[Senate Hearing 114-796]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-796
CORRUPTION, GLOBAL MAGNITSKY, AND MODERN SLAVERY: A REVIEW OF HUMAN
RIGHTS AROUND THE WORLD
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 16, 2015
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BOB CORKER, TENNESSEE, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
MARCO RUBIO, Florida BARBARA BOXER, California
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
CORY GARDNER, Colorado CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
RAND PAUL, Kentucky TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Lester Munson, Staff Director
Jodi B. Herman, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hon. Bob Corker, U.S. Senator From Tennessee..................... 1
Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, U.S. Senator From Maryland.............. 3
Hon. Tomasz P. Malinowski, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Sarah Margon, Washington Director, Human Rights Watch,
Washington, DC................................................. 15
Prepared statement........................................... 17
Mark Lagon, President, Freedom House, Washington, DC............. 20
Prepared statement........................................... 22
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Dr. Mark Lagon to Questions Submitted by Senator Bob
Corker......................................................... 35
Responses of Assistant Secretary Tomasz P. Malinowski to
Questions
Submitted by Senator Bob Corker................................ 36
Responses of Assistant Secretary Tomasz P. Malinowski to
Questions
Submitted by Senator Rand Paul................................. 38
Responses of Assistant Secretary Tomasz P. Malinowski to
Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez........................... 39
Letter Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez...................... 42
Article Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez..................... 45
(iii)
CORRUPTION, GLOBAL MAGNITSKY, AND MODERN SLAVERY: A REVIEW OF HUMAN
RIGHTS AROUND THE WORLD
----------
THURSDAY, JULY 16, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Corker, Gardner, Cardin, Menendez, and
Kaine.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
The Chairman. Foreign Relations Committee will come to
order.
I want to say in advance, we have got about seven votes
that are coming up in about 40 minutes. And, with the approval
of our ranking member and other members, I think what we may
do, because that is probably too long of a period to have a
recess, I would think, is that we just move back and forth and
alternate chairmans and ranking members. We may have to
substitute others to keep this going. But, we certainly know
the importance of this hearing.
I very much want to thank our ranking member, Senator
Menendez, and others for their tremendous efforts in this
regard, along with Senator McCain. I want to make sure I am in
the right place, here.
As Americans, we believe our government should secure and
do--and not do harm to our rights. What this really means is
that we believe in the rule of law. Where the rule of law is
absent or weak, we know that we can expect to see governments,
groups, and individuals violating the rights of others. Where
societal norms have broken down, you are not all surprised to
see the worst of human nature take over. And we do not have to
look too far around the world to find examples of how
corruption distorts economics and fuels social conflict, and
how it robs citizens of opportunity and dignity.
With similarly devastating effect for security and
stability throughout the world, human rights abuses continue to
manifest themselves in various forms, from disenfranchisement
to unlawful imprisonment, torture, and even extermination.
Yesterday, the ranking member and I were over at a presentation
by the Holocaust Museum depicting a young man named Caesar who
had basically chronicled what was happening in prisons in
Syria. It offends even the most basic human sensibilities. And
to know that that is happening right now as we are sitting here
in this hearing, that people are being tortured in the most
crass ways--ways that I think people never imagined could take
place in this time. So, I very much, again, appreciate our
ranking member's pursuit and certainly his impassioned comments
yesterday.
The world continues to look at the United States to defend
basic freedoms and the rule of law when attacked. Furthering
the cause for democratic governance and rule-based economic
systems also happens to benefit us here at home. Respect for
individual rights not only defines us as Americans, but it is
embedded in our foreign affairs laws by requiring the State
Department's annual human rights report and human rights
vetting for military training and creating authority to support
civil society and the rule of law through foreign assistance.
That certainly does not mean that we do not struggle to
find the right balance between our concerns over human rights
and competing interests. There is an additional balance to be
struck between what we would like to see happen on the human
rights front and the reality of how much leverage or influence
we actually have to achieve these goals.
Arguably, the human rights landscape changed over the past
few years. After the end of the cold war, our view of universal
human rights and political freedom was dominant. But today,
major international players simply do not accept these views
and have not embraced the rule of law. Countries like Russia
and China, for example. Instead, they have used law to
criminalize dissent and isolate dissenters. Terrorists and
criminal nonstate actors also carry out unspeakable human
rights violations.
In addition, modern slavery violates the most fundamental
human rights. As many as 27 million men and women, especially
women and children, are held in conditions of slavery. And I am
proud that this committee passed out, on a unanimous vote, a
bill that it appears may benefit from appropriations and begin
a process where the United States takes an even stronger lead
in this issue. These victims are overwhelmingly poor and
vulnerable, living without the protections of the rule of law.
This reality should call us to action to work to deepen our
partnership with governments and civil society globally who are
willing to work to eliminate modern slavery.
I appreciate this committee for voting out the legislation
on a unanimous basis, as I mentioned. I hope that our witnesses
today will help us explore these issues.
I would just point out, for the benefit of members, that
questions about human trafficking and modern slavery are best
directed at our second panel, since those issues are not
directly within the purview of Assistant Secretary Malinowski
at the State Department.
And with that, I recognize our distinguished ranking
member, Senator Cardin, for opening comments.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
Senator Cardin. Well, Mr. Chairman, first, thank you so
much, not just for convening this hearing, but for championing
human rights. This committee has a very proud record of
advancing basic rights. The trafficking legislation that you
referred to, your initiative, is very important. The United
States has been the global leader in fighting modern-day
slavery. And we thank you very much for your commitment to
strengthen our position so that we can strengthen the resolve
internationally against human trafficking.
During the State Department reauthorization discussions
that we had, we included many provisions that strengthen basic
human rights as part of our foreign policy objectives,
including requiring our State Department to assess the status
of corruption globally. That is another area that this
committee advanced. There have been many, many, many examples
of this committee advancing human rights. Particularly--just
recently, we passed legislation that says the State Department
should accumulate the information on war crimes committed by
the Assad regime so that we can hold them accountable. And the
Senate agreed with our position on accountability for war
crimes in Syria.
So, we have a strong track record. I am particularly proud
of the Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act that was
passed by this committee and enacted into law in the last
Congress, and that we have set up a way to hold those who were
responsible for gross violations of human rights accountable.
As I said yesterday, Sergei Magnitsky was not the first
Russian to be incarcerated for no reason, tortured and killed,
but he is one that we knew about. And due to the courage of
Bill Browder, that information became public and we took action
to let the world know that we will stand by those who stand up
against corruption, and we will help. And we passed the
Magnitsky Accountability Act. Many said, Why are we doing this?
Why do we want to create this type of a challenge in our
relationship with Russia? The United States is strongest when
we not only get engaged, but we get engaged and stand by our
principles. And we were successful in getting that legislation
done.
As a result, dozens of people have been sanctioned, many
other countries have also taken action to say that they will
join us in our crusade against the human rights violators, and
we are seeing a different attitude. And, quite frankly, lives
have been saved, and people have been encouraged, and change is
taking place.
So, this hearing, I think, gives us a chance to focus on
what we can do to strengthen that. One effort will be to change
the Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act to the Global
Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act so that it will apply
to all countries, not just Russia. I will just remind the
members of this committee, that the legislation was changed, in
conference, to be restricted solely to Russia as an
accommodation to the House, an accommodation to the
administration, in order to get the bill enacted. I think now
there is general consensus that this should be done globally.
Quite frankly, the tools are being used by the administration
today, beyond Russia, in other countries. What this does is
legislate that, giving the administration--any administration--
the tools to use, but also allowing for congressional
committees to initiate requests to the administration to review
individuals.
This is a strong bipartisan bill. You already acknowledged
Senator McCain. Senator McCain has been a great leader on this
crusade for human rights. I want to acknowledge other
cosponsors: Senators Shaheen, Rubio, Durbin, Wicker, Markey,
Kirk, Blumenthal, and Cruz. We have all sides of the political
spectrums. We come together on fighting for human rights
globally.
And lastly, Mr. Chairman, let me just acknowledge Tom
Malinowski and his incredible career, both in government and
outside of government, crusading for human rights. He makes us
all proud. He has taken on not only other governments and other
people; he takes on, at times, the State Department, which we
appreciate, and he is here to testify, which we very much
appreciate.
I also want to acknowledge Mark Lagon, from the Freedom
House--Freedom House has done incredible work in regards to
human rights--and Sarah Margon, from the Human Rights Watch.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator. And again, thanks for
your tremendous leadership on this issue. I know this is one
that you spent a great part of your career working on, and I
thank you for that.
Our first witness of the first panel today is Assistant
Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Tom
Malinowski. Previously, he was Washington Director for Human
Rights Watch from 1998 to 2001. He served as Senior Director on
the National Security Council at the White House from 1994 to
1998. He was a speechwriter for Secretaries Warren Christopher
and Madeleine Albright, and a member of the Policy Planning
Staff at the Department of State.
It is good to have you before our committee. I first met
Tom, having an adult beverage in Munich, I think, a few years
ago. It is good to have you here.
I also want to welcome our other witnesses. Professor Mark
Lagon is the president of the Freedom House. Previously, he was
Global Politics and Security Chair at the Master of Science and
Foreign Policy Program at Georgetown University. He was
executive director and CEO of the leading anti-human-
trafficking nonprofit Polaris Project until January 2009. He
also directed the Office of Monitor and Combat Trafficking in
Persons at the U.S. Department of State. He is also a staff
alumnus to the Foreign Relations Committee.
We welcome you back, Mark, and thank you for your great
service here.
Ms. Sarah Margon is the Washington director at Human Rights
Watch. Prior to joining Human Rights Watch, she was associate
director of Sustainable Security and Peacebuilding at the
Center for American Progress. She also served as senior foreign
policy advisor to Senator Russ Feingold, and is also a staff
alumni of the Foreign Relations Committee, where she was staff
director to the Subcommittee on African Affairs.
We also welcome you back, and know that both of you will be
treated exceptionally well. We thank you for being here today.
I would remind all of you that, if you would--you all have
done this before--keep your comments to about 5 minutes. Your
written comments will be made part of the record.
And we apologize for the votes that are getting ready to
take place, but we thank you so much for being here to help us
with this issue.
And, with that, Tom, why do you not go ahead.
STATEMENT OF HON. TOMASZ P. MALINOWSKI, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Cardin. Thanks for holding this hearing. Thanks for placing
such a high priority on these important bipartisan issues.
And let me also thank you for giving me such a small
subject to try to summarize in 5 minutes. [Laughter.]
I am going to--I will try. I may----
The Chairman. I will tell you what: Take 6, if you wish.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you. [Laughter.]
So, let me give you a general overview of what I see as the
big opportunities and challenges, and then you can have at me
on whatever you like.
So, you know, as you know, my work forces me to focus on
the worst and most depressing things that are happening around
the world. I often start, when I talk about these things, by
trying to remind folks that there is a lot of good stuff
happening in many parts of the world. A lot of people are still
fighting the fight for human rights and for freedom, and they
are winning. When I look back on the events of the last year, I
think about the success of the Maidan movement in the Ukraine,
and all the work those folks are still doing to try to hold
their country to the path that they have chosen. I think about
Afghanistan and Indonesia and the elections that took place
there, where, amongst all the choices people had, they went for
the candidates who had the most progressive human-rights-
oriented visions for the future of their country. I think about
this remarkable movement for term limits that has started and
spread throughout Africa; the more recent elections in Nigeria
and Sri Lanka, where people risked so much to assert the right
to change their leaders; about the opportunities I think we
still have in Burma, and the new opportunities that are
emerging in Vietnam. And in all of these cases, the United
States, we, have played, I think, a very, very central role in
supporting people who are fighting for their rights. And that
ought to give us, not just some hope for the future, but
confidence in ourselves, a very, very important quality.
Now, all that said, the global movement for human rights
has run into some pretty significant headwinds, and there are
days when it feels to me like the number and intensity of the
crises we face is about as great as at any point in recent
history. So, let me mention what I think are three of the
biggest overarching challenges we face.
The first is the--obviously, the brutality of nonstate
actors like Daesh and Boko Haram and al-Shabaab and the Taliban
groups that have launched systematically planned efforts to
target whole groups of people because of their ethnicity or
faith, and propagated an ideology that justifies, even
celebrates, the killing and enslavement of people. We have to
defeat these groups, and that necessarily involves coercive
measures. But, at the same time, we have to remember what they
came from. They did not come from nothing. Many cases--
certainly true in Nigeria and Syria and Iraq--extremist groups
came to the fore driven by atrocities and human rights abuses
and corruption committed by governments. And so, our response
to these groups also has to be consistent with the values of
promoting human rights.
And that leads me to the second overarching challenge that
I think we face daily around the world, and that is the
misapplication of counterterrorism and counterterrorism laws to
stifle legitimate political dissent. When a Saudi
counterterrorism court sentences a blogger to 1,000 lashes,
when Egypt uses the threat of terrorism to justify the
prosecution of nonviolent opposition, when China prosecutes
Uighur scholars who promote moderation and reconciliation, it
is not just a blow to human rights, it is a setback to
effective counterterrorism. And so, a great part of our
engagement with partners in our coalitions against terrorism is
about delivering the message that, when the paths to nonviolent
change are blocked, more and more people who have grievances
are going to fall under the sway of extremist groups.
Now, the third big challenge--and you mentioned this, Mr.
Chairman--is that, for the first time in many, many years, we
are facing a serious challenge to universal norms of human
rights from two of the world's great powers: Russia and China.
I think it is important, in the case of Russia, for example, to
recognize that the intervention in Ukraine that we have seen is
profoundly related to President Putin's increasingly harsh
crackdown domestically, which has been building since 2011,
when he faced those first effective protests against his rule.
You have seen, of course, the progression, the laws labeling
NGOs as foreign agents or undesirable foreign organizations,
the complete lack of progress and accountability for cases like
Sergei Magnitsky, the murder of opposition leaders, and so
forth.
And this insecurity at home has increasingly led the
Kremlin to view the assertion of a universal norm of human
rights and democracy by governments, by civil society groups
all around the world, as a threat to its interests. And so,
when a democratic experiment arose in Ukraine, Russia acted
against a sovereign state to stop it, leading not just to a
human rights crisis, but to a threat to global order.
And in China, we are also seeing, in some ways, a very
similar increasingly assertive set of measures to restrict
civil society and to challenge the legitimacy of global norms
that uphold the rights of civil society. In recent days, we
have seen over 100 lawyers detained in China who are defending
the rights of others. We have seen the passage or proposal of
laws on NGOs, on national security, that will empower the
government to round up, not just human rights groups, but to
restrict the activities of everything from chambers of commerce
to groups that do student exchanges, work on environmental
issues, everything that is not controlled by the government,
all justified by an increasingly assertive official discourse
of resisting what they call ``cultural infiltration'' from the
United States and the international community. And,
unfortunately, we see this trend in a lot of other smaller
countries that are able to point to the example of Russia and
China to justify what they are doing.
Now, all of this is very bad news. I would suggest that the
global crackdown on civil society that we are seeing is, in
part, a response to the effectiveness and success of these
movements over the last several years. So, in a way, it is no
surprise that authoritarian regimes are pushing back. What it
means for us is, we have to redouble our vigilance. So, how do
we do that? We have a lot of tools. We have public and private
diplomacy. We can mobilize other countries through the U.N. and
other international organizations. We can put great emphasis on
issues like corruption. And that is something we are doing,
because we know, not only is corruption linked to bad
governance, to human rights abuses everywhere in the world, it
is also one of the most important political vulnerabilities of
regimes like Putin's, for example, and others, because it is
the one thing they cannot justify at home or abroad.
And finally, we have the option of imposing targeted
sanctions, particularly targeted financial sanctions. And, as
you both know, this is an option that I have supported in many
cases, it is one that we have employed as a government in a
number of cases, it can be effective, but it is not always the
right answer. It is not something that we can uniformly do,
from the standpoint of effectiveness, in every single country
that faces human rights challenges. And that is why I think we
need the flexibility to work with you to determine where that
tool is likely to do more good than harm.
So, Senator Cardin, you mentioned the Global Magnitsky Act.
I want to, first of all, commend you and thank you for all of
the work that you have done on the issues that we have been
discussing over the years, including the work on the Act. And
we very much appreciate your efforts to address some of our
concerns in preserving that important flexibility to be able to
impose sanctions where it is going to be effective and
appropriate. And we very much look forward to working with you,
with the committee, on this and other important legislation as
you move forward.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Malinowski follows:]
Prepared Statement of Assistant Secretary Tomasz P. Malinowski
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Cardin, for holding this
important hearing. You've given us a broad subject, so there are any
number of issues I could touch on, but let me begin by giving you a
general overview of the challenges and opportunities I see right now in
our efforts to promote human rights around the world.
As you know, we recently released our 2014 Human Rights Reports,
which gave us a chance to take stock of human rights conditions
worldwide. We focus in those reports on what is going wrong in all the
countries they examine, and we must, since the whole point of our human
rights diplomacy is to help right those wrongs. But we also recognized
what is going right--the achievements that people working for democracy
and human rights have made in the last year that give us hope, even in
this difficult period. In Ukraine, peaceful protests helped citizens
reclaim their country's traditions of political choice and freedom of
expression. In Afghanistan and Indonesia, millions of people went to
the polls, and chose among all the candidates before them leaders with
the most progressive, democratic vision for the future of their
country. In Burkina Faso, people stood up to uphold their constitution,
part of a larger movement for term limits in Africa and beyond. In
Nigeria, voters braved violence, and in Sri Lanka they were galvanized
by corruption and nepotism, to affirm their ability to choose and
change their leaders. In each of these cases, the United States stood
up for those seeking human rights, often over many years in the face of
significant setbacks. These examples, therefore, should give us not
just hope for progress in the world but confidence in our ability to
advance it.
That said, the global movement for human rights has also run into
powerful headwinds in many places, and on some days it feels like the
number and intensity of crises we face are greater than at any time I
can remember.
The first challenge I want to highlight is the brutality of
nonstate actors, from the Taliban and al-Shabaab to Boko Haram and
Daesh. We are all too familiar with the litany of crimes these
terrorists have committed: murder, torture, rape, religious
persecution, slavery, and more. Daesh, in particular, stands out for
having launched systematically planned and organized efforts to attack
whole groups of people because of their ethnicity or faith, and for
propagating an ideology that justifies, and even celebrates, the
killing of civilians and enslavement of women. As Secretary Kerry has
made clear, the international community must confront and to defeat
these groups, and coercive measures are obviously an essential part of
that effort.
At the same time, we must remember that these groups did not emerge
from nothing. Violent extremism in Nigeria was exacerbated by the
actions--and in some ways the inaction--of the previous government. In
Syria, Daesh's rise was fueled by Assad's horrific abuses against his
own people. In Iraq, Daesh took hold because many in the Sunni
community felt marginalized, felt that legitimate grievances were being
ignored by the government in Baghdad. So these violent extremist groups
are not only a primary cause of human rights abuses; they are also a
product of human rights abuses.
As President Obama noted in the 2015 National Security Strategy,
many of our biggest national security challenges come from the biggest
human rights failures. When governments violate the rights of their
citizens and ignore calls for accountability, inclusivity, rule of law,
decent work, and fundamental freedoms, they fuel instability and
violence.
So our response to terrorist groups must be consistent with human
rights, too, which leads me to a second urgent challenge we face around
the world today--the misapplication of counterterrorism laws to stifle
criticism, crush dissent, and restrict the space for civil society. For
example, in Saudi Arabia, peaceful Internet activist Raif Badawi was
sentenced to 10 years in prison and 1,000 lashes by the Ministry of
Interior's Specialized Criminal Court, a court originally set up to try
terrorists. Egypt has used a real threat of terrorism to justify the
prosecution of nonviolent opposition figures, human rights activists,
and demonstrators. Bahrain has a legitimate interest in protecting its
people against violent groups, yet its government has focused much of
its energy on prosecuting peaceful critics, including this year,
opposition leader Sheikh Ali Salman. Last year in China, Ilham Tohti, a
Uighur scholar who promoted moderation and reconciliation among ethnic
groups, was sentenced to life in prison.
Terrorism doesn't give authorities a license to use violence
indiscriminately, and it's not a legitimate excuse to lock up political
opponents, restrict civil society, or pin a false label on activists
who are engaged in peaceful dissent. Such measures are not just wrong;
they're not just violations of human rights. They're also
counterproductive to our security goals; they play directly into the
hands of terrorists.
As President Obama said at the Countering Violent Extremism Summit
in February, ``When people are oppressed and human rights are denied .
. . when dissent is silenced, it feeds violent extremism. When peaceful
democratic change is impossible, it feeds into terrorist propaganda
that violence is the only answer available.'' That's why a great part
of our engagement with partners in the coalition against Daesh, and
with countries facing this kind of threat is about delivering the
message that when the paths to nonviolent change are shut down, more
and more people who have grievances will fall under the sway of
extremists and the false promises they offer. It's why our security
cooperation with these countries will remain bound by restrictions that
promote respect for human rights and encourage a focus on violent
extremism rather than peaceful dissent. We do this for our own
security, as well as to advance the human rights and dignity of people
around the world.
The third challenge I want to put before you today is this--for the
first time in many years, we are facing a serious challenge to
universal norms of human rights from two of the world's great powers.
Russia's intervention in Ukraine threatens to upend an
international order that has kept the peace in Europe since World War
II. We have responded accordingly, and appropriately. But we should
also remember that Putin's actions in Ukraine are profoundly related to
his increasingly harsh crackdown on dissent within Russia since 2011,
when he saw widespread overwhelmingly peaceful public protests as a
threat to his power. Seventy-six of the country's most respected NGOs
now are now listed as ``foreign agents'' and a new law banning
``undesirable foreign organizations'' will intensify the government's
suppression of Russian civil society. These laws have been used not
just against human rights groups, but against any NGO that receives
foreign funding, from organizations that finance high school science
camps, to those supporting the mothers of soldiers; recently,
organizations have been targeted simply because their staff spoke at
conferences on foreign soil. At the same time, there has been no
progress in identifying those responsible for the murders of
journalists, human rights defenders, and with the killing of Boris
Nemtsov, leaders of the political opposition.
The Kremlin appears to see the assertion of a universal norm of
human rights and democracy by governments and civil society groups
around the world as a call to ``color revolutions'' and thus a threat
to the regime. In Ukraine Russia has acted against a sovereign state
where a successful democratic transition might set a positive example
for others. The result has been an occupation of Crimea and
intervention in eastern Ukraine in which widespread human rights abuses
have been committed. Meanwhile, Russia has used its veto in the U.N.
Security Council to oppose the enforcement of human rights norms around
the world, blocking everything from efforts to hold accountable those
responsible for atrocities in Syria to a commemoration of the genocide
at Srebrenica in Bosnia.
Sadly, in China, we are seeing increasingly assertive measures to
restrict civil society and to challenge the legitimacy of universal
human rights norms. In recent days, the Chinese Government has detained
a large group of lawyers who had done nothing more than defend, the
rights of others brought before the criminal justice system. The timing
of these arrests, shortly after China's passage of a new National
Security Law has heightened our concerns that China may seek to use
legislation to commit human rights abuses and to restrict enjoyment of
fundamental freedoms of expression, association, peaceful assembly, and
religion.
China's draft NGO and counterterrorism laws are similarly
disturbing. They are broad, vaguely phrased laws that give officials
considerable latitude to police civil society and suppress views that
they perceive as being in any way threatening to Communist Party rule.
As in Russia, the Chinese NGO law will allow the government to go after
any and all foreign, and foreign supported, organizations, including
groups involved in work as benign as student exchanges or environmental
issues. And the Chinese Government justifies it with a new and
disturbing official discourse that paints ``cultural infiltration''
from the United States and the international community as a threat.
These developments could restrict foreign trade and investment in China
and obstruct the Chinese people's interaction with the outside world,
reversing a 36-year process of ``reform and opening'' to the outside
world that has enriched both China and the international community. As
we did during our recent Strategic and Economic Dialogue with China, we
will continue to encourage China's leaders to weigh the costs to its
citizens' well-being and productivity of blocking them from the ideas
and information that spark and move the world forward. But that is what
the Chinese Government appears to be determined to do.
Unfortunately, other countries around the world, from Cambodia to
Ethiopia to Azerbaijan, have sought to copy Russia and China's
repressive examples, passing laws to stifle NGOs and restrict what
their people can access on the Internet and other media. You might
recall Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban's speech last summer,
declaring his intention to build an ``illiberal state'' modeled on the
likes of Russia and China. When authoritarian leaders are challenged at
home and abroad by demands for more inclusive and transparent
government--demands that cite universal values and international law--
they find it convenient to point to an alternative model being
displayed and promoted by influential world powers like Russia and
China.
I realize this is quite a dark outlook, but I do want to point out
that one of the reasons for the recent wave of crackdowns on civil
society is that civil society has become very effective. Crackdowns are
a response to the success that global civil society has had in
promoting human rights--success in raising the expectations of people
in countries that have long resisted democratic change that they're
entitled to the same fundamental freedoms as everyone else around the
world. And that success is profoundly threatening to authoritarian
regimes. So it's not a surprise to seem them pushing back. But the push
back does, mean that we need to remain vigilant in our defense of
universal values.
There's no single approach to doing this. Different tools, in
different combinations, are appropriate depending on the circumstances.
But let me lay out some of the tools at hand.
First, we always strive to address our concerns in our public and
private diplomacy--even with countries with which we must do business
on other issues.
We work in the United Nations, in regional organizations, and other
multilateral fora to strengthen and generate international support for
compliance with human rights obligations.
Related to this, one thing we increasingly have emphasized is the
importance of fighting corruption in countries where there is clearly a
confluence between graft and poor governance. Corruption is often the
reason why authoritarian leaders seize and cling to power; but it is
also often one of their greatest vulnerabilities--the abuse of power
that generates the greatest domestic opposition and that they are least
able to justify on the world stage. The United States is well-
positioned to lead a redoubled global effort to confront corruption. We
were the first country to criminalize bribery by our companies
overseas. We have led the creation of global standards and binding
legal frameworks to prevent and combat graft, and to foster the
international legal cooperation that is increasingly necessary. In the
last few years, we have forged a consensus in the G20 to strengthen
safeguards against the flow of illicit funds, including by cracking
down on the use of anonymous shell companies. We are helping emerging
democracies like Sri Lanka and Ukraine recover stolen assets, and where
possible prosecuting those with links to foreign corruption in our
courts. We are partnering with a number of African countries to address
corruption and other sources of illicit finance there.
At the same time, we use our assistance to partners around the
world, including security assistance, to leverage improved respect for
human rights. And finally, we have the option of using targeted
measures, including targeted financial sanctions in certain contexts.
They are an important tool in many cases. They enable us to impose
costs on individuals responsible for certain human rights abuses
without punishing entire countries or economies. They can show how
seriously the United States takes these issues, while giving the
victims of human rights abuses a sense that someone is standing up for
them. And America's position in the international financial system
gives us unique opportunities to employ such measures. But financial
sanctions aren't the right answer in every situation, and our ability
to employ this tool effectively would diminish if we employed it
indiscriminately. That's why we believe we need the flexibility to
determine, in consultation with Congress, when financial and other
sanctions will do more good than harm.
Senator Cardin, I want to commend you for all of the work you have
done to combat global human rights violations, including your recent
work on the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, which was
reported out of this committee last year. We greatly appreciate your
effort to address our concerns for preserving our flexibility in key
areas and look forward to working with you and other members of the
committee as this bill proceeds through the legislative process to
ensure that it achieves common goals.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much for that testimony.
And very much appreciate your efforts in all of the places that
you have served.
So, you talked about Russia--and let us just mention China,
in particular--but also other countries. We had a situation
come before us here recently, where we are dealing with China
on a civil nuclear agreement, whereby we know that they are
going to cheat and use that technology to help them in military
activities. We know that is going to happen. And yet, you know,
our country is entering into an agreement with them and--
because of the commercial interest that exists relative to us
working with China on commercial issues. So, when it comes to
this particular issue, human rights, talk to me about how we
deal with the balance. My guess is, your greatest challenge at
the State Department is that the State Department has multiple
interests that it is trying to accommodate, and issues that
they are trying to achieve, or movement. So, how do we balance
that? To me, that is one of the greatest rubs that we have,
relative to human rights issues, is that we have other
equities, if you will, with governments that sometimes
compromise our abilities.
Mr. Malinowski. First, I think it is important to be
completely honest about that. Of course we have other
interests. And I would be--it would be silly of me to suggest
that this is the only set of interests that the United States
has in the world. I tend to resist the notion that our interest
in promoting human rights, and our interest in protecting our
security, our prosperity, is--that those interests are
fundamentally at odds. I think sometimes we face short-term
tradeoffs, where we may have to work with a particular country
on something that is essential to our security right now. And,
at times, that may lead us to calibrate our efforts on other
important issues.
In the long run--and this is the point I was making about
counterterrorism--and not just the very long run, but in--
medium term--it is--I do not think it is possible for us to
secure the broad range of our interests in the world unless we
are also working with and empowering ordinary people in
countries like Russia and China and Afghanistan and Indonesia,
and so on, and so on. Most of our--and President Obama has made
this clear; it is stated very plainly in our national security
strategy--most of the most fundamental challenges to our
national security around the world come from places where
people's rights are not respected. And that is not a
coincidence.
So, that is the argument that I make. Even in the cases
where we have short-term tradeoffs, there is no situation where
we cannot stand up strongly and say what we think. In the case
of China, we just had our strategic and economic dialogue here
in Washington, and everybody involved, from Secretary Kerry on
down, pressed extremely hard on issues like the NGO law, the
arrest of lawyers, Tibet, Xinjiang--making the argument that I
have just made, that these problems are related to many of our
other concerns with China. And I think we find that, even if
all we are doing is making statements, governments around the
world are profoundly sensitive to what the United States says
and does not say. That is been one of the interesting things
that I have learned in this job, that even just what we say,
what you say as a Congress, is heard very clearly around the
world and is taken very, very seriously.
So, there is always something that we can do, even in those
situations.
The Chairman. And if you would, just for our education,
when you say ``empower groups,'' let us talk China for
instance. One of our jobs is to empower groups. What are some
of the most effective ways that we do that?
Mr. Malinowski. There are--well, there are many different
things that we can do. In some cases, we can provide direct
support to civil society organizations that are advocating for
universal human rights.
The Chairman. And is that permissible under the leadership
that exists in China right now?
Mr. Malinowski. In some places, it is harder; in some
places, it is easier. In some places, we are very careful about
how we talk about what we do, because of the difficulties. We
take our cue, of course, from those brave activists,
themselves. There are countries where, for their own safety,
for their own interests, they feel like they cannot work with
outside governments or groups. So, that is one way.
Speaking out on their behalf, frankly, is very, very
important. I do not know how many times I have had
conversations with activists in other countries who have simply
said, ``Just speak out on our behalf. Remind us that we exist,
that we are important, that we are not forgotten.'' Sometimes
the targeted sanctions, where that is appropriate, are a good
way of empowering people, because they feel, ``Somebody did
something, somebody imposed a degree of accountability for what
is being done to us.'' Wherever possible, we try to mobilize
other countries. And increasingly, one of the things that my
Bureau is doing is pooling funds with other countries that are
dedicated to the same principles so that we are able to respond
collectively to cries for help from civil society around the
world.
So, many different things that we can do. Are we doing
enough? Never. We always face the challenge of doing more. And
we will continue to do our best.
The Chairman. I think that the way the Global Magnitsky
bill is now drafted, the sanctions are permissive. They are not
mandatory. Is that correct?
?????Senator Cardin.????? There is no required action by
the administration to evaluate every human rights violator
around the world, that is correct.
The Chairman. I know that is something that is going to be
subject of debate. My guess is, the administration would prefer
not to see this enacted. I do not think it has necessarily been
fond of this. But, if there were mandatory sanctions, just give
us practical implications of that.
Mr. Malinowski. That would be a significant problem. And
that is the administration's position. It is my personal
position. I do not think--first of all, I--as I mentioned, I do
not think that targeted financial sanctions are the answer to
every single human rights abuse and human rights abuser in the
world. If we were mandated by law to do it, we would have to
have the subjective process, where the lawyers would say, ``If
there is evidence, then we have to act.''
Number two, the resource implications of that would be just
extraordinary, particularly for countries that have very small
embassies, small posts, to have to be able to look at every
single case that rises to the level to potentially the
evidentiary standard in the legislation. So, I think that
would, in a sense, break the bank.
I think--again, very much appreciate the efforts that you
have made, Senator Cardin, to make this about creating an
authority to be able to target individuals around the world.
Obviously, the Congress would retain its authority to impose--
to pass legislation that imposes sanctions on a variety of
issues, variety of countries where you think it is appropriate.
So, I think flexibility is preserved all around with that
approach.
We have not taken a position on the legislation, neither
positive nor negative, but it is something that we very much
look forward to working with you both on.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Well, Mr. Chairman, let me say, we have
always intended, when the bill was originally introduced, the
Magnitsky law, that it would give authority to the executive
branch to be able to use these tools and a mechanism where the
legislative branch could ask the executive branch to
investigate specific cases, but no mandatory aspect. And we
thought that was the best way to go, because, quite frankly, if
it becomes mandatory--we were concerned about resources and
costs and whether you really are going to diminish the
importance of these tools. We want to go after the cases where
they can have the most impact, not only on the individual, but
on the circumstances within a country and those who are
fighting for human rights. So, it was intentionally designed
that way.
And I want to thank Mr. Malinowski, because during the
considerations of the bill, there were some clarifications, and
we very much appreciate the input in making it clear our
intentions on the legislation.
I also just really want to underscore your point about
putting a spotlight on issues. I have been involved in the
Helsinki Commission since my first days in the House of
Representatives, many years ago, before the fall of the Soviet
Union. And the Helsinki Commission by visiting a country and
talking to the activists was incredibly valuable in changing
the human rights records within many of the countries under the
Soviet domination. And it was one of the most important steps
we took in order to liberate people and give them hope. And I
think it contributed to the change and the end of the dominance
of the Soviet Union. So, that was an important step.
Mr. Malinowski, I will urge you to carefully engage on the
Trans-Pacific Partnership. I say that because Congress has
spoken. The TPA--Trade Promotional Authority--that we have
given to the administration has as one of its principal
negotiating objectives, which means the administration must act
in this area--good governance and anticorruption. We recognize
that there are times when you can make progress. And when
countries want trade rights with the United States, they will
change. And this is an opportunity for countries that have less
than satisfactory progress on human rights to be able to do
something positive. And we need champions.
Secondly, let me point out that some of your colleagues in
the State Department are working with the United Nations on the
Sustainable Development Goals, the next set of goals that
follow up on the Millennium Development Goals. There is a
Sustainable Development Goal, Goal 16, that is being proposed
that deals with good governance. This would be a major change.
As you know, the Millennium Development Goals tried to deal
with world poverty, with women's education, with infant
survival, and we made tremendous progress. But, as you pointed
out in your testimony, if you have a corrupt society, you are
not going to be able to do everything you need to keep babies
alive or to deal with poverty or to deal with education. It is
corrosive to those accomplishments.
So, we are able to at least propose it. And I would urge
you also to get involved with your colleagues to make sure that
we are successful in getting a good governance, anticorruption
focus in the Sustainable Development Goals. We have to use
every tool available. And that also includes the Global
Magnitsky.
And I just wanted to ask you a question. The administration
did use targeted sanctions against seven individuals
responsible for serious human rights violations in Venezuela.
You were able to do that. What challenges did the
administration face in the Venezuela case in being able to use
targeted sanctions?
Mr. Malinowski. I would say there are--I would point to
several challenges. One--and I think it is appropriate that we
face this challenge--the evidentiary standard is quite high.
And my colleagues at the Treasury Department insist that, when
we propose the use of targeted sanctions for conduct, such as
human rights abuses, that there be evidence, that we have solid
evidence, so that, when we go to the banks, we are not--you
know, we do not expose ourselves to potential legal action and
other measures by those whom we sanction. So, that is always
the case.
In the case of Venezuela, there was some blowback, as I am
sure you saw, from the region, including from some of our
allies and partners in the region, and from the Government of
Venezuela itself, because, under the current law that grants us
authority to impose these sanctions, IEPA, we have to--when we
target individuals, we have to issue--the President has to
issue an executive order that declares a state of national
emergency with respect to that country. And the language of the
executive order, the mandatory language, can--and was, in the
case of Venezuela--be exploited to suggest that the United
States is, in effect, going to war against that country. And
so, the Government of Venezuela pointed to some of that
language and said, you know, ``You see, the Americans are
coming after us,'' when, in fact, all we were doing was holding
accountable a number of individuals for abuses of human rights
and for corruption.
Senator Cardin. And that is one of the reasons why we would
suggest that the Global Magnitsky bill could avoid those types
of real problems, including statements that you have to make
that are not necessarily productive to our relationship with
other countries when we are going after human rights violators.
So, you have already pointed out that targeted sanctions are
valuable tools, so I will not reiterate that.
But, let me just make one last point on this. We have the
separation of branches of government. There are not many other
countries in the world that have that. We need to use that to
our advantage. You know, you cannot control what Congress does.
Sometimes that gives you an ability to go places and do things
that you otherwise could not do. So, I would just urge the
administration to play that more aggressively than you have in
the past. Congress, yes, can initiate laws with sanctions. We
can do it. We have done it. We have done it successfully; at
times, when the administration did not want us to do it--really
did not want us to do it. We still did it. And the results, I
would say, have been very, very positive, not only for the
advancement of human rights, but for advancement of many of our
other goals.
So, the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act,
is an effort to get that right, to give you the tools that you
can use, but to also say there are going to be times when
Congress wants an easier process so we do not have to declare
an emergency, like you have to do today when using these tools.
We do not have to pass a specific law; we can do it through our
committees and direct you to take a look at an individual who
we think deserves that type of attention. And I think it really
does play to the strength of America's independent branches of
government, allowing you to do what you should, but also
allowing Congress to carry out its role, either by passing
specific laws or directing the administration to take action.
And again, I thank you for your incredible record, both in
government and out of government, for what you have done to
advance human rights.
The Chairman. Thank you so much.
There will be a number of questions, I think, from other
Senators. And if you would answer those fairly promptly, this
helps us establish a record to deal with this legislation that
I know you support and Senator Cardin has championed. So, thank
you so much for being here. Thank you for your service.
And I think, in light of what is getting ready to happen
with votes, it might be good to go ahead and bring the other
witnesses up. Let us hear their testimony, and then we can
alternate. Sorry this has been so brief. It is not out of
disrespect for--well, I--with us questioning, I mean, it is
probably okay. So----
[Laughter.]
The Chairman [continuing]. Anyway. Thank you so much.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you so much.
[Pause.]
The Chairman. Thank you both for being here. And I know you
have been introduced. Just because of the way the seating order
is, Sarah, if you would like to start first, that would be
great.
STATEMENT OF SARAH MARGON, WASHINGTON DIRECTOR, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Margon. Sure, I am happy to.
Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, other members of
the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today. As a
former Senate staffer and a liaison to this committee, it is a
particular honor to be here. So, thank you.
I would like to specifically thank Senator Cardin for his
long-standing commitment to fighting corruption and addressing
global human rights abuses, including, but certainly not
limited to, the bill we are discussing today, the Global
Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act.
Now, the world is undergoing incredible turmoil with grave
implications for millions of people. If you look at countries
where the Arab Spring took root, it has been replaced, in many
cases, by conflict and repression. ISIS and other Islamic
extremists are committing mass atrocities and threatening
civilians, not only in the Middle East, but in Asia, in Africa,
and beyond. Even if we look past ISIS, many governments have
sought to respond to the very real danger of armed militancy
with a myopic security response. Legitimate counterterrorism
measures are often coupled with an unprecedented crackdown on
independent civil society and the media that receives, in many
cases, little more than a passing criticism from the United
States and other countries. Governments such as Bahrain and
Ethiopia have thrown peaceful activists and human rights
defenders in jail for being outspoken, under the guise of
fighting terrorism. Partnerships with security forces and
governments known to be both corrupt and abusive, from Egypt to
Afghanistan to Uganda, appear to be receiving less, rather than
more, scrutiny from the United States. Around the world, we
have documented how repressive government tactics often spark,
or at least exacerbate, many of today's most pressing security
challenges. And yet, human rights defenders challenge these
injustices, and risk harassment and attack, while those who
threaten them generally do so with great impunity.
It is within this framework that I would like to discuss
three countries where I actually think the Global Magnitsky
bill might be particularly valuable.
Let us start with Iraq. More than 12 years after the United
States-led forces invaded Iraq, it has become quite clear that
the country's transition to a functioning and stable democracy
built on the rule of law is in tatters. Even before ISIS's
dramatic territorial gains more than a year ago, human rights
conditions were deteriorating dramatically. Iraq grappled with
a weak criminal justice system plagued by serious corruption
and political interference. Courts frequently based convictions
on coerced confessions and trial proceedings that fell far
short of international standards.
At that time, the Iraq Government was struggling to address
bombings and attacks, and it employed draconian and abusive
tactics by heavy-handed security forces increasingly under the
political influence of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki,
who also sponsored militias outside of regular security forces.
ISIS's takeover of massive swaths of territory in June 2014 was
a testament to the alienation of Sunni communities as many
welcomed ISIS fighters as liberators from the sectarian
oppression of government authorities. To put it simply, former
Prime Minister Maliki's unchecked anti-Sunni policies created
fertile ground for ISIS to escalate the conflict that has
helped spawn today's crisis.
A sanctioned regime like the one the Global Magnitsky bill
would create is certainly no panacea for what we are facing
there, but, as a starting point, it sends a clear signal that
the United States is not open for business to persons
responsible for serious human rights abuses or large-scale
corruption. It also has the potential to spur greater domestic
accountability for such abuses, which is largely absent.
On Uzbekistan: Uzbekistan's human rights record is nothing
short of atrocious. Thousands of people are imprisoned on
politically motivated charges, torture is endemic, and the
authorities regularly go after civil society activists,
opposition members, and journalists in very barbaric ways.
Muslims and Christians who practice their religion outside
strict state controls are persecuted, and, despite some changes
in 2013 due to outside pressure, the government still forces an
estimated 2 million adults to harvest cotton every fall under
draconian conditions. Now, Washington has some tools to
encourage reform, but they have not been used, despite a much
reduced need to rely on Tashkent for the transit of United
States troop supplies out of Afghanistan.
When it comes to Uzbekistan, the Obama administration needs
a fresh approach that leans more in the direction of strategic
pressure instead of strategic patience, mainly because there is
no evidence that officials who oversee or engage in torture,
forced labor, or persecution of activists will change their
behavior absent serious political or economic consequences.
Very quickly on Bahrain: While the majority of Bahrainis
are Shiite, the country is ruled by a Sunni-dominated
autocratic monarchy that has shown no real intention to reform,
despite a number of cosmetic initiatives. In 2011, the
authorities used lethal force to suppress a largely peaceful
pro-democracy movement which proved to be a turning point. King
Hamad appointed an independent commission to look into human
rights violations, and dutifully accepted all of its
recommendations. But, little has been done to implement those
recommendations. Efforts to restart a national dialogue have
failed enough over the past year. Bahrain's main opposition
party has refused to participate in the national dialogue
process to protest authorities prosecuting some of its senior
members for exercising their right to free speech.
More generally, Bahrain's court convicts and imprisons
peaceful dissenters. The trials we have been able to monitor
have been exceptionally unfair. Here again, a global
sanctioning regime like the Global Magnitsky bill--like the one
the Global Magnitsky bill intends to authorize could help add
general pressure for a more rights-respecting political
environment, as it would provide the administration with the
tools needed to show the opposition the United States has
embraced their concerns, as well, beyond just the occasional
release of a prisoner, which we saw last week and then again
the re-arrest, despite the U.S. decision to lift arms
restrictions.
I think I will stop there.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Margon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Sarah Margon
Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, other members of the
committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today. As a former
Senate staffer--and a liaison to this committee in particular--it is a
true honor to sit before you now. I would like to specifically thank
Senator Cardin for his long-standing commitment to fighting corruption
and addressing global human rights abuses--including but not limited to
the introduction of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability
Act. Your support, Mr. Ranking Member, particularly in the face of such
global tumult, is greatly appreciated.
Indeed, the world is undergoing incredible turmoil, with grave
implications for millions of people. In almost every country where the
Arab Spring took root, it has been replaced by conflict and repression.
ISIS and other lslamist extremists are committing mass atrocities and
threatening civilians not only in the Middle East but also in Asia,
Africa, and beyond. Even beyond ISIS, many governments have sought to
respond to the very real danger of armed militancy with a myopic
security response that ignores the importance of upholding fundamental
rights. Legitimate counterterrorism measures are often coupled with an
unprecedented crackdown on independent civil society and the media that
receives little more than passing criticism from the United States and
other democracies. Governments such as Bahrain and Ethiopia have thrown
peaceful activists and human rights defenders in jail for being
outspoken on human rights under the guise of fighting terrorism.
Partnerships with security forces and governments known to be both
corrupt and abusive--from Egypt to Afghanistan to Uganda--appear to be
receiving less rather than more scrutiny from the United States.
Around the world, Human Rights Watch has documented how repressive
government tactics often spark, or at least exacerbate, many of today's
most pressing security challenges. And yet, human rights defenders and
others who expose and challenge these injustices risk harassment and
attack while those who threaten them generally do so with impunity. It
is with this framework in mind that today I would like to briefly
discuss current human rights trends in three countries where a tool
like the Global Magnitsky bill might be particularly valuable.
iraq
More than 12 years after U.S.-led forces invaded Iraq, it has
become quite clear that the country's transition to a functioning and
sustainable democracy built on the rule of law lies in tatters. Even
before ISIS' dramatic territorial gains more than a year ago, human
rights conditions in the country were deteriorating. The rights of
Iraq's most vulnerable citizens, especially women, the Sunni minority,
and detainees, have been regularly violated by the government with
impunity.
Before ISIS, Iraq grappled with a weak criminal justice system,
plagued by corruption and political interference. Courts frequently
based convictions on coerced confessions and trial proceedings that
fell far short of international standards. Thousands of women, as well
as many men, were detained without charge, and subjected to torture and
ill-treatment. Even secret detention facilities in the government
district came to light.
At that time, the Iraqi Government was struggling to maintain
security against terrorist bombings, and employed draconian and abusive
tactics by heavy-handed security forces, increasingly under the
political influence of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who also
sponsored militias outside of the regular forces. Suicide attacks, car
bombs, and assassinations increased again over the past few years,
killing more than 12,000 people outside of combat zones in 2014 alone.
The government responded with mass arbitrary arrests, torture of
detainees, and convictions after unfair trials based on information
provided by secret informers.
ISIS's takeover of massive swathes of Iraqi territory in June 2014
was a testament to the alienation of Sunni communities, as many
welcomed ISIS fighters as ``liberators'' from the sectarian oppression
of government authorities. To put it simply, former Prime Minister
Maliki's unchecked anti-Sunni policies created fertile ground for ISIS
to escalate the conflict, enlist several Sunni armed groups, and help
spawn today's crisis.
Now, as ISIS seeks to expand its brutal control and the government
responds with regular forces and abusive militias, civilians have
become the targets of unlawful attacks and political repression by both
sides. There is virtually no accountability for grave abuses. ISIS is
abhorrently proud of its summary executions, systematic rape and
subjugation of women. At the same time, the Iraqi criminal justice
system has proved incapable of holding members of government forces and
allied militias to account for extrajudicial executions, abductions,
indiscriminate attacks and widespread and deliberate destruction of
civilian property.
A sanctions regime like the one the Global Magnitsky bill would
create is certainly no panacea for the many challenges faced by Iraq
but it would, as a starting point, send a clear signal that the United
States is not open for business to persons responsible for serious
human rights abuses or large-scale corruption. It also has the
potential to spur greater domestic accountability for such abuses. If
Prime Minister Al-Abadi is sincere about his commitment to create a
more inclusive government, he should welcome the establishment of such
a sanctions regime as a tool to help reinforce his goals.
uzbekistan
Uzbekistan's human rights record is nothing short of atrocious.
Thousands of people are imprisoned on politically motivated charges,
torture is endemic, and the authorities regularly go after civil
society activists, opposition members, and journalists. Muslims and
Christians who practice their religion outside strict state controls
are persecuted and, despite some changes in 2013 due to outside
pressure, the government still forces an estimated 2 million adults to
harvest cotton every fall under draconian conditions.
Now, Washington already has some of the tools it needs to encourage
reform, but they have not been used in quite some time, despite a much-
reduced need to rely on Tashkent for the transit of U.S. troop supplies
out of Afghanistan. There is little factual evidence to support
concerns that stronger criticism by the U.S. over rights will lead
Uzbekistan to forge a stronger alliance with Russia. Some even argue
that President Islam Karimov needs (and craves) Western support and
legitimacy a great deal more than the West needs him.
When it comes to Uzbekistan, the Obama administration needs a fresh
approach that leans more in the direction of ``strategic pressure''
instead of ``strategic patience''--mainly because there is no evidence
that officials who oversee or engage in torture, forced labor, or the
persecution of activists will change their behavior absent the prospect
of serious political or economic consequences. Indeed, since 2009--when
the administration increased contacts and military cooperation with
Tashkent--human rights concerns have gone from bad to worse.
So the possibility of Uzbekistan officials facing a fair U.S.-based
sanctions regime based on responsibility for human rights abuses and/or
major graft presents an excellent, targeted opportunity to leverage
change. With a new tool in the hands of U.S. diplomats and a greater
potential for individual scrutiny, we might see the power of deterrence
in action by stirring inaugural signs of change: just knowing that they
could be banned from coming to the United States or from using its
banking system could be enough to force an abusive official to think
twice before acting.
bahrain
Over the last year, Bahrain's main opposition party has refused to
participate in the national dialogue process to protest authorities
prosecuting some of its senior members for exercising their rights to
free speech. In November the party also boycotted the elections to
protest a manifestly unfair electoral system. This, along with the
continued detention of 13 high-profile opposition leaders jailed solely
on account of their exercise of their rights to freedom of peaceful
assembly, association, and expression has led to stalemate on the long-
awaited national dialogue, which the authorities appear determined to
undermine at every turn. More generally, Bahrain's courts convict and
imprison peaceful dissenters--the trials we have been able to monitor
were without exception grossly unfair--and have yet to hold any senior
officials accountable for torture and other serious rights violations.
The high rate of conviction on vague terrorism charges and imposition
of long prison sentences for peaceful criticism reflect the weakness of
the justice system and its lack of independence.
While the majority of Bahrainis are Shiite, the country is ruled by
a Sunni-dominated, autocratic monarchy that has shown no real intention
to reform, despite a number of cosmetic initiatives. In 2011, the
authorities used lethal force to suppress a largely peaceful pro-
democracy movement, which proved to be a turning point. While King
Hamad appointed an independent commission to look into human rights
violations and dutifully accepted all of its recommendations, little
has been done to implement those recommendations. Efforts to restart a
national dialogue between the government and opposition have failed, in
large part because the key opposition leaders remain imprisoned.
Notably, the last few weeks have seen a rather convulsive back and
forth as the Bahraini authorities arrested, released, and then re-
arrested some of these prominent detainees. At the same time, the Obama
administration announced it was lifting arms restrictions to the
Bahraini Defense Force--a change Bahraini authorities had long been
pushing for--not only because of their participation in the anti-ISIS
coalition but because they had ostensibly also taken ``meaningful''
steps at reform.
There is little evidence to suggest that the Bahrain Government is
committed to engaging in real reform, and the administration's decision
to restart military aid may well provide a disincentive and, in fact,
encourage the Government of Bahrain to pursue the path of repression
rather than that of accommodation.
Once again, a global sanctioning regime like the one the Global
Magnitsky bill intends to authorize could help add general pressure for
a more rights-respecting political environment as it would provide the
administration with the tools needed to show the opposition that the
United States has embraced their concerns as well--beyond just the
release of the occasional prisoner. Specifically, by denying visas and
access to the U.S. banking system to members of the security forces and
judicial system credibly linked to serious crimes such as torture, the
United States would be reasserting its commitment to accountability and
the rule of law in Bahrain--a key but very absent component of any
meaningful path forward.
conclusion
As what feels like cataclysmic upheaval in nearly all corners of
the world persists, it often seems like those who seek to uphold basic
international norms and support fundamental freedoms are consistently
at risk while autocratic governments get a free pass. Even as positive
change seems increasingly hard to come by, such efforts are still worth
pursuing. And that's why passing the Global Magnitsky bill is so
important. This bill does not sanction governments wholesale, cut off
security assistance, or restrict economic cooperation. It is not
designed to interrupt bilateral, government-to-government engagement--
it is designed to take a tailored approach that creates a long overdue
tool for the U.S. to easily go after abusive individuals.
Honing in on corrupt and abusive officials makes it harder for
authoritarian rulers, dictators, and kleptocrats to recruit and
maintain a coterie of supporters. We have seen a return to this trend
and so by removing the perks of crime, this bill--if it becomes law--
would shine a light on those who commit such acts and hold them to
account. In that, Mr. Chairman, there can be very little downside.
I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Thank you.
Mark. Excuse me. Doctor.
STATEMENT OF MARK LAGON, PRESIDENT,
FREEDOM HOUSE, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Lagon. Mark is fine.
Chairman Corker, Senator Cardin, thank you very much for
inviting me back to testify. It is a pleasure.
I would like to talk very simply about the two kinds of
human rights questions that you have called upon us to look at,
and a couple of canny sets of tools that could really deal with
them: on the one hand, where governments do not protect the
most vulnerable people, the scourge of human trafficking, and
the area that Freedom House is more focused on, which is where
repressive regimes repress and rob their citizens with
corruption. There are canny tools that you have been working in
the committee to advance Senator Corker's legislation on an
antitrafficking partnership fund, and Senator Cardin's
legislation on targeted sanctions. I think these are exactly
the kind of canny tools we should use.
I have a couple of overall messages. Human rights is not
just about our values. But, corruption, repression,
trafficking, these engage strategic and economic interests of
the United States. We need American leadership globally, and
not only as a beacon for human dignity, but to advance our
economic and strategic interests in these areas. If you look at
the way that General al-Sisi, since taking power, has
instituted some of the harshest crackdowns that you have seen
in modern Egyptian history, and the way that terrorism has
actually spiked as a result, one sees that there are actually
security interests bound up in urging changes for human
rights--all the while, the United States giving massive
military assistance to Egypt.
And my second major message is, let us leverage the
influence the United States has. Canny tools that maximize U.S.
leverage do not cost much to the taxpayer and avoid harm to
innocent people while putting pressure on those who need to
change and to protect human rights are important.
First, with respect to modern slavery, which the
International Labor Organization, in a rather conservative
estimate, says is at least 21 million people in the world, is a
terrible problem for the most vulnerable groups. Labor
trafficking victimizes the most people. Sex trafficking yields
the most profits for traffickers on the backs of its victims.
Let us not only look at human trafficking as a matter of
dignity and freedom, although that is why I wake up in the
morning and come to work. Businesses and economies are harmed
by the very problems that human trafficking represents.
Businesses' value, their productivity, their reputations suffer
when human trafficking is intermingled with their operations.
Human trafficking is based on the antitheses of economic--the
economic growth, prosperity, and entrepreneurship that we
should be for.
In particular, on the case of Malaysia, Freedom House
supports the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Thanks to Senator
Cardin and Senator Menendez, the administration has made some
assurances that it will not go soft on countries that deserve a
Tier 3 ranking. You really should watch, as a matter of
oversight, Malaysia and Thailand in that respect.
On human trafficking, Freedom House has endorsed Chairman
Corker's End Modern Slavery Initiative Act as exactly the kind
of tool we should proceed with, leveraging taxpayer resources
with the resources of other nations, corporations, and
philanthropies to fight modern slavery.
As for the larger questions of authoritarianism and
corruption, they are intermingled. And, where people say that
authoritarian rule brings about stability, they are wrong.
Freedom House has documented that 90 percent of terrorist
attacks in the world, and 98 percent of terrorism fatalities,
occur in not-free or partly free countries, as opposed to free
democracies. We have an interest in more countries becoming
democracies, for our counterterrorism policy. Corruption often
fuels human rights abuses, because corrupt officials will go to
greater and greater lengths to protect their own economic
benefits and fight for staying in power.
Freedom House has documented, in its Freedom in the World
Report, two major trends, one that authoritarian rulers are
using more and more harsh traditional tactics in places like
Egypt, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Vietnam, Azerbaijan, and Russia's
invasion of Crimea outside its borders.
Secondly, our research at Freedom House indicates that
there is a key relationship between human rights and terrorism.
Repression breeds more terrorism, and counterterrorism is being
used as an excuse by governments to impose their restrictions
and repression on civil society for completely nonviolent,
peaceful uses. A recent newly passed national security law in
China is just such an act.
Let me finish with a few brief further observations.
In Iran and Cuba, the United States needs to leverage its
diplomacy to look at human rights issues and not separate its
diplomacy to either look, in the case of Iran, solely at the
important issue of nuclear peace, or, in the case of Cuba,
treating diplomacy as an end in itself. The United States
decision to plow forward, full speed ahead, with a restoration
of diplomatic relations with Cuba just as 100 peaceful
activists were being detained sends troubling mixed messages.
Let me end by an important word about an additional tool in
the toolbox needed, besides diplomacy. The Global Magnitsky
Human Rights Accountability Act is something that Freedom House
has endorsed, strongly believes would be an important and
effective tool by imposing visa bans and asset freezes on
foreign officials responsible for either human rights abuses or
corruption.
Four reasons to back it.
A visa ban would draw international attention to the
individuals responsible and put authoritarian leaders in a no-
win situation. They either protect the repugnant officials
responsible for human rights abuses and corruption or they cut
them loose and lose their own means for keeping power.
Secondly, the act would impose tangible consequences so
that perpetrators would be held to account. Those perpetrators
might think twice if they are not able to leave their country
for the United States or access funds in U.S. banks.
Third, by targeting high-level corruption, the bill goes
right after the Achilles heel of authoritarian regimes. If
there are some days in which citizens of countries find human
rights an abstraction, they will never find corruption
abstraction. They always understand that, and they have
widespread support for going after their leaders who are
robbing them blind.
And then, finally, the Global Magnitsky Act, by not
targeting particular nations and allowing the executive branch
and Congress with its referrals to have a targeted surgical
approach, would allow sanctions to be applied to places like
Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia so that you can deal with the larger
economic and security interests and put pressure on those most
responsible for corruption and human rights.
So, in order to deal with the problem of human trafficking
for the most vulnerable people not being protected by states,
or the bigger problem that Freedom House focuses on, which is
the repression of people and the robbery of people by
autocratic governments, these kinds of tools, both Senator
Corker's bill on the Human Trafficking Fund and Senator
Cardin's bill on targeted sanctions, are exactly the kinds of
lean, targeted tools that we should use. We should think of
Sergei Magnitsky and how we ought to look out for those who are
being squeezed by corruption and human-rights-offending
officials, and put the squeeze on them.
Thanks.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Lagon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Mark P. Lagon
introduction
Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, distinguished members of
the committee, it is an honor to testify before you on the current
state of human rights around the world.
Today, I will look at two kinds of human rights problems and two
kinds of judicious policy tools to address them. The human rights
problems are (1) human trafficking--when governments fail to protect
the most vulnerable--and (2) a more central problem where unaccountable
governments repress and rob their citizenry, the centerpiece of Freedom
House's research and programming. The prudent tools to leverage U.S.
influence I want to talk about are (1) Senator Corker's legislation for
an antitrafficking partnership fund and (2) Senator Cardin's
legislation for targeted sanctions on corrupt and rights-abusing
officials.
I offer two simple messages: First, that addressing corruption,
repression, and trafficking are about our tangible economic and
strategic interests every bit as much as about our values.
Unfortunately, the news is grim on repressive, unaccountable, corrupt
governments around the world. The 2015 edition of ``Freedom in the
World,'' Freedom House's annual worldwide review of political and civil
rights, found freedom in decline for the 9th straight year. The annual
State Department Human Rights Reports--finally released after weeks of
delay--bear this out.
As President of Freedom House, I often hear objections that a
multitude of human rights challenges globally are too ingrained for the
United States to successfully affect or that there are already so many
problems here at home we shouldn't bother with the many challenges
overseas. These arguments are short-sighted and ill-founded.
Decisive U.S. global leadership is still needed both to serve as a
beacon for human dignity and freedom and to advance our interests.
Especially given globalization, our strategic and economic interests
are inextricably linked with the protection and promotion of human
rights.
Let's take two of the toughest cases. It is estimated that $300
billion is lost per year in intellectual property theft, and China
accounts for 70 percent of that loss.\1\ If Chinese authorities
respected rule of law, nowhere near this level of IP theft, including
from U.S. headquartered multinational corporations, would occur. Human
rights has a direct bearing on U.S. security interests, too. In Egypt,
terrorist attacks have soared since General al-Sisi took power, and he
has instituted arguably the harshest crackdown in modern Egyptian
history.\2\ Activists have been arbitrarily arrested, independent
groups are being harassed and shut down, and dozens have disappeared
over the last several months.\3\ That is while the U.S. continues to
give massive military assistance to that regime.
My second message is to encourage putting inexpensive, high-
leverage, targeted tools in the U.S. foreign policy toolbox to advance
those interests in human rights. There are tools that maximize U.S.
leverage, will not cost the American taxpayer much, and avoid harm to
innocent people and enterprises in the U.S. and globally. I'll touch on
ones the chairman and ranking member have been advocating.
modern slavery
In some countries, our foreign policy challenge is pushing
governments to protect their most vulnerable populations. According to
a conservative International Labor Organization estimate, human
trafficking--aptly referred to as modern day slavery--victimizes some
21 million men, women, and children around the world through sexual and
labor exploitation. While labor trafficking victimizes more people, sex
trafficking yields more profits to the traffickers on the backs of its
victims. Trafficking preys on the powerless and depends on corruption
and weak rule of law in order to thrive.
But it is not only human dignity and freedom that suffer from the
impacts of trafficking. Businesses and economies are impacted, as well.
Businesses' value, productivity, and reputation suffer where gross
exploitation of marginalized populations arise, so often facilitated by
corruption. Economic growth, prosperity, entrepreneurship, and poverty
alleviation benefit greatly from transparency, rule of law,
predictability, and formal economic activity. Conversely, human
trafficking is based on all the antitheses of these factors--not only
dehumanizing its victims but undercutting the mutual interests of the
U.S. and other nations in thriving markets grounded in access to
justice for all.
Freedom House supports the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the
recent legislation to facilitate such trade deals. Senators Menendez
and Cardin, among others, asked whether Tier 3 countries in the annual
Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report would be let into TPP. The
executive branch must not send forward candidates for TPP who are in
the lowest ranking in the TIP Report, about which it has given
assurances to the Congress. In particular, Malaysia is a very
problematic case with intermingled issues of corruption and lack of
protections for marginalized and migrant populations, and should not be
let off the hook of the intended ``minimum standards'' set out in the
Trafficking Victims Protection Act.
Freedom House has emphatically endorsed Chairman Corker's End
Modern Slavery Initiative Act (S. 553), which creates a grantmaking
foundation to address global trafficking and is funded by leveraging
taxpayer resources with those of other nations, corporations, and
philanthropic foundations. If passed, this legislation will take a bold
step forward in the fight against modern slavery and will enable U.S.
foreign policy to more effectively pressure governments to protect
their most vulnerable populations. It is exactly the kind of prudent,
canny foreign policy tool we need, an idea I will return to.
authoritarianism and corruption
Authoritarianism and the corruption that usually goes hand in hand
with it also pose major challenges for human rights. Some erroneously
believe authoritarian rule brings stability. In fact, the opposite is
true. Repression breeds discontent, and a lack of democratic governance
can create an enabling environment for terrorism. Freedom House
analysis highlights how 90 percent of terrorist attacks and 98 percent
of terrorism fatalities occur in Not Free and Partly Free countries, as
opposed to Free democracies.\4\ Moreover, corruption often fuels human
rights abuses, because corrupt officials will go to ever-greater
lengths to hold onto power lest they lose their access to state
resources. In addition to its well-known reports, much of what Freedom
House does is civil-society capacity building partnerships. One
important area of programming prepares journalists to uncover
corruption and criminality, and withstand threats of violence, as
Freedom House programs have done in Ukraine, Moldova, and Mexico. And I
know corruption in Moldova. In 2008, as antitrafficking ambassador, the
office I directed saw and called out in the TIP Report how the head of
a U.S.-funded antitrafficking interagency office in Moldova was
complicit in trafficking. A Tier 3 ranking lit a fire under its leaders
to clean up the problem. Freedom House research indicates Moldova still
has a long way to go in fighting corruption and strengthening
democratic governance.\5\
The 2015 ``Freedom in the World'' report has two overarching
findings. First, Freedom House found a troubling increase in the use of
aggressive tactics by authoritarian regimes worldwide and saw worrying
backsliding in accountable governance of nations of regional and
economic importance: Venezuela, Egypt, Turkey, Thailand, Kenya, and
Hungary. Our 2015 report found a more explicit rejection of democratic
standards than previous years. Earlier, autocrats acknowledged
international agreements and attempted to veil their undemocratic
actions with quasi-democratic language--holding elections that were
free but not fair, for example. Today, authoritarian rulers are turning
to more aggressively antidemocratic behavior and harsher, more
``traditional'' tactics in places like Egypt, Rwanda, Ethiopia, and
Vietnam; Azerbaijan's crackdown on human rights defenders; and Russia's
invasion of Crimea.
Second, the relationship of human rights to terrorism is crucial to
an enlightened understanding of U.S. strategic interests. Again,
repression amplifies the discontent fueling terrorism. And our annual
report found a marked increase in authoritarian regimes using
``counterterrorism'' as an excuse to crack down on nonviolent dissent
and repress minorities. In China, terrorism is invoked as an excuse to
repress the Uighur ethnic minority, jailing anyone expressing dissent
and bringing ethnically Han Chinese to populate Xinjiang. A newly
passed ``national security law'' broadened the definition of what
constitutes a threat to national security and has been used--as the
State Department noted--``as a legal facade to commit human rights
abuses.'' \6\ Over the last week, more than 100 lawyers, activists, and
other peaceful human rights defenders have been detained.\7\ So, too,
even in strengthening a coalition of partners to fight ISIS as itself a
threat to human rights, the U.S. Government should take care not to
give such partners--like Bahrain and its big sibling Saudi Arabia--a
pass to crack down on peaceful opposition and civil society. I wear a
Freedom House wristband (purple like the Not Free nations on our
Freedom in the World map) to recall Abdulhadi al-Khawaja, a journalist
jailed in Bahrain since 2011 in just such an overreach by an autocratic
``partner.''
Let me focus on cases Assistant Secretary Malinowski raised at the
release of the annual Human Rights Report. In dealings with Iran, the
United States should address the serious human rights concerns with at
least the same energy as it did in negotiating a nuclear accord. The
talks with Iran unfortunately coincided with a de-prioritization and
de-linking of human rights from the global agenda, when they instead
should have advanced the concerns that the Iranian people and the world
share about the regime's repression. Earlier this week, in spontaneous
gatherings after the announcement of an agreement, Iranians reminded us
of what those priorities were. They publicly chanted for the release of
opposition leaders and declared that their next agreement should secure
their civil rights. We must raise the cases of Americans detained in
Iran and seek tangible progress on human rights and rule of law issues,
including the hundreds of political prisoners, Iran's staggeringly high
execution rate, its repressive media and online environment, and its
subjugation of women and religious minorities.
In negotiations with Cuba, the United States must ensure that
actual progress is made in moving the ball forward on human rights,
civic space, and free elections. As in Iran, the yardstick of success
for U.S.-Cuba policy is not merely the diplomacy in and of themselves--
it is whether we use diplomatic relations to promote meaningful reforms
and reduce cruel repression in Cuba. The United States decision to
continue full speed ahead with the restoration of diplomatic
relations--despite last week's detention of more than 100 peaceful
activists in Cuba \8\--sends troublingly mixed messages about the
importance of human rights and civil society for U.S. foreign policy.
Diplomatic engagement, when leveraged rather than seen an end in
itself, can serve as an important and powerful tool in our foreign
policy tool box to address human rights. But, as the United States
Senate well knows, there are times at which new tools are needed.
Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act
The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act is just such a
tool. The Global Magnitsky bill would build on current U.S. policy of
condemning human rights abuses and supporting human rights defenders by
imposing visa bans and asset freezes on foreign officials responsible
for gross human rights violations or large-scale corruption.
Freedom House has endorsed the Global Magnitsky Act and believes it
will be an important and effective foreign policy tool for several
reasons:
1. A visa ban would draw international attention to individuals
responsible for human rights abuses and may constrain their ability to
escape justice at home in the future by putting authoritarian rulers
into a no-win situation: either they protect the most repugnant
officials and thereby expose the cruelty of their regimes or they cut
loose those officials who do their dirty work, undermining their
ability to stay in power through any means.
2. The Global Magntisky Act imposes tangible consequences--
something that may deter future human rights abuses. Perpetrators of
human rights abuses usually are shielded by their governments and
expect to evade justice. Some foreign officials may think twice about
cracking down on opposition or civil society activists if they are
unable to leave their country for the United States or access funds in
U.S. bank accounts. An escape route to the United States matters a
great deal to officials in some countries, particularly in the
Americas.
3. It targets high-level corruption--the Achilles heel of
authoritarian regimes. While human rights may seem to many ordinary
citizens as a bit removed from their daily life, the injustice of high-
level corruption is widely understood, and addressing it is widely
supported by the public.
4. No country would be singled out. While comprehensive sanctions
serve as an important and appropriate foreign policy tool in acute
cases, the Global Magnitsky Act would successfully target abusers
without harming average citizens. It could apply to countries like
Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia that tend to escape criticism for their human
rights abuses because of U.S. economic or security interests (although
it would depend to a significant degree on congressional referrals for
effective implementation).
conclusion
To sum up, on the one hand, human trafficking victimizes the most
vulnerable--particularly women, children, minorities, and innocent
migrants. The End Modern Slavery Initiative Act leverages U.S.
resources with partner funders and partner implementers to give those
marginalized people basic access to justice.
On the other hand, the way in which more and more governments are
repressing civil society and robbing their citizens with systematic
corruption is Freedom House's major analytical finding. We document how
those human rights abuses are more brazen and directly coercive; fuel
terrorism; and use counterterrorism as the pretext to silence, detain,
torture, and kill nonviolent dissenting voices. The State Department
Human Rights Report offers copious additional evidence. The global
targeted sanctions legislation named after a lawyer who was abused and
killed in a Russia jail, Sergei Magnitsky, is just the kind of tool we
need--maximizing pressure on those who repress and rob, and minimizing
collateral damage to others.
The U.S. has the smarts and more than the modest resources needed
to apply these canny policy tools to move the needle back in the other
direction, toward more global freedom. The U.S. Congress should swiftly
pass both the End Modern Slavery Initiative Act and the Global
Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act to promote not just our
values but our strategic and economic interests by bolstering human
rights.
----------------
End Notes
\1\ ``The IP Commission Report,'' The Commission on the Theft of
American Intellectual Property, May 2013.
\2\ Michele Dunne and Robert Kagan, ``Obama Embraces the Nixon
Doctrine in Egypt,'' The Washington Post, April 3, 2015.
\3\ Sarah El Deeb, ``Egyptian security agencies increasingly
detaining activists in secret, rights lawyers say,'' U.S. News and
World Report, June 17, 2015.
\4\ Bret Nelson and Tyler Roylance, ``Terrorism Remains Rare in
Democracies,'' Freedom House (blog), January 9, 2015.
\5\ Vytis Jurkonis, ``With Corrupt Elites at the Helm, Moldova
Drifts Off Course,'' Freedom House (blog), June 30, 2015.
\6\ ``U.S. Condemns Detention of Human Rights Defenders in China,''
U.S. Department of State (press release), July 12, 2015.
\7\ Ivan Watson and Steven Jiang, ``Scores of rights lawyers
arrested after nationwide swoop in China,'' CNN, July 14, 2015.
\8\ ``U.S. raises concern over detention of 100 activists in
Cuba,'' Reuters, July 7, 2015.
The Chairman. Thank you both very much.
Just to not spend a great deal of time on this, Dr. Lagon,
but you mentioned Iran and Cuba. I mean, do you have any sense,
at present, that we have put aside human rights issues in Cuba
or Iran in pursuing other agreements--or are you just raising
that issue to ensure that we do not?
Dr. Lagon. Well, you know, I have huge regard for Assistant
Secretary Malinowski. He is a longtime friend. I am sure he is
pushing these issues. But, it is quite clear that, on the Iran
matter, there has been a complete de-linkage with human rights.
When you look, this week, and people going into the streets and
celebrating the comprehensive sanctions being removed with the
nuclear deal, some of those people said, ``Now we need an
agreement for our civil rights.'' But, the United States and
the international community should be on the side of diplomacy
applied to human rights as well as nuclear matters.
On Cuba, we should just be careful that diplomacy does not
become an end in itself. And it is clear the Cuban regime knew
what it was doing in locking up 100 people at exactly the time
the diplomatic relations were being put in place. Let us use
the diplomacy to fight for reform.
The Chairman. Do you want to mention something about that,
Miss Margon?
Ms. Margon. Sure. I was just going to say, in the case of
Cuba, I think, actually, by changing and lifting the embargo,
what the administration has done is opened up a real
opportunity to work with the Latin American countries on human
rights in Cuba, which has long been missing, given their stance
on the embargo.
In the case of Iran, there is obviously a lot to do, but
there is potentially a new opening, if we can move forward.
The Chairman. Let me ask you both. I wonder if you would
elaborate a little bit on the issue of slavery--modern slavery
and its connection to really increasing criminal justice
systems' ability to deal with that. What we have found and what
we believe to be the case is that modern slavery is a crime of
convenience, that, since no one is really pursuing--since the
poor do not have access to criminal justice the way the elite
do, in essence small-business people take advantage of it, and
there is no price to pay. But, when there is a price to pay,
when you actually have a system that fights against that and
arrests people, all of a sudden it diminishes greatly. And I
wonder if either of you might want to respond to that.
Dr. Lagon. Well, if I might begin.
I entirely agree with the premise, Senator Corker, that you
laid out in your opening statement, that this about the absence
of rule of law. There are two basic phenomena here. There are
whole groups of people--women, minorities, Dalits in India,
some innocent migrants who go and work as guest workers in
places--that are not accorded access to justice. And so, what
happens is that the reward is much higher than the risk for the
traffickers. And so, both as a human rights matter and as a law
enforcement matter, you need to have those rights count. You
know, for the woman who is a domestic servant in Kuwait and who
is abused both because she is a woman and because she is a
foreign national from the Philippines or Nepal, she has to be
treated like a real human being. And those who are responsible
for holding her passport for--or for beating her, they need to
be held to account.
The Chairman. Would you want to respond? Very good.
I think, because of the timing, I am going to stop my
questioning. I may interject later. I think the two of you have
just voted. Is that correct? I am going to step and go vote,
and, if it is okay, would you become chairman of the committee
for a while? Thank you.
Senator Menendez [presiding]. All right, let me ask
unanimous consent now. [Laughter.]
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for your confidence.
I regret--this is a footnote--that I missed Secretary
Malinowski. I would like to get an answer from him about the
TIP report. And I would also--would have asked him how 2,822
arbitrary politically motivated arrests in Cuba during the
first 7 months of this year alone is an indicator that we are
going to be headed in the right direction. Pretty amazing to
me. It is pretty amazing to me that, when our colleagues in the
Senate go to visit in Cuba, they do not visit with human rights
activists, political dissidents, independent journalists,
because, if they do, they get barred from a government meeting.
We have got to break that idea, because, if, globally, the
message we send is that, in order to meet the government
officials of a country, that we cannot meet with human rights
activists, political dissidents, independent journalists in
China, in Malaysia, and any other place in the world, that will
be a sad state of affairs for the United States.
Mr. Chairman, let me start off by thanking Human Rights
Watch, particularly your colleagues who do the hard work every
day on behalf of trafficking victims around the world, for
contributing your experience and expertise to our efforts. And
before I proceed with some questions, I would like to enter a
couple of documents for the record. And I am sure the chairman
would not mind. The first is a letter I sent yesterday to
Secretary of State Kerry, along with 18 of my colleagues--and I
understand a similar letter in the House has nearly 130
signatures--expressing our concern about reports of a possible
unwarranted upgrade of Malaysia in this year's long-delayed
Trafficking in Persons report. And the other document I would
like to submit in the record is a piece from yesterday's Hill
by David Abramowitz, the vice president of Humanity United, on
the same topic.
And, without objection, it is so ordered.
[Editor's note.--The letter and Hill article mentioned above
can be found in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the
Record'' section at the end of this hearing.]
Senator Menendez. Mr. Ambassador, I am glad you are here
today. Your experience as our lead diplomat on this issue can
help us get some perspective on what is going on right now. The
2015 TIP report, which we have still not seen, will have the
latest release date ever. So, let me ask you. What is the
normal reporting period covered by a TIP report?
Dr. Lagon. The TIP report covers from March to March and
comes out, typically, in June. When this committee confirmed me
as the TIP Ambassador, I had to get on with the job 10 days
later, because that is when it was supposed to come out, by
mid-June. It is unfortunate to leave an important job vacant,
similar to what occurred with the Ambassador for International
Religious Freedom for a while. I am very glad to finally see a
nomination seems to be moving forward. But, in any case, the
report really works. You know, it propels governments to try
and change their laws.
Senator Menendez. Yes, well, I certainly appreciate your
service in your previous iteration, and now, I am sure, with
your present leadership. It will continue to be important.
Now, I understand that it is not unprecedented for some
late-breaking information after the closure of a reporting
period that we just describe has been included, but, to your
knowledge, have events or actions taken in June or July of a
year ever affected a country's ranking?
Dr. Lagon. No.
Senator Menendez. Was it your personal experience, when it
comes to external pressure--did you have external pressure to
get to the right answer on a country's ranking because of other
diplomatic or security concerns?
Dr. Lagon. There is always a pulling and hauling at the
State Department between--typically, between the TIP office and
the regional bureaus, where regional bureaus are raising other
equities--security interests, counterterrorism issues, energy
access, commercial concerns. In general, the Department has
come out in the right place refereeing between those interests.
I saw it during my tenure. But, I really commend you--and
before you walked in the room, I commended you and Senator
Cardin--for raising, in the context of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership, countries like Malaysia--and, for that matter,
Thailand--who would be affected under the TPP. They should not
be shielded from the basic minimum standards set out in the
Trafficking Victims Protection Act.
Senator Menendez. Well, as you know, my amendment prohibits
fast track for Tier 3 human trafficking countries, signed into
law by President Obama as part of the Trade Promotion
Authority. In your view, is that type of action helpful in
combating human trafficking?
Dr. Lagon. Well, I think that you need to protect the
integrity of the TIP report. It is clear that Tier 3 rankings,
whether they involve sanctions or just the stigma of a Tier 3
ranking, work. And particularly where the United States has a
relationship on other grounds, on strategic and economic
grounds, countries have responded to that. Allies of the United
States, like Israel and Turkey in earlier eras, before I even
came into the trafficking position, Cambodia----
Senator Menendez. So, if----
Dr. Lagon [continuing]. Facing the threat of Tier 3 or
staying on Tier 3----
Senator Menendez. So, if the possibility of being on Tier 3
of the TIP report was an incentivizing factor to change your
actions and move into action, pass the appropriate laws, and
whatnot, would it not even be a greater incentivizer that if,
in addition to being on Tier 3 on the TIP report, you get--
cannot get preferential access to U.S. markets?
Dr. Lagon. Well, I think that, you know, it cuts against
the idea of using the leverage.
Senator Menendez. Yes. It's----
Dr. Lagon. I think it is unfortunate that Tier 3 countries
do not get the economic sanctions that are intended for them,
and that is waived, oftentimes, but it is really important to
put that--more stigma on----
Senator Menendez. Now, I would ask you and Miss Margon,
who--I do not want you to feel, like, left out, here, after
complementing your organization's great work--if, in fact--and
I hope this is not the case, because I have seen nothing for
Malaysia to move from Tier 3 to Tier 2--but, if, in fact, that
was the case, what would you say about such an action?
Ms. Margon. Thank you, Senator Menendez. And thank you for
your leadership on this. We have really enjoyed working with
you. We also hope it is certainly not the case, but we
understand a final, final decision may not have yet been made.
We remain hopeful. But, if, in fact, a decision has been made,
we would say that it seems very likely that it would be
political interference to move it up.
Senator Menendez. And would it not have--my final question
and then I will turn to Senator Kaine--would it not have the
consequence--beyond Malaysia, that it would be political
interference--would it not have the consequence of undermining
the veracity of the TIP report in a way that other countries
would say, ``Well, if it is--if I am important enough to the
United States for trade or for some other reason, then I do not
have to really live up to worrying about if I am on Tier 3 or
not''?
Ms. Margon. I think it certainly undermines the TIP report.
It sends a poor message to other countries that may be
sanctioned or on the Tier 3 list. It also undermines the
presidentially stated goals of the TPP, in terms of moving
those countries in Asia into a better place. And that is part
of the longer term vision that we would like to see by having
Malaysia make the required changes before it is moved up.
Dr. Lagon. I would just----
Senator Menendez. Yes.
Dr. Lagon [continuing]. Add one thing.
Senator Menendez. Yes.
Dr. Lagon. You know, the United States has been very
comfortable putting security allies like Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait--Kuwait, a country that we marshaled our military forces
to liberate--on Tier 3, to call it like it is. I would like to
see us even go farther on the broader human rights front and
press those nations to reform. It is in their interests and in
our security interests, as well.
Senator Menendez. I agree with you.
And the last point I will make is that, beyond the TIP
issue, if you start political maneuvering for the purposes of
accomplishing a goal, then, in addition to the human rights and
trafficking question, you would have to worry about labor
rights and environmental issues that we are all concerned about
in trade agreements, and saying, ``Will you manipulate those in
order to meet the standard?''
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Senator Menendez.
And thanks, to the witnesses.
Just a couple of items. First, Dr. Lagon, I want to ask
about the Americas. Your Freedom in the World Report from 2015
lists two pretty important American partners, Mexico and
Colombia, as partly free. And I am interested in having you
elaborate on that and sort of give me the directional arrow,
sort of partly free and improving, or partly free and
degrading.
Dr. Lagon. Well, you know, Freedom House is proud of trying
to call it like it is. And, while it is not the State
Department, it is great that the reports do get the attention
of the officials of other governments, I have learned in my 6-
months tenure from the number of diplomats and officials I have
visited. It is almost as many as when I was the TIP Ambassador.
Colombia is an important partner of the United States, and
it has much to admire, but there are serious problems. Our
colleagues at Transparency International indicate that it is
number 94 out of 175 on the--on its Corruption Perceptions
Index. There is--you know, the military still operates with
relatively limited civilian oversight. There have been
soldiers, in the number of some 700, who have been convicted
for crimes, but very few high-ranking officers who have been.
So, you know, even with our allies, we really need to look at
the problems. They are right in the middle of the scale from 1
to 7 on both political rights and civil liberties.
Now, Mexico, we are very invested in at Freedom House. It
may not be widely known, but our reports are most famous, but
our programmatic work with civil society partners and
governments around the world is actually the bulk of what we
do. And we have a program in Mexico. We work with authorities
to try and protect journalists from violence. That really
captures the problem in Mexico, where there is the structure of
democracy, but criminality, corruption, violence are so
suffusing the system that, for instance, journalists cannot be
assured to have access to parts of the country to cover
questions of criminality, drug trafficking, and so on. And we
are working on that.
Mexico is one of the top legislative priorities of Freedom
House. It is--it perfectly captures the broad theme of my
opening statement, which is that our interests and our values
go together, and we need to work on the governance and human
rights problems in Mexico, because, in fact, issues of
immigration, drug trafficking, human trafficking, that are
interests of the United States, are bound up in that.
Senator Kaine. Is the violence that journalists experience
in Mexico--is it pretty variable around the country, depending
upon which state we are talking about?
Dr. Lagon. Yes, it is. It is.
Senator Kaine. So, different states have done a better job
of trying to tackle some of these transparency and violence
issues?
Dr. Lagon. We had a retreat of Freedom House's--all of
Freedom House's staff last week, and I had dinner late last
week with the director of our Mexico office. She was telling me
about that variation. It is not just where you would expect it
to be, but, you know, certain areas where you see the maximum
trafficking, border regions with Central America, particularly
problematic.
Senator Kaine. From Freedom House's perspective, the
President has made, in his budget proposal, a proposed
investment in the three countries in the northern triangle in
Central America--Guatemala, Salvador, Honduras. They all have
very serious human rights challenges. As we contemplate an
investment of that magnitude, what are some of the things that,
you know, you would hope some of those dollars would be devoted
to, to try to improve the human and civil rights situations in
those countries?
Dr. Lagon. Well, I think--you know, honestly, we--it is a
bargain to invest in civil society to be able to speak up for
their rights, to know how they can get access to the justice
system. Creating a situation in which journalists feel safe to
be able to cover corruption, cover violence--I mean, it is
really striking how there are more people who are dying in
Central America for criminal violence than one saw during the
civil wars towards the end of the cold war. It--so, that
investment would be a high priority.
It is not as if the United States has not invested money in
these countries, in its past. It is what we have been investing
it in.
Senator Kaine. I lived in Honduras during that, kind of,
cold war, civil war period in the 1980s, and it really grieves
me to see a nation that is actually more violent with a, quote,
``democratic government'' than it was under a military
dictatorship, where the oppression was very widespread, but the
murder rate was dramatically lower. Really grieve for folks
living in the region for that.
Ms. Margon, thank you for Human Rights Watch's help. I
recently did a CODEL to assess the war against ISIL in Iraq and
also in northern Syria, visiting Gaziantep, Turkey. And you
were helpful to my team, in terms of understanding some of the
human rights issues in Turkey, Kuwait, Iraq, and Syria. Wanted
to ask you one question dealing with that part of the world.
Human Rights Watch has indicated that the Kurdish-armed group
that controls much of northern Syria, they have achieved some
significant battlefield success, with the United States help,
against ISIL--that is a positive--but that they are having
continuing challenges in not meeting their obligations to
demobilize youth soldiers, those under age 18. How prevalent is
this problem? Is it limited just to Kurdish forces in northern
Syria? Does it flow over into the Kurdistan area in Iraq? Talk
about that a little bit.
Ms. Margon. Thank you. I hope it was a good trip. It was
certainly a significant undertaking during a short few days.
The Kurdish troops in Syria have actually tried, from a lot
of what my researchers have told me--in fact, one came back
from a recent trip--they have acknowledged that they have this
problem, and have tried to work with it. It is obviously a
complicated issue to demobilize children. And when you are in
the middle of a crisis, it is more difficult. But, I do think
that there is some commitment to do it. We obviously found that
they have not gone as far as they said they would. And so, we
are continuing to press them.
The problem of child soldiers in that region is, across the
board, rampant. I was in Iraq last fall, and did not see any
problem with the Kurdish troops from the KRG. That was not
something--in fact, I saw--what I saw there was very well-
behaved, very disciplined soldiers, and commanders who were
deeply upset by what they are seeing with the Shia militias,
and were not at all shy to talk about it. So, that I did not
see in any way----
Senator Kaine. Good.
Ms. Margon [continuing]. In the KRG.
But, it is something we are working with. And we are
pleased that the YPG is open go to working on it and trying to
move to a better place. That is, for us, a very good sign, as
opposed to immediately denying it and rejecting that there is a
problem.
Senator Kaine. Yes.
And if I could ask one more question. I am right at the end
of my time.
Interested in each of your thoughts, or either of your
thoughts, about the situation with the press in Egypt. You
know, another relationship that has been a strong partnership,
not without tension, not without challenges--I was in Egypt a
little bit over a year ago with Senator King at a propitious
moment, in terms of the trial of various al-Jazeera and other
journalists, and tried to have a conversation with then-General
Sisi, who was not yet President, but just about how difficult
it is for the United States to understand trials and
prosecutions and imprisonments of journalists. Our culture just
makes that so hard to give any deference to. Talk a little bit
about how that has gone. And is it trending the right way or
the wrong way? Press freedom.
Ms. Margon. Do you want to start on that or----
Dr. Lagon. Sure.
Ms. Margon. Okay.
Dr. Lagon. The wrong way. [Laughter.]
And Freedom House is really concerned about the direction
things are going, under al-Sisi. And, frankly, concerned about
the continuation of U.S. military assistance and general
assistance at the level it is at. Military authorities have
shut down virtually all opposition media outlets following the
coup. And it was a coup. And it leaves state media and those
private outlets that are openly pro-military and pro-al-Sisi
the ones that have a voice. So, it--you know, and part of our
research is focused on freedom of the press. We have a
dedicated report on that we have put out for 35 years. The
situation--the arrow is going down.
Ms. Margon. I would echo that. I think what we are seeing
is a crackdown, not just against Islamic extremists and the
Muslim Brotherhood under the guise of stability and security,
but a crackdown against activists, independent thinkers,
dissent, and independent media in a way that is actually
reversing what the stated goals of the Egyptian president are.
We are seeing a rise in attacks in Egypt and a rise in
repression. The two parallel tracks are not going to get that
country where it needs to be. And I would say that the
administration has not taken a strong enough stance on that
government. They may be a purported important partner in the
fight against ISIS, but pushing issues of independent press,
activists, and independent thought to the side, and increasing
their repressive legislation, including laws that crack down
very severely on NGOs and independent groups, is an
unacceptable way forward.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, to both of you.
I will hand it back to you, Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin [presiding]. Sure.
Well, Senator Kaine, thank you for the question on Egypt.
There is a scheduled, not yet date-specific, fall meeting, at
the ministerial level, with Egypt, and we are weighing in that
human rights be part of that strategic dialogue. So, I
appreciate you raising the issue, and the response, because
there is great concern as to the direction of Egypt.
Let me thank both of you for your incredible work and
support on bringing together workable strategies to advance
human rights globally. And I thank you for your testimony.
Let me just highlight an opportunity we have in regards to
using a tool like the TIP report, but instead for corruption.
This committee, in its work on the State Department
Authorization Act, moved in the direction to require the State
Department to assess the status of human rights and
anticorruption issues in every country in the world, similar to
what we do in the Trafficking in Persons report. It is a first
step. The Trafficking in Persons report is well established, it
has consequences depending which tier you are on. We are not
there yet on corruption, and we need to work on that.
So, I would just urge you all to work with us as we try to
put greater emphasis in all of our foreign policy deliberations
on the anticorruption agenda. We have done that with
trafficking. We truly have. Witness the debate you had with
Senator Menendez on whether we can move forward with the Trans-
Pacific Partnership with Malaysia. There should be
consequences, and there should be consequences for countries
that do not meet established standards for dealing with
corruption and are not taking steps to counter that. And we
should be able to develop that while working with groups such
as Human Rights Watch and Freedom House. So, I just urge you to
deal with that.
Let me ask you one question, if I might, about China.
China's in the news a great deal. They are certainly watching
what we are doing on the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The
maritime security issues are of great concern. They just
participated with us on the Iranian negotiations. And we have
regular strategic and economic dialogue with China where human
rights concerns are raised. In fact, the seventh dialogue was
just concluded. And, at just about the same time, the Chinese
authorities detained and interrogated over 100 human rights
lawyers and activists all across China. And the more and more
reports that I am getting, it looks like China, that everyone
says is on this great path of liberalization and great path of
human rights, does not look like they are making too much
progress today.
Do we need to be more aggressive? Are the tools adequate
for us to help the advancement of human rights in China? What
else would you suggest?
Dr. Lagon. You first.
Ms. Margon. Thanks, Mark.
Thank you, Senator, for that question. We would agree with
you, China is not moving in the right direction, in terms of
liberalization on human rights issues and the rule of law. In
fact, it is very concerning to see where China is going.
We understand that human rights issues may have been raised
at the recent dialogue. Assistant Secretary Malinowski said as
much. But, the problem is, what we are seeing is that it is
raised, there is no followup, and it is often not raised
publicly. So, I have a couple of suggestions on China, but I
also think that, if really implemented, a tool like the Global
Magnitsky bill could be a very effective tool. And ostensibly,
the Chinese President should welcome a tool like that, given
his commitment to root out corruption, as well.
Briefly, I think the three things that would be helpful to
see more of from the administration on China would include
speaking publicly about the individual cases of detained and
attacked activists at the very highest level and across the
entire U.S. Government. This happens sometimes, but not
consistently. And, from what we can tell, it is what most
effectively challenges, and likely changes, the calculations of
senior officials. It does not cost anything and it would go a
long way. We hear it, time and time again, from activists and
the families of activists and victims.
The second is to visibly reach out to people outside the
government. I think it was Senator Menendez who mentioned the
importance of U.S. Government officials seeing civil society
and others. And when the United States goes to China, this is
particularly important as a show of solidarity. Obviously,
their security would need to be checked to make sure it would
not put them in any danger. But, that would also be very
important to do regularly.
And then, finally, given the horrific developments over the
last week or so, we would also suggest that the human rights
and counterterrorism dialogues--I think they are expected in
August--be postponed.
So, I will stop there. Thanks.
Dr. Lagon. Well, I think, you know, the detention of 100
human rights leaders and activists shows exactly how much fear
the Chinese leadership has and--when it is about to enter a
dialogue--you know, strategic economic dialogue with the United
States--none, and that we really do need to amp up that
emphasis on human rights. And it does need to be public.
We, at Freedom House, put out a report, at the beginning of
the year, called the ``Politburo's Predicament,'' that looks at
the style and content of the leadership under Xi Jinping. It is
getting markedly worse, let us be clear. There is more
centralized power in an individual's hands with Xi than anyone
since Deng. And we look at 17 different groups, sectors, faith
groups in Chinese society, and a good number of those are
facing marked increased pressure.
Anticorruption campaigns, which are seen as the sort of
centerpiece of Xi's rule, are perfect manifestation of ``rule
by law'' rather than ``rule of law.'' Who is getting targeted
for corruption? Those people who are convenient to Xi and his
inner circle to eliminate. And people who are useful to him are
being allowed to live high on the hog on the corruption they
have. This is a perfect place to use a Global Magnitsky
sanctions bill. It is sort of accepted, among legislators,
executive branch officials, business leaders, that we will
never have comprehensive sanctions on China. But, this would be
a great way to highlight corruption and those who are
responsible for the most heinous human rights abuses, and put
the Chinese leadership in an even more precarious position in
its high-wire act, as society would see what it is actually
doing to them, in repressing and robbing them.
Senator Cardin. Well, let me thank you both for your
testimonies and for those suggestions. And I know our committee
is going to continue to be very aggressive.
The record will remain open until the close of business on
Monday.
And, with that, the committee will stand adjourned. Thank
you both.
[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Dr. Mark Lagon to Questions
Submitted by Senator Bob Corker
global magnitsky
Question. What would the policy and practical implications of a
mandatory Global Magnitsky sanctions regime be?
Answer. The President would have an effective, targeted foreign
policy tool at his disposal to constrain human rights abusers and
grossly corrupt officials without the need to implement broad-based
sanctions that can be difficult to pass and can at times
unintentionally harm innocent civilians. We know these types of
targeted sanctions work--whereby Russia and Belarus are good examples--
and are an effective method of protecting and promoting human rights by
holding those most responsible to account.
western hemisphere
Question. Colombia: Colombia is our ally and has made real progress
on human rights. A recent detailed report states that between 2002 and
2008, army brigades across Colombia routinely executed civilians under
pressure from superiors to show ``positive'' results and boost body
counts in their war against guerrillas. While rank and file have been
prosecuted and convicted, the report asserts that senior officers knew
about and condoned the killings through a system of monetary and other
compensation to soldiers for verified killings. The report says that no
senior officer has ever been investigated.
What can you tell the committee about this matter?
Answer. In Colombia, preserving rule of law and prosecuting crimes
remains a serious challenge, and the individuals responsible for these
killings should be held accountable. It is fairly widely known that
members of both the military and police carried out killings of
civilians with near-complete impunity, rationalized by some authorities
due to similar actions taken by FARC and by paramilitary groups. The
Colombian Government must dedicate more resources to its victims unit
to make the Victims Law and its accompanying commitments a reality.
This effort should include reparations for victims of attacks carried
out not only by nonstate actors but also by state officials. The
government must also dedicate more resources to the public prosecutor's
office at the federal and state levels so that past and current crimes
can be seriously investigated and prosecuted.
asia
Question. Vietnam: I remain troubled by reports that the
administration may consider fully lifting the lethal military equipment
sales ban, amidst intense lobbying on the part of Vietnam, including
during the General Secretary's recent visit.
Can you comment on these reports?
Answer. There is a renewed effort to fully lift the ban on arms
sales to Vietnam after Secretary Kerry and Secretary Carter visited the
country to meet with government officials this summer. The
administration partially lifted a 40-year ban on arm sales last year as
a way to counteract China's expansionist efforts in the South China
Sea. Freedom House is second to none in its concern about China's human
rights abuses within its borders and the pernicious model of illiberal
rule it offers regionally and globally. Moreover, U.S. efforts with
partners to stem China's aggressive moves beyond its borders in the
South China Sea are very sound. Yet fully lifting the ban on arms sales
sends the wrong message to the Communist Party of Vietnam: that the
U.S. is willing to overlook the increasing repression under a single
party authoritarian regime.
Question. What are the specific benchmarks Vietnam must achieve in
order for the administration to fully lift the lethal military
equipment sales ban?
Answer. Both Secretary Kerry and Secretary Carter noted that
progress on human rights issues is important to expanding the military
partnership between the two countries. State Department officials told
reporters during Secretary Kerry's recent trip that the ban would not
be eased further without progress on human rights. Some steps have been
made over the past year, but there still is significant room for
improvement. The United States should push for reversal of the
increased crackdown on freedom of expression and Internet, for lifting
the restrictions on religious freedom, and for the release of all
prisoners of conscience before agreeing to sell arms to Vietnam.
Vietnam is rated ``Not Free'' in Freedom in the World 2015.
______
Responses of Assistant Secretary Tomasz P. Malinowski to Questions
Submitted by Senator Bob Corker
Question. What would the policy and practical implications of a
mandatory Global Magnitsky sanctions regime be?
Answer. First, I want to emphasize that we share the goals behind
the Global Magnitsky legislation. Combating corruption and human rights
violations worldwide are key priorities for the administration.
With regard to policy implications, we believe the objectives of
the visa provisions included in the Global Magnitsky legislation are
already accomplished through other authorities. The administration
enforces a global policy to deny entry to those who commit serious
human rights violations through enforcement of the 2011 Presidential
Proclamation 8697, and is working to implement section 7031(c) of the
FY 2015 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, which renders ineligible those officials involved
in gross violations of human rights. Additionally, the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) already includes ineligibilities that apply to
those who have engaged in torture, extrajudicial killings, genocide,
particularly severe violations of religious freedom, and the use or
recruitment of child soldiers, among others.
The Global Magnitsky legislation also makes public corruption an
independent ground for ineligibility, which means it also duplicates
existing sanctions under the 2004 President Proclamation 7750 and the
anticorruption provisions of section 7031(c) of the FY 2015 Department
of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
each of which is being actively utilized by the Department.
On economic sanctions, the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (IEEPA) provides broad authority to impose sanctions in situations
where the President has declared a national emergency due to an unusual
and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, or
economy of the United States.
The reporting requirements in section (4) of the Global Magnitsky
legislation could detract from the multilateral frameworks we have set
up around the world to carry forward our overall international
anticorruption policy, including those multilateral frameworks through
which we are seeking to convince other governments to adopt and apply
similar visa restrictions. This successful policy has moved us over the
past 15 years from unilateral accusations to meaningful peer review
processes and increasing cooperation and coordination on law
enforcement, asset recovery, and visa sanctions action.
In terms of practical implications, the mandatory Global Magnitsky
bill does not provide additional resources for implementation. We know
from the enforcement of similar human rights grounds that the
investigations and examinations of credibility required under such an
act would be fact-intensive and take time to develop. Many of our
embassies are small, with only one or two reporting officers. Their
ability to advance U.S. Government priorities would be significantly
reduced if they were required to research, investigate, analyze, and
report on cases that may not meet significant thresholds.
In terms of domestic staffing resources, based on the 2012 Senate
version of the bill, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
alone previously estimated it would need seven additional full-time
equivalent (FTE) employees (one FTE per region and one supervisor) to
cover the additional workload related to a mandatory human rights
prong. When last reviewed in March 2012, the cost of seven FTE
positions at FY 2016 levels was $1,629,000 per fiscal year. While the
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs has not
estimated the staffing required to cover the additional workload
related to the bill's corruption prong, it is likely to be substantial.
Based on the additional workload, the Department anticipates that it
would need significant additional staffing increases across the
Department, including in regional bureaus, the Bureau of Consular
Affairs, the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs, and the Office of the Legal Advisor and other functional
bureaus to meet the requirements of the bill adequately.
The State Department notes that the Senate version provides
flexibility for targeted implementation and more importantly that it
provides a permissive authority to apply sanctions. This approach would
significantly ameliorate the resource and staffing implications
associated with a mandatory sanctions regime. We further note that the
House version does not incorporate this needed provision. Were the
House bill to be enacted, the impacts on resources and staffing within
the Department would be far greater as set forth above.
Question. Colombia.--Colombia is our ally and has made real
progress on human rights. A recent detailed report states that between
2002 and 2008, army brigades across Colombia routinely executed
civilians under pressure from superiors to show ``positive'' results
and boost body counts in their war against guerrillas. While rank and
file have been prosecuted and convicted, the report asserts that senior
officers knew about and condoned the killings through a system of
monetary and other compensation to soldiers for verified killings. The
report says that no senior officer has ever been investigated.
What can you tell the committee about this matter?
Answer. The Department is aware of the Human Rights Watch Report
titled ``On Their Watch: Evidence of Senior Army Officers'
Responsibility for False Positive Killings in Colombia,'' released in
June 2015. Senior officials from our Embassy in Colombia and in the
Department met with Human Rights Watch to discuss these issues. I
personally met with Human Rights Watch Americas Director Jose Miguel
Vivanco on July 10 to discuss the report, and the Department has asked
both the Colombian authorities and Human Rights Watch for additional
information.
The report states Colombian prosecutors are investigating more than
3,000 alleged ``false positives'' extra judicial killings by military
personnel. Upward of 800 army members have been convicted for
extrajudicial killings committed between 2002 and 2008, most of them
low ranking soldiers. No officers at the brigade-command level or above
have been convicted for extrajudicial killings; Human Rights Watch
notes that 16 active and retired army generals are under investigation.
The Colombian Attorney General's Office announced on April 13, 2015, it
would be investigating 22 active and retired generals.
In early June 2015, judicial hearings began against five colonels
from the Pedro Nel Ospina Battalion of the 4th Brigade, including
Colonels Edgar Emilio Avila Doria, Colonel Jose Zanguna Duarte, Colonel
Diega Padilla, Colonel Raul Huertas Ceballos, and Colonel Carlos
Cadena, for their alleged involvement with more than 70 ``false
positives'' killings. We will follow progress in these investigations
very closely.
We take all allegations of human rights violations in Colombia
seriously, and will continue to work to support all efforts to bring
justice for victims and perpetrators alike.
Question. I remain troubled by reports that the administration may
consider fully lifting the lethal military equipment sales ban, amidst
intense lobbying on the part of Vietnam, including during the General
Secretary's recent visit. Can you comment on these reports? What are
the specific benchmarks Vietnam must achieve in order for the
administration to fully lift the lethal military equipment sales ban?
Answer. We have consistently communicated to Vietnamese officials,
including during General Secretary Trong's visit, that further progress
on human rights is integral to our bilateral relationship and is
necessary for a further deepening of bilateral ties, including in
security cooperation. Further progress on human rights would be a key
factor for the United States to consider when determining whether a
full lifting of the ban on the transfer of lethal defense articles is
appropriate.
Vietnam has taken positive steps on human rights, but there remains
much room for improvement. During the Human Rights Dialogue, I urged
the Vietnamese Government to make progress in three key areas: a more
systematic release of political prisoners, including several of the
priority cases such as Ta Phong Tan that we discussed with them during
the Dialogue; a moratorium on new arrests and detentions of activists,
bloggers, and others for peacefully expressing their views; and
revising the disappointing first drafts of the Penal Code revisions and
the Law on Religion. Our message is clear: demonstrable progress on
human rights is critical to the advancement of U.S.-Vietnam relations
across the board, including in the security sphere.
Ahead of the modification to our policy last fall to permit the
transfer of maritime security-related defense articles to Vietnam, the
State Department and Defense Department consulted with Congress. If we
were to consider further policy changes, we would again consult with
Congress before making any decision.
______
Responses of Assistant Secretary Tomasz P. Malinowski to Questions
Submitted by Senator Rand Paul
Question. With President Obama's plan to lift sanctions that are
part of Executive Order 13628 related to the Iran Threat Reduction and
Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, what is the State Department's leverage
to influence the horrible human rights record in Iran?
Answer. Our commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA) will not result in the United States Government
terminating Sections 2 or 3 of Executive Order 13628, which are the
sections that impose sanctions related to human rights abuses and
freedom of expression consistent with the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010. Under the JCPOA, the United
States commits to terminate select provisions of Executive Order 13628
that relate to nuclear-related sanctions--specifically, Sections 5-7
and 15--on Implementation Day, i.e., after Iran has completed its key
nuclear-related commitments. These sections provide for technical fixes
or amendments to other sanctions pertaining to Iran's petroleum sector
that will be relieved under the deal and are unrelated to sanctions
imposed in connection with Iran's human rights abuses.
We have enforced, and will continue to enforce, existing human
rights sanctions. Since 2010, the Treasury Department, in consultation
with the State Department, has sanctioned 12 Iranian entities and six
Iranian individuals under Executive Order 13628 for restricting the
freedoms of expression or peaceful assembly of Iranians. These
designations will not go away under the JCPOA and neither will the
designations of five Iranian entities and 14 Iranian individuals under
Executive Order 13553 for their involvement or complicity in serious
human rights abuses. Lastly, the four entities we have targeted
pursuant to Executive Order 13606 for their provision of information
technology that could be used by the Government of Iran to commit
serious human rights abuses will remain designated. Iranian entities
sanctioned pursuant to various human rights authorities include the
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), the Basij, the Ministry of
Intelligence and Security (MOIS), the Ministry of Culture and Islamic
Guidance, the Committee to Determine Instances of Criminal Content, and
the Iranian Cyber Police. We have also sanctioned top officials within
some of these organizations.
We will continue to press Iran to end its mistreatment of its
citizens. We will continue to cosponsor and lobby for the U.N. General
Assembly's annual resolution expressing deep concern at human rights
violations in Iran and to lead lobbying efforts to maintain the mandate
of the Special Rapporteur on human rights in Iran--a mandate we were
instrumental in establishing through our leadership at the U.N. Human
Rights Council. We will also continue to document reports of Iran's
human rights violations and abuses in our annual Human Rights and
International Religious Freedom Reports. And we will continue to raise
our voice in support of the Iranian people and their desire for greater
respect for human rights and the rule of law.
Question. Each year, often without seeing improvements, the U.S.
State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development give
millions of U.S. taxpayer dollars to countries that have human rights
and corruption records that are considered the worst of the worst. Why
does the Department continue to aid and enable these regimes?
Answer. U.S. assistance supports programs that are in the U.S.
national interest, spanning a range of issues from fighting terrorism
to humanitarian assistance to antipoverty and health promotion
programs. It also includes programs and policies that strengthen good
governance, protect human rights, strengthen the rule of law, and
combat corruption. Sometimes, in order to protect or advance our
national interests, we must work with governments that have poor human
rights records. Congress regularly makes funds available for assistance
to these types of governments.
We also regularly withhold assistance from governments that abuse
human rights. We often do so as a matter of policy. We also do so as a
matter of law, specifically the State Leahy law (Section 620M of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended), which provides that no
assistance shall be furnished to any unit of the security forces of a
foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible information that
such unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. In every
case, when an individual security force member is nominated for
assistance, the Department vets that individual as well as his or her
unit. In cases where an entire unit is designated to receive
assistance, the Department vets the unit and the commander. All vetting
results from U.S. embassies are evaluated by vetters within the Bureau
of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL), where we vigorously
implement the State Leahy law and evaluate the human rights records of
the unit and individuals against a full spectrum of open source and
classified records.
In many cases where a country has a problematic human rights
record, U.S. assistance in those countries may be channeled through
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including those that fight for
greater respect for human rights and democratic principles. DRL focuses
programmatic activities in countries where governments commit egregious
human rights violations, are undemocratic or in transition, and where
democracy and human rights advocates are under pressure. More than 90
percent of all DRL programs operate in restrictive or challenging
environments. DRL grants and cooperative agreements are focused on
supporting civil society organizations that work on the very problems
you identified. DRL programming is intended to uphold democratic
principles, promote human rights and fundamental freedoms, prevent
atrocities, combat violent extremism, address gender-based violence,
strengthen rule of law, increase access to justice and accountability,
and target impunity and corruption. America is more secure in a world
where governments protect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of
all individuals.
______
Responses of Assistant Secretary Tomasz P. Malinowski to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. In an era marked by increasing global economic
integration characterized by the negotiation of trade agreements, such
as the TPP, in the pipeline, and preference programs that according to
the administration have a new emphasis on the observance of
international labor rights and standards, I understand that for State
Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL), labor
funded programs have remained stagnant and represent only about 5
percent of its total Human Rights and Democracy Fund budget.
Why does that number remain so low? Will we not need more
resources to match the rhetoric of labor rights in our
negotiating objectives?
Answer. DRL has supported labor programs since it began its
democracy and human rights programs in 1998 and we agree that there is
a need to continue emphasizing international labor rights and
standards. DRL does so by dedicating at least 5 percent of Democracy
Fund/Human Rights and Democracy Funds (DF/HRDF) for labor programs. We
also incorporate labor projects within global rapid response mechanisms
as well as regional or country-specific portfolios also funded with DF/
HRDF, and manage, on behalf of other Department bureaus, Economic
Support Funds (ESF) transferred to DRL. Due to these other funding
streams, the overall amount DRL program to advance labor rights is de
facto greater than 5 percent. Over the past 5 years, we have allocated
nearly $34 million for labor rights.
DRL dedicates at least 5 percent of our DF/HRDF budget even in the
constrained budget environment in which we are operating, and as
mandates for DF/HRDF have increased substantially without corresponding
increases in funding. The amount of funding we allocate for labor
rights is greater than our entire regional democracy-promotion
portfolios for Europe and Eurasia, Middle East and North Africa, and
South and Central Asia.
Question. As you think about the regional trade and economic
challenges and opportunities, are there areas--at State, at Treasury,
at Commerce, at USTR, at USAID--where do you think additional resources
are needed?
Answer. Currently, U.S. foreign assistance programs support
improving trade and investment climates in developing countries as a
means to promote sustainable economic growth in countries that have the
political will to carry out the needed reforms. Opening up new markets
also supports U.S. jobs, eliminates barriers in foreign markets and
establishes rules to stop unfair trade. President Obama's FY 2016
Request includes support for programs to be carried out by State and
USAID that include technical assistance and training to build trade
capacity, the establishment of bilateral and multilateral trade policy,
and the negotiation of new trade agreements required to overcome
regional trade barriers and economic challenges in developing nations.
State and USAID work very closely together to identify and request the
resources needed to achieve the U.S. Government's foreign policy
objectives and development goals for trade. State and USAID collaborate
with the interagency (i.e., Treasury, Commerce, and USTR) on trade
programming and transfer funds to these other agencies where they have
a comparative advantage to provide assistance.
Question. Mr. Assistant Secretary, in March, you led the first
human rights discussion with the Castro regime on human rights. Would
you please share with us your impression of those talks? Also, as there
have now been more than 2,822 arbitrary, politically motivated arrests
in Cuba during 2015, could you please provide impression of whether
these talks with the Castro regime will lead to greater protections for
human rights in Cuba?
Answer. On March 31, I led the planning discussion with a 13-member
Cuban delegation largely comprised of officials from the Ministry of
Exterior Relations' Directorate for Multilateral Affairs and
International Law. The atmosphere of the meeting was professional and
there was broad agreement on methodology for a substantive dialogue. We
agreed that the basis for future discussions would be compliance with
international human rights standards, including the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which will help us push back against the
usual Cuban argument that Cuba has its own definition of human rights.
We also agreed that each side would be open to discussing any topic.
The Cuban side wished to leave the timing and location of the first
substantive round of dialogue for future decision through diplomatic
channels. We have proposed various dates, and we are awaiting the Cuban
Government's response.
It is striking that the Cuban Government is so threatened by the
peaceful activities of civil society activists that it continues to
engage in the arbitrary, short-term detentions you have mentioned. As
we have said, we did not expect the Cuban Government to immediately
change its behavior toward its own people simply because it had
reestablished diplomatic relations with the United States, and I would
not expect them to change their behavior just because we have human
rights discussions. But reestablishment of diplomatic relations and
opening the Embassy in Havana not only allows us to better advocate for
respect for universal human rights and fundamental freedoms it has
changed the expectations of the Cuban people in ways the Cuban
Government cannot possibly meet unless it changes its policies.
Secretary Kerry and I were able to meet with several activists and
other representatives of Cuban society during the Secretary's visit to
Havana on August 14, and it is clear that they are thinking through how
they can take advantage of these new circumstances to press for real
change. Change in Cuba will come from the Cuban people, and we will use
our continued engagement to support their efforts to promote respect
for human rights and to advance democratic reforms.
Question. The State Department's Trafficking in Persons (TIP)
Reports normally cover the reporting period from April 1 to March 31 in
a given year. The 2015 TIP Report, which still has not yet been
released, will have the latest release date ever for a TIP Report.
In prior TIP reports, have events or actions taken in June
or July of a year ever before been used to affect a country's
tier ranking?
Answer. The 2015 TIP Report, which was released on July 27, covers
government antitrafficking efforts through March 31, 2015, with a few
exceptions for notable developments that occurred in early April. This
reporting period is consistent with those for past TIP Reports, which
have--on limited occasions--included developments after March 31.
Question. My amendment prohibiting fast track authority for Tier 3
human trafficking countries was recently signed into law by President
Obama as part of the Trade Promotion Authority legislation. In your
view, is that kind of sanction helpful in combating human trafficking?
Answer. Following the internationally agreed tenets of the U.N.
Palermo Protocol and the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), the
U.S. Government's efforts to combat trafficking in persons concentrate
on the 3P approach: prosecution of human traffickers, protection of the
victims of sex and labor trafficking, and prevention of the crime. The
Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons engages in year-
round diplomacy, working closely with foreign governments to encourage
and assist their efforts to meet the minimum standards to combat
trafficking in persons established in the TVPA.
The Department welcomes dialogue and continued partnership with
Congress on ways to better advance efforts to combat human trafficking.
We will stay apprised of developments regarding the amendment and look
forward to discussing this further with you.
Question. John Sifton, Asia advocacy director at Human Rights
Watch, recently stated that, with regards to human trafficking,
``Malaysia has done very little to combat this scourge,'' and that
``this is not a gray area.'' Do you agree with this analysis? Why or
why not?
Answer. The Department remains deeply concerned about human
trafficking in Malaysia and continues to urge Malaysian Government
officials to take bold steps to combat trafficking. Malaysia's Tier 2
Watch List ranking clearly indicates the country does not meet the
minimum standards established in the TVPA and there is much room for
improvement in the government's antitrafficking efforts. However, the
Government of Malaysia made significant efforts to comply with the
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking.
In 2014 and early 2015, government officials consulted with civil
society to draft amendments to Malaysia's antitrafficking law to
address the country's flawed victim protection regime, which were
approved by the Cabinet. If implemented, these amendments would address
a number of the recommendations in the TIP Report over the past several
years--including allowing trafficking victims to move freely and work
outside of government facilities and NGOs to run shelters for victims.
We will continue to encourage the government to implement the
amendments to the antitrafficking law and issue associated regulations
in consultation with NGO partners and consistent with international
standards in the Palermo Protocol. We will closely monitor the
implementation and effectiveness of these amendments as we evaluate
Malaysia's efforts.
Malaysian authorities also increased the number of trafficking
investigations and prosecutions compared to 2013, adopted a pilot
project to enable a limited number of trafficking victims to leave
government facilities in order to work, trained government officials on
human trafficking, and issued public service announcements highlighting
the risks of human trafficking. Going forward, we will continue to
press the government to increase its law enforcement efforts to convict
traffickers.
______
Letter Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
______
Article Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
[From The Hill, July 14, 2015]
Undermining the State Department's Trafficking Report
By David Abremowitz
Recent press reports suggest that the State Department will
recommend that Secretary John Kerry take a shameless and unprincipled
stand in this year's Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP Report) by
concluding that the government of Malaysia is making significant
efforts to combat human trafficking in its country. Anti-trafficking
groups, including the coalition I work with, are urging Kerry to reject
this unnecessary capitulation to the government of Malaysia and U.S.
government regional and trade experts.
Malaysia has a serious human trafficking problem, which is why last
year the State Department downgraded Malaysia to a Tier 3 country in
the TIP Report, a level that includes the worst human trafficking
offenders in the world. Malaysia--where we see forced labor in
agriculture, construction, electronics and textile industries, as well
as in domestic service in homes and women coerced into prostitution--
deserves to be among them. Steps that might be considered progress have
only come in recent days, months after the closure of this year's
reporting period (April 1, 2014 to March 31, 2015), and do not yet
demonstrate real resolve by the Malaysian government.
The basis for this cynical and manipulative recommendation is
simple: The State Department is trying to ensure that, come what may,
Malaysia can stay part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a key
trade agreement that is part of the White House's legacy in the pivot
to Asia. Recent fast-track trade legislation signed by the president
provided that no trade agreement that includes a Tier 3 country can get
fast-track consideration, effectively killing Malaysia's participation
in it. It appears that State Department regional bureaus and trade
experts are overruling the trafficking concerns to make sure this
doesn't happen.
These forces seem to be taking advantage of the absence of an
Ambassador-at-Large for Trafficking in Persons, a position that has
been vacant for more than nine months. This vacancy leaves no dedicated
senior official to fight the battles on behalf of the trafficking
office--and more importantly, on behalf of victims and survivors.
Supporters for a Malaysia upgrade point to provisions in a recent
Malaysian law. These provisions, for example, permit the government to
provide assistance to trafficking victims, but unfortunately they leave
it to the discretion of Malaysian authorities to actually do so, and
there is no guarantee of funds to make such a program a reality. This
is of particular concern because in Malaysia, as with many countries,
the promise of already existing laws that could make a real impact on
human trafficking falters because of poor or nonexistent
implementation. What's more, some press reports suggest that the State
Department will discount the mass graves on the Malaysian border
because they were discovered after the reporting period, but may now
count these even more recent changes because it better serves their
interest.
Unfortunately, prioritizing trade over trafficking will undermine
the integrity of the TIP Report and will make it more difficult to free
the estimated 21 million people who are suffering from human
trafficking and modern slavery. And it may undermine the U.S. ability
to ensure that Malaysia follows through with its commitments.
What is particularly bewildering about the State Department's
action is that it is wholly unnecessary. Several human rights groups
that work to end modern slavery worked with the administration to
create an exception to allow Malaysia to stay in the TPP, provided the
country takes concrete actions to implement the principal
recommendations in the TIP Report. This exception will likely be
adopted before the end of the month, giving flexibility to the
president and providing additional time for Malaysia to follow through
with its commitment to, for example, actually fund new programs for
victims under the new law and to pursue traffickers who confiscate
documents.
Kerry has a decision to make: undermine global U.S. leadership
efforts to combat human trafficking and let Malaysia off the hook, or
stand up for not only thousands of victims of human trafficking in
Malaysia but millions of people who suffer from modern slavery around
the world. The former unprincipled capitulation will tarnish this
administration's many efforts to combat human trafficking around the
world, as well as Kerry's own reputation as a champion In the fight
against human trafficking. The latter courageous truth-telling will
confirm that the U.S. continues to be a champion in freeing those who
are exploited by the more powerful. The choice is simple, Mr.
Secretary.
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