example, a
leak developed in the polyvinyl chloride well casing at the 360 ft
depth). Cementing of the casing to repair the leak had a deleterious
effect on the soil, sand and gravel in the vicinity which interfered
with receiving clear signals using the suspension logging system in the
borehole, but when analyzed and combined with intensive re-examination
of available data, using a much more extensive modeling of site
performance than heretofore, the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
determined in late 2004 that unfavorable stiffening of the sandstone
and mudstone interbed layers located between 350 and 1,200 feet under
the WTP site could allow earthquakes to shake the site more severely in
the building frequency range of 4-6 Hertz than had been previously
calculated. The Department has engaged the USACE to assemble a panel of
seismic experts to review and affirm the seismic criteria before going
forward.
Question 12. Why did it take so long to find out that the seismic
standards were inadequate?
Answer. Development of seismic ground motion criteria is an
intensive process that generally takes 18-24 months to complete.
Modifications to these criteria require a similarly careful and
deliberate process involving expert geologists, seismologists, and
geophysicists. The time spent to revise the criteria in this case was
not excessive, but was proportionate to the potentially significant
impact of any increases in the criteria.
Question 13. How will the Department improve its oversight
practices to avoid such a fundamental problem in the future?
Answer. On August 10, 2005, the Secretary of Energy issued a
memorandum that laid out a strategy for aggressive and disciplined
project management for the Department. The strategy focuses on four
main areas: 1) strict adherence to DOE Order 413.3, Project Management
for the Acquisition of Capital Assets; 2) training, education, and
experience; 3) recognition of superior performance by program managers,
project directors, and contracting officers; and 4) accountability of
program managers, project directors, and contracting officers for
meeting project cost, schedule and performance targets. The DOE Project
Management System includes several rigorous internal and external
independent reviews throughout the life of a project that are performed
by senior expert professionals. They assess and evaluate the existence
and implementation of key project management, project control,
business, and technical systems and processes on an ongoing basis. The
Department has sound project management policies and procedures in
place and a capable workforce committed to successful performance. We
need to vigorously pursue both increased competencies in program
management and more consistent application of the standard practices.
Question 14. Other recent problems at the Hanford waste treatment
plant could result in project costs increasing significantly. How will
DOE assure the Congress that DOE can manage this project in the future
so that project problems will be minimized and cost increases
prevented?
Answer. The Secretary of Energy has implemented several key
initiatives to address the cost, scope, schedule, contract, and
management issues associated with the Waste Treatment Plant (WTP)
project. They include: 1) assembling a Headquarters' senior level
management team to oversee the project comprised of individuals with
specialized expertise in cost, contracting, management, and technical
design/engineering that will conduct an after action review to assess
the causes of the project issues; 2) submitting weekly progress reports
to the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management; and, 3)
providing periodic progress reviews from the Assistant Secretary for
Environmental Management to the Secretary of Energy; and, 4) holding
periodic meetings where Bechtel senior corporate officials provide to
the Secretary of Energy Bechtel's demonstration of its corporate
commitment and project management capabilities to WTP.
The Department is presently having all project management, project
control, business, and technical aspects of WTP reviewed and evaluated
by internal and external independent senior professionals. These
recommendations will be reviewed and implemented as applicable to
ensure the project is being planned and executed in accordance with
commitments. In addition, beginning in the first calendar quarter 2006,
a status report on the WTP project will be sent to Congress on a
quarterly basis.
Question From Senator Alexander
Question 1. There are plans to conclude some EM projects despite
the fact that numerous facilities and properties will remain
contaminated. What are your plans for finishing the job at these sites?
Answer. DOE faces future cleanup activities from currently
operational or excess facilities that are contaminated or overlay
contaminated soil and groundwater. This work scope includes cleanup
activities for the Department's excess facilities, including
deactivation and decommissioning of facilities, cleanup of contaminated
media, and disposition of excess nuclear and/or hazardous materials.
The contamination is generally at facilities managed by the National
Nuclear Security Administration, the Office of Science, and the Office
of Nuclear Energy, Science, and Technology.
The Department expects to develop plans for these facilities and
properties in fiscal year (FY) 2006. The FY 2006 planning activities
are expected to include updating the data related to defining the
scope, cost and schedule. The Department anticipates being guided by
its cleanup obligations under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Coordination, and Liability Act.
Question From Senator Smith
Question 1. In 2003, CH2MHill estimated that all of the wastes from
the C-tank field at Hanford could be removed by September 2006, for a
total of $90 million. However a recent Inspector General report states
that the schedule won't be met, and the budget is likely to be $215
million. Can you explain in detail the delays and the cost overruns?
More importantly, what is the real schedule for emptying these tanks,
and the rest of the tanks?
Answer. The primary challenges impacting waste retrieval are 1)
ensuring worker safety, and 2) the chemical complexity of the Hanford
wastes. The Department has taken appropriate steps to ensure worker
safety, such as placing tank farm workers on supplied air where
necessary due to tank vapor concerns. The use of supplied air decreases
worker productivity and can extend retrieval durations. The Department
and the contractor are undergoing a study of these chemicals to assess
where workers can cease the use of supplied air. Relative to chemical
complexity, Hanford wastes are chemically unique due to the
multiplicity of processes that generated those wastes. In some cases,
the wastes are readily retrievable. In other cases, tank-specific
technical challenges arise and must be addressed.
As was discussed with the State of Washington, the Washington
Congressional delegation, and committees of jurisdiction, including the
Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee on October 6, 2005, some
elements within this milestone are in jeopardy. The Inspector General
(IG) report IG-706 looked at one element within the M-45-00B milestone,
i.e., completing the retrieval of all 16 tanks within C Farm by
September 30, 2006. That element of M-45-00B is in jeopardy, yet the
Department continues to strive to complete that element in full
compliance with the M-45 retrieval criteria despite the challenges
encountered in retrieving the C farm tanks. The three tanks retrieved
to date have been retrieved in compliance with established Tri-Party
Agreement (TPA) standards.
The Department does not know at this time whether all elements of
this complex milestone will be met by the date specified in the TPA.
Questions From Senator Bunning
Question 1. I have learned from previous inquiries that the clean-
up contract for Paducah needed to be awarded in October, 2005 in order
to have the new contractor transitioned and in place by January 2006.
Please provide my office with evidence that DOE will have the new
clean-up contractor in place in order to prevent another extension of
the current clean-up contract.
Answer. The contract was awarded on December 27, 2005, to Paducah
Remediation Services. As requested by the companies, the unsuccessful,
as well as the successful bidders were debriefed on January 11-12,
2006. The companies have up to ten days (January 22, 2006) after these
debriefs to file a timely protest with the U.S. Government
Accountability Office. Nonetheless, the Department is proceeding with
contract execution. The contract with Bechtel Jacobs was extended
through April 23, 2006, to allow them to provide assistance to the new
contractor.
Question 2. We are over two years behind on having the clean-up
contractor in place. Please provide my office with the evidence to show
that we are still on schedule for an accelerated clean-up with a
completion date of 2010.
Answer. In October 2003, the Department signed an agreement with
the Commonwealth of Kentucky that set forth a strategy to complete site
cleanup by the planned accelerated cleanup completion date of 2019.
This 2019 cleanup strategy has been incorporated into the enforceable
site cleanup agreement between DOE, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Since Fiscal Year 2004, the
Paducah budget requests have been based on achieving the 2019 cleanup
date, and the Department has been requiring its remediation contractor
to perform work consistent with the 2019 date.
The Paducah Remediation small business contract was awarded in
December 2005, accelerated cleanup work at the Paducah site is
continuing to progress under the current remediation contract, as the
new contractor transitions into place. While some projects (e.g., scrap
metal) have experienced delays, and other projects (e.g., inactive
facility decontamination and decommissioning and legacy waste
disposition) are ahead of schedule, the project is on track to meet the
2019 cleanup completion date.
Question 3. The DOE Lexington Office was set up eliminate
unnecessary delay of communication between Paducah and DOE
headquarters. The technical direction for all work comes from
Lexington, but certain administrative functions continue to go through
Oak Ridge and the Consolidated Business Center in Cincinnati, Ohio.
This structure puts Lexington at the discretion of these other offices
for administrative approvals and assistance which can directly impact
technical performance. If DOE can establish direct reporting for the
Lexington office for technical matters, why can't they do the same for
the administrative responsibilities?
Answer. The Portsmouth Paducah Project Office (PPPO) reports
directly to Headquarters regarding all mission-related activities and
responsibilities. Support functions are provided by the Consolidated
Business Center in Cincinnati, Ohio, for approximately 20 Office of
Environmental Management sites, including the PPPO. The Department has
determined that the consolidation of these functions in a central
location for some small and medium-sized sites is the most cost-
effective, and appropriate approach.
Oak Ridge continues to provide the following support to PPPO:
safeguards and security (personnel security oversight, general physical
security, control of classified matter, Nuclear Materials Control and
Accountability, etc.) contracts/grants (e.g., limited administration of
contracts and grants that originated from Oak Ridge Operations that
have not yet been transferred to PPPO), and activities arising under
the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) lease (certain
administrative support for budget and finance activities arising from
the USEC lease).
No delay in communication or technical performance is expected as a
result of this organizational structure.
Question 4. When the new clean-up contract is awarded at Paducah,
will the Oak Ridge office still have an administrative role with
Paducah matters?
Answer. The Oak Ridge Office will not have a role in administering
the new Paducah remediation contract. The Office of Environmental
Management is evaluating the current structure for Paducah project
execution. As a result of this review, the Oak Ridge Office may have a
continuing role at Paducah in connection with certain areas, such as
safeguards and security and the administration of the Gaseous Diffusion
Plant lease agreement between the Department and the United States
Enrichment Corporation. This does not affect the line responsibility
for budget and performance of the environment work at the site, for
which the Manager, Portsmouth Paducah Project Office, reports directly
to the DOE Headquarters.
Question 5. The community in Paducah is trying to establish a
vision for the long term strategy for the site. I am committed to the
community and share their concern for the future. What is your office's
role with regard to the post clean-up and reindustrialization of the
Paducah site?
Answer. The Department is committed to working with the community
and other stakeholders at the Paducah site to ensure that they are
included in the process for establishing a vision for site uses
following cleanup. Our stakeholders have several avenues for
participation at the sites. For example, our stakeholders can work
through Site Specific Advisory boards, such as Paducah's Citizens
Advisory Board, which provide formal recommendations to the Department
with respect to future site uses. Stakeholders are also provided the
opportunity to review and comment upon various cleanup documents, which
include discussions of projected future land uses. The Department
maintains a productive relationship with Paducah re-use organizations
as they seek economic development and re-industrialization
opportunities for the Paducah community.
The Portsmouth Paducah Project Office's management also is
available to speak with members of the public who wish to discuss the
Paducah cleanup strategy. Once the Department has completed its cleanup
activities at the Paducah site, responsibility for long-term management
of the site will transfer to the Department's Office of Legacy
Management.
Question 6. When do you expect DOE to begin implementing a worker
health and safety rule as required under Section 3173 of FY 2003
Defense Authorization Act that follows Congressional intent?
Answer. The Department has submitted a final rule to the Office of
Management and Budget implementing section 3173 of the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA). The Department expects to publish the final
rule in the Federal Register by the end of the 2nd quarter of FY 2006.
Based on section 3173 of the NDAA, these regulations ``shall take
effect on the date that is one year after the promulgation date of the
regulations.'' However, DOE will continue to enforce DOE Order 440.1A,
Worker Protection Management for DOE Federal and Contractor Employees,
and 10 CFR 850, Chronic Beryllium Disease Prevention Program, worker
safety and health requirements through contractual means until the
effective date of the final rule.
Question 7. I just learned the start date for DUF6
operations could be delayed because DOE is requiring the contractor to
submit new design activity plans to comply with the Defense Nuclear
Facility Safety Board's seismic data standards. These standards are
more stringent than current DOE standards. The contractor has already
submitted design plans to DOE that account for the geology of the site,
and construction is underway. Is DOE still firmly committed to the May
2007 start date for the DUF6 operations?
Answer. On September 30, 2005, the Deputy Secretary approved the
Project Performance Baseline and Start of Construction for the depleted
uranium hexafluoride (DUF6) project with expected
commencement of operation in April 2008. Previous schedules were based
on conceptual and preliminary designs that had not been validated
through the Department's external independent review process. The need
to adjust the previous schedules reflects the typical uncertainty
associated with large construction projects during early design stages.
The Department has higher confidence in the new schedule now that the
design is complete.
Since approval of the project baseline in September, we have seen
continuous progress at the site.
Questions From Senator Bingaman
Question 1. Mr. Rispoli, a number of my fellow members have been
concerned about the Department's policy towards contractor employee
pension plans at EM sites. These employees include incumbent as well as
new hires at EM operations including Hanford, Paducah and the Waste
Isolation Plant or those about to be closed including Rocky Flats and
Fernald. There appears to be particular unease amongst employees and
even contractors when an operation changes contracts with respect to
credit for time-in-service as well as a disparity in overall benefits
between incumbent employees who may be in defined benefit plans and new
hires who may be in defined contribution plan. Other issues in the
overall benefits disparity in a contract change include health care
while working and in retirement. I cite these benefit combinations only
as examples, they may of course vary site-to-site. Does EM have a
uniform policy towards pension plans and if so would the Department
please forward this policy to us at the earliest possible date and be
prepared to brief staff and members?
Answer. During the past several weeks, DOE officials have been
briefing Senate and House staff members on the Department's general
policy approach regarding the provision of pension benefits to
Management and Operating Contractor (M&O) and former M&O contractor
employees. Pursuant to this policy, incumbent employees who are
employed by a contractor under a new contract(s) will remain in their
existing pension plan(s) pursuant to plan eligibility requirements and
applicable law; that is, ``if you're in, you're in.'' However,
contractors selected for award of a new contract(s) will be required to
provide market-based pension plans for new, non-incumbent employees
hired after contract award. With respect to medical benefits for
contractor employees, the Department is currently assessing its
policies. The Department anticipates completing a formal policy
statement concerning contractor employee medical benefits in the late
winter or early spring timeframe. Like the pension policy for M&O and
former M&O employees, the medical benefits policy would be applied
Department-wide, not just to contracts at EM sites.
Question 2. It is my understanding that at WIPP, the EM program has
intervened a number of times in negotiations between the bargaining
units and the WIPP contractor. Is this true? If this is true what
specifically did the DOE say to the WIPP contractor?
Answer. The Office of Environmental Management is not aware of
intervention by the
Department with the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant contractor,
Washington TRU Solution, Inc., or the bargaining unit during labor
negotiations.
Question 3. Much has been credited towards the Rocky Flats closure
by moving from performance based contract to incentive based
contracts--that is the contractor receives more cash award for
achieving milestones at an earlier date. Do you think this contracting
model will work at long-term closure sites like Hanford, Savannah River
or Idaho where the remediation involves the removal or isolation of
liquid high level wastes?
Answer. Yes, in fact, contracts similar to the one used at Rocky
Flats were awarded at Idaho and for the River Corridor at Hanford (the
former involves remediation of tank waste). In addition, the Department
will review all contracting models for each acquisition and will
utilize the model that will give taxpayers the best return on
investment and yield the best results in public health and safety and
protection of the environment. The Rocky Flats contract is a cost-plus-
incentive fee contract, and its attributes will be considered for
Hanford and Savannah River liquid waste management scope of work in
upcoming contract competitions this fiscal year.
Question 4. In the case of Rocky Flats accelerated clean up Kaiser-
Hill received on the order of $500M for closing the site successfully
and one year before the target date. I note that Rocky Flats did not--
like Hanford or Savannah--involve large reprocessing facilities which
generated large volumes of liquid high level waste. Given that early
Rocky Flats closure resulted in a $500M incentive award would the
Department have to recalibrate the incentive award fee for the more
difficult and long-term cases like Hanford?
Answer. While sites like Savannah River and Hanford do have large
inventories of liquid wastes unlike Rocky Flats, the Department will
evaluate each contract requirement on a case-by-case basis to determine
the appropriate incentive fee structure for these large facilities.
Over the past few years, the Department has implemented aggressive
performance-based contracting approaches that include clearly defined
statements of work and results-oriented incentives. We will continue to
put in place site-wide or project-specific incentives, tailored to each
individual site or project mission, to try to produce significant cost
and schedule savings and duplicate the success of the Rocky Flats
closure site.
Question 5. A recent GAO report on performance reporting found that
the EM accelerated clean up effort was behind schedule for three of the
most challenging and costly activities (1) disposing of transuranic
waste, (2) disposing of radioactive tank wastes and (3) closing tanks
of contaminated radioactive wastes. The GAO estimates that the EM
program will not save the $50 billion as originally claimed under
accelerated clean up with a total program cost of $129 billion by 2035.
What program tools are in place so that the Congress can monitor not
only the amount of waste cleaned up but the cost expended in meeting
targeted milestones against the targeted cost?
Answer. The Department of Energy is constantly working on improved
ways to better report performance and the costs to attain program
performance. Earned value management system is an industry standard
that measures how planned work on a project was completed within
expected costs and schedule and is now a tool being fully implemented
throughout the Environmental Management (EM) program. Earned value data
are collected from all the EM sites for all EM cleanup projects, both
line item and expense funded, along with the targeted milestones using
the Integrated Planning, Accountability, and Budgeting System--
Information System (IPABS-IS)--a single information management system
for all the programs and activities overseen by EM.
These data are reported monthly and are reviewed by EM project and
program managers to track the status of projects and to implement
recovery actions, if necessary. On a quarterly basis, the Assistant
Secretary reviews project performance with site managers to assess
project status and resolve issues. DOE plans to provide a new biannual
report to Congress, using the earned value data by site. This report
will also include annual budget estimates and life-cycle costs. This
report will summarize progress on these measures and discuss issues
associated with accomplishing the cleanup goals. This report should
amount to a complete response to the U.S. Government Accountability
Office's report and allow Congress the ability to monitor both the
amount cleanup completed along with the cost expended in meeting
targeted milestones.
Question 6. The Nunn-McCurdy Act governs expenditures for
Department of Defense acquisition programs triggering a set of
notifications and actions when certain cost and milestone thresholds
are exceeded. What is the Department's opinion to developing a similar
set of guidelines for EM programs?
Answer. The Department of Energy (DOE) currently has a comparable
set of guidelines for notifications and actions by the acquisition
executives for all capital asset projects under DOE Manual 413.3-1,
Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets. The Deputy
Secretary, as the Secretarial Acquisition Executive (SAE) for DOE, must
evaluate and approve any change in project scope or performance that
affects the project's mission need as originally approved by the SAE at
Critical Decision-0, Approve Mission Need. In addition, the SAE must
review and approve any increase of six months or more in the original
project completion date or an increase of $25 million or 25 percent of
the original cost baseline as originally approved by the SAE at
Critical Decision-2, Approve the Performance Measurement Baseline.
In addition, the Office of Environmental Management (EM) has
expanded the Department's requirements by establishing similar
thresholds for all of its operating (i.e., expense funded) projects and
has implemented additional control points internal to EM through the
establishment of a Headquarters' Configuration Control Board (CCB). The
CCB is designated and chartered as a management system by the Assistant
Secretary for EM to ensure the proper definition, coordination,
evaluation, and disposition of all proposed changes to the program
elements under Headquarters' configuration control.
This system also documents all requests for changes, justification
for changes, and final decisions concerning project cost and milestone
changes.
Question 7. The OMB has used the Program Assessment Rating Tool, or
PART, in addition to GPRA to bring accountability to the expenditure of
funds by the agencies. On page 17 of the FY06 EM budget submission, the
EM program received an overall PART score of 49 (ineffective) with a 20
(failing) for ``results/accountability'' for Fiscal Year 2004, for
Fiscal Year 2005 the overall score was 61 (adequate) with a 26
(failing) for ``results/accountability'' due to a lack of cost and
performance monitoring and for the Fiscal Year 2006 budget it says ``EM
was not required to do a PART evaluation for the FY2006 budget given
its participation over the last two years.'' Can you please explain
what you mean that you were not required to perform a PART analysis
given the past two years of failing grades in ``results and
accountability''?
Answer. The Office of Environmental Management (EM) was one of the
first DOE programs that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and
DOE selected to conduct a Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART)
evaluation. Two PARTs were completed for EM in the first year--one for
clean up (rated ineffective) and one for R&D (rated results not
demonstrated). Both appeared in the FY 2004 Congressional Budget
request. For the FY 2005 Budget, the two EM programs were re-evaluated
in one PART and the program improved its PART score to 61 (adequate).
EM was not reassessed for the FY 2006 Budget because it is OMB policy
to assess programs using PART once every five years or when the program
provides evidence of significant improvement. Although EM was not re-
evaluated using the PART, DOE-EM was requested to provide current data
on the performance measures included in the PART Summary and report on
the status of its follow-up actions. This information was reported with
the FY 2006 President's Budget. Comparable information was collected
again this year and will be reported in a new website, ExpectMore.gov,
designed to better inform the public on how Federal programs are
performing. ExpectMore.gov will be launched with the release of the
President's FY 2007 Budget. The Department continues to use PART to
identify areas of program management weaknesses and improve its
programs to produce meaningful results for the taxpayer.
Question 8. The National Academies recently released an interim
report as required under last year's Defense Authorization Act on
reclassifying the residual high level waste left in storage tanks at
Savannah River National Laboratory. Their recommendation was that it
might be better to decouple the removal of the bulk tank waste from the
permanent grouting in of the residual waste until a better
technological solution becomes available. What is the Department's
opinion of the report's recommendation?
Answer. The Department does not believe that, in general, removal
of the bulk tank waste should be decoupled from the permanent grouting
of the residual waste. A primary purpose of section 3116 of the
National Defense Authorization Act of 2005 was to specify criteria that
would permit tank closures and associated actions to go forward if the
specified criteria were met. One of the criteria is that the highly
radioactive radionuclides have been removed to the extent practical.
The Department will work closely with the appropriate agencies in
each State where storage tanks are located in making decisions. While
the Department understands the importance of proceeding with tank
closures in a timely manner, it will not proceed in cases where it
determines that a delay in tank closure is called for to protect public
health and safety and protection of the environment.
Question 9. Do you know how stable this grout material is with
respect to the long-lived radioactive residual waste?
Answer. Yes, the Department has conducted studies which show the
grout material will be stable with respect to the long-lived
radioactive residual waste for at least 1,000 years.
Question 10. Given that the Congress has not approved the transfer
of clean up functions to the NNSA for their site specific generated
waste--will EM continue to hold the function of cleaning up sites and
waste streams from ongoing Department Activities?
Answer. The Office of Environmental Management (EM) continues to be
responsible for the legacy environmental cleanup work at National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) sites. NNSA is responsible for
the management of any newly generated waste. EM retains budget
authority, responsibility and accountability for all cleanup activities
at NNSA sites. Under the NNSA Act, NNSA retains authority in directing
its contractors and Federal personnel in conducting the cleanup.
Questions From Senator Cantwell
Question 1. The Secretary has committed to me on multiple occasions
that the Department is committed to Hanford cleanup in accordance with
the Tri-Party Agreement (TPA). Yet, when suggested at the oversight
hearing that the TPA should be redrafted, you seemed to agree. Do you
support Hanford cleanup in accordance with the provisions of the Tri-
Party Agreement? If not, do you speak for the Secretary in reversing
the Department's stated position to support the federal cleanup
commitment contained in the TPA?
Answer. The Department remains committed to the cleanup at the
Hanford site in accordance with the Tri-Party Agreement (TPA). It is
important to remember that the TPA is a ``living'' document that was
designed to be updated. For example, there are TPA milestones to define
new milestones at specified points in time. Similarly, new sections are
added to the TPA, as appropriate. As with any ``living'' document, the
TPA parties should continue to explore any and all mutually beneficial
opportunities to improve safety, effectiveness, efficiency, and
flexibility of the Hanford cleanup. The objective of the TPA is to
ensure that cleanup is being accomplished in a safe and timely manner.
Question 2. How many times have TPA milestones been amended?
Answer. The total number of milestones and target dates currently
exceeds 1,400 of which approximately 900 milestones and 290 target
dates have been completed. In accordance with the terms of the Tri-
Party Agreement (TPA), there have been 442 approved change requests,
six amendments, and three modifications known as ``Directors
Determinations.'' Originally, in 1989, the TPA contained only 161
milestones, all of which were enforceable.
Question 3. How many times has the Department of Energy requested
that a TPA milestone be amended?
Answer. Under the terms of the Tri-Party Agreement (TPA), there
have been 442 approved change requests, six amendments, and three
modifications known as ``Directors Determinations.''
Within these requests, the parties have agreed to adding 864 new
milestones, deleting 168 milestones, and extending 208 milestones.*
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*The accompanying graph has been retained in committee files.
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Question 4. How many TPA milestones have been completed since the
adoption of the agreement in 1989?
Answer. Under the terms of the Tri-Party Agreement, 901 enforceable
milestones and 292 unenforceable target dates have been completed.
Question 5. How many times has a DOE request for TPA amendment been
agreed to by the State of Washington and the EPA?
Answer. All of the 451 Tri-Party Agreement changes to date have
been the consensus of the three agencies. The original number of
milestones, 161, has increased over time to the current number of 1,158
enforceable milestones to date.
Question 6. On October 28, the administration sent the Congress a
list of proposed funding rescissions. Included in that list was a
request to rescind $100 Million of previously appropriated funds from
the construction of the Waste Treatment Plant. The administration
included the Waste Treatment Plant rescission into a series of
reductions that the administration termed ``. . . lower-priority
federal programs . . .'' Do you believe that the construction of the
vitrification plant is a lower priority federal program?
Answer. The Waste Treatment Plant at Hanford is the Department's
single largest and most complex construction project, the most
significant project in the Environmental Management portfolio, and the
Department is committed to completing the plant. Taking into account
the technical and management issues associated with the Waste Treatment
Plant, the Administration's proposal and the congressional
appropriation support the fiscal year 2006 plans to continue
construction while technical issues are being resolved and a new
estimate at completion is being developed and validated.
Question 7. Does the Department of Energy support the proposed
rescission of funding?
Answer. The Department supports the Administration's decision to
dedicate needed resources to the relief efforts resulting from the Gulf
Coast hurricanes. Taking into account the technical and management
issues associated with the Waste Treatment Plant, the Administration's
proposal and the congressional appropriation support the fiscal year
2006 plans to continue construction while technical issues are being
resolved and a new estimate at completion is being developed and
validated.
Question 8. If the Department does not support the rescission
related to the Waste Treatment Plant, what has the Department done to
convey that message to the President?
Answer. The Department supports the need to balance the nation's
priorities with the more immediate needs resulting from the Gulf Coast
hurricanes. As you are aware, construction of the plant has been slowed
due to significant technical challenges, which reduced near-term
funding requirements for this project. Based on the status of the
project, Congress decided to provide $521 million for the plant in
2006, more than $100 million below the 2006 Budget request. Getting the
Waste Treatment Plant back on track continues to be one of the
Department's highest priorities.
Question 9. What factors would the department consider when
deciding whether to ship waste to a commercial disposal facility?
Answer. The Department of Energy's (DOE) waste management orders
and policies dictate the usage of commercial disposal facilities, which
vary by type of waste. For example, high-level waste will be disposed
of at the Yucca Mountain, Nevada, national repository and defense
transuranic waste is being disposed of at the DOE Waste Isolation Pilot
Plant in Carlsbad, New Mexico.
It is the Department's current policy that low-level waste, owned
by the DOE, be disposed of on-site, when possible, or off-site at one
of DOE's regional disposal facilities. DOE policy does provide for use
of commercial low-level waste disposal sites or facilities if specific
conditions are met. Specifically, the Department must: 1) certify that
use of the commercial facility represents safe and compliant disposal,
in accord with the commercial facility's licensed capabilities; and, 2)
demonstrate that use of commercial disposal is more cost-effective, or
in the best interest of the government. To determine the best interest
of the Federal government, the Department considers numerous factors
including safety, security, compliance, schedule efficiency, long-term
liability, and stakeholder and regulator acceptance. It is the
Department's policy that waste disposal decisions be made in the
context of life-cycle cost analysis, which includes the unit cost of
disposal, pre-disposal activities, transportation, and post-closure
liabilities. The Department is reviewing this guidance as part of its
development of its National Low-Level Waste Disposition Strategy. The
purpose of the National Disposition Strategy is to integrate and
optimize low-level waste management activities throughout the complex.
Question 10. The Department has yet to acknowledge that it will
miss the September, 2006 milestone for cleanup at the C-Tank Farm. As
you know, an October 2005 Inspector General report has projected that
the C-Tank milestone will be missed. Is there some aspect of the IG
report you disagreed with?
Answer. The M-45-00B milestone is complex with multiple sub-
elements ranging from C-tank farm Retrievals and technology
demonstrations to the submittal of Tank Waste Retrieval Work Plans and
Integration Plans. A number of those sub-elements have been
successfully completed and progress is being made on the remaining sub-
elements. The Department does not know at this time whether all
elements of this complex milestone will be completed by September 30,
2006, and, therefore, appropriately informed the State of Washington,
the Washington Congressional delegation, and committees of
jurisdiction, including the Senate Energy and Natural Resources
Committee, that some elements of the M-45-00B milestone are in jeopardy
of being missed. As noted in Appendix 3 to the Inspector General (IG)
Report, the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management (EM),
concurred with the recommendations in the IG report, but disagreed that
an updated waste retrieval plan and notification to regulators of
changed schedules should be based on the limited retrieval experience
to date. Rather, the Assistant Secretary indicated that the revised
waste retrieval plan, cost, and schedule will be developed ``when
additional meaningful operational data is (sic) obtained'' and that the
best course of action relative to establishing new regulatory
milestones is to ``defer revision of the existing milestones for C Farm
retrieval until addition additional operational data is (sic) obtained
on the tank retrievals currently ongoing.'' The Assistant Secretary
noted that this course of action is ``Consistent with the concern
identified in the report regarding limited retrieval experience.''
Question 11. The October Inspector General report also found that
missing the C-Tank Farm milestone may impact the ability of the
Department to complete a 2018 milestone to cleanup waste from Hanford's
single shell tanks. Does the Department agree with that assessment?
Answer. We do not agree with estimating retrieval costs and
schedules for the remaining approximately 145 single-shell tanks based
solely upon retrieval results for the first one or two tanks. Recent
tank waste retrievals have shown sharp performance improvements, e.g.,
Tank C-202 required only approximately 25 percent as much time to
retrieve as tank C-203. DOE plans to develop a revised retrieval plan
(after resolution of related issues regarding the Waste Treatment Plant
and the tank farm contract) that takes into account the variety of
factors that influence waste retrieval including the characteristics of
the waste in each tank, lessons learned from all tank waste retrievals
and retrieval technology tests to that point in time, and the
logistical factors that influence tank waste retrieval rates.
Question 12. What issues are coming from the ongoing reviews of the
Waste Treatment Plant and what are your plans to get the project back
on track?
Answer. The Department, along with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
and Bechtel National, Inc., is currently undertaking several major
activities to ensure that we fully understand what is required to
complete the project and begin operations. The Department is reviewing
and evaluating the major project management, project control, business,
and technical systems and processes by both internal and independent
external senior professionals. An After Action Review is being
conducted by an external independent firm to assess the causes of the
issues surrounding the project. All recommendations will be reviewed
and implemented as appropriate to ensure the project is being planned
and executed responsibly.
The Department has directed several actions to strengthen the
project management system for the Waste Treatment Plant (WTP). A
summary of keys actions include:
Establishing a senior-level WTP Oversight Team;
Hiring several experienced Federal personnel in the areas of
contracting, procurement, and contract law;
Certifying WTP Federal Project Directors to the highest
level of the DOE Project Management Career Development Program;
Clarifying roles and responsibilities of senior field
managers and contracting personnel;
Commissioning a Headquarters' Team to assess the Office of
River Protection compliance with DOE Order 413.3, Program and
Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets;
Assuring the WTP contractor has an Earned Value Management
System in-place that fully complies with American National
Standards Institute/Environmental Industry Association (ANSI/
EIA) 748-A-1998;
Regularly updating DOE senior management on the status of
the project; and,
Conducting rigorous periodic evaluations by the EM WTP
Oversight Team, and other DOE project oversight offices.
Question 13. What are you doing or will you do to improve
communications with the Congress, the State, and the stakeholders on
the Waste Treatment Plant?
Answer. Improving communications with all interested parties, not
just the Congress, has been a priority of mine since entering office.
The Department will continue to communicate with interested parties
regarding the Waste Treatment Plant. The Department plans on a series
of briefings with Congressional committees and State delegation members
and the State, as the following activities are completed: After Action
Report, December 2005 Estimate At Completion, External Reviews of the
WTP Technical Capability/Cost/Schedule, and the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers Cost Validation of the Estimate At Completion. In regard to
communicating with stakeholders of the State of Washington, senior
officials from the Office of River Protection meet regularly with the
Hanford Advisory Board and State of Washington representatives. Also,
frequent site tours of the WTP project are given upon request that
includes opportunities for questions and discussion.
Question 14. What are you doing or will you do to ensure that any
proposed supplement treatment technologies for single-shell tank waste
are brought on line safely and in a cost-effective manner?
Answer. Technologies that are being developed in the Office of
Environmental Management (EM) program are tested and demonstrated to
ensure that they meet or exceed safety requirements as required in all
applicable DOE Orders, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
requirements, and the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent
Order. For a technology to be considered for implementation, it must
clearly be shown that it is more cost-effective than the current
baseline technology selected.
For example, the Demonstration Bulk Vitrification System (DBVS)
pilot plant at Hanford will demonstrate the ability of the bulk
vitrification supplemental treatment process to treat actual Hanford
single-shell tank (SST) waste (waste from tank S-109). The management
of the DBVS subproject is compliant with applicable DOE Orders, RCRA
requirements, and the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent
Order. The DBVS project will be evaluated at each design, construction,
and operations step (Critical Design--CD) for safety and cost. The DBVS
design will be completed prior to the emplacement of equipment. Prior
to DBVS startup the system will undergo an On-Site Operational
Readiness Review (ORR) that ensures all procedures and safety measures
are in place.
DOE considers cost-effectiveness as part of the evaluation of an
alternative project technology, if it is to be deployed in the site's
baseline operations. DOE is currently developing new and improved
technologies for Waste Treatment Plant waste loading and melter
performance, which could assist in the retrieval of SST wastes.
Question 15. Which program of the Environmental Management budget
is funding current efforts to develop supplemental tank waste treatment
technology?
Answer. The funding of current efforts to develop supplemental tank
waste treatment technology is included in the budget of the Office of
River Protection's Tank Farm Activities program.
Question 16. What is DOE doing or will it do to develop other
supplemental treatment technologies to treat the least radioactive
waste in double shell tanks?
Answer. The Office of Environmental Management's (EM) Technology
Development and Deployment activities invest in innovative technologies
which could be demonstrated to be evaluated and considered for
deployment by site operations. Early development work on supplemental
tank waste treatment technology was jointly funded by DOE-EM
Headquarters and the Office of River Protection site operations. The
Department is considering several technologies, with a focus on bulk
vitrification. If, through tank waste demonstration, bulk vitrification
is found to be capable of safely and effectively treating Hanford tank
waste, it could be deployed in parallel to the Waste Treatment Plant.
Additional technologies, such as Selective Dissolution and Fractional
Crystallization, are being studied to optimize this supplemental
technology.
Question 17. The Tri-Cities community has several contract
procurement concerns at Hanford. These include effective performance
incentives, small business opportunities, and the DOE strategies to
rebid the tank farms and central plateau work scopes. Also, I
understand that DOE is moving ahead to rebid these Hanford contracts.
As a member of the Senate Committee on Small Business and
Entrepreneurship I am willing to work with DOE to resolve small
business procurement issues, such as the credit DOE receives for small
business procurements by its prime contractors. Would you be willing to
participate in these discussions if they were structured in a manner
that does not conflict with federal procurement laws and regulations?
Answer. In accordance with section 6022(a) of Title VI of the
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War
on Terror, and Tsunami relief, 2005, P.L. No. 109-13, the DOE and Small
Business Administration entered into a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) on September 30, 2005, setting forth a methodology for measuring
the achievement of DOE with respect to contract awards to small
businesses. This MOU defines how DOE receives credit for small business
procurements by its prime contractors, as well as how DOE receives
credit for the award of prime contracts to small businesses. The
Department appreciates your offer to work with us and is willing to
meet with you on small business issues.
Question 18. The Tri-Cities community is dedicated to continue
expanding the missions of the Volpentest HAMMER Training and Education
Center beyond the training of Hanford cleanup workers. This initiative
would reduce DOE-EM's commitment to HAMMER as the cleanup work force
continues to decline. As part of the overall Hanford contract
procurement strategy, will you evaluate the benefit of a separate
procurement on HAMMER, perhaps as a small business set aside, that
would facilitate the expansion of HAMMER's missions?
Answer. We are currently working on a procurement strategy for
large pieces of cleanup work and services at Hanford, including the
scope currently under Fluor Hanford, which manages the Volpentest
Hazardous Materials Management and Emergency Response Training Center
(HAMMER) facility and whose contract expires at the end of fiscal year
2006. As part of this process, we do plan to evaluate various
contracting options for HAMMER. Our goal is to find an approach that
reflects its ongoing role in training our cleanup workers and, at the
same time, supports its ability to grow and prosper through a
diversified clientele.
Question 19. Are you willing to endorse and support these mission
development activities with other parts of DOE, the Department of
Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, and others?
Answer. The Department utilizes the Volpentest Hazardous Materials
Management and Emergency Response Training Center (HAMMER) facility to
provide hands-on safety training for workers involved in environmental
cleanup.
The HAMMER facility remains available for use by other DOE entities
and other agencies on a full cost recovery basis. Because HAMMER was
established to ultimately be self-sustaining, the Department continues
to encourage the development of new missions to offset the impacts of a
declining Office of Environmental Management workforce in the future.
The Department will cooperate with the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) to develop a strategy and a cooperative agreement to
ensure that HAMMER remains available to meet its training needs.
HAMMER is already involved in the training of fire, law
enforcement, Customs and Border Protection, security, emergency
medical, and other emergency response personnel for a wide-spectrum of
regional and Federal agencies on a full cost recovery basis. A strong
partnership has been forged between HAMMER and the Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory to use HAMMER as a test bed to deploy new field
technologies for homeland security personnel.
Questions From Senator Salazar
Question 1. The Department will soon complete the environmental
cleanup of its Rocky Flats plant west of Denver. In general, the
cleanup has progressed well. But, as at many contaminated sites being
cleaned up across the country, some contamination will remain in the
ground. A part of the site will be designated a National Wildlife
Refuge. It will be necessary, therefore, to impose certain restrictions
on land use to ensure that the remedy remains protective of human
health. Because existing legal mechanisms to restrict land use are not
adequate for this purpose, many states have adopted or are adopting
legislation to create enforceable use restrictions, or ``institutional
controls.'' In 2001, the Colorado Attorney General's office drafted and
sponsored such legislation, and, with the support of the Colorado
Department of Public Health and Environment, the General Assembly
passed the legislation unanimously. Governor Owens signed it into law.
Colorado's institutional control legislation enjoyed strong support
from both industry and the environmental community, because it reduces
cleanup costs and it makes cleanups safer and more reliable. Colorado's
legislation served as the model for the Uniform Environmental Covenants
Act, which is now being considered in a number of states across the
country. When I questioned you about the Department of Energy's
willingness to comply with this Colorado law at Rocky Flats by entering
into environmental covenants to restrict future uses of the site, you
promised to look into this question. I understand that the Department
of Energy has now committed to comply with Colorado law and is now
negotiating a written agreement with the State. Can you confirm today
that the Department of Energy will enter into environmental covenants
for the Rocky Flats site and will you please explain the current status
of the Department's discussions with the State?
Answer. The Department of Energy fully supports the concept of an
environmental covenant at Rocky Flats and has been working closely with
the Colorado Office of the Attorney General and the Colorado Department
of Public Health and Environment to define an implementation approach
for the Colorado covenants law at the Rocky Flats site. The Department
anticipates that agreement will be reached on the text of covenants
between the U.S. Department of Energy and the State of Colorado prior
to regulatory completion of the Rocky Flats Closure Project.
Question 2. Financial savings in expedited clean up and bonus to
Kaiser-Hill. I have heard estimates that the Department of Energy and
the American public will save between $500 million and $600 million as
a result of the early completion of the physical cleanup at Rocky
Flats. What is the Department of Energy estimate of the cost savings
realized as a result of the expedited clean up?
Answer. The target cost for the Kaiser-Hill Closure Contract
effective February 2000 is $3.987 billion. Actual cost, still subject
to final audit, is $3.443 billion reflecting a savings of $544 million.
Kaiser-Hill is expected to receive $153 million (28 percent) of that
savings as additional incentive fee under the terms of the contract.
The taxpayers would receive $391 million of the savings (72 percent).
Question 3. What is the Department of Energy's current estimate of
the bonus that will be paid to Kaiser-Hill as a result of completing
the physical cleanup in October 2005 instead of December 2006?
Answer. The schedule incentive in the Kaiser-Hill Closure Contract
is $15 million for physical completion on December 15, 2006. The
maximum Kaiser-Hill can earn for acceleration of the cleanup is $20
million if completed by March 31, 2006. Further acceleration to October
2005 earns Kaiser-Hill no additional fee for schedule performance.
It should be noted that the total fee that can be earned, from all
schedule, cost and performance incentives is approximately $510
million. This fee was in recognition of: (1) meeting the target cost,
$342 million, (2) coming in below the proposed target cost (e.g.,
contractor earns thirty cents of every dollar under the proposed target
to a maximum fee), $149 million, and, (3) as noted above, finishing
cleanup before March 31, 2006, $20 million. The total available fee
pool was approximately $562 million.
Question 4. What is the total amount of all bonuses that have been
paid to date by the Department of Energy to Kaiser-Hill for services at
Rocky Flats?
Answer. Under the current contract, Kaiser-Hill, Inc., has been
authorized to collect provisional fee payments of $225,348,794 in
advance of final fee determination, as of September 30, 2005. Final
determination of fee earned is contingent upon validation of physical
completion of all contract scope, and total closure contract target
costs.
It should be noted that the total fee earned, from all schedule,
cost and performance incentives is approximately $510 million. This fee
was in recognition of: (1) meeting the target cost, $342 million, (2)
coming in below the proposed target cost (e.g., contractor earns thirty
cents of every dollar under the proposed target to a maximum fee), $149
million, and, (3) as noted above, finishing cleanup before March 31,
2006, $20 million. The total available fee pool that can be earned is
approximately $562 million.
Question 5. The regulatory transition at Rocky Flats from the
jurisdiction of the Department of Energy's Office of Environmental
Management to the Office of Legacy Management will mark the first such
transition in the nation at a major cleanup site. Over the course of
the cleanup, and especially as we near the completion of the cleanup,
Environmental Management has made many promises and commitments to the
State of Colorado and to the local communities surrounding Rocky Flats.
These commitments include the procedures and standards for monitoring
programs, the management of surface water impoundments, and other long
term management activities. The State of Colorado, the local
governments and the residents of the surrounding communities are also
concerned about the ability of the Department of Energy to respond
promptly to any emergency situations that present real or potential
releases of radiation in excess of the governing standards. I, and
other members of Colorado's Congressional delegation, will be closely
watching the transition from Environmental Management to Legacy
Management to be sure that these past commitments are honored and that
the Department of Energy retains the expertise necessary to properly
monitor and to respond to any violations of the standards. What is the
Department of Energy doing to ensure that the Office of Legacy
Management will fully honor all of the commitments made by the Office
of Environmental Management at Rocky Flats?
Answer. The Office of Legacy Management (LM) intends to fully honor
all of the commitments made by the Office of Environmental Management
(EM) at Rocky Flats. Representatives of both Offices, at the
Headquarters and site level, worked very closely during the final
phases of site cleanup and the beginning of site transition to ensure
that LM has full and complete knowledge, understanding, and support of
all post-closure monitoring and maintenance commitments. The staff
members for all of the environmental monitoring and maintenance,
records management, and information technology activities are previous
Rocky Flats employees. In addition, LM is the lead for negotiating the
modification of the Rocky Flats Cleanup Agreement to include post-
closure activities. LM is also developing the Long-Term Surveillance
and Maintenance Plan for all post-closure activities at the site with
EM support. These responsibilities ensure a clear partnership with EM
and LM in securing regulatory completion for Rocky Flats, and in
fulfilling all commitments for the site.
Question 6. What is the Department of Energy doing to ensure that
the knowledge and skills developed by Environmental Management will be
immediately available to aide in the response to emergency events,
should they occur?
Answer. The Office of Environmental Management (EM) has been
working with the Office of Legacy Management (LM) to develop emergency
procedures for the future surveillance and maintenance of the site,
after LM assumes jurisdictional responsibility. During the transition
period from physical completion of cleanup to regulatory completion and
transfer of jurisdiction from EM to LM, LM is assisting EM in
implementing appropriate emergency management procedures in accordance
with applicable requirements.
In addition, the Department has ensured that it has site-specific
knowledge and skills available at Rocky Flats by transferring several
Rocky Flats Office EM employees to LM. This staff will help ensure the
continuity of knowledge of site history needed for an appropriate
response to routine, as well as emergency, situations.
The Department also maintains national assets, such as the
Radiological Assistance Program (RAP), in the event of a radiological
emergency. The RAP Teams are the first responders for a suspected
radiological emergency and are designed to arrive on-site within four
to six hours. Rocky Flats is within RAP Team Region 6, which maintains
its offices at the Department's Idaho Operations Office.
Question 7. Will you notify me and this Committee promptly if you
become aware of any funding limitation or any bureaucratic roadblock
that is negatively impacting the transition from Environmental
Management to Legacy Management?
Answer. The Department will promptly notify you and the Committee
should any issues arise that could adversely impact transition.
Question 8. The Senate recently adopted an amendment to the
Department of Defense Authorization bill, sponsored by me and Senator
Allard, which provides direction and funding for the acquisition of
certain mineral rights at Rocky Flats to facilitate the transfer of
affected lands to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service for creation of a
National Wildlife Refuge. As you know, this amendment was offered in
order to resolve a long-standing disagreement between the Departments
of Energy and Interior over the impact of these mineral rights on the
transfer of the subject lands from Energy to Interior and the creation
of the Wildlife Refuge. In anticipation of enactment of these
provisions into law, what will the Office of Environmental Management
do so that the program to acquire these mineral rights can proceed as
quickly as possible?
Answer. The Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act
(P.L. 109-163) signed on January 6, 2006, authorized $10 million for
the Secretary of Energy to purchase the essential mineral rights at the
Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site. In preparing for the
potential purchase of privately held mineral rights at Rocky Flats, the
Department of Energy conducted an appraisal of mineral rights values
(sand and gravel). The appraisal is complete, and the information will
be used by the Department when effecting the purchase of mineral rights
from willing sellers.
Question 9. In the written testimony submitted by each of you, you
refer to the need for a skillful, dedicated workforce to accomplish the
ambitious goals of the
Department of Energy's environmental cleanups. Ms. Tuor's testimony
credits the ``efforts and innovation'' of the Rocky Flats workforce as
one of the factors that contributed to the completion of the Rocky
Flats cleanup under budget and ahead of schedule. Assistant Secretary
Rispoli's testimony describes the need for ``effective incentives for
the federal and contractor workforce for superior performance'' in
future cleanup efforts. At Rocky Flats, the workers in the field made
many contributions that helped Kaiser-Hill and the Department of Energy
achieve this great success. These contributions include:
Participating in safety work planning and in the Joint
Company Union Safety Committee, resulting in very few project
closures due to safety violations.
Determining methods for deploying chemical decontamination
that led to the successful decontamination of more than 85
percent of the sites' 1,457 gloveboxes to low level. This
method of decontamination greatly reduced the cost of disposal
and improved safety by avoiding dangerous cutting operations.
Developing cans and containers for the treatment, packaging
and disposal of the site's high content plutonium wastes.
In a recent article in the journal Weapons Complex Monitor, Ms.
Tuor is quoted as saying,
``When we started listening to them on safety, the trend was
really changed . . . What we learned, and we saw it time after
time after time, was if we got them involved in planning of the
work, and the identification of the hazards and the controls,
and we put together with them a reasonable work process, they
would exceed our production expectations every time.''
We have learned from Rocky Flats that the dedicated participation
of the workers on the ground is critical to the safe, cost-saving and
expeditious completion of these projects. Frankly, I am concerned that
the message to workers from the early completion at Rocky Flats is not
helpful. When the workers at Rocky Flats put their hearts and their
minds and their backs into the project and helped complete the cleanup
fourteen months ahead of schedule, many workers lost the lifetime
medical benefits they would have received if the project had been
completed on time.
Contractors like Kaiser-Hill receive a bonus for early completion,
but the workers may feel that they are not rewarded fairly upon early
completion. What are the Department of Energy and its contractors doing
to assure the workers on the ground that their retirement benefits will
not be reduced or eliminated if these workers help complete the cleanup
ahead of schedule?
Answer. Neither Kaiser-Hill nor the Department took the Rocky Flats
workforce by surprise by the 2005 closure objective. In fact, Kaiser-
Hill negotiated collective bargaining agreements with the Guards (1999)
and the Steelworkers (2001) that provided more generous compensation
and retirement eligibility components as part of Kaiser-Hill's
objective of providing just the sort of rewards for the workforce as
your question suggests are appropriate. Although these sorts of
collective bargaining commitments by Kaiser-Hill were subject to DOE
approval (or disapproval), the Department did not seek to limit
extension of these expanded benefits for the Rocky Flats workforce.
Their added costs, of course, are borne by the taxpayer.
It should be understood that there is no certainty that any
individual Rocky Flats employee would have been continuously employed
there accruing pension and benefits service credits had the completion
date occurred a year or two years later. That is because there would
have been continued phased layoffs based on particular work completions
done during the progress of the items comprising the closeout work
elements. There was no commitment made to the representatives of the
Rocky Flats workforce that this natural progression would not occur. On
the contrary, the represented workforce was fully apprised of the early
closure objective and successfully negotiated enhanced compensation and
retirement eligibility benefits, as its collective bargaining
representatives determined were most advantageous for the members of
its bargaining units.
The Department's general approach regarding the provision of
pension benefits to facility management contractor employees is that
incumbent employees who are employed by a contractor under a new
contract will remain in their existing pension plans pursuant to plan
eligibility requirements and applicable laws; that is, ``if you're in,
you're in.'' However, a contractor selected for award of a new contract
will be required to provide market-based pension plans for new non-
incumbent employees hired after contract award. The Department is
currently assessing its approach with respect to reimbursing the costs
of medical benefits for contractor employees.
______
Responses of Nancy Tuor to Questions From Senator Domenici
Question 1. I am particularly interested in what Congress did or
did not do to enable the success at Rocky Flats. Were there any
programmatic or financial decisions enabled by the recent legislation
that, in your mind, directly contributed to your efforts?
Answer. In my view, there were a couple of significant factors
related to role of Congress in the success of Rocky Flats.
First, the predictable and stable funding delivered by the House
and Senate Appropriations Committees was absolutely critical to support
the structure of the closure contract, and ultimately the project's
success. Our team was hired to complete this specific work based on our
collective experience in project management. Among the most important
elements of effective project management is a robust baseline that
included over 16,000 separate activities for senior management to plan
and tract progress to the overall project completion goal. An essential
component to a well-developed baseline is predictable funding to match
the forecasted activities.
Second, our efforts at Rocky Flats enjoyed considerable attention
and support from key leaders in Congress. Starting with our own
delegation, including Senator Allard who addressed this Committee
hearing, and other Congressional leaders, such as Chairman Domenici, we
were fortunate to have supporters who tracked our progress. Through
this informed oversight, Congress was able to anticipate and offer
assistance when necessary to help the project to completion. For
example, some quantity of our weapons-grade plutonium was designated
for shipment to Savannah River site for disposition through the mixed-
oxide reactor fuel program. When some concern from South Carolina
developed over this program, Senator Allard, Senator Graham and key
leaders in the House and Senate committees of jurisdiction were able to
resolve the issue. Effectively, this allowed us to complete our
shipments and, ultimately, complete the project.
Question 2. I am also very interested in the cooperative nature of
the relationship between the Rocky Flats project and the environmental
regulators. This is not a common occurrence at major DOE cleanups. What
were the elements that promoted increased cooperation and collaboration
among the agencies in this regulatory relationship?
Question 3. What elements of your contract were the most important
drivers in this cleanup?
Answer. As discussed during the hearing, I am submitting the
attached document detailing a number of key enablers in the success of
the Rocky Flats project. Specifically, the document addresses elements
of the contract and interactions with environmental regulators.
FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES ENABLING SUCCESSFUL CLOSURE, ROCKY FLATS
ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY SITE, DECEMBER 6, 2005
Several fundamental changes were implemented at the Rocky Flats
Environmental Technology Site (RFETS) that contributed to its
successful closure. The most significant of these are: the contract
incentivized total project performance and allocated risk between the
government and the contractor. Second, appropriate expertise and talent
were retained and community outreach was conducted, such that the right
people/organizations were always engaged in the project. Third, strong
foundations for success were created by the development of broad
consensus on the RF end-state and the government/contractor commitment
to safety, compliance and state-of-the-art practices. Fourth, the State
and Federal regulators were fully integrated into the cleanup decision-
making process and vested in project success, resulting in a revised
regulatory agreement with a bias for action, more efficient/predictable
decisions, and completion of accelerated actions. Fifth, the pace of
risk reduction was accelerated. Finally, the entire project was funded
on a consistent and predictable schedule and enjoyed strong bipartisan
support.
Background. In 1995, the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site
(RFETS) was one of the Department of Energy's (DOE) biggest and most
challenging efforts to cleanup and close a former nuclear weapons site,
and the largest Site designated for accelerated closure. Like many
other DOE facilities, it had been shrouded in Cold War secrecy. Much of
the surrounding community viewed Rocky Flats negatively, expressing
concerns about environmental contamination and potential threats to
public health which were fueled by the 1989 FBI raid. Furthermore,
stakeholders were becoming increasingly impatient and distrustful, as
cleanup and risk reduction activities were not prioritized and
activities during that period were directed primarily to security and
maintenance.
At that time, Rocky Flats was subject to a very complex regulatory
structure due to differing requirements under the Superfund, hazardous
waste, clean water, drinking water, and clean air laws, both state and
federal; and, due to overlapping jurisdiction between the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Colorado's environmental
agencies. The relationship between DOE's environmental regulators and
the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board was also new, not completely
defined, and further complicated cleanup activities.
By 1995 the corporate culture at the Site was bankrupt, suffering
from five years of an uncertain mission, no clear vision for the
future, and a revolving door of external oversight and assessment
requirements. Since the time of the FBI raid in 1989 and the ensuing
safety shut-down, the Site's mission was in question and little work
was being performed. Despite the hundreds of millions of dollars spent
to address contamination between 1991 and 1995, little effective
cleanup and risk reduction had occurred. The workforce was extremely
demoralized and relations with the Site's unions were strained. Issues
fundamental to the new closure mission were unknown, including end-
state, future land-use, and soil cleanup levels. DOE estimated it would
take 70 years and cost more than $36 billion to clean up the site. The
Management & Operating (M&O) contract and fee structure remained
intact.
The Site's ability to maintain compliance with environmental
requirements was also in question. DOE's 1991 Interagency Agreement
(IAG) with Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE)
and EPA provided a legally enforceable framework for assessing and
remediating environmental contamination. It specified completion of 268
milestones over a 12-year period. These were primarily ``paper
milestones,'' calling for the submittal of investigation plans and
reports to CDPHE and EPA for approval, and did not require actions/
results based on risk reduction priorities. The transaction costs of
gaining the approval of both agencies, frequent adjustments to scope of
work, and negotiating ``good cause'' for milestone revisions were high.
Further, it became clear that many milestones could simply not be met
and there was no clear path to resolve the domino effect this would
have on subsequent dependent milestones. The regulators lost confidence
in the ability of the Site to meet commitments, thus further
diminishing their willingness to adjust the milestones.
As a result, DOE entered negotiations with EPA and CDPHE to amend
the IAG. Negotiations were unsuccessful until the parties realized that
they shared a common vision and goals, and that the command and control
paradigm should change to accomplish their mutual interests as soon as
possible.
Closure Strategy. Fundamental changes in several key areas were
required to successfully close the Site. These are briefly summarized,
below.
1. Performance Contracts. DOE departed from the traditional
M&O contracting approach utilized at weapons production
facilities and adopted a contracting strategy in late 1993 that
abandoned the traditional M&O cost-plus-award-fee approach in
favor of a performance based integrating management contract.
The 1995 contract with K-H tied 85% of fee to discrete outcomes
or deliverables (performance measures). Under the new contract,
DOE rescinded the authority of low and mid-level DOE personnel
to provide detailed and sometimes conflicting contractor
direction and, instead, designated high-level managers as
Contracting Officer Representatives (CORs). The COR-designation
provided for better integration and allowed the contractor to
determine how work would be accomplished.
In 2000, a second DOE contract with K-H replaced the first,
further accelerating the target completion date to 2006. K-H's
performance justified a sole source award for the follow-on
contract, building upon the parties' experience and successes.
The structure of the 1995 performance measures, incentives and
planning cycles transitioned to the 2000 Cost-Plus-Incentive-
Fee contract format. The 2000 closure contract authorized all
project completion work at the time of signing, provided the
contractor with a great amount of flexibility for work
sequencing and allocation of resources, incentivized a
relentless drive for closing the site, and established a 70/30
(government/contractor) risk-sharing ratio for cost under-and
over-runs. Finally, the 2000 performance contract included
specific DOE commitments about what services/items it would
provide and when they would be provided, such as receiver sites
for Special Nuclear Material and radioactive waste.
2. Human Relations. Both DOE and K-H realized the value of
bringing the right talent to the table and in retraining and
redirecting the highly skilled workforce that remained at Rocky
Flats. DOE selected K-H in 1995, in part, based upon the
environmental remediation expertise of its parent CH2MHill, and
K-H's commitment to engage high-quality management, policy,
legal, and technical experts and subcontractors, and to retain
a discouraged but knowledgeable and capable workforce. K-H
invested in and reinvigorated the workforce, emphasizing safe
work practices, retraining its steelworkers to perform D&D
work, offering performance incentives, and providing out-
placement services to all when their part of the project was
concluded. DOE and K-H also shared the realization that they
could not achieve the desired results alone. Regulatory
agencies, state and local governments, Congress, citizen groups
and environmental groups had been vocal critics in the past;
active participation and support from these groups was
consciously cultivated by the DOE/K-H senior management team.
Indeed, the successful closure of the Site could not have been
achieved without this coalition's focus upon key results and
willingness to embrace creative, innovative approaches.
3. Strong foundations. DOE and K-H built a strong foundation
for ultimate success in the early years, most notably in the
form of--
End-State Vision. DOE and K-H developed a ``straw man''
end-state proposal in 1995, offering an image of the Site
in 2015. By so doing, it provided a beginning point for
thoughtful discussion among regulatory agencies, state and
local governments, Congress, citizen groups and
environmental groups. As modified to reflect their
consensus, the Vision and underlying assumptions became a
commonly shared, powerful statement of the closure goals
for Rocky Flats. This vastly important 8-page statement of
common ground led to a fundamental change in DOE's
relationship with its regulators, the community and its
contractor.
Safety Culture. A strong emphasis was placed upon
identifying and mitigating hazards, maintaining a safe
workplace, and performing all work safely. A safe workplace
was embraced as a necessary performance standard, and the
Site began its transition back from expert-based to
standards-based performance. As the project progressed,
safety was fully incorporated as a fundamental component of
success. K-H's management team measured safety on a daily
basis, recognizing that it is the key factor in maintaining
a healthy workforce and continuing productivity.
State of the art practices, procedures and data systems
were implemented and adjusted as needed throughout the
Project. These included rigorous project management
principles and reliance upon life cycle baseline planning.
Robust programs to assure compliance with all requirements
were created. Moreover, program termination planning was
initiated 3 years before the target completion date to
ensure that compliance programs would be terminated as soon
as their underlying purpose was fulfilled and an orderly
transition would occur to DOE's Office of Legacy Management
for all continuing requirements.
4. RFCA. The end-state Vision was codified in RFCA as a non-
enforceable preamble and appendix, providing guidance to future
decision-makers. The function of the regulatory agreement
fundamentally shifted, from one containing numerous procedural
controls over DOE to one that enabled accelerated actions to
achieve the consensus end-state as soon as possible. Several
basic propositions of RFCA became significant factors in the
successful closure of the Site, including its bias for action,
in the form of--
Prioritizing risk reduction activities to assure the
elimination of the highest risks first;
Conducting the cleanup activities as Accelerated Actions,
not waiting to initiate remediation until completion of
site-wide investigations and publication of the final
remedy decision;
Streamlining the decision processes, allowing for
utilization of standard operating procedures for recurring
conditions;
In-process environmental characterization during
remediation thereby allowing work to proceed early while
nevertheless providing full and accurate characterization;
and,
Site-wide remediation action levels (avoiding debate for
each separate accelerated action) based upon reasonably
foreseeable land use (first, as an open space; subsequently
established as a congressionally mandated wildlife refuge).
These action levels were calculated to assure that in the
aggregate, after completion of the accelerated actions, the
risk profile of the Site would satisfy the requirements of
CERCLA and RCRA and most likely result in no further
cleanup actions being required.
RFCA also redefined DOE's regulatory relationships to achieve more
efficient and predictable decisions, in the form of--
High level commitments from the RFCA signatories
(Assistant Secretary for DOE-EM, Acting Regional
Administrator for Region 8, EPA, Executive Director of
CDPHE, and RF Field Office Manager) to its end-state
vision, goals, objectives and processes allowed every
person involved in the RF closure/cleanup to understand the
Project's direction;
Consultative process among DOE (and K-H as its prime
contractor), CDPHE and EPA, emphasizing early-and-frequent,
rather than announce-and-defend, communication;
Regulatory integration between RCRA and CERCLA so that all
requirements would be achieved through a single process,
without needless duplication of effort;
Lead-regulator designations so that one agency would have
primary but contingent decision authority within its sphere
(work-versus statute-based day-to-day oversight), reserving
final authority to each agency according to its statutory
mandates;
Rapid dispute resolution. Each organization encouraged its
personnel to make agreements at the lowest working level
possible. Disagreements were raised to the next level of
managers quickly, going up all the way to the Governor, EPA
Administrator, and Secretary of Energy if need be;
Integrated sitewide life cycle planning addressing high
risk reduction actions typically outside the ambit of an
environmental regulatory agreement (such as non-enforceable
target dates for stabilizing/removing plutonium solutions
and residues in aging systems housed in aging buildings)
and,
Mutual respect for the parties' differing statutory and
contractual responsibilities, as well as trust in the bona
fides of each, developed as a result of implementing these
provisions and the roadmap to success provided by the
Vision. This, in turn, led to an ever-stronger foundation
for sound and efficient cleanup decisions.
RFCA established rolling milestones and aligned them with the
budget planning process. No more than 12 milestones would be
set for any fiscal year, each to denote key results to be
achieved within the following year plus two future years. This
allowed goal-setting participation in the federal budget
process by the regulators and stakeholders. The future year
milestones could be adjusted, according to the circumstances,
including project sequencing, budgetary, and other
considerations.
5. Risk Reduction. The pace of risk reduction was accelerated
through
Early actions to address highest risks first by
stabilizing, consolidating, and removing the nuclear
material. K-H shrank the Protected Area and consolidated
storage of plutonium into one building thereby
significantly reducing the ``mortgage'', then reprogrammed
the saved money into other accelerated D&D and
environmental remediation projects;
Broad consensus on the radionuclide soil action levels
(RSALs) was reached by working with the RFCA Parties and
communities. A key element in the evolution of the RSALs
was making them risk-based. This allowed the community and
site to focus on the surface and near-surface contamination
which drove risk rather than the radionuclide contamination
at greater depth. (NOTE: In reality, the community and
regulators got a very good deal--the surface soil clean up
was greatly expanded due to lower action levels while it
turned out that very little deep contamination existed.)
Success breeds success. Early building demolitions and
tank closures were completed, and all promised reports were
delivered satisfactorily and on-time. To resolve historic
non-compliance, DOE entered into orders on consent with
agreed compliance plans. These actions helped to establish
DOE/K-H credibility, provided tangible evidence that
closure could be accomplished, and demonstrated the Site's
commitment to successful closure on-time. It also allowed
K-H and the RFCA parties to practice the consultative
process in non-controversial projects before moving on to
the harder cases. These corollary results of early actions,
in turn, helped to create and sustain a shared momentum
toward closure.
6. Innovation and Technology. K-H completed the closure
project based upon sound science and good business practices,
bringing in outside expertise as needed (e.g., the Actinide
Migration Evaluation Panel). K-H also encouraged creativity in
responding to technical challenges (e.g., the use of a passive
groundwater treatment system; cerium nitrate as a glove box
decontaminant; unique packaging for oversized equipment; and
adaptation of commercial equipment for D&D purposes). It was
essential in each case to stay focused on the cleanup issue and
how to apply innovative technologies to identified needs,
avoiding the trap of innovations in search of an application.
7. Other factors contributing to the successful closure of
Rocky Flats. Several additional parties and circumstances were
significant. These include:
A shared commitment to successful closure by DOE-HQ and
complex-wide field office cooperation;
Strong bipartisan support in Congress, both from the
Colorado delegation and from key leaders in the House and
Senate;
Stable project funding, which allowed for mortgage
reduction and effective project planning;
Strong leadership from the Colorado State government;
Community concerns about potential offsite contamination
were addressed early by DOE funding for the Water Diversion
project to route potentially contaminated water away from a
city-owned drinking water reservoir; and, by a thorough
investigation of the offsite downwind area which concluded
that offsite contamination was nonexistent or so minimal as
to present no significant risk. Further, the Health
Advisory Panel sponsored by CDPHE, with financial support
from DOE, concluded that the surrounding community
residents have never been subject to significant increased
health risks by their proximity to Rocky Flats;
DOE-HQ publicly committed that there would be no onsite
disposal of waste.
Response of Nancy Tuor to Question From Senator Salazar
Question 1. In the written testimony submitted by each of you, you
refer to the need for a skillful, dedicated workforce to accomplish the
ambitious goals of the Department of Energy's environmental cleanups.
Ms. Tuor's testimony credits the ``efforts and innovation'' of the
Rocky Flats workforce as one of the factors that contributed to the
completion of the Rocky Flats cleanup under budget and ahead of
schedule. Assistant Secretary Rispoli's testimony describes the need
for ``effective incentives for the federal and contractor workforce for
superior performance'' in future cleanup efforts. At Rocky Flats, the
workers in the field made many contributions that helped Kaiser-Hill
and the Department of Energy achieve this great success. These
contributions include:
Participating in safety work planning and in the Joint
Company Union Safety Committee, resulting in very few project
closures due to safety violations.
Determining methods for deploying chemical decontamination
that led to the successful decontamination of more than 85
percent of the sites 1,457 gloveboxes to low level. This method
of decontamination greatly reduced the cost of disposal and
improved safety by avoiding dangerous cutting operations.
Developing cans and containers for the treatment, packaging
and disposal of the site's high content plutonium wastes.
In a recent article in the journal Weapons Complex Monitor, Ms.
Tuor is quoted as saying,
``When we started listening to them on safety, the trend was
really changed . . . What we learned, and we saw it time after
time after time, was if we got them involved in planning of the
work, and the identification of the hazards and the controls,
and we put together with them a reasonable work process, they
would exceed our production expectations every time.''
We have learned from Rocky Flats that the dedicated participation
of the workers on the ground is critical to the safe, cost-saving and
expeditious completion of these projects. Frankly, I am concerned that
the message to workers from the early completion at Rocky Flats is not
helpful. When the workers at Rocky Flats put their hearts and their
minds and their backs into the project and helped complete the cleanup
fourteen months ahead of schedule, many workers lost the lifetime
medical benefits they would have received if the project had been
completed on time.
Contractors like Kaiser-Hill receive a bonus for early completion,
but the workers may feel that they are not rewarded fairly upon early
completion. What are the Department of Energy and its contractors doing
to assure the workers on the ground that their retirement benefits will
not be reduced or eliminated if these workers help complete the cleanup
ahead of schedule?
Answer. This question is appropriately addressed by the Department
of Energy.