APR 6 - 1998



Federal Implementation Guideline for Electronic Data Interchange

ASC X12 Version/Release 003070 FEDERAL CONVENTIONS FOR USING ASC X12 TRANSACTION SETS

Implementation Convention



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¹At Boulder, CO 80303.

²Some elements at Boulder, CO.

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Electronic Commerce Acquisition Program Management Office Standard Management Committee - Secretariat National Institute of Standards and Technology Gaithersburg, MD 20899-0001

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Reports on Information Technology

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)'s Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) develops standards and guidelines, provides technical assistance, and conducts research for computers and resources. As part of the overall federal effort to establish a single face to industry for conducting electronic commerce, ITL has been designated as the organization responsible for coordinating the development of Federal Implementation Conventions (ICs) for Electronic Data Interchange (EDI). ICs are defined by functional-area experts who create and select options from standard EDI Transaction Sets to yield the implementations to be used for practical EDI. These ICs are made available to federal agencies and industry by electronic means and this Special Publication Series.

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10.0 FEDERAL CONVENTIONS FOR USING ASC X12 TRANSACTION SETS

This part of the Federal Implementation Guidelines defines the Federal transaction set conventions. It includes the instructions for implementing the control and security structures and definitions of the usage indicators and applicable codes.

This version of Part 10 of the Federal Implementation Guidelines, based on the ANSI ASC X12 Version 003 Release 070 standards, supersedes and cancels the August 1994 version of Part 10.

Except where specifically otherwise indicated, this document directs how the agencies, components and activities of the United States Federal government will exchange Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) data formatted in accordance with the provisions of the ANSI ASC X12 standards.

10.1 INTRODUCTION

The power of the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Accredited Standards Committee (ASC) X12 standard is in its building block concept, which standardizes the essential elements of business transactions. The concept is analogous to a "standard bill of materiel and the construction specifications," which gives the architect flexibility in what can be designed with standardized materiel and procedures. The Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) system designer, like the architect, uses the ASC X12 standards to build business transactions that are often different because of their function and yet utilize the ASC X12 standards. The "bill of materiel and the construction specification" of ASC X12 are the standards found in the published technical documentation.

ASC X12.3, December 1996 —The *Data Element Dictionary* specifies the data elements used in the construction of the segments that comprise the transaction sets developed by ASC X12.

ASC X12.5, December 1996 —The *Interchange Control Structure* provides the interchange control segment (also called an envelope), consisting of a header and trailer, for the EDI transmission; it also provides a structure to acknowledge the receipt and processing of the envelope.

ASC X12.6, December 1996 —The *Application Control Structure* defines the basic control structures, syntax rules, and semantics of EDI.

ASC X12.22, December 1996 —The *Data Segment Directory* provides the definitions and specifications of the segments used in the construction of transaction sets developed by ASC X12.

ASC X12.58, December 1996 -- The Security Structures define the data formats for authentication, encryption, and assurances in order to provide integrity, confidentiality, verification and non-repudiation of origin for two levels of exchange of Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) formatted data: functional group and transaction set level.

X12.59, December 1996 -- The *Implementation of EDI Structure/Semantic Impact* provides a clear distinction between the syntax of X12 structures and the semantics of transaction set usage.

X12C/TG1/95-65 -- Technical Report Reference Model for the Acknowledgment and Tracking of EDI Interchanges summarizes the use of the ANSI ASC X12 control elements and standards for the acknowledgment and tracking of EDI interchanges.

International Telecommunication Union - Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) Recommendation X.509 (1993)/ ISO/IEC 9594-8 (1995), Information Technology- Open Systems Interconnection- The Directory: Authentication Framework. The Directory, defines a framework for the provision of authentication services by the Directory to its users. It specifies the form of authentication information held by the Directory, describes how authentication information may be obtained from the Directory, states the assumptions made about how authentication information is formed and placed in the Directory, defines three ways in which applications may use authentication information to perform authentication, and describes how other security services may be supported by authentication.

In addition to using existing standards to build specific transactions, the standards may be used to provide control and tracking of interchanges if accomplished in a specific standardized approach. ANSI ASC X12 has defined and approved several control structures and Transaction Sets intended to augment EDI auditing and control systems. It is the intent of these standards to provide a tracking mechanism for EDI data as it moves through the transmission cycle. Through the implementation of these tracking tools and analysis of the resulting information, delay or failures in delivery can be identified and corrected.

The work accomplished by ANSI ASC X12C in this area produced a generic acknowledgment model that has been adapted to support Federal Government EDI processes. Implementation of the acknowledgment mechanisms identified by this model will provide a basic capability to track interchanges as they flow from senders through Service Request Handlers (SRH) to receivers across the EC/EDI Infrastructure. (An SRH is a service provider whose primary function is to provide communications services between other components in the model.) This basic capability will provide functionality for each component to determine translation and transmission status, including current location and disposition of an

interchange. Use of the implemented acknowledgment mechanisms to determine singular event status can provide components with the information necessary to obtain some level of confidence that interchanges are flowing through the infrastructure properly. Taken as a sequence of acknowledgment events, the model provides senders with a means to track interchanges from generation to delivery to a Service Request Handler at the boundary of the infrastructure, without imposing the processing and communications overhead that would be required for true application to application acknowledgments.

In addition, the implemented acknowledgment mechanisms of this model will allow individual components to build upon or enhance their internal audit trail processes.

This part of the Federal Implementation Guidelines is meant to be an overarching architecture of the control and security structure which the government is implementing in the Electronic Commerce Infrastructure (ECI) and other government EC activities. However, not all the parts of the architecture will be implemented immediately. The specifics of which parts are actually implemented will be defined in agreements between actual components in the trading network and architecture, such as Value Added Networks (VANs) and government users of the ECI.

It is not the intent of this guideline to specify how the implemented acknowledgment mechanisms are to be used. While support of these mechanisms is required, their usage between infrastructure components will be as agreed between those components. As an example, the use of certain acknowledgment mechanisms between the government and VANs is specified in a VAN Licensing Agreement (VLA). Where there is a conflict between the implementation guidance provided in Part 10 and the VLA, the VLA shall take precedence. Also, the use of acknowledgments between Government Points of Translation (GPoT) and other infrastructure components can be as mutually agreed upon.

The Service Level Agreement (SLA) between the ECI and the respective government Automated Information Systems (AIS) acts in a similar manner as the VLA. Where there is a conflict between the implementation guidance provided in Part 10 and the SLA, the SLA shall take precedence.

By focusing on basic acknowledgment functionality that is independent of communications protocols, enhanced tracking of interchanges is accomplished without requiring individual components to adhere to or support a full accountability system.

For further clarification of acronyms, abbreviations, and codes, refer to ASC X12 published technical documentation. For copies, contact either the EDI focal point within your service or agency, or,

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	alternatively, contact the administering body (see Section 1.3 of these guidelines).

10.2 CONTROL SEGMENTS

In addition to communications control, the EDI interchange structure provides the standards user with multiple levels of control to ensure data integrity. It does so by using header and trailer control segments designed to identify uniquely the start and end of the interchange functional groups and transaction sets. The relationship of these control segments is shown in Figure 10.2-1. Control Segment specifications are defined in Section 10.6.

10.2.1 Description of Use


The interchange header and trailer segments (ISA/IEA) along with the optional interchange acknowledgment segments (TA1 and TA3) constitute the interchange control structure (i.e., an interchange envelope). Interchange control segments perform the following functions:

- Define data element separators, subelement separators and data segment terminators
- Provide control information
- Identify interchange sender and receiver
- Allow for authorization and security information.

The actual interchange control structure includes neither the group control structures nor the transaction control structures; these are defined by ASC X12 as application control structures, and their version and release may differ from those for the interchange envelope. An interchange envelope encompasses one or more functional groups (GS/GE), which, in turn, enclose one or more related transaction sets (ST/SE). The relationship for these structures is illustrated in Figure 10.2-1.

The purpose for GS/GE functional grouping is to provide an additional control envelope surrounding like transaction sets conforming with a unique Implementation Convention (IC). Their usage is prescribed as interchange control segments in order to present a consistent methodology for electronic data interchange within the government community and for commercial entities that conduct EDI business with the government.

Implementation Note: The Federal Government Electronic Commerce Infrastructure (ECI) shall send and receive textual data ASCII encoded. If unencrypted binary segments are filtered, Base 64 filtering shall be used.



Note:

When an Interchange contains TA3s, it shall contain only TA3s. The TA3s replace all Functional Groups, Security Envelopes, Transaction Headers and Trailers, as well as Detail Segments in the above diagram.

Figure 10.2-1. Hierarchical Structure.

10.2.1.1 Data Element, Data Segment, and Component Data Element Separation

In ASC X12 documentation, the data element separator is graphically displayed as an asterisk (*). The actual data element separator employed within the interchange envelope dictates the value for the entire interchange. The first occurrence of the data element separator is at the fourth byte of the interchange control header. The value appearing there dictates the data element separator used through the next interchange trailer.

In a similar manner, the interchange control header establishes the value to be used for segment termination within an interchange. ASC X12 documentation represents this graphically by a new line (N/L). The first instance of segment termination occurs immediately following the ISA16 data element, and the data value occurring there sets the value for the interchange.

Designation of a component data element separator differs from the other separators in that the ISA segment provides a discrete element (ISA16) for defining the component data element separator data value.

Implementation Note::

- 1. ASCII hexadecimal character 1C shall be used as the segment terminator in Federal Government interchanges.
- 2. ASCII hexadecimal character 1D shall be used as the data element separator in Federal Government interchanges.
- 3. ASCII hexadecimal character 1F shall be used as the component element separator in Federal Government interchanges.
- 4. These characters are reserved for these purposes and shall not be used in data elements, except that they may be used in data element 785, Binary Data.

10.2.1.2 Identification of Implementation Convention

The Federal Government develops and maintains Implementation Conventions (ICs) based on ASC X12 standards. All entities conducting EDI business within the Government or externally with the Government shall comply with all applicable ICs. ICs are available from National Institute of Standards and Technology acting as the secretariat for the Federal EDI Standards Management Coordinating Committee (FESMCC). Conventions on the use of interchange control structures are provided herein to document a consistent approach to control structure content. The functional group control structures include the ability to identify specific ICs to which the Transaction Sets contained within that group conform.

Interchange senders will provide the ASC X12 Version/ Release/Subrelease and implementation convention identifier in GS08. This identifier uniquely identifies the convention to which the transaction set conforms.

Implementation Note: Envelope control segments have few options and, except for minor tailoring, are identical for every EDI interchange. The tailoring involves the code values selected for the GS01 and GS08 elements. GS01 classifies the particular transaction set(s) within a functional group and GS08 identifies the specific IC with which the transactions contained within the group comply. (Note: The version and release identified in ISA12 pertains to the interchange control envelope, not to the contained transaction sets.)

The Version/Release/Industry Identifier Code (GS08) is structured as follows:

Positions 1 through 6: ANSI ASC X12 Version and Release

number (e.g. 003010) upon which the

IC is based.

Position 7 Organizational Scope

F = Federal

D = DOD

G = Government (transitional)

Positions 8 through 10 Transaction Set Identifier Code (e.g.,

850).

Position 11: Derivative: A character used to

differentiate between different functional implementations of the

same transaction set.

If the convention is not a derivative, an underscore (_) will appear in this

position.

Position 12: A sequential number starting with 0

and incremented by 1 each time the

convention is re-issued.

An example of the Version/Release/ Industry Identifier Code for X12 Version 003050, Federal Specific IC, revision 1, Commercial Invoice (810C) is 003050F810C1.

10.2.1.3 Control Numbers

ASC X12 standards provide for syntax control on three levels: interchange, group, and transaction. Within each level, control numbers exhibit a positive match between the header segment and its corresponding trailer (i.e., ISA/IEA, GS/GE, and ST/SE). Assignment of these control numbers, at each level, is as follows:

Implementation Note: ISA/IEA Interchange Control Numbers (ISA13/IEA02).

- 1. The nine-digit interchange control number is usually assigned by the originator's translation software. Originating organizations may use any numbering scheme consistent with their business practices.
- 2. The scheme must provide sufficient uniqueness to identify each interchange. Unique identification is defined as the triplet: Interchange Sender ID, (ISA05, ISA06), the Interchange Receiver ID, (ISA07, ISA08) and the nine-digit Interchange Control Number (ISA13). This triplet shall be unique within a reasonably extended time frame.
- 3. If there is no TA3, Interchange Delivery Notice, after 2 hours, then retransmit with the same interchange control number (ISA13).
- 4. If an interchange is rejected, the corrected interchange shall have a new interchange control number (ISA13).

Implementation Note: GS/GE Data Interchange Control Numbers (GS06/GE02).

- 1. This is a one to nine-digit number usually assigned by the originator's translation software. This number uniquely identifies functional groups transmitted between sending and receiving application pairs. Originating organizations may use any numbering scheme consistent with their business practices.
- 2. The scheme must provide sufficient uniqueness to identify each functional group. The Group Control Number value (GS06), together with the Application Sender's Code (GS02), Application Receiver's Code (GS03), and Functional Identifier Code (GS01), shall be unique within an extended time frame -- such as a year.

Implementation Note: ST/SE Transaction Set Control Numbers (ST02/SE02). The originator's translation software usually assigns the transaction set control number. Originating organizations may use any numbering scheme consistent with their business practices. The scheme must provide sufficient uniqueness to identify each transaction set, within the context of the functional group.

The control numbers within corresponding header and trailer segments must match. This provides a means to detect loss of data.

10.3 ADDRESSING

The purpose of addressing is to provide an unambiguous reference to a transmission's sender and intended receiver. The addressing model used by the Federal Government for ASC X12 EDI transmissions is graphically depicted in Figure 10.3-1. In this model, there is addressing for two types of transmissions. The first is an interchange. It consists of control segments and application data. The second type is application data. Application data flow from the sending to the receiving applications and is transported within an interchange. Since interchanges are assembled by the sending translation point and disassembled by the receiving translation point, the flow of an interchange is defined to be from translation point to translation point. Application data must be provided to the sending translation point by the sending application and is depicted as a User Defined File (UDF). It must also be provided to the receiving application by the receiving translation point and is also depicted as a UDF.

While the model depicts data flow from the government to a vendor, it is equally applicable in the reverse flow.




Figure 10.3-1 Addressing Model

10.3.1. Interchanges

Interchanges flow between translation locations. The Government Point of Translation (GPoT) can be implemented as part of the government Application Information System (AIS), as part of the Electronic Commerce Processing Node (ECPN), or as a stand-alone function. Likewise, the Industry Point of Translation (IPoT) on the

vendor side can be in the Vendor Application, as part of the VAN's services, or as a stand-alone function.

The GPoT and IPoT are addressed by the Interchange Sender ID (ISA05 and ISA06) and Interchange Receiver ID (ISA07 and ISA08) data elements. These, combined with the Interchange Control Number (ISA13), create a triplet that defines a globally unique identifier for the interchange. The ASC X12 Interchange flows between these translation points.

Implementation Note:

- 1. When an interchange contains one-to-one transactions, the Interchange Sender ID (ISA06) and Interchange Receiver ID (ISA08) data elements shall be the addresses of the interchange translation points (both government and non-government).
- 2. Translation Points (ISA06 and ISA08) shall be identified via a unique identifier from one of the sources listed as allowable codes in the ISA05 definition in section 10.6. The Data Universal Numbering System (D-U-N-S) number and D-U-N-S +4 are the preferred identifiers.
- 3. All commercial and government entities conducting business electronically shall provide their translation point (ISA06/ISA08) codes during registration.
- 4. In the ECI, when an interchange contains public transactions the ISA08 will be addressed individually to all certified VANs, not necessarily each IPoT. The ISA06 will contain the ECPN's address.

10.3.2 Application Sender and Receiver Codes

Application data is transported within the interchange via groups. Group addressing (GS02/GS03) must define the user application end points shown in figure 10.3-1 as the AIS and the Vendor Application. These addresses are locally unique and are defined between the translation point and its customers. The data that flows between the translation points and the Application Senders and Receivers are not defined by ASC X12, but are in a format agreed between the applications and their translation points.

ASC X12 standards provide for the identification of senders and receivers on two levels, the interchange and the group. The group level identifies application senders and receivers. Depending on where translation is performed, the sender/receiver IDs may be the same at the interchange and group levels and may use any number of available naming schemes.

At the GS/GE level, D-U-N-S and D-U-N-S plus 4 are recommended, especially for identifying government organizations. Other identifiers may be used.

A D-U-N-S number may be acquired from Dun and Bradstreet and the plus 4 portion of the number is assigned and maintained internally by each entity. Specific use of these numbers is provided for in the control structures section of this document.

Implementation Note:

- 1. The GS02/03 identifiers need be unique only within the context of the associated ISA address.
- 2. All commercial and government entities conducting business electronically shall provide their Application Sender and Receiver (GS02/GS03) codes during registration.

10.4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The successful conduct of business via EDI requires that trading partners be able to determine when transactions were received, not received, received in error, or otherwise did not complete the transmission or receiver application processing cycle. The generation or handling of these events may be communications based, EDI processing based, or both. In addition, senders may desire to know such information on an exception basis, such as reporting only for error conditions, or they may need regular indication of the status of delivery to allow them to maintain local, internal audit information. Also, providers of communications services may need to know when interchanges for which they have accepted responsibility were forwarded and accepted by the next service provider in the transmission path, or whether forwarding was not successful.

In either scenario, the transmission or processing of interchanges can be viewed as an acknowledgment event in a general sense, creating the need for some response. From a sender's perspective, the acceptance of their interchange by a translator or communications provider is an acknowledgment event that could either be indicated by a simple receipt, or a more thorough reporting of what actions were taken after receipt. For a service provider, forwarding interchanges can also result in an acknowledgment event being created that calls for an acknowledgment action to take place.

Taken as a set of acknowledgment requirements, these and other events can be considered as a set of circumstances which results in or require some acknowledgment action to take place. Rather than consider every possible action and event, a basic sub-set of these events can be defined that describes the majority of cases that form a generalized picture of tracking interchanges. Together with acknowledgment mechanisms that relate to those events and specific components that create or respond to those events, an acknowledgment model can be described.

ANSI ASC X12C has worked in this area, having produced a generic Acknowledgments Model in X12C/TG1/95-65 -- Technical Report Reference Model for the Acknowledgment and Tracking of EDI Interchanges. This technical report identifies specific entities in the EDI communications and processing path that serve as the event generators or handlers, as well as identifying X12 standards based acknowledgment mechanisms. Also, the senders and receivers of the interchanges are recognized as being the terminating application systems for which the EDI transactions are sent from or sent to, regardless of where translation occurs. The government has taken the ANSI X12 approach to an acknowledgments model, refining it through identification of specific entities and acknowledgment events. Support for this model will provide users and service providers with the ability to track interchanges and respond to requests for status of such

interchanges. In addition, the internal audit trail processes of each entity will be enhanced with the availability of specified event mapping.

10.4.1 Description of Acknowledgment Model

As adapted from the generic model developed within ASC X12C, the Government Acknowledgment Model identifies specific components, acknowledgment events, and X12 mechanisms that are related to those events. Based upon the Electronic Commerce Processing Node (ECPN) as a central component, the model establishes a view of the EC/EDI Infrastructure as encompassing commercial and government entities, as well as service providers and users.

In this model, service providers are those components that provide translation services, communications services, or some EDI processing services. Specifically, the model identifies the ECPNs, VANs and Translation Points as service providers. A Service Request Handler (SRH) is a service provider whose primary function is to provide communications services between other components in the model. Users include Trading Partners (TPs) and Automated Information Systems (AISs).

The acknowledgment mechanisms identified in the model include unspecified as well as X12 based mechanisms. Where the model has identified an acknowledgment event but does not specify a mechanism for handling that event, it is implied that components involved in that event will agree on what mechanism will be used.


X12 based acknowledgment mechanisms include control segment structures in addition to transaction sets. The Interchange Delivery Notice (TA3) segment, Data Status Tracking (242) transaction set and the Functional Acknowledgment (997) transaction set all have distinct properties and functions. However, their use in a general sense as acknowledgment mechanisms allows a sequence of communications and processing events to be tied together in a logical stream. Each acknowledgment event is mapped to an X12 standards based mechanism according to where the event takes place, what type of event occurred, and what role the receiving or generating component plays in the data flow stream.

The TA3 can provide information on the status of delivery of an interchange, the time an interchange was received, or the disposition of an interchange, and is used to report such information between Service Request Handlers. The Data Status Tracking (242) transaction set, in addition to providing the ability to represent the information contained in the TA3, allows transmission status information to be conveyed from service request handlers to senders. The Functional Acknowledgment (997) transaction set indicates the status of translation of the interchange header and trailer information. These mechanisms are more fully described later in this section.

The model, as depicted in Figures 10.4-1, 10.4-2, 10.4-3, and 10.4-4, identifies the sets of events that, through implementation and use of the specified acknowledgment mechanisms, provides for the tracking of interchanges across the infrastructure.

Implementation Note:

- 1. While the requirement for acknowledgments from Government Points of Translation (GPoT) to supported AISs was identified, no single mechanism could be identified. It is therefore left to agreement between them as described in the Service Level Agreement.
- 2. TAl is not supported in this acknowledgment model implementation.
- 3. The government translation function can be implemented as part of the government Application Information System (AIS), as part of the Electronic Commerce Processing Node (ECPN), or as a standalone function. GPoT acknowledgment responsibilities reside at the location performing translation.
- 4. The vendor translation function can be implemented as part of the Vendor Application, Value Added Network (VAN) or as a stand-alone function. IPoT acknowledgment responsibilities reside at the location performing translation.



Notes

- a. The GPoT translation function may be performed by the ECPN, AIS, or by a separate entity.
- b. For the purposes of the model, the govt-to-govt scenario is represented by replacing the VAN-Translation components with a GPoT component.
- c. The IPoT may be operated by the VAN, the Vendor, or a third party. In all cases, the IPoT is the ultimate recipient of the interchange for the purposes of acknowledgment in this model.
- d. 997s and 242s can be mapped at the GPoT to UDFs & forwarded to the AIS as agreed between the GPoT and their customer base. 242s will not be acknowledged by 997s.
- e. UDF is User Defined File (flat file, proprietary file).
- f. The use of 824s are not precluded by this model.
- g. Support for the model acknowledgment mechanisms is mandatory. The manner of their usage is as detailed further in the Federal EDI Implementation Guidelines Part 10, or other agreements.

Figure 10.4-1 Acknowledgment Model, Commercial to Government


Sequence / Event	<u>Mechanism</u>	<u>From</u>	To
1. Receipt of UDF by GpoT	TBD	GPoT	AIS
2. Translation Result	TBD	GPoT	AIS
3. Disposition (Acknowledge that interchange	TBD	GPoT	AIS
has left GPoT)			
4. Interchange receipt by ECPN	242	ECPN	GPoT
5. Interchange Disposition at SRH	TA3	VAN	ECPN
(Government to Government)	TA3	GPoT	ECPN
5a Report of Interchange Disposition at SRH	242	ECPN	GPoT
5b. Report of Interchange Disposition at SRH	UDF	GPoT	AIS
6. Translation Result	997	IPoT	GPoT
6a Translation Result	UDF	GPoT	AIS

Notes

- a. Not all events 1, 2 or 3 may occur or need to be acknowledged
- b. TBD indicates the acknowledgment mechanism is to be determined, or as agreed to between components
- c. UDF: User Defined File (flat file, proprietary file format)

Figure 10.4-2 Acknowledged Events, Commercial to Government

ANSI ASC X12 VERSION/RELEASE 003070FED1



Notes:

a. Acknowledgments among VANs, Translation Points and their customers are matters to be decided by them and are not defined in the government Acknowledgment Model.
b. Some GPoTs may generate a second 242, with the ECPN acting as a pass-through.

c. For government to government scenario, replace the VAN with a GPoT. The ECPN will generate 242s in lieu of TA3s in step 1.

Figure 10.4-3 Acknowledgment Model, Government to Commercial

Sequence / Event	Mechanism	<u>From</u>	To
Interchange receipt by ECPN	TA3	ECPN	VAN
(Government to Government)	TA3	ECPN	GPoT
2. Interchange Disposition at GpoT	TA3	GPoT	ECPN
2a. Report of Interchange Disposition at GPoT	242	ECPN	VAN
(Government to Government)	242	ECPN	GPoT
3. Translation Result	997	GPoT	IPoT

Note:

In step 2a, the disposition report carried in a TA3 is mapped to a 242

Figure 10.4-4 Acknowledged Events, Government to Commercial

10.4.2 Interchange Acknowledgment

At the interchange level, acknowledgments can occur for a number of events. Successful translation, syntax error, or a more detailed acknowledgment of the disposition of an interchange can be reported. The available X12 mechanisms for such interchange acknowledgments includes the Functional Acknowledgment (997) transaction set, the Interchange Acknowledgment (TA1), and the Interchange Delivery Notice Segment (TA3). In general, the 997 is used exclusively for reporting the status of syntactical analysis of the interchange by the receiving translator, although it could be used as an indication that an interchange was received. The Interchange Acknowledgment (TA1) is not supported in this acknowledgment model. The Interchange Delivery Notice (TA3) provides the ability for reporting on the status of actions taken on a particular interchange. The manner in which these mechanisms are used, and the features within each that are utilized, provides a set of tools for building a sequence of acknowledgments for the life cycle of an interchange as it flows across an infrastructure.

10.4.2.1 TA3

The purpose of the TA3 is to provide a notice from the receiving SRH to the sending SRH that an interchange was delivered, not delivered, refused, purged, or transferred to the next SRH. It provides a notification of action taken, notice of time/date action was taken, and the ability to report on more than one event.

As an acknowledgment mechanism in this model, the TA3 is used between the ECPN and VANs, as Service Request Handlers, to indicate the status of interchanges sent from the government to commercial components, as well as the reverse scenario. To indicate outbound delivery status, the information contained in this TA3 is further translated into a 242 transaction set and sent to GPoTs for their use, which may include supplying this information to the interchange sender. The government uses the TA3 to indicate interchange delivery status to the sending commercial infrastructure components.

Implementation Note:

- 1. An interchange that contains a TA3 shall contain only TA3s.
 - 2. An interchange may contain multiple TA3s.
- 3. Upon delivery to the interchange receiver's mailbox, a TA3 shall be generated.
- 4. If delivery to the interchange receiver's mailbox is not made within 2 hours, a TA3 shall be generated indicating a non-delivery status. The appropriate reason codes will be specified. A TA3 shall be generated every 2 hours indicating non-delivery status

until the interchange is delivered to the receiver's mailbox. Upon delivery, note 3 above applies.

- 5. If an interchange is accepted but subsequently determined to be non-deliverable, a TA3 shall be generated indicating code RJ in TA312 and the appropriate reason code in TA303.
 - 6. No acknowledgment is made for the receipt of a TA3.

10.4.2.2 Data Status Tracking (242) Transaction Set

The Data Status Tracking (242) transaction set conveys status information from a service request handler to the interchange sender, interchange receiver, or both. It can be used to provide status information regarding an interchange as it flows from an interchange sender through one or more service request handlers to an interchange receiver during its transmission cycle.

In the acknowledgment model, the 242 transaction set is used for two events: (1) it conveys information from the TA3 that was generated by the VAN or GPoT that received the interchange, and (2) it is used to provide acknowledgment information between government components. Because it is a transaction set, translation sites can map that information into a UDF for the sending applications use. How this information is used depends on the internal business processes at the application site, and is not covered by the model. In addition, this information may be used by the GPoT in its capacity as a Service Request Handler for internal audit trail purposes.

Implementation Note:

- 1. For interchanges between government components, a 242 shall be generated upon delivery to the interchange receiver's mailbox. If delivery to the interchange receiver's mailbox is not made within 2 hours, a 242 shall be generated indicating a non-delivery status.
- 2. The 242 transaction set shall not be acknowledged (via a 997), nor shall it be used to report the final disposition of a 997 transaction set.
- 3. Additional 242 acknowledgments from interconnect service providers may be required by additional agreements among trading partners.

10.4.2.3 Interchange Acknowledgment Segment (TA1)

The Interchange Acknowledgment Segment (TA1) is used to acknowledge receipt of one interchange header and trailer envelope.

Implementation Note: The TA1 is not supported in this acknowledgment model.

10.4.3 Application Advice (824) Transaction Set

Although it can provide acknowledgment functionality, use of the Application Advice (824) transaction set is not specified by this model. Currently, it is primarily used on an exception basis for reporting between applications, and its full use as an acknowledgment mechanism within the model would create substantial impact on the communications and processing systems.

10.4.4 Functional Acknowledgments (997) Transaction Set

While the Functional Acknowledgment (997) transaction set is not part of the interchange control structure, it is integral to the overall process for interchange integrity, and for completeness of the acknowledgment model.

Support for the Functional Acknowledgment is required in all cases. The 997 verifies (or challenges) the syntactical correctness (e.g., ability to translate) of transaction-level data within a functional group.

Implementation Note:

- 1) Syntactic correctness shall be determined by comparison to the requirements of the applicable implementation convention, not simply the ASC X12 standard.
- 2) The 997 transaction set shall not be acknowledged.
- 3) When an X12 transaction containing "Not Used" segments and/or data elements is received by the Government, the transaction will be rejected and a 997 will be generated indicating why the transaction was rejected.

10.5 SECURITY

ASC X12.58, published in December, 1996, provides for the implementation of security services at the functional group and transaction set levels. The available security services include: data integrity, confidentiality, assurance, verification, and non-repudiation of origin. These services may be implemented individually or in any combination.

ASC X12.58 can meet several security objectives. Among these are:

- The recipient of an EDI transaction can verify the identity of the originator of the transaction.
- The recipient of an EDI transaction can verify the integrity of its contents.
- The originator of an EDI transaction can provide confidentiality for its contents.

ASC X12.58 provides a mechanism that can be applied to the X12 functional group or transaction set, in contrast to other alternatives which are usually applied to the entire interchange. ANSI X12.58 is transaction data independent. When X12.58 security mechanisms are applied inside the interchange, they can be handled and routed as standard X12 transactions without disrupting the end-to-end security. Since security services are applied within the interchange, they are independent of the mechanism used to transport them. Thus X12.58 can provide security even when the interchanges leave the boundaries of the ECI.

The Federal Government is committed to providing security services for ASC X12 compliant EDI via the constructs provided by ASC X12.58. However, very significant changes to those constructs have been made within various version/releases of the ASC X12 standards. Also, ASC X12.58 security constructs are not backward compatible. That is, 003070 constructs may not be applied to provide security services to the bulk of the current federal implementations, which are in version/release 3060, 003050, 3040 and earlier.

10.5.1 Authentication

 Message authentication is a procedure to verify that received messages have not been altered. A hash function, a public function that maps a message of any length into a fixed hash value, can be used as an authenticator when used in

conjunction with some form of data encryption, such as digital signature.

Implementation Note: Assurance via the S2A/SVA segments shall be used in lieu of authentication.

10.5.2 Confidentiality (Encryption)

The X12.58 standards allows for the implementation of various algorithms to encrypt X12 transactions. Cryptographic algorithms fall into two categories: secret key and public-key. Secret key algorithms are based on both the sender and receiver sharing the same secret key (i.e., key unknown to other parties). This key is used to encrypt the transaction prior to transmission and decrypt it upon receipt. Public-key algorithms are based on both sender and receiver having a pair of keys, one public and one private. All exchanges of keys between sender and receiver are limited to the public portion only, so the private key portion is protected. Initially, the Government will support the following encryption algorithms:

- Data Encryption Standard (DES)
- Triple DES (DE3)
- Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA)
- SKIPJACK

Implementation Note:

- 1. Confidentiality services may be applied at either the functional group (GS/GE) level, the transaction set (ST/SE) level or both.
- 2. When applied, the SIS shall be inserted immediately after the GS segment and the SIE shall be inserted immediately prior to the GE segment
- 3. When applied, the S2S shall be inserted immediately after the ST segment and the S2E shall be inserted immediately prior to the SE segment.

10.5.3 Assurance (Digital Signatures)

A digital signature is an authentication technique that also includes measures to counter repudiation by the source. Assurances (S1A or S2A and SVA), as defined in X12.58, allow the originator of the transaction to express "business intent" via a digital signature. The Government will support implementation of the Digital Signature Standard. When used, one S2A and one SVA are inserted immediately before the SE segment of the transaction set being assured. If subsequent assurances are applied, additional S2A/SVA pairs are inserted between the previous assurance, and the SE

segment of the transaction set being assured. Detailed instructions for the use of the S2A and SVA segments are contained in section 10.6

Implementation Note:

- 1. Assurance (digital signature) may be applied at either the functional group (GS/GE) level, the transaction set (ST/SE) level or both.
- 2. When digital signature is applied at the group level, the S1A and SVA segment pair(s) shall be inserted immediately preceding the GE segment of the group being assured (digitally signed).
- 3. When digital signature is applied at the transaction set level, the S1A and SVA segment pair(s) shall be inserted immediately preceding the SE segment of the transaction set being assured (digitally signed).
- 4. When both assurance and confidentiality are applied, assurance (S1A or S2A and SVA) shall be applied first and then confidentiality (S1S and S1E or S2S and S2E).

10.5.4 X12.58 Capabilities by Release

ANSI X12 Release	Authentication	ncryption	Assurance
3040	(Note 1)	(Note 3)	
3050	(Note 1)	(Note 3)	
3060	(Note 2)	X	X
3070	(Note 2)	(Note 3)	X

NOTES:

- 1. Authentication accomplished using a message authentication code (MAC). The MAC is a hash of the data.
- 2. Authentication accomplished as a by-product of the digital signature or by using the MAC defined in earlier releases of the ANSI X12 standard.
- 3. Private (symmetric) keys supported by this release. Asymmetric keying is possible but not without some "non-standard" use of data elements.

10.5.5 Sequencing of Cryptographic Techniques

In practical situations, the users of the X12.58 standards will choose combinations of features rather than just a single feature. This is possible since all features are designed to be used in isolation or in any combination.

Authentication does not protect the confidentiality of the message because the information is interchanged in its plain text form. Message encryption

can be used to provide confidentiality while using authentication to provide integrity protection of the same data. When both authentication and encryption are used, the authentication is performed before encryption of the original plain text data.

Where more than one service is selected at a specific level, the order of processing is:

- a. Before applying any security services, the data must first be translated into an EDI format
- b. Addition of one or more assurances
- c. Authentication
- d. Compression
- e. Encryption
- f. Filtering for data communications

When assurance segments are used, they must be added to unsecured (not authenticated or encrypted) transactions. If a transaction set is received (with or without assurances) with encryption and/or authentication applied by the originator, the transaction set must be either decrypted or authenticated prior to the addition of any further assurances. Once any assurances have been added, the transaction set can be encrypted or authenticated prior to being forwarded to additional parties.

When applying security services at the functional group level, all security services at the transaction set level must be completed before applying security services at the functional group level.

The receiving organization processes the received message in the reverse order, starting with inverse filtering, followed by decryption, and then by decompression, validation of authentication and validation of the assurances. When processing inbound security services at the transaction set level, all security services at the functional group level must be removed before processing inbound security services at the transaction set level. In this manner the receiving organization unwraps the EDI message by processing the security services and removing the security segment pairs from the message before processing the next security service.

10.5.6 Transmission of Security Segments

Security services (authentication, encryption and assurances) are provided at two levels within ASC X12 in conjunction with the following envelopes:

- Functional Group (GS/GE envelope)
- Transaction Set (ST/SE envelope)

At each of these levels, authentication, encryption and assurances are each optional. Assurances are independent of authentication or encryption. In addition, any service used at one level is independent of a service used at the other level.

If encryption and/or authentication is provided, the security header segment (S1S or S2S) immediately follows the segment initiating the beginning of this level (GS or ST); the security trailer segment (S1E or S2E) precedes the segment terminating the level (GE or SE). If assurances are present, the S1A or S2A segments and its trailing SVA segment immediately precedes the SE or GE if authentication and/or encryption is not used and immediately proceed the S1E or S2E segment if authentication and/or encryption is used. If encryption and/or authentication at both levels is provided and if assurances are used at both levels, the sequence of segments, illustrating these levels, is:

ISA-Interchange Header

(Other Groups whether secured or not at Level 1)

GS-Functional Group Header

S1S-Security Header Level 1

(Other Transaction Sets whether secured or not at Level 2)

ST - Transaction Set Header

S2S-Security Header Level 2

(The Transaction Set Segments)

S2A - Security Assurance Level 2

SVA - Assurance Token Level 2

(Other optional S2A-SVA pairs at Level 2

S2E-Security Trailer Level 2

SE-Transaction Set Trailer

(Other Transaction Sets whether secured or not at Level 2)

S1A - Assurance Segment Level 1

SVA - Assurance Token Level 1

(Other optional S1A-SVA pairs at Level 1)

S1E-Security Trailer Level 1

GE-Functional Group Trailer

(Other Functional Groups whether secured or not at Level 1)

IEA-Interchange Trailer

10.6 Interchange Control, Acknowledgment and Security Segment Specifications

This section contains the implementation conventions for the:

- Interchange Control Header (ISA), Version/release 003070
- Interchange Delivery Notice Segment (TA3)
- Functional Group Header (GS), Version/release 002003
- Functional Group Header (GS), Version/release 003010
- Functional Group Header (GS), Version/releases 003040 through 003070
- Security Header Level 1 (S1S), Version/releases 003040 and 003050
- Security Header Level 1 (S1S), Version/releases 003060 and 003070
- Security Header Level 2 (S2S), Version/releases 003040 and 003050
- Security Header Level 2 (S2S), Version/releases 003060 and 003070
- Security Assurance Level 2 (S2A), Version/releases 003060 and 003070
- Assurance Token Level 2 (S2A), Version/releases 003060 and 003070
- Security Trailer Level 2 (S2E), Version/releases 003060 and 003070
- Assurance Segment Level 1 (S1A), Version/releases 003060 and 003070
- Assurance Token Level 1 (SVA), Version/releases 003060 and 003070
- Security Trailer Level 1 (S1E), Version/releases 003060 and 003070
- Functional Group Trailer (GE),
- Interchange Control Trailer (IEA), Version/release 003070

ISA Interchange Control Header Segment:

Usage: Mandatory

Max Use:

Purpose:

To start and identify an interchange of zero or more functional groups and interchangerelated control segments

Syntax Notes: Semantic Notes: Comments: Notes:

> 1. Use ASCII Hexadecimal 1D in the fourth byte of the Interchange Control Header. This first occurrence of an element separator dictates the value the translation software will employ throughout the interchange.

2. Use ASCII Hexadecimal 1C after ISA16. This first occurrence of a segment terminator dictates the value the translation software employs throughout the interchange.

3. See ISA16 for subelement separator usage.

Data Element Summary

			Data E	lement Summary	
	Ref. Des.	Data <u>Element</u>	<u>Name</u>		<u>Attributes</u>
Must Use	ISA01	I01	Authorization	Information Qualifier	M ID 2/2
			Code to identify	the type of information in the Authorization	tion Information
			00	No Authorization Information Prese Information in I02)	ent (No Meaningful
			05	Department of Defense (DoD) Com Identifier	munication
				Use to indicate the Department of I the information authorizer. Use the sender is not a DOD entity.	-
		06	United States Federal Government (Identifier	Communication	
				Use to indicate the Federal Govern- information authorizer. Use this co sender is not a Federal Governmen	ode even if the
Must Use	ISA02	102	Authorization !	Information	M AN 10/10
			interchange sen	d for additional identification or authorization or the data in the interchange; the type ation Information Qualifier (I01)	
			le additional identification or authorizati therwise, fill this field with blank charact	_	
				it is recommended that the specific coding partner data security officials to ensure	preservation of data

Must Use	ISA03	103		type of information in the Security Infor	
			00	No Security Information Present (No M Information in I04)	leaningful
			01	Password	
				Use based on trading partner agreeme	nt.
Must Use	ISA04	I04	sender or the data in Security Information If ISA03 is code 00,	atifying the security information about the interchange; the type of information in Qualifier (I03), fill this field with blank characters. Ot	is set by the
				between Trading Partners.	482 4A 8000000
Must Use	ISA05	105	Interchange ID Qu		M ID 2/2
		-	te the system/method of code structure user ID element being qualified	sed to designate	
				or D-U-N-S+4 (Code 16) are prefered.	
			01	Duns (Dun & Bradstreet)	Sala - Addahahil
		02	SCAC (Standard Carrier Alpha Code)		
		04	IATA (International Air Transport Asso	ociation)	
		08	UCC EDI Communications ID (Comm		
			09	X.121 (CCITT)	10)
		10 Department of Defense (DoD) Activity Address Code			
			16	Duns Number With 4-Character Suffix	riddress Code
Must Use	ISA06	I06	Interchange Sende		M AN 15/15
Must Use ISA06 I06		100	Identification code preceiver ID to route sender ID element	bublished by the sender for other parties that to them; the sender always codes the	to use as the
			1. Enter the taentif	ier of the sender's translation point.	
			2. Left justify and t	oad on the right with blanks.	
Must Use	ISA07	I05	Interchange ID Qu		M ID 2/2
			-	te the system/method of code structure us	sed to designate
				er ID element being qualified or <i>D-U-N-S+4</i> (Code 16) are prefered.	and part of
			Õ1	Duns (Dun & Bradstreet)	
			02	SCAC (Standard Carrier Alpha Code)	
			04	IATA (International Air Transport Asso	ociation)
			08	UCC EDI Communications ID (Comm	ID)
			09	X.121 (CCITT)	
			10	Department of Defense (DoD) Activity	Address Code
			16	Duns Number With 4-Character Suffix	
Must Use	ISA08	107	used by the sender a use this as a receivir	by the receiver of the data; Who is their sending ID, thus other parties sending ID to route data to them iter of the receiver's translation point (but iter).	ding to them will
			and non-governmen		seen of a

						· Palating and in	
			2. Left justify an	d pad on the right with blanks.			
Must Use	ISA09	108	Interchange Date	2	\mathbf{M}	DT 6/6	
			Date of the interch	nange			
			1. Express the UI was created.	C (previously known as GMT) date tha	it this i	interchange	
			2. Express the dat	te in a six-position (YYMMDD) format.			
Must Use	ISA10	109	Interchange Time Time of the interc		M	TM 4/4	
			1. Express the UI was created.	C (previously known as GMT) time that	it this i	interchange	
			2. Express the tim	e in a four-position (HHMM) format.			
Must Use	ISA11	I10	Interchange Con	trol Standards Identifier	\mathbf{M}	ID 1/1	
				ne agency responsible for the control state closed by the interchange header and tradu.S. EDI Community of ASC X12, 7	iler		
Must Use	ISA12	I11		trol Version Number per covers the interchange control segme	M ents	ID 5/5	
			Use to identify the ASC X12 version and release for the interchange				
			-	transactions carried within the envelop			
			00307	Draft Standards for Trial Use Approv by ASC X12 Procedures Review Box October 1996			
Must Use	ISA13	I12	Interchange Com		\mathbf{M}	N0 9/9	
			A control number assigned by the interchange sender				
			business practices	ties may use any numbering scheme co . However, the scheme must uniquely a very long period of time.			
Must Use	ISA14	I13	Acknowledgment		\mathbf{M}	ID 1/1	
			Code sent by the s	ender to request an interchange acknow	ledgme	ent (TA1)	
			Interchange Ackn (e.g. TA3 or trans	cknowledgment applies only to return of owledgment. It does not apply to other action set 242) as required by Part 10 of the TAI is not supported, no acknowledge.	acknowledge	owledgments Federal	
			0	No Acknowledgment Requested			
				Use this code to indicate an intercha acknowledgment via TA1 shall not l interchange receiver.	_	rned by the	
Must Use	ISA15	I14	Test Indicator	ů,	\mathbf{M}	ID 1/1	
			Code to indicate w production	hether data enclosed by this interchange	envel:	ope is test or	
			P	Production Data		* *******	
				Use to identify all data other than te	st data		
			T	Test Data			
				Use when testing interchanges.		initia ethiomias	

Must Use ISA16

I15 Component Element Separator

throughout the interchange.

M AN 1/1

Type is not applicable; the component element separator is a delimiter and not a data element; this field provides the delimiter used to separate component data elements within a composite data structure; this value must be different than the data element separator and the segment terminator

Enter ASCII Hexadecimal 1F. The value of this element dictates the value the translation software employs for component element separation

Segment: TA3 Interchange Delivery Notice Segment

Usage: Mandatory

Max Use:

Purpose: To provide a notice from the receiving service request handler to the sending service request handler that an interchange was delivered or not delivered to the interchange

receiver's mailbox, or some other ancillary service was performed, and that the interchange receiver retrieved, refused, or purged the interchange; TA3 is exchanged

only between service request handlers; use of the TA3 segment is optional

Syntax Notes:

- 1 If either TA322 or TA323 is present, then the other is required.
- If either TA324 or TA325 is present, then the other is required.
- 3 If either TA326 or TA327 is present, then the other is required.

Semantic Notes:

- 1 TA301 and TA302 identify the service request handlers processing the interchange being reported.
- 2 TA304 through TA311 and TA318 through TA321 are used to identify the interchange whose status is being reported.
- 3 TA312 through TA314 identify the action being reported and the date and time that action was performed. TA315 through TA317 provide a second set of interchange action code, date and time that can be included if a given TA3 is reporting on more than one event.
- 4 TA322 through TA327 contain optional information exchanged by service request handlers to supply additional information concerning actions taken upon the interchange being reported.

Comments:

Notes:

- 1. Only one interchange action may be reported per TA3. If multiple events are to be reported, multiple TA3s must be used.
- 2. Only one interchange control structure error may be reported per TA3. If multiple errors are to be reported, multiple TA3s must be used.

Data Element Summary

Ref. Data Des. Element Must Use TA301 I38		-	Handler ID Qualifier entifying the service request handler	Att M	ributes ID 2/2	
				to indicate the Federal Government. I ablic or private organization.	Do so w	hether the
Must Use TA302 I39		I 39	Service Request This is the identif	Handler ID fication code of the sending service requ	M est hand	AN 1/15 dler
			Cite the D-U-N-S or D-U-N-S+4 of the service request handler providing this notice of interchange delivery.			
Must Use TA303 I43		I43	Error Reason C The code indicate structure or in de 000	es the error found or not found in proces	M sing the	ID 3/3 e control
			001	The Interchange Control Number in Trailer Do not Match; the Value fro used in the Acknowledgment		
			002	This Standard as Noted in the Contr Identifier is not Supported	ol Stano	lards

			003	This Version of the Controls	is not Supported
			004	The Segment Terminator is I	
			005	Invalid Value as Shown in th Control Number	e Reported Interchange
			006	Invalid Value as Shown in th	e Reported Interchange
			007	Invalid Value as Shown in th	e Reported Interchange
			008	Time Invalid Value as Shown in th Sender ID Qualifier	e Reported Interchange
			009	Invalid Value as Shown in th Sender ID	e Reported Interchange
			010	Invalid Value as Shown in th Receiver ID Qualifier	e Reported Interchange
			011	Invalid Value as Shown in the Receiver ID	e Reported Interchange
			016	Trading Partnership not Estal	blished
			017	Invalid Number of Included	
			018	Invalid Control Structure	
			019	Improper (Premature) End-or	f-file (Transmission)
			020	Duplicate Interchange Contro	ol Number
			021	Invalid Data Element Separa	tor
			022	Invalid Component Element	Separator
			023	Failure to Transfer Interchang Request Handler	ge to the next Service
			031	Receiver Not On-line	
			032	Abnormal Conditions	
Must Use	TA304	I44	or transaction s	ne start segment ID of the original i	
Must Use	TA305	I 45	Reported Con		M AN 1/14
			This is the cont	rol number value of the original int	terchange, functional group
			(appearing in 1	et l number assigned in the original i (SA13) for which notice is being p (SA13) is linked to the original interch	rovided. With this control
Must Use	TA306	I 46	Reported Date	_	M AN 1/8
				ppearing in ISA09 of the interchan	
Must Use	TA307	I47	Reported Time		M AN 1/8 nctional group
				ppearing in ISA10 of the interchan	
Must Use	TA308	I48	Reported Inter	rchange Sender ID Qualifier ler ID qualifier value appearing in c	M AN 1/4 original interchange
				appearing in ISA05 of the intercha	-

				ANSI ASC X12 VERSION/RELEASE 00	J3070
Must Use	TA309	I49	Reported Send		5
				er ID value of original interchange or functional group	
			Cite the value a notice is being	uppearing in ISA06 of the interchange for which delivery provided.	
Must Use	TA310	I50	0.1	change Receiver ID Qualifier M AN 1/4	
			_	ver ID qualifier value appearing in original interchange	
				ppearing in ISA07 of the interchange for which delivery	
			notice is being		
Must Use	TA311	I51	Reported Rece		5
				ver ID value of original interchange or functional group	
			Cite the value a notice is being	ppearing in ISA08 of the interchange for which delivery provided.	
Must Use	TA312	I40	Action Code	M ID 2/2	
			This is a code in	adicating the action taken on the interchange or functional	
			group by the ser	rvice request handler or the receiver	
			AK	Transfer to the Next Service Request Handler has bee Acknowledged	en
			ВН	Transfer to Service Request Handler not Capable of	
				Reporting Further Status	
			DL	Delivered Interchange by Service Request Handler	
			PU	Purged by Interchange Receiver	
			RD	Redirected by Service Request Handler to an Alternat	te
				Receiver as Identified in the Reference Code	
			RF	Refused by Interchange Receiver	
			RJ	Rejected by Service Request Handler; See Error Reas	son
			DТ	Code for Cause	
			RT	Retrieved Interchange by Receiver	
			TR	Transferred to Next Service Request Handler by Service Request Handler, but not yet Acknowledged	
Must Use	TA313	I41	Action Date	M DT 6/6	
				date when the service request handler took action on the	
				ange or functional group	
			Express the UI (YYMMDD) for	C (previously known as GMT) date in a six-position	
Must Use	ΤΛ314	I42	Action Time	M TM 4/6	
Must Osc	IASIA	172		time when the service request handler took action on the	
				ange or functional group	
			Express the UT	C (previously known as GMT) time in a four-position	
			(HHMM) form		
Not Used	TA315	I40	Action Code	O ID 2/2	
				ndicating the action taken on the interchange or functional	
			C 1 -	rvice request handler or the receiver	
NT 4 TT 1	TD 4.21.6	T 44) Data Element Dictionary for acceptable code values.	
Not Used	TA316	I41	Action Date	O DT 6/6 c date when the service request handler took action on the	
				lange or functional group	
Not Used	TA317	I42	Action Time	O TM 4/6	
2.000				time when the service request handler took action on the	
				ange or functional group	
Not Used	TA318	I52	First Reference		
			This is the ID q	ualifier appearing in original interchange	

Not Used	TA319	I53	First Reference ID	O	AN 1/14
			This contains information from the original interchange. Reference ID Qualifier data element	, as defin	ed by the Firs
Not Used	TA320	I54	Second Reference ID Qualifier	0	AN 1/4
	1110 = 0		This contains ID qualifier information appearing in orig	inal inter	
Not Used	TA321	I55	Second Reference ID	0	AN 1/14
			This contains information from the original interchange, Second Reference ID Qualifier data element	, as defin	ed by the
	TA322	156	Reference Code Qualifier	X	ID 2/2
			This is a code defining the information contained in the element	Referenc	ce Code data
			If TA312 is code RD, use TA322 and TA323 to identify which the interchange was redirected.	the orgo	anization to
			ID of Alternate Receiver to which Been Redirected	Interchar	nge Has
	TA323	I57	Reference Code	X	AN 1/35
			This contains reference information exchanged between handlers concerning the reported interchange as defined Reference Code Qualifier data element Cite the identifier of the organization to which the interedirected. The organization shall be identified via a urne of the sources listed as allowable codes in the ISAC 10.6 of the Federal EDI Guidelines. The Data Universal (D-U-N-S) number and D-U-N-S +4 are the preferred to	by the c rchange nique id 05 defini al Numb	was entifier from tion in section ering System
ot Used	TA324	I56	Reference Code Qualifier	X	ID 2/2
			This is a code defining the information contained in the element	Referenc	e Code data
Not Used	TA325	I57	Reference Code	X	AN 1/35
			This contains reference information exchanged between handlers concerning the reported interchange as defined Reference Code Qualifier data element		-
	TA326	I56	Reference Code Qualifier	X	ID 2/2
ot Used			This is a code defining the information contained in the	Reference	o Code data
Not Used			element		e Code data
Not Used	TA327	I57	_	X	AN 1/35

Segment:

GS Functional Group Header

Usage:

Mandatory

Max Use:

e:

Purpose:

To indicate the beginning of a functional group and to provide control information

Syntax Notes: Semantic Notes:

The data interchange control number GS06 in this header must be identical to the same data element in the associated functional group trailer, GE02.

Comments:

A functional group of related transaction sets, within the scope of X12 standards, consists of a collection of similar transaction sets enclosed by a functional group header and a functional group trailer.

Notes:

- 1. Use to identify the functional group containing one or more related transactions.
- 2. Use to identify the specific implementation convention with which the transaction sets contained within the functional group envelope comply.
- 3. The version and release of the GS segment must be the same as the version and release of the transactions that follow it as specified in the Version / Release / Industry Identifier Code (GS08).
- 4. The GS segment represented here is valid for version 2003.

	Ref.	Data			
	Des.	Element	Name	<u>Attı</u>	<u>ributes</u>
Must Use	GS01	479	Functional Identifier Code	\mathbf{M}	ID 2/2
			Code identifying a group of application related transaction	sets	
			Cite any valid code defined for data element 479 in the AS Standards Data Element Dictionary providing a Federal i convention exists for the cited transaction set.		
Must Use	GS02	142	Application Sender's Code	M	AN 2/12
			Code identifying party sending transmission.		
			 Cite the sending application's identifier. This identifier within the domain of the sending application's translation Dun and Bradstreet number (DUNS) is recommended to juniqueness. Transmit the required number of characters without leblanks. 	point provid	t. Use of a le universal
Must Use	GS03	124	Application Receiver's Code Code identifying party receiving transmission	M	AN 2/12
			 Cite the receiving application's identifier. This identific within the domain of the receiving application's translation Dun and Bradstreet number (DUNS) is recommended to puniqueness. Transmit the required number of characters without leblanks. 	on pois provid	nt. Use of a le universal
			3. If the group contains PUBLIC transactions, enter the	iteral	string

			'PUBLIC'.			
Must Use	GS04	29	Data Interchange Date Date sender generated a fu	unctional group of transaction set	M ts.	DT 6/6
			1. Enter the UTC (previous created.	usly known as GMT) date that th	iis seg	ment was
Must Use	GS05	30	Data Interchange Time Time (HHMM) when the sets (local time at sender's	ix-position (YYMMDD) format. sender generated a functional gross location). usly known as GMT) time that the		
Dan A III	CSM	20		our-position (HHMM) format.	D.f.	NIO 1/O
Must Use	GS06	28		ed and maintained by the sender	M	N0 1/9
			1. Originating activities their business practices.	nay use any numbering scheme	consis	stent with
			functional group. The Gr	ide sufficient uniqueness to ider oup Control Number value, togo Receiver's Codes, shall be unique thas a year	etlier n	vith the
Must Use	GS07	455	Responsible Agency Cod Code used in conjunction standard			ID 1/2 ssuer of the
Must Use	GS08	480	Version / Release / Indus Code indicating the version EDI standard being used.	try Identifier Code on, release, subrelease, and indust Positions 1-3, Major Version Nu on; Positions 7-12, Industry or Tr	M try iden imber;	Positions 4-
				mplementation Convention, base by the government has a unique		
			Positions 1 through 6:	ANSI ASC X12 Version and number (e.g. 003010) upon vIC is based.		
			Position 7:	Organizational Scope F = Federal D = DOD		
				G = Government (transition	al)	
			Positions 8 through 10:	Transaction Set Identifier Coa (e.g. 850).	le	
			Position 11:	Variant: A character used to differentiate between different	t	

functional implementations of the same transaction set.

If the convention is not a variant, an underscore () will appear in this position.

Position 12:

A sequential number starting with 0 and incremented by 1 each time the implementation convention is revised.

Segment: GS Functional Group Header

Usage: Mandatory

Max Use:

Purpose:

To indicate the beginning of a functional group and to provide control information

Syntax Notes: Semantic Notes:

The data interchange control number GS06 in this header must be identical to the same data element in the associated functional group trailer, GE02.

Comments:

A functional group of related transaction sets, within the scope of X12 standards, consists of a collection of similar transaction sets enclosed by a functional group header and a functional group trailer.

Notes:

- 1. Use to identify the functional group containing one or more related transactions.
- 2. Use to identify the specific implementation convention with which the transaction sets contained within the functional group envelope comply.
- 3. The version and release of the GS segment must be the same as the version and release of the transactions that follow it as specified in the Version / Release / Industry Identifier Code (GS08).
- 4. The GS segment represented here is valid for version 3010.

Data Element Summary

			Data Element Summary				
	Ref.	Data					
	Des.	Element	<u>Name</u>	Att	<u>ributes</u>		
Must Use	GS01	479	Functional Identifier Code Code identifying a group of application related transaction	M on sets	ID 2/2		
			Cite any valid code defined for data element 479 in the Standards Data Element Dictionary providing a Federa convention exists for the cited transaction set.				
Must Use	GS02	142	Application Sender's Code Code identifying party sending transmission.	M	AN 2/12		
			 Cite the sending application's identifier. This identify within the domain of the sending application's translatid Dun and Bradstreet number (DUNS) is recommended to uniqueness. Transmit the required number of characters without 	on point o provid	t. Use of a le universal		
Must Use	GS03	124	Application Receiver's Code Code identifying party receiving transmission	M	AN 2/12		
			1. Cite the receiving application's identifier. This identifier must be unique within the domain of the receiving application's translation point. Use of a Dun and Bradstreet number (DUNS) is recommended to provide universal uniqueness.				
			2. Transmit the required number of characters without	leading	or trailing		

blanks.

	-		3. If the group contains I'PUBLIC'.	PUBLIC transactions, enter the literal string
Must Use	GS04	29	Group Date	M DT 6/6
			Date sender generated a fu	unctional group of transaction sets.
			1. Enter the UTC (previous created.	usly known as GMT) date that this segment was
			2. Express the date in a si	x-position (YYMMDD) format.
Must Use	GS05	30	Group Time	M TM 4/4
			Time (HHMM) when the sets (local time at sender's	sender generated a functional group of transaction
				usly known as GMT) time that this segment was
				our-position (HHMM) format.
Iust Use	GS06	28	Group Control Number	M N0 1/9
			Assigned number originat	ed and maintained by the sender
			1. Originating activities their business practices.	nay use any numbering scheme consistent with
				ide sufficient uniqueness to identify each
				oup Control Number value, together with the
				Receiver's Codes, shall be unique within an
	G G 0 =	455	extended time frame - suc	
Iust Use	GS07	455	Responsible Agency Cod	
			_	with Data Element 480 to identify the issuer of the
			standard X Accr	edited Standards Committee X12
Iust Use	GS08	480	Version / Release / Indus	
			Code indicating the version EDI standard being used.	n, release, subrelease, and industry identifier of the Positions 1-3, Major Version Number; Positions 4- on; Positions 7-12, Industry or Trade Association ID
			Fach Fodoral and DoD I	nplementation Convention, based on an ANSI ASC
				by the government has a unique identifier specified
			Positions 1 through 6:	ANSI ASC X12 Version and Release number (e.g. 003010) upon which the IC is based.
			Position 7:	Organizational Scope
				F = Federal
				D = DOD
				C - C
				G = Government (transitional)
			Positions 8 through 10:	Transaction Set Identifier Code (e.g. 850).
			Positions 8 through 10: Position 11:	Transaction Set Identifier Code

functional implementations of the same transaction set.

If the convention is not a variant, an underscore (_) will appear in this position.

Position 12:

A sequential number starting with 0 and incremented by 1 each time the implementation convention is revised.

Segment:

GS Functional Group Header

Usage:

Mandatory

Max Use:

1

Purpose:

To indicate the beginning of a functional group and to provide control information

Syntax Notes: Semantic Notes:

- 1 GS04 is the group date.
- 2 GS05 is the group time.
- 3 The data interchange control number GS06 in this header must be identical to the same data element in the associated functional group trailer, GE02.

Comments:

A functional group of related transaction sets, within the scope of X12 standards, consists of a collection of similar transaction sets enclosed by a functional group header and a functional group trailer.

Notes:

- 1. Use to identify the functional group containing one or more related transactions.
- 2. Use to identify the specific implementation convention with which the transaction sets contained within the functional group envelope comply.
- 3. The version and release of the GS segment must be the same as the version and release of the transactions that follow it as specified in the Version / Release / Industry Identifier Code (GS08).
- 4. The GS segment represented here is valid for version 3040 through 3070.

	Ref.	Data		
	Des.	Element	Name	Attributes
Must Use	GS01	479	Functional Identifier Code	M ID 2/2
			Code identifying a group of application related transaction s	sets
			Cite any valid code defined for data element 479 in the ASC X12 3040 through 3070 (as applicable) Standards Data Element Dictionary providing a Federal implementation convention exists for the cited transaction set.	
Must Use	GS02	GS02 142	Application Sender's Code Code identifying party sending transmission; codes agreed to partners	M AN 2/15 to by trading
			1. Cite the sending application's identifier. This identifier must be unique within the domain of the sending application's translation point. Use of a Dun and Bradstreet number (DUNS or DUNS+4) is recommended to provide universal uniqueness.	

			The state of the s
			2. Transmit the required number of characters without leading or trailing blanks.
Must Use	GS03	124	Application Receiver's Code M AN 2/15
			Code identifying party receiving transmission. Codes agreed to by trading
			partners
			1. Cite the receiving application's identifier. This identifier must be unique
			within the domain of the receiving application's translation point. Use of a
			Dun and Bradstreet number (D-U-N-S or D-U-N-S+4) is recommended to
			provide universal uniqueness.
			2. Transmit the required number of characters without leading or trailing
			blanks.
			3. If the group contains PUBLIC transactions, enter the literal string
			'PUBLIC'.
Must Use	GS04	373	Date M DT 6/6
			Date (YYMMDD)
			1. Enter the UTC (previously known as GMT) date that this segment was
			created.
			<u> </u>
3.6	GG0#	225	2. Express the date in a six-position (YYMMDD) format.
Must Use	GS05	337	Time M TM 4/8
			Time expressed in 24-hour clock time as follows: HHMM, or HHMMSS, or
			HHMMSSD, or HHMMSSDD, where H = hours (00-23), M = minutes (00-50), S = integer seconds (00-50) and DD = decimal seconds decimal seconds.
			59), S = integer seconds (00-59) and DD = decimal seconds; decimal seconds are expressed as follows: D = tenths (0-9) and DD = hundredths (00-99)
			1. Enter the UTC (previously known as GMT) time that this segment was
			created.
			2. Express the time in a four-position (HHMM) format.
Must Use	GS06	28	Group Control Number M N0 1/9
			Assigned number originated and maintained by the sender
			1. Originating activities may use any numbering scheme consistent with
			their business practices.
			2. The scheme must provide sufficient uniqueness to identify each
			functional group. The Group Control Number value, together with the
			Application Sender's and Receiver's Codes, shall be unique within an
Much II-	CC07	455	extended time frame - such as a year. Responsible Agency Code M ID 1/2
Must Use	GS07	455	Responsible Agency Code M ID 1/2 Code used in conjunction with Data Element 480 to identify the issuer of the
			standard
			X Accredited Standards Committee X12
Must Use	GS08	480	Version / Release / Industry Identifier Code M AN 1/12
wiust Ose	0300	700	Code indicating the version, release, subrelease, and industry identifier of the
			EDI standard being used, including the GS and GE segments; if code in
			DE455 in GS segment is X, then in DE 480 positions 1-3 are the version
			number; positions 4-6 are the release and subrelease, level of the version; and
			positions 7-12 are the industry or trade association identifiers (optionally
			assigned by user); if code in DE455 in GS segment is T, then other formats are
			allowed

Each Federal and DoD Implementation Convention, based on an ANSI ASC X12 transaction set, used by the government has a unique identifier specified as follow:

Positions 1 through 6: ANSI ASC X12 Version and Release

number (e.g. 003010) upon which the

IC is based.

Position 7: Organizational Scope

F = FederalD = DOD

G = Government (transitional)

Positions 8 through 10: Transaction Set Identifier Code

(e.g. 850).

Position 11: Variant: A character used to

differentiate between different functional implementations of the

same transaction set.

If the convention is not a variant, an underscore (_) will appear in this

position.

Position 12: A sequential number starting with 0

and incremented by 1 each time the implementation convention is revised.

S1S Security Header Level 1 Segment: Optional Usage: Max Use: Purpose: To initiate the beginning of a secured area and to provide the parameters needed for authentication or encryption of a functional group If either S1S04 or S1S05 is present, then the other is required. **Syntax Notes:** If any of S1S06 S1S07 S1S08 or S1S09 is present, then all are required. **Semantic Notes:** If S1S01 is "AA" or "BB", S1S04 is required. If S1S01 is "BB" or "EE", S1S06 is required. Comments: Notes: 1. X9 has a minimum length of 4 characters for S1S02 (the security originator); no mechanism, or registration method is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee the uniqueness of the identifier 2. X9 has a minimum length of 4 characters for S1S03 (the security recipient); no mechanism, or registration method is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee the uniqueness of the identifier 3. The S1S segment represented here is only valid for versions 3040 and 3050. **Data Element Summary** Ref. Data Des. Element Name Attributes Must Use S1S01 990 Security Type M ID 2/2 Code identifying the security algorithms and methods employed for this level of interchange. EE Encryption, No Authentication M AN 4/16 Must Use S1S02 824 Security Originator Name Unique designation (identity) of the cryptographic process that performs authentication or encryption on data to be interchanged, or originates a cryptographic service message Note: X9 has a minimum length of 4 characters for the security originator; no mechanism, or registration method is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee the uniqueness of the identifier AN 4/16 Must Use S1S03 825 Security Recipient Name M Unique designation (identity) of the cryptographic process that performs authentication or decryption on received data, or is the destination of a cryptographic service message Note: X9 has a minimum length of 4 characters for the security recipient; no mechanism, or registration method is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee the uniqueness of the identifier S1S04 991 AN 1/16 **Authentication Key Name** Name of the key used for authentication. This name is mutually known to the security originator and the security recipient, is unique for this relationship, and allows a particular key to be specified. ID 1/1 S1S05 992 **Authentication Service Code** X Authentication option 1 ANSI X9.9 Binary Data 2 ANSI X9.9 Coded Character Set, Entire Message, No **Editing**

			Standard value for ANSI X9.17 data element separator expressed segment terminator expressed as the calculation of the message at (MAC)	d as an aster a linefeed	risk and the character for
S1S06	993	Encryption F	Key Name	X	AN 1/16
		security origin	tey used for encryption. This name is manator and the security recipient, is unique particular key to be specified.	-	
S1S07	994	Encryption S	-	X	ID 1/3
		the encryption	representing options for encryption pro- n mode and the transmission filter specific ext data into transmittable text. ANSI X9.23 Cipher Block Chair Hexadecimal Filter	fication for	filtering
		22	ANSI X9.23 Cipher Block Chair Filter	ning (CBC)	, ASCII
		41	ANSI X9.23 CFB-8 (Cipher Fee Filter		
		42	ANSI X9.23 CFB-8 (Cipher Fee	, ,	
S1S08	995	Length of Da		X	N 1/18
		Length of data text.	a is the number of character positions of	the encryp	ted, filtered
S1S09	996	Initialization	Vector (IV)	X	AN 16/16
		notation as 16 bit value is us increase secur cryptographic each message not its ASCII interchange properties in the a random of the security	representation of a 64-bit value expresse ASCII characters from the set of characters are as a starting point for encryption of a city by introducing cryptographic variance equipment; a new Initialization Vector; the IV shall not be intentionally reused representation, is used for the cryptographic rocess, the resultant encrypted and filtered totation is the representation for archiving pseudo-random number; when encryping the Electronic Code Book (ECB) modernessage	cters (09, And data sequence and to sy (IV) shall be the control of the control	AF); the 64- nce to nchronize be used for binary value, s; in the is sent; the s; the IV shall must be

	Segment:	S1S	Security Header Level 1				
	Usage: Max Use:	Optional					
	Purpose:		te the beginning of a secured area and to provide the parameters needed for cation or encryption of a functional group	or			
Syn	tax Notes:	 If eit If an If eit 	ither S1S04 or S1S05 is present, then the other is required. ny of S1S06 S1S07 S1S08 or S1S09 is present, then all are required. ither C03204 or C03205 is present, then the other is required. ither C03206 or C03207 is present, then the other is required.	ther S1S04 or S1S05 is present, then the other is required. y of S1S06 S1S07 S1S08 or S1S09 is present, then all are required. ther C03204 or C03205 is present, then the other is required.			
Semai	ntic Notes:	1 If S1	1S01 is "AA", "BB", "AC" or "BC", then S1S04 is required. 1S01 is "BB", "EE", "AC" or "EC", then S1S06 is required.				
C	Comments:	1 X9 h No r	has a required minimum length of four characters for \$1\$02 (security orig mechanism, or registration method, is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee queness of the identifier.				
		No r	has a required minimum length of four characters for S1S03 (security recipmechanism, or registration method, is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee queness of the identifier.	_			
		3 In S	1S04, the special name "01234567890ABCDEF" is reserved for the hexacle 01234567890ABCDEF (i.e., a fixed, nonsecret value) to provide a well-ne for data-integrity testing only.				
	Notes:		as a minimum length of 4 characters for S1S02 (the security originator);	; no			
		uniquend 2. X9 ha mechani uniquend	ism, or registration method is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee the tess of the identifier as a minimum length of 4 characters for S1S03 (the security recipient); resim, or registration method is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee the tess of the identifier	no			
		3. Ines	S1S segment represented here is only valid for versions 3060 and 3070.				
			Data Element Summary				
	Ref.	Data					
3.6	Des.	Element					
Must Use	S1S01	990	Security Type M ID 2/2 Code identifying the security algorithms and methods applied for this lev				
			interchange EC No Authentication, Compression, Encryption				
			EE No Authentication, No Compression, Encryption				
N/I	C1 C02	02.4		161			
Must Use	S1S02	824	Security Originator Name M AN 1/2 Unique designation (identity) of the cryptographic process that performs authentication or encryption on data to be interchanged, or originates a cryptographic service message				
			Note: X9 has a minimum length of 4 characters for the security originat mechanism, or registration method is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee				
			uniqueness of the identifier	16.4			
	S1S03	825	Security Recipient Name O AN 1/ Unique designation (identity) of the cryptographic process that performs authentication or decryption on received data, or is the destination of a cryptographic service message				
			Note: X9 has a minimum length of 4 characters for the security recipien				

mechanism, or registration method is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee the

	S1S04	991	uniqueness of the i		X	AN 1/64
	31304	<i>yy</i> 1	Name of the key u security originator	sed for authentication; this name is mutu and the security recipient, is unique for t	ally k his re	nown to the elationship,
			and is intended to	allow the changing of the key from time	io iiii	16
			hexidecimal value	key name "0123456789ABCDEF" is res 0123456789ABCDEF (i.e. a fixed non-sown value for data integrity testing only)		
	S1S05	992	Authentication Se		X	ID 1/1
			Authentication opt	nions		
			4	MD5 Hash		
			5	SHA Hash		
	S1S06	C031	Encryption Key I	nformation	X	
			Information neede	d to identify or obtain the encryption key		
Must Use	C03101	993	Encryption Key N		M	AN 1/64
			_	sed for encryption; this name is mutually		
				and the security recipient, is unique for tallow the changing of the key from time		
			una is intended to	and the changing of the key from time		
			Note: If any of the	e optional fields are present, the Key Nan	ne sho	ould contain
				f a public key is being used to encrpyt the		•
				the asymmetric key-encrypting-key used	to er	ncrypt the one-
	C03102	1564	time key. Protocol ID		0	ID 3/3
	C03102	1501		rotocol used to encrypt the session key		10 5/5
			KEA	Key Encryption Algorithm		
			RSA	RSA Algorithm		
	C03103	1565	Look-up Value	1011111901111111	0	AN 1/512
	000100	1000	-	tify a certificate containing the public ke	_	
			the one-time key	ing a communication contaming the paone no.	, 450	a to enerypt
	C03104	1566	Keying Material		O	AN 1/512
			Additional materia	l required for decrypting the one-time ke	У	
	C03105	1567	One-time Encryp	tion Key	O	AN 1/512
			Hexadecimally filt	ered encrypted one-time key		
	S1S07	C032	Encryption Servious	ce Information	X	
			Information require	ed by the encryption operation		
Must Use	C03201	994	Encryption Servious		\mathbf{M}	ID 1/3
			_	esenting options for encryption processing	-	_
			-	d filtering; the code either defines the enc lter specification for filtering binary data		
				at the following subelements define these		
			21	ANSI X9.23 Cipher Block Chaining (6		
				Hexadecimal Filter		
			22	ANSI X9.23 Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)	, ASCII
			41	Filter ANSI X9.23 CFB-8 (Cipher Feedback) Це	vadecimal
			71	Filter	<i>j</i> , 110.	nauceillaí

			ANSI ASC X12 VERSI	UN/KI	ELEASE 003070
		42	ANSI X9.23 CFB-8 (Cipher Feedback	(). AS	CII Filter
C03202	1568	Algorithm ID	(1	0	ID 3/3
		Algorithm used for	Encryption		
		DE3	Triple DEA		
		DES	Data Encryption Standard (Same as D	EA)	
			As specified in FIPS 46-2.		
		SKJ	Skipjack		
C03203	1569	Algorithm Mode o	f Operation	O	ID 3/3
		Mode of Operation	of the Encryption Algorithm		
		CBC	Cipher Block Chaining		
C03204	1570	Filter ID Code		X	ID 3/3
		Code specifying the	type of filter used to convert data code	value	es
		ASB	ASCII-Baudot Filter		
		ASC	ASCII Filter		
		HDC	Hexadecimal Filter		
		UUE	Uuencoding		
		ZZZ	Mutually Defined		
			Use to indicate Base 64.		- i
C03205	799	Version Identifier		X	AN 1/30
		Revision level of a	particular format, program, technique or	algo	rithm
C03206	1571	Compression ID		X	ID 3/3
		Type of Compression	on Used		
		913	X9E13 Compression as defined by X9	.32	
		ZZZ	Mutually Defined		
			Use to indicate that each block has be	en co	mpressed
			by using a combination of the Lempe		
			algorithm and Huffman coding, in ac		
			the Internet Engineering Task Force for Comments (RFC) 1951 format.	(IEII	r) Kequesi
C03207	799	Version Identifier	jor comments (12 c) 1701 jorman	X	AN 1/30
		Revision level of a	particular format, program, technique or	algo	rithm
			the compression algorithm cited in S1S		
		above.			and distribution
S1S08	995	Length of Data		X	N 1/18
			e number of character positions of the co		
S1S09	996	Initialization Vector	ext; when data is plain text, this field sha	III be i	AN 16/16
31307	<i>)) 0</i>		entation of a 64-bit value expressed in h		
		_	II characters from the set of characters (
		bit value is used as a	a starting point for encryption of a data s	seque	nce to
			introducing cryptographic variance and		
			ment; a new Initialization Vector (IV) s		
		_	V shall not be intentionally reused; the 6 entation, is used for the cryptographic p		
			, the resultant encrypted and filtered 64-		
		hexadecimal notatio	n is the representation for archiving pur	poses	; the IV shall
		be a random or pseu	do-random number; when encrypted, the	ie IV i	must be

decrypted using the Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode and the same key used to encrypt the message

S2S Security Header Level 2 Segment:

Usage:

Optional

Max Use:

Purpose:

To initiate the beginning of a secured area and to provide the parameters needed for authentication or encryption of a transaction set

Syntax Notes:

- If either S2S04 or S2S05 is present, then the other is required.
- If any of S2S06 S2S07 S2S08 or S2S09 is present, then all are required.

Semantic Notes:

If S2S01 is "AA" or "BB", S2S04 is required. If S2S01 is "BB" or "EE", S2S06 is required.

Comments:

Notes:

- 1. X9 has a minimum length of 4 characters for S2S02 (the security originator); no mechanism, or registration method is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee the uniqueness of the identifier
- 2. X9 has a minimum length of 4 characters for S2S03 (the security recipient); no mechanism, or registration method is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee the uniqueness of the identifier.
- 3. The S2S segment represented here is only valid for versions 3040 and 3050.

			Data Element Summary		
	Ref. Des.	Data Element	Name	Att	<u>ributes</u>
Must Use	S2S01	990	Security Type	M	ID 2/2
Widst Osc	32301	770	Code identifying the security algorithms and methods empl		
			of interchange.	oyeu	ioi imis ievei
			EE Encryption, No Authentication		
Must Use	S2S02	824	Security Originator Name	M	AN 4/16
Must Osc	32302	024	Unique designation (identity) of the cryptographic process		
			authentication or encryption on data to be interchanged, or		
			cryptographic service message	01.5	a coo a
			Note: X9 has a minimum length of 4 characters for the seco	urity (originator; no
			mechanism, or registration method is provided by X9 or X1	2 to §	guarantee the
			uniqueness of the identifier		
Must Use	S2S03	825	Security Recipient Name	\mathbf{M}	AN 4/16
			Unique designation (identity) of the cryptographic process		
			authentication or decryption on received data, or is the dest	inatio	n of a
			cryptographic service message		
			Note: X9 has a minimum length of 4 characters for the second	urity 1	recipient; no
			mechanism, or registration method is provided by X9 or X1		
			uniqueness of the identifier		
	S2S04	991	Authentication Key Name	X	AN 1/16
			Name of the key used for authentication. This name is mutu	ially l	known to the
			security originator and the security recipient, is unique for t	his re	lationship,
			and allows a particular key to be specified.		
	S2S05	992	Authentication Service Code	X	ID 1/1
			Authentication option		
	S2S06	993	Encryption Key Name	X	AN 1/16
			Name of the key used for encryption. This name is mutually	y kno	wn to the
			security originator and the security recipient, is unique for t	his re	lationship,

		and allows a pa	articular key to be specified.		
S2S07	994	Encryption Se		X	ID 1/3
		the encryption	epresenting options for encryption proc mode and the transmission filter specif xt data into transmittable text.	ication for	filtering
		21	ANSI X9.23 Cipher Block Chair Hexadecimal Filter	ing (CBC)),
		22	ANSI X9.23 Cipher Block Chair Filter	ning (CBC)	, ASCII
		41	ANSI X9.23 CFB-8 (Cipher Fee Filter	dback), He	xadecimal
		42	ANSI X9.23 CFB-8 (Cipher Fee	dback), AS	SCII Filter
S2S08	995	Length of Data	a (LOD)	X	N 1/18
		Length of data text.	is the number of character positions of	the encryp	oted, filtered
S2S09	996	Initialization V	Vector (IV)	X	AN 16/16
		notation as 16 abit value is used increase securit cryptographic each message; not its ASCII reinterchange prohexadecimal nobe a random or	presentation of a 64-bit value expressed ASCII characters from the set of characters as a starting point for encryption of a try by introducing cryptographic variance equipment; a new Initialization Vector of the IV shall not be intentionally reused expresentation, is used for the cryptographic cess, the resultant encrypted and filtered that in its the representation for archiving pseudo-random number; when encrypting the Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode message	cters (09, data sequence and to sy (IV) shall the thick the first the firs	AF); the 64- ence to ynchronize be used for t binary value, ss; in the V is sent; the s; the IV shall must be

Segment: S2S Security Header Level 2

Usage: Optional

Max Use:

Purpose: To initiate the beginning of a secured area and to provide the parameters needed for authentication or encryption of a transaction set

Syntax Notes: 1 If either S2S04 or S2S05 is present, then the other is required.

- 2 If any of S2S06 S2S07 S2S08 or S2S09 is present, then all are required.
- 3 If either C03204 or C03205 is present, then the other is required.
- 4 If either C03206 or C03207 is present, then the other is required.

Semantic Notes:

1 If S2S01 is "AA", "BB", "AC" or "BC", then S2S04 is required. If S2S01 is "BB", "EE", "AC" or "EC", then S2S06 is required.

Comments:

- 1 X9 has a required minimum length of four characters for S2S02 (security originator). No mechanism, or registration method, is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee uniqueness of the identifier.
- 2 X9 has a required minimum length of four characters for S2S03 (security recipient). No mechanism, or registration method, is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee uniqueness of the identifier.
- 3 In S2S04 the special name "01234567890ABCDEF" is reserved for the hexadecimal value 01234567890ABCDEF (i.e., a fixed nonsecret value) to provide a well-known value for data-integrity testing only.

Notes:

- 1. X9 has a minimum length of 4 characters for S2S02 (the security originator); no mechanism, or registration method is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee the uniqueness of the identifier
- 2. X9 has a minimum length of 4 characters for S2S03 (the security recipient); no mechanism, or registration method is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee the uniqueness of the identifier.

mechanism, or registration method is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee the

3. The S2S segment represented here is only valid for versions 3060 and 3070.

			Data Licii	icht Summar y			
	Ref.	Data					
	Des.	Element	<u>Name</u>		Att	<u>ributes</u>	
Must Use	S2S01	990	Security Type		\mathbf{M}	ID 2/2	
			Code identifying the interchange	ne security algorithms and methods appli	ed for	r this level of	
			EC	No Authentication, Compression, Enc	ryptic	on	
			EE	No Authentication, No Compression,	Encry	ption	
Must Use	S2S02	824	Security Originat	or Name	\mathbf{M}	AN 1/64	
			Unique designation (identity) of the cryptographic process that perfor				
			authentication or e	ncryption on data to be interchanged, or	origin	nates a	
			cryptographic serv	ice message			
				nimum length of 4 characters for the sec istration method is provided by X9 or X dentifier			
	S2S03	825	Security Recipien		0	AN 1/64	
			1 0	n (identity) of the cryptographic process ecryption on received data, or is the dest ice message	_		
			Note: X9 has a mi	nimum length of 4 characters for the sec	urity:	recipient; no	

	S2S04	991	uniqueness of the identifier Authentication Key Name	X	AN 1/64
			Name of the key used for authentication; this name is mut security originator and the security recipient, is unique for and is intended to allow the changing of the key from time	this re	elationship,
			Note: The special key name "0123456789ABCDEF" is rehexidecimal value 0123456789ABCDEF (i.e. a fixed non-provide a well-known value for data integrity testing only	-secret)	value) to
	S2S05	992	Authentication Service Code	X	ID 1/1
			Authentication options		
			4 MD5 Hash		
			5 SHA Hash		
	S2S06	C031	Encryption Key Information	X	
			Information needed to identify or obtain the encryption ke	y	
Must Use	C03101	993	Encryption Key Name Name of the key used for encryption; this name is mutuall security originator and the security recipient, is unique for and is intended to allow the changing of the key from time	this re	elationship,
	C03102	1564	Note: If any of the optional fields are present, the Key Na either "PUBLIC" if a public key is being used to encrypt the actual name of the asymmetric key-encrypting-key use time key. Protocol ID	he one	-time key or
			Code specifying protocol used to encrypt the session key		
			KEA Key Encryption Algorithm		
			RSA RSA Algorithm		
	C03103	1565	Look-up Value	0	AN 1/512
			Value used to identify a certificate containing the public k the one-time key	ey use	d to encrypt
	C03104	1566	Keying Material	O	AN 1/512
			Additional material required for decrypting the one-time k	æy	
	C03105	1567	One-time Encryption Key	0	AN 1/512
			Hexadecimally filtered encrypted one-time key		
	S2S07	C032	Encryption Service Information	X	
			Information required by the encryption operation		
Must Use	C03201	994	Encryption Service Code	\mathbf{M}	ID 1/3
			Coded values representing options for encryption procession of compression and filtering; the code either defines the enthe transmission filter specification for filtering binary dat text or specifies that the following subelements define the 21 ANSI X9.23 Cipher Block Chaining Hexadecimal Filter 22 ANSI X9.23 Cipher Block Chaining Filter 41 ANSI X9.23 CFB-8 (Cipher Feedback Chaining Filter)	ncrypti a into t se valu (CBC)	on mode and transmittable es
			Filter	м <i>у</i> , 110	Audeemiai

		42	ANSI X9.23 CFB-8 (Cipher Feedbac		
C03202	1568	Algorithm ID		O	ID 3/3
		Algorithm used for	* *		
		DE3	Triple DEA		
		DES	Data Encryption Standard (Same as I	PEA)	
			As specified in FIPS 46-2.		
		SKJ	Skipjack		
C03203	1569	Algorithm Mode of	of Operation	O	ID 3/3
		Mode of Operation	of the Encryption Algorithm		
		CBC	Cipher Block Chaining		
C03204	1570	Filter ID Code		X	ID 3/3
		Code specifying the	e type of filter used to convert data code	value	es
		ASB	ASCII-Baudot Filter		
		ASC	ASCII Filter		
		HDC	Hexadecimal Filter		
		UUE	Uuencoding		
		ZZZ	Mutually Defined		
			Use to indicate Base 64.		
C03205	799	Version Identifier		X	AN 1/30
		Revision level of a	particular format, program, technique o	r algo	rithm
C03206	1571	Compression ID		X	ID 3/3
		Type of Compressi	on Used		
		913	X9E13 Compression as defined by X9	9.32	
		ZZZ	Mutually Defined		
			Use to indicate that each block has be by using a combination of the Lempe algorithm and Huffman coding, in a the Internet Engineering Task Force for Comments (RFC) 1951 format.	el-Ziv ccord	LZ77 ance with
C03207	799	Cite the version of	the compression algorithm cited in	X	AN 1/30
		S1S07 (C03206) al			
			particular format, program, technique o		
		Cite the version of above.	the compression algorithm cited in S2S	S07 (C	(03206)
S2S08	995	Length of Data	investibilitieseesinee een elliste, en elm, 1985	X	N 1/18
22500	,,,,	0	ne number of character positions of the c		
		•	ext; when data is plain text, this field sh	_	
S2S09	996	Initialization Vect	•	X	AN 16/16
		notation as 16 ASC bit value is used as increase security by cryptographic equipeach message; the I not its ASCII represented interchange process.	entation of a 64-bit value expressed in last characters from the set of characters a starting point for encryption of a data variance introducing cryptographic variance and pment; a new Initialization Vector (IV) (IV) shall not be intentionally reused; the sentation, is used for the cryptographic pass, the resultant encrypted and filtered 64 on is the representation for archiving put	(09, a seque d to sy shall be 64-bit process	AF); the 64- ence to vnchronize be used for binary value, ss; in the V is sent; the

be a random or pseudo-random number; when encrypted, the IV must be decrypted using the Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode and the same key used to encrypt the message

S2A Assurance Level 2 Segment: Optional Usage: Max Use: Purpose: To allow for multiple assurances at the ST/SE level Syntax Notes: If C02804 is present, then C02803 is required. If C02806 is present, then C02805 is required. 3 If C02808 is present, then C02807 is required. If C02810 is present, then C02809 is required. If C02812 is present, then C02811 is required. 5 If C02814 is present, then C02813 is required. If C02816 is present, then C02815 is required. 7 8 If C02818 is present, then C02817 is required. If C02820 is present, then C02819 is required. **Semantic Notes:** Comments: X9 has a required minimum length of four characters for S2A04 (security originator). No mechanism, or registration method, is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee uniqueness of the identifier. X9 has a required minimum length of four characters for S2A05 (security recipient). No mechanism, or registration method, is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee uniqueness of the identifier. The date/time stamp may determine which of several key values apply, depending on start and expiration dates of different key values that may share the same Key distribution is performed by other means and thus only onetime keys are allowed in S2A09. The use of particular codes and corresponding values in S2A09 is dependent on the exigencies of the various crytographic algorithms. 1. Assurance (Digital Signature) segments (S2A/SVA) are not part of the control Notes: envelope structure. When used, insert the S2A/SVA segment pair(s) immediately preceding the SE segment of the transaction set for which assurance is being provided. See Section 10.5.3 of the Federal Implementation Guidelines. 2. The S2A segment represented here is only valid for versions 3060 and 3070. **Data Element Summary** Ref. Data Des. Element Name **Attributes** Must Use S2A01 1432 ID 3/3 **Business Purpose of Assurance** The stated business purpose for appending the assurance to an existing secured-entity (whether functional group or transaction set); the codes represent the intention of the business or application that has control over the assurance originator ASG Authorization Signature Appropriate to this Document CSG Authorization Co-signature Appropriate to this Document Must Use S2A02 C034 **Computation Methods** M Algorithms used to calculate an assurance Must Use C03401 1574 M ID 3/3 **Assurance Algorithm** Code specifying the algorithm used to compute the assurance token DSS Digital Signature Standard As specified in FIPS 186. **RSA** RSA

Must Use	C03402	1575	Hashing Algorithm N	1	ID 3/3		
			Code specifying the algorithm used to compute the assurance	dige	est		
			MD5 MD5				
			SHA Secure hash algorithm				
Aust Use	S2A03	1434	Domain of Computation of Assurance Digest The bounds of the text, whether contiguous or not, over which of the Assurance Token is computed using the defined method computation and any relevant Assurance Token parameters; the either a transaction set (beginning with the ST and including a the first S2A segment, but excluding any S2S segment) or function with the GS and including all transaction sets up to segment, but excluding any S1S segment	the lolo le "l ll se	egy of body" is egments up to onal group		
			"This Assurance" is defined as from the "S" in S1A or S2A up including the data element separator preceeding the assurance				
			"Previous Assurance(s)" is defined as including the entire S1A				
			segment and the entire SVA that follows the included S1A or S2A Refer to 003060 Data Element Dictionary for acceptable code values.				
	S2A04	1435	Assurance Originator		AN 1/64		
		Unique designation (identity) of the cryptographic process tha stated assurance on data to be interchanged	t pe				
			Note: X9 has a required minimum length of 4 characters for a				
			originator; no mechanism, or registration method, is provided	by i	X9 or X12 to		
	S2A05	1436	guarantee uniqueness of the identifier Assurance Recipient)	AN 1/64		
			Unique designation (identity) of the cryptographic process tha		erforms		
			validation of the stated assurance on received data. In the abse Assurance Recipient all potenial receivers will often be able to assurance because the cryptographic technique is based on a "popposed to "secret") technology	va	lidate the		
			Note: X9 has required minimum length of 4 characters for a s no mechanism, or registration method, is provided by X9 or X uniqueness of the identifier		to guarantee		
	S2A06	1443	Assurance Reference Number C		AN 1/35		
			Alphanumeric reference number issued by security assurance of particular assurance in which it occurs; unique when used in consecurity originator data element	_			
	S2A07	1437	Date/Time Reference)	AN 17/25		
			Date/time stamp in format as follows:				
			YYYYMMDDHHNNSSTTTZZZ+XXXX, where YYYY = 4 leading century), MM = month of year (0112), DD = day of r HH = hour of day in 24-hour format (0023), NN = minutes of 59), SS = second of hour (0059), TTT = [optional] milli-seco ZZZ = [optional] three character, nominal time zone indicator daylight savings time indicator) and XXXXX = 3-5 digit (inch or - sign) offset of time to universal time, with three position for hours-offset for whole hours, and five position format indicating	nor f the nds (inc idir	oth (0131), the hour (00- (000999), cluding the leading + that indicating		

			ANSI ASC X12 VERSION	RELEASE 003070
			minutes offset where this is necessary. For example:	
	S2A08	1438	199306152213300CDT+0930 which represents 15 June 1993 (10:13pm), Central Daylight Time (Nominal Value "CDT"), in that is offset + 9:30 from Universal Time (Australia) Assurance Text	a time zone
			Any text needed to convey the name of a signatory, registration certification number, or other assurance-originator defined or a business text related to the specific assurance; this text is not d purposes and thus functions technically as "free form text" tho structure that is defined by the assurance originator, an industry governmental agency, or bi-laterally between assurance original assurance recipient	mutually-agreed efined for X12 ugh it may have y group, a
	S2A09	C028	Assurance Token Parameters O)
			Parameters needed to calculate the Assurance Token	
Must Use	C02801	1439	Assurance Token Parameter Code M.	I ID 2/2
			A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter CI Certification Authority ID	
			CI Certification Authority ID EK Key Value - One-Time Key	
			KN Key Name	
			NT Notarization	
			OD Key-Encrypting-Key for One-Time Key	
			UI User ID	
Must Use	C02802	1442	Assurance Token Parameter Value A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more options the proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to con Assurance Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or mobe required	s, required for mpute the
Not Used	C02803	1439	Assurance Token Parameter Code A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter	ID 2/2
Not Used	C02804	1442	Assurance Token Parameter Value A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more options the proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to con Assurance Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or mobe required	s, required for mpute the
Not Used	C02805	1439	Assurance Token Parameter Code A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter	ID 2/2
Not Used	C02806	1442	Assurance Token Parameter Value A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more options the proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to con Assurance Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or more	s, required for mpute the
Not Used	C02807	1439	be required Assurance Token Parameter Code A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter	ID 2/2
Not Used	C02808	1442	Assurance Token Parameter Value A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more options the proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to con Assurance Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or mobe required	, required for npute the
Not Used	C02809	1439	Assurance Token Parameter Code X	ID 2/2

			A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter		
Not Used	C02810	1442		Э С	AN 1/64
Not oscu	C02010	1112	A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more option the proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to concern the Assurance Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or more required	ıs, r əmp	equired for oute the
Not Used	C02811	1439	-	X	ID 2/2
Not Used	C02812	1442	Assurance Token Parameter Value A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more option the proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to confide Assurance Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or more required	omp	oute the
Not Used	C02813	1439	-	X	ID 2/2
Not Used	C02813	1439	Assurance Token Parameter Code A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter	X	ID 2/2
Not Used	C02814	1442	Assurance Token Parameter Value A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more option the proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to confide Assurance Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or multiple be required	omp	oute the
Not Used	C02815	1439	-	X	ID 2/2
Not Used	C02816	1442	Assurance Token Parameter Value A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more option the proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to confide Assurance Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or more required	omp	oute the
Not Used	C02817	1439	-	X Na	ID 2/2
NI - 4 TI J	C02010	1.442	•		
Not Used	C02818	1442	Assurance Token Parameter Value A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more option the proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to concern the Assurance Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or make required	omp	oute the
Not Used	C02819	1439	-	X	ID 2/2
Not Used	C02820	1442	Assurance Token Parameter Value A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more option the proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to confide Assurance Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or make required	omp	oute the
	S2A10	1440	•	o Iolo	AN 1/512 ogy expressed
			in ASCII-hex notation		

Segment: SVA Security Value

Usage: Optional

Max Use: 1 Purpose: To

To provide the encoded output of a cryptographic algorithm

Syntax Notes: Semantic Notes: Comments:

Notes:

1. Assurance (Digital Signature) segments (S2A/SVA) are not part of the control envelope structure. When used, insert the S2A/SVA segment pair(s) immediately preceding the SE segment of the transaction set for which assurance is being provided. See Section 10.5.3 of the Federal Implementation Guidelines.

2. The SVA segment represented here is only valid for versions 3060 and 3070.

	Ref.	Data	Data Elem	ent Summar y	
	Des.	Element	Name	At	tributes
Must Use	SVA01	1570	Filter ID Code	M	ID 3/3
			Code specifying the	type of filter used to convert data code valu	ies
			ASB	ASCII-Baudot Filter	
			ASC	ASCII Filter	
			HDC	Hexadecimal Filter	
			UUE	Uuencoding	
			ZZZ	Mutually Defined	
				Use to indicate Base 64.	
Must Use	SVA02	799	Version Identifier Revision level of a	M particular format, program, technique or alg	AN 1/30 orithm
Must Use	SVA03	C033	Security Value	M	
			Value of the Securit	ty Token	
Must Use	C03301	1572	Security Value Qu	alifier M	ID 3/3
			Type of Security Va	alue	
			ASV	Assurance Token	
			CRT	Certificate	
				Only for use in the 3070 version of this se	egment.
			PUB	Public Key	nama aparen di di Salama (1991)
				Only for use in the 3070 version of this se	egment.
Must Use	C03302	1573	Encoded Security Encoded representa Qualifier	- com structured (1994) 1994 (1994) And the State of the	AN 1/10E16

Segment: S2E Security Trailer Level 2

Usage: Optional Max Use: 1

Purpose: To end a secured area and to provide the value of cryptographically computed

authentication codes

Syntax Notes: Semantic Notes:

Comments:

Notes: The S2E segment represented here is valid for versions 3040, 3050, 3060 and 3070.

Data Element Summary

Ref. Data

Des. Element Name

Must Use S2E01 997 Hash or Authentication Code M AN 1/64

The message authentication code or hash/digest generated by the authentication process; when the Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm is used, the field consists of 4 hexadecimal coded characters (i.e., characters from the set 0..9, A..F), a separator character (space, "-", or other), and 4 hexadecimally coded characters; when non-DES hashes are used, the result of the hash is expressed as hexadecimally coded characters without spaces; when authentication or hash is not used, this field should be filled with a non-blank character other than the set (0..9, A..F) for the minimum length

Enter the character "Z".

S1A Assurance Level 1 Segment: Optional Usage: Max Use: Purpose: To allow for multiple assurances at the GS/GE level If C02804 is present, then C02803 is required. **Syntax Notes:** If C02806 is present, then C02805 is required. 3 If C02808 is present, then C02807 is required. 4 If C02810 is present, then C02809 is required. If C02812 is present, then C02811 is required. 5 If C02814 is present, then C02813 is required. 7 If C02816 is present, then C02815 is required. If C02818 is present, then C02817 is required. If C02820 is present, then C02819 is required. Semantic Notes: Comments: X9 has a required minimum length of four characters for S1A04 (security originator). No mechanism, or registration method, is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee uniqueness of the identifier. X9 has a required minimum length of four characters for S1A05 (security recipient). No mechanism, or registration method, is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee uniqueness of the identifier. The date/time stamp may determine which of several key values apply, depending on start and expiration dates of different key values that may share the same Key distribution is performed by other means and thus only onetime keys are allowed in S1A09. The use of particular codes and corresponding values in S1A09 is dependent on the exigencies of the various cryptographic algorithms. Notes: 1. Assurance (Digital Signature) segments (S1A/SVA) are not part of the control envelope structure. When used, insert the S1A/SVA segment pair(s) immediately preceding the GE segment of the group for which assurance is being provided. See Section 10.5.3 of the Federal Implementation Guidelines. 2. The S1A segment represented here is only valid for versions 3060 and 3070... **Data Element Summary** Ref. Data Des. Element Name Attributes Must Use S1A01 1432 **Business Purpose of Assurance** M ID 3/3 The stated business purpose for appending the assurance to an existing secured-entity (whether functional group or transaction set); the codes represent the intention of the business or application that has control over the assurance originator ASG Authorization Signature Appropriate to this Document **CSG** Authorization Co-signature Appropriate to this Document Must Use S1A02 C034 **Computation Methods** \mathbf{M} Algorithms used to calculate an assurance Must Use C03401 1574 **Assurance Algorithm** M ID 3/3 Code specifying the algorithm used to compute the assurance token DSS Digital Signature Standard As specified in FIPS 186. **RSA** RSA

Must Use	C03402	1575	Hashing Algorithm	М	ID 3/3	
			Code specifying the algorithm used to compute the assurance	dig	est	
			MD5 MD5			
			SHA Secure hash algorithm			
Must Use	S1A03	1434	Domain of Computation of Assurance Digest The bounds of the text, whether contiguous or not, over which of the Assurance Token is computed using the defined method computation and any relevant Assurance Token parameters; the either a transaction set (beginning with the ST and including at the first S2A segment, but excluding any S2S segment) or fur (beginning with the GS and including all transaction sets up to segment, but excluding any S1S segment	h the dolo he " all se actio	ogy of body" is egments up to onal group	
			"This Assurance" is defined as from the "S" in S1A or S2A u including the data element separator preceeding the assurance			
			"Previous Assurance(s)" is defined as including the entire S1 segment and the entire SVA that follows the included S1A or Refer to 003060 or 003070 Data Element Dictionary, as appliacceptable code values.	S2A	A	
S1A0	S1A04	1435	Assurance Originator	C	AN 1/64	
			Unique designation (identity) of the cryptographic process that performs stated assurance on data to be interchanged			
			Note: X9 has a required minimum length of 4 characters for a originator; no mechanism, or registration method, is provided guarantee uniqueness of the identifier			
	S1A05	1436	Assurance Recipient	C	AN 1/64	
			Unique designation (identity) of the cryptographic process that validation of the stated assurance on received data. In the absorbase Assurance Recipient all potential receivers will often be able to assurance because the cryptographic technique is based on a "opposed to "secret") technology	ence to va	of an alidate the	
			Note: X9 has required minimum length of 4 characters for a son mechanism, or registration method, is provided by X9 or X uniqueness of the identifier			
	S1A06	1443	-	0	AN 1/35	
			Alphanumeric reference number issued by security assurance particular assurance in which it occurs; unique when used in esecurity originator data element		ginator for the	
	S1A07	1437)	AN 17/25	
			Date/time stamp in format as follows:			
			YYYYMMDDHHNNSSTTTZZZ+XXXX, where YYYY = 4 leading century), MM = month of year (0112), DD = day of HH = hour of day in 24-hour format (0023), NN = minutes of 59), SS = second of hour (0059), TTT = [optional] milli-second zZZ = [optional] three character, nominal time zone indicator daylight savings time indicator) and XXXXX = 3-5 digit (incl	mor of th onds	onth (0131), e hour (00- s (000999), cluding	

	ANSI ASC X12 VERSION/RELEASE 003				
			hours-offset for whole hours, and five position format indiminutes offset where this is necessary. For example:	cating	hours and
	S1A08	1438	199306152213300CDT+0930 which represents 15 June 1 (10:13pm), Central Daylight Time (Nominal Value "CDT" is offset + 9:30 from Universal Time (Australia) Assurance Text		
			Any text needed to convey the name of a signatory, registric certification number, or other assurance-originator defined business text related to the specific assurance; this text is no purposes and thus functions technically as "free form text" structure that is defined by the assurance originator, an indigovernmental agency, or bi-laterally between assurance or assurance recipient	or mu ot def thoug ustry	itually-agreed ined for X12 th it may have group, a
`	S1A09	C028	Assurance Token Parameters	0	
			Parameters needed to calculate the Assurance Token		
Must Use	C02801	1439	Assurance Token Parameter Code A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter	M	ID 2/2
			CI Certification Authority ID		
			EK Key Value - One-Time Key		
			KN Key Name		
			NT Notarization		
			OD Key-Encrypting-Key for One-Time K	ley	
			UI User ID		
Must Use	C02802	1442	Assurance Token Parameter Value A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more opto the proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to Assurance Token; depending on the algorithm used, one of the required	o comj	oute the
Not Used	C02803	1439	Assurance Token Parameter Code A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter	X	ID 2/2
Not Used	C02804	1442	Assurance Token Parameter Value A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more opto the proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to	o com	oute the
			Assurance Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or	more	values may
Not Used	C02805	1439	be required Assurance Token Parameter Code A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter	X	ID 2/2
Not Used	C02806	1442	Assurance Token Parameter Value	0	AN 1/64
	0.2000	<u>.</u>	A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more opto the proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to Assurance Token; depending on the algorithm used, one of be required	tions, i	required for pute the
Not Used	C02807	1439	Assurance Token Parameter Code A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter	X	ID 2/2
Not Used	C02808	1442	Assurance Token Parameter Value A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more opto the proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to Assurance Token; depending on the algorithm used, one of be required	comp	oute the

	(12 VERSION/				
Not Used	C02809	1439	Assurance Token Parameter Code A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter	ζ.	ID 2/2
Not Used	C02810	1442	Assurance Token Parameter Value A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more option the proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to concern the Assurance Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or more options.	ıs, 1 əmp	oute the
			be required		
Not Used	C02811	1439	Assurance Token Parameter Code A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter	ζ.	ID 2/2
Not Used	C02812	1442	Assurance Token Parameter Value A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more option the proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to co Assurance Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or mobe required	ıs, ı omp	oute the
Not Used	C02813	1439	Assurance Token Parameter Code A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter	ζ.	ID 2/2
Not Used	C02814	1442	Assurance Token Parameter Value A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more option the proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to co Assurance Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or mobe required	s, r mp	oute the
Not Used	C02815	1439	Assurance Token Parameter Code A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter	ζ.	ID 2/2
Not Used	C02816	1442	Assurance Token Parameter Value A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more option the proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to co Assurance Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or mobe required	s, r mp	oute the
Not Used	C02817	1439	Assurance Token Parameter Code A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter	ζ.	ID 2/2
Not Used	C02818	1442	Assurance Token Parameter Value A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more option the proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to co Assurance Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or mobe required	s, r mp	oute the
Not Used	C02819	1439	Assurance Token Parameter Code A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter		ID 2/2
Not Used	C02820	1442	Assurance Token Parameter Value A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more option the proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to co Assurance Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or mobe required	s, r mp	oute the
	S1A10	1440	Assurance Digest C The result of the application of the hash defined in the method in ASCII-hex notation		AN 1/512 egy expresse

Segment: SVA Security Value

Usage: Optional

Max Use: 1 Purpose: To

To provide the encoded output of a cryptographic algorithm

Syntax Notes: Semantic Notes: Comments:

Notes:

1. Assurance (Digital Signature) segments (S1A/SVA) are not part of the control envelope structure. When used, insert the S1A/SVA segment pair(s) immediately preceding the GE segment of the transaction set for which assurance is being provided. See Section 10.5.3 of the Federal Implementation Guidelines.

2. The SVA segment represented here is only valid for versions 3060 and 3070.

	Ref.	Data				
	Des.	Element	<u>Name</u>		Att	<u>ributes</u>
Must Use	SVA01	1570	Filter ID Code		\mathbf{M}	ID 3/3
			Code specifying the	type of filter used to convert data code	value	es
			ASB	ASCII-Baudot Filter		
			ASC	ASCII Filter		
			HDC	Hexadecimal Filter		
			UUE	Uuencoding		
			ZZZ	Mutually Defined		
				Use to indicate Base 64.		
Must Use	SVA02	799	Version Identifier		M	AN 1/30
			Revision level of a	particular format, program, technique or	r algo	rithm
Must Use	SVA03	C033	Security Value		\mathbf{M}	
			Value of the Securit	ty Token		
Must Use	C03301	1572	Security Value Qualifier		M	ID 3/3
			Type of Security Value			
			ASV	Assurance Token		
			CRT	Certificate		
				Only for use in the 3070 version of th	gment.	
			PUB	Public Key		
				Only for use in the 3070 version of th	is seg	gment.
Must Use	C03302	1573	Encoded Security	Value	M	AN 1/10E16
			Encoded representa Qualifier	tion of the Security Value specified by t	the Se	ecurity Value

Segment: S1E Security Trailer Level 1

Usage: Optional Max Use: 1

Purpose: To end a secured area and to provide the value of cryptographically computed

authentication codes

Syntax Notes: Semantic Notes:

Comments:

Notes: The S1E segment represented here is valid for versions 3040, 3050, 3060 and 3070.

Data Element Summary

	Rei.	Data			
	Des.	Element	Name	Attributes	
Must Use	S1E01	997	Hash or Authentication Code	\mathbf{M}	AN 1/64
			The message authentication code or hash/digest generated by the		
			authentication process; when the Data Encryption Standard	(DES	S) algorithm
used, the field consists of 4 hexadecimal coded c			used the field consists of 4 hexadecimal coded characters to	ie c	haracters fro

authentication process; when the Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm is used, the field consists of 4 hexadecimal coded characters (i.e., characters from the set 0..9, A..F), a separator character (space, "-", or other), and 4 hexadecimally coded characters; when non-DES hashes are used, the result of the hash is expressed as hexadecimally coded characters without spaces; when authentication or hash is not used, this field should be filled with a non-blank character other than the set (0..9, A..F) for the minimum length

Enter the character "Z".

Segment: **GE** Functional Group Trailer

Usage: Mandatory

Max Use: 1
Purpose: To

To indicate the end of a functional group and to provide control information

Syntax Notes: Semantic Notes:

The data interchange control number GE02 in this trailer must be identical to the same data element in the associated functional group header, GS06.

Comments:

The use of identical data interchange control numbers in the associated functional group header and trailer is designed to maximize functional group integrity. The control number is the same as that used in the corresponding header.

	Ref. Des.	Data <u>Element</u>	Name	<u>Attributes</u>	
Must Use	GE01	97	Number of Transaction Sets Included	M N0 1/6	
			Total number of transaction sets included in the functional group or interchange (transmission) group terminated by the trailer containing this data element 1. Use to identify the number of ST segments (transactions) within a functional group. 2. Transmit the required number of characters without leading or trailing blanks.		
Must Use	GE02	28	Group Control Number Assigned number originated and maintained by the se	M N0 1/9	
			Cite the same group control number as was assigned GS06.	by the originator in	

Segment: IEA Interchange Control Trailer

Usage: Mandatory

Max Use:

Purpose: To define the end of an interchange of zero or more functional groups and interchange-

related control segments

Syntax Notes: Semantic Notes: Comments:

	Ref.	Data			
	Des.	Element	<u>Name</u>	Att	<u>ributes</u>
Must Use	IEA01	I16	Number of Included Functional Groups A count of the number of functional groups included in an	M n interc	N0 1/5 hange
			1. Use to identify the number of GS segments (functiona interchange.	l group	s) within an
			2. Transmit the required number of characters without leading or trailing blanks.		
Must Use	IEA02	I12	Interchange Control Number A control number assigned by the interchange sender	M	N0 9/9
			Cite the same nine-digit interchange control number as originator in ISA13.	was ass	



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