[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE PROGRESS OF THE DHS
CHIEF INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
INFORMATION SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 24, 2006
__________
Serial No. 109-80
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Norman D. Dicks, Washington
John Linder, Georgia Jane Harman, California
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Tom Davis, Virginia Nita M. Lowey, New York
Daniel E. Lungren, California Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Columbia
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Zoe Lofgren, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Katherine Harris, Florida Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Islands
Dave G. Reichert, Washington Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Michael McCaul, Texas James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK
ASSESSMENT
Rob Simmons, Connecticut, Chairman
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Zoe Lofgren, California
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Loretta Sanchez, California
Daniel E. Lungren, California Jane Harman, California
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Nita M. Lowey, New York
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
(II)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Rob Simmons, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Connecticut, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk
Assessment..................................................... 1
The Honorable Zoe Lofgren, a Representative in Congress From the
State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk
Assessment:
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
Oral Statement................................................. 2
The Honorable Jim Gibbons, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Nevada................................................ 14
The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Rhode Island................................. 16
Witness
Mr. Charles E. Allen, Chief Intelligence Officer, Officer of
Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
THE PROGRESS OF THE DHS
CHIEF INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
----------
Wednesday, May 24, 2006
House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information
Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:39 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Rob Simmons
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Simmons, Gibbons, Lofgren, and
Langevin.
Mr. Simmons. [Presiding.] The Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Intelligence Information Sharing and Terrorism
Risk Assessment will come to order.
Today, the subcommittee meets to hear testimony on how Mr.
Charlie Allen, the DHS chief intelligence officer, has
progressed in his efforts to better integrate the DHS
intelligence enterprise and strengthen its ability to share
intelligence and analysis with state, local, tribal and private
sector partners.
In October 19, 2005, we held a hearing with Assistant
Secretary Allen in the wake of a very public dispute over the
New York and Baltimore tele-threat streams. Since that time, I
have been assured by Assistant Secretary Allen and officials
from New York and Baltimore that the issues related to that
dispute have been largely resolved.
Coordination has improved, and DHS has begun deploying
analysts to state and local fusion centers. And I can say
yesterday that 2 days ago, I went to the Maryland fusion
center, and we saw firsthand that those improvements have been
made.
While DHS assistance to states, localities and tribes can
and will be improved, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis
is taking important steps to integrate with and support state,
local and tribal sector information sharing initiatives.
In October, we also discussed the secretary's plans for
integrating the department's intelligence offices, and he
indicated that better integration of operational intelligence
components would be a top priority.
Mr. Allen, I would be interested in hearing from you today
on how this effort has progressed and what the continued
challenges are. Seven months ago, you had a lot on your plate.
Today's hearing is designed to be an update and progress report
on how things are going.
I would ask that the remainder of my opening statement be
inserted into the record as if read.
Mr. Simmons. And I would like to make a brief comment based
on a reading of Chapter 13 in the 9/11 Commission report, Page
399: ``As presently configured, the national security
institutions of the United States government are still the
institutions constructed to win the Cold War. The United States
confronts a very different world today. Instead of facing a few
very dangerous adversaries, the United States confronts a
number of less visible challenges that surpass the boundaries
of traditional nation states and call for quick, imaginative
and agile responses.''
Mr. Allen, you were instrumental in the fight to win the
Cold War. Now, you have been placed in a position of
responsibility at the beginning of another kind of war that
takes new organizations, one of which you now serve in, new
ideas, new responses, new approaches.
We wish you all the best in this, but we also wish to be
kept up to date on how this process is developing and what
progress there is to report. It is an important and it is an
exciting challenge, because the safety and security of the
American people in this democracy are at stake.
So I look forward to hearing your testimony.
And at this point, I will yield to the distinguished
ranking member of the committee, Ms. Lofgren.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And my apologies for
being late. I was at another markup.
I look forward to continuing to work with you, Mr. Allen. I
appreciate your courtesy in keeping us apprised of your
progress. And as we all know, the job you have is enormously
important for the security of our country, and I thank you for
your willingness to take it on.
I would just also note that we were able to have a briefing
in a classified setting, and I also appreciated. And one
concern that I have talked about publicly is the issue of the
NSA Warrantless Wiretap Program that the president has
discussed. And certainly, the Department of Homeland Security
is not a collector of information but a recipient of
information and then also a distributor of information.
Rather than repeating all of the questions, I would simply
say, are there any of the questions they asked you in a
classified setting that you are able to answer here in this
public setting? And if so, I would welcome those answers. If
not, I would respect what you are not able to answer.
And with that, I would yield back the balance of my time.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Prepared Opening Statement of the Honorable Zoe Lofgren
I am also very happy that we are meeting with you again, Mr. Allen,
to get an update on your progress as the Chief Intelligence Officer. I
am certain that the longer you serve in your position, the clearer that
both your challenges and resulting mission focus are becoming.
This is precisely the type of oversight hearing that this
Subcommittee should be having on a regular basis on the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) to ensure that we are up-to-date on
your needs, priorities, and progress, and I look forward to regular
briefings and hearings with you in the future.
I might add, Mr. Allen, that your May 10th letter to me addressing
your progress was very helpful, and I would encourage you to continue
such communication with us.
While I am pleased to learn that I&A is making progress on many
fronts, I do have several concerns--including one that has been a major
subject of discussion in recent months.
As you know, Mr. Allen, I have been very troubled by reports about
the NSA's domestic surveillance program and its implications for
privacy and civil liberties.
I am particularly concerned about the NSA domestic surveillance
program's implications for the Department and your office.
Regardless of whether or not I&A has received intelligence
information from the NSA's domestic surveillance program, I believe
that your office--if it cannot already--should be able to track the
origin of intelligence information it receives, segregate out
information that it learns has been obtained illegally, and report such
instances to the relevant Congressional committees.
The Department of Homeland Security must have the public trust. If
your office receives ``fruit of the poisoned tree''--intelligence
information that has been obtained illegally--that trust understandably
will be shaken. Over time, if we don't level with the American people,
we are bound to lose their support in the war on terror.
I don't think you or anyone else wants to happen, Mr. Allen, and I
hope you will share your thoughts on how we can ensure that DHS does
not become complicit in activity that trades the liberties and civil
rights that make our nation great for a promise of security that--
without those liberties and rights--leaves everyone insecure.
I also hope we will be able to revisit with you your progress on
developing your IT network architecture.
Your staff was kind enough to generate for us a general outline of
how you want that architecture to look and a sense of what things might
cost.
I hope you'll be able to address your current priorities, where
this funding should be coming from, and the consequences of your not
getting the resources you need to build a seamless system connecting
you, the Department's intelligence components, and your intelligence
consumers.
Finally, Mr. Allen, I remain very interested in the Department's
efforts to secure the nation's critical infrastructure.
I appreciated Dr. Connell's (CON-L) testimony on HITRAC (HI-TRACK)
when we last met in February, and I hope we'll have a chance to discuss
your progress there as well.
Welcome, again, Mr. Allen. I look forward to our discussions today.
Mr. Simmons. The gentlelady, having yielded back, and the
chairman of the committee and the ranking member of the full
committee not being present to make any statements, I will now
recognize Mr. Allen.
Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES E. ALLEN, CHIEF INTELLIGENCE OFFICER,
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Allen. Thank you, Chairman Simmons, Ranking Member
Lofgren, for giving me the opportunity to report on my progress
during my first 7 months as the chief intelligence officer of
the Department of Homeland Security.
I have a brief statement that summarizes my longer
statement, and I ask that to be submitted for the record.
The mandate of the chief intelligence officer is to lead,
to integrate and manage the department's intelligence program.
Thanks to the hard work of our employees in the Office of
Intelligence Analysis and the department's intelligence
components, I believe we have made solid progress towards
transforming DHS intelligence, that we are finally beginning to
leverage unique capabilities and officers of the DHS
intelligence enterprise.
The future is promising for DHS intelligence, and with the
continued support of Secretary Chertoff and the Congress, we
will continue to make significant progress in the next 7
months.
Last October, I discussed with you five equally important
priorities for Homeland Security intelligence. Today, I will
briefly review those and then conclude, speak to some of the
challenges that I will have in the next 7 months.
First, by all accounts, under the leadership of Dr. Mary
Connell, the deputy assistant secretary for intelligence who
sits behind me, we have improved the quality of intelligence
analysis across the department.
Key customers, including the secretary and the deputy
secretary, have praised her products, and we have produced
analytic products for the ``National Terrorism Bulletin'' and
the ``President's Daily Brief.''
We have increased our overall production, applied analytic
best practices to distinguish what is known from what is
surmised, and to ensure the fair consideration of competing
hypotheses.
We are aggressively expanding training opportunities for
our employees and developing department-wide standards for
production and dissemination of homeland intelligence.
Substantively, we have broadened our mission to ensure that
we are addressing the full scope of homeland security. This
includes, not only assessing immediate threats, but also
focusing on such issues such as potential threats to U.S.
critical infrastructures, security of our borders, use of
nonconventional weaponry by terrorists, and the phenomenon of
radicalization of American society.
Second, to promote the integration of DHS intelligence, I
have established a Homeland Security Intelligence Council. This
council comprising the leadership of all DHS intelligence
components is a decision making body which addresses cross-
cutting issues such as recruitment, training, analytic
standards, budgetary and programmatic issues. We engage on
issues that need a management decision and look to develop
enterprise-wise solution in tackling difficult intelligence
problems.
As part of this integration, I have approved the first ever
DHS intelligence enterprise strategic plan. This plan sets in
place our strategic vision with clear-cut objectives to address
requirements, collection dissemination and information sharing,
analysis and warning and to create the overall DHS intelligence
culture that is supported by solid business practices.
We have conducted the first-ever review of component
intelligence programs, a process which not only evaluated
component intelligence efforts, but also permitted me to engage
in direct dialogue with the heads of the operating components
of DHS on ways to strengthen their intelligence programs.
In addition, I have initiated a comprehensive intelligence
campaign plan in a department-wide strategy for intelligence
surveillance and reconnaissance to integrate component and
national resources to focus on border security, as well as to
support disaster relief.
DHS and the intelligence community must come together to
support this critical initiative.
Finally, we have developed a key enabler, an enterprise
information architecture that will accelerate DHS' intelligence
integration, ensuring we have the information management
systems that provide connectivity to the intelligence elements
of the operating components, as well as permitting robust
sharing of information with state and local governments and the
private sector.
To strengthen my office's support to state, local and
tribal authorities in the private sector, my principal deputy
assistant secretary, Mr. Jack Tomarchio, who is not here today
but elsewhere, has traveled extensively to listen to and learn
from these important partners and to improve our understanding
of their need for intelligence and information sharing.
My office also recently prepared a plan, now under review
by Secretary Chertoff, to support and engage with state and
local fusion centers around the country. We have deployed DHS
intelligence officers to New York City, Los Angeles, Maryland
and Louisiana.
We are running a pilot program with the additional states
to widen interaction with their intelligence centers via a
homeland security information network, a pilot project, as I
stated, which will be far more robust for sharing information
in the future.
Additionally, we are disseminating a wide range of Homeland
Security related products to state and local governments, as
well as to the private sector at both classified and
unclassified levels.
Another of my priorities is to ensure that DHS intelligence
takes its full place in the intelligence community. In this
respect, we are working closely with Ambassador Negroponte and
his deputies in the office of the director of National
Intelligence to ensure that budget guidance emphasizes a need
of homeland security partners.
We are also are enhancing our relationship with the
National Counterterrorism Center, the National Counter
Proliferation Center, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Last but not least, to solidify our relationship with
Congress, I and my intelligence officers have maintained a
rigorous schedule of intelligence briefings to the
congressional leadership and key committees of both chambers.
Additionally, we have taken steps to ensure members and
staff have access to relevant DHS intelligence products and
personnel.
I am working to develop a transparent and open relationship
with the Congress and so enhance and sustain a close
cooperative working relationship with all the committees to
which I report.
Some of our transformation efforts cut across my five
priorities. We have developed an end-to-end strategy to
increase significantly the use of open sources in our analysis,
and we have developed and are implementing a recruiting program
to ensure we hire and develop into all-source analysts a cadre
of the best and brightest officers out of America's
universities.
Serious challenges, however, remain. Looking ahead 6 to 12
months, we will need to strengthen further our analytic
capabilities, including accelerated training for analysts.
I must work ever more closely with the heads of DHS
operating components to ensure that their intelligence elements
are strengthened and that they collaborate on threats far more
closely than they do today.
Above all, we must increase our interaction as you pointed
out with state and local fusion centers, as well as the private
sector, to ensure that we significantly increase our
information sharing with all segments, government and non-
government.
In many respects, however, our greatest challenge will be
implementation of our enterprise architecture, which will be
the transmission belt for integrating our DHS intelligence
enterprise, as well as the means by which we reach out to state
and local governments and to the private sector.
Chairman and ranking minority member, we are still at war
with an adaptive enemy who mean to do us great harm. We
continue to track closely serious threat streams, working
closely with Ambassador Negroponte and the rest of the
intelligence community.
We must stay ahead of these threats, and we plan to
increase substantially our analysis in the coming months.
I am thankful for the support I receive from the
administration, my colleagues in the intelligence community,
and from the Congress, including members of this subcommittee.
I look forward to your questions and to your recommendations.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Allen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Charles E. Allen
Introduction
Chairman Simmons, Ranking Member Lofgren, members of the
Subcommittee, it is my pleasure to return to report on my progress
during my first seven months as Chief Intelligence Officer (CINT) of
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). We are moving rapidly to
transform the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) across a broad
front.
When I appeared before you last October, I set forth five equally
important priorities, which remain unchanged:
Improving the quality of intelligence analysis across
the Department;
Integrating the DHS intelligence enterprise;
Strengthening our support to state, local, and tribal
authorities, as well as the private sector;
Ensuring that DHS intelligence takes its full place in
the Intelligence Community; and,
Solidifying our relationship with the Congress by
improving our transparency and responsiveness.
Today I will my report progress on addressing these priorities, as
well as outline some specific goals for the next 6 to 12 months. But
first, I would like to revisit briefly why the Department has a Chief
Intelligence Officer and what my responsibilities are serving in this
capacity.
You are undoubtedly aware that the guiding principle of
intelligence reform since the attacks of September 11, 2001, is
integration. Two major commissions--the 9/11 Commission and the WMD
Commission--have made integration of the national intelligence
community the centerpiece of their recommendations. The principal
reason to integrate is to improve intelligence performance, as well as
employ our scarce intelligence resources more efficiently.
These guiding principles for intelligence integration at the
national level apply to integration of DHS intelligence as well. Our
Department shares with others the most important mission of all--
protecting the Homeland from terrorist attacks. DHS has a wide range of
other critical missions, such as securing our borders and critical
infrastructure against all other threats and hazards. A department with
so many interconnected missions cannot succeed without a fully
integrated intelligence enterprise supporting it. Just as our nation
needs an integrated intelligence enterprise, so does DHS. Furthermore,
by integrating its own intelligence community, DHS contributes to
integration of the national intelligence community.
This thinking informed the Secretary's Second Stage Review, which
resulted in, among other things, the establishment of the position of
CINT. DHS Management Directive 8110, which Secretary Chertoff signed in
January, establishes the authorities of the CINT to effectively
integrate and manage the Department's intelligence programs. It makes
the CINT accountable for designing the DHS intelligence system to
optimize the intelligence function, setting standards for functional
performance, creating Department-wide policies and processes, and
providing automated solutions to yield greater efficiencies.
Progress on priorities
Improving the quality of analysis
We have made significant improvements in our analysis,
concentrating on issues that matter to Secretary Chertoff, our DHS
leadership, and our nation. Under the leadership of my Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Intelligence, Dr. Mary Connell, we have changed the focus
and format of key products to make them more relevant and accessible to
a wider range of consumers--policymakers, operators, and other
analysts--at all levels. We have increased our monthly production. In
keeping with best analytic practices, we take pains to distinguish for
our readers what is known from what is surmised, and we ensure fair
consideration of competing hypotheses--there is no ``groupthink'' among
my analysts. A measure of our success in improving our analysis is that
we have now begun to submit intelligence articles for the National
Terrorism Bulletin and the President's Daily Brief.
We continue to improve the quality of our analysis by expanding
training opportunities for our analysts within the context of a DHS
Intelligence Learning and Development Strategic Plan, completed in
January, 2006. We are offering a full range of courses to improve our
key analytic skills, including critical thinking, intelligence writing,
and briefing, not only for I&A's employees, but across our DHS
intelligence enterprise. I look forward to a time when our bench is
full enough and deep enough to fully accommodate the need for
continuous training and education without compromising our ability to
fulfill our day-to-day mission.
Through the recently established Content Management Board, we are
developing consensus on Department-wide standards for formatting and
dissemination of intelligence products, including posting of relevant
products for use by state, local, and private-sector partners. We are
also recommending enhancements to DHS intelligence production and
dissemination standards to achieve the highest possible quality, and we
are championing ``write-to-release,'' tearlining, and other practices
to ensure the broadest dissemination of DHS intelligence products.
Substantively, while terrorist threats and networks remain central
concerns, we have broadened our focus to include potential U.S.
vulnerabilities such as border and critical infrastructure security, as
well as the spread of pandemic disease, which could weaken our ability
to secure and protect the Homeland. Beyond these issues, we also are
concerned with the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) materials and we are working to
understand the growth and spread of extremist ideology, which
terrorists could exploit to multiply their resources and capabilities
to attack the United States.
Border Security: We are taking an aggressive approach
to support the securing our nation's borders. We believe the
threats to our security must be viewed across a spectrum of
concerns--narcotics, terrorism, illegal immigration, human
smuggling and trafficking, to name a few--and at the nexus of
these threats. We are working tirelessly to support the
intelligence and information needs of our frontline border
agencies, including Customs and Border Protection, the Coast
Guard and Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
Critical Infrastructure: Partnering with Robert
Stephan, Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, I
have strengthened the Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk
Analysis Center (HITRAC), the linchpin in our support to the
efforts of the Department and the private sector to determine
the risk of attack against key infrastructure as well as the
protective measures that may be taken. Additionally, at the
direction of the Secretary, I&A has begun to provide
intelligence support to the Committee on Foreign Investments in
the United States (CFIUS)--fulfilling a critical intelligence
need to secure our homeland.
CBRNE: I&A analysts provide all-source intelligence
support to assist DHS customers identify, prevent, disrupt, and
prepare for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear,
explosive, and cyber attacks on the Homeland. They assess and
forecast adversary capabilities, intent, and methods of
terrorists through collaboration with DHS components--
especially the Science and Technology Directorate and the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO)--and federal, state,
local, tribal, and international partners. Outside of DHS, our
analysts work closely with the National Counterterrorism Center
(NCTC), the National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC), and
the FBI to leverage expertise and information and produce
analytic products of the highest quality for the Secretary, DHS
components, and governmental partners at all levels.
I&A provides a range of support for DNDO and
helps link DNDO to the Intelligence Community. On an
ongoing basis, I&A gathers and assesses intelligence
reporting for situational awareness, analyzes emerging
trends, incorporates DNDO's information requirements,
and supports the establishment of regional centers for
radiation detection support. In addition, I&A supports
high-level DNDO Congressional briefs, participates in
Nuclear Alarm Assessment Conferences for unresolved
radiation alarms, and interfaces with DNDO's Nuclear
Assessment Program.
Radicalization: We have sharpened and refined our
focus on radicalization, viewing it as a strategic warning
issue--if we can understand the radicalization phenomenon, we
can identify the root of terrorism before it matures and
manifests itself in attacks against the Homeland. Working
closely with selected state and local government partners
across the U.S., we are examining the places where
radicalization occurs and the individuals it touches. Our
efforts are coordinated with and complement the work being done
by the FBI and other Intelligence Community colleagues, as well
as international partners who confront similar issues.
Together, we intend to develop a comprehensive understanding of
the radicalization challenge.
Integrating the DHS intelligence enterprise
As I said at the outset, the role of the CINT is to integrate the
DHS intelligence enterprise. In this respect, I have taken a number of
important steps in fulfillment of this role, including:
Establishing the Homeland Security Intelligence
Council (HSIC), consisting of the heads of the DHS component
intelligence offices, to serve as my principal decision-making
forum for intelligence issues of Department-wide significance;
Developing and approving the first-ever DHS
Intelligence Enterprise Strategic Plan, which provides all DHS
intelligence components with a strategic context for their
operations and investments;
Conducting a review of component intelligence programs
that will result in my making substantive inputs to the
Secretary's Resource Allocation Decisions--the first time this
has occurred, and a major step toward treating the budget
resources the Department devotes to intelligence as a coherent
program;
Through the efforts of I&A's Collection and
Requirements Division, developing a Department-wide roadmap for
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), ensuring
that the surveillance capabilities of DHS's operating
components will be employed with those of the Intelligence
Community and the Department of Defense in national crises or
natural disasters; and
Initiating a comprehensive Intelligence Campaign Plan
for Border Security, with an initial emphasis on the Southwest
border, bringing the resources of both the national and
Departmental intelligence communities to bear on this acute
problem.
To help weld together the component parts of the DHS intelligence
enterprise and bring them closer to both national and local consumers,
we are designing an enterprise information architecture. Dr. Carter
Morris, Director of I&A's Information Sharing and Knowledge Management
Division, has developed a comprehensive assessment of the existing
intelligence information technology architecture in DHS, along with
recommendations to improve and enhance it. I am now reviewing this
assessment. Nothing has higher priority programmatically for DHS
intelligence than strengthening our ability to manage our information.
Strengthening support to state, local, and tribal authorities and
the private sector
DHS has a crucial responsibility to serve state, local, and tribal
authorities and the private sector. This set of partners is so
important that I have given my Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Intelligence and Analysis, Mr. Jack Tomarchio, the primary
responsibility for enhancing our relations with them. He is my ``Mr.
Outside,'' and his extensive travels across the country listening to
state, local, tribal, and private-sector officials' need for
intelligence and information sharing have greatly enhanced our
understanding of their issues, and has provided us with meaningful
insights on how to better serve them. Complementing his efforts is the
work of I&A's External Relations and Law Enforcement Partners Program.
This outreach team, consisting of former law enforcement and public
safety officials, attends association conferences and meetings to
inform state and local representatives about DHS information-sharing
programs and initiatives.
Substantively, our analysts and briefers have provided immediate
warning and outreach to state homeland security advisers and to other
state and local officials on threat reporting.
Another important aspect of our plans to serve state, local and
tribal authorities and the private sector is our plan to support the
state and local fusion centers that many states and large cities are
establishing. Our recently developed plan is under review by the
Secretary. Meanwhile, we have deployed DHS intelligence personnel to
New York, Los Angeles, Maryland, and Louisiana to improve our support
in these key regions. We plan to deploy several more officers to a
number of fusion centers before the end of the current fiscal year.
Additionally, we have initiated a pilot program with six states--
California, Arizona, Illinois, Florida, Virginia, and New York--to
widen our interaction with intelligence analysts at their fusion
centers via the HSIN-Intelligence portal; after further evaluation, we
expect to extend this pilot program to a wider community of fusion
centers.
We are also taking advantage of information technology to
facilitate our outreach. We regularly hold teleconferences with state
Homeland Security Advisors and other key officials at the state and
local level. We have given new technical direction to the Homeland
Security Information Network--Secret (HSIN-S)--which should be
operational this quarter. We will extend HSIN-S to state and local
fusion cells on an interim basis until a more capable system is
available. Finally, we are working hard on the deployment of a more
robust information handling system, the Department's Homeland Security
Data Network (HSDN).
Ensuring that DHS intelligence takes its full place in the
Intelligence Community
We are also transforming our role in the national intelligence
community. DHS I&A engages daily, at all levels, with the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the individual
Intelligence Community departments and agencies. Our collaboration with
NCTC is strengthening by leaps and bounds. We have begun to submit
articles for production in the National Terrorism Bulletin (NTB) and
plan to increase our NTB submissions in coming months. Last month we
participated along with other Intelligence Community members in an
NCTC-sponsored joint requirements review for open-source intelligence
needs to complement the previous joint requirements reviews for the
other intelligence collection disciplines. Additionally:
We have worked with the ODNI to shape its budget
guidance to serve better the unique needs of Homeland Security.
As a result of our efforts, departments and agencies with
Intelligence Community members received guidance to provide
resources for the development of sensitive but unclassified
(SBU) intelligence products more readily used by state, local,
and tribal authorities and the private sector;
We are leading the Intelligence Community's efforts to
support border security through the development our
comprehensive Intelligence Campaign Plan for border security.
We are developing this plan in full partnership with the IC
collection agencies and hand in hand with the staff elements of
the Deputy Directors of National Intelligence for analysis,
collection, and customer outcomes;
--I&A analysts have served as the functional lead for the
Department's participation in the National Counterterrorism
Community Terrorist Threat Warning System, and have provided
consistent support to the monthly meetings of the Interagency
Intelligence Committee on Terrorism;
We are engaged in a continuing and constructive
dialogue with the ODNI on a wide range of issues. With DNI
oversight, we are refining our roles and responsibilities,
authorities, and capabilities vis-a-vis the rest of the
Intelligence Community in the domain of homeland security. In
particular, we are collaborating with the FBI on DHS's
responsibilities for sharing information with state and local
governments.
Our relationships with other Intelligence Community
organizations continue to strengthen measurably, for example,
the FBI has added four intelligence analysts to its existing
special-agent liaison officer team in our office. This will
improve analytic collaboration between FBI and DHS and provide
DHS with new and continuing database access to FBI holdings,
improving our ability to provide unique information to our
customers. In turn, we have announced a DHS liaison officer
position to the FBI at a senior leadership level to emphasize
the importance we put on this relationship.
Solidifying our relationship with Congress
Since my arrival, I have initiated briefings with members and
senior staff designed to enhance awareness of threats to the Homeland
and how we are reinvigorating and strengthening our overall
intelligence efforts. The Homeland Threat Stream Matrix is a continuing
and high-interest briefing that my Office provides to Congressional
officials with a need to know. Additionally, senior intelligence
officers from our current analysis division provide regular threat
briefings to the leadership and key committees of both chambers, a well
as to individual members as required. Finally, we have taken measures
to ensure members and staff have access to relevant DHS intelligence
products.
Cross-cutting accomplishments
I want to mention several accomplishments that do not fall neatly
into one or another of my priorities but which are crucial enablers to
our mission.
Open source
We have developed a concept of operations for aggressive use of
open sources (OSINT) that leverages current activities of the
Department, other departments and agencies including the DNI Open
Source Center, the private sector, and our state and local partners in
order to improve analysis and, when applicable, to protect intelligence
sources and methods.
We will gather domestic open-source information--
including ``gray literature''--directly, and we will purchase
access to value-added collections that complement those already
available to DHS through its partner departments and agencies.
DHS officers will handle open-source information as a
normal part of their everyday routine. Additionally, a cadre of
specialists will support the mission needs of the Secretary and
DHS components. The value provided by these specialists will
include economies of scale, quality control and qualification
of sources, and linkages and indexing to related open-source
information as well as to intelligence and threat-advisory
issuances.
Dissemination will be both ``push'' and ``pull.'' We
will use existing channels of information dissemination.
Additionally, we may offer open-source information
``wholesale'' to authorized organizations and ``retail'' to
selected users by direct subscription, and as a service
available through a common services architecture.
Human capital
We developed and implemented a DHS Intelligence Recruitment
Strategic Plan to bring onboard the best and brightest people fresh out
of America's universities and colleges. We have taken 30 of our
positions and converted them to GS-7/9/11 levels to take advantage of
the ongoing recruiting efforts and build the foundation for a
sustainable DHS intelligence enterprise. We are building a DHS
Intelligence Basic Course to train our GS-7/9/11s--not only those hired
by DHS I&A but by other Departmental intelligence components--to
instill a true DHS intelligence culture at the beginning of our new
intelligence professionals' careers.
Looking ahead 6-12 months
We have made progress but I am determined to move forward even
stronger in the coming months. My agenda to continue I&A's
transformation includes:
Continuing to strengthen the quality of our analysis,
focusing on training our analysts in core analytic skills,
continuing to extend this training throughout the DHS
Intelligence Enterprise, and tailoring our counterterrorism
threat warning and assessment products more closely to our
customers' requirements;
Continuing to build our expertise in the analytic
focus areas of border security, critical infrastructure, CBRNE,
and radicalization, while also strengthening our intra-
Departmental support;
Enhancing intelligence support to the Department's
principals through enhanced briefing programs, which capitalize
on the skills and expertise of our most experienced analysts;
Making urgently needed improvements to our I&A
facilities to enhance the effectiveness and well-being of our
workforce to provide our officers with critically needed
information technology and workstations;
Achieving key deliverables in our integration of the
DHS intelligence enterprise, such as enhanced training efforts,
a DHS intelligence officer rotation program, and strengthening
our interoperability with DHS our components.
Significantly strengthening our growing relationship
with state and local authorities and the private sector,
especially by increasing the interaction we have with State and
Local Fusion Centers and by making more of our production
available to our non-federal customers via HSIN and ultimately
via HSDN; and
Expanding relationships with our international
partners, especially our closest allies. We have made progress
in this area in the past six months and we must now move
quickly to make further gains in our relationships with these
close friends.
Conclusion
Members of the Subcommittee, I want to conclude my testimony as I
did six months ago: by reminding you--and the American people you
represent--that we are in a war with an adaptive enemy who means to do
us grave harm. In addition, we are on watch for possible hazards to the
homeland arising from illegal immigration, natural disaster, and
pandemic disease, among other things. To stay ahead of these threats,
the dedicated employees of I&A have been working long, hard hours to
transform the way we do business. We must be resolute in our efforts
and we cannot rest. I am grateful for the support and dedication of the
men and women of I&A. I am also thankful for the support I have
received from the Administration, from my colleagues in the
Intelligence Community, and from Congress, including the members of
this Subcommittee. Our transformation at I&A is well under way, but
much work remains to be completed. I look forward to this challenging
work. We owe it to ourselves and we owe it to the American people.
I am eager to work with this Subcommittee to continue I&A's
transformation, and I look forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Simmons. I thank the gentleman.
I mentioned that earlier this week, I had the opportunity
to visit a fusion center in Maryland. I look forward to
visiting a number of additional fusion centers located in
different areas of the country. It is my belief that these
fusion centers are going to be critically important as sources
of information and as locations where responses can be
coordinated, not only in the event of a terrorist threat, but
also in the event of other natural crises.
That being said, the National Governors Association
recently surveyed all of the governors of the United States.
They placed the state intelligence fusion centers as top
priorities, and so I think your concern and my concern coincide
with that of the governors.
It is my understanding that when you look at the fusion
centers, however, they are organized differently in different
areas. They have different lead sponsors. Some are sponsored
principally by the FBI, others by DHS, others by municipal
police.
It is my understanding that some federal guidelines on
fusion centers have been developed by DHS, but they have not
yet been released.
I wonder if you could comment on the issue of fusion
centers and what we need to do to move those concepts forward.
Mr. Allen. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I strongly agree with the
need for us to develop this strong relationship with the fusion
centers, but they do differ remarkably in many ways. Some
states as yet have not formed fusion centers. Others are in the
early stages of doing so.
And we are, I think, in agreement with you, and I know that
the Secretary will want to issue some guidelines, because as we
give out grants and as we begin training under legislation, the
head of grants and training can actually help provide money so
that the fusion centers can hire officers and analysts to come
in.
So the federal money will be involved with these. We will
want to have some general guidelines so that there is a common
understanding of roles, missions, functions, the flow of
information down as you spoke earlier.
One of the things that we know that is very important is to
be able to harvest some of the information that has been
lawfully obtained by these fusion centers, which deals perhaps
with suspicious activities or trends and patterns of things
that either states or local law enforcement organizations have
detected. So in my view, the federal guidelines is going to be
a key way of guiding this.
The one thing we do not propose to do is tell any of the
states or local governments how they should structure and
organize their fusion centers. But we would hope that they
would welcome federal guidelines as suggestions on how they can
most effectively organize themselves.
As you know, there are a number of fusion centers that will
be opening. New Jersey will be opening soon a fusion center in
Trenton, and, of course, the Regional Intelligence Center in
Los Angeles will be opening in mid-July where I will be present
to speak on behalf of Secretary Chertoff.
Your point, sir, extremely well taken.
Mr. Simmons. I thank you for that response.
And again, I refer to Page 399 in the 9/11 Commission
report which says that current threat calls for quick as well
as imaginative and agile responses. So, if, in fact, the
department's assessment of its recommendations on fusion
centers is stuck on somebody's desk, and I don't mean yours, my
inclination is to move forward with some legislative
initiatives on the subject, and maybe at some point, that set
of recommendations and our legislative initiative can meet.
Again, I think it is critically important, and I thank you
for the work that you have done in that line.
Again, I now recognize the ranking member.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As I mentioned in my opening statement, we did have a good
opportunity to meet with Mr. Allen in a classified setting
yesterday, and just going?I have another question other than
the NSA issue.
But the concern that I have is that, if there is
information that is collected by another agency, not DHS, that
in the end is decided was collected in violation of the
statute, whether there is an ability to audit where information
came and where it went as distributed from DHS.
And the question is: Are you able to discuss this in this
public setting?
And if so, could you talk about that, and if you cannot
talk about that, then just tell me that, and I will go to my
second question.
Mr. Allen. Yes, Congresswoman Lofgren, I can speak to the
point of view that we receive information from all of the
collection agencies of U.S. intelligence community as well as
we receive information, obviously, of a law enforcement nature.
We believe that all of the information collected by these
other agencies is lawfully obtained. We know of no occasion of
information that we have received that was unlawful, because we
view that those agencies work with their general councils, with
their inspector generals, and we know of absolutely no occasion
on which any unlawful information has been received by the
Department of Homeland Security. And, obviously, we respect the
information of a law enforcement nature.
So, I can say that we receive a wide variety of information
just like the National Counterterrorism Center receives a wide
variety of information. We apply our intelligence to these
areas of homeland security, which I spoke about the fact that
we analyze intelligence warnings and threats, and we try to be
agile and nimble. If there is a threat of any urgency, we do
secure borders.
We are doing a tremendous amount of work on the critical
infrastructures that is working to ensure that the private
sectors of U.S. society are protected. We work against
unconventional weaponry, and we work very closely with our
director of science and technology.
And then, of course, there is information from the open
domain which come into us as well as that from the collection
agencies in the intelligence community.
We know of no unlawful information, and we are very
confident that the information we have is lawfully obtained as
part of our analysis.
Ms. Lofgren. If I may, Mr. Allen, certainly, whatever
information we have from whatever source, we would use to
interrupt an attack on this country. The question really is, if
it turned out that your trust in the information coming in
was?you were disappointed, if that information became the basis
for a law enforcement action and prosecution instead of an
interruption issue whether we would be able to track it into
light.
So I am going to move on to the second question, which
really relates to High Track. In February, you and Dr. Mary
Connell talked about the progress of the critical
infrastructure vulnerability assessment that High Track is
doing. And I am worried and, frankly, maybe a little concerned
about the private sector participation in these efforts.
The GAO report says that only 290 voluntary submissions
have been made on critical infrastructure information from the
private sector. And they identify some things in their judgment
the department should do, that we should define specific
government needs for critical infrastructure information,
explain how the information will be used, assure the private
sector the information will be protected, who will have access
to the information, and somehow give an indication of benefit
to the owners of the information for sharing.
Have you had a chance to think about these suggestions, and
do you agree with them, or is there something else that we
should be doing?
Mr. Allen. I believe that the High Track, which I think is
absolutely vital that we further enhance and strength our high
track production. Dr. Connell, who is with me, has worked very
hard to put additional analysts into High Track.
We also have requested substantial increase in the number
of sector specialists which have to come from the
infrastructure protection directorate so that we can get the
synergy that is involved.
I understand the anxiety of the private sector, but I think
that in the last 6 months, you have seen a true increase in the
amount of information we flow to the private sector. I just had
a very senior official in the private sector from your state
call on his own and compliment the kind of support that he was
now receiving, that it was effective. It enabled him to take
the kinds of protective measures for his sector that he needed.
I am meeting with the--because there is a critical
infrastructure security committee, I meet with the heads of
each of the 17 U.S. private sectors. They like our new product.
We have a lot of work to do there, Congresswoman. You put
your finger right on something that we are going to work very
hard. We are very proud of what we have done.
One of the things that we have started to do is working
with the private sector on suspicious activities and reporting
out to those sectors things that have been detected either in
intelligence or law enforcement channels in order to enable
them to understand what might be going on as far as trends and
patterns of someone wishing to harm the private sector.
We are very pleased with where we are, but in the next 6
months, I want to come back very strongly and tell you that we
are a lot better off than we are today.
Ms. Lofgren. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I never dreamed that
we would start our 3:30 hearing at 4:30, and unfortunately,
Chairman Sensenbrenner and I and Mr. Conyers are hosting a
members meeting for roughly a hundred people at 5 o'clock. And
Jim Sensenbrenner is a very strong chairman, but I don't want
to tick him off, so I am thinking that I will rush over to that
meeting and then try and come back, leaving the minority in the
capable hands of Mr. Langevin for the moment.
Mr. Simmons. Good luck with Mr. Sensenbrenner.
The chair now recognizes the distinguished gentleman from
Nevada, a member of the Intelligence and Armed Services
Committee, who has on the distant horizon perhaps the
opportunity to be a governor. And so these issues might be of
particular interest to him.
Mr. Gibbons. Well, they are, Mr. Chairman, and I want to
thank you for the lead-in. You are a very good, straight man,
and I appreciate that as well.
Mr. Allen, it is always a pleasure to see you before our
committee, and I know oftentimes that the stress of a rigorous
schedule of reporting and briefing Congress oftentimes puts a
hardship on the agency to do their job. And for that, we
apologize, but there is no over alternative for us but for you
to be here.
What I am interested in, of course, is the state-federal
relationship here. As you have mentioned, there are a number of
states that are just beginning or started or are in the early
phases of having an analytic center or a fusion center, if you
will.
I would like you to tell me, if you can, how do you gauge
what they are doing correctly or what they are doing
incorrectly today? And if you can, tell me which states are
doing it right and which ones are doing it wrong.
Mr. Gibbons. That is a very good question, how to evaluate
and judge the efficacy of the various state fusion centers. And
some are so in their early stages, they are just now getting
computers and equipment and getting the personnel staff, say,
like the state of Virginia.
I was with Governor Kaine a few weeks ago, and he is
anxious for me to send an analyst down to work in his state
fusion center, which is going to be really outstanding, and the
Homeland Security adviser there working closely with the
governor to ensure that he builds what we want.
We go to, I believe, some states out in the far northwest.
Montana, Idaho, and others have yet to come online with the
state fusion center.
But there are some very strong ones. There is some in the
south. I know that Georgia has a very strong one. It is obvious
that Tennessee is extremely active. New York is very, very
active up in Albany. Very pleased with some of the--
Mr. Gibbons. How do you gauge those?
Mr. Allen. Based on what they are doing, based on their own
content of their own analyses, based on their interactions with
us, and we have steady interactions either on--if it is a
class-mat matter, on a secure phone or nonsecure phone. I have
calls with them or my subordinates on a regular basis. So we
can make judgments as to how well they are faring or not
faring. They obviously need assistance from our training and
grants directorate. They need funding, because they do not
necessarily have the funds themselves.
So I think the guidelines that Chairman Simmons spoke of
are very important. Those are guidelines that are, of course,
being worked closely with the Department of Justice so that we
ensure that we have the very best guidelines and supporting of
intelligence and law enforcement activities that may occur in
these fusion centers.
Mr. Gibbons. That support and the guidelines, does that
include the training of the individuals for these state fusion
centers?
Mr. Allen. Yes, sir, because under the legislation which
the Congress has provided, under grants and training, which I
do not control, but obviously, we work closely with grants and
training, can give funding for training programs. They can give
training--they can actually give funds so they can hire
analysts or other officers to staff the fusion centers.
Mr. Gibbons. Well, those would presumably already be
trained officers, trained analysts that come from some other
agency, can which in my view, brings the question of: Do we
have enough analysts, trained intelligence officers for this
kind of this opportunity that can go and participate in these
state functions without short-changing the work of the 10
different offices of the intelligence that you have under your
direction.
Mr. Allen. That is going to be an issue. We are going to
put some analysts and some liaison officers to coordinate
relationships.
As far as training, we actually, under the law, have been
able too bring some of the people, for example, New York and
Maryland, some of their analysts into some of my training
programs which I initiated. So we are working very closely with
the states.
Right now, given how stretched we are in the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis, deploying additional officers out to
the states will be a strain, but we are going to--I have talked
to the secretary and the deputy secretary, and they both feel
that we need to do this. So we are going to put officers in
many of these state fusion centers over the next 2 to 3 years.
Mr. Gibbons. One final question, Mr. Allen, and I don't
mean to belabor this. Have we improved the long delays that it
has been taking to get local and state law enforcement officers
certified or cleared for classified information, giving them
the classification to receive that?
I mean, there have been a number of complaints that we have
heard over the last many, many months, that it is just taking
too long.
Mr. Allen. I have learned of this since my arrival. I am
unhappy with the progress that has been made. I am working with
the director of office security to clear additional officers
with the state fusion centers, local government.
For example, I have all but completed clearing 50 officers
with the intelligence division of New York state. I just met
with Mr. McClary, police chief of Las Vegas. He is putting in a
request to clear four of his people. We are going to do that.
So, yes, I am very active and working directly with the
chiefs of police, with the sheriffs of the major counties to
clear some of their people. There is no reason why we should be
behind or delay clearing these people, clearing all of them.
Compartmenting information will be a little difficult, but we
ought to be able to give them secret clearances, and we ought
to be able to do it rather rapidly, Congressman.
Mr. Gibbons. And what does that rapidly mean? With your
influence say, for example, if--
Mr. Allen. Well, we can do it in a matter of weeks once
they get the information in. The ones in New York have been
cleared very rapidly. We are clearing a number of people. And I
am clearing people in the private sector, people who really run
security of major private sectors. They need the clearances
too.
And I have worked directly with the private sector to get
them clearances at the secret level. We need to accelerate
this. We have not done what should have been done, and I am not
too happy with that, by I am doing my level best to improve
that.
Mr. Gibbons. Well, you sound like you are the right person
for the job. You are the first one that has shown any
enthusiasm about moving that issue along quickly, and I
appreciate it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Simmons. I thank the gentleman for his questions.
The chair now recognizes the distinguished gentleman from
Rhode Island, Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Allen, I want to thank you for being here today and for
your testimony. Just on a personal observation and note, I
appreciate how accessible you have been. You have been before
this committee now several times, and we have had private
briefings with you in closed session. In addition, you and I
have had one-on-one discussions in my office. I appreciate how
accessible you have been.
Let me turn to a topic that we have discussed before and
builds on the line of this issue of open communication--more
effective intelligence sharing with state and local officials.
I know one of the times we have had discussion in my
office, we talked about RISSNET, Regional Information Sharing
Systems Network, that law enforcement already uses right now
for communicating with respect to sharing intelligence on
criminal activity.
And it seems to be a good model that works, and law
enforcement is comfortable with it. I know you sent a
representative, as I understand it, because you said you would,
to RISSNET to evaluate their capabilities and whether that is
something the Department of Homeland Security should be using
to share information about potential terrorist activity.
Can you just report to the committee your assessment of
RISSNET and just the information sharing mechanism that you
will be using in homeland security?
Mr. Allen. Congressman, that is a promising capability. My
deputy went up to Massachusetts to talk to officials there. I
will get back to you with their assessment. I do not have a
final assessment on his visit. We will get back to you on
RISSNET with the formal writing, formal question for the
record, if I may, sir.
Mr. Langevin. I appreciate that. And again, I appreciate
the fact that you dispatched one of your deputies so quickly to
go and at least evaluate the capability of RISSNET.
If I could, you also said that state regional fusion
centers obviously are being touted as an important resource to
promote information sharing with state and local and tribal law
enforcement officers and other entities nationwide. My
understanding, though, is that DHS is planning to send I&A
representatives to fusion centers--I know you have mentioned
that several times here today as well--in order to basically
act as liaisons with the DHS.
I also understand that the various folks that you will be
sending are at different levels of experience, different skill
sets and will be playing different roles. So my question is:
How will there be a consistent DHS footprint in the fusion
centers without some common standards for the people that you
are sending into the field?
What is your concept of operations implementation plan for
the fusion centers initiative being finalized only now after
you have already deployed personnel to the field? Basically,
what are the key points from your concept of operations and
implementation plans?
Mr. Allen. That is a good question. I did deploy people
with the Secretary's approval before the concept of operation
and implementation plan has been fully staffed and all the
funding for fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2007 have been
identified.
I did that because when I arrived, I found we had nothing
in the field. We had New York, we had Los Angeles, we had other
cities that wanted support. So I pressed hard to get some
people out on an ad hoc basis. That is no substitute for a plan
and for implementation of the plan. And some of the officers I
have sent have?and it depends to some degree on the fusion
center and their requirements. Out in Los Angeles, we need an
officer to help coordinate.
Up in New York, particularly in New York City, we need not
only a liaison officer, but they also want analysts to help
work with the intelligence divisions in New York City and with
the Counterterrorism Division to help them shape their analyses
and to do mentoring. So it does differ from state to state.
Our implementation plan suggests that most of our people
will work in liaison and coordinating capacities. But, for
example, down in the state of Virginia, because they have a
laboratory there with the military with Governor Kaine, I
believe he wants to have an analyst down in the state of
Virginia.
The state of Maryland, we sent one of our finest analysts
Dr. Connell has up to Maryland to help with the one that
Chairman Simmons met.
We have to get all this together, and very candidly, our
concept operation has come together since January. And now, we
have to get the implementation plan out and approved by the
Secretary, and then we have to carefully determine the work and
the activities that each will undertake out in the state fusion
center.
In most cases, I think it will be liaison officers,
coordinating officers, but a number of these places really do
need analysts. Governor Kaine made that very clear in the state
of Virginia.
Mr. Langevin. So it is your intent that although this first
appointment of individuals from I&A were more of an ad-hoc
basis that eventually, there will be a uniform plan for the
type of people that is deployed with various capabilities and,
skill sets?
Mr. Allen. Yes, sir, that is absolutely my intention. My
principal deputy, Jack Tomarchio, has been charged with doing
the kind of detailed implementation plan. He is a person from
the private sector who has worked very closely at the state and
local government levels in his career, and I have every
confidence that in 6 months from now, we can come back, and we
will lay out a plan that will be very satisfactory to you.
We will not have a lot of people out in fiscal year 2006,
but we hope to put 15 or 20 more out possibly in fiscal year
2007.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you very much.
Mr. Simmons. I thank the gentleman for his questions, and I
would like to do a second round if the gentleman would
accommodate me. Thank you very much.
I had the opportunity to meet Robert Stephan, the assistant
secretary for Infrastructure Protection. He is an impressive
guy, Air Force career, retired colonel, I believe, and he
filled me in quite a bit on High Track and how that is going.
I appreciate your comments that there seems to be more
cooperation from the private sector, and I think that is a good
sign that we are getting that cooperation.
I raised with him one issue that concerns me when it comes
to critical infrastructure and protection. And that is
passenger rail, particularly Amtrak. I sit on the Railroad
Subcommittee of Transportation. I have Amtrak through my
district, in fact, through my hometown. Many of my constituents
ride on a regular basis.
And looking back to the Baltimore tunnel and the New York
City tunnel issues, looking to the Spain commuter rail attack,
and also the British subway attack, it seems to me that that is
a model of attack that has been used by the terrorists in the
past. And certainly, with our rail infrastructure, our
situation might lend itself to that kind of attack, in
particular because Amtrak police are so limited in their
numbers.
We have three Amtrak police, who are based in New Haven,
Connecticut, who cover the Amtrak line from the New York border
to Providence. There are another three that operate out of
Maryland. Very limited resource, stretch resource. They do not
fill all their slots. Their new recruits frequently disappear
and go off to work with municipal police.
And so I guess my question would be: What effort or what
focus has been applied to the issue of passenger rail, in
particular Amtrak? And do you share my concern over the lack of
numbers and of the Amtrak police?
Mr. Allen. Chairman Simmons, I share completely your
concern about passenger rail, mass transit. Nothing probably
gives us more worries. We obviously work, as Kip Hawley, the
head of the Transportation Security Administration, has stated
about the passenger rail mass transit, that it is a deep
concern to him.
We have hardened our aviation security, although there are
still risks there, and Mr. Hawley is concentrating particularly
on detecting explosives.
But passenger rail, you are right. It is a very open
society, thousands of miles, either above ground or underground
across this great country. And the amount of security is, of
course, limited.
What we are doing is providing our assessments, providing
suggested potential ways that the mass transit sector can
mitigate some of these risks.
There are more measures being taken, certainly, at the
federal level, by Mr. Hawley. I believe in a classified
session, he could tell you more specifically some of the very
subtle measures that are being taken that may not be totally
evident. There are a number of areas.
I do agree that based just on what we know about al-
Qa'ida's interest in this or affiliated networks, that this
gives us--this is the kind of thing that certainly keeps me up
at night. And if we get a threat that deals with mass transit,
rest assured that that gives heavy scrutiny.
We work with the FBI and the National Counterterrorism
Center. We get the Homeland Security adviser on secure phone or
send secure messages. If it is a classified matter or if it is
one that we can just use the official-use only level, we get it
to them quickly. This is probably as worrisome a sector as we
have, sir.
Mr. Simmons. Thank you for that, and I will ask one more
question, realizing my time is disappearing.
Open-source intelligence--we have talked about it before.
That is my understanding that the Oklahoma City National
Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism has a
terrorism knowledge base that includes over 30 years of open-
source terrorism data.
We have a new open-source center that is affiliated with
CIA, the FBIS, which I am sure you are familiar with. It is
interesting and instructive to look at the recent concern
expressed over the National Security Agency surveillance
program to understand how Americans are instinctively concerned
about secret operations, in particular, those that could
possibly involve their own privacy here domestically within the
United States.
That is one argument among many for a focus on open-source,
in particular, for the Department of Homeland Security which
has responsibilities primarily within the domestic United
States to be using as much information as possible that is
derived from openly publicly available sources so Americans are
assured or get some assurance that their privacy is not being
violated.
I know you have testified in favor of open source. I know
you are an advocate for it. Over the last 6 months or 7 months,
what progress do you see incorporating open source into your
analytical product?
Mr. Allen. Chairman Simmons, under Dr. Connell here and
with the advice of some real specialists in open source, we are
now in the early phases of developing a comprehensive open-
source strategy, one of things that we have done is, for the
first time, the Department of Homeland Security, my office is
taking over the open-source information system portal of
information that deals with the homeland. This is something
that we have just now taken over.
We are looking at putting together a cadre of government
specialists as well as contractors from my office to work as a
virtual satellite bureau of the open source center that is run
by CIA to ensure that we meet the requirements, not only of the
federal government for Homeland Security open source
information, but that we also make available this information
we put down to the states. The states also, as you know, have
open source things publicly and lawfully acquired that we hope
to have push back towards us.
One of the things that Dr. Connell has done is to scrub all
the requirements for open source. When we came in 6 months ago,
7 months ago, none of that had been done. There was no open
source strategy, no open source program. We now have the
beginnings--and this is going to be one of my highest
priorities. Commercial imagery is something that I feel very
strongly about.
There are many ways that we can benefit homeland security
and through information sharing down and pull information back
from state and local government, all of which is open in the
public domain, all of which is legal.
Mr. Simmons. Thank you.
The gentleman from Rhode Island?
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Allen, I note one of I&A's major concerns is
radicalization within the United States and the threat that
this phenomenon poses to the homeland.
Without disclosing any classified information, of course,
what is your assessment of the extent of the radicalization
problem today, and what challenges is the intelligence
committee facing in this sphere, and what can be done to
prevent radicalized individuals, be they violent Jihadists or
right-wing extremists, from committing terrorist acts?
Mr. Allen. Yes. I appreciate the question, Congressman,
because we have formed a radicalization cell within our finest
officers under Dr. Connell within the Office of Intelligence
and Analysis. They are looking at the very broad aspects of
radicalization. They are also looking, not only at what you
might call those who are engaged in believing in the Jihad, but
we are looking at extremists on the right. We are looking at
animal liberation movements, earth liberation movements, people
who would use violence or do damage to our infrastructure.
Our greatest worry, however, of course, those right now are
those involved in starting to believe in the Jihadist message.
And as we know, we have this virtual world where we see people
connected to the Internet and the Internet culture--there is
Internet culture supporting the Jihad, as you are well aware.
It is a major driver.
We are not trying to get into the work that is done by the
National Counterterrorism Center or the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. We are working in a complementary way that,
because we have found out that states have a great deal of
information, a great deal to offer, all the states are looking
at radicalization. Your own state, I am sure, as well.
We know that California, New York and others are doing a
remarkable job, and we hope to work with state and local
governments and with the major cities, law enforcement
departments to be able to get a better understanding of how
perhaps radicalization is spreading across the United States.
It is very small, it is very limited, but we know what damage
only one or two individuals can do to our society.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. On that point, my understanding is
that much of the radicalization in the United States that is of
concern to the intelligence community is actually occurring in
our federal and state prison systems.
From your perspective, how easy is it for the prison
authorities to share information about radicalized inmates with
the intelligence community and state and local law enforcement
authorities?
And what areas of improvement are called for in terms of
improving information sharing in this area, and what role do
you envision your office playing in this regard?
Mr. Allen. I believe that we will play a very vital role
along with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and with the
National Counterterrorism Center. States and local law
enforcement agencies can share information that may involve
U.S. persons if those persons are engaged in advocating or
directing the violent actions against our society.
So we believe, though, that we are not looking at
individuals as we are looking at how this happens. What is the
phenomenon that causes a student from the University of North
Carolina to suddenly try to kill students, as he tried to do on
the 3rd of March 2006, an individual, that, for all ostensible
purposes, was not radical, was not an extremist, but obviously
had extremist beliefs and some extremist ties, particularly
probably the Internet? So these are things that are very
difficult for us to understand.
We are partnering with Dr. Maureen McCarthy of the director
of the Science and Technology of Homeland Security, which is
doing some very interesting research in behavioral sciences in
trying to look at this phenomenon of radicalization.
I am very pleased with where we are. We have got a long
way. Until Dr. Connell put together this team about a couple of
months ago, this radicalization studies were not being done in
Homeland Security. So we will be doing some assessments,
coordinating them with the rest of the intelligence community,
including the intelligence elements of the FBI.
I think this will help a great deal. Our Secretary is very
interested in this phenomenon of radicalization. It troubles
him greatly.
Mr. Langevin. It certainly concerns me. I know members of
the committee as well as other people in law enforcement. Thank
you for your answer on that issue.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Simmons. I thank the gentleman.
My recollection is that President Kennedy said many years
ago in reference to some of the activities the intelligence
community and the CIA that success has many fathers, but
failure is everywhere an orphan. It is particularly difficult
in our free and open society for American citizens to have a
sense of how their intelligence organizations are doing.
Yes, 9/11 was a terrible event for us, and some would say a
failure for the intelligence community. Since 9/11, we have not
had a similar event, but it is hard to know what that means.
Does that mean that we have been supremely successful and we
have thwarted hundreds and hundreds of attempts to replicate
that day here in the United States? Does it mean we are just
simply lucky, and the bad guys aren't trying anymore?
I wonder if it would be possible for you to share with us
your sense of whether we have had successes in the interim,
whether you are aware of successes where attempts have been
thwarted. And you may not be able to talk about that in detail,
but I think it would be useful to respond to that kind of
question in open session.
Mr. Allen. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I was a young officer
when President Kennedy came to CIA headquarters and what was
then a very new building and stood in the quadrangle in front
and said those famous words, and I stood about 30 yards from
the president. So that stands out vividly.
Mr. Simmons. Did I get it right?
Mr. Allen. Yes, sir, you certainly did. And he spoke those
words.
Mr. Simmons. I was not there.
Mr. Allen. And it was an emotional moment for all of us
after the Bay of Pigs. We had a great director then, John
McCone, one of the most famous directors we ever had. So it was
a historic moment. There is no question of that.
We have serious threats. We have had serious threats since
September 11, 2001. We have had extraordinary success, I think,
overseas led by intelligence and by the U.S. military. But I
think the intelligence operations overseas have been simply
nothing short of magnificent. I have been involved in many of
them in my previous capacity at the Central Intelligence
Agency. I am very proud of what the agency has done and
continues to do.
In this country, there have been clearly plots disrupted
and thwarted. Some of them were in preliminary stages. Others
were moving along to a more direct attack upon Americans. And
they take place in a number of forms. Some are fairly
ambitious, some are rather modest.
It is my belief that these threats will not diminish, that
even though we have an al-Qa'ida that has weakened and has been
battered, it is clear that the leadership of al-Qa'ida still
wants to conduct transnational operations. We have heard from
Osama bin-Laden in audio tape three times: 19th January; 23
April; and then 23 May just in this year. We have heard from
Zawahari, the number-two guy, I believe four times this year.
So in my view, we are a country at war and a country under
threat. It is going to take all of us. It is going to take all
the national intelligence community and all the state and local
law enforcement working collaboratively to keep the country
safe. That is what I do every day. It is what I have done.
Particularly in the last 15 or 20 years in my career, I always
go to work thinking, my job is to keep the country safe, and
that is what I try to do.
Mr. Simmons. Well, I thank you for that, and I thank you
for your success thus far.
As you recall, after the collapse of the wall and the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, the end of the Warsaw Pact,
there was a sense in this country that we no longer had any
special threats. And we glided through the 1990s defunding our
military and defunding our intelligence.
Now, we are in a situation where we not only have to
refund, but we have to reorganize. What would be the one or two
principal hurdles that you face in this refunding and in this
reorganization that this subcommittee can be helpful on?
Mr. Allen. I think, first of all, is the quality of our
people. I think that the U.S. intelligence community drew down
by almost 25 percent in personnel in the 1990s. Our military
intelligence fell by about 33 percent. There is a big deficit.
We are trying to grow analysts now and also intelligence
operations officers and the best and brightest technologists.
I am out recruiting on college campuses now, and we are
getting hundreds and hundreds of applications for, say, a
hundred or 120 positions. That is very encouraging to me. We
are going to have to grow these analysts. And CIA and FBI are
going to have to grow wonderful operatives to help do this.
So the first thing we have to do is continue to get support
from you, sir, and helping us build and grow and train the best
minds in the country, whether they are in operations, whether
they are in science, or whether they are all-source analysts.
We have a real deficiency.
Dr. Connell is trying to build and grow and mentor a lot of
officers right now, and we are looking forward to these bright,
young Americans coming in to work for our DHS intelligence
enterprise.
The second thing that has to be done, of course, is to get
us out of the 20th century when it comes to information
technology and information sharing. We are doing a lot of this.
I believe that what has gone on under previous Director Tenet
and now under Ambassador Negroponte trying to be able to find
ways to lawfully share information far more effectively than we
have in the past and to support us in this information
technology, what Congressman Langevin talked about, the system
up in Massachusetts.
Those kinds of tools, we need to have tools like that,
which will be very invaluable. It will help us understand what
is going on in the country, help us link information quickly.
Those things have to be funded. So your continued support and
information technology in helping us grow officers, whether
they be operations officers or analysts or scientists, we
appreciate it. We appreciate it very much.
Mr. Simmons. The gentleman from Rhode Island?
Mr. Langevin. I may have some questions, but I will submit
it for the record at a later time, Mr. Chairman. But at this
point, I have no further questions.
Mr. Simmons. I thank the gentleman for his participation.
Mr. Allen, I thank you and your staff for being here today.
We apologize for the late start because of the previous
committee activity that kept the room. But we appreciate very
much this update.
We will have some questions for the record. The members of
the committee may have some additional questions for you, and
we will ask you to respond to these in writing. The hearing
record will be held open for 10 days.
And there being no further business, without objection, the
subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]