[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
POLICE AS FIRST PREVENTERS: LOCAL STRATEGIES IN THE WAR ON TERROR
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL ATTACK
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 21, 2006
__________
Serial No. 109-105
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
__________
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35-627 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2006
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Norman D. Dicks, Washington
John Linder, Georgia Jane Harman, California
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Tom Davis, Virginia Nita M. Lowey, New York
Daniel E. Lungren, California Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Columbia
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Zoe Lofgren, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Katherine Harris, Florida Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Islands
Dave G. Reichert, Washington Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Michael McCaul, Texas James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL ATTACK
John Linder, Georgia, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Christopher Shays, Connecticut EdwarD J. Markey, Massachusetts
Daniel E. Lungren, California Norman D. Dicks, Washington
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Jane Harman, California
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Columbia
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Peter T. King, New York (Ex Islands
Officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(Ex Officio)
(II)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable John Linder, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Georgia, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Prevention of
Nuclear and Biological Attack.................................. 1
The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Rhode Island................................. 2
The Honorable Jim Gibbons, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Nevada................................................ 29
WITNESSES
Mr. John F. Timoney, Chief of Police, City of Miami, Florida:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Mr. Brett Lovegrove, Superintendent, Anti-Terrorism Branch, City
of London Police, London, United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland:
Oral Statement................................................. 11
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Major Ahmet Sait Yayla, Counterrrorism and Operations Division,
ankara Police Department, Ankara, Republic of Turkey:
Oral Statement................................................. 17
Prepared Statement............................................. 19
POLICE AS FIRST PREVENTERS: LOCAL STRATEGIES IN THE WAR ON TERROR
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Thursday, September 21, 2006
House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological
Attack,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:18 p.m., in
Room 1310, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. John Linder
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Linder, Gibbons and Langevin.
Also Present: Representative Ros-Lehtinen.
Mr. Linder. The Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and
Biological Attacks will come to order. I ask unanimous consent
to allow the written statement from the Los Angeles police
chief to be included in the record. Without objection, so
ordered.
Mr. Linder. The subcommittee is meeting today to hear
testimony on police as first preventers and local strategies in
the war on terror. I want to welcome our witnesses and thank
you for traveling in some cases great distances to Washington,
D.C., to testify before us on this important topic. I thank you
for keeping us safe by serving on the front lines in the global
war on terror.
The threat of a terrorist using a weapon of mass
destruction is very real. Al Qaeda has stated its intent to
acquire a WMD. Preventing it and other terrorist groups from
acquiring a nuclear or biological weapon is imperative to
keeping America and the world safe.
Effective intelligence gathering is essential. We need to
focus our efforts on finding bad actors in addition to
preventing the means by which they could cause harm. But
locating these bad actors needs to happen not just abroad, but
at home in our local communities, and prevention efforts must
occur at all levels of government.
Today's hearing focuses on prevention efforts at the local
level by local police. Police officers tend to be thought of
primarily as first responders. But in reality they also serve
as first preventers. Local police are the ones patrolling the
streets, and their instincts and knowledge serve as the first
line of defense in preventing home-grown terrorists from
attacking.
We all understand the threat. The attackers on 9/11 lived
and trained in the United States, but we failed to fuse
together and understand the small pieces of collective
intelligence in order to prevent these attacks. We cannot
afford that kind of failure again, especially if that failure
means an attack using a weapon of mass destruction anywhere in
the world. The sharing of intelligence information quickly and
accurately with officers on the ground is of supreme
importance.
I am encouraged by the development of fusion centers and
joint terrorism task forces that break down artificial
jurisdictional barriers in order to provide information to
those law enforcement officers who need it, when they need it.
It seems to me that intelligence about the next terrorist
attack is more likely to come from the witnesses at this table
than the national and international Intelligence Communities.
Regional and multiagency coordination ensures that terrorism
prevention is everyone's responsibility.
The local leaders we have with us today in some way daily
face the scourge of terrorism. The threat of terrorism is a
global one, and the strategies to prevent terrorism must be
global as well. Prevention strategies that work in Ankara,
Turkey, or London, England, may be applicable to Atlanta,
Georgia. Effective policing efforts create a hostile
environment for terrorists. By walking the beats and getting to
know the communities they patrol, local police officers will
likely to be the ones to identify bad actors and break up
terrorist cells and disrupt terrorist networks.
Additionally, local police need training in terrorist
tactics and identifying the support structures terrorists need
to plan and carry out the attacks. Local police forces must
become effective problem solvers and not just incident
responders.
Many in Congress think too often of a ``Washington first''
solution, but as you all know, in the end all terrorism is
local, and we must promote local strategies and local solutions
to counter the terrorist threat. Prevention begins in the
streets of Atlanta and the subways of London and the shops of
Ankara, the ports of Miami, and it is there that we will
prevail on the global war on terror.
Mr. Linder. I now yield to my friend from Rhode Island Mr.
Langevin for the purposes of making an opening statement.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank our witnesses for being here today. I look
forward to what you have to say, and just on a personal note, I
have the deepest personal respect for members of our law
enforcement community, and from my private life I know
firsthand the dangers that our first responders face day in and
day out and the extraordinary job you do to keep our community
safe, and we are grateful for your dedication.
I appreciate the opportunity to have a-- hearing on this
important topic: The police as first responders.
As many of us know and understand, all terrorism is
essentially local. We depend on our local law enforcement
officials to do everything in their power to prevent
attacks deg.om occurring, just as we depend on them to be first
responders on the scene once an attack has occurred.
The bipartisan 9/11 Commission has consistently stated that
a secure homeland primarily depends on State, local and tribal
law enforcement officers in our communities. These are the
people who are best positioned to observe criminal and other
activity that might be the first signs of a terrorist plot,
thereby helping to thwart attacks before they occur. It is
therefore crucial that our local law enforcement officials be
positioned to play offense as well as defense.
While there is no question that we need to ensure that they
are equipped as responders and are well equipped, we also need
to focus on providing them with the proper tools to serve as
preventers. Most importantly, we need to ensure our local
police--our police officers, sheriffs and other law enforcement
officials are able to make sense of what they encounter on the
ground and are able to share their observations and concerns
with the Federal Intelligence Community. This will in turn make
our homeland much safer.
The concept of intelligence-led policing has been cited by
many aspects as one of the best forms of prevention. In order
for police and sheriff officers to be effective in their
preventative efforts, they need to be able to fully participate
in the intelligence cycle and be granted law enforcement
intelligence products that suit their needs. Unfortunately, six
years after the most horrific terrorist attacks on our country,
our country has experienced, there is currently no national
strategy that focuses on intelligence-led policing.
Intelligence is only good if it is effectively shared with
the people able to quickly respond. Information sharing is
therefore one of the most important tools our local law
enforcement officials can have. State and local fusion centers
were designed to be the hubs of information sharing where
police, health officials, the private sector and other Homeland
Security officials could all come together to receive the same
intelligence. However, our Nation's fusion centers only work
when they are given the proper funding levels to operate. This
is another gap that we need to fix.
Now, while State and local fusion centers can serve as
catalysts for intelligence-led policing, without the funding
local law enforcement officials cannot be trained in the
intelligence cycle, thereby rendering the centers ineffective.
Now, I am committed to continue to work with my colleagues
to strengthen information sharing and to properly fund our
State and local fusion centers to better assist our local law
enforcement communities. I certainly look forward to hearing
from our witnesses here today on how best to achieve these
goals, and I want to thank the witnesses for being here, and I
want to thank you, Mr.Chairman, for holding this hearing.
Mr. Linder. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Linder. Our witnesses today are Mr. John F. Timoney,
chief of police, city of Miami, Florida; Mr. Brett Lovegrove,
superintendent, Antiterrorism Branch, City of London Police,
London, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;
and Major Ahmet Sait Yayla, the Counterterrorism and Operations
Division, Ankara Police Department, Ankara, Republic of Turkey.
I would like to remind you that your whole statement will
be made part of the record, and we ask you to keep your spoken
statements to 5Sec. nutes, and we will have questions
afterward.
Chief Timoney.
STATEMENT OF JOHN F. TIMONEY, CHIEF OF POLICE, MIAMI POLICE
DEPARTMENT, CITY OF MIAMI
Chief Timoney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for
inviting me to testify before this important committee. I come
here as not just a chief of a major city in the South, but also
as a representative of police professionals all across America.
The attack of 9/11 took an enormous toll on police and the
police profession. At that time I was the police commissioner
of Philadelphia. Prior to that, I spent 29 years at the New
York City Police Department retiring after--29 years after as
the number two person in the organization. I know many people
were killed on 9/11, as some were colleagues or were just
ordinary citizens. It is a day I will never forget.
The city of Miami, as you are well aware, is--in south
Florida also referred to as the Gateway to the Americas--has
got a huge international airport, the third largest in the
country. It has got a very active seaport with the largest
cruise ship and airlines in the world. And then not known by
many people, but Miami is the second biggest international
banking center in the United States after New York.
So these assets along with others make Miami a challenge
for counterterrorism officials and also an attractive target
for terrorists looking to strike at the region. And it is
important to point out that 14 of the 19 9/11 highjackers
resided and trained in south Florida.
When I became the police chief of Miami 4 years ago, Miami-
Dade County had a priority for me to develop a comprehensive
antiterrorism initiative which included intelligence gathering,
community involvement, rapid response and mitigation. Towards
that end, I am happy to report that we have stood up our own
Office of Emergency Management and Homeland Security that is
responsible for overseeing this entire endeavor.
We deal in four critical areas: intelligence, prevention
and education, response and mitigation, and, obviously,
training.
The Miami Police Department terrorism response plan is
quite comprehensive. It is meant to identify and deal with any
eventuality involving acts of terrorism, whether it is the
delivery of a suspicious package or a weapon of mass
destruction into populated areas of downtown Miami.
As cochairman of the FBI-South Florida Joint Terrorism Task
Force, I am fully aware of the enormous challenges that law
enforcement in south Florida faces, but I have also witnessed a
dramatic change in the posture of the Federal authorities in
dealing with local law enforcement. I can't stress enough the
importance of us working in a multiagency cooperation, with
communication and coordination.
I testified before a congressional hearing right after 9/11
when I was the police commissioner of Philadelphia, and my
remarks were to the effect that the next piece of information
that I get from the FBI will be the first. Well, I am here to
say that that has changed. It has changed dramatically.
But let me get back to the four areas where we are focused
in on, and, Chairman, you had said this in your opening remarks
about intelligence. That is our number one weapon against any
kind of terrorist attack. Good, actionable intelligence can
mean the difference.
It was often the feeling at local law enforcement prior to
9/11 that intelligence gathering was a Federal responsibility,
but the events in Madrid and London and some events recently
here in the United States are highlights that local law
enforcement can have a very important role.
If you look at the Madrid bombers, most of those guys were
common drug dealers. And so if your narcotics enforcement unit
was in tune and had performers underground, maybe that plot
could have been interrupted. Similarly in the London bombings,
these were just ordinary individuals. Who knows, if the beat
officer was more in tune with that community, maybe that could
have been prevented. So we in Miami and in the region are
committed to making sure our beat officers and officers working
the 9/11 areas are in tune with that community.
We are also members, obviously, of the Joint Terrorism Task
Force, and I can tell you the sharing of information and
briefings is so much better than prior to 9/11. Prior to 9/11
you got informed after the event, after an arrest was made. Now
I am briefed literally on a daily basis of what is going on and
in cases that are working. So the relationship is--I am sorry.
The relationship is very good.
Also in Florida we have developed the South Florida
Regional Domestic Security Task Force, again which is kind of
an overlay at the local and State level of an intelligence
branch where we share information.
In the area of prevention and education, there is a role
for the public in this, and our flagship program is a thing
called Miami Shield, which your staff has been provided. And on
any given day and any given week, Miami police officers and
vehicles will appear at a building in downtown Miami. Officers
will take up strategic beats; supervisors and detectives will
interview pedestrians, building managers, and hand out a
variety of brochures, some for the citizens, some for the
business managers. Some of the brochures are quite lengthy,
very informative of what you can do at work, but also in your
place of residence. They are in three languages: Spanish,
English and Creole.
This has been an extremely successful program, and if
nothing else, in reassuring the people of Miami that the police
departments are ready, willing and able to deal, God forbid,
with any eventuality.
I just--while I know this meeting is not on responsive
mitigation, I think at the local level we will still be the
first responders, and towards that we have conducted a variety
of operations over the last 3-1/2 years. I will just mention
two or three.
Operation Eagle Eye was an operation we did about 2 years
ago involving four venues, different parts of the city of
Miami, involving over 600 police officers and 1,000 volunteers
in weapons of mass destruction-type situations. It was
observed, evaluated by people from Homeland Security, and we
learned a lot from that. It went very well. We can always learn
from these situations.
We also, in Operation Pigeon Drop, tested our own mail room
in police headquarters. What if there was an anthrax attack?
That worked out very well.
We did a similar thing in downtown, one of the high office
buildings in Miami, called Operation White Powder, without
notice, having an anthrax-type package delivered to test
building security, and they passed with flying colors.
And then most important of these operations was the one
last July, Operation Cassandra, where we tested the issue of
interoperable radios between the Miami Police Department, local
jurisdictions surrounding Miami, Miami-Dade, both fire
departments, and the Florida Department of Law Enforcement.
That exercise was observed by people from Homeland Security,
and in their after-accident report they noted that, first of
all, there were no flaws in the radio system, and that Miami
came out as among the best in the country.
So all of that was, I think--has gone quite well.
One other thing on the--on the national level which I think
was extremely important, Homeland Security required all
localities to be trained in NIMS, the National Information
Management System. And this is very important for smaller
localities that depend on mutual aid coming into a system so
that all police departments are working from the same sheet of
music.
So really the story today as compared to 5Sec. ars ago is a
pretty good story. I know a lot of people complain that not
enough has been done, but I would rather emphasize what has
been done, and when you look at it objectively over the last 4
years, quite a bit has been done; however, like anything else,
I guess there could be room for improvement.
And I think I would like just to in my concluding remarks
point out two things: You know, this progress, first of all,
could not have been made without the cooperation and
partnership with the Federal Government. It is extremely
important. However, on the issue of funding, it is our
preference--I saw last year that New York, for example, funding
was cut in favor of some rural areas. This is not a knock on
rural areas, but clearly funding should be based on risk, on
vulnerability, on target richness. And I think if you used
those criteria, you have got to conclude that it is going to be
one of the larger cities that will be the subject of the
attack. And so our preference is for the funding to be done
that way, number one.
Number two, that the funding go directly to the cities, and
in far too many States, it gets hung up at the State level.
That is not the case in Florida. Jeb Bush has done a good job
in getting it to the localities. I speak to other chiefs who
complain it has not come down fast enough.
And then finally, for me maybe most important, maybe more
relevant to this committee, is this whole issue of
intelligence. It is 5 years out. It is not clear to me who is
in charge of intelligence on a national level. Is it the FBI?
Is it Homeland Security? Is it Mr. Negroponte's office? It is
not clear. And somebody needs to give somebody that task,
because if more than one person, one entity, has the task,
there is nobody to hold accountable. You would be back to
finger-pointing.
I have seen the change in the FBI under Director Mueller
under the last 5 years, and it has been a sea change. Some of
things may have been wrong, but by and large the area of
information sharing has been tremendous. They have the
structure set up. They have the Joint Terrorism Task Force. So
why would we waste another 3 or 5 years to stand up another
superintelligence agency that may or may not work when we
already have one in place with a structure in place? And that
would be my preference. I have spoken to other chiefs across
the Nation and that, too, is their preference, but I leave it
up to this committee using its influence on the White House,
but somebody has got to make a decision that one entity is in
charge.
I thank you very much for your indulgence, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The statement of Chief Timoney follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chief Timoney
Honorable members of the Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and
Biological Attack, fellow members of the law enforcement community,
distinguished guests.good afternoon. I come before you today not only
as Chief of Police of a major metropolitan city in the South East, but
as a representative of police professionals across this nation who have
been faced with one of the most significant challenges in the history
of American law enforcement.
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 took an enormous
personal toll on the policing profession. At the time, I was Police
Commissioner of the Philadelphia Police Department. Prior to that, I
spent twenty-nine years with the New York City Police Department, where
I retired as First Deputy Police Commissioner, the number two person in
that organization. I knew many of those who died on that day. Some were
former colleagues; others were just ordinary citizens.
The City of Miami is South Florida's largest city. It is known as
the "Gateway to the Americas" and serves as an international hub due to
its international airport (third highest international passenger
traffic in the U.S.) and busy seaport (approximately 8 million tons of
cargo pass through the port yearly/it is also the busiest cruise ship
port in world). Additionally, the Miami River is Florida's fifth
busiest cargo port. The River terminates near the airport, thereby
presenting vulnerability to Miami International Airport and its
surrounding infrastructure. The Metromover and the Metrorail are two
components of the county's mass transportation systems that cut through
the heart of Miami, where thousands commute on a daily basis. Miami is
also home to the second largest concentration of international banks in
the country, 64 consulates, several bi-national chambers of commerce,
and foreign trade offices. These factors make Miami a unique city that
presents special challenges for counterterrorism officials and an
attractive target for terrorists looking to strike at the region's
economy. Additionally, it is important to note that 14 of the 9/11
highjackers resided in South Florida prior to the attacks.
When I became Chief of Police of the Miami Police Department in
January of 2003, one of Mayor Manny Diaz's priorities was to develop a
comprehensive antiterrorism initiative, including intelligence
gathering, community involvement, rapid response and mitigation. Toward
that end, I am pleased to report that my agency has established the
Miami Police Department's Office of Emergency Management and Homeland
Security (OEM), responsible for overseeing training, policy, resource
deployment, and the development of situational/operational plans. This
Unit is charged with the production of the Department's local terrorism
preparedness/response plan. Four critical areas: Intelligence,
Prevention/Education, Response/Mitigation, and Training are key
components of this plan and are detailed further in this testimony. The
Miami Police Department's terrorism response plan is quite
comprehensive. It is meant to identify and deal with any eventuality
involving acts of terrorism, whether it is the delivery of a suspicious
package or a weapon of mass destruction attack in heavily-populated
Downtown Miami.
Further, the Miami Police Department has taken substantial steps to
train its personnel in counterterrorism. Today, all MPD officers are
trained and equipped with the latest in Personal Protection Equipment
(PPE). They are able to utilize their gear immediately upon being
mobilized for an all-hazardous incident. Recently, a state-of-the-art
Mobile Command Center vehicle was added to our emergency response
fleet. This vehicle gives our first responders the ability to have a
mobile command center on the scene of an incident within minutes of an
emergency. Of equal importance is the development of Operation Miami
Shield, a counterterrorism awareness program explained further in this
document (Operation Miami Shield manuals enclosed).
As Co-Chairman of the FBI's South Florida Joint Terrorism Task
Force, I am fully aware of the enormous challenges the South Florida
law enforcement community has faced and overcome. I have also witnessed
a dramatic change in the posture of federal authorities in dealing with
local law enforcement. I can't stress enough the importance of multi-
agency cooperation, communication and organized coordination among
agencies in the event we are called to take action.
Highlighted below is a breakdown of a few of the Miami Police
Department's strategies against terrorism.
II. Intelligence:
Without question, the number one weapon in our fight against
terrorism is good, actionable intelligence that informs law enforcement
of what may happen so authorities can take affirmative steps to prevent
or interrupt a possible terrorist plot. The emergence of homegrown
terror cells in the U.S. and other countries, such as Britain and
Spain, highlights the importance of intelligence and the significant
role of local law enforcement.Since the events of September 11, the
relationship between federal and local law enforcement agencies has
improved tremendously and has proven to be vital in achieving greater
levels of cooperation, coordination, and exchange of information.The
following entities have the ability to gather intelligence/information
and disseminate it effectively, and in a timely manner, to the
appropriate law enforcement agencies. Our overall effectiveness in the
arena of homeland security is enhanced by our ability to tap into the
following.
The City of Miami Police Department has joined forces with the FBI
as a member of the Miami FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force. The Task Force
has been very aggressive in intelligence gathering and investigation of
terrorist activity in this region. Most recently, it successfully
concluded a significant investigation into a homegrown terror cell bent
on destroying government and law enforcement buildings in Miami. The
plot was disrupted with the arrest of seven individuals who now await
trial in Miami Federal Court.
The Southeast Region Domestic Security Task Force (SERDSTF)
consists of all-state and local law enforcement agencies that
communicate in the region and share information with the common goal of
combating terrorism.
Terrorism Alert Guide is used as a tool by the Miami Police
Department. The guide utilizes existing public/police partnerships to
deter, dissuade, and discourage terrorism. The terrorism guide provides
several avenues for the gathering of intelligence.
ThreatCom is a state program run by the Florida Department of Law
Enforcement (FDLE) designed to strengthen domestic security prevention,
preparedness, protection, response, and recovery through
interdisciplinary interagency consensus and commitment. This is
achieved by building and relying on regional mutual aid response
capabilities. ThreatCom has also developed a paging system that allows
the forwarding of information and intelligence to state and local law
enforcement agencies.
III. Prevention/Education:
Terrorists choose their targets based on weaknesses and
vulnerabilities they observe in high rise buildings, critical
infrastructure, facilities, and transportation sites. They are known to
study routines, customs, habits and schedules of those associated with
their intended targets. Terrorists, just like the common criminal, seek
to avoid detection and blend in with the crowd. To deal with this
threat, the Miami Police Department created Operation Miami Shield.
Operation Miami Shield is the flagship antiterrorism program of the
Miami Police Department aimed to engage and educate the general public
on the subject. It operates in this manner: Twice a month, on different
days and times, locations are chosen within the city to which police
personnel and resources are deployed. The selection of the location is
based on its potential for a terrorist attack. This is called a soft
target. Officers are assigned a strategic post that makes them highly
visible. In addition, terrorism awareness pamphlets are distributed to
the general public in three languages, English, Spanish and Creole, and
an audiovisual public service announcement, also in the three
languages, runs continuously at the command post for pedestrians to
view. Supervisors, in turn, make contact with building managers and
local merchants to provide them with information, literature and
training designed to enhance their awareness and educate them on the
actions they should take in the event they become a target.
While at the scene, the Miami Police Department uses a valuable
tool designed to gather and document specific information about a
potential target. It is a way to catalog critical infrastructure within
the city. The tool is the Homeland Security Comprehensive Assessment
Model (HLS CAM). HLS CAM also assists building security, administrative
personnel and merchants in identifying and addressing potential
weaknesses in their structures or in their daily practice.
Terrorism Alert Guide:
The Miami Shield Terrorism Alert Guide, distributed to citizens and
merchants during the operation, contains the following:
What does Operation Miami Shield stand for?
Serve as the eyes and ears for your community
Have a plan in place at home and work
Identify potential problems and notify police
Evaluate your surroundings and stay alert
Learn evacuation and emergency contingency plans
Do not aggravate the incident; simply watch and call police
The guide tells citizens to "See Something Say Something", which
explains to the public that they are the eyes and ears of the region by
working together with police and fire rescue/emergency first
responders. The guide urges the public to pay attention to their
surroundings, notice anything that is unusual and report it to the
police. It also lists the Seven (7) Signs of Terrorism:
1. Surveillance
2. Elicitation
3. Test of security
4. Acquiring supplies
5. Suspicious person out of place
6. Dry Run/Trial Run
7. Deploying assets
Business-card style Miami Shield Information Cards are also
distributed throughout the city and are available at the Miami Police
Department's three district police stations as well as at satellite
locations at the neighborhood level.
IV.Response/Mitigation:
The Miami Police Department has developed comprehensive plans for
response, mitigation, and recovery for any natural or man-made disaster
which may threaten the lives, safety or property of the citizens of
Miami.
The following are examples of operations conducted by the Miami
Police Department in an attempt to assess its response capabilities and
address training needs.
Operation Eagle Eye:
On March 4, 2005 the Miami Police Department conducted a large-
scale functional Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) exercise called
Operation Eagle Eye. The operation involved more than 600 Miami Police
officers, sworn personnel from neighboring jurisdictions, Miami
firefighters, and over 1,000 volunteers.
Operation Eagle Eye, conducted at four venues, was designed to
challenge the responders to accomplish several objectives as well as
determine the Department's level of preparedness in response to a
terrorist attack. This successful operation revealed the Department's
current capabilities in the area of WMD response and recovery and gave
command staff an idea of the areas that needed improvement. This
operation was witnessed and evaluated by outside observers, including
staff from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Operation Pigeon Drop:
On January 31, 2006 Operation Pigeon Drop was designed to test
Miami Police Headquarters' mail room policies and procedures. The
exercise featured the evacuation of ninety percent of the building in
response to a simulated anthrax delivery. It also tested the agency's
Incident Command System's ability to coordinate with the Miami Fire
Rescue's Hazmat Team and first responders.
Operation White Powder:
On Thursday April 20th, 2006, the City of Miami Office of Emergency
Management and Homeland Security assisted the Crescent Corporation in
Operation White Powder, a test of security measures at 201 Biscayne
Tower (a critical infrastructure in the City of Miami). The successful
operation revealed that they were on track with their policies and
procedures on evacuations and the handling of a powder incident.
Operation Cassandra:
On July 20th, 2006, Miami Police participated in Operation
Cassandra in cooperation with the Urban Area Security Initiative-Miami
Project (UASI). This tactical interoperability communications exercise
focused primarily on communication between participating regional
agencies. Members of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security -Office
of Grants and Training evaluated the exercise.
Personnel assigned to a command post at the Orange Bowl Stadium
handled a simulated explosion in Miami-Dade County's Administration
Building. Over 4,000 employees work and visit this building on a daily
basis. It is also a crucial mass transit hub. The after action report
revealed that Region VII (Miami and participating agencies) ranked
among the best in the country.
Resources:
The following are examples of resources available to assist the
Miami Police Department in recovery efforts.
Southeast Region Domestic Security Task Force (SERDSRF): These
regional teams provide ample response capabilities throughout the
region in response to a WMD event. They are equipped with compatible
and standardized equipment and training and they adhere and comply with
relevant sections of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and
the State of Florida Incident Field Operations Guide (FOG).
Additionally, the Miami Police Department utilizes the federal
government's Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) in order to ensure
the continued performance of minimum essential functions during a wide
range of potential emergencies. This is accomplished through the
development of plans, procedures, and provisions for alternate
facilities, personnel, resources, interoperable communications, and
vital records/ databases.
A Mobile Emergency Command Center Vehicle is now a component of
Miami PD's fleet that allows for interoperable communication with
regional assets. The command center is also equipped with a satellite
system and a mobile weather station.
V: Training:
The key to a successful terrorism response plan is in the
development of standardized training programs such as the National
Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Incident Command System
(ICS). The federal government should be commended for setting national
standards for incident command. For example, standardized training
programs allow police personnel from any given location to respond to
an incident by using the same management tools and practices as
outlined by the federal government.
The following are examples of terrorism response training programs
that have been conducted by the Miami Police Department:
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
Response Platoon Training
Simulated Disaster Training
Preparation for Mobilization Training
Emergency Operations Center
Interoperable Communications
Field Force Training
Vehicle Rescue Training
Weapons of Mass Destruction
VI. Conclusion:
Since September 11th, local police have come a long way. Police
departments are better trained, better equipped, and certainly better
informed than they have ever been regarding terrorism.
This progress could not have been achieved without the support of
and partnership with the federal government. Quite simply, local police
do not have the resources or funding, and in some cases, the
sophistication to deal with a major terrorist incident. The locals
often viewed terrorism as a national responsibility to be dealt with
exclusively by the feds. The events of September 11 and subsequent
events, here and abroad, have made it clear that terrorism is
everybody's responsibility. Local law enforcement has a very important
role in intelligence gathering, investigation, response and mitigation
in the event of a terrorist attack. I think we have made great progress
over the past five years. While some people complain that not enough
has been done, I think it's more important to emphasize what, in fact,
has been done. By any objective analysis, one can only conclude that an
awful lot has been done.
There are still, however, two problem areas that I believe need to
be addressed. First, federal allocation of funds must be based on risk
target richness and vulnerability. Clearly, a major city is more likely
to be a target of a terrorist attack rather than a rural area. The
notion of reducing New York City's funding last year, in favor of less
populated areas, is just outrageous. Major cities need fair and
appropriate funding that goes directly to the cities in a timely
manner, without stop-offs at state and county governments.
Second, we are now five years out from September 11 and it is still
not clear to me who has the ultimate responsibility for intelligence
gathering and dissemination.
Is it the FBI? Is it Homeland Security? Is it Mr. Negroponte's
office? My preference would be that this task be vested with the FBI.
The FBI has made significant improvements to the gathering and timely
dissemination of intelligence information under Director Robert Mueller
and it already has the appropriate structure in place, the Joint
Terrorism Task Force, to carry out this responsibility. Do we really
want to spend the next three to five years standing up a new
intelligence agency that offers no guarantee of success and which may,
in fact, make us vulnerable over the coming years?
Thank you for giving me the honor to speak before this committee.
Mr. Linder. I ask the committee to allow Ms. Ros-Lehtinen
to sit in the hearings and participate if she would like.
Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Lovegrove.
STATEMENT OF BRETT LOVEGROVE, SUPERINTENDENT, ANTI-TERRORISM
BRANCH, CITY OF LONDON POLICE, LONDON, ENGLAND
Mr. Lovegrove. I would like to thank you. I would like to
thank you on behalf of the United Kingdom police officers for
giving me the opportunity to give an overview of the United
Kingdom structure in how we manage incidents and manage
counterterrorism issues, and also focus on the intelligence
aspects of how they are managed in the United Kingdom in a
structural sense.
My report, as you are aware, focuses on a number of
component parts that contribute towards the overall
preparedness of the United Kingdom. Each aspect is being
developed over time, and most certainly as a result of the
Republican terrorist attacks during the 1980s, 1990s and into
2000.
It wasn't always that way. Many years ago the emergency
services would develop strategies and tactical responses in
isolation. Partnerships were more informal, and therefore,
information and intelligence-sharing opportunities were few.
Technological and communication systems were fragmented, and
legislative instruments worked in isolation, although they were
there.
Today I am happy to report that we have indeed got a much
better structure that has been developed over those tragedies.
The Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 has formalized the United
Kingdom's national approach to working together. It has brought
some isolated areas of work together in a coherent structure.
And some examples are striated geographical regions in which
authorities develop and deliver strategies for emergency
response. And you would imagine that this is a much easier task
in the U.K. than perhaps would be in the United States just
because of the sheer size of your country.
Divided authorities. It hass divided authorities into
Category 1 and 2 responders with particular responsibility for
sharing information and practice.
And thirdly, a method of accountability to all of our
communities through the United Kingdom Government.
One thing in the United Kingdom, in terms of responding to
emergency incidents when they take place, such as the 7th of
July, we have what we call a Gold Command structure, and at
times of major incidents and major tragedies, this enhanced
working requires a structure within which all parties can
coordinate resources and understand precisely their
responsibilities.
What is hopeful, it seems, of tragedies, we have decided
many years ago that the policing organization within which the
tragedy takes place takes primacy, takes the lead. Now, that is
important. I was the commander of the first explosions in
London on the 7th of July, and the one thing that wasn't going
through my head because it didn't need to was an argument about
jurisdiction. Everybody within that Gold Command structure,
through tabletop exercising, through developing strategies
together, through understanding each others' business, knew
that we had prime responsibility for the scene. And the reason
why that is is because as any police officer knows, the police
officer is usually there among the first organizations, but
always has the responsibility to the community long after the
other specialists, such as the ambulance service and fire
departments, have left the scene. And so taking primacy of a
scene and of an investigation just makes sense.
The Gold, Silver, Bronze structure can be briefly described
as a Gold Commander of which there is only one, and in terms of
terrorist attacks, it is always a police officer. Around the
Gold coordinating group, our chief officers are each of the
specialist departments, the blue light agencies; it could be
the health protection agencies, military and the specialists
that contribute to the major instances at hand.
The civil commander that sits underneath that Gold
structure is the tactical head that ensures that the delivery
of tactics and the delivery of resources to the scene of the
tragedy actually gets delivered efficiently.
And, of course, the Bronze commander is the team leader
that delivers the tactics out on the street, and that perhaps
internationally is what most people saw on the television
cameras on the 7th of July, the Bronze teams going in to save
lives in a coordinated way.
Even for a small gathering of such an island such as the
United Kingdom, the ability to share intelligence has always
proven elusive until this day. Today an organization called
JTAC, which is the Joint Terrorism Analysis Cell, provides the
single point of contact when receiving and transmitting
intelligence. JTAC is made up of a number of organizations, and
they sit together all the time every day. And they are
organizations that ordinarily receive national and
international sources of intelligence, so that on a day-to-day
basis, a global intelligence picture can be delivered fast time
and fed out via a secret and secure cluster to the different
regions in the United Kingdom, and that can happen in hours
rather than days and weeks.
I would like to say at this point that the value of
partnerships in the United Kingdom is perhaps the most
valuable, not only, part of the intelligence network we have,
but the most valuable way of delivering our services. For
example, we have independent advisory groups, teams, they are
teams of community representatives who we invite onto our
strategic groups to develop the strategies with us, and their
contribution is absolutely invaluable. Tabletop exercising is
incredibly important to test our tactical response to make sure
everybody understands each others' organizations. A weekly
bridge call to the security professionals to make sure that
they understand what the latest threat is and what they--what
we are going to do about protecting them, and what we would
like them to do. And, of course, covert and overt operations.
Technology solutions. The city of London perhaps has the
highest density of CCTV cameras and automatic number plate
recorders in the--certainly the United Kingdom. ANPR, Automatic
Number Place Recorders, in the city of London alone recorded
over 38 million registration plates within which we were able
to discover terrorist movements, arrest criminals, serious
criminals who undertake serious crime, and arrest them
appropriately.
So we--technologically the city of London is a hard target.
The communications systems that we have in terms of not only
intelligence, but communicating with the public for us are
quite easy; on the 7th of July was able to communicate with
half a million people at a time using our community e-mail, our
pager and text alerts, and that was invaluable to me as head of
counterterrorism to show and tell them exactly what I wanted
them to do and what they wanted me to do, because they are
working with us in partnership to mitigate any further threat
to themselves. An incredibly important tool.
And, of course, legislation. I have already mentioned the
Civil Contingencies Act, but we also have the Police and
Criminal Evidence Act which provides the powerful stop and
search, and the Terrorism Act of 2000 which provides us with a
facility to make sure that we stop and search, under reasonable
grounds, people who we suspect to be terrorists.
And lastly, before I finish, we have learned a lot of
lessons from the 7th of July, and I have said in my report that
perhaps it would not seem good to actually mention those lesson
learned here in detail because in the United Kingdom there may
well be an inquiry of the 7th of July to make sure we do learn
the lessons and everybody understands that we have. But if I
can just say three lessons learned, three areas.
Firstly, the technology communications with partners, we
need to be better at that. That means more investment by the
government, better on the information that is forthcoming. We
need to be better in our media strategies, getting messages out
faster to the wider public outside of London, not just the
London community if indeed another tragedy happens there. And
thirdly, to make sure the location of the Gold coordination
group allows communication with those agencies that they so
effectively need.
So we are learning organization. We continue to do that.
But the point I would like to make is in terms of intelligence,
we place an incredibly high value on our partnerships with the
community and the intelligence that they provide to us. Thank
you.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Mr. Lovegrove.
[The statement of Mr. Lovegrove follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brett Lovegrove
Mr. Chairman and members of the sub-committee, may I thank you on
behalf of the City of London Police for the opportunity to testify
before you today. It is well known that our two countries stand
shoulder to shoulder in the fight against terrorism in all its forms.
Our valued partnership allows us to exchange information and
experiences; this is one of the mainstays of our international
determination.
Can I also take this opportunity to thank you for your support
after the tragedy that unfolded in London on the 7th July 2005. I am
heartened to know that this support continues whilst the investigations
into the bombings continue.
My testimony will cover the following:
A Contextual Outline of the City of London
The National and Local Emergency Management Structure
The Command Structure
The Intelligence System
The Value of Partnerships
Technological Solutions
Communication Systems
Legislation
Lessons Learned
A Contextual Outline of the City of London
The City of London is the financial heart of the United Kingdom. It
is not only part of the critical national infrastructure; it provides a
significant contribution to the financial well being of the
international community.
This international aspect of the City makes it `target rich'.
The City generates over 10% of the gross domestic product for
the UK
It manages over $500 billion foreign exchange turnover per
day
It takes 56% of the global equity market
The City has a 24/7 culture with a busy transport, leisure
and retail economy
Over 550 foreign banks operate within the area
It is said that the City has more American banks than New
York and more Japanese banks than Tokyo
The four main priorities of the City of London Police are:
Counter Terrorism
Economic Crime
Community Policing
Public Order
The `glue' that holds the effectiveness of the counter terrorism
efforts together is the number of effective partnerships with the
business and residential community which I shall elaborate upon later
in this statement.
The National and Local Emergency Management Structure
The emergency response to terrorist attacks has been honed over the
years by the activities of Irish Republican terrorism in the 1970/
1980's. The London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP, http://
www.leslp.gov.uk/) was set up in October 1996 to ensure that the `blue
light' agencies provided a partnership approach to man-made and natural
disasters.
Since then, the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 has demanded a more
inclusive approach to large-scale incidents. The Civil Contingencies
Secretariat (established in 2001), aims to co-ordinate government
department effort and ensure that the UK's communities remain safe and
secure and that we retain a World-class capability to recover from
emergencies. Their specific objectives are:
To identify and predict emergencies
Maintain a state of readiness
Build resilience for the future
Provide leadership to the resilience community
Promote effective management
The 2004 Act required the UK to develop Regional Resilience Forums
designed to respond and managed disasters.
A government minister chairs the London Regional Resilience Forum
(LRRF) and its membership includes the chief officers of the police,
fire, ambulance, utilities, business representatives, local authorities
and transport operators. This membership is replicated on a national
basis.
Because of its size and the fact that London is made up of 32
boroughs, it is divided into six Local Resilience Fora (LRF's) that
ultimately report to the LRRF.
The responsibility of responding is divided into Category 1 and
Category 2 responders. Category 1 responders include:
Emergency services
Local authorities
Health
The environment agency
Category 2 responders include:
The utility companies
Transport
Health and Safety Executive
Because the areas that underpin this structure are specialised, a
number of sub-groups of advisors and experts undertake work on specific
subject matter. The sub-groups are also capable of responding fast time
to events when they occur. I refer you to Appendix `A'.
London's responders also work to the Strategic Emergency Plan
(which can be found at http://www.londonprepared/plan), which is a
comprehensive summary of the key plans of the members of the London
Resilience Partnership. It serves as the reference document for `Gold'
level representatives who would have a strategic responsibility when
responding to major incidents.
The Command Structure
In light of the number of partners that could be called in to
support the strategic command and the tactical delivery of a major
incident, it is critical that all the skills and assets belonging to
the individual partners are co-ordinated in the most effective way
possible.
For some years now, the UK has refined a Gold, Silver and Bronze
system of incident command. I refer you to Appendix `B'.
The Gold Commander who is, in the event of a terrorist incident, a
police officer, chairs the Gold Group and remains in overall command.
The members of the Gold Group are chief officers of the Category 1 and
2 responder organisations. They set the overall strategy for the
incident and are responsible for resourcing the incident and their own
individual organisations but tactical decisions to their own respective
Silver Commanders. The Gold Group remains in contact with their Silver
Commanders but do not interfere with the tactical response.
The Silver Group mirror the Gold Group in their membership but are
responsible for tactically delivering the Gold Strategy. The Silver
Commander is responsible for developing and co-ordinating the tactical
plan and provides the pivotal link between the Gold Group strategy and
the tactical delivery at Bronze level.
The Bronze Commander is the team leader who ensures the effective
tactical delivery of the Silver Commander's plan.
Each level must keep in frequent contact, especially if the overall
strategy or tactical plan changes.
The benefits are:
It's a simple structure that is easily overlaid onto any
major incident (including public disorder and CBRN events)
It is easily understood by multi-agency partners
It focuses on role and function and not rank
This command structure is tested within police forces every day and
are the subject of regular testing at all levels.
The Intelligence System
In the wake of the July attacks, the police and security services,
in order to develop community leaders within London especially within
the Muslim community, have together undertaken a significant amount of
work. Operation Canyon (an intelligence gathering initiative within all
our communities) was launched as a formal operation to identify and
maximise opportunities. This has proven to be very successful. The
Special Branch (SB-the national police organisation that gathers and
exploits intelligence relating to extremist political and terrorist
activity) in the UK has taken the lead in this area of work.
At a regional level the Special Branch Regional Intelligence Cells
(RIC) have evolved and each UK region has it's own facility. They are
staffed by the police forces within their region on a secondment basis
and are centrally funded. Their role is, as the name suggests, the
development of intelligence across the region, and each RIC has
capability in respect of surveillance, analysis and financial
investigators and they co-ordinate intelligence in cross border
enquiries within a RIC area.
Also emerging are regional CT `hubs' that have a capability to
carry out the executive action phase of CT investigations.
The Joint Terrorism Analysis Cell (JTAC) continues to provide a co-
ordinated response to threat assessment and intelligence reporting and
provide a valuable national briefing facility. It co-ordinates
information from various government departments and is the single point
of contact for intelligence products relating to national and
international terrorism.
Locally, the City of London SB provides a high quality level of
service, especially to our internal staff and our business communities
in the form of briefings and intelligence sharing. They also monitor
the activation of powers under the Terrorism Act 2000.
Because Counter Terrorism is the number one objective of the City
of London Police, this police force deploys a number of counter
terrorism tactics. Some of these will be very familiar to any police
service in the UK and the US.
All officers are briefed daily on the International and Irish
terrorist threat to the United Kingdom.
The briefings will include:
Methods undertaken by terrorists for hostile reconnaissance
Terrorists fund raising through "white collar crime"
Terrorists fund raising through tax avoidance in areas of
fuel, tobacco, and alcohol
Patrolling tactics are formulated specifically to our needs by
appointed officers within the Force and implemented as part of a daily
vigilance level of the City of London Police.
Patrols in response to specific intelligence are implemented under
Operation Rainbow. Operation Rainbow is a menu of nationally agreed
policing options to combat terrorism and police forces are tasked at a
local, regional and national level.
Local - By appointed officers within the City of London
Regional - By appointed officers from forces within the
London area
National - By appointed officers from forces within England
and Wales
The Value of Partnerships
In addition to the immeasurable benefits of the emergency
responders working together, the City of London understands and values
each and every business and residential partnership that we have worked
hard to forge.
We recognised long ago that law enforcement agencies do not have
all the answers. Indeed, our partners have a vast array of skills and
knowledge that we can never have. Our partner activity in the community
includes:
The Independent Advisory Group included in all our policing
activity
CT briefings throughout the year to Chief Executive Board
level down to `front of house' security professionals
Table-top exercising key stakeholders with a particular focus
on business continuity
Weekly `Bridge Call' (or conference call) to update key
people on CT threats and crime issues for cascading to their
personnel
Covert and overt CT operations
On the last point, I would like to briefly highlight two examples
of this work.
Firstly, Project Griffin is a joint police and security
professional initiative that focuses attention on the identification of
terrorists undertaking hostile reconnaissance activity. There are three
strands:
The awareness day
The bridge call
The cordon deployment
The awareness day includes a range of specialists delivering
presentations on the latest threat assessment, construction of
explosives, terrorist methodology, hostile reconnaissance behaviour and
cordon deployment.
The bridge call ensures that all Project Griffin partners are kept
up to date with the latest threat so that they can deploy their own
resources appropriately.
The cordon deployment is activated if a major incident occurs
thereby releasing police officers to undertake other duties that they
are specially trained for.
Project Griffin has been rolled out across most of the larger
cities in England and Wales and Scotland have introduced it in Glasgow.
The result is that we have 3000 extra pairs of eyes and ears to help us
combat the terrorist planning phase (4000 across the UK), a positive
and lively range of partnerships upon which we can build further
initiatives, an enviable professional relationship with business who
have a joint vested interest
Secondly, Operation Buffalo is a partnership initiative with the
business community that tests the quality of a company's physical
security whereby under-cover officers try to penetrate their security
arrangements. The learning that emanates from this activity is
invaluable and helps companies to `target harden' their arrangements
where necessary.
Technological Solutions
It is well known that the City of London has an extensive CCTV
coverage that exists both in the public environment and within the
privately owned buildings. The police controlled system is digitally
managed so that, for mainly investigative and evidential reasons, the
system can be quickly interrogated.
Additionally, the City of London Police benefit from the Automatic
Number Plate Recording (ANPR) system. The ANPR system is provided with
information from the Police National Computer (PNC) that contains
details of all UK registered vehicles, persons of interest to law
enforcement agencies and government departments, and all offender
antecedent history and identifying features.
When a vehicle that has an `interest marker' passes through the
ANPR system, command and control are immediately alerted and an
appropriate policing response deployed. Additionally, the mobile
version of the ANPR system allows its deployment in support of covert
or overt operations against identified targets. In 2005, the ANPR
system read nearly 36 million registration plates that led to numerous
arrests and even more items of intelligence. This has proved to be an
invaluable CT facility.
The City of London Police remains at the leading edge of UK
technological development and works hard to exploit new and workable
technology.
Communication Systems
For many years, the City of London Police have utilised a combined
e-mail, pager and text facility that allows us, in extremis, to
communicate directly with 500,000 people in the community at a time. It
is also an additional way to communicate police activity and how the
police wish the community to respond.
This facility proved exceptionally useful during the tragedy of the
7th July last year and allowed key stakeholders to manage the
expectations of their staff.
We have also built a loudspeaker system, connected to Police
Headquarters command and control, which allows us to communicate with
key `crowded places' and direct people away from dangers and towards
safe areas.
Legislation
All police officers are deployed on patrols use powers under the
Terrorism Act 2000 to stop and search members of the public and their
vehicles. Under section 43 of the Act, the officer must have suspicion
that the person stopped is a terrorist. Section 44 is authorised by a
high-ranking police officer and must be ratified by the Secretary of
State. Section 44 authorises a police officer in uniform to stop and
search any person and any vehicle. No suspicion on behalf of the police
officer is required.
The City of London Police uses these powers extensively. In the
year 2005/06, 8594 members of the public were stopped under the Act.
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, provides the power to
stop and search people if they personally have reasonable grounds to
believe that a person (or persons) have committed an offence or have
stolen items or articles concerned in crime on their person. A separate
power exists specifically to search people in a defined area and time
for knives and other weapons.
This combined activity, provided it is done sensitively,
appropriately and with good reason, serves as a deterrent to both the
common criminal and a sophisticated terrorist planner.
We are always cognisant of maintaining the human rights of
individuals and in our efforts to prevent terrorist attacks, we always
consider whether any of our activity contravenes the Human Rights Act.
A standing item on any CT planning agenda is the community risk
assessment whereby managers are able to gauge the effect of a CT
operation on the wider community.
Lessons Learned
It would not be helpful for me to describe in detail about the
police response to the tragic events of the 7th July last year at a
time where a UK debate is taking place about whether or not a public
inquiry should undertake a review.
It is right to say, however, that we are a learning organisation
that has already examined the recommendations in the publicly
accessible report published by the London Assembly and made plans to
ensure that future responses by this force will have paid heed to them.
Mr. Linder. Major Yayla.
STATEMENT OF AHMET SAIT YAYLA, MAJOR, COUNTERTERRORISM AND
OPERATIONS DIVISION, ANKARA POLICE DEPARTMENT, ANKARA, TURKEY
Major Yayla. Mr. Chairman and distinguished committee
members, first of all, I would like to thank you very much for
inviting me here to testify for the Ankara Police Department.
As I previously presented in my written testimony, considering
the time communication, I would like to address the highlights
of my testimony.
The first is before our experience from the Turkish
National Police and from Ankara Police Department, the methods
that they were operated to deal with domestic terrorism are
also proved effective in dealing with international terrorism
operating in Turkey which is a present-day concern. Now we look
at those terrorist organizations that we consider as domestic
terrorism, we also realize that almost all of them have their
international apparatus. For example, the PKK freely operates
in some of the countries around Turkey, like Syria, northern
Iraq and some countries in some cases Europe. So they receive a
lot of international support even if they only operate in
Turkey in terms of the spread of their terrorism.
The second important matter, the community asks is the
Turkish National Police and Ankara Police Department deal with
terrorism as a crime problem and observes all legal procedures
by using all available resources at its hand. By this, for
example, the Ankara Police Department with over 15,000 officers
can direct all of its officers and teams when they are needed
to halt or to oversee a terrorist threat. All of the police
officers in the city of Ankara can communicate to look at one
channel through the radios, and this gives us an opportunity to
better deal with the problem of terrorism especially during the
crisis situation.
The Turkish Police considers as terrorism is considered a
crime problem, which is the police can handle. There is the
police rather than the military at the center of this problem
that deals solely with this problem. The four important
factors, the police who make great progress in fighting
terrorism by integrating intelligence with operations against
terrorist groups. By relying on intelligence, the police are
able to address terrorism without disrupting communities. As a
result, there is not a backlash by the community against the
police, which comes back as a support of the community in the
fight against terrorism.
One of the most important objectives of the terrorist
organizations is to create a conflict between the governments
and societies so that the societies will be away from the
governments and will not help them in their fight or in their
dealings to carry out this fight against terrorism. By using
intelligence, we can diminish distress between the government
and public.
The fifth important aspect is the police, in addressing
terrorism, are following the law, acting within the law, and
rely on intelligence and information, and especially do not
rely on torture for confessions that are drawn from the
terrorists or suspects. Rather, for our perspective, police
work combined with intelligence is essential to our success,
especially in Ankara and in other areas of Turkey.
The second important method. It is also very important to
go after the causes of terrorism so that the repeat cycle of
the terrorists can be interrupted. If the terrorists lose their
justification, they are not going to be able to recruit more
people. And by this we can diminish the threat coming from the
terrorist organizations.
Another important question against terrorism is the
international cooperation and international harmonized training
to local police so that they have cooperation and have a better
fight against terrorism on an international level. By this way,
the international terrorism may be stopped at its form before
it goes beyond the borders.
And finally, one of the most important tools for the
Turkish National Police and for Ankara Police Department that
were very effective in sharing information at hand was the
police network we use in Turkey that connects the whole country
to one network where all of the police officers can reach where
there is a police station in the country. By this way, the
information can be shared. Especially, this is very useful in
the fight against terrorism.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Major.
[The statement of Major Yayla follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ahmet Sait Yayla
Turkey, has been one of the world's most important land bridges
linking Europe, Asia, and Africa throughout history. Furthermore,
Turkey is surrounded by neighboring regions where years of political
problems, terrorism, and unrest have shaped the political and social
fabric of Turkish society. These regions include the Middle East,
Balkans, and Caucasian Republics. Turkey's unique, critical geo-
political position coupled with the catalyzing effects of world
politics, including the Cold War and Turkey's own political, social and
economic problems made, Turkey a suitable ground for many different
terrorist organizations, especially between the 1960's and 1990's. Due
to the effects of different terrorist campaigns over the years, Turkey
has lost over 35,000 people to terrorism since 1960.
Unfortunately, Turkey began to experience terrorism at home much
earlier than many other Western countries, which necessitated
developing tactics and systems to cope with the problem of terrorism.
In this regard, this testimony examines some of the more important
precautionary measures and tactics that have been adopted by the
Turkish National Police (TNP) and will also consider the missteps and
successes in the fight against terrorism with the explanation of the
role of information sharing and current policies adopted by the TNP.
The testimony starts with a brief explanation about the structure of
the government of Turkey in the fight against terrorism, followed by
more effective steps and policy changes that were implemented by the
Turkish Government. It is believed that tactical and organizational
changes made a higher rate of success possible and that those changes
need to be widely known in order to serve as examples for other
countries that have recently begun to experience terrorism.
Turkey has a central government style and it has four main national
agencies that deal with terrorism. The first is the Turkish National
Police, which has jurisdiction over eighty percent of the population in
Turkey, including the cities, towns, townships, greater rural
communities, border gates, highways, airports, and other stations. The
second is the Gendarmerie, which has jurisdiction over fifteen percent
of the population in the rural countryside and in villages. The third
is the Turkish Military, whose main job with terrorism is to deal with
the terrorists on the borders of Turkey and in very remote rural areas
close the borders, especially in the southern part of Turkey. And
finally, there is the National Intelligence Agency (MIT) that collects
intelligence which could be used to counter terrorism.
Unlike most of the law enforcement agencies in the U.S., the TNP is
a national police agency with a personnel of over 200,000 that provides
all law enforcement services in the urban areas of Turkey. In
comparison to the United States' criminal justice structure, the TNP
could be considered as a combination of the federal agencies, such as
the FBI, DEA, and the local law enforcement agencies including the
local and city police departments and the state police. One of the
primary duties of the TNP is to deal with terrorism, and to take
precautionary measures to prevent possible terrorist attacks. The TNP
became especially effective and successful against terrorism after
measures and policy changes were adopted in the late 1980's and early
1990's.
These changes were made because of increased terrorist threats,
which will be explained in the next section.The TNP has two main
departments that deal with terrorism around the country: the Anti-
Terrorism Department and the Intelligence Department. However, dealing
with or preventing terrorism is not the duty of these two departments
only. Other departments, such as city police departments, or any other
division or department of the TNP, are also required to take measures
against terrorism whenever necessary.
Anti-Terrorism Department
The central Anti-Terrorism Department and Intelligence Department
are located in the headquarters of the TNP. Also, satellite anti-
terrorism divisions and intelligence divisions have been established
within all of the city and township police departments. Central
departments act as coordinators for the city anti-terrorism divisions
and intelligence divisions and provide assistance to them.
Concurrently, they act as the main database centers because they
receive information from local departments, analyze that information,
and make it available for the related personnel in the headquarters and
cities. The central departments also act as the database and archive
centers for the general efforts against terrorism. In contrast, the
central departments, city anti-terrorism divisions and intelligence
divisions deal with more immediate threats of local terrorism to their
cities. The city police chiefs are in charge but must also coordinate
their efforts with the central departments.
The main duty of the city anti-terrorism divisions is to deal with
the terrorist threats in their cities. This is accomplished by carrying
out operations against terrorists and their organizations, taking
precautions to prevent terrorist attacks and movements, arresting and
interviewing suspects, questioning the terrorists, and taking the
suspects and terrorists before justice officials. All of the activities
of the anti-terrorism divisions are monitored by independent
prosecutors. Suspects' lawyers are required to be present immediately
following an arrest, when the suspect is taken into the custody of
anti-terrorism divisions, and during the interview or questioning
process. All of the investigations related to terrorist activities are
carried out by the anti-terrorism divisions, who then send all
information gained to the Anti-Terrorism Department at the Headquarters
so that the Anti-Terrorism Department can gauge the overall climate of
terrorism in Turkey and inform and coordinate the city anti-terrorism
departments. All of the activities and information that are received by
the city anti-terrorism departments are entered into the TNP Central
Computer Network Anti-Terrorism Project so that the information is
shared and available for the other city anti-terrorism departments
whenever needed.
A typical city anti-terrorism division would have enough expert
personnel specialized in operations and interrogation, a bomb squad,
archival personnel, information systems designers, tactical operations
teams, immediate response teams, and technical support personnel.
Police officers who are specifically trained in the stated areas are
allowed to work only within their areas of expertise and they receive
regular in-service training to maintain up-to-date knowledge in their
field. Only officers who are specially trained by the Anti-Terrorism
Department are allowed to work in the city anti-terrorism divisions.
The chiefs of city anti-terrorism divisions are directly responsible to
the city police chiefs and to the Anti-Terrorism Department for
national harmony of the job in areas of data input, information
sharing, and training. City anti-terrorism divisions also work
collaboratively with the city intelligence divisions.
Intelligence Department
Similar to the Anti-Terrorism Department, intelligence divisions
are established in city police departments that work under the city
police chiefs' supervision and coordinate with the Central Intelligence
Department at the TNP headquarters. Intelligence divisions collect and
gather intelligence through different operations in their cities. The
police officers that work for the Intelligence Departments are selected
and trained by the Central Intelligence Department after successfully
finishing an intelligence course that provides specialized training.
During this course, candidates are assigned to different cities to work
for the intelligence divisions. The personnel of the intelligence
divisions are specialized in their work areas and they also receive
training related to their tasks to ensure the quality of the work. In
this regard, intelligence divisions have many different offices where
the police officers focus solely on their areas of expertise unless
requested to join a wider effort. For example, an officer assigned to
the bureau that targets religiously inspired terrorist organizations
would generally only work for that office. This specialization makes
the officers quite knowledgeable in their field and it enables them to
gain a deeper level of knowledge and gain more details of the terrorist
organizations they are following. Another important aspect of this
division is target specified intelligence collecting. Instead of
following a wide group of suspects, intelligence divisions focus on a
small number of well known suspects in order to control different
terrorist organizations. This policy enables the TNP to get only
related information which saves time and resources and reduces the
response time. By controlling a small group of people, the TNP can
learn what kind of activities that terrorist organization is carrying
out, what specific threat they impose, who the new contacts or recruits
are, where the terrorist cells or safe houses are and more importantly
what the capacity of that terrorist organization is.
Intelligence divisions collect and evaluate the intelligence they
have gathered, and then inform the Central Intelligence Department at
the TNP Headquarters through a special computer network that is
specifically designed for this task. All of the information is required
to be shared with the headquarters. This sharing enables the
Headquarters to see the all-inclusive picture of terrorist activities
and movements throughout Turkey and, if needed, steer the city
intelligence divisions appropriately. When necessary, the Central
Intelligence Department can also make information available for all of
the city intelligence divisions around Turkey so that the other
officers who know anything related to this operation can add their
input. This shared information can also enhance activities or
investigations in their cities.
City intelligence divisions also verify the information they have
with the city anti-terrorism divisions because other anti-terrorism
divisions may also have related information through their interviews,
interrogations, the documents that were obtained from searches, etc.
When needed or on a regular basis, anti-terrorism and intelligence
divisions or their corresponding bureaus meet to discuss the
developments in their cities and to share the information they have
regarding their responsibilities. Anti-terrorism operations are planned
with the presence of intelligence divisions' correspondents to ensure
they contribute and input their knowledge and ideas. As the operations
are carried out, there is also always a representative from an
intelligence division to ensure that intelligence officers get first
hand information and contribute their input from the operations or
interrogations. This cooperation and collaboration between the
intelligence divisions and anti-terrorism divisions is one of the keys
to the success of the TNP against terrorism.
Another important aspect of this cooperation is the collaborative
teamwork on specific terrorist related cases. This is a key element of
the TNP's success because instead of waiting for intelligence from the
anti-terrorism divisions, this partnership enables the intelligence
divisions to go directly to the field with anti-terrorism divisions in
order to collect specific intelligence related to specific events.
Changes Implemented to Improve TNP's Capability to Deal with Terrorism
The intensity of terrorist incidents and the number of casualties
as a result of the incidents which began to rise sharply at the
beginning of the 1980's in Turkey, led to an organizational revolution
of the TNP.The following measures and steps were taken by the TNP to
ensure success and efficiency regarding terrorism. One of the first
steps was to reform the system of personnel and provide additional
education and training. Another was the formation of the Central Anti-
Terrorism Department and Intelligence Department at the TNP
Headquarters and their satellites in the cities. As a part of this
step, one of the largest police computer and information systems
networks in the world named POL-NET was created. Additionally, new
policies and promotion of information sharing helped the exchange of
information between the cities and the headquarters. Other reforms
included the establishment of advanced Police Criminal Laboratories,
the foundation of the Special Operations Department, social programs,
and the adaptation of advanced technology.
Personnel Reform along with Education and Training Activities
One of the first experiences of the police officers in the field
was realizing how little they knew about the terrorist organizations
they were investigating. In fact, they rarely received specialized
training regarding terrorism or investigation techniques of terrorist
incidents. Another dilemma was the fact that most of the terrorists had
some college education or were college graduates. This posed
difficulties especially during interrogation when a mind game between
the interrogators and terrorists would take place.
In order to cope with this problem, the TNP prepared a long-term
plan to perform several personnel reforms concerning education and
training. The initial steps were long-term precautions to ensure a
better future for the TNP. From this perspective, the TNP increased the
number of police colleges from one to five. Police colleges are
equivalent to vocational high schools and are also boarding schools.
Graduates of the police colleges attend the national Police Academy,
which basically provides a bachelor's degree similar to a degree
obtained from the universities' criminal justice departments in the
U.S.. The graduates of the national Police Academy became mid-level
managers of the TNP. This initial step proved to be very successful and
effective because the schools became more specialized and selective.
More importantly, police colleges were highly successful in
establishing bonds between their students. Almost all of the students
became brothers or buddies for life and supported each other through
their tenure in the following years. This bond helped eradicate
reluctance in sharing the proper information in the following years.
College graduates easily and willingly, in fact without being asked,
shared information with their co-workers and other police officers in
different cities or in the headquarters for the success of the TNP
simply because their friends were in charge of those departments and
they wanted to help them in their duties so that they would be more
successful in providing safety to their citizens. This bond and
friendship between the mid-level leadership and later the high-level
leadership of the TNP has been one of the biggest secrets behind its
success. Finally, even the terrorists who had been arrested under the
old system admitted that it was more difficult to influence or maneuver
the new interrogators .
The Police College students are accepted to the national Police
Academy. The academy is located in Ankara, in the capital city of
Turkey, where several other major universities are located. Different
Police College students along with other male and female students who
were accepted to the national Police Academy from different high
schools through a thorough selection process, received a top quality
education for four years from the experts who were either academy
professors or who were among the best and most accepted faculties of
different universities in Ankara. The national Police Academy not only
provided state of the art education, but also was an excellent base for
establishing strong bonds for the future leadership of the TNP because
its graduates become sergeants as soon as they graduate.
Furthermore, TNP officers were also encouraged to attend master's
programs in different universities, including the Police Academy
Institute for Security Sciences to increase their level of expertise.
In addition, several officers were sent abroad to receive their
doctorates in different universities in the United States and Europe.
The TNP adopted this policy so that its members can receive higher
level education and earn relevant doctoral degrees in addition to
studying other police agencies abroad and their policies.
Currently, there are 170 senior officers in the United States who
are working towards their doctorate degrees in several different U.S.
universities. Those officers are selected through a highly competitive
process. Their expenses are paid by the Turkish Government. The TNP
also has an institute named Turkish Institute for Police Studies (TIPS)
that is located in the United States to assist its officers in the U.S.
and carry out research. TIPS acts as a bridge between Turkey and in
this case the U.S. by interacting with several U.S. local and federal
law enforcement departments, carrying out different activities
including conferences, seminars and workshops, and training exchange
with corresponding U.S. law enforcement.
The TNP also pays close attention to its police officers who carry
out daily field activities. Middle school graduation used to be
adequate in order to become police officers during 1980's. This level
was increased to high school. Only high school or college graduates are
currently accepted into the police schools of the TNP where regular
police officers must graduate. The training in the police schools also
was enriched and the duration of the police schools was first increased
to nine months, then to one year, and then to a two year associate
degree after 2000. Finally, the TNP established a contract with
Eskisehir Anatolia University, one of the largest universities in
Turkey, to provide distance education to its police officers so that
the police officers could become college (university) graduates over
the years. Currently, over 60,000 police officers are attending several
different programs of Eskisehir Anatolia University to receive their
undergraduate degrees through distance education.
In addition to the commitment of providing appropriate and modern
education to its members, the TNP also continuously trained its members
in their areas of expertise. Especially after the 80's, the TNP has
adopted a policy of professionalism and only allowed certain experts to
work for certain departments. For example, if an officer did not
receive training on terrorism or intelligence, he would not be allowed
to work in anti-terrorism or intelligence departments. In this regard,
central departments including the Anti-Terrorism Department and the
Intelligence Department started to train their officers in the cities
and shared the knowledge of experts through these trainings. Experts
from the field who were daily facing the terrorist threat and who were
actually carrying out operations and interrogations at the Ankara,
Istanbul, Izmir, Diyarbakir, and Bursa police departments, were invited
to teach in those courses so that real field experts could share their
first-hand experience and facts with the trainees.
This also led to sharing experiences of different large city police
departments. Although the TNP is only one agency, different TNP city
departments were becoming real experts in different areas simply by
adopting the circumstances in their cities. Their experiences were
shared during these training courses. In this way, the TNP began to
provide extensive in-service training programs through the coordination
of the Education and Training Department. Currently, the TNP annually
provides in-service training to over 80,000 officers.
Establishment of Central Anti-Terrorism and Intelligence
Departments at the TNP Headquarters and their Satellites in the
CitiesOne of the main problems of the TNP was not being able to share
information throughout Turkey. Terrorism is an organized activity and
terrorists in different cities, today in different countries, interact
with each other to plan, support and carry out activities. Therefore,
it is quite normal that a city anti-terrorism division might have
information regarding a terrorist or a terrorist organization that is
needed by another city. This problem imposed extremely negative
consequences because even though a terrorist was known by a TNP
officer, he might not be caught because no one else knew about him.
Before the 80's, there was a term called "captain's notebook". This
term comes from the captains who were bureau directors in charge of the
activities of a particular terrorist movement in a city and who would
write down everything related to that terrorist organization in a
notebook.
They would be reluctant to show that notebook to anyone else simply
because that notebook meant their success to keep their jobs. Once a
captain retired or was reassigned to somewhere else, the information in
those notebooks would be useless. To prevent this waste in resources,
the TNP established central anti-terrorism and intelligence departments
that have organizational power over the city anti-terrorism and
intelligence departments to establish a communication and information
network so that the information could be shared among different city
divisions and so the overall efforts would be organized by the central
departments for more successful operations and precautions.
City anti-terrorism and intelligence divisions, although under the
supervision of the city police chiefs who are also under the
supervision of the TNP General Director, began to coordinate with the
central departments after those departments were established as central
departments by the mid-80s. Basically, the central departments acted as
information pools and the city divisions passed any information they
had to the central departments. However, the information flow was not
one-way and the central departments fed the city divisions with the
information they were receiving from other cities. Central departments
also provided training and technical support to the city divisions and
informed them about recent developments. Over the years, this structure
proved to be so successful and effective that information flow and
sharing between the departments became rapid and useful as officers
realized the importance of collaboration.
Another important step with the central departments was the
appointments of new sergeants who recently graduated from the national
Police Academy. These new sergeants were educated and trained for eight
consecutive years and they were quite eager to help the TNP to cope
with the problem of terrorism as soon as possible. With this new energy
and dynamism, central departments started to adopt many new
technologies and policies to improve the tactics and strategies against
terrorism. Eventually, those sergeants became the captains and chiefs
of their departments and today all of those departments are headed by
the Police Academy graduates who have been extensively working for
anti-terrorism and intelligence departments and who are very
experienced in their fields.
TNP Computer and Information Systems Network, POLNET
Another step to effectiveness in dealing with terrorism was the
establishment of the Department of Information Technology in 1982. This
department's main duty is to help the TNP to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of its duties. This department basically produces
information systems' projects by working with the officers in the field
so that the software and systems are developed appropriately for the
needs of the field. It then makes those programs and systems available
to the TNP. The Department of Information Technology established one of
the largest closed computer network systems for the TNP, which is an
organizational intranet with around 15,000 computers and over 30,000
users in every location where the TNP has jurisdiction including TNP
Headquarters, city police departments, police stations, airports,
border gates, and other places where the TNP has infrastructures around
the country. Currently, this network is one of the largest Microsoft-
based networks in the world.
The Department of Information Technologies assisted the fight
against terrorism by developing special software packages that are
designed by the officers who were working at anti-terrorism departments
and by making that package available to the officers at other anti-
terrorism departments. In this way the TNP anti-terrorism departments
were able to input, search and share data as soon as needed. This
network helped the TNP to obtain information considerably faster and to
share information more appropriately. It also enabled the central Anti-
terrorism Department's capability of coordination to be more effective.
A similar but more special network was also established for the
Intelligence Department and its divisions. The intelligence divisions
at city police departments were able to use POL-NET and their own
special networks as well.
Of course, POL-NET was not solely limited to terrorist related
activities. POL-NET has over 30 different projects including passports,
driver's licenses, border gate control, AFIS, vehicle registration,
traffic control, public security, foreigner registration and many
others. All of those systems were also great investigative tools for
the anti-terrorism and intelligence departments. Designated users in
those departments would search for suspects and their related
activities, such as addresses, entry or exit to the country, location
of foreigners' housing, traffic tickets, registered vehicles and many
other features. This system enables officers to reach the suspects very
quickly. Consequently, POL-NET and the Department of Information
Technologies were a revolutionary support for the TNP in dealing with
terrorism and today, it still continues to be one of the greatest
supports. POL-NET is known today as one of the world's largest internal
networks and it is the largest Microsoft based internal network in the
world as of today.
New Policies and Culture Regarding Information Sharing
There are three important reasons why TNP officials are not
reluctant to share information. First of all, everybody at TNP
recognized the importance and value of information sharing after they
saw how it helped to dismantle the terrorist organizations with the
stated methods above. Secondly, TNP was furnished with appropriate
tools to share information effectively and quickly including the Pol-
Net, and the internal phone system that connects all of the offices
around the country, the internal email system, countrywide radio
system. Also, all of the TNP officers have GSM phones which can be used
to call any TNP officials free of charge. Finally, bonds between the
leadership of the TNP that were established during the Police College
and national Police Academy years make it extremely easy to share
information formally and informally simply because the managers at the
offices know each other very well. This also made sharing information
easy especially during emergencies and crises. All of the stated
factors above yielded an establishment of understanding or a culture of
"information is for sharing and it must be shared unless otherwise
stated" at the TNP.
Social Programs to Prevent Terrorism
The TNP felt the necessity of taking some social approach to
terrorism by the beginning of the 90s as well. There were two important
reasons. The first is that the youth were becoming victims of terrorism
propaganda. The second is the dilemma of newly recruited terrorists.
The situation is that once they join the terrorist organization they
cannot leave that organization. If they try to leave, the terrorist
organization will punish them or they are afraid of going to jail if
they leave the terrorist organization. To prevent these two negative
effects on the youth, the TNP carried out several social strategies.
One of the first tactics was amnesties for the terrorists who would
turn themselves in. Until now, eight general amnesties were declared
and many terrorists saved themselves through those amnesties. The
second strategy that was implemented was giving a chance to the first
time arrestees who were being newly recruited and not yet members of
the terrorist organizations with the requirement of not having carried
out any terrorist activity. A second chance was given by working with
the prosecutors' offices if the arrestees assured to leave the
terrorist organization and not to interact with the terrorists again.
Even though this policy was not formal, it worked very well and many
newly recruited terrorists were saved in this way. Because of this the
families were also involved in this process and the teenagers were left
to the care of their families. Another approach was having the police
closer to the communities by carrying out different activities that
targeted youths, such as knowledge competitions among the high school
students. This approach could be considered a similar program to
community policing. And finally, the TNP Central Anti-Terrorism
Department printed many pamphlets and brochures to inform the youth
about the real dangers of terrorism. All of the activities stated above
were somewhat successful and saved at least some newly recruited
terrorists or potential terrorist candidates according to the
statements of people who saved themselves through one of those
programs.
Adaptation of Advanced Technologies
The TNP also felt the necessity of equipping itself with new
technology to catch up with the terrorists. Two of the most advanced
adaptations were the POL-NET and Criminal Labs, which were explained
previously. Apart from those, departments were furnished with any
necessary equipment which not only the headquarters but also the city
departments were allowed to purchase. This expedited acquiring the new
technology. Additionally, bomb squads were equipped with newly designed
equipment to counter the terrorists' usual use of explosives. Today,
there are bomb squads with proper equipment in every city of Turkey
that can go to the scene immediately. Consequently, TNP and its
departments adopted new and changing technology as needed in order to
be at least one technological step ahead of the terrorists
technologically as much as possible.
Human Rights, New Regulations and Obeying the Rule of Law
One of the main reasons of joining terrorist organizations
according to the surveys of the terrorists during their interrogations
, was the assumption that the TNP did not consider the international
rules of human rights for the suspects in their custody and did not
obey the rule of law when it came to the terrorist suspects. In fact,
many terrorist suspects were made to believe by their organizations
that they would be killed or seriously harmed after they were arrested
or they would be detained for months even though it was not the case.
Furthermore, the TNP realized that once a terrorist suspect was
arrested, that suspect's relatives and friends became easy recruitment
targets for the terrorist organizations. In order to cope with this,
Turkey adopted new and clearer regulations and policies in regards to
handling terrorist suspects. First of all, the detention procedures
were changed. The duration of detention was shortened to a maximum four
days. Very strict guidelines were adopted as detention rules in order
to ensure that no improper behaviors existed against the detainees. For
example, the detainees were not chained and only handcuffed when they
were out of the detention rooms. More importantly, the suspects were
allowed to meet with their lawyers alone during their detention for
legal assistance before they were brought in front of the judges.
Consequently, the implementation of the strict guidelines regarding
the interviewing and interrogation procedures and human right issues
halted the mispropaganda of the terrorist organizations. Many
terrorists were shocked as a result of the transparent policies adopted
by the TNP during their detention because almost all of the terrorists
were made to believe that the police would act inappropriately during
their detention. One of the main problems of the TNP was the claim that
the TNP did not obey the rule of law. These precautions along with the
shortening of the detention duration stopped these claims. The
terrorist organizations were not able to use these in their propaganda
against the TNP. This also reduced the number of the new recruits at
least because the families and friends of the terrorist suspects were
clearly aware of the status of the suspects in the TNP custody.
Finally, all of these also helped the TNP to gain the trust of
terrorist families and they started to visit the TNP anti-terrorism
divisions frequently to seek assistance from the police.
Closing
This article was not written to praise the TNP; however, it was
written to present the measures taken by the TNP to deal with terrorism
more effectively and professionally so that other countries or agencies
could learn from its experiences. The TNP, while not without faults,
proved itself as an exemplary force by being successful against
terrorism through its reforms that began in the mid-1980s. Today,
terrorist incidents in Turkey have diminished to a minimal level, so
much so that the national media is not reporting terrorist incidents
around the country on a daily basis. Consequently, the commitment to
education, the organizational culture regarding information sharing,
and structural and technological reforms, including establishment of
Anti-Terrorism, Intelligence and Information Technologies departments,
establishment of POL-NET has enabled the TNP to deal with terrorism
more effectively and efficiently at both the local and the national
level.
Mr. Linder. Chief Timoney, you hit on something that was
interesting to me and has been a thorn under my saddle for some
time. That is the intelligence aspect of this that I think we
are inadequate on. How do you train the duty cop? What kind of
training do you put them through to make him more responsive to
intelligence?
Chief Timoney. The--really, for the average police officers
it is just the whole notion of them being out there, being
accessible and not being surprised by the way you may get
information.
We have a few things going on in Miami which I can't get
into, but it came as a result of the regular officer in the car
in certain areas getting information. And by the way, the
information is usually coming from somebody that is involved in
the criminal trade, in the drug dealers, drug users.
I mentioned to you at lunch a case I was involved in when I
was in narcotics. A woman who was an elderly woman who is a
millionaire 10 times over, looking to have her husband killed
from a very prominent family, went down and engaged a drug
dealer in the lower east side of Manhattan who then notified my
informant, who notified me, and we introduced our undercover to
that operation for 6 months and got the money and then broke
that case. And she was actually tried and convicted.
So you are going to get this information every once in a
while from a legitimate citizen, but most often from people who
are on the other side of the law who are looking either to make
a deal for themselves, make some money or what have you.
Mr. Linder. Do you have any special attention to or
concerns with in training your street cops on the threats about
nuclear and biological risks?
Chief Timoney. Ideally we would train every police officer,
but realistically the ones that have been trained in that are
those police officers that are working in the downtown area.
They have all been trained, the supervisors have been trained.
They actually carry a thing on their gun belt, the detector, in
the event that some radioactive device was in any of the
buildings or anywhere in the whole downtown area and the
Brickell Banking Corridor.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Lovegrove, what percentage of people that
live in England are Muslim?
Mr. Lovegrove. I am sorry?
Mr. Linder. What percent of the people who live in England
are Muslims?
Mr. Lovegrove. Are what?
Mr. Linder. Are Muslim.
Mr. Lovegrove. There are a maximum, about 350,000 Muslims
in the United Kingdom.
Mr. Linder. How do they react to the community policing? Do
they have--do you build a relationship with that community?
Mr. Lovegrove. Well, we certainly have, but over a number
of years. It is not something that we have done in response to
the 7th of July. We certainly have isolated extremely good
examples of best practice prior to the 7th of July. Wherever
there is a Muslim community in London, we would focus on that
community as we would any other minority community. Of course,
since the 7th of July, there has been a much better joined-up
piece of work to embrace the whole of the Muslim community,
because what happened in the 7th--on the 7th of July affected
the Muslim community in terms of their hatred towards what
those four men did. That it--we have found that the Muslim
community have rallied behind us to make sure that they remain
a very important part of the communities of the United Kingdom.
Mr. Linder. Didn't the tip come from a Muslim community?
Mr. Lovegrove. The first response came from us because we
already had those links. However, we were delighted by the
really positive response by the Muslim community to take
terrorism out of where they live and they work.
Having said that, of course, we are not naive. There are
some parts of the Muslim community that either remain silent or
remain secretive about what they know. That is for many
different reasons. That doesn't mean the Muslim community wish
anybody harm as a whole. We still believe they are the vast
minority in the Muslim community and some other communities,
wider communities, who take on terrorist activities that wish
to cause people harm.
Mr. Linder. Major Yayla, you commented that one of your
challenges and one of the things you work on in Turkey is to
try and determine the cause of terrorism. Have you come up with
a conclusion?
Major Yayla. When we look at domestic terrorism, we can
find and we can see some reasons that are very apparent to see
and even some--through some researchers we can see, but when we
look at international terrorism like al Qaeda, no.
Mr. Linder. They are all pretty well educated and fairly
wealthy actors, the ones who at least were in the September
11th experience here.
Major Yayla. You are right. They are a lot of different
kinds of people, and we see a lot of--amongst the terrorists
who are attacking against different targets. So I believe like
education level of the terrorists is extremely high in Turkey.
Mr. Linder. Thank you. My time has expired. Does the
gentleman from Rhode Island wish to inquire?
Mr. Langevin. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here and for your testimony.
Two of the biggest problems that we hear about intelligence
that related to counterterrorism is stovepiping and lack of
human intelligence. Obviously stovepiping occurs not just
between Federal agencies, but most especially when multiple
levels of governments get involved, as I am sure you have all
experienced in some way or another.
Can you tell us the key issues that you would like to see
resolved so that stovepipes are removed and you get all of the
information that you do need, and because of your close contact
with your local communities you can--it would be a great
source. And let me ask you this: Is the Federal Government
listening to you and partnering with you as a valued resource?
Chief Timoney. On the information sharing as it now stands,
it really is--it is pretty good. It is completely different
than it was prior to 9/11.
On the human intelligence side, I think, for example, local
police departments, as far as getting into those communities,
have done a much better job because there is a maxim in local
policing, big city policing, that you wouldn't have a police
department that kind of represents the community you serve. So,
for example, if you pick the Chinese community in New York, and
I was a captain in Chinatown in the early 1980s--in 1980; there
were about two or three by the mid-1980s. There may have been
20 Chinese police officers as a result of going out and
agressively recruiting Chinese candidates. The MIPD now has 700
Chinese officers.
It is my sense--I am not picking on anybody in the Federal
Government--it is my sense that the law enforcement agencies
haven't done that good of a job. They don't suffer from the
same community pressures that we at the local level do, which,
even if you were inclined to go that way, you have to go that
way for survival.
I think the same thing should apply for the intelligence
agencies within the United States. You have got to get out
there, to be much more aggressive. If you look at the NYPD and
what they have recruited in the Muslim community working for
the NYPD at their intel, it is a showcase. That is what you are
supposed to be doing.
But often I feel that there is some--there is a gap at the
Federal level that the Federal officials and all of the
agencies don't feel the same pressure that we at the local
level have the pressure to change and diversify and all of
those things.
Mr. Langevin. Gentlemen, how have you dealt with the issue
of stovepiping and sharing of intelligence?
Mr. Lovegrove. I think we are fortunate. I do feel quite
fortunate in this respect because the United Kingdom's
government has not only supported the fact that we can
structure ourselves and make a single point of contact, the
JTAC facility, within which there are police, military
intelligence, transportation, security, health protection
agencies, all in one office, as I have been there. It is quite
a big office. They are all talking to each other, and the
analysts that take that bigger picture and put it into real
workable products that people like me can use is really quite
impressive and does work.
They support that. But what is more impressive is the
government has restructured itself to do that. In my report you
will note I talk about the London Regional Resilience Forum,
which is only one regime in the United Kingdom where the
combined authorities of London work together to mitigate not
only natural, but man-made disasters such as terrorism.
So it is--it is not just a spiritual support the government
gives us. I can actually see the structural support and
practical support the United Kingdom does give. So I feel
fortunate in that way.
Major Yayla. In our case if you do not share intelligence
or information, there is no fight against terrorism. The
professional terrorist members, especially the cells, they
operate just like regular people. And for the community, it is
almost impossible to realize them as the terrorists or to have
any tips against them, just like the al Qaeda members in Miami.
So if you look from the outside, they are regular members of
the community. So if you do not have any intelligence against
them, and if you do not share this intelligence with the proper
divisions, we cannot fight against terrorism, and we cannot be
successful against terrorism.
In our case, for example, in the Ankara PD, the
intelligence department, the police have their own intelligence
against terrorism and an antiterrorism department that carries
out operations against the terrorist groups work together. They
have everything from the beginning of the operation until the
end of the operation shared on the same table. And whenever the
intelligence department has any specific information regarding
a terrorist threat, it is immediately shared with the
antiterrorism divisions.
Mr. Langevin. With the Chairman's indulgence, I just have
one quick additional question for Chief Timoney, if I could.
To follow up on my last question, in my home State of Rhode
Island, we are part of the New England State Police Information
Network, or NESPIN, which is part of the Regional Information-
Sharing System, or RISS. For those of you who don't know, RISS
is a federally funded program adminstered by the Department of
Justice in cooperation with the Department of Justice programs
and the Bureau of Justice assistance to serve as a
communication network to serve for local law enforcement to
target anything from terrorism to cybercrime.
So my question is, Chief, does the Miami Police Department
participate in RISS, or do you participate in another system;
and do you find the system to be successful; and how do you
think it can be improved to better suit your needs?
Chief Timoney. Yeah. That is a very interesting question
because you can go to different parts of the country and find
these different systems. In general, the call fusion centers, I
mean, they may go to the name of RISS. They may go to name of
FIG, Field Intelligence Group. What we are working on in the
process in Miami, because there was a--before that there was
the two, the terrorism early warning system, which got mixed
reviews. So we are trying to improve in that process in Miami
coming up with a whole new entity under the auspices and in
partnership with the FBI called the Field Intelligence Group.
One of the realities, and this is something that people
don't talk about--I talk about it all the time--to set up an
intelligence-gathering unit simply for terrorism at the local
level, it is not that busy. There isn't that much information
coming in. And my biggest worry is complacency, that these
police officers and agents lose interest. So my preference is
that while we are dealing with--obviously, with terrorism,
there is a nexus with criminal intelligence and gangs. So we
put them all in the same umbrella. We have a certain amount of
terrorism expertise, but we want to have enough work to keep
them busy, to keep them interested, because the enemy is really
complacency and boredom. And sometimes you can go literally for
weeks without good intel coming in, and you need to have
something to be working on. So it may be criminal intelligence,
you know, on who is doing bank robberies or gang or drug
intelligence.
So there isn't any one system that is - that is, I would
say the--you know, the showcase for anyone in the Nation. It
varies from region to region.
Mr. Linder. The gentleman from Nevada wishes to inquire.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And, gentlemen, thank you for your presence here today. And
having read through your testimony, each of you have presented
us with unique information that is very helpful to us, and we
thank you for that.
Continuing on with much of this discussion about
intelligence. I am curious how each of your communities,
whether it is Miami, London or Ankara, how do you receive
international intelligence that is valuable to your operation?
Chief Timoney. Yeah. Right now it is not changing. It is
the FBI. We get it from the Joint Terrorism Task Force. The FBI
gets it is from the CIA. But our point of contact is the FBI. I
get questioned all the time with Homeland Security, but we deal
with the FBI. That is kind of the fact of life. And so that is
where we get the information, from the FBI.
Mr. Lovegrove. I have two valuable sources. One is very
formal, and the other is informal. The formal way is through
our special branch, which is a national entity broken down into
regions, and if--and all intelligence comes through a special
branch, and dare I say it, I use the word JTAC again, it comes
through JTAC to makes sure there are no gaps in any kind of
intelligence process.
But where I am in the city of London, I think it is either
the first or second largest international sector in the world,
and I get an amazing amount of global intelligence from the
business systems itself, which is a very good reflection of the
partnerships and trust and confidence that we have in each
other. I then feed that into the JTAC system, and it is
analyzed, and then a product comes out of that, an actual
operational product.
But that global intelligence has proved to be invaluable.
Some of the biggest financial systems in the world will develop
that intelligence to protect their assets and their people
worldwide. That is very important to them. But, of course, that
same intelligence around methodology of terrorist attacks, the
latest information from different countries in the world is fed
back to the United Kingdom, because we know in London, that
is--we have seen not only the 7th of July, but in other
instances certainly more recently where the threat against
airliners has been mitigated, intelligence, international
intelligence, has to be handled very well and very, very fast.
So we--it has worked before. We continue to work hard to make
sure it works better, but it is simple, but it works.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you.
Major Yayla.
Major Yayla. We have four sources for international
intelligence. The first is the Turkish National Intelligence
Service. When they have appropriate information regarding
international intelligence, they will share that information
with us.
The second is the international agreements that the TNP and
Ankara PD has. For example, the FBI and the CIA person in
Ankara will visit us. We will have lunch, dinners with them or
other representatives from other states, and they will, from
time to time, share the information they have regarding
international terrorist groups with us. And this is very common
with the FBI and CIA representatives in Ankara.
The third is the interceptions we do to our terrorist
department, the communication; for example, the terrorist
trying to call international numbers from Turkey, or the
communication between Turkey and the other countries.
The fourth one is 2-hour interrogations and investigations.
When you arrest a terrorist, and if he speaks during his
interrogation, he will provide information if he had been in an
international level. Or the communication that we capture in
the terrorist cells will give us some information.
Mr. Gibbons. You know, I want to congratulate each and
every one of you for creating value-added programs within each
of your communities that makes intelligence the first line,
first defense, preventative use of intelligence for preventing
a terrorist attack, and thank you for doing that.
Many of the programs you have created and talked about here
I am sure are models that other communities will be able to
look at and adapt, or adopt in whole or in part to their own
communities.
This is not all a good news scenario, I am sure. I mean,
sitting here, you are all telling very, very positive stories
about accomplishments and successes and how we are moving
forward in the war on terrorism and being able to use
intelligence. But I think at the end of the day, each of you in
your communities, each of you in your leadership role, must sit
back and wonder, you know, what is it that you are missing,
because in this job, your job, what you miss does hurt you.
What you don't know will hurt you.
I would only ask in a follow-up question very briefly from
each of you, what keeps you awake at night at the end of the
day?
Chief Timoney. When I first went to Miami getting the job,
I took a helicopter ride, and you only appreciate the
vulnerability of Miami from the air when you look down and you
see 10,000 boats. They are all white; they all look alike. We
know there is human smuggling, we know there is drug smuggling,
and any one of those boats can come up the mouth of the river
loaded with a bomb of some type. There are high-rise buildings
on both sides, and I think about that a lot.
Mr. Lovegrove. It is difficult to choose just one, but I
will go from the top of the list. I think it is a realization
that the terrorist is an ingenious person. They will keep
innovating, and they won't stop. They will keep doing things
differently. So once I have had the sleepless night and I wake
up, the very first thing I say to myself, and I make sure my
team understands this, is what am I going to do differently
today than I did yesterday, because if I don't do anything
differently today, the terrorist will.
Who would have thought that liquid explosives would, a few
weeks ago, be smuggled on board aircrafts and used to create
other tragedies? That was we managed to stop that one with, I
have to say, the tremendous help of the United States, and
acknowledgment of the States is absolutely fantastic. And that
probably answers my last question around international
intelligence. We have a fantastic relationship with the U.S.
Long may that continue.
But what keeps me awake is keeping ahead of the terrorists.
But so far, you know, we are doing okay.
Mr. Gibbons. Major Yayla.
Major Yayla. I always think about the explosives because
they can do the most damage. For example, for the last 9 months
the TNP captured around 3,500 pounds of plastic explosives like
C4, A4, in the last 9 months. And the terrorist carried out
bombings by using around 50 pounds of explosives that we were
not able to catch on time before they were used. I always think
about that small 50-pound plastic explosives that can damage
thousands of people that we were not able to catch on time, and
that the terrorists carried out to run 10 attacks by using that
50 pounds of explosives.
Mr. Gibbons. Mr. Chairman, thank you for indulging me, and
thank you to these gentlemen for their great service both to
their countries and to the combined efforts of our countries
together in the war on terrorism.
Thank you.
Mr. Linder. The gentlelady from Florida seeks to inquire.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much for the opportunity. I
just wanted to sing some words of praise to our police chief. I
have the great honor of representing a good chunk of the city
of Miami, and we are in good hands with this police chief.
As you pointed out in your testimony, written and verbal,
you said without question the number one weapon in our fight
against terrorism is good, actionable intelligence, and I know
that Mr.Sec. bbons was talking about that. But how difficult is
it to make that distinction between what we would classify as
true threats and quacks?
Recently there was a sting operation in south Florida
involving a group who might have posed a true security threat,
but they seemed to lack arms and organization, a sponsor, a
plan; yet when we look at the operations of the 9/11
highjackers, and you correctly pointed out that 14 of those had
south Florida roots, all that they had were box cutters. And
look at the damage they did. Were we to have arrested them
before their horrible deeds were put into motion, many
Americans would be shaking their heads and saying, what threat?
What problem? Nothing could have happened. And we don't want
this feeling of complacency spreading in the United States to
think that, unless an individual is tied to an organized entity
and has the wherewithal and funds and real operation behind
them, that they do not pose a threat. Box cutters don't appear
to be a grave threat, and they forever changed our Nation.
So how difficult is it for you working with Federal
agencies and local and State agencies to make that distinction,
if a distinction needs to be made, between a true threat,
something that looks like a threat, but may even be--almost
hardly passes the smell test. And what improvement, secondly,
would you like to see of the communication, even though you
think it is much improved, between the Federal, State and local
enforcement agencies?
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chief Timoney. That really is the $64,000 question: How do
you tell real--a terrorist from these that--they talk a good
game, and you don't know. You get the threat, and in that case
I remember getting briefed early on, and I was a little
skeptical, as was the FBI, but the guy is saying certain
things, and you have to follow it. Not once did this individual
ever kind of back off. As a matter of fact it--it increased.
I don't want to get into the details because the trial is
coming up, but suffice to say there were enough overt acts
taken by these individuals that we had to take them serious,
and then after about 4 or 5 months, we shut the case down for
an entirely separate matter, which I don't even have to go into
now, but had nothing to do with the strength or weakness of the
case.
People say, well, they don't look like terrorists; they are
from model city. I can guarantee you that if Scotland Yard had
arrested the July 7th bombers 2 weeks earlier, people would
have been saying the same thing, those are not real terrorists,
one guy is a 19-year-old Jamaican, for God's sake, because we
all have this perception of a terrorist being a Mohammad Atta
walking through an airport. They all have to look like that.
Well, guess what; they don't. The home-grown types don't look
like that. It is a difficult situation. The ones in Madrid were
low-level drug dealers engaged in this.
So once you take the information, you have accepted it, and
you have got to run with the case. And as far as the improving
the intelligence, again, I think the FBI has made great, great
strides. Can it be a improved? I guess everything can be
improved upon. What I can tell you is there has been a marked
improvement over the last 4 or 5 years, and just the
relationship is completely different. It isn't the FBI calling
you as they get ready to go do a press conference with somebody
they locked up in your locality. I am involved in the
briefings. On the cases themselves I get intel briefings on a
regular basis, so it is not the same as it was prior to 9/11.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Linder. I want to thank each of you for coming and
bringing your wealth of experience and knowledge and sharing
with this committee. I think we need to focus more on
intelligence. I kept thinking after the recent experience in
Great Britain, that for a week later blue-haired ladies
couldn't carry their lipstick on the airplanes.
I think we focus too often on things instead of people.
There are an infinite number of ways and things to use to hurt
us. There are a finite number of bad actors. Maybe it is time
to start looking for people instead of things.
Thank you all very much. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]