

**MARKUP OF H.R. 2002, H.RES. 273,
H.R. 97, H.R. 753, H.R. 1704, H.R.
1952, H.R. 615, H.R. 526, H.RES. 106,
H.R. 1359, H.R. 951, H.R. 2116, H.R.
1004 AND H.R. 9**

MARKUP
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

APRIL 9, 2019

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CONTENTS

	Page
THE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS EN BLOC	
H.R. 2002	3
H. Res. 273	9
H. R. 97	15
H. R. 753	18
H. R. 1704	25
H. R. 1952	37
H. R. amendment to 1952	41
H. R. 615	42
H. R. 526	44
H. Res. 106	54
H. R. 1359	58
H. R. 951	75
H. R. 2116	80
AMENDMENTS OFFERED FOR THE RECORD	
Amendment offered for the record from Chairman Engel	111
Amendment offered for the record from Representative Sherman	127
Bill H.R. 9 offered for the record	132
Amendment offered for the record from Representative McCaul	144
Amendment offered for the record from Representative Curtis	155
Amendment offered for the record from Representative Wright	169
Amendment offered for the record from Representative Buck	176
Amendment offered for the record from Representative Zeldin	190
APPENDIX	
Hearing Notice	200
Hearing Minutes	201
Hearing Attendance	202
STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD FROM COMMITTEE MEMBERS	
Statement submitted for the record from Representative Chabot	203
Statement submitted for the record from Representative Rooney	205
RECORD VOTE TALLIES	
Record vote tallies for H.R. 1004, Sherman Amendment #1	206
Record vote tallies for H.R. 9, McCaul Amendment #1	207
Record vote tallies for H.R. 9, Curtis Amendment #1	208
Record vote tallies for H.R. 9, Wright Amendment #1	209
Record vote tallies for Table Amendment, Buck Amendment #1	210
Record vote tallies for H.R. 9, Zeldin Amendment #1	211
Record vote tallies for H.R. 9	212
MARKUP SUMMARY	
House Foreign Affairs Committee Markup Summary	213

**MARKUP OF H.R. 2002, TAIWAN ASSURANCE
ACT OF 2019; H.RES. 273, REAFFIRMING THE
UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN
AND TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT; H.R. 97, RAWR
ACT; H.R. 753, GLOBAL ELECTORAL EX-
CHANGE ACT OF 2019; H.R. 1704, CHAM-
PIONING AMERICAN BUSINESS THROUGH
DIPLOMACY ACT OF 2019; H.R. 1952, INTER-
COUNTRY ADOPTION INFORMATION ACT;
H.R. 615, THE REFUGEE SANITATION FACIL-
ITY SAFETY ACT OF 2019; H.R. 526, CAM-
BODIA DEMOCRACY ACT; H.RES. 106, DE-
NOUNCING FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION;
H.R. 1359, DIGITAL GLOBAL ACCESS POLICY
ACT OF 2019; H.R. 951, U.S.-MEXICO TOURISM
IMPROVEMENT ACT; H.R. 2116, GLOBAL FRA-
GILITY ACT; H.R. 1004, PROHIBITING UNAU-
THORIZED MILITARY ACTION IN VEN-
EZUELA ACT; AND H.R. 9, CLIMATE ACTION
NOW ACT**

**Tuesday, April 9, 2019
House of Representatives
Committee on Foreign Affairs**

Washington, DC

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in Room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Eliot Engel (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Chairman ENGEL. We can get started. We might be able to do a bunch before they call the first vote, so the committee will come to order.

Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess of the committee at any point. Pursuant to Committee Rule 4, the chair announces that the chair may postpone further proceedings on any vote relating to any matter under consideration during today's markup. Pursuant to notice, we meet today to markup 14 measures. Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements or extraneous materials on today's business.

As members were notified yesterday, we intend to first consider 12 bipartisan measures en bloc. Then we will move on to consider the ANS to H.R. 1004, and finish with consideration of H.R. 9. So let's proceed to the en bloc.

The measures are H.R. 2002, the Taiwan Assurance Act of 2019; H.Res. 273, Reaffirming the United States commitment to Taiwan and to the implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act; H.R. 97, Rescuing Animals with Rewards Act, RAWR; H.R. 753 Global Electoral Exchange Act of 2019; H.R. 1704, Championing American Business Through Diplomacy Act of 2019; H.R. 1952, Intercountry Adoption Information Act with a Smith amendment; H.R. 615, The Refugee Sanitation Facility Safety Act of 2019; H.R. 526, the Cambodia Democracy Act; H.Res.106, Denouncing female genital mutilation; H.R. 1359, Digital Global Access Policy Act of 2019; H.R. 951, U.S.-Mexico Tourism Improvement Act; and, H.R. 2116, the Global Fragility Act.

[The Bills and Resolutions en bloc follow:]

**AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE
TO H.R. 2002
OFFERED BY MR. McCAUL OF TEXAS**

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

2 This Act may be cited as the “Taiwan Assurance Act
3 of 2019”.

4 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

5 Congress makes the following findings:

6 (1) April 10, 2019, marks the 40th anniversary
7 of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Public Law
8 96–8).

9 (2) Since 1949, the close relationship between
10 the United States and Taiwan has benefitted both
11 parties and the broader Indo-Pacific region.

12 (3) The security of Taiwan and its democracy
13 are key elements of continued peace and stability of
14 the greater Indo-Pacific region, which is in the polit-
15 ical, security, and economic interests of the United
16 States.

17 (4) The People’s Republic of China is currently
18 engaged in a comprehensive military modernization

1 campaign to enhance the power-projection capabilities
2 ties of the People’s Liberation Army and its ability
3 to conduct joint operations, which is shifting the
4 military balance of power across the Taiwan Strait.

5 (5) Taiwan and its diplomatic partners continue
6 to face sustained pressure and coercion from the
7 People’s Republic of China, which seeks to isolate
8 Taiwan from the international community.

9 (6) It is the policy of the United States to rein-
10 force its commitments to Taiwan under the Taiwan
11 Relations Act in a manner consistent with the “Six
12 Assurances” and in accordance with the United
13 States’ “One China” policy.

14 (7) In the Taiwan Travel Act, which became
15 law on March 16, 2018, Congress observed that the
16 “self-imposed restrictions that the United States
17 maintains on high-level visits” between the United
18 States and Taiwan have resulted in insufficient
19 high-level communication.

20 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

21 It is the sense of Congress that—

22 (1) Taiwan is a vital part of the United States’

23 Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy;

24 (2) the United States Government—

1 (A) supports Taiwan's continued pursuit of
2 asymmetric capabilities and concepts; and

3 (B) urges Taiwan to increase its defense
4 spending in order to fully resource its defense
5 strategy; and

6 (3) the United States should conduct regular
7 sales and transfers of defense articles to Taiwan in
8 order to enhance its self-defense capabilities, par-
9 ticularly its efforts to develop and integrate asym-
10 metric capabilities, including undersea warfare and
11 air defense capabilities, into its military forces.

12 **SEC. 4. TAIWAN'S INCLUSION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANI-**
13 **ZATIONS.**

14 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
15 gress that the People's Republic of China's attempts to
16 dictate the terms of Taiwan's participation in inter-
17 national organizations, has, in many cases, resulted in
18 Taiwan's exclusion from such organizations even when
19 statehood is not a requirement, and that such exclusion—

20 (1) is detrimental to global health, civilian air
21 safety, and efforts to counter transnational crime;

22 (2) negatively impacts the safety and security
23 of citizens globally; and

24 (3) negatively impacts the security of Taiwan
25 and its democracy.

1 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
2 United States to advocate for Taiwan’s meaningful par-
3 ticipation in the United Nations, the World Health Assem-
4 bly, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the
5 International Criminal Police Organization, and other
6 international bodies, as appropriate, and to advocate for
7 Taiwan’s membership in the Food and Agriculture Orga-
8 nization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
9 Cultural Organization, and other international organiza-
10 tions for which statehood is not a requirement for mem-
11 bership.

12 **SEC. 5. REVIEW OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE TAIWAN**
13 **GUIDELINES.**

14 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
15 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
16 shall conduct a review of the Department of State’s guid-
17 ance that governs relations with Taiwan, including the
18 periodic memorandum entitled “Guidelines on Relations
19 with Taiwan” and related documents, and reissue such
20 guidance to executive branch departments and agencies.

21 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
22 gress that the Department of State’s guidance regarding
23 relations with Taiwan—

24 (1) should be crafted with the intent to deepen
25 and expand United States-Taiwan relations, and be

1 based on the value, merits, and importance of the
2 United States-Taiwan relationship;

3 (2) should be crafted giving due consideration
4 to the fact that Taiwan is governed by a representa-
5 tive democratic government that is peacefully con-
6 stituted through free and fair elections that reflect
7 the will of the people of Taiwan, and that Taiwan
8 is a free and open society that respects universal
9 human rights and democratic values; and

10 (3) should ensure that the conduct of relations
11 with Taiwan reflects the longstanding, comprehen-
12 sive, and values-based relationship the United States
13 shares with Taiwan, and contribute to the peaceful
14 resolution of cross-Strait issues.

15 (c) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.—Not later than
16 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
17 Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on For-
18 eign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on For-
19 eign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report that
20 includes a description of—

21 (1) the results of the review pursuant to sub-
22 section (a) of the Department of State’s guidance on
23 relations with Taiwan, including a copy of the re-
24 issued “Guidelines of Relations with Taiwan” memo-
25 randum; and

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1 (2) the implementation of the Taiwan Travel
2 Act (Public Law 115–135) and any changes to guid-
3 ance on relations with Taiwan that are the result of
4 such implementation.



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.....
(Original Signature of Member)116TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION**H. RES. 273**Reaffirming the United States commitment to Taiwan and to the
implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVESMr. ENGEL submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the
Committee on _____

RESOLUTIONReaffirming the United States commitment to Taiwan and
to the implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act.

Whereas the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) was signed into law on April 10, 1979, codifying into law the basis for continued commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people of Taiwan, and serving as the foundation to preserve and promote continued bilateral bonds;

Whereas the TRA enshrines the United States commitment to make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability;

Whereas pursuant to section 1206 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107–228; 22 U.S.C. 2321k note.), Taiwan is to be treated as though it were designated a major non-NATO ally for transfers of defense articles or defense services;

Whereas in 1982, President Ronald Reagan further clarified the importance and resilience of the United States-Taiwan relationship with the issuance of the Six Assurances;

Whereas the TRA and the Six Assurances are cornerstones of United States policy with respect to Taiwan, as was reaffirmed by the House of Representatives with the adoption of H. Con. Res. 88 in 2016;

Whereas the TRA and the Six Assurances have been essential components in helping to maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific, thereby furthering the political, security, and economic interests of the United States and Taiwan;

Whereas the United States and Taiwan have forged ever closer economic and security relations over the last four decades based on their shared commitment to democracy, human rights, the rule of law and free market principles, and their willingness to partner in efforts to combat global terrorism and to address other global challenges, such as those related to the environment, public health, energy security, education, women's empowerment, digital economy, poverty, and natural disasters;

Whereas the United States-Taiwan partnership has been further strengthened since the 2015 memorandum of understanding establishing the Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF), which has allowed the two parties to cohost many workshops on critical topics, includ-

ing one in December 2018 on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to which ten regional governments sent participants;

Whereas Taiwan has the expertise, willingness, and capability to engage in international efforts to mitigate global challenges related to such issues as public health, aviation safety, crime, and terrorism, but its participation in such efforts has been constrained by conditions imposed by the People's Republic of China (PRC);

Whereas successive Congresses have called upon the executive branch to develop strategies to obtain meaningful participation for Taiwan in international organizations, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL);

Whereas the Congress most recently expressed support for Taiwan's participation at the World Health Organization's World Health Assembly as an observer on January 22, 2019, with the adoption of H.R. 353 by the House of Representatives;

Whereas communication on bilateral security, cultural, and commercial interests would be greatly enhanced with the full implementation of the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115–135), which became law on March 16, 2018, and which states that the United States Government “should encourage visits between officials from the United States and Taiwan at all levels”;

Whereas the United States and Taiwan have built a strong economic partnership, with the United States now Taiwan's third largest trading partner and with Taiwan the

11th largest trading partner of the United States and a key destination for United States agricultural exports;

Whereas strong United States-Taiwan economic relations have been a positive factor in stimulating economic growth and job creation for the people of both the United States and Taiwan; and

Whereas successive Congresses have publicly reaffirmed United States commitments to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act and Six Assurances, including most recently on December 31, 2018, with the enactment into law of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409), which stated among other things that—

(1) it is United States policy “to support the close economic, political, and security relationship between Taiwan and the United States”;

(2) “The President should conduct regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan that are tailored to meet the existing and likely threats from the People’s Republic of China, including supporting the efforts of Taiwan to develop and integrate asymmetric capabilities, as appropriate, including mobile, survivable, and cost-effective capabilities into its military forces.”; and

(3) “The President should encourage the travel of high-level United States officials to Taiwan, in accordance with the Taiwan Travel Act.”: Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved*, That the House of Representatives—

2 (1) reaffirms that the Taiwan Relations Act, to-
3 gether with the Six Assurances, are and will remain
4 cornerstones of United States relations with Taiwan;

1 (2) encourages United States officials at all lev-
2 els to travel to meet with their counterparts in Tai-
3 wan, and for high-level Taiwan officials to enter the
4 United States and meet with United States officials,
5 per the Taiwan Travel Act;

6 (3) reiterates that the President should conduct
7 regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan con-
8 sistent with Taiwan's national security requirements
9 in accordance to prior legislation, including the Asia
10 Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law
11 115-409);

12 (4) calls on the Secretary of State to actively
13 engage internationally in support of Taiwan's mean-
14 ingful participation in international organizations
15 engaged in addressing transnational threats and
16 challenges such as those related to health, aviation
17 security, and crime and terrorism;

18 (5) recognizes Taiwan's partnership in com-
19 bating global terrorism, including as a full partner
20 in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, and in ad-
21 dressing other global challenges through the Global
22 Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF) and
23 other such initiatives;

24 (6) underscores the importance of the close peo-
25 ple-to-people ties cultivated through initiatives such

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1 as the Fulbright Program, which has supported
2 thousands of scholar and grantee exchanges between
3 the United States and Taiwan over the past 60
4 years; and

5 (7) acknowledges the important work done by
6 the American Institute in Taiwan and the Taipei
7 Economic and Cultural Representative Office in sup-
8 port of United States-Taiwan interests.



I

116TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 97

To amend the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 to authorize rewards for thwarting wildlife trafficking linked to transnational organized crime, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 3, 2019

Mr. BUCHANAN (for himself and Ms. TITUS) introduced the following bill;
which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

A BILL

To amend the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 to authorize rewards for thwarting wildlife trafficking linked to transnational organized crime, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Rescuing Animals
5 With Rewards Act of 2019” or the “RAWR Act”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

7 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

1 (1) Wildlife trafficking is a major transnational
2 crime that is estimated to generate over \$10 billion
3 a year in illegal profits and which is increasingly
4 perpetrated by organized, sophisticated criminal en-
5 terprises, including known terrorist organizations.

6 (2) Wildlife trafficking not only threatens en-
7 dangered species worldwide, but also jeopardizes
8 local security, spreads disease, undermines rule of
9 law, fuels corruption, and damages economic devel-
10 opment.

11 (3) Combating wildlife trafficking requires a co-
12 ordinated and sustained approach at the global, re-
13 gional, national, and local levels.

14 (4) Congress stated in the Eliminate, Neu-
15 tralize, and Disrupt Wildlife Trafficking Act of 2016
16 that it is the policy of the United States to take im-
17 mediate actions to stop the illegal global trade in
18 wildlife and wildlife products and associated transna-
19 tional organized crime.

20 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
21 gress that the Department of State’s rewards program is
22 a powerful tool in combating sophisticated international
23 crime and that the Department of State and Federal law
24 enforcement should work in concert to offer rewards that
25 target wildlife traffickers.

1 SEC. 3. REWARDS FOR JUSTICE.

2 Subparagraph (B) of section 36(k)(5) of the State
3 Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C.
4 2708(k)(5)) is amended by inserting “wildlife trafficking
5 (as defined by section 2(12) of the Eliminate, Neutralize,
6 and Disrupt Wildlife Trafficking Act of 2016 (16 U.S.C.
7 7601(12); Public Law 114–231)) and” after “includes”.

○



116TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 753

To promote international exchanges on best election practices, cultivate more secure democratic institutions around the world, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 24, 2019

Mr. CASTRO of Texas (for himself and Mr. MEADOWS) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

A BILL

To promote international exchanges on best election practices, cultivate more secure democratic institutions around the world, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Global Electoral Ex-
5 change Act of 2019”.

6 **SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

7 It is the sense of Congress that—

8 (1) recent elections globally have illustrated the
9 urgent need for the promotion and exchange of
10 international best election practices, particularly in

- 1 the areas of cybersecurity, results transmission,
2 transparency of electoral data, election dispute reso-
3 lution, and the elimination of discriminatory reg-
4 istration practices and other electoral irregularities;
- 5 (2) the advancement of democracy worldwide
6 promotes American interests, as stable democracies
7 provide new market opportunities, improve global
8 health outcomes, and promote economic freedom and
9 regional security;
- 10 (3) credible elections are the cornerstone of a
11 healthy democracy and enable all persons to exercise
12 their basic human right to have a say in how they
13 are governed;
- 14 (4) inclusive elections strengthen the credibility
15 and stability of democracies more broadly;
- 16 (5) at the heart of a strong election cycle is the
17 professionalism of the election management body
18 and an empowered civil society;
- 19 (6) the development of local expertise via peer-
20 to-peer learning and exchanges promotes the inde-
21 pendence of such bodies from internal and external
22 influence; and
- 23 (7) supporting the efforts of peoples in democ-
24 ratizing societies to build more representative gov-

1 ernments in their respective countries is in the na-
2 tional interest of the United States.

3 **SEC. 3. GLOBAL ELECTORAL EXCHANGE.**

4 (a) GLOBAL ELECTORAL EXCHANGE.—The Sec-
5 retary of State is authorized to establish and administer
6 a Global Electoral Exchange Program to promote the utili-
7 zation of sound election administration practices around
8 the world.

9 (b) PURPOSE.—The purpose of the Global Electoral
10 Exchange Program described in subsection (a) shall in-
11 clude the promotion and exchange of international best
12 election practices, including in the areas of—

- 13 (1) cybersecurity;
- 14 (2) results transmission;
- 15 (3) transparency of electoral data;
- 16 (4) election dispute resolution;
- 17 (5) the elimination of discriminatory registra-
18 tion practices and electoral irregularities;
- 19 (6) equitable access to polling places, voter edu-
20 cation information, and voting mechanisms (includ-
21 ing by persons with disabilities); and
- 22 (7) other sound election administration prac-
23 tices.

24 (c) EXCHANGE OF ELECTORAL AUTHORITIES.—

1 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State may,
2 in consultation, as appropriate, with the United
3 States Agency for International Development, make
4 grants to any United States-based organization de-
5 scribed in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue
6 Code of 1986 and exempt from tax under section
7 501(a) of such Code with experience in and a pri-
8 mary focus on foreign comparative election systems
9 or subject matter expertise in the administration or
10 integrity of such systems that submits an application
11 in such form, and satisfying such requirements, as
12 the Secretary may require.

13 (2) TYPES OF GRANTS.—An organization de-
14 scribed in paragraph (1) may receive a grant for one
15 or more of the following purposes:

16 (A) To design and implement programs
17 bringing election administrators and officials,
18 including government officials, poll workers,
19 civil society representatives, members of the ju-
20 diciary, and others who participate in the orga-
21 nization and administration of public elections
22 in a foreign country that faces challenges to its
23 electoral process to the United States to study
24 election procedures in the United States for
25 educational purposes.

1 (B) To design and implement programs
2 taking the United States or another country's
3 election administrators and officials, including
4 government officials, poll workers, civil society
5 representatives, members of the judiciary, and
6 others who participate in the organization and
7 administration of public elections to study and
8 discuss election procedures for educational pur-
9 poses.

10 (3) LIMITS ON ACTIVITIES.—Activities adminis-
11 tered under the Global Electoral Exchange Program
12 may not—

13 (A) include observation of an election for
14 the purposes of assessing the validity or legit-
15 imacy of that election;

16 (B) facilitate any advocacy for a certain
17 electoral result by a grantee when participating
18 in the Program; or

19 (C) be carried out without proper consulta-
20 tion with State and local authorities in the
21 United States that administer elections.

22 (4) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of
23 Congress that the Secretary of State should estab-
24 lish and maintain a network of Global Electoral Ex-
25 change Program alumni, to promote communication

1 and further exchange of information regarding
2 sound election administration practices among cur-
3 rent and former program participants.

4 (5) FURTHER LIMITS.—A recipient of a grant
5 under the Global Electoral Exchange Program may
6 use such grant for only the purpose for which such
7 grant was awarded, unless otherwise authorized by
8 the Secretary of State.

9 (6) NOT DUPLICATIVE.—Grants made under
10 this subsection may not be duplicative of any other
11 grants made under any other provision of law for
12 similar or related purposes.

13 **SEC. 4. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT.**

14 Not later than one year after the date of the enact-
15 ment of this Act and in each of the following two years
16 thereafter, the Secretary of State shall provide to the
17 Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representa-
18 tives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen-
19 ate a briefing on the status of any activities carried out
20 pursuant to this Act during the preceding year, which
21 shall include, among other information, the following:

22 (1) A summary of all exchanges conducted
23 under the Global Electoral Exchange Program, in-
24 cluding information regarding grantees, participants,
25 and the locations where program activities were held.

1 (2) A description of the criteria used to select
2 grantees under the Global Electoral Exchange Pro-
3 gram.

4 (3) Any recommendations for the improvement
5 of the Global Electoral Exchange Program, based on
6 the purpose specified in section 3(b).

7 **SEC. 5. NO ADDITIONAL FUNDS AUTHORIZED.**

8 No additional funds are authorized to be appro-
9 priated to carry out the requirements of this Act. Such
10 requirements shall be carried out using amounts otherwise
11 authorized to be appropriated.

○



I

116TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 1704

To foster commercial relations with foreign countries and support United States economic and business interests abroad in the conduct of foreign policy, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 13, 2019

Mr. McCAUL (for himself, Mr. ENGEL, and Mr. YOHIO) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

A BILL

To foster commercial relations with foreign countries and support United States economic and business interests abroad in the conduct of foreign policy, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Championing Amer-
5 ican Business Through Diplomacy Act of 2019”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress finds the following:

1 (1) According to the 2017 National Security
2 Strategy of the United States of America, “Retain-
3 ing our position as the world’s preeminent economic
4 actor strengthens our ability to use the tools of eco-
5 nomic diplomacy for the good of Americans and oth-
6 ers.”.

7 (2) A November 7, 2018, cable from Secretary
8 of State Michael R. Pompeo to all diplomatic and
9 consular posts—“Boosting Commercial Diplomacy
10 Around the World”—stated that “helping American
11 companies is a foreign policy priority . . . Pro-
12 moting broad-based, responsible, and sustainable
13 economic growth helps to stabilize regions and cre-
14 ates new and growing markets for U.S. companies.
15 A transparent and level playing field for U.S. invest-
16 ment in these countries counters real and growing
17 challenges such as China’s Belt and Road initia-
18 tive.”.

19 (3) In the January–February 2019 issue of The
20 Foreign Service Journal, Ambassador Barbara Ste-
21 phenson, the President of the American Foreign
22 Service Association, wrote “Foreign Service support
23 for American business . . . is a major reason why
24 the U.S. Foreign Service was created.”.

1 **SEC. 3. ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT**
2 **OF STATE.**

3 Subsection (c) of section 1 of the State Department
4 Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a) is
5 amended—

6 (1) by redesignating paragraph (3) as para-
7 graph (4); and

8 (2) by inserting after paragraph (2) the fol-
9 lowing new paragraph:

10 “(3) ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC
11 AND BUSINESS MATTERS.—

12 “(A) IN GENERAL.—Subject to the numer-
13 ical limitation specified in paragraph (1), there
14 is authorized to be established in the Depart-
15 ment of State an Assistant Secretary of State
16 who shall be responsible to the Secretary of
17 State for matters pertaining to international ec-
18 onomics and business matters in the conduct of
19 foreign policy.

20 “(B) MATTERS CONTEMPLATED.—The
21 matters referred to in subparagraph (A) include
22 the following:

23 “(i) International trade and invest-
24 ment policy.

25 “(ii) International finance, economic
26 development, and debt policy.

1 “(iii) Economic sanctions and com-
2 bating terrorist financing.

3 “(iv) International transportation pol-
4 icy.

5 “(v) Support for United States busi-
6 nesses.

7 “(vi) Economic policy analysis and
8 private sector outreach.

9 “(vii) International data privacy and
10 innovation policies.

11 “(viii) Such other related duties as
12 the Secretary may from time to time des-
13 ignate.”.

14 **SEC. 4. CHIEF OF MISSION RESPONSIBILITIES.**

15 Section 207 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22
16 U.S.C. 3927) is amended by adding at the end the fol-
17 lowing new subsection:

18 “(d) PROMOTION OF UNITED STATES ECONOMIC IN-
19 TERESTS.—Each chief of mission to a foreign country
20 shall have as a principal duty the promotion of United
21 States economic and commercial interests in such coun-
22 try.”.

1 **SEC. 5. INCREASED TRAINING IN ECONOMIC AND COMMER-**
2 **CIAL DIPLOMACY.**

3 Section 708 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22
4 U.S.C. 4028) is amended by adding at the end the fol-
5 lowing new subsection:

6 “(d) ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY.—
7 The Secretary of State, with the assistance of other rel-
8 evant officials and the private sector, shall establish as
9 part of the standard training provided for economic and
10 commercial officers of the Foreign Service, chiefs of mis-
11 sion, and deputy chiefs of mission, training on matters re-
12 lated to economic and commercial diplomacy, with par-
13 ticular attention to market access and other elements of
14 an enabling framework for United States businesses, com-
15 mercial advocacy, and United States foreign economic pol-
16 icy, in addition to awareness about the support of the
17 United States Government available to United States busi-
18 nesses, including support provided by the Department of
19 Agriculture, the Department of Commerce, the Export-
20 Import Bank of the United States, the Millennium Chal-
21 lenge Corporation, the Trade and Development Agency,
22 the Department of the Treasury, the United States Agen-
23 cy for International Development, and the United States
24 International Development Finance Corporation.”.

1 **SEC. 6. REPORT FROM EACH MISSION ON MATTERS OF**
2 **COMMERCIAL RELATIONS.**

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the
4 date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter,
5 the chief of mission at each bilateral diplomatic mission
6 of the United States and the Director of the American
7 Institute in Taiwan shall submit to the Secretary of State
8 the following:

9 (1) Data and other information regarding ac-
10 tions taken by each such mission or Institute during
11 the previous year to foster commercial relations and
12 safeguard United States economic and business in-
13 terests in the country or region in which each such
14 chief of mission and the Director serves.

15 (2) Each such mission's and Institute's antici-
16 pated economic and commercial priorities for the
17 coming year.

18 (b) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—The Secretary of State,
19 after receiving the information required under subsection
20 (a), shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
21 the House of Representatives and the Committee on For-
22 eign Relations of the Senate a report, disaggregated by
23 country or region, on activities and initiatives, including
24 with appropriate examples, to create an enabling environ-
25 ment and otherwise promote United States economic and
26 business interests in each such country or region, as well

1 as information about significant foreign competition to
2 United States businesses in the relevant country or region,
3 including state-directed investments by foreign govern-
4 ments and United States strategic competitors in such
5 country or region.

6 **SEC. 7. REPORT ON UNIFIED INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATE-**
7 **MENT AND COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE.**

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State and the
9 Secretary of Commerce shall jointly produce and make
10 publicly available on a United States Government internet
11 website an annual country- and region-specific report re-
12 garding commercial relations with foreign countries and
13 regions and safeguarding United States economic and
14 business interests abroad, including with regard to United
15 States exports and investments, including by small- and
16 medium-size enterprises.

17 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Each report re-
18 quired under subsection (a) shall include the following
19 with respect to each country or region covered by each
20 such report:

21 (1) Information about doing business in each
22 country or region.

23 (2) Background information about each coun-
24 try's or region's political environment.

1 (3) Information about selling United States
2 products and services in each country or region.

3 (4) Leading sectors for United States exports
4 and investment in each country or region.

5 (5) Information about trade regulations, cus-
6 toms, and standards in each country or region, such
7 as—

8 (A) information on import tariffs; and

9 (B) documentation about which United
10 States businesses should be aware when export-
11 ing, including any prohibited items or tem-
12 porary entry procedures.

13 (6) Investment climate statements describing
14 each country's or region's openness to foreign invest-
15 ments, such as information relating to each coun-
16 try's or region's—

17 (A) investment policies;

18 (B) market barriers;

19 (C) business risks;

20 (D) legal and regulatory system, including
21 dispute resolution;

22 (E) level of public and private sector cor-
23 ruption;

24 (F) level of political violence and insta-
25 bility;

1 (G) adherence to internationally recognized
2 core labor standards; and

3 (H) protection of property rights.

4 (7) Information about trade and project financ-
5 ing in each country or region, such as each country's
6 or region's—

7 (A) banking and financial system, and how
8 United States businesses typically get paid;

9 (B) foreign exchange controls; and

10 (C) important sources of funding for
11 project financing.

12 (8) Relevant business travel information and
13 business customs in each country or region.

14 (9) Information about services and personnel of
15 the diplomatic mission of the United States available
16 to United States businesses to support their activi-
17 ties in each country or region.

18 (10) Any significant trade or commercial agree-
19 ment that exists between the United States and each
20 country or region.

21 (11) A point of contact at the diplomatic or
22 consular mission of the United States in each coun-
23 try or region for United States businesses.

1 **SEC. 8. IMPROVING AWARENESS OF UNITED STATES GOV-**
2 **ERNMENT TOOLS AND SERVICES TO SUP-**
3 **PORT UNITED STATES BUSINESSES OVER-**
4 **SEAS.**

5 The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Com-
6 merce shall take actions to improve United States busi-
7 nesses' awareness of United States Government tools and
8 services to assist such businesses overseas, especially small
9 and medium-sized enterprises, including by coordinating
10 with State trade agencies, Export Assistance Centers, and
11 Small Businesses Development Centers.

12 **SEC. 9. NEGOTIATIONS TO ESTABLISH INTERNATIONAL**
13 **QUALITY INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT**
14 **STANDARDS.**

15 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President, acting through the
16 Secretary of State, and in coordination with other relevant
17 Federal agency heads, shall initiate and pursue negotia-
18 tions with countries to establish international standards
19 for government-supported quality infrastructure invest-
20 ment overseas, including with respect to the following:

- 21 (1) Respect for the sovereignty of countries in
22 which infrastructure investments are made.
23 (2) Anti-corruption.
24 (3) Fiscal and debt sustainability.
25 (4) Environmental, social and governance safe-
26 guards.

1 (5) Local labor.

2 (6) Transparency.

3 (b) REPORT ON PROGRESS OF NEGOTIATIONS.—Not
4 later than one year after the date of enactment of this
5 Act, the President shall provide a briefing to the Com-
6 mittee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives
7 and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate
8 on the progress of any negotiations described in subsection
9 (a).

10 **SEC. 10. REPORT BY COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE**
11 **UNITED STATES.**

12 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than two years after the
13 date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General
14 of the United States shall submit to the Committee on
15 Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the
16 Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report
17 on United States economic and commercial diplomacy.

18 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report re-
19 quired under subsection (a) shall include an assessment
20 of the following:

21 (1) What is known about the effectiveness of
22 United States economic and commercial diplomacy
23 in influencing foreign governments and supporting
24 United States businesses abroad.

1 (2) Coordination between the Department of
2 State and the Department of Commerce with respect
3 to United States economic and commercial diplo-
4 macy.

5 (3) The effectiveness of training provided pur-
6 suant to subsection (d) of section 708 of the Foreign
7 Service Act of 1980 (as added by section 4 of this
8 Act) on matters relating to economic and commer-
9 cial diplomacy.

10 (4) The status and effectiveness of actions
11 taken by the Secretary of State under section 7 of
12 this Act regarding commercial relations with foreign
13 countries and regions and safeguarding United
14 States economic and business interests abroad.

15 (5) Recommendations to improve United States
16 economic and commercial diplomacy.

○

116TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 1952

To amend the Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000 to require the Secretary of State to report on intercountry adoptions from countries which have significantly reduced adoption rates involving immigration to the United States, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 28, 2019

Mr. COLLINS of Georgia (for himself and Mr. LANGEVIN) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

A BILL

To amend the Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000 to require the Secretary of State to report on intercountry adoptions from countries which have significantly reduced adoption rates involving immigration to the United States, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Intercountry Adoption
5 Information Act of 2019”.

1 **SEC. 2. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED IN**
2 **ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERCOUNTRY ADOPT-**
3 **TIONS.**

4 (a) REPORT ELEMENTS.—Section 104(b) of the
5 Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000 (42 U.S.C. 14914(b))
6 is amended by adding at the end the following new para-
7 graphs:

8 “(9) A list of countries that established or
9 maintained a significant law or regulation that pre-
10 vented or prohibited adoptions involving immigration
11 to the United States, regardless of whether such
12 adoptions occurred under the Convention.

13 “(10) For each country listed under paragraph
14 (9), the date on which the law or regulation was ini-
15 tially implemented.

16 “(11) Information on efforts taken with respect
17 to a country listed under paragraph (9) to encourage
18 the resumption of halted or stalled adoption pro-
19 ceedings involving immigration to the United States,
20 regardless of whether the adoptions would have oc-
21 curred under the Convention.

22 “(12) Information on any action the Secretary
23 carried out that prevented, prohibited, or halted any
24 adoptions involving immigration to the United
25 States, regardless of whether the adoptions occurred
26 under the Convention.

1 “(13) For each country listed pursuant to para-
2 graph (12), a description of—

3 “(A) what policies, procedures, resources,
4 and safeguards the country lacks, or other
5 shortcomings or circumstances, that caused the
6 action to be carried out;

7 “(B) what progress the country has made
8 to alleviate those shortcomings; and

9 “(C) what steps the Department of State
10 has taken in order to assist the country to re-
11 open intercountry adoptions.”.

12 (b) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF REPORT.—Section 104
13 of the Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000 (42 U.S.C.
14 14914) is amended by adding at the end the following new
15 subsection:

16 “(c) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF REPORT.—The Sec-
17 retary shall make the information contained in the report
18 required under subsection (a) available to the public on
19 the website of the Department of State.”.

20 (c) PRIVACY CONCERNS.—In complying with the
21 amendments made by subsections (a) and (b), the Sec-
22 retary shall avoid, to the maximum extent practicable, dis-
23 closing any personally identifiable information relating to
24 United States citizens or the adoptees of such citizens.

1 (d) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 104(a) of
2 the Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000 (42 U.S.C.
3 14914(a)) is amended by striking “International Rela-
4 tions” and inserting “Foreign Affairs”.

5 (e) APPLICATION DATE.—The amendments made by
6 this section shall apply with respect to reports required
7 to be submitted under section 104 of the Intercountry
8 Adoption Act of 2000 (42 U.S.C. 14914) beginning on the
9 date that is 1 year after the date of enactment of this
10 Act.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1952
OFFERED BY MR. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY

Page 3, after line 11, insert the following:

1 “(14) An assessment of the impact of the fee
2 schedule of the Intercountry Adoption Accreditation
3 and Maintenance Entity on families seeking to adopt
4 internationally, especially low-income families, fami-
5 lies seeking to adopt sibling groups, or families seek-
6 ing to adopt children with disabilities.”.

Page 4, line 8, strike “1 year” and insert “180
days”.





116TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 615

To provide women and girls safe access to sanitation facilities in refugee camps.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 16, 2019

Ms. MENG (for herself, Mr. ENGEL, Ms. MOORE, Ms. NORTON, Mr. KEATING, Ms. LEE of California, Mr. ESPAILLAT, Mrs. DINGELL, Ms. HAALAND, Ms. OMAR, Ms. KUSTER of New Hampshire, Ms. JACKSON LEE, Mr. RASKIN, Ms. BASS, Mr. MEEKS, Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN, Ms. MCCOLLUM, Mr. LOWENTHAL, Mrs. TORRES of California, Mr. PAYNE, Mr. HASTINGS, Ms. HILL of California, Mr. COHEN, and Mr. DEUTCH) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

A BILL

To provide women and girls safe access to sanitation facilities in refugee camps.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Refugee Sanitation Fa-
5 cility Safety Act of 2019”.

1 **SEC. 2. SECURE ACCESS TO SANITATION FACILITIES FOR**
2 **WOMEN AND GIRLS.**

3 Section 501 of the Foreign Relations Act, Fiscal
4 Years 1994 and 1995 (22 U.S.C. 2601 note) is amended
5 in subsection (a)—

6 (1) by striking “and” at the end of paragraph
7 (10);

8 (2) by striking the period at the end of para-
9 graph (11) and inserting “; and”; and

10 (3) by adding at the end the following:

11 “(12) the provision of safe and secure access to
12 sanitation facilities, with a special emphasis on
13 women and girls, and vulnerable populations.”.

○



116TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 526

To promote free and fair elections, political freedoms, and human rights
in Cambodia, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 11, 2019

Mr. YOHO (for himself, Mr. McCAUL, and Mr. ENGEL) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To promote free and fair elections, political freedoms, and
human rights in Cambodia, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the “Cambodia Democracy
5 Act of 2019”.

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

7 Congress finds the following:

8 (1) Prime Minister Hun Sen has been in power
9 in Cambodia since 1985 and is the longest-serving

1 leader in Southeast Asia. Despite decades of inter-
2 national attention and assistance to promote a plu-
3 ralistic, multi-party democratic system in Cambodia,
4 the Government of Cambodia continues to be
5 undemocratically dominated by the ruling Cambodia
6 People’s Party (CPP), which controls every agency
7 and security apparatus of the state.

8 (2) In 2015, the CPP-controlled parliament
9 passed the “Law on Associations and Non-Govern-
10 mental Organizations”, which gave the government
11 sweeping powers to revoke the registration of NGOs
12 that the government believed to be operating with a
13 political bias in a blatant attempt to restrict the le-
14 gitimate work of civil society. On August 23, 2017,
15 Cambodia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs ordered the
16 closure of the National Democratic Institute and the
17 expulsion of its foreign staff. On September 15,
18 2017, Prime Minister Hun Sen called for the with-
19 drawal of all volunteers from the United States
20 Peace Corps, which has operated in Cambodia since
21 2006 with 500 United States volunteers providing
22 English language and healthcare training.

23 (3) The Government of Cambodia has taken
24 several measures to restrict its media environment,
25 especially through politicized tax investigations

1 against independent media outlets that resulted in
2 the closure of The Cambodian Daily and Radio Free
3 Asia in early September 2017. Additionally, the Gov-
4 ernment of Cambodia has ordered several radio sta-
5 tions to stop the broadcasting of Radio Free Asia
6 and Voice of America programming.

7 (4) On September 3, 2017, Kem Sokha, the
8 President of the Cambodia National Rescue Party
9 (CNRP), was arrested on politically motivated
10 charges, including treason and conspiring to over-
11 throw the Government of Cambodia, and faces up to
12 30 years in prison. The CNRP's previous leader,
13 Sam Rainsy, remains in exile. On November 16,
14 2017, Cambodia's Supreme Court dissolved the
15 CNRP, eliminating the primary opposition party.

16 (5) Each of the six elections that have taken
17 place in Cambodia since 1991 were conducted in cir-
18 cumstances that were not free and fair, and were
19 marked by fraud, intimidation, violence, and the gov-
20 ernment's misuse of legal mechanisms to weaken op-
21 position candidates and parties.

22 (6) In the most recent general election in July
23 2018, following the dissolution of the CNRP, the
24 CPP secured every parliamentary seat, an electoral
25 victory that a statement from the White House

1 Press Secretary stated was “neither free nor fair
2 and failed to represent the will of the Cambodian
3 people”.

4 (7) The United States is committed to pro-
5 moting democracy, human rights, and the rule of
6 law in Cambodia. The United States continues to
7 urge the Government of Cambodia to immediately
8 release Mr. Kem Sokha, reinstate the political status
9 of the CNRP and restore its elected seats in the Na-
10 tional Assembly, and support electoral reform efforts
11 in Cambodia with free and fair elections monitored
12 by international observers.

13 **SEC. 3. SANCTIONS RELATING TO UNDERMINING DEMOC-**
14 **RACY IN CAMBODIA.**

15 (a) DESIGNATION OF PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR
16 UNDERMINING DEMOCRACY IN CAMBODIA.—Not later
17 than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
18 the President shall apply the sanctions described in sub-
19 section (b) on—

20 (1) each senior official of the government, mili-
21 tary, or security forces of Cambodia that the Presi-
22 dent determines has directly and substantially un-
23 dermined democracy in Cambodia;

24 (2) each senior official of the government, mili-
25 tary, or security forces of Cambodia that the Presi-

1 dent determines has committed or directed serious
2 human rights violations associated with undermining
3 democracy in Cambodia; and

4 (3) entities owned or controlled by senior offi-
5 cials of the government, military, or security forces
6 of Cambodia described in paragraphs (1) and (2).

7 (b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—

8 (1) ASSET BLOCKING.—The President shall ex-
9 ercise all of the powers granted to the President
10 under the International Emergency Economic Pow-
11 ers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent nec-
12 essary to block and prohibit all transactions in prop-
13 erty and interests in property of a person designated
14 under subsection (a) if such property and interests
15 in property are in the United States, come within
16 the United States, or are or come within the posses-
17 sion or control of a United States person.

18 (2) VISA RESTRICTIONS.—

19 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State,
20 in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland
21 Security, shall continue to implement the policy
22 announced by the Department of State on De-
23 cember 6, 2017, to restrict entry into the
24 United States of persons involved in under-

1 mining democracy in Cambodia, including any
2 person designated under subsection (a).

3 (B) EXCEPTION FOR MULTILATERAL AC-
4 TIVITIES.—Persons otherwise restricted from
5 entry into the United States under this section
6 may be admitted if such admission is necessary
7 to comply with United States obligations under
8 the Agreement between the United Nations and
9 the United States of America regarding the
10 Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at
11 Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into
12 force November 21, 1947, or under the Conven-
13 tion on Consular Relations, done at Vienna
14 April 24, 1963, and entered into force March
15 19, 1967, or other applicable international obli-
16 gations of the United States.

17 (3) PENALTIES.—The penalties provided for in
18 subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the Inter-
19 national Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
20 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a person that violates,
21 attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a
22 violation of paragraph (1) to the same extent that
23 such penalties apply to a person that commits an
24 unlawful act described in subsection (a) of such sec-
25 tion 206.

1 (c) LIST OF DESIGNATED PERSONS.—

2 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
3 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
4 President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a list of persons designated under
5 subsection (a).
6

7 (2) UPDATES.—The President shall transmit to
8 the appropriate congressional committees updated
9 lists under paragraph (1) as new information becomes available.
10

11 (d) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may exercise
12 all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the
13 International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
14 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this section.

15 (e) WAIVER.—The President may waive the application of sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect
16 to a person designated under subsection (a) if the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that such waiver is in the national interest of the United States.
17
18
19
20

21 **SEC. 4. SUSPENSION OF SANCTIONS.**

22 (a) SUSPENSION.—The sanctions described in section
23 3 may be suspended for up to 1-year upon certification
24 by the President to the appropriate congressional committee.

tees that Cambodia is making meaningful progress toward the following:

(1) Ending government efforts to undermine democracy.

(2) Ending human rights violations associated with undermining democracy.

(3) Conducting free and fair elections which allow for the active participation of credible opposition candidates.

(b) RENEWAL OF SUSPENSION.—The suspension described in subsection (a) may be renewed for additional, consecutive-day periods if the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that Cambodia is continuing to make meaningful progress towards satisfying the conditions described in such subsection during the previous year.

SEC. 5. SUNSET.

This Act shall terminate on the date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the

1 House of Representatives, and the Committee on
2 Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking,
3 Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.

4 (2) PERSON.—

5 (A) IN GENERAL.—The term “person”
6 means—

7 (i) a natural person; or

8 (ii) a corporation, business associa-
9 tion, partnership, society, trust, financial
10 institution, insurer, underwriter, guar-
11 antor, and any other business organization,
12 any other nongovernmental entity, organi-
13 zation, or group, and any governmental en-
14 tity operating as a business enterprise or
15 any successor to any entity described in
16 this clause.

17 (B) APPLICATION TO GOVERNMENTAL EN-
18 TITIES.—The term “person” does not include a
19 government or governmental entity that is not
20 operating as a business enterprise.

21 (3) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term
22 “United States person” means—

23 (A) a United States citizen or an alien law-
24 fully admitted for permanent residence to the
25 United States; or

1 (B) an entity organized under the laws of
2 the United States or of any jurisdiction of the
3 United States, including a foreign branch of
4 such an entity.

○



116TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. RES. 106

Denouncing female genital mutilation/cutting as a violation of the human rights of women and girls and urging the international community and the Federal Government to increase efforts to eliminate the harmful practice.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 6, 2019

Ms. FRANKEL (for herself and Mr. PERRY) submitted the following resolution;
which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

RESOLUTION

Denouncing female genital mutilation/cutting as a violation of the human rights of women and girls and urging the international community and the Federal Government to increase efforts to eliminate the harmful practice.

Whereas female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C) is recognized internationally as a violation of the human rights of women and girls;

Whereas FGM/C comprises all procedures that involve partial or total removal of the external female genitalia, or other injury to the female genital organs for nonmedical reasons;

Whereas an estimated 200 million girls and women alive today have been victims of FGM/C, with girls 14 and younger representing 44 million of those who have been cut;

Whereas more than 3 million girls are estimated to be at risk of FGM/C annually;

Whereas the practice is mostly carried out on young girls between infancy and age 15;

Whereas the practice is rooted in gender inequality and is often linked to other elements of gender-based violence and discrimination, such as child marriage;

Whereas the World Health Organization asserts that FGM/C has no health benefits for women and girls, and can have long-term impacts on their physical, psychological, sexual, and reproductive health;

Whereas the impacts of FGM/C on the physical health of women and girls can include bleeding, infection, obstetric fistula, complications during childbirth, and death;

Whereas, according to UNICEF, FGM/C is reported to occur in all parts of the world, but is most prevalent in parts of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia;

Whereas, although the practice of FGM/C is highly concentrated in specific regions and associated with several cultural traditions, it is not tied to any one religion;

Whereas, in 2016, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention published a report estimating that 513,000 women and girls in the United States were at risk or may have been subjected to FGM/C;

Whereas, in 2015, the United Nations adopted a set of 17 Sustainable Development Goals for 2030 that includes a

target to eliminate FGM/C, having previously recognized in 2010 that “the abandonment of this harmful practice can be achieved as a result of a comprehensive movement that involves all public and private stakeholders in society”;

Whereas the elimination of FGM/C has been called for by numerous intergovernmental organizations, including the African Union, the European Union, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, as well as in 3 resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly;

Whereas the Department of State reports on FGM/C in its Annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, including information on whether FGM/C is prevalent, the type and category of genital cutting that is most common, as well as international and governmental efforts being taken to address the practice;

Whereas the Federal Government recognized FGM/C as a form of gender-based violence in the United States Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Gender-Based Violence Globally, released in August 2012 and updated in June 2016, and the United States Global Strategy to Empower Adolescent Girls, released in March 2016;

Whereas a Government Accountability Office report released in 2016 concluded that “State and USAID currently have limited international assistance efforts to address FGM/C.”; and

Whereas, in 2012, the United Nations General Assembly designated February 6 as the International Day of Zero Tolerance for Female Genital Mutilation to enhance awareness of and encourage concrete actions by states and individuals against the practice: Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved*, That the House of Representatives—

2 (1) denounces female genital mutilation/cutting
3 as a violation of the human rights of women and
4 girls;

5 (2) affirms the importance of ending the prac-
6 tice of female genital mutilation/cutting globally for
7 the safety and security of women;

8 (3) calls upon the international community to
9 increase efforts to accelerate the elimination of fe-
10 male genital mutilation/cutting; and

11 (4) urges the Department of State and the
12 United States Agency for International Development
13 in their gender programming to incorporate coordi-
14 nated efforts to eliminate female genital mutilation/
15 cutting.

○



I

116TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 1359

To promote Internet access in developing countries and update foreign policy toward the Internet, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 26, 2019

Mr. WRIGHT (for himself, Mr. McCaul, Mr. TED LIEU of California, and Mr. BERA) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

A BILL

To promote Internet access in developing countries and update foreign policy toward the Internet, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the “Digital Global Access
5 Policy Act of 2019” or the “Digital GAP Act”.

6 SEC. 2. PURPOSE.

7 The purpose of this Act is to—

8 (1) encourage the efforts of developing coun-
9 tries to improve and secure mobile and fixed access

1 to the Internet in order to catalyze innovation, spur
2 economic growth and job creation, improve health,
3 education, and financial services, reduce poverty and
4 gender inequality, mitigate disasters, and promote
5 free speech, democracy, and good governance;

6 (2) promote build-once policies and approaches
7 and the multi-stakeholder approach to Internet gov-
8 ernance; and

9 (3) ensure the effective use of United States
10 foreign assistance resources toward that end.

11 **SEC. 3. FINDINGS.**

12 Congress makes the following findings:

13 (1) Internet access has been a driver of eco-
14 nomic activity around the world. Bringing Internet
15 access to the more than 4,000,000,000 people who
16 do not have it could increase global economic output
17 by \$6,700,000,000,000 and raise 500,000,000 peo-
18 ple out of poverty.

19 (2) The number of Internet users has more
20 than tripled from 1,000,000,000 to over
21 3,000,000,000 since 2005, including 2,000,000,000
22 living in the developing world, yet more than half of
23 the world's population remains offline, living without
24 the economic and social benefits of the Internet. By
25 the end of 2016, over 80 percent of households in

1 the developed world had Internet access, compared
2 with just 40 percent of households in developing
3 countries and just 11 percent in the world's least de-
4 veloped countries. Of the world's offline population,
5 an estimated 75 percent live in just 20 countries,
6 and rural, female, elderly, illiterate, and low-income
7 populations are being left behind.

8 (3) Studies suggest that women are dispropor-
9 tionately affected by a digital gap in developing
10 countries, where there are on average 23 percent
11 fewer women online than men. Bringing an addi-
12 tional 600,000,000 women online could contribute
13 \$13,000,000,000 to \$18,000,000,000 to annual
14 GDP across 144 developing countries.

15 (4) The United States has been a leader in pro-
16 moting access to an open, secure, interoperable
17 Internet around the world. Recognizing that support
18 for expanded Internet access furthers United States
19 economic and foreign policy interests, including ef-
20 forts to end extreme global poverty and enabling re-
21 silient, democratic societies, the Department of State
22 launched a diplomatic effort called "Global Con-
23 nect".

24 (5) Internet access in developing countries is
25 hampered, in part, by a lack of infrastructure and

1 a poor regulatory environment for investment. Build-
2 once policies and approaches, which seek to coordi-
3 nate public and private sector investments in roads
4 and other critical infrastructure, can reduce the
5 number and scale of excavation and construction ac-
6 tivities when installing telecommunications infra-
7 structure in rights-of-way, thereby reducing installa-
8 tion costs for high-speed Internet networks and serv-
9 ing as a development best practice.

10 **SEC. 4. EXPANDING INTERNET ACCESS IN DEVELOPING**
11 **COUNTRIES.**

12 (a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

13 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
14 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
15 mittees” means—

16 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations,
17 the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
18 Transportation, and the Committee on Appro-
19 priations of the Senate; and

20 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
21 Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the
22 Committee on Appropriations of the House of
23 Representatives.

24 (2) BROADBAND.—The term “broadband”
25 means an Internet Protocol-based transmission serv-

1 ice that enables users to send and receive voice,
2 video, data, graphics, or a combination thereof,
3 using technologies including fiber optic, mobile, sat-
4 ellite, and Wi-Fi.

5 (3) BROADBAND CONDUIT.—The term “broad-
6 band conduit” means a conduit for fiber optic cables
7 and other connectivity technologies that support
8 broadband or wireless facilities for broadband serv-
9 ice.

10 (4) BUILD-ONCE POLICIES AND APPROACHES.—
11 The term “build-once policies and approaches”
12 means policies or practices that encourage the inte-
13 gration of Internet infrastructure into traditional in-
14 frastructure projects that minimize the number and
15 scale of excavation and construction activities when
16 installing telecommunications infrastructure in
17 rights-of-way to reduce costs, such as by laying fiber
18 optic cable simultaneously with road construction.

19 (5) STAKEHOLDERS.—The term “stakeholders”
20 means the private sector, the public sector, coopera-
21 tives, civil society, the technical community that de-
22 velops Internet technologies, standards, implementa-
23 tion, operations, and applications, and other groups
24 that are working to increase Internet access or are

1 impacted by the lack of Internet access in their com-
2 munities.

3 (b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to
4 consult, partner, and coordinate with the governments of
5 foreign countries, international organizations, regional
6 economic communities, businesses, civil society, and other
7 stakeholders in a concerted effort to close the digital gap
8 by increasing public and private investments in secure
9 Internet infrastructure and creating conditions for uni-
10 versal Internet access and usage worldwide by pro-
11 moting—

12 (1) first-time access to fixed or mobile broad-
13 band Internet by 2027 for at least 1,500,000,000
14 people living in urban and rural areas in developing
15 countries;

16 (2) Internet deployment and related coordina-
17 tion, capacity building, and build-once policies and
18 approaches in developing countries, including actions
19 to encourage—

20 (A) standardization of build-once policies
21 and approaches for the inclusion of broadband
22 conduit in rights-of-way projects that are fund-
23 ed, co-funded, or partially financed by the
24 United States or any international organization
25 that includes the United States as a member, in

1 consultation with telecommunications providers,
2 unless a cost-benefit analysis determines that
3 the cost of such approach outweighs the bene-
4 fits;

5 (B) adoption and integration of build-once
6 policies and approaches into the development
7 and investment strategies of national and local
8 government agencies of developing countries
9 and donor governments and organizations that
10 will enhance coordination with the private sec-
11 tor for road building, pipe laying, major infra-
12 structure projects, and development-related con-
13 struction such as schools, clinics, and civic
14 buildings;

15 (C) provision of increased financial support
16 by international organizations, including
17 through grants, loans, technical assistance, and
18 partnerships to expand information and com-
19 munications access and Internet connectivity;
20 and

21 (D) avoidance of vendors and contractors
22 likely to be subject to extrajudicial direction
23 from a foreign government;

24 (3) policy and regulatory approaches that pro-
25 mote a competitive market for investment and inno-

1 vation in Internet infrastructure and service to en-
2 courage first-time, affordable access to the Internet
3 in developing countries, including actions to encour-
4 age, as appropriate—

5 (A) the integration of universal and gen-
6 der-equitable Internet access and adoption
7 goals, to be informed by the collection of related
8 gender disaggregated data and research on so-
9 cial norms that often limit women's and girls'
10 use of the Internet, into national development
11 plans and United States Government country-
12 level strategies;

13 (B) effective, transparent, and efficient
14 spectrum allocation processes and reforms of
15 competition laws that may impede the ability of
16 companies to provide Internet services; and

17 (C) efforts to improve procurement proc-
18 esses to help attract and incentivize investment
19 in secure Internet infrastructure;

20 (4) the removal of tax and regulatory barriers
21 to Internet access, as appropriate;

22 (5) the use of the Internet to increase economic
23 growth and trade, including, as appropriate—

1 (A) policies and strategies to remove re-
2 strictions to e-commerce, cross-border informa-
3 tion flows, and competitive marketplaces; and

4 (B) entrepreneurship and distance learning
5 enabled by access to technology;

6 (6) the use of the Internet to bolster democ-
7 racy, government accountability, transparency, gen-
8 der equity, and human rights, including through the
9 establishment of policies, initiatives, and investments
10 that—

11 (A) support the development of national
12 broadband plans or information and commu-
13 nication technologies strategies that are con-
14 sistent with fundamental civil and political
15 rights, including freedom of expression, religion,
16 belief, assembly, and association;

17 (B) expand online access to government in-
18 formation and services to enhance government
19 accountability and service delivery, including for
20 areas in which government may have limited
21 presence; and

22 (C) support expression of free speech and
23 enable political organizing and activism in sup-
24 port of human rights and democracy through
25 activities that expand access to independent

1 sources of news and information and safeguard
2 human rights and fundamental freedoms online,
3 in compliance with international human rights
4 standards;
5 (7) programs and mechanisms that actively pro-
6 mote and advance access to and adoption of Internet
7 and other information and communications tech-
8 nologies by women, people with disabilities, minori-
9 ties, low-income and marginalized groups, and un-
10 derserved populations, such as programs that ad-
11 dress social norms and barriers to women's active
12 participation in the digital economy or Internet pol-
13 icymaking;
14 (8) mechanisms for public and private financing
15 of rural broadband connectivity and digital inclusion;
16 (9) public Internet access facilities and Wi-Fi
17 networks in places such as libraries, government
18 buildings, community centers, and schools;
19 (10) the creation and support of research and
20 educational networks;
21 (11) cybersecurity, data protection, and privacy,
22 including international use of the latest version of
23 the National Institute of Standards and Technology
24 Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure
25 Cybersecurity; and

1 (12) interagency coordination and cooperation
2 across all executive branch agencies regarding the
3 promotion of Internet initiatives as a part of United
4 States foreign policy.

5 (c) DEPARTMENT OF STATE.—The Secretary of
6 State, in coordination with other agencies, multilateral in-
7 stitutions, foreign countries, and stakeholders, shall ad-
8 vance the policy articulated in this Act and promote ex-
9 panded Internet connectivity worldwide, as appropriate,
10 by—

11 (1) encouraging foreign countries to prioritize
12 secure Internet connectivity in development plans;

13 (2) promoting the formation of region-specific
14 multi-sector working groups to ensure technical and
15 regulatory best practices; and

16 (3) encouraging the development of digital lit-
17 eracy programs in developing countries.

18 (d) USAID.—The Administrator of the United
19 States Agency for International Development (USAID)
20 should advance the policy articulated in this Act and sup-
21 port expanded Internet connectivity worldwide, as appro-
22 priate, by—

23 (1) supporting efforts to expand secure Internet
24 infrastructure and improve digital literacy, and other
25 appropriate measures to improve Internet connecti-

1 ty and usage, in close coordination with the Sec-
2 retary of State;

3 (2) encouraging public and private investment
4 in Internet infrastructure and services of developing
5 countries that takes into consideration the data se-
6 curity and integrity risks attendant to the products
7 and services of vendors likely to be subject to
8 extrajudicial direction from a foreign government;

9 (3) integrating efforts to expand Internet ac-
10 cess, develop appropriate, sustainable, and equitable
11 technologies, and enhance digital literacy and the
12 availability of relevant local content across develop-
13 ment sectors, such as USAID health, education, ag-
14 riculture, and economic development programs;

15 (4) expanding the utilization of information and
16 communications technologies in humanitarian aid
17 and disaster relief responses and United States oper-
18 ations involving reconstruction and stabilization to
19 improve donor coordination, reduce duplication and
20 waste, capture and share lessons learned, and aug-
21 ment disaster preparedness and risk mitigation
22 strategies;

23 (5) establishing and promoting guidelines for
24 the protection of personal information of individuals
25 served by humanitarian, disaster, and development

1 programs directly through the United States Gov-
2 ernment, and through contracts funded by the
3 United States Government and by international or-
4 ganizations; and

5 (6) establishing programs that directly address
6 and seek to close gaps in access, adoption, and use
7 of the Internet and other information and commu-
8 nications technologies by women, minorities, and
9 other marginalized groups.

10 (e) PEACE CORPS.—Section 3 of the Peace Corps Act
11 (22 U.S.C. 2502) is amended—

12 (1) by redesignating subsection (h) as sub-
13 section (e); and

14 (2) by adding at the end the following:

15 “(f) It is the sense of Congress that access to the
16 Internet can transform agriculture, community economic
17 development, education, environment, health, and youth
18 development, which are the sectors in which Peace Corps
19 develops positions for volunteers.

20 “(g) In giving attention to the programs, projects,
21 training, and other activities referred to in subsection (f),
22 the Peace Corps should develop positions for volunteers
23 that include leveraging the Internet, as appropriate, for
24 development, education, and social and economic mobil-
25 ity.”.

1 (f) LEVERAGING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT.—In
2 pursuing the policy described in this Act, the President
3 should direct United States representatives to appropriate
4 international bodies to use the influence of the United
5 States, consistent with the broad development goals of the
6 United States, to advocate that each such body—

7 (1) commit to increase efforts and coordination
8 to promote affordable, open, and gender-equitable
9 Internet access, in partnership with stakeholders and
10 consistent with host countries' absorptive capacity;

11 (2) integrate affordable and gender-equitable
12 Internet access data into existing economic and busi-
13 ness assessments, evaluations, and indexes such as
14 the Millennium Challenge Corporation constraints
15 analysis, the Doing Business reports, International
16 Monetary Fund Article IV assessments and country
17 reports, and the Affordability Drivers Index;

18 (3) standardize the inclusion of broadband con-
19 duit as part of highway or comparable construction
20 projects in developing countries, in consultation with
21 telecommunications providers, unless—

22 (A) such inclusion would create an undue
23 burden;

1 (B) such inclusion is not necessary based
2 on the availability of existing broadband infra-
3 structure;

4 (C) such inclusion would require the incor-
5 poration of the hardware, software, or mainte-
6 nance of vendors likely to be subject to
7 extrajudicial direction from a foreign govern-
8 ment; or

9 (D) a cost-benefit analysis determines that
10 the cost of such inclusion outweighs the bene-
11 fits;

12 (4) provide technical assistance to the regu-
13 latory authorities in developing countries to remove
14 unnecessary barriers to investment and develop reg-
15 ulations to support market growth and development;

16 (5) utilize clear, accountable, and metric-based
17 targets, including targets with gender-disaggregated
18 data, to measure the effectiveness of efforts to pro-
19 mote Internet access; and

20 (6) promote and protect human rights online,
21 such as the freedoms of expression, religion, belief,
22 assembly, and association, through resolutions, pub-
23 lic statements, projects, and initiatives, and advo-
24 cating that member states of such bodies are held
25 accountable for violations.

1 (g) REPORTING REQUIREMENT ON IMPLEMENTATION

2 EFFORTS.—Not later than one year after the date of the
3 enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the
4 appropriate congressional committees a report on efforts
5 to implement the policy described in this Act and, to the
6 extent practicable, describe efforts by the United States
7 Government to—

8 (1) provide technical and regulatory assistance
9 to promote Internet access in developing countries;

10 (2) strengthen and support development of reg-
11 ulations that incentivize market growth that contrib-
12 utes to increased Internet access in developing coun-
13 tries;

14 (3) encourage public and private investment in
15 Internet infrastructure, including broadband net-
16 works and services, in developing countries;

17 (4) increase gender-equitable Internet access
18 and close gender gaps in Internet and other infor-
19 mation and communications technology adoption and
20 use, especially in countries in which social norms
21 limit such adoption and use by women and girls, and
22 otherwise encourage or support Internet deployment,
23 competition, and adoption; and

1 (5) conduct outreach and explore partnership
2 opportunities with the private sector on activities
3 that advance the policy described in this Act.

4 **SEC. 5. COST LIMITATION.**

5 No additional funds are authorized to be appro-
6 priated to carry out the provisions of this Act.

7 **SEC. 6. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.**

8 Nothing in this Act may be construed to infringe
9 upon the related functions of any Executive agency (as
10 defined in section 105 of title 5, United States Code) vest-
11 ed in such agency under any other provision of law.

○



I

116TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 951

To promote bilateral tourism through cooperation between the United States
and Mexico.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 4, 2019

Mr. CUELLAR (for himself and Mr. McCAUL) introduced the following bill;
which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

A BILL

To promote bilateral tourism through cooperation between
the United States and Mexico.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “United States-Mexico
5 Tourism Improvement Act of 2019”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress finds the following:

8 (1) The United States and Mexico have bene-
9 fitted economically from a bilateral, mutually bene-

1 ficial partnership focused on enhancing the tourism
2 industry in both countries.

3 (2) In 2016, Mexican tourism to the United
4 States peaked at 18,990,585 visitors, constituting 1
5 in 4 (24.9 percent) of all tourists that year.

6 (3) Additionally, in 2016, spending by Mexican
7 tourists in the United States totaled \$20.3 billion,
8 which represented a 3 percent growth from 2015.

9 (4) Tourist activity to the United States from
10 Mexico has declined since 2016, which is in contrast
11 to an overall international tourism industry increase
12 in the United States.

13 (5) In 2017, international tourist arrivals to-
14 taled 76,900,000, up 0.7 percent from 76,400,000 in
15 2016.

16 (6) The same year, 77,000,000 international
17 visitors spent a record \$251.4 billion on hotels, trav-
18 el, food, and souvenirs, a 2-percent increase over
19 2016.

20 (7) However, also in 2017, there was a 6.1-per-
21 cent decline in visitors to the United States from
22 Mexico, comprising a loss of 1,166,585 Mexican
23 tourists from 2016.

24 (8) The Department of Commerce has not yet
25 released 2017 spending totals by Mexican tourists in

1 the United States, but a corresponding monetary de-
2 cline would be approximately \$1.24 billion in lost
3 revenue.

4 (9) This is a critical economic trend given that
5 Mexico is the biggest source of international visitors
6 to the United States after Canada.

7 **SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

8 It is the policy of the United States—

9 (1) to continue deepening bilateral tourism
10 through governmental cooperation between the
11 United States and Mexico;

12 (2) to improve third-party tourism to the
13 United States and Mexico through joint inter-
14 national promotional efforts; and

15 (3) to seek to prioritize and expand the tourism
16 industries in both countries by emphasizing ex-
17 changes in various international economic sectors,
18 including relating to—

19 (A) hospitality and accommodation;

20 (B) retail;

21 (C) medical procedures;

22 (D) dental care; and

23 (E) cultural education.

1 **SEC. 4. STRATEGY TO EXPAND BILATERAL TOURISM**
2 **THROUGH COOPERATION WITH MEXICO.**

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall de-
4 velop a strategy through the High Level Economic Dia-
5 logue (HLED) platform to carry out the bilateral tourism
6 policy described in section 3 and to encourage the Govern-
7 ment of Mexico to take reciprocal action relating to bilat-
8 eral tourism.

9 (b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under sub-
10 section (a) shall—

11 (1) encourage more joint tourism initiatives be-
12 tween the United States and Mexico, including col-
13 laborations between governmental and non-govern-
14 mental entities;

15 (2) encourage United States and Mexican non-
16 profit institutions and private businesses to assist
17 prospective and developing entrepreneurs in
18 strengthening their business skills in the United
19 States and Mexico; and

20 (3) assess the feasibility of fostering partner-
21 ships between medical and dental institutions in the
22 United States and Mexico, including hospitals, clin-
23 ics, medical schools, and dental programs, for the
24 purpose of allowing patients greater ease and sense
25 of security when considering cross-border medical
26 procedure and dental care options.

1 (e) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date
2 of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall
3 submit to Congress a report on the strategy required
4 under subsection (a).

○

116TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 2116

To enhance stabilization of conflict-affected areas and prevent violence and fragility globally, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APRIL 8, 2019

Mr. ENGEL (for himself, Mr. McCAUL, Mrs. WAGNER, Mr. ROONEY of Florida, Mr. SMITH of Washington, Mr. KEATING, Mr. TED LIEU of California, Mr. WRIGHT, Mr. FITZPATRICK, and Mr. MALINOWSKI) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

A BILL

To enhance stabilization of conflict-affected areas and prevent violence and fragility globally, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the “Global Fragility Act”.

5 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

6 Congress finds the following:

7 (1) According to the United Nations, an un-
8 precedented 68.5 million people around the world,

1 the highest level ever recorded, are currently forcibly
2 displaced from their homes.

3 (2) According to the World Bank, violence and
4 violent conflict are now the leading causes of dis-
5 placement and food insecurity worldwide, driving 80
6 percent of humanitarian needs, with the same con-
7 flicts accounting for the majority of forcibly dis-
8 placed persons every year since 1991.

9 (3) According to the Institute for Economics
10 and Peace, violence containment costs the global
11 economy \$14.76 trillion a year, or 12.4 percent of
12 the world's GDP.

13 (4) Violence and violent conflict underpin many
14 of the United States Government's key national se-
15 curity challenges. Notably, violent conflicts allow for
16 environments in which terrorist organizations recruit
17 and thrive, while the combination of violence, cor-
18 ruption, poverty, poor governance, and underdevelop-
19 ment often enables transnational gangs and criminal
20 networks to wreak havoc and commit atrocities
21 worldwide.

22 (5) According to research by the University of
23 Maryland and University of Pittsburgh, exposure to
24 violence increases support for violence and violent
25 extremism. Research increasingly finds exposure to

1 violence as a predictor of future participation in vio-
2 lence, including violent extremism.

3 (6) United States foreign policy and assistance
4 efforts in highly violent and fragile states remain
5 governed by an outdated patchwork of authorities
6 that prioritize responding to immediate needs rather
7 than solving the problems that cause them.

8 (7) Lessons learned over the past 20 years, doc-
9 umented by the 2013 Special Inspector General for
10 Iraq Reconstruction Lessons Learned Study, the
11 2016 Fragility Study Group report, and the 2018
12 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Lessons
13 Learned Study on Stabilization, show that effective,
14 sustained United States efforts to reduce violence
15 and stabilize fragile and violence-affected states re-
16 quire clearly defined goals and strategies, adequate
17 long-term funding, rigorous and iterative conflict
18 analysis, coordination across the United States Gov-
19 ernment, including strong civil-military coordination,
20 attention to the problem of corruption, and integra-
21 tion with and leadership from national and sub-na-
22 tional partners, including local civil society organiza-
23 tions, traditional justice systems, and local govern-
24 ance structures.

1 (8) The “Stabilization Assistance Review” re-
2 leased in 2018 by the Departments of State and De-
3 fense and the United States Agency for Inter-
4 national Development states, “The United States
5 has strong national security and economic interests
6 in reducing levels of violence and promoting stability
7 in areas affected by armed conflict.”. The Review
8 further states, “Stabilization is an inherently polit-
9 ical endeavor that requires aligning U.S. Govern-
10 ment efforts—diplomatic engagement, foreign assist-
11 ance, and defense—toward supporting locally legiti-
12 mate authorities and systems to peaceably manage
13 conflict and prevent violence.”.

14 **SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

15 It is the policy of the United States to—

16 (1) ensure that all relevant Federal depart-
17 ments and agencies coordinate to achieve coherent,
18 long-term goals for programs designed to stabilize
19 conflict-affected areas and prevent violence and fra-
20 gility globally, including when implementing the
21 Global Fragility Initiative established pursuant to
22 section 6;

23 (2) seek to improve global, regional, and local
24 coordination of relevant international and multilat-
25 eral development and donor organizations regarding

1 efforts to stabilize conflict-affected areas and pre-
2 vent violence and fragility globally, and, where praec-
3 ticable and appropriate, align such efforts with mul-
4 tilateral goals and indicators;

5 (3) expand and enhance the effectiveness of
6 United States foreign assistance programs and ac-
7 tivities to stabilize conflict-affected areas and pre-
8 vent violence and fragility globally;

9 (4) support the research and development of ef-
10 fective approaches to stabilize conflict-affected areas
11 and prevent violence and fragility globally, and data
12 collection efforts relevant to such approaches; and

13 (5) improve the tools and authorities for assess-
14 ment, monitoring, and evaluation needed to enable
15 learning and adaptation by such relevant Federal de-
16 partments and agencies working to stabilize conflict-
17 affected areas and prevent violence and fragility
18 globally.

19 **SEC. 4. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**

20 (a) STABILIZATION AND PREVENTION FUND.—

21 (1) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established in
22 the Treasury of the United States a fund to be
23 known as the “Stabilization and Prevention Fund”
24 (in this subsection referred to as the “Fund”), to be
25 administered by the Department of State and the

1 United States Agency for International Development
2 (USAID), and consisting of amounts authorized to
3 be appropriated pursuant to paragraph (2).

4 (2) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—
5 There is authorized to be appropriated to the Fund
6 \$200,000,000 for each of the five fiscal years begin-
7 ning with the first fiscal year that begins after the
8 date of the enactment of this Act. Amounts author-
9 ized to be appropriated pursuant to this paragraph
10 are authorized to remain available until expended.

11 (3) PURPOSES OF THE FUND.—

12 (A) IN GENERAL.—Amounts authorized to
13 be appropriated to the Fund shall be used for
14 economic and development assistance for any of
15 the following:

16 (i) To support stabilization of conflict-
17 affected areas and prevent violence and
18 fragility globally, including through the
19 Global Fragility Initiative established pur-
20 suant to section 6.

21 (ii) To provide assistance to areas lib-
22 erated or at risk from, or under the control
23 of, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria,
24 other terrorist organizations, or violent ex-
25 tremist organizations, including for sta-

1 bilization assistance for vulnerable ethnic
2 and religious minority communities af-
3 fected by conflict.

4 (B) ADDITION.—Amounts authorized to be
5 appropriated to the Fund are in addition to any
6 amounts otherwise made available for the pur-
7 poses described in subparagraph (A).

8 (4) CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.—Not later
9 than 15 days before amounts from the Fund are ob-
10 ligated, the Secretary of State or Administrator of
11 the United States Agency for International Develop-
12 ment shall submit notification of such obligation
13 to—

14 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
15 the House of Representatives;

16 (B) the Committee on Appropriations of
17 the House of Representatives;

18 (C) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
19 the Senate; and

20 (D) the Committee on Appropriations of
21 the Senate.

22 (b) COMPLEX CRISES FUND.—

23 (1) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established in
24 the Treasury of the United States a fund to be
25 known as the “Complex Crises Fund” (in this sub-

1 section referred to as the “Fund”), to be adminis-
2 tered by USAID.

3 (2) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

4 There is authorized to be appropriated to the Fund
5 \$30,000,000 for each of the five fiscal years begin-
6 ning with the first fiscal year that begins after the
7 date of the enactment of this Act. Amounts author-
8 ized to be appropriated pursuant to this paragraph
9 are authorized to remain available until expended.

10 (3) PURPOSES OF THE FUND.—

11 (A) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any
12 other provision of law, except section 620M of
13 the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
14 2378d), amounts in the Fund may be used to
15 carry out the provisions of the Foreign Assist-
16 ance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) to
17 support programs and activities to prevent or
18 respond to emerging or unforeseen foreign chal-
19 lenges and complex crises overseas, including
20 through the Global Fragility Initiative estab-
21 lished pursuant to section 6.

22 (B) ADDITION.—Amounts authorized to be
23 appropriated to the Fund are in addition to any
24 amounts otherwise made available for the pur-
25 poses described in subparagraph (A).

1 (4) LIMITATIONS.—

2 (A) IN GENERAL.—Amounts in the Fund
3 may not be expended for lethal assistance or to
4 respond to natural disasters.

5 (B) ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES.—Not
6 more than five percent of amounts in the Fund
7 may be used for administrative expenses.

8 (5) CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.—Not later
9 than five days before amounts from the Fund are
10 obligated, the Administrator of the United States
11 Agency for International Development shall submit
12 notification of such obligation to—

13 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
14 the Senate;

15 (B) the Committee on Appropriations of
16 the Senate;

17 (C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
18 the House of Representatives; and

19 (D) the Committee on Appropriations of
20 the House of Representatives.

21 (6) WAIVER.—Notification in accordance with
22 paragraph (5) may be waived if—

23 (A) notification by the deadline specified in
24 such paragraph would pose a substantial risk to
25 human health or welfare; and

1 (B) the congressional committees specified
2 in such paragraph—

3 (i) are notified not later than three
4 days after an obligation of amounts from
5 the Fund; and

6 (ii) are provided with an explanation
7 of the emergency circumstances that neces-
8 sitated such waiver.

9 (c) OTHER FUNDING AND COST MATCHING.—The
10 Global Fragility Initiative established pursuant to section
11 6—

12 (1) may be supported by funds other than
13 funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant to this
14 section; and

15 (2) shall seek to leverage funds from sources
16 other than the United States Government in order
17 to promote coordination and cost-matching to the
18 maximum extent practicable.

19 **SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING ASSISTANCE FOR**
20 **THE GLOBAL FRAGILITY INITIATIVE.**

21 It is the sense of Congress that the President, the
22 Secretary of State, the Administrator of USAID, the Sec-
23 retary of Defense, and the heads of other relevant Federal
24 departments and agencies should work with the appro-

1 puate congressional committees to provide sufficient types
2 and levels of funding to—

3 (1) allow for more adaptive and responsive pol-
4 icy and program planning, implementation, and scal-
5 ing under the Global Fragility Initiative established
6 pursuant to section 6, including through more flexi-
7 ble funding mechanisms and exemptions from spe-
8 cific and minimum funding levels when such exemp-
9 tions would make such programs better able to re-
10 spond to local needs, the results of monitoring and
11 evaluation, or changed circumstances in relevant
12 countries;

13 (2) better integrate the initiative and other con-
14 flict and violence reduction objectives and activities
15 into other policy and program areas, where appro-
16 priate; and

17 (3) support transparent and accountable multi-
18 lateral funds, initiatives, and strategies to enhance
19 and better coordinate both private and public efforts
20 to stabilize conflict-affected areas and prevent vio-
21 lence and fragility globally.

22 **SEC. 6. GLOBAL FRAGILITY INITIATIVE.**

23 (a) IN GENERAL.—

24 (1) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State,
25 in coordination with the Administrator of the United

1 States Agency for International Development
2 (USAID), the Secretary of Defense, the Atrocities
3 Prevention Board (or any successor entity), and the
4 heads of other relevant Federal departments and
5 agencies, shall, in accordance with subsection (b), es-
6 tablish an interagency initiative, to be referred to as
7 the “Global Fragility Initiative”, to stabilize conflict-
8 affected areas and prevent violence and fragility
9 globally.

10 (2) STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION.—The Glob-
11 al Fragility Initiative required under this subsection
12 shall be developed in consultation with representa-
13 tives of local civil society and national and local gov-
14 ernance entities, as well as relevant international de-
15 velopment organizations with experience imple-
16 menting programs in fragile and violence-affected
17 communities, multilateral organizations and donors,
18 and relevant private, academic, and philanthropic
19 entities, as appropriate.

20 (b) ESTABLISHMENT PLAN.—Not later than 180
21 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
22 retary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of
23 USAID, the Secretary of Defense, the Atrocities Preven-
24 tion Board (or any successor entity), and the heads of
25 other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall

1 submit to the appropriate congressional committees an
2 interagency plan regarding the establishment of the Global
3 Fragility Initiative pursuant to subsection (a) that in-
4 cludes the following:

5 (1) Identification of the roles and responsibil-
6 ities of each participating Federal department or
7 agency, while ensuring that—

8 (A) the Department of State is the overall
9 lead department for establishing United States
10 foreign policy and advancing diplomatic and po-
11 litical efforts;

12 (B) USAID is the lead implementing agen-
13 cy for development, humanitarian, and related
14 non-security program policy;

15 (C) where appropriate, the Department of
16 Defense may support the activities of the De-
17 partment of State and USAID by providing
18 requisite security and support to civilian efforts
19 with the joint-formulation, coordination, and
20 concurrence of the Secretary of State and Ad-
21 ministrator of USAID; and

22 (D) other Federal departments and agen-
23 cies support the activities of the Department of
24 State and USAID as appropriate, with the con-

1 currence of the Secretary of State and Adminis-
2 trator of USAID.

3 (2) Identification of which officials of the De-
4 partment of State, USAID, and the Department of
5 Defense, with a rank not lower than Assistant Sec-
6 retary or Assistant Administrator, as the case may
7 be, will be responsible for overseeing and leading the
8 initiative.

9 (3) Identification of the authorities, staffing,
10 and other resource requirements needed to effec-
11 tively implement the initiative.

12 (4) Descriptions of the organizational steps the
13 Secretary of State, the Administrator, the Secretary
14 of Defense, and the head of each other relevant Fed-
15 eral department or agency will take to improve plan-
16 ning, coordination, implementation, assessment,
17 monitoring, evaluation, adaptive management, and
18 iterative learning with respect to the programs ear-
19 ried out under the initiative.

20 (5) Descriptions of the steps the Secretary of
21 State, the Administrator, the Secretary of Defense,
22 and the head of each other relevant Federal depart-
23 ment or agency will take to ensure appropriate host-
24 country ownership and to improve coordination and
25 collaboration under the initiative with international

1 development organizations, international donors,
2 multilateral organizations, and the private sector.

3 (6) Descriptions of potential areas of improved
4 public and private sector research and development,
5 including with academic, philanthropic, and civil so-
6 ciety organizations, on data collection efforts and
7 more effective approaches to stabilize conflict-af-
8 fected areas and prevent violence and fragility glob-
9 ally.

10 (7) Descriptions of the processes for regularly
11 evaluating and updating the initiative on an iterative
12 basis, including regarding priority country and re-
13 gional plans described in subsection (d).

14 (8) A list of priority countries and regions se-
15 lected pursuant to subsection (c), including descrip-
16 tions of the rationale for such selections.

17 (c) SELECTION OF PRIORITY COUNTRIES AND RE-
18 GIONS.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the
19 Administrator of USAID and the Secretary of Defense,
20 and in consultation with the appropriate congressional
21 committees, shall select certain countries as “priority
22 countries” and certain regions as “priority regions” for
23 the Global Fragility Initiative—

24 (1) on the basis of—

1 (A) clearly defined indicators of the levels
2 of violence or fragility in such country or re-
3 gion, such as the country or region's—

4 (i) ranking on recognized global fra-
5 gility lists, such as the Organization for
6 Economic Co-operation and Development
7 States of Fragility report, the Fund for
8 Peace Fragile States Index, the World
9 Bank Harmonized List of Fragile Situa-
10 tions, the Institute for Economics and
11 Peace Global Peace Index, and Holocaust
12 Museum Early Warning Project Risk As-
13 sessment;

14 (ii) ranking on select United States
15 Government conflict and atrocity early
16 warning watch lists; and

17 (iii) levels of violence, such as violence
18 committed by armed groups, violent ex-
19 tremist organizations, gender-based vio-
20 lence, and violence against children and
21 youth; and

22 (B) an assessment of—

23 (i) the capacity and commitment of
24 national and sub-national government enti-
25 ties and civil society partners in such coun-

try or region to work with Federal departments and agencies on the initiative, including by demonstrating the willingness and making demonstrable efforts to improve governance, enhance rule of law, and protect human rights; and

(ii) the likelihood that selection as a priority country or priority region would allow the initiative to measurably stabilize conflict-affected areas or prevent violence and fragility in such country or region; and

(2) in a manner that ensures that—

(A) not fewer than three countries or regions are designated as “Stabilization Countries” or “Stabilization Regions”, as the case may be, in which current levels of violence are among the highest in the world;

(B) not fewer than three countries or regions are designated as “Prevention Countries” or “Prevention Regions”, as the case may be, in which current levels of violence are lower than such levels in Stabilization Countries or Stabilization Regions but risk factors for violence or fragility are significant;

1 (C) countries and regions selected are in
2 the areas of responsibility of at least three geo-
3 graphic bureaus of the Department of State;
4 and

5 (D) regions, rather than individual coun-
6 tries, are selected where the threat or spillover
7 of violence, conflict, or fragility threatens mul-
8 tiple countries within a single geographic re-
9 gion.

10 (d) COUNTRY AND REGIONAL PLANS.—Not later
11 than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act,
12 the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Adminis-
13 trator of USAID, the Secretary of Defense, the Atrocities
14 Prevention Board (or any successor entity), and the heads
15 of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall
16 submit to the appropriate congressional committees ten-
17 year plans to align and integrate under the Global Fra-
18 gility Initiative required under subsection (a) all relevant
19 diplomatic, development, security assistance and coopera-
20 tion, and other relevant activities of the United States
21 Government with respect to each of the countries and re-
22 gions selected pursuant to subsection (c). Each such coun-
23 try and regional plan shall include the following:

1 (1) Specific multi-year interagency plans for co-
2 ordination and implementation under each such
3 plan.

4 (2) An up-to-date baseline analysis for each
5 such country or region, including an analysis of po-
6 litical dynamics, impacts of violence, and conditions
7 that contribute to violence and fragility.

8 (3) Prioritized descriptions of the goals and ob-
9 jectives for stabilizing conflict-affected areas and
10 preventing violence and fragility in each such coun-
11 try or region.

12 (4) Descriptions of how and when the relevant
13 goals, objectives, plans, and benchmarks for each
14 such country or region will be incorporated into rel-
15 evant United States country plans and strategies, in-
16 cluding Department of State Integrated Country
17 Strategies, USAID Country Development Coopera-
18 tion Strategies, and Department of Defense Cam-
19 paign Plans, Operational Plans, and Regional Strat-
20 egies, as well as any equivalent or successor plans or
21 strategies.

22 (5) Interagency plans to ensure that appro-
23 priate local actors, including government and civil
24 society entities and organizations led by women,
25 youth, or under-represented communities, have an

1 appropriate ownership stake in developing, imple-
2 menting, assessing, monitoring, evaluating, and up-
3 dating relevant activities under each such plan.

4 (6) Interagency plans to integrate existing and
5 planned security assistance and cooperation pro-
6 grams in each such country or region with the initia-
7 tive and to maximize positive outcomes and mitigate
8 risks associated with such programs, including risks
9 related to corruption, governance, and human rights.

10 (7) Assessment, monitoring, and evaluation
11 frameworks for diplomatic, development, and secu-
12 rity activities, which shall be informed by consulta-
13 tions with the stakeholders specified in subsection
14 (a)(2), with clear, date-certain metrics for each such
15 country or region, as well as interagency plans for
16 using such frameworks to adapt such activities on a
17 regular and iterative basis.

18 (8) Descriptions of available policy tools and
19 how such tools will be used to stabilize conflict-af-
20 fected areas or prevent violence and fragility in each
21 such country or region.

22 (9) A description of how planning and imple-
23 mentation for each such country or region will be co-
24 ordinated to ensure such planning and implementa-

1 tion are conducted in partnership between the
2 United States Government and—

3 (A) governments of such countries;

4 (B) international development organiza-
5 tions;

6 (C) relevant international donors;

7 (D) multilateral organizations; and

8 (E) the private sector.

9 (10) A regional component outlining plans to
10 address relevant transnational issues in cases in
11 which an individual country is selected and such
12 country is affected by or at risk of regional fragility
13 or violence.

14 (11) A component outlining plans to address
15 national-level factors at the individual country level
16 in cases in which a region is selected and such re-
17 gion is affected by or at risk of fragility or violence
18 as a result of such national-level factors.

19 (e) IMPLEMENTATION.—The Secretary of State, in
20 coordination with the Administrator of USAID, the Sec-
21 retary of Defense, and the heads of other relevant Federal
22 departments and agencies, and in consultation with the
23 Atrocities Prevention Board (or any successor entity), rel-
24 evant United States ambassadors, USAID mission direc-
25 tors, geographic combatant commanders, and other rel-

1 evant individuals with responsibility over activities in each
2 priority country or region selected pursuant to subsection
3 (c), shall ensure that—

4 (1) the Global Fragility Initiative required
5 under subsection (a), including each of the country
6 and regional plans under subsection (d), is imple-
7 mented, updated, and coordinated on a regular and
8 iterative basis; and

9 (2) such initiative is used to guide United
10 States Government policy at a senior level and incor-
11 porated into relevant strategies and plans across the
12 United States Government such that the activities of
13 all Federal departments and agencies are consistent
14 with such initiative.

15 **SEC. 7. BIENNIAL REPORTS AND CONGRESSIONAL CON-**
16 **SULTATION.**

17 (a) BIENNIAL REPORTS.—Not later than two years
18 after the date of the enactment of this Act and every two
19 years thereafter until the date that is ten years after such
20 date of enactment, the Secretary of State, in coordination
21 with the Administrator of USAID, the Secretary of De-
22 fense, the Atrocities Prevention Board (or any successor
23 entity), and the heads of other relevant Federal depart-
24 ments and agencies, shall submit to the appropriate con-
25 gressional committees an unclassified report, which may

1 include a classified annex, on progress made and lessons
2 learned with respect to the Global Fragility Initiative es-
3 tablished pursuant to section 6, including each country
4 and regional plan required as part of such initiative, in-
5 cluding the following:

6 (1) Descriptions of steps taken to incorporate
7 the initiative and such country and regional plans
8 into relevant strategies and plans that affect such
9 countries and regions.

10 (2) Accountings of all funding received and ob-
11 ligated to implement each such country and regional
12 plan during the previous two years, as well as fund-
13 ing requested, planned, and projected for the fol-
14 lowing two years.

15 (3) Descriptions of progress made towards the
16 goals and objectives established for each such coun-
17 try and region, including progress made towards
18 achieving specific targets, metrics, and indicators.

19 (4) Descriptions of updates made during the
20 previous two years to the goals, objectives, plans of
21 action, and other elements described in each such
22 country and regional plan, as well as any changes
23 made to programs based on the results of assess-
24 ment, monitoring, and evaluation.

1 (b) CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATION.—The Sec-
2 retary of State, the Administrator of USAID, and the Sec-
3 retary of Defense shall provide to any appropriate congres-
4 sional committee upon the request of any such committee
5 regular briefings on the implementation of this Act.

6 **SEC. 8. GAO REVIEW.**

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than two years after the
8 date of the enactment of this Act and every two years
9 thereafter until the date that is ten years after such date
10 of enactment, the Comptroller General of the United
11 States shall consult with the Chairman and Ranking Mem-
12 ber of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate
13 and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
14 Representatives regarding opportunities for independent
15 review of the activities under the Global Fragility Initia-
16 tive established pursuant to section 6, including opportuni-
17 ties to—

18 (1) assess the extent to which United States
19 Government activities in each country and region se-
20 lected as part of the initiative are being implemented
21 in accordance with the initiative and the relevant
22 country or regional plan under the initiative;

23 (2) assess the processes and procedures for co-
24 ordinating among and within each relevant Federal

1 department or agency when implementing the initia-
2 tive and each such country and regional plan;

3 (3) assess the monitoring and evaluation efforts
4 under the initiative and each such country and re-
5 gional plan, including assessments of the progress
6 made and lessons learned with respect to each such
7 plan, as well as any changes made to activities based
8 on the results of such monitoring and evaluation;

9 (4) recommend changes necessary to better im-
10 plement United States Government activities in ac-
11 cordance with the initiative, as well as recommenda-
12 tions for any changes to the initiative; and

13 (5) assess such other matters as the Comp-
14 troller General determines appropriate.

15 (b) AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION.—The heads of
16 all relevant Federal departments and agencies shall ensure
17 that all relevant data, documents, and other information
18 is made available to the Comptroller General of the United
19 States for purposes of conducting independent reviews
20 pursuant to this section.

21 **SEC. 9. DEFINITIONS.**

22 In this Act:

23 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
24 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
25 mittees” means—

1 (A) the Committees on Foreign Relations,
2 Armed Services, and Appropriations of the Sen-
3 ate; and

4 (B) the Committees on Foreign Affairs,
5 Armed Services, and Appropriations of the
6 House of Representatives.

7 (2) RELEVANT FEDERAL DEPARTMENT OR
8 AGENCY.—The term “relevant Federal department
9 or agency” means the Department of the Treasury
10 and any other Federal department or agency the
11 President determines is relevant to carry out the
12 purposes of this Act.

○

Chairman ENGEL. I will now recognize myself to speak on the en bloc measures. I strongly support all of these bipartisan bills and resolutions in this package. Because we have limited time and a lot of business to get through today, I will keep my remarks brief.

First, I was very pleased to work with Ranking Member McCaul on H.Res. 273 and H.R. 2002, two bipartisan measures to further strengthen the U.S.-Taiwan partnership. Tomorrow marks the 40th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act and it is important for Congress to reaffirm our commitment to Taiwan and the implementation of that landmark legislation.

Next, we have the Global Fragility Act, another bill that I introduced along with Mr. McCaul. This legislation passed our committee and the House last Congress and I am pleased that we are considering it again today. It will help strengthen and coordinate our government's efforts to help countries become stronger and more stable and thus make it harder for terrorists, criminals, and other violent groups to put down roots.

I am also happy to join with Mr. McCaul on H.R. 1704, the Championing American Business Through Diplomacy Act, which prioritizes commercial diplomacy so the State Department can better support American businesses in the global market. When we think of the importance of diplomacy for American businesses, we must look at our southern border. Mexico is one of our largest trading partners, and the proximity between our two nations makes the U.S.-Mexico tourism industry an important economic driver.

The U.S. tourism industry would suffer if President Trump follows through on his ill-advised desire to close the U.S.-Mexico border. The U.S.-Mexico Tourism Improvement Act, a common-sense bill introduced by Mr. Cuellar and Mr. McCaul would benefit both our countries. This legislation will increase exchange programs in a number of economic sectors and demonstrate the kind of mutually beneficial partnership Congress wants with Mexico.

I am also happy to support Mr. Yoho's Cambodia Democracy Act. This bill codifies existing sanctions to hold Cambodia's leaders accountable for their crackdowns on democracy and stripping the Cambodian people of their rights.

We have two other strong measures on human rights before us today as well, H.Res. 106 introduced by Ms. Franklin and Mr. Perry, rightly denounces female genital mutilation as an egregious violation of women's and girls' human rights. And Ms. Mangin and Mr. Zeldin's Refugee Sanitation Facility Act will help provide women and girls and other vulnerable populations with safe and secure access to sanitation facilities in refugee camps.

We also have a number of other good bipartisan measures that our committee passed last Congress. First, the Intercountry Adoption Information Act creates more transparency in the international adoption process so prospective parents are better informed about policy changes that could affect their adoptions. Next, the Rescuing Animals with Rewards Act, which embraces and enhances U.S. efforts to combat wildlife trafficking by authorizing rewards for information leading to the arrest or conviction of those engaged in the illicit wildlife trade.

The Digital Global Access Policy Act, which passed the House last year, makes it a U.S. foreign policy priority to promote inter-

net access in the developing world. And, finally, we have the Global Electoral Exchange Act which also passed the House last Congress. This bill introduced by Mr. Castro and Mr. Meadows would establish a program at the State Department to exchange best practices for elections around the world.

I am pleased to support all of these bills and I would like to thank our members for their hard work. And now I will recognize my friend, our Ranking Member, Mr. McCaul of Texas, for any remarks he might have.

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Today, our committee will markup and pass key legislation that will expand our economic prosperity and strengthen our national security. One of today's bills is my Championing American Business Diplomacy Act which I am pleased that my friend, Chairman Engel, co-sponsored. The legislation makes the promotion of U.S. economic interest a principal duty of our missions abroad. It also requires economic and commercial training for our diplomats serving overseas. By creating more international opportunities for American businesses, we can push back on growing Russian and Chinese influence across the globe.

We will also be marking up legislation that recognizes and strengthens our relationship with Taiwan. Taiwan is a strong, democratic ally and is increasingly under threat from Communist China. My Taiwan Assurance Act, which Chairman Engel also co-sponsored, reaffirms our support for Taiwan's defense capabilities and advocates for their participation in international organizations. As we celebrate the 40th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act it is important for our Taiwanese friends to know that our alliance will only grow stronger.

Although our national security strategy has prioritized threats from rising nation-States, we cannot forget about threats that stem from weak and fragile States. These States are underdeveloped and often suffer from violent conflicts that are exploited by terror groups. Our Global Fragility Act which establishes the Global Fragility Initiative will serve as an interagency policy framework to better coordinate and prioritize our efforts to stabilize conflict areas. This will help prevent violence and extremism from spreading around the world. This is an important bipartisan bill that could have very positive results over time.

We will also consider legislation to combat wildlife trafficking, denounce the barbaric practice of female genital mutilation, improve tourism between the United States and Mexico, strengthen intercountry adoption, and support democratic movements around the world. I believe these bills should win strong bipartisan support from our committee and I look forward to seeing them pass on the floor of the House.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. McCaul.

Does anyone seek recognition for the purpose of speaking on the en bloc package?

Ms. Omar?

Ms. OMAR. Thank you, Chairman. I really appreciate the effort to put forth a lot of bills that I will be voting yes on, but I wanted to take this opportunity to speak to bills that I am co-sponsoring.

The first is H.R. 615, the Refugee Sanitation Facility Safety Act. I am proud to be an original co-sponsor of this bill which will provide much needed protection for girls and women in refugee camps around the world.

Obviously, this issue is very personal to me. Girls and women in refugee camps are often unable to use sanitation facilities for fear of sexual assault. Ensuring that our support for refugee camps worldwide emphasizes the need to protect vulnerable populations is critically important. I want to express my support for my colleague, Congresswoman Meng, for introducing this important legislation and to my many colleagues on this committee who have co-sponsored this bill. I specifically want to thank my colleague, Mr. Zeldin, who is currently the only Republican co-sponsor of this bill.

Second, I want to express my strong support for H.R. 2116, the Global Fragility Act. Conflict prevention and support for fragile States should be the forefront of our foreign policy. I am thankful to Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul, and other members of this committee for introducing this bill and I am excited to be supporting and voting yes for it.

Thank you so much for the bills that you have put forth and I look forward to this great work continuing. Thank you.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you very much.

Mr. Smith?

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to convey my strong support for Congressman Collins' Intercountry Adoption Information Act and briefly explain the amendment that I am offering today. Just parenthetically I have long been a strong supporter of adoption. Matter of fact, back in 1989, I introduced legislation with over a hundred co-sponsors to create the adoption tax credit of \$5,000. That was included in the "Contract with America" and it has doubled since. And now, people who are faced with upfront adoption expenses can get up to \$13,000 worth of tax credit. It is still not enough, especially for intercountry adoptions.

As we all know, all too often parents who are willing to open their hearts and homes are met with resistance from foreign governments who hold children hostage. In the past, we saw this happen in countries such as Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. And I have had hearings on the DRC and that policy that they had. Although with the change of leadership in both countries, we believe, are changing.

Beyond external obstacles placed on foreign governments which we cannot control, there are ones which we can control within our own government. Chief among them are the onerous fees that adoptive parents must pay. A Senate Appropriations Committee report last year called upon the State Department to assess whether such fees placed, and I quote, "undue financial burden on families seeking to adopt internationally, especially low-income families, families seeking to adopt sibling groups, or families seeking to adopt children with disabilities."

Despite this directive, the State Department did not provide this information, hence the need for this amendment. I hope members will support it. It will require a report within 180 days of the law's

enactment, so we do not have to wait over a year to obtain this information. I yield back and thank you.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you.

Are there any other members seeking recognition on the en bloc?
Ms. Houlahan?

Ms. HOULAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to take a moment to speak on the bipartisan resolution denouncing the practice of female genital mutilation. I am very pleased that my colleague from Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry, is co-leading this resolution and it is my honor to be a co-sponsor. Genital cutting harms three million girls annually, jeopardizing their health, their safety, and violating their right to their autonomy over their own bodies.

I hope this resolution will be a starting point for a larger and bipartisan conversation about women's health including their access to contraception, preventing maternal deaths, and ending child marriage. With that in mind, I would be remiss if I spoke to the importance of this resolution without mentioning the great work of the United Nations Population Fund. The UNFPA is a leader in helping communities abandon the practice of female genital mutilation and it plays a key role in addressing women's health needs around the world. In spite of that, the President's administration has requested in its budget that Congress de-fund this critical program.

I urge my colleagues to support this resolution and to continue to support funding for programs like the UNFPA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you very much.

Mr. Wright?

Mr. WRIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you and Ranking Member McCaul for agreeing to include H.R. 1359, the Digital Gap Act, in today's markup, which I introduced with Ranking Member McCaul and Representative Bera and Lieu. Today, the internet remains out of reach for more than half the world's population. That means four billion people, predominantly those in developing countries and women, do not have access to the benefits the internet provides like the free flow of information, life-changing innovations in health and education, and e-commerce.

Expanding internet access is critical to driving economic growth, reducing poverty, improving education and health care, empowering women, bolstering democratic principles, and advancing U.S. interests around the globe. The Digital Gap Act will bring us one step closer to universal internet access by promoting common sense build-once policies, by working to remove tax and regulatory barriers to investment and by increasing public-private partnerships in internet infrastructure partnerships.

The United States has long been a leader in promoting expanded internet access and passing the Digital Gap Act today will ensure we continue this leadership. Thank you again, Chairman and Ranking Member, for including this bill and I urge my colleagues to support all the bills en bloc. Thank you and yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you. Is there any other member seeking recognition on the en bloc?

Having heard no further requests for recognition, then, without objection, the committee will proceed to consider the noticed items en bloc. Without objection, the Smith amendment to H.R. 1952 is agreed to. The question occurs on the measures en bloc, as amended.

All those in favor say aye.

All those opposed, no.

In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it.

The measures considered en bloc are agreed to, and, without objection, each measure in the en bloc is ordered favorably reported, as amended. Without objection, staff is authorized to make any technical and conforming changes and the chair is authorized to seek House consideration under suspension of the rules.

Now onto the next item of business. We are temporarily waiting for bills on the floor and when that happens we will suspend, but I think it is probably better to just continue.

Pursuant to notice for purposes of markup, I now call up H.R. 1004, Prohibiting Unauthorized Action in Venezuela Act.

The clerk will report the bill.

Ms. STILES. H.R. 1004, to prohibit the introduction of the United States armed forces into hostilities with respect to Venezuela and for other purposes.

Chairman ENGEL. Without objection, the first reading of the bill is dispensed with. Without objection, the bill shall be considered as read and open to amendment at any point.

I now offer an amendment in the nature of a substitute.

[The Amendment offered by Mr. Engel follows:]

**AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE
TO H.R. 1004
OFFERED BY MR. CICILLINE OF RHODE ISLAND**

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

2 This Act may be cited as the “Prohibiting Unauthor-
3 ized Military Action in Venezuela Act”.

**4 SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON INTRODUCTION OF UNITED
5 STATES ARMED FORCES INTO HOSTILITIES
6 WITH RESPECT TO VENEZUELA.**

7 (a) FUNDING PROHIBITION.—None of the funds au-
8 thorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available
9 to the Department of Defense or to any other Federal de-
10 partment or agency may be used to introduce the Armed
11 Forces of the United States into hostilities with respect
12 to Venezuela, or into situations with respect to Venezuela
13 where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indi-
14 cated by the circumstances, except pursuant to—

15 (1) a declaration of war;

16 (2) a specific statutory authorization described
17 in subsection (b); or

1 (3) a national emergency created by attack
2 upon the United States, its territories or posses-
3 sions, or the Armed Forces.

4 (b) SPECIFIC STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION DE-
5 SCRIBED.—A specific statutory authorization described in
6 this subsection is an authorization that—

7 (1) meets the requirements of the War Powers
8 Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1541 et seq.); and

9 (2) is enacted after the date of the enactment
10 of this Act.

11 (c) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this Act
12 may be construed to affect or alter the requirements of
13 the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1541 et seq.) or
14 any restrictions or reporting requirements contained in
15 such Resolution.



Chairman ENGEL. The clerk will please report the amendment.

Ms. STILES. Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 1004 offered by Mr. Engel and Mr. Cicilline, strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: Section 1, short title, this act may be—

Chairman ENGEL. Without objection, the reading of the amendment will be dispensed with. Without objection, the amendment in the nature of a substitute will be considered base text, the purposes of further amendment, and I now recognize myself for remarks on H.R. 1004.

First of all, I want to thank Mr. Cicilline for authoring this bipartisan bill and for his testimony before this committee last month. Having just returned from the Colombia-Venezuela border, it saddens me to see just how quickly conditions in Venezuela are deteriorating. I heard truly heartbreaking stories from so many migrants and refugees who have fled the country.

And, I am pleased that in the past month, our committee advanced three key pieces of legislation all of which passed the House. They keep the pressure on Nicolas Maduro and support the Venezuelan people. Frankly, I would prefer to focus our committee's attention solely on supporting the people of Venezuela in the struggle for a better future. But, unfortunately, we are forced to respond and reinforce the role of Congress under the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution. I do believe that it is Congress' right and ability to declare war and I think for too long we have been abrogating our responsibility to the executive branch no matter who the President was.

There are some who will say we should not have a debate in Congress over the use of force in Venezuela, instead we should wait and see what the President decides to do before we even have a conversation about the use of force. I must respectfully disagree. Under Article I of our Constitution it is the responsibility of Congress to decide whether America will go to war. If the President wants to threaten military force, the War Powers Resolution specifies that he needs to make sure Congress supports that decision and will be prepared to authorize it, if necessary.

So the bill we are considering today should really be unnecessary. The President should just follow the Constitution and the law, but, unfortunately, we have all seen Presidents of both parties carry out military interventions without coming to Congress. So today's legislation simply reasserts the legal requirement that the President must work with us now, not after U.S. troops are put in harm's way.

We have ceded our authority for far too long, sitting on the sidelines. If we do not take action, the executive branch will keep disregarding the law and ignoring our role in this process. I have said it before and I will say it again, Maduro is a kleptocratic dictator and the Venezuelan people deserve better. We must continue to assert pressure on the regime and provide support for the Venezuelan people. None of this effort is undermined by reminding the Trump Administration that they must uphold the Constitution and come to Congress for any military authorization. To avoid this conversation would be irresponsible and a shirking of our most solemn responsibility.

So I support this measure and urge all members to join me in doing so. And I will now recognize our Ranking Member, Mr. McCaul of Texas, for the purpose of his remarks on H.R. 1004.

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I strongly oppose H.R. 1004 and I am gravely concerned that this exercise today is both dangerous and political. I understand the Majority wants to send a message to President Trump and, sadly, most Democrats will not directly recognize Juan Guaido as a legitimate interim President. But it is the Venezuelan people who are fighting for their freedom that this measure will hurt. Simply put, the ultimate winner of this markup and our division here today is Maduro and his failed Socialist regime.

Colombian President Duque said this to me, and I strongly believe when he said that the credible threat of force is keeping interim President Guaido alive and deterring Maduro from further escalation of violence against innocent Venezuelan people we are trying to support. We must not underestimate this regime's cruelty. And the chairman and I saw it firsthand, they are starving their people and refusing to let humanitarian aid into the country. Maduro is holding approximately 864 political prisoners as we markup this bill including six CITGO workers, four of which are from my home State of Texas. He has unleashed armed colectivos who murder Venezuelans with impunity.

I had the honor of meeting Juan Guaido's wife and she expressed her concern over the serious danger facing her husband. I also met the family of Guaido's chief of staff, Roberto Marrero, who remains imprisoned after being swept up by Maduro's Cuban-backed intelligence services. Shortly after we met, the Maduro regime revoked Guaido's parliamentary immunity and is threatening to arrest him based on allegations of terrorism.

Our administration has stated its commitment to a peaceful resolution and we are all supportive of this. But the conditions on the ground are getting worse, not better. I just visited the Venezuela-Colombia border with Chairman Engel and witnessed the devastation and the humanitarian crisis. Fifty thousand Venezuelans escape every day and Maduro is solely to blame.

The U.S. sanctions are working, but they need more time to have effect. The administration has made clear that more can and will be done to financially constrain the regime. Last week I was with Vice President Pence at a speech in Houston where he announced a new round of sanctions targeting Venezuelan oil shipments to Cuba. We have a coalition of 54 countries supporting the opposition. Maduro is feeling the heat. We should not give him reason to breathe a sigh of relief.

We all want to see a peaceful transition in Venezuela through free and fair elections, and to make this happen Maduro must understand that the best outcome is to step down and leave the country peacefully. However, this legislation jeopardizes that outcome by appearing to take military force off the table and handing a propaganda win to Maduro. It also emboldens the Cubans and the Russians who are the real interventionists in Venezuela.

And speaking of Cuba and Russia, I would not be surprised if they help create and if this bill helps create propaganda showing division in Washington over our policy in Venezuela during this

markup. Let me be clear, I am a strong supporter of the sole power of Congress to declare war under Article I. If the circumstance presented itself, I would be the first to push Congress to act.

Opponents of this bill are not advocating for military action. We simply do not want to handcuff ourselves and limit our options to end this crisis. So I hope that my colleagues can recognize the dangers of passing this bill at this time and join me in voting against it. Any actions this Congress takes regarding Venezuela, in my judgment, should be bipartisan and demonstrate unity of our common values of freedom and democracy which we all stand for. The Venezuelan people have suffered enough. Let's not let this bill complicate their efforts to achieve freedom from socialist tyranny, and put an end to this humanitarian disaster. With that I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. McCaul.

Votes on the floor have been called, so I am going to do a recess now. Once members have voted, I ask please that all members return as soon as possible to continue the markup and then we will have others who wish to speak on the bill and some members have amendments to offer as well. So the committee stands in recess, subject to the call of the chair, and we will start right after votes are done with on the floor.

[Whereupon, at 2:35 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 3:21 p.m., the same day.]

Chairman ENGEL. OK, the committee will come to order. I realize that members wish to speak on the bill, some may wish to speak on the bill and that some members may have amendments to offer. If members have general remarks on the bill we could hear those now and then move on to amendments.

So, is there anyone who would like to make a general remark on any of the bills?

Mr. CICILLINE. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ENGEL. Mr. Cicilline?

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this markup today and for considering H.R. 1004, a bipartisan bill with 64 cosponsors. As the chairman noted, we are offering an amendment in the nature of a substitute to be considered as base text and I ask all of my colleagues on the committee to support this legislation.

I wish this bill was not necessary. I would prefer we spent our time working to find ways to support the Venezuelan people and their efforts to establish democracy in Venezuela. However, because of the belligerent and irresponsible language by Trump administration officials, we have no choice as a Congress but to weigh in and ensure that this administration understands that it does not have consent to engage in war in Venezuela.

This bill very simply restates the law as already enforced in the War Powers Act and laid out in our Constitution that any military force with respect to Venezuela must be authorized by Congress. So if you have a disagreement with this bill, you have a disagreement with the Constitution. Nicolas Maduro is a dictator whose regime has destroyed Venezuela's economy, starved its people, and engaged in widespread corruption and repression. The people of Venezuela deserve a better future, a future they determine, and we all

believe the Venezuelan people have a right to pick their leaders, a right Maduro has denied his people by refusing to hold free and fair elections.

Nicolas Maduro is the responsible party when it comes to the current situation in Venezuela. We must have a policy that continues to place pressure on him and that seeks a diplomatic solution in Venezuela. But the Trump administration's use of rhetoric surrounding military force in Venezuela is unfortunate and counterproductive. Not only would military intervention be illegal, it would also come with serious consequences that I feel would not only hurt the Venezuelan people, but also the prospects for democracy.

Under the Constitution and the War Powers Act, the President may not take unilateral military action and must consult with and receive authorization from Congress. As Special Representative Elliott Abrams confirmed when he was here testifying before this committee, the conditions for unilateral, Presidential military action have not been met. Congress has not declared war on Venezuela. There is not any existing statutory authorization that would allow for military intervention in Venezuela, and Venezuela has not attacked the United States, its territories, or possessions, or its armed forces. Yet the administration continues the drumbeat of aggressive saber-rattling rhetoric, promoting military intervention as an option, the only country of the coalition that continues to make that claim.

This administration has already shown their willingness to take illegal military action without consulting Congress, such as when they launched attacks on the Assad regime without proper authorization. I understand that some of my colleagues will say that while they do not support military intervention in Venezuela, they oppose this bill because they do not think it is necessary or they think it is unnecessarily partisan or that its passing could harm Juan Guaido. I would like to respond to this line of argument.

First, the bill is absolutely necessary in order for Congress to be clear about what our expectations are surrounding military action in Venezuela. I would like to refer to the testimony of Deborah Pearlstein, a professor of law at the Cardozo School of Law and a witness at the hearing we held last month on this bill.

She said, and I quote, "the President's power waxes and wanes as a function of what Congress does." When Congress has said nothing, the President is acting in, effectively, a constitutional twilight zone. She continued, "the President is in a different constitutional position when Congress has affirmatively said, 'Not yet,' or 'No,' and that is the shift that this legislation would make, end quote. If you want to properly exercise our constitutional authority in light of the administration's ongoing rhetoric, we are compelled to act.

Second, to the criticism that this bill makes the issue of Venezuela partisan, I would say please join us in supporting this common-sense legislation and let's send a clear and bipartisan message to the administration and to the world that Congress has decided to stop abrogating our constitutional role in military affairs. The only reason we are here considering this bill today is because the

administration took it upon itself to threaten a war it does not have an authorization to start.

And third, to the argument that passing this legislation could put Mr. Guaido in danger, I have to respond by saying that I have the utmost respect and admiration for Mr. Guaido, but must point out that his security is threatened by the very nature of who he is and how he has chosen to stand up for the people of Venezuela. I admire his courage greatly, but we cannot allow the potential brutish actions of Nicolas Maduro to dictate American foreign policy decisions.

Finally, to the argument that this bill would take pressure off of Maduro or take any options off the table, this is simply not reflected in the substance of the bill. This bill takes no options off the table. If the administration wanted to come to Congress tomorrow to discuss authorization for military action, it could do so. The U.S. Constitution and the War Powers Resolution have set up the checks and balances framework for American military action, not this legislation.

I would like to finish by saying that this administration has shown a troubling disregard for the Constitution and for Congress. That is why I introduced this legislation and that is why we must pass it. U.S. military action with respect to Venezuela would be illegal and ill-advised. Americans do not want another endless foreign military engagement and the administration has not made any case based on American national security or our interests for intervention in Venezuela.

Rather than threaten war, the United States must continue to work with the Lima Group, Europe, and the international community to use diplomatic and economic tools to pressure Maduro to honor the will of his people. Congress should do everything in its power to support a peaceful, truly democratic transition of power in Venezuela. I am thankful to the more than 60 bipartisan co-sponsors, many of the members of this committee, who are supporting this bill and I ask my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to join me in voting in support of the Constitution, in support of Congress's role, and in support of this bill. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. Mr. Yoho, did you wish to speak?

Mr. YOHIO. Yes, sir, I did. After Mr. Kinzinger.

Chairman ENGEL. OK, Mr. Kinzinger is recognized.

Mr. KINZINGER. Well, I thank the gentleman and thank you, Chairman. I am going to try to do this as professionally without getting upset as I can.

I want to talk briefly about what is going on in Venezuela, a disgusting situation. People are starving to death. We are seeing firsthand the failure of autocratic rule of socialism. In the process, Mr. Maduro has decided that he is going to maintain power against the legitimately elected President, Mr. Guaido of Venezuela. If the United States wants to pressure Maduro out of his fake office that he does not have the right to have, we have what is called the DIME model, diplomatic, information, military, and economic things at our disposal.

My friend, Mr. Cicilline, just said that, you know, we need to use diplomatic and economic processes to force a solution here. And the

thing I would make mention of that is when you are dealing with an enemy or an adversary, the only thing that makes diplomacy effective as well as economic is a military option on the table, is having that threat there. If you look at North Korea, what is it that compelled Kim Jong-un under the table? It was the threat of military force. What is it that took him away from the table? It was the removal of the military threat. That is the same situation in Venezuela.

But let's say if this passes what does this do? Let's say, Mr. Guaido, President Guaido is held captive. Let's say he is captured by Maduro. We cannot use military force to rescue him. Let's say we want to put food aid in to save the people that are starving to death in Venezuela and we need the military to escort food to people. They would be prohibited from doing it after this.

Let's say the Russians build a military base in Venezuela and start flying fighter CAPs over the country and basically declare it Russian territory. This would prevent the United States from doing anything in——

Mr. CICILLINE. Would the gentleman yield for——

Mr. KINZINGER. No, I will not. Let me finish. I listened politely to you, sir.

Let's say that they build a military base. The United States cannot introduce any military action to push back against it. Let's say a massacre occurs in Venezuela. The United States cannot use the military to stop it. If you look at what happened in Rwanda, one of the greatest regrets of the Clinton Administration is inaction because of a massacre. If this situation happens in Venezuela, which is not that far out to think of, we would be prevented.

Now, sure, we could come here and have a debate. And if you think that this House can have a grown-up debate about this by taking away the power that the President legitimately has under Article II in the Constitution, if we are already political about Venezuela imagine what it will become at that point. Imagine the politics while a massacre is occurring.

By the way, I actually thought about introducing an amendment to this to add Canada to the list and Jamaica and every other country, because if we are going to now pass resolutions saying we cannot introduce military force in Venezuela we may as well say the same thing about Canada or any other country that we have no intention at this point of going to war against. It would just make sense. That is about the purpose of this bill.

And the other thing I want to say, Mr. Chairman, with all due respect, I have been on this committee now, I guess it is my fifth year. I have been in Congress for 9 years. And one of the things I have just loved about this committee is our ability to really come together in bipartisan ways. In fact, the entire time I think that I was on Foreign Affairs up until this year we have never taken a recorded vote in this committee, because everything we have done, we have had debates, we have had discussions, but we have really worked together to advance the interest of the United States of America.

Even when President Obama was President, we would have hearings that could get a little contentious on things like Syria and that kind of stuff, but for the most part we would pass resolutions

that we all agreed on. But so far on this committee we have done something about Yemen and now we are doing something about Venezuela.

Mr. Chairman, my request to you as passionately as I can ask it is, can we at least pick a week in the next month or when we come back from break where we can actually do things on a bipartisan basis again and kind of see how it feels? Because if it feels good, maybe we can get back to that as the way we do things on committee instead of bringing up bills and passing them to make a point about the Trump administration.

By the way, I cannot think of crazy—I mean, look. There is rhetoric the President does that I do not always agree with, but I cannot think of that on Venezuela. He gave a really passionate speech in Florida about freedom in Venezuela and Cuba. He said the military action is not off the table, as he should say with any situation like that because it gives teeth to diplomacy.

So this is an answer in search of a problem. There is no problem and I do not know why we are taking this up. I had actually thought we were going to have a hearing and let this go away, but again we are back here. So, look. I am fired up. I am passionate about it. I respect everybody on this committee, but this is just really bothersome to me and I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. Well, I am sorry that the gentleman thinks that people should not be allowed to express their opinions on the Foreign Affairs Committee. I have been on this committee a long time and I believe that we ought to have more people speaking their mind, not fewer.

Anyone on this side? Mr. Sherman?

Mr. SHERMAN. I would just like to briefly respond to the last speaker. There is no more bipartisan committee in Congress than this one. And, in fact, this very markup we have quite a number of pieces of bipartisan legislation that will pass. It is true that watching Congress does not inspire one that this is the finest decisionmaking body assembled in history, but to say for that reason we should leave all decisionmaking about matters of life and death to this administration, I think that goes a little too far, especially it goes too far under our Constitution which vests in Congress the right to send this country to war.

This is a very reasonable proposal. It says we should not invade Venezuela. If there are developments that come up, the President can call us into special session and we can deal with them immediately. But to say that to support this bill is to ignore the genocide in Rwanda and the lessons that it taught us is absurd. It is far more likely that this administration will invade Venezuela and do harm than it is that we are going to see a Rwanda-style genocide in Venezuela that somehow the Trump administration would prevent were it not for this bill.

With that I yield to the gentleman from Rhode Island.

Mr. CICILLINE. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I attempted to ask the gentleman who was just speaking, my Republican colleague, a question. The question is, the scenarios that you describe for the committee that were horrific and you said this bill would stop us from doing anything about it, that is absolutely not true. Nothing in this bill would limit the ability of the Congress to au-

thorize intervention in any way we see appropriate. It simply reaffirms that Congress has a role and that we be held accountable for those decisions.

It is easy to say, "You know what, Mr. President, you make this decision. We will avoid our responsibility, because then we avoid the tough decisions." That is what we were elected to do. That is what the Constitution requires, that we deliberate, that before we send men and women into harm's way to risk their lives in defense of our country that we own that responsibility, that we debate it and we vote on it, because we reflect the will of the American people.

So it is nothing in the legislation changes the Constitution. It does not limit the President's power. It does not change the Constitution. It simply is a reminder in light of the rhetoric of this President that Congress must authorize military action. That is all it is. This is about reaffirming our responsibility.

The reason we do not have Canada in the bill is I have not heard the President threaten military action in Canada. But we have heard him say repeatedly, the military option is on the table. And then people say, "Oh, it really is not. We do not want to do it." Then you should vote for the bill. This is about preserving Congress's role as a deliberative body in decisions of war and peace. That is what we were elected to do. That is what we get paid to do.

I know it is easier if we avoid the tough decisions and just leave it up to the President. Our Constitution requires something more, and so all I am asking is to support this bill which just reaffirms. And by the way, the group, the international group, the Lima Group, they all manage to be playing a very productive role in a peaceful transition to democracy without the threat of military force.

The United States is an outlier. We do not need to be in that position. This is a moment for Congress to do its job, to assert its authority as set forth by our Founding Fathers in our Constitution and to be responsible before we send men and women into harm's way. With that—

Mr. SHERMAN [presiding]. I will reclaim my time.

Mr. CICILLINE. Yes.

Mr. SHERMAN. I think the gentleman makes an excellent point. And I think that if action in the future should be taken into Venezuela, this Congress can make a well-reasoned decision. I then yield back and then recognize the gentleman, Mr. Yoho.

Mr. YOH0. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And this is a very important topic obviously to go on this long. I just want to remind my colleagues, not just on the other side but all of us here, we are making a decision here in a bill form versus a resolution saying that the President cannot do this. And I do not remember the President saying he was going to go in there. He just said all options are on the table.

And I think with the tinderbox that Venezuela is right now, I think what you are seeing play out there is it is not about Venezuela. This is a lot more than Venezuela. This is the Cuban Government that has been propping up Venezuela for years with 10–40,000 troops protecting Maduro, before that Chavez, and then you

have the Russians in there. And if Venezuela falls, so does Cuba. And so to take military option off the table, and the President like I said he never said he was going in there. And I truly believe that if he was, he would come to Congress and ask for that authority.

But to play into the hands of the Maduro regime, the Cuban regime, the Russians who are probably watching this saying, "Look at the Americans, they are divided on this issue in their own party," and we have not done anything. We are worried about, this is not a genocide. My colleague, Mr. Sherman, said there is no genocide there like Rwanda. Let's hope there is not. There was not a genocide in Syria, but now there is over 500,000 people that have been slaughtered because Russia got in there and backed up Assad.

Do we want that same thing in our hemisphere? And I asked my colleague from Rhode Island, who is a small business owner, are you doing this for the benefit of the Venezuelan people or is it for this thing for this President?

Mr. CICILLINE. I am happy to answer if you will yield.

Mr. YOHO. And I am not going to yield that.

Mr. CICILLINE. But you asked the question and you are not going to yield to let me answer it?

Mr. YOHO. I am not going to. I have got to yield some time to my colleague, here, Mr. Kinzinger.

Mr. KINZINGER. Well, I thank the gentleman.

And just a couple of points, the key in Venezuela right now is getting the military to abandon the fake regime, the Maduro fake regime. When you take military off the table, the military is not very compelled to abandon the regime because they do not see a threat. They see the Russians introduced there. They see, you know, tens of thousands Cuban people holding up the regime. The mere threat of force can cause the military to abandon Mr. Maduro.

Second, to my friend, you mentioned that this really does nothing outside of the War Powers Act. The War Powers Act gives the President flexibility to move and then he has to advise Congress and then eventually it comes to Congress for a vote. This expressly prohibits the President from introducing any military force unless it is to rescue a U.S. citizen.

So it expressly prohibits the U.S. from using military force to create a humanitarian corridor, to rescue Guaido, to stop a genocide. I am not saying a genocide is going to happen, but who knows what can happen in this environment, any flash kind of issue like this. This bill expressly prohibits that. So it would be actually pretty hard to say that the President can act within the War Powers Resolution when this bill, if passed and signed into law, of course it will not be, when this bill says the President cannot do anything unless it is in defense of an American who is being held hostage.

And I also want to make one other quick point. I supported President Obama in his actions in Syria in 2013. I wanted the President to attack the regime. The President came to Congress. The President I do not think needed to come to Congress in 2013, he could have made the decision on his own like President Trump did in fighting back and pushing and enforcing the red line against chemical weapons.

When it came to Congress, and I will blame my side as much as anything for this, it became political when he brought it to Con-

gress and we did not give him the authority to attack. And we look in the Middle East and most people would agree the biggest mistake ever made in Syria was the failure to enforce the red line in 2013. And there have been a number of mistakes since then.

I am not playing the old what-ifs and the way-back game, but I am making the point that I believe a President should have the ability to do foreign policy on a speed-type situation like this without every little tiny action having to come to Congress, because I am not commander-in-chief and nobody in here is commander-in-chief. And with that I will yield back to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. YOHO. I appreciate your comments.

Mr. CICILLINE. Are you ready?

Mr. YOHO. No, not right yet, but I appreciate you trying.

We need to keep in mind that the legitimate President is President Guaido and we are weakening his hand to take over as a legitimate President of that country when they see the Americans saying, "Well, you know what, we are backing away from this. We are going to let whatever happens." And I think we have seen that happen in Libya and other countries.

And I think this is a time that we stay united. As we go to vote on this today that we stay united as the U.S. Congress and send a strong message that all options are on the table and I suggest that we vote no on this. I yield back.

Mr. DEUTCH [presiding]. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Malinowski, is recognized.

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Thank you. I appreciate the comments from Mr. Kinzinger and others on the other side.

Let me see if I can find some common ground here. I think there are two separate questions. One is, should the use of force be on the table, and the other is, what is the process for making these decisions. I appreciate the comments of Ranking Member McCaul that those who oppose this resolution are not necessarily in favor of the use of military force. I would argue the opposite is also true for many of us. Those who are willing to vote in favor of this resolution are not necessarily opposed to the use of force under any and all circumstances.

I can imagine circumstances under which I would vote very rapidly in favor of the use of force in Venezuela. Mr. Kinzinger mentioned some of those hypothetical situations. So I do not think it is the case that this would automatically become politicized if President Trump were to come here. I support, I recognize Mr. Guaido as the legitimate leader of Venezuela. I think we should recognize that as a Congress and I would support legislation to that effect as well.

But I think what this legislation is about is process. It is about whether in that circumstance the U.S. Congress should play a role in making a decision, and for that narrow reason I would vote in favor of it. I yield.

Mr. DEUTCH. I am sorry. Mr. Perry is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Members of the committee, I think the process is clear. The Constitution is clear. The President is already limited and should not be limited further in this case or any other case. And it seems to

me that if we want to stand with the freedom-loving people of America and Venezuela we have a choice here of either allowing the process to take its course if need be, because if any committee should understand this, we should understand that diplomacy without a strong deterrence, without a strong military response capability is like a saw without teeth.

And the conversation we are having right now in this committee about this discussion, whoever is watching, I am sure the Communist Chinese are loving this. I am sure the Cuban Government is loving this. And I am sure the Russians are happy to collude on this. We either stand with the freedom-loving people of Venezuela or we do not. We either send a message to Maduro that America does not stand with him, or we do not.

And that is what this is going to end up being. That is what this vote is going to be about. It is shirts and skins at this point. If you do not get that I think you are missing the bigger picture. The process is already clear. There already is a law. There already is a Constitution. Limiting the President to act as he should and then following up as we should is the process that has been outlined and usurping that only emboldens our enemies and Venezuela's enemies.

And I yield to Mr. Kinzinger.

Mr. KINZINGER. Well, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

And I think it is important to point out that the War Powers Resolution what it really does, it requires the President to notify Congress within 48 hours of committing armed forces to military action and it forbids them from remaining for more than 60 days without congressional approval. And it also provides a mechanism as we have experienced here and elsewhere for a privilege resolution to withdraw troops, and we understand that.

So to say that this simply just reinforces the War Powers Resolution, it does not do that. The President has flexibility according to the War Powers Resolution to make decisions on the use of military action and then Congress is triggered at that point to act. But to preemptively say that we cannot, that we are going to take away the President's ability to even threaten the use of military force because, you know, and now somehow get a diplomatic solution with just economic measures or to say that the President cannot commit military to any circumstance except rescuing U.S. hostages in Venezuela, I am all for rescuing U.S. hostages in Venezuela, but I can think of a thousand other things, scenarios that if I brought up we would probably have a hundred percent agreement that that would cause the introduction of U.S. troops.

But let's say something happens really quickly. Let's say a humanitarian corridor issue or let's say it has to do with the Russian jets and we are gone for the next 2 weeks. And if the President needs our vote now because this thing was just signed into law, we would have to come back 48 hours, probably take a couple days to debate and then vote. So we have now limited the President's ability to act by 5 days, if we are lucky, if we can get everybody back here in that kind of a time.

The War Powers Resolution is just fine. It is exactly what we need to handle a situation like this, but this I believe is being done because for whatever reason there is a political consideration. And

I do not mean that pejoratively to my friend, Mr. Cicilline and I are friends. But I do think this is unnecessary. And with that I will yield back to my friend from Pennsylvania.

Mr. PERRY. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I yield the balance.

Mr. DEUTCH. Well, I think you want to yield the balance of your time to Mr. McCaul, the ranking member.

Mr. PERRY. That is what I meant.

Mr. MCCAUL. I thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

I know this is well-intentioned, but I have to tell you I think it is very dangerous. And what I saw down on the border of Venezuela with the Chairman were a bunch of babies and young children and mothers and grandmothers who were leaving that country, 50,000 a day, for one reason and one reason only, and that is President Maduro, the illegitimate President and the humanitarian crises he has brought upon his own people.

So I think it is important to look at, as Mr. Perry pointed out, who is for this and who is against this, because I think that is instructive. I can tell you that Ambassador Vecchio came to me trying to stop this and then the Majority agreed to, "Well, let's just have a hearing and then we will stop." And they broke that promise and then they came back and now they are marking this bill up. I have talked to the Ambassador from Venezuela. He does not want to see this go forward. I have talked to the Ambassador from Colombia. They do not want to see this go forward.

The President of Colombia himself said the only thing keeping Guaido, President Guaido alive and safe is a threat of credible force. Who is for this? Maduro is, the Russians are, the Chinese are, and the Cubans. Let's remember who our enemies are and who our friends are and it is the people of Venezuela, not our enemies. And I yield back.

Mr. DEUTCH. The gentleman from Virginia is recognized.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I cannot imagine a more important in saying a debate than the one we are having. There is nothing more momentous and consequential in any vote we will ever cast than it is about war and peace. And for too long, frankly, the legislative branch since World War II have found the coward's way out. We have criticized the executive branch for its actions, but of course we take no responsibility for it even though the Constitution is quite clear.

Article I, in my view, could not be clearer. Only the legislative branch has the right to decide on war and peace. And by the way and to marshal the armed forces commensurate with that decision. If there are imputed powers to Article II for the President in his role as commander-in-chief, surely there are also commensurate imputed powers in Article I for the legislative branch of the U.S. Congress.

Now I have heard some arguments from my friend from Pennsylvania that startle me. He has given us a stark choice. He says you are either with the people of Venezuela or you are not, and I guess the subtext of that challenge is if we do not vote for military intervention at some point we are not. Well, I beg to differ. I do not think that is the choice at all in front of us.

I would also argue that reasonable people can reasonably disagree. But, frankly, the introduction of U.S. military could backfire.

And if it is going to happen, we need this debate. We need the regular process Mr. Cicilline is telling us we need, otherwise we might as well have at it. We have got troops we do not know anything about in Niger. We are supporting a war in Yemen Americans do not really want. We are contemplating intervention in South America that again Americans do not want, or at least they do not want without a cogent explanation coming from the elected representatives here in the Congress.

So I hope we have more robust debate, but I hardly believe the choice is as stark as my friend from Pennsylvania put it, and I utterly reject the choice he has given us. That is not our choice. The choice in front of us is, will we ever return to regular order constitutionally? Will we take responsibility of sending young men and young women in harm's way, or will we continue to take the coward's way out as we have, frankly, since World War II?

This resolution is a step in the right direction, is a step in restoring responsibility and taking responsibility as the separate but co-equal branch we are supposed to be and commensurate with the powers explicit and implied in Article I of the Constitution of the United States. So I support Mr. Cicilline's resolution and I thank him for his leadership, and I thank my colleagues on both sides for what I think is a vital and consequential debate about the deployment of U.S. force. I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you. I recognize myself and yield to Mr. Cicilline as much time as he may need.

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to just say at the outset that the argument that was just made by my friends on the other side of the aisle that the President of the United States can do whatever he wants for 60 days is absolutely false. The War Power Act only triggers a 60-day period once the President has engaged the military. And he can only do so, according to 1541(c) in four—three circumstances: the President may only exercise pursuant to a declaration of war; a specific statutory authorization; or a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories, or armed—or its armed forces.

So it is only if the President acts pursuant to one of those three conditions that the 60-day clock is triggered. So, this notion that the President can actually do whatever he wants is very disturbing to hear because Article 1 vests that responsibility in Congress.

So I want to correct that record. That is a false assertion that the President is permitted and that this bill narrows in any way the President's authority.

This mirrors the exact language of the War Powers Act, this resolution. So, it does not narrow the President's ability at all. That is No. 1.

No. 2, I always am alarmed when I hear what heads of other foreign governments shaping American foreign policy. There are just as many people who believe that Maduro uses this threat of military action by the United States in propaganda to rally people in his country to his side. The threat, when you consider U.S. history in this region of the world.

So, there are lots of very smart military and diplomatic thinkers who think it is essential that Congress reassert its authority in this moment.

And with respect to the question I never got to answer that Mr. Yoho asked, this is about fundamental question of war and peace, whether or not the Congress of the United States is going to fulfill its responsibility and have a serious debate and be accountable for what we decide. And all of the other countries that have been involved in this have been—have managed to play a productive role—the Lima Group, the Europeans—without the threat of military force.

And you know what would be especially wonderful if the world, the Venezuelan people and the world watched the United States honor its Constitution, honor the rule of law as we are promoting democracy in Venezuela, act democratic here in America and not violate our Constitution, not surrender our responsibilities as Members of Congress. Let's show them by example that we debate tough issues, that Congress in the Constitution is given this responsibility and we meet the responsibility. Let's model really good behavior as a vibrant and strong democracy and not surrender the authority that Congress has by our Constitution, by the great people of this country.

And so I thank the gentleman for yielding and yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. DEUTCH. I thank, I thank the gentleman. And I yield back. Is there any further discussion on the bill?

[No response.]

Mr. DEUTCH. Seeing none, are there amendments at the desk?

Mr. SHERMAN. I have an amendment at the desk.

[The amendment offered by Mr. Sherman follows:]

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**AMENDMENT TO THE AMENDMENT IN THE
NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 1004
OFFERED BY MR. SHERMAN OF CALIFORNIA**

Amend section 2(e) to read as follows:

- 1 (c) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this Act
2 may be construed to—
- 3 (1) affect or alter the requirements of the War
4 Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1541 et seq.) or any
5 restrictions or reporting requirements contained in
6 such Resolution;
- 7 (2) provide authorization or support for the use
8 of military force with respect to Venezuela; or
- 9 (3) prohibit the use of the Armed Forces of the
10 United States to rescue United States citizens in
11 Venezuela.



Mr. DEUTCH. Mr. Sherman is recognized.

The Clerk will please report the amendment.

Ms. STILES. Sherman Amendment Number 1. Amendment to the amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 1004. Amendment Section 2(c) to read as follows: Rule of construction——

Mr. SHERMAN. I move we dispense with reading of the amendment.

Mr. DEUTCH. Without objection. Mr. Sherman is recognized.

Mr. SHERMAN. The bill is perhaps controversial. I think it is well thought out and necessary. Hopefully, this amendment will not be controversial. If you like the bill, this makes it better. If you do not like the bill, this makes it better. It just clarifies a few things.

First, it makes a claim that nothing in this bill is an authorization or a direction to the President to send military force into Venezuela. If the President was listening to this debate, I think that would be apparent to him in any case.

Second, rule of construction is it provides that this bill does not prevent efforts solely for the purpose of rescuing United States citizens in Venezuela.

With that, this would be regarded as a non-controversial amendment and move forward quickly.

I yield back.

Mr. DEUTCH. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Is there further debate on the amendments?

[No response.]

Mr. DEUTCH. The question is on the amendment.

All those in favor, say aye.

Aye.

All opposed, no.

In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it. And the amendment is agreed to.

Are there other amendments?

[No response.]

Mr. DEUTCH. Any other request for recognition? Seeing none, the question is on the amendment in the nature of a substitute.

All those in favor, say aye.

All opposed, no.

In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it.

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DEUTCH. The gentleman is recognized.

Mr. McCAUL. I request a recorded vote.

Mr. DEUTCH. A roll call vote is ordered. Clerk will please call the roll.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Sherman?

Mr. SHERMAN. Aye.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Sherman votes aye.

Mr. Meeks?

[No response.]

Ms. STILES. Mr. Sires?

Mr. SIRES. Aye.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Sires votes aye.

Mr. Connolly?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Aye.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Connolly votes aye.

Mr. Deutch?
 Mr. DEUTCH. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Deutch votes aye.
 Ms. Bass?
 [No response.]
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Keating?
 Mr. KEATING. Yes. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Keating votes aye.
 Mr. Cicilline?
 Mr. CICILLINE. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Cicilline votes aye.
 Mr. Bera?
 Mr. BERA. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Bera votes aye.
 Mr. Castro?
 Mr. CASTRO. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Castro votes aye.
 Ms. Titus?
 [No response.]
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Espailat?
 Mr. ESPAILLAT. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Espailat votes aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Lieu?
 Mr. LIEU. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Lieu votes aye.
 Ms. Wild?
 Ms. WILD. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Ms. Wild votes aye.
 Mr. Phillips?
 Mr. PHILLIPS. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Phillips votes aye.
 Ms. Omar?
 Ms. OMAR. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Ms. Omar votes aye.
 Mr. Allred?
 Mr. ALLRED. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Allred votes aye.
 Mr. Levin?
 Mr. LEVIN. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Levin votes aye.
 Ms. Spanberger?
 Ms. SPANBERGER. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Ms. Spanberger votes aye.
 Ms. Houlahan?
 Ms. HOULAHAN. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Ms. Houlahan votes aye.
 Mr. Malinowski?
 Mr. MALINOWSKI. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Malinowski votes aye.
 Mr. Trone?
 Mr. TRONE. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Trone votes aye.
 Mr. Costa?
 [No response.]

Ms. STILES. Mr. Vargas?
 Mr. VARGAS. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Vargas votes aye.
 Mr. Gonzalez?
 Mr. GONZALEZ. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Gonzalez votes aye.
 Mr. McCaul?
 Mr. McCAUL. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. McCaul votes no.
 Mr. Smith?
 Mr. SMITH. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Smith votes no.
 Mr. Chabot?
 Mr. CHABOT. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Chabot votes no.
 Mr. Wilson?
 [No response.]
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Perry?
 Mr. PERRY. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Perry votes no.
 Mr. Yoho?
 Mr. YOHO. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Yoho votes no.
 Mr. Kinzinger?
 Mr. KINZINGER. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Kinzinger votes no.
 Mr. Zeldin?
 Mr. ZELDIN. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Zeldin votes no.
 Mr. Sensenbrenner?
 [No response.]
 Ms. STILES. Mrs. Wagner?
 Mrs. WAGNER. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mrs. Wagner votes no.
 Mr. Mast?
 Mr. MAST. Mr. Mast votes no.
 Mr. Rooney?
 [No response.]
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Fitzpatrick?
 [No response.]
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Curtis?
 Mr. CURTIS. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Curtis votes no.
 Mr. Buck?
 [No response.]
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Wright?
 Mr. WRIGHT. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Wright votes no.
 Mr. Reschenthaler?
 Mr. RESCHENTHALER. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Reschenthaler votes no.
 Mr. Burchett?
 Mr. BURCHETT. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Burchett votes no.

Mr. Pence?
 Mr. PENCE. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Pence votes no.
 Mr. Watkins?
 [No response.]
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Guest?
 Mr. GUEST. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Guest votes no.
 Mr. Chairman?
 Chairman ENGEL [presiding]. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Chairman votes aye.
 Chairman ENGEL. Are there any other members who have nothing recorded?
 Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Chairman.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Meeks?
 Mr. MEEKS. Vote aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Meeks votes aye.
 Mr. Costa?
 Mr. COSTA. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Costa votes aye.
 Chairman ENGEL. Are there any other members? Ms. Titus?
 Mr. Wilson? How is Mr. Wilson recorded?
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Wilson is not recorded.
 Mr. WILSON. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Wilson votes no.
 Ms. TITUS. Mr. Chairman.
 Chairman ENGEL. How is Ms. Titus recorded?
 Ms. STILES. Ms. Titus is not recorded.
 Ms. TITUS. Yes.
 Ms. STILES. Ms. Titus votes aye.
 Chairman ENGEL. Mr. Watkins?
 Mr. WATKINS. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Watkins votes no.
 Chairman ENGEL. Anybody else?
 [No response.]
 Chairman ENGEL. The Clerk will report the tally.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Chairman, on that vote there are 25 ayes, and 17 noes.
 Chairman ENGEL. 25 ayes, and 17 noes. The amendment is agreed to.
 The question is to report the bill H.R. 1004, Prohibiting Unauthorized Action in Venezuela Act to the House, as amended, with the recommendation that the bill do pass.
 All in favor, say aye.
 All opposed, no.
 In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it.
 The measure is ordered favorably reported, as amended.
 Pursuant to notice for purposes of mark-up, I now call up H.R. 9, the Climate Action Now Act.
 The Clerk will report the bill.
 [The Bill H.R. 9 follows:]



I

116TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 9

To direct the President to develop a plan for the United States to meet its nationally determined contribution under the Paris Agreement, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 27, 2019

Ms. CASTOR of Florida (for herself, Ms. PELOSI, Mr. HOYER, Mr. PALLONE, Mr. ENGEL, Mr. GRIJALVA, Ms. JOHNSON of Texas, Mr. NEAL, Mr. MCGOVERN, Mr. NADLER, Ms. BROWNLEY of California, Ms. BONAMICI, Mr. LEVIN of California, Mr. HUFFMAN, Mr. MCEACHIN, Mr. NEGUSE, Mr. CASTEN of Illinois, Mr. LUJÁN, Mr. HASTINGS, Mr. SCHNEIDER, Mr. BEYER, Mr. LOWENTHAL, Ms. PORTER, Mr. SCOTT of Virginia, Mr. SOTO, Mr. GALLEGO, Mrs. CAROLYN B. MALONEY of New York, Mr. MALINOWSKI, Mr. CISNEROS, Mr. CRIST, Ms. NORTON, Ms. MATSUI, Mr. ROUDA, Ms. MUCARSEL-POWELL, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. COHEN, Mr. PANNETTA, Ms. VELÁZQUEZ, Mr. COURTNEY, Ms. FRANKEL, Mr. CUMMINGS, Mr. WELCH, Ms. BARRAGÁN, Mr. VAN DREW, Mr. HIGGINS of New York, Mr. TONKO, Mr. CLYBURN, Mr. CARBAJAL, Mr. THOMPSON of California, Mr. JEFFRIES, Mr. KILMER, Ms. SPANBERGER, Ms. BLUNT ROCHESTER, Mr. ROSE of New York, Ms. SCHAKOWSKY, Mrs. DAVIS of California, Mr. BRENDAN F. BOYLE of Pennsylvania, Mr. LARSEN of Washington, Mr. MCNERNEY, Ms. DEAN, Ms. CLARKE of New York, Mr. LEVIN of Michigan, Mrs. TRAHAN, Mr. DEFazio, Mr. LYNCH, Ms. HAALAND, Mr. BLUMENAUER, Ms. JUDY CHU of California, Mr. RUPERSBERGER, Ms. DEGETTE, Ms. SCHRIER, and Ms. KUSTER of New Hampshire) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To direct the President to develop a plan for the United

States to meet its nationally determined contribution under the Paris Agreement, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Climate Action Now
5 Act”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress finds the following:

8 (1) In Paris, on December 12, 2015, parties to
9 the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
10 mate Change (UNFCCC) reached a landmark agree-
11 ment to combat climate change and to accelerate
12 and intensify the actions and investments needed for
13 a sustainable low carbon future.

14 (2) The Paris Agreement’s central aim is to
15 strengthen the global response to the threat of cli-
16 mate change by keeping a global temperature rise
17 well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial lev-
18 els and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature in-
19 crease even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius.

20 (3) The Paris Agreement requires all parties to
21 put forward their best efforts through nationally de-
22 termined contributions (NDCs) and to strengthen
23 these efforts in the years ahead.

1 (4) The Paris Agreement further requires each
2 party to update its nationally determined contribu-
3 tion every 5 years, with each successive nationally
4 determined contribution representing a progression
5 beyond the previous nationally determined contribu-
6 tion, and reflecting the party's highest possible am-
7 bition.

8 (5) The United States communicated its nation-
9 ally determined contribution to achieve an economy-
10 wide target of reducing its greenhouse gas emissions
11 by 26 to 28 percent below its 2005 level in 2025 and
12 to make best efforts to reduce its emissions by 28
13 percent.

14 (6) A number of existing laws, regulations, and
15 other mandatory measures in the United States are
16 relevant to achieving this target, including the Clean
17 Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.), the Energy Policy
18 Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-486), and the Energy
19 Independence and Security Act of 2007 (Public Law
20 110-140).

21 (7) On June 1, 2017, President Trump an-
22 nounced his intention to withdraw the United States
23 from the Paris Agreement, which would leave the
24 United States as the only UNFCCC member state
25 that is not a signatory to the Paris Agreement.

1 (8) Under the terms of the Paris Agreement,
2 the earliest possible effective withdrawal date by the
3 United States is November 4, 2020. However, the
4 United States is still obligated to maintain certain
5 commitments under the Paris Agreement, such as
6 continuing to report its emissions to the United Na-
7 tions.

8 **SEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS TO ADVANCE THE**
9 **WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED STATES FROM**
10 **THE PARIS AGREEMENT.**

11 Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds
12 are authorized to be appropriated, obligated, or expended
13 to take any action to advance the withdrawal of the United
14 States from the Paris Agreement.

15 **SEC. 4. PLAN FOR THE UNITED STATES TO MEET ITS NA-**
16 **TIONALLY DETERMINED CONTRIBUTION**
17 **UNDER THE PARIS AGREEMENT.**

18 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the
19 date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall de-
20 velop and submit to the appropriate congressional commit-
21 tees and make available to the public a plan for the United
22 States to meet its nationally determined contribution
23 under the Paris Agreement that describes—

24 (1) how the United States will achieve an econ-
25 omy-wide target of reducing its greenhouse gas

1 emissions by 26 to 28 percent below its 2005 level
2 by 2025; and

3 (2) how the United States will use the Paris
4 Agreement's transparency provisions to confirm that
5 other parties to the Agreement with major econo-
6 mies are fulfilling their announced contributions to
7 the Agreement.

8 (b) UPDATES TO PLAN.—Not later than one year
9 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually
10 thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate
11 congressional committees and make available to the public
12 an updated plan under subsection (a).

13 (c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
14 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congres-
15 sional committees” means—

16 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
17 Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House
18 of Representatives; and

19 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
20 Committee on Environment and Public Works, and
21 the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of
22 the Senate.

23 **SEC. 5. PARIS AGREEMENT DEFINED.**

24 In this Act, the term “Paris Agreement” means the
25 decision by the United Nations Framework Convention on

- 1 Climate Change's 21st Conference of Parties in Paris,
- 2 France, adopted December 12, 2015.



Ms. STILES. H.R. 9, To direct the President to develop a plan for the United States to meet its nationally determined contribution under the Paris Agreement, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, Section 1. Short title.

This Act may be cited as the “Climate Action Now Act.”

Section 2. Findings.

Chairman ENGEL. Without objection, the first reading of the bill is dispensed with. Without objection, the bill shall be considered as read and open to amendment at any point.

And at this time I recognize myself to speak on the legislation. I will keep my remarks brief.

Just last week we had an impressive panel of military, defense, and international development experts testify about how climate change is a direct threat to the national security of the United States. This is not news. We have known it for decades.

Climate change is a grave threat that transcends borders. And when we face pressing global security issues. The United States is strongest when we work shoulder to shoulder with our friends and partners around the world. That is why the Paris Agreement was such a defining moment for the future of our planet. The countries of the world came together to face this global crisis.

At times like these, the world usually looks to the United States for leadership. So, when President Trump announced his intention to withdraw from this landmark agreement, it showed the world that America is on retreat. I think it was wrong. Every nation in the world has signed on to this agreement. If we withdraw, we will be the only country unwilling to step up to this challenge. What does that say about America’s role in the world?

So we can, we must do better because we already are seeing the consequences of our inaction: natural disasters, famines, instability, human suffering. The time for action to avoid the worst effects of climate change is rapidly closing. We must demonstrate to the rest of the world and to future generations that we are still committed to taking on this fight.

So, today our committee is considering legislation to address this issue and reassert American leadership on the world stage. The “Climate Action Now Act” keeps the United States in the Paris Climate Accord, renewing our country’s pledge to address climate change head on. The Paris Agreement allows every country to determine its own emission reduction targets and to develop a public plan for how to meet these targets.

This bill follows that same model. It gives the Administration total flexibility to decide what approach we need to follow, and what kind of technology we need to use to reach our national targets. H.R. 9 gives all of us an opportunity to show Americans that we hear them, that we take their concerns seriously, and that we are taking action to ensure a healthier, safer, and more sustainable future. This should not be a partisan issue.

I strongly support this measure. And I urge my colleagues to do the same.

And I will now recognize our Ranking Member, Mr. McCaul of Texas, for any remarks he might have.

Mr. McCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We can all agree the climate is changing, as Secretary Pompeo testified to, and that we need to take positive steps to address it. However, I oppose H.R. 9 because, among other problems, it attempts to codify President Obama's greenhouse gas reduction pledge under the Paris Agreement.

During last week's hearing on climate change I was encouraged that both sides of the political aisle expressed a shared understanding of the national security threat of climate change. Witnesses invited by both Democrats and Republicans testified to the importance of technology and innovation to address the challenge.

However, the bill before us does nothing to bolster research or promote innovation. Instead, it recommitments the United States to President Obama's pledge under the Paris Agreement, which was submitted on behalf of the United States without any role of the Congress. We were not even so much as consulted about his pledge to cut greenhouse gases by 26 to 28 percent below 2005 levels by 2025.

The private sector was also not meaningfully consulted. And not only that but, as Mr. Worthington, Executive Director of the U.S. Energy Association, testified to, the Administration provided no cost-benefit analysis or economic justification to rationalize its pledge. All we have to rely on are third party analyses, one of which found that his commitments would cost the economy \$250 billion in gross domestic product and 2.7 million jobs by 2025.

Furthermore, when asked by Mr. Zeldin at last week's hearing whether President Obama should have submitted the Paris Agreement to the Senate for ratification, all four witnesses unanimously, including the three invited by the Democrat Majority, agreed that he should have.

Meanwhile China, the world's largest greenhouse gas emitter, will continue to increase its emissions through 2030 under its Paris Agreement pledge. The United States, on the other hand, saw a 14 percent reduction from 2005 to 2017.

So, instead of doubling down on a pledge that Congress had no role in setting, it will have an unknown and potentially catastrophic impact on the United States' economy, and which will do nothing to address China's growing emissions. I believe that we should work on a bipartisan bill to boost research, advance technology, promote innovation, and develop some real solutions.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. McCaul. The gentleman yields back.

I realize members wish to speak on the bill and that some members have amendments to offer. If members have general remarks on the bill first, we should hear those now and then move on to amendments.

Is there anyone who has general remarks on the bill? Mr. Espaillat.

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The effects of climate change are evident today in more extreme temperatures, and more frequent and more intense natural disasters. Many studies and reports affirm a simple fact: both the causes and effects of climate change have been impacting already vulner-

able communities at greater and disproportionate level. Lower income communities, indigenous people, communities of color, agrarian and other marginalized communities not only are bearing the brunt of the impacts of climate change, but these communities also have lower capacity to prepare for and cope with extreme weather and climate-related events endangering their health and well-being.

The people of the Caribbean have faced year-long drought and catastrophic hurricanes that are decimating agriculture. The Northern Triangle faces an extreme dry corridor, causing food shortages and further affecting migration trends.

Across Asia rising sea levels threaten island communities. And in Southern Africa shifts in rain patterns strain agriculture production, leading to malnutrition, and multiplying the threat of armed conflict and extremism.

But it is not just happening to other countries. In my district, Mr. Chairman, black and brown children are experiencing worsening asthma because of increased heat and pollution. Parents come to my office looking for help for their health care, and cannot afford—and they cannot afford it. This is a local and global issue. And I am glad that the Foreign Affairs Committee today is demonstrating that we understand the need to address climate change with global solutions.

We must incorporate climate justice into all of our policies as we move forward. Every piece of legislation on climate change considered by this House, in every bill we pass, and in every hearing we hold we must ensure that climate justice is addressed, and we proactively work to protect the most vulnerable among us.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I yield back the remaining part of my time.

Chairman ENGEL. The gentleman yields back. Is there anyone else who wishes to speak on the bill?

Ms. WILD.

Ms. WILD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ghandi once said that a breach of a promise is a surrender of truth. The United States abandoning the Paris Agreement is nothing short of a surrender. Our allies are watching, our adversaries are watching.

We have an opportunity here to fulfill a promise, a promise that nearly 200 other countries have made and honored.

We also have an opportunity to resurrect the truth about climate change, that it is based on objective scientific evidence, and that the United States' carbon footprint has contributed to this crisis. We can seize those opportunities by voting in favor of H.R. 9 today.

On December 12th, 2015, the United States joined nearly 200 countries in signing the Paris Agreement to combat climate change. As part of that agreement, the United States adopted a plan to reduce its carbon pollution by 26 to 28 percent below 2005 levels by 2025. Today we stand as the only country that has withdrawn from that global pact. The only country.

And even as some refuse to acknowledge the reality of the climate crisis, our country continues to pay the price of extreme natural disasters that grow in force and frequency which cause loss of

life, destruction of infrastructure, and damage to our economy. It should not take one more——

Ms. WILD [continuing]. Breaking flood or wildfire or hurricane or drought to do what is right.

Enough is enough. In order to make good on our commitment, it is imperative that we prohibit Federal funds from being used to take any action to advance the withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agreement.

It is also imperative that we call on the administration to develop and make public a concrete plan for how the United States will meet the pollution reduction goals submitted to the world in 2015.

Anything short of passing H.R. 9 is a signal to our allies that we are unreliable, a signal to our adversaries that we ceded this space to them, and an abdication of our most solemn duty to keep our constituents safe.

Thank you. I yield back.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Would my friend yield for a question? Behind you.

Ms. WILD. Yes.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the gentlelady from Pennsylvania.

I was listening intently to what she had to say and it thought you said we are the only nation now not a party to the Paris Climate Accord. Is that correct?

Ms. WILD. That is correct.

Mr. CONNOLLY. So when President Trump pulled us out, we at least had company in Nicaragua and Syria.

Ms. WILD. That is correct.

Mr. CONNOLLY. And now you tell me that they have both joined?

So we do not even have Nicaragua and Syria to keep us company. Is that correct?

Ms. WILD. My esteemed colleague, I do not know when Nicaragua decided to rejoin. But Syria ended its holdout in 2017.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Wow. What a lonely place to be.

I thank my friend.

Ms. WILD. Thank you. I yield back.

Mr. YOHIO. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman ENGEL. Are there any other members?

Mr. Yoho?

Mr. YOHIO. Yes. I am in opposition to this. And, you know, again, I think politics are being played on this.

The United States, thank God, is the only country that pulled out of this because they did show leadership. As Chairman McCaul, or Ranking Member McCaul, pointed out, from 2005 to 2017, carbon emissions in the United States of America has gone down 14 percent. Our production in manufacturing has gone up. Our energy consumption went down 2 percent. That is leadership.

China's commitment to this was, "We will try." Yet, it is going to tie the hands of the American consumers to pay for China trying as they pollute?

They are putting on coal plant after coal plant after coal plant around the world, not just in China but in other countries, increasing the CO2 footprint.

You know, we have got LNG coming out of this country that is leading an energy revolution, driving down the CO2 cost and, you know, this whole discussion over climate change nobody is in denial that it is happening. But it is the cause of why it is happening.

And if you look at the anthropogenic effect, yes, I am sure humans have contributed to it. But if you look at the natural causes, over 51 percent of it, according to science, since we are so hell bent on science, is coming from solar activity. I do not believe you are going to stop that.

And so to have a bill coming out basically attacking the president for pulling out of the climate deal I think is pure politics and it is below the bipartisanship of this committee.

And I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. The gentleman yields back. Is there any other member that wishes to speak on either side?

Yes, Mr. Mast?

Mr. MAST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You know, I would just also want to point out as we discuss this that many of the members of this committee were not present when we had Secretary Tillerson here discussing the Paris Climate Accord, discussing how the United States of America does not simply contribute billions of dollars to a program and just leave the conversation, just give up those resources and say, no, we are not going to play a role in this—we are not going to see what happens to those dollars—go off and do with it whatever you like.

That is not what occurs with this. In fact, we are still present at every conversation having to do with the Paris Climate Accord. We are still actively engaged in this.

We have just made it a point to say, listen, you are not going to get our money and our resources and give us no more say than the people—the countries that are the least contributors to these programs, very, very specifically pointed out by Secretary Tillerson at the time that he came here.

And I would point out that many were not present for that conversation. With that, I yield back to our Ranking Member.

Chairman ENGEL. Are there any other members? Mr. Wright, did you have your hand up?

Mr. WRIGHT. I did have a comment on the bill, Mr. Chairman, and that is I sense an incongruity from my friends on the other side.

We just finished a markup on a bill because Democrats are afraid of what President Trump might do unilaterally but it did not seem to bother you when President Obama did things unilaterally like this Paris Accord without submitting it to the Senate.

And the reason there was Republican opposition to it then and now is it placed the United States of America at a distinct economic disadvantage vis-a-vis other countries in the world.

Now, why any president or any Congress would want to place our own country at an economic disadvantage is mind-boggling and that is why we—that is why I will certainly be voting no on this.

Thank you.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you. The gentleman yields back. Anyone else?

Let us now move to amendments. Is there anyone that wishes to submit an amendment?

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman ENGEL. Mr. McCaul?

Mr. McCAUL. I have an amendment in the nature of a substitute at the desk and I ask for its consideration at this time.

Chairman ENGEL. The clerk will please report the amendment.

Ms. STILES. McCaul Amendment Number 1, amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 9, offered by Mr. McCaul. Strike all after the enacting clause and——

[The amendment offered by Mr. McCaul follows:]

AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE
TO H.R. 9
OFFERED BY MR. McCAUL OF TEXAS

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

2 This Act may be cited as the “Climate Action Now
3 Act”.

4 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

5 Congress finds the following:

6 (1) Despite claims by the proponents of the
7 Paris Agreement of its historic nature, the 2019
8 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the United States
9 Intelligence Community states “Global environ-
10 mental and ecological degradation, as well as climate
11 change, are likely to fuel competition for resources,
12 economic distress, and social discontent through
13 2019 and beyond.”.

14 (2) As a party to the Paris Agreement, United
15 States Government actions taken to address the
16 challenge of climate change pursuant to such agree-
17 ment should enjoy broad, bipartisan support, includ-

1 ing policies that promote private sector-led innova-
2 tion and technological advancement.

3 (3) Whether the United States remains a party
4 to the Paris Agreement or not, climate change re-
5 quires an international effort, which the United
6 States should lead as a role model for other coun-
7 tries.

8 (4) The United States Energy Information Ad-
9 ministration estimates that United States energy-re-
10 lated carbon dioxide emissions declined by 14 per-
11 cent from 2005 to 2017, starting well before the
12 United States became a party to the Paris Agree-
13 ment. This impressive decline brought greenhouse
14 gas emissions to their lowest levels since 1992.

15 (5) In 2016, President Obama signed an instru-
16 ment of acceptance of the Paris Agreement on be-
17 half of the United States without submitting the
18 agreement to the Senate for its advice and consent
19 to ratification. When asked at a congressional hear-
20 ing on April 2, 2019, whether President Obama
21 should have submitted the Paris Agreement to the
22 Senate, all four witnesses concurred that the Presi-
23 dent should have submitted the Paris Agreement to
24 the Senate.

1 (6) According to an analysis by the World Re-
2 sources Institute of the top 100 greenhouse gas
3 emitters, the United States is just one of twelve
4 countries to adopt the Paris Agreement through uni-
5 lateral action by the President, without any role for
6 the legislature.

7 (7) Pursuant to the Paris Agreement, in 2016
8 the United States communicated its nationally deter-
9 mined contribution (NDC) to achieve an economy-
10 wide target of reducing its greenhouse gas emissions
11 by 26 to 28 percent below its 2005 level in 2025 and
12 to make best efforts to reduce its emissions by 28
13 percent. China, the world's largest emitter of green-
14 house gases, plans to continue to increase emissions
15 through 2030, according to its NDC.

16 (8) Congress had no formal input on the NDC
17 submitted by the United States and President
18 Obama did not provide any economic justification or
19 cost-benefit analysis to rationalize the greenhouse
20 gas reduction targets pledged by the United States.

21 (9) A report prepared by NERA Economic Con-
22 sulting in 2017 found that meeting the commitments
23 President Obama made as part of the Paris Agree-
24 ment could cost United States gross domestic prod-
25 uct \$250 billion and 2.7 million jobs by 2025.

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1 (10) On June 1, 2017, President Trump an-
2 nounced his intent to withdraw the United States
3 from the agreement “but begin negotiations to reen-
4 ter either the Paris Accord or a really entirely new
5 transaction on terms that are fair to the United
6 States, its businesses, its workers, its people, its tax-
7 payers”.

8 **SEC. 3. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 2016 UNITED STATES NA-**
9 **TIONALLY DETERMINED CONTRIBUTION**
10 **UNDER THE PARIS AGREEMENT.**

11 (a) PLAN.—

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days
13 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
14 President shall develop and submit to the appro-
15 priate congressional committees and make available
16 to the public, along with a detailed economic and
17 cost-benefit analysis, a plan for the United States to
18 meet its nationally determined contribution under
19 the Paris Agreement that describes how the United
20 States will achieve an economy-wide target of reduc-
21 ing its greenhouse gas emissions by 26 to 28 percent
22 below its 2005 level by 2025.

23 (2) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—The plan re-
24 quired under paragraph (1) may not be construed to
25 constitute a nationally determined contribution of

1 the United States pursuant to Article 4 of the Paris
2 Agreement.

3 (b) REPORT.—Not later than one year after the date
4 of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the
5 President shall submit to the appropriate congressional
6 committees a report on the progress of any international
7 negotiations to address climate change.

8 (c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
9 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congres-
10 sional committees” means—

11 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
12 Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House
13 of Representatives; and

14 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
15 Committee on Environment and Public Works, and
16 the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of
17 the Senate.

18 **SEC. 4. CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION WITH RESPECT TO**
19 **THE PARIS AGREEMENT.**

20 (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provi-
21 sion of law, the President shall notify Congress not less
22 than 30 days prior to submitting a new nationally deter-
23 mined contribution (NDC) on behalf of the United States
24 pursuant to Article 4 of the Paris Agreement.

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1 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The notification
2 required by subsection (a) shall include the following:

3 (1) A detailed economic justification of the
4 NDC.

5 (2) A cost-benefit analysis of the NDC.

6 (3) A description of how the NDC will promote
7 availability of diversified energy supplies and a well-
8 functioning global market for energy resources, tech-
9 nologies, and expertise for the benefit of the United
10 States and United States allies and trading part-
11 ners.

12 (4) A description of how the NDC will support
13 United States international efforts to alleviate en-
14 ergy poverty.

15 (5) A description of how the NDC will impact
16 United States global economic competitiveness.

17 (6) A description of how the NDC will impact
18 United States national security interests.

19 **SEC. 5. PARIS AGREEMENT DEFINED.**

20 In this Act, the term “Paris Agreement” means the
21 decision by the United Nations Framework Convention on
22 Climate Change’s 21st Conference of Parties in Paris,
23 France, adopted December 12, 2015.



Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Chairman, I would dispense with the reading request.

Chairman ENGEL. Without objection, a further reading of the amendment will be dispensed with. A point of order is reserved.

The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes in support of the amendment.

Mr. McCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to say from the outset, echoing what Mr. Mast indicated, and that is that we never pulled out of the Paris Agreement. We are still under the Paris Agreement.

The president just signaled his intention to possibly pull out in the future if it was not fixed. My amendment simply requires any new U.S. commitments under Paris come to Congress along with an economic analysis.

It recognizes a government policy that enjoys broad bipartisan support is needed to address the challenge of climate change, including policies that promote private sector-led innovation and technological advancement.

It requires that President Obama's pledge to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 26 to 28 percent below 2005 levels by 2025 be accomplished by an economic justification and cost-benefit analysis, which his administration never provided to the Congress.

It also requires any future commitments by the United States to be subjected to congressional notification and include detailed information about the economic impact of such commitments, including what it will mean for the poor, for world energy markets, for our economic competitiveness, and for the United States national security interests.

Under the Paris Agreement, the United States is just one of 12 countries out of the top 100 emitters to have no meaningful role for its legislature to provide input on our pledges.

The president alone should not have that power to unilaterally reduce our emissions by 2025 when China, the world's top emitter, will not do the same until 2030.

In short, my amendment calls for a bipartisan approach to addressing climate change including technology and innovation that adds a role for Congress and ensures that our commitments are based on economic reality.

I urge support, and with that, I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. The gentleman yields back.

Is there further debate on the amendment?

Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman ENGEL. Mr. Keating? The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes to speak on the amendment.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I speak in opposition to this amendment. The principal purpose of the Climate Action Now Act is to keep the United States in the Paris Climate Accord. This amendment fails to accomplish this most basic task, and for that reason alone, I oppose it.

As you know, the Paris Agreement is the first truly universal agreement among nations to tackle climate change. Rarely is there consensus among nearly all nations on any topic.

But with the Paris Agreement, leaders from around the world collectively agreed that climate change is driven by human behav-

ior, that it is a threat to the environment and all of humanity, and that global action is needed to stop it. It has also created a clear framework for all countries to make emission reduction commitments.

At present, 197 countries—every nation on the Earth, with the last signatory being war-torn Syria—have adopted the Paris Agreement. If we follow through, as the president has announced, we will be the only country on Earth unwilling to step up to this challenge.

The U.S. has retreated from leadership positions. With this amendment, we are retreating from even followership positions. It would be a terrible shame if we followed this president, ignored the threats of climate change, and ceded our role in the global stage to other countries.

I urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment and I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. The gentleman yields back. Is there further debate on the amendment?

Seeing none, the question is on the amendment.

All those on Mr. McCaul's amendment—all those in favor say aye.

All opposed, say no.

In the opinion of the chair, the noes have it and the amendment is not agreed to.

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman ENGEL. Mr. McCaul?

Mr. McCAUL. I request a recorded vote.

Chairman ENGEL. A roll call vote is ordered and the clerk will please call the roll.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Sherman?

[No response.]

Mr. Meeks?

[No response.]

Mr. Sires?

[No response.]

Mr. SIREN. No.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Sires votes no.

Mr. Connolly?

[No response.]

Mr. Deutch?

[No response.]

Ms. Bass?

[No response.]

Mr. Keating?

[No response.]

Mr. KEATING. No.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Keating votes no.

Mr. Cicilline?

Mr. CICILLINE. No.

Mr. Cicilline votes no.

Mr. Bera?

Mr. BERA. No.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Bera votes no.

Mr. Castro?

[No response.]

Ms. Titus?
 [No response.]
 Mr. Espaillat?
 Mr. ESPAILLAT. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Espaillat votes no.
 Mr. Lieu?
 Mr. LIEU. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Lieu votes no.
 Ms. Wild?
 Ms. WILD. No.
 Ms. STILES. Ms. Wild votes no.
 Mr. Phillips?
 Mr. PHILLIPS. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Phillips votes no.
 Ms. Omar?
 Ms. OMAR. No.
 Ms. STILES. Ms. Omar votes no.
 Mr. Allred?
 Mr. ALLRED. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Allred votes no.
 Mr. Levin?
 Mr. LEVIN. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Levin votes no.
 Ms. Spanberger?
 Ms. SPANBERGER. No.
 Ms. STILES. Ms. Spanberger votes no.
 Ms. Houlahan?
 Ms. HOULAHAN. No.
 Ms. STILES. Ms. Houlahan votes no.
 Mr. Malinowski?
 Mr. MALINOWSKI. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Malinowski votes no.
 Mr. Trone?
 Mr. TRONE. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Trone votes no.
 Mr. Costa?
 Mr. COSTA. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Costa votes no.
 Mr. Vargas?
 Mr. VARGAS. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Vargas votes no.
 Mr. Gonzalez?
 Mr. GONZALEZ. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Gonzalez votes no.
 Mr. McCaul?
 Mr. McCAUL. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. McCaul votes aye.
 Mr. Smith?
 [No response.]
 Mr. Chabot?
 Mr. CHABOT. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Chabot votes aye.
 Mr. Wilson?
 [No response.]

Mr. Perry?
 Mr. PERRY. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Perry votes aye.
 Mr. Yoho?
 Mr. YOHO. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Yoho votes aye.
 Mr. Kinzinger?
 Mr. KINZINGER. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Kinzinger votes aye.
 Mr. Zeldin?
 Mr. ZELDIN. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Zeldin votes aye.
 Mr. Sensenbrenner?
 [No response.]
 Mrs. Wagner?
 Mrs. WAGNER. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mrs. Wagner votes aye.
 Mr. Mast?
 Mr. MAST. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Mast votes aye.
 Mr. Rooney?
 [No response.]
 Mr. Fitzpatrick?
 [No response.]
 Mr. Curtis?
 Mr. CURTIS. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Curtis votes aye.
 Mr. Buck?
 [No response.]
 Mr. Wright?
 Mr. WRIGHT. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Wright votes aye.
 Mr. Reschenthaler?
 Mr. RESCHENTHALER. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Reschenthaler votes aye.
 Mr. Burchett?
 Mr. BURCHETT. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Burchett votes aye.
 Mr. Pence?
 Mr. PENCE. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Pence votes aye.
 Mr. Watkins?
 Mr. WATKINS. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Watkins votes aye.
 Mr. Guest?
 Mr. GUEST. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Guest votes aye.
 Mr. Chairman?
 Chairman ENGEL. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Chairman votes no.
 Chairman ENGEL. Is there anyone who has not been recorded
 who would like to do so?
 How is Mr. Connolly recorded?
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Connolly is not recorded.

Mr. CONNOLLY. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Connolly votes no.
 Chairman ENGEL. Mr. Deutch—how was Mr. Deutch recorded?
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Deutch is not recorded.
 Mr. DEUTCH. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Deutch votes no.
 Chairman ENGEL. Anybody else? Mr. Wilson?
 Mr. WILSON. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Wilson votes aye.
 Chairman ENGEL. OK. If there are no other votes, the clerk will report the tally.
 [Pause.]
 Chairman ENGEL. Clerk will report the tally.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Chairman, on that vote there were 16 ayes and 21 noes.
 Chairman ENGEL. 16 ayes and 21 noes. The amendment is not agreed to.
 Do other members seek recognition?
 Mr. CURTIS. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk and I ask for its consideration at this time.
 Chairman ENGEL. Mr. Curtis?
 The gentleman has 5 minutes.
 The clerk will report the amendment.
 Ms. STILES. Curtis Amendment Number 1, page four after line 23 insert the following paragraph.
 [The amendment offered by Mr. Curtis follows:]

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AMENDMENT TO H.R. 9
OFFERED BY Mr. Curtis

Page 4, after line 23, insert the following paragraph:

- 1 (1) how the United States' nationally deter-
2 mined contribution compares to the nationally deter-
3 mined contributions of other nations, including
4 China which is allowed to increase emissions for an
5 additional 13 years under the Paris Agreement;



Mr. CURTIS. Mr. Chairman, I move that we dispense with the reading of the amendment.

Chairman ENGEL. Without objection, further reading of the amendment will be dispensed with. A point of order is reserved.

Mr. Curtis?

Mr. CURTIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My amendment would simply note the nationally determined contributions like greenhouse gas emissions of the United States compared with those of other countries.

This includes China, which in the 2015 Paris Agreement has actually been permitted to increase emissions to the year 2013. As we engage in the debate about climate change, I believe it is important to note that over the past decade the U.S. has decreased annual carbon dioxide emissions by hundreds of millions of tons while in the last 20 years China has tripled its carbon dioxide emissions.

Without a level playing field and accountability from high-emissions countries like China, the United States' efforts to reduce emissions will have little if any effect on the planet overall.

I urge my colleagues to adopt this common sense amendment to improve transparency, and I yield my time.

Chairman ENGEL. The gentleman yields back his time.

Is there further debate on the amendment?

Mr. Malinowski?

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will speak in opposition to the amendment. It sounds to me as if all of us here or most of us recognize that climate change is a serious issue, a serious threat to our economy, our national security, to our well being.

The vast Majority of Americans believe that and believe that we need to do something about it. In many States, including my own—New Jersey—State governments have set very ambitious goals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

I think we also all agree that there is absolutely nothing that the United States can do alone to meet this threat if large developing economies like China do not do their part.

So would not it be great if there were an international agreement that imposed no requirements on the United States apart from those that we voluntarily commit to while also requiring large developing economies like China to, for the very first time, make commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions themselves?

Wait a second. We have that. It is the Paris Accords. That is the function of the Paris Accords. It is not to require anything of the United States other than what we have committed to because the commitments are strictly voluntary but for the very, very first time China has said what it plans to do, and it is entirely transparent because we know exactly what commitments they have made.

And, in fact, China has committed that by 2030 it will reduce carbon emissions per unit of GDP by 60 to 65 percent from 2005 levels to 2030, and despite being the world's largest greenhouse gas emitter, China has created the world's largest carbon market, pumped three times as much money into renewables as the United States, surpassed us in terms of both the number of electric vehicles on the road, the number of available charging stations.

So my worry is not that we are somehow letting China off the hook, because we are not. My worry is that China is actually poised to beat us in the race to a clean energy future with all of the economic implications that will have—that China is taking advantage of our inexplicable decision to withdraw from Paris to seize the mantle of global leadership on this issue.

And so this bill simply says we do not cede leadership to anybody. We are not going to be the only country that pulls out of the Paris Accord and allow China to basically lord it over us in the international community to say, we are doing something and the Americans are not, and it very simply asks the president to tell us how we are going to meet the commitments and it allows him to do it in whatever way he chooses.

Let us keep this bill simple. Let us remain a global leader. I am opposed to this amendment for that reason, and I yield.

Chairman ENGEL. Is there any further comments on the amendment?

Mr. ZELDIN. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman ENGEL. Yes, Mr. Zeldin?

Mr. ZELDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to speak in support of the gentleman's amendment. I think we have some different takes with regards to exactly what China and some other countries are agreeing to.

My concern with the Paris Agreement was with the reality that China is the world's largest greenhouse gas emitter but for the first 13 years of the deal they are agreeing to continue to increase emissions and you can actually give China more credit than India.

But just to recap, each nation under the Paris Agreement can do whatever they want to reach a long-term goal. The only thing India and China are committed to at the international level is to issue a report to the U.N. on their climate mitigation efforts next year and to keep up the reporting every 5 years.

There is no enforcement mechanism. Both nations have issued carbon mitigation plans to reach the vague targets of the Paris Accords that require them to drastically take coal-fired power plants offline.

And since China has an authoritarian centrally planned economy, they are making some progress. India is not, and it is an election year. So any efforts to rework their reliance on coal are on pause until at least their election is over later this year.

With regards to the other countries around the world, they are not stepping up to the plate and we have a concern with that. I would love to see the United States be in a position to enter into a deal where other countries contributing to this issue are stepping up like we are.

And we have seen a significant reduction in emissions over the course of about a dozen years, if you look at the numbers between about 2005 and 2017. That is why I was grateful of, I believe, Republican Mr. McCaul's amendment as well.

I think it is important to be engaging the private sector and technology and let us do it on an international level. Let us talk about economic concerns in our Nation just like they can talk about economic concerns in theirs.

As we are setting our own commitment concerned about our country, concerned about—we need to be concerned about energy costs. But this bill does not make any reference to the costs that are going to go up on my constituents, and I wish that it had and that is why I was grateful for Mr. McCaul's amendment.

But I just feel like as far as the agreement in total, that these other nations that are doing so much to contribute to this problem really should have stepped up more than they did. And additionally, I think it is greatly concerning that Congress did not have a role to play in this process.

You had other countries—the EU and—I mean, other nations and in their legislatures they would have debates over this. Some would have votes. Some of them would involve their nation's population.

Here, President Obama unilaterally agreed to a deal where China was agreeing to increase emissions for the next 13 years. I believe that China should have done more.

I believe that India should have been committed to do more. There are other nations that should have been committing to do more and actually some made commitments that they are not going to attain that were unreasonable. Now, what about that?

I mean, with a straight face when you look at, you know, a commitment being made by the EU where we know that there is no way that they are going to meet that target—that is also something that should be debated here in Congress. I also believe it should have been submitted as a treaty. But I would like to yield to Mr. Yoho.

Mr. YOH0. And I just want to remind people that China has made a lot of commitments. If we look at the commitment of not militarizing the Spratly or Parsley Islands while they were in the Rose Garden with President Obama—committed not to do that at the same time they were doing it.

They committed to allow Hong Kong to remain an autonomous region for 50 years. But 22 years into it, Xi Jinping says as far as he is concerned it is null and void.

And so I am not concerned with that China is doing. I look at America's leadership and what we are doing in reducing footprint—the footprint of CO2.

I yield back to the gentleman. Thank you for—

Mr. ZELDIN. Yes, and I think it is—I think it is very important for us to be able to enter into a good deal for the United States. That should be our goal—what is the best deal that we can get for the United States—and I would argue that we could have gotten a better deal.

And I would encourage whoever the president is now, whoever the next president is, whoever else is serving here in Congress that this is an important topic for, you know, us and future Congresses and future presidents to be debating.

We should just try to get more results from the countries that are contributing the most to the issue.

The United States has been leading and we should continue to lead. Other nations need to do their part.

I yield back.

Mr. SIREs [presiding]. Does the gentleman yield back? Is there further debate?

Mr. Connolly for 5 minutes.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair. I got to say, my head is spinning. First we have a Republican Party here in the Congress that, by and large, has consistently denied climate change.

We were looking at the international affairs section of the president's budget and in 140 pages he makes reference to climate change once. Once.

Now we hear from our friend from New York. His criticism is not that we are doing something about climate change but that others are not doing enough.

And I wonder if the irony of that position strikes anyone else. It certainly struck me. If that is your critique, we are happy to join in.

And my friend from New York ended his remarks by saying the United States is doing its share—others ought to follow. Well, actually as the gentlewoman from Pennsylvania pointed out, the United States is the only country of 197 that is not a member—a signatory—to the Paris Climate Accord.

So you cannot have it both ways. If you want to really toughen things up we are happy to join you. But first, we got to participate in the Paris Climate Accord or we give away all moral authority, as President Trump did.

My friend from Florida, Mr. Yoho, brought up a lot of issues regarding China and I would probably join him in most of those issues. But they have very little to do with the bill in front of us at the moment.

I guess when we cannot make the argument about the substance of climate change we revert to other behavior we do not like. But the fact of the matter is our own military, the IPCC, an intergovernmental committee of this administration, are unanimous in looking at the threats of global warming and the very alarming rise, unprecedented in 800,000 years, of CO₂.

It is going to affect our way of life, our children, and our grandchildren, and at some point maybe we can get off the talking points. Maybe we can get off the ideological precepts that bind us in straitjackets and think about future generations and our obligation to them.

I oppose the amendment on those grounds. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SIREs. Congressman Perry wants to be heard.

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is my understanding that our friends Turkey and Russia have not ratified the agreement either. But with that, I will turn my time over to or yield to the gentleman from New York, Mr. Zeldin.

Mr. ZELDIN. Thank you, and I appreciate the gentleman from Virginia's attempt to put words in my mouth and to speak for me and for other members on our side of the aisle.

We think for ourselves over here. We are not sheep just to do whatever others in our party State. We have difference of opinion and we debate them.

We share our ideas in certain things that we have a problem with—that I, speaking for myself, have a problem with is that these other nations are not stepping up and doing their part.

I have a problem of what the economic consequence is going to be for a constituent of mine who is really struggling to be able to pay their bills. We should be talking about the economics of the proposal.

I think that is a—it is a fair point. As Members of Congress we just had a debate on an amendment with regards to the use of force in Venezuela and the gentleman from Virginia was passionately talking about how Congress should take back their Article I powers and how important it is for Congress to step up and not cede our power to the executive branch.

And then the next bill that comes up the gentleman from Virginia is here passionately talking about how important it is for this chamber to cede our power to the executive branch.

There is no concern at all that Congress has no role to play whatsoever with the negotiation and entry into this agreement without coming to Congress, without consulting us?

Well, what about us as Republicans and Democrats working together? Chairman Engel has stated for years of being able to serve on this committee, Chairman Royce before him, Mike McCaul—members on both sides of the aisle wanted to talk, Republicans and Democrats, about how we can move forward with our Nation's foreign policy. There are so many issues that are before our country that are so important.

This is one that there is a valid amendment being offered. You can oppose it. You can support it. But do not put words in my mouth. We have important concerns with regards to the Paris Agreement. I believe that we can enter into a better deal.

I have a district that is almost completely surrounded by water on the east end of Long Island. I would encourage the gentleman from Virginia to come visit. We have great wineries on the North Fork. It is a great place to come, especially between Memorial Day and Labor Day.

We could talk about rising sea levels. We could talk about what we can do to improve water quality, to improve air quality. We might not agree on all the solutions but let us talk about it.

But, you know, right now with this particular debate this conversation, whether this amendment, the bill at large, Mr. McCaul's amendment, I do not think that we should be insulted for not all agreeing with each other in this committee. Having a difference of opinion between the legislative branch and the executive branch—I think that disagreement is healthy.

But let us not put words into each other's mouth and instead let us talk about solutions. I think that there are—that there are companies that have new technologies where we can figure out ways to reduce emissions without the executive branch or maybe without even the legislative branch forcing that company to make that change.

We should have a conversation as to why emissions went down between 2005 and 2017. What went right? What are some companies doing better?

I appreciate—I look forward to an opportunity to work with the gentleman from Virginia as opposed to just debating him here, and I am not going to attempt to put words in this mouth.

But, you know, you want to talk about irony, using the words that came out of his mouth from one speech to the next, from one bill to the next about whether or not we should be ceding our power or taking advantage of our Article 1 powers.

This agreement should have been submitted to the Senate as a treaty and when I posed that question to all four witnesses including the three Democratic witnesses who were here, they all agreed that this should have been submitted to the Senate as a treaty.

But there was a philosophy of the last administration. When we asked them about the Iran nuclear deal, if you remember, there were a few members here who asked Secretary Kerry why was this not submitted to Congress?

Why was it not submitted to the Senate as a treaty? And his answer was that he would not—that they would not have been able to get it passed, and I do not think that is a good excuse.

Whether it is the last administration, the current administration or the next. There is a lot of debate to be had over the course of the next 2 years and whoever the next—you know, what the American people decide who the president is going to be for the next 4 years, the next 4 years after that.

And whether it is a Republican or a Democrat, this is an issue that is going to outlast every single one of us at this—in this chamber and I think a lot of people at home and across this country would appreciate it if we could find a way to do a better job working together on this important issue of climate change.

Mr. SIREs. Congressman Levin is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just want to say a few things about the situation about China and some of these arguments.

First of all, the main thing that happened between 2005 and 2012 is called the Great Recession, and that is the main reason why our green gas emissions went down.

Also, some of us in the States moved forward on energy efficiency and renewable standards while this body did not do much to advance the ball. So we had some leadership from the States.

In terms of China, first of all, we have to look at the history of carbon emissions. Even in 2100, even with China's growing economy—and I agree over reliance on coal—20 percent of cumulative greenhouse gas emissions will come from this country and have come from this country in 2100, 17 percent from the European Union and 12 percent from China, even then.

So we have contributed much more of the problem. We will have even many years hence.

But on another level, I do not care what China does. I care about American leadership, and as Mr. Malinowski says, I care about our leadership in the economy.

We are being left behind on high-speed rail, on electrification of vehicles, on the employment of solar and wind and offshore wind and on energy storage and on micro grids and so many other fronts.

This is going to be the next 50 years of fortunes in global capitalism. We are being left behind because we are scared. We are scared to lead. We are scared to just admit the reality of science.

There is no debate over how much of greenhouse gas emissions are caused by human activity. There is no real scientific debate over this.

Let us go. Let us reestablish American leadership. The Paris Accords are a faint first step of what we need to do and my kids, for one, are not going to let us sit around here and debate endlessly.

They want action. We need to get on with passing this and then we need to take a lot of concrete steps to reduce our carbon emissions and show American leadership on the new sustainable economy that is to come.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Will my friend yield?

Mr. LEVIN. My brother, I yield to you.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank—I thank the gentleman from Michigan.

You know, the gentleman from New York accuses people of putting words in his mouth. That is not what happened.

The accusation was not that he spoke words that in fact he did not. It was that one's head was spinning over trying to follow the logic on the other side of the aisle.

Does anyone here really believe that the amendments we are going to consider and have considered to this bill are designed to improve it? They are, in fact, designed to derail the bill.

They are designed to slow this down and that is a consistent pattern of our friends on the other side of the aisle when it comes to this subject.

I do not remember my friend from New York complaining when the president of the United States denied climate change. Denied the recommendation of his own intergovernmental panel. Denied the findings of the IPCC.

It is not putting words in your mouth. It is holding you to account for a very sorry record of empirical denial about a subject that is going to affect every person and every living thing on this planet.

It is consequential to withdraw from an international agreement we helped spearhead. Yes, maybe it should have been a treaty. I hardly believe that is a dispositive issue. You got to begin somewhere. Why not begin as an agreement?

And I find it ironic that the charge was made that the previous administration left out the Congress. I seem to recall a delegation of us getting ready to go on an airplane to Paris to celebrate the signing of the agreement that was blocked by the Republican Speaker of the House of Representatives so that no one from Congress on the House side was able to go and celebrate that moment.

It has been a deliberate consistent pattern of science denial and deflection rather than deal with the subject, and one wonders why.

I thank my friend from Michigan for yielding.

Chairman ENGEL [presiding]. The gentleman's time has expired. Are there any other members who wish to be heard?

Mr. DEUTCH. Mr. Chairman? Mr. Chairman?

Chairman ENGEL. Mr. Deutch?

Mr. DEUTCH. I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to respond to one thing that we heard, which is this idea that this is an issue that we can debate today but whatever we do today we are going to be debating it through the end of this administration and the next administration and administrations that come after that.

Where is the urgency from my colleagues on this issue? This is not an issue that can wait 2 years and 4 years and 8 years and 12 years. It will be too late. That is why it is so important for us to move forward.

I support the Climate Action Now Act. I applaud the work of Representative Castor, the chair of the Select Committee on the Climate Crisis.

As Floridians, Representative Castor and I know the impact of climate change because it is happening right now. That is why we need action right now. Not next year, not after the next election, not after four more Presidential elections.

It will be too late. When will we sense the urgency? How many warmest years on record do we have to endure before there is finally some acknowledgment that this is a crisis?

The whole world came together in Paris to make commitments that would respond to the threat of climate change. Under this administration, America has now turned its back on those commitments, turned its back on the world, and turned its back on the future generations who will not have the luxury of a decision point.

That is where we are now. It is our decision that we are making for them and we have got to get it right.

So I support Representative Castor's work as the chair of the select committee. I support her strong legislation to bring us back to the global stage, to bring us back to our commitments to take action on climate change and to do it right now.

And I would also like to take this moment to extend an invitation. I would like to invite my Republican colleagues to join the bipartisan Climate Solutions Caucus. We have got to move climate change beyond politics.

I agree with that, and I thank the 45 Republicans who joined this bipartisan dialog on the real threats and possible solutions last Congress, and I invite all of my Republican colleagues to join me and my co-chair, Francis Rooney, in this Congress to move forward.

It is important to have bipartisan conversations. The fact is that alternative energy companies that will secure our energy future need to be part of those conversations. So do energy companies who are working hard on sustainability, and military experts who have warned of the threats of climate migration and famine and drought, scientists who have measured the impact on local economies from regional impacts that are happening today across the country.

Fortune 500 companies who are already doing their part to reduce their carbon footprint. Last year several caucus members and I drafted a legislative tool to help reduce carbon emissions and I am going to take advantage of this moment to encourage my colleagues to look at the Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act, which is a companion—should be a companion to this Climate Action Now Act because it would reduce carbon pollution by 45 percent by 2030 with an over 90 percent reduction by 2050 and it

would create over 2 million new jobs in a decade and it would prevent 13,000 pollution—related deaths in the United States annually.

The Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act would put a price on pollution and the fees collected would go back to the American people to ease the transition to a clean carbon-neutral economy that would be felt by lower income and middle income families. That is how we address those concerns.

I applaud the committee here for taking up H.R. 9 and I invite my colleagues to join the Climate Solutions Caucus and I ask them to look at real efforts that would address this crisis right now. That is what our legislation will do, and I go back to where I started.

If we do not act now, we are nearing a point of no return when it comes to our retirement, when it comes to our health, when it comes to our economy.

I strongly support H.R. 9 to recommit us to leadership and to climate action and to doing it right now.

I thank the chairman. I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman ENGEL. The gentleman yields back.

Is there anyone else who wishes to be heard on this amendment?

Mr. Mast?

Mr. MAST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I find it amazing that we are having a debate about this without anybody really on either side bringing up a whole lot of the facts on reductions of emissions—where the U.S. stands, where China stands, where India stands, where the EU stands, what has gone on per capita, how many metric tons, what has gone on in the energy sector.

So let us talk a little bit about some of the facts that exist out there. U.S.—highest decline in CO₂ emissions, you know, really in modern history.

Now, we still have higher emissions per capita than most others. I am not going to deny that. That is a fact as well. So per capita we do use more. But highest decline in emissions from any country out there, 758 million metric tons between 2005 and 2017.

At the same period of time, China up 50 percent. Their emissions grew by 3 billion metric tons at the same time as ours fell by 758 million metric tons. India up 88 percent at the exact same time.

So I think we should talk about some of these, talk about where this has occurred in the U.S. energy sector. Largely in the U.S. energy sector, this has occurred as a result of the growing or, rather, really beginning with the growth in the shale industry in the United States.

That is really when that time began, contributing to what happened in our energy sector going to natural gas. That is what has precipitated most of that decline in the United States.

I think as we debate this and we talk about this on both sides it is important that we throw out some of the numbers related to what the U.S. has actually been going out there and achieving.

Not that we should ever sit there and rest on our laurels to date or simply boast of the past. That is not our job to do. But it is important to bring it up as we have this debate.

And I yield back.

Mr. CURTIS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAST. Who asked for that? Absolutely, Mr. Curtis, I will yield the remainder of my time to you.

Mr. CURTIS. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, as the author of this amendment, I would like to point out that very little of our discussion has actually had to do with my amendment. I suspect it has been good therapy for all of us. And with that in mind, I would like to indulge in just a little bit of therapy and then perhaps——

Chairman ENGEL. Welcome to the Congress, Mr. Curtis.

Mr. CURTIS. You know, I feel much like the last bill. There is actually a lot that we agree on here and we get caught up on some partisan issues.

I would like to remind everybody that the intent of this bill is to measure performance. Those of us who have worked to increase performance in business, in athletics, anything, know that what we measure improves, and that is simply all this amendment is doing is asked to measure performance and to compare how we are doing.

The one gentleman that did actually refer to my amendment discussed competition between China and United States. I actually think this would introduce a healthy competition between countries.

And so with that in mind, Mr. Chairman, I yield my time and hope we can soon vote on my amendment.

Chairman ENGEL. The gentleman yields back his time.

Anybody else wish to speak?

Mr. Phillips?

Mr. PHILLIPS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I feel compelled to set the record straight as we talk about our country's performance relative to emissions.

The truth is that in 2018 our emissions are projected to increase by 3.4 percent—an increase, not a decrease, as some on the other side have noted. And at a time when the world desperately needs to decrease emissions, ours are increasing.

In a year where more dirty coal plants closed in our country than any other year in history, our emissions are increasing and that means vast declines in coal use were not enough to offset the other harms that are being caused by this administration, like efforts to weaken standards for ozone pollution, repeal the clean power plan, repeal the waters of the United States rule, withdraw the mercury effluent rule, eliminate the lead risk reduction program, repeal the rule regulating coal ash, weaken emission standards for brick and tile manufacturers, rollback of vehicle emission standards, withdraw a proposed rule reducing air pollutants at sewage treatment plants, and yes, withdraw from the Paris climate agreement.

So for us to pretend that we are a model actor here, in my estimation, is inappropriate. We should not pretend that there is no problem and I think it is time that we fulfill our responsibilities to work with our friends and partners around the world to combat this threat.

Therefore, I urge my fellow members to vote no on this amendment.

I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. The gentleman yields.

Any further comments?

Seeing none, the question is on the amendment.

All those in favor, say aye.

All those opposed, no.

In the opinion of the chair, the noes have it and the amendment is not agreed to.

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask for a recorded vote?

Chairman ENGEL. A roll call vote is ordered and the clerk will please call the roll.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Sherman?

[No response.]

Mr. Meeks?

Mr. MEEKS. No.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Meeks votes no.

Mr. Sires?

Mr. SIRES. No.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Sires votes no.

Mr. Connolly?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Nay.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Connolly votes no.

Mr. Deutch?

[No response.]

Ms. Bass?

Ms. BASS. No.

Ms. STILES. Ms. Bass votes no.

Mr. Keating?

Mr. KEATING. No.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Keating votes no.

Mr. Cicilline?

[No response.]

Mr. Bera?

Mr. BERA. No.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Bera votes no.

Mr. Castro?

Mr. CASTRO. No.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Castro votes no.

Ms. Titus?

[No response.]

Mr. Espaillat?

Mr. ESPAILLAT. No.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Espaillat votes no.

Mr. Lieu?

Mr. LIEU. No.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Lieu votes no.

Ms. Wild?

Ms. WILD. No.

Ms. STILES. Ms. Wild votes no.

Mr. Phillips?

Mr. PHILLIPS. No.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Phillips votes no.

Ms. Omar?

[No response.]

Mr. Allred?

Mr. ALLRED. No.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Allred votes no.

Mr. Levin?
 Mr. LEVIN. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Levin votes no.
 Ms. Spanberger?
 Ms. SPANBERGER. No.
 Ms. STILES. Ms. Spanberger votes no.
 Ms. Houlahan?
 Ms. HOULAHAN. No.
 Ms. STILES. Ms. Houlahan votes no.
 Mr. Malinowski?
 Mr. MALINOWSKI. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Malinowski votes no.
 Mr. Trone?
 Mr. TRONE. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Trone votes no.
 Mr. Costa?
 Mr. COSTA. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Costa votes no.
 Mr. Vargas?
 Mr. VARGAS. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Vargas votes no.
 Mr. Gonzalez?
 Mr. GONZALEZ. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Gonzalez votes no.
 Mr. McCaul?
 Mr. McCAUL. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. McCaul votes aye.
 Mr. Smith?
 Mr. SMITH. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Smith votes aye.
 Mr. Chabot?
 Mr. CHABOT. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Chabot votes aye.
 Mr. Wilson?
 Mr. WILSON. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Wilson votes aye.
 Mr. Perry?
 Mr. PERRY. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Perry votes aye.
 Mr. Yoho?
 Mr. YOHO. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Yoho votes aye.
 Mr. Kinzinger?
 Mr. KINZINGER. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Kinzinger votes aye.
 Mr. Zeldin?
 Mr. ZELDIN. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Zeldin votes aye.
 Mr. Sensenbrenner?
 [No response.]
 Mrs. Wagner?
 Mrs. WAGNER. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mrs. Wagner votes aye.
 Mr. Mast?

Mr. MAST. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Mast votes aye.
 Mr. Rooney?
 [No response.]
 Mr. Fitzpatrick?
 [No response.]
 Mr. Curtis?
 Mr. CURTIS. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Curtis votes aye.
 Mr. Buck?
 [No response.]
 Mr. Wright?
 Mr. WRIGHT. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Wright votes aye.
 Mr. Reschenthaler?
 Mr. RESCHENTHALER. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Reschenthaler votes aye.
 Mr. Burchett?
 Mr. BURCHETT. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Burchett votes aye.
 Mr. Pence?
 Mr. PENCE. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Pence votes aye.
 Mr. Watkins?
 Mr. WATKINS. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Watkins votes aye.
 Mr. Guest?
 Mr. GUEST. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Guest votes aye.
 Mr. Chairman?
 Chairman ENGEL. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Chairman votes no.
 Chairman ENGEL. Are there any others who seek to vote who have not voted?
 Mr. Deutch?
 Mr. DEUTCH. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Deutch votes no.
 Chairman ENGEL. Anybody else?
 The clerk will tally the vote.
 [Pause.]
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Chairman, on that vote, there are 17 ayes and 22 noes.
 Chairman ENGEL. 17 ayes and 22 noes. The amendment is not agreed to.
 Do other members seek recognition?
 Mr. Wright?
 Mr. WRIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have an amendment at the desk.
 Chairman ENGEL. Clerk will please report the amendment.
 Ms. STILES. Wright Amendment Number 1, at the end of the bill add the following new section: Section 6 effective date. This act takes effect on the date——
 [The amendment offered by Mr. Wright follows:]

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AMENDMENT TO H.R. 9
OFFERED BY Mr. Wright

At the end of the bill, add the following new section:

1 SEC. 6. EFFECTIVE DATE.

2 This Act takes effect on the date that the Secretary
3 of State certifies that China and Russia have each com-
4 mitted to emissions reductions that are equivalent to the
5 emissions reductions commitments of the United States.



Chairman ENGEL. Without objection, further reading of the amendment will be dispensed with. A point of order is reserved.

The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes in support of amendment.

Mr. WRIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My amendment is very simple and it changes the effective date of H.R. 9 to whenever the secretary of State can certify that China and Russia are making emission reduction commitments equivalent to those made by the United States.

President Obama unilaterally committed us to reducing our emissions by 25 to 28 percent, below 2005 levels by 2025. Fulfilling this commitment has the potential, as our Ranking Member has noted, to reduce U.S. gross domestic product by \$250 billion and eliminate 2.7 million American jobs.

This makes no sense, however, when you consider that in 2017 when emissions in the rest of the world were increasing, U.S. carbon emissions were the lowest since 1992.

Why would we commit to further reducing our emissions at such great cost to our economy and the prosperity of the American people when other countries like Russia, India, and China continue to pollute the Earth at unprecedented levels?

Before we make additional economic sacrifices to reduce our emissions, we need to see comparable action from the worst greenhouse gas offenders. Otherwise, it is all for nothing.

This amendment is not a pull out. It is a delay. Let us stop putting the United States at an economic disadvantage vis-a-vis the rest of the world, and I urge my colleagues to support this amendment and I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. The gentleman yields back. Is there further debate on the amendment?

Ms. Wild?

Ms. WILD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I rise in opposition to this amendment, which requires China and Russia commit to emissions reductions that are equivalent to the emissions reductions commitments of the United States. But the amendment does not define what equivalent means.

Equivalent to what? It is not clear what exactly we are binding ourselves to or expecting from other countries with this amendment.

Second, the language appears to suggest that the United States to wait to act until other countries, specifically China and Russia, commit to reduce emissions. Yet, those countries have already committed to climate action.

This amendment delays the effective date of the bill, wrongly uses China and Russia as excuses for inaction, and risks ceding global leadership on this issue.

However, the amendment serves as a reminder that the whole world, including the United States, China, and Russia, need to do more if we are to be spared from the worst impacts of climate change.

The Chinese government acknowledged in its most recent comprehensive assessment of climate change that it is already affected by worsening floods, more extreme droughts, diminished fishery productivity, and other ecological changes.

It recognizes that a warming climate will threaten the country's agricultural production, make economically important cities vulnerable to flooding, and eventually dry out many of the country's rivers.

Under the Paris Agreement, China committed to leveling off its carbon emissions no later than 2030 and reducing carbon emissions per unit of gross domestic product by 60 to 65 percent from 2005 levels by 2030.

Those targets are not as ambitious as ours. Remember, each nation gets to submit its own. But Beijing is acting quite aggressively to reduce emissions and deploy clean energy technologies.

Despite being the world's largest greenhouse gas emitter since 2005, China has created the world's largest carbon market, pumped approximately three times as much money into renewables as the United States, and surpassed the United States in terms of both the number of electric vehicles on the road and the number of publicly available charging stations.

China is also embracing the nexus between climate and security. In 2017, China signed on to a joint statement with the European Union, terming rising global temperatures a root cause of instability.

And on the global stage, the Trump administration's effective withdrawal from the Paris Agreement has created a global leadership void that China has been keen to exploit.

And Russia—Russia is the world's fifth largest greenhouse gas emitter and is one of 13 nations that signed the Paris Agreement but still has not formally ratified it.

Under the Paris Agreement, Russia proposed to reduce emissions 25 percent to 30 percent below 1990 levels by 2030. Russia said for years that it would delay ratification until the parties agreed on rules for implementation, which just happened at the 24th Conference of Parties in Poland in December 2018.

And now, according to the Los Angeles Times, Russia is moving closer to ratifying the Paris climate agreement later this year. In January, the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs said its members supported ratification, citing concerns over economic restrictions and competitiveness.

Russia also recognizes that future trade deals with the EU could be in jeopardy without ratification. The European Commission has said it prefers to deal with countries that back the Paris Accord.

A 2017 deal between Japan and the EU specifically referred to implementation of the climate accord. It takes courage to experiment with new ways of doing things and to leave old habits behind.

The U.S. has always led on big global challenges and now we must seize on the commitments from around the world and apply the unmatched strength and ingenuity of the American government and private sector to the problem of combating climate change.

This amendment wrongly uses China and Russia as excuses for inaction and that I why I stand in firm opposition to it.

Thank you. I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. The gentlewoman yields back.

Is there further debate on the amendment?

Seeing none, the question is on the amendment.

All those in favor say aye.

All those opposed, no.

In the opinion of the chair, the noes have it, and the amendment is not agreed to.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I request a recorded vote.

Chairman ENGEL. A roll call vote is ordered, and the clerk will please call the roll.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Sherman?

[No response.]

Mr. Meeks?

Mr. MEEKS. No.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Meeks votes no.

Mr. Sires?

Mr. SIRES. No.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Sires votes no.

Mr. Connolly?

[No response.]

Mr. Deutch?

[No response.]

Ms. Bass?

Ms. BASS. No.

Ms. STILES. Ms. Bass votes no.

Mr. Keating?

Mr. KEATING. No.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Keating votes no.

Mr. Cicilline?

Mr. CICILLINE. No.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Cicilline votes no.

Mr. Bera?

Mr. BERA. No.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Bera votes no.

Mr. Castro?

Mr. CASTRO. No.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Castro votes no.

Ms. Titus?

[No response.]

Mr. Espaillat?

Mr. ESPAILLAT. No.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Espaillat votes no.

Mr. Lieu?

Mr. LIEU. No.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Lieu votes no.

Ms. Wild?

Ms. WILD. No.

Ms. STILES. Ms. Wild votes no.

Mr. Phillips?

Mr. PHILLIPS. No.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Phillips votes no.

Ms. Omar?

[No response.]

Mr. Allred?

Mr. ALLRED. No.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Allred votes no.

Mr. Levin?

Mr. LEVIN. No.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Levin votes no.
 Ms. Spanberger?
 Ms. SPANBERGER. No.
 Ms. STILES. Ms. Spanberger votes no.
 Ms. Houlahan?
 Ms. HOULAHAN. No.
 Ms. STILES. Ms. Houlahan votes no.
 Mr. Malinowski?
 Mr. MALINOWSKI. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Malinowski votes no.
 Mr. Trone?
 [No response.]
 Mr. Costa?
 Mr. COSTA. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Costa votes no.
 Mr. Vargas?
 Mr. VARGAS. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Vargas votes no.
 Mr. Gonzalez?
 Mr. GONZALEZ. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Gonzalez votes no.
 Mr. McCaul?
 Mr. McCAUL. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. McCaul votes aye.
 Mr. Smith?
 [No response.]
 Mr. Chabot?
 Mr. CHABOT. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Chabot votes aye.
 Mr. Wilson?
 Mr. WILSON. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Wilson votes aye.
 Mr. Perry?
 Mr. PERRY. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Perry votes aye.
 Mr. Yoho?
 Mr. YOHO. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Yoho votes aye.
 Mr. Kinzinger?
 Mr. KINZINGER. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Kinzinger votes aye.
 Mr. Zeldin?
 Mr. ZELDIN. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Zeldin votes aye.
 Mr. Sensenbrenner?
 [No response.]
 Mrs. Wagner?
 Mrs. WAGNER. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mrs. Wagner votes aye.
 Mr. Mast?
 Mr. MAST. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Mast votes aye.
 Mr. Rooney?
 [No response.]

Mr. Fitzpatrick?
 [No response.]
 Mr. Curtis?
 Mr. CURTIS. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Curtis votes aye.
 Mr. Buck?
 Mr. BUCK. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Buck votes aye.
 Mr. Wright?
 Mr. WRIGHT. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Wright votes aye.
 Mr. Reschenthaler?
 [No response.]
 Mr. Burchett?
 Mr. BURCHETT. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Burchett votes aye.
 Mr. Pence?
 Mr. PENCE. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Pence votes aye.
 Mr. Watkins?
 Mr. WATKINS. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Watkins votes aye.
 Mr. Guest?
 Mr. GUEST. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Guest votes aye.
 Mr. Chairman?
 Chairman ENGEL. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Chairman votes no.
 Chairman ENGEL. Are there any other members that wish to be recorded?
 Mr. Deutch?
 Mr. DEUTCH. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Deutch votes no.
 Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman?
 Chairman ENGEL. Mr. Connolly?
 Mr. CONNOLLY. I vote nay.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Connolly votes no.
 Chairman ENGEL. Anybody else?
 The clerk will report the tally.
 Let's hold. Mr. Trone?
 Ms. STILES. You are not recorded, sir.
 Mr. TRONE. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Trone votes no.
 Mr. Chairman, on that vote, there were 16 ayes and 23 noes.
 Chairman ENGEL. 16 ayes and 23 noes. The amendment is not agreed to.
 Do other members seek recognition?
 Mr. BUCK. Mr. Chairman?
 Chairman ENGEL. Yes?
 Mr. BUCK. I have an amendment at the desk.
 Chairman ENGEL. Mr. Buck. The clerk will please report the amendment.
 Ms. STILES. "Buck Amendment No. 1.
 At the end of the bill, add the following new section.

Section 6. Recognizing the duty of the Federal Government to create a Green New Deal.

(a) Findings. Congress finds the following:

The October 2018 report entitled, ‘Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 Celsius’ by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the November 2018 Fourth National Climate Assessment Report found that human activity”——

Chairman ENGEL. Without objection, further reading of the amendment will be dispensed with.

[The amendment offered by Mr. Buck follows:]

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AMENDMENT TO H.R. 9
OFFERED BY MR. BUCK OF COLORADO

At the end of the bill, add the following new section:

1 **SEC. 6. RECOGNIZING THE DUTY OF THE FEDERAL GOV-**
2 **ERNMENT TO CREATE A GREEN NEW DEAL.**

3 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

4 (1) The October 2018 report entitled “Special
5 Report on Global Warming of 1.5 °C” by the Inter-
6 governmental Panel on Climate Change and the No-
7 vember 2018 Fourth National Climate Assessment
8 report found that—

9 (A) human activity is the dominant cause
10 of observed climate change over the past cen-
11 tury;

12 (B) a changing climate is causing sea lev-
13 els to rise and an increase in wildfires, severe
14 storms, droughts, and other extreme weather
15 events that threaten human life, healthy com-
16 munities, and critical infrastructure;

17 (C) global warming at or above 2 degrees
18 Celsius beyond preindustrialized levels will
19 cause—

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3

1 (i) global reductions in greenhouse gas
2 emissions from human sources of 40 to 60
3 percent from 2010 levels by 2030; and

4 (ii) net-zero global emissions by 2050.

5 (2) Because the United States has historically
6 been responsible for a disproportionate amount of
7 greenhouse gas emissions, having emitted 20 percent
8 of global greenhouse gas emissions through 2014,
9 and has a high technological capacity, the United
10 States must take a leading role in reducing emis-
11 sions through economic transformation.

12 (3) The United States is currently experiencing
13 several related crises, with—

14 (A) life expectancy declining while basic
15 needs, such as clean air, clean water, healthy
16 food, and adequate health care, housing, trans-
17 portation, and education, are inaccessible to a
18 significant portion of the United States popu-
19 lation;

20 (B) a 4-decade trend of wage stagnation,
21 deindustrialization, and antilabor policies that
22 has led to—

23 (i) hourly wages overall stagnating
24 since the 1970s despite increased worker
25 productivity;

1 regional, social, environmental, and economic injus-
2 tices (referred to in this section as “systemic injus-
3 tices”) by disproportionately affecting indigenous
4 peoples, communities of color, migrant communities,
5 deindustrialized communities, depopulated rural
6 communities, the poor, low-income workers, women,
7 the elderly, the unhoused, people with disabilities,
8 and youth (referred to in this section as “frontline
9 and vulnerable communities”).

10 (5) Climate change constitutes a direct threat
11 to the national security of the United States—

12 (A) by impacting the economic, environ-
13 mental, and social stability of countries and
14 communities around the world; and

15 (B) by acting as a threat multiplier.

16 (6) The Federal Government-led mobilizations
17 during World War II and the New Deal created the
18 greatest middle class that the United States has ever
19 seen, but many members of frontline and vulnerable
20 communities were excluded from many of the eco-
21 nomic and societal benefits of those mobilizations.

22 (7) Congress recognizes that a new national, so-
23 cial, industrial, and economic mobilization on a scale
24 not seen since World War II and the New Deal era
25 is a historic opportunity—

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7

- 1 (v) a sustainable environment; and
- 2 (E) to promote justice and equity by stop-
- 3 ping current, preventing future, and repairing
- 4 historic oppression of indigenous peoples, com-
- 5 munities of color, migrant communities,
- 6 deindustrialized communities, depopulated rural
- 7 communities, the poor, low-income workers,
- 8 women, the elderly, the unhoused, people with
- 9 disabilities, and youth;
- 10 (2) the goals described in subparagraphs (A)
- 11 through (E) of paragraph (1) (referred to in this
- 12 section as the “Green New Deal goals”) should be
- 13 accomplished through a 10-year national mobiliza-
- 14 tion (referred to in this section as the “Green New
- 15 Deal mobilization”) that will require the following
- 16 goals and projects—
- 17 (A) building resiliency against climate
- 18 change-related disasters, such as extreme
- 19 weather, including by leveraging funding and
- 20 providing investments for community-defined
- 21 projects and strategies;
- 22 (B) repairing and upgrading the infra-
- 23 structure in the United States, including—

1 (F) spurring massive growth in clean man-
2 ufacturing in the United States and removing
3 pollution and greenhouse gas emissions from
4 manufacturing and industry as much as is tech-
5 nologically feasible, including by expanding re-
6 newable energy manufacturing and investing in
7 existing manufacturing and industry;

8 (G) working collaboratively with farmers
9 and ranchers in the United States to remove
10 pollution and greenhouse gas emissions from
11 the agricultural sector as much as is techno-
12 logically feasible, including—

13 (i) by supporting family farming;

14 (ii) by investing in sustainable farm-
15 ing and land use practices that increase
16 soil health; and

17 (iii) by building a more sustainable
18 food system that ensures universal access
19 to healthy food;

20 (II) overhauling transportation systems in
21 the United States to remove pollution and
22 greenhouse gas emissions from the transpor-
23 tation sector as much as is technologically fea-
24 sible, including through investment in—

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11

1 (M) identifying other emission and pollu-
 2 tion sources and creating solutions to remove
 3 them; and

4 (N) promoting the international exchange
 5 of technology, expertise, products, funding, and
 6 services, with the aim of making the United
 7 States the international leader on climate ac-
 8 tion, and to help other countries achieve a
 9 Green New Deal;

10 (3) a Green New Deal must be developed
 11 through transparent and inclusive consultation, col-
 12 laboration, and partnership with frontline and vul-
 13 nerable communities, labor unions, worker coopera-
 14 tives, civil society groups, academia, and businesses;
 15 and

16 (4) to achieve the Green New Deal goals and
 17 mobilization, a Green New Deal will require the fol-
 18 lowing goals and projects—

19 (A)) providing and leveraging, in a way
 20 that ensures that the public receives appro-
 21 priate ownership stakes and returns on invest-
 22 ment, adequate capital (including through com-
 23 munity grants, public banks, and other public
 24 financing), technical expertise, supporting poli-
 25 cies, and other forms of assistance to commu-

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13

1 build wealth and community ownership, while
 2 prioritizing high-quality job creation and eco-
 3 nomic, social, and environmental benefits in
 4 frontline and vulnerable communities, and
 5 deindustrialized communities, that may other-
 6 wise struggle with the transition away from
 7 greenhouse gas intensive industries;

8 (F) ensuring the use of democratic and
 9 participatory processes that are inclusive of and
 10 led by frontline and vulnerable communities and
 11 workers to plan, implement, and administer the
 12 Green New Deal mobilization at the local level;

13 (G) ensuring that the Green New Deal mo-
 14 bilization creates high-quality union jobs that
 15 pay prevailing wages, hires local workers, offers
 16 training and advancement opportunities, and
 17 guarantees wage and benefit parity for workers
 18 affected by the transition;

19 (II) guaranteeing a job with a family-sus-
 20 taining wage, adequate family and medical
 21 leave, paid vacations, and retirement security to
 22 all people of the United States;

23 (I) strengthening and protecting the right
 24 of all workers to organize, unionize, and collec-

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15

- 1 (N) ensuring a commercial environment
2 where every businessperson is free from unfair
3 competition and domination by domestic or
4 international monopolies; and
5 (O) providing all people of the United
6 States with—
7 (i) high-quality health care;
8 (ii) affordable, safe, and adequate
9 housing;
10 (iii) economic security; and
11 (iv) clean water, clean air, healthy and
12 affordable food, and access to nature.



Chairman ENGEL. A point of order is reserved.

The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his amendment.

Mr. BUCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We are here to discuss a serious problem, the socialist takeover of the Democratic Party. The idea that Washington knows best is just oozing from every pore of the People's House these days. This bill is no different.

The underlying bill, the Climate Action Now Act, is nothing more than a progressive temper tantrum after President Trump wisely withdrew us from the flawed Paris Climate Agreement. I ask my colleagues, what did this sage and sensible climate deal that President Obama did not even bother submitting as a treaty offer us as a nation? I will tell you exactly what we got from the deal.

A big stocking full of coal, coal that is completely useless because we cannot use it to heat our homes. We have an empty agreement that makes people feel good about how the U.S. is, quote, "doing something," quote, while China and Russia are able to continue emitting greenhouse gases with impunity for another 13 years.

We are being asked to spend billions, if not trillions, of dollars to meet these emissions goals. And Democrats' schemes will kill jobs, raise America's energy bills, kick more people from the middle class, and limit our country's global leadership capabilities, just so we can feel good about ourselves. That does not sound like global leadership. It sounds like the Democrats' fantasy to remove our private sector's power and remake America into a government-controlled socialist state.

This brings me to another socialist climate fantasy of the Democratic Party, the Green New Deal. Speaker Pelosi said this fantasyland plan is, quote, "about jobs. It is about good-paying green jobs. It is about public health, clean air, and clean water for our children. It is about defending national security." End of quote.

Even Newsweek, which is not exactly a bastion of conservative thought, commented that, quote, "The Climate Action Now Act would fall far short of instilling the broad, sweeping reforms that the Green New Deal calls for."

This plan that Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Senator Ed Markey introduced is transformational, transformational in that it will turn America into the socialist state that Bernie Sanders has cried for since he spent his honeymoon on Soviet Russia.

The Green New Deal is a government takeover of our Nation's economy that puts Washington's social planners in control. While some on the left have argued that it is the only way to stop our world from ending in a decade, I do not believe killing all the cows and making my colleagues from Hawaii and Puerto Rico take a boat to work every day will really save the world.

Among other highlights from the Green New Deal, we will replace every building in the United States; we will completely cut out all fossil fuels in 10 years; we will outlaw combustion engines, and guarantee a job for every person, whether or not they want to work.

An analysis Chairman Burr recently released from Senate consideration showed that the Green New Deal will raise an average

American family's power bill by \$3,800 per year. And even worse, we will be asking our kids and grandkids to foot the astounding \$93 trillion bill to realize this punch-drunk fantasy.

This plan will do nothing to help our economy. It will only serve to halt profitable industries, hurt American families, and burden us with such a great debt that we will not be able to defend ourselves if we are attacked by a foreign adversary.

No wonder my Democratic colleagues are nervous about being held accountable for their plan. Their political courage was on display when the Senate voted 0 in favor, 57 opposed, and 43—that is right 43—present votes. In fact, a sponsor of this legislation, Congresswoman Castor, did not commit to bring the Green New Deal up for a vote.

My amendment gives my colleagues exactly that opportunity. Adopt my amendment and give the House the opportunity to stand and be counted on this measure.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. I raise a point of order that the amendment is not germane.

Does any member wish to be heard on the point of order?

Mr. BUCK. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman ENGEL. Yes?

Mr. BUCK. I do not understand why it would not be germane. It is an environmental bill in front of the committee right now, and this is an environmental amendment to the bill.

Chairman ENGEL. The amendment relates to a subject to which there is no reference in the text before us. The objective of the amendment is unrelated to the objective of H.R. 9.

Mr. BUCK. Mr. Chairman, may I be heard?

Chairman ENGEL. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. BUCK. Mr. Chairman, I think the clean air and clean water are in both pieces of legislation. I think that the intent is the same. I am sure that my Democratic colleagues understand the financial burdens that their current legislation places on us, and I am sure they understand that the Green New Deal, while it would go further, no doubt, it would still place huge burdens on us. And I believe that the relevance, the germaneness is clear.

If this were a piece of legislation solely dealing with jobs and solely dealing with some non-related issue, I would agree with the chair. But I would ask the chair to reconsider his ruling.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ENGEL. Well, let me rule again. The chair finds that the amendment is not germane.

Mr. BUCK. Mr. Chairman, I ask for a vote on that, please.

Chairman ENGEL. State your parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. CONNOLLY. My parliamentary inquiry was—you have just answered it—has the chair made a ruling?

Chairman ENGEL. Yes.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair.

Chairman ENGEL. Who else seeks recognition?

Mr. BUCK. Mr. Chairman, I asked for a vote on that.

Mr. CICILLINE. Point of order, Mr. Chairman. There is no vote on a—there is nothing pending to request a vote on. The ruling has been made.

Mr. BUCK. Mr. Chairman, I appeal the ruling of the chair.

Chairman ENGEL. The gentleman is appealing the rule of the chair.

Mr. CICILLINE. Move to table. Mr. Chairman, I vote to table.

Chairman ENGEL. The vote is on the motion to table.

All those in favor say aye.

All those opposed say no.

In my opinion, the ayes have it.

Mr. BUCK. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman ENGEL. Yes?

Mr. BUCK. I ask for the yeas and nays on that, please.

Chairman ENGEL. The yeas and nays have been asked for and are ordered.

The clerk will call the roll.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Sherman?

[No response.]

Ms. STILES. Mr. Meeks?

Mr. MEEKS. Aye.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Meeks votes aye.

Mr. Sires?

Mr. SIRES. Aye.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Sires votes aye.

Mr. Connolly?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Aye.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Connolly votes aye.

Mr. Deutch?

Mr. DEUTCH. Aye.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Deutch votes aye.

Ms. Bass?

[No response.]

Ms. STILES. Mr. Keating?

Mr. KEATING. Aye.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Keating votes aye.

Mr. Cicilline?

Mr. CICILLINE. Aye.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Cicilline votes aye.

Mr. Bera?

Mr. BERA. Aye.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Bera votes aye.

Mr. Castro?

Mr. CASTRO. Aye.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Castro votes aye.

Ms. Titus?

Ms. TITUS. Aye.

Ms. STILES. Ms. Titus votes aye.

Mr. Espaillat?

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Aye.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Espaillat votes aye.

Mr. Lieu?

Mr. LIEU. Aye.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Lieu votes aye.

Ms. Wild?

Ms. WILD. Aye.

Ms. STILES. Ms. Wild votes aye.

Mr. Phillips?
 Mr. PHILLIPS. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Phillips votes aye.
 Ms. Omar?
 [No response.]
 Mr. Allred?
 Mr. ALLRED. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Allred votes aye.
 Mr. Levin?
 Mr. LEVIN. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Levin votes aye.
 Ms. Spanberger? Ms. Spanberger?
 [No response.]
 Ms. STILES. Ms. Houlahan?
 Ms. HOULAHAN. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Ms. Houlahan votes aye.
 Mr. Malinowski?
 Mr. MALINOWSKI. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Malinowski votes aye.
 Mr. Trone?
 Mr. TRONE. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Trone votes aye.
 Mr. Costa? Mr. Costa? Mr. Costa?
 Mr. COSTA. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Costa votes aye.
 Mr. Vargas?
 Mr. VARGAS. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Vargas votes aye.
 Mr. Gonzalez?
 Mr. GONZALEZ. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Gonzalez votes aye.
 Mr. McCaul?
 Mr. McCAUL. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. McCaul votes no.
 Mr. Smith?
 Mr. SMITH. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Smith votes no.
 Mr. Chabot?
 Mr. CHABOT. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Chabot votes no.
 Mr. Wilson?
 Mr. WILSON. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Wilson votes no.
 Mr. Perry?
 Mr. PERRY. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Perry votes no.
 Mr. Yoho?
 Mr. YOHO. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Yoho votes no.
 Mr. Kinzinger?
 Mr. KINZINGER. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Kinzinger votes no.
 Mr. Zeldin?
 Mr. ZELDIN. No.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Zeldin votes no.
 Mr. Sensenbrenner?
 [No response.]
 Mrs. Wagner?
 Mrs. WAGNER. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mrs. Wagner votes no.
 Mr. Mast?
 Mr. MAST. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Mast votes no.
 Mr. Rooney?
 [No response.]
 Mr. Fitzpatrick?
 [No response.]
 Mr. Curtis?
 Mr. CURTIS. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Curtis votes no.
 Mr. Buck?
 Mr. BUCK. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Buck votes no.
 Mr. Wright?
 Mr. WRIGHT. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Wright votes no.
 Mr. Reschenthaler?
 [No response.]
 Mr. Burchett?
 Mr. BURCHETT. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Burchett votes no.
 Mr. Pence?
 Mr. PENCE. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Pence votes no.
 Mr. Watkins?
 Mr. WATKINS. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Watkins votes no.
 Mr. Guest?
 Mr. GUEST. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Guest votes no.
 Mr. Chairman?
 Chairman ENGEL. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Chairman votes aye.
 Chairman ENGEL. Are there any others who seek to vote?
 Ms. SPANBERGER. How did I vote?
 Ms. STILES. Ms. Spanberger, you are not recorded yet.
 Ms. SPANBERGER. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Spanberger votes aye.
 Chairman ENGEL. Anyone else who has not voted who would like to vote at this time?
 The clerk will report the results.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Chairman, on that vote, there are 23 ayes and 17 noes.
 Chairman ENGEL. 23 ayes and 17 noes. The ruling of—the motion to table is agreed to. The ruling of the chair that the amendment is not germane is sustained.
 Is there further debate or amendment?

Mr. ZELDIN. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk and ask for its immediate consideration at this time.

Chairman ENGEL. For what purpose does the gentleman from New York seek recognition?

Mr. ZELDIN. I have an amendment at the desk and I would ask for immediate consideration.

Chairman ENGEL. The gentleman from New York has 5 minutes.

Mr. ZELDIN. This amendment would require that the Paris Agreement obtain ratification from the Senate. The Paris Climate Agreement was a treaty——

Chairman ENGEL. Will the gentleman suspend? I just want to make sure the clerk will report the amendment before the gentleman speaks.

Ms. STILES. “Zeldin Amendment No. 1.

At the end of the bill, add the following section:

Section 6. Effective date. This Act shall take effect”——

Chairman ENGEL. Without objection, further reading of the amendment will be dispensed with.

[The amendment offered by Mr. Zeldin follows:]

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AMENDMENT TO H.R. 9
OFFERED BY MR. Zeldin

At the end of the bill, add the following section:

- 1 **SEC. 6. EFFECTIVE DATE.**
- 2 This Act shall take effect on the date that the Senate
- 3 approves a resolution of advice and consent to ratification
- 4 of the Paris Agreement.



Chairman ENGEL. A point of order is reserved.

The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his amendment.

Mr. ZELDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This amendment would require that the Paris Agreement obtain ratification from the Senate. The Paris Climate Agreement was a treaty in every sense of the term. The United States Constitution says that treaties must obtain the advice and consent of the Senate before the United States may lawfully enter into the agreement.

President Obama deemed the Paris Agreement to not be a treaty in order to evade constitutional review. While the duly elected legislatures in other nations like Canada and the European Union posted hearings, debates, and, ultimately, voted on the Paris Accord, President Obama chose to bypass the Constitution and entered into this sweeping international agreement without seeking congressional approval.

These types of agreements should be agreed to in a transparent manner that follows the Constitution and the law. I support many overall goals here, but the United States approached this entire Paris Climate Agreement all wrong. Other nations made modest commitments pegged to their GDP growth, while President Obama made a unilateral pledge to bring emissions 25 to 28 percent below 2005 levels by 2025. There are some very important practical issues with that pledge regarding feasibility which especially include unmanageable time constraints and energy cost increases for our constituents.

Last week, we held a hearing on this issue, and every single witness agreed that the Senate should ratify any future Paris Climate Agreement. Any international deal going forward needs congressional input in a vote that lays out the negotiating goals and a ratification vote after the fact.

That is why I am offering this amendment today and encourage every member to support it.

I yield back the rest of my time.

Chairman ENGEL. The gentleman yields back.

The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Levin, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I rise in opposition to this amendment. My friend from New York earlier in the day was saying, let's have discussions about how we can achieve these objectives and approve, you know, and tackle climate change. But this amendment is simply a delay tactic.

The amendment would delay the effective date of this bill until the Senate ratifies the Paris Agreement. But the Paris Agreement does not require Senate ratification. The President had authority to enter into the Paris Agreement, derived from the Constitution. The Senate approved the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and Domestic Law. The United States enters into international agreements all the time without Senate ratification.

This language indefinitely delays the effective date of this bill. The gentleman knows very well the Senate has no intention of ratifying this. It is a pure delay tactic, and I urge my colleagues to vote no.

Thank you.

Chairman ENGEL. I thank the gentleman.

Anyone else seek recognition?

Mr. Perry, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. PERRY. Mr. Chairman, I yield to my friend, Mr. Zeldin.

Mr. ZELDIN. Thank you, Mr. Perry.

And to my colleague who has just spoken, there have been a lot of speeches today where we are putting words into the mouths of Republicans. This is a genuine concern that was expressed last week. We had Democratic witnesses and one Republican witness, and all four agreed that this should have been submitted as a treaty.

And I had an exchange with one of my other colleagues on the other side aisle to an earlier amendment, and that colleague on your side of the aisle also acknowledged the fact. Now I do not know, I have not spoken to every single member on your side of the aisle as to whether or not you believe the Paris Agreement should have been submitted as a treaty. I am not going to attempt to try to speak for anyone I have not spoken to on the other side of the aisle.

But it is a genuine belief that the Paris Agreement should have been submitted as a treaty. It was a genuine belief that the Iran nuclear deal should have been submitted as a treaty. It is OK if you want to disagree with us, but where we request a treaty to be submitted to the Senate for ratification, just to make the claim that it is simply a delaying tactic, with all due respect, I mean, just understand that there are people who believe that the Paris Agreement was a treaty that should have been submitted. There are people who believe that there should have been hearings, that there should have been public debate and votes, and input by Congress.

If you disagree that Congress should have a role to play in agreeing to the Paris Agreement, you can have that position, but it is our position on our side of the aisle at least—I am speaking for myself—that the Paris Agreement should have been treated as a treaty.

But, with all due respect to Mr. Levin, we have not had a chance really to meet in person. Just understand that we genuinely have that position on our side of the aisle.

Mr. LEVIN. Will the gentleman yield? Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ZELDIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. LEVIN. Yes, thank you so much, and I really appreciate your comments. And I really do take your concern to be genuine.

Last week, we had no one here from the State Department. It is the State Department that makes the determination about whether something like this needs to go to the Senate. The State Department made that determination at the time.

But, in any event, I and my colleagues—and I wish it were more bipartisan—feel strongly that the Paris Accord is a modest first step in a long, urgent, urgent road to move much faster to tackle climate change. I have not heard, honestly, I do not think, a single word from that side of the room today about concrete ideas that you wish to put forward to move our country faster to tackle climate change or our world. And in fact, in all the time that you were in total control of this Congress, not a single thing happened.

So, I do appreciate the genuineness of your concern. I look forward to working with you on so many matters, but I have to oppose the amendment.

Thank you so much.

Mr. ZELDIN. I appreciate the gentleman for his remarks. Earlier he was speaking about actions that were taken by the States of New York and in California, and crediting the States for the reduction in emissions over the course of the last 10 or 15 years. There are others who have a different take. They believe that market forces contributed to the reduction of emissions. And we could debate it. Maybe we will have a disagreement.

But, with regards to the last point that the gentleman just stated as far as what we feel on our side of the aisle, many of my colleagues who I have spoken to believe that market forces and new technology and companies making the right decisions, that the economy, that a lot of positive progress with regards to the environment can be done, not by the governmental intervention of New York and California as much as the use of technology and new ways to be able to provide—

Mr. LEVIN. I know your time is expiring.

Let me just say that for the last 7 years before I joined the Congress, I ran a private company that drove climate change in the State—I was not referring to New York and California. I was proudly, although silently, referring to Michigan. And it was government policy, but also market forces. I am all for market forces, but they need clear signals from the government.

And I so appreciate the discussion.

Mr. ZELDIN. Thank you. I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. The gentleman's time has expired.

Any other members who wish to speak?

Seeing none, the question is on the amendment.

All those in favor say aye.

All those opposed say no.

In the opinion of the chair, the noes have it, and the amendment is not agreed to.

Mr. ZELDIN. Mr. Chair, I request a recorded vote.

Chairman ENGEL. There has been a request for a recorded vote, and the clerk will please call the role.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Sherman?

[No response.]

Mr. Meeks?

Mr. MEEKS. No.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Meeks votes no.

Mr. Sires?

Mr. SIRES. No.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Sires votes no.

Mr. Connolly?

[No response.]

Mr. Deutch?

[No response.]

Ms. Bass?

Ms. BASS. No.

Ms. STILES. Ms. Bass votes no.

Mr. Keating?

Mr. KEATING. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Keating votes no.
 Mr. Cicilline?
 Mr. CICILLINE. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Cicilline votes no.
 Mr. Bera?
 Mr. BERA. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Bera votes no.
 Mr. Castro?
 Mr. CASTRO. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Castro votes no.
 Ms. Titus?
 [No response.]
 Mr. Espaillat?
 Mr. ESPAILLAT. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Espaillat votes no.
 Mr. Lieu?
 Mr. LIEU. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Lieu votes no.
 Ms. Wild?
 Ms. WILD. No.
 Ms. STILES. Ms. Wild votes no.
 Mr. Phillips?
 Mr. PHILLIPS. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Phillips votes no.
 Ms. Omar?
 [No response.]
 Mr. Allred?
 Mr. ALLRED. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Allred votes no.
 Mr. Levin?
 Mr. LEVIN. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Levin votes no.
 Ms. Spanberger?
 Ms. SPANBERGER. No.
 Ms. STILES. Ms. Spanberger votes no.
 Ms. Houlahan?
 Ms. HOULAHAN. No.
 Ms. STILES. Ms. Houlahan votes no.
 Mr. Malinowski?
 Mr. MALINOWSKI. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Malinowski votes no.
 Mr. Trone?
 [No response.]
 Mr. Costa?
 Mr. COSTA. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Costa votes no.
 Mr. Vargas?
 Mr. VARGAS. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Vargas votes no.
 Mr. Gonzalez?
 Mr. GONZALEZ. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Gonzalez votes no.
 Mr. McCaul?

Mr. McCaul. Aye.
Ms. STILES. Mr. McCaul votes aye.
Mr. Smith?
[No response.]
Mr. Chabot?
Mr. CHABOT. Aye.
Ms. STILES. Mr. Chabot votes aye.
Mr. Wilson?
Mr. WILSON. Aye.
Ms. STILES. Mr. Wilson votes aye.
Mr. Perry?
Mr. PERRY. Aye.
Ms. STILES. Mr. Perry votes aye.
Mr. Yoho?
Mr. YOHO. Aye.
Ms. STILES. Mr. Yoho votes aye.
Mr. Kinzinger?
Mr. KINZINGER. Aye.
Ms. STILES. Mr. Kinzinger votes aye.
Mr. Zeldin?
Mr. ZELDIN. Aye.
Ms. STILES. Mr. Zeldin votes aye.
Mr. Sensenbrenner?
[No response.]
Mrs. Wagner?
Mrs. WAGNER. Aye.
Ms. STILES. Mrs. Wagner votes aye.
Mr. Mast?
Mr. MAST. Aye.
Ms. STILES. Mr. Mast votes aye.
Mr. Rooney?
[No response.]
Mr. Fitzpatrick?
[No response.]
Mr. Curtis?
Mr. CURTIS. Aye.
Ms. STILES. Mr. Curtis votes aye.
Mr. Buck?
Mr. BUCK. Aye.
Ms. STILES. Mr. Buck votes aye.
Mr. Wright?
Mr. WRIGHT. Aye.
Ms. STILES. Mr. Wright votes aye.
Mr. Reschenthaler?
[No response.]
Mr. Burchett?
Mr. BURCHETT. Aye.
Ms. STILES. Mr. Burchett votes aye.
Mr. Pence?
Mr. PENCE. Aye.
Ms. STILES. Mr. Pence votes aye.
Mr. Watkins?
Mr. WATKINS. Aye.
Ms. STILES. Mr. Watkins votes aye.

Mr. Guest?
 Mr. GUEST. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Guest votes aye.
 Mr. Chairman?
 Chairman ENGEL. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Chairman votes no.
 Chairman ENGEL. Mr. Costa?
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Costa?
 Mr. COSTA. Votes no.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Costa votes no.
 Chairman ENGEL. Ms. Spanberger?
 Ms. SPANBERGER. No.
 Ms. STILES. Ms. Spanberger votes no.
 Chairman ENGEL. Anyone who has not voted who would like to do so?
 Mr. Sherman?
 Mr. SHERMAN. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Sherman votes no.
 Chairman ENGEL. The clerk shall tally and call the roll.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Chairman, on that vote, there were 17 ayes and 24 noes.
 Chairman ENGEL. 17 ayes and 24 noes. The amendment is not agreed to.
 Are there any other requests for recognition?
 Hearing none, we then move on to final passage.
 Hearing no further requests for recognition, the question is to report H.R. 9, the Climate Action Now Act, to the House with the recommendation that the bill do pass.
 All those in favor say aye.
 All opposed, no.
 In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it.
 Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Chairman?
 Chairman ENGEL. Mr. McCaul?
 Mr. McCAUL. I request a recorded vote.
 Chairman ENGEL. The Ranking Member requests a recorded vote.
 The question is to report H.R. 9, the Climate Action Now Act, to the House with the recommendation that the bill do pass.
 The clerk will please call the roll.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Sherman?
 Mr. SHERMAN. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Sherman votes aye.
 Mr. Meeks?
 Mr. MEEKS. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Meeks votes aye.
 Mr. Sires?
 Mr. SIRES. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Sires votes aye.
 Mr. Connolly?
 Mr. CONNOLLY. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Connolly votes aye.
 Mr. Deutch?
 Mr. DEUTCH. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Deutch votes aye.

Ms. Bass?
 [No response.]
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Keating?
 Mr. KEATING. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Keating votes aye.
 Mr. Cicilline?
 Mr. CICILLINE. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Cicilline votes aye.
 Mr. Bera?
 Mr. BERA. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Bera votes aye.
 Mr. Castro?
 Mr. CASTRO. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Castro votes aye.
 Ms. Titus?
 Ms. TITUS. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Ms. Titus votes aye.
 Mr. Espaillat?
 Mr. ESPAILLAT. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Espaillat votes aye.
 Mr. Lieu?
 Mr. LIEU. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Lieu votes aye.
 Ms. Wild?
 Ms. WILD. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Ms. Wild votes aye.
 Mr. Phillips?
 Mr. PHILLIPS. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Phillips votes aye.
 Ms. Omar?
 [No response.]
 Mr. Allred?
 Mr. ALLRED. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Allred votes aye.
 Mr. Levin?
 Mr. LEVIN. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Levin votes aye.
 Ms. Spanberger?
 Ms. SPANBERGER. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Ms. Spanberger votes aye.
 Ms. Houlahan?
 Ms. HOULAHAN. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Ms. Houlahan votes aye.
 Mr. Malinowski?
 Mr. MALINOWSKI. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Malinowski votes aye.
 Mr. Trone?
 Mr. TRONE. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Trone votes aye.
 Mr. Costa? Mr. Costa?
 Mr. COSTA. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Costa votes aye.
 Mr. Vargas?
 Mr. VARGAS. Aye.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Vargas votes aye.
 Mr. Gonzalez?
 Mr. GONZALEZ. Aye.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Gonzalez votes aye.
 Mr. McCaul?
 Mr. McCAUL. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. McCaul votes no.
 Mr. Smith?
 [No response.]
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Chabot?
 Mr. CHABOT. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Chabot votes no.
 Mr. Wilson?
 Mr. WILSON. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Wilson votes no.
 Mr. Perry?
 Mr. PERRY. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Perry votes no.
 Mr. Yoho?
 Mr. YOHO. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Yoho votes no.
 Mr. Kinzinger?
 Mr. KINZINGER. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Kinzinger votes no.
 Mr. Zeldin?
 Mr. ZELDIN. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Zeldin votes no.
 Mr. Sensenbrenner?
 [No response.]
 Mrs. Wagner?
 Mrs. WAGNER. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mrs. Wagner votes no.
 Mr. Mast?
 Mr. MAST. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Mast votes no.
 Mr. Rooney?
 [No response.]
 Mr. Fitzpatrick?
 [No response.]
 Mr. Curtis?
 Mr. CURTIS. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Curtis votes no.
 Mr. Buck?
 Mr. BUCK. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Buck votes no.
 Mr. Wright?
 Mr. WRIGHT. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Wright votes no.
 Mr. Reschenthaler?
 [No response.]
 Mr. Burchett?
 Mr. BURCHETT. No.
 Ms. STILES. Mr. Burchett votes no.
 Mr. Pence?

Mr. PENCE. No.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Pence votes no.

Mr. Watkins?

Mr. WATKINS. No.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Watkins votes no.

Mr. Guest?

Mr. GUEST. No.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Guest votes no.

Mr. Chairman?

Chairman ENGEL. Aye.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Chairman votes aye.

Chairman ENGEL. Have all members been recorded?

The clerk will report.

Ms. STILES. Mr. Chairman, on that vote, there are 24 ayes and 16 noes.

Chairman ENGEL. 24 ayes and 16 noes. The ayes have it. The measure is ordered favorably reported.

Mr. MCCAUL. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman ENGEL. Yes, Mr. McCaul.

Mr. MCCAUL. Pursuant to House rules, I request that members have the opportunity to submit views for any committee report that may be produced on any of today's measures.

Chairman ENGEL. Without objection.

Without objection, the staff is authorized to make necessary technical and conforming changes for all the measures considered today.

So, this concludes our business. I want to thank Ranking Member McCaul and all of the committee members for their contributions and assistance with today's markup.

The committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:50 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

FULL COMMITTEE MARKUP NOTICE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128

Eliot L. Engel (D-NY), Chairman

April 9, 2019

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN markup of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to be held in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website <https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/>):

DATE: Tuesday, April 9, 2019

TIME: 2:00 p.m.

MARKUP OF: H.R. 9, Climate Action Now Act
H.R. 2002, Taiwan Assurance Act of 2019
H. Res. 273, Reaffirming the United States commitment to Taiwan and to the implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act
H.R. 97, RAWR Act
H.R. 753, Global Electoral Exchange Act of 2019
H.R. 1704, Championing American Business Through Diplomacy Act of 2019
H.R. 1004, Prohibiting Unauthorized Military Action in Venezuela Act
H.R. 1952, Intercountry Adoption Information Act
H.R. 615, The Refugee Sanitation Facility Safety Act of 2019
H.R. 526, Cambodia Democracy Act
H.Res. 106, Denouncing female genital mutilation
H.R. 1359, Digital Global Access Policy Act of 2019
H.R. 951, U.S-Mexico Tourism Improvement Act
H.R. 2116, Global Fragility Act

By Direction of the Chairman

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202-225-5021 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MINUTES OF FULL COMMITTEE MARKUP

Day Tuesday Date 04/09/19 Room 2172 RHOB

Starting Time 2:10 p.m. Ending Time 5:50 p.m.

Recesses 1 (2:35 to 3:21) (____ to ____) (____ to ____) (____ to ____) (____ to ____)

Presiding Member(s)

Chairman Eliot L. Engel, Rep. Brad Sherman, Rep. Ted Deutch, Rep. Albio Sires

Check all of the following that apply:

Open Session ☒

Electronically Recorded (taped) ☒

Executive (closed) Session ☐

Stenographic Record ☒

Televised ☒

BILLS FOR MARKUP: (Include bill number(s) and title(s) of legislation.)

H.R. 9, Climate Action Now Act, H.R. 2002, Taiwan Assurance Act of 2019, H. Res. 273, Reaffirming the United States commitment to Taiwan and to the implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act, H.R. 97, RAIPR Act, H.R. 753, Global Electoral Exchange Act of 2019, H.R. 1704, Championing American Business Through Diplomacy Act of 2019, H.R. 1004, Prohibiting Unauthorized Military Action in Venezuela Act, H.R. 1932, Intercountry Adoption Information Act, H.R. 615, The Refugee Sanitation Facility Safety Act of 2019, H.R. 526, Cambodia Democracy Act, H.Res. 106, Denouncing female genital mutilation, H.R. 1339, Digital Global Access Policy Act of 2019, H.R. 951, U.S-Mexico Tourism Improvement Act, H.R. 2116, Global Fragility Act

COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

See attached.

NON-COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

N/A

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record.)

SFR - Chabot, Rooney

ACTIONS TAKEN DURING THE MARKUP: (Attach copies of legislation and amendments.)

See markup summary.

RECORDED VOTES TAKEN (FOR MARKUP): (Attach final vote tally sheet listing each member.)

Subject	Yeas	Nays	Present	Not Voting
H.R. 1004 as amended	25	17	0	5
McCaul ANS to H.R. 9	16	21	0	10
Curtis Amendment to H.R. 9	17	22	0	8
Wright Amendment to H.R. 9	16	23	0	8
Motion to Table Buck Appeal of the Chair's ruling	23	17	0	7
Zeldin Amendment to H.R. 9	24	16	0	7
H.R. 9	24	16	0	7

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE _____

or

TIME ADJOURNED 5:50 p.m.

Cara Bursky
Full Committee Hearing Coordinator

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

FULL COMMITTEE MARKUP

<i>PRESENT</i>	<i>MEMBER</i>
X	Eliot L. Engel, NY
X	Brad Sherman, CA
X	Gregory W. Meeks, NY
X	Albio Sires, NJ
X	Gerald E. Connolly, VA
X	Theodore E. Deutch, FL
X	Karen Bass, CA
X	William Keating, MA
X	David Cicilline, RI
X	Ami Bera, CA
X	Joaquin Castro, TX
X	Dina Titus, NV
X	Adriano Espaillat, NY
X	Ted Lieu, CA
X	Susan Wild, PA
X	Dean Phillips, MN
X	Ilhan Omar, MN
X	Colin Allred, TX
X	Andy Levin, MI
X	Abigail Spanberger, VA
X	Chrissy Houlahan, PA
X	Tom Malinowski, NJ
X	David Trone, MD
X	Jim Costa, CA
X	Juan Vargas, CA
X	Vicente Gonzalez, TX

<i>PRESENT</i>	<i>MEMBER</i>
X	Michael T. McCaul, TX
X	Christopher H. Smith, NJ
X	Steve Chabot, OH
X	Joe Wilson, SC
X	Scott Perry, PA
X	Ted Yoho, FL
X	Adam Kinzinger, IL
X	Lee Zeldin, NY
	James Sensenbrenner, Jr., WI
X	Ann Wagner, MO
X	Brian J. Mast, FL
	Francis Rooney, FL
X	Brian K. Fitzpatrick, PA
X	John Curtis, UT
X	Ken Buck, CO
X	Ron Wright, TX
X	Guy Reschenthaler, PA
X	Tim Burchett, TN
X	Greg Pence, IN
X	Steve Watkins, KS
X	Michael Guest, MS

STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD FROM COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Statement for the Record from Representative Steve Chabot Markup of Various Measures April 9, 2019

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to focus on a couple measures.

As a longtime supporter of Taiwan and a founder of the Congressional Taiwan Caucus, I want to thank Chairman Engel and Ranking Member McCaul for their work on two excellent bills, H.Res. 273, which reaffirms our longstanding partnership with Taiwan and which I am cosponsoring as well as H.R. 2002, the Taiwan Assurance Act. It is timely that we are considering these bills since tomorrow marks the 40th anniversary of the signing of the Taiwan Relations Act or the TRA.

As we mark the TRA's Anniversary, it is worth remembering the relationship between our two peoples is critical for peace and security in Asia.

When President Jimmy Carter cut diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1979, Congress responded to this capitulation with the TRA.

Since then, the TRA has served as the cornerstone of our relationship with the people of Taiwan. It has been strengthened by President Reagan's Six Assurances and House passage of my resolution reaffirming the Six Assurances as well as the enactment of the Taiwan Travel Act last year, legislation I sponsored to encourage high-level visits between our two countries.

Since the TRA's enactment, Taiwan has become a thriving democracy and a beacon of freedom for the people of Asia. Unfortunately they are under constant threat from China – from not being able to participate in the World Health Organization, to diplomatic isolation, to military threats. This has become worse under President Xi who has engaged the full force of the Chinese state against Taiwan.

That is why Mr. McCaul's legislation is so important. The Taiwan Assurance Act strengthens our commitments to Taiwan's defense and reinforces our support for its participation in international organizations. While I would prefer not to have a reference in this legislation to the misguided U.S. One-China Policy, I understand why it's included, namely so we can get it passed the Senate.

It would also force the State Department to review its "Guidelines on Relations with Taiwan" and require a report on this and on the implementation of the Taiwan Travel Act.

Such a report would be timely. Since the Taiwan Travel Act was signed into law, very little has actually happened. I asked Secretary Pompeo when he was here what the status of implementation was and his answer wasn't terribly satisfying. This legislation would, hopefully, change that.

Moving on briefly, I would also like to voice my support for two of the other bills we have today. First, H.Res. 106, which denounces female genital mutilation and I want to thank Ms. Frankel and Mr. Perry for proposing it. As a cosponsor, I don't think we can condemn this

practice in strong enough terms. There is no place for it anywhere in the world, and no cultural norms can excuse it.

Finally, as a Co-Chair of the Congressional Cambodia Caucus and a cosponsor of H.R. 526, the Cambodia Democracy Act, I want to thank Mr. Yoho for his work on this important legislation. This bill imposes sanctions on those who participated in Prime Minister Hun Sen's illegal, arbitrary crackdown on democracy. This bill is complimented by the Cambodia Trade Act – legislation Congressman Alan Lowenthal and I introduced to review Cambodia's trade privileges under GSP, and by the European Union's ongoing review of its trade preferences for Cambodia.

This past Sunday, I had the privilege to visit members of the Cambodian-American community in my district. They were very supportive of the work we are doing here to help Cambodians control the destiny of their country. Its high time that Hun Sen allows for free and fair elections and the more we can do to encourage him to do so, the better.

Thank you, I yield back.

Statement for the Record from Representative Francis Rooney
Markup of Various Measures
April 9, 2019

I strongly oppose H.R. 1004, which would embolden the Maduro regime and threaten the safety of interim President Juan Guaido and the rest of the National Assembly. The United States should use all diplomatic tools, including the possibility of military intervention, to hasten the end of Maduro's failed socialist regime.

A credible threat of force keeps interim President Juan Guaido alive and provides a strong deterrence against the escalation of violence against the Venezuelan civilians we are supporting. Further, the reliance on colectivos, foreign intelligence operatives and military advisors highlight the Maduro regime's willingness to challenge peaceful political demonstration with force.

The Trump Administration and Congress have continued to express a commitment to a peaceful resolution and we must continue to work with our allies to enforce the strong sanctions we have imposed against the Maduro regime. While I oppose this bill, I am not presently advocating for military action, I just do not want to limit our options when dealing with this crisis. Taking an option off the table, especially the credible threat of military force, only increases the chance of us having to use it in the future. I encourage my colleagues to oppose this bill, keep all options for dealing with the Maduro regime on the table, and continue supporting the Venezuelan people in their struggle for freedom.

RECORD VOTE TALLIES

Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives
116th Congress

Date: 04/09/19

Record Vote Description:

H.R. 1004

Sherman

Amendment #1

SS

Clerk's initials

Member	Aye	No	Present
Eliot L. Engel, D-NY, Chairman	/		
Brad Sherman, D-CA	/		
Gregory W. Meeks, D-NY	/		
Albio Sires, D-NJ	/		
Gerald E. Connolly, D-VA	/		
Theodore E. Deutch, D-FL	/		
Karen Bass, D-CA	/		
William R. Keating, D-MA	/		
David N. Cicilline, D-RI	/		
Ami Bera, D-CA	/		
Joaquin Castro, D-TX	/		
Clara Tilus, D-NV	/		
Adriano Espallal, D-NY	/		
Ted Lieu, D-CA	/		
Susan Wild, D-PA	/		
Dean Phillips, D-MN	/		
Ilhan Omar, D-MN	/		
Coleen Allred, D-TX	/		
Andy Levin, D-MI	/		
Abigail Spanberger, D-VA	/		
Christy Hoelscher, D-PA	/		
Tom Malinowski, D-NJ	/		
David Trone, D-MD	/		
Jim Costa, D-CA	/		
Julian Vargas, D-CA	/		
Vicente Gonzalez, D-TX	/		
SUBTOTAL 1			

25

Member	Aye	No	Present
Michael T. McCaul, R-TX	/		
Chris Smith, R-NJ	/		
Steve Chabot, R-OH	/		
Joe Wilson, R-SC	/		
Scott Perry, R-PA	/		
Ted Yoho, R-FL	/		
Adam Kinzinger, R-IL	/		
Lee Zeldin, R-NY	/		
Jim Sensenbrenner, R-WI	/		
Ann Wagner, R-MO	/		
Brian Mast, R-FL	/		
Francis Rooney, R-FL	/		
Brian Fitzpatrick, R-PA	/		
John Curtis, R-UT	/		
Ken Buck, R-CO	/		
Ron Wright, R-TX	/		
Guy Reschenethaler, R-PA	/		
Tim Burchett, R-TN	/		
Greg Pence, R-IN	/		
Steve Watkins, R-KS	/		
Michael Guest, R-MI	/		
SUBTOTAL 2			

	Aye	No	Present
SUBTOTAL 1	25	19	
SUBTOTAL 2	25	19	
TOTAL	25	19	

19

Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives
116th Congress

Date: 04/09/19

Record Vote Description:

H.R. 9

McCaul
Amendment # 1

SS

Clerk's Initials

Member	Aye	No	Present
Eliot L. Engel, D-NY, Chairman		/	
Brad Sherman, D-CA		/	
Gregory W. Meeks, D-NY		/	
Albio Sires, D-NJ		/	
Gerald E. Connolly, D-VA		/	
Theodore E. Deutch, D-FL		/	
Karen Bass, D-CA		/	
William R. Keating, D-MA		/	
David N. Cicilline, D-RI		/	
Ami Bera, D-CA		/	
Joaquin Castro, D-TX		/	
Dina Titus, D-NV		/	
Adriano Espallat, D-NY		/	
Ted Lieu, D-CA		/	
Susan Wild, D-PA		/	
Dean Phillips, D-MN		/	
Iwan Omar, D-MN		/	
Colin Allred, D-TX		/	
Andy Levin, D-MI		/	
Abigail Spanberger, D-VA		/	
Chelsey Houshawn, D-PA		/	
Tom Malinowski, D-NJ		/	
David Trone, D-MD		/	
Jim Costa, D-CA		/	
Juan Vargas, D-CA		/	
Vicente Gonzalez, D-TX		/	
SUBTOTAL 1			

21

Member	Aye	No	Present
Michael T. McCaul, R-TX	/		
Chris Smith, R-NJ	/		
Steve Chabot, R-OH	/		
Joe Wilson, R-SC	/		
Scott Perry, R-PA	/		
Ted Yoho, R-FL	/		
Adam Kinzinger, R-IL	/		
Lee Zeldin, R-NY	/		
Jim Sensenbrenner, R-WI	/		
Ann Wagner, R-MO	/		
Brian Mast, R-FL	/		
Francis Rooney, R-FL	/		
Brian Fitzpatrick, R-PA	/		
John Curtis, R-UT	/		
Ken Buck, R-CO	/		
Ron Wright, R-TX	/		
Guy Reschenthaler, R-PA	/		
Tim Burchett, R-TN	/		
Greg Pence, R-IN	/		
Steve Womack, R-MS	/		
Michael Guest, R-MS	/		
SUBTOTAL 2			

	Aye	No	Present
SUBTOTAL 1	16	2	
SUBTOTAL 2	16	2	
TOTAL	16	2	

16

Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives
116th Congress

Date: 04/09/19

Record Vote Description:

H.R. 9

Curtis

Amendment #1

SS

Clerk's initials

Member	Aye	No	Present
Eliz L. Engel, D-NY, Chairman			/
Brad Sherman, D-CA			/
Gregory W. Meeks, D-NY			/
Albio Sires, D-NJ			/
Gerald E. Connolly, D-VA			/
Theodore E. Deutch, D-FL			/
Karen Bass, D-CA			/
William R. Keating, D-MA			/
David N. Cicilline, D-RI			/
Ami Bera, D-CA			/
Joaquin Castro, D-TX			/
Dina Titus, D-NV			/
Adriano Espaillat, D-NY			/
Ted Lieu, D-CA			/
Susan Wild, D-PA			/
Dean Phillips, D-MN			/
Ihan Omar, D-MN			/
Colin Allred, D-TX			/
Andy Levin, D-MI			/
Abigail Spanberger, D-VA			/
Chrissy Houshan, D-PA			/
Tom Malinowski, D-NJ			/
David Trone, D-MD			/
Jim Costa, D-CA			/
Juan Vargas, D-CA			/
Vicente González, D-TX			/
SUBTOTAL 1			

22

Member	Aye	No	Present
Michael T. McCaul, R-TX	/		
Chris Smith, R-NJ	/		
Steve Chabot, R-OH	/		
Joe Wilson, R-SC	/		
Scott Perry, R-PA	/		
Ted Yoho, R-FL	/		
Adam Kinzinger, R-IL	/		
Lee Zeldin, R-NY	/		
Jim Sensenbrenner, R-WI	/		
Ann Wagner, R-MO	/		
Brian Mast, R-FL	/		
Francis Rooney, R-FL	/		
Brian Fitzpatrick, R-PA	/		
John Curtis, R-UT	/		
Ken Buck, R-CO	/		
Ron Wright, R-TX	/		
Guy Reschenthaler, R-PA	/		
Tim Burchett, R-TN	/		
Greg Pence, R-IN	/		
Steve Watkins, R-KS	/		
Michael Guest, R-MIS	/		
SUBTOTAL 2			

	Aye	No	Present
SUBTOTAL 1	17	22	
SUBTOTAL 2	17	22	
TOTAL	17	22	

17

Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives
116th Congress

Date: 04/09/19

Record Vote Description:

H.R. 9
Wright
Amendment #1

SS
Clerk's Initials

Member	Aye	No	Present
Eliot L. Engel, D-NY, Chairman		/	
Brad Sherman, D-CA		/	
Gregory W. Meeks, D-NY		/	
Albio Sires, D-NJ		/	
Gerald E. Connolly, D-VA		/	
Theodore E. Deutch, D-FL		/	
Karen Bass, D-CA		/	
William R. Keating, D-MA		/	
David N. Cicilline, D-RI		/	
Ami Bera, D-CA		/	
Joaquin Castro, D-TX		/	
Dina Titus, D-NV		/	
Adriano Espaillat, D-NY		/	
Ted Lieu, D-CA		/	
Susan Wild, D-PA		/	
Dean Phillips, D-MN		/	
Ihan Omar, D-MN		/	
Colin Allred, D-TX		/	
Andy Levin, D-MI		/	
Abigail Spanberger, D-VA		/	
Christy Hoelscher, D-PA		/	
Tom Malinowski, D-NJ		/	
David Trone, D-MD		/	
Jim Costa, D-CA		/	
Juan Vargas, D-CA		/	
Vicente Gonzalez, D-TX		/	
SUBTOTAL 1			

23

Member	Aye	No	Present
Michael T. McCaul, R-TX	/		
Chris Smith, R-NJ	/		
Steve Chabot, R-OH	/		
Joe Wilson, R-SC	/		
Scott Perry, R-PA	/		
Tod Yoho, R-FL	/		
Adam Kinzinger, R-IL	/		
Lee Zeldin, R-NY	/		
Jim Sensenbrenner, R-WI	/		
Ann Wagner, R-MO	/		
Brian Mast, R-FL	/		
Francis Rooney, R-FL	/		
Brian Fitzpatrick, R-PA	/		
John Curtis, R-UT	/		
Ken Buck, R-CO	/		
Ron Wright, R-TX	/		
Guy Reschenthaler, R-PA	/		
Tim Burchett, R-TN	/		
Greg Pence, R-IN	/		
Steve Watkins, R-KS	/		
Michael Guest, R-MS	/		
SUBTOTAL 2			

	Aye	No	Present
SUBTOTAL 1	16	23	
SUBTOTAL 2	16	23	
TOTAL	16	23	

Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives
116th Congress

Date: 04/09/19

Record Vote Description:

-Table Amendment-
(Germaniness)
Buck
Amendment # 1

SS
Clerk's Initials

Member	Aye	No	Present
Eliot L. Engel, D-NY, Chairman	/		
Brad Sherman, D-CA	/		
Gregory W. Meeks, D-NY	/		
Albio Sires, D-NJ	/		
Gerald E. Connolly, D-VA	/		
Theodore E. Deutch, D-FL	/		
Karen Bass, D-CA	/		
William R. Keating, D-MA	/		
David N. Cicillone, D-RI	/		
Ami Bera, D-CA	/		
Joaquin Castro, D-TX	/		
Dina Titus, D-NV	/		
Adriano Espallard, D-NY	/		
Yed Liu, D-CA	/		
Susan Wild, D-PA	/		
Dean Phillips, D-MN	/		
Ihan Omar, D-MN	/		
Colin Allred, D-TX	/		
Andy Levin, D-MI	/		
Abigail Spanberger, D-VA	/		
Chrissy Houlahan, D-PA	/		
Tom Malinowski, D-NJ	/		
David Trone, D-MD	/		
Jim Costa, D-CA	/		
Juan Vargas, D-CA	/		
Vicente Gonzalez, D-TX	/		
SUBTOTAL 1			

23

Member	Aye	No	Present
Michael T. McCaul, R-TX	/		
Chris Smith, R-NJ	/		
Steve Chabot, R-OH	/		
Joe Wilson, R-SC	/		
Scott Perry, R-PA	/		
Yed Yoho, R-FL	/		
Adam Kinzinger, R-IL	/		
Lee Zeldin, R-NY	/		
Jim Sensenbrenner, R-WI	/		
Ann Wagner, R-MO	/		
Brian Mast, R-FL	/		
Francis Rooney, R-FL	/		
Brian Fitzpatrick, R-PA	/		
John Curtis, R-UT	/		
Ken Buck, R-CO	/		
Ron Wright, R-TX	/		
Guy Reschenthaler, R-PA	/		
Tim Burchett, R-TN	/		
Greg Pence, R-IN	/		
Steve Watkins, R-KS	/		
Michael Guest, R-MB	/		
SUBTOTAL 2			

17

	Aye	No	Present
SUBTOTAL 1	23	17	
SUBTOTAL 2	23	17	
TOTAL	23	17	

Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives
116th Congress

Date: 04/09/19

Record Vote Description:

H.R. 9
Zeldin
Amendment #1

SS
Clerk's initials

Member	Aye	No	Present
Eliot L. Engel, D-NY, Chairman			
Brad Sherman, D-CA			
Gregory W. Meeks, D-NY			
Albio Sires, D-NJ			
Gerald E. Connolly, D-VA			
Theodore E. Deutch, D-FL			
Karen Bass, D-CA			
William R. Keating, D-MA			
David N. Cicillino, D-RI			
Ami Bera, D-CA			
Joaquin Castro, D-TX			
Dina Titus, D-NV			
Adriano Espallard, D-NY			
Ted Lieu, D-CA			
Susan Widi, D-PA			
Dean Phillips, D-MN			
Ihan Omar, D-MN			
Colin Allred, D-TX			
Andy Levin, D-MI			
Algislii Spanberger, D-VA			
Chrissy Houlahan, D-PA			
Tom Malinowski, D-NJ			
David Trone, D-MD			
Jim Costa, D-CA			
Joan Verges, D-CA			
Vicente Gonzalez, D-TX			
SUBTOTAL 1			

24

Member	Aye	No	Present
Michael T. McCaul, R-TX			
Chris Smith, R-NJ			
Steve Chabot, R-OH			
Joe Wilson, R-SC			
Scott Perry, R-PA			
Ted Yoho, R-FL			
Adam Kinzinger, R-IL			
Lee Zeldin, R-NY			
Jim Sensenbrenner, R-WI			
Ann Wagner, R-MO			
Brian Mast, R-FL			
Francis Rooney, R-FL			
Brian Fitzpatrick, R-PA			
John Curtis, R-UT			
Ken Buck, R-CO			
Ron Wright, R-TX			
Gay Reschardthaler, R-PA			
Tim Burchett, R-TN			
Greg Pence, R-IN			
Steve Watkins, R-KS			
Michael Guest, R-MS			
SUBTOTAL 2			

17

	Aye	No	Present
SUBTOTAL 1	13	24	
SUBTOTAL 2	13	24	
TOTAL	13	24	

Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives
116th Congress

Date: 04/09/19

Record Vote Description:

H.R. 9

SS

Clerk's initials

Member	Aye	No	Present
Eliot L. Engel, D-NY, Chairman	/		
Brad Sherman, D-CA	/		
Gregory W. Meeks, D-NY	/		
Albio Sires, D-NJ	/		
Gerald E. Connolly, D-VA	/		
Theodore E. Deutch, D-FL	/		
Karen Bass, D-CA	/		
William R. Keating, D-MA	/		
David N. Cicilline, D-RI	/		
Ami Bera, D-CA	/		
Joaquin Castro, D-TX	/		
Dina Titus, D-NV	/		
Adriano Espaillat, D-NY	/		
Ted Lieu, D-CA	/		
Susan Wild, D-PA	/		
Dean Phillips, D-MN	/		
Ihan Omar, D-MN	/		
Colin Allred, D-TX	/		
Andy Levin, D-MI	/		
Abigail Spanberger, D-VA	/		
Chrissy Houlahan, D-PA	/		
Tom Malinowski, D-NJ	/		
David Trone, D-MD	/		
Jim Costa, D-CA	/		
Juan Vargas, D-CA	/		
Vicente Gonzalez, D-TX	/		
SUBTOTAL 1			

24

Member	Aye	No	Present
Michael T. McCaul, R-TX	/		
Chris Smith, R-NJ	/		
Steve Chabot, R-OH	/		
Joe Wilson, R-SC	/		
Scott Perry, R-PA	/		
Ted Yoho, R-FL	/		
Adam Kinzinger, R-IL	/		
Lee Zeldin, R-NY	/		
Jim Sensenbrenner, R-WI	/		
Ann Wagner, R-MO	/		
Brian Mast, R-FL	/		
Francis Rooney, R-FL	/		
Brian Fitzpatrick, R-PA	/		
John Curtis, R-UT	/		
Ken Buck, R-CO	/		
Ron Wright, R-TX	/		
Guy Roscenthale, R-PA	/		
Tim Burchett, R-TN	/		
Greg Pence, R-IN	/		
Steve Watkins, R-KS	/		
Michael Guest, R-MS	/		
SUBTOTAL 2			

16

	Aye	No	Present
SUBTOTAL 1	24	16	
SUBTOTAL 2	24	16	
TOTAL	24	16	

MARKUP SUMMARY

04/09/2019 House Foreign Affairs Committee Markup Summary

By unanimous consent, the Chair called up the following bipartisan measures and amendment, previously provided to Members, to be considered *en bloc*:

- (1) H.R. 2002, Taiwan Assurance Act of 2019, (McCaul)
- (2) H.Res. 273, Reaffirming the United States commitment to Taiwan and to the implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act (Engel)
- (3) H.R. 97, Rescuing Animals with Rewards Act (RAWR), (Titus)
- (4) H.R. 753, Global Electoral Exchange Act of 2019, (Castro)
- (5) H.R. 1704, Championing American Business Through Diplomacy Act of 2019, (McCaul)
- (6) H.R. 1952, Intercountry Adoption Information Act (Collins)
 - Smith Amendment
- (7) H.R. 615, The Refugee Sanitation Facility Safety Act of 2019 (Meng)
- (8) H.R. 526, Cambodia Democracy Act, (Yoho)
- (9) H.Res. 106, Denouncing female genital mutilation, (Frankel)
- (10) H.R. 1359, Digital Global Access Policy Act of 2019, (Wright)
- (11) H.R. 951, U.S.-Mexico Tourism Improvement Act, (Cuellar)
- (12) H.R. 2116, The Global Fragility Act, (Engel)

The measures considered *en bloc* were agreed to by voice vote.

By unanimous consent, the measures were ordered favorably reported, as amended, to the House, and the Chairman was authorized to seek House consideration under suspension of the rules.

The Chair called up the following measures to be considered:

H.R. 1004, Prohibiting Unauthorized Action in Venezuela Act, (Cicilline)

- Engel amendment in the nature of a substitute was adopted as base text by unanimous consent.
- Sherman amendment, an amendment to the amendment in the nature of a substitute, was agreed to by voice vote.

H.R. 1004 ordered reported to the House, as amended, with a favorable recommendation by a roll call vote of 25 ayes and 17 noes.

H.R. 9, the Climate Action Now Act

- McCaul amendment in the nature of a substitute. NOT AGREED to by a roll call vote of 16 ayes and 21 noes.
- Curtis amendment. NOT AGREED to by a roll call vote of 17 ayes and 22 noes.

- Wright amendment. NOT AGREED to by a roll call vote of 16 ayes and 23 noes.
- Buck amendment. RULED NON-GERMANE, appeal tabled by a roll call vote of 23 ayes and 17 noes.
- Zeldin amendment. NOT AGREED to by a roll call vote of 17 ayes and 24 noes.

H.R. 9 ordered reported to the House with a favorable recommendation by a roll call vote of 24 ayes and 16 noes.

The Committee adjourned.

***All measures can be found [here](#).

