[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE SCIENCE OF PREVENTION
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF
NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL ATTACK
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 14, 2006
__________
Serial No. 109-103
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Committee on Homeland Security
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Norman D. Dicks, Washington
John Linder, Georgia Jane Harman, California
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Tom Davis, Virginia Nita M. Lowey, New York
Daniel E. Lungren, California Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Columbia
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Zoe Lofgren, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Katherine Harris, Florida Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Islands
Dave G. Reichert, Washington Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Michael McCaul, Texas James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL ATTACK
John Linder, Georgia, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Christopher Shays, Connecticut EdwarD J. Markey, Massachusetts
Daniel E. Lungren, California Norman D. Dicks, Washington
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Jane Harman, California
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Columbia
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Peter T. King, New York (Ex Islands
Officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(Ex Officio)
(II)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable John Linder, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Georgia, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Prevention of
Nuclear and Biological Attack.................................. 1
The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Rhode Island, and Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack.... 27
The Honorable Donna Christensen, A Representative in Congress
From the U.S. Virgin Islands................................... 31
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washinton......................................... 32
The Honorable Jim Gibbons, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Nevada................................................ 29
WITNESSES
The Honorable Jay Cohen, Under Secretary for Science and
Technology, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Dr. John Marburger, Director, Office of Science and Technology
Policy, Executive Office of the President:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Mr. Vayl Oxford, Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office,
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 19
Prepared Statement............................................. 20
Panel II
Dr. Ronald Atlas, Chair, Committee on Biodefense, Public and
Scientific Affairs Board, American Society of Microbiology:
Oral Statement................................................. 40
Prepared Statement............................................. 42
Dr. William Happer, Cyrus Fogg Brackett Professor of Physics,
Princeton University:
Oral Statement................................................. 35
Prepared Statement............................................. 36
THE SCIENCE OF PREVENTION
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Thursday, September 14, 2006
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear
and Biological Attack,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in
Room 1311, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. John Linder
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Linder, Gibbons, Dent, Langevin,
Dicks, and Christensen.
Mr. Linder. The Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attacks,
will come to order. The subcommittee is meeting today to
discuss bolstering the science around preventing nuclear and
biological attack. I want to welcome and thank the witnesses
for testifying before this committee today and on this
important topic. We are 5 years removed from 9/11 and nearly 4
years since Congress authorized the creation of the Homeland
Security. Entrusted to this massive new department was the job
of leveraging the considerable scientific and technology
resources of the United States to prevent the unthinkable, the
terrorist attack using a weapon of mass destruction.
The horrors of the nuclear or biological attack require the
need for robust science and technology solutions and many of
the changes within DHS have been promising. Creation of the
domestic nuclear detection office, for example, with its focus
on the transformational research and development in its
leadership in creating new detection technologies has been
encouraging. Necessary changes made at DNDO exemplify the
importance of pushing the envelope in furthering the goals of
science and technology.
Achieving successful solutions require a consistent and
clear strategic plan to set research priorities while allowing
outside-the-box breakthroughs.
The question before us today is in the nearly 4 years after
the creation of DHS and the science and technology directorate,
what has been accomplished? It continues to be apparent to me
that the focus of the S&T director on minor improvements to
existing technology rather than developing new technologies to
ensure a better solution, whereas innovation as government
funding further the science of prevention. Regrettably, I feel
with few exceptions that the answer is no. The scientific
community, which is so eager to help make the Nation safer, has
lost confidence in the science of technology directorate. We
have heard that the S&T directorate has been plagued with bad
morale, poor and biased management, unjustified funding
decisions and lack of peer review and general failure to
effectively engage the scientific community. As the Senate
Appropriations Committee recently stated, a seemingly
rudderless ship exists within the leadership within the S&T.
These assertions are alarming and entirely unacceptable. Unless
I am encouraged by the Under Secretary Cohen to head the S&T
directorate, as he now recognizes, he has a tough shift ahead
in turning this ship ahead. From developing better biological
agent detection capabilities that want to be attacking our
Nation's population infrastructure and agriculture to a better
understanding of bioagents themselves and the consequences, we
must push for a better science and technology options.
We have enormous biotech expertise in this country that
exists in our universities, the national labs and in industry.
Failing to engage national, and in some cases, international
experts will guarantee failure in overarching our Homeland
Security mission. I look forward to continuing to work with DHS
to ensure success in our efforts. I hope that the initial
success at DNDO in developing much improved next generation
technologies and its focus on transportation R&D will serve as
a model for R&D.
I now recognize my friend from Rhode Island, Mr. Langevin,
for the purpose of making an opening statement.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome
our panel here today. It is great to have you before us. And I
certainly appreciate the opportunity to have a hearing on this
topic, the science of prevention.
In pursuit of the Homeland Security mission, science and
technology should enable the operational units of Department of
Homeland Security as well as the hundreds of thousands of first
responders and private sector critical infrastructure to better
protect themselves and the public. We must assure that
technology development is done with this mission in mind.
Ultimately mission success is the only metric that has any
meaning.
An interesting technology that does not enhance our ability
to foil terrorists' intentions and protect our citizens should
be viewed as a failure. One technology that I am convinced must
be aggressively developed and deployed to accomplish both of
these goals is radiation protomonitors and other non-intrusive
imaging equipment. As this committee has heard, the likelihood
of a terrorist successfully constructing a nuclear weapon is
much lower than conventional explosives dirty bombs or chemical
or biological weapons. However, the devastation of such an
attack will be so great that we must try to detect and
intercept any special nuclear material, such as highly enriched
germanium or weapons-grade plutonium from entering our country.
Now I am pleased that the director, Vayl Oxford, is here
today from the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, DNDO. I am
very interested to hear about the development and deployment
progress of the next generation advanced spectroscopic portal
systems as well as advances in non-interest technologies to
detect these materials.
And I must say, of all of the departments at DHS, DNDO has
brought great credit to that department, and we appreciate that
director's leadership there. The other non-intrusive
technologies could be used to detect explosives, especially
liquid explosives whose use came to the forefront only a few
weeks ago when the London police intercepted an alleged plot to
detonate liquid explosive bombs on planes bound for the United
States.
Next, I know that Under Secretary Cohen, who is confirmed
for his new position last month, has made this a top priority,
and I trust that we will get an update on your progress and
Admiral Cohen, just on a personal note, I have known you for
several years now in my other role as a member of the House
Armed Services Committee. You have a stellar reputation as
director of Office of Naval research. And I am glad that you
are back on the job and I note the country is safer already.
So Admiral Cohen, you have many challenges facing you
besides liquid explosives, however. The S&T directorate has
been plagued by personnel performance, accounting and even
ethics problems. Because of these problems, it has not been
accomplishing what should be its core mission acting as a
forcemultiplier to ensure success in defeating terrorists and
protecting our citizens.
Now the Office of Science and Technology Policy is also
important for us to hear from today. You represent the guidance
coming from the White House to the S&T community of the
executive branch agencies. Now I am concerned that DHS, S&T
division has not completely made it on to your radar screen and
has failed to win your confidence.
The Department of Homeland Security needs the support of
the White House if it is going to succeed and that support has
been pretty spotty to date. To most of us, the science and
technology efforts within the Department have been somewhat of
a black box and hope that the hearing today shines some light
inside. So gentlemen, I want to thank you for being here and
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I yield back.
Mr. Linder. I thank you. Our witnesses today are Dr. John
Marburger, the Director of Office and Science Technology Policy
and the Executive Office of the President. That is to say on
this first panel. The Honorable Jay Cohen, Under Secretary for
Science and Technology for the Department of Security, and Mr.
Vayl Oxford, who has testified many times here, director of the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Homeland Security.
It is a policy here to try to keep your prepared remarks to
5 minutes. Your entire written statement will be part of the
record. And Secretary Cohen, it will be nice if we can see
yours for 30 minutes before the meeting starts in the future.
Dr. Marburger.
STATEMENT OF JOHN MARBURGER, DIRECTOR, OFFICE AND SCIENCE
TECHNOLOGY POLICY, AND EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
Mr. Marburger. Yes, sir. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and
members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to have this
opportunity to make brief oral remarks on the role of the
administration and my office in support of the science behind
prevention efforts and the research and development efforts
underway to develop countermeasures to nuclear and biological
attacks, and I am glad that my longer version of my testimony
will be included in the record of today's hearing.
I am also delighted to testify with my colleagues, Under
Secretary Cohen and Director Oxford, and I assure you that our
administration has high expectations of them.
In December 2002, President Bush released the ``National
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,'' the report
that lays the groundwork for countering the very serious threat
from nuclear and biological weapons. The technical part of this
strategy was informed by an important study released earlier
that year by the National Academy of Sciences in their report
called ``Making the Nation Safer, the Role of Science and
Technology in Countering Terrorism,'' and that report continues
to be an important source of guidance for these efforts.
Following the national strategy, three homeland security
presidential directives, HSPDs, have been issued that bear on
countering biological and nuclear weapons. HSPD 9, released on
January 30, 2004, called ``Defense of the United States
Agriculture and Food,'' highlights many roles for research and
development including a role for my office in the acceleration
and expansion of countermeasure development. HSPD 10, released
on June 12th, 2004 called ``Biodefense For the 21st Century''
laid out specific agency responsibilities under four titles:
Threat Awareness, Prevention and Protection, Surveillance and
Detection, and Response and Recovery. The longer descriptions
are in my written version of my testimony.
HSPD 14, released April 15th last year established the
domestic nuclear detection office DNDO within the Office of
Homeland Security, and, of course, the director of DNDO, Mr.
Oxford, is present today and can describe in great detail the
role and activities of that office.
Research supporting the aims of these directives,
especially relating to biological and nuclear agents, requires
the expertise and capabilities of multiple departments and
agencies, and not just DHS and S&T. The key actors are DHS
itself, Health and Human Service, Department of Energy, and the
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Basic research at the National
Science Foundation is also significant for this effort, and in
my written testimony, I describe how my office assists in the
policy guidance to and coordination of this multi-agency work.
I don't want to go into that bureaucratic detail here but I
will be glad to answer questions about it.
Most of the $11.5 billion in Homeland Security R&D spending
that is $8.2 billion of it, during the past 3 years has been
directed toward weapons of mass destruction threats. Of the
$4.84 billion requested for R&D for fiscal year 2007, $3.76
billion is targeted for these threats, a substantial portion of
it. The R&D priority guidance issued each year jointly by my
office and the Office of Management and Budget includes a
section on Homeland Security R&D that encourages agencies to
emphasize research in seven specific areas, of which five are
relevant to the work of this subcommittee. And for each of
these five, I have provided background and a little vision
statement and expectations for future work in my written
testimony.
To keep my oral remarks brief, I will conclude by just
stating the descriptive titles of these five areas so you can
have a quick overview of the scope of the work. The first one
is detection, decontamination and remediation of biological
agents; second, the modeling of infectious disease outbreaks;
the third, the development of medical countermeasures for WMD
agents, generally not only biological and nuclear; the fourth
is protection of food and agriculture; and finally, the
detection of nuclear materials. These are priority areas that
we have asked all agencies to participate and perform research
on.
So in summary, defending our Nation against attacks with
weapons of mass destruction has been and will continue to be a
top priority of this administration.
While science and technology have contributed a great deal
to our defenses against nuclear and biological agents, there is
still very much more work to be done. And with the continued
support of Congress, and the excellent leadership of the
gentlemen to my left, we will continue to make significant
improvements in our capabilities to defend ourselves against
the threat of biological and nuclear weapons.
Thank you for the opportunity.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Dr. Marburger.
[The statement of Mr. Marburger follows:]
Prepared Statement of John H. Marbgurger, III
Introduction
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. It is a
pleasure to be here today before the Subcommittee on Prevention of
Nuclear and Biological Attack. Your hearing focuses on an issue of
critical importance--the science behind prevention efforts, and the
research and development efforts underway to develop countermeasures to
nuclear and biological attacks. Making full use of the nation's
collective S&T expertise is critical for long-term success in this
endeavor, and in the overall war on terrorism.
The possibility of an attack with nuclear or biological weapons has
long been seen by this Administration as one of the greatest threats to
U.S. national security. Unlike other weapons, nuclear and biological
weapons have the potential to inflict catastrophic damage in terms of
both the number of casualties and the destruction of public
infrastructure. The President released The National Strategy to Combat
Weapons of Mass Destruction in December of 2002 to lay the groundwork
necessary to counter the threat from nuclear and biological weapons.
This strategy called for a coordinated national effort to prevent,
prepare, and respond to this threat, and highlights the critical
importance of science and technology in this endeavor.
The information and recommendations contained in the 2002 National
Academy of Sciences (NAS) report ``Making the Nation Safer: The Role of
Science and Technology (S&T) in Countering Terrorism'' were taken into
consideration in the development of the national S&T response to this
threat. This report highlighted a number of areas where science and
technology could be applied to reduce the threat from biological and
nuclear weapons, including:
improved special nuclear material detection
capabilities;
improved communication between the intelligence S&T
and public health communities;
development of early warning and detection
technologies for biological agents;
improved models to better understand the potential
impact of biological weapons;
increased research, development and production of new
medical countermeasures;
improved personnel protective equipment; the
development of methodologies;
guidelines for the decontamination of radiological
material or biological agents.
Finally, there have been a number of Homeland Security Presidential
Directives (HSPDs) issued over the past four years that have particular
relevance to countering the threat from biological and nuclear weapons.
I would like to specifically address three of them, as they have played
a key role in shaping our nuclear and biodefense R&D efforts: HSPD-9,
NSPD-33/HSPD-10 and HSPD-14.
Signed on January 30th, 2004, HSPD-9 Defense of United States
Agriculture and Food establishes a national policy to defend the
agriculture and food system against terrorist attacks, major disasters,
and other emergencies. This directive lays out the steps necessary to
prepare our nation for such events and highlights many roles for
research and development, including a role for my office in the
acceleration and expansion of countermeasure development.
Released on the 28th of April, 2004, NSPD-33/HSPD-10. Biodefense
for the 21st Century, defines the nation's biodefense strategy. This
directive was the culmination of a comprehensive end-to-end assessment
led by the Homeland Security Council (HSC) of biodefense needs and
capabilities across all agencies, and laid out specific agency
responsibilities to support four main pillars:
Threat awareness,
Improve the Intelligence Community's ability
to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence on
biological weapons and their potential users.
Anticipate and prepare for novel or
genetically engineered biological threat agents.
Prevention and protection,
Improve our ability to detect, interdict and
seize weapons technologies and materials to disrupt the
proliferation trade, and to pursue proliferators
through strengthened law enforcement cooperation,
including Interpol.
Enhance diplomacy, arms control, and bilateral
and multilateral efforts that impede adversaries who
seek biological weapons.
Assess the vulnerabilities of our critical
infrastructure to focus protective efforts.
Surveillance and detection, and
Develop and integrated early warning system to
rapidly recognize and characterize any biological
attack, permitting an early and robust response to
prevent illness and deaths, as well as economic and
social disruption.
Enhance our ability to attribute biological
weapons attacks, thereby strengthening deterrence of
attack.
Response and recovery
Create and refine comprehensive plans to
mitigate the lethal, medical, psychological and
economic consequences of an attack.
Provide the newest and most effective medical
countermeasures such as vaccines, drugs and diagnostics
to prevent illness and save lives.
Coordinate federal assets to assist state and
local public health and medical response to mass
casualty events caused by WMD.
Develop risk communications strategies, plans
and products to reach all segments of domestic and
international communities.
Improve capabilities to remediate and
decontaminate the environment following a biological
attack.
HSPD-14, released on April 15th of 2005, established the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) within the Department of Homeland
Security. The DNDO was established to provide the U.S. with a
multilayered and well coordinated nuclear detection architecture, and
to serve as the lead federal agency for the research and development
pertaining to nuclear and radiological detection capabilities. As Mr.
Oxford is present today I will let him describe in detail the essential
role of, and the significant advances made by, the DNDO in securing our
nation from nuclear terrorism.
These reports and directives form the foundation of the S&T
community's efforts to develop and deploy technologies in support of
the prevention of nuclear and biological attacks. Rather than list the
accomplishments of the last four years, I would like to take this
opportunity to look forward by defining our current homeland security-
related S&T priorities, and the role S&T must continue to play as part
of a comprehensive strategy to combat terrorism and WMD.
The Role of OSTP in the Coordination of S&T related to Homeland
Security
Let me first take a brief moment to provide an overview of The
Office of Science and Technology Policy, and its role in Homeland
Security S&T.
The Office of Science and Technology Policy, which I lead, has the
primary responsibility within the Executive Office of the President to
prioritize and recommend federal R&D activities, and to coordinate
those activities at the interagency level.
S&T related to homeland security is particularly unique in its need
for coordination as it impacts mission areas, and requires the diverse
skill sets and expertise, of multiple departments and agencies. In
2006, nine different departments and agencies received funding for
homeland security-related research and development projects.
The primary mechanism for coordination of interagency science and
technology issues is the National Science and Technology Council
(NSTC), which was established by Executive Order 12881. This Cabinet-
level Council, chaired by the President, is the principal means for
Coordinating science and technology issues across the executive branch.
One of the NSTC's four standing committees, the Committee on Homeland
and National Security is focused on identifying S&T priorities and
facilitating the planning among federal departments and agencies
involved in homeland and national security S&T. The work of the
Committee on Homeland and National Security is closely coordinated with
the efforts of the Homeland Security Council and the National Security
Council.
R&D Priorities to Counter the Threat of WMD as Stated in the OSTP/
OMB Budget Priorities Memo for FY 2008.
From 2004 to 2006, homeland security-related R&D funding has
totaled $11.5 billion dollars with an additional $4.8 billion requested
for FY2007. The majority of this funding is directed at enhancing our
capabilities to prevent, detect, protect from, or respond to, an attack
with WMD. Of the $11.5 billion dollars of homeland security-related R&D
funding from 2004 to 2006, $8.2 billion dollars was devoted towards
countering the threat from WMD. Of the $4.84 billion requested for
homeland security-related R&D funding in the President's FY2007 budget,
$3.76 billion is targeted at countering the threat from WMD.
The work being done to counter the threat from WMD, especially the
threat from biological and nuclear agents, requires the expertise and
capabilities of multiple Departments and Agencies and is not solely the
realm of DHS S&T. The Departments and agencies most heavily involved in
this research are DHS, DoD, HHS, DoE, and USDA. Basic research at NSF
also contributes greatly to this effort.
On June 23rd of this year, OSTP released, in coordination with the
Office of Management and Budget, a memorandum for the heads of
executive departments and agencies on Administration Research and
Development (R&D) Budget Priorities for FY 2008. This memo highlights
the Administration's R&D priorities and emphasizes improving management
and performance to maintain excellence and leadership in science and
technology. It also provides general guidance for setting priorities
among R&D programs, identifies interagency R&D efforts that should
receive special focus in agency budget requests, and reiterates the R&D
Investment Criteria that agencies should use to improve investment
decisions for and management of their R&D programs. These updated R&D
budget priorities reflect an extensive, continuous process of
consultation with the President's Council of Advisors on Science and
Technology (PCAST) and collaboration within the interagency National
Science and Technology Council (NSTC). For the past four years, this
memo has included a section on priorities in Homeland Security related
R&D and I would like to talk about these priorities today.
Four years have passed since the publication of the President's
National Strategy for Homeland Security which identified the Nation's
S&T enterprise as a key asset in our efforts to secure the homeland.
All parts of that S&T enterprise, both public and private, have
answered the call for the development of ``new technologies for
analysis, information sharing, detection of attacks, and countering
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons.'' Despite the
significant achievements over the past four years, many challenges
remain to mitigate vulnerabilities. Every year, we seek to highlight
these challenges in the priorities memo, not to exclude ongoing
efforts, but to focus new initiatives and funding in the areas where
they are most needed.
For FY08, we encourage agencies to place increased emphasis on
Homeland Security related R&D efforts that support:
quick and cost-effective sampling and
decontamination methodologies and tools for remediation
of biological and chemical incidents;
the development of integrated predictive
modeling capability for emerging and/or intentionally
released infectious diseases of plants, animals and
humans, as well as for chemical, radiological or
nuclear incidents, and the collection of data to
support these models;
the exploitation of recent advances in
biotechnology to develop novel detection systems and
broad spectrum treatments to counter the threat of
engineered biological weapons;
the development of novel countermeasures
against the natural or intentional introduction of
agricultural threats, including R&D on new methods for
detection, prevention, and characterization of high-
consequence agents in the food and water supply;
transformational capabilities for stand-off
detection of special nuclear material and conventional
explosives;
biometric recognition of individuals for
border security, homeland security, and law enforcement
purposes in a rapid, interoperable, and privacy-
protective manner; and
recognizing and expediting safe cargo entering
the country legally, while securing the borders against
other entries.
I would like to take this opportunity to provide you with a brief
discussion of our vision for each of the five areas contained in this
memo relevant to the mission of this subcommittee.
Decontamination of Biological Agents
The small scale indoor release of anthrax in October 2001
illustrated the magnitude of the threat to public health and
infrastructure that is posed by biological weapons. The attacks claimed
five victims and contaminated multiple postal facilities, the American
Media, Inc., building in Boca Raton, Florida, and the Hart Senate
Office building. The cleanup of these buildings cost hundreds of
millions of dollars and took years to complete. The Brentwood Mail
Facility alone cost $130 million and took over 2 years to finish. These
small attacks clearly demonstrated the gaps that exist in technologies,
methods, and procedures used for the decontamination of biological
agents. A deliberate attack with anthrax over a major metropolitan area
has the potential to displace thousands of people and close hundreds of
businesses for years. As an example of the cost associated with losing
even one piece of critical infrastructure, the San Francisco Airport
Authority estimated a daily economic effect of $85 million lost for
each day spent undergoing decontamination and restoration. Investment
in the development of new technologies and methodologies for the wide
area decontamination of biological and chemical agents is needed to
offset the cost of restoration after a potential terrorist attack.
Furthermore, many of the technologies that need to be developed will
also improve our current capabilities to clean up the contamination and
environmental damage that are associated with natural disasters
Developing the technologies necessary to address the deficiencies
in our current biological agent decontamination capabilities will
require a mixture of both long term basic research, and short term
applied and advanced development research. A focused and directed
investment in the R&D of novel decontamination technologies for
biological agents over the next 10 years will yield the tools needed to
improve the efficiency and reduce the time and cost associated with the
decontamination operations, regardless of future target cleanup levels.
Short term applied research on novel decontamination technologies over
the course of the next five years could have an immediate positive
impact on our decontamination capabilities. Examples of near term
technological solutions include the development of: novel tenting
materials for rapid site preparation for fumigation, better fumigant
monitors, improved characterization of surface effects, and development
and testing of non-destructive decontamination methods. A comprehensive
decontamination R&D program must also include long-term basic research
focused on better understanding the characteristics of biological
agents as they relate to decontamination. The recent NAS report
entitled "How Clean is Safe?" concluded "there is insufficient
information to quantify a 'safe' amount of residual biological agent in
a decontaminated facility." It also pointed out that there are many
issues that decision makers need to consider when decontaminating a
facility. Studies that examine environmental persistence,
susceptibility to various decontaminants, and improved methodologies
for sampling will be critical for any future efforts to develop
realistic clean up levels for biological agents.
The National Science and Technology Council's Subcommittee on
Decontamination Standards and Technologies was formed in 2005 to
coordinate the efforts of all Departments and Agencies with
responsibilities for, or capabilities applicable to the environmental
decontamination of biological agents. The subcommittee has been working
to develop risk management-based guidance for biological and chemical
agent decontamination operations. This work is currently in review and
should be available in the next few months. The SDST has also been
working to identify the technology needs and gaps that must be overcome
in order to support efficient decontamination operations, and to
coordinate the R&D efforts of multiple agencies (namely DOD, DHS, and
EPA) to address those gaps.
Modeling
There are pockets of world-class infectious disease modeling
expertise within a small number US universities, national laboratories,
and the federal government; however current efforts are limited and
insufficient to produce needed national capacity. It presently is a
``scientific cottage industry'' supported to a limited extent by the
National Science Foundation, Departments of Health and Human Services,
Agriculture, Interior, Energy, Defense, and Homeland Security.
With the current threat of a highly pathogenic avian influenza
pandemic and other fairly recent outbreaks of emerging or zoonotic
diseases such as SARS, there has never been a greater need for the U.S.
to have the capability to model the geospatial and temporal spread of
infectious diseases to enhance and/or enable threat awareness,
prevention and protection, surveillance and detection, and to test and
identify measures for response and recovery as called for by HSPD's 9
and 10.
Epidemiological/mathematical/statistical models can be used to
develop response plans, inform policy decisions, compare and exercise
effects of control measures under different scenarios, train personnel,
and educate industrial groups. One highly successful model for
accomplishing this is the Models of Infectious Disease Study (MIDAS)
established by the National Institutes of Health (NIH). MIDAS funds
several world-class groups of investigators using epidemiological and
mathematical models to address high priority infectious diseases of
public health. MIDAS has already had a profound impact on the Nation's
understanding of pandemic influenza, including its transmission, the
effectiveness of various strategies for mitigating its spread, and the
required amounts of vaccines and anti-virals. Much of the information
reported through the MIDAS group has been used to inform policy
decisions, and in turn surfaced additional questions, the answers
which, could help inform additional policy questions.
The Department of Homeland Security is conducting a joint analysis
between the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center
(NISAC) and the Critical Infrastructure Protection Decision Support
System (CIPDSS) team to investigate possible impacts in two specific
areas in support of the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza. The
first is to analyze the potential impacts of pandemic influenza on U.S.
infrastructures by evaluating which infrastructure sectors will be most
impacted by a potential influenza pandemic and how the proposed
policies for mitigation measures such as social distancing and vaccine
and antiviral distribution would alter the impacts to infrastructures.
Issues that will also be evaluated include identifying differential
impacts (by asset, infrastructure, population and region), including
specifically healthcare and emergency response impacts and how
infrastructure impacts will influence the spread and recovery
processes. The second area of focus will be an evaluation of the
effects of uncertainties on response effectiveness and economic impacts
from a pandemic affecting the national workforce and the national
infrastructure.
In addition, the Departments of Agriculture, Interior and Homeland
Security are in the process of building a collaborative effort to model
the impacts of various countermeasures against foreign animal diseases
such as Avian Influenza and Foot and Mouth Disease. The next step in
this process would be to connect the two by bringing together the
public health and animal health communities to examine the need for the
coordination of modeling in each of these communities and how this
might best be accomplished.
Development of Medical Countermeasures
The development and acquisition of medical countermeasures to
prevent and/or treat the effects of CBRN agents is a critical component
of our efforts to prepare for and mitigate the effects of an attack
with WMD. In fact, the development of medical countermeasures against
WMD accounts for a significant portion of all S&T funds directed
against the WMD threat. The key role for development and acquisition of
effective medical countermeasures against WMD previously has been
identified in Homeland Security Presidential Directives 4, 9, and 10.
In addition, supporting legislation, including the Project BioShield
Act of 2004, which provides nearly $5.6 billion dollars over ten years
to provide for the acquisition of new medical countermeasures against
CBRN agents, highlights the importance of an integrated enterprise
across the Federal government and includes stakeholders from academia
and industry.
Significant progress has been made in the development of medical
countermeasures against biological and nuclear agents over the past
four years.
The National Institute of Allergies and Infectious
Diseases at the National Institute of Health has seen an
increase in biodefense and medical countermeasures development
funding from $53 million in 2001 to $1.8 billion in fiscal year
2006, (with close to $1.9 billion requested for 2007) with
comparable funding in FY05, 06, and 07), and has set up an
aggressive program of basic research aimed at better
characterizing a select group of biological agents thought to
have a high probability of being used as potential bioterror
agents, as well as implementing programs to better understand
the effects of chemical and radiological agents in an effort to
develop new countermeasures against these threats. Much of the
NIAID medical countermeasure research effort has centered on
multiple Centers of Excellence based around cutting edge U.S.
medical research centers in an effort to focus the research
efforts of the academic community on these important issues.
NIAID has also improved the U.S. biodefense infrastructure by
funding the construction of 4 new high containment laboratories
(BSL-3/4) in order to increase the laboratory facilities
necessary for the high volume of research on high priority
biothreat agents.
DHS has completed Material Threat Assessments (MTAs)
for all of the class A biological agents, as well as nerve
agents and radiological threats. These intelligence based
assessments play a critical role in the BioShield procurement
process by providing HHS with the necessary information on
which to build their requirements for medical countermeasures.
As of January 2006, DHS has completed a comprehensive threat
analysis of likely biothreat agents. This new threat assessment
methodology will provide a powerful tool for future
prioritization of WMD medical countermeasure R&D and
acquisition needs.
The Special Reserve Fund (SRF) of Project BioShield
has been utilized to award four contracts for the delivery of
countermeasures that address two of the four initial material
threats (anthrax and radiation, small pox was addressed before
Project BioShield):
$877.5 million for 75 million doses of rPA
anthrax vaccine
$362.7 million for 15 million doses of AVA
anthrax vaccine
$17.5 million for 4.8 million units of
Pediatric KI syrup
$21.9 million for 390,000 doses of Ca-DTPA,
and 60,000 doses of Zn-DTPA
$362.6 million for 200,000 doses of botulinum
antitoxin
$308.4 million for 30,000 courses of anthrax
therapeutics
$165 million for 20,000 treatment courses of
anthrax monoclonal antibody
$144 million for 10,000 treatment courses of
anthrax immune globulin
Furthermore, additional requests for product have been
issued to solicit competition for BioShield contracts to
fulfill the need for:
Up to 20 million doses of next generation
(MVA) small pox vaccine
Up to 100,000 treatment courses of drugs to
counter the effects of neutropenia associated with
acute radiation syndrome (ARS).
The threat from biological weapons is dynamic and evolving. Recent
advances in the life sciences have made it easier than ever before to
enhance traditional biological threat agents to avoid our current
countermeasures, or to engineer completely novel threat agents that we
would be unable to detect or treat.
We must continue to support ongoing efforts to develop improved and
more effective countermeasures against the traditional threat agents
(anthrax, plague, smallpox, etc.) that present an immediate threat to
our National Security, and present the best opportunity for medical
mitigation. Simultaneously however, the Nation must begin to invest in
technologies that will allow for a rapid and flexible defense against
enhanced or engineered biological agents. The development of new host
based diagnostic techniques including: Molecular biomarkers--such as
messenger ribonucleic acid (mRNA) and proteins--could provide new tools
to determine an individual's exposure to a number of potential
pathogens. Additionally recent breakthroughs in the life sciences can
be exploited to develop new therapeutics and broad spectrum
countermeasures. For example, emerging technologies like RNA
interference--coupled with vectors for delivering DNA vaccines and
advances in DNA synthesis technology could form the basis for a highly
robust system for therapeutics against a wide range of viral
infections. While a great deal of basic and applied research will be
required to make these possible new detection mechanisms and treatments
a reality, such systems could drastically reduce the time needed to
respond to future threats.
Protection of Food and Agriculture
Our agricultural system is vital to the well being of the United
States and accounts for approximately 12 percent of our Gross Domestic
Product. It ensures that we can feed our Nation without depending on
other countries--a significant strategic advantage over many countries
in the world. Recognizing this importance the President has designated
the Nation's agriculture and food systems as a critical infrastructure
and on January 30th, 2004, signed Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 9 (HSPD-9) which established a national policy to defend the
agriculture and food system against terrorist attacks, major disasters,
and other emergencies.
In response to HSPD-9, which calls for an acceleration and
expansion of the development of current and new countermeasures against
the intentional introduction or natural occurrence of catastrophic
animal, plant, and zoonotic diseases, the Subcommittee on Foreign
Animal Disease Threats (FADT) of the President's National and Science
Technology Council, has brought together leading agro-defense experts
and decision makers from many federal agencies to identify the key
technological tools needed to protect our agricultural system and the
supporting research to develop them. The Subcommittee has focused on
those agricultural threats with the greatest potential economic or
public health impacts and limited its scope to the research and
development (R&D) needed to inform policy decisions and/or provide the
key tools to mitigate the impacts of a natural or intentional
agricultural outbreak.
Also in response to HSPD-9, the Department of Homeland Security
established the National Center for Food Protection and Defense in
Minnesota and the National Center for Foreign and Zoonotic Disease
Defense in Texas. Each of these centers is conducting research to
further protect and defend our nation's food and agricultural system.
Detection of Nuclear Materials
The prevention of the terrorist use of nuclear weapons against the
United States remains one of the highest priorities of this
administration. Central to our ability to defend against nuclear
terrorism is our ability to detect and interdict illicit special
nuclear material as early and as far away from U.S. territory as
possible. The ability to interdict nuclear and radiological material
(to search, locate, identify and/or track) is dependent on the
technological capability to detect material with the appropriate
sensitivity and selectivity, at a distance without false alarms, and to
carryout this work in operational settings that requires self
sufficient, efficient, mobile, hardened and integrated systems. The
technical gaps to achieve such a complete capability require
evolutionary as well as transformational advancements. It requires
exploitation of existing technologies and development of new detectors
to improve detector arrays, reduce false or nuisance alarms, operate at
lower power, have faster electronics, be environmentally stable, have
higher efficiency, be available at different sizes/shapes depending on
the operational setting, have improved selectively and sensitivity and
greater network capability, and work at greater standoff distances.
Closing these gaps will require improved active and passive
interrogation methods, improved radiography, and innovative techniques
to improve quality of images, detection at high speeds, and the
development of an open architecture with sensor networks to support
data fusion and integration. As with nonproliferation, no single
detection system alone can do the job and development of capability to
address the interdiction mission in concert with the nonproliferation
efforts will radically improve our domestic security.
As mentioned earlier a central figure in ensuring that this
research is accomplished is the newly formed Domestic Nuclear Defense
Office within DHS. The President's FY 2007 budget request supports
aggressive R&D and operational programs for nuclear defense, including
a requested $535 million in FY 2007 (a 70 percent increase over FY 2006
funding) for DNDO, which includes funds that will support the kind of
transformational research that will be necessary to develop the next
generation of detection systems. However, we also urge the Senate and
the House to restore full funding to DNDO as it enters into conference
negotiations on the DHS appropriations bill.
While the development of advanced nuclear materials detection
technologies has been called out as a priority in the 2008 budget memo,
it is important to note that there are additional technical challenges
associated with a robust and comprehensive defense against a terrorist
use of a nuclear weapon which mandate investment in research and
development that runs the gamut from basic science and technology to
prototype deployment. Beyond detection, the spectrum of R&D is equally
broad, covering research with the objective of decreasing the
legitimate demand for highly enriched uranium or plutonium; detecting
nuclear development and testing programs overseas; securing existing
stockpiles of weapons and material; attribution; render safe; and
consequence management. R&D programs across the federal government are
supporting these various elements of domestic nuclear defense. These
programs are structured to meet each federal department's highest
priority objectives engendering unique requirements that ultimately
drive mission-specific advanced technology development. The R&D efforts
underlying many of these mission areas have common or synergistic
elements. These synergies necessitate consideration of how 0best to
coordinate efforts, identify and fill technical gaps, and promote
technical advancement ensuring the generation-after-next defensive
capability. OSTP has been leading an interagency effort under the HSC/
NSC Domestic Nuclear Defense Policy Coordinating Council to ensure that
all nuclear defense R&D is adequately coordinated and appropriately
funded to meet each federal department's highest priority
objectives.ConclusionDefending our nation against attacks with weapons
of mass destruction, especially nuclear and biological weapons has been
and will be continue to be a top priority of this administration. We
have worked diligently over the past four years to develop strategies
to address these threats. Our strategies for the defense against
biological and nuclear weapons are based upon sound scientific input,
and provide a coordinated plan that takes full advantage of the diverse
and varied scientific capabilities and expertise of the entire federal
government to ensure that we have the necessary tools to prevent,
detect, protect against, or respond to attacks with WMD. While science
and technology have contributed a great deal to our defenses against
nuclear and biological agents there is still much work to be done. With
the continued support of Congress for this essential research we will
continue to make significant improvements in our capabilities to defend
ourselves against the threats of biological and nuclear weapons.
Mr. Chairman, and members of the Subcommittee, I thank you for the
opportunity to testify to today. I look forward to answering any
questions you may have.
Mr. Linder. Secretary Cohen.
STATEMENT HON. JAY COHEN, UNDER SECRETARY FOR SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Cohen. Good afternoon, Chairman Linder, Congressman
Langevin and the distinguished members of this subcommittee. I
appreciate very much your invitation to be here today and to
have an opportunity to testify concerning the significant role
of science and technology and bringing new solutions to bear to
the challenges that face both the Nation and, by extension, the
Department of Homeland Security in making us more secure.
It was my intent to address some specifics here, but I
think in light of your opening comments, Mr. Chairman, I would
first like to apologize that you did not receive my testimony
well in advance as you require. I will find out why that didn't
happen, and I can assure you that will not happen again.
I am also honored to be sitting between Dr. Marburger who
has been a mentor for me in this area. I am not a scientist. I
am barely a shade tree engineer, but I have had the privilege
of working with him for the last 6 years, and I have recently
met Vayl Oxford and appreciate very much as a nuclear
submariner his responsibilities using the Naval reactors model
that the Department of Navy uses of cradle to grave
responsibilities for nuclear and radiological protection of our
country.
Many of you from prior hearings that I have had over the
last week are aware that in the first 3 weeks on board, I
reported for duty on the 10th of August, with the support of
the administration, and especially Secretary Chertoff.
I have realigned consistent with the 19 pages of
implementing legislation, which I appreciate so much the vision
of the Congress and the administration in establishing the
Department of Homeland Security, the S&T directorate. That has
been approved a week ago by Secretary Chertoff. It was briefed
to the Congress last Thursday and we are off to the races
aligning and manning to that new construct.
After 9/11, and all of us in the room lived through that,
had a chance to observe those heinous events, things that were
unthinkable before 9/11 all of a sudden became not only
plausible, but potentially probable. And in the evaluation of
the probability of occurrence and the consequence of occurrence
in multiplying those two together, you come up with risk. I
dare say that many of us before 9/11 thought that the
probability of occurrence of a chemical, biological, nuclear,
radiological attack on our soil was low to insignificant other
than naturally occurring animal diseases. But after 9/11, we
realized, the administration realized and the Congress realized
that that was not the case. And so from the start there was
leadership and focus in nuclear, radiological, chemical, and
biological DNDO has been responsible appropriately for the
nuclear and radiological. The Department of Homeland Security,
S&T directorate has been responsible for the chemical and
biological aspects of that detection, prevention, remediation,
recovery, et cetera.
Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, that represents today
50 percent of my budget, and as I have realigned in to six
departments of energetics, chembio, C4ISR, which I know Ms.
Harman will appreciate, is very military, and Congressman
Langevin. My people said no, no. Call it command and control.
You know, sounds less military, but the facts of life are we
are at war, and my department and my directorate must be
involved in command, control, computers, communication,
intelligence surveillance and recognizance. And that is a
cross-cutting department for me that affects everything else
that we do, and shame on me if I don't leverage the tens, nay
hundreds of billions of dollars of investment that has been
made in other agencies and in Department of Defense.
And as I have said in previous hearings, and I know Mr.
Chairman, you have heard this, you may get tired of me
complimenting the Congress, but I appreciate so much in the 19
pages of enabling legislation that you had the vision to
realize we were not going to recreate the NIH. We were not
going to recreate the national science foundation. But you
wanted me to leverage those investments and focus them for the
national defense and Homeland Security mission areas.
Additionally, we have borders in maritime, a balance of our
Customs and Border Protection as well as our Coast Guard. So we
have a seamless border of our land and our seas.
Human factors which are so important. This is an area that
I think we will find in the future will be unique to the
Department of Homeland Security, especially the psychology of
terrorism, hostile intent and the reaction of our citizens and
our society to various threats and attacks. And then finally,
infrastructure and geophysical sciences, to me, transportation
is merely infrastructure that moves.
So chembio is half my budget. It is one of my six
departments. We have had a chance to brief you in classified
hearings as to the progress that has been made there. Much
remains to be done. I think during the question and answer
period, you will see some of the innovative things that have
occurred. But Mr. Chairman, I believe the committee is right.
We have not gone far enough. We can go much farther, and I
think Dr. Marburger will tell you I am not afraid of risk,
focused risk, innovation, the partnership between industry,
academia and our national labs makes this country the great
country that it is and I plan on fully utilizing those tools
that you have given me to protect our country in the chembio
area.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Secretary Cohen.
[The statement of Mr. Cohen follows:]
Prepared Statement for the Record Hon. Jay M. Cohen
Introduction
Good afternoon, Chairman Linder, Ranking Member Langevin and
Members of the Subcommittee. I appreciate the invitation to meet with
you today to discuss the significant role of science and technology in
bringing to bear solutions to the challenges the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and the Nation face in making us all more secure.
Specifically I will address the realignment of the Directorate to
better meet the mission needs of our customers--the DHS Components, and
the customers of our customers--the first responders; the work of the
Homeland Security Research Enterprise including the DOE National Labs;
and the progress we've made in one of the biggest DHS priorities,
biological defense.
President Bush noted the important role of science and technology
in protecting the Nation in July of 2002 when he discussed the creation
of the Department of Homeland Security: ``We will harness our science
and our technology in a way to protect the American people. We will
consolidate most federally funded homeland security research and
development, to avoid duplication, and to make sure all the efforts are
focused.''
The Science & Technology Directorate (S&T Directorate)'s mission is
to protect the homeland by providing Federal, State, local, and Tribal
officials with state-of-the-art technology and resources. To accomplish
this mission and be successful we have made changes to mature the
organization. My goal for the Directorate, as envisioned by our
enabling legislation, is to become a full service organization that is
customer focused and output oriented. It must also be cost effective,
efficient, responsive, agile, and flexible.
It is essential that the Nation invest strategically in research
and development to detect and prevent a nuclear or biological incident
and to minimize the consequences should such an event occur. This
requires the S&T Directorate to focus research on areas that will best
fill our customer's capability gaps and improve operations. We must set
our priorities to align with National and Department of Homeland
Security priorities.
Setting Priorities
My years at the Office of Naval Research taught me that a research
and development (R&D) organization must take to heart customers'
insights, priorities, and goals. Since my arrival at DHS on August 10,
I have identified a number of strategic changes that are required to
transform the Directorate into a world class science and technology
management organization that is adept in mobilizing the resources of
the Nation's and the world's vast R&D enterprise to address gaps and
vulnerabilities in homeland security.
When Secretary Chertoff launched a Second Stage Review of
Department operations last year, he emphasized the need for the
Department to focus on risk. ``We cannot protect every single person
against every single threat at every moment and in every place. We have
to, with our finite resources and our finite employees, be able to
focus ourselves on those priorities which most demand our attention.
And that means we have to focus on risk. And what does that mean? It
means we look at threat, we look at vulnerability, and we look at
consequence.'' The S&T Directorate will endeavor to fulfill the threat-
based needs of our customers and focus on enhancing the ability to
reduce risk throughout the Department.
To quickly capture and articulate these broad risk based
priorities, I internally refer to them as the ``4 B's'':
Bombs
Borders
Bugs, and
Business
S&T will work with our customers to sharpen the focus of our
research and enhance our customers' capabilities in these core areas to
better secure our nation.
The R&D Budget Priorities issued annually by the Office of Science
and Technology Policy (OSTP) and the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) help guide the S&T Directorate's planning efforts. The budget
priorities for FY 2008, issued in June 2006, acknowledge the far-
reaching response of the nation's science and technology enterprise as
called for in the President's National Strategy for Homeland Security
for the development of ``new technologies for analysis, information
sharing, detection of attacks, and countering chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear weapons.''
The OSTP/OMB budget priorities acknowledge the significant number
of achievements over the past four years, as well as the many
challenges to reducing the nation's vulnerabilities to high-consequence
events that remain. Among the areas cited as being in need of increased
emphasis, are several in the biodefense arena that S&T with our
interagency partners is actively addressing. These include:
Quick and cost-effective sampling and decontamination
methodologies and tools for remediation of biological and
chemical incidents
The development of integrated predictive modeling
capability for emerging or intentionally released infectious
diseases of plants, animals and humans, as well as for
chemical, radiological or nuclear incidents, and the collection
of data to support these models
The exploitation of recent advances in biotechnology
to develop novel detection systems and broad spectrum
treatments to counter the threat of engineered biological
weapons
The development of novel countermeasures against the
natural or intentional introduction of agricultural threats,
including R&D on new methods for detection, prevention and
characterization of high-consequence agents in the food and
water supply.
S&T will focus on the customers' risk based priorities and
capability gaps. In order to effectively implement these research
priorities, the S&T Directorate is organized to be more accessible by
the DHS Components to leverage the value added work the men and women
of S&T are bringing to the fight. Our DHS customers utilize
technologies and solutions that will make their jobs better, more
efficient, more cost effective, and safer.
Implementing R&D Priorities
Toward this end, S&T will utilize customer-led Integrated Products
Teams (IPT). DHS Management will lend acquisition expertise and
guidance to this effort. DHS R&D program requirements will be reviewed
at least annually and IPTs will be tasked with formulating specific
goals and budgets. These teams will be chaired by the DHS customers who
need new technology to improve their performance in achieving their
mission. Test and Evaluation functions will be integral to the IPT
process to help ensure that the products and capabilities delivered
meet customer and first responder needs.
Six Disciplines--the S&T Divisions
The S&T Directorate is now organized in six Divisions along
disciplines that are aligned with our customers' requirements. Each
Division has at least one Section Director of Research and a Section
Director of Transition. The Section Director of Research works with
S&T's Director of Research and is focused on basic research; and
coordinates with the National Laboratories and S&T's University
Programs, including the Centers of Excellence. The Section Directors of
Transition work with S&T's Director of Transition and focus efforts on
applications and expediting technology transition.
The disciplines and examples of programs in each Division are:
Energetics--i.e. Aviation Security; Mass Transit
Security; Counter MAN pads
Chemical/Biological--i.e. Chem/Bio Countermeasure R&D;
Threat
Characterization; Agro-Defense; Bio-surveillance,
Response & Recovery
C4ISR--i.e. Information management; Intelligence/
Information Sharing; Situational Awareness (e.g.,
interoperability and compatibility; security screening; cyber
security)
Borders/Maritime--i.e. Land Borders; Maritime/U.S.
Coast Guard; Cargo
Human Factors--i.e. Social-Behavioral-Terrorist
Intent, Human Incident Response, Biometrics
Infrastructure/Geophysical Science--i.e. Critical
Infrastructure Protection; Regional, State and Local
Preparedness and Response; Geophysics
Additionally, the Director of Innovation (Homeland Security
Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) works with the leaders of
each Division and, as specified in the Homeland Security Act of 2002,
``support(s) basic and applied homeland security research to promote
revolutionary changes in technologies; advance the development, testing
and evaluation, and deployment of critical homeland security
technologies; and accelerate the prototyping and deployment of
technologies that would address homeland security vulnerabilities.''
The S&T Directorate will align its investment portfolio to balance
project risk, cost, impact, and the time required to deliver results.
Investments span across three technology Transition Readiness Levels:
Short-term R&D projects of less than three years; mid-term projects of
three to eight years; and long-term efforts that extend beyond eight
years. Our investment portfolio must be prioritized across long-term
research, product transition and leap-ahead capabilities. A healthy
push and pull between the research and application arms of the
organization, coupled with tension over mid-term resources, will help
S&T achieve a balanced investment portfolio.
To execute these priorities the S&T Directorate has resources
across public sector, private sector and academia; I refer to this as
the Homeland Security Research Enterprise. Thanks to the enabling
legislation, we have the ability to utilize DHS labs, Department of
Energy's National Labs, Homeland Security Institute and the DHS Centers
of Excellence. Additionally we utilize other agencies' resources
including those of Department of Defense (DoD); National Institute of
Standards and Technology; Health and Human Services; Department of
Agriculture; Environmental Protection Agency; National Science
Foundation; DoD Federally Funded Research & Development Centers;
industry; international partners; and stakeholder associations. This
allows the Directorate to select the best performer based on
capabilities.
DHS Use of DOE National Laboratories
We have a strong working relationship with the DOE National Labs
and I thank you for enabling the Directorate to utilize these important
national assets. For more than half a century, the Federal Government
has invested tens of billions of dollars in creating the Department of
Energy's (DOE) National Laboratory system. Today these Laboratories
represent state-of-the-art scientific capabilities that support the
development of innovative technologies to address evolving national
needs. For this reason, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 gave DHS
special access to the National Labs. It created the Office of National
Laboratories (ONL) within the S&T Directorate and gave it
responsibility for coordinating and utilizing these unique national
assets in support of the DHS mission.
ONL, with the active collaboration of DOE, is working to
continually improve the utilization of this enormous national resource
by enabling DHS to harvest the full range of National Laboratory
science and technology innovations.
Many homeland security programs that were conducted by the National
Labs prior to 9/11 were transferred to DHS at its inception and have
since formed a solid core of technical competence for S&T. With the
active support of DOE, the S&T Directorate continues to use the
National Labs, building upon their unique capabilities, vast
experience, and past performance in specific areas vital to homeland
security.
The relevant technical capabilities of all of the National
Laboratories are used to support S&T and its DHS customers in
identifying technical goals and the specific science and technology
innovations needed to satisfy those goals. The ONL coordinates efforts
to identify and organize multi-laboratory R&D teams that represent the
most qualified technical experts to ensure the most efficient
allocation of the National Lab capabilities and resources to help
achieve the goals of DHS customers.
Following DOE review and acceptance, the selected multi-lab teams
will execute the National Lab programs under DOE management and
supervision.
ONL coordinates annual reviews of National Laboratory performance
using teams of DHS customers, S&T Directorate Program Managers and
independent technical experts. These reviews evaluate R&D performance
based on three primary criteria: mission and DHS customer relevance;
technical competency; and management effectiveness. Since many DHS R&D
programs are of multi-year duration, the above process will be used to
manage program execution as well as to initiate new programs. ONL will
also support the DOE in its laboratory strategic planning and annual
reviews of performance to maintain enduring national capabilities that
support both the DHS and DOE missions.
One of the Department's biggest priorities is detecting, preventing
and responding to a biological attack, or ``Bugs'' in my shorthand. As
you are aware, the deliberate or accidental release of a biological
threat agent has the potential for disastrous consequences that include
mass casualties. The economic impact of biological event could
significantly disrupt the nation's critical infrastructures and the
functioning of our society.
Biodefense: The S&T Biological Countermeasures Program
The DHS S&T Biological Countermeasures program provides the
understanding, technologies and systems needed to protect against
possible biological attacks on the nation's population, agriculture or
infrastructure. The program places its greatest emphasis on those
biological attacks that have the greatest potential for widespread
catastrophic damage. These include aerosolized anthrax, smallpox,
highly virulent agricultural scourges such as foot and mouth disease,
and contamination of selected food supplies. Where appropriate, the
program incorporates biodefense as part of an integrated chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive (CBRNE) defense across
civil and military agencies.
The program's core requirements derive from the President's
Biodefense Strategy for the 21st Century Homeland Security Presidential
Directive (HSPD-10), which provides a comprehensive framework for our
nation's biodefense, and Defense of the U.S. Agriculture and Food
(HSPD-9), which establishes a national policy to defend the Nation's
agriculture and food systems against terrorist attacks, major
disasters, and other emergencies. Programs are formulated to respond to
each of the 11 specific taskings in these HSPDs for which DHS S&T has a
lead or major role. In addition, the composition, priorities, and goals
of the overall portfolio and of each major program area are reviewed
and approved or altered annually as part of S&T's formal five-year
RDT&E planning process.
Current lead or major roles of S&T's Biological Countermeasures
program include:
Conducting periodic risk and policy net assessments to
guide the overall biodefense program;
Establishing the National Biodefense Analysis and
Countermeasures Center (NBACC) to conduct the laboratory
experiments needed to close key knowledge gaps in understanding
the risks posed by current threats and to develop strategies
for defending against future threats;
Working with the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) to develop countermeasures to biological
threats;
Leading the coordination of a national-attack warning
system,
Expanding BioWatch, a monitoring program designed to
provide cities with the earliest possible warning of an
aerosolized attack;
Developing bio-detection systems for critical
infrastructures;
Developing detection systems for protecting the food
supply;
Establishing the National Bioforensic Analysis Center
as the Nation's lead facility for technical analysis of samples
from potential biocrimes or acts of bioterrorism to support
attribution by the appropriate Federal agencies;
Operating and upgrading the Plum Island Animal Disease
Center, the only facility in the U.S. dedicated to studying
certain foreign animal diseases such as Foot and Mouth Disease;
and
Working jointly with the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) to expand current and new agricultural
countermeasures, and develop a plan for safe, secure, state-of-
the-art biocontainment laboratories for foreign and zoonotic
diseases.
These activities are coordinated at the Federal level through a
variety of mechanisms, most notably through the Homeland Security
Council, several subcommittees under the National Science and
Technology Council and the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and
through direct coordination with specific departments.
The overall guiding principle has been to allocate work to the
private or academic sectors, whenever possible, and only assign work to
national or Federal laboratories that:
is inherently governmental or quasi-governmental;
involves selected core competencies;
does not provide sufficient financial incentive to
attract industry involvement;
The vast majority of work that is performed in the private or
academic sector goes through normal competitive processes that range
from Requests for Proposals to Broad Agency Announcements (BAA) with
source selection based on programmatic review.
For work to be performed at the National Laboratories, the Office
of Research and Development Program Manager, working with the
designated Thrust Area coordinator, decides which laboratory should
perform the work based on internal proposals and knowledge of the
relative strengths of each laboratory.
Applying these guidelines has resulted in the following major roles
for each of these entities:
DOE National Laboratories: building on their strong
computational capabilities and role in the intelligence community, the
National Labs have established and operate the Biodefense Knowledge
Center; continue to provide technical reachback support for the
BioWatch monitoring system which they piloted; and continue to play a
major role in assay development for the highly specific recognition of
biological agents, having built a successful partnership with the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and other Federal
agencies in developing secure, robust validated assays for government
applications.
Other Federal Laboratories: provide unique government
facilities for working with biological agents. The U.S. Army Medical
Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) provides interim
housing for the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center
(NBACC); the U.S. Department of Agriculture and Food and Drug
Administration laboratories for characterizing the stability of
biological agents in various food matrices; the Edgewood Chemical and
Biological Center for independent testing of detection systems; the
Environmental Protection Agency and the CDC for the collection and
analysis of BioWatch samples respectively.
Private Sector: provides operational support for NBACC,
BioWatch and Plum Island Animal Disease Center; provides unique
facilities and capabilities for supporting NBACC; provides the
technology and transition to the marketplace for next generation
detection technologies to help meet needs for such systems as a fully
autonomous 3rd Generation BioWatch Detection system, rapid detection
systems that can act like ``bio smoke alarms'' for critical facilities,
detection systems for monitoring central food processing facilities,
novel detection systems for better characterizing forensic samples and
for charactering unknown or emerging agents; and the development of
novel assays to support these new detection platforms.
Academic: draws on the expertise of the university Centers of
Excellence to provide the longer term R&D needed to respond to an
evolving threat and to train the next generation of homeland security
scientists. These include:
Fundamental insights into the nature of terrorism
(Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, University of
Maryland);
Research on the environmental risks posed by various
biological agents (Center for Advancing Microbial Risk
Assessment, Michigan State University);
Evaluation of current risk assessment tools and the
development of next generation tools (Center for Risk and
Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events, University of Southern
California);
Research into potential threats to animal agriculture
(National Center for Foreign Animal and Zoonotic Disease
Defense, Texas A&M University); and
Post-harvest food security (National Center for Food
Protection and Defense, University of Minnesota)
Given the rapid pace of advancement in biotechnology and its
attendant implications for evolution in both the available
countermeasures and in the future, a variety of mechanisms are used to
stay informed of future developments including: formal technology
watches and assessments; sponsoring of scientific conferences and
National Academy Studies; participation in the program reviews and
planning process of other agencies; pre-BAA workshops for ideas and
tools to address specific needs; annual DHS S&T conferences to make
known our strategies and to meet with developers in special breakout
sessions; and frequent contact with developers throughout the year to
learn of their capabilities, products, and ideas.
Making the Nation Safer
S&T has also made great strides in addressing many of the
recommendations from the post-9/11 study by the National Academies of
Science entitled Making the Nation Safer. Examples from our biological
defense activities include:
Creating networks for detection and surveillance--we
have pioneered the Nation's first biological monitoring system,
BioWatch, operating in more than 30 urban areas to detect
biological threat agents and are working with our interagency
partners to developing a nationally coordinated approach to
biodetection, including mutually agreed upon bio-detection
assays and notification protocols.
Develop and coordinate bioterrorism forensics
capabilities--we established the National Bio-Forensics
Analysis Center (NBFAC), as the Nation's only dedicated secure
operational bioforensics laboratory. This capability, operated
in partnership with the FBI, did not exist prior to the events
of 2001 and has been designated in the President's Biodefense
for the 21st Century as the lead federal facility for the
technical analysis of bio-crime and bio-terror related samples
in a secure environment.
Developing methods and standards for decontamination:
DHS has partnered with the San Francisco International Airport,
EPA, CDC, local, regional and state agencies to develop and
demonstrate improved protocols and sampling techniques for
restoring airports and other transportation hubs following a
biological event; sponsored an NAS study on ``Reopening Public
Facilities After a Biological Attack''; currently co-chairs,
along with the EPA, the Subcommittee on Decontamination
Standards and Technology under the aegis of the National
Science and Technology Committee; and is leading an interagency
effort to develop improved sampling strategies and
methodologies.
Create special research organizations to address both
classified and unclassified issues related to countermeasures
to bioterrorism: the DHS National Biodefense Analysis and
Countermeasures Center is dedicated to just such a capability,
providing a dedicated, secure environment to conduct laboratory
experiments to close key gaps in our understanding of those
aspects of the biological threat that bear on the effectiveness
of our countermeasures and to conduct the analytical risk
assessments required under the President's Biodefense for the
21st Century, to help prioritize these threats and inform the
allocation of national resources.
Establish laboratory standards: DHS plays a
significant role in the Integrated Consortium of Laboratory
Networks (ICLN) which is developing a system of Laboratory
Response Networks, including the associated standards and
protocols, to collectively address the full range of chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear threats.
Conclusion
I thank the Subcommittee for this opportunity to present my plan
and vision for the Science & Technology Directorate, and to provide
insights into the Directorate's process of prioritizing R&D investments
that will strengthen our nation's ability to detect, protect against,
respond to, and recover from acts of terror as well as acts of nature.
In the weeks and months ahead, we will be finalizing and implementing
our plans to create a more responsive, customer-focused and robust
science and technology management organization that I am confident will
prove to be a vital national asset. I will be happy to address any
questions you may have.
Mr. Linder. Mr. OXford.
STATEMENT OF VAYL OXFORD, DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION
OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Oxford. Good afternoon, Chairman and Mr. Langevin, and
distinguished members of subcommittee. I would like to thank
the committee for the opportunity to discuss the Research and
Development activities of DNDO and how these activities will
directly address the nuclear and radiological threat. I am
pleased to be here with Dr. Marburger and Under Secretary Cohen
as well. DNDO has embraced a multi-layered homeland defense
system, much like the one recommended in the 2002 National
Academy Report Making the Nation Safer, the Role of Science and
Technology in Countering Terrorism. Over 60 percent of DNDO's
fiscal year 2007 budget request is intended for R&D activities.
We believe this level of investment is necessary to achieve our
R&D development goals. Through these investments DNDO is
improving the capabilities in detection and interdiction of
radiological and nuclear threats. I would like to share
highlights in some of these areas.
First of all, we have completed initial development and
high fidelity testing for the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal
program or ASP. On July 14th, we awarded contracts to Raytheon
Company, Thermo Electron Corporation, and Canberra Industries
for low rate initial production of those systems. After further
testing this fall, we expect full rate production to begin in
2007. To detect shielded materials like special nuclear
material, DNDO is developing the next generation radiography
system. The Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography System, or
CAARS, will automatically detect, within cargo, high density
material that could be used to shield threat materials. On
September 8th, contracts were awarded to L3 Communications,
American Science and Engineering Incorporated and SAIC
Corporation for the development of the CAARS system.
DNDO also continues to develop handheld, backpack, mobile,
and relocatable assets. Through this program, we will improve
the probability of identification, wireless communications and
durability of these systems. One specific goal set by the
Secretary in this area is to deploy radiation detection
capabilities to all Coast Guard inspection and boarding teams
by the end of 2007.
Our exploratory research program is exploring new detection
materials and active interrogation techniques evolving
algorithms and conducting phenomenology studies to improve
detective performance and increase system accuracy and
reliability. In December of 2005, we published a call for
proposals to the national and Federal laboratories, received
150 proposals, and selected 44 for award resulting in nearly
$40 million of advanced research in nuclear protection. In a
similar way, DNDO released a solicitation in March of 2006 to
private industry and academia, and are now evaluating over 70
proposals for awards in the similar areas.
We are launching several advanced technology demonstrations
or ATDs to validate concepts and then transition to system
development. In 2007, exploratory research efforts in special
nuclear material verification will transition to an ATD. This
active verification of special nuclear material will enhance
detection identification through the development of gamma and
neutron-based direct detection techniques. In April, we
solicited proposals for our first ATD the intelligent personal
radiation locator to replace existing radiation pagers with a
pocket-size radio isotope identifier with wireless
communication capability. It will be used by law enforcement,
first responders and counterterrorism agencies in routine
activities and surveillance.
We will also pursue a stand-off detection ATD to locate and
identify nuclear threat materials at a distance beyond 100
meters.
Finally, a long-dwelled detection in-transit ATD is planned
to explore our capabilities to exploit the time available
during cargo transit to detect threat materials in cargo and
conveyances. Also in the transformational research area, our
academic research program will provide a much-needed emphasis
in nuclear detection sciences, a field that has been in decline
at American universities for years.
In fiscal year 2007, DNDO will assume the mission to stand
up and manage the National Technical Nuclear Forensic Center on
behalf of the U.S. government, with its mission to develop an
overarching national level technical forensics and stewardship
program for the U.S. government. DNDO will be responsible for
developing capabilities in pre-detonation material forensics to
support attribution authorities as they conduct collection,
analysis, and enforcement missions.
Finally, as Secretary Chertoff announced in July, we have
launched the Securing the Cities Prgram. This initiative is
intended to enhance the protection capabilities in and around
the Nation's highest risk urban areas. Using the New York City
area as the initial engagement area, DNDO and regional partners
will develop an analytically based detection architecture that
will lead to identification of needed equipment, training and
support infrastructure to protect those environments.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I look
forward to your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Oxford follows:]
Prepared Opening Statement Vayl S. Oxford
Introduction
Good afternoon Chairman Linder, Ranking Member Langevin, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee. As Director of the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), I would like to thank the Committee
for the opportunity to discuss the research and development (R&D)
activities of DNDO and how these activities will directly enhance the
probability of mission success. I am pleased to be here with other
distinguished witnesses, Dr. Marburger and Under Secretary Cohen.
In the past, I shared with this subcommittee some of the ways that
DNDO is working with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the
Department of Energy (DOE) to deploy radiation detection equipment
domestically and overseas. Collaborating with our implementing partners
to increase the effectiveness of nuclear detection globally is vital.
However, greater security can be achieved through the development and
deployment of increasingly sophisticated and innovative technologies
throughout all three layers of the global architecture--overseas, at
our borders, and within the United States.
As such, the DNDO has embraced a multilayered homeland-defense
system much like the one recommended in the 2002 National Academies'
report, ``Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology
in Countering Terrorism.'' This methodology requires improved
capabilities in detection and interdiction of illicit materials,
intelligence fusion, data mining, attribution, and effective response
to nuclear and radiological threats. To address these requirements, the
DNDO maintains a preeminent research and development program, while
simultaneously capitalizing on the benefits of integrating this program
with larger acquisition efforts. Over 60% of DNDO's fiscal year 2007
budget request is intended for R&D activities. We believe this level of
investment will help us achieve both R&D and acquisitions goals.
Detection and interdiction of illicit materials
The DNDO improves the probability of detection and interdiction by
integrating and deploying current technologies, continually improving
these technologies through near-term enhancements and transformational
research and development, and expanding detection capabilities at the
Federal, State and local levels. The technical challenges to
radiological and nuclear detection that we face stem from trying to
resolve operational challenges and other obstacles to effective
detection like proximity to a source, shielding of a source, velocity
of a transported source, and decreasing the rate of false and nuisance
alarms.
DNDO development programs are directly tied to robust systems
engineering and test and evaluation programs. The aim is to ensure that
all acquired systems address identified capability gaps and have been
fully evaluated prior to any acquisition decisions. Additionally, all
deployed technologies will be accompanied by the appropriate training,
exercise, and response protocols. This will ensure that systems are
operated properly, and all alarms are immediately reported to the
appropriate agencies and personnel. Deployed systems will also be red
teamed to assess their true impact on homeland security.
While the baseline architecture will continue to be documented, the
architecture team has begun examining options for strengthening the
architecture in the near and long-term. These options will be evaluated
in terms of risk reduction, direct and indirect costs, operational
feasibility, and other relevant decision factors. In addition,
recommended enhancements are being identified and prioritized. The DNDO
and its internal interagency staff are reviewing and refining the
recommendations to reflect the full range of technical and policy
factors that must be addressed in determining the preferred overall
architecture.
The international portions of the architecture are being developed
in close coordination with the Department of Defense (DOD), DOE, and
Department of State (DOS), as well as components of Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) with international responsibilities and
relationships. The border portions are closely coordinated both within
DHS (e.g., with CBP and the Coast Guard), as well as with other
relevant agencies. The interior portions of the architecture are being
closely coordinated with the Department of Justice (DOJ), Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other Federal, State, and local
entities.
A critical component of the DHS nuclear countermeasures
architecture is a passive radiation detection portal suitable for
examining cargo containers, trucks, privately-owned vehicles, mail, and
bundled cargo. The Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) program is a
next-generation radiation portal monitor that rapidly and accurately
detects the presence of radiation at realistic operational settings,
and also identifies the materials causing the alarms. This allows the
dismissal of alarms caused by non-threatening sources, thereby reducing
the operational burden due to nuisance alarms.
We have completed the initial engineering development phase of ASP
and in support of this program have executed the first ever high
fidelity test and evaluation campaign to measure the improvements in
performance provided by these next-generation systems. To address
concerns about the additional cost of these next-generation systems,
DNDO also completed a Cost-Benefits Analysis of ASP and poly-vinyl
toluene (PVT) radiation portal monitors (RPMs). We demonstrated that
purchasing and deploying a mix of current and next-generation systems
would result in time-savings costs, while significantly enhancing the
effectiveness of DHS Customs and Border Protection (CBP) secondary
inspection operations, as well as greatly reducing secondary referral
rates when ASP-like systems are used as a means of primary inspection.
On July 14th, 2006, DNDO awarded contracts to Raytheon Company,
Thermo Electron Corporation, and Canberra Industries, Inc. for the
development and production of ASP were announced on July 14. The
priority for the first year is development and testing of the fixed
radiation detection portal that will become the standard installation
for screening cargo containers and truck traffic. In the near future,
the DNDO will conduct testing and data collection of the first 27 ASP
units at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), the New York Container Terminal
(NYCT), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), and selected
Ports of Entry (POEs) located in the north, south, east, and west. The
DNDO will complete system qualification testing and the subsequent
engineering changes as required--ensuring the pilot and production ASP
units can withstand shock, vibration, temperature gradients, and other
environmental stresses. Full-rate production (a decision based upon
test results) is expected to begin in 2007.
The DNDO, in cooperation with CBP, will install and commission
fixed and mobile ASPs ordered in FY 2006 (including 24 pilot units) and
is planning orders for additional cargo portals, 30 SUV/truck--based
systems, and 2 rail systems. By the end of calendar year 2007, planned
deployments of current (PVT) and next generation (ASP) portals to all
major seaports will provide coverage of 98% of all incoming seaborne
containerized cargo, as well as over 90% of all containerized cargo
passing through land border crossings. The DNDO will also be acquiring
ASP systems on behalf of DOE for deployment through the Megaports
Initiative, further enhancing the broader U.S. strategy to scan
incoming cargo before it reaches our borders. A Memorandum of Agreement
on DNDO/DOE cooperation is in negotiation and DOE has identified funds
for the purchase of twelve ASP systems.
While spectroscopic portals will provide a next-generation
capability to passively detect unshielded or lightly shielded nuclear
materials, no passive system can detect nuclear materials that are
heavily or completely shielded. Radiography systems (using active
imaging techniques) can provide a solution to the challenge of
detecting shielded nuclear material. To detect heavily or completely
shielded materials like special nuclear material (SNM), and
particularly highly enriched Uranium (HEU), DNDO is developing a next-
generation radiography system that will minimize negative impacts on
commerce and the flow of traffic. Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography
System, or CAARS, will automatically detect high-density material
shielded within cargo that could escape detection by radiation portal
systems, like ASP. The automated image processing techniques envisioned
for CAARS will also substantially improve throughput rates over current
generation radiography systems. On September 8th, contracts were
awarded to L-3 Communications, American Science and Engineering,
Incorporated, and SAIC Corporation for the development of CAARS.
Fundamentally, DNDO believes that a combination of passive
spectroscopic systems and advanced radiography systems will allow us to
detect unshielded, lightly shielded and heavily shielded nuclear
materials, components, and weapons that may be illicitly transported in
cargo containers, air cargo bundles, or other conveyances.
In addition to portal monitors and radiography systems, DNDO is
investing substantial funds to continue developing handheld, backpack,
mobile, and re-locatable assets for non-Port of Entry (POE) venues.
These systems are designed to integrate into existing law enforcement
operations, providing cues for further investigative action when
radiation is detected. DNDO acquired 88 improved handheld units in
fiscal year 2006, of which 83 were provided to CBP operators for use in
obtaining operational feedback for spiral development. We expect to
purchase 407 handheld units in fiscal year 2007. Two Hundred and fifty
seven units will be provided to CBP operators and 150 units will be
provided to the USCG. By the end of FY 2007 the USCG will have rad/nuc
detection capability for all inspection/boarding teams. Each system
will have improved probability of identification, improved ability to
communicate with a reachback center, and better durability for rugged
field conditions.
We are also engaging with the Coast Guard (USCG) and State and
local partners to address the challenges associated with radiation
detection in the maritime environment. The harsh environment and
operational constraints that the USCG faces makes development of
effective operational equipment a considerable technical challenge. As
the Secretary has stated, one major goal for this Department is the
deployment of radiation detection capabilities to all U.S. Coast Guard
inspection and boarding teams by the end of 2007. To ensure that the
Department accomplishes the Secretary's goals, DNDO is committed to
developing a Joint Acquisition Plan with the Coast Guard to provide
handheld and backpack radiation detection devices that will fulfill
imminent operational needs in fiscal year 2007, as well as lead to the
development of next-generation technologies that have the
identification capabilities, connectivity, and ruggedness required in
the maritime environment.
Despite the progression of our near-term R&D efforts, there are
still key, long-term challenges and vulnerabilities in our detection
architecture that require long-range, higher risk research programs to
deliver the highest payoff improvements in detection capabilities. Our
transformation research and development work will render next-
generation technologies that address the current limitations of
deployed systems. Significant advances in radiation detection
technology could potentially impact all capability gaps in our present
detection architecture, from the ubiquitous, distributed network of
inexpensive radiation detectors to highly sensitive, standoff detection
systems for sensing mobile threats at speed. We are launching
initiatives to develop technologies to meet architectural challenges by
pursuing a robust Exploratory Research Program to stimulate the entire
field of nuclear detection sciences. The effort will involve
participants across private industry, the National Laboratories, and
academia. In order to achieve effective coordination between the
numerous government agencies involved in related work on nuclear
detection, the DNDO participates in the Counterproliferation Program
Review Committee, co-chaired by DOD and DOE with members from the
Intelligence Community, Department of State, and others, which provides
a yearly report to the Congress and works to ensure that technology
development in this area is fully integrated.
The discovery and development of new detection materials and
concepts is a major focus of DNDO exploratory research over the next
five years. We continue to pursue new methods and signatures that will
provide techniques for verification of shielded special nuclear
materials. In addition, we are adjusting algorithms and devising new
models to improve the technical capacity of the equipment and increase
the accuracy and reliability of the systems for operators. We are also
conducting experiments and modeling to find ways to reduce the false
alarm rate so that background radiation and non-threat sources are not
necessitating escalated response protocols and wasting the time of law
enforcement operators.
In December 2005, DNDO published a Call for Proposals to the
National Laboratories soliciting novel detection approaches, materials,
and advanced technologies. DNDO received over 150 proposals, and
ultimately selected 44 for award, resulting in nearly $40 million in
research programs. Similarly, DNDO released a solicitation in March
2006 for private industry and academia proposals in the same research
topics. Over 200 white papers were submitted, and we are now in the
process of evaluating 70 proposals for additional awards.
Beginning in 2007, we anticipate a third solicitation, specifically
to support our Academic Research Program. This program will provide a
much needed emphasis in nuclear detection sciences, a field that has
been in decline at American universities for years. The future security
of our Nation requires such a rejuvenation effort at our universities.
A consistent, sustained program to spur the academic community will
provide the nuclear detection experts of the future. In addition, the
program will foster potentially high risk but high payoff ideas that
could lead to solutions that have not yet been considered.
We are also launching several Advanced Technology Demonstrations
that will provide concept validation, the last phase in our exploratory
research process. The first ATD is the Intelligent Personnel Radiation
Locator (IPRL) that we solicited proposals for in April 2006. IPRLs are
intended to ultimately replace the limited detection capability of
existing radiation pagers with pocket-sized radioisotope detectors and
identifiers that will wirelessly communicate with similar devices in
the vicinity, automatically combining data to increase sensitivity and
triangulate directional information. These devices will have sufficient
energy resolution and sensitivity to reliably discriminate between
normally-occurring radioactive materials (NORM), background, and
potential threats, and will be used by law enforcement, first
responder, counterterrorism, and possibly intelligence agencies in
routine activities and surveillance. This year, the DNDO funded 3-year
prototype-development efforts for IPRLs. The ATD will culminate in test
and evaluation of the IPRL prototypes in early fiscal year 2009.
We are also pursuing the Stand off Detection ATD that aims to
extend nuclear detection ranges beyond 100 meters, potentially allowing
for airborne platform applications. Stand-off detection and imaging
address the need for the capability to locate and identify nuclear
threat materials at a distance, in both land and maritime environments.
The DNDO will look at key existing technologies like gamma-ray imaging,
advanced detection algorithms, and sensor and data fusion techniques
that may dramatically improve sensitivity and directional accuracy. A
solicitation on this topic will be released later this year.
Also in 2007, we expect that research into SNM verification will be
transitioned to an ATD. We anticipate that active verification (AV) of
SNM will be developed for secondary and primary screening at high
throughputs to enhance detection and identification through development
of gamma and neutron-based interrogation techniques.
Currently, we are pursuing an experimental modeling campaign to
determine and characterize the background for cargo containers at sea,
in order to determine the potential false alarm rates and feasibility
of such systems. Following this effort, a Long Dwell Detection In-
Transit ATD is being planned to explore our capabilities to exploit the
time available during cargo transit to detect threat materials in cargo
and conveyances.
Intelligence fusion and data mining
Successful detection alone will not lead to mission success. The
DNDO must ultimately have the ability to fuse detection data and
intelligence assessments in a near real-time environment to maintain
overall system and situational awareness. This plan will require the
DNDO to closely interact with the Intelligence Community, through the
DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), as a developer of
intelligence requirements and consumer of intelligence products.
However, it should be made clear that the DNDO will not act as an
intelligence collection agency. To meet the information and analysis
mission, the DNDO has established the Joint Analysis Center (JAC). The
JAC will enhance the effective sharing and use of nuclear detection
information and intelligence from all mission related detection systems
to provide a greater situational awareness of the nuclear and
radiological threat. By fusing the international and domestic detection
streams of information generated by the intelligence and
counterterrorism communities, the JAC will be able to provide a better
informed decision making environment, enabling more effective alarm
resolution, trend analysis, and threat awareness. Additionally, this
information and analysis capability will be integrated with a detailed
understanding of current and future detection system performance to
increase our awareness and confidence in the global detection
architecture.
Forensics and Attribution
The DNDO must also support national capabilities to conduct
forensics in support of attribution activities. In fiscal year 2007,
DNDO will assume the mission to stand up and manage the National
Technical Nuclear Forensics Center (NTNFC) with its overarching
national-level technical forensics stewardship and integration mission.
In addition to leading the NTNFC, DNDO is responsible for the DHS
mission in pre-detonation materials forensics. This area is focused on
bulk analysis and integration of all sources of technical information,
including isotopic and chemical composition, physical structure, and
route attribution. We will help develop and sustain pre-detonation
concept of operations and technical capabilities to handle and analyze
nuclear and radiological materials; establish, maintain, exercise, and
operate collection and analysis capabilities for pre-detonation
materials in support of the law enforcement community; and support
appropriate research and development activities to address gaps and
shortfalls in forensics capabilities.
Effective response to nuclear and radiological threats
As nuclear detection technology is deployed across the global
architecture, the Federal government must commit to providing the
necessary technical support to ensure that equipment is used
effectively, alarms are resolved accurately, and the appropriate
personnel are notified in the event of a legitimate detection of a
threat. In recognition of this need, the DNDO provides operational
support services; including 24/7 technical reachback support for alarm
resolution, effective training and response protocols, and operational
support coordination to ensure appropriate expertise is in place to
support prompt resolution of nuclear/radiological detection alarms. The
effective utilization of these services will ensure that deployed
equipment is properly used and alarm information is appropriately
reported and escalated to response agencies. While DNDO is responsible
for coordination of the response to nuclear and radiological threats,
the DOE, FBI, and DOD are responsible for deploying personnel in the
event of an alarm and have the necessary technical expertise to help
identify the item in question.
DNDO is also taking steps to expand detection capabilities within
the domestic interior. Within our Nation's borders, we are leveraging
and strengthening existing commercial vehicle inspection programs and
surveillance capabilities to make domestic detection more effective and
these initiatives will make use of next generation equipment
deployments. We have launched the Southeast Transportation Corridor
Pilot program to deploy radiation detectors to interstate truck weigh
stations and other sites. These deployments will be at locations agreed
to by our regional partners in accordance with the domestic detection
architecture developed by the DNDO. Grants will be available initially
targeting the states of Georgia, Kentucky, South Carolina, Tennessee,
and Virginia; to be followed by expected expansion into Alabama,
Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Washington DC in fiscal year
2007. Included in the pilot program will be the necessary training,
technical reachback and operational protocols.
As Secretary Chertoff officially announced in July, we have
launched the Securing the Cities program (SCP), that will enhance
protection and response capabilities in and around the Nation's highest
risk urban areas. The DNDO will initially work with major metropolitan
agencies in the New York City area, as well as New York State and other
Northeast regional partners, to develop preventive radiological/nuclear
detection programs. This initiative will include an analysis of
critical road networks, mass transit, maritime, rail, and general
aviation vulnerabilities. SCP will identify infrastructure protection
and information sharing improvements, fixed and mobile detection
deployment augmentation requirements, and source security enhancements.
The initiative will include integrated training and exercise
opportunities in support of the New York City area and Northeast
region. The DNDO and regional partners will jointly develop analysis-
based detection architectures, to include all necessary planning,
equipment, training, exercises, and operational support infrastructure.
As these initiatives mature, it is expected that equipment (including
Advanced Spectroscopic Portal systems) will be deployed and operated
and the lessons learned will be exported to other regions and cities to
enhance our overall protection against nuclear and radiological
threats. We are currently in the midst of our program design and
deployment planning phase for this initiative.
Conclusion
As the National Academies report concluded in 2002, while progress
was being made by the R&D and policy communities related to nuclear and
radiological terrorism, a key deficit in USG efforts was the lack of
coordination across the Departments and agencies The founding of the
DNDO as an interagency coordinating office, its focus on the entire
global architecture, and the desire to produce technological solutions
which benefit the entire homeland defense community, directly addresses
this concern.
Yet, while technology is a critical tool in combating the nuclear
threat, the threat we face cannot be effectively overcome by technology
alone. Coordination between Federal, State, tribal, and local law
enforcement agencies, as well as the larger intelligence and
counterterrorism communities, is critical. An integrated and
cooperative approach to detection and information analysis will
ultimately provide substantial improvement in alarm resolution, threat
assessments, data trend analysis, and, most importantly, overall
probability of mission success.
This concludes my prepared statement. With the committee's
permission, I request my formal statement be submitted for the record.
Chairman Linder, Ranking Member Langevin, and Members of the
Subcommittee, I thank you for your attention and will be happy to
answer any questions that you may have.
Mr. Linder. Thank you all. Dr. Marburger, what is the
single most significant S&T accomplishment since you have been
the director of OSTP.
Mr. Marburger. The single most important initiative that we
have been involved in is probably this year's Advanced
Competitiveness Initiative that the President launched in his
State of the Union message in January. That initiative restores
funding to some previously underfunded agencies in precisely
the areas that are necessary to be strong to support Homeland
Security research, and makes arrangements for improving and
strengthening education, incentives for industry to engage in
long term high risk research, and overhauls other policies of
the U.S. government regarding workforce and immigration
policies to make our Nation competitive far into the future and
to provide a research basis for strengthening us in all
respects.
Mr. Linder. In your written testimony you said that OSTP
strategies to address biological and nuclear threats is the
result of sound scientific input. Do you have a panel of
scientists on biology and nuclear threats in the private sector
or the academy where you call them in for peer analysis of your
science.
Mr. Marburger. Absolutely, sir. First of all, each of our
participating agencies relies on external review groups drawn
from the scientific community and we rely heavily on the
national academies as I referred in my testimony for expert
advice on a wide range of issues. In addition, my office runs a
large number of interagency working groups that draw on
scientific and engineering talent from within the agencies and
their laboratories to meet on specific issues and coordinate
policy and planning across the executive branch.
Mr. Linder. Secretary Cohen, we have been having a
difficult time getting information, programmatic and budget
information from the S&T directorate for some time. I hope you
will make an effort to correct that and speed that up, too.
Questions have been raised and you are brand new, a lot of
questions have been raised about S&T for some time. But the
questions that have been raised about the lack of peer review
at S&T, would you like to comment on that?
Mr. Cohen. Well, peer review is the longstanding goal
standard by which we do basic research. The S&T directorate, as
it is currently organized, and that is my organization which I
am responsible for, is a full service S&T management
organization. My directorate does not do S&T. I manage S&T. I
resource S&T. And so it has three components: Basic research,
applied research, and advanced technology. The scientists focus
on the basic research. The matrix in that area are degrees,
published papers, peer review, symposia, patents, and awards.
On my output function in advanced technology there you can
consider that acquisition lite, l-i-t-e, where you have given
me and the other S&T officials in the government, the ability
to put millions of dollars at risk in science and technology to
prevent billions of dollars in acquisition from being at risk.
That is the right model. It is obviously focused risk, with
risk comes the chance of failure, but also the chance of great
leaps ahead and breakthroughs.
The metrics in advanced technology are cost schedule and
capability, Two totally different sets of metrics. It is a
schizophrenic organization. Scientists don't like to give up
their discoveries because they then have to move on to a new
discovery. Engineers don't like to take the time it takes to
have discoveries reach maturity because they are on a tight
time line to deliver capabilities and fill requirement
shortfalls for the customer or the customer of the customer.
So in basic research, my division heads overseeing their
research section, directors use as appropriate peer review, the
academies, who are very familiar with that as we look at new
lines of research, we validate those with the national research
counsel, with the academies, both science and engineering. It
has its place, but I am much broader than that, sir, and you
expect more of that from me.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Oxford, in the 2000 report making this
Nation safer by the national academies, makes many
recommendations focused on prevention of nuclear attack. How
are we doing 4 years later?
Mr. Oxford. Well, Mr. Chairman, let me, again, reiterate
some of the successes we have had and maybe get to some of the
ranking member's questions as well. Since we established DNDO,
the budget has grown from what I inherited as a $95 million
budget to something that is over 500 million in the 2007
request. The acquisition budget has doubled in the 2 years
since we have established the Office.
By the end of this year, we will be screening 80 percent of
all incoming seaborne cargo containers. By the end of 2007, we
will have achieved 98 percent of the incoming containers, and
we will be over 90 percent at each of our northern and southern
borders.
So in that regard, along with the joint diployment strategy
that we have with Customs and Border Protection, we think we
have a solid plan to capture the maritime and landborne cargo
coming into this country. We have now set our sights in our
strategic planning function to look at other threat pathways of
concern to specifically, the air pathways general aviation and
smaller maritime craft that could be the conveyances also,
besides the cargo container.
To go back to some of your previous questions, we have
established both an internal and an external peer review
process. We are working with the National Science Foundation as
a body to review our transportational research programs, to
ensure that we get it right. That is, as you know, a national
body to do that. We are also establishing through the Homeland
Security Advisory Committee, a group to peer review our
architecture and R&D efforts.
We are also working with Dr. Marburger, Science Technology
Council, to look at technology road maps in this area. So
again, we have an external review process. We are standing
something up through the National Defense University to look at
our long-term architecture priorities to make sure that we are
not deceiving ourselves; that we have it right.
And finally, we have a robust red teaming process as part
of our internal independent assessment to make sure that our
processes and procedures are accurate.
Mr. Linder. Thank you. My time has expired.
Secretary Cohen, I am going to have my staff submit for
your attention some very specific questions we have regarding
the S&T particularly with the funding processes, IPAs and
biowatch. We will submit that for you to respond in writing, if
you would.
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you
again for your testimony today.
Dr. Oxford, I would like to start with you, if I could. You
have addressed some of my questions in your introduction that
you just gave, but as you know, I have tried through several
avenues, to increase funding for radiation portal monitors,
both domestically and abroad. And I know that, as you reported,
the contracts have been awarded for limited production of
roughly 50 high resolution portals using sodium iodide crystals
by February of 2007.
So, and the question is, are these deployment plans for the
Advanced Spectroscopic Portals still on target for February,
and do you envision an even faster production schedule after
February? In addition, can you please tell me about your
coordination efforts with DOE, and also with Customs and Border
Protection with regards to screening cargo overseas for nuclear
or radiological threats and have you determined a common
operating memorandum of understanding, et cetera, regarding
screening procedures and technology.
Mr. Oxford. Absolutely. We have now developed a joint
deployment strategy with Customs and Border Protection for all
domestic locations. We did this in a cost-effective way to
manage both risk and cost. If you had looked at us a year ago,
we would have been suggesting a black and white transition from
current generation technology to next-generation technology to
cover all of our ports of entry that would have been a $3.5
billion proposal.
By working with CBP and understanding these systems, we
have now developed a deployment strategy where at low volume
ports of entry we will use current generation technology in the
primary screening mode with ASP in the secondary screening mode
at the large volume locations like L.A./Long Beach, we will use
ASP in both primary and secondary. That has cut the overall
cost to that architecture to $1.4 billion. And we think we are
able to manage risk also by having a cost effective solution.
That allows us then to build ASP at the rates necessary. We
have fully budgeted over the next 3 or 4 years to get us fully
to our deployment goals that we have with CBP. So I think,
again, for the domestic ports of entry we have a solid plan in
place, and we are executing according to the schedule.
Regarding overseas deployment, as you know, DNDO has a
centralized planning function, but we do decentralize the
execution. So for overseas locations, we will continue to rely
on the Megaports program out of DOE to deploy the radiation
portal monitors at locations overseas. We are currently working
with the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Department of State
(DOS) to develop an overseas architecture. You may have seen
some of the debate this week. We are looking at opportunities
now to deploy both passive systems and active systems overseas
in an integrated way to deport that data back to the U.S. and
make a risk assessment on containers before they are loaded on
the ship.
The DOE has agreed that they will buy the next generations
systems off of our contracts, therefore leveraging our research
and starting to enhance the deployment capabilities overseas.
So I think in that regard, we are developing a similar overseas
plan to what you see now starting to materialize domestically.
Mr. Langevin. Also I understand that there are currently
several types of reliable technology used in radiation portal
monitors, the most talked about are sodium iodide and high--
purity germanium technologies. Recently, the DNDO, I know, had
three major contracts for Advanced Spectroscopic Portals. Two
went to companies that utilize sodium iodide technology, and
one went to a company which uses germanium technology. Just for
our purposes here, could you explain some of the key
differences between these two technologies and how they
operate, what they are able to detect and their respective
costs, and could you also please expand on how you and the rest
of the officials at DNDO came to that decision?
Mr. Oxford. Let me try to make a very quick distinction
between germanium and sodium iodide. We would consider one a
medium resolution, but the sodium iodide could do a reasonably
good job in detecting and identifying materials through the
sodium iodide crystal. Germanium is considered the gold
standard in terms of its ability to replicate the nuclear
signature. The problem has been it has suffered from power and
cooling supportability issues that not only complicate its
deployment in terms of a larger footprint, but it has also been
estimated at being more costly. We got fixed price quotes, as
part of our contract we just signed. We have cost estimates or
cost quotes from the vendors in the sodium iodide in the range
of $357,000, and the germanium costs are almost $700,000.
So there is almost a 2-1 ratio there. So what we chose to
do in awarding these three contracts is to put the germanium
manufacturer on a little slower track to allow them to mature
the capability to see if we can get the power and cooling
requirements down as well as the costs through some R&D
investment because if we can get them to be successful, they
will be the answer to doing things like rail surveillance.
Right now, the false alarm rates associated with current-
generation and possibly even sodium iodide would--may lead to
excessive false alarm rates and you can understand the
complications of stopping the rail car and having to pull it
out of a train before allowing the train to proceed. So we need
very low false alarms. That is one of the potential solutions
that we would have with germanium.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Mr. Linder. The gentleman's time has expired. Does the
gentleman from Nevada wish to inquire?
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
gentlemen, thank you for being here today. Thank you for your
service to our country as well. We know this is a very
important issue. As we look over the DNDO and the R&D budgets
that are there, some of our concerns are, of course, as
reprogramming and other priorities take place in the budgeting
office research and development oftentimes gets left on the
cutting table. And are you concerned right now with priorities
that some of your projects, R&D projects, are going to be left
on the table without sufficient funding?
Dr. Marburger.
Mr. Marburger. Yes, sir. I regard myself as an advocate for
R&D for Homeland Security purposes within the budget process.
And we try to be responsive to the proposals that come to us
from Homeland Security. To the extent that the budgeting
process within the Department has credibility, we can be even
more vigorous advocates, and I believe that the leadership that
we have in place today will lead to good results for
recommendations for their R&D budgets.
This is basic. Basic research is something that you can't
just drag at any pace. There are various levels of maturity for
the technologies and the physical phenomena involved in
detection, for example, that are rather mature. And advances in
detection capability particularly are sometimes slow and
incremental. We always hope for a breakthrough, and that
requires broad funding of basic physical sciences and we
support that. But in general, I would say that the research
specifically associated with Homeland Security, and
particularly, for countering weapons of mass destruction and
its effects enjoys a very high priority in the budget process,
and has many champions within the White House.
Mr. Gibbons. So there are no specific areas that you can
relate to this committee which are going to be cut as a result
of changing budget priorities within the R&D?
Mr. Marburger. No. I can't speak to specific areas that
will be cut. We will rely very much on the advice coming to us
from the Department of Homeland Security and the gentlemen to
my left.
Mr. Gibbons. All right. Perhaps Secretary Cohen, you could
tell us what your philosophy is what you believe your office
directors are doing with regard to compressing the
developmental timelines, developmental timelines for projects
and technologies that were mentioned. I know Mr. Oxford
mentioned a number of projects, large projects, very difficult
nuclear projects, detection projects.
What is the policy within DNDO with regard to compression
of those timelines because we just heard Dr. Marburger say that
there are some things that can't be done quickly, and is that
philosophical or is that a physical obstacle?
Mr. Cohen. Well, it is actually both, sir, but it is an
excellent question. I know some of the members who have heard
this from me will be boring to them, but in science and
technology, we plant a thousand flowers. That is basic
research. That is unfettered research. You don't know what you
don't know and you have got to go up a lot of alleys to figure
out which ones are blind and Einstein said if you knew the
answer, it wouldn't be research.
From those thousand flowers, you harvest a hundred
projects. That is applied research. From those hundred
projects, you determine two to three prototypes. That is
advance technology and from that you get the George Foreman
grill. That is the profit maker. Now I was the chief of Naval
research for 6 years and working for civilian and military
leadership Navy and Marine Corps, and all of those leaders put
their fingers in my chest and said you have got the wrong
model.
Here is your model, you plant one flower. It becomes one
project, it becomes a prototype and from that, we get the
George Foreman grill. Now, oh, that that could be. The time
frames in prototyping and demonstration tends to be in the 1--
to 3-year time frame. The time frames associated with basic
research tend to be in the 8--to 15-year time frame. And so a
$75,000 investment in the mid 1970s in the more precise
measurement of time resulted in global positioning because
distance is a function of time in 1990. And E equals MC squared
gave us nuclear power.
Basic research is ineloquent. It is something that product
managers and budgeteers find very uncomfortable. When asked
what we will get in 20 years for our basic research dollars
today, all I can tell you is if we don't invest, we will have
nothing and the history of investment in basic research which
only the Federal government has either the resources or the
vision to sustain because we don't have the bell labs anymore,
and we don't have the IBM labs. Everyone is looking at the
quick kill. We will not sustain the S&T or the innovation or
the economic strength that has made this country so great.
Mr. Gibbons. I guess my point was that after a century of
technology advancements, we are hoping you can compress that
8--to 15-year time frame into something reasonable so that we,
those of us who have to give that ineloquent answer to
constituents know that the time between the money we invest,
and the defense which they are expecting gets compressed into
the minimum of time possible.
You know, we don't want to sacrifice quality, of course,
but we do have the very inevitable problem that those who are
looking to harm this country aren't going to wait for the
scientists to feel comfortable with every avenue looked at in
getting that technology in to the hands of those that can help
us.
Mr. Cohen. Congressman, you have it exactly right. That is
my job, and in my model, 80 percent of my dollars goes to the
output function for either near term or breakthrough
advancements, and that has been my history over the last 6
years, and I hope to be able to do that in Homeland Security.
Mr. Linder. The gentleman's time has expired. Dr.
Christensen seeks to inquire.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, welcome
back, Mr. Cohen. Welcome to all of the panelists.
Dr. Marburger in his written statement lists the four main
pillars of biodefense: Threat awareness, prevention and
protection, surveillance and detection and response and
recovery. I would like to ask a question focused more on the
response and recovery.
Because under that, you are to create refine comprehensive
plans to mitigate the consequences of an attack and provide the
newest and most effective medical countermeasures. What new and
effective countermeasures have we developed in the last couple
of years?
Mr. Marburger. Countermeasures?
Mrs. Christensen. For biological.
Mr. Marburger. For biological are continually evolving in
the research labs of the Nation. Under the sponsorship of the
National Institute For Allergic and Infectious Diseases, which
gets the bulk of bioterrorism funding, there are research
programs on vaccines and rapid production of vaccines and the
mechanisms of infectious diseases particularly in their
programs and modeling and all of the infrastructure that is
required.
Centers for Disease Control also have programs to tie
together the information capability to identify outbreaks and
some of these have already--
Mrs. Christensen. That is under the surveillance. But I
just don't see anything being developed. I am not sure what
Project BioShield has yielded. I have some notes here that says
just a small quantity of pediatric iodide and several million
doses of anthrax vaccine has been added to the S&S recently. So
we have had people come to testify either before the entire
committee or one of our sub--maybe the subcommittee, and I
don't remember the name of the medication, but one is one to
treat radiation sickness, and the other is to stop bleeding.
Have they made application, Mr. Cohen, and/or--
Mr. Marburger. That is a level of detail that I can't
respond to, but I would be very glad to.
Mrs. Christensen. I am not seeing anything new coming on
line.
Mr. Cohen. If I may, Doctor. I would like to take that for
the record, and I am glad to meet with you and with people who
have that answer. But I don't have that at the tip of my
fingers and I apologize.
Mrs. Christensen. To follow up on Mr. Gibbons' questions
about the shortening of the time. It seems to me that while
maybe for other kinds of countermeasures or technology or
detection devices that may be a little more difficult to
shorten the time, but we do have some legislation that would
direct funding to that research to shorten the time between the
time we find the bug and develop--can develop a vaccine. Do you
think that is a little more feasible than maybe for some of the
other kinds of technologies that you are developing? Because we
don't know--we may not have ever seen what the agent is before.
And we can't wait 12 years to get a vaccine or, you know, and
so wouldn't you think that it would be important for us to
direct, devote some attention to shortening the time from bug
to drug?
Mr. Cohen. Absolutely. And we have to do better. You have
this exactly right. Regrettably, the only area that you can
legislate that is in the area of risk management, which you
have given me in the Safety Act, and I thank you so much for
that, and also in the FDA kind of world of regulation where
today, so many discoveries that we fast-track to market, we are
finding people aren't even applying for patents because the
process takes so long that they believe, and Jobs is a perfect
example in this, in iPod, its time to market. Get it to market.
Develop the market share and then do spiral and continuous
development and improvement and to heck with the patent because
you are getting the money based on the profit times, large
number of things that are going out. So we have to be very
careful. Just because we legislate or mandate doesn't mean that
we will get the desired effect. But where we can streamline
regulatory and remove unnecessary requirements, that would be
of enormous help, ma'am.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Dicks.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know on that
subject, Secretary Cohen, you have the responsibility to do the
material threat assessments. You are aware of that, right?
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. And we think most of the problem has been over
in HHS. Maybe Dr. Marburger can help us from the White House to
get somebody's attention over there. But the fellow who was in
charge of the program left. And with very little having been
accomplished. This is one area that I think deserves a lot more
attention than it has gotten, and the administration, I think,
is very vulnerable to criticism here for the fact that one of
the material threat assessments we haven't got anything done,
basically nothing has happened, and Congress passed BioShield
giving you the money, and you know what is--do you have a
philosophy on this? I mean, some people say Dr. Fauci is
running the whole thing. I mean, is there anybody in charge of
this within the administration who takes it seriously?
Mr. Marburger. Absolutely, sir.
Mr. Dicks. Then why hasn't anything happened?
Mr. Marburger. Well, I take exception to the notion that
nothing has happened. And I would be glad to respond in writing
to specifically the progress that has been made since BioShield
Act was passed. These are difficult problems. We think we have
responsible and competent people working on them. But I do not
have that detail at my fingertips to be able to respond to
that.
Mr. Dicks. That bothers me that the person in the White
House was supposed to be ahead of S&T, this is a major area and
still years have gone by here. We have had all of these
hearings. I applaud the committee. The committee has had
hearings on this. This hasn't been a lack of oversight by
Congress. Dr. Cohen--I mean, Secretary Cohen.
Mr. Cohen. I am honored, sir, but I will stick with Mr.
I am the responsible individual and the chairman and
Congressman Langevin in the SCIF last week took a very detailed
brief. I am so pleased to have Dr. John Vitko here with me
today, and he is my division head for chembio. He is the right
man, but I was not familiar with this a month ago before I got
here, and I will tell you, I believe and will brief you off
line, of course.
Mr. Dicks. Right.
Mr. Cohen. As I have in the past in the HPSCI, et cetera,
but this, I believe you will find is a success story because of
the classification of the consequences, we have not publicly
done this. But, I think, you will be pleased and I think they
don't have to comment, but I think the chairman and Congressman
Langevin understood the extent to which we have accomplished
your desired goals.
Mr. Dicks. Why was the decision made to move DNDO out of
S&T directorate?
Mr. Marburger. I can speak to that, because I was involved
in making recommendations to that effect. Because the
consequences of detonation of even a small and imperfect
nuclear weapon in a major U.S. city are so profound that we
felt that it was important to single out this function and give
it special leadership and special access to the highest levels
within the Department of Homeland Security to enable it to move
expeditiously to implement the best technology that we have and
the best ideas to protect the Nation from such an eventuality.
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Oxford, do you think this was a good
decision? Do you think this was the right decision?
Mr. Oxford. I absolutely think it is the right decision. We
have brought together the interagency that was not working well
together to bring a comprehensive focus. When you see an office
dynamic where I have FBI agents, DOD employees, and DOE
employees sitting in the same office, day in, day out, working
one problem, knowing there is a time frame that we have to work
within, it is a concentrated effort that, I think, in some
cases could be a model for other efforts, to be honest.
Mr. Dicks. It might help us on the BioShield issue, could
be an example. You want to run that?
Mr. Oxford. No, sir.
Mr. Dicks. All right. In terms of reorganizations, you took
the Transportation Security Lab, which was in TSA, and moved it
to S&T. Why did you do that? Why was that done?
Mr. Marburger. I can't answer that question. That was an
internal arrangement that was made within the Department of
Homeland Security as it was being set up, and I don't believe
that any of my colleagues here on the panel were there at the
time that decision was made.
I believe--I can only speculate. I think that it would be
inappropriate for me to do so, but I would be glad to respond
to the question.
Mr. Dicks. For the record, if you could give us an answer,
that would be good.
Mr. Cohen. Congressman, if I may, I was not there for the
decision, but I believe it was absolutely the right decision.
And I think you are aware I was sworn in on the 10th of August.
That was the day that the airline liquid explosives--
Mr. Dicks. Right.
Mr. Cohen. --plot broke.
The very next day I created a team, a rapid response team,
using a program manager and engineer, who understand how to get
the deliverables and energetics out the door; the scientist who
understood the underlying chemistry; and Susan Harwell, who is
Director of the Transportation Security Laboratory and
understood the culture and the needs of the FAA, the TSA, the
air transport environment.
And then immediately, on the 11th of August, I brought to
bear our Centers of Excellence, meaning our academic units, as
well as the Department of Energy labs, which you so wisely gave
me access to. With the moneys and the talent we have invested
there in chemistry and physics over the years, we went out with
a request for information, paralleled that with a safety act
announcement to get people to come forward with solutions.
We have over 40 responses in the month. Within the next 30
days we will be testing those, as well as the COTS, commercial
off-the-shelf, devices that the Transportation Security Lab had
been testing over the last year, as well as SBIR devices that
come forward so that we can give Kip Hawley and the TSA the
necessary tools they need to ease their problems and increase
the security. I know there is consideration to move the
Transportation Security Lab back to TSA.
I know the frustration, which I accept; I am responsible. I
came to this job with my eyes open, and I want to be held
accountable, will be held accountable; but it would be a
terrible mistake, I believe, sir, at this point, for the Nation
to move that back. We just need to get on with the solutions.
Kip Hawley and I have signed an MOU that was in the works
for 9 months on the Transportation Security Laboratory. We
signed that literally days after I got into the job, and I
would ask your indulgence to leave the Transportation Security
Lab as one of my five organic labs in S&T.
Mr. Dicks. If I--just one last thing, Chairman.
Mr. Linder. Sure.
Mr. Dicks. What is the current status of the Counter-
MANPADS program?
Mr. Cohen. As you are aware, we provided a very
comprehensive report to the Congress at the end of July. The
initial tests, both by BAE and Northrop Grumman, were
successful. Our large-body aircraft, there are aspects of this
that I prefer not to discuss in public, but the Congress very
wisely provided a small amount of money for us to look at
alternative, nonaircraft-based solutions. We went out with the
BAE for that. We have got three excellent proposals. We expect
to announce those awards here very shortly, and we will demo
that over the next year.
But in my construct--and I know, Congressman, you are aware
of what I did with Swampworks and high-risk, high-gain. With a
very small 1 percent of my budget, I am looking at even higher
risk, higher gain, off aircraft solutions--which again I don't
want to discuss in a public venue--that I think industry is
excited about; and I hope to experiment with those and then
prototype them very soon.
But we know how to defeat the MANPADS. The question now is
one of cost, false alarms, misfires and the legalities of
having active systems on commercial aircraft.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you.
Mr. Linder. Time of the gentleman has expired.
We are facing a series of three votes, so I would be happy
to excuse the three panelists on the first panel. Thank you for
your contributions. Thank you for taking the questions. We will
expect some answers from you in writing from you on specific
questions.
If the next panel of two gentlemen, Dr. Happer and Dr.
Atlas, would be patient with us, we will be back as soon as
these votes are over.
[Recess.]
Mr. Linder. The remainder of the hearing of the
subcommittee on nuclear and biological attack will continue.
We thank Dr. Happer and Dr. Atlas for being patient with
us. From time to time, we actually have to go and vote at this
place. We welcome you here. As we said before, your entire
written statement will appear in the record, and we ask you to
confine your statements to 5 minutes.
Mr. Linder. Dr. Happer.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM HAPPER, Ph.D., CYRUS FOGG BRACKETT
PROFESSOR PHYSICS, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
Mr. Happer. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members
of the committee. My name is William Happer. I am professor of
physics at Princeton.
Although I am in academia now, I have spent a good fraction
of my life participating in national issues. I served as the
Director of the Department of Energy's Office of Energy
Research in the early 1990s; I have been a member of the JASON
Group for nearly 25 years; and perhaps most pertinent to our
discussion today, I serve, along with Ron Atlas, as a member of
the Science and Technology Advisory Committee to the Department
of Homeland Security as Director of Research and Development.
So we have had a good opportunity to observe there while the
committee was functioning.
I also wrote the--or I chaired the panel that wrote the
chapter on nuclear and radiological threats for the Academy's
report, ``Making the Nation Safer.'' In the course of that, I
received, with my panel, many briefings, and there is just no
question in my mind--and I am sure in almost everyone in this
room's mind--that the supreme terrorist threat really is a
nuclear weapon detonated in one of our cities.
In every study I saw, and I saw lots of them, it is hard to
avoid at least 100,000 casualties. So somewhere like that is
the minimum that you start with, plus, you know, all the
psychic damage, lingering radioactivity. It is a scenario we
have just got to prevent.
A point I want to make is that we want to support DNDO as
much as we can, but the title says ``domestic,'' and the
biggest part of this problem and where I think the biggest
payoff is is overseas. And so, as we try to support DNDO and
homeland security, we want to be sure that the overall balance
of our efforts to defeat nuclear terrorism includes these
important offshore activities.
For example, the work on materials protection and
accountability that the U.S. has sponsored in the former Soviet
Union has been extremely helpful to our security, and huge
numbers of kilograms of highly enriched uranium are secure now
that weren't when that program started. We want it to continue.
I certainly think that DNDO is doing the right thing by
putting most of its focus on nuclear explosives and not dirty
bombs. We certainly don't want the dirty bombs going off, but
every study I saw when I was on the panel that wrote nuclear
and radiological threats for the Academies indicated that it
was unlikely that anyone would be killed by the radiation from
a dirty bomb, although certainly the explosive itself was very
dangerous. There are many things that need to be done there,
and I think DNDO has the balance about right.
Also, you know, we have to be realistic about detection.
There are not going to be breakthroughs with the detectors that
we know about. There were questions earlier about sodium iodide
and germanium detectors. These are pretty mature technologies,
and a lot can be done to improve the engineering of these, but
they are not going to be breakthroughs. They will be better;
there may be replacements that don't require so much cooling
and may be easier to ship around and maintain, but don't expect
miracles.
Another thing I urge you to do is, I put a Web site in my
testimony that you can click on and see a picture of Harold
Agnew, former Director of Los Alamos on Tinian Island, holding
the core of the Nagasaki bomb. Have a look. It is this big; you
know, it is the size of a lunch box. He is quite happy. He has
no radiation problem, and there isn't much radiation in these
materials so we have a hard job ahead of us.
I will not say any more, since I have almost run out of
time and I don't want to cut into my colleague's time here. So
thank you very much for your attention. I will be happy to
answer questions.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Dr. Happer.
[The statement of Mr. Happer follows:]
Prepared Statement of William Happer, Ph.D.
Chairman King and members, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before the Committee on Homeland Security's Subcommittee on Prevention
of Nuclear and Biological Attack to testify on the how the US Researach
and Development (R&D) efforts are going in the area of countering
nuclear terrorism. I am particularly interested in how well these
efforts track the Recommendations of the 2002 National Academies
Report, ``Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology
in Countering Terrorism.'' I was the chair of the panel that wrote the
chapter on Nuclear and Radiological Threats in that report. Ours was
the first chapter after the introduction, and this reflected the
consensus of the National Academies that the supreme terrorist threat
to the United States is the detonation of improvised or stolen nuclear
weapons in our cites.
My name is William Happer, and I am the Cyrus Fogg Brackett
Professor of Physics at Princeton University. Though my present home is
Academia, I have a long history of participation in national issues. I
served as the Director of the Department of Energy's Office of Energy
Research (now the Office of Science) from 1991--1993. I have been a
member of the JASON group since 1976, where I first became acquainted
with issues associated with nuclear weapons. I serve on the boards of a
number of not-for-profit organizations, including the MITRE
Corporation. I was a co-founder of a successful medical imaging startup
company, Magnetic Imaging Technologies, Inc., which was based on
technology developed by my academic research group over the years.
Perhaps most pertinent to this testimony, I served as a member of the
Science and Technology Advisory of the Department of Homeland
Security's Directorate of Research and Development, so I had a good
opportunity to observe DHS's research and development activities while
the advisory committee functioned.
During the time I served on that committee the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office (DNDO) was established in DHS, and much of my
testimony will be focused on how well I think DNDO is doing. I offer
several observations for the committee's consideration. These represent
my personal views, and not necessarily those of the organizations with
which I am associated.
Observation 1: The DNDO is addressing the supreme terrorist threat
to our country, the detonation of an improvised or stolen nuclear
weapon in one of our cities. While preparing to write its report, The
National Academies Panel on Nuclear and Radiological Threats that I
chaired received many briefings on research and development projects
related to this area. What we learned, much of it at the classified
level, left no doubt that the consequences of a terrorist nuclear
weapon detonated in a US city would be at least 100,000 prompt
casualties, unprecedented property damage, and lingering consequences
from radioactive contamination. Helping to prevent these nightmare
scenarios is DNDO's most important job, so we should support them in
every way we can.
Observation 2: A big part of stopping nuclear terrorism should be
activities beyond our shores. Unlike many non-nuclear explosives, or
agents for chemical and biological terrorism, neither highly enriched
uranium (HEU ) nor plutonium can be made without massive infrastructure
that could not be supported by a terrorist organization. The special
nuclear materials will have to be acquired from states that already
possess that infrastructure. The first and most effective line of
defense from nuclear terrorism is to prevent terrorist organizations
from acquiring special nuclear materials in any way ? for example, from
state sponsors, by theft, armed robbery, or by purchase on the black
market.
Nuclear weapons and special nuclear materials in the United States
are very carefully controlled, so the most likely sources of nuclear
weapons or the materials to improvise them will be in foreign
countries. Stopping special nuclear materials at their foreign sources
is beyond the mandate of DNDO, but as we support DNDO's activities, we
should also be sure that those government agencies and programs,
charged with keeping these materials out terrorist hands, are
appropriately supported. For example, the work on Materials Protection
and Accountability that the US has sponsored in countries of the former
Soviet Union has made a very important contribution to our nuclear
security. I hope that this committee will work other Congressional
committees to optimize the entire defense strategy against nuclear
terrorism, both the domestic and foreign components.
Observation 3: DNDO should put most of its focus on nuclear
explosives, not radiological dispersal devices (dirty bombs). The
dispersal of radioactive materials with conventional explosives has
gotten a lot of press attention, and we certainly would like prevent
the use of a ``dirty bomb'' like this. But study after study has
concluded that dirty bombs are not a very good terrorist weapon. The
radiation from the bomb is unlikely to kill anyone, although the
dispersing explosive could be lethal. No doubt there would be great
public alarm, well out of proportion to the actual damage of a dirty
bomb, and it is appropriate to make plans to deal with this, in
advance. For example, a more scientific approach to what constitutes
radioactive contamination would be very helpful. Because of the higher
elevation, the background radiation dose in Denver is several times
higher than in New York City or Washington. With good reason, residents
of Denver do not worry about this. But with present regulations and
public pressure, we might be forced to declare parts of east-cost
cities uninhabitable where the residue from a dirty bomb raised the
background radiation levels to those of Denver. This would be silly. It
would be much easier to make that point now than after an incident. I
believe that DHS through its various agencies is already addressing
this problem, and they should continue.
The large amounts of radioactive material needed to make a dirty
bomb are much easier to detect than the relative feeble signals from
HEU or plutonium. But a massive national network of detectors to make
life hard for dirty bombers is not a good use of limited resources of
funds and competent people. We should certainly consider such a network
if it could be effective against real or improvised nuclear weapons in
terrorist hands.
Observation 4: Detecting nuclear weapons is very hard. Recalling
1946 Senate testimony by Robert Oppenheimer, Kai Bird and Martin J.
Sherwin (April 25, 2005 issue of The Nation) wrote:
Sometime that year he was asked in a closed Senate hearing room
``whether three or four men couldn't smuggle units of an
[atomic] bomb into New York and blow up the whole city.''
Oppenheimer responded, ``Of course it could be done, and people
could destroy New York.'' When a startled senator then followed
by asking, ``What instrument would you use to detect an atomic
bomb hidden somewhere in a city?'' Oppenheimer quipped, A
screwdriver [to open each and every crate or suitcase]."
What was true in 1946 remains true today. It is very difficult to
detect special nuclear materials without very close inspection.
Both uranium, and especially plutonium, are radioactive. Their
gamma radiation and neutrons can penetrate many packaging materials.
Given close access to the uranium or plutonium, sufficient time, and
good passive detectors of gamma rays or neutrons, it is possible to
identify special nuclear materials. The energy spectrum of the gamma
rays is especially useful. But HEU has a very feeble signal and is
especially hard to detect. And while plutonium is much more radioactive
than HEU, it can be effectively shielded. Lead is a very good shield
for gamma rays. It is worth remembering that the sailors of our
ballistic missile submarines bunk close to plutonium-containing
warheads, but the locations and shielding are such that the sailors do
not receive an unacceptable dose of radiation during their sea duty.
Instead of relying on the self-radioactivity of SNM, there have
been many proposals to use active probes that irradiate suspicious
packages with x-rays, gamma rays or neutrons. I believe that DNDO is
sponsoring work on a number of these active devices, and it is entirely
appropriate that they do so. We need to assess how well active probes
could work in practice.
Given the resourcefulness that terrorist organizations have shown
in the past, one would have to assume that they will make every effort
to avoid instrumented ports of entry. For example, to avoid detection
at unexpected instrumented sites, the SNM could be shielded, or it
could be divided into smaller, harder-to-detect pieces to be assembled
later in a location that is safe for the terrorists. At the website,
http://www.lanl.gov/history/people/agnew.shtml you can see a picture of
the core of the Nagasaki bomb, held by Harold Agnew, a former director
of Los Alamos on Tinian Island. The point is that Harold had no
difficulty holding the package, about the size of a shoe box, in his
left hand. While somewhat larger amounts of HEU are needed for a bomb
than Pu, the materials we need to intercept are not very large and they
are relatively easy to conceal and to envelop in radiation shields.
Observation 5: Improvements, but no breakthroughs, can be expected
from R&D work on passive detectors. I occasionally read about the need
for a Manhattan Project to improve nuclear radiation detection. I am
sure that worthwhile improvements in passive detectors are possible,
but these are almost certain to be incremental and not breakthroughs.
To add a little substance to this discussion, recall that the two most
common types of gamma-ray detectors are scintillation detectors and
solid-state detectors.
In scintillation detectors the gamma ray is absorbed in a
transparent material and produces scintillation, a flash of light in
the material. The light flash reveals that the gamma ray has been
absorbed and the brightness of the flash can be used to estimate the
energy of the gamma ray. Typical scintillating materials for gamma-ray
detectors with fairly good capabilities to measure the energy of the
gamma ray are crystals of sodium iodide or cesium iodide with trace
impurities to increase the brightness of the light flash. A big
advantage of most scintillation detectors is that they operate at room
temperature and require no special cooling. The main disadvantage is
the limited ability of scintillation detectors to measure the exact
energy of the gamma ray.
In a second type of detector, the solid-state detector, the gamma
ray releases electric charges in a semi conducting material. The pulse
of current from these charges reveals the presence of the gamma ray.
The amount of charge collected is an excellent measure of the gamma
ray's energy, much more precise than for a scintillation detector. The
high energy resolution makes it possible to unambiguously identify
uranium, plutonium and even the isotopic composition of these materials
if they are present in sufficient quantities and there is sufficient
time for the measurement. A disadvantage of solid-state detectors is
that the best ones, for example, intrinsic high-purity germanium, need
to be cooled to liquid nitrogen temperatures.
Both types of detectors have been the subject of many years of
research and development. But a focused R&D program on passive
detectors could lead to improvements in performance and better
suitability for DNDO systems. For example, one could probably develop
uncooled semiconductor detectors, by using semiconductors with larger
band gaps than germanium, but this would come at the unavoidable cost
of somewhat poorer energy resolution.
We live in a radioactive world and a gamma ray detector will also
detect cosmic rays coming through our atmosphere from outer space, and
ionizing radiation from naturally occurring materials. Granite building
stone normally includes lots of uranium and thorium, and even bananas
or people, with their naturally occurring content of radioactive \40\K,
are noticeably radioactive and will trigger counts in gamma detectors.
A good passive detector for finding special nuclear material will also
be a good detector of background radiation. If the expected number of
counts from the background is much larger than that of the package
containing HEU or plutonium, no amount of detector improvement will
help.
Neutrons can also be detected passively, and once again, there has
been a great deal of work done over the past half century to improve
the performance of neutron detection. Again, I see the possibility of
modest improvements in passive neutron detectors but not breakthroughs.
Observation 6: Bigger improvements can be expected from R&D on
active detectors than for passive detectors. An active detector uses
some external probe to look special nuclear materials. For example, the
probe could be a beam of x rays, gamma rays or neutrons. There has been
much less work, over the years, on active detectors of special nuclear
materials than on passive detectors. So there is more room for
improvement here, especially in reducing the cost and making the
packages more readily deployable at ports of entry. Active detectors
will tend to be much more costly and cumbersome than passive detectors,
since the equipment to make the probing beams is often expensive and
additional passive detectors are needed as part of the overall system.
Observation 7: It is important to subject both passive and active
detectors of special nuclear materials to rigorous experimental
testing. Testing detectors for special nuclear materials under
realistic conditions will be essential for real progress. Such tests
are quite difficult to do. I already mentioned the need to keep special
nuclear materials out of terrorist hands. An obvious place for
terrorists to acquire such materials is where tests are being done with
them. So realistic testing must be done with completely reliable
security measures. Before the formation of DNDO there were plans to
build a test facility at the Nevada Test Site, where there is long
experience in handling special nuclear materials and real nuclear
weapons. This was going to be an expensive facility, but I thought it
was a good idea, and I hope that these plans are still on track.
Observation 8: An appropriate amount of funding should be set aside
for basic research on radiation detection. In my previous observations
I have focused on very near-term responses to keeping nuclear weapons
out of the US. I think that a focus on these near-term problems is
appropriate, given the immediate threats we are facing. But I would
urge DNDO to champion a certain amount of basic research that is only
loosely related to near-term radiation detection. Most of the
instruments that DNDO is using now originated in basic research in
nuclear and particle physics. Supporting high quality basic research on
radiation detection would be a very wise investment. For example, some
of the most exciting mysteries facing contemporary physics and
astronomy are the nature of neutrinos. Of all currently known
radioactive decay products, neutrinos are hardest to detect. Modest
support of basic research in neutrino detection would be perfectly
sensible for DNDO or one of its partner agencies with the mission to
defeat nuclear terrorism. Another great mysteries of physics and
astronomy is the nature of the missing matter in the universe. Several
academic groups are pushing the limits of radiation detectors in hopes
of detecting this missing matter through hypothetical and extremely
rare ionizing events. Dating geological samples with the feeble signals
of parent and daughter radioactive isotopes is also an area where
technology of interest to DNDO is being pushed to its limits.
DNDO should also support research on improving the detectors we
already have. For example, some very promising new materials, both
scintillators and solid state detectors, are currently impractical
because no one knows how to grow the necessary high-quality crystals
affordably and reliably. But this is not what I mean by basic research
for the long term. It is hard to keep the most imaginative and
motivated people working exclusively on improvements of existing
detector technology, since the work does not lead to much peer
recognition, publications in prestigious journals or to the excitement
of discovery of previously undetectable types of matter.
If history is any guide, the sort of breakthroughs that could make
DNDO much more effective in the long term are most likely to come from
some unexpected finding in basic research. But since the timing of such
breakthroughs is completely unpredictable, the best strategy is to
focus on what can be done in the near future with existing or
incrementally improved detectors, while keeping some modest fraction of
the budget set aside for basic science that is loosely related to
DNDO's goals.
Observation 9: An institutionalized red team should be part of
DNDO. A planned nuclear attack on the US would probably be staffed with
the most capable and technically competent terrorists who could be
recruited by the parent organization. They will not be former
proprietors of falafel stands, but they will include people trained in
nuclear physics. Such experts would work to maximize the likelihood
that a nuclear weapon can be successfully smuggled into the US. The US
needs a red team of highly competent people that is assigned the same
job--to defeat our national radiation detection system. Of course the
findings of the red team should be classified, but the team should be
encouraged to think expansively and with no constraints. Not only
should they consider attempts to smuggle HEU through the instrumented
San Isidro crossing near San Diego, but they should consider someone
getting the small amounts of material needed across the long US land
borders with Mexico or Canada, most of which is very loosely monitored.
We have an extensive and beautiful coastline, and small boats regularly
set out and return from uninstrumented harbors for deep sea fishing
trips. DNDO needs avoid building a Maginot network of radiation sensors
that invites the classic response to fixed defenses--to go around them.
Observation 10: DNDO needs a technically competent, independent
advisory committee. DNDO should be required to seek advice periodically
from independent advisory groups on both the scope and size of their
efforts. When I served as the Director of Energy research in the
Department of Energy from 1990 to 1993, I and my staff benefited from a
number of very knowledgeable advisory groups. We did not always like
their advice, but we often got very valuable and timely knowledge about
science and technology developments we had missed because of the time
pressures on those who work in the federal government. Such a group
could provide the agency and the Congress with an independent
assessment of the how well the DNDO programs are doing and of the
resources needed to sustain an effective national effort.
Observation 11: DNDO needs appropriate and stable funding. Finally,
the effectiveness of the DNDO effort will depend to a large extent on
the adequacy, both in terms of magnitude and constancy, of the funding
provided to undertake the work deemed to be important to homeland
security. Regrettably, the threat of nuclear terrorism seems destined
to remain with us for many years--technological capabilities to inflict
massive harm on U.S. populations are becoming increasingly widespread
and potentially accessible to terrorists worldwide. It will be
necessary for the United States to mount an aggressive, long-term
counter-terrorism R&D effort to stay at least one step ahead of
terrorist capabilities.
This concludes my testimony to the committee. I would be happy to
clarify my comments or answer committee members' questions. Again,
thank you for the opportunity to testify.
Mr. Linder. Dr. Atlas.
STATEMENT OF RONALD ATLAS, Ph.D., AMERICAN SOCIETY OF
MICROBIOLOGY
Mr. Atlas. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I
am pleased to present testimony on behalf of the American
Society For Microbiology concerning the biodefense research and
development activities of the Department of Homeland Security.
One of the Department of Homeland Security biodefense
responsibilities, articulated in Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 10, Biodefense for the 21st Century, is to play a
lead role in environmental detection which has meant the
implementation of the BioWatch system. Besides developing the
science means for this system, DHS's S&T Directorate actually
funds the operational costs, and currently that is about a
third of their biological countermeasures budget.
It is a substantial cost to the program, which raises the
issue for us of ensuring that the operational costs, as those
rise, do not interfere with the necessary R&D efforts of the
directorate for future biological threats. We think that
BioWatch and the environmental detectors that it employs need
to be evaluated on a regular basis if the public health
community that is to respond to any signals is to trust those
systems and know how to respond.
The Department of Homeland Security S&T Directorate also
operates the Plum Island facility where infectious agents of
agricultural importance are studied. Indeed, as ``Making the
Nation Safer'' pointed out, agroterrorism is a significant
threat to the Nation. Because Plum Island needs upgrading,
there is consideration being given to moving that site to the
mainland where it could, in fact, foster interactions among
leading scientists from various academic excellence centers.
That, we think, can be done safely, but the Congress will need
to recognize that the most critical pathogens, such as the
virus for foot-and-mouth disease currently under U.S. statute
can only be studied offshore. So we are going to need
congressional action if we, in fact, relocate the site to the
mainland.
I would point out that the Department of Homeland Security
Centers for Excellence are creating a university-based resource
for our biodefense efforts, and it is our feeling that these
need to be allowed sufficient time to develop and nurture. In
this regard, we are concerned about the proposed provision in
the Senate's version of the fiscal year 2007 Homeland Security
appropriation bill that would preclude universities from
recompeting for funding as Centers for Excellence. In contrast,
it is our belief that Congress should be seeking sustained
excellence, and therefore, we should be assessing these centers
carrying out the necessary peer review, but then allowing them
to move forward.
Many of the provisions of HSPD-10 involve coordination by
the Department across multiple agencies, and this is absolutely
critical, as we heard earlier, in efforts like BioShield and
other biodefense efforts carried out by NIH and other agencies
in guiding and providing the necessary strategic guidance for
those programs.
Much of our concern today centers around the ability of the
DHS and, specifically, its S&T Directorate to obtain critical
science advice. This has also been expressed by the National
Academy on recent reports. We do know, at DHS's request, the
Academy established a Committee on Biodefense Analysis and
Countermeasures to advise on national biodefense countermeasure
systems of DHS. Hopefully, that will function very well. It is
absolutely essential if we are to have international partners
not suspecting that the U.S. biodefense program is, in fact, a
centrifuge for elicit activities.
I guess my time is almost up. As Dr. Happer indicated, he
and I did serve on Homeland Security's Technology Advisory
Committee, which had been mandated by the Congress. When the
date for the charter of that committee ran out, its activities
were suspended, and I would urge this committee and the
Congress, in fact, to reauthorize that committee. It was a
committee, I think, that--Dr. Happer and I would tell you, it
included the full span of individuals from scientists like
ourselves through physicians in public health through the chief
of police to the firefighters, so that we were able to provide
the under secretary the true end-to-end assessment of the
Department's activities that I think are truly critical.
In final conclusion, I think I would urge the directorate
to reach out to the scientific community to help guide its
efforts; and while that is difficult when, in fact, secrecy
needs to be maintained, I still think, and the ASM thinks, that
the peer review system can work and help to ensure that the R&D
efforts of the S&T Directorate are of the highest quality and
that we are fully engaged with the Department in trying to
protect the Nation against acts of bioterrorism.
I and the American Society for Microbiology stand ready to
help the Department in any way we can in those efforts. Thank
you.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Dr. Atlas.
[The statement of Mr. Atlas follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ronald M. Atlas, Ph.D.
Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, my name is Ronald Atlas
and I am pleased to present testimony on behalf of the American Society
for Microbiology (ASM) concerning research and development activities
of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). I am Graduate Dean at the
University of Louisville, where I also co-chair the Center for Health
Hazards Preparedness. I also co-chair the Committee on Biodefense of
the ASM Public and Scientific Affairs Board. The ASM is the largest
single life science society with more than 42,000 members, and its
principal goal is the study and advancement of scientific knowledge of
microbiology for the benefit of human welfare. ASM members are involved
in research, clinical, and public health efforts, focused on developing
new preventions, therapies, and cures for infectious diseases.
The ASM supports and encourages the efforts by the DHS Science and
Technology (S&T) Directorate to provide effective programs that protect
our nation against bioterrorist threats. Science and technology play a
critical role in homeland security whether disasters are caused by
terrorist or natural events. DHS has made significant strides to
improve cutting-edge technology and systems that enhance emergency
response capabilities. We believe, however, that the nation's
scientific community can and should be better engaged by DHS in this
effort to ensure that the best approaches are developed and employed to
protect against the potentially catastrophic effects of bioterrorism.
In this regard, the ASM strongly supports the recommendations of the
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to increase the involvement and
guidance of the broader scientific community with the DHS. The need for
greater scientific input is particularly important because of DHS's
role in making risk assessments about biothreats that identify
countermeasure needs not only for the R&D programs of DHS S&T but also
for the public health programs at other agencies, including the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
It is important that the DHS S&T Directorate build public
confidence in its activities, that they be effectively coordinated with
other federal agencies with a biodefense focus, and that they be based
on sound science policy. In our view, it is especially important for
the DHS S&T Directorate to have clear and robust peer review processes
to ensure the merit and high quality of its biodefense-related research
programs. We urge Congress to reauthorize the charter for the Homeland
Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee (HSSTAC) and also
for the DHS to establish appropriate external advisory panels. Our
testimony will also focus on the need to improve threat assessment and
other DHS assigned activities through greater engagement with the
scientific community, including greater involvement of peer review; the
need for funding for the DHS university based Centers of Excellence,
fellowships and training programs to encourage students to pursue areas
of study related to homeland security; the need for more R&D on
environmental detectors; the continuation of efforts to improve the
BioWatch system of environmental surveillance; and the need for a
centralized animal health organization.
DHS Should Develop a Strategic Plan and Seek Scientific Input to
Set Priorities for Funding
The terrorist events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent
anthrax attacks led to a substantial restructuring of government
agencies to defend against terrorist attacks. Part of that change was
aimed at bringing forth the best efforts of the scientific, medical,
public health, and engineering communities to meet these national
needs. In June 2002, the Administration proposed to establish the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Congress quickly
mandated the DHS through the Homeland Security Act of 2002. This Act
provides for an Undersecretary for Science and Technology to oversee
DHS research activities aimed at developing countermeasures for acts of
terrorism, including bioterrorism.
To refine the specific responsibilities of the DHS in defending
against bioterrorism, the Administration issued Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 10 (HSPD-10), Biodefense for the 21st Century.
According to that Directive, ``The Department of Homeland Security, in
coordination with other appropriate federal departments and agencies,
is developing comprehensive plans that provide for seamless,
coordinated federal, state, local, and international responses to a
biological attack.'' The ASM believes that HSPD-10 establishes an
appropriate division of responsibilities in the area of biodefense and
that DHS has an appropriate lead role in formulating coordinated plans.
The ASM believes that development of those plans requires critical
inputs from the scientific community. The ASM also agrees with the
House and Senate Homeland Security Appropriations Committee directives
calling for the DHS to develop a strategic plan that delineates how it
will coordinate with other federal agencies involved in biodefense.
Importantly, the development of that plan requires critical input from
the scientific community. The strategic plan also should be published
in the Federal Register for review and comment.
The DHS Needs To Interact More Fully with the Scientific Community
Soon after the anthrax crimes in 2001, the National Academies of
Science (NAS) undertook a comprehensive study which provided advice on
protecting the nation against bioterrorism. The report, ``Making the
Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering
Terrorism,'' includes chapters, that I and other members of the ASM,
helped to write. It recommends a series of actions, including the
development of new tools for the surveillance, detection, and diagnosis
of bioterrorist threat agents; greatly expanded research programs aimed
at increasing our knowledge of pathogenesis of and immune responses to
biological agents; and research critical to deterrence, response, and
recovery, particularly in areas involving decontamination and
bioterrorism forensics.
Many recommendations in that report by the NAS were incorporated
into the DHS R&D agenda. Moreover, the Congress assigned critical
segments of those public health and research programs to the HHS. Thus,
DHS plays a strategic role in defining the threat and identifying needs
for vaccines, therapeutics, diagnostics and detection and warning
systems while the HHS maintains the major role in researching and
stockpiling vaccines and therapeutic agents to protect the public
against disease agents that could produce mass casualties through a
bioterrorist attack.
The ASM strongly supports the HHS continuing to play this critical
biodefense R&D function. Specifically, the ASM supports the lead role
of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the National Institute
of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) in basic research and
training and research resources, including an emphasis on translating
basic research into the development of critical vaccines, diagnostics
and therapeutics to combat infectious diseases and agents of
bioterrorism.
Congress and the Administration appear to agree that major funding
for biomedical research for biodefense should remain in the HHS. The
ASM supports this approach because robust linkages between NIAID and
the wider scientific community ensure that the best researchers are
engaged in biodefense research. Moreover, the strong peer review system
of the NIH further ensures the high quality of this research, and is
suited to integrating basic biomedical research investigating emerging
and re-emerging infectious diseases with other more applied research
that will be needed to protect human health and national security
against the threat of bioterrorism. By establishing Regional Centers of
Excellence, NIAID is fostering efforts in both the academic and private
sectors to develop defenses against a variety of infectious diseases--
from anthrax to avian influenza. This capacity to derive dual benefits
from research investments is proving critical for advancing human
health and for meeting national security needs.
While supporting the paramount role of the NIH/NIAID in overseeing
research to protect against infectious diseases and bioterrorism, the
ASM also supports the strategic role of DHS in biodefense. That role
includes prioritizing investments in biodefense-related research,
development, planning, and preparedness. Biannual risk assessments
should guide the setting of those priorities. However, the ASM is
concerned that the DHS and the intelligence community are not
adequately involving the broader science community in making threat
assessments. This concern also was expressed in the NAS report,
``Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences,''
which calls for strengthening and enhancing the scientific and
technical expertise within and across the security communities.
The ASM recommends stronger interactions among the DHS,
intelligence, and scientific communities to develop a broad consensus
on biothreats and to provide appropriate strategic guidance to the DHS
S&T Directorate and the HHS Office of Public Health Emergency
Preparedness. Such a consensus will also help to guide the Project
BioShield countermeasure procurement process and the research agenda.
The ASM and the broader scientific community stand ready to provide the
guidance needed for developing medical countermeasures.
The DHS Centers of Excellence and Training Programs Need Sustained
Support
The DHS has established six Centers of Excellence to create a
university based capacity to engage the expertise of academia in
addressing the science and education needs of the department. Ongoing
merit review and evaluation of the work of these centers assures high
quality performance and focus on the evolving needs of the DHS. Even in
their formative phase, the value of the centers is being recognized as
well as the need for eligibility for sustained support that will lead
to dual benefits by meeting both national security as well as public
health needs. The centers should be allowed sufficient time to
demonstrate their contributions to the DHS S&T mission and at the local
and state levels to enhance planning, prevention and emergency
response. In this regard, we are concerned about the proposed provision
in the Senate's version of the FY 2007 Homeland Security Appropriation
bill that would preclude universities from re-competing for funding as
a DHS Center of Excellence. In contrast, we believe that Congress
should be seeking sustained excellence. We believe that the activities
of these centers, as well as all other R&D activities of DHS S&T, can
and should be assessed by continuing ongoing rigorous peer review to
assure the public of their value.
The ASM considers fellowship and training programs an essential
activity for DHS S&T to encourage students to pursue areas of study
related to homeland security. While it is still too early to judge the
outcomes of the fellowship support programs of DHS, it appears that
they are attracting high quality students who can participate in the
future protection and security of the nation. Like the Centers of
Excellence, the ASM believes that these training programs need time to
develop and should be supported and regularly assessed.
The ASM also believes it is important to build career tracks for
those considering a career in DHS. As part of its training initiative,
DHS should consider building a program modeled after the two-year
epidemic intelligence service (EIS) program at CDC, begun soon after
the inception of that agency. This program has led to a steady flow of
bright young talented professionals in diverse fields, which have
populated many of the leadership positions in CDC and in parallel state
agencies in the following years. These EIS graduates have served the
government in the field of public health with remarkable competency
through the decades, and a similar program should be valuable for DHS.
Maintain NAS Committee that Advises the DHS and Strengthens Peer
Review of DHS S&T programs
The ASM supports the role of the NAS Committee on Biodefense
Analysis & Countermeasures, which was formed following a request from
the DHS, in advising the department on technical issues and studies
related to the DHS National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures
Center (NBACC). The NBACC is managed by the DHS S&T Directorate and is
part of the national interagency Homeland Security Biodefense Campus at
Fort Detrick.
NBACC programs provide knowledge of infectious properties of
biological agents, effectiveness of countermeasures, decontamination
procedures, and forensics analyses to support policy makers and
responders in developing policies, programs, and technologies. The
technical advice from this committee should be viewed as critical for
the NBACC to achieve its mandate in conducting biodefense R&D.
The ASM believes that the advice from the Committee on Biodefense
Analysis & Countermeasures can help to allay concerns that have been
raised about public oversight of the NBACC activities. In particular,
this committee should help to address compliance issues regarding the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), which permits research
only for defense against biological weapons. Oversight of such
activities in federal facilities is very important for maintaining
transparency and international confidence in the legitimacy of US
biodefense programs.
Going beyond the role of the Committee on Biodefense Analysis &
Countermeasures, the ASM recommends that the DHS and the NBACC have a
formal peer review system--one that will have to balance secrecy
requirements with the need for transparency to ensure the quality of
research and development programs as well as and the legitimacy of the
NBACC threat characterization efforts. Properly designed studies,
formal advisory boards, and a robust system of peer review will
reassure the Congress and the public of the value of the DHS S&T and
NBACC investments. Coordinating the appropriate biodefense-related
NBACC and HHS efforts is also important.
Congress Should Reauthorize the DHS Homeland Security Science &
Technology Advisory Committee
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 directed the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security to establish the Homeland Security
Science and Technology Advisory Committee (HSSTAC). However, the DHS
disbanded the HSSTAC as soon as the Congressional mandate for this
committee expired. The ASM urges the Congress to reauthorize the HSSTAC
charter. This committee, on which I served, brought together
scientists, physicians, members of the business community, and first
responders to provide the Undersecretary for S&T with broad advice and
technical support.
The DHS and FBI Should Work Together on Microbial Forensics
The Administration designated NBACC the lead federal agency for
forensic analysis of materials recovered following a biological attack.
This is a new field of microbiology that requires coordination among
scientists from several disciplines along with the law enforcement
community. Separately, the FBI established a Scientific Working Group
on Microbial Forensics to provide advice on the development of forensic
methods and protocols, particularly those that can meet standards
suitable within the US legal system. Although the DHS participates in
those advisory meetings, it has not established a comparable advisory
group. In the interest of addressing these important national
biodefense needs, the ASM recommends that the DHS work more closely
with this FBI Scientific Working Group and also consider establishing
its own external microbial forensics advisory group.
BioWatch, Environmental Detection, and Decontamination Need Ongoing
Assessments
Environmental detection is a critical activity for the DHS S&T.
Early detection of infectious diseases--whether from natural outbreaks
or bioterrorist attacks--is critical for curtailing morbidity and
mortality. In terms of medical diagnoses, we rely on the medical and
public health communities, giving a key role to the federal Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for recognizing suspicious disease
outbreaks.
For bioterrorism, however, early environmental detection can avert
the catastrophic spread of disease or facilitate early treatments. The
DHS S&T implemented the BioWatch system in several major cities to
detect biothreat agents that can spread as aerosols. The DHS S&T
Directorate funds the operational costs of the BioWatch system, which
currently represent about a third of the S&T biological countermeasures
budget. Because of the substantial cost of Biowatch within the S&T
biological countermeasures budget, we must ensure that it does not
divert funding from core research and development activities. Thus, we
recommend that Congress and the Administration ensure the adequacy of
the funding of S&T R&D activities to protect against future biological
threats.
We further recommend that the DHS S&T Directorate focus on the
research and development efforts needed to provide the nation with
optimal environmental detectors. In particular, more research and
development is needed to build a better system--one that could provide
instantaneous accurate detection. Progress upgrading the current
detection system and making it more cost-effective will help toward
gaining the full confidence of the public health community. To meet the
expectations of BioWatch the ASM recommends that this program, and the
environmental detection systems it employs, be evaluated on a regular
basis to determine their general effectiveness and reliability. As with
other DHS S&T programs, the ASM believes that BioWatch should have a
peer review system to ensure that it focuses on the most significant
biothreat agents.
Although the Environmental Protection Agency is assigned the lead
role, the DHS S&T should continue to play a critical role developing
decontamination systems. Several DHS systems for environmental
detection and decontamination are based on programs under way at
several of the Department of Energy National Laboratories. Although
seemingly innovative, these programs and the prototype detection
systems that they are producing should be subject to rigorous peer
review to ensure their quality. Lacking such review, the broader
community may not develop confidence in these systems when a warning
goes off or a facility is said to be decontaminated following a
bioterrorism attack.
Finally, the Administration assigned major public communication
responsibilities to the Department of Homeland Security. With other
appropriate federal departments and agencies, the DHS is charged with
developing comprehensive communication strategies in the event of a
bioterrorism attack. However, the NAS study, ``How Clean is Safe,''
concluded that public acceptance of status reports is inevitably based
on whether they trust what government officials tell them. Thus,
communications from DHS need to be credible if they are to be
effective. The best methods for decontaminating facilities and the
finest techniques for detecting bioterrorist outbreaks are of little
use if the public does not believe in them.
Centralized Organization for Animal Health Issues Needed
Agriculture can be the target of bioterrorist attacks. The NAS
report, ``Making the Nation Safer,'' recommended establishing a
centralized animal health surveillance organization equivalent to the
CDC. It also recognized the need for increased R&D efforts to protect
our food resources. The DHS S&T Directorate established two academic
Centers of Excellence, one at Texas A&M University and the other at the
University of Minnesota, for addressing agro-security issues. The DHS
S&T Directorate also operates the Plum Island facility where infectious
agents of agricultural importance are studied.
We need a first class facility where the most dangerous animal
pathogens can be studied. Because the Plum Island facility needs
significant upgrading, DHS is considering a number of alternate, more
cost-effective, and more readily accessible sites for a facility.
Constructing and operating an animal health facility on the mainland
can be done safely; however, it may require the Congress to enact
legislation permitting several animal pathogens, including those
responsible for foot and mouth disease and rinderpest, to be studied on
the US mainland. Such research is critical for the development of
vaccines, therapeutic drugs, and detection methods to protect against
diseases that could severely damage US agriculture and our economy. To
foster the highest quality research it will be advantageous to have the
facility interact with the NIH and DHS academic Centers of Excellence
on key areas of research.
Conclusions
In conclusion, the ASM supports the critical roles given to DHS by
HSPD-10 which make the DHS S&T programs of central importance for
making the nation safer against threats of bioterrorism directed
against humans and agriculture. We believe that HSPD-10 appropriately
distributes shared responsibilities across the Federal government
assigning to DHS a critical coordination role that is essential for
defending the nation against a bioterrorist attack. The ASM strongly
supports recommendations from the NAS to increase the involvement of
the broader scientific community in assessing specific bioterrorist
threats and, more generally, in guiding the efforts of both the DHS and
the HHS in developing detection systems, medical countermeasures,
decontamination methodologies, and other biodefense-related measures.
Improved intelligence and threat characterization are also critical to
these efforts.
The DHS S&T Directorate should reach out to the scientific
community to help guide its efforts. Without such input, it will be
difficult to build an effective public health response, one that the
medical community and the public will trust. We think that the DHS
should have robust peer review systems to guide its S&T efforts and to
ensure the quality of its R&D efforts. We urge the Congress to
reauthorize the charter for the HSSTAC and for the DHS to establish
additional external advisory panels to guide its R&D efforts. We
recognize that the need for secrecy may conflict with the need for
broadly based peer evaluations, but believe that these difficulties can
be overcome. We strongly believe that DHS should provide enhanced
support for agrosecurity since they are charged with this
responsibility and the area is critically important to biodefense. The
ASM stands ready to assist the DHS S&T directorate as well as all other
agencies involved in defending our nation against bioterrorism.
Mr. Linder. Dr. Atlas, do you agree with Dr. Happer that
the supreme threat to this country is a nuclear explosion?
Mr. Atlas. I think that there is a difference between
biologists and my colleagues in nuclear physics in that the
biologists think that some agents can equal--maybe not exceed,
but equal a nuclear threat; and they are easier to obtain and
develop. So we have seen biological on a par at points with
nuclear.
But I think, as Dr. Happer said--the comments I heard
suggested a dirty bomb is not up there and, likewise, the
chemical threats are not at the same level, so that when we
were advising the previous under secretary on the committee, I
think biological and nuclear kept rising to the top.
And, Will, you may or may not agree with that. But those
two stood out above, in my mind, the other sorts of threats
that we face. Which is not so say that we didn't suggest to the
under secretary that the more common, not mass-casualty sorts
of weapons, like conventional bombs needed real concern by the
Department. We were on board with that.
Mr. Linder. I happen to agree with you that nuclear and
biological are at the top of the list. It makes me curious as
to why we spend one out of eight of our dollars for homeland
security on airline protection and less than 2Sec. rcent on
intelligence, which is the only thing that is going to bring us
a breakthrough on the spread of nuclear and biological
intelligence.
It does seem to me that our priorities are not very
rational.
Dr. Happer, if you would agree that one of the threats to
us is financial, how can we cripple this country financially? A
dirty bomb in Lower Manhattan may not kill a lot of people
immediately and it may not cause a radioactive disease, but
wouldn't just the cleanup effort be hugely costly and take
years to do?
Mr. Happer. I would be surprised if it would take years to
do it.
We recently renovated a building at Princeton that was
contaminated with radioactivity from the 1930s, and it cost us
several hundred thousand dollars, you know, and we had to pull
out some stuff. You wouldn't have wanted to be in the parts
that were contaminated before we cleaned it up, but there are
companies that do this and have experience doing this. And I
personally think that we would handle it.
Mr. Linder. You go out of your way to tell us that these
things are not going to be breakthroughs, that much of the
science is mature in radioactive detection?
Mr. Happer. That is because I am alarmed about calls for a
Manhattan Project. There is no way you can spend that amount of
money wisely on radiation detectors.
Mr. Linder. What could be a breakthrough? What might come
along that is totally new?
Mr. Happer. Well, one thing I mentioned in my testimony is
that if you look at breakthroughs in the past, for example,
nuclear weapons themselves, that was an accident, you know; in
fact, the hero was a woman. You know, Lise Meitner, who was
looking at some work for which Fermi got the Nobel Prize,
thinking he had made plutonium; and in fact, he realized, this
isn't plutonium at all, this is barium. And nobody thought of
that.
You know, but she was a good enough chemist to recognize
it, and so it was she really who is responsible for discovering
fission.
So these things happen in a very unpredictable way. But to
give an example that--you know, the basic science community is
now trying to detect neutrino, if you think it is hard to
detect highly enriched uranium, plutonium, it is much harder to
detect neutrino from the sun and outer space. So I guess, if I
were running the program, I would put a little bit of money
into very loosely connected science that was pushing the limits
on something that was even harder than nuclear material.
So I would support some work on neutrino detection or maybe
looking for dark matter--you know, a big mystery, what is it?
And again, we have got very bright, motivated, driven people,
you know, thinking, how can I detect this? How can I detect
this? And I think that is where a breakthrough might come from.
Mr. Linder. Dr. Atlas, when are we going to reach a point
when the BioWatch program is actually use could help avert at
least the distribution, as it occurred 5 years ago in the
anthrax attacks.
Mr. Linder. Doesn't this entire program require a human
being to go out and pick it up and bring it in and test it? At
what point can we get some reading directly off satellites that
there is something going on at this point?
Mr. Atlas. And I think the answer to that is, they would
not need major new breakthroughs in technology. We, in fact,
have the capability to do autonomous detection of micro-
organisms where the samples can be relayed to a central
location.
There has been a first-generation BioWatch. There have been
other developments under way at DHS; and I think the issue that
I raised when I questioned how much effort goes into operation
versus how much can be offered in the future generations, in
fact, rests there. In my view, some new systems can be made
available, are being made available, a plan to replace that
first generation. We need to move forward in that way.
Mr. Linder. Thank you. My time has expired.
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony here today.
Dr. Happer, I would like to follow up on a comment you made
during your testimony, and the chairman had raised during his
questioning period. You said that we shouldn't expect any
breakthroughs in the area of nuclear detection technology, and
I wonder if you could again just expand on that a little bit,
only because we know that technology squares every 18 months.
And, yes, I know that doesn't apply to the laws of physics,
but it does apply to technology. So why couldn't we, or
shouldn't we, expect breakthroughs in nuclear detection?
Mr. Happer. Well, I maybe have misrepresented myself
slightly in that I did mention that there is always a
possibility of an accidental breakthrough, and we discussed
that a few minutes ago. But let's talk about the two detectors
that you brought up, which are sodium iodide and high-frequency
germanium. Both of those have been around for many decades.
In fact, when I was a student, I counted gamma rays with
sodium iodide; and when I look at the detectors today, they are
not very different from the ones I used in the 1960s.
And germanium is a little bit newer, and as was mentioned
by Mr. Oxford, one of the problems with germanium is just the
practicality of always pouring liquid nitrogen in it; so there
is a big infrastructure to keep it operating that you don't
need for sodium iodide.
So I think, although you might not have a breakthrough, you
could have some other material that would not require so much
cooling. You would then maybe have not quite as good
resolution, but I wouldn't call that a breakthrough. I would
call that very, very useful for a system.
What I mean by ``breakthrough'' is something like the
discovery of fission, right, or the discovery of, you know,
semiconductors to replace electronic tubes. That is what I had
in mind as a ``breakthrough.''
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Gentlemen, this panel focuses obviously on threats usually
more characterized as WMD, or to be more specific, CBR,
chemical-biological-radiological, or nuclear or explosive; and
we have a large number of threats that have to be addressed.
Now, the DNDO is focused on nuclear radiological threats while
the rest of the S&T Directorate is tasked with chemical,
biological and explosive.
The nuclear weapons as, we have mentioned many times here
today and in previous hearings, are judged to be the most
difficult of these threats to acquire, but also the most
catastrophic. So given the relative dangers across the CBRNE
spectrum, do you think that the funding priorities of the
President's budget of $536 million for DNDO, $83 million for
chemical countermeasures, $86.5 million for explosive
countermeasures and $337 million for biological countermeasures
is the correct balance?
Mr. Atlas. I think that is a difficult question in that
whatever the next attack is, the Congress and the public are
going to look and ask, why weren't we adequately protected
against that? So whatever we are investing in does seem
appropriate. But also I have no doubt we will second-guess it
if we are attacked with one of the other weapons; and that, I
think, is a difficulty, that--none of us have a crystal ball.
We would like to know where and what the next real threat
is going to be. Given that, we place the emphasis on those
agents that we think will cause or have the potential to cause
the greatest harm; and in that regard, we seem to be
appropriately making decisions that nuclear-biological get more
than chemical or explosives. But I venture to say, if we
started seeing bombs going off on mass transportation systems,
the public would be hollering to indicate the question, Why
weren't we paying more attention to those? That, I think, is
the reality.
Mr. Langevin. Let me take it a step further. Even the right
balance maybe is not the right way to approach it.
Are you surprised by how much or how little we are spending
on any one of the things that I just read? Does it shock you
that we might not be spending more in a particular area?
Mr. Happer. Let me try and step in for just a minute here.
I do think that we could use some more money spent on
conventional chemical explosives not only for our country
where, God forbid, we might have something like Madrid or
London, but, you know, the War in Iraq where we are losing most
of our--you know, troops to improvised explosive devices. And
yet if you look at the money that is being spent on
conventional explosives, it is very modest.
Now, again, that is a very mature technology. It is a
little bit like nuclear detectors. It is hard to make a
breakthrough, but we should still probably be trying harder
than we are.
Mr. Atlas. Let me in the biological arena point out, as
this committee has noted, we have split responsibilities
between DHS and other agencies like HHS; and there is
significant biodefense funding outside of DHS. The one area
within the DHS biological program that I think one might point
to with concern is the agroterrorism area; there, we don't have
the equivalent sort of funding outside of DHS on this.
Certainly the Department of Agriculture is involved to an
extent, but nothing like what we have in the DHHS programs for
human biodefense.
Mr. Langevin. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Dicks.
Mr. Dicks. You suggested a Red Team. I have always been in
favor of red teams in situations like this, somebody to
challenge the conventional wisdom. And one of the things that
was mentioned in the 9/11 Commission report was a need for
imagination.
I think a Red Team could be a very big benefit. Tell us why
you why you suggested that.
Mr. Happer. Well, I am worried that in the effort to try
and put something out in the field, we will put something out
all right, we will spend a lot of money, but it could well be
that it is very easily defeated.
And so that is the classic problem; it was the problem the
French had when they built the Maginot Line. They didn't have a
Red Team, in fact. Or they did have a Red Team, but it wasn't
very official; and it got the right answer, but it was ignored.
So I just--I would like to feel that we are not going to
build a marginal detection system that has the same fate as
every other marginal detection system. You just go around it
somehow. And the best way I think to avoid that is to try to
figure out, how would I defeat that myself. I know everything
about it. My job is to defeat it. I am not going to put it in
the press, but I am going to give Mr. Oxford hell about his
current design and he is going to have to respond to it, and it
is going to be entirely internal and private.
Mr. Dicks. You also suggested that DNDO needs a technically
competent independent advisory committee. Do they not have one
now?
Mr. Happer. I am a little out of date. I spoke to Mr.
Oxford and--just as the meeting was breaking up for your vote,
and he invited me over to see what is happening now. And I will
try to do that.
But--to the best of my knowledge, they don't have an
official advisory committee, but that may be just because I
don't know about it.
Mr. Dicks. Now on the BioWatch, the whole thing, Dr. Atlas,
we have--you know, DHS has to do these material threat
assessments which have been rather slow in coming. Maybe they
picked up a little bit, but for a while they were very slow.
But HHS is seen just to be totally unable to respond. What is
your take on all this? I mean what needs to happen here to get,
you know--or should something happen?
I mean, some people say we ought to wait. I can't believe
that we can't have some better preparation than just sitting on
our hands.
Mr. Atlas. And I am not sure about the validity of whether
HHS can or has not responded. Certainly from the scientific
community's view, HHS, through the National Institute of
Allergy and Infectious Disease, has gotten way out in front in
terms of them being able to foster the development of new
vaccines and drugs that will be effective in the future.
Now, admittedly, a lot of that is basic research, but they
are all rushing towards translation into production. And they
do depend on DHS for strategic direction, and I am not sure
that early on that strategic direction was forthcoming. ASM,
myself included, was involved in advising the Congress and
testifying on that decision to split responsibilities between
DHS, strategic function, and giving HHS tactical function.
If you are referring to BioShield, which is the newSec.
Mr. Dicks. Right.
Mr. Atlas. --which is--this newer wrinkle on BioShield is
this procurement device whereby DHS designates what is of
concern and then HHS undertakes the activity that leads to
procurement. I believe that only four agents have so far come
forward as the designated threats for which HHS procures. So we
have a bunch of talks and threats about radiological devices,
and my understanding is, those are entering the stockpile.
The question is whether or not the BioShield should also
have an advanced development function, so that when something
is not ready for procurement, there needs to be development. I
think that is where we need better direction, perhaps from the
Congress, to help guide that relationship between DHS and HHS
so that, in fact, the needs of the Nation are properly being
met.
Mr. Dicks. Who would do that? I mean, the advanced research
would be done by the universities and by--
Mr. Atlas. They are most likely to be done by biotech
companies. In truth, many universities are spinning off biotech
companies and building bioparks to foster that.
It tends to be more an industrial development scheme, and I
suspect the Congress is hearing more calls from that sector for
action, that they are not being well served under the current
version of Bio--but this has been in its development and, I
suspect, will continue to be an extraordinarily complex effort
and act as to where the Congress really wants to have
investments made.
Is it to bolster industry? And if so, how do we ensure that
the right devices are being picked for that development? And I
think that is across the board.
Mr. Dicks. Exposure to nuclear weapons, I mean, to
radiation from a nuclear blast is a major problem area; and you
know--what do you think we should do then?
Mr. Happer. Well, you know, most people in Hiroshima and
Nagasaki were killed by the blast. The number who died of
radiation was quite small. I would be surprised if it was more
than a few percent. But the real problem from a nuclear weapon
is the blast.
And with respect to exposure, you know--I pointed out in my
notes that, you know, we have sailors in our ballistic missile
submarines who bunk right by the missiles; they are loaded with
plutonium. The amount of radiation from plutonium, which is
much more radioactive than HEU, is manageable, so even with
their 6 months of sea duty, you know, every year, they don't
get very much of a dose.
So unless you actually have a weapon, the amount of
radiation is not going to be very great.
Now, a dirty bomb, there is the additional problem--well,
you get something that is really radioactive, cesium, cobalt,
and you try to blow it up and disperse it. But if you actually
try to do that--and people have done experiments and kept
running models--it is very hard to disperse it.
You know, I remember I used to watch people spraying, for
the boll weevil in North Carolina. You know, the guy gets up in
the airplane in the morning. He sprays back and forth. It is
noon, he is still spraying. It is a dispersal problem.
It is just very hard to disperse things, whereas a blast,
it moves at the speed of sound everywhere. So within a fraction
of a second it has wiped out the city.
Mr. Dicks. That has to be number one--
Mr. Happer. Yes. Yes.
Mr. Dicks. --in your judgment.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Linder. Thanks to the both of you. Thank you for your
patience today. You have been very helpful.
Dr. Atlas, it is good to see you again. Dr. Happer, I think
we will be seeing more of you, too. Thank you.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:24 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]