[Senate Hearing 111-1033]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-1033
NOMINATION OF JOHN S. PISTOLE,
TO BE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 10, 2010
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas,
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts Ranking
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
BILL NELSON, Florida JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
TOM UDALL, New Mexico SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
MARK WARNER, Virginia MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
Ellen L. Doneski, Staff Director
James Reid, Deputy Staff Director
Bruce H. Andrews, General Counsel
Ann Begeman, Republican Staff Director
Brian M. Hendricks, Republican General Counsel
Nick Rossi, Republican Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on June 10, 2010.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Rockefeller................................. 1
Statement of Senator Hutchison................................... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Statement of Senator DeMint...................................... 6
Statement of Senator Begich...................................... 27
Statement of Senator Warner...................................... 30
Statement of Senator Thune....................................... 32
Statement of Senator LeMieux..................................... 35
Statement of Senator Dorgan...................................... 39
Witnesses
John S. Pistole, Administrator-Designate, Transportation Security
Administration, and Assistant Secretary-Designate, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security................................ 7
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Biographical information..................................... 10
Appendix
Response to written questions submitted to John S. Pistole by:
Hon. Daniel K. Inouye........................................ 47
Hon. Bill Nelson............................................. 47
Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg..................................... 48
Hon. Amy Klobuchar........................................... 49
Hon. Tom Udall............................................... 50
Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison.................................... 51
Hon. Olympia J. Snowe........................................ 54
Hon. Jim DeMint.............................................. 59
Hon. John Thune.............................................. 59
Hon. Sam Brownback........................................... 61
NOMINATION OF JOHN S. PISTOLE, TO BE
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION AND
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 10, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John D.
Rockefeller IV, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
The Chairman. Good morning, everybody. This hearing comes
together, and the two most important members of this committee
are here, present, and ready to work.
We are here today to consider John Pistole to be, at last,
hopefully, almost definitely, the Administrator of the TSA.
It's embarrassing that such an enormous undertaking doesn't
have the leadership that it needs. I am convinced that you can
provide that leadership on the basis of work we've done in the
Intelligence Committee and on basis of the conversations that
we've had about all of this. There's no question in my mind
about it.
We cannot ignore the fact that for far too long we just
have--we've been without one, and we paid a terrible price for
one. And I want to talk about that in the questions.
This country has endured an attempted Christmas Day attack
aboard an airplane bound for Detroit; an attempted Times Square
bombing, where the terrorist was pulled off the plane that was
about to take off for Dubai and they pulled him off; and just
this weekend, two men were arrested, again at JFK, as they
attempted to board a flight to Egypt on their way to Somalia.
Well, that's a good combination--and they were planning on
joining an international terrorist organization. We've got to
get this all right.
Our vast and open transportation system, which is
classically American in its nature, is part of everybody's
lives in small towns, in big cities, and we understand that.
They connect our communities to a wider world, which we need.
The enormous reach is what makes our transportation system such
a powerful tool for terrorists. We open ourselves, because we
are that nature, and we pay a price for it, because they can
take advantage of it. Single purchase, cash, all the rest of
it. It's not even really that hard, but it is going to have to
be.
And they're constantly looking for new ways to make
attacks, to do things. They're single operators. They can be
less sophisticated, they don't have to be as highly trained.
They can get this all off the Internet. They can do it because
they're mad at America. They could be Americans; and they are,
in fact, some of them. And that's going to grow. Wherever
people are having trouble economically, in the Middle East or
in this country, and people get mad and frustrated, they want a
way out, they want something to belong to, which they can say
gives them identity. And, unfortunately, terrorism is one of
the ways that they can do that and feel like they're strong men
and women.
As I indicated, we've had concentrated discussions on a
variety of things over the years, on the Intelligence
Committee. That's very important to me. I know what some of the
stuff that they're thinking about is, and what has been
attempted and not worked, and what has been attempted and has
worked. And it's all very upsetting.
So, TSA takes on this tremendously new dimension of,
needing to make lines more efficient, to get people less angry,
all up against a budget freeze--which we have to talk about--
and, at the same time, be a step ahead, if possible, of
terrorists.
So, we need an experienced and skilled Administrator. And
we need that person now, to lead the TSA and to lead the
workforce, because people can work hard, but if they don't have
a leader, something happens to them eventually. And you, I
think, are that kind of leader. Protecting our country against
future attacks. We just need all of this, period.
I, myself, just speaking as one Senator, am confident that
you, John Pistole, are ready. You're qualified to lead this
agency effectively.
As the FBI's deputy director, Mr. Pistole is currently the
Bureau's second in command. That's the--just to consider that--
Bob Mueller, then John Pistole--that's a fairly famous, large
agency, which does things all over the world, and you've been
deputy for that. And you've worked with it for 27 years, which
is a tad more than a learning experience.
You've been a special agent. You served in many different
leadership roles, focusing on civil rights, white-collar crime,
leading field officers, and instructing new agents. You
participated in the investigative and recovery efforts for the
Egypt Air Flight 990 crash off the coast of Rhode Island.
And you were later appointed as an inspector to the
inspection division, in Washington D.C., conducting evaluations
and audits of FBI field offices and headquarters divisions.
Well, that was giving you the run of the campus to find out
what was wrong--the run of the Nation.
After September 11, in 2001, Director Mueller appointed
you, John Pistole, to the FBI's counterterrorism division,
where you testified before the 9/11 Commission. I remember that
testimony. We all watched all of it--on a panel titled,
``Preventing Future Attacks in the United States.''
With such diverse experience, such a broad investigative
and national security background, and the disciplined nature of
the John Pistole that I know--the hard worker, tough guy--I
firmly believe that you have what it takes to impact this
agency. I'm just speaking for myself and not necessarily for
others.
So, to move forward, we need to make that change. We need
to have an effective leader at TSA.
I think it's one of the most difficult positions in all of
Washington, because you have all of America, in magnificent
sequence, getting mad at you for their inconveniences. And I
think there are going to be more inconveniences. I think there
are going to have to be more inconveniences if we're going to
really do the terrorism thing well. And a lot of people won't
like that. It's just such an important job.
Let me end up by saying that Commerce Committee has a
significant role in homeland security oversight. Others don't
seem to want to recognize that, but we do, and we know it, and
we take it very seriously.
This committee is currently drafting two very important
security bills. One is the TSA reauthorization. The other is
the port security bill. We hope to have those ready to
introduce within several weeks--within a week or two.
Mr. Pistole, should you be confirmed, I very much intend to
work with you to make sure that TSA succeeds. It's just so
important. It's life and death stuff, and it's at the heart of
American traveling and the essence of freedom that people feel.
And those things come in conflict at some point. I expect you
and the administration to communicate with and work with
Congress to make sure that TSA has the funds it needs.
So, I thank you. I've read your FBI reports. They were
utterly boring they were so clean.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. I yield now to my Ranking Member, my partner,
Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison.
STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Hutchison. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I really appreciate that you called this
hearing so quickly, because there is no question that this
important agency not having a head that has a strategy and a
plan and an ability to manage 50,000 people across the country
and the world is not the way it should be. And so, I appreciate
that we are acting quickly.
And, Mr. Pistole, you and I have met. And I, too, have read
your FBI report. And I would concur with my Chairman. I'm going
to tell you a funny story later. But, I think that, honestly, I
believe the President has made the right decision this time.
I'm not going to read an opening statement, but just a
couple of points.
As you know--and we talked about this--I am very concerned
about this obvious pressure to allow collective bargaining by
TSA employees. I am adamantly against that--I will ask you that
question, as I told you I would--because law enforcement and
security personnel are just in a different category. And that
is recognized from local government all the way to the FBI and
others.
You can't have 8-hour days. You have to be able to respond
to emergencies. And you have to be willing and want to do that.
To take this job, as TSA inspector, you have to want to keep
America safe. And you have to be willing to go the extra mile
and not be a 9-to-5 type of employee. There are other jobs for
you, if that is what you want to do.
So, I will be asking you about that. And as we go forward,
if you are confirmed, we're going to ask you, down the road,
what the status of that is, because you'll have to make that
decision. And I hope that, with your background, it is the
right one.
And the other point that I would just make is that you,
having served in the FBI, are serving in an agency that has,
what, 102 years of history, but you're going in to be the top
of an agency that has been in business for 9 years. And there
have been a few stumbling blocks.
We were here when we were writing the bill that created the
TSA. And we looked carefully at all the different ways to
organize it, and we gave it to Homeland Security, and we made
it a separate agency there, and we wanted to make sure that we
do all of the right things for this important position.
And so, there have been kinks, but largely it has worked.
And I hope that you will be the one that sets the standards for
the future, for the way the agency operates. And it has to be
efficient, and it has to also not encroach on the traveling
public to too great a degree. And there's just a fine balance
there.
I want to say that, in my experience in the airports, for
instance, the employees at TSA do a great job, and they're
friendly, and they're nice, and they understand the
frustrations of the passenger that has to be the one who is
screened. And I certainly have had that experience myself, and
it's not fun. But, they've been very, very nice and polite and
understanding.
So, I think that it is a good agency, in the main. But, we
also have other, besides air, issues. We have ports and will
want input on port security, because, as I mentioned to you, in
my home State of Texas we have the second largest chemical
complex in the world right next to a port. And so, we need to
make sure that we're doing everything to secure our ports, our
trains, all of the buses, all of the traveling modes that our
people use and that are used in commerce.
So, it's a big job. I think you're up to it. And I have
seen nothing that would give me pause. And the people who
really know you and have worked with you, which I haven't, also
give you the thumbs-up.
So, I'm looking forward to a working relationship with a
no-nonsense law-enforcement-background person, like yourself,
that will get on the job and not take no for an answer.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Hutchison.
We would welcome Senator DeMint to give a very, very short
comment, and Senator Begich to make a very short comment, and
then we'll go to you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Hutchison follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison, U.S. Senator from
Texas
Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening today's hearing. The
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) performs a vital mission
at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in helping to protect the
security of the traveling public. Yet, TSA has been without an
Administrator since January 2009. It is important for our Committee to
review the qualifications and priorities of the President's third
nominee to fill this critical position, and I am hopeful that the
country will soon have a TSA Administrator confirmed and on the job.
I want to welcome Mr. Pistole, and thank you for your willingness
to serve as the TSA Administrator. Your 26 year career at the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is commendable, as is your willingness to
continue your career in public service.
The job of TSA Administrator brings with it the responsibility of
assuring not only the security of all modes of transportation, but also
the economic viability of the country's transportation system and the
sustainment of the free flow of commerce. If confirmed, the job before
you will be extremely challenging, and the decisions you make may have
far-reaching effect. Given your background at the FBI, you will
undoubtedly be familiar with the threats our country faces, yet your
management skills will also be put to the test, given that you would
assume the helm of an agency with over 50,000 employees scattered
throughout the country. With that in mind, I want to mention several
issues that I believe will be of importance for the next Administrator
on day one:
First, is the issue of allowing collective bargaining for the
country's transportation security officers (TSOs), or screeners. I
would like to note that Federal law prohibits screeners from striking;
and all the previous TSA Administrators have maintained that allowing
screeners to collectively bargain would negatively impact TSA's
fundamental security mission. With your background in security, Mr.
Pistole, I am sure you can appreciate the need for TSA to have a
flexible workforce which can react quickly to emerging threats. While
the FBI does not have unions, I wonder whether the FBI could do its job
as effectively, if the agents had collective bargaining authority. This
Committee will be extremely interested in how you address this issue.
Second, I strongly encourage TSA to work to develop better
relationships with all of its stakeholders. The success of the agency--
and the security of our nation--is linked to cooperation and trust
between industry and government. Over the years, constituents and modal
industry stakeholders alike have noted that TSA too often pays lip-
service to partnerships and frequently tries to institute policies that
have great economic impact without first seeking industry input. A safe
and effective security system is mutually beneficial to industry and
government alike; properly coordinating to create a seamless and secure
environment will be a daily challenge. The traveling public wants and
deserves a security experience that is effective, but without being
overly cumbersome or economically unrealistic.
Third, as is the case with several other government departments and
agencies, TSA often seems to find itself playing catch-up, fighting the
last terrorist battle, and getting caught in the trap of spending
hundreds of millions of dollars on unproven equipment and programs. I
believe that the head of TSA needs to be willing to make the tough
decisions about programs and projects that do not work as desired, and
focus on making TSA an agency that is ahead of the curve, rather than
behind it. Mr. Pistole, if you are confirmed, I hope that you will
bring your leadership experience and valuable intelligence and law
enforcement expertise to an agency that could really benefit from the
unique professional background you hold.
In this country, we are heavily dependent upon the openness and
security of our transportation systems, which affords the free flow of
goods and travelers each day. We place great trust in TSA, much like
the FBI, to do its job effectively and efficiently. However, in order
to do the job properly, TSA will need long-term leadership with a
clear, yet flexible and nimble, strategy, to identify, address and act
upon the threats of today and tomorrow. Unfortunately, much like our
transportation systems, our threats are vast and reach across our
country, and the world. While balancing those two conflicting systems
will be tremendously difficult, it is paramount.
Next month, the FBI will celebrate its 102nd anniversary. By
contrast, TSA is in only its ninth year of existence. But, since 9/11,
the FBI has had to re-invent itself as a more prevention-oriented,
intelligence-driven agency, and you have played a leading role in that
effort. I will want to hear how your experience managing change at the
FBI would inform your leadership of the TSA.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again. Mr. Pistole, I look forward to your
testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. JIM DeMINT,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA
Senator DeMint. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's not very,
very short, but it is reasonably brief, by senatorial
standards. Thank you.
The Chairman. This is a bad beginning.
[Laughter.]
Senator DeMint. I just----
Senator Hutchison. We go by House standards over here.
Senator DeMint. Yes, the----
Senator Hutchison. One minute.
Senator DeMint.--the one minute.
[Laughter.]
Senator DeMint. Mr. Pistole, it's good to see you again.
Thank you for coming by my office. I enjoyed our conversation.
And I believe you are well qualified for this position.
I want to make the same point to you that I've made to
other nominees, that the ability of TSA to be able to quickly
respond to threats is essential to their effectiveness.
Abandoning the current policy that prohibits collective
bargaining by transportation security officers will
significantly undermine TSA's ability to respond to threats,
and protect the Nation. And it's a change that I hope you will
counsel the President against.
I implore you to approach every policy issue at TSA with a
simple question, ``What will this do to improve security?'' We
all know the President has made a political promise to the
unions, in return for their support, to force collective
bargaining onto over 50,000 transportation security officers,
but, your promise has to be to keep the American people safe.
I asked the Secretary of Homeland Security, a few months
ago, this question, ``how will collective bargaining at the TSA
will improve security?'' Her answer was, ``that the two weren't
mutually exclusive.'' Her answer was illustrative, because
clearly she couldn't come up with a good answer of why
collective bargaining was actually going to improve security.
When the Secretary of Homeland Security can't tell us how a
change to Homeland Security policy will improve security, it
should stop us in our tracks. This should be a clear message
that collective bargaining at the Transportation Security
Administration remains a threat to aviation safety, and the
only reason to adopt collective bargaining is a payback to
political allies.
Having been a career civil servant who spent his life
serving the Nation under administrations of both parties, I
hope you will provide advice to the President that turns on
that single question, ``How will this improve security?''
As I've mentioned, collective bargaining will not only not
improve security, it will have a direct negative impact on
security.
First, it will impose a 19th-century industrial personnel
management model to a 21st-century Information Age threat. The
threat we see in the aviation sector is creative and nimble,
and our response needs to be creative and nimble. We need to
continually improve what we do at TSA. The men and women who
protect the aviation sector need to be able to quickly respond
to changing counterterrorism tactics so we can thwart the
tactics of our adversaries and protect passengers without
having to get a signoff from a union boss. The Secret Service,
the Coast Guard, the military, and the FBI, where you were
second in command, realized this long ago, and they prohibit
collective bargaining.
Additionally, you can't have a security workforce that has
rigid, standardized procedures. The standardized procedures
that are part and parcel of a collective bargaining agreement
are exactly the kind of procedures terrorists can survey and
defeat. It's frustrating that the American Federation of
Government Employees--on their website, they ask for exactly
that. They ask, ``How would collective bargaining rights--what
would it mean to you?'' The union states that they're promising
that workplace rules will be improved and standardized. This is
a threat to national security, and completely unacceptable, and
I hope you will do everything you can to ensure that the union
demands----
[Chairman tapped the gavel.]
Senator DeMint. Yes, sir. I'll just include the rest of
this in my questions.
But, I think you know your colleagues at the FBI will laugh
at you if you ever try to make the case that security forces
need third-party negotiations.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator DeMint.
Mr. Pistole, we welcome you here. We would like very much
for you to introduce your wife and two daughters, and then hear
your statement.
STATEMENT OF JOHN S. PISTOLE, ADMINISTRATOR-
DESIGNATE, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY-DESIGNATE,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Pistole. Well, thank you, Chairman Rockefeller and
Ranking Member Hutchison.
And I would like to take that privilege of introducing my
wife of nearly 31 years, Kathy Harp, and our daughters, Lauren
and Jennifer, who are here with me today. So, thank you for
that. And I thank them for their unwavering love and support,
because without them it's a very difficult job to do. So, thank
you for being here.
And to the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to be
here today. And I appreciate your very kind opening comments,
Chairman and Ranking Member, and to be here as the President's
nominee, as the Assistant Secretary for TSA. I'm honored by the
President's call to service and by Secretary Napolitano's
support.
And I--in addition to expressing appreciation to this
committee for what you've been through and are doing now for
this important position, I'd also like to express my personal
appreciation to those in Federal, state, local, tribal law
enforcement, and in the U.S. intelligence community that I've
had the privilege of working with these nearly 27 years.
And I'd also be remiss if I didn't acknowledge our
international partners, with whom I've had the privilege of
work, because it's--without their help we would be unable to
fully address the worldwide terrorist threats which may impact
the homeland.
We know that--I--national security and counterterrorism are
familiar territory for me. And during my career with the FBI, I
think it's--has provided me the skills and experience necessary
to lead TSA and address the challenges of keeping the Nation's
transportation system secure.
For example, in 1992, when I worked with Italian
authorities investigating the assassination, by the Sicilian
Mafia, of the two top anti-Mafia judges and a number of body
guards killed by what could be described as a surface
transportation bomb, and then later a vehicle-borne IED, a
VBIED, respectively, in two different assassinations.
In 1999, as you mentioned, I helped lead the investigation
recovery efforts of Egypt Air 990, off the coast of New
England, which killed over 230 people.
And after the tragic events of 9/11, I was put in charge of
helping transform the mission and focus of the FBI's new and
greatly expanded counterterrorism efforts.
In May 2003, I led an FBI team to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia,
investigating the al Qaeda-affiliated vehicle-borne bombings
targeting three Western housing compounds which killed 40
people, including eight Americans.
And, as you noted, for the last five and a half years, I
have served as a deputy director of the FBI, overseeing all the
FBI efforts to protect the Homeland.
These experiences, and the years I spent as a street agent
in Minneapolis and New York, particularly on a joint FBI-NYPD--
joint organized crime task force, and then as a field
supervisor in Indianapolis, assistant special agent in charge
in Boston, inspector, as you noted, and then as an instructor
at the international law enforcement academy, in Budapest--all
of these taught me the critically important lesson on
developing key partnerships, all designed to protect our
citizens from those who would cause us harm.
Now, we know, since the creation of--after 9/11, TSA has
played a vital role in securing our Nation's transportation
systems. Like the FBI, TSA relies upon a dedicated workforce,
including over 47,000 TSOs at airports and throughout the
Nation. They are TSA's field officers, the front line in a
layered network protecting our aviation domain from
adversaries.
I will dedicate myself to supporting TSA's workforce, if
confirmed, in ensuring the highest standards of
professionalism. And I--also, if confirmed, I will assess TSA's
non-aviation surface transportation efforts, in concert with
state and local authorities.
Additionally, I will work in close collaboration with all
stakeholders, including other Federal agencies, state, local,
tribal governments, private industry, our international
partners, and, of course, the traveling public.
In closing, I look forward to advancing TSA's critical
mission. And so, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Hutchison, I
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today--
distinguished members of the Committee--and welcome your
questions, and, if confirmed, look forward to working with you
and members of the Committee.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement and biographical information of Mr.
Pistole follows:]
Prepared Statement of John S. Pistole, Administrator-Designate,
Transportation Security Administration, and Assistant Secretary-
Designate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Good Morning, Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, and
distinguished members of the Committee. I am deeply privileged to
appear before you today as the President's nominee as Assistant
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA). I am honored by the
President's call to service and by the support of Secretary Napolitano.
With your kind indulgence, I would like to recognize my wife of
nearly 31 years, Kathy, and our daughters, Lauren and Jennifer, who are
with me today, and thank them for their unwavering love and support. I
would also like to express my appreciation to those in Federal, state,
local and tribal law enforcement communities and the U.S. Intelligence
Community, with whom I've had the privilege to work since becoming a
Special Agent of the FBI in 1983. And to the men and women of TSA, I
would like to say that I am eager to join your ranks and to work with
you in safeguarding our Nation's transportation system.
National security and counterterrorism are familiar territory for
me, and my 26-year career with the FBI has provided me with the skills
and experience necessary to lead TSA and meet the Administration's
objective of keeping the Nation's transportation systems secure. In
1999, while an Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC), in Boston, I
participated in the investigation and recovery efforts involving Egypt
Air Flight 990 after it crashed off the coast of New England. After the
tragic events of September 11, 2001, I was put in charge of helping
transform the mission and focus of the FBI's new and greatly expanded
counterterrorism program, culminating in my appointment as the
Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and
Counterintelligence. In 2003, I led an FBI team to Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia, investigating the bombings of three housing compounds in which
40 people died, including eight Americans.
In my current position as Deputy Director, I was involved in the
investigation of the December 25, 2009, attempted attack on Northwest
Flight 253 in addition to overseeing the investigative efforts leading
to the apprehension of Najibullah Zazi in connection with a plot
against New York City subways. Additionally, I was involved in the
investigation of Faisal Shahzad related to the attempted car bombing
last month in Times Square. In these and all other efforts during my
career with the FBI, I have worked steadfastly to expand and improve
efforts to ensure the security of the homeland.
Since its creation after 9/11, TSA has played a vital role in
securing our Nation's transportation systems. I look forward to
advancing TSA's critical mission in close collaboration with all of our
partners, including other Federal agencies, state, local and tribal
governments, private industry, our international partners, and, most
importantly, the traveling public.
Today, we face threats from other terrorist cells around the world,
and from homegrown terrorists who are not affiliated with a particular
network, but who, nonetheless are inspired by the message of hatred and
violence. Nearly 9 years ago, as I helped restructure the FBI to deal
with the terrorist threat in the wake of 9/11, it was evident that our
success depended upon a multi-pronged approach that combined a variety
of disciplines, including risk assessment, intelligence, and security
initiatives, as well as law enforcement. In the transportation domain,
TSA also employs a layered approach to security, including its
Transportation Security Officers and advanced screening technologies at
airport checkpoints, Federal Air Marshals patrolling domestic and
international flights, canine patrols in both aviation and transit rail
domains, and participation in Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), to
name just a few. If confirmed, I will use the lessons I learned in
restructuring our counterterrorism efforts within the FBI to further
enhance TSA's counterterrorism efforts across all modes of
transportation to keep the traveling public safe.
The years I spent as a Special Agent in the Minneapolis and New
York Divisions, as a field supervisor of a White Collar Crime (WCC) and
Civil Rights Squad in Indianapolis, as Assistant SAC in Boston
overseeing WCC and Computer Intrusion programs, and as an instructor of
Organized Crime matters at the International Law Enforcement Academy
taught me the valuable contribution of the men and women who work on
the front line in protecting our homeland.
Like the FBI, TSA relies upon a dedicated workforce including about
47,000 TSOs at airports throughout the Nation. They are TSA's field
officers, the front line in protecting our aviation domain from our
adversaries. I believe in mentoring, both in the field and in the
classroom, and I will pursue it as one of my priorities. If confirmed,
I will dedicate myself to supporting TSA's workforce that continues to
meet the highest standards of professionalism through comprehensive
training, respect, and opportunity for advancement.
My familiarity with and respect for field operations is combined
with years in senior management. Following my detail to help lead the
Information Security Working Group (ISWG) on security and vulnerability
issues, I was appointed by Director Mueller following the tragic events
of 9/11 as Deputy Assistant Director for Operations of the
Counterterrorism Division, then as Assistant Director, and afterwards
as Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and
Counterintelligence before being promoted Deputy Director in October
2004. I understand complex organizations and am dedicated to leading
TSA to the next level.
As part of the U.S. Intelligence Community, I understand the
importance of information sharing and I am committed to building upon
the Administration's efforts to counter terrorism. Moreover, based upon
my counterterrorism and international experience at the FBI, I
understand that our Nation's defenses must begin beyond our borders
through strong international partnerships. Our aviation security also
depends upon the commitment of our foreign partners to enhance aviation
security measures. I look forward to building upon the progress made by
Secretary Napolitano and Deputy Secretary Lute in their aggressive
global outreach initiative to enhance international aviation security,
particularly for international flights bound for the United States. If
confirmed, I will build upon these efforts to make the international
aviation system safer and ensure the security of our homeland.
If confirmed, I look forward to partnering with this committee in
deploying enhanced screening technologies, both at domestic airports
and by our international partners. Advanced technologies are critical
to detect evolving threats such as explosives. At the same time, TSA
must remain respectful of personal privacy, dignity and civil rights
and liberties, areas that are priorities for me.
Finally, throughout my years of service as a law enforcement
official, I have remained forever mindful of the need to identify those
who wish to do us harm and also protect individual civil rights and
liberties. We should be judged not only by our ability to defend our
Nation from terrorism, but also by our commitment to defend the rights
and freedoms we all enjoy. If confirmed, safeguarding the civil
liberties and privacy interests of all Americans will remain a top
priority.
If confirmed, I would like a close working relationship with
Congress and with this committee. I would be honored to serve with the
outstanding men and women of TSA as their Assistant Secretary, and I
applaud the work they perform each and every day, along with the
outstanding work performed by Gale Rossides in her role of Acting
Administrator.
In closing, I again thank President Obama and Secretary Napolitano
for their confidence and faith in my ability to lead TSA. Mr. Chairman,
Ranking Member Hutchison, I thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today and I look forward to answering your questions.
______
A. BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION
1. Name (Include any former names or nicknames used): John S.
Pistole.
2. Position to which nominated: Assistant Secretary of Homeland
Security, Transportation Security Administration.
3. Date of Nomination: May 17, 2010.
4. Address (List current place of residence and office addresses):
Residence: Information not released to the public.
Office: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 935 Pennsylvania Ave.,
NW, Washington, DC 20535.
5. Date and Place of Birth: June 1, 1956; Baltimore, MD.
6. Provide the name, position, and place of employment for your
spouse (if married) and the names and ages of your children (including
stepchildren and children by a previous marriage).
Kathleen M. Harp, homemaker; children: Lauren E.H. Pistole, age
20, Jennifer A.H. Pistole, age 17.
7. List all college and graduate degrees. Provide year and school
attended.
Anderson University, B.A. cum laude, 1978.
Indiana University School of Law--Indianapolis, J.D., 1981.
8. List all post-undergraduate employment, and highlight all
management-level jobs held and any non-managerial jobs that relate to
the position for which you are nominated.
1981-1983: Attorney, Teague, Cole, Hamer & Pistole, P.C.,
Anderson, IN.
1983 to present: Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Sept. 1983-Jan. 1984, FBI Academy, Quantico, VA.
Jan. 1984-Mar. 1986, Special Agent, Minneapolis Field Office.
Apr. 1986-Nov. 1990, Special Agent, New York City Field Office.
Nov. 1990-Mar. 1994, Supervisor, FBI Headquarters, Washington,
DC.
Mar. 1994-July 1999, Supervisor, Indianapolis Field Office.
July 1999-July 2001, Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Boston
Field Office.
July 2001-May 2002, Inspector, Inspections Division, FBI
Headquarters, Washington, DC.
May 2002-Sep. 2003, Deputy Assistant Director for Operations,
Counterterrorism Division, FBI Headquarters, Washington, DC.
Sep. 2003-Dec. 2003, Assistant Director for Operations,
Counterterrorism Division, FBI Headquarters, Washington, DC.
Dec. 2003-Oct. 2004, Executive Assistant Director for
Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence, FBI Headquarters,
Washington, DC.
Oct. 2004 to present, Deputy Director, FBI Headquarters,
Washington, DC.
9. Attach a copy of your resume. A copy is attached.
10. List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other part-time
service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other
than those listed above, within the last 5 years: None.
11. List all positions held as an officer, director, trustee,
partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any
corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business, enterprise,
educational, or other institution within the last 5 years: None.
12. Please list each membership you have had during the past 10
years or currently hold with any civic, social, charitable,
educational, political, professional, fraternal, benevolent or
religious organization, private club, or other membership organization.
Include dates of membership and any positions you have held with any
organization. Please note whether any such club or organization
restricts membership on the basis of sex, race, color, religion,
national origin, age, or handicap.
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), 2002 to
present; Executive Committee member since 2004. (service in
official FBI capacity).
International Security Management Association (ISMA), 2005 to
present, Government Affairs member. (service in official FBI
capacity).
Centreville United Methodist Church, member since 2002.
13. Have you ever been a candidate for and/or held a public office
(elected, nonelected, or appointed)? If so, indicate whether any
campaign has any outstanding debt, the amount, and whether you are
personally liable for that debt: No.
14. Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $500 or more for the past 10 years. Also list all offices you
have held with, and services rendered to, a state or national political
party or election committee during the same period: None.
15. List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, honorary
society memberships, military medals, and any other special recognition
for outstanding service or achievements.
Presidential Rank Award for Distinguished Executive, 2005.
Honorary Doctor of Law degree, and Commencement speaker for
Anderson University, 2006.
Edward H. Levi Award for Outstanding Professionalism and
Exemplary Integrity (DOJ), 2007.
Outstanding Alumni award and Commencement speaker at Indiana
University School of Law, Indianapolis, 2009.
16. Please list each book, article, column, or publication you have
authored, individually or with others. Also list any speeches that you
have given on topics relevant to the position for which you have been
nominated. Do not attach copies of these publications unless otherwise
instructed.
Published Articles:
``Safeguards are in Place,'' USA Today (Nov. 9, 2005) (with
Rachel Brand).
``Tools Against Spies and Terrorists,'' Washington Post (Nov.
12, 2005) (with Rachel Brand).
``An FBI That Changes with the Times,'' letter to the editor,
Washington Post (July 8, 2005).
Also, see attached list of speeches.
17. Please identify each instance in which you have testified
orally or in writing before Congress in a governmental or non-
governmental capacity and specify the date and subject matter of each
testimony.
See attached list of testimony before Congressional committees.
18. Given the current mission, major programs, and major
operational objectives of the department/agency to which you have been
nominated, what in your background or employment experience do you
believe affirmatively qualifies you for appointment to the position for
which you have been nominated, and why do you wish to serve in that
position?
Since 9/11, I have played a key role in the FBI's mission of
preventing terrorist attacks in the U.S. I am part of and intimately
familiar with the U.S. Intelligence Community, along with Federal,
state, local and tribal law enforcement, all of which are key drivers
for carrying out this mission. I have helped lead the transformation of
the FBI into a threat-based, intelligence-driven organization.
It would be an honor and privilege to apply my more than 26 years
of FBI experience, including the last 5 years as Deputy Director, the
senior career position in the FBI, to the challenges of leading TSA,
the agency charged with protecting the Nation's transportation systems
to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce.
19. What do you believe are your responsibilities, if confirmed, to
ensure that the department/agency has proper management and accounting
controls, and what experience do you have in managing a large
organization?
Having served the last 9 years in the Senior Executive Service
(SES) for the FBI, I recognize the importance of ensuring proper
management and accounting controls are in place and adhered to
rigorously. I have worked with the DOJ Office of Inspector General on a
number of issues relevant to this topic, particularly in the last 5
years as Deputy Director. I have also worked with GAO on similar
issues, and was instrumental in establishing an ``Office of Integrity
and Compliance'' at the FBI to identify potential issues posing a risk
to the FBI's mission, before they became an issue.
As Deputy Director, I have extensive leadership and management
experience helping lead a 34,000 employee agency with nearly a $8
billion budget. I serve as the rating official for all 56 Special
Agents in Charge (SACS), along with 12 key executives at FBIHQ. I chair
the bi-monthly SES Board, which reviews SES positions and makes
recommendations to the Director for selection. I have represented the
FBI domestically and internationally, briefing the President,
testifying before Congress, participating in National Security
Committee (NSC) Deputies Committee meetings, and Office of the Director
of National Intelligence (ODNI) Executive Committee (EXCOM) and
Counterterrorism (CT) Resources meetings chaired by the DNI.
20. What do you believe to be the top three challenges facing the
department/agency, and why?
1. To protect the national security of the U.S. and traveling
public by utilizing all available intelligence regarding
threats and prioritizing resource allocations to these threats.
2. To ensure all personnel at TSA have a personal investment in
the mission of the agency.
3. To ensure there is robust short-term and long-term strategic
planning identifying potential threats coupled with internal
controls to maximize the efficiency of security services TSA
provides to its customers.
B. POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
1. Describe all financial arrangements, deferred compensation
agreements, and other continuing dealings with business associates,
clients, or customers. Please include information related to retirement
accounts.
Upon retirement from the FBI, I will begin drawing my government
pension. No other issues.
2. Do you have any commitments or agreements, formal or informal,
to maintain employment, affiliation, or practice with any business,
association or other organization during your appointment? If so,
please explain: No.
3. Indicate any investments, obligations, liabilities, or other
relationships which could involve potential conflicts of interest in
the position to which you have been nominated.
In connection with the nomination process, I have consulted with
the Office of Government Ethics and the Department of Homeland
Security's designated agency ethics official to identify potential
conflicts of interest. Any potential conflicts of interest will be
resolved in accordance with the terms of an ethics agreement that I
have entered into with the Department's designated agency ethics
official and that has been provided to this Committee. I am not aware
of any other potential conflicts of interest.
4. Describe any business relationship, dealing, or financial
transaction which you have had during the last 10 years, whether for
yourself, on behalf of a client, or acting as an agent, that could in
any way constitute or result in a possible conflict of interest in the
position to which you have been nominated.
In connection with the nomination process, I have consulted with
the Office of Government Ethics and the Department of Homeland
Security's designated agency ethics official to identify potential
conflicts of interest. Any potential conflicts of interest will be
resolved in accordance with the terms of an ethics agreement that I
have entered into with the Department's designated agency ethics
official and that has been provided to this Committee. I am not aware
of any other potential conflicts of interest.
5. Describe any activity during the past 10 years in which you have
been engaged for the purpose of directly or indirectly influencing the
passage, defeat, or modification of any legislation or affecting the
administration and execution of law or public policy.
None, except in my Federal Government capacity.
6. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest,
including any that may be disclosed by your responses to the above
items.
Any potential conflicts of interest will be resolved in accordance
with the terms of an ethics agreement that I have entered into with the
Department's designated agency ethics official and that has been
provided to this Committee. That said, I am not aware of any potential
conflicts of interest.
C. LEGAL MATTERS
1. Have you ever been disciplined or cited for a breach of ethics
by, or been the subject of a complaint to any court, administrative
agency, professional association, disciplinary committee, or other
professional group? If so, please explain.
In June 2009, while traveling on vacation, a loose bullet was found
in my briefcase during security screening in the Frankfurt airport. I
had inadvertently left the bullet in my briefcase, and I had been
unaware it was there. When I returned to the United States, I reported
the incident to the FBI. I was reminded of the applicable rules, but
received no formal reprimand or censure.
From 2007-2010, the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector
General (OIG) published three reports examining the FBI's use of
National Security Letters and ``exigent letters.'' The reports
criticized the FBI's past practices, but also noted that the FBI had
taken appropriate remedial actions beginning in 2007. OIG subsequently
communicated to FBI's Office of Professional Responsibility that it
found no misconduct on my part, and that every level of the FBI bears
some responsibility for the problems cited.
During my tenure as a senior official at the FBI, DOJ OIG has
issued reports relating to the FBI's operations. None of these reports
were the result of complaints filed against me, and I have not been
disciplined or reprimanded in any of the matters. These reports are
available at http://wwwjustice.gov/oig/reports/FBI/index.htm.
In addition, please see the EEO matters discussed in my response to
Question 3, below.
2. Have you ever been investigated, arrested, charged, or held by
any Federal, State, or other law enforcement authority of any Federal,
State, county, or municipal entity, other than for a minor traffic
offense? If so, please explain: No.
3. Have you or any business of which you are or were an officer
ever been involved as a party in an administrative agency proceeding or
civil litigation? If so, please explain.
As Deputy Director of the FBI, I chair the Personnel Board and
serve as the rating official for much of the FBI's Senior Executive
Service. As a result, I have been responsible for making hundreds of
personnel decisions. In a few instances, described below, employees
have filed EEO complaints related to these personnel decisions or
related personnel actions. In one case, also below, an employee named
me in a lawsuit related to a personnel decision.
In 2009, an employee who received a negative performance
inspection brought an EEO complaint alleging gender
discrimination. Although I had decided against reassigning the
employee based on the inspection, the employee alleged that the
inspection and related processes were conducted improperly.
This matter is in discovery before the EEOC.
In 2007, an employee who had unsuccessfully sought a
specific position within the FBI brought an EEO complaint
alleging gender discrimination. The FBI General Counsel's
office settled the case in June 2008.
In 2008, an employee brought an EEO complaint alleging
gender discrimination. The employee claimed to have been passed
over for promotion and subject to disparate treatment and
harassment by officials conducting a performance review. The
employee also alleged that I had stated that the employee
should consider retiring to avoid being removed from the
employee's position. I did not make such a statement; in fact,
I had determined that reassignment of a particular case from
the employee was a sufficient remedy, and decided against
reassigning the employee. The matter is in discovery before the
EEOC.
In 2008, an FBI employee who did not receive a performance
bonus brought an EEO complaint alleging gender and race
discrimination. Performance bonuses are recommended by the
Executive Assistant Directors and Associate Deputy Director
based on employee ratings. This employee was not rated highly
enough to receive a bonus. The matter is pending before DOJ's
Complaint Adjudication Office.
In 2009, a former FBI employee brought an EEO complaint
alleging gender and race discrimination. An inspection had
revealed multiple performance issues and potential criminal
violations on the part of the employee, and the employee had
retired rather than face transfer. The matter is pending before
DOJ's Complaint Adjudication Office.
In 2006, an FBI employee brought an EEO complaint alleging
discrimination based on reprisal when the Special Agent Middle
Management Selection System (SAMMS) Board denied the employee's
request to participate in the Inspector-in-Place program. I
concurred with the Board's decision. The FBI's Complaint
Adjudication Board found no discrimination based on reprisal,
and the employee did not appeal the ruling.
In 2008, a former FBI employee named me as a codefendant in
a suit alleging civil rights violations and discrimination
related to being reassigned. The plaintiff had been transferred
after an OIG investigation found that the plaintiff had
retaliated against a subordinate for being a whistleblower, and
a subsequent inspection revealed additional performance issues.
As Deputy Director, I made the decision to reassign the
employee. FBI's Office of Professional Responsibility
subsequently recommended dismissal, but the employee retired.
The FBI has filed a motion to dismiss the case, Tabman v. FBI,
which is pending in D.C. District Court.
In addition, I recently became aware that during my service at the
FBI, I have been named in two additional lawsuits:
Khan v. Chertoff was a mandamus complaint alleging delays in
the processing of immigration applications. I was named as a
codefendant in my official capacity, along with Michael
Chertoff, Jonathan Scharfen, and Alberto Gonzalez. The case was
dismissed on March 20, 2008. To the best of my knowledge, I had
no personal involvement in this matter.
In 2006, in Godinez v. Pistole, a prisoner brought a pro se
suit alleging civil rights violations. The case was dismissed
on December 21, 2006. To the best of my knowledge, I was never
served in this case.
4. Have you ever been convicted (including pleas of guilty or nolo
contendere) of any criminal violation other than a minor traffic
offense? If so, please explain: No.
5. Have you ever been accused, formally or informally, of sexual
harassment or discrimination on the basis of sex, race, religion, or
any other basis? If so, please explain.
Please see the EEO complaints described above in response to
Question 3.
6. Please advise the Committee of any additional information,
favorable or unfavorable, which you feel should be disclosed in
connection with your nomination: None.
D. RELATIONSHIP WITH COMMITTEE
1. Will you ensure that your department/agency complies with
deadlines for information set by Congressional committees?
I will do everything within my power to ensure deadlines are met.
2. Will you ensure that your department/agency does whatever it can
to protect Congressional witnesses and whistle blowers from reprisal
for their testimony and disclosures? Yes.
3. Will you cooperate in providing the Committee with requested
witnesses, including technical experts and career employees, with
firsthand knowledge of matters of interest to the Committee? Yes.
4. Are you willing to appear and testify before any duly
constituted committee of the Congress on such occasions as you may be
reasonably requested to do so? Yes.
______
Attachments
BIOGRAPHY/RESUME OF JOHN S. PISTOLE
John S. Pistole began his career as a Special Agent with the FBI in
1983. He served in the Minneapolis and New York Divisions before being
promoted to a Supervisor in the Organized Crime (OC) Section at FBIHQ.
He assisted the Italian National Police in their investigations into
the 1992 assassinations of two prominent Magistrates. He also served as
an Instructor in OC matters at the FBI Academy for nearly 30 New Agents
Classes.
Mr. Pistole later served as a field supervisor of a White-Collar
Crime (WCC) and Civil Rights Squad in Indianapolis, Indiana, where he
created a Health Care Fraud Task Force and a Public Corruption Task
Force. During this time, he also developed curricula and provided
instruction at the first two sessions of the newly opened International
Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest, Hungary.
Mr. Pistole next served as Assistant Special Agent in Charge,
Boston, Massachusetts, where he had oversight for WCC, Computer
Intrusion Programs, and all FBI matters in the States of Maine and New
Hampshire and WCC, especially Public Corruption, in Rhode Island. In
1999, he helped lead the investigative and recovery efforts for the
Egypt Air Flight 990 crash off the coast of Rhode Island. Following the
espionage arrest of Robert Hanssen, he was detailed to FBIHQ and helped
lead the Information Security Working Group, addressing security and
vulnerability issues. He was then named an Inspector in the Inspection
Division in Washington, D.C., where he led teams conducting evaluations
and audits of FBI field offices and Headquarters divisions.
Following the events of 9/11, Director Mueller appointed Mr.
Pistole to the Counterterrorism Division, first as Deputy Assistant
Director for Operations, then as Assistant Director. Mr. Pistole was
then appointed as the Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism
and Counterintelligence. In October, 2004, Mr. Pistole was promoted to
Deputy Director, the number two position in the FBI. He is a recipient
of the 2005 Presidential Rank Award for Distinguished Executive. In
2007, Mr. Pistole received the Department of Justice Edward H. Levy
Award for Outstanding Professionalism and Exemplary Integrity.
Mr. Pistole practiced law for 2 years prior to joining the FBI. He
is a graduate of Anderson University, where he was the 2006
Commencement speaker and received an honorary Doctor of Laws; and the
Indiana University School of Law--Indianapolis, where he was the 2009
Commencement speaker and the recipient of the Outstanding Alumni Award.
He is married and has two daughters.
______
List of Speeches and Remarks Given by John S. Pistole
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Address and Location Date
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Norwood Policy Academy's 12th Municipal Police Officers 7/22/2000
Graduation
Quincy, MA
Speech to Graduates
New Agents Graduation 09/10/04
Quantico, Virginia
Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership
Society of Former Special Agents 09/15/04
San Francisco, CA
Islamic Militants among Us: How Real Is the Threat?
Welcoming DCI Porter Goss 10/04/04
FBI Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Welcome to DCI GOSS/FBI--CIA Cooperation
Hispanic Heritage Month Celebration 10/05/04
FBI Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Hispanic Americans and the FBI
National Disability Awareness Month 10/06/04
FBI Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Success Knows No Limitations
AG Ashcroft Farewell Ceremony 01/26/05
FBI Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
A Tribute to AG Ashcroft
Center for Strategic and International Studies 02/15/05
Washington, D.C.
Transnational Threats and Information Sharing
New Agents Graduation 04/12/05
Quantico, Virginia
Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership
National Executive Institute 04/21/05
Quantico, VA
Leading Today's FBI
National Academy Graduation 06/10/05
Quantico, VA
Global Law Enforcement Cooperation
FBI Honorary Medals Ceremony 07/13/05
Liberty Crossing, McLean, VA
Honoring the FBI'S Heroes
DOD Worldwide Combating Terrorism Conference 09/14/05
Arlington, VA
Working Together to Fight Terrorism
New Agents Graduation 09/15/05
Quantico, Virginia
Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership
ANSIR Conference 09/19/05
Indianapolis, IN
Counterintelligence, National Security, and the FBI
Harvard University MBA Student Presentation 10/04/05
Cambridge, MA
Managing Change and Leading Transformation at the FBI
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies 10/17/05
Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany
The FBI, Global Partnerships, and the War on Terror
Association of Former Intelligence Officers 10/28/05
FBI Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Intelligence at the FBI
Vance Overseas Security Advisory Council Annual Briefing 11/08/05
Dinner
Washington, D.C.
The FBI: Combating Today's Threats
New Agents Graduation--05-14 01/24/06
Quantico, VA
Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership
Tokyo Press Roundtable 03/07/06
Tokyo, Japan
International Cooperation to Combat Crime
National Legal Center for the Public Interest--Day With 03/22/06
Justice
Great Hall, RFK Main Justice Building, Washington, D.C.
Today's FBI
Anderson University Commencement 05/06/06
Anderson, IN
Stepping out in Faith
New Agents Graduation--06-06 05/10/06
Quantico, VA
Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership
Special Agent Memorial Ceremony 05/17/06
FBI Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Honoring the FBI's Fallen Special Agents
Memorial Day Wreath Laying 05/26/06
FBI Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
A Tribute to America's Veterans
New Agents Graduation--06-08 06/07/06
Quantico, VA
Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership
Operation Holiday Crush Press Conference 06/23/06
RFK Main Justice Building, Washington, D.C.
Announcing Indictments in Miami Seven Terrorism Case
International Association of Police Chaplains--Luncheon 07/10/06
Keynote
Indianapolis, IN
Today's FBI, Today's Challenges
International Association of Police Chaplains--Opening 07/10/06
Ceremony
Indianapolis, IN
FBI Chaplain Program
New Agents Graduation--06-10 07/19/06
Quantico, VA
Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership
New Agents Graduation--06-11 08/16/06
Quantico, VA
Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership
New Agents Graduation--06-12 08/30/06
Quantico, VA
Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership
Commonwealth Club of San Francisco 09/11/06
San Francisco, CA
September 11, 2006: The FBI in a Post-9/11 World
Attorney General Awards 09/12/06
RFK Main Justice Building
Honoring DOJ Leaders
New Agents Graduation--06-13 09/14/06
Quantico, VA
Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership
Society of Former FBI Special Agents 09/21/06
New York City, NY
The Legacy of Former Agents
International Symposium on Agroterrorism 09/25/06
Kansas City, MO
Working Together to Protect America's Agriculture
Chesapeake II Conference Toast 10/12/06
Chantilly, VA
Partnership Toast
New Agents Graduation--06-16 10/26/06
Quantico, VA
Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership
World Economic Forum 11/27/06
New Delhi, India
The Global FBI
Media Availability 11/28/06
Kiev, Ukraine
Global Law Enforcement Cooperation
Prefetto Giovanni De Gennaro Award Ceremony 12/08/06
FBI Headquarters, Washington, DC
Honoring Giovanni De Gennaro
Holiday Reception 12/15/06
FBI Headquarters, Washington, DC
Happy Holidays
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007
------------------------------------------------------------------------
University of Pennsylvania, Department of Criminology 1/26/07
Philadelphia, PA
FBI Transformation-info Sharing and Partnership
Major County Sheriffs Association 01/31/07
Washington, D.C.
Working Together to Protect America from Crime
Council on Christian Colleges and Universities 02/02/07
Washington, D.C.
Christian Education and Public Service
National Fusion Center Conference 03/07/07
Destin, FL
The Force of Fusion: Working Together to Protect America
Indianapolis School of Law Distinguished Speaker Series 03/20/07
Indianapolis, IN
Today's FBI: Fact Vs. Fiction
New Agents Graduation 03/26/07
Quantico, VA
Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership
Hazardous Devices School Memorial 04/16/07
Huntsville, Alabama
A Tribute to Bomb Technicians
ChoicePoint Users Conference 05/08/07
Arlington, VA
Intelligence, Information-sharing, and Partnerships
Special Agents Memorial Service 05/16/07
FBI Headquarters, Washington, DC
Honoring the FBI's Fallen Special Agents
Society of Former Special Agents 05/22/07
South Lake Tahoe, CA
Honoring the FBI's Heroes
Memorial Day Wreath Laying Ceremony 5/24/07
FBI Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Pearls in Policing 06/11/07
The Hague, Netherlands
Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism
SOCA Meeting 06/26/07
London, England
Counterterrorism, Information Sharing, Legats
SOCA Podcast 06/26/07
London Embassy, London, England
The FBI and the United Kingdom--Working Together to Protect
Our Nations
Corporate Fraud Task Force Anniversary 07/17/07
Washington, D.C.
Combating Corporate Corruption
Hispanic Heritage Month 10/10/07
FBI Headquarters, Washington, DC
Celebrating Diversity in the FBI
Ethics and Intelligence Seminar 10/19/07
Queenstown, MD
Ethics and Integrity in the Intelligence Community
American Bankers Association/ABA Money Laundering 10/22/07
Conference
Washington, D.C.
The FBI and the Private Sector: Investigating Terrorism
Financing
Legat Conference 10/24/07
FBI Headquarters, Washington, DC
Introductions of DNI Mcconnell, Secretary Chertoff, and CIA
Director Hayden
Wreath Laying Ceremony 11/05/07
Nairobi, Kenya
Honoring the Victims of the 1998 East African Embassy
Bombings
100 Club of Indianapolis 11/20/07
Indianapolis, IN
Evolution of the FBI
Native American/Alaskan/Pacific Islander Heritage Month 11/28/07
Celebration
FBI Headquarters, Washington, DC
Celebrating Diversity in the FBI
New Agents Graduation (07-06) 12/07/07
Quantico, VA
Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership
National Academy Graduation (Session 231) 12/14/07
Quantico, VA
Global Law Enforcement Cooperation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Coastal Crisis Chaplaincy Banquet 01/24/08
Charleston, SC
The Power of the Chaplaincy
Field Office Building Dedication 02/19/08
San Antonio, TX
A Modern Building for a Modern FBI
Anti-Defamation League Distinguished Service Award Ceremony 02/24/08
Albuquerque, NM
Balancing Counterterrorism and Civil Rights
2nd IACP Summit on Transnational Gangs 03/03/08
Los Angeles, CA
Working with Global Partners to Combat Transnational Gangs
New Agents Graduation (08-01) 03/05/08
Quantico, VA
Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership
Kellogg Case Study Program with Int'l Security Management 03/31/08
Association
Chicago, IL
FBI Update, Private Sector Partnerships, Current Threats
Domestic Security Executive Academy 04/10/08
Quantico, VA
FBI Update, Private Sector Partnerships, Current Threats
Police Officer Memorial Prayer Breakfast 04/25/08
St. Louis, MO
Police Week, Law Enforcement Line of Duty Deaths,
Leadership
Special Agent Memorial Service 05/13/08
FBIHQ
Police Week, Law Enforcement Line of Duty Deaths, Sacrifice
Remarks to Vice President of Colombia and other dignitaries 05/19/08
Bogota, Colombia
Partnerships and Current Threats
National Academy Latin American and Caribbean Retrainer 05/20/08
Santiago, Chile
Power of Partnerships, Case Successes, Global Threats
Ambassador's Reception 05/21/08
Buenos Aires, Argentina
Power of Partnerships, FBI's 100th Anniversary
AMIA Meeting and Press Statement 05/21/08
Buenos Aires, Argentina
Power of Partnerships, Terrorism
Junior Special Agents 06/06/08
Washington, D.C.
Civic Duty, Education
International Security Management Association Conference 06/10/08
Boston, MA
Power of Partnerships, Private Sector
Community Relations Conference 06/18/08
Tampa, FL
Community Outreach, Power of Partnerships, FBI Today
Strategic Alliance Conference 06/23/08
Monterey, CA
Power of Partnerships, Global Threat
Defense Senior Leadership Conference 07/15/08
Arlington, VA (Pentagon)
Combating Radicalization/terrorist Threat
FBI DAY (Emcee Script) 07/17/08
Washington, D.C.
Celebrating a Century of Service
Dedication of William H. Webster Conference Room 07/17/08
FBI Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Honoring Judge William Webster
100th Anniversary International Reception 07/17/08
FBI Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Celebrating a Century of Partnerships
Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and 09/10/08
Terrorism
Washington, D.C.
WMD Threat/FBI Response
Society of Former Special Agents 09/17/08
Honolulu, HI
Update on the FBI's Current Focus
FBI New York 100th Anniversary Commemoration 09/18/08
New Rochelle, NY
Celebrating a Century of Service
Information Technology Study Group 10/22/08
Washington, D.C.
Electronic Surveillance and Information Technology
Unveiling of Society of Former Special Agents Medallion 12/19/08
FBI Headquarters, Washington, DC
A Tribute to Former Special Agents of the FBI
New Agents Graduation (08-16) 12/23/08
Quantico, VA
Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership
Intelligence Basic Course Graduation (09-01) 12/23/08
Quantico, VA
Intelligence in the FBI
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009
------------------------------------------------------------------------
National Security Higher Education Advisory Board 2/04/209
Washington, DC
Opening Remarks
New Agents Graduation (09-01) 03/11/09
Quantico, VA
Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership
National Executive Institute 03/19/09
Fredericksburg, VA
Today's FBI/Partnerships/importance of NEI
Indiana University School of Law--Commencement 04/28/09
Indianapolis, IN
You Can Make a Difference
EDI Leadership Conference 05/09/09
Quantico, VA
Leading Change
Society of Former Special Agents Regional Meeting 05/19/09
Sun Valley, ID
State of the Bureau
Memorial Day Wreath Laying 05/20/09
FBI Headquarters, Washington, DC
A Tribute to Fallen Soldiers
Federal Law Enforcement Memorial Service 05/21/09
Phoenix, AZ
Law Enforcement Line of Duty Deaths, Sacrifice
New Agents Graduation 5/28/09
Quantico, VA
Graduation Speech
ODNI Trade Association Meeting 5/29/09
Washington, DC
FBI Transformation-importance of Private Partnership and
Domain Awareness
``Pearls in Policing'' Conference 06/14/09
The Hague, Netherlands
FBI of Tomorrow
New Agents Graduation (09-07) 07/09/09
Quantico, VA
Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership
New Agents Graduation (09-10) 08/19/09
Quantico, VA
Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership
New Agents Graduation 9/02/09
Quantico, VA
Graduation of New Agents Class
Cook County Crime Stoppers Awards Ceremony 09/10/09
Chicago, IL
Partnerships and Community Leadership
ISA Graduation, Ulpan Language School 09/16/09
Tel Aviv, Israel
Partnership, Intelligence, and Information Sharing
Domestic Security Executive Academy 09/21/09
Quantico, VA
Partnership, Intelligence, and Information Sharing
Ethics and Compliance Officers Association 09/24/09
Chicago, IL
Ethics and Compliance in Law Enforcement
ATAC Federal Prosecutors Conference 09/30/09
Washington, D.C.
National Security, Counterterrorism, Intelligence
Hispanic Heritage Month 10/08/09
FBIHQ
Celebrating Diversity in the FBI
AFCEA Symposium 10/14/09
Chantilly, VA
Today's FBI and Intelligence
University of Indianapolis Lectureship 10/15/09
Indianapolis, IN
Public Service and Civic Responsibility
OSAC Winter Meeting 11/18/09
Washington DC
The FBI: Combating Today's Threats
Baltimore Field Office Dedication in Honor of Sam Hicks 11/23/09
Baltimore, MD
Partnerships, Line of Duty Death
New Agents Graduation 09-15 11/24/09
Quantico, VA
Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership
George Marshall European Center for Security Studies 12/08/09
FBIHQ
Partnerships, Intelligence, FBI Priorities
New Agents Graduation 09-17 12/23/09
Quantico, VA
Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SOCA Luncheon 02/04/10
Washington, D.C.
Organized Crime, Partnerships
FBI National Academy Associates Executive Board Conference 02/17/10
Quantico, VA
Partnerships, Intelligence, FBI Priorities
National Executive Institute Opening Banquet 03/18/10
Crystal City, VA
Partnerships, Intelligence, Leadership
FBI National Academy Associates Africa/Middle Eastern 03/22/10
Retrainer
Botswana
Partnerships, Intelligence, FBI Priorities
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network Distinguished Speaker 04/07/10
Series
Alexandria, VA
Partnerships, Intelligence, FBI Priorities
North Texas Crime Commission 04/14/10
Dallas, TX
Partnerships, Intelligence, FBI Priorities
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Testimony
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date Committee Hearing Topic
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Open Session
------------------------------------------------------------------------
04/01/2009 HJC Proposals to Fight Fraud
and Protect Taxpayers
03/20/2009 House Committee on Financial Federal and State
Services Enforcement of
Financial Consumer and
Investor Protection
Laws
02/11/2009 SJC The Need for Increased
Fraud Enforcement in
the Wake of the
Economic Downturn
03/28/2007 HPSCI FBI Use of National
Security Letters
01/25/2007 SSCI Implementation of
Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004
08/23/2004 House Judiciary Subcommittee Creating a National
on Crime, Terrorism and Intelligence Director
Homeland Security
08/03/2004 Senate Governmental Affairs FBI Reforms to Meet
Committee Current Threats
06/16/2004 National Commission on The 9/11 Plot
Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States
04/14/2004 National Commission on Law Enforcement and the
Terrorist Attacks Upon the Intelligence Community
United States
10/14/2003 Senate Judiciary Subcommittee Terrorist Recruitment in
on Terrorism, Technology and Prison and the Recent
Homeland Security Arrests Related to
Guantanamo Detainees
10/01/2003 House Select Committee on Fraudulent
Homeland Security Identification
Documents and the
Implications for
Homeland Security
09/25/2003 Senate Committee on Banking, Identifying, Tracking
Housing and Urban Affairs and Dismantling the
Financial Structure of
Terrorist Organizations
09/24/2003 House Financial Services The Terrorist Financing
Subcommittee on Oversight Operations Section
and Investigations
09/09/2003 Senate Finance Committee The Alias Among Us: The
Homeland Security and
Terrorism Threat from
Document Fraud,
Identity Theft and
Social Security Number
Misuse
07/31/2003 Senate Committee on Terrorism Financing:
Governmental Affairs Origination,
Organization and
Prevention
03/18/2003 Senate Committee on Foreign Diplomacy and the War
Relations Against Terrorism
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Closed Session*
------------------------------------------------------------------------
01/28/2010 SSCI Fort Hood Update
01/27/2010 HPSCI Fort Hood Update
02/12/2008 SSCI Cyber Initiative
(Testimony pending)
09/20/2007 SSCI FISA and Protect America
Act
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The transcripts for closed, classified hearings are maintained by the
Committees and not made available to the FBI.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Pistole, very much.
I'm going to open the questioning by asking you to try and
give a thumbnail sketch of how you see the terrorism threat;
and the use of airplanes; and therefore, the use of detection
equipment, and how satisfactory is it. How do you see the
terrorism threat coming from overseas? How do you see it from
people who come from overseas to be embedded here? And how do
you see it coming from Americans themselves, as anger grows,
which, of course, it is? And then how does that mesh in to how
you change and amplify the technology that people have to go
through to be searched? Because that is an absolute obligation,
and whole-body imaging is anathema to a lot of people. I don't
know how you get around that. So, could you talk about how you
see the sequencing of threats, the magnitude of the threats,
where the threats are from, and how you adjust technology to
try and counter that?
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And that actually
addresses my top priority, if confirmed, in going into TSA, to
ensure that the men and women of TSA, and all those who deal
with it, see it as a threat-based, intelligence-driven agency
with a national security focus answering the question of, How
do we manage risk?
We know that al Qaeda and its affiliates, including TTP,
for example, associated with Shahzad, on Times Square, and a
number of other affiliated AQ--al Qaeda-related groups--have
the intent to commit attacks in the homeland. The question is
their capability.
And so, what I've been doing in my current job, as Deputy
Director, is trying to work with all the interagency partners
to identify those threads of intelligence which may help inform
our actions here in the homeland. And I think at TSA it becomes
especially critical.
For example, given the Christmas Day plot, and the
concealment technique that was used in that plot, which has to
be used to help inform the people on the front lines as to what
type of detection is appropriate--is the best suited to detect
those type of new concealment methods, knowing that there was a
great deal of sophistication in that device.
And so, what it comes back to is making sure that TSA has
the latest intelligence, the latest training, the latest
techniques, and the latest technology to work as part of that
layer of defense.
The best scenario is if we have the intelligence through
part of the U.S. intelligence community to say, ``There are
threats at this particular location,'' whether it's an airport,
a port, a cargo ship. We know, obviously--from Madrid, in March
of 2004; in London, in July of 2005--both July 7 and 21; from
Moscow, 2 months ago, two female suicide bombers on the subway
there; from Mumbai, in 2007; a number of other incidents in
India--that terrorists are interested in soft targets.
So, the more we harden our targets, the more we see
opportunities that the terrorists are looking for to hit us,
such as in Times Square. Somebody can--as you mentioned, the
freedoms we have here in the country--somebody can drive in,
park a car, walk away, and explode a device, causing maximum
carnage. So, that's what we have to do, make sure we're threat-
based, intelligence-driven, allocating our resources to the
risk.
And I think that all factors into what is the technology
that we're acquiring, how do we train our people, and how do
they go about doing their jobs as part of that layered
security.
The Chairman. So, you're really making the security factor
the main factor, in terms of the use of imaging and technology
and what it is that people have to go through.
Mr. Pistole. Absolutely.
The Chairman. We started with shoes; that was because of
the shoe-bomber.
Mr. Pistole. Right.
The Chairman. You know, when we have a--more than a 3-ounce
tube of toothpaste, and we've got to pitch it, people don't
like it. I don't know whether that's related to security, but
it sure could be.
Mr. Pistole. True.
The Chairman. So, is that what rules in making decisions
about imaging and equipment and what people have to go through?
Mr. Pistole. Yes. I mean, security is paramount, Mr.
Chairman. The whole purpose of the agency and all the U.S.
Government efforts since 9/11 have been to enhance security;
obviously, trying to balance civil liberty and privacy issues
that are attendant to being citizens of the United States.
In my current job, I've had a lot of opportunities to do
that, in how we investigate U.S. citizens and those--others, to
make sure that we're doing everything legally possible to
prevent bad things from happening, while protecting the civil
liberties and privacies of those who we don't have an
investigative interest in. So----
The Chairman. But, that leaves the Watch List. And the
Watch List was violated recently.
Mr. Pistole. Yes, the Watch List is an important tool in
the overall toolbox, if you will, that the U.S. Government has.
It is constantly being evaluated and modified to ensure that it
is the best information possible to provide the best tools
possible to those who would engage with the traveling public.
So, for example, individuals who we describe as ``clean
skins,'' those who have no terrorist affiliations, such as
Abdulmutallab, with Christmas Day. It makes it a challenge. If
that person's not on a Watch List, how do we screen for that,
other than through these enhanced techniques?
And so, the Watch List performs a valuable function in
trying to identify, basically, as a tipper to say, ``OK. Here's
somebody you should take a additional look at.'' It's not
dispositive of anything. But, if somebody is on a Watch List,
particularly the No Fly or Selectee, then obviously additional
scrutiny should be, and is, applied to ensure that person does
not pose a threat to aviation security, in that instance, or to
other opportunities that person may have to do something bad in
the U.S.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Pistole.
Senator Hutchison.
Senator Hutchison. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I will just ask you the question, as the Ranking
Member, if you and your agency will be available to all of the
members of our committee, as well as our staffs on our behalf,
for information that we need to be the oversight committee of
the U.S. Senate.
Mr. Pistole. Absolutely, Senator Hutchison. I look forward
to that, if confirmed.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you. Let's talk about collective
bargaining.
We have asked nominees, before, the question about what you
think about it, how you would respond to it. But, I'm going to
ask you a different question, because I know that the Secretary
will make a final decision on this. But, my question to you is,
What is going to be your advice to the Secretary? And what
factors are you going to use to give her advice on whether this
would hurt the capability to respond, to avoid any kind of work
stoppages or slowdowns or any of the ways that people use to
show that they aren't pleased if collective bargaining doesn't
go their way?
Mr. Pistole. Sure. Thank you, Senator.
Secretary Napolitano did ask me to conduct a review of this
issue, which I'll do, engaging all stakeholders in the process.
In terms of any big issues or decisions like that, in my
leadership experience at the FBI I tried to do just that. So,
it's consistent with that perspective of trying to gather as
much information as possible, and then making an informed
judgment or recommendation. And so, I need more information to
do that.
My experience with the FBI is such that, of course, we
don't have unions or collective bargaining. And so, I'm attuned
to the security/safety issue. And, from my perspective,
whatever the discussions are can't adversely affect the safety
and security of the traveling public.
Senator Hutchison. Every previous Administrator has
determined that collective bargaining is not appropriate for
this particular agency. Will you consult with former heads of
the TSA in your deliberations about what you will recommend?
Mr. Pistole. I would consider that, Senator. As people who
are, I would think, part of the stakeholders in this process,
given their experience and everything, obviously would be open
to all those who have valuable insights in that regard.
Senator Hutchison. Let me just ask you if the Secretary has
indicated to you that she will take your advice or when she
asked you to look into it, did she say that she would rely on
you, or indicate that she might go a different way?
Mr. Pistole. No. She gave no indication. She simply asked
me to do the review. And, from my perspective, that is an
independent assessment that I would do with--again, engaging
all the stakeholders, but that will be my assessment, and we've
had no discussions about the outcome of that.
Senator Hutchison. Well, we certainly are going to, as I
said earlier, want to have a progress report and be fully
informed of----
Mr. Pistole. Absolutely.
Senator Hutchison.--of your decision. And be able to
discuss it.
Let me ask you about your thoughts on the other issues
besides airline security. I think that many of the focuses in
this agency have certainly been airline--and, as they should
be.
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Hutchison. That is a place where people are
vulnerable, and we know that many tricks have been tried, and
largely we have avoided having another 9/11. But, what other
areas do you see as priorities and where you would need to put
resources for safety?
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator. It--as I mentioned, given
the interest in and successful attacks that we've seen in
Europe and India, in particular, against rail networks; the
attempted attack by Najibullah Zazi, last fall, against the New
York City subways, a plot that was disrupted; the intelligence
that's out there that indicates, again, targeting of more soft
targets, means that the rail system with, you know, the
millions--the multiple or more millions of passengers traveling
by rail every day in subways than the 2 million air passengers
that we have here in the U.S., makes that one of the key
priorities.
Ports are also a critical area that needs to be worked as
part of the interagency. Obviously, Coast Guard has a large
responsibility there with helping inform and then work with the
other agencies to address the vulnerabilities that al Qaeda and
other terrorist groups have indicated an interest in trying to
do bad things to.
So, those two part--obviously, HAZMAT carriers those--the
over-the-road truckers who can carry hazardous loads, the
freights, as I mentioned, heavy rail, light rail, subways,
those are all areas that fall within that umbrella of
transportation security. And so, if confirmed, I look forward
to working with you and the Committee to assess those
vulnerabilities and to figure out the best way to manage risk
by allocating resources.
Senator Hutchison. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hutchison.
Senator DeMint.
Senator DeMint. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Pistole, the reason that some of us are making such an
issue of collective bargaining, it's a signal to us. There's no
doubt in my mind that you have the qualifications to make the
Transportation Security Agency a better agency, to continue to
improve it, that you know how to manage people and focus on
security. But, if we see you yielding to political pressure,
that would suggest to us that the priorities have changed. And
that's why it's so important to us.
I've got a letter from candidate Barack Obama to John Gage,
of the National--or the American Federation of Government
Employees, promising to provide collective bargaining benefits.
And so, that's going to be a very difficult political pressure
for you to stand down, but I think you probably have worked in
difficult environments before.
When we met a few weeks ago, you said you had never thought
of having collective bargaining at the FBI. And you are one of
the Nation's leading counterterrorism officers. I find it
instructive that you didn't even think that the workforce at
the FBI needed to unionize.
Would it be accurate to say that implementing collective
bargaining at FBI would not improve national security?
Mr. Pistole. I'm sorry, Senator, if you could rephrase--or
restate that? I apologize. In terms of the FBI----
Senator DeMint. Would collective bargaining improve
security--would it improve national security----
Mr. Pistole. Oh. I----
Senator DeMint.--at the FBI?
Mr. Pistole. Thank you. No, Senator. Obviously--and, from
the FBI's perspective, we have to have the ability to surge
resources at any time, to be able to deploy people, not only
nationwide, but worldwide, at a moment's notice. And so, the
perspective is one--again, from my experiences, is one of not
collective bargaining.
Senator DeMint. Yes.
Mr. Pistole. So, that's why I need to----
Senator DeMint. But----
Mr. Pistole.--go into it----
Senator DeMint.--let me ask this, because obviously the
people who work at the agency, the officers, are very important
to us, and the way they're treated----
Mr. Pistole. Sure.
Senator DeMint.--is very important to us. And if you assume
the reins at the TSA, can you commit to paying the TSO--the
officers an honest wage, having the highest workplace
standards, ensuring the professional development of your
officers? And do you promise not to show favoritism or
discriminate in the processes that evaluate performance and
determine promotion, overtime, shift bids, or health and
safety? Is--would that be your commitment?
Mr. Pistole. Well, Senator, of course what I am very
focused on is the workforce development issues. You've gone
into a lot of detail there. What I pledge to do is make sure
that the--all the TSOs and all employees of TSA that have a
voice to--that they know can be heard by the head of the
agency, and that they can engage and can discuss those issues,
some of which you've outlined, in a meaningful fashion. So,
yes, I pledge to----
Senator DeMint. But, you don't think you necessarily need a
third party to tell you to do that.
Mr. Pistole. That's something I have to withhold judgment
on, because I don't have the information yet. I need to conduct
that review, talk to the stakeholders, and make an informed
judgment.
Senator DeMint. You don't have the information about what
your commitment to the employees will be?
Mr. Pistole. No. I know what my commitment to the employees
would be, if confirmed. Thank you, Senator.
Senator DeMint. When you do your assessment, will you make
that assessment available to this committee?
Mr. Pistole. I would need to talk with the Secretary
initially, and then, in discussions with her, make that
decision.
Senator DeMint. So, you're not sure whether or not you'll
give us your assessment.
Mr. Pistole. I'm not sure. I need to talk to the Secretary
about that.
Senator DeMint. OK. All right. The unions are making the
case that if we don't have collective bargaining, that someone
in your position will not provide the proper workplace
environment and fairness. I think your history shows that
that's not true----
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator DeMint.--but that's certainly something you're
capable of. So, again, I know we've made enough of this issue,
but I will trust your judgment----
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator.
Senator DeMint.--until proven otherwise.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator, appreciate it.
Senator DeMint. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator DeMint.
Senator Begich.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK BEGICH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Begich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you very much. It was great to see you, a couple days
ago.
I do have--I want to restate some of the questions we
talked about, but I have to take--I wasn't planning to ask any
questions on this, or even make a statement on it. But, on the
whole collective bargaining issue, you know, I'm hopeful that--
you know, what I've learned here, in a year and a half, little
issues like this suddenly become big issues because of
philosophical differences, versus what is right and what needs
to be done.
Let me ask you, first, one basic question, then I'm going
to give you a comment, here.
First, the question is, In your position, you will--will
you do everything possible to make sure that whatever rules,
regulations, procedures--everything you do will ensure the
safety of traveler as well as the highest quality of workers in
TSA?
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Senator Begich. That's the ultimate question. How you get
there----
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Senator Begich.--is--you know, this is the part of the role
that I look to administration to work on. As a former Mayor,
someone who had to administer well over 800 police and fire,
who are unionized, I saw not one diminishment of public safety,
because people who go into this field--and correct me if I'm
wrong; you've been in the FBI for many years--they chose this
field not because it's union or nonunion.
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Begich. They choose this field because this is the
area of interest to them, because they instinctively--you want
to make this place a safer place. Is that a fair----
Mr. Pistole. That's right.
Senator Begich.--statement.
Mr. Pistole. Sense of mission.
Senator Begich. That's right. You don't sit there go,
``Geez, is this union or nonunion?''
Mr. Pistole. No.
Senator Begich. So, I have to take some exception to both
minority members, and that is, I will stack the police
department that I had against any public safety team in this
country. They were unionized, but they never forgot their
number-one mission----
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Begich.--which is the public safety of, in that
case, our community there. Same thing you would see at TSA. Is
that a fair----
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Senator Begich.--statement? Under any circumstances, the
goal is--you're going to make sure those folks understand their
number-one mission----
Mr. Pistole. That's----
Senator Begich.--is traveling----
Mr. Pistole. Yes, sir.
Senator Begich. And so, I want to take a--some exception. I
understand there are philosophical issues, but, again, people
don't go into these jobs and say, ``Geez, you know, if the
union doesn't do this, I'm not going to keep the public safe.''
Do you have that feeling, that they would do that?
Mr. Pistole. I really don't have that sense, Senator.
Obviously, coming from my, you know, 27 years----
Senator Begich. Right.
Mr. Pistole.--at FBI, nonunion/collective bargaining----
Senator Begich. But, you've worked as an FBI agent with
police----
Mr. Pistole. Sure.
Senator Begich.--officers all across----
Mr. Pistole. All the time.
Senator Begich.--the country.
Mr. Pistole. Task forces----
Senator Begich. Right.
Mr. Pistole.--all across the country.
Senator Begich. You can probably not tell me which ones are
union or nonunion, correct?
Mr. Pistole. I----
Senator Begich. But, you----
Mr. Pistole. Some are, some aren't.
Senator Begich. Right. But, you can probably tell me who
were the best officers.
Mr. Pistole. Sure.
Senator Begich. And it's irrelevant of----
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Begich.--what--if they belong to bargain unit, or
not. Because that never really enters the discussion. Is that
fair?
Mr. Pistole. That's correct.
Senator Begich. OK. I apologize. I had no interest in
talking about this issue. Again, as a mayor who managed public
safety officers, I can tell you, again, their number-one goal
is to keep the public safe.
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Begich. Period. And so, I just take a little
exception to the debate that just went on.
But, let me get to very specific Alaskan issues, if I can,
as we talked about. And one of them was the whole issue of the
TWIC cards and how--the transportation issue. We talked a
little about that; I want to just make sure we have this
conversation on the record.
Mr. Pistole. Sure.
Senator Begich. And that is, the complication for people in
rural Alaska to get those--that next step, where they have to
get the card personally delivered to them, which in some cases
could be very expensive to fly to go to the next location to
get that, and/or time commitment.
We talked about some ideas of trying to utilize technology
in this way, of understanding the need to make sure the safety
is cleared, the right person gets the card.
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Begich. I want to reiterate the point, but also
make sure you and I are on the same page, that you would be
willing to look at innovative ways to ensure that they get
these cards, that the security is there, but this expensive
back-and-forth traveling--may be an opportunity to avoid that
with some new technologies. Is that a fair----
Mr. Pistole. Yes. Senator, I--if confirmed, I look forward
to working with you and the Committee on that issue, to make
sure that the best business model's in practice, and the latest
technologies are used--again, while ensuring the safety and
security of those guards and the workers is paramount.
Senator Begich. Also, we talked about the whole issue of
when Anchorage Airport went into a full--right after 9/11, kind
of, almost volunteered to upgrade their facilities, in advance
of all the regulation and everything put into place. But,
they're--they did it because they were remodeling--renovating
the airport, as well as others around the country. And there
are a few of these airports, similar situation, where they
expended money, but the TSA, now, has not reimbursed them,
after multiple years. Is this an area you would look into and
help us try to figure out a resolution?
Mr. Pistole. Yes, Senator. I would look into that.
Senator Begich. OK. The last one is just a general comment.
And you and I had a conversation on this, and that is just the
whole issue of the uniqueness of aviation in Alaska. Would it
be fair, in our conversation we had, that there is some
differences, but you have to see them as they lay out--but, in
rural Alaska, rural states, having a full-blown TSA--for
example--I'll just use an example I used in--with you--was in a
village, like Chevak, which--very small--that maybe there needs
to be not one-size-fits-all, but an understanding of rural
internal state travel, and how TSA can be more customer
friendly in that regard. Is that a fair----
Mr. Pistole. That's fair, Senator. And, if confirmed, I
look forward, again, to working with you and the Committee as
to those issues, how we can tailor the appropriate resources at
the respective airports.
Senator Begich. Excellent. Last comment. And, again, I look
forward--I know you've been to Palmer, you've been there for a
little while.
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Senator Begich. You went there for a short bit. I look
forward to trying to bring you up to Alaska, and we'll go visit
one of those villages.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator, appreciate it.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
The Chairman. Mr. Pistole, I warn you that the Senator who
just spoke is obsessed, and properly so, with Alaska. And you
will see him and hear from him often.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Pistole. That's----
The Chairman. Senator Warner.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK WARNER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm not sure my good friend and colleague is simply
obsessed with Alaska, he's obsessed with a lot of things.
[Laughter.]
Senator Warner. So, I--you know.
Mr. Pistole, it's good to see you again. And let me----
Mr. Pistole. Senator.
Senator Warner.--make a couple of----
Mr. Pistole. Likewise.
Senator Warner.--quick comments. One, I think you've got
the absolute right background for this position.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Warner. And I enjoyed visiting with you yesterday.
And obviously you've had a history of public service. And to be
willing to step into this breach, considering the challenges of
this job, and the past challenges of some of the nominees, I'm,
again, grateful for your willingness to step forward.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Warner. And Senator Begich already raised one of
the issues that I was going to raise. I, too, have one of those
airports that did the right thing, relied upon TSA assertions,
that if you go ahead and upgrade next-generation security
facilities during the middle of a remodeling effort, that makes
good business sense. And then, when they came to get
reimbursed, those dollars haven't been there. So, I look
forward to hearing the same kind of response, as well. And this
is probably one of those ecumenical issues, I imagine. I've got
colleagues on the other side of the aisle who've got this same
issue.
Let me also reassert what I think the Chairman has
mentioned, what I think all our colleagues believe, is that
your number-one job is to make sure that your TSA employees
ensure the safety of the homeland, the safety of our traveling
public, both domestic and foreign, and clearly a--my
conversations with you and reviewing your background, you've
got that expertise.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Warner. But, I do believe there is another piece to
this, and we raised this yesterday, and I want to just take
another moment on it. And that is--you've got--you'll have
close to 50,000 employees. And in many ways, this is the--these
employees are the first impression----
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Warner.--that visitors coming to our country
interact with. It's also a required intersection with all of
the domestic traveling public. And I don't think, again, I'm
going to be alone in this issue, but I constantly hear
complaints about mistreatment of the traveling public by TSA
officers.
I recently received a letter from a constituent who
described a incident of waiting literally 40 minutes in a
screening line at Dulles. And he described the TSA officers as
surly and inappropriate. He said they had no consideration of
folks waiting in line. And again, as we discussed, I think most
Americans realize that the--in--the privilege of flying will
require the privilege--or--and the requirement of additional
screening in a post-9/11 world. But, that requirement can be
done in a manner that is--doesn't have to be surly. I think one
of the challenges you're going to have in this requirement is
making sure that customer service----
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Warner.--not to be trumped by security. Security
always has to trump. But, customer service has to be a
component of your TSA officers.
And what I think added insult to injury--and again,
probably most of my colleagues have flown out of Dulles
recently--we've spent literally tens of millions of dollars on
a new security mezzanine, and it's more than a bit frustrating
for the traveling public to get carted and shuttled down to
this new security mezzanine, with lots and lots of gates, and
see, then, those gates woefully understaffed and--this is
repeated comments--sometimes staffed by folks who are surly
and--there's the ``surly and inappropriate behavior,'' the
comments of my constituent. And these folks have got a job to
do, but they can do it in a way that, I think, both doesn't
mitigate their security concerns, actually would enhance the
security concerns if they feel cooperation from the traveling
public, as well as the role of this first impression that comes
about with our--with many of our foreign travelers.
So, what steps would you take to ensure appropriate
staffing, to ensure that, as you buildup this esprit de corps
at the TSA--you've got a new agency with a lot of burdens--that
customer service is part of that?
Mr. Pistole. Sure.
Senator Warner. Civil servants ought to act in a civil
manner.
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Warner. And what kind of metrics could we, as the
oversight committee, look to you, as you get into this role, to
make sure that we're seeing that kind of progress, both in
terms of staffing, morale, and in the customer service area?
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator. And I would just start off
by saying I agree with all of your statements in terms of--
customer service has to be part and parcel of the security
mission, and that oftentimes you can accomplish more through
better customer service than the type of conduct that you
described, which, if confirmed, my expectation and clear
direction would be to focus on those issues.
I think everybody recognizes, in this room and any of the
traveling public, that the TSOs have a challenging job. Some
would say it's very challenging, with limited reward, you know,
only recognized if something bad happens, which is not a good
metric.
So, what I want to do, if confirmed, is work with the human
resources people of TSA and the Department to assess what the
current metrics are. I, frankly, don't know right now.
Obviously, throughput is one of those key issues. How many
people can get through the screening in there--with their
carry-on bags, those things, and what makes sense. And so, I
will, if confirmed, look forward to working with the Committee,
to be informed by, perhaps, expectations, managing those
expectations, and then trying to work, again, through the
training and retraining of TSOs and other TSA personnel to make
sure that their role in this layered security apparatus that we
have in the United States makes sense, that we don't have undue
interruptions to the commerce or free flow of business and of
people and goods, while still maintaining that security that
you mentioned.
So, I look forward to, again, if confirmed, working with
you and the Committee on those issues.
Senator Warner. Well, thank you, Mr. Pistole. And I'd,
again, want to say thank you for being willing to step up. This
is going to be a--I think, a bit more multidimensional
challenge. You bring the security background, I think, and
great expertise. But, as we discussed yesterday, I think
there's going to be a lot of management components of this
challenge that I look forward to working with you on.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator Warner.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Senator Thune.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Deputy Director
Pistole. Appreciate your willingness----
The Chairman. Senator Thune.
Senator Thune.--and interest in serving as Administrator of
the TSA.
Like a number of my colleagues, I've been concerned, with
the Administration's long delay in filling what, in my view, is
a very top position. This is even before Mr. Southers and
General Harding withdrew their names from consideration. With
your longstanding service to our Nation at the FBI, I think you
would bring an important perspective to TSA when it comes to
strengthening security for the traveling public.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you.
Senator Thune. And so, we welcome your interest and
willingness to serve.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you.
Senator Thune. There's no question that we face a lot of
challenges, going forward, when it comes to addressing the
changing terrorist threats. A couple of challenges that I
believe TSA is faced with include complacency from the general
public, and, second, the need to bolster security protocols, as
was witnessed by the December bombing attempt in Detroit; and
the recent New York City incident, in which Mr. Shahzad almost
fled the country after purchasing a one- way ticket to Dubai.
So, clearly, there are lots of challenges still out there.
It's going to be always hard to--we're always asking for some
of our agencies to do more with less. And I wanted to get at
one issue and get your response to it, because the budget
request for TSA is $8.16 billion for this year, which is a 6.6-
percent increase over Fiscal Year 2010. And I think, as you
know, on Tuesday the White House issued a directive, to all
agency heads, to trim at least 5 percent from their budgets.
And the question I have has to do with an award that was
recently issued by the TSA. It was an IT services contract that
was $52 million more expensive than the lower bid from a
contractor with almost the same technical solution ratings.
Now, given the fiscal crisis that our country is facing, does
this make sense for taxpayers?
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator. I'm not familiar with that
particular contract. I was not privy to any of those dealings,
yet. I am still dealing with the FBI budget, frankly, and all
those issues. But, if confirmed, obviously that is one of the
key areas, to make sure that taxpayer dollars are being wisely
invested in the proper tools and technology to do the things
that we need to do to protect the traveling public. So, yes, I
pledge to work with the Committee on those issues, bring a
sense of strong fiscal responsibility to this position.
Senator Thune. OK. I would appreciate, as you undertake to
do that, looking at the procurement process. And I'll just give
you a little more background on this, since you're not
acquainted with it. I hope that it's something you can kind of
dig into. But, it's a contract that appears to be very poorly
handled. It has been going on for more than a couple of years.
It has been the subject of at least two successful protests,
and a third is pending with the GAO. During the course of those
protests the GAO found that there were irregularities in the
acquisition process. And in addition, due to the length of time
that has passed since the proposal for IT services was first
issues--issued, it's my understanding that the scope of work
sought by TSA may not accurately reflect its current needs.
So, there has been a long tail on this thing. It has been
in the works, as I said, for a couple of years. And I would
hope that--it seems, to me at least, that, given the excess
cost for the current contract award, and the flaws in the
solicitation process, that TSA ought to take a--undertake a
fresh, independent review of this procurement, and report back
to Congress on plans to address concerns about the procurement,
and plans to improve that acquisition process. So, I hope that
we can count on you.
As I mentioned earlier, these are hard times, you know,
fiscally for the country. We're dealing with unprecedented
levels of deficit spending and debt. And when you hear stories
like this----
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Thune.--it doesn't do anything to bolster the
public's confidence in their government and its ability to make
sure that they are being good stewards of America's tax
dollars. So, I appreciate your following up on that, and hope
that we can continue to work with you and try and bring a
resolution to this that's acceptable and that's in the best
interest of the taxpayers.
I know you don't have extensive background when it comes to
the aviation sector, in particular, but I'd like to know a
little bit more about what you see as the TSA's role when it
comes to general aviation, including smaller airports in places
like South Dakota and across the country.
There is no question, I think, that these--that--you know,
we hear this all the time from those who use airports, from a
general aviation standpoint. And obviously we've got a lot of
commercial travelers. But, how do you see the TSA interacting
and dealing with the general aviation community and the issues
that they're concerned about with regard to safety?
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator. And I think it's back to
the--my early statement about TSA being a threat- based,
intelligence-driven agency with that national security mission
in mind, and trying to answer the daily question, How do we
manage the risk? So, with general aviation, clearly it becomes
of--What are the risks associated with general aviation? We
know of a number of interests by terrorists of using what may
be seen as a softer protective screen, if you will, on general
aviation than commercial aviation. And so, it's something that
I need to review all the latest threat assessments to see what
information--or what has already been done, and then try to
make some informed judgments--again, with the fiscal restraints
that you mentioned--recognizing you can't be all things to all
people at all times in all places. So, how do we allocate those
limited resources in a meaningful fashion based on risk?
But, I look forward to working with you and the Committee
as to that--those issues.
Senator Thune. OK.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I see my time's expired.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Thune.
And when you hear of examples, like you mentioned, it's
important to tell the Committee about it, because we're not
aware of that.
Senator Thune. OK.
The Chairman. So, that would be helpful.
Senator Thune. We will certainly do that, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. All right.
Senator LeMieux.
STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE S. LeMIEUX,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I want to say, Mr. Pistole, thank you for your
service; not just your willingness to submit yourself for this
position, but your service with the FBI since 1983.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator.
Senator LeMieux. And I want to take a moment, if I may, to
thank your wife and your daughters. We all----
Mr. Pistole. Appreciate that.
Senator LeMieux.--serve with the support of our family. And
you've made sacrifices, but they've made sacrifices, too. So--
--
Mr. Pistole. Absolutely.
Senator LeMieux.--thank you----
Mr. Pistole. Appreciate that, Senator.
Senator LeMieux.--for the partnership that they have
provided for you.
I think you've got great credentials for this job. I
enjoyed our meeting the other day. You and I spoke a lot about
technology. And I want to echo my colleague from South Dakota's
comments about using technology for purposes of efficiency.
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator LeMieux. We've heard about long lines in our
airports in Orlando and Miami. And there's a lot of concern
about the modernization of the way that the TSA employees work,
whether they are on overtime, because they're not using,
perhaps, the best technology possible.
So, I look forward to you reviewing those contracts and
systems and evaluations, to make sure we're doing the best
thing possible. And know I have your commitment to do that.
Mr. Pistole. Absolutely, Senator. I look forward to doing
that.
Senator LeMieux. Also on technology, you know, we spoke
about this issue, and we've talked about it here at this
committee before, when we were evaluating some of the folks
that came before you, and that is--is the general frustration
that the American people have that an 85-year-old grandmother
or, you know, my 5-year-old child will be pulled aside for a
lot of extra screening, or delayed, when we know that more
than, you know, 90 percent of our threats are from Islamic
extremists. And we need to do a better job of protecting
against those who are going to do danger to us, and trying to
speed other people through who pose no danger to the American
people.
And I know that there are laws in place that--as we
discussed, that tie our hands, in some extent, about how we can
use predictive modeling technology and things like that. But, I
would like for you, just on the record, to express your
commitment that we're going to try to use technology, we're
going to look to what other countries, like Israel, are doing.
They've got, apparently, software that they're using now that
checks the stress on people. They use a lot of just personal
interaction with the folks who get on the plane, to try to
qualify them.
And I just want to get your commitment----
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Senator LeMieux.--on the record, that we're going to look
for innovative ways so that the average American traveler, who
presents no threat, is going to be able to get through quicker,
but we are going to provide the scrutiny we need on those who
might actually endanger our country.
Mr. Pistole. Well, thank you, Senator LeMieux, and I
appreciate your focus on technology. We know there's a lot out
there. It's a question of the right technology with the right
application at the right time. And with TSA being part of that
layered security, my hope and goal is to make sure that
intelligence will help inform those decisions and judgments as
to what that right technology is--going back to Christmas Day,
that concealment method and--that we discussed.
But, clearly, I believe that technology has to inform and
enable those functions. I had the opportunity to meet with Dr.
Tara O'Toole from DHS S&T, the Science and Technology
directorate, last week to have some of these discussions about
what is the technology that the Department, the agency, is
looking at. I had a opportunity to have a demonstration out at
the integration facility, just south of Reagan Airport, the TSA
has to do some of the testing of the equipment, the enhanced
imaging technology, before it's deployed, and then had the
opportunity to have that demonstration.
But, again, with all the great work that, for example, the
Israelis do, in terms of the behavior detection, obviously TSA
does that as part of that layered security. If there is
technology that helps enable that, in terms of information--
obviously, in the FBI we have behavioral analysis experts who
focus on those type things. Again, all enabled by, not
encumbered by, technology. So, I look forward to working with
you on that.
Senator LeMieux. I appreciate that. And I know that you
have a focus on it.
And it's very important, Mr. Chairman, because we have so
many millions of people traveling through this country every
month, and we have to do what Senator Warner said, which is--
these folks have to be involved in customer service, too.
I appreciate the fact, now, that it seems like the TSA
folks are trying to be more friendly. I appreciate the fact
that, when you're traveling with a family, like I did back down
to Florida this week, with four kids, that there was a separate
line for families that are traveling with a baby, and all those
kinds of things. I appreciate that.
And, you know, the balance you have is to keep us safe----
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator LeMieux.--but to not burden our civil liberties,
and to try to get us through the airports as quickly as
possible. So----
Mr. Pistole. Agreed.
Senator LeMieux.--if you can continue to focus on the
customer service aspect, on the one hand, and then going after
the actual people who threaten us, on the other, I think that
would be a great focus for you.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator LeMieux.
Senator LeMieux. OK.
Mr. Pistole. Look forward to it, if confirmed.
Senator LeMieux. Yes, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator LeMieux.
Mr. Pistole, I'm going to ask the next question. I have to
then do something.
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
The Chairman. Senator Dorgan, will be the chairman, which
he probably ought to be anyway----
[Laughter.]
The Chairman.--and will carry the hearing.
I want to just go on with what Senator LeMieux was saying,
because the tradeoff, really, with the American people is that
we're going to put you to a certain amount of inconvenience,
and that inconvenience is usually related to the last
incident----
Mr. Pistole. That's right.
The Chairman.--as opposed to forward-looking. The tradeoff
is that in return, we're going to give you good service, and
friendly service, and fast service--and especially fast
service--but thorough. The technology helps on that.
Mr. Pistole. Right.
The Chairman. I've been through a lot of airports where
there have been thumbprints and other things that simply aren't
being used.
I want to go to what Senator Warner said about Dulles
Airport. It's one of the most frustrating experiences I've ever
been through. When you walk a half a mile, then take a train
for half a mile to go up and down and all over, then you're
really confronted with, like, 15 or 20 different stations for
people to go through, and only two of them are manned, and it
takes 45 minutes. That's not carrying out the bargain that you
do for security. And, in fact, it probably rushes security. It
may have the opposite effect.
So, for my first question of you, is that a solvable
problem? I mean, I don't do a great deal of travel. I can't
talk about Los Angeles Airport or San Francisco Airport and all
the rest of them. I normally deal, as does Senator Dorgan and
Senator Begich, with small airports, and everything is fine.
But, there has got to be a solution to that. I mean, we can't
have that Dulles syndrome. And I'm assuming, if it's there,
that it's in other places.
The deal is, you get tougher security----
Mr. Pistole. Right.
The Chairman.--and you get tougher technology. In return
for that, you get better service and friendly service, and
that's a fair deal. We're not upholding--at least at those
airports that I can think of--that deal.
How do you do that with the budget cuts that may come your
way that Senator Thune mentioned? I mean, do you have enough
money to sufficiently staff other stations. I can't tell you
the anger of, not just your Chairman here, but of all the
people in both lines, muttering as they looked in both
directions, seeing all kinds of unopened lines.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You've obviously
touched on a very significant issue. And, in the course of this
process, I've had the opportunity to hear some personal--both--
positive stories, but some very frustrating times, including
one of a certain Senator who had a 2-hour wait recently. Very
frustrating. Just in terms of the economic impact and the
inefficiencies of that.
So, I think the staffing issue, again, has to be informed
by the intelligence, because we have to make sure that the
people who are doing it--making those staffing decisions are
informed by the intelligence, and then have a good business
model for what they're doing.
So, if confirmed, what I pledge to do is work with the
Committee in making sure there are metrics in place, because I
believe that what gets measured gets done. And if we're not
paying attention to those type of things, such--what's the
throughput rate--and I believe those things are--but, I just
don't have enough information at this point, other than to say
it is one of my top priorities to look at, because the customer
service has to be positive to keep the American public engaged
while keeping the security at the forefront.
The Chairman. I understand that.
I'm going to ask one more question, which you can answer,
and one more that you can think about.
You go to another part of Dulles Airport, which is where
general aviation lands--Senator Thune brought this up--and
there's nothing. There are no waiting lines. Nobody is checking
identity. You just carry whatever you have. You walk out. You
walk on. There are no scanners that you walk through. That is
the majority of airplanes in the air at any given time.
I'm not talking about crop dusters, I'm talking about, some
kinds of King Airs, and certainly jets. And they are the
majority of the flights that are using our antiquated, air
traffic control system as we try to build a new one. They don't
participate in this. They've done little things, but, they're a
very tight group, and it's very easy for them to make phone
calls to the Finance Committee and to this committee and shut
down any effort to make them spend more money. Now, they're
doing a little bit more this year, but not much. Are you ready
to take that on, because nobody else has been?
Mr. Pistole. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Obviously, if
confirmed, I would look forward to engaging the general
aviation community, in terms of what they see as the best
approach, in terms of risk management, recognizing that they
have a vested interest in a certain process, but also
recognizing that threats can come from general aviation
aircraft, such as we saw in February, with the IRS building in
Austin, Texas. We know of other, well, terrorist groups who
have expressed interest, as you mentioned, in crop dusters,
different things. So, if it's a vulnerability that's not being
addressed, that's what I want to make a determination of and
then look forward to working with you and the Committee to find
ways forward to address those issues.
The Chairman. So, that is a strong yes----
Mr. Pistole. That is----
The Chairman.--answer?
Mr. Pistole.--a yes.
The Chairman. You will not, years from now, have failed to
address that and change the behavior of general aviation?
Mr. Pistole. Yes----
The Chairman. Remember they can make phone calls. And, boy,
when they make phone calls, everybody just bows down, except me
and a few others here. And it's unfair, it's an unjust matter.
I'll leave my other question and turn the chair over to
Senator Dorgan.
And I thank you. I will certainly be voting for you. And
I'd, incidentally, say, out of turn perhaps, that we'll be
having an off-the-floor markup on your nomination, next week.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
STATEMENT OF HON. BYRON L. DORGAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH DAKOTA
Senator Dorgan [presiding]. Mr. Chairman, thank you very
much.
And, Mr. Pistole, I'm going to be supporting your
nomination. I think you have a----
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Dorgan.--set of credentials that is sorely needed
at TSA. And I think all of us on this committee would believe
that that has been vacant far too long, for a number of
circumstances. But, it is a critically important position.
You know, decades ago, you used to just go to the airport
and walk onto an airplane when they told you it was time. A lot
of younger Americans have never experienced that. But, you just
boarded an airplane. And then they began to hijack airplanes,
particularly to Cuba, but some other locations, as well. And
pretty soon they started screening passengers to make sure they
didn't have a weapon when they got on. And the screening has
become more intensive and more intrusive.
And nowadays, of course, the challenges of screening are
pretty substantial. All of us have watched a 6-year-old child
be wanded at an airport someplace, or a Catholic nun being
intensively screened. You know, and so you watch those things,
and you just shake your head.
On the other hand, we understand we want to get on an
airplane that is free of weapons----
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Dorgan.--and that is not likely to be commandeered
or hijacked or threatened.
So, there is this issue of inconvenience. Screening is an
inconvenience.
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Dorgan. The question is how much. And can we do the
job that's necessary for screening, while--and protect the
American people and protect the traveling public--while
reducing the inconvenience to the extent possible?
And, as Senator Rockefeller indicated, we traditionally
protect against the last attack and the last mode of attack.
You know, we found out that you could put a bomb in a shoe, and
so we start taking off our shoes. Not until then did we start
taking off our shoes, but then we did. We found that they can
put a bomb in underwear; that has not resulted in specific
actions. But, you know, we're continuing to--I wasn't trying to
be funny there----
[Laughter.]
Senator Dorgan.--I was--as I was thinking about it. We're--
--
Mr. Pistole. I think minds were wondering somewhere----
Senator Dorgan. Yes.
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
[Laughter.]
Senator Dorgan. And bottles of--3 ounces of----
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Dorgan.--liquid. And we're----
Mr. Pistole. That's right.
Senator Dorgan.--continuing to try to address the things we
now see can happen.
So, I want to ask you a series of questions.
Mr. Pistole. Yes, sir.
Senator Dorgan. Number one, you said that you were involved
in the investigation of Northwest 253, which occurred at
Christmastime, with a man that boarded an airplane destined for
the United States with a bomb in his underwear. And I want to
ask you, as you looked at that, tell me what you think the
failings were. I have a notion of a fair number of failings.
But, what did you sense--as someone who was involved in the
investigations, what were the failings?
Mr. Pistole. Well, Senator, I think there were--there was a
lot of information that was out there, in terms of the
intelligence-community collection. Unfortunately, none of it
was dispositive or specific enough to say, ``This individual is
currently posing a threat.'' And so, the challenge that--which
I think has been reviewed and discussed at some length--is, How
do we ensure, as a U.S. Government, that all those holdings of
information--even including, perhaps, the misspelling of a
name, as has happened with AbdulMutallab, or the timely sharing
of information to the decisionmakers who have to ensure--for
example, should a visa be revoked, on the one hand, should the
person be on a No Fly or Selectee list, on the other hand? What
is the other intelligence about their--about the origin? Is
there any intelligence about the type of device?
So, those are three key areas that I think that the U.S.
Government identified and is working at addressing.
Senator Dorgan. Well, let me just ask more specifically.
This is a potential terrorist whose father went to American
authorities and pointed at his son----
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Dorgan.--and said, ``This guy is potentially
troublesome''----
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Dorgan.--``hanging around with people that are
difficult, probably terrorists.''
Mr. Pistole. He's concerned about him, right.
Senator Dorgan. So--that's right. A father points to his
son----
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Dorgan.--and tells American authorities, ``Watch
this.''
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Dorgan. As a result of that, he is not put on a No
Fly List. He does not have an open visa that is revoked. So,
those are two major failures, it----
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Dorgan.--seems to me. And it might have been
spelling, it might have been something else, it might have been
people asleep at the desks, up and down the line. But then, in
addition to that, in addition to somebody saying, ``Here's the
guy. Watch him,'' and we don't watch him, then he gets to an
airport with a bomb in his underwear. So, how does he get
through a screening at an airport with a bomb in underwear?
Mr. Pistole. As we know, Senator, from going back over all
of the information we have, and through the debriefings of Mr.
Abdulmutallab, of course, who has cooperated since that time,
he was able to get through the screening in Amsterdam, Schiphol
Airport. He went through a screening, but, because of the
concealment technique that was used, where he had never touched
it, so explosive trace detection equipment, even if they'd done
it on his hands, would not have picked up any explosives,
because he had not touched it, and there were no metallic
parts, obviously--this was a chemical TAP--TATP/PETN
combination----
Senator Dorgan. Tell us what those letters mean.
Mr. Pistole. Yes. Triacetone triperoxide is the initiator.
And when the passengers on the plane heard what they described
as firecrackers, that was actually--there's actually a
precursor, glycol--it's a--KMNnO is the chemical composition--
initiator that goes into the TAPT. That was what--when people
described firecrackers, that's what the--it was the TAPT
initiating. And then the main charge is a PETN--and I don't
recall what all that stands for--but, it's a common explosive
device, not dissimilar to C4, for example, for----
Senator Dorgan. Right.
Mr. Pistole.--military use. So, it was--we were very, very
fortunate that the main charge of PETN, which was nearly double
the amount that Richard Reid had in his shoe, that you
mentioned, shoe bomb from December of 2001. We did some
testing, afterwards, of Richard Reid, and--on an unpressurized
fuselage of a plane, would have blown a hole about this big in
the side of the fuselage, unpressurized. And, of course, you
know, pressurized--Abdulmutallab had nearly twice that amount.
And so, obviously, the damage would have been much more
significant, probably causing catastrophic failure to that
aircraft.
So, that is the challenge of, How do we work with our
international partners to make sure that they have the latest
technology, techniques, and training, that, if flights are
going to come into the U.S., that they apply the same standards
that we have? And I know Secretary Napolitano and the Deputy
Secretary Jane Lute have been engaged in a worldwide effort in
that regard, to engage our foreign partners, to ensure that
those standards are similar, if not better than the U.S.
standards for anybody coming in. And so, that's been one of the
challenges since Christmas Day. And, if confirmed, I look
forward to working with our international partners, both in the
security and law enforcement services, but, obviously, the
aviation industry, to make sure those screening standards are
up to the U.S. standards.
Senator Dorgan. All right. I have additional questions, but
I'll wait and ask in another round.
Senator Hutchison.
Senator Hutchison. No further questions.
Senator Dorgan. Senator Begich, do you have additional
questions?
Senator Begich. No further questions.
Senator Dorgan. Well, then let me continue on this issue of
the screen. Because, again, a father says, ``Here's the guy.''
Mr. Pistole. Yes. Yes.
Senator Dorgan. And we miss a bunch of opportunities to
revoke a visa and put on a No Fly List this person that's been
identified, reasonably so, for us. And then he gets through a
screen because he's done whatever he has done with this
concealed bomb to mask its image on a screen and to not have
metal parts to it.
Let me ask about the prevalence of the capability of the
screening devices at most airports, both here and abroad, to
detect exactly what went through a screen undetected at
Christmastime.
Mr. Pistole. Sure, Senator. Obviously, the X-ray machines,
the typical ones that you see at most airports, would not pick
up the type of device he used, because there are no metal parts
to it. The new advanced imaging technology machines would give
a much better opportunity, because there would be an anomaly
identified in--hopefully--that's one of the things that--need
to make sure that the training is up to speed, so if an anomaly
is detected, then a further patdown or other additional
screening would be appropriate. It--again, it's a----
Senator Dorgan. But, those are not in use, largely, at this
point.
Mr. Pistole. There are--have been a number of the
enhanced--the AIT machines deployed through U.S. airports.
There's a plan for, I believe, 450 by the end of the year.
But--I have to check my numbers on that--but, it's something
that--there is a plan to do that, all the while addressing
whether that it is focusing on yesterday's threat, and they've
now developed a new threat. And so, we have to make sure the
intelligence is helping inform the latest R&D, research and
development, for the best technology to defeat other types of
threats.
Senator Dorgan. But, some of the 9/11 conspirators,
terrorists, they went to a small airport in Maine to board an
airplane, never again then to have to go through a screening
process.
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Dorgan. And when you talk about deploying 400, the
question is, Will the entrance into the system, from a small
airport in a remote area, detect or catch that circumstance?
Mr. Pistole. You're absolutely right, Senator. Obviously,
Muhammad Atta and his three coconspirators, who flew from
Portland, Maine, to Boston Logan the morning of 9/11, had
considered, we believe, the greater possibility, not
necessarily from a screening perspective, but from the
suspicious-activity-behavior perspective. As opposed to having
a larger group flying from Boston Logan on two flights, they
decided to have four go from Portland, Maine, to look less
suspicious. But screening's a key part of this, Senator.
Senator Dorgan. And let me ask you about screening, and
especially the issue of body imaging.
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Senator Dorgan. Have you seen the examples of the most
sophisticated body imaging? And give me your evaluation of
that, in the context of being a husband, a father, a citizen--
--
Mr. Pistole. Sure.
Senator Dorgan.--and then also in the context of being
someone who wants to see everything about anybody that goes on
an airplane, in order to keep a weapon off that plane.
Mr. Pistole. Well, that's right. I mean--and you've hit on
that tension, that dynamic that we--that TSA and the government
is dealing with.
Yes, I have had a demonstration of the screening equipment
and the privacy steps that are currently employed. Obviously,
having screener, who never sees a person, reviewing the image
in a separate room; the person who is physically engaging the
passenger never sees that image; and that image is deleted
immediately after that person is cleared. So, there are privacy
issue--or privacy safeguards built in. That being said, some
people are concerned about--you know, they're modest and would
not want that. At this point, that type of an enhanced--or the
AIT screening, the enhanced imaging technology, is optional.
So, people, if they don't want to go through that, they can go
through the traditional metal detector, wanding, patdown, as
appropriate.
So, I think it's the best technology available, for right
now, trying to balance the security with the privacy issues.
But, if confirmed, I look--would look forward to working with
the Committee, in terms of, Are we using the best approach?--
again, both from a training, techniques, and technology
perspective.
Senator Dorgan. You're going to be confronted with that
issue a lot, I think, as we try to determine, What is it we
implement that further strengthens our ability to detect a
weapon?
Let me ask the issue of trying to move frequent flyers
through these lines. As you know, there was a company that was
called Clear that started up and was established. Are you
familiar with that at all?
Mr. Pistole. I've had some briefings on it.
Senator Dorgan. Yes.
Mr. Pistole. I have a little bit of information about it.
Senator Dorgan. That company took applications from people,
measured their--they got their background, and measured their--
the iris of their eyes, took their fingerprints, and so on, and
that way, when that person who signed up paid a fee, went
through the screening line, with their fingerprints and so on,
immediately they determined, ``All right. We know that person.
That person is in the system. That person's a Presbyterian
minister from Herreid, South Dakota, or whatever. We know this
person.''
Mr. Pistole. Yes,
Senator Dorgan. Fingerprints, iris, and so on.
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Dorgan. That company, however, I believe, went
bankrupt. And do you know whether there are other efforts in
the private sector or public sector to try to address the
question of someone who flies twice every week, that's their
job, as a----
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Dorgan.--salesperson or representative, and who
perhaps we can know much better and move through much more
quickly? I'm not talking about----
Mr. Pistole. Sure.
Senator Dorgan.--Members of Congress, here. I'm talking
about----
Mr. Pistole. No. No. Understood.
Senator Dorgan.--people who are salesmen and others that
fly all the time.
Mr. Pistole. Right. Yes. I understand there are some
efforts underway in the private sector to replicate that
business model and to make sure that the messaging is accurate
so it's--people realize that they're still going to through
screening----
Senator Dorgan. Right.
Mr. Pistole.--it more a concierge service, if you will, of
being able to go--with that trusted ID and identification
system to expedite that process. So, if confirmed, I would
obviously look into that and see if there are viable ways of
doing that--again, ensuring the safety of the traveling public.
Senator Dorgan. One last question, if I might. Let's assume
that you are confirmed, in a matter of days, and you, at long,
long last, assume this role, because it has been vacant far too
long. What is your most immediate and urgent concern as you
turn your attention to running this agency?
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator. So, one of the first
things I did when I was nominated was to meet at TSA
headquarters and get a threat briefing, an intelligence
briefing. So, my top priority is making sure that TSA has the
latest intelligence, threat information, and is making informed
judgments as to how to allocate their resources. So, that's the
top priority, followed very closely by addressing workforce
development issues, as I mentioned; and then, third, engaging
all stakeholders in the business of TSA to make sure that they
know that their voice can be heard and that all the issues that
they are dealing with will be addressed by TSA.
Senator Dorgan. And I said one last question. Let me ask
one more, if I might. Could you submit to us--I'll submit a
question in----
Mr. Pistole. Sure.
Senator Dorgan.--writing on the issue of soft targets.
Terrorists, obviously----
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Dorgan.--take a look at the target opportunities to
commit an act of terrorism in our country, and they see what we
would consider hard targets--that is, the targets we are now
protecting very substantially--and then they see soft targets,
where our attention is not there, because we've not experienced
the same threat there. And I'd like to ask if you might--from
the standpoint of transportation----
Mr. Pistole. Sure.
Senator Dorgan.--give us your estimate of, What are the
lists of soft targets that concern you, and that are going to
require your attention? I think--I won't ask that publicly
here. I think I'll ask that you submit that to us----
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Dorgan.--in writing, if you would.
Mr. Pistole. Be glad to do that, Senator. I've seen a
number of classified reports, as you indicate, both by the DHS
and the Intelligence Analysis Group, also by--within the FBI
and the National Counterterrorism Center--have all done
collaborative work in that regard. And, as you know, there are
a number of soft targets out there.
Senator Dorgan. All right. Well, let me join others who
have thanked your family for lending you for some public
service here for a while.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator. Much appreciated.
Senator Dorgan. And I--as I said, I will be a strong
supporter of your nomination. Hope that we can move this with
great speed, because it is long overdue.
The deadlines for questions to be submitted for the record
for this nomination will be 6 p.m. on Friday.
And--anything, finally, Senator Hutchison?
Senator Hutchison. Thank you very much, Mr. Pistole.
Senator Dorgan. If not, we thank you, Mr. Pistole, for
being with us today.
This hearing is----
Mr. Pistole. Thank you very much, Senator. Appreciate your
support.
Senator Dorgan. This hearing's adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:28 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Daniel K. Inouye to
John S. Pistole
Question 1. As you are aware, almost everyone who flies has
experienced, or knows someone who has experienced, an unpleasant
encounter with TSA employees. Yet, while security should be TSA's top
priority, it may not be necessary to treat any and every traveler as a
security threat. What quality measures do you propose to take to insure
higher vigilance of TSA inspection teams, in order to curtail these
often-recounted ``horror stories''?
Answer. While security will always remain our top priority, if
confirmed, I am fully committed to ensuring that TSA takes into account
the needs of travelers and businesses on all modes of transportation.
If confirmed, I will make it clear throughout the agency that all TSA
employees must ensure the respectful treatment of the traveling public
while fulfilling their critical duties of protecting the Nation's
aviation system. I will also work with TSA's human capital leadership
to assess ways in which TSA can improve its customer service--through
enhanced training, drills, and strengthened oversight, among other
strategies.
Question 2. Hawaii has the distinction of being the most isolated
group of islands in the world. It is 6 hours behind us here on the East
Coast, and 3 hours behind the West Coast. Given its distance from other
states and the high volume of travelers from diverse countries we
welcome every day, how do you propose maintaining the service TSA
provides for Hawaii in the event that a threat occurs?
Answer. I understand that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
recently issued its Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, which
identified ensuring the Nation's resilience to terrorist attacks,
natural disasters and other threats, as a critical mission of the
agency. If confirmed, I will work with DHS, TSA's program offices and
stakeholders to incorporate resilience and protection throughout the
Nation's transportation networks, including in Hawaii.
Question 3. If given the opportunity, how would you propose
expanding TSA's focus from reactionary (in response to the threat of a
shoe bomb, we are now asked to send our shoes through TSA's X-ray
machines; similarly, in response to the threat of liquid bombs, we are
asked to limit our carry-on liquids to under three ounces), to
proactive? Is such a thing possible within the limits of TSA's scope
and duties?
Answer. I understand that the technology experts at TSA, the
Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate,
and their counterparts at the Department of Energy and its National
Laboratories are currently working together to ensure that we have the
best technology available to respond to new and emerging threats. If
confirmed, I will work with these and other officials within TSA, DHS,
the Department of Energy, and other Federal Government agencies to
evaluate our existing systems to ensure we remain ahead of our
adversaries in anticipating potential future vulnerabilities.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Bill Nelson to
John S. Pistole
Question 1. How do you feel about registered traveler programs? If
you support them, will you work with the industry to facilitate a safe,
thorough, expedited way for pre-screened travelers to go through
airport security going forward, and for their personal information to
be protected?
Answer. At this point, I have not yet had the opportunity to fully
evaluate the registered traveler programs. However, if confirmed, I
will review these programs in depth. My goal is to ensure that
intelligence informs decisions, so we can enhance our focus on the
threat, while protecting the privacy of the American public.
Question 2. When implementing safety and security rules and
policies for general aviation, will you continue to work with the GA
community to ensure that those rules are appropriate and feasible?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely and
continuing TSA's collaboration with the general aviation community
regarding security requirements.
Question 3. I would also like to echo Sen. Warner's and Sen.
Begich's concerns about airports that have still not been reimbursed
appropriately for in-line EDS systems. I look forward to working with
you, Sen. Warner, Sen. Begich and others to rectify this situation.
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the issue and would welcome the
opportunity to work with you, Senator Warner, and Senator Begich on
this matter.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
John S. Pistole
Question 1. Worldwide, mass transit and passenger rail have been
frequent targets of terrorist attacks. Compared with aviation, the 9/11
Commission stated that, ``opportunities to do harm are as great or
greater in surface transportation.'' Yet our transportation security
efforts--both resources and personnel--have largely focused on
aviation. As TSA Administrator, how will you better protect the
millions of Americans who travel by mass transit and passenger rail?
Answer. Rail security is of vital importance to our economy, and
identifying and implementing capabilities to further reduce the risk of
terrorism to mass transit and passenger rail is a key goal of the TSA.
From my experience with the FBI, I believe that training and
information sharing are important components of a robust security
system. I was closely involved in the disruption of the plot by
Najibullah Zazi and others to detonate bombs in the New York City
subway system, and I fully understand the challenges involved in
protecting the mass transit system. If confirmed, I would conduct an
in-depth review of mass transit security needs. I understand that
significant efforts are already underway, such as the Surface
Transportation Security Priority Assessment and the continued
distribution of grant funds for surface transportation security to
transit providers.
Question 2. The TSA has missed many of the deadlines outlined in
the 9/11 Act for securing our surface transportation. For example, TSA
has only completed a portion of the risk assessment and national
security strategy for our Nation's rail system that was due in 2008.
What specific steps will you take to promptly complete overdue items
and meet all future Congressional deadlines for surface transportation
security?
Answer. If confirmed, I will make it a Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) priority to continue working as expeditiously as
possible toward completion of any 9/11 Act requirements that are not
yet met.
Question 3. In January, a man intentionally breached a secure
airport exit lane at Newark Airport, shutting down a busy terminal for
over 6 hours and forcing sixteen thousand passengers to be re-screened.
No matter how much money we spend on technology to screen passengers,
it's useless if someone can just slip through the back door. What
changes will you make to secure exit lanes, especially at our busiest
airports?
Answer. I understand that ensuring the security of sterile areas of
airports through exit lane control is an important responsibility of
the Transportation Security Administration and its airport partners. If
confirmed, I will conduct a thorough review of existing protocols and
explore appropriate methods through staffing and technology to ensure
that proper exit lane controls exist and are enforced.
Question 4. In the Newark Airport breach, the security of a busy,
heavily traveled exit was left to just one TSA guard. A man was able to
sneak in when that lone guard was distracted. Will you examine TSA
staffing levels at Newark Airport so that critical homeland security
responsibilities are not left to just one individual?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the level of staffing at exit
lanes at Newark International Airport (EWR) and I will take steps to
ensure that those Transportation Security Officers who are assigned to
exit lanes are appropriately trained and focused on their
responsibilities. I will also work to ensure that the exit lane design
provides the proper control to best protect sterile areas of airports
Question 5. The GAO recently found that the TSA's behavioral
detection program resulted in over one thousand arrests in our Nation's
airports, but none of these arrests were for terrorism. However,
sixteen individuals later identified as terrorists were able to pass
through airport security, including one at Newark International
Airport. As Administrator, what actions will you take to reform this
program?
Answer. As a career FBI officer with extensive experience in
counterterrorism and counterintelligence, I believe behavior analysis
can add a critical layer to transportation security. If confirmed, I
intend to work with TSA and the leadership of the Department of
Homeland Security to ensure that TSA's behavioral detection program is
an effective, science-based program that enhances transportation
security.
Question 6. After the Moscow subway attack that killed forty people
and injured dozens more, a number of transit agencies across the
country visibly increased their security presence. However, we heard
very little from the TSA. After a major terrorist attack on a mass
transit system, what role should the TSA play in communicating with the
public?
Answer. One of the best ways to promote transportation security
awareness among the public is to engage both industry and the public in
developing and implementing security initiatives. Homeland security is
a shared responsibility for all Americans. The traveling public and
individual citizens are critical partners in our security efforts, as
demonstrated by the effectiveness of the ``See Something, Say
Something'' efforts that proved so critical to averting the attempted
bombing in Times Square. If confirmed, I would conduct an in-depth
review of information sharing with our transportation security partners
and the general public. From my 26 years of experience with the FBI,
including my current position as Deputy Director, I appreciate the
necessity of proactively communicating appropriate information to
stakeholders, including the general public. If confirmed, I will bring
that experience to my position at the Transportation Security
Administration.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to
John S. Pistole
Question 1. During your testimony, you mentioned that TSA intends
to deploy 450 full-body scanners over the course of this year. What is
your understanding of the effectiveness of the new full-body scanning
technology?
Answer. I believe Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) is an effective
technology that provides important detection capabilities--serving as
one of TSA's many layers of security. If confirmed, I will further
review the technology and the deployment plans to ensure threat-based
intelligence continues to inform the agency's efforts to defeat
existing and future threats to aviation security.
Question 2. How will you work to ensure that TSA operators use
these scanners to their maximum efficiency?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that TSA personnel
receive the training and resources necessary to maximize AIT's
capabilities to effectively screen and detect threats to aviation
security. I will also review TSA's use of the industry recognized
Staffing Allocation Model to effectively allocate staffing levels to
meet traffic volumes.
Question 3. How will you work to ensure that we continue to
evaluate and improve upon this screening technology to meet evolving
threats?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with TSA's technology and
operational experts in evaluating AIT, in both laboratory and
operational settings, to improve the technology itself processes for
utilizing it, and training for those operating it to maximize screening
capabilities. Moreover, I intend to work very closely with the
Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate to
maximize research and development capabilities.
Question 4. Since 2008, TSA has been conducting a procurement
process for an information technology (IT) contract to maintain a
secure, nationwide network linking TSA headquarters, regional offices
and airport locations and provide IT and communication equipment.
During this time period, the process has been subject to three
protests. The first two of these protests were upheld by the GAO and
the third is currently pending with the GAO. During the course of the
protests, the GAO has found that there were irregularities in the
acquisition process. Do you have plans to undertake a fresh review of
this procurement to assess whether the contract has been fairly
awarded?
Answer. While I am not aware of the specifics of this particular
procurement, it is my understanding that this acquisition has been
conducted utilizing best value procurement techniques under which
technical performance is measured against cost in order to ensure the
government obtains the best value for required supplies or services.
If confirmed, I will work to ensure that TSA's procurement policies
reflect current security requirements while prioritizing fiscal
responsibility.
Question 5. If confirmed, will you conduct a review of TSA's
procurement process to ensure that taxpayer dollars are being wisely
invested?
Answer. Yes.
Question 6. Under current TSA policy, luggage checked at
appropriately cleared Canadian airport facilities must be rescreened
before it is transferred to a U.S.-based connecting flight. This
requirement frequently causes delayed-connections for passengers as
well as significant logistical problems for U.S. airlines and airport
operators, particularly the Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport. It is my
understanding that TSA has been working with stakeholders and Canadian
authorities for well over a year to reach an agreement on this issue.
When do you think an agreement might be reached that would negate the
need for such rescreening of baggage while ensuring that aviation
security standards are fully met?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work with Canada on ways
to minimize delays and logistical difficulties, while ensuring we
uphold U.S. laws for screening all checked bags on international
flights entering the United States that are subsequently transferred to
domestic connecting flights.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tom Udall to
John S. Pistole
Question 1. Members of the general aviation community have
expressed concerns about TSA's Large Aircraft Security Program (LASP)
proposed rulemaking. My understanding is that TSA plans to respond by
issuing a supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to address
some of these concerns. Could you share how TSA under your leadership
will engage and work with the general aviation community when
developing and promulgating aviation security requirements?
Answer. I understand that TSA has been involved in extensive work
to strengthen general aviation security while also recognizing the
importance that general aviation serves in our economy. I also
understand that TSA is moving forward with a Supplemental Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking and is working diligently to release a rulemaking
that is reasonable and feasible for industry to implement, while at the
same time maintaining an effective level of security. If confirmed, I
look forward to working closely with the general aviation community
regarding security requirements.
Question 2. To enhance aviation security, the TSA began initial
testing in October 2003 of its Screening of Passengers by Observation
Techniques (SPOT) program. Behavior Detection Officers (BDO) carry out
SPOT's mission to identify persons who pose a risk to aviation security
by focusing on behavioral and appearance indicators. GAO was asked to
review the SPOT program and issued a report in May on its lack of
effectiveness.
The SPOT program costs $200 million per year. However, the GAO
study shows that at least 16 known terrorists travelled through 8
different U.S. airports 23 times, where the program was implemented. If
confirmed, do you plan to continue the SPOT program, and if so, what
changes will you make?
Answer. As a career FBI officer with extensive experience in
counterterrorism and counterintelligence, I believe behavior analysis
can add a critical layer to transportation security. If confirmed, I
intend to work with TSA and the leadership of the Department of
Homeland Security to ensure that TSA's behavioral detection program is
an effective, science-based program that enhances transportation
security.
Question 3. On December 25, 2009, a passenger on Flight 253 en
route to Detroit attempted to detonate a small explosive device shortly
before landing. The flight had 278 passengers and eleven crewmembers on
board. In March 2010, TSA began deploying 450 advanced imaging
technology (AIT) units, which were purchased with American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) funds. The machines cost about $175,000 each.
What is the likelihood than an AIT unit would have detected the bomb on
the Christmas Day suspect?
Answer. While there is no silver bullet technology, based on my
knowledge of the type of device used and the information I have
received on AIT capabilities, I believe AIT can be an effective tool
against the type of threat used on Northwest Flight 253. If confirmed,
I will ensure that TSA continues to develop, evaluate and deploy
technology, processes, and training to maximize the probability of
detecting threats such as the one seen on Christmas Day.
Question 4. When using AIT units, how will TSA protect passengers'
privacy rights while also ensuring that passengers are properly
screened?
Answer. Based on the initial briefings I have received on AIT and a
demonstration of AIT at Reagan National Airport, I understand that TSA
employs strict guidelines to protect passenger's privacy rights and to
ensure proper screening. The TSA officer who views the image of a
passenger being screened is located remotely from the passenger and
never interacts directly with the passenger to preserve anonymity . No
cell phones, cameras, or other recording devices are permitted in the
room where the TSA officer views the image. AIT also employs privacy
filters on the images themselves to conceal the identity of passengers.
Additionally, AIT units cannot store images, as the image storage
functions are disabled by the manufacturer before the AIT equipment is
placed in an airport.
Moreover, passengers may opt out of AIT screening and undergo
alternative screening--TSA has placed signs at screening checkpoints
advising passengers of this option. I understand that these privacy
protections are reflected in the publicly available Privacy Impact
Assessment (PIA). If confirmed, I look forward to working with the
Committee to ensure we are using the best possible approach to securing
the traveling public while respecting their privacy.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison to
John S. Pistole
Question 1. When taking on new positions and challenges, people
often rely heavily on their past experience. In your case, that would
be law enforcement and counterintelligence matters, both critical
areas. However, TSA was created to make our transportation system
secure, while also ensuring the free movement of people and commerce.
Maintaining a balance between these two directives will be a difficult
task. If confirmed, how do you intend to approach this challenge?
Protecting the traveling public from threats is and will continue
to be TSA's top priority. Implementing effective security procedures
and facilitating the flow of people and commerce are not mutually
exclusive. It is my firm belief that the best security programs take
into account the needs of travelers and businesses on all modes of
transportation. If confirmed, I am committed to engaging industry
leaders and the public to hear their views and concerns on the best
ways to both secure our transportation systems and streamline the
movement of people and commerce.
Question 2. According to your questionnaire, in 2009, you indicate
you were briefly stopped in Frankfurt, Germany, prior to boarding an
aircraft, for inadvertently having a spare bullet in your briefcase.
While the German screening system did catch the stray bullet, the
security process in the U.S. failed to detect the bullet when you
departed. While you obviously pose no threat, does it concern you that
you easily passed through U.S. security with the bullet and, if
confirmed, what improvements to our detection capabilities will you
focus on?
Yes, it concerns me. If confirmed, I'll focus efforts on improving
training. developing more advanced techniques, and deploying the latest
technologies to further increase our Nation's security and bolster our
abilities to detect threats.
Question 3. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently
issued a report on TSA's ``Screening Passengers By Observation
Techniques'' or ``SPOT'' program, in which the GAO highlighted that TSA
failed to detect at least 16 terrorists, who had passed through eight
different airports where TSA screeners are trained in behavior
detection. In fairness, it is unclear whether the behavior detection
officers encountered any of these terrorists. Nevertheless, GAO
expressed concern that TSA does not have sufficient metrics to validate
SPOT's effectiveness, or a strategic plan for the program, upon which
it has spent hundreds of millions of dollars, with only tenuous
results. While aspects of a similar program may work in Israel, the
U.S. aviation system is much different; therefore, would you discuss
your thoughts on such an inexact science, and how it might be used from
a law enforcement perspective?
As a career FBI officer with extensive experience in
counterterrorism and counterintelligence, I believe behavior analysis
can add a critical layer to transportation security. If confirmed, I
intend to work with TSA and the leadership of the Department of
Homeland Security to ensure that TSA's behavioral detection program is
an effective, science-based program that enhances transportation
security.
Question 4. Following the attempted Christmas Day bombing, TSA
announced that it planned to purchase over 1,000 whole-body imaging
machines, also known as AIT. Although the GAO and other investigative
entities have expressed concern about the ability of the technology to
detect strategically placed explosives, the agency seems intent on
moving forward with implementation. Therefore, if confirmed, will you
plan to review this technology and modify its deployment, if necessary?
If confirmed, I will review the effectiveness of TSA's advanced
imaging technology's detection capabilities and work to ensure that the
agency's deployment plans are consistent with strategic transportation
security objectives.
Question 4a. Will you consider deferring implementation until the
next generation of machines is ready, with automated software to detect
suspicious items, rather than using the very labor intensive system
that is currently required?
I have received preliminary briefings on Advanced Imaging
Technology (A17). If confirmed, I will further evaluate AIT to ensure
that the technology employed by TSA provides effective detection
capabilities and that its continued deployment will be in the best
interests of aviation security.
Question 4b. Will you evaluate TSA's implementation plan, which has
already encountered cost issues and space constraints at airports,
resulting in the installation of only about 17 percent of this year's
targeted number of machines?
If confirmed, I will review TSA's deployment plans for AIT and
ensure that TSA works closely with airport stakeholders to design
configurations that meet local needs. I will also support the
continuation of ongoing dialogue with stakeholders on the national
deployment of AIT.
Question 5. As Chair of the FBI's Personnel Board, you have been
responsible for making countless personnel decisions; however, in the
past 4 years, you have been the subject of six Equal Employment
Opportunity (EEO) complaints, including gender and race discrimination
complaints. Have these cases been resolved?
In each of these cases and in all my work throughout my career at
the FBI, I acted in good faith and without bias. My understanding is
that several of these cases are pending resolution, while the others
are closed. There has been no adverse finding against me.
Question 5a. Would you care to elaborate on any of these
complaints?
As I stated, I acted in good faith and without bias in each of
these matters, which comprise a small percentage of the hundreds of
personnel matters I have been involved with in my role as a senior
manager at the FBI and the chair of the SES hoard.
Question 6. Mr. Pistole, over the past several months, you have
been involved in the investigations of at least two transportation
security incidents, the Christmas Day attempted bombing and the Time
Square attempted bombing. In both cases, the accused perpetrators were
read their legal rights. In your view, why should suspected terrorists,
especially non-U.S. citizens, like the accused Christmas Day bomber, be
Mirandized?
The first priority in any terrorism investigation is the protection
of the American public. In both cases, prior to the issuance of Miranda
warnings, agents first engaged in vigorous questioning of the suspects
under the public safety exception to Miranda, as recognized in the
Quarles decision. If confirmed, I will continue to work on ways to
utilize all lawful means to protect the American public.
Question 7. After the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, the FBI's use
of National Security Letters (NSLs) to demand records in terrorism
cases greatly increased. More concerning, as revealed in a series of
reports by the DOJ Office of Inspector General, the FBI also began
using so-called ``exigent letters'' to request information from
telecommunications carriers on the basis of claimed emergencies, with a
promise that a NSL or subpoena would soon follow. In some cases,
however, there was no emergency and the follow-up legal process did not
materialize. While you were not accused of any wrongdoing, the
Inspector General named you as one of the senior officials who should
have been more aware of the conduct of your subordinates. Would you
please inform the Committee of your involvement with NSLs and ``exigent
letters'' and what changes you made to the FBI's policy following the
Inspector General's report on this matter in 2008?
I never signed or approved an NSL or ``exigent letter.'' I learned
of their misuse after the DIG informed me and other senior leaders
following its first audit. Once advised, I, along with the FBI Director
and General Counsel, led the efforts to address these problems by
issuing several directives: (1) we eliminated the use of exigent
letters altogether; (2) we instituted a rigorous review and approval
protocol for the issuance of NSLs, coupled with an extensive audit and
evaluation follow-up; and (3) we directed our Inspection Division to
conduct follow-up audits to ensure compliance.
Question 8. TSA has spent many years and billions of dollars
developing name-based vetting programs, such as Secure Flight and the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC); however, the
disturbing trend of so-called ``home-grown terrorists,'' who may have
clean backgrounds but who have become inspired by radical organizations
or individuals such as the cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, seems to expose
vulnerabilities in the government's systems. Given your intelligence
background, what suggestions would you offer for mitigating any
unintended loopholes in these programs which constitute the Nation's
last lines of defense?
Secure Flight and TWIC are two of the multiple, layered security
tools employed by the U.S. Government in our fight against terrorism--
ranging from personnel to technology to information sharing efforts. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with the Committee to ensure any
loopholes in these two important programs are addressed expeditiously.
Question 9. TSA's mandate is to ensure the security of all modes of
transportation, including pipelines and aspects of the maritime sector
that are critical to my home state of Texas. The Port of Houston, for
example, contains valuable energy and commodity facilities, which are
vital to the state's and the Nation's economies, and which merit
greater security protection. As Deputy Director of the FBI, you have
much experience in prioritizing agency needs, yet at TSA, you may be
faced with too many priorities and limited resources. How do you intend
to improve the working partnership between TSA and the U.S. Coast Guard
in the maritime security arena and assure Federal efficiency?
I understand that TSA currently enjoys a strong working
relationship with the U.S. Coast Guard. Both agencies have worked
closely on strengthening the security of the Nation's maritime ports
through a number of cooperative efforts, including: the Port Security
Grant Program, which is administered in close cooperation with FEMA; a
joint TWIC pilot program designed to deploy biometric readers; and a
joint program designed to secure passenger ferries and cruise ships. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with Commandant Papp and the Coast
Guard team to further explore ways to collaboratively improve maritime
security.
Question 10. After an FBI sting operation, last week a Texas man
was arraigned on charges that he tried to aid al-Qaeda. As part of the
operation, the FBI reportedly gave the suspect a falsified TWIC, a TSA
security card for transportation workers in the maritime sector. The
suspect allegedly intended to use this card to board a ship bound for
the Middle East. While this card was invalid, it highlights the
disturbing situation created by TSA and the U.S. Coast Guard, whereby
TWIC cards are currently used as flash passes, with no card reader
system in place to verify whether the cardholder merited access to
secure areas of our Nation's ports. If confirmed, will fixing TWIC be a
top priority for you?
If confirmed, continuing to refine and improve the TWIC program,
including the completion of the reader pilot program, will be a
priority for me. I understand that the U.S. Coast Guard is a key
partner in the TWIC program, and as I noted above, if confirmed, I
intend to work closely with the Coast Guard to further improve port
security.
Question 11. U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan is accused of shooting 13
people and injuring 32 others at Fort Hood, Texas, on November 5, 2009.
Reportedly, prior to the incident, the FBI had monitored e-mail
communications between Major Hasan and an Islamic radical cleric, known
to be an al-Qaeda sympathizer. Following the shooting, the FBI
determined that Major Hasan was not part of a larger terrorist plot. In
the aftermath of the incident, it appears that there may have been a
communications breakdown between the FBI and the Army, and had this not
happened, this tragic event might not have occurred. While FBI Director
Robert Mueller has ordered an independent review of the case, what
lessons learned, about sharing intelligence and other matters, could
you highlight for the Committee?
While an independent review is currently ongoing, 1 previously led
an internal review which identified several areas of improvement, which
Director Mueller and I later implemented. These included:
Information Sharing with the Department of Defense. The FBI
has formalized a process for notifying the Department of
Defense of FBI investigations involving military personnel in
order to streamline the process for information sharing and
coordination between our agencies.
Supplemental Review in Significant Cases. We established a
supplemental Headquarters-level review process in significant
national security cases to limit the risk of human error in
analysis and to broaden the perspective of analysis in these
cases, all based on ``high-risk'' targets identified by NCTC.
Technology Improvements. We are making specific technology
improvements in handling sensitive information to strengthen
the ability of our Agents and analysts to automatically detect
intelligence connections that are critical to understanding and
uncovering threats. (Details are classified.)
Training for Joint Terrorism Task Force Members. We expanded
and strengthened training for members of our Joint Terrorism
Task Forces on the use of data bases and legal dissemination of
sensitive information to maximize access to all available
information to all relevant partners across the Federal
Government.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Olympia J. Snowe to
John S. Pistole
Question 1. As you well know, both the no-fly and selectee lists
have their own minimum derogatory criteria requirements which are
considerably more stringent than the Terrorist Watchlist's ``reasonable
suspicion'' standard. In order to be placed on the no-fly list, ``a
known or suspected terrorist must present a threat to civil aviation or
national security.'' Consequently, the no-fly list is a very small
subset of the Terrorist Watchlist which, according to DHS, contained
approximately 4,000 people on September 30, 2009, of those
approximately 170 were U.S. persons. In your opinion, are the current
requirements for placement on the selectee list and no-fly list too
stringent?
Answer. The President has ordered a review of the entire watchlist
system. I fully support that review, and if confirmed, will work
closely with TSA and Federal Government leadership to implement any
changes suggested from that review.
Question 1a. What changes would you make to the existing
requirements to prevent incidents like Christmas Day from occurring
again?
Answer. It is my understanding that the criteria for inclusion on
the terrorism watch lists is the product of a government-wide process.
If confirmed, I will work with my counterparts to review the existing
watch list system, offer recommendations based on my best judgment and
experience, and support the implementation of any changes based on that
review.
Question 1b. Why didn't the Watch Lists have the names of
individuals like Shahzad and Farouk, which could have prevented the
former from purchasing a ticket and boarding an aircraft, or stopped
Farouk from boarding the aircraft in Amsterdam on its way to the U.S.?
Answer. It is my understanding that in the case of Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab, insufficient information was presented under the
procedures then in existence to place him on the No Fly or Selectee
lists. Furthermore, Faisal Shahzad had in fact been placed on the
watchlist--which resulted in his apprehension by U.S. Customs and
Border Protection.
Question 1c. Is the threshold for requiring a foreign visitor to
undergo special scrutiny upon arrival in the United States considerably
lower than the criteria for preventing that individual from boarding an
aircraft overseas? If so, why? How often does the Transportation
Security Administration audit international airports to ensure that the
security apparatuses in place are compliant with U.S. security
standards?
Answer. TSA does not conduct passenger screening overseas. With
respect to international airport inspections, it is my understanding
that TSA applies a risk-based prioritization to its Foreign Airport
Assessment Program, inspecting s international airports to ensure they
meet international standards for aviation security.
Question 2. With the implementation, at least domestically, of the
Secure Flight program this August, what impacts do you believe that
program would have had on the recent incidents on Christmas Day and in
Times Square? Had that program been in place, would it have stifled
those potential attacks before they got underway? Or prevented Shahzad
from ever passing through security at Kennedy Airport?
Answer. It is my understanding that Secure Flight is now fully
implemented for 100 percent of domestic flights, and will be
implemented for all direct international flights to the U.S. by the end
of 2010. I also understand that issues of comparison of passenger
information to the most current version of the watchlist can be
mitigated through cutover to the Secure Flight program.
Question 3. Deputy Director Pistole, one of the issues I discussed
with Secretary Napolitano in her appearance late last year before this
Committee, was screening of air cargo on passenger aircraft. I have
long advocated for a much more intense screening regimen for commercial
airline cargo. This concern has only been reinforced by the number of
foiled terrorist plots to attack transatlantic airliners in the last 2
years--most recently efforts made on Christmas Day. It is obvious
terrorist elements still seek to use commercial aviation as their
primary weapon for attacking Western interests. With the passage of the
9/11 Recommendations in late 2007, Congress mandated this loophole be
closed. And considerable progress has been made toward achieving one
hundred percent screening, both under the previous administration's
watch and your own. Yet, concerns remain, evidenced by the recent
Government Accountability Office's report released at the end of March.
It is my understanding that the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) recently published an interim final rule intending
to make the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP) mandatory for all
shippers. Yet the Inspector General's report indicates there is a lack
of personnel necessary to meet the 100 percent screening requirement.
How would you plan on certifying all aspects of CCSP-approved
facilities, if the Inspector General's report is correct?
Answer. I understand that TSA has the ability to certify all
entities who have currently applied to the Certified Cargo Screening
Program (CCSP). TSA has 450 Transportation Security Inspectors-Cargo
(TSI-C) currently on board with an additional 50 expected later this
year. If confirmed, I will review the CCSP program and the IG report to
ensure that appropriate oversight procedures are in place.
Question 3a. According to the Inspector General's report, the TSA
is ``ineffective'' in ensuring both compliance, and by extension, the
security, of that cargo screened by private entities. While the
Department has ``agreed'' with the Inspector General's assessment, I am
concerned that will the extent of the action taken. What changes to the
oversight process, either for Known Shippers or for CCSP participants,
do you envision to ensure these facilities are complying with TSA
requirements?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the CCSP and the Inspector
General's report and take appropriate measures to ensure compliance
with the program and the effective screening of air cargo on passenger
aircraft.
Question 4. In order to achieve the 100 percent screening threshold
by next summer, it seems to me that the network of approved CCSP
facilities capable of scanning cargo must be enlarged to meet the
obvious need, given that 12 million pounds of cargo travel in
commercial aircraft every day. Last fall, this Committee discussed a
report by the Homeland Security Inspector General suggesting the dearth
of available screeners would make what Congress has mandated in the 9/
11 Recommendation legislation--that is, the 100 percent screening
requirement--unattainable. Last week's GAO report echoed those same
concerns. Do you know the current total of TSA personnel dedicated to
monitoring air cargo screening protocols? Do you believe that figure is
robust enough to guarantee the entirety of this cargo is being
screened?
Answer. I understand that TSA is confident that industry is capable
of attaining the 100 percent mandate in the U.S. on August 1, 2010. I
am told that industry has already achieved over 75 percent, well in
advance of the deadline. The Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP)
locations are screening over 45 percent of the total cargo, and recent
surveys have indicated that sufficient capacity exists at carriers,
Indirect Air Carriers (IAC), and Independent Cargo Screening Facilities
(ICSF) to meet the overall mandate.
As noted above, TSA currently has 450 Transportation Security
Inspectors-Cargo (TSI-C) on board with an additional 50 expected later
this year. I understand that there are over 730 CCSP participant
locations and almost 500 of them are already regulated IACs, who are
currently inspected by Transportation Security Inspectors-Cargo (TSI-
C).
Question 5. That 9/11 Recommendations law included a term that
would make air cargo inspections commensurate with screening levels
that luggage receives. I believe that even in the broadest of legal
interpretations, I think we can all agree the Known Shipper Program and
the CCSP Program are not ``commensurate'' with the kind screening
luggage is subject to. It is not even clear to me that this so-called
pre-cleared material is subject to random screening or explosive
detection. Do you envision a program that will require at least random
screening of material, even if it is being shipped from an entity on
the Known Shipper list or a participant in the CCSP Program?
Answer. I understand that TSA requires that all cargo screened
through the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP) undergo screening
commensurate with screening levels that luggage receives. A strict
chain of custody process for transfer is also enforced, and all cargo
screened is subject to random inspection by TSA, including TSA and Law
Enforcement canine teams. If confirmed, I look forward to participating
in further reviews of the CCSP and air cargo security measures.
Question 6. We have heard numerous estimates of the cost of
implementing a comprehensive screening regime for air cargo. My
understanding is that an internal study conducted by the Department
indicates such a screening regime could cost as much as $100 billion.
That is an absolutely stunning figure. Does the Department have a
current estimate in terms of dollars as to how much such a massive and
widespread technology deployment would cost?
Answer. From what I understand, the expected costs to industry are
significantly less than the amount you mention. If confirmed, I look
forward to participating in further reviews of this program leading to
the issuance of a final rule that will include a full economic analysis
of the cost of complying with the requirements of the 9/11 Commission
Act.
Question 7. I'm certain that, given your background, you are
familiar with certain cargo screening technologies such as explosive
trace detection and X-ray portals that TSA is advocating for use by its
partners to meet the 100 percent mandate. However, according to GAO,
the effectiveness of those technologies has not been tested in an
operational environment, but are already being used by industry to
screen cargo to seem to be ``in compliance'' with the 100 percent
screening requirement. If these technologies are not effective, why are
they being used to fulfill the Congressional mandate on screening?
Answer. I have only had preliminary briefings on TSA's air cargo
security program and the technology that is used to screen cargo. If
confirmed, I will ensure that TSA and the Department's Science and
Technology Directorate continue to collaborate on identifying and
testing the effectiveness of cargo screening technologies to be used to
secure our Nation's ports.
Question 8. Of course, one of the most hotly-debated issues
concerning the TSA today is the claim that, in the very near future,
Whole Body Imaging (WBI) devices will become the first line of defense
when airline passengers are seeking access to secure areas. The TSA
Director at O'Hare, one of America's busiest airports, was recently
quoted as saying she believes WBI devices will be mandatory in the very
near future. As the Administration has proposed, 450 new scanners will
be distributed to an indeterminate number of airports by the end of
2010. To what extent do you believe this increase in deployment will
secure the aviation network?
Answer. I support the use of advanced imaging technology (AIT)
equipment as an important tool to protect the traveling public from
evolving threats. If confirmed, I will further review the technology
and deployment plans to ensure that threat-based intelligence continues
to inform the agency's efforts to defeat existing and future threats to
aviation security.
Question 8a. Being from a state with no major hub airports, I am
concerned that this effort will simply encourage potentially dangerous
passengers to avoid larger airports that possess the WBI technology,
instead choosing smaller facilities like those in Bangor, Maine by
which to enter our domestic aviation network. Can we expect all
commercial airports to have this technology in the very near future?
Answer. I appreciate your concerns about the potential for
terrorists to target smaller airports to avoid detection; however, AIT
is just one of TSA`s many layers of security--including Federal Air
Marshals and other trained aviation security personnel; canine teams;
information sharing with our international and private sector partners;
and many among other aviation security tools.
From the briefings I have had thus far, I understand TSA's
nationwide plan to deploy 1,000 AIT units through FY11 will include a
range of airports.
Question 9. The GAO recently indicated that staffing and training
costs for the deployment of the additional 450 WBI scanners could add
an additional $2.5 billion to the costs associated with the rollout of
these newly purchased scanning devices. Is that cost-effective when
very apparent gaps will remain at smaller, less traveled airports even
if all of the new scanners are deployed?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review and evaluate TSA's staffing
models and deployment and operational procedures to ensure that risk-
based and cost-effective screening measures are implemented nationwide.
Question 9a. Do you believe that the WBI devices procured by the
Department of Homeland Security would have been triggered by the
explosives carried on the aircraft by Mr. Farouk on Christmas Day this
past year?
Answer. While there is no silver bullet technology, based on my
knowledge of the type of device used and the information I have
received on AIT capabilities, I believe MT can be an effective tool
against the type of threat used on Northwest Flight 253. If confirmed,
I will ensure that TSA continues to develop, evaluate and deploy
technology, processes, and training to maximize the probability of
detecting threats such as the one seen on Christmas Day.
Question 10. With the enormous national debt in mind, do you
believe there is another, more effective way we can employ the
increasingly scarce resources we have to improve our aviation security
regime?
Answer. Based on a preliminary briefing and demonstration of AIT
capabilities, I believe AIT is an effective technology that provides
important detection capabilities. If confirmed, I will review TSA's
technology and operations to optimize use of scarce resources while
maximizing security effectiveness.
Question 11. Late last year, the GAO published a report included
some very pertinent information regarding TSA's inability to secure
sensitive areas at our transportation facilities. One program cited as
failing was the lethargic pace of deploying the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential (TWIC) Card--now, the roll-out of the
program, which was intended to be completed at the beginning of this
year, remains unfinished. While the TWIC Card has taken considerable
steps forward in the last 6 months, having enrolled nearly all of the
1.5 million port workers across the country, right now the biometric
card is little more than a glorified identification. To fulfill its
purpose, it must be employed in conjunction with a card reader.
TSA spokesmen have cited ``technical difficulties'' as the reason
behind past delays in the deployment of the card readers; I think
you'll agree that without these devices, the whole point of the
biometric identifier cards is rendered moot. Now we have begun a series
of pilot programs at seven ports across the country, which is intended
to culminate in a new final rule for use of the card readers. Can you
elaborate further on what technical difficulties this crucial element
of the program is facing? Have the failings of card readers been the
result of poorly designed specifications at the Department of Homeland
Security, or mistakes by the vendors?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assess this issue in detail. I also
will work closely with the U.S. Coast Guard and all key stakeholders,
including port security directors, to fully identify and resolve issues
affecting the full deployment and operational performance of the TWIC
card reader program.
Question 11a. It is my understanding that during previous testing,
the TWIC Card Readers were unable to withstand water, as well as
temperature extremes, among other problems that suggest it is
unworkable in the maritime environment. This would seem to be a major
failing if the Card is initially intended to be distributed to port
workers. Have these problems been resolved to the satisfaction of the
TSA, given that we have begun the pilot programs utilizing the card
readers?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the U.S. Coast Guard
and all key stakeholders, including port security directors, to fully
identify and resolve all technical issues to ensure adequate
environmental operating performance of TWIC Card readers.
Question 11b. Given that the program is already costing well over
$100 million and has been plagued by delays and missteps, when can we
assume these readers ready to be deployed?
Answer. If confirmed, I will undertake a full assessment of the
TWIC reader pilot program to ensure its effective completion.
Question 12. Throughout its various incarnations, the prescreening
program now known as Secure Flight has been plagued with delays,
privacy concerns, and worries about opportunities for appeals by
incorrectly detained passengers. Now, as the program is on the cusp of
being implemented system-wide, there is growing consternation among the
traveling public as to what is required by the TSA and the commercial
carriers in order to travel without fear of being detained.
My constituents, and individuals across the country, are confused
as to exactly what TSA is requiring for travelers as to what they have
to provide in order to travel. For example, one individual who spoke to
the New York Times sought to disclose his full name as it appears on
his driver's license, which is what he believed was required, but when
booking his plane ticket, that particular carrier did not offer either
a field for his middle name, nor the fact that he was a ``Junior,''
which places the name on his boarding pass in direct conflict with his
identification. Such conflict could result in significant uncertainty
for passengers, as, according to the article, ``travelers may or may
not incur significant delays.'' That ambiguity epitomizes the problems
with this program's implementation. If the airlines are not complying
with the requirements laid out by the Homeland Security Department,
what assurances can you offer them that they will not be detained or
prevented from getting aboard their aircraft? What exactly is expected
of travelers by the Department and the TSA?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the Secure Flight program,
giving careful consideration to the important issues you have raised to
ensure that passenger data is accurately collected and that TSA clearly
and effectively communicates what is expected from passengers under the
program.
Question 13. To switch gears for a moment, I am certain you are
aware of November's report out of Chicago that a number of TSA
screening checkpoints were compromised at both O'Hare and Midway
Airports. Astonishingly, individuals posing as passengers were able to
enter secure areas of O'Hare and Midway with just a credit card--which
a number of security experts are claiming is one of the easiest forms
of identification to falsify. This particular problem was specifically
identified by the 9/11 Commission in their report to Congress. Can you
explain to the Committee what steps are being taken, if any, to prevent
these sorts of security failures--particularly at one of America's
busiest airports?
Answer. I understand that TSA has a specific list of acceptable
identification documents, posted to TSA's public website, that can be
used to access the sterile area and are checked by TSA Travel Document
Checkers. A single credit card is not an acceptable form of
identification. TSA has implemented the Identification Verification
Call Center (IVCC) process to further verb the identity of an
individual and ensure their names are properly vetted if the person
does not have an acceptable form of identification. If the IVCC process
cannot confirm a person's identity, he or she will be denied access to
the sterile area. If confirmed, I will ensure TSA continues to focus on
enhancing airport security by effectively verging the identities of
individuals prior to granting them access to the sterile area.
Question 14. The concept of pushing our borders out has been the
primary thematic aspect of our port security plan, and it is one that I
wholeheartedly support. My interest is the advancement of the Secure
Freight pilot program and the willingness or even capability of our
trading partners to meet the kind of standards we are imposing on the
global supply chain. With over 700 ports that ship to the U.S., meeting
those standards is a tall order for nearly all of our trading partners.
According to the GAO, one of the failings in the implementation of
Secure Freight program, and really, in the entire litany of port
security programs, has been an inability of CBP and their partners to
define methods of assessing any increases in security, and efficiently
collecting and examining that data if it is collected. In short, we
have resources and manpower dedicated to a host of programs that we
suspect are enhancing our security, but we have no certainty in terms
of data that our ports are any more secure.
The Administration at one point indicated that it hoped to reduce
the number of ports shipping to America from over 700 to 100. This
minimizes the potential areas of risk, which is admirable conceptually.
But is it practicable?
Does restraining the number of ports available to foreign shippers
engaging in trade with the U.S. at the same time restrain movement in
the supply chain? How can we be assured that, by eliminating more than
75 percent of the available ports to minimize risk, we are not
inadvertently creating choke points for cargo shipments?
The Belgian government, for example, has suggested that configuring
the port of Antwerp, a massive international facility, to meet the
requirements of our 100 percent screening regime could cost the port
over a billion Euros! If one of our trading partners determines that it
is not worth it to meet the criteria and end that aspect of their
relationship with the U.S., what affect does that on our global
economy? On the American economy? What alternatives can the U.S. offer
these nations to sustain a high level of security while permitting
certain trading relationships to continue?
Some of our European trading partners believe a complete deployment
and operation of total scanning technology could only occur if a new
international agreement is reached. Do you agree with this assessment,
and if so, would protecting the global supply chain and ensuring that
the program is improving security require new agreements with the
entire host of nations who ship to American ports? How long could such
a process take?
Do we have, either in development or in testing phases, scanning
portals capable of handling transshipment cargo? If not, do we fall
back to a more risk-based screening approach in dealing with
transshipment traffic?
Answer. I understand that the Secure Freight Program and the
screening of maritime cargo is the responsibility of U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP).
Question 15. Since the attacks of 9/11, the General Aviation
community appears to have been a partner in the enhancement of security
by developing and implementing a large number of workable and effective
security measures. These include an Airport Watch program, the
monitoring of aircraft financing transactions, a new requirement for
government issued, tamper-proof photo-IDs for pilots, and guidelines
for security at general aviation airports. As you probably know, the
Large Aircraft Security Program (LASP) proposed late last year by TSA
raises several concerns for the General Aviation community in my state.
It appears to ``cut-and-paste'' security measures specifically designed
for commercial operations on to general aviation operations. This fails
to recognize the vast differences between commercial and GA operations.
The proposal also would apply to smaller, personal aircraft, not just
large ones as the title implies.
I've been told that TSA is making changes to the original proposal,
and will have Supplementary Proposal of Rulemaking released sometime
this year. What requirements do you envision will be placed on general
aviation as a result of this new rulemaking effort?
Answer. I understand that TSA has been involved in extensive work
to strengthen general aviation security while also recognizing the
importance that general aviation serves in our economy. I also
understand that TSA is moving forward with a Supplemental Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking and is working diligently to release a rulemaking
that is reasonable and feasible for industry to implement, while at the
same time maintaining an effective level of security. If confirmed, I
look forward to working closely with the general aviation community
regarding security requirements.
Question 15a. Do you expect that taxes will rise dramatically to
pay for this new program--which in its previous incarnation included
all manner of new requirements, most overseen by TSA-approved
contractors paid for by general aviation, particularly taxes on general
aviation airports, owners and operators?
Answer. I have not been involved in a review of the economic
analysis of any new proposed regulation addressed security for general
aviation. If confirmed, I look forward to participating in a review of
the draft rule and ensuring that this and all rulemaking efforts
provide effective increases in security and are reasonable for
regulated parties to implement.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Jim DeMint to
John S. Pistole
Question. Mr. Pistole, you indicated during your confirmation
hearing that you would have to consult with the Secretary to see
whether you will be able to provide the Committee with a copy of your
review and recommendation regarding whether collective bargaining will
be allowed at the TSA. Have you been able to discuss the matter with
the Secretary and will you be able to provide the Committee with a copy
of your analysis and recommendation?
Answer. While I have not yet discussed post-assessment procedures
with the Secretary, I understand that the Department will share
information from the review with the Committee.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
John S. Pistole
Question 1. Mr. Pistole: As you know, on Tuesday the White House
issued a directive to all agency heads to trim at least 5 percent from
their budgets. The TSA recently awarded an IT services contract that
was $52 million more expensive than a lower bid from a contractor with
almost the same technical solution ratings. Given the fiscal crisis
facing our Nation, does this make sense for taxpayers?
Furthermore, the procurement for this contract appears to have been
poorly handled. It has been going on for more than 2 years and has been
the subject of at least two successful protests and a third is pending
with GAO. During the course of those protests, the GAO found that there
were irregularities in the acquisition process. In addition, due to the
length of time that has passed since the proposal for IT services was
first issued, it is my understanding that the scope of work sought by
TSA may not accurately reflect its current needs.
It seems to me that given the excess cost for the current contract
award and the flaws in the solicitation process, TSA should undertake a
fresh, independent review of this procurement and report back to
Congress on plans to address concerns about this procurement and plans
to improve TSA's acquisition process. Given the Federal Government's
budget crisis, we certainly want to ensure that TSA is procuring only
those services that accurately reflect its needs at the most
advantageous price.
Answer. While I am not aware of the specifics of this particular
procurement, it is my understanding that this acquisition has been
conducted utilizing best value procurement techniques under which
technical performance is measured against cost in order to ensure the
government obtains the best value for required supplies or services.
If confirmed, I will work to ensure that TSA's procurement policies
reflect current security requirements while prioritizing fiscal
responsibility.
Question 2. While you don't have extensive background when it comes
to aviation, I would like to know more about what you see as TSA's role
when it comes to general aviation--including smaller airports in South
Dakota and across the country?
Answer. I understand that TSA has been involved in extensive work
to strengthen general aviation security while also recognizing the
importance that general aviation serves in our economy. I also
understand that TSA is moving forward with a Supplemental Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking and is working diligently to release a rulemaking
that is reasonable and feasible for industry to implement, while at the
same time maintaining an effective level of security. If confirmed, I
look forward to working closely with the general aviation community
regarding security requirements.
Question 3. I pose this question because a number of general
aviation users in South Dakota have inquired about recent actions by
TSA when it comes to what they believe are controversial Security
Directives that mandate commercial airports conduct security threat
assessments on all general aviation users that have access to the
airport. While I can understand the need to conduct threat assessments
to improve security at commercial airports, what balance would you
strive for to ensure that general aviation users aren't impeded when it
comes to the freedom they currently enjoy when traveling from one
airport to another?
Answer. As I noted above, I understand that, after extensive
coordination with the general aviation community, TSA is moving forward
with a revised rulemaking that recognizes the issues you highlighted If
confirmed, I look forward to actively participating in this process.
Question 4. What do you see when it comes to the future of Security
Directives, especially as it relates to the manner in which they are
issued and whether or not you believe that such measures should be
subject to public comment and review?
Answer. I believe that security directives should continue to be
used to address security threats that require an expedited response,
but should only be issued where warranted If confirmed, I will work to
balance the need for prompt and effective response with public comment
and review.
Question 5. Should airports be reimbursed for costs related to
implementation of security directives?
Answer. While the Federal Government has a significant role in
aviation security, I believe that there are shared responsibilities
with regulated parties.
Question 6. Seeing that only 17 percent or approximately 80 out of
450 Advanced Imaging Technology screening machines have been installed
across the country from funding provided under the stimulus bill, are
you comfortable with this pace of deployment?
Answer. From briefings I have had, I understand that TSA expects to
deploy all 450 units by the end of this calendar year.
Question 7. In a February 2009 report to Congress on the
effectiveness of TSA's surface transportation security inspectors
(STSIs), the DHS Inspector General noted that TSA reorganized its
inspector force to have surface-focused inspectors report to aviation-
focused supervisors, rather than surface- focused supervisors. Two-
thirds of the inspectors hired after the reorganization had no rail or
mass transit experience.
The IG concluded that, ``The current TSI command structure inhibits
TSI effectiveness'' and recommended--3 times--that TSA place surface
inspectors under the authority of a TSA headquarters official
responsible for surface transportation. TSA rejected the recommendation
each time, and the IG's office ultimately backed off the proposal. If
confirmed, can you assure us you will reassess this policy?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review TSA `s organizational structure
and processes to ensure the agency can effectively respond to current
and future security threats in all modes of transportation.
Question 8. Aviation aside, what do you think are the greatest
security threats to the Nation's transportation systems?
Answer. The U.S. faces an ever-evolving terrorist threat aimed at
exploiting perceived vulnerabilities in each of our transportation
systems. If confirmed, I will ensure that TSA continues to work with
the intelligence community, our Federal, state, local and international
partners and industry to detect and disrupt current threats and further
strengthen security across all modes.
Question 9. If confirmed, what strategies and actions will you
implement to enhance the security of our rail, highway, and pipeline
networks?
Answer. I understand that TSA just completed a Freight Railroad
Security Risk Assessment. If confirmed, I will conduct an in-depth
review of surface transportation security needs that will employ risk
assessments and utilize current intelligence. From my experience with
the FBI, I believe that training, information-sharing with state,
local, tribal, international and private sector partners, and extensive
use of drills and exercises are important components of a robust
security system.
Question 10. There are over 2 million miles of pipeline across the
country, including over 6,000 miles in South Dakota, carrying oil,
natural gas, and other products. Given that a threat to our Nation's
pipelines could have grave economic consequences, how should TSA use
risk management to recalibrate its attention to critical threats to the
Nation's pipelines (and energy supply)?
Answer. Although I have not had an opportunity to receive in-depth
briefings on the methods the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) has employed to reduce risk to our pipeline system, I support a
risk-based approach. I do understand that TSA's primary focus has been
on those pipeline systems that have the highest energy throughput and
potentially the highest impact in the event of a disruption. If
confirmed, I will review the progress made to date and assess the
strategy for future efforts.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Sam Brownback to
John S. Pistole
Question 1. The Large Aircraft Security Program (LASP) Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) was introduced by the TSA at the end of the
last Administration and elicited more than 7,000 negative public
comments because it did not address security issues in an effective,
practical manner. Since then, the staff at the TSA has worked toward a
new Supplemental NPRM which would take into consideration the comments
filed to the original proposal as well as through direct TSA engagement
with industry. Unfortunately, TSA missed a self imposed deadline to
issue the Supplemental NPRM by the end of last year, and it's not clear
when it will be released.
Are you committed to moving forward on this Supplemental NPRM and
issuing it as soon as possible? Can you also discuss the general
approach that you would take with respect to engaging constructively
with industry on new security requirements? Would you ensure these
proposals are targeted toward specific risks and fully consider the
practical implementation of these proposals?
Answer. I understand that TSA is moving forward with a Supplemental
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the Large Aircraft Security Program
(LASP). If confirmed, Hook forward to working closely with the general
aviation community to ensure that the rulemaking effort reflects
reasonable and feasible standards for industry to implement, while
ensuring an effective level of security.
Question 2. The 2003 FAA reauthorization bill required the TSA to
conduct security audits of all FAA certificated foreign repair
stations. However, the TSA never fulfilled this requirement, and as a
result Congress again required an audit in the 9/11 Recommendations
bill and prohibited the FAA from certifying any new stations until the
rule was finalized. TSA missed a 2008 deadline for completing the rule
and as a result maintenance providers have been unable to open any new
foreign repair stations. TSA is now in the process of finalizing a
notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) on the foreign repair station
security rule, having sent it to OMB for review.
Are you familiar with this issue? Will you work to get this NPRM
through OMB as quickly as possible when you are confirmed? Will this be
a priority for you? Will you allow for adequate stakeholder input and
FAA coordination to ensure effective implementation of the final rule?
Answer. I understand that TSA issued a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking regarding Aircraft Repair Station Security in December 1009
and that industry comments have been received and are under review.
Recognizing the value of partnership and coordination, I can assure you
that if confirmed, I will ensure that TSA will continue its efforts to
seek input from its government and industry partners as the agency
works toward completion of the Final Rule.
Question 3. We have seen the TSA repeatedly use Security Directives
(SD) to vastly expand existing requirements without a compelling
emergency security threat. TSA needs to do a better job of identifying
immediate threats that require emergency action, and whether those
actions should be implemented through rulemaking. The most recent
example involves the expansion of security credentialing requirements
to tens-of-thousands of pilots and employees at airports and aviation
manufacturers without due consideration and process of the
Administrative Procedures Act. This resulted in SD-1542-8F (followed by
-8G) which was developed last summer. When should TSA use Security
Directives instead of rulemaking under the APA? What criteria would you
use to make these decisions?
Answer. I believe that security directives should be used to
address security threats that require an expedited response, but only
where warranted. If confirmed, I will work to balance the need for
prompt and effective response with public comment and review.
Question 4. Under President Obama, OMB has issued guidance
outlining agency and department heads' duty to carefully consider
contractor policies to ensure the government does not ``spend more than
it should to get the job done'' and that in this economic climate the
government has ``a responsibility to make sure every dollar collected
from taxpayers is spent wisely,'' The Office of Federal Procurement
Policy has called on agencies to fully consider the agency's actual
needs in order ``to minimize risk and maximize the value of Government
contracts.''
As you know, on Tuesday the White House issued a directive to all
agency heads to trim at least 5 percent from their budgets. The TSA
recently awarded an IT services contract that was $52 million more
expensive than a lower bid from a contractor with almost the same
technical solution ratings. Given the fiscal crisis facing our nation,
does this make sense for taxpayers?
Furthermore, the procurement for this contract appears to have been
poorly handled. It's been going on for more than 2 years and has been
the subject of at least two successful protests and a third is pending
with GAO. During the course of those protests, the GAO found that there
were irregularities in the acquisition process. In addition, due to the
length of time that has passed since the proposal for IT services was
first issued, it is my understanding that the scope of work sought by
TSA may not accurately reflect its current needs.
It seems to me that given the excess cost for the current contract
award and the flaws in the solicitation process, TSA should undertake a
fresh, independent review of this procurement and report back to
Congress on plans to address concerns about this procurement and plans
to improve TSA's acquisition process. Given the Federal Government's
budget crisis, we certainly want to ensure that TSA is procuring only
those services that accurately reflect its needs at the most
advantageous price.
Answer. While I am not aware of the specifics of this particular
procurement, it is my understanding that this acquisition has been
conducted utilizing best value procurement techniques under which
technical performance is measured against cost in order to ensure the
government obtains the best value for required supplies or services.
If confirmed, I will work to ensure that TSA's procurement policies
reflect current security requirements while prioritizing fiscal
responsibility.
Question 5. I've heard multiple stories about the ability of first
responders to communicate efficiently and effectively with other first
responders. Whether it is TSA officers working with local law
enforcement, fire or other Federal agencies, having the technical
capability to talk to each other is critical.
Throughout the various TSA security programs and DHS funding
streams, we see an immediate need to address and solve the problem of
interoperability with security technologies that are currently
deployed. We would like to see TSA and DHS apply interoperability
requirements to all funding streams from direct grants to agency
procurements. If you are confirmed, will you please provide this
committee, in the first 30 days, a procurement action plan and issue
specific guidance to the TSA's procurement officers and program leaders
that requires an interoperability standard or criteria be included in
all future and, possibly, ongoing procurement activities?
Answer. I agree that communications interoperability between first
responders is a key requirement for the effective management of
security incidents. If confirmed, I will work with Transportation
Security Administration leadership and our security partners across the
country to further the development and application of interoperable
communications standards in the transportation security environment and
I will be certain to keep both you and the Committee updated.
Question 6. One of the serious issues with airport security is the
fact that there are several systems used to secure the facility which
are managed by different organizations or agencies within the airport.
What are your plans to unify the multiple security systems and leverage
them more effectively within an airport to provide better situational
awareness, thus improving passenger safety and airport efficiency?
Answer. Although I have not had an opportunity to engage in an in-
depth discussion on this issue, I understand that each airport operates
under an Airport Security Program that details the specific roles and
responsibilities of each entity involved in the security of that
airport's unique operating environment and describes how these entities
work together. If confirmed, I will review the systems and procedures
currently used to secure airport facilities to determine if there are
opportunities to implement security improvements and efficiencies that
could be applied nationwide.
Question 7. What was the total dollar amount paid to Transportation
Security Officers (TSOs) in overtime salary in FY 2009?
Answer. I understand that TSA paid its Officers $61.4 million in
overtime in FY 2009.
Question 8. What systems are currently in place to track overtime
payments to TSOs?
Answer. I am told that the National Finance Center (NFC) Payroll
system is the official system of record for pay information, including
overtime. The NFC is supported by Time and Attendance data recorded and
certified in the WebTA system by supervisors.
I further understand that TSA is able to extract reports on pay,
hours worked and other information from the NFC system and uses this
information to manage pay activity.
Question 9. Does the TSA have an authorized budget for overtime for
TSOs?
Answer. From my initial briefings, I understand that TSA has the
authority to incur overtime and budgets for it accordingly.
Question 10. What is the nominee's view on sole source contracting
for projects over $5 million?
Answer. While sole source contracting may be necessary in some
instances, it is my view that these acquisitions, regardless of value,
should be limited, adequately justified, approved by senior acquisition
officials, and transparent to industry and the public.
Question 11. How often are sole source contracts reviewed to ensure
satisfactory delivery of products and services?
Answer. While I do not have specific knowledge of TSA's current
procedures for reviewing sole source contracts, I understand that all
TSA contracts are reviewed on a continual basis based upon overall size
and risk to ensure satisfactory delivery of products and services.
Question 12. What systems does the TSA have in place to protect
against identity theft of TSOs personal information, such as ID cards?
Are biometric systems being used on the work sites?
Answer. While I do not have specific information on current steps
that TSA has taken to protect its employees from identity theft, I take
this issue very seriously. Identity theft is not only a financial crime
but can be a major security issue when it comes to identification
documents of those who serve in critical security positions. If
confirmed, I will take appropriate steps to protect the personal
information of all TSA employees including its Officers to ensure our
aviation systems remain safe.
Question 13. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has noted
that standard dry-chemical fire extinguishers pose a threat to
airplanes if they are discharged on the plane and therefore bars them
on commercial aircraft. The Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) recognizes this threat and therefore, prohibits passengers from
carrying them through the security checkpoint. A basic fire
extinguisher can cause tremendous damage if discharged on an airplane
because it is corrosive to electronic equipment and can cause
tremendous visual and respiratory impairment to the pilots. However,
once through security, airport concourses are lined with unsecured and
unmonitored dry chemical fire extinguishers that can be removed without
any central detection and carried onto an airplane and deployed into
the cockpit. Are you aware of the danger posed by unsecured fire
extinguishers in airport concourses?
Answer. I am not specifically familiar with this issue. If
confirmed, I will review this matter.
Question 14. What measures would you take as Administrator to
ensure that fire extinguishers are not carried onto airplanes?
Answer. I am not specifically familiar with this issue. If
confirmed, I will review this matter.
Question 15. Do you plan to require airports to address how they
are dealing with the concourse fire extinguisher threat?
Answer. I am not specifically familiar with this issue. If
confirmed, I will review this matter.
Question 16. The benefits of the DCA Access Standard Security
Program (DASSP) in terms of numbers of General Aviation aircraft
operating in/out of DCA continue to be limited due to the relatively
few airports approved as DASSP gateways. Many key airports for general
aviation operations lack airline service and therefore a local TSA
presence and are unable to gain DASSP gateway approval due to
insufficient TSA resources. For these airports, a third party screener,
funded by the airport and its tenants could be used to mitigate the
impact on TSA staffing, however this is not currently allowed under the
DASSP. If confirmed as TSA Administrator, would you support the
inclusion of third party screeners as part of the DASSP and overall
growth in the number of airports approved as DASSP gateways?
Answer. If confirmed, I will look into the accessibility of general
aviation flights into Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport to
ensure that the program operates effectively for potential users while
maintaining the necessary level of security.
Question 17. Under what circumstances should sole source
contracting be used?
Answer. While sole source contracting may be necessary in some
instances, it is my view that these acquisitions, regardless of value,
should be limited, adequately justified, approved by senior acquisition
officials, and transparent to industry and the public.