[Senate Report 110-262]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
110th Congress
2nd Session SENATE Report
110-262
_______________________________________________________________________
Calendar No. 578
INSPECTOR GENERAL REFORM ACT OF 2007
__________
R E P O R T
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
to accompany
S. 2324
TO AMEND THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978 (5 U.S.C. APP.) TO ENHANCE
THE OFFICES OF THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, TO CREATE A COUNCIL OF THE
INSPECTORS GENERAL ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
February 22, 2008.--Ordered to be printed
Filed, under authority of the order of the Senate of February 14, 2008
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TED STEVENS, Alaska
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHN WARNER, Virginia
JON TESTER, Montana JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director
Kevin J. Landy, Chief Counsel
Holly A. Idelson, Counsel
Brandon L. Milhorn, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Richard A. Beutel, Minority Senior Counsel
Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
I. Purpose and Summary..............................................1
II. Background and Need for the Legislation..........................2
III. Legislative History..............................................7
IV. Section by Section Analysis......................................8
V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact.................................12
VI. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate.......................12
VII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported...........15
Calendar No. 578
110th Congress Report
SENATE
2d Session 110-262
======================================================================
INSPECTOR GENERAL REFORM ACT OF 2007
_______
February 22, 2008.--Ordered to be printed
Filed, under authority of the order of the Senate of February 14, 2008
_______
Mr. Lieberman, from the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, submitted the following
R E P O R T
[To accompany S. 2324]
The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, to which was referred the bill (S. 2324) to amend the
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to enhance the
Offices of the Inspectors General, to create a Council of the
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, and for other
purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon
with amendments and recommends that the bill do pass.
I. Purpose and Summary
S. 2324 is a bipartisan bill to strengthen the Inspector
General system within the federal government. It has been
almost 30 years since Congress created the Inspector General
system to improve government efficiency and accountability. The
Inspector General Act of 1978 (IG Act) \1\ established a
network of internal watchdogs within key federal agencies to
help prevent and uncover waste, fraud and abuse. In 1988, the
IG Act was expanded to reach most major departments and
agencies.
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\1\ The IG Act (PL 95-452) and its subsequent amendments are
codified at 5 U.S.C. Appendix and 31 U.S.C. Section 1105(a)(25).
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By and large, the IG Act has worked well to help the
Executive Branch and Congress alike strive to ensure more
effective and efficient government. However, time has revealed
some shortcomings in the existing Act. It is essential that
Inspectors General operate with sufficient independence to do
their jobs well, yet the current IG structure does not go far
enough to safeguard this independence. At the same time, it is
imperative to strengthen the oversight process for the IGs
themselves, to ensure they do not abuse their unique
authorities. This legislation, therefore, would make certain
adjustments in the structure and organization of the Inspector
General community. It strengthens and modernizes this community
to provide for both greater independence and greater
accountability of the Inspectors General.
II. Background and Need for the Legislation
Today it is easy to take for granted the network of federal
Inspectors General, who serve a unique and indispensible role
as internal watchdogs within executive departments and
agencies. Yet while the Inspector General concept dates back to
the beginnings of our government, the modern statutory
Inspector General community is a relatively new institution.
The framework for these statutory IGs was laid out in the
Inspector General Act of 1978, and expanded in the 1988
amendments to that Act. These Inspectors General are charged
with conducting audits and investigations to promote the
effective, efficient and ethical operation of the government
agencies. They do this as senior officials within their
respective agencies, where they operate with a broad mandate
and report directly to the agency head. Yet the IGs are also
charged with reporting directly to Congress, giving them a
unique status and responsibility to inform and facilitate
effective Congressional oversight of the Executive Branch.
There are currently 58 Inspector General offices
established under the IG Act. Of these, 29 are appointed by the
President with Senate confirmation (presidential IGs) and 29
are appointed by their agency heads in designated federal
entities (DFE IGs). In addition, there are three statutory
Inspectors General already established in the legislative
branch--for the Government Printing Office (GPO), \2\ the
Library of Congress \3\ and the Capitol Police. \4\ A fourth
legislative branch Inspector General--for the Architect of the
Capitol--was authorized after this legislation was considered
in the Committee.\5\
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\2\ 44 U.S.C. Section 3902.
\3\ U.S.C. Section 185.
\4\ 2 U.S.C. Section 1909.
\5\ Public Law 10-161, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008,
Division H.
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Pursuant to executive orders, the IG community is organized
into two interagency councils: the President's Council on
Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE) for presidential IGs and the
Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency (ECIE) for the
DFE IGs.\6\ The Deputy Director for Management in the Office of
Management and Budget chairs both councils.
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\6\ Executive Order 12805, May 11, 1992; Executive Order 12993,
March 2, 1996.
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The work of these Inspectors General has been invaluable.
Investigations by Inspectors General have helped the government
recover billions of dollars in fraudulent charges, and their
audit recommendations could create billions more in savings.
Their work has also shut down possible future abuses by laying
the groundwork for thousands of prosecutions, suspensions,
debarments and personnel actions. In 2006 alone, audits by
Inspector General offices resulted in $9.9 billion in potential
savings from audit recommendations and $6.8 billion in
investigative recoveries.\7\
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\7\ Honorable Clay Johnson III, testimony, Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee, July 11, 2007.
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An example from the Committee's recent work illustrates the
tremendous value of the work of the IGs. In a six-month period
following the Hurricane Katrina disaster, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) IG operation produced 29 reports
related to the recovery efforts that included such alarming
discoveries as that 63 percent of the DHS purchase-card
transactions made during the response had no documentation of
goods or services actually being received.\8\ The DHS IG
investigations overall in this period helped produce 243
convictions for fraud or related offenses, and recovery of
millions of taxpayer dollars.\9\
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\8\ Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General,
Semiannual Report to Congress April 1, 2006--September 30, 2006, p. 3.
\9\ Id.
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The investigations and reports of Inspectors General
throughout the government help Congress shape legislation and
oversight activities--improving the government's performance,
providing important transparency into programs, and giving
Americans better value for their tax dollar. Their work goes
beyond dollar savings, however; by revealing unethical or
unlawful conduct, the Inspectors General also help safeguard
the integrity and credibility of government. For instance, the
Department of Justice Office of Inspector General (OIG)
revealed the sloppy and sometimes inappropriate use of National
Security Letters to conduct wiretaps within this country.\10\
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\10\ ``Department of Justice Office of Inspector General, ``A
Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Use of National
Security Letters,'' March 2007.
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To achieve these results, Inspectors General must operate
without fear of improper intervention or intimidation by
management or political forces. That is why the IG Act gives
the Inspectors General a high degree of operational autonomy
and authorizes a direct reporting channel to Congress. It is
critical that agency management respect this independence and
not attempt to retaliate against a vigorous Inspector General
by threatening his or her tenure or budget, or otherwise
interfere in effective oversight by the IG.
For the most part, the Inspectors General have been able to
operate with sufficient independence. However, the Committee is
aware of several instances of real or perceived encroachments
on IG authority. Just in the past year, for instance, there
have been several public accounts from current or former
Inspectors General who believed they were being improperly
pressured or denied resources to carry out needed oversight.
The Committee is aware of additional complaints from several
OIGs.
The Committee is also concerned about oversight of the
Inspectors General, because with their heightened autonomy
comes a heightened risk of abuse of power. Again, recent years
have brought to light significant misconduct allegations
against several Inspectors General. To maintain the
effectiveness of the IGs and faith in their oversight, there
must be a credible and effective channel to investigate
complaints against an Inspector General or his senior staff, so
as to deter and punish real or potential misconduct. The
Integrity Committee of the PCIE has provided an important
channel for investigating such complaints. However the
Integrity Committee operates without clearly understood
procedures or effective Congressional oversight. It is critical
that this oversight process become more transparent and more
accountable.
S. 2324 would build on the strengths of the IG Act, while
addressing some of these recent concerns. Some key aspects of
the legislation are discussed below.
QUALIFICATIONS AND COMPENSATION
This legislation amends the Inspector General Act of 1978
to explicitly require appointments on the basis of ability and
integrity, not political affiliation. This is already required
for the presidentially appointed IGs, and the legislation would
extend these requirements to the DFE IGs as well.
With respect to compensation, the legislation would ensure
that Inspectors General receive compensation that is
appropriate to their status and responsibilities yet also
assure that this compensation does not present any real or
apparent conflict of interest.
Currently there are two problems with compensation for the
Inspectors General. First, the compensation of some Inspectors
General depends on bonuses awarded by officials they oversee.
Presidentially appointed IGs have generally agreed to forego
such bonuses, but they remain an important part of the overall
compensation of some DFE IGs. This presents at least the
appearance of a conflict of interest, and should not be part of
the IG pay structure.
Second, some Inspectors General earn too little. Many
Inspectors General are paid considerably less than officials
they supervise. In some cases this is linked to a self-imposed
ban on bonuses, in others it is simply the result of the
Inspector General being slotted too low on the pay scale.
The bill prohibits any Inspector General from receiving a
bonus but would ensure that the overall compensation of any IG
is appropriate and adequate to attract and retain skilled
professionals. For presidentially appointed IGs, the bill
includes a specific, statutory pay raise to Executive Schedule
III plus 3 percent. For DFE IGs, the legislation requires that
the Inspector General be classified at a grade, level, or rank
designation at or above those of a majority of the senior level
executives of that agency. In addition, it requires that DFE
IGs receive not less than the average compensation of those
senior executives within the agency. To ensure that this
formula yields appropriate salaries for the DFE IGs, the
legislation also requires that Government Accountability Office
(GAO) report back to Congress on the implementation of these
pay provisions.
STRENGTHENING INDEPENDENCE
In addition to adjusting the qualifications and
compensation provisions for Inspectors General, the legislation
would add certain structural protections to safeguard their
independence.
The bill includes a requirement that the President or
appropriate agency head notify Congress 30 days before
transferring or removing an Inspector General. This would allow
for an appropriate dialogue with Congress in the event that the
planned transfer or removal is viewed as an inappropriate or
politically motivated attempt to terminate an effective
Inspector General. As part of this advance notice, the
Administration would be required to supply written reasons for
the planned transfer or termination. This advance notice
provision was widely endorsed by the IG community as a useful
deterrent against improper intimidation or dismissal. By
contrast, the Inspectors General were divided over proposals to
create fixed terms for IGs with dismissal only ``for
cause.''\11\
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\11\ GAO, Highlights of the Comptroller General's Panel on Federal
Oversight and the Inspectors General, GAO-06-931SP (Washington, D.C.;
Sept. 11, 2006).
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While we hope that this advance notice will encourage
useful communication between Congress and the Executive Branch
on IG performance and serve as an effective deterrent against
improper terminations, we note that the provision does not
alter the President's ultimate authorities with respect to
Executive Branch employees.
The legislation also would safeguard IG independence in the
budget process, by requiring a separate budget line for
Inspectors General that includes their overall budget and
training needs. Currently, there is not necessarily a separate
line item for each OIG within the budget of its respective
agency and no requirement that training expenses or
contributions to the work of the PCIE or ECIE be clearly
identified. This budget requirement will create greater
transparency regarding IG program and training needs, to help
ensure these offices are adequately funded and to protect
against any punitive budget cuts.
The legislation includes several other measures designed to
strengthen the operational authorities of the Inspectors
General, including enhancing their authority to manage their
own staff.
COUNCIL
The existing IG Councils (the PCIE and the ECIE) serve as
vehicles for individual Inspectors General to forge common
standards and provide resources to support their respective
missions. The PCIE also includes an Integrity Committee that is
the mechanism for reviewing misconduct allegations against
Inspectors General or their top staff members.
While these Councils play a valuable role, they are badly
in need of strengthening. The Councils operate on an ad hoc,
shoestring budget, have no dedicated staff, and have limited
legal authority for joint endeavors, such as a standardized
training program for OIG staff. In testimony and numerous
interviews with Committee staff, the Inspectors General have
cited strengthening the resources and authorities of the
Councils as a key component of improving the effectiveness of
the IG community.
This legislation would create a more robust IG Council to
promote the work of the Inspectors General, and also provide
more effective oversight for the IG community. It would replace
the two existing councils with one, statutory council for the
entire IG community. The bill gives the new Council a broad
charter to conduct activities to build a strong, professional
IG community and explicitly authorizes individual Inspectors
General to pool resources for Council programs, including
training. Additionally, as noted above, the budget provisions
of the bill require that the Inspectors General and
Administration identify the amounts sought and recommended for
Council expenses and training--a provision designed to bring
greater transparency to the cost of Council activities and
which the Committee intends will encourage adequate funding for
these extremely important activities. The Committee also
supports enhanced funding for the Council through any other
appropriate mechanism.
The bill would also codify an Integrity Committee to review
allegations of misconduct by Inspectors General and their top
staff, as described below.
ACCOUNTABILITY
This legislation also addresses issues of how the
Inspectors General are to be held accountable. Unfortunately,
the Inspectors General are not immune from real or alleged
misconduct or mismanagement and it is critical that there be an
effective and credible mechanism to address these complaints
when they arise. Currently, the Integrity Committee of the PCIE
serves as a forum for allegations against Inspectors General
and their senior staff. The bill would strengthen the Integrity
Committee by codifying it and requiring greater transparency
and Congressional oversight for its work. Congress currently
has no systematic or assured way to learn of serious
allegations against an Inspector General or learn the results
of an investigation into those allegations. The new Integrity
Committee would be required to notify Congress of its
procedures, and prepare regular reports on investigations it
undertakes. The Committee is also concerned that there are not
dedicated resources for the Integrity Committee and intends
that the budget provisions of this bill be used to help assure
sufficient resources for effective Integrity Committee work, as
well as other Council activities.
Additionally, S. 2324 requires that the Government
Accountability Office prepare a report analyzing the policies
and practices of the Integrity Committee, as well as other
mechanisms for handling complaints against an Inspector General
or his staff.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OIG
Another provision of the bill would eliminate a statutory
restriction on the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice
(DOJ) OIG. Currently, the DOJ OIG does not have authority to
investigate misconduct allegations concerning Department
attorneys acting in a legal capacity or investigators acting at
an attorney's direction. Those cases are instead referred to
the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR). No other
statutory Office of Inspector General has such a limitation;
alleged misconduct by career lawyers at other federal
departments and agencies is within the purview of that agency's
Inspector General.
This bill would eliminate that restriction. The Committee
believes it is appropriate to give the DOJ OIG a ``right of
first refusal'' on allegations involving Department lawyers, as
well as other officials. OPR does not operate with the same
structural independence as the OIG, and its reports are rarely
made public. The Committee believes it is more appropriate that
the OIG investigate matters involving high ranking Department
attorneys or widespread policies or practices at the
Department. It is troubling, for instance, that the
investigations into the U.S. attorney firing scandal was
initially referred to OPR; the OIG was allowed to participate
only after objecting to the Department leadership.\12\ The
current arrangement also can lead to unproductive duplication
of effort between the OIG and OPR when an investigation
implicates matters within the IG's jurisdiction as well as some
aspects of attorney conduct.
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\12\ The Honorable Glenn A. Fine, testimony, Senate Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, July 11, 2007.
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By including this provision, the Committee is not seeking
to diminish or disparage the important contributions of OPR.
The Committee recognizes that OPR is generally highly regarded
for its expertise and integrity. For the most part, the work of
OPR would continue as it does now; the Committee does not
anticipate or intend that the OIG would normally investigate
routine attorney misconduct cases involving line attorneys that
are the core of OPR's work. The Committee anticipates that the
OIG and OPR would work out a protocol to determine which cases
should be referred to OPR and which retained by the OIG--much
as the Inspector General has with other investigative elements
of the Department of Justice.
ADDITIONAL ENHANCEMENTS
S. 2324 includes additional provisions that improve and
strengthen the IG system:
The bill would clarify that the subpoena authority
of Inspectors General extends to electronic documents.
The bill would require that agencies provide a
clear link to that agency's Inspector General website, and that
OIG reports be promptly posted on agency websites.
The bill would allow DFE IGs to apply to the
Department of Justice for law enforcement designation and seek
recoveries under the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act,
authorities currently exercised only by presidential IGs.
III. Legislative History
S. 2324 was introduced on November 8, 2007, by Senator
McCaskill with Senators Collins, Lieberman and Coburn as
original cosponsors. The bill was read twice and referred to
the Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs on
November 8, 2007.
S. 2324 was grounded in two earlier legislative proposals--
S. 680 and S. 1723. S. 680, the Accountability in Government
Contracting Act of 2007, was introduced on February 17, 2007 by
Senator Collins and originally included some of the reforms
included in this legislation. However, the provisions of S. 680
governing Inspectors General were removed from that bill during
markup on August 1, 2007. S. 1723, the Improvement in
Government Accountability Act of 2007, was introduced on June
28, 2007 by Senator McCaskill and also contained many of the
provisions included in S. 2324.
In addition, the Committee held a hearing on July 11, 2007
to consider the status of the Inspector General system and the
need for possible reforms. Witnesses at that hearing were: The
Honorable Clay Johnson III, Deputy Director for Management,
Office of Management and Budget; The Honorable Glenn A. Fine,
Inspector General, Department of Justice; the Honorable Earl E.
Devaney, Inspector General, Department of the Interior; the
Honorable Eleanor J. Hill, former Inspector General, Department
of Defense; and Danielle Brian, Executive Director, Project on
Government Oversight. The Committee also received written
testimony from: the Honorable Phyllis K. Fong, Inspector
General, Department of Agriculture; Dr. Christine Boesz,
Inspector General, National Science Foundation; David M.
Walker, Comptroller General of the United States; Jane E.
Altenhofen, Inspector General, National Labor Relations Board;
and Susan Khoury, former Special Agent, Office of the Inspector
General, Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Following the July hearing, Senators McCaskill, Collins,
Lieberman and Coburn collaborated to draft a new version of
Inspector General reform legislation, which was then introduced
as S. 2324.
On November 14, 2007, the Committee considered S. 2324.
Senators Lieberman, Collins, McCaskill and Coburn offered a
manager's amendment, which made technical changes and added a
section relating to investigations of allegations against the
Special Counsel or Deputy Special Counsel. The amendment was
adopted by voice vote. The bill, as amended, was adopted by the
Committee by voice vote and ordered reported to the Senate.
Members present for the vote on the manager's amendment were
Senators Lieberman, Carper, McCaskill, Tester, Collins,
Stevens, Voinovich and Coleman. Members present for the vote on
the bill as amended were Senators Lieberman, Carper, McCaskill,
Tester, Collins, Stevens, Voinovich, Coleman and Coburn.
Senators Akaka, Clinton and Obama joined as cosponsors on
November 13, 2007. Senators Carper and Stevens joined as
cosponsors on November 14, 2007, Senator Levin joined as a
cosponsor on November 15, 2007 and Senator Coleman joined as a
cosponsor on November 16, 2007. Senator Grassley joined as a
cosponsor on December 19, 2007.
IV. Section by Section Analysis
Section 1: Title
Section 2: This section requires that Inspectors General
for the designated federal entities (non-presidential
appointees) be selected on the basis of skills and integrity
and without regard to political affiliation--the same
requirements that currently apply to presidentially appointed
IGs. This section is designed to ensure that Inspectors General
are selected on the basis of their qualifications to perform
this important role and not any other basis. This section
eliminates the unintentional distinction between presidentially
appointed IGs and non-presidentially appointed IGs.
Section 3: This section requires that before an Inspector
General can be removed or transferred, Congress must be
provided with 30 days advance written notice including reasons
for termination or transfer. This section applies to
presidentially appointed IGs, those at designated federal
entities, and the three statutory IGs within the legislative
branch. The Committee intends that Inspectors General who fail
to perform their duties properly whether through malfeasance or
nonfeasance, or whose personal actions bring discredit upon the
office, be removed. The requirement to notify the Congress in
advance of the reasons for the removal should serve to ensure
that Inspectors General are not removed for political reasons
or because they are doing their jobs of ferreting out fraud,
waste and abuse.
Section 4: This section is necessary to ensure that the
compensation of Inspectors General is set at a level to attract
highly competent and skilled individuals to public service and
to retain these individuals as long as they continue to perform
at the highest levels. The Committee has evidence that the
current pay for Inspectors General has created disparities
where some IGs are being paid less than their deputies or other
members of their office. Combine these pay disparities with the
fact that many Inspectors General choose to refuse bonuses
awarded their peers in order to avoid the appearance of
impropriety, and the pay disparities in the current system
actually serve as a disincentive for individuals to seek out
and retain the Office of Inspector General.
Subsection (a) adjusts the pay for presidentially appointed
IGs. Pay for these Inspectors General would rise from Executive
Schedule IV to Executive Schedule III, plus 3 percent.
Currently, most presidentially appointed IGs earn less than
subordinates in the Senior Executive Service (SES). This
disparity is exacerbated by the fact that SES employees are
eligible for performance awards or bonuses, which the
presidential IGs have voluntarily agreed to forego and which
would be prohibited for them under this legislation. By
increasing the pay of the presidentially appointed IGs to
Executive Schedule III plus 3 percent, the Committee hopes to
eliminate or significantly diminish this disparity.
Subsection (b) would adjust the classification and pay for
the Inspectors General of designated federal entities. For the
DFE IGs, grade, level or rank designation would be set at or
above those of a majority of the senior level executives of the
agency, such as the General Counsel, the Chief Acquisition
Officer, the Chief Information Officer, the Chief Financial
Officer and the Chief Human Capital Officer at that agency. The
Inspector General's pay can not be less than the average total
compensation of the senior level executives at that agency.
Section 5: Prohibits any Inspector General from receiving a
cash bonus or award. It is already the practice of many
Inspectors General to refuse bonuses from the agencies they
serve. They do so to avoid the appearance of impropriety that
accepting a bonus from the organization they are providing
oversight to might cause them to be less than vigorous in their
pursuit of fraud, waste and abuse. The Committee believes it is
appropriate to extend the no-bonus policy to all Inspectors
General. At the same time, the Committee recognizes that
bonuses are currently a significant part of the overall
compensation for some DFE IGs, and has attempted in Section 4
to adjust the salaries of these IGs such that they will not be
significantly harmed by the no-bonus policy.
Section 6: Requires that each Inspector General have his or
her own legal counsel or obtain necessary legal counsel from
another OIG or the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity
and Efficiency (created in Section 7 of this bill). This
provision does not require that each OIG have its own Counsel.
It does require that each Inspector General obtain advice from
a lawyer that is employed by an Inspector General or the IG
Council so as to preserve the independence of the Inspectors
General.
Section 7: Subsection (a) creates a new Inspector General
council that would merge, codify and strengthen the two
existing councils, created by Executive Order, for the
presidentially appointed and designated federal entity IGs
respectively. The council's mission is to ``address integrity,
economy and effectiveness issues that transcend individual
government agencies, and also to increase the professionalism
and effectiveness of personnel by developing policies,
standards, and approaches to aid in the establishment of a
well-trained and highly skilled workforce in the Offices of
Inspectors General.''
This subsection establishes an Integrity Committee within
the council to receive, review, investigate or refer for
investigation allegations of wrongdoing that are made against
Inspectors General or certain senior staff members within an
OIG. The Integrity Committee is chaired by an official of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and would also include the
Office of Government Ethics and the Office of Special Counsel,
as well as several Inspectors General. The Integrity Committee
would be required to report to Congress on its activities.
The Council would also submit recommendations of
individuals to fill IG vacancies. The purpose of this provision
is to provide the President and agency heads the benefit of the
advice of the IG community, not to tie the hands of the
President or agency head in selecting Inspectors General. The
committee believes that this practice will provide valuable
advice to selecting officials and improve the quality and
professionalism of the IG community.
The Council is authorized to develop a budget, and to
establish a fund to support the Integrity Committee functions
and to fund training across the government and for other
authorized purposes. This will allow the Inspectors General to
incorporate in their agency budget submissions requirements to
support the Council and for the Council to ``pool'' funds among
the IGs to ensure that required training is provided for IGs
and their employees. It will ensure that necessary funding is
clearly identified and apportioned among the agencies to
support the vital and necessary functions of the Council.
This section also specifies, in subsection (b), that the
Integrity Committee can review allegations of wrongdoing
against the Special Counsel of the Office of Special Counsel,
provided that the Special Counsel recuse himself from
considering any such allegation.
Section 8: This section specifies that Inspector General
budget requests at the agency level clearly document the
amounts requested and specifically identify amounts needed for
training and support of Council activities. The section also
requires that the President's budget submission state how much
money they are requesting for each IG office, as well as the
funding level each Inspector General requested from their
agency. This provision will provide Congress with transparency
into the funding of the agency IGs but does not interfere with
the agency head's or the President's right to formulate and
transmit a budget to Congress. Ensuring adequate funding of the
Office of the Inspector General in each agency through the
current budget process is essential to ensuring the
independence of the Inspectors General.
Section 9: This section extends the subpoena power of the
Inspectors General to address information stored in any medium,
including electronically stored information. Nothing in this
section is intended to provide for the disclosure of
information otherwise exempted from release pertaining to the
witness protection program. It does, however, clarify that IG
authority extends to all documents whether generated or stored
in hard copy or electronic media.
Section 10: This section would authorize Inspectors General
at designated federal entities (DFEs) to pursue fraud claims
and recoup losses under the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act
(an authority currently given to the presidentially appointed
IGs). This clarifies the authority of the Inspectors General in
the DFEs but does not require that they exercise this authority
if it is not consistent with authorities already exercised by
the agency.
Section 11: This section authorizes all Inspectors General
appointed under Sections 3 or 8(G) of the IG Act to apply to
the Justice Department for law enforcement authorities for its
agents, an authority currently held only by the presidentially
appointed IGs. This eliminates the unnecessary distinction
between presidentially appointed and designated federal entity
IGs.
Section 12: This section broadens the requirements for the
IG semiannual reports to encompass inspection and evaluation
reports as well as audits.
Section 13: This section requires several enhancements of
Inspector General websites. It requires a direct link to the IG
website from the agency homepage; requires all reports and
audits to be posted within 3 working days of its public
release; and requires that IG websites include a direct link
for individuals to anonymously report fraud, waste or abuse.
The requirement for the 3 working day posting is subject to the
support received by the Inspectors General from their
respective agencies in managing their websites.
Section 14: This section would eliminate a statutory
restriction on the jurisdiction of the DOJ OIG, enabling the
OIG to investigate allegations of wrongdoing by all Department
employees. Currently, the OIG cannot investigate misconduct
involving attorneys and investigators operating at their
direction and these cases are referred to the Office of
Professional Responsibility (OPR). The Committee anticipates
that OPR will continue to investigate most of the routine
misconduct cases involving Department attorneys. However, as
evidenced by the issues raised by the recent dismissal of
certain U.S. Attorneys, there are some cases of alleged
attorney misconduct that should be reviewed by the OIG--for
instance because they involve high ranking Department lawyers
or reflect broad policies or practices of the Department. This
provision affirms the primary jurisdiction of the OIG over all
Departmental misconduct, without prejudicing or precluding all
appropriate referrals to OPR.
Section 15: Subsection (a) enhances certain personnel
authorities for Inspectors General, specifying that they,
rather than the agency head for their respective entities, will
be considered the ``agency head'' with respect to certain
personnel matters. It should expedite personnel actions and
give the Inspectors General greater leeway to structure and
staff their offices as they consider necessary. Subsection (b)
authorizes the Treasury Inspector General for Tax
Administration to help provide physical security for Internal
Revenue Service employees.
Section 16: Subsection (a) requires GAO to report on the
adequacy of oversight mechanisms for the Inspectors General,
including the practices of the Integrity Committee and the
handling of complaints against Inspectors General through other
channels. Subsection (b) requires a report on the
implementation of the pay provisions of this legislation in
Section 4.
V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact
Pursuant to the requirement of paragraph 11(b)(1) of rule
XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate the Committee has
considered the regulatory impact of this bill. CBO states that
there are no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as
defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and no costs on
State, local, or tribal governments. The legislation contains
no other regulatory impact.
VI. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate
December 3, 2007.
Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman,
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
U.S. Senate,Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 2324, the Inspector
General Reform Act of 2007.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Matthew
Pickford.
Sincerely,
Peter R. Orszag.
Enclosure.
S. 2324--Inspector General Reform Act of 2007
Summary: S. 2324 would amend the Inspector General Act of
1978. In general, the legislation would strengthen the
independence of inspectors general (IGs) from their respective
federal agencies. The bill would:
Require Congressional notification on the
removal of an inspector general;
Expand the reporting requirements for IG
budget requests;
Require IGs to have their own legal counsel;
Establish an IG Council;
Provide IGs with some additional
investigative, law enforcement, and personnel
authorities and require additional reports by IGs and
the Government Accountability Office (GAO).
CBO estimates that implementing S. 2324 would cost $83
million over the 2008-2012 period, assuming the appropriation
of the necessary funds. The legislation could affect direct
spending and revenues, but CBO estimates that any such effects
would be negligible.
S. 2324 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA)
and would not affect the budget of state, local, or tribal
governments.
Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated
budgetary impact of S. 2324 is shown in the following table.
The costs of this legislation fall within budget function 800
(general government) and all other budget functions where
federal agencies employ inspectors general.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
By fiscal year, in millions of
dollars--
---------------------------------------
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION
Inspector General Authorities:
Estimated Authorization 6 12 12 12 12
Level......................
Estimated Outlays........... 6 11 12 12 12
Council of Inspectors General on
Integrity and Efficiency:
Estimated Authorization 5 5 5 5 5
Level......................
Estimated Outlays........... 4 5 5 5 5
Pay Provisions:
Estimated Authorization 1 1 1 1 1
Level......................
Estimated Outlays........... 1 1 1 1 1
Other Provisions:
Estimated Authorization 1 * 0 0 0
Level......................
Estimated Outlays........... 1 * 0 0 0
Total Changes:
Estimated Authorization 13 18 18 18 18
Level..................
Estimated Outlays....... 12 17 18 18 18
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note--* = less than $500,000.
Basis of estimate: For this estimate, CBO assumes that the
bill will be enacted near the end of calendar year 2007, that
the necessary funds will be provided for each year, and that
spending will follow historical patterns for similar
activities.
The Inspector General Act of 1978 created independent
offices headed by inspectors general responsible for conducting
and supervising audits and investigations; promoting economy,
efficiency, and effectiveness; and preventing and detecting
fraud and abuse in government programs and operations. There
are two types of IGs. There are 30 IGs who are appointed by the
President with Senate confirmation (known as Presidential IGs),
half of whom serve the 15 cabinet departments. Another 34 IGs
serve as designated federal entity (DFE) IGs at smaller
agencies and are appointed (and may be removed) by the head of
the agency. The Government Accountability Office reported that
IGs had appropriated budgets of almost $2 billion in 2006 and
employ over 12,000 employees.
Spending subject to appropriation
Inspector General Authorities. Under current law, many IG
activities come under the purview of the agency they oversee.
The budgets for IG activities are included as part of the
agency's overall budget request to the Congress, with funding
determined by the Congress through the appropriations process.
Personnel matters, including hiring and retirement issues, are
handled by each IG's agency. IGs at some of the larger agencies
have independent law enforcement authorities, such as carrying
firearms and executing warrants for arrests; those at smaller
agencies are usually deputized by the U.S. Marshall Service to
perform such functions. In addition, IGs issue semi-annual
reports on their activities and operations.
S. 2324 would amend existing law to make all IG offices
separate agencies with the same powers and duties as the agency
they monitor and investigate. IGs would be authorized to submit
specified budget requests to OMB that would include their
requests, the President's request, training requirements, and
the funding needs of the IG council. The legislation would also
require IGs to have their own legal counsel as well as
additional reporting requirements for IGs and their websites.
Under S. 2324, IGs would be given additional personnel
authorities, including more flexible hiring authorities. In
addition, S. 2324 would provide new law enforcement authorities
to IGs appointed by agency heads, including the ability to
carry firearms and execute warrants.
Based on information from IG offices and the cost of
similar authorities, CBO estimates that those provisions would
cost $53 million over the 2008-2012 period, mostly for
additional personnel costs. CBO expects that few IG offices
would become wholly independent of the administrative support
of their agencies, but most would require additional personnel,
especially the smaller IG offices. This estimate includes the
cost of additional staff, training for budget and human
resources functions, website development, as well as additional
law enforcement training.
Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.
Currently, there are two advisory councils for IG functions:
inspectors general appointed by the President are members of
the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE),
while DFE IGs are members of the Executive Council on Integrity
and Efficiency (ECIE). The two councils were created by
Presidential Executive Orders and usually meet separately. They
receive no specific appropriation but are funded by the various
IGs on an ad hoc basis.
S. 2324 would establish a single council with duties and
functions similar to the PCIE and ECIE. It would charge the new
council with identifying, reviewing, and discussing areas of
weakness and fraud in federal operations and programs;
developing plans for coordinated governmentwide activities that
address those problems; developing policies and professional
programs for IG personnel; and investigating allegations
against IGs. Based on information from PCIE and ECIE regarding
their current operations, CBO estimates that implementing this
provision would cost $25 million over the 2008-2012 period,
primarily for the cost of professional training for IGs.
Pay Provisions. Section 4 would amend the Inspector General
Act of 1978 to raise the annual salary level of 31 IGs
specified in the legislation from Level IV to Level III of the
executive schedule plus an additional 3 percent. The bill would
set a minimum level of pay for IGs of designated federal
entities at the average level of total compensation received by
senior level staff members at those entities. In addition,
section 5 would prohibit payment of cash awards and bonuses to
IGs.
Based on data and information provided by the Office of
Personnel Management, CBO estimates that increasing the pay for
IGs would cost $4 million over the 2008-2012 period, subject to
the availability of appropriated funds.
Other Provisions. The legislation would require GAO to
prepare two reports within one year on the practices, policies,
and procedures of the IG council and the pay of IGs. Based on
the cost of similar reports, CBO estimates that preparing and
distributing the report would cost about $1 million over the
2008-2009 period.
Direct spending and revenues
A few IGs are employed by offices that have direct spending
authority to pay salaries and expenses. Amendments made by S.
2324 would have an insignificant impact on spending by those
offices. Enacting S. 2324 could affect federal revenues from
civil penalties as a result of allowing IGs appointed by their
agency heads to investigate and report false claims and recoup
losses resulting from fraud involving amounts under $150,000.
Collections of civil penalties are recorded in the budget as
revenues and deposited in the general fund of the Treasury.
Based on information from Presidential IGs, CBO estimates that
any change in revenues that would result from enacting the bill
would not be significant.
Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: S. 2324
contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as
defined in UMRA and would not affect the budget of state,
local, or tribal governments.
Previous CBO estimate: On September 27, 2007, CBO
transmitted a cost estimate for H.R. 928, the Improving
Government Accountability Act, as ordered reported by the House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on August 2, 2007.
The two pieces of legislation have similar provisions relating
to IGs, but S. 2324 has additional personnel and reporting
requirements. The cost estimates reflect those differences.
Estimate prepared by: Federal Spending: Inspectors
General--Matthew Pickford, Pay and benefits--Barry Blom; Impact
on state, local, and tribal governments: Elizabeth Cove; Impact
on the private sector: Paige Piper/Bach.
Estimate approved by: Peter H. Fontaine, Assistant Director
for Budget Analysis.
VIII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the following changes in existing
law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows
(existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black
brackets, new matter is printed in italic, existing law in
which no change is proposed is shown in roman):
UNITED STATES CODE
TITLE 2--THE CONGRESS
CHAPTER 5--LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
* * * * * * *
Sec. 185. Inspector General of the Library of Congress
* * * * * * *
(c) * * *
(2) Removal. The Inspector General may be removed
from office by the Librarian of Congress. [The
Librarian of Congress shall, promptly upon such
removal, communicate in writing the reasons for any
such removal to each House of the Congress.] If the
Inspector General is removed from office or is
transferred to another position or location within the
Library of Congress, the Librarian of Congress shall
communicate in writing the reasons for any such removal
or transfer to both Houses of Congress, not later than
30 days before the removal or transfer.
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 29--CAPITOL POLICE
Subchapter I--Organization and Administration
* * * * * * *
Sec. 1909. Inspector General for the United States Capitol Police
* * * * * * *
(b) * * *
(3) Removal. [The Inspector General may be removed
from office prior to the expiration of his term only by
the unanimous vote of all of the voting members of the
Capitol Police Board, and the Board shall communicate
the reasons for any such removal to the Committee on
House Administration, the Senate Committee on Rules and
Administration and the Committees on Appropriations of
the House of Representatives and of the Senate.] The
Inspector General may be removed or transferred from
office before the expiration of his term only by the
unanimous vote of all voting members of the Capitol
Police Board. If an Inspector General is removed from
office or is transferred to another position or
location within the Capitol Police, the Capitol Police
Board shall communicate in writing the reasons for any
such removal or transfer to the Committee on Rules and
Administration of the Senate, the Committee on House
Administration of the House of Representatives, and the
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the
House of Representatives, not later than 30 days before
the removal or transfer.
* * * * * * *
TITLE 5--GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYEES
PART III--EMPLOYEES
Subpart D--Pay and Allowances
CHAPTER 53--PAY RATES AND SYSTEMS
Subchapter II--Executive Schedules and Pay Rates
* * * * * * *
Sec. 5315. Positions at Level IV
* * * * * * *
Level IV of the Executive Schedule applies to the following
positions, for which the annual rate of basic pay shall be the
rate determined with respect to such level under chapter 11 of
title 2, as adjusted by section 5318 of this title:
* * * * * * *
[Inspector General, Department of Education]
* * * * * * *
[Inspector General, Department of Energy]
* * * * * * *
[Inspector General, Department of Health and Human
Services]
[Inspector General, Department of Agriculture]
* * * * * * *
[Inspector General, Department of Housing and Urban
Development]
* * * * * * *
[Inspector General, Department of Labor]
[Inspector General, Department of Transportation]
[Inspector General, Department of Veterans Affairs]
* * * * * * *
[Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security]
* * * * * * *
[Inspector General, Department of Defense]
* * * * * * *
[Inspector General, Department of State]
* * * * * * *
[Inspector General, Department of Commerce]
[Inspector General, Department of the Interior]
[Inspector General, Department of Justice]
[Inspector General, Department of the Treasury]
[Inspector General, Agency for International Development]
[Inspector General, Environmental Protection Agency]
[Inspector General, Export-Import Bank]
[Inspector General, Federal Emergency Management Agency]
[Inspector General, General Services Administration]
[Inspector General, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration]
[Inspector General, Nuclear Regulatory Commission]
[Inspector General, Office of Personnel Management]
[Inspector General, Railroad Retirement Board]
[Inspector General, Small Business Administration]
[Inspector General, Tennessee Valley Authority]
[Inspector General, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation]
* * * * * * *
[Inspector General, Resolution Trust Corporation]
* * * * * * *
[Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency]
* * * * * * *
[Inspector General, Social Security Administration]
* * * * * * *
[Inspector General, United States Postal Service]
* * * * * * *
APPENDIX
Inspector General Act of 1978
* * * * * * *
Sec. 2 Purpose and establishment of Offices of Inspector General;
departments and agencies involved
In order to create independent and objective units--
(1) to conduct and supervise audits and
investigations relating to the programs and operations
of the establishments listed in section [11(2)] 12(2);
* * * * * * *
Sec. 3. Appointment of Inspector General; supervision; removal;
political activities; appointment of Assistant
Inspector General for Auditing and Assistant
Inspector General for Investigations
* * * * * * *
(b) An Inspector General may be removed from office by the
President. [The President shall communicate the reasons for any
such removal to both Houses of Congress.] If an Inspector
General is removed from office or is transferred to another
position or location within an establishment, the President
shall communicate in writing the reasons for such removal or
transfer to both Houses of Congress, not later than 30 days
before the removal or transfer.
* * * * * * *
(e) The annual rate of basic pay for an Inspector General
(as defined under section 11(3)) shall be the rate payable for
level III of the Executive Schedule under section 5314 of title
5, United States Code, plus 3 percent.
(f) An Inspector General (as defined under section 8G(a)(6)
or 11(3)) may not receive any cash award or cash bonus,
including any cash award under chapter 45 of title 5, United
States Code.
(g) Each Inspector General shall, in accordance with
applicable laws and regulations governing the civil service,
obtain legal advice from a counsel either reporting directly to
the Inspector General or another Inspector General.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 4. Duties and Responsibilities; reports of criminal violations to
Attorney General
* * * * * * *
(b) * * *
(2) For purposes of determining compliance with
paragraph (1)(A) with respect to whether internal
quality controls are in place and operating and whether
established audit standards, policies, and procedures
are being followed by Offices of Inspector General of
establishments defined under section [11(2)] 12(2),
Offices of Inspector General of designated Federal
entities defined under section 8F(a)(2),\1\ and any
audit office established within a Federal entity
defined under section 8F(a)(1),\1\ reviews shall be
performed exclusively by an audit entity in the Federal
Government, including the General Accounting Office or
the Office of Inspector General of each establishment
defined under section 11(2), or the Office of Inspector
General of each designated Federal entity defined under
section 8F(a)(2).
* * * * * * *
Sec. 5. Semiannual reports; transmittal to Congress; availability to
public; immediate report on serious or flagrant
problems; disclosure of information; definitions
* * * * * * *
(a) * * *
(6) a listing, subdivided according to subject
matter, of each audit report, inspection reports and
evaluation reports issued by the Office during the
reporting period and for each [audit] report, where
applicable, the total dollar value of questioned costs
(including a separate category for the dollar value of
unsupported costs) and the dollar value of
recommendations that funds be put to better use;
* * * * * * *
(8) statistical tables showing the total number of
audit reports, inspection reports and evaluation
reports and the total dollar value of questioned costs
(including a separate category for the dollar value of
unsupported costs), for [audit] reports--
* * * * * * *
(9) statistical tables showing the total number of
audit reports, inspection reports and evaluation
reports and the dollar value of recommendations that
funds be put to better use by management, for [audit]
reports--
* * * * * * *
(10) a summary of each audit report, inspection
reports and evaluation reports issued before the
commencement of the reporting period for which no
management decision has been made by the end of the
reporting period (including the date and title of each
such report), an explanation of the reasons such
management decision has not been made, and a statement
concerning the desired timetable for achieving a
management decision on each such report;
* * * * * * *
(b) * * *
(2) statistical tables showing the total number of
audit reports, inspection reports and evaluation
reports and the dollar value of disallowed costs, for
[audit] reports--
* * * * * * *
(3) statistical tables showing the total number of audit
reports, inspection reports and evaluation reports and the
dollar value of recommendations that funds be put to better use
by management agreed to in a management decision, for [audit]
reports--
* * * * * * *
Sec. 6. Authority of Inspector General; information and assistance from
Federal agencies; unreasonable refusal; office
space and equipment
* * * * * * *
(a) * * *
(4) to require by [subpena] subpoena the production
of all information, documents, reports, answers,
records, accounts, papers, and other data in any medium
(including electronically stored information, as well
as any tangible thing) and documentary evidence
necessary in the performance of the functions assigned
by this Act, which [subpena] subpoena, in the case of
contumacy or refusal to obey, shall be enforceable by
order of any appropriate United States district court:
Provided, That procedures other than [subpenas]
subpoenas shall be used by the Inspector General to
obtain documents and information from Federal agencies;
* * * * * * *
(d) [For purposes of the provision of Title 5, United
States Code, governing the Senior Executive Service, any
reference in such provisions to the ``appointing authority''
for a member of the Senior Executive Service or for a Senior
Executive Service position shall, if such member or position is
or would be within the Office of an Inspector General, be
deemed to be a reference to such Inspector General.] (1)(A) For
purposes of applying the provisions of law identified in
subparagraph (B)--
(i) each Office of Inspector General shall be
considered to be a separate agency; and
(ii) the Inspector General who is the head of an
office referred to in clause (i) shall, with respect to
such office, have the functions, powers, and duties of
an agency head or appointing authority under such
provisions.
(B) This paragraph applies with respect to the following
provisions of title 5, United States Code:
(i) Subchapter II of chapter 35.
(ii) Sections 8335(b), 8336, 8344, 8414, 8468, and
8425(b).
(iii) All provisions relating to the Senior Executive
Service (as determined by the Office of Personnel
Management), subject to paragraph (2).
(2) For purposes of applying section 4507(b) of title 5,
United States Code, paragraph (1)(A)(ii) shall be applied by
substituting 'the Council of the Inspectors General on
Integrity and Efficiency (established by section 11 of the
Inspector General Act) shall' for `the Inspector General who is
the head of an office referred to in clause (i) shall, with
respect to such office,
(e) * * *
(1) In addition to the authority otherwise provided
by this Act, each Inspector General[ appointed under
section 3], any Assistant Inspector General for
Investigations under such an Inspector General, and any
special agent supervised by such an Assistant Inspector
General may be authorized by the Attorney General to--
* * * * * * *
(9) In this subsection the term `Inspector General'
means an Inspector General appointed under section 3 or
an Inspector General appointed under section 8G.
(f)(1) For each fiscal year, an Inspector General shall
transmit a budget estimate and request to the head of
establishment or designated Federal entity to which the
Inspector General reports. The budget request shall specify the
aggregate amount of funds requested for such fiscal year for
the operations of that Inspector General and shall specify the
amount requested for all training requirements, including a
certification from the Inspector General that the amount
requested satisfies all training needs for the Inspector
General's office for that fiscal year, and any resources
necessary to support the Council of the Inspectors General on
Integrity and Efficiency. Resources necessary to support the
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
shall be specifically identified and justified in the budget
request.
(2) In transmitting a proposed budget to the President for
approval, the head of each establishment or designated Federal
entity shall include--
(A) an aggregate request for the Inspector General;
(B) amounts for Inspector General training;
(C) amounts for support of the Council of the
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency; and
(D) any comments of the affected Inspector General
with respect to the proposal.
(3) The President shall include in each budget of the
United States Government submitted to Congress--
(A) a separate statement of the budget estimate
prepared in accordance with paragraph (1);
(B) the amount requested by the President for each
Inspector General;
(C) the amount requested by the President for
training of Inspectors General;
(D)the amount requested by the President for support
for the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity
and Efficiency; and
(E) any comments of the affected Inspector General
with respect to the proposal, including whether the
budget request submitted by the head of the
establishment or designated Federal entity would
substantially inhibit the Inspector General from
performing the duties of the office.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 8D. Special provisions concerning the Department of Treasury
* * * * * * *
(k) * * *
(1) * * *
(C) shall be responsible for protecting the
Internal Revenue Service against external
attempts to corrupt or threaten employees of
the Internal Revenue Service, but shall not be
responsible for the conducting of background
checks[ and the providing of physical
security]; and
* * * * * * *
Sec. 8E. Special provisions concerning the Department of Justice
* * * * * * *
(b) In carrying out the duties and responsibilities
specified in this Act, the Inspector General of the Department
of Justice--
(1) may initiate, conduct and supervise such audits
and investigations in the Department of Justice as the
Inspector General considers appropriate;
(2) except as specified in subsection (a)[ and
paragraph (3)], may investigate allegations of criminal
wrongdoing or administrative misconduct by an employee
of the Department of Justice, or may, in the discretion
of the Inspector General, refer such allegations to the
Office of Professional Responsibility or the internal
affairs office of the appropriate component of the
Department of Justice;
[(3) shall refer to the Counsel, Office of
Professional Responsibility of the Department of
Justice, allegations of misconduct involving Department
attorneys, investigators, or law enforcement personnel,
where the allegations relate to the exercise of the
authority of an attorney to investigate, litigate, or
provide legal advice, except that no such referral
shall be made if the attorney is employed in the Office
of Professional Responsibility;]
[(4)](3) may investigate allegations of criminal
wrongdoing or administrative misconduct by a person who
is the head of any agency or component of the
Department of Justice; and
[(5)](4) shall forward the results of any
investigation conducted under paragraph [(4)](3), along
with any appropriate recommendation for disciplinary
action, to the Attorney General.
* * * * * * *
(d) The Attorney General shall ensure by regulation that
any component of the Department of Justice receiving a
nonfrivolous allegation of criminal wrongdoing or
administrative misconduct by an employee of the Department of
Justice[, except with respect to allegations described in
subsection (b)(3),] shall report that information to the
Inspector General.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 8G. Requirements for Federal entities and designated Federal
entities
(a) Notwithstanding section [11] 12 of this Act, as used in
this section--
(1) * * *
(A) an establishment (as defined under
section [11(2)] 12(2) of this Act) or part of
an establishment;
* * * * * * *
(c) Except as provided under subsection (f) of this
section, the Inspector General shall be appointed by the head
of the designated Federal entity in accordance with the
applicable laws and regulations governing appointments within
the designated Federal entity. Each Inspector General shall be
appointed without regard to political affiliation and solely on
the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting,
auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public
administration, or investigations.
* * * * * * *
(e) If an Inspector General is removed from office or is
transferred to another position or location within a designated
Federal entity, the head of the designated Federal entity
[shall promptly communicate in writing the reasons for any such
removal or transfer to both Houses of the Congress] shall
communicate in writing the reason for any such removal or
transfer to both Houses of Congress, not later than 30 days
before the removal or transfer.
* * * * * * *
(g) * * *
(4) Each Inspector General shall, in accordance with
applicable laws and regulations governing appointments
within the designated Federal entity, appoint a Counsel
to the Inspector General who shall report to the
Inspector General or obtain the services of a counsel
appointed by and directly reporting to another
Inspector General or the Council of the Inspectors
General on Integrity and Efficiency on a reimbursable
basis.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 8L. Information on websites of Offices of Inspectors General
``(a) ``Direct Links to Inspectors General Offices.--
``(1) In general.--Each agency shall establish and
maintain on the homepage of the website of that agency,
a direct link to the website of the Office of the
Inspector General of that agency.
``(2) Accessibility.--The direct link under paragraph
(1) shall be obvious and facilitate accessibility to
the website of the Office of the Inspector General.
``(b) Requirements for Inspectors General Websites.--
``(1) Posting of reports and audits.--The Inspector
General of each agency shall--
``(A) in accordance with section 552a of
title 5, United States Code (commonly referred
to as the Privacy Act), not later than 3
working days after any report or audit (or
portion of any report or audit), that is
subject to release under section 552 of that
title (commonly referred to as the Freedom of
Information Act), is made publicly available,
post that report or audit (or portion of that
report or audit) on the website of the Office
of the Inspector General; and
``(B) ensure that any posted report or audit
(or portion of that report or audit) described
under subparagraph (A)--
``(i) is easily accessible from a
direct link on the homepage of the
website of the Office of the Inspector
General;
``(ii) includes a summary of the
findings of the Inspector General;
and--
``(iii) is in a format that
``(I) is searchable and
downloadable; and
``(II) facilitates printing
by individuals of the public
accessing the website.
``(2) Reporting of fraud, waste, and abuse.--
``(A) In general.--The Inspector General of
each agency shall establish and maintain a
direct link on the homepage of the website of
the Office of the Inspector General for
individuals to report fraud, waste, and abuse.
Individuals reporting fraud, waste, or abuse
using the direct link established under this
paragraph shall not be required to provide
personally identifying information relating to
that individual.
``(B) Anonymity.--The Inspector General of
each agency shall not disclose the identity of
any individual making a report under this
paragraph without the consent of the individual
unless the Inspector General determines that
such a disclosure is unavoidable during the
course of the investigation.''.
(b) Implementation.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of enactment of this Act, the head of each agency and the
Inspector General of each agency shall implement the amendment
made by this section.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 11. Establishment of the Council of the Inspector General on
integrity and efficiency
``(a) Establishment and Mission.--
``(1) Establishment.--There is established as an
independent entity within the executive branch the
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency (in this section referred to as the
'Council').
(2) Mission.--The mission of the Council shall be
to--
``(A) address integrity, economy, and
effectiveness issues that transcend individual
Government agencies; and
``(B) increase the professionalism and
effectiveness of personnel by developing
policies, standards, and approaches to aid in
the establishment of a well-trained and highly
skilled workforce in the offices of the
Inspectors General.
``(b) Membership.--
``(1) In general.--The Council shall consist of the
following members:
``(A) All Inspectors General whose offices
are established under--
``(i) section 2; or
``(ii) section 8G.
``(B) The Inspectors General of the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence and the
Central Intelligence Agency.
``(C) The Controller of the Office of Federal
Financial Management.
``(D) A senior level official of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation designated by the
Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
``(E) The Director of the Office of
Government Ethics.
``(F) The Special Counsel of the Office of
Special Counsel.
``(G) The Deputy Director of the Office of
Personnel Management.
``(H) The Deputy Director for Management of
the Office of Management and Budget.
``(I) The Office of Inspectors General of the
Library of Congress, Capitol Police, and the
Government Printing Office.
``(J) Any other members designated by the
President.
``(2) Chairperson and executive chairperson.--
``(A) Executive chairperson.--The Deputy
Director for Management of the Office of
Management and Budget shall be the Executive
Chairperson of the Council.
``(B) Chairperson.--The Council shall elect 1
of the Inspectors General referred to in
paragraph (1)(A) or (B) to act as Chairperson
of the Council. The term of office of the
Chairperson shall be 2 years.
``(3) Functions of chairperson and executive
chairperson.--
``(A) Executive chairperson.--The Executive
Chairperson shall--
``(i) preside over meetings of the
Council;
``(ii) provide to the heads of
agencies and entities represented on
the Council summary reports of the
activities of the Council; and
``(iii) provide to the Council such
information relating to the agencies
and entities represented on the Council
as assists the Council in performing
its functions.
``(B) Chairperson.--The Chairperson shall--
``(i) convene meetings of the
Council--
``(I) at least 6 times each
year;
``(II) monthly to the extent
possible; and
``(III) more frequently at
the discretion of the
Chairperson;
``(ii) exercise the functions and
duties of the Council under subsection
(c);
``(iii) appoint a Vice Chairperson to
assist in carrying out the functions of
the Council and act in the absence of
the Chairperson, from a category of
Inspectors General described in
subparagraph (A)(i), (A)(ii), or (B) of
paragraph (1), other than the category
from which the Chairperson was elected;
``(iv) make such payments from funds
otherwise available to the Council as
may be necessary to carry out the
functions of the Council;
``(v) select, appoint, and employ
personnel as needed to carry out the
functions of the Council subject to the
availability of appropriations and the
provisions of title 5, United States
Code, governing appointments in the
competitive service, and the provisions
of chapter 51 and subchapter III of
chapter 53 of such title, relating to
classification and General Schedule pay
rates;
``(vi) to the extent and in such
amounts as may be provided in advance
by appropriations Acts, enter into
contracts and other arrangements with
public agencies and private persons to
carry out the functions and duties of
the Council;
``(vii) establish, in consultation
with the members of the Council, such
committees as determined by the
Chairperson to be necessary and
appropriate for the efficient conduct
of Council functions; and
``(viii) prepare and transmit a
report annually on behalf of the
Council to the President on the
activities of the Council.
``(c) Functions and Duties of Council.--
``(1) In general.--The Council shall--
``(A) continually identify, review, and
discuss areas of weakness and vulnerability in
Federal programs and operations with respect to
fraud, waste, and abuse;
``(B) develop plans for coordinated,
governmentwide activities that address these
problems and promote economy and efficiency in
Federal programs and operations, including
interagency and interentity audit,
investigation, inspection, and evaluation
programs and projects to deal efficiently and
effectively with those problems concerning
fraud and waste that exceed the capability or
jurisdiction of an individual agency or entity;
``(C) develop policies that will aid in the
maintenance of a corps of well-trained and
highly skilled Office of Inspector General
personnel;
``(D) maintain an Internet website and other
electronic systems for the benefit of all
Inspectors General, as the Council determines
are necessary or desirable;
``(E) maintain 1 or more academies as the
Council considers desirable for the
professional training of auditors,
investigators, inspectors, evaluators, and
other personnel of the various offices of
Inspector General;
``(F) submit recommendations of individuals
to the appropriate appointing authority for any
appointment to an office of Inspector General
described under subsection (b)(1)(A) or (B);
``(G) make such reports to Congress as the
Chairperson determines are necessary or
appropriate; and
``(H) perform other duties within the
authority and jurisdiction of the Council, as
appropriate.
``(2) Adherence and participation by members.--To the
extent permitted under law, and to the extent not
inconsistent with standards established by the
Comptroller General of the United States for audits of
Federal establishments, organizations, programs,
activities, and functions, each member of the Council
shall adhere to professional standards developed by the
Council and participate in the plans, programs, and
projects of the Council, as appropriate.
``(3) Additional administrative authorities.--
``(A) Interagency funding.--Notwithstanding
section 1532 of title 31, United States Code,
or any other provision of law prohibiting the
interagency funding of activities described
under subclause (I), (II), or (III) of clause
(i), in the performance of the
responsibilities, authorities, and duties of
the Council--
``(i) the Executive Chairperson may
authorize the use of interagency
funding for--
``(I) Governmentwide training
of employees of the Offices of
the Inspectors General;
``(II) the functions of the
Integrity Committee of the
Council; and
``(III) any other authorized
purpose determined by the
Council; and
``(ii) upon the authorization of the
Executive Chairperson, any department,
agency, or entity of the executive
branch which has a member on the
Council shall fund or participate in
the funding of such activities.
``(B) Superseding provisions.--No provision
of law enacted after the date of enactment of
this subsection shall be construed to limit or
supersede the authority under paragraph (1),
unless such provision makes specific reference
to the authority in that paragraph.
``(4) Existing authorities and responsibilities.--The
establishment and operation of the Council shall not
affect--
``(A) the role of the Department of Justice
in law enforcement and litigation;
``(B) the authority or responsibilities of
any Government agency or entity; and
``(C) the authority or responsibilities of
individual members of the Council.
``(d) Integrity Committee.--
``(1) Establishment.--The Council shall have an
Integrity Committee, which shall receive, review, and
refer for investigation allegations of wrongdoing that
are made against Inspectors General and staff members
of the various Offices of Inspector General described
under paragraph (4)(C).
``(2) Membership.--The Integrity Committee shall
consist of the following members:
``(A) The official of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation serving on the Council, who shall
serve as Chairperson of the Integrity
Committee.
``(B) Three or more Inspectors General
described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of
subsection (b)(1) appointed by the Chairperson
of the Council, representing both
establishments and designated Federal entities
(as that term is defined in section 8G(a)).
``(C) The Special Counsel of the Office of
Special Counsel.
``(D) The Director of the Office of
Government Ethics.
``(3) Legal advisor.--The Chief of the Public
Integrity Section of the Criminal Division of the
Department of Justice, or his designee, shall serve as
a legal advisor to the Integrity Committee.
``(4) Referral of allegations.--
``(A) Requirement.--An Inspector General
shall refer to the Integrity Committee any
allegation of wrongdoing against a staff member
of the office of that Inspector General, if--
``(i) review of the substance of the
allegation cannot be assigned to an
agency of the executive branch with
appropriate jurisdiction over the
matter; and
``(ii) the Inspector General
determines that--
``(I) an objective internal
investigation of the allegation
is not feasible; or
``(II) an internal
investigation of the allegation
may appear not to be objective.
``(B) Definition.--In this paragraph the term
`staff member' means--
``(i) any employee of an Office of
Inspector General who reports directly
to an Inspector General; or
``(ii) who is designated by an
Inspector General under subparagraph
(C).
``(C) Designation of staff members.--Each
Inspector General shall annually submit to the
Chairperson of the Integrity Committee a
designation of positions whose holders are
staff members for purposes of subparagraph (B).
``(5) Review of allegations.--The Integrity Committee
shall--
``(A) review all allegations of wrongdoing
the Integrity Committee receives against an
Inspector General, or against a staff member of
an Office of Inspector General described under
paragraph (4)(C);
``(B) refer any allegation of wrongdoing to
the agency of the executive branch with
appropriate jurisdiction over the matter; and
``(C) refer to the Chairperson of the
Integrity Committee any allegation of
wrongdoing determined by the Integrity
Committee under subparagraph (A) to be
potentially meritorious that cannot be referred
to an agency under subparagraph (B).
``(6) Authority to investigate allegations.--
``(A) Requirement.--The Chairperson of the
Integrity Committee shall cause a thorough and
timely investigation of each allegation
referred under paragraph (5)(C) to be conducted
in accordance with this paragraph.
``(B) Resources.--At the request of the
Chairperson of the Integrity Committee, the
head of each agency or entity represented on
the Council--
``(i) may provide resources necessary
to the Integrity Committee; and
``(ii) may detail employees from that
agency or entity to the Integrity
Committee, subject to the control and
direction of the Chairperson, to
conduct an investigation under this
subsection.
``(7) Procedures for investigations.--
``(A) Standards applicable.--Investigations
initiated under this subsection shall be
conducted in accordance with the most current
Quality Standards for Investigations issued by
the Council or by its predecessors (the
President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency
and the Executive Council on Integrity and
Efficiency).
``(B) Additional policies and procedures.--
``(i) Establishment.--The Integrity
Committee, in conjunction with the
Chairperson of the Council, shall
establish additional policies and
procedures necessary to ensure fairness
and consistency in--
``(I) determining whether to
initiate an investigation;
``(II) conducting
investigations;
``(III) reporting the results
of an investigation; and
``(IV) providing the person
who is the subject of an
investigation with an
opportunity to respond to any
Integrity Committee report.
``(ii) Submission to congress.--The
Council shall submit a copy of the
policies and procedures established
under clause (i) to the congressional
committees of jurisdiction.
``(C) Reports.--
``(i) Potentially meritorious
allegations.--For allegations described
under paragraph (5)(C), the Chairperson
of the Integrity Committee shall make a
report containing the results of the
investigation of the Chairperson and
shall provide such report to members of
the Integrity Committee.
``(ii) Allegations of wrongdoing.--
For allegations referred to an agency
under paragraph (5)(B), the head of
that agency shall make a report
containing the results of the
investigation and shall provide such
report to members of the Integrity
Committee.
``(8) Assessment and final disposition.--
``(A) In general.--With respect to any report
received under paragraph (7)(C), the Integrity
Committee shall--
``(i) assess the report;
``(ii) forward the report, with the
recommendations of the Integrity
Committee, including those on
disciplinary action, within 30 days (to
the maximum extent practicable) after
the completion of the investigation, to
the Executive Chairperson of the
Council and to the President (in the
case of a report relating to an
Inspector General of an establishment
or any employee of that Inspector
General) or the head of a designated
Federal entity (in the case of a report
relating to an Inspector General of
such an entity or any employee of that
Inspector General) for resolution; and
``(iii) submit to the congressional
committees of jurisdiction an executive
summary of such report and
recommendations within 30 days after
the submission of such report to the
Executive Chairperson under clause
(ii).
``(B) Disposition.--The Executive Chairperson
of the Council shall report to the Integrity
Committee the final disposition of the matter,
including what action was taken by the
President or agency head.
``(9) Annual report.--The Council shall submit to
Congress and the President by December 31 of each year
a report on the activities of the Integrity Committee
during the preceding fiscal year, which shall include
the following:
``(A) The number of allegations received.
``(B) The number of allegations referred to
other agencies, including the number of
allegations referred for criminal
investigation.
``(C) The number of allegations referred to
the Chairperson of the Integrity Committee for
investigation.
``(D) The number of allegations closed
without referral.
``(E) The date each allegation was received
and the date each allegation was finally
disposed of.
``(F) In the case of allegations referred to
the Chairperson of the Integrity Committee, a
summary of the status of the investigation of
the allegations and, in the case of
investigations completed during the preceding
fiscal year, a summary of the findings of the
investigations.
``(G) Other matters that the Council
considers appropriate.
``(10) Requests for more information.--With respect
to paragraphs (8) and (9), the Council shall provide
more detailed information about specific allegations
upon request from any of the following:
``(A) The chairperson or ranking member of
the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
``(B) The chairperson or ranking member of
the Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform of the House of Representatives.
``(C) The chairperson or ranking member of
the congressional committees of jurisdiction.
``(11) No right or benefit.--This subsection is not
intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or
procedural, enforceable at law by a person against the
United States, its agencies, its officers, or any
person.''.
* * * * * * *
Sec. [11] 12. Definitions
* * * * * * *
Sec. [12] 13. Effective date
* * * * * * *
TITLE 31--MONEY AND FINANCE
Subtitle II--The Budget Process
CHAPTER 11--THE BUDGET AND FISCAL, BUDGET, AND PROGRAM INFORMATION
* * * * * * *
Sec. 1105. Budget contents and submission to Congress
(a) * * *
(33) [a separate appropriation account for
appropriations for the Inspectors General Criminal
Investigator Academy and the Inspectors General
Forensic Laboratory of the Department of the Treasury.]
a separate appropriation account for appropriations for
the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency, and, included in that account, a separate
statement of the aggregate amount of appropriations
requested for each academy maintained by the Council of
the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.
* * * * * * *
Subtitle III--Financial Management
CHAPTER 38--ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES FOR FALSE CLAIMS AND STATEMENTS
Sec. 3801. Definitions
(a) * * *
(1) * * *
(D) the United States Postal Service; [and]
(E) National Science Foundation; and
(F) a designated Federal entity (as such term
is defined under section 8G(a)(2) of the
Inspector General Act of 1978).
* * * * * * *
TITLE 42--THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
CHAPTER 129--NATIONAL AND COMMUNITY SERVICE
Subchapter I--National and Community Service State Grant Program
DIVISION G--CORPORATION FOR NATIONAL AND COMMUNITY SERVICE
* * * * * * *
Sec. 12651e. Officers
* * * * * * *
(b) * * *
[(3) Compensation The Inspector General shall be
compensated at the rate provided for level IV of the
Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5.]
* * * * * * *
TITLE 44--PUBLIC PRINTING AND DOCUMENTS
CHAPTER--GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
* * * * * * *
Sec. 3902. Appointment of Inspector General; supervision; removal
* * * * * * *
(b) The Inspector General may be removed from office by the
Public Printer. [The Public Printer shall, promptly upon such
removal, communicate in writing the reasons for any such
removal to each House of the Congress.] If the Inspector
General is removed from office or is transferred to another
position or location within the Government Printing Office, the
Public Printer shall communicate in writing the reasons for any
such removal or transfer to both Houses of Congress, not later
than 30 days before the removal or transfer.