[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
TRENDS IN ILLICIT MOVEMENT OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL ATTACK
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
September 22, 2005
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Serial No. 109-41
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Norman D. Dicks, Washington
John Linder, Georgia Jane Harman, California
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Tom Davis, Virginia Nita M. Lowey, New York
Daniel E. Lungren, California Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Columbia
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Zoe Lofgren, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Katherine Harris, Florida Donna M. Christensen , U.S. Virgin
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Islands
Dave G. Reichert, Washington Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Michael McCaul, Texas James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL ATTACK
John Linder, Georgia, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Christopher Shays, Connecticut EdwarD J. Markey, Massachusetts
Daniel E. Lungren, California Norman D. Dicks, Washington
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Jane Harman, California
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Columbia
Michael McCaul, Texas Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Peter T. King, New York (Ex Islands
Officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(Ex Officio)
(II)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable John Linder, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Georgia, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Prevention of
Nuclear and Biological Attack
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Rhode Island, and Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack.... 3
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washington........................................ 25
The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress
From the State of California................................... 26
The Honorable Michael McCaul, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas............................................. 23
The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton, a Delegate in Congress From
the District of Columbia....................................... 28
The Honorable Christopher Shays, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Connecticut.................................. 30
WITNESSES
Dr. Raymond J. Juzaitis, Associate Director, Nonproliferation,
Arms Control, and International Security, Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, University of California:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Dr. Rensselaer Lee, President, Global advisory Services:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Mr. Glenn E. Schweitzer, Director of Central Europe and Eurasia,
The National Academy of science:
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Prepared Statement............................................. 15
TRENDS IN ILLICIT MOVEMENT
OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS
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Thursday, September 22, 2005
House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Prevention of
Nuclear and Biological Attack,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:05 p.m., in
Room 210, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. John Linder
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Linder, Shays, Lungren, McCaul,
Langevin, Dicks and Norton.
Mr. Linder. The Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack
will come to order.
I would like to welcome and thank our distinguished panel
of witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee today.
It has often been said that defending against nuclear
terrorism will require a multilayered approach. Given the
complexity of the problem and the extraordinary consequences of
a successful nuclear event, we must look to any and all
opportunities for preventing such attack. Should a terrorist
organization acquire the requisite nuclear material, we would
then be faced with the difficult task of interdiction. Here, as
in so many areas, timely intelligence is critical. We cannot be
everywhere all the time; but if we have good intelligence, we
may be in the right place at the right time.
The Department of Homeland Security is developing, in
collaboration with other agencies, a global system for nuclear
detection. The challenge is daunting, and the relevant
geographical area is enormous. We have also heard in previous
subcommittee hearings of the inherent limitations of detection
technology. We must therefore focus our resources where they
can be most effective.
When it comes to nuclear smuggling, our interdiction
efforts should take note of trends in the trafficking of
nuclear materials. We should also be aware of existing
contraband smuggling routes and techniques of evasion currently
used by criminal organizations. These methods present a well-
worn path for clandestine distribution of materials, including
human beings, around the globe.
Unfortunately, nuclear smuggling is not a purely
hypothetical threat. Incidents of nuclear smuggling continue to
appear in the news. Just last month Turkish officials in
Istanbul arrested two men smuggling a small amount of uranium,
enriched to 17 percent. Press reports indicate that the uranium
likely originated from a Russian nuclear facility. Fortunately
this case, like most nuclear smuggling incidents, involved
materials not suitable for a nuclear weapon. But just like the
illicit drug trade, what we detect may only represent a
fraction of the material involved.
When it comes to the intermingling of criminal and
terrorist organizations, we have clear examples closer to our
shores. In South America, the terrorist organization known as
the Revolutionary Army Forces of Colombia has been trafficking
in illegal drugs for many years. The U.S. Drug Enforcement
Agency has also reported that both Hamas and Hezbollah have
established drug and other criminal operations in the triborder
area of Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil. Bureaucracy may spend
its time and money reinventing the wheel; terrorists will
exploit existing networks and assets.
As DHS begins to invest in detection technology, it will be
useful to discuss the links between terrorist and criminal
networks, existing smuggling routes, and ways for us to monitor
and interdict smuggling of nuclear material.
Fixing levees and draining a city has proved difficult and
costly enough. I for one cannot even begin to comprehend both
the human toll and clean up cost resulting from a nuclear
explosion in a U.S. city.
I look forward to the testimony of our expert panel, and I
recognize the Ranking Member.
Prepared Statement of Hon. John Linder
I would like to welcome and thank our distinguished panel of
witnesses for appearing before the Subcommittee today.
It has often been said that defending against nuclear terrorism
will require a multi-layered approach. Given the complexity of the
problem and the extraordinary consequences of a successful nuclear
event, we must look to any and all opportunities for preventing such an
attack.
Should a terrorist organization acquire the requisite nuclear
material, we would then be faced with the difficult task of
interdiction. Here, as in so many areas, timely intelligence is
critical. We cannot be everywhere all the time, but if we have good
intelligence we may be in the right place at the right time.
The Department of Homeland Security is developing, in collaboration
with other agencies, a global system for nuclear detection. The
challenge is daunting, and the relevant geographical area is enormous.
We have also heard in previous subcommittee hearings of the inherent
limitations of detection technology. We must therefore focus our
resources where they can be most effective.
When it comes to nuclear smuggling, our interdiction efforts should
take note of trends in the trafficking of nuclear materials. We should
also be aware of existing contraband smuggling routes and techniques of
evasion currently used by criminal organizations. These methods present
a well worn path for clandestine distribution of materials, including
human beings, around the globe.
Unfortunately nuclear smuggling is not a purely hypothetical
threat. Incidents of nuclear smuggling continue to appear in the news.
Just last month, Turkish officials in Istanbul arrested two men
smuggling a small amount of uranium enriched to 17%. Press reports
indicate that the uranium likely originated from a Russian nuclear
facility. Fortunately this case, like most nuclear smuggling incidents,
involves materials not suitable for a nuclear weapon. But just like the
illicit drug trade, what we detect may only represent a fraction of the
material involved.
When it comes to the intermingling of criminal and terrorist
organizations, we have clear examples closer to our shores. In South
America the terrorist organization known as the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia has been trafficking in illegal drugs for many
years. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency has also reported that both
Hamas and Hezbollah have established drug and other criminal operations
in the tri-border area of Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil.
Bureaucracy may expend its time and money reinventing the wheel;
terrorists will exploit existing networks and assets. As DHS begins to
invest in detection technology, it will be useful to discuss the links
between terrorist and criminal networks, existing smuggling routes and
ways for us to monitor and interdict smuggling of nuclear material.
Fixing levees and draining a city has proved difficult and costly
enough. I, for one, cannot even begin to comprehend both the human toll
and clean up cost resulting from a nuclear explosion in a U.S. city.
I look forward to the testimony of our expert panel.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to
welcome our witnesses here today, and I certainly look forward
to hearing their testimony.
Our work in this subcommittee has shown that the nuclear
terrorist threat is very real, requiring the full attention of
our government. We have learned about the relative ease with
which a terrorist can build a crude nuclear device, and
therefore we must do all we can to prevent them from building
or obtaining other nuclear material, including taking steps to
reduce the illicit smuggling of nuclear material.
Security of fissile materials in Russia still concerns me,
especially after the National Intelligence Council reported in
December 2004 that undetected smuggling of nuclear materials
has occurred at Russian weapons facilities. Reports
specifically mentioned that Russian authorities twice thwarted
terrorist efforts to survey nuclear weapons storage sites. The
intelligence council report leads me to believe that while
progress has been made in securing fissile material, more must
be done to prevent this material from ending up in the hands of
terrorists. Revelations about the A.Q. Khan proliferation
network show that nation-states could provide terrorists with
nuclear material, and therefore we must adapt our
nonproliferation programs to deal with this threat.
I would like to hear from our witnesses today about where
they feel the smuggling trends are going and where our
government should focus its attention to further deter
smuggling efforts.
Criminal smuggling has presented a challenge for our
government for decades, as smugglers move illegal drugs and
migrants into the country. I would like to know if there are
steps that can be taken using the lessons learned from drug and
migrant smuggling.
I would also be interested in hearing your opinions on what
our government needs to do to ensure that our nonproliferation
programs are capable of mitigating the nuclear terrorist
threat.
Finally, I would like to hear from our witnesses about how
our government could better coordinate its proliferation and
detection programs. Specifically, do you think the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office is capable of leading the government's
efforts to develop a global architecture?
I look forward to our witnesses addressing these and other
issues. And, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for
holding today's hearing.
Mr. Linder. I thank the gentleman. Members are reminded
that they may submit written reports for the record.
We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses
before us today on this important topic. Let me remind the
witnesses that their entire written statement will appear in
the record. We ask, due to the number of witnesses on our
panel, that you strive to limit your testimony to 5 minutes.
Dr. Juzaitis is an associate laboratory director at the
Lawrence Livermore National Lab.
Dr. Lee is the president of Global Advisory Services and a
senior fellow with the Foreign Policy Research Institute.
Mr. Schweitzer is director for Central Europe and Eurasia
at the National Academy of Sciences.
Dr. Lee.
STATEMENT OF RENSSELAER LEE
Mr. Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am going to
start with the observation that the nuclear smuggling danger is
probably quite a bit more serious than it appears. Admittedly,
the visible face of the nuclear black market doesn't seem very
compelling: Lots of radioactive junk floating around, a
multitude of sellers, few bona fide buyers, and more a minor
international nuisance than a first order of strategic threat.
But this picture may be misleading.
As with other illegal businesses, drugs, for example, what
is seized is only a small fraction of what may be circulated
through smuggling channels. Important incidents go unreported
or undetected--or actually go unreported or underreported,
especially in former Soviet bloc countries. And it goes without
saying that sophisticated thieves and smugglers are far less
likely to get caught than the amateur players and scam artists
who dominate the known smuggling incidents.
Furthermore, anecdotal evidence suggests that a handful of
nation-states and subnational actors are in the market for
strategic nuclear wares. It is certainly conceivable that
would-be sellers and prospective buyers can connect with each
other in ways that are not readily apparent to Western law
enforcement and intelligence agencies.
In my written testimony I have discussed some of the
nuclear leakage threats that I think are most worrisome, such
as the corruption inside former Soviet nuclear facilities,
state-sponsored proliferation a la A.Q. Khan, and mounting
evidence that cross-border smuggling operations are becoming
more sophisticated.
I would like to focus here on demand-side challenges just
for the next couple of minutes, especially strategies that are
likely to be used by adversaries to pursue their WMD
objectives. Al-Qa'ida's activities, of course, are of
particular interest since that organization has made multiple
attempts to acquire both nuclear materials and tactical nuclear
weapons since the early 1990s. It is believed that al-Qa'ida,
lacking the requisite official contacts inside nuclear supplier
countries, would try to recruit criminal groups to obtain the
items that it wants and smuggle them to a target country like
the United States. And al-Qa'ida's natural allies for this
purpose probably would not be the major transnational
syndicates that we are all familiar with like the Colombian
cartels, the Sicilian Cosa Nostra, and the larger Slavic
formations like Uralmash and Solntsevo in Russia. These groups
boast lucrative and well-protected illegal businesses,
extensive investments in the legal economy, and de facto
political representation in their societies, and they probably
wouldn't want to risk these assets by getting involved in a
high-profile and risky activity like smuggling dangerous
nuclear materials.
Terrorists probably would find better luck picking
ideologically sympathetic groups with less of a stake in the
surrounding social order. Reports of al-Qa'ida's negotiations
with the Chechen mafiya in Russia to buy tactical nukes, though
I think these are probably exaggerated, they seem to fit this
pattern. And the Chechens certainly have the international
connections to mount a successful smuggling operation.
I have argued that the measures that we are introducing
against nuclear smuggling abroad might not be effective against
high-end threats from collusion, for example, from collusion
among well-placed nuclear insiders, increasingly
professionalized smuggling operations and sophisticated
procurement schemes of well-heeled adversaries. State-sponsored
proliferation is a particularly difficult challenge, of course.
We provide nuclear security assistance to states on the
assumption that they want to protect their own nuclear assets.
Well, if they don't, our options are obviously rather limited.
Certainly there aren't too many magic bullets that can
prevent some of these worst-case scenarios that I talked about
and mentioned in my written testimony from becoming a reality,
but I have suggested that we should try to complement our
essentially right now reactive and stationary lines of defense
approach to nuclear security with proactive, intelligence-based
policies that could help contain corruption and at the same
time provide advanced warning of illegal nuclear deals. I
mentioned these examples: Human reliability systems that can
detect corrupt or disloyal conduct, whether employees of
nuclear enterprises or people who are responsible for
interdicting nuclear smuggling. I also mentioned law
enforcement and intelligence operations that could shut down
demand-driven smuggling networks and expose high-level
corruption at the state level.
But we must also understand, and in conclusion, that our
nuclear security policy is inextricably tied to the imperatives
of the global fight against terrorism. We have got to be
vigilant against catastrophic events, not just those that are
gestating abroad, but also those that are aimed at the home
front or even already en route to U.S. shores.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Dr. Lee.
[The statement of Dr. Lee follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rensselaer Lee
A SHADOW MARKET?
The threat of catastrophic terrorism in the post-9/11 world raises
new concerns about a recurrent and pervasive phenomenon: the illegal
trade in nuclear and radiological materials. The true dimensions of the
nuclear smuggling business and its implications for international
stability and relationships are somewhat ambiguous. Little nuclear
material of significance and no nuclear warheads appear to circulate in
the black market; buyers are elusive; and arrest and seizure statistics
provide little evidence of participation in the market by rogue states,
terrorists , and major transnational crime formations, Nevertheless,
the observed reality of the traffic may be a misleading guide to the
magnitude and patterns of the traffic as a whole. It is what we can't
see happening that gives us greatest cause for worry.
As with other illegal businesses, drugs for example, what is seized
is only a small fraction of what circulates in international smuggling
channels. Some significant incidents go unreported, particularly in
former Soviet states. Also, it stands to reason that sophisticated and
well-connected smugglers are far less likely to get caught than the
amateur criminals and scam artists who dominate the known incidents.
And on the demand side, we can be fairly certain that a handful of
nation-states and sub-national actors are ``in the market'' for nuclear
materials. Over the years, North Korea, Iraq, Iran and Libya have tried
to purchase stolen fissile material for a bomb, and al-Qa'ida has
sought such materials in various venues--Africa, Western Europe and the
former Soviet Union--since the early 1990s. Conceivably, purveyors of
strategic nuclear wares may converge with end-users in ways that are
simply not visible to Western law enforcement and intelligence
agencies.
INSIDIOUS THREATS
Insider theft. Typical smuggling incidents have involved
opportunistic thefts of small amounts of material by solitary nuclear
workers, who then search for a buyer, often with the help of local
relatives or petty criminals, who in turn are soon apprehended by
police.. Yet here are important exceptions. For example, in 1998
Russia's Federal Security Service reportedly foiled an attempt by
``staff members'' of a Chelyabinsk nuclear facility (probably
Chelyabinsk-70) to steal 18,5 kilograms of highly-enriched uranium,
almost enough for a nuclear bomb Where the material was headed and who
the customers were. Is unclear but an operation of this magnitude
almost certainly would have required prior arrangement with a
prospective buyer. Also unclear is whether the theft attempt was an
isolated case or a single failure in a string of successful diversions.
Other incidents have involved deceptive practices by senior
facility managers, specifically illegal exports under cover of the
legal trade in nuclear and radioactive materials. In a well- known
case, at the Mayak Production Association in Chelyabinsk, the manager
of Mayak's isotope separation plant was convicted of exporting a non-
nuclear radioisotope (iridium-192) using false customs documentation,
Yet managers could just as well create appropriate paperwork to conceal
a more serious diversion--describing a shipment of HEU as a relatively
innocuous substance-such as natural uranium or cesium, for example.
State-sponsored proliferation. A further danger--one also difficult
to detect--is that of ``state-sponsored'' proliferation, in which high
government officials covertly transfer strategic nuclear goods to
client states or groups, either for personal gain or as a matter of
policy The black market network run by A.Q. Khan is latter-day model
for this. Khan is known to have sold centrifuge technology and nuclear
bomb designs to states such as Iran and Libya; yet, according to an
Iranian exile group, it also provided an undisclosed quantity of
highly-enriched uranium to the Iranian government in 2001. Almost as
egregiously, Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission in July 2000 took out
a full-page ad in a Pakistani newspaper offering for export enriched
uranium, plutonium and other nuclear materials. (The ad was withdrawn
under U.S. pressure) Similarly, some U.S. officials believe that the
Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation allows Iran to maintain wide
ranging contacts with Russian nuclear entities and to exploit these
relationships to advance its nuclear weapons objectives.
Demand-side challenges: nation states, terrorists and criminals.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that nation states and terrorists are in
the market for strategic nuclear goods, but face significantly
different constraints in procuring them. Nation states have the
advantage of being able to deal with government officials or facility
managers directly, and might successfully exploit quasi-official
channels and networks (leveraging formal cooperation agreements) to get
what they want. Terrorists lack such opportunities, and must somehow
link up with a social subset of people who willing to commit illegal or
disloyal acts. The obvious candidates here are criminal organizations,
specifically ones having connections inside nuclear enterprises and
cross-border smuggling experience.
Who would be al-Qa'ida's natural allies within the criminal world?
Probably not major transnational formations such as the Slavic
Solntsevo and Uralmash gangs, the Sicilian Cosa Nostra and the
Colombian cartels. These entities boast well-protected and lucrative
illegal businesses as well as extensive investments in the legal
economy and de-facto political representation; they probably would not
want to jeopardize these assets (bringing down the wrath of the world's
law enforcement agencies) by trafficking in strategic nuclear
materials. Al-Qa'ida is more likely to seek as partners ideologically
sympathetic criminals who have relatively less of a stake in the
surrounding status quo, or even other terrorist groups. Petty criminals
recruited by professional jihadists in the jails of Western Europe,
North America and the Middle East might fall into this category, Also,
reports that al-Qa'ida has sought assistance from the Chechen
``mafiya'' and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in pursuing its
nuclear ambitions seem to dovetail with this hypothesis.
Smuggling dynamics. Nuclear smuggling is widely perceived as an
anemic, disorganized and supply-driven business. Yet evidence suggests
increasing levels of sophistication in cross-border smuggling
operations. For instance, sellers of nuclear material are increasingly
likely to rely on paid couriers instead of trying to move are goods on
their own.. Smugglers are believed to collect and share information on
which Russian customs posts are equipped with radiation monitors and to
route their shipments accordingly. Reportedly, smugglers have probed
the sensitivity of monitors by sending across decoys with innocuous
radioactive items such as radium--dial wristwatches. According to
Western customs officials, smugglers are becoming more adept at
shielding and concealing their wares, for example encasing material in
lead containers installed in vehicles instead of carrying it on their
persons. All this seems to suggest an organizational intelligence
behind the traffic, as well as (ominously) expectations that customers
exist or can be found for stolen and smuggled materials. Finally,
several data bases indicate a significant shift in the locus of
smuggling activity, from Europe to the Caucasus and Central Asia.
Little weapons-usable material has been detected along these southern
routes, but the trend is nonetheless worrisome because of the relative
proximity of the traffic to regional trouble spots in the Middle East
and South Asia. Possible links of nuclear smuggling to obviously arms
and drugs trafficking networks in these regions need to be explored
further.
Worst case scenarios. Finally, the visible machinations of the
nuclear black market provide little clue to what might already have
happened. Recall the period of the 1990s, when the Russian nuclear
complex was going through a period of deep malaise. Former Senator Sam
Nunn, now the CEO of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, told a Senate
Hearing in 1995 that the collapse of the USSR ``let loose a vast
potential supermarket, for nuclear weapons, weapons-grade uranium and
plutonium, and equally deadly chemical and biological weapons.'' Even
allowing for some hyperbole, it would be a miracle indeed if no leakage
of significance had taken place during this period. Indeed, nuclear
smugglers captured in Europe in the 1990s indicated to authorities that
significant quantities of HEU and plutonium had already escaped from
government control and were available for sale. Where this material (if
it exists) is today is anyone's guess: it could be buried somewhere in
a birch forest, stashed in someone's attic, circling the globe looking
for potential buyers, or hidden in a cave in remote eastern
Afghanistan.
RESPONSES
Limitations of policy. Nuclear security conditions apparently have
improved in Russia and other new states since the 1990s. Russian
officials claim that thefts have tapered off at nuclear facilities, and
no weapons-usable material has surfaced in international smuggling
channels in recent years, at least according to the official IAEA
record. U.S materials protection and border monitoring programs and the
turnaround in the Russian economy (reflected in much of the nuclear
complex) may account for these trends. Nevertheless, prospective
thieves and smugglers may have become smarter at circumventing or
neutralizing the new systems being installed. Also, nuclear officials
are more likely today than in the 1990s to have international
connections or relationships enabling them to find connections to
potential buyers. The legitimate international trade in radiological
materials may provide a cover or channel for shipments of nuclear wares
that could be diverted to dangerous uses. We cannot conclude,
therefore, that the nuclear smuggling has diminished in importance,
even though the visible signs seem encouraging.
New U.S. safeguards are probably fairly effective against low-end
threats from unsophisticated thieves and smugglers but this is not much
cause for comfort. At the facility level today's main threat comes not
from disgruntled solo players but from conspiracies of well-placed
employees able to shut down alarm systems, bribe guards and alter
relevant paperwork Russian experts tell us that at most Russian
facilities collusion of just 4 or 5 insiders is required to carry out a
successful diversion scheme. Similarly, the border and cargo monitoring
systems being deployed in the former USSR and Europe may be ineffective
in intercepting serious smugglers with the requisite technological
expertise and knowledge of the terrain to move their wares covertly.
Obviously, smart smugglers can opt to circumvent those customs posts
that are equipped with radiation monitors. Alternatively, they may
simply bribe border officials to turn off or ignore the sensors. A
further limitation is that most of the equipment being installed at
borders is not sensitive enough to detect well-shielded HEU, which is
the material most likely to be used in a terrorist bomb.
Additionally, our nuclear security programs absolutely are not
designed to counter the state-sponsored proliferation scenarios
discussed above. The systems focus on providing support to states
presumably desirous of protecting their own nuclear assets. High-level
diplomatic pressure and concerted political action are probably the
only effective means of dealing with states, or their top officials,
that refuse to play by the rules.
Finally, new U.S. security measures have taken a long time to
implement. For the Department of Energy's Materials Protection, Control
and Accounting Program is not scheduled for completion until the year
2008. But already 15 years have passed since the disintegration of the
Soviet Union. The more time our programs require, the more problematic
their strategic justification, which raises the question of whether we
are simply locking the proverbial barn door after some of the horses
have already escaped.
Intelligence-based security. Our ``lines of defense''-approach to
nuclear security policy have many weaknesses that can be exploited by
clever adversaries intent on obtaining the ingredients for a nuclear
weapon. This reality highlight the need for approaches that can lower
the scope and degree of official corruption (difficult as this is),
provide advance warning of illegal nuclear deals and stop consequential
proliferation incidents before they happen. Various options present
themselves: here:
First, we might work with the Russians to construct a vulnerability
profile of each nuclear energy enterprise. This could be based on such
factors as economic conditions and wage scales, neighborhood presence
of organized crime and potential terrorist groups, past histories of
theft and theft attempts, accessibility to foreign visitors, and
frequency of travel abroad by enterprise scientists. It should also be
possible to gauge the susceptibility of the nuclear workforce to bribes
or blackmail and employees' propensity to engage on corrupt or disloyal
conduct.
Illicit drug use, gambling habits major medical expenses, and
conspicuous consumption unrelated to income are obvious warning signs.
Post-employment screening techniques--polygraphs, psychological
testing, and investigation of bank records--can be powerful predictive
tools. They might also yield information on prior thefts, possibly
leading to recovery of stolen material that perpetrators have not yet
had the chance to export. Additionally, remote monitoring of nuclear
storage sites and guard posts from vantage points inside and outside
the facility in question could provide an additional layer of security
against insider thefts. Some such steps are now being introduced within
the Russian nuclear complex, but not on the scale contemplated here.
A second recommendation is to focus more intelligence and law
enforcement resources on the nuclear smuggling problem, especially on
the demand side of the proliferation equation. Better intelligence can
be seen as a dynamic component of nuclear defense, complementing the
essentially reactive and stationary risk management systems that the
United States is implementing in the former USSR and elsewhere. Not
enough is known about adversaries' WMD procurement networks in nuclear
supplier states: how they are organized, and financed, what front
companies and other intermediaries are used, who their inside
collaborators are and so on. Law enforcement sting operations in which
operatives play the role of purveyors of strategic nuclear materials
can be useful in fleshing out buyer and end-user networks and in
shutting some of them down.
Third, and related to this, collaboration with law enforcement and
security agencies in countries of proliferation concern needs to be
strengthened. Such organizations do much of the heavy lifting in
containing nuclear theft and smuggling (see Chelyabinsk incident
referred to earlier.) They also possess useful information on smuggling
incidents, trends, players, networks and terrorist connections that
would be of great value in configuring U.S nonproliferation programs in
these countries.
Finally, as should be obvious, the imperatives of U.S. nuclear
security policy are ultimately inseparable from the imperatives of the
global war on terrorism. Al Qa'ida's attempts to acquire nuclear
materials and weapons have gone on for well over a decade. A large
penumbra of uncertainty surrounds the extent of nuclear leakage from
Russia and other supplier states. We do not know how far al-Qa'ida and
its affiliates may have progressed toward building a bomb. Hence, as we
build our defenses against proliferation in Russia, Europe and
elsewhere, we must remain vigilant against threats that may be already
out there, waiting to strike us when we least expect.
Mr. Linder. Dr. Juzaitis.
STATEMENT OF RAYMOND J. JUZAITIS
Mr. Juzaitis. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Congressman
Langevin, and members of the committee. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today. My remarks today
summarize my prepared statement that I ask be submitted for the
record. ???
Mr. Linder. Without objection, it will be.
Mr. Juzaitis. Let me first say that nuclear terrorism is an
enduring threat. The principles of nuclear weapons cannot be
uninvented, and the hundreds of tons of weapons-usable nuclear
material generated since the 1940s cannot be simply unproduced.
More countries may join the nuclear club, and nonstate
adversaries and extremist groups beyond al-Qa'ida may arise.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory supports the nuclear
counterterrorism mission on many fronts. In fact, the very
organization that I lead, the Nonproliferation Arms Control and
International Security Directorate at Lawrence Livermore,
actually has main responsibility over the homeland security
program as well. We understand that our programmatic responses
to nonproliferation and homeland security are simply two sides
of the same coin. A lot of the technologies are employed in
meeting the objectives of both sets of programs.
We are a key participant in the national-international
programs supported by multiple agencies, including the
Departments of Energy, Defense, Homeland Security, State, and
Justice, that are addressing critical aspects of this complex
threat. As part of a comprehensive nonproliferation and
counterterrorism program, Livermore analysts have assessed
incidents of illicit trafficking of alleged nuclear materials
for more than 25 years. We maintain a comprehensive database of
illicit trafficking incidents, assessments, and related
information. These assessments provide important insights into
this very key observable of the much larger nuclear terrorism
and nuclear proliferation landscape. The Nuclear Assessment
Program of which I think this committee is aware has been in
existence for over 30 years, providing comprehensive technical,
operational, and behavioral assessments of nuclear extortion
threats. The same NAP personnel also assess nuclear black
market transactions. As you are aware, NAP publishes a monthly
newsletter which summarizes open-source reporting of illicit
trafficking in nuclear materials.
I would also like to state here at this point that through
DOE's membership in the broader Intelligence Community,
Lawrence Livermore has access to all-source information that
appropriately informs many, if not most, of our technical
activities. However, and I say that strongly here, that all
testimony today will reference only--reference only the
information available through open-source reporting.
With regard to nuclear smuggling trends, and as described
in unclassified reports, I am unaware of any illicit
trafficking incident predating the dissolution of the Soviet
Union that involved weapons-usable nuclear material; that is,
plutonium or highly enriched uranium. However, since the early
1990s, open-source information indicates that there have been
roughly a dozen or so incidents involving significant amounts--
and significant here, I mean gram quantities or larger--of
potentially weapons-usable nuclear material. Most of these
incidents involved an individual or small group of people with
legitimate access to the material, who opportunistically stole
it and subsequently tried to find a buyer. Through their own
error and/or law enforcement investigation of the theft, the
individuals were apprehended, and the material was recovered.
My laboratory and others have also catalogued hundreds of
other illicit trafficking incidents, maybe 600 to 700 of these,
in which non-weapons-usable materials such as radioactive
sources or completely bogus materials such as lead or mercury
were being trafficked by sellers who claimed to have possession
of nuclear materials. In general, the traffickers asserted that
the material was weapons-usable. In some cases they claimed
that material was a functional nuclear explosive.
In light of recent world events, even though nuclear
smuggling currently appears to be dominated by scams and driven
by opportunists, there is no room for complacency. Each
smuggling incident must be carefully assessed on its own merits
as an incident or a collection of incidents that might be the
needle in the haystack that indicates that a genuine adversary
is attempting to or has successfully acquired fissile material
or even a weapon diverted from a country's nuclear stockpile.
As such, every observed incident like this is an early
indicator or could be an early indicator of a much greater
threat.
So in terms of recommendations, as important as it is to
carefully track and assess the illicit trafficking of alleged
nuclear materials, we must stay focused on the big picture,
which is countering nuclear terrorism and nuclear
proliferation. And what we would like to do is not just respond
to these kinds of indicators, but build a comprehensive program
that actually anticipates and prepares for the threat. This is
an extremely complex problem for which there are no silver
bullet solutions.
As I noted earlier, many important programs are already
under way to tackle critical elements of the problem. To name a
few, the Cooperative Threat Reduction and Material Protection
Control Accounting programs are helping to secure legacy Soviet
nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials. Second Line of
Defense and Megaports programs and the new Proliferation
Security Initiative are enhancing capabilities for detecting
and interdicting nuclear materials in foreign border crossings,
airports, seaports, and while in transit. The Nuclear
Assessment Program and other efforts that are based on
intelligence information can analyze specific incidents and
track trends in nuclear threats and nuclear smuggling.
So, all in all, there are multiple elements of a
comprehensive program. The key effort for us is--or the key
consideration is to link these separate programs together into
a global architecture that is risk-based and actually informs
our investment of resources so that all the varying elements
can work together in order to reduce the continuing threat
posed by proliferation and, possibly through nuclear smuggling,
a terrorist event here in our country. I thank this committee
for this opportunity.
Mr. Linder. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Juzaitis follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Raymond J. Juzaitis
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today. I am the Associate Director for
Nonproliferation, Arms Control, and International Security at the
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), which is administered by
the University of California for the Department of Energy's National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).
LLNL is a national security laboratory, established in 1952 to
strengthen U.S. nuclear deterrence. As a principal participant in the
Stockpile Stewardship Program, we help maintain confidence in the U.S.
deterrent and its nuclear weapons stockpile in the absence of nuclear
testing. We are also key contributors to critical national programs
aimed at reducing the threat posed by the proliferation and potential
terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction (WMD).
At LLNL, we take an integrated, systems approach to the
interrelated challenges of nonproliferation, counterproliferation,
counterterrorism, and homeland security. We address all of the phases
of the WMD threat (indications and warning, prevention and detection,
response and recovery), the different types of threat (nuclear,
radiological, chemical, biological, high explosive, cyber), and the
various threat ``players'' (declared and de-facto weapons states, overt
and covert proliferators, state-sponsored and transnational terrorist
groups). We integrate science, technology, and analysis as we assess
the capabilities, motivations, and intentions of proliferators and
terrorists, devise technologies and systems to detect proliferation-
related activities and smuggled WMD materials, and collaborate with
policy makers, the intelligence and defense communities, emergency
planners, and first responders in developing capabilities for dealing
with WMD proliferation or terrorism. We partner with industry,
academia, and other research institutions to bring the full weight of
the U.S. scientific community to bear on these most pressing national
security challenges. In addition, we work closely with customers and
end-users to ensure that the technological solutions we develop meet
their real-world operational needs.
Well before September 11, 2001, LLNL was addressing the threat of
WMD terrorism. In 1996, LLNL was requested by the Director of Central
Intelligence and the Deputy Secretary of Energy to organize a study of
the threat posed by terrorist groups using WMD against the U.S. The so-
called Livermore Study Group (comprised of 20 experts from the
Intelligence Community, DOD, DOE, FBI, State Department, Congress, U.S.
industry, and academia) developed nuclear, chemical, and biological
threat scenarios to identify key needs. They constructed an end-to-end
framework for dealing with the WMD terrorism threat and made specific
recommendations with respect to government structure, policy and legal
changes, and science and technology to address the most critical gaps
thus identified. One of the group's key recommendations was for a
national program integrated across the entire federal system to
comprehensively address the threat of WMD terrorism.
``DEFENSE IN DEPTH'' TO COUNTER NUCLEAR TERRORISM
Nuclear terrorism is an enduring threat. The principles of nuclear
weapons cannot be un-invented, and the hundreds of tons of weapons-
usable nuclear material generated since the 1940s cannot be un-
produced. The future stability of some of today's nuclear weapon states
is not assured, more countries may join the ``nuclear club,'' and non-
state adversaries and extremist groups beyond al-Qa'ida may arise.
Countering the terrorist nuclear threat requires a ``defense in
depth''--namely, an integrated system of systems comprised of multiple
programs and activities aimed at anticipating, detecting, and
interdicting the threat as close to the source and as far from the
target as possible. Many of the elements of such a defense in depth are
already in place.
The first lines of defense--securing nuclear weapons and weapons-
usable materials at their source--are embodied by the Cooperative
Threat Reduction (DOD) and the Material Protection, Control, and
Accounting (DOE) programs, which were established in the 1990s after
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Additional layers of defense are
provided by the Second Line of Defense (DOE) and Megaports (DOE)
programs as well as the newly established Proliferation Security
Initiative (DOD), which are enhancing capabilities for detecting and
interdicting nuclear materials at foreign border crossings, airports,
seaports, and while in transit.
At the other end of the defense spectrum are long-standing national
nuclear incident response programs. These include the Nuclear
Assessment Program (originally DOE, transferred to DHS in 2003) for
evaluating communicated nuclear threats and nuclear smuggling cases,
the Radiological Assistance Program (DOE) for assisting local response
entities, the Accident Response Group (DOE) for handling accidents
involving U.S. nuclear weapons, the Joint Technical Operations Team
(DOE) for locating and dealing with a terrorist nuclear device, Triage
(DOE) and Reachback (DHS) programs for providing expert technical
assistance to responders in the field, the Consequence Management
program (DOE) for dealing with the immediate aftermath of a nuclear
incident, and the Nuclear Attribution program (DOD, DOE, DOJ, DHS) for
identifying the origins of terrorist nuclear material or a nuclear
device,
LLNL provides technical, analytical, and operational capabilities
in support of all of these efforts.
DETECTION TECHNOLOGIES AND SYSTEMS
Every layer of defense requires nuclear detection systems.
Radiation detection portals for vehicles and personnel have long been
in use at the nation's nuclear weapons complex. Similar instruments,
together with access control and material accounting systems, have been
installed at numerous sites in Russia and elsewhere to enhance the
protection and control of Soviet-legacy weapons-usable nuclear
material. Radiation detection instruments are also deployed at foreign
border crossings and ports as well as at various entry points into this
country. For example, U.S. Customs and Coast Guard inspectors are
currently equipped with radiation pagers and low-resolution handheld
isotope identifiers. The ORTEC Detective, based on LLNL's high-
resolution handheld RadScout isotope identifier, is being deployed and
will greatly improve the rapidity and effectiveness of secondary
screenings.
Other detection systems have been developed and deployed for road-
based and waterway monitoring. For example, LLNL's Adaptable Radiation
Area Monitor (which won a 2005 R&D 100 award and is being
commercialized) has been demonstrated in challenging urban deployments,
including DHS's Countermeasures Testbed. Other deployments at various
military bases, under the DTRA's Unconventional Nuclear Warfare Defense
program, have demonstrated the ability of innovative algorithms and
software packages to integrate the detection signals from a network of
sensors to provide tracking and interdiction capabilities. In addition
to demonstrating the capabilities of the detection technologies, such
real-world deployments are also providing invaluable experience in
developing concepts of operations (conops) and coordinating response
functions among the various involved agencies.
Other research is under way to develop imaging detectors and new
detector materials and to demonstrate next-generation detection
concepts. Our overall aim is to develop a suite of detection
technologies that (1) are inexpensive to manufacture, operate, and
maintain, (2) are able to operate unattended for long periods of time
in inhospitable environments, and (3) incorporate data processing,
networking, and communications capabilities to provide network-wide,
context-aware information. Such systems, when integrated with effective
conops, should make it feasible to effectively monitor for nuclear
threats (and discriminate non-threat detections) without impeding
legitimate commerce or travel.
NUCLEAR SMUGGLING: A KEY NUCLEAR THREAT OBSERVABLE
For more than 25 years, Livermore analysts have assessed incidents
of illicit trafficking of alleged nuclear and radiological materials.
LLNL maintains comprehensive databases of illicit trafficking
incidents, assessments, and related information, providing important
insights into this key observable of the larger nuclear terrorism and
nuclear proliferation landscape.
With regard to nuclear smuggling trends, and as described in
unclassified reports, I am unaware of any illicit trafficking incident
pre-dating the dissolution of the Soviet Union that involved
potentially weapons-usable nuclear material (e.g., plutonium or highly
enriched uranium).
Since 1993, open-source information indicates that there have been
roughly a dozen incidents involving significant amounts (gram
quantities or larger) of potentially weapons-usable nuclear material.
Most of these incidents involved an individual or small group of
people, with legitimate access to the material, who opportunistically
stole it and subsequently tried to find a buyer. Through their own
error and/or law enforcement investigation of the theft, the
individuals were apprehended and the material recovered.
LLNL and others have also catalogued hundreds of illicit
trafficking incidents in which non-weapons-usable materials, such as
radioactive sources, or completely bogus materials, such as lead or
mercury, were being trafficked by sellers who claimed to have
possession of nuclear material. The traffickers generally asserted that
the material was weapons-usable; in some cases, the traffickers claimed
that the material was a functional nuclear explosive or ``suitcase
nuke.''
In light of recent world events, even though nuclear smuggling
currently appears to be dominated by scams and driven by opportunists,
there is no room for complacency. Each smuggling incident must be
carefully assessed on its own merits, as any incident (or collection of
incidents) might be the ``needle in the haystack'' that indicates that
a genuine adversary is attempting to or has successfully acquired
fissile material or even a weapon diverted from a country's nuclear
stockpile. Attention also needs to be paid to the ``big picture,'' via
assessments of nuclear smuggling incidents in total and linkages to
tactical threat incident analysis and strategic and operational
analyses, in order to improve interdiction and the identification of
threat trends.
THE NEED FOR AN OVERARCHING GLOBAL ARCHITECTURE
Given the multiple U.S. agencies that are responsible for the
programs that comprise a defense in depth and the geographic span of
the activities, the nation's efforts to counter nuclear terrorism must
be formulated and implemented within an overarching, integrated, global
architecture. Given the size and complexity of the endeavor, this
architecture must be based on a systematic assessment of risks vs.
investments.
This architecture needs to coordinate three critical thrusts--
securing nuclear weapons and nuclear materials at their source
(domestic and foreign), detecting and tracking the movement (licit and
illicit) of nuclear materials, and enhancing U.S. detection,
interdiction, and response capabilities.
With a systems approach, we can develop a national investment
strategy that allocates resources--technologies, people, effort--where
they are most effective. A qualitative and quantitative risk-based
framework will allow us to credibly answer such questions as: Which
instruments and systems should be deployed and where? Should we deploy
more equipment or more people? What new technologies or capabilities
are needed to fill which current or anticipated gaps? How can we most
effectively work with foreign entities to detect and interdict threats
as far from U.S. shores as possible?
Even more important, a global architecture for countering nuclear
terrorism will facilitate the critical coordination and sharing of
information among the various involved agencies. The eventual goal with
such a system is to be able to fuse detection data and intelligence
assessments in a near-real-time environment to achieve overall
situational awareness. Such an integrated approach to detection and
information analysis will provide dramatic improvement in alarm
resolution, threat assessment, trend analysis, and ultimately national
defense against nuclear threats.
THE REAL KEY TO DEFENDING AGAINST NUCLEAR TERRORIM
As I've outlined, most of the necessary elements of a ``defense in
depth'' against nuclear terrorism are defined and many are already in
place. Work is under way to develop, demonstrate, and deploy
increasingly capable nuclear detection systems. Long-standing threat
assessment capabilities exist and are being enhanced with novel
information extraction and data fusion tools.
But the real key to countering nuclear terrorism is effective
coordination among all of the agencies with responsibilities for this
exceedingly difficult problem. The 9/11 Commission and WMD Commission
reports spelled out very clearly the damage we do to national security
when stovepiping and turf battles are the interagency norm. A recent
GAO report (June 2005) highlighted the common problem of lack of
effective planning and coordination among agencies responsible for
combating nuclear smuggling.
Partnership, collaboration, peer review, and communication are
needed in order for the nation to successfully defend against nuclear
terrorism. Definition of an overall global nuclear defense architecture
requires coordination among technologists, policy-makers, and front-
line responders, educating each other on what is operationally
required, what is technically feasible, and what is politically
acceptable. Likewise, technologists, industry, and end-users must
collaborate to define technical system requirements, to demonstrate and
validate new systems, and to commercialize new technologies and
transition new systems into the hands of the end-users. Interagency
coordination is equally important in the sharing of threat information
and assessments, in implementing and operating the overall defense
system, and in responding to and handling real threat incidents.
Cooperation and partnership are needed internationally as well,
since much of the ``heavy lifting'' in countering nuclear terrorism is
done abroad--nuclear material protection and control efforts, enhanced
border and maritime security, international safeguards and export
control regimes, law-enforcement collaboration in investigating
trafficking incidents or interdicting suspect shipments, and so forth.
In addition, in light of the difficulty of securing funding for
long-term research efforts, it is critical that the various agencies
with R&D charters coordinate their efforts, both to make sure the
entire spectrum of needed research is covered and to see to it that
scientific advances and technology developments supported by one agency
are effectively moved from laboratory to deployment. Many of the LLNL
technologies that are being deployed to counter nuclear terrorism are
the product of many years of support by DOE/NNSA. Working in
partnership, DHS, DOE/NNSA, DOD, and other federal agencies can ensure
that, in total, the most important problems are being addressed,
technology developments are effectively transferred to user
organizations, and the nation's resources (technical talent,
facilities, funding, etc.) are optimally applied to counter nuclear
terrorism.
CLOSING REMARKS
Unlike the days of the Livermore Study Group, when we talked of the
need to prepare for the ``catastrophic maybe'' of WMD terrorism, there
is widespread recognition of the reality, severity, and enduring nature
of the terrorist threat, particularly the threat of nuclear terrorism.
This recognition is being translated into increased funding for the
organizations and programs chartered to counter terrorism and secure
the U.S. homeland. Included in this increased funding are critical
monies for the long-term R&D needed to generate the technological
breakthroughs that will be required to turn counterterrorism concepts
into effective operational systems. However, even as the nation
increases its focus on protecting the homeland against nuclear
terrorism, it is essential to continue support for the programs that
provide early-stage defense in securing and interdicting nuclear
material, the information analysis and data mining efforts to search
for and provide early warning of specific threat activities, and the
emergency response capabilities that enable the nation to deal
effectively with the full range of nuclear terrorist threats.
Just as U.S. scientific and technological superiority helped secure
the peace during the Cold War, science and technology are key to
winning the war against terrorism. However, terrorists are innovative,
resourceful, and committed. Thus, we must be even more innovative,
resourceful, and committed to thwarting their attempts to harm to this
country and its citizens. WMD terrorism is an enduring threat, and the
nation must prepare for the long haul. In particular, programs in
proliferation prevention, counterterrorism, and homeland security
require sustained investment. They are closely linked and must not be
selected ``either/or''; neither can they be conducted in isolation from
one another. It is critical that we work to ensure effective
coordination, collaboration, and communication among the many
departments and agencies with responsibilities for proliferation
prevention, counterterrorism, and homeland security.
We at LLNL have long been concerned about the terrorist nuclear
threat. We have built on our historical nuclear weapons mission and
developed expertise, capabilities, and technologies to meet this
threat. LLNL is already providing critical elements of the nation's
defense against nuclear, chemical, and biological terrorism. Our
hallmark approach of integration--across technical disciplines and
among R&D institutions, sponsors, and end-users--is well suited to the
nuclear terrorism challenge. We are committed to using our scientific
and technological resources to meet the nation's national security
needs today and in the future.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Schweitzer.
STATEMENT OF GLENN E. SCHWEITZER
Mr. Schweitzer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to
discuss a topic with you that has concerned me for more than a
decade. And I will be talking from that perspective rather than
simply as a representative of an organization.
I am going to talk about dirty bombs, and I will try to
quickly answer five questions. The first question: How real is
the likelihood of a dirty bomb detonation? My answer is: Very
real. They are simple to construct; the material is readily
available in dozens of countries; the consequences will be
highly disruptive, although the death toll will be low; and
leading experts throughout the United States and the world
predict it will soon happen.
Secondly, what is the likelihood that radioactive material
will be smuggled into the United States rather than terrorists
using radioactive material that is already here for a dirty
bomb attack in the United States? I would say the probability
of smuggling it in in the near term is low, but in the longer
term, as NRC and DOE tighten the reins on the way we handle
waste materials, I would say the import option increases
significantly in likelihood in the years ahead.
Why should the United States be concerned over detonation
of a dirty bomb abroad? My testimony--and there are a number of
reasons, and I will just pick two. One is copycat scenarios are
well-known now in the terrorist world. And, secondly, the
United States has both public and private assets abroad.
Next, what is the evidence that terrorist organizations are
working with criminal organizations in smuggling of radioactive
material? My testimony cites seven specific recent cases where
terrorist organized crime groups were caught with the
radioactive material in hand. There are hundreds of other
reports, as my colleague mentioned, 600 I think he said, but I
think these are very persuasive in that criminals with known
links to terrorist groups have been caught with the material in
hand and with other evidence which suggests they have dirty
bombs on their minds. There are many more unconfirmed reports,
lots of unconfirmed reports, of the drug runners handling
nuclear materials.
Finally, what should the U.S. Government do to prevent
dirty bomb attacks? First, I think it is important to recognize
that homeland security extends beyond the boundaries of the 50
States to include the routes and--routes of nuclear terrorism.
Secondly, many years of steady effort will be needed to reduce
the threat to a tolerable level, and programs to counter the
threat should be put in place for at least a decade. Short-term
solutions will have little impact in this area.
Thirdly, money is crucial for any networks, and the big
money is in the hands of the narcotraffickers. Crimps in the
drug and money-laundering supply lines will have direct and
indirect effects in reducing the threat of high-tech terrorism.
And, finally, governments have always had a stewardship
responsibility in the nuclear field, and the United States
cannot give too much emphasis to helping weak governments
strengthen their regulatory infrastructures.
In sum, Mr. Chairman, we need to follow the dangerous
material trail, the brain trail, and the financial trail as
best we can. And only by enlisting the efforts of countries
throughout the world will we be successful in doing just that.
Thank you.
Mr. Linder. Thank you very much, Mr. Schweitzer.
[The statement of Mr. Schweitzer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Glenn E. Schweitzer
I appreciate the opportunity to share with the subcommittee my
views on the threat posed by the growing capability and interest of
terrorist groups in embedding highly radioactive materials in explosive
devices. I present this testimony in my personal capacity as a long-
time specialist in international affairs with a technical background in
nuclear engineering who has attempted to find practical ways to combat
international terrorism for more than a decade. Thus, while I am a
staff member of the National Academies, I am not speaking on behalf of
the National Academies or any other organization. Also, I have not had
access to classified information on the topic being discussed today.
Therefore, my views undoubtedly reflect only a portion of the total
story concerning the coming age of the use by terrorists of dirty
bombs.
Nevertheless, I believe that the information and impressions I have
garnered from open sources and from personal contacts with technical
specialists and policy analysts interested in radiological terrorism
will be helpful to you in making judgments as to the seriousness of the
threat and appropriate responses by the United States--at the
international, national, and local levels. I assume that the primary
interest of this subcommittee is directed to the role of the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) in preventing a successful attack on our
population and our assets within the 50 states. But as you well know,
effective preventive measures must involve a number of government
departments and agencies, and also international organizations.
Therefore, some of my remarks are intended for a broader audience than
only DHS.
In preparation for this testimony, I reviewed my assessment of the
linkages between organized crime and terrorist organizations that was
published in 1998. At that time, there were clear overlaps between
terrorist networks and organized crime networks--in Latin America, in
Europe, and in Asia. However, many academics and government officials
were attempting to draw sharp distinctions between terrorist groups
that seek political changes and organized crime and drug cartels that
are enterprises driven by a thirst for the accumulation of wealth. They
argued that terrorists routinely use violence to achieve political
goals whereas criminal organizations employ violence more selectively
and only when bribery and intimidation fail. \1\
But the reality then and now has not been so jigsaw-puzzle neat.
Terrorist and criminal organizations rely on the same global
transportation, communication, and financial infrastructures for
illegal ploys. They take advantage of the same breakdowns in authority
and enforcement in states under siege. They both seek increasing shares
of the fortunes generated from narco-trafficking and other crimes.
Whether mercenaries are hired to do the bidding of drug lords or of
terrorist kingpins, the hit teams share a single motive in employing
violence--earning their financial keep. And when terrorist groups use
their own suicide teams, they too need some level of financial support
to prepare for and to launch an activity--for example, money that is
stolen through well known criminal devices such as credit card fraud.
Later in the testimony I will show how these observations of the mid-
1990s are playing out with regard to current interest in the use of
dirty bombs.\2\
Also in the early 1990s, new terrorist scenarios could be clearly
seen on the horizon. In 1993, I discovered a new advertisement of the
Hong Kong Sunshine Industrial Company, a shadowy hub of organized crime
trading in conventional arms. A freshly printed flyer of the company
that was being distributed through underground channels was given to me
by a foreign government official who apparently was well connected with
purveyors of illicit activities. It stated that the company was
offering employment opportunities for specialists with skills in
rocketry and nuclear weapons.\3\ At about the same time, the Aum
Shinrikyu sect in Japan became interested in weapons of mass
destruction as they explored the availability of uranium, experimented
with biological agents, and killed and injured hundreds of innocent
passengers through release of sarin gas in the Tokyo subway system.
I needed no further evidence then, nor do I now, that organized
crime has entered a new phase of complicity with high-tech terrorist
organizations. Thus, it should not be surprising that my 1998 book
warned of a wave of anthrax letters and postulated the detonation of a
dirty bomb at Europol headquarters in The Hague as plausible events. At
the same time, I have always believed that for the near term, simpler
approaches will be used by most terrorists. Thus, the book also
suggested that greater attention be given to the possibility of suicide
skyjackings and of repetitive subway bombings.\4\
Now nearly a decade has passed. What has changed in the outlook
that terrorists and organized crime will collaborate in spawning high-
tech attacks on western countries?
There have been many changes. The following have not been for the
better:*
The memberships of terrorist organizations have grown:
more recruits and more technically skilled members.
Terrorist organizations have been emboldened by
successful operations of like-minded brethren in the United
States, Europe, Russia, and elsewhere.
The number and distribution of terrorist cells,
loosely linked through the Internet and couriers, have
increased significantly.
Money laundering networks remain a problem as
financial fronts have long experience in reappearing in
different configurations after they are penetrated.
Drug trafficking routes continue to expand, with clear
linkages to al-Qa'ida and other terrorist organizations in the
Middle East and Asia
Positive developments during the past decade have included the
following:
The United States and other nations have expanded
counter-terrorism programs to protect populations and assets,
improve intelligence, and pursue known terrorists.
Weak governments are increasingly cooperating with
responsible western governments in rooting out safe havens for
terrorist groups.
International organizations are promulgating standards
for protecting dangerous materials and preventing thefts of
these materials (e.g., International Atomic Energy Agency's
Code of Conduct for radiological material) and are expanding
information-sharing with law enforcement organizations (e.g.,
Interpol data base).
Other pluses and minuses can be added to this list. But the bottom
line seems clear. Terrorist groups are growing in strength while the
vulnerabilities of their targets are only slowly being reduced.
I have selected Dirty Bombs as the theme for this presentation
because the probability of the detonation of a dirty bomb that
disperses radioactive material at home or abroad is high. There are
other means for dispersing radioactive contaminants into the air or
water, but the dirty bomb is probably the easiest radiological
dispersion device for terrorists to master and use. I share the view of
many specialists that radiological terrorism is becoming a near and
present danger, as indicated by the results of a poll of 85 experts
recently conducted by Senator Richard Lugar concerning the threat of
weapons of mass destruction. The results of the poll included the
following:
Respondents judged the probability of a major radiological
attack over the next five years to be greater than the
probability of a biological, chemical, or nuclear attack, with
68 of 83 respondents saying there was a 10 percent chance of an
attack that affects a major portion of a city. When the
timeline is extended to ten years, 40 of 82 respondents judged
the risk of such an attack as 50 percent or greater.\5\
The following assessment of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) echoes these results:
The radioactive materials needed to build a ``dirty bomb'' can be
found in almost any country in the world, and more than 100 countries
may have inadequate control and monitoring programs necessary to
prevent or even detect the theft of these materials. . .What is needed
is cradle-to-grave control of powerful radioactive sources to protect
them against terrorists or theft.\6\
A dirty bomb can take many forms and can range in size from a
suitcase to a truck. The approach that would most likely be followed by
a terrorist organization at present is to embed one or more ionizing
radiation sources (IRSs) in an explosive device that depends on TNT,
dynamite, C-4, or other available explosive material.\7\ Upon
detonation, the radioactive material would contaminate areas in the
vicinity of the explosion. The death toll from the radiation would
probably not be high, with the number of victims killed by the
radiation probably less than the number killed by the blast of the
explosion. The size of the contaminated area would of course depend on
the composition and the dispersal characteristics of the radioactive
material (e.g., ranging from powder to metallic pieces), on the
dispersion effectiveness of the explosive device, and on the local
weather conditions. Some scenarios project contamination spreading over
many blocks of a densely populated city.
While the death toll might not be high, the disruptive effect of an
explosion could be large. The levels of danger associated with nuclear
contamination are poorly understood by most populations which only know
that radiation exposure is not good and should be avoided. Thus, a rush
to evacuate once word spread that radioactive contamination had been
rained on businesses and residences might be hard to control. A multi-
block area of a city might well be closed following a detonation--
disrupting transportation, businesses, government facilities, and
populated neighborhoods. Such closures might last days, weeks, or
months depending on the nature and extent of the contamination and the
success of clean-up efforts. All the while, displaced people might be
hesitant to return to the area, worried about long-term effects of
exposure to any level of contamination and concerned about repetition
of such an act. A variety of books and articles have been written in
recent years about the effects of a dirty bomb detonation under various
scenarios.\8\
For terrorist groups with some modest level of technical skills,
the key to constructing a dirty bomb is availability of appropriate
radioactive material. As noted in the IAEA statement, such material is
omnipresent. Much is in the form of IRSs used in medicine, food
processing, well logging, electricity generation, industrial gauging,
and scientific research, for example. There are literally millions of
IRSs scattered around the world, and tens of thousands of them have
sufficiently high activity to make them worrisome components of dirty
bombs.\9\
Against this general background, I cite the following seven
incidents since early 2004 that clearly indicate the interest of both
terrorist organizations and organized crime in dirty bombs.
Scotland Yard charged eight terror suspects in London
with (a) plotting to commit murder using Americium-241 from
smoke detectors together with explosives in devices based on
schemes in the Terrorist's Handbook, and (b) having
surveillance plans for the New York Stock Exchange, the
International Monetary Fund, and the Prudential Building in New
Jersey. The leader was identified as bin Laden's ``U.K.
general.'' \10\
In a police scam, Scotland Yard arrested four terror
suspects attempting to purchase ``red mercury'' smuggled to
London from Russia for sale to a Saudi buyer who was purported
to be sympathetic to ``Muslim causes.'' \11\
Russian and Ukrainian security forces arrested an
international criminal group for possession of Osmium-187 near
Kursk.\12\
The Ukrainian security service confiscated three
containers of Cesium-137 and arrested four members of an
organized crime group in the Crimea.\13\
In a related incident, the Ukrainian security service
arrested members of an organized crime group who were in
possession of six containers of Cesium-137.\14\
The Ukrainian security service arrested members of an
organized crime group that is spread throughout the country and
seized two containers of Cesium-137 in Armiansk, Ukraine.\15\
Ukrainian police arrested 3-4 members of a criminal
gang who had Strontium-90 together with a large cache of arms
near Odessa.\16\
In short, we are no longer talking only about hypothetical threats
of terrorists and organized crime groups trafficking in dangerous
materials that could be used in potent dirty bombs.
Some dirty bomb experts believe that the most likely scenario for
detonation of a dirty bomb in the United States is the theft of one or
more IRSs in use or in storage in the United States and then detonation
of a bomb in a nearby city. There would be no need to circumvent
customs procedures that are increasingly sensitive to detection of
radioactive material. Last week Business Week set forth a scenario of a
dirty bomb being detonated at the New York Stock Exchange using
radioactive material from an IRS that a sleeper cell had stolen from a
hospital in New Jersey. Surely this type of scenario should be of
concern.\17\
But illegal importation of IRSs into the United States may become a
better option for nuclear terrorists in several years. Soon the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) will have put in place stronger procedures
for ensuring proper handling and security of IRSs, and the Department
of Energy (DOE) will have completed most of its intensified effort to
collect abandoned IRSs in the United States.
Against this background, the following considerations heighten
concern over thefts of IRSs abroad:
Once a stolen IRS enters the international black
market in Europe or elsewhere there is no way to predict where
it will end up. Indeed, international terrorist groups might
attempt to bring it into the United States.
The successful detonation of a dirty bomb anywhere in
the world could encourage copy cat scenarios in the United
States and elsewhere as has been the case with other tactics
adopted by terrorist organizations.
Stolen IRSs that make their way to remote terrorist
hideaways might be used for training purposes in preparation
for attempting theft and detonation of an IRS in the United
States or for sending suicide teams trained in dirty bomb
methods to the United States.
Looking beyond these concerns that relate directly to the primary
responsibilities of DHS, thefts of IRSs abroad can have additional
adverse effects on U.S. interests, namely:
Dirty bombs could be used against U.S. government or
private sector assets abroad.
A dirty bomb incident anywhere could dampen public
support for using nuclear technology for civilian purposes at a
time when an expansion of nuclear power is being evaluated in
the United States and elsewhere in the light of recurring
energy problems.
The United States imports a variety of IRSs for
scientific, industrial, and agricultural purposes; and
malevolent use of an IRS abroad could adversely affect
international trade involving IRSs.
A primary concern of this hearing is what can be done to prevent
international criminal networks, terrorist networks, or hybrid networks
from becoming a significant smuggling channel of ingredients for dirty
bombs. The London cases cited above indicate that international
trafficking in IRSs to be used in dirty bombs is coming of age. The
Ukrainian cases suggest that while nuclear crime involving networks of
small cells of criminals may be increasing, there is no direct evidence
that construction of dirty bombs was the motivating factor in these
cases.
It is useful to look at other networks as well. Reflecting on the
A.Q. Khan money-making network that engaged in trade of centrifuges for
enriching uranium with countries which were on the black list of
western countries, clearly Khan's official position in Pakistan and
personal stature were keys to the success of this network. Apparently
governments were his customers, and it seems likely that they were
comfortable dealing with someone who had government credentials,
regardless of whether Khan's authority was or was not misrepresented;
and such respect for government operatives is an important lesson
learned.\18\ Turning to the relevance of al-Qa'ida's financial network,
the characteristic that stands out is the source of the money--the
Saudi Government and Saudi charities. The network had many twists and
turns; and if others have the starter cash, they presumably could copy
many of the approaches.\19\
Finally, the drug networks should probably be of greatest concern
in considering the future of international smuggling of material for
dirty bombs. They have long been channels for trade in conventional
weapons, and they probably could handle IRSs without too much
difficulty. At the same time, as previously noted, terrorist groups
need financial sustenance for a variety of activities.
There are already clear linkages of terrorist groups to the opium/
heroin trade from Afghanistan; and the amount of money involved is so
large that astute dirty bomb terrorists may well seek direct or
indirect ties with the many way stations along these routes. In 2003,
U.S. Central Command reported its first seizure of a small al-Qa'ida
boat smuggling hashish worth about $10 million. Since that time many
reports have emanated from Afghanistan and elsewhere of al-Qa'ida
involvement in drug trafficking. Also, related terrorist organizations
have reportedly been involved in drug smuggling in the Philippines.
Finally, one report indicates the possibility that drug money is being
used for obtaining radioactive material for dirty bombs.\20\
Against this background, what steps should now be taken to reduce
the likelihood that dirty bombs will be detonated in the United States,
in the near term or in the more distant future of say five years?
First, the U.S. government is already taking many steps to prevent
a dirty bomb detonation in the United States. As noted, the NRC and DOE
are tightening security on IRSs and radioactive waste. At points of
entry into the United States, radiation monitors are being deployed in
increasing numbers and with increasing sensitivities. Sealed shipping
containers are increasingly being certified as free of tampering en
route to the United States. New York and other cities are arming
enforcement agencies with pagers and more elaborate detection
capabilities. And you know better than do I the many other steps to
develop more robust security barriers throughout the country.
Internationally, the United States has been a leader in galvanizing
a multinational approach to preventing and intercepting radiation
smuggling. The IAEA has adopted a variety of guidelines concerning the
classification and handling of IRSs, methods for protecting and
accounting for them, and recommended procedures for import and export
of IRSs. Also, the Agency provides assistance to many countries that
are endeavoring to strengthen their nuclear security systems. The
United States initiated the Proliferation Security Initiative to
facilitate search and seizure of ships suspected of having illicit
weapons-related cargoes, and particularly nuclear cargo. DOE has
mounted programs in more than 40 countries to upgrade the security at
particularly vulnerable sites where radioactive material is used or
stored. Also, DOE has improved radiation detection capabilities at
international borders and at key ports throughout the world.
Let me now offer several principles for advancing these and other
efforts that are important for protecting the American people from a
dirty bomb attack.
Homeland security does not begin at the outer
boundaries of the 50 states but extends to the roots and routes
of threats that are targeted on the 50 states.
While cradle-to-grave stewardship of IRSs is the goal,
many years will be necessary to reduce the threat of dirty
bombs to a tolerable level; and efforts that are launched to
contribute to achieving this goal should be put in place for at
least a decade.
Money is required for international networks of
criminals or terrorists or for hybrid networks to be effective,
and the biggest cache of accessible funds is in the hands of
the narco-traffickers. Crimps in their drug supply lines and
their financial networks will have indirect, but important,
effects for reducing many types of high-tech smuggling.
Governments have always had a clear responsibility to
ensure proper handling of all types of nuclear materials, and
the United States cannot give too much emphasis to helping
other governments strengthen their regulatory infrastructures
for ensuring adequate stewardship over dangerous nuclear
material.
In short, in order to ensure the safety of the United
States, we need to follow the dangerous material trail, the
brain trail, and the financial trail as best we can. And only
by enlisting the efforts of countries throughout the world,
will we be successful in doing just that.
References
1. Glenn E. Schweitzer with Carole D. Schweitzer,
Superterrorism: Assassins, Mobsters, and Weapons of Mass Destruction,
Plenum Press, 1998, p. 288.
2. ibid
3. ibid, p. 155
4. ibid, pp. 111, 230, 282
5. Richard Lugar, The Lugar Survey of Proliferation Threats
and Responses, United States Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, June
2005, pp 22-23.
6. Inadequate Control of the World's Radioactive Sources,
International Atomic Energy Agency, 2004, p.1.
7. For a discussion of common explosive material see
op.cit., Schweitzer, p. 240
8. For example, see Management of Terrorist Events Involving
Radioactive Material, National Council on Radiation Protection and
Measurements, NCRP Report #138, Chapter 4.
9. For a discussion of composition of dirty bombs and
possible scenarios, see Charles Ferguson and William C. Potter, The
Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, Routledge, 2004, Chapter 6.
10. Ben English, ``Nuke Bomb Plot Foiled,'' Herald Sun,
August 19, 2004.
11. Agence France Press, September 26, 2004
12. Interfax, October 2004, Kursk
13. ``Containers of Cesium Discovered in a House in
Krasnoperekopsk District of Crimea,'' http://www.nti.org/db/nistraff/
2005/20050010.htm
14. ibid
15. NTI Data Base, ``Ukrainian Security Service Arrests
Cesium Dealers,' June 4, 2004
16. Oleksandr Korchynsky, ``Ukrainian Police Discover
Radioactive Containers in Arms Cache near Odessa,'' Segodnya, Kiev,
August 16, 2004
17. Bruce Nussbaum, ``The Next Big One,'' Business Week,
September 19, 2005, p. 42.
18. Michael Laufer, A.Q. Khan Nuclear Chronology, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Proliferation Brief, Voume 8, Number
6, September 7, 2005.
19. Jean-Charles Brisard, Testimony to the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, October 22,
2003.
20. op. cit., Schweitzer, Chapter 6. ``Navy Makes Persian
Gulf Drug Bust,'' CBS/AP, Washington, December 19, 2003. Rowan
Scarborough, ``Drug Money Sustains al-Qa'ida,'' The Washington Times,
December 29, 2003.
Mr. Linder. Dr. Lee, do we have any idea how many locations
there are of fissile material?
Mr. Lee. How many locations? Well, I think if you are
talking about the former Soviet Union nuclear facilities of one
kind or another, I would say somewhere between 50--maybe 50,
75, 100. You have got also around the world a great many
nuclear reactors that I understand use highly enriched uranium.
It is not just a former Soviet Union problem, it is also a
problem that affects many other countries, including countries
that have received highly enriched uranium from either Russia
or the United States to run their reactors with. I don't want
to be quoted on those numbers, but it is a fairly extensive
problem extending really as a global problem.
Mr. Linder. You said that a successful smuggling operation
needs to put an end user together with a would-be seller. Do we
have any idea who the middlemen are?
Mr. Lee. Well, the middlemen might be criminal groups. They
might be--
Mr. Linder. Is the Mafia involved?
Mr. Lee. Well, again, my sense is that your major criminal
organizations that have a big stake in society, and lots of
sort of legal as well as illegal connections, might not want to
put themselves on the spot and to sort of incur the wrath of
international law enforcement by getting involved in
trafficking, and certainly on any significant scale nuclear
radioactive materials on behalf of terrorist groups or even at
all.
So I think when you say Mafia, no. I see really the problem
is sort of these kind of these criminal groups that are really
somewhat outside the mainstream of their societies that might
have ideological pretensions and ambitions and views that
really go against--again, against the mainstream of their
society. Like, for example, the Chechen groups in Russia which
are involved in the supporting an insurgency there in southern
Russia and the Caucasus. I mean, these are the groups I think
you have to worry about.
Also, there are all these small petty criminals that al-
Qa'ida has been recruiting in the jails of Western Europe,
probably also in North America. When you are talking about
these big criminal foreign nations, I am less sure that they
are the ones that al-Qa'ida would be sort of partnering with.
Mr. Linder. Dr. Juzaitis, who uses your database of
transfers that you keep, the 600 to 700 things?
Mr. Juzaitis. The database that I spoke of that the NAP
publishes is published through the Department of Homeland
Security. They are the sponsor. The information in those
newsletters is directed at policymakers and sponsors to give an
overall appreciation for the magnitude of the threat. And those
we can actually count--the secondary transmission of those
memos I wouldn't know, but it is official use only, but it is
openly--it is available.
Mr. Linder. Is all-source information significantly
different than open-source? Can you answer that?
Mr. Juzaitis. I think I would like to reserve the answer
for that for a more appropriate session.
Mr. Linder. That would be fine.
Mr. Juzaitis. But let me say that we do analyze across the
whole spectrum of adversaries, and we look for relationships
among individuals, we look for relationships among states,
organizations, and try to connect where there are motivations,
technical capabilities, and access to materials as part of an
analysis, and we try to do that with the all-source
information.
Mr. Linder. Thank you.
Mr. Schweitzer, you talked about following the three
trails, and one was the brain trail. Do we have a sense of who
these people are? Should we be looking for people instead of
things?
Mr. Schweitzer. Well, there are all sorts of brains. There
are the financial brains, there are the nuclear brains, and
then there are the smuggling brains. And if you talk about
nuclear scientists, I don't think there is any way to approach
that except to encourage transparency around the world. And I
strongly advocate an approach of an engagement to encourage
transparency. Obviously, you won't get inside some of the
classified facilities around the world, but I think that that
is the only approach to that.
On the smugglers, I am persuaded that drug smuggling is
where the real problem is. I don't share the view that they
won't touch it. I think that the day has arrived where they
touch most anything. They touch all sorts of conventional
weapons, they have the networks, and I think that those are the
people you worry about.
The financial ones, the Department of Treasury has been
trying to crack that nut for a decade, and the people who have
financial institutions are geniuses in folding and reappearing
in another cloak the next day. So you just have to keep
plugging away at it.
Mr. Linder. Thank you. My time has expired.
The gentleman from Rhode Island is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, I want to
thank our witnesses for being here today.
Let me begin with this. Our government has struggled to
stop the transnational threats of drugs and migrant smuggling
for quite some time now, as you are very well aware. And I am
interested to learn about the new ways to attack smuggling
networks so we don't use the same old methods that have failed
against drug and migrant smugglers.
Dr. Lee, you mentioned in your testimony that our
government should construct a vulnerability profile of Russian
nuclear energy enterprise and determine where smuggling is
likely to occur. On that point, do any of our nonproliferation
programs have this component? And, if not, how are the
assessments made as to where we are going to--
Mr. Lee. I believe this is happening on kind of a selective
basis. I think DOE is doing a project to try to get sort of on
a small scale to look at criminal groups and potential
terrorist groups that are sort of acting or operating in the
neighborhood of nuclear enterprises, and I think this is A very
important step. You have got a sense of what kind of an
environment. I mean, some of these nuclear facilities really
exist in kind of a sea of sort of--and in many respects in
neighborhoods that are highly undesirable, lots of drug
trafficking, lots of other kinds of criminal activities. That
doesn't mean, however, that all these criminals are necessarily
interested in taking on the high-risk business of smuggling of
nuclear materials, but it certainly is a risk factor.
In terms of what is going on in terms of inside the
enterprise, sort of personnel reliability systems, polygraphs,
psychological testing, I think this is absolutely vital. I
mean, it is vital from the standpoint of identifying risk-type
behavior, for example, drug use, within the enterprise; you
know, corrupt behavior, thefts or planned thefts, thefts that
have already occurred. I mean, these are things that I think
are being contemplated. Some of the Russians that I have talked
to are somewhat leery of this. I think it is a question of sort
of reimposing a totalitarian system OF sorts on the nuclear
complex. But other Russians, I think, are beginning to see the
value of these personnel reliability indicators that could
really, I think, improve the security at the enterprise level
itself.
Mr. Langevin. What other techniques could our government
use to stay ahead of the terrorists, in your opinion?
Mr. Lee. Well, I think really it comes down to very much an
intelligence-based system that can really go after terrorist
groups and rogue states and other adversaries that are trying
to obtain nuclear material. And here I think certainly we have
to have our own sort of unilateral U.S. intelligence
capabilities in countries like Russia and other former Soviet
States as close as possible to areas of proliferation concern,
like, for example, the former secret cities.
Also, I think, though, we need to enhance our cooperation
with host countries' security services, because I think they
have a lot to teach us about what is going on, so what the
threats are, and we can use the information they provide to try
to configure our nuclear security systems more effectively.
Mr. Langevin. In terms of our current nonproliferation
programs, are you satisfied that they have some of these
components already in operation?
Mr. Lee. I think we are sort of moving in the right
direction.
Mr. Langevin. Could you highlight what the most important
of them are?
Mr. Lee. I think we are moving in the right direction, but,
you know, it is a very slow process. And one of the things that
worries me, I mean, frankly, about all of our programs is they
have been very slow to implement. It is nobody's fault, it just
happens. You know, that--the Soviet Union collapsed 15 years
ago, and we have programs--we are talking about finalizing the
securing of nuclear and nuclear materials and weapons by 2008;
equipping 300, 330 customs posts by 2012; training 15,000 or
creating 15,000 civilian jobs or weapons sites by the year
2030. I am certainly not going to be around then. And
meanwhile, but the threat is now. The threat is now. I mean,
the terrorists are not going to--they are not going to wait
until we put in all this architecture before consummating a
threat.
So we have to accept the possibility that some of the
problem is already out there; it has escaped from government
control. It is somewhere; maybe in the hands of terrorists,
maybe not. But that is the problem that worries me the most of
all of this. And, you know, where is this material? Circulating
around the world somewhere. Is it buried in the birch forest in
Russia? You know, where is it? But I don't think that we can
afford to assume that some material hasn't already escaped. How
do we recover it? I don't know the answer to that.
Mr. Langevin. I see my time has expired, but thank you for
your answer.
Mr. Linder. The gentleman from Texas is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In my State of Texas, the border is always a big issue. And
I went down to--I was invited by Henry Cuellar, Democrat from
Laredo, to sort of assess that area. It is the largest land
port on the southwest border. It is on the Mexican side, Nuevo
Laredo. It is completely lawless at this point in time. There
is a lot of violence. There are cartels going at war with each
other. We had 43 U.S. citizens kidnapped last year alone in
Nuevo Laredo. And when I was briefed by the DEA on this whole
situation, they explained the--and I think, Mr. Schweitzer, you
touched on this point. They showed us the cartel routes, and
they smuggle contraband whether it is a bale of marijuana,
whether it is human smuggling, whether it is potentially a
nuclear device, and that greatly concerns me.
A couple questions come to mind. In my view--you could
comment on the coordination between agencies like the DEA and
the FBI who look at these things and the Department of Homeland
Security from an intelligence standpoint. And is it likely--are
there devices that are small enough nuclear devices that could
be smuggled like, say, a bale of marijuana could? What is your
assessment?
Mr. Schweitzer. I think Dr. Juzaitis is in a better
position than I am to comment on the coordination of the
government agencies.
Mr. McCaul. If I could follow up with you. You mentioned
that there is a theory that, particularly on the southwest
border, they wouldn't touch this type of stuff, they wouldn't
be associated, but you seem to have the countervailing view.
Mr. Schweitzer. I am not sure--I don't buy that argument.
Mr. McCaul. You don't buy which argument?
Mr. Schweitzer. That they wouldn't touch it.
Mr. McCaul. That they wouldn't touch it.
Mr. Schweitzer. If the price is right, and they have some
semblance of understanding of the need for shielding or
protecting themselves or whatever, and--I don't think it is off
limits at all for these organizations. In fact, as you say,
they are getting into everything now.
Mr. McCaul. I tend to agree.
On the coordination issue?
Mr. Juzaitis. Mr. Congressman, the coordination is
absolutely required to protect these kinds of long borders.
There is focus these days--let me back up one moment. There is
a lot of focus these days on radiation portal monitors and
protecting formal points of entry. However, I know that we are
working very hard together, coordinated, across government
agencies to look at nonports of entry and how you would ensure
that smuggling is not occurring there. And that is where we
argue that nuclear detection by itself may not be the answer,
it is not the silver bullet, because it is impossible to
instrument every inch of open border. Therefore, other
technologies are being looked at, persistent surveillance
technologies, and assessments are being made. These are in the
formative steps, and they are less developed than instrumenting
ports of entry, but they are being worked, and there is
coordination occurring between the FBI, the customs
organizations, and the national labs through the Department of
Homeland Security.
So coordination is occurring. It is not wonderful, it needs
to be there even better, but I think the first steps are being
made to make this more of a comprehensive architecture that is
looking at all ways of getting into the country, not just
through the obvious ports and airports.
Mr. McCaul. These are all focused on the same area in sort
of activity, but they all are have their own silos. DEA will
just look at the drugs, for instance, and FBI will just look at
the potential terrorists. And it seems to me that information
sharing is vital.
Mr. Linder. It is vital. And ideally this problem can be
solved if you integrate good information, intelligence,
detection, and response, interdiction and response. Heretofore,
you know, up until 9/11, those were separately organized and
run. Since 9/11, there is ever-increasing coordination. But
unless we get a situational awareness, you know, in our
detection infrastructure, which means you have to integrate
information and other modes of knowing things besides
detecting, it won't work. And that does involve multiple
agencies and coordination.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Linder. The gentleman from Washington is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. Dicks. Many security experts including these witnesses
believe that terrorists will conduct an attack using a dirty
bomb rather than a nuclear device. Mr. Schweitzer, you
mentioned that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission will revise
their relatively lax security procedures for the handling of
radioactive material that could be used in a dirty bomb. You
also mentioned that the Department of Energy will have
completed an intensified effort to collect abandoned
radioactive material here in the U.S. Can you expand on the
measures taken by the NRC and the Department of Energy?
Mr. Schweitzer. Well, as you may know, the Department of
Energy had an open-source recovery program for a number of
years, and in the last recent years rounded up 10,000 of these
ionizing radiation sources which could be the ingredients for
dirty bombs. And that program is continuing, and they are
gradually reducing the number that are loose in the United
States because of companies going bankrupt and leaving the
sources behind, or because of mishandling or whatever, and I
think that situation is very much better than it was, and it is
getting better all the time. DOE is funding that program, and
it is being aggressively run out of Los Alamos laboratory. So I
feel comfortable that they are going a good job.
Mr. Dicks. Are there additional steps that could be taken?
Mr. Schweitzer. I think the program managers would say:
Give us more money, we will move faster. But I am not in a
position to say how fast they can or can't go.
On the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, there are right now
proposed regulations to impose cradle-to-grave responsibilities
on the holders of ionizing radiation sources specifically,
which I think is the likely ingredient of a dirty bomb, and
those regulations should be rolling out in the next few months.
So I may--
Mr. Dicks. Are the regulations going to help? Are they
going to be positive?
Mr. Schweitzer. They certainly will be positive. They will
put a greater burden on the holders of these sources to make
sure that they are under more stringent security control; and
that when they are finished with them, they won't just throw
them out in the back yard, they will get rid of them properly.
So, yes, I think those two activities are very positive.
Mr. Dicks. Dr. Lee, witnesses at previous hearings have
testified that current U.S. and international programs have not
adapted to today's nuclear threat, the terrorists' pursuit of
nuclear weapons. Do you believe that we need to broaden our
focus on the human threat from scientists to other employees at
nuclear facilities?
Dr. Lee. I certainly do. I think we are going to have to--
we are going to somehow have to persuade the Russians who right
now, I think, are rather reluctant to impose some very
stringent nuclear security systems, personnel reliability
systems at the nuclear enterprise level. This means very rigid
or much more rigid, rigorous screening techniques for people
who are coming in to work at these facilities, and also a lot
of different postemployment screening techniques that we can
use to try to detect, again, evidence of corrupt behavior or
risk factors such as, you know, personal habits that might make
people vulnerable, people inside the enterprise vulnerable to
pressure from criminals or terrorist groups, which I think is a
major problem.
Certainly by extension, I think these same ideas can be
applied to people, officials that are responsible for the
interdiction of nuclear materials, customs officials right now
in Russia, notorious cases of bribery of customs officials. I
mean, this is certainly a risk factor in terms of nuclear
smuggling. So we want to get the best possible people in there,
and we are going to have to use some techniques that are used
in the United States, transplant these to Russia and to other
former Soviet States as soon as we can do this.
Mr. Dicks. The administration has praised the Nunn-Lugar
program for its accomplishments in the former Soviet satellite
States and Russia's interior, yet 2005 funding reflected only
modest increases in the program's funding. More broadly,
critics have voiced concern that the administration's 22
percent increase in funding for threat reduction programs,
though a step in the right direction, is too little too late.
Can Nunn-Lugar accomplish its goal with its current level of
funding from Congress?
Dr. Lee. I think I would like to refer at least part of
this question to Dr. Juzaitis. I think it is not a question
of--not just a question of how much money we are putting into
these programs. I mean, there is certainly constraints on the
other side, on the Russians' side, how quickly we can actually
implement these new security safeguards that we are putting in.
I think we also have to have smarter safeguards. Again,
these personnel reliability systems, I think, should be a major
focus of our efforts, measures that can contain, defeat
corruption, difficult as this might be. And I think this is
really where we have to be going with these programs, because
this is where the real threat comes.
Mr. Dicks. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Linder. The gentleman from California is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I thank
our witnesses. As you know, we have competing requirements to
be in different places, and so I am sorry I wasn't here to hear
your testimony, but I assure you I will go through it in
detail.
A question I would pose to all three of you is this: The 9/
11 Commission suggested that one of the problems we have had in
government is a failure to be imaginative, to imagine the
unimaginable. I recall a number of years ago when I was in a
small group, former President Nixon was talking about the
aftermath of the Walker spy incident. And he said, you know,
when we were originally dealing with the threat of worldwide
communism, we had to deal with people in our midst who turned
on our country because they believed in what they were doing.
Now we have a situation where people are doing it for purely
monetary reasons, referring to the Walker spy incident. And I
know that you have, at least one of you has, covered it
somewhat in your testimony, prepared remarks, but how serious
is the concern we should have that we are not only dealing with
al-Qa'ida and al-Qa'ida sympathizers, but dealing with others
who would be involved in this for purely monetary reasons,
criminal-type organized crime? Should that be a serious
consideration on our part? Yes, sir.
Mr. Schweitzer. I think I reported in my testimony that the
incident in London were simply--reportedly were middlemen
working for cash for a buyer in Saudi Arabia to supply the
radioactive material, and I think this will be more and more
common. The terrorists themselves will get access to money, and
I think it will be through the drug routes and other ways, and
they will be able to buy off the criminals to do some of the
heavy lifting.
So I think it is a combination of certain groups who have
ideological problems, and they want to have retribution, and
there are aiders and abetters who are in it for the cash. Now,
that hasn't played out very much right now, but I think as we
look to the future, that is going to play out more and more.
Mr. Juzaitis. Mr. Congressman, I responded earlier to an
earlier question about the scope of adversaries that we are
looking at, and I guess I would like to reiterate at this point
the fact that to be imaginative means to imagine all kinds of
relationships between people that have motivation, that have
technological capabilities or have access to technological
capabilities, as well as access to materials. There is a nexus
that has to be keenly focused on, and that is the combination
of those three.
Money, of course, is the motivating element for many
adversaries, but there are others. As my colleagues said,
ideological motivation is a motivator. So as we track and as we
observe in our intelligence programs, in looking at all-source
information as well as open-source information, we should
always be maximizing our ability to establish the relationships
between those three: motivation, technological capability, as
well as access to materials.
Mr. Lungren. Dr. Lee.
Mr. Lee. Let me just make a comment on that. I think when
we are talking about criminals and their propensity to get
involved in a high-profile, high-risk business like nuclear
smuggling, I think that we have to make--I think there are
criminals and criminals. I know that law enforcement officers,
for example, in Israel and France and other countries around
the world find criminals to be sometimes a very useful source
of information about terrorist groups. You know, this is an--
informal liaisons or alliances, you might say, are formed
between law enforcement and criminal groups in order to root
out more dangerous antisystemic terrorist elements. And I think
within the criminal world, I mean, there are people who might
be willing to smuggle nuclear weapons into the United States
for money, but I would still argue and--that the majority of
criminals who have successful businesses of one kind or another
probably are not going to want to get into that kind of
business.
Mr. Lungren. Unless we imagine the unimaginable. I mean,
based on the experience I had in law enforcement, one of the
things that was acutely important to us was the intelligence
cooperation among different elements of law enforcement. You
could be doing a drug case--in California we were looking at a
drug case, and we happened upon one of the largest organized
efforts for staged automobile accidents. We weren't looking for
that, we were looking for drugs, but in the process of doing
that, we found that.
And sometimes I think we have to disabuse ourselves of the
notion that the war on terrorism in a very real sense can
totally be concentrated on al-Qa'ida and al-Qa'ida-like people;
that there are others who, for whatever reason that has nothing
to do with ideology, may, in fact, enhance or cooperate with
those who are doing that. And I guess I was just trying to get
a feel from you that, because of the enormity of the question
of nuclear devices or of dirty bombs, whether that in and of
itself--can we be comforted that criminals would be driven away
from this because of the awfulness of the impact? And my own
sense is we make a mistake if we look at it that way.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Linder. Does the gentlelady from the District of
Columbia seek to inquire?
Ms. Norton. First of all, I want to thank you, Mr.
Chairman, for holding this hearing. I regret very much that I
have been detained. Of course, I do want to say that we are not
close to the border where people most talk about smuggling, but
I represent the District of Columbia, and my major concern is
when both Presidential candidates, for example, say that
nuclear is the greatest threat, when the Secretary of Homeland
Security focuses us on nuclear, and then we learn how easy it
is to, in fact, smuggle a device into this country--I mean, if
it is so easy, I don't know why it hasn't already been done.
And I don't know whether that is what we most have to fear.
We, of course, are looking now for known terrorist
organizations, but I would like to ask you whether or not it is
likely, given what we are told is the ease for, in fact,
smuggling in such devices, is it likely that that has been
done, could be done? Or is that more difficult than we have
been given to believe?
Mr. Lee. I will just make a quick comment, because I think
my colleagues are probably in a better position to talk about
this, but we have a multilayered system of defenses starting at
the gates of Russian nuclear facilities and going through
borders, megaports, and coming all the way to the United
States. And our system of defense is at the U.S. border. Each
one of these lines of defenses has major gaps, holes, can be
exploited by clever adversaries.
You know, I share your fears, and I just hope that what you
say, this scenario, is not going to come to pass, but I think
there are systems in place. Classified information, I suppose,
can probably provide some additional information to what could
be said in this hearing, but this certainly is a very good
question. I mean, I hope our supply-side nuclear control
programs are more successful than our supply-side drug control
programs. But you just asked; I mean, look at what does come in
here already, drugs, illegal immigrants.
Mr. Juzaitis. I would like to complement that statement by
an observation that we should not rush to the conclusion that
nuclear weapon or nuclear material smuggling will automatically
transpose itself into the drug smuggling network. They are
dominated by very different supply-and-demand equations. In the
drug business, there are millions of customers and millions of
suppliers, and the network is very ubiquitous.
In terms of nuclear materials, as I said, they are not that
easy to come by, and it does demand a nexus, a coming together
of motivation, access to material, as well as technical
capability.
So the sources are not as various as in the drug case. And
one could argue that having gotten enough material to pose a
real radiological threat to the country, a terrorist may not
wish to consign the delivery of that to a drug smuggling
network. They would want to maintain much closer control over
that than is usually the case in the drug business.
Ms. Norton. Well, what makes you think that a drug
smuggling network would use it? I don't blame them. Don't they
have their own networks? Why would they need to go to drug
smugglers who have no reason to take unnecessary risks since
smuggling for them is as easy as walking across the border? I
am assuming that they would have to understand that they have
to find their way into the United States, and they would figure
it out. They certainly figured it out on 9/11.
Mr. Juzaitis. That is correct. I was just making the point,
they would probably not--yes, then we agree, they would not
necessarily use the drug smuggling network. But, again, the
answer is vigilance in order to observe any kind of activity
like this that we could see early.
Mr. Lee. Drug smuggling, we are talking about a mass market
business here. Again, lots of suppliers, lots of consumers. It
certainly is not the characteristics of the nuclear smuggling
business. But, of course, all you need is really one hit on the
nuclear smuggling side, and the consequences could be
devastating.
Mr. Schweitzer. I hesitate a little bit on this. If you are
talking about smuggling into the United States in the near
term, I mention in my statement that I don't think it is going
to happen, because the nuclear material, at least for dirty
bombs, is more easily obtained here. And there is no need to
smuggle them in. But as we tighten the controls here, then the
option becomes more interesting.
There is a very serious nexus between drug smuggling and
nuclear in Tajikistan, which is on the Afghan border. It is the
edge of Russia, and the place swarms with both radiological
material and drugs, and those are headed for Europe.
Fortunately, there is an ocean between us and Europe.
But I think we better be careful to say that drug smugglers
are happy with what they are doing, and they are not going to
be tempted by big money to take on the nuclear issue.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, my concern is that the drug smugglers are the
ultimate teachers here. They know how to do it, and they have
something to teach and are willing to teach for money, not so
much that they themselves will lend their network to it. I
think they are fat and happy, actually. I agree that you can't
take them out of the equation, because once they see there is
money to be made, look at Pakistan, where the top general, an
official, is involved, and he is in office.
So, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for giving me the
opportunity, particularly since I was delayed. But I do think
this is the most serious question, and I think that, even if we
had a hold on proliferation, and I am sure there is testimony
here that we are nowhere near where anybody would say that,
then it seems to me we would still have the problem that these
materials can now be made all over the world and that there are
scientists all over the world who might well be willing to do
so, even in the face of proliferation.
So guarding this country and figuring out ways to do so,
assuming the worst case, seems to me to be the most important
thing we can do when it comes to nuclear materials.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Linder. I thank the gentlewoman.
The gentleman from Connecticut.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Chairman, thank you for having this hearing,
and I thank our witnesses, three truly outstanding witnesses
that have tremendous backgrounds. As Mr. Lungren said, we could
spend hours, frankly, dealing with this issue.
I don't know if you will do a second round, but the bottom
line to my concern is, as I listen to you, I think I will not
be surprised--you just reinforced it--I will not be surprised
if there is ultimately an attack, a nuclear attack and,
clearly, definitely not surprised if there is a dirty bomb in
the United States, in the next 5 to 10 years. I just wouldn't
be surprised. I mean, I would be shocked by it, but I wouldn't
be surprised. By ``shocked,'' I mean the implications of it are
shocking.
Would you be surprised? I would like to ask each of you.
Mr. Schweitzer. I will go first, because I spoke to that
issue. Senator Lugar ran a survey of 85 experts, and the
consensus of those experts was that, within 10 years, there is
a 50 percent chance. I think they were probably a little bit--I
think they were too optimistic, myself.
Mr. Shays. Optimistic--
Mr. Schweitzer. I think the percentage is higher than 50
percent.
Mr. Juzaitis. I have no basis of making a mathematical
assessment of that nature. I think the kinds of things that we
are talking about don't lend themselves to stochastic analysis,
statistical analysis. There are too many human factors
involved, performance factors involved.
On the other hand, I would say, what do we do? What is
actionable out of that? No matter what probability--
Mr. Shays. Let's get into that. So you are saying, you
would be surprised?
Mr. Juzaitis. No, I am just withholding judgment. I have to
act and do everything--
Mr. Shays. I am not asking you percentages, because it
could even be one out of 20. But one out of 20 is possible. And
the issue is, if there was a nuclear explosion in the United
States, would you basically say, oh, my God, I never thought
this would happen? Or would you say, well, I am not surprised?
I don't need a long answer to it. What is the answer? Don't
scientists think about things like this?
Mr. Juzaitis. They do, all the time.
Mr. Shays. If it happened, would you be surprised?
Mr. Juzaitis. We do our work as if we would not be
surprised.
Mr. Shays. Okay.
Dr. Lee?
Mr. Lee. I wouldn't be surprised.
On the other hand, I guess we have to ask the question of
whether a terrorist with a nuclear weapon would necessarily
want to use it against the United States.
Mr. Shays. Okay, don't even wonder about that.
Mr. Lee. Or use it as a threat instrument.
Mr. Shays. Good grief--
Mr. Lee. I would go pretty much with what Glen Schweitzer
said, I would not be surprised.
Mr. Shays. In the 6 years, now 8 years really, that I have
done this work in the National Security Subcommittee as
Chairman, the one last thing I wouldn't even wonder about it--I
think they crave to do it. By ``they,'' I think Islamic
terrorists would consider that they had done the Lord's work in
their own twisted way.
I have seen a weapon at Los Alamos that was basically made
by material that someone could make pretty easily, as long as
you didn't care about yield, as long as you could get enriched
uranium to collide fast enough, 50-year-old technology, right,
and do that, maybe it wouldn't fit nicely on the tip of a
nuclear warhead, but a terrorist doesn't care about that. It
would be an ugly looking thing. It would be large, but it could
work.
What is interesting about your hearing, Mr. Chairman, is
the only issue, in my judgment, is, can they get a hold of the
weapons grade material? That is the only issue. And you all
have made a strong case for, well, they sure as heck could ship
it into the United States, enriched uranium, basically, about
30 pounds, and I could hold it with my hands, and it is not
warm. Plutonium I think would be more difficult for them to do.
I could hold it in my hands, and it feels warm. But it is the
size of a large orange, as opposed to a large grapefruit for
enriched uranium. So these things to me seem to be hugely
important.
The only point I would kind of make where I wrestle with
this, I believe in Nunn-Lugar. My challenge with Nunn-Lugar is,
I think the Russians don't spend half the money we give them.
They don't quantify what they do. They think that we want to
know, we have this kind of desire to get at their technology
and know what they know, and yet all we want is for them to get
this stuff and contain it. That is the only thing we want. So I
am willing to spend even bad money on this.
But maybe could I ask for a reaction to whether they think
the Russians spend all of this money or a part of the money
that we give them?
Mr. Lee. Well, it is fairly clear from talking to the
Russians, at least the ones that I have seen in recent visits
over there, they are less concerned about the insider threat,
the corrupt insider stealing the material, making off with it
and selling it somewhere, than they are about the possibility
that their local Chechen terrorists could break into a nuclear
facility and use this as kind of a staging point for some
demand, like removal of Russian troops from Chechnya.
I don't think the Russians take these scenarios seriously
enough. I don't think they are sharing information they should
be sharing about smuggling incidents. It is a very difficult
country to get information from.
Somehow, at the top level of both of our countries, we have
to work out a much better information sharing system on this
smuggling problem, both insider threats within nuclear
enterprises and also the kind of threats that are out there.
For example, al-Qa'ida, Iran, their procurement networks in
Russia. I mean, what is going on? We have very little
information on this.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Linder. Dr. Juzaitis, in your testimony, you said more
countries may join them. I think we know about 20 nuclear
countries, ballpark. Who are we concerned about?
Mr. Juzaitis. Well, I think our attention these days is
being placed on Iran and North Korea. Two, for example.
Mr. Linder. South Africa?
Mr. Juzaitis. As you know, South Africa had a program and
dismantled it very convincingly.
Mr. Linder. Did they?
Mr. Juzaitis. Yes.
Mr. Linder. Any other nations you are worried about?
Mr. Juzaitis. We worry about everybody who has access to
nuclear energy in fact because even as we talk about securing
the legacy materials of the Cold War, there is a brand new
class of materials in an expanding nuclear energy world that
are being produced in nuclear reactors ostensibly for peaceful
purposes all across the world. So this whole latent threat of,
what do we do about the material in an expanding nuclear energy
economy, should also factor into our equation of how to deal
with this problem.
Mr. Linder. How effective have international organizations,
such as Interpol, been in cooperating with us to detect, arrest
and prosecute nuclear smugglers, each of you?
Dr. Lee?
Mr. Lee. I think I will defer on this. I have visited
Interpol and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and I
think they do a fairly good job of collecting information that
other governments are willing to tell them, but they are not
really primarily agencies involved in investigating nuclear
smuggling.
We have not really gone beyond the first or second level in
the business of collecting information about the internal
workings of this traffic. We know really very little about it.
A lot of the information is being held by law enforcement
organizations in Europe and Russia that are not willing to
share criminal cases they are sitting on.
A lot of the stuff needs to be brought into the light of
day so that we can analyze this information and get some
understanding of how these networks operate.
Mr. Linder. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Juzaitis, you cite the need for an overarching, global
architecture to counter the nuclear terrorist threat. This
architecture would obviously require the Federal Government to
coordinate its efforts to secure material at its source, track
movements and enhance detection and interdiction efforts. While
the Department of Homeland Security would not be involved in
securing material at its source, it certainly could play a role
in tracking material and detection and interdiction operations.
The Department, as you know, has established the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office this year to develop the global
detection architecture. I wanted to ask you, do you think the
DNDO is the right step to develop a coordinated approach to
combat the nuclear terrorist threat? I know you have touched on
it already, but what other steps should the government take to
develop a nuclear terrorist strategy?
Mr. Juzaitis. I guess I would like to say that the DNDO,
standing up the DNDO is a step in the right direction. It
embodies the functions of coordinating with other agencies in
the way that we at the laboratories would like to happen.
There is more work to be done, and we have to--again, we at
the labs work with all of the agencies. So by the time we are
thinking about the problem in its technical context, the
boundaries of agencies should not--it is an integrated problem.
The DNDO is a good step at coordinating multiple agencies.
The architecture itself, this is the first time that we
have had multiple programs across the U.S. Government. But this
has been the first time that a global architecture has been
even talked about in the sense of having a risk-based
integration of multiple layers that give you a defense in
depth. So we applaud that function.
Mr. Langevin. And do the other witnesses care to comment at
all?
Mr. Schweitzer. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make one
comment. I don't really--I am uneasy with the drift of the
conversation. It is as if the United States is going to go in
and do all these things. The key is the host countries taking
the steps, whether it is Russia, whether it is Pakistan or
whatever. What we do in Russia is trivial compared to what they
do themselves. The whole thrust of the U.S. policy should be to
help them get on their feet and do it themselves.
We should not be talking about how much more money we need
to give to Russia. We should be talking about how much money
they need to put into it, and we should adopt approaches that
encourage them to do that. It should not be a Washington-driven
program, as it has been for the last 15 years. It needs to be a
Moscow-driven program that meets international standards.
So the idea that we are going to design the global
architecture for all the other countries in the world, to me,
doesn't make sense. The problem is too big. It has to be each
country has to take charge of its nuclear material and be a
good steward of that material.
Therefore, I am a little worried about the notion that this
is going to be a Washington-driven movement to secure nuclear
material all over the world. It is just not going to happen.
Mr. Langevin. Mr. Schweitzer, let me ask you, on that
point, and the other witnesses can comment, do you feel that
the Russians sufficiently get it, that they need to secure this
material? Or is it kind of one of those issues of what they
feel they don't know won't hurt them, and obviously mistakenly
so? But do they understand how serious this is?
I think it was Mr. Shays, my colleague, someone raised the
issue that it is questionable whether the Russians are actually
spending all the money on trying to secure this material at its
source that we are actually giving them.
Mr. Schweitzer. Talking about fissile material
specifically, there is no question that the Russians from the
top all the way through the ranks do not share our concern as
to the vulnerability of their institutions. They don't see--
they don't believe that these institutions are leaking like our
experts contend they are. There is probably some halfway in
between which is the truth.
But one of the--as result, the Russians say, you want to
put up the money, we will upgrade them; but if we have to put
up the money, why should we upgrade them? They are safe. We
know how to protect facilities.
There were indeed a few incidents in the nineties in which
the Russians readily confess up to of small amounts of material
being taken out. There may have been other incidents which no
one knows about. But in terms of Congressman Shays' comments
about, are they ripping off the money, if I have any criticism
of the DOE program, they are spending too much time auditing
the money.
The answer is, in my belief, I don't believe they are
ripping off the money. Most of the money goes to the United
States; it doesn't go to Russia. I bet we have 150 visitors in
the program in Russia today. We get the reports every week of
how many Americans are over there auditing what is going on,
and it is enormous.
So I think it is a bad rap for DOE to say their money is
being ripped off. It certainly is not, at least in my view. But
I do feel very strongly that it is time well past that we pass
the torch to Russia; we mobilize the G-8 partners to help us
and put the monkey squarely on their back to start coming up
with the money. Because I think if they realize that the world
doesn't share their optimism, that everything is safe, even
though you walk around those 30--you go around those 30
kilometer perimeters and see holes in the fences, I think we
are in trouble.
This one is just too big. If you have radioactive sources,
there are tens of thousands of them out there. How are we going
to police that?
Mr. Linder. The gentleman from California.
Mr. Lungren. Could I switch times?
Mr. Linder. Absolutely.
The gentleman from Connecticut.
Mr. Shays. If that is all right. I love people who have
strong feelings and passion, maybe because I think I do, so I
compliment you for that. But I think you are just totally off
base, because I don't think you could even come close to
documenting that they are spending the money right.
Let me just finish. Maybe I am judging it from a wrong
experience, but I went with Nunn and Lugar to Russia. I looked
at their chemical sites. I looked at some of their chemical
sites. I looked at some of their biological sites, and I looked
at Mayak. Then I went to Murmansk on another trip.
I went up there knowing we are spending millions and
millions of dollars to have them break down their subs so they
don't just have them sit in water and sink to the bottom with
all the radioactive material.
What they do is they chop off the front and back, take any
radioactive material, open the hatch and stick it in there and
let it float, and that is the way they used to get of their
ships; they just let them sink in the fjords. But these are
radioactive.
So, at any rate, we go and drive around. It is a huge site.
I counted less than 30 people. I started to raise questions
about the thousands of people that they are billing us for.
They would not show me any more than the 30. To placate me,
they let me see K-19--was that the ship? And the one that sunk,
they let me see that. They let me see the one in the movie. But
I never saw more than 30 people.
To placate us more, they showed us some of the parts they
had taken apart, and we could take them. But they never
documented.
So I just think you hope they are spending the money right.
I don't think they have ever documented they spent the money
right. Now, maybe I am mistaken in taking that experience with
the breakdown of the radioactive stuff and equating it with the
other areas, but then I had people in Mayak say we built the
Mayak plant, so, yes, we know what we spent for it. That, I
would agree with you.
I just would make one more point. When we saw the chemical
sites, if any logical person could think they protect them, we
saw about a million shells, give or take, hundreds of
thousands. They look like wine bottles put in. They were in an
old building that would be what somebody goes to when they go
to summer Camp. They were on cinderblocks. They only had a
padlock on the door. Someone could simply take out one of those
chemical shells and just put in a dummy wood piece.
So there is nothing that gives me confidence about the
Soviets taking this seriously or being believable.
Mr. Schweitzer. I will answer very quickly. I have walked a
number of the sites in the nuclear area only, specifically, and
specifically fissile material. I have no idea what they are
doing up north where you were, and I have no way to doubt you.
I would agree, from my judgment, they may not be spending
the money correctly, but I don't think it is going into the
director's pocket. I don't think it is going into the new
Mercedes, which was the worry 15 years ago, that we give money
and all the Institute directors have new Mercedes. I don't
think that is happening with the DOE program for protecting
fissile material.
Mr. Shays. Why? You just don't think it, or why? On what
basis can you come to that conclusion?
Mr. Schweitzer. We have seen the expenditure records and we
have seen the actual upgrades. But I am not saying they did the
right thing. I mean, that is a different issue. There are lots
of places where you can see where this detector was put in
mistakenly or whatever.
I guess I have become a defender of that program, even
though I am usually considered a critic.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Linder. The gentleman from California.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like us to focus on something, Mr. Schweitzer, that
you talked about in your presentation, at least in your written
remarks, about selecting the dirty bombs to be the theme for
your presentation. I take it from what you have written, you
believe this scenario of a dirty bomb being exploded is more
likely than another type of device that we might include in the
overall subject we have today. Is that correct?
Mr. Schweitzer. Yes, I think a dirty bomb is more likely
than some kind of a device to disperse, a fan type device to
disperse radioactivity or certainly a fissile device. Yes, I
think it is the most worrisome in the near term, not in terms
of consequences, but in terms of likelihood.
Mr. Lungren. I understand.
Doctor?
Mr. Juzaitis. I think that is very logical. These kinds of
dirty bombs would be more--that kind of an attack would be more
probable. However, the consequence is not the same as an
improvised nuclear device that would deliver yield.
The saving grace of that though is the amount of materials.
The radioactivity represented by the sources that would be used
in dirty bombs is also easier to detect, and therefore nature
gives us a chance at identifying those things before they wreak
havoc. Therefore, that also argues for a layered defense
mechanism or a global architecture where we actually have
radiation detection within our borders, because the kind of
materials that one would use for a dirty bomb do not just
originate outside our shores.
So a comprehensive architecture would include detection
capabilities within our shores, and given the nature of the
material to be used in those bombs, they are easier to detect
than one would in special nuclear material for bombs.
Mr. Lee. Radiological materials, our systems of detection
that we are placing abroad, and I guess to some extent at our
own borders, they can detect this material quite easily. On the
other hand, highly enriched uranium, which is the materials the
terrorists are most likely to use for a nuclear bomb, this
material is much harder to detect, and our systems we have are
not really sensitive enough to detect well-shielded plutonium.
So it is a different order of problem we are talking about
here.
Mr. Lungren. What would you, Mr. Schweitzer, describe as
the effects of a dirty bomb? The reason I ask that is because I
think in your presentation, in the written presentation, you
talk about the uncertainty, the lack of knowledge, the reaction
from the people in the presence of a dirty bomb. Frankly, it
reminds me a lot of the things that we are confronted with the
two large natural disasters--well, the natural disaster we had
10 days ago and the one we might have right upon us now. How
would you describe the consequence of a dirty bomb of some
reasonable size?
Mr. Schweitzer. I would suspect that there would not be
many more people killed that weren't killed by the explosion
itself. So I wouldn't expect many deaths from radiation either
in the short or long term. But I would expect, he did,
depending on a lot of things, large-scale contamination, and
that would, I think, immediately result in cordoning off multi-
block areas of cities and people would want to get away from
it, people don't know what radiation is, they just know it is
bad, get out of here.
Mr. Lungren. How long would we have to cordon off the
areas?
Mr. Schweitzer. It could be a week, a month or longer. How
long did the buildings in the Congress have to stay off limits
because of the anthrax attacks? If the material gets embedded
into the buildings and continues to radiate, it could be a long
time. But the initial uncertainty would certainly result in a
lot of chaos.
In terms of the analogy with the response to the hurricane,
et cetera, I think you have to keep in mind that these become
crime zones, and you could imagine a crime zone overlaid on top
of the hurricane, that is a real problem. People don't want to
go back in there if it is a crime zone. People may not be
allowed to go back in.
I think the analogy doesn't go too far. Also you are
worried about a second one. You have had one of these bombs go
off, people are worried, will there be a second one. Plus you
have the uncertainty of, can you go back in, and then you have
the people investigating it.
Mr. Lungren. If you had a dirty bomb exploded in the midst
of the Super Bowl, what would be the impact on the people that
were there? What would be the loss of life, what would be the--
Mr. Schweitzer. I think the contamination problem would not
be great because you are pretty well confined. But I think the
deaths would be primarily from the explosion. How many people
would die from the explosion? It depends on the size, how much
TNT you have, how much dynamite you have. So I don't think the
death toll is really the--it is always a concern, but it is not
the concern like it is on a fissile bomb where you kill
hundreds of thousands of people.
Mr. Linder. I thank all of you, Dr. Lee, Dr. Juzaitis, Mr.
Schweitzer. You have been very helpful. We are grateful.
This meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:34 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]