[Senate Hearing 115-653]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-653
THIS IS NOT A DRILL: AN EXAMINATION OF EMERGENCY ALERT SYSTEMS
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JANUARY 25, 2018
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
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37-299 PDF WASHINGTON : 2019
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Chairman
ROGER WICKER, Mississippi BILL NELSON, Florida, Ranking
ROY BLUNT, Missouri MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
TED CRUZ, Texas AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JERRY MORAN, Kansas BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
DEAN HELLER, Nevada TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma GARY PETERS, Michigan
MIKE LEE, Utah TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire
CORY GARDNER, Colorado CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO, Nevada
TODD YOUNG, Indiana JON TESTER, Montana
Nick Rossi, Staff Director
Adrian Arnakis, Deputy Staff Director
Jason Van Beek, General Counsel
Kim Lipsky, Democratic Staff Director
Chris Day, Democratic Deputy Staff Director
Renae Black, Senior Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on January 25, 2018................................. 1
Statement of Senator Thune....................................... 1
Statement of Senator Schatz...................................... 3
Statement of Senator Nelson...................................... 4
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 31
Statement of Senator Sullivan.................................... 33
Statement of Senator Udall....................................... 34
Statement of Senator Capito...................................... 36
Statement of Senator Markey...................................... 38
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 40
Statement of Senator Cortez Masto................................ 42
Statement of Senator Duckworth................................... 43
Statement of Senator Wicker...................................... 45
Witnesses
Lisa M. Fowlkes, Chief, Public Safety and Homeland Security
Bureau, Federal Communications Commission...................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Scott Bergmann, Senior Vice President, Regulatory Affairs, CTIA.. 8
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Michael Lisenco, The National Association for Amateur Radio...... 13
Prepared statement........................................... 15
Sam Matheny, Chief Technology Officer, National Association of
Broadcasters................................................... 23
Prepared statement........................................... 24
Appendix
Letter dated January 23, 2018 to Chairman Ajit Pai, Commissioner
Mignon Clyburn, Commissioner Michael O'Reilly, Commissioner
Brendan Carr and Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel from Barb
Graff, Chair, Big City Emergency Managers; and Director, City
of Seattle Office of Emergency Managers........................ 49
Letter dated January 25, 2018 to Hon. John Thune and Hon. Bill
Nelson from Steven K. Berry, President and CEO, Competitive
Carriers Association........................................... 51
Response to written questions submitted to Lisa M. Fowlkes by:
Hon. John Thune.............................................. 52
Hon. Brian Schatz............................................ 52
Hon. Gary Peters............................................. 53
Response to written questions submitted to Scott Bergmann by:
Hon. Brian Schatz............................................ 54
Hon. Tom Udall............................................... 54
Hon. Gary Peters............................................. 56
Response to written questions submitted to Sam Matheny by:
Hon. Gary Peters............................................. 58
THIS IS NOT A DRILL: AN EXAMINATION OF EMERGENCY ALERT SYSTEMS
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THURSDAY, JANUARY 25, 2018
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John Thune,
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Thune [presiding], Wicker, Blunt,
Fischer, Sullivan, Heller, Capito, Gardner, Nelson, Cantwell,
Klobuchar, Schatz, Markey, Udall, Peters, Duckworth, Hassan,
and Cortez Masto.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA
The Chairman. Good morning, and welcome to today's hearing
on our country's Emergency Alert Systems. I hope to hear from
our panel this morning about what's working, what's not, and
what we can do better to prevent false alerts like we saw with
the Hawaii ballistic missile warning earlier this month.
Ensuring state and local governments have the proper tools
and safeguards to properly alert the public of an impending
emergency is absolutely critical. False alerts not only create
unnecessary panic, but they undermine the integrity of the
Emergency Alert System, leading to public distrust and
confusion. What happened in Hawaii is inexcusable and must be
addressed to ensure an incident like that never happens again.
It is essential that Americans have an Emergency Alert
System that they can trust, and, overwhelmingly, by and large,
I believe they do. There is much that is working well with the
Emergency Alert System. In fact, it's arguably a model public-
private program, operating as envisioned by this committee
through the WARN Act.
Industry partners, including those represented here today,
have been investing to improve the system and are working
collaboratively with government and public safety officials to
carry out the mission. We certainly do not want to overlook
these successes, but as recent events have shown, there are
problems that must be addressed.
Today's hearing will be the first of two hearings on
Emergency Alert Systems. In the near future, we will hold a
field hearing in Hawaii to further address the January 13
ballistic missile false alarm and to follow up on the issues
that are discussed today.
Since the early days of the cold war, the United States has
been building and improving an Emergency Alert System to warn
our citizens, first from the risks of a Soviet attack and later
expanded to include natural disasters like fires, floods,
tornados, and tsunamis. We have continued to build on this
lifesaving system to include AMBER Alerts, which seek the
public's assistance when a child is in danger. Soon, we will
also have Blue Alerts, which can be issued when there is an
imminent and credible threat to a law enforcement officer.
From the beginning, our Emergency Alert Systems have
harnessed the immense resources of commercial communications
systems--broadcast television and radio in the beginning, and
eventually cable and satellite TV and mobile phone networks--to
reach the American public as quickly and effectively as
possible.
Here is how the system works, or should work. Our alert
system relies on Federal, state, and local officials authorized
by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, or FEMA, to decide
when an alert is appropriate and what it should communicate.
These alerts are then sent to FEMA. When FEMA receives an
alert, it validates that it is from an authorized entity before
forwarding it to the broadcasters, mobile phone service
providers, and others, who, in turn, send the alert out on
televisions, radios, and mobile phones in the affected areas.
The Federal Communications Commission regulates the
interface between those sending the messages and the
communications companies that deliver the messages to us.
Ensuring that people get the information they need and that
alerts are credible and make sense to the recipients is an
ongoing process, but it is fundamental that messages must be
credible.
Messages sent in error like the Hawaii ballistic missile
alert run the risk of undermining the entire alert system by
reducing people's confidence in alerts. While we do not want to
prevent authorized officials from communicating alerts to the
public when they see fit, we must ensure that such officials
are better trained. There are additional improvements we can
undertake as well.
For example, there is no question that the National Weather
Service's watch and warning system saves lives, but it can also
be enhanced. That is why I included provisions in the Weather
Research and Forecasting Innovation Act of 2017, which became
law last spring, that require the National Weather Service to
use the latest behavioral science and stakeholder feedback to
improve its watch and warning system. We should make sure that
lessons learned from one incident inform and improve future
alerts.
The FCC is also taking steps to make improvements to the
alert system through the use of better geo-targeting of
messages, which is being considered at its current proceeding,
that is, targeting messages to those who need to receive them
and not sending them to those who don't. This helps avoid alert
fatigue and also addresses the concerns expressed by some local
officials during the California wild fires last year that an
overly broad alert could result in traffic jams with those
unnecessarily leaving their homes and hindering the evacuation
of those who truly do need to leave.
As we'll hear today, the goal of providing timely emergency
information to our communities is also advanced by private
citizens, like those amateur or ``Ham'' radio operators who
have helped keep people connected after tragedies like
Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria.
Today, I am pleased to welcome Ms. Lisa Fowlkes, Chief of
the FCC's Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau; Mr. Scott
Bergmann, Senior Vice President of Regulatory Affairs at CTIA--
The Wireless Association; Mr. Sam Matheny, Executive Vice
President and Chief Technology Officer of the National
Association of Broadcasters; and Mike Lisenco, a representative
of the Amateur Radio Relay League.
Thank you all for being here. I look forward to today's
discussion.
I will now recognize the Ranking Member, Senator Schatz,
for any opening remarks that he may have, and I think he can
speak personally to the impact of this issue.
STATEMENT OF HON. BRIAN SCHATZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII
Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
For many people in Hawaii, one of the most harrowing hours
of their lives started just a few minutes after 8 a.m. on
January 13, 2018. Cell phones across the state lit up with a
warning that a ballistic missile attack was imminent. For the
next 38 minutes, both residents and visitors panicked. People
were terrified as they scrambled to get in touch with loved
ones. I know, because I was home in Honolulu that morning, and
I started to get dozens of texts with screenshots of the push
alert asking me what was happening.
Meanwhile, within a minute or two, officials at the Hawaii
Emergency Management Agency had spoken to the Pacific Command
and confirmed that there was no missile attack--only nobody
told the rest of us. The people of Hawaii may be relieved about
the false alarm, but they are also angry. All of this was
avoidable, from the false alarm itself to the series of
mistakes at multiple junctures surrounding the incident. Human
and bureaucratic errors made the crisis worse, but there are
also inherent flaws in the system itself.
We are here today because of problems in our Emergency
Alert Systems, from Hawaii's false alarm to issues in
communications related to the recent California wildfires. So I
want to thank Chairman Thune and Ranking Member Nelson for
holding this hearing and for agreeing to hold a field hearing
in Hawaii in the near future, and I want to thank the FCC,
including Ms. Fowlkes, who came to a meeting I convened last
week with FEMA, the DoD, and the Department of Homeland
Security, for helping us determine what happened and how to fix
it.
What happened in Hawaii raises some basic policy questions.
Right now, any city, county, or state can choose to participate
in this program on missile alerts, and when they do, they gain
the technical ability to get the word out, but that does not
make them experts in knowing when a missile is coming. That
rests with the Department of Defense. It is increasingly clear
to me that if we get all 50 states and all the territories and
3,007 counties across the country participating in this
program, the likelihood of another mistaken missile alert as a
result of human or bureaucratic error is not zero.
Local officials have led on disaster response and recovery,
but if the Federal Government knows a missile is coming, it is
worth asking if they should be the ones to tell everyone.
States are laboratories of democracy. They should not be the
laboratories for missile alerts, which is why this is an
important question for Congress to consider.
We have lively debates about federalism, about the role of
local versus Federal Government. But a missile attack is
Federal. A missile attack is not a local responsibility.
Confirmation and notification of something like a missile
attack should reside with the agency that knows first and knows
for sure. In other words, the people who know should be the
people who tell us.
That is why I'm introducing legislation with Senators
Harris, Gardner, and others to make it clear that the authority
to send missile alerts should rest with the Departments of
Defense and Homeland Security. These agencies have to work with
the state and local emergency management agencies when they get
the word out so that the public is safe and informed.
Thank you again, Chairman Thune and Ranking Member Nelson,
for your leadership on this issue, and I look forward to
hearing from the witnesses on where we stand and what we can do
better.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Schatz, and thank you for
sharing your experience, and we all look forward to working
with you to make sure something like that never happens again
to your constituents or anybody else in this country.
So the Ranking Member, Senator Nelson, is here.
Senator Nelson, an opening statement?
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, by the way, I
thought yesterday's hearing down at the auto show on autonomous
vehicles was outstanding. So thank you. I think there's going
to be a lot of good to come out of that hearing.
The Chairman. I hope you're right. Very interesting.
Senator Nelson. If you were told that a ballistic missile
was inbound, and your loved ones were spread out, what in the
world would go through your mind? It's exactly what went
through the mind of Senator Schatz. Regrettably, he knows the
answer to that question, and he knows it's very real and it's
very personal. He was there. He received the alert, and it's
because of that personal connection to this situation and the
leadership that he has shown in the aftermath that I'm going to
be here simply to support him in this.
Nobody should have to go through what the folks of Hawaii
did. But the flip side of that is we want to make sure that
there is a system in place so if there is an inbound nuclear
warhead, our people are alerted.
When disasters occur, Americans rely not only on emergency
alerts, but also on our 911 system. But the infrastructure is
aging, and, frankly, it has been left behind in the digital
revolution. Congress must make modernizing the 911 system a
national priority, which is why I've worked with Senator
Klobuchar to introduce the Next Generation 911 Act of 2017--we
need a template for moving ahead on a bipartisan basis, and
this is a good bill to start moving ahead on this issue.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Nelson. That's something,
hopefully, this committee can work together on and get done for
the good of all the people in this country and, of course, most
specifically, for the people of Hawaii.
We do have a great panel, and we look forward to hearing
from them this morning. We'll start with Ms. Lisa Fowlkes, who
is the Chief of Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau at
the Federal Communications Commission, which has jurisdiction
over the integration of all these forms of communication; Mr.
Scott Bergmann, who is Senior Vice President, Regulatory
Affairs, CTIA; Mr. Mike Lisenco, who is Chairman of the
Advocacy Committee, Amateur Radio Relay League, and member of
the Board of Directors; and Sam Matheny, Executive Vice
President and Chief Technology Officer at the National
Association of Broadcasters.
We'll start, Ms. Fowlkes, with you.
If you all could confine your oral remarks to five minutes
or thereabouts, we will make sure that all of your testimony is
made a part of the written record, and it will give us some
time to ask questions.
So, Ms. Fowlkes, please proceed. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF LISA M. FOWLKES, CHIEF,
PUBLIC SAFETY AND HOMELAND SECURITY BUREAU,
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Ms. Fowlkes. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Thune,
Ranking Member Nelson, and members of the Committee. Thank you
for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss our
Nation's emergency alerting systems.
The false ballistic missile warning issued on January 13 by
the State of Hawaii was absolutely unacceptable. It resulted in
widespread panic, and the extended period it took to correct
the error, nearly 40 minutes, compounded the problem. Looking
beyond the immediate consequences of the mistake, which were
serious in and of themselves, this cry of wolf damaged the
credibility of emergency alert messaging, which can be
dangerous when a real emergency occurs.
The Commission acted swiftly to open an investigation into
the matter. That investigation is ongoing, but based on current
information, it appears that the false alert was a result of
two failures. First, simple human error. Second, the state did
not have safeguards or process controls in place to prevent the
human error from resulting in the transmission of a false
alert.
Last week, the FCC sent two employees to interview
representatives of the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency and
other stakeholders. The Hawaii Emergency Management Agency
tells us that it is working with its vendor to integrate
additional technical safeguards into its alert origination
software and has changed its protocols to require two
individuals to sign off on a transmission of test and live
alerts.
We are quite pleased with the level of cooperation we have
received from the leadership of the Hawaii Emergency Management
Agency thus far. We are disappointed, however, that one key
employee, the person who transmitted the false alert, is
refusing to cooperate with our investigation. We hope that
person will reconsider.
Moving forward, the Commission will focus on ways to
prevent this from happening again. Federal, state, and local
officials throughout the country need to work together to
identify any vulnerabilities to false alerts and do what is
necessary to fix them. We also must ensure that should a false
alert nonetheless occur, a correction is issued promptly in
order to minimize confusion.
Emergency alerting systems provide timely and lifesaving
information to the public, and we must take all measures to
bolster and restore the public's confidence in these systems.
While the incident in Hawaii is very present in our minds, we
cannot lose sight of the fact that the Wireless Emergency
Alerts, or WEA, has greatly enhanced public safety.
In the last 5 years, WEA has been used to issue over 33,000
emergency alerts. In California, WEA was used four times in
response to the 2017 wildfires in northern California and 16
times for the Los Angeles area wildfires. WEA was also used
extensively in all areas affected by the 2017 hurricanes.
The Commission has taken significant steps to enhance alert
capabilities by leveraging advancements in technology. In
September 2016, the Commission adopted rules to enable wireless
alerts to contain more content and to enable support for alerts
written in Spanish.
When the WEA program launched in 2012, participating
wireless providers were generally required to target alerts to
a county or counties affected by the emergency. As of last
November, all participating wireless providers are now required
to transmit alerts to a geographic area that best approximates
the area affected, even if it is smaller than a county. To
further improve WEA, next Tuesday, the Commission will vote on
an order that would require participating wireless providers to
target alerts with an overreach of no more than one-tenth of a
mile and require carriers to preserve WEA alerts for 24 hours.
In closing, we look forward to partnering with emergency
management professionals from your jurisdictions on the
alerting capabilities that they need to use America's public
alert and warning systems with confidence during times of
crisis.
Thank you, and I look forward to any questions you may
have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Fowlkes follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lisa M. Fowlkes, Chief, Public Safety and
Homeland Security Bureau, Federal Communications Commission
Good morning, Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and Members of
the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to
discuss our Nation's emergency alerting systems.
The false alert issued on January 13th by the State of Hawaii, in
which recipients were warned of an imminent ballistic missile attack,
was absolutely unacceptable. It resulted in widespread panic, and the
extended period it took to correct the error--nearly 40 minutes--
compounded the problem. Looking beyond the immediate consequences of
the mistake, which were serious in and of themselves, this cry of
``wolf'' damaged the credibility of alert messaging, which can be
dangerous when a real emergency occurs.
The Commission acted swiftly in the wake of this incident to open
an investigation into the matter. That investigation is ongoing--we had
investigators on the ground in Hawaii just last week--but based on
information gathered to date, it appears that the false alert was
issued as a result of both human error and the state having
insufficient safeguards and process controls in place to prevent that
human error from resulting in the transmission of a false alert. The
Hawaii Emergency Management Agency has advised us that it is working
with its vendor to integrate additional technical safeguards into its
alert origination software, and has changed its protocols to require
two individuals to sign off on the transmission of tests and live
alerts.
Moving forward, the Commission will focus on what steps need to be
taken to prevent a similar incident from happening again. Federal,
state, and local officials throughout the country need to work together
to identify any vulnerabilities to false alerts and do what's necessary
to fix them. We also must ensure that corrections are issued
immediately after a false alert goes out in order to minimize panic and
confusion. Emergency alerting systems provide timely and life-saving
information to the public, and we must take all measures to bolster and
restore the public's confidence in these systems.
The incident in Hawaii is very present in our minds. But I don't
want this incident to detract from the benefits of and success stories
behind wireless emergency alerts. In this respect, I would like to
describe the FCC's efforts to support Wireless Emergency Alerts,
commonly known as ``WEA,'' since the system was deployed in April 2012.
In the last 5 years, WEA has been used to issue over 33,000 emergency
alerts. WEA helps individuals take protective action in cases of
threats to life and property. The National Weather Service alone has
sent well over 21,000 WEA alerts. For example, we understand that local
California officials used WEA four times in response to the 2017
wildfires in Northern California, and sixteen times for the Los Angeles
area wildfires. Representatives from the California Governor's Office
of Emergency Services and officials in Marin and Mendocino Counties
reported successful use of WEA to move citizens in their jurisdictions
to safety. WEA was also used extensively in all areas affected by the
2017 hurricanes, including 21 WEA alerts sent in Puerto Rico alone.
WEA also helps to recover missing children. In 2016 alone, 179
AMBER Alerts were issued in the U.S. involving 231 children. Since the
system was deployed in 2012, WEA has been credited with the safe return
of 25 missing children. For example, on May 14, 2016, in North Las
Vegas, Nevada, a 22-month-old child was abducted and driven off in a
stolen car. An AMBER Alert was immediately activated and sent out to
cell phones using the WEA system. The kidnappers took the child to
their friend's house, and while they were there, the WEA Alert began to
arrive on everyone's phone. The abductors tried to flee, but the friend
took the child and the car keys, called 911, and brought the child to a
police station. The child was safely rescued, and the kidnappers were
arrested.
The Commission places the highest priority on ensuring that
emergency management authorities and first responders have the most up-
to-date tools available to respond to such events. Since WEA was first
deployed in 2012, the Commission has taken significant steps to enhance
federal, state, and local alert and warning capabilities to leverage
advancements in technology.
In September 2016, the Commission adopted rules to enable wireless
alerts to contain more content by increasing message length from 90 to
360 characters and by supporting embedded phone numbers and URLs. It
also took action to enable support for alerts written in Spanish and
make it easier for state and local authorities to test WEA, train
personnel, and raise public awareness about the service.
The Commission also recognized that it is critical for emergency
managers to be able to geographically target alerts to only those
phones located in areas affected by an emergency. When the WEA program
launched in 2012, participating wireless providers were generally
required to send the alerts to a geographic area no larger than the
county or counties affected by the emergency situation. As of last
November, all participating wireless providers are now required to
transmit alerts to a geographic area that best approximates the area
affected by the emergency situation, even if it is smaller than a
county.
But the Commission is not stopping there. Next Tuesday, the
Commission will vote on an Order that would require participating
wireless providers to target alerts with an overreach of no more than
one tenth of a mile. Public safety officials strongly support our
proposed action. For example, APCO recently hailed the Chairman Pai's
proposal as a ``dramatic enhancement to WEA'' that will provide public
safety professionals with increased confidence that the system will be
able to deliver emergency information more efficiently.\1\ State and
local governments also support the Chairman's proposal. For example,
Harris County states that the Chairman proposal ``will empower local
public safety officials with the tools necessary to keep WEA relevant''
and that if ``adopted in a way that clearly outlines intended
expectations and requirements, it will be the single most important
improvement to the Nation's alerts and warnings infrastructure in
years.'' \2\
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\1\ Ex Parte Letter from Jeffrey S. Cohen, Chief Counsel, APCO, PS
Docket No. 15-91 (Jan. 12, 2018).
\2\ Ex Parte Letter from Francisco Sanchez, Deputy Emergency
Management Coordinator, Harris County, PS Docket No. 5-91 (Jan. 19,
2018).
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Enhanced geo-targeting is one among several pertinent improvements
currently before the Commission that would make WEA a more powerful
tool for saving lives during emergencies. By matching alerts to phones
actually located within the affected area, the Commission's proposal
would assist emergency response efforts and instill confidence in the
public's reliance on WEA. Because people will be receiving alerts that
are relevant to them, they will be less likely to opt out of the
program and more likely to take the alerts they receive seriously. We
are also currently considering how to provide emergency managers with
the ability to transmit alerts in languages in addition to English and
Spanish, alerts that can contain pictures, and alerts that could
provide the public with the ability to reply. While WEA is a powerful
alert and warning tool, it is also important to note that it is only
one among several tools available to emergency managers to alert and
warn their communities.
For example, the Emergency Alert System, or EAS, is the traditional
system used to provide alerts and warnings to the public over
broadcast, cable and satellite systems, and remains a vital tool for
emergency managers, state and local authorities. The Commission has
been working to modernize the EAS to ensure that it remains a relied
upon and useful tool. For example, just this past December the
Commission adopted a new ``blue alert'' code for both EAS and WEA that
will allow alert originators to provide targeted information to the
public regarding threats to law enforcement and to help apprehend
dangerous suspects. In addition, in November the Chairman circulated an
item for the Commission's consideration that would modernize and
streamline the filing process for EAS state plans.
Over the past several years, the FCC has also worked closely with
FEMA to conduct nationwide tests of the EAS to assess its reliability
and effectiveness. The FCC has also successfully deployed the EAS
Electronic Reporting System, or ETRS, a user-friendly database that
allows the over 25,000 EAS participants to report test results in close
to real time. The most recent test was conducted on September 27, 2017,
and our initial analysis of the ETRS results shows improvements in most
areas. For example, results indicate more than 95 percent of
participants received the test alerts, and nearly 92 percent
successfully retransmitted the alert--both up from the previous year.
Further, more than twice as many EAS Participants retransmitted the
Spanish language version of the alert than was the case in 2016. In
all, we are encouraged by the results and will continue to strive to
find ways to enhance the EAS as well.
In closing, we look forward to partnering with emergency management
professionals from your jurisdictions on the alerting capabilities that
they need to use the EAS and WEA with confidence during crises when
every second counts.
Thank you for your consideration, and I look forward to any
questions you may have.
The Chairman. Thank you, Ms. Fowlkes.
Mr. Bergmann.
STATEMENT OF SCOTT BERGMANN, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, REGULATORY
AFFAIRS, CTIA
Mr. Bergmann. Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and
members of the Committee, on behalf of CTIA, thank you for the
opportunity to testify about the critical and successful role
of Wireless Emergency Alerts.
CTIA commends this Committee for its focus today on this
issue and for your leadership on it over the last decade,
extending back to the passage of the WARN Act in 2006 which
created the Wireless Emergency Alert, or WEA, program, a
partnership between the wireless industry, government, and
public safety officials.
Since its launch 5 years ago, Wireless Emergency Alerts
have become a critical resource for hundreds of millions of
Americans who rely on mobile phones every day. Today, wireless
providers serving more than 99 percent of U.S. subscribers
voluntarily participate in WEA. More than 33,000 WEA alerts
have been sent, helping to locate those in danger and warn of
imminent threats or dangers.
CTIA members are deeply committed to ensuring that we
remain a trusted and effective source for the American public.
So the recent false alert in Hawaii underscores the importance
of the functionality, integrity, and credibility of our
Nation's Emergency Alert System. With that in mind, my
testimony will address the vital role that WEA plays, our
ongoing efforts to enhance its capabilities, and the importance
of maintaining the system's integrity.
A decade ago, this committee recognized the value of
Wireless Emergency Alerts to reach nearly every American. Now,
as more than half of American households are wireless only, WEA
has become an essential tool for public safety officials to
reach Americans wherever they are. WEA is part of our broader
national alerting system.
Federal, state, and local authorities transmit emergency
messages to FEMA. FEMA authenticates and formats messages for
distribution to the various national alerting systems, and
wireless providers deliver authorized WEA messages to the
targeted area as determined by alert authorities. Wireless
providers do not control message content and do not exercise
discretion over whether to transmit messages.
Because local authorities can target WEA alerts to a
particular area, they're extremely effective at reaching those
Americans directly impacted by an emergency. WEA's unique sound
and vibration help ensure that everyone is aware of the alert.
Wireless Emergency Alerts have helped to return abducted
children; they have warned millions of people in the path of
severe weather events, like flooding, tornadoes, and wildfires;
and they've helped law enforcement catch terror suspects in the
2013 Boston Marathon bombing and 2016 Chelsea bombing in New
York City.
We continue to expand WEA's capabilities. In the past year,
the FCC has adopted rules to expand the content that
authorities can send to consumers, adding additional
characters, Spanish language, Blue Alerts, and downloadable
content from embedded links, as well as support for additional
state and local testing. We've supported these enhancements
because our members are committed to the proven lifesaving
success of WEA.
Next week, the FCC plans to adopt an order that further
enhances WEA's geo-targeting capabilities. Today, WEA alerts
can be targeted down to the cell sector level, a significant
improvement over WEA's initial county level targeting. Given
the expanding public safety mission for WEA, CTIA supports the
FCC's proposed enhanced geo-targeting framework, which can help
public safety minimize over-alerting through innovative,
device-based solutions. Significant standards, deployment, and
testing work still needs to be done to support this capability.
For this reason, we'll be challenged to meet the FCC's proposed
timeline of November 2019, but the wireless industry will work
intently to do so.
Finally, the false alert in Hawaii underscores that public
confidence in our national alerting systems must remain our
highest priority. Alert originators must send warnings
appropriately and judiciously, FEMA must authenticate messages
quickly and accurately, and providers must deliver messages to
the targeted area. We commend this committee and Chairman Pai
for working quickly to identify lessons learned from this
event, and we appreciate Commissioner Rosenworcel's call for
additional best practices.
There will be many lessons learned, but this event also
demonstrated that the technical capabilities of the WEA system
work. For this reason, policymakers and the public should have
confidence that in the event of a real emergency, authenticated
information can be disseminated rapidly and effectively through
the Wireless Emergency Alert System. CTIA is proud of the
critical role that WEA plays in our national alert system and
is committed to working collaboratively to maintain public
confidence.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bergmann follows:]
Prepared Statement of Scott Bergmann, Senior Vice President,
Regulatory Affairs, CTIA
Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and members of the
Committee, on behalf of CTIA and our member companies throughout the
wireless ecosystem, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss the critical and successful role of Wireless Emergency
Alerts within our Nation's emergency alert system.
CTIA commends the leadership of this Committee for its passage of
the Warning, Alert, and Response Network (WARN) Act, which created the
Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) program, a public-private partnership
between the wireless industry, government, and alert originators. The
Wireless Emergency Alert system was launched in 2012 and is jointly
implemented and administered by the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). In the five years
since the launch of the Wireless Emergency Alert system, it has become
a critical resource for the hundreds of millions of Americans who rely
on their mobile phones every day.
CTIA and its member companies are proud of the wireless industry's
role in the Wireless Emergency Alerts system. Today, all four national
wireless providers and dozens of regional providers, serving more than
99 percent of all U.S. subscribers, are voluntarily participating in
the Wireless Emergency Alert system; transmitting thousands of alerts
each year and helping our public safety professionals save lives.\1\
Ensuring that Wireless Emergency Alerts remain a trusted source of
emergency information for the American public is one of our highest
priorities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Wireless Emergency Alerts, Order on Reconsideration, 32 FCC Rcd
9621, 9625 n.28 (2017); see also, CTIA, How Wireless Emergency Alerts
Help Save Lives, https://www.ctia.org/consumer-tips/how-wireless-
emergency-alerts-help-save-lives (last visited Jan. 23, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The mistaken alert that was issued in Hawaii on January 13, 2018 is
of course at top of mind for policymakers, CTIA and its member
companies, all WEA stakeholders, and the public writ large. The Hawaii
incident underscores to all of us the importance of the functionality
and integrity--and credibility--of our Nation's emergency alert
systems. Any incident that affects the public's confidence in emergency
alerts risks undermining the effectiveness of all alerting systems,
including WEA. We lose the effectiveness of emergency alerting if
people simply ignore or opt-out of receiving these critical messages.
For this reason, we are deeply committed to doing our part to
ensure that Wireless Emergency Alerts remain a trusted and effective
tool for public safety. With that in mind, I would like to address the
program's success, the cooperative voluntary framework on which WEA
operates, ongoing efforts to enhance the geographic targeting (geo-
targeting) of alert messages, and, finally, the importance of
maintaining the system's integrity.
The Success of Wireless Emergency Alerts
The Wireless Emergency Alert system is the newest and most
effective means the Nation has for warning Americans of imminent
dangers and other incidents requiring immediate action. A decade ago,
Congress and this Committee wisely recognized the value of wireless in
reaching nearly every American and set in motion the creation of the
Wireless Emergency Alert system. Now, as more than half of American
households have cut the cord and are ``wireless only,'' \2\ alerts and
warnings sent to our mobile devices are the obvious choice for public
safety officials to make sure we can take action wherever we are,
whatever we are doing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Stephen J. Blumberg & Julian V. Luke, Ctrs. for Disease Control
& Prevention, Nat'l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Wireless Substitution:
Early Release of Estimates From the National Health Interview Survey,
July-December 2016 (May 2017); see also, Alina Sleuth, Nat'l Pub.
Radio, The Daredevils Without Landlines--And Why Health Experts Are
Tracking Them (May 4, 2017),
https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2015/12/03/458225197/
the-daredevils-without
-landlines-and-why-health-experts-are-tracking-them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wireless Emergency Alerts delivered to wireless devices in a
targeted area--with their unique sounds, high volumes, and forceful
vibrations--save lives. The WEA system sends out Amber Alerts and
shelter-in-place directives, warns citizens of fires, floods, and
tornados, and otherwise keeps the public apprised of real threats.
Because WEA messages are delivered to consumers with capable mobile
devices in an area targeted by local authorities, they are an extremely
effective mechanism for reaching those Americans that are directly
impacted by an emergency. It is no wonder that some have called
Wireless Emergency Alerts ``the government's most potent public
notification system.'' \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Aaron C. Davis & Sandhya Somashekhar, The only California
county that sent a warning to residents' cellphones has no reported
fatalities, Wash. Post, Oct. 13 2017, https://www
.washingtonpost.com/investigations/the-only-california-county-that-
sent-a-warning-to-residents-
cellphones-has-no-reported-fatalities/2017/10/13/b28b5af4-b01f-11e7-
a908-a3470754bbb9_story
.html?utm_term=.cd24bb9ecf9chttps://www.washingtonpost.com/
investigations/the-only-califor
nia-county-that-sent-a-warning-to-residents-cellphones-has-no-reported-
fatalities-/2017/10/13/b2
8b5af4-b01f-11e7-a908-a3470754bbb9_story.html?utm_term=.cd24bb9ecf9c.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since 2012, more than 33,000 Wireless Emergency Alerts have been
sent to consumers with WEA-capable devices.\4\ These messages have
asked the public for help in locating someone in danger or warned
Americans of imminent threats or disasters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Mark Lucero, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, Integrated Public
Alert & Warning System16 16 (Aug. 8, 2017), https://
view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nap
sgfoundation.org%2Fwp-
content%2Fuploads%2F2017%2F08%2FFEMA_IPAWS_Keynote_MarkLu
cero_20170708.pptxhttps://view.officeapps.live.com/op/
view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.-
napsgfoundation.org%2Fwp-
content%2Fuploads%2F2017%2F08%2FFEMA_IPAWS_Keynote_
Mark-Lucero_20170708.pptx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For example, in 2015, an AMBER Alert for a missing child was sent
through the WEA system to wireless consumers in Minnesota. A citizen in
the area received the alert on their smartphone, saw a black Honda
Civic that matched the description issued in the alert, and called 9-1-
1. Authorities responded and rescued the child from the abductor. This
is just one of many such stories--a total of 910 children have been
successfully recovered through the AMBER Alert system, as of January 8,
2018.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Amber Alerts, Nat'l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children,
http://www.missingkids.com/gethelpnow/amber (last visited Jan. 23,
2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wireless Emergency Alerts have also been used extensively to warn
the public of severe weather emergencies. This past fall, more than 300
Wireless Emergency Alerts warned people around Houston, Texas about
Hurricane Harvey and its rising floodwaters, more than 200 Wireless
Emergency Alerts warned Floridians about the strong winds of Hurricane
Irma, and Wireless Emergency Alerts played a critical role in warning
many Californians about the devastating wildfires.\6\ In 2013, 29
children were saved from a tornado ripping through a soccer building in
Windsor, Connecticut when the camp manager received a Wireless
Emergency Alert seconds before the tornado touched down.\7\ Even as the
system was only months old in 2012, public safety officials were using
Wireless Emergency Alerts to warn the people in the path of Superstorm
Sandy.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ See generally CTIA, Hurricane Harvey: Resiliency & Relief,
https://www.ctia.org/hurricane-harvey/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2018);
Davis & Somashekhar, supra note 3; Richard Perez-Pena, Fire Alert Sent
to Millions of Cellphones Was California's Largest Warning Yet, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 7, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/07/us/cellphone-
alerts-california-fires.html.
\7\ Rick Wimberly, Powerful Wireless Emergency Alerts Success
Stories at Congressional Hearing, Emergency Management, Oct. 24, 2013,
http://www.govtech.com/em/emergency-blogs/
alerts/Powerful-Wireless-Emergency-Alerts-Success-Stories-at-
Congressional-Hearing.html; see also, David Owens & Chloe Miller,
National Weather Service Confirms Two Tornadoes Monday, Hartford
Courant, July 2, 2013, http://articles.courant.com/2013-07-02/news/hc-
tornado-warning-0702-20130701_1_windsor-locks-dome-national-weather-
service-confirms.
\8\ Wimberly, supra note 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Local emergency officials have also used Wireless Emergency Alerts
to inform the public of ongoing law enforcement and terrorist threats,
and to enlist their assistance. In 2013, Massachusetts authorities sent
a shelter-in-place Wireless Emergency Alert while apprehending the
suspects in the Boston Marathon Bombing.\9\ And in 2016, the City of
New York sent a description of the suspect in the Chelsea Bombing
through a Wireless Emergency Alert, leading to the suspect's arrest
within hours of the alert.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Id.
\10\ David Goodman & David Gelles, Cellphone Alerts Used in New
York to Search for Bombing Suspect, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 2016, https:/
/www.nytimes.com/2016/09/20/nyregion/cellphone-alerts-used-in-search-
of-manhattan-bombing-suspect.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For more than a decade, the wireless industry has worked diligently
to develop and deploy this capability in its networks and devices.
Through cell broadcast technology unique to the WEA system, mobile
providers can broadcast Wireless Emergency Alerts from cell-sites in
areas targeted by local emergency officials to wireless devices in a
timely manner. Today, there are millions of devices throughout the U.S.
that are capable of receiving these critical messages.
Wireless Emergency Alerts are part of the broader national alerting
system, known as the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System
(IPAWS), managed by FEMA. Through IPAWs, authorized federal, state, and
local authorities, known as alert originators, transmit emergency
messages to a FEMA-operated system. FEMA's system authenticates and
formats the message for distribution across a variety of channels,
including the WEA system. Of note, the substance and distribution
channel of an alert is determined by the federal, state, or local
government that originates the alert. Wireless providers deliver
authorized WEA messages to the target area identified by the alert
originator without input into the content of a message or discretion
over whether or not to transmit it.
Reflecting the evolution of our mobile wireless networks and
devices, the capabilities of the Wireless Emergency Alert system
continue to advance in a remarkably short timeframe. In less than six
years since the voluntary Wireless Emergency Alert system was first
launched, the FCC has adopted various updates and improvements--and is
poised to adopt another one next week. In 2016, the FCC put rules in
place to increase the maximum alert length from 90 characters to 360
characters for LTE wireless systems and future networks, as well as
support additional local and state testing capabilities, Spanish-
language alerts, and embedded links and phone numbers. In particular,
the FCC noted that allowing embedded references to be included in WEA
alerts ``will dramatically improve WEA's effectiveness'' and that
commenters identified this capability as ``the most critical among all
of our proposed improvements to WEA.'' \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Wireless Emergency Alerts, Report and Order and Further Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 31 FCC Rcd 11112, 1113711137-38 (2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CTIA's member companies are working hard to add these new
capabilities into the WEA system, and have already answered public
safety's call to ensure that alerts are capable of including embedded
links so that consumers will be able to go to a website to see a photo
of the missing child, or a suspected terrorist.
Enhanced Geo-targeting Requirements
In the coming days, the FCC plans to adopt another order focused on
the geo-targeting capabilities of the WEA system. The FCC initially
mandated targeting at the county level, but many participating
providers began voluntarily supporting geo-targeting of Wireless
Emergency Alerts well below the county level to enable local officials
to minimize over-alerting. An appropriately targeted WEA message can
mitigate the possibility that an alert will cause distress or panic in
areas not actually at risk and enhance public confidence in the
emergency alert system. Today, participating providers deliver Wireless
Emergency Alerts to a targeted area that best approximates the area
identified by the alert originators down to the cell-sector level.
While the ability to geo-target Wireless Emergency Alerts down to
the cell-sector level will remain a constant feature of the system, we
share the expressed goal of public safety leaders to harness innovative
location technologies to further minimize the possibility of over-
alerting. For this reason, CTIA supports the framework for enhancing
the geo-targeting capabilities of the WEA system that the FCC will
consider next week. If adopted, a participating wireless provider would
be required to match the alert area by distributing the WEA message to
100 percent of the alert area that the carrier's network serves with no
more than a tenth of a mile overshoot. To deliver this new capability,
wireless providers will shift from a solely network-based approach to
target the alert area to one that also harnesses location capabilities
within mobile devices. Once available, this capability will give local
alert originators an additional tool to minimize the possibility that
someone will receive an irrelevant Wireless Emergency Alert.
The draft geo-targeting order proposes an aggressive implementation
timeline that will present a significant challenge for wireless
providers and device manufacturers. As the proposed Order notes,
significant standards, deployment and testing work remains to support
this enhanced geo-targeting capability throughout the chain of the
alert--from alert originators to FEMA's gateway to wireless networks to
mobile devices. If adopted, the wireless industry--including
participating providers and device manufacturers--will work intently,
as it always has, in an effort to meet the FCC's aggressive deadline.
Maintaining Public Confidence After Hawaii
The January 13, 2018 incident in Hawaii has underscored for all of
us--government and industry alike--that the success of Wireless
Emergency Alerts relies on the public's trust. Trust in the system
hinges on execution. Alert originators must send Wireless Emergency
Alerts appropriately and judiciously; the FEMA authentication and
verification process must be expeditious and robust; and participating
wireless providers must deliver WEA messages to the targeted area. Only
this way will the public know that when a Wireless Emergency Alert is
sent, the danger is real.
This Committee should be commended for focusing on what errors led
to the mistaken Hawaii alert and on drawing out lessons learned. Going
forward, we should strive to make sure that another harm does not take
root--namely, the danger that the next time an alert is issued, that
some will not take it seriously or refuse to evacuate.
CTIA and the wireless industry also commend FCC Chairman Pai for
swift action to investigate the cause of this incident and appreciate
FCC Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel's recent recommendations and
suggestions for new best practices around the training and use of our
Nation's emergency alert system. Notably, Congress recognized the need
to train and equip our alert originators to more effectively use our
Nation's emergency alert system when the IPAWS Modernization Act became
law in 2015. And in 2016, the FCC encouraged emergency management
agencies to engage in proficiency training exercises that could help
minimize system failures and ensure that any failures are corrected
during a period when no real emergency exists. CTIA strongly supports
all of these efforts and encourages FEMA and other public-safety
authorities to offer training opportunities for alert originators that
promise to bolster WEA's utility and credibility going forward.
While we expect there are many lessons to be learned from the
experience in Hawaii, and many will be cautionary, we should also
acknowledge that wireless networks and devices performed exactly as
designed and effectively delivered and presented the alert message as
received from the FEMA gateway. The speed and effectiveness of its
delivery should give policymakers and the public confidence that in the
event of a real emergency, the Wireless Emergency Alert system will
disseminate information rapidly and accurately to Americans--wherever
they may be.
* * *
CTIA and the wireless industry are proud of the critical role that
Wireless Emergency Alerts play in our Nation's emergency alert system,
and are committed to continue working collaboratively with public
safety professionals at every level of our government to maintain
public confidence in Wireless Emergency Alerts.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. If CTIA can provide
any additional information you would find helpful, please let us know.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Bergmann.
Mr. Lisenco.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL LISENCO, THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR
AMATEUR RADIO
Mr. Lisenco. Good morning, Chairman Thune, Ranking Member
Nelson, and distinguished members of the Committee. It is a
great privilege to address you this morning in my capacity as a
member of the Board of Directors of the American Radio Relay
League, the National Association for Amateur Radio.
ARRL has approximately 175,000 members throughout the
United States, and we represent the interest of the 750,000
licensed amateur or ham radio operators in the U.S. Amateur
radio is an avocational pursuit. We are radio experimenters and
we are communicators, but there's also a very serious side to
amateur radio. It is far more than a hobby.
With our license from the FCC comes a responsibility to
promote emergency communications during times of disaster. The
ARRL maintains memoranda of understanding with the U.S.
military, FEMA, and DHS. We provide all of the emergency
communications for the American Red Cross and the Salvation
Army. To quote former FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate, ``As
much as we think we are sophisticated with technology, things
break. Seeing how amateur radio in a disaster, in a crisis,
oftentimes was the one thing that was still up and running, a
ham transmitting can mean the difference between life and
death.''
Amateur radio operators are included in emergency
communications plans in every state of the union. The role
played by hams in disasters was on full display in the fall of
2017, which saw four major hurricanes make landfall in the
United States and its territories. These storms caused
significant damage of Florida, Texas, Puerto Rico, and the
Virgin Islands. In advance of, during, and in the aftermath of
each one, trained amateur radio operators using radio stations
in their homes and portable and mobile facilities responded in
large numbers.
Hams provided critical weather spotting information from
their residences to the National Weather Service and the
National Hurricane Center. They joined dozens of their brethren
in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands after Hurricane
Maria to provide restoration communications for the U.S.
military, FEMA, DHS, and first responders. They provided health
and welfare communications where no other method of
communication was available.
They provided all of the communications for the Red Cross
and the Salvation Army. The Red Cross requested an ARRL
dispatched an additional 50 amateur radio operators equipped
with emergency communications kits outfitted free of charge by
ARRL to help restore communications in the immediate aftermath.
And, as discussed in my written testimony, they did a multitude
of other things, all at no cost to the public or to the Federal
Government.
In Hawaii, our teams are prepared to assist in the case of
any emergency, whether natural or manmade. For example, in the
immediate aftermath of Maria, an amateur operator in Maui was
highlighted on Hawaii News Now for his work in connecting a
Maui family with relatives in Puerto Rico. He did so using an
effective outdoor antenna and a station from his residence,
which he would also utilize in the event of a disaster in Maui.
After the January false alarm, MSNBC's Left Field reported
that, ``In the case of electromagnetic pulse from a blast, 90
percent of the people will be without communication, and ham
radio is actually one of the ways that you will be able to hear
what is happening throughout the islands, whether or not people
are OK, who is alive.''
While ARRL and the amateur radio community rarely need
anything from the Federal Government, what we must have is an
effective outdoor amateur radio antenna in order to practice
our avocation on our properties. The ability to practice our
craft is crucial to our being ready to perform when needed in a
crisis. To do that, we must have some sort of effective outdoor
antenna. Deed restricted communities undermine the ability of
the amateur radio community to be ready when disaster strikes.
These restrictions prevent any outdoor antennas of any size or
height. Today, 90 percent of all new housing starts are done so
under the restrictions, all of which preclude amateur radio
antennas.
What Senators Wicker and Blumenthal have done with the
Amateur Radio Parity Act is to strike a necessary balance
between a ham's desire to install an antenna and the HOA's
right to govern the size and placement of these antennas. It is
important to note that the bill is different than the
legislation opposed by Ranking Member Nelson in 2015. At that
time, the distinguished senator from Florida expressed
reservations about the legislation, stating that he supported
amateur radio, but, ``there must be a happy compromise.''
Based on his stated concerns, ARRL began intense
negotiations with Community Associations Institute, the only
national association for homeowners' associations, lasting
several months. These discussions culminated in a happy
compromise endorsed by CAI and ARRL, as well as the American
Red Cross and the Salvation Army, and the compromise bill has
passed the House by voice vote twice. We hope that this
committee will extend its support to the Wicker-Blumenthal
bill, S. 1534, to ensure that the amateur radio community can
continue to be relied upon when a disaster strikes.
Again, I thank the Committee for the opportunity to speak
to you today about the role of amateur radio in a disaster. I
look forward to answering any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lisenco follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael Lisenco, on behalf of ARRL, the national
association for Amateur Radio
I. Summary of Testimony
1. In emergencies, prior to and during disasters and their
immediate aftermath, when other communications systems have failed or
are overwhelmed, volunteer Amateur Radio operators are ready, willing,
able and prepared to provide alerting information, restoration
communications; interoperable communications for first responders which
lack that capability; health and welfare message traffic, and
operations and support communications for disaster relief organizations
and served agencies.
2. Radio Amateurs quickly re-establish communications during that
critical window of time between a disaster's occurrence and the re-
establishment of normal communications.
3. Amateur Radio operators contributed substantially to the
dissemination of accurate information following the recent missile
alert in Hawaii; and Amateur Radio is a key component of communications
planning in the event of an actual ballistic missile attack in Hawaii.
4. The extensive Amateur Radio deployment of 50 volunteers from the
U.S. mainland to Puerto Rico, and the long-term dedication of more than
75 resident Amateur Radio operators in the first few days of the
recovery effort following the devastation there was the best example of
the value of Amateur Radio in disaster relief communications. Virtually
all communications infrastructure on the Island was destroyed or
crippled by the high winds. Amateur Radio operators provided
restoration communications for weeks following the hurricane, and in
fact local radio Amateurs are still providing communications for power
utilities.
5. The value of Amateur Radio in disasters, and in emergency
alerting, weather spotting and in message traffic relay for served
agencies is due not only to the extensive training and the ubiquitous
geographic distribution of residential Amateur Radio stations
throughout the United States. It is due also to the fact that hardened
Amateur Radio stations with effective outdoor antennas capable of
operation on multiple frequency allocations throughout the radio
spectrum at a moment's notice are available ahead of time. Absent that,
Amateur radio cannot provide the kind of volunteer public service
communications for which it is deservedly well-known.
6. Had the level of devastation that occurred in Puerto Rico
happened in Hawaii instead, the Amateur Radio response that was
provided so effectively after Hurricane Maria could not have been
provided to the same extent in Hawaii. The difference is that in Puerto
Rico, there is not the same level of ubiquitous, preclusive private
land use regulations that preclude the installation of effective
outdoor antennas at the licensees' residences. These must be in place
and operational well before a disaster occurs.
7. Given the prevalence and increasing numbers of private land use
regulated communities in the United States, residential Amateur Radio
antennas cannot be installed or maintained in most of them. An Amateur
Radio licensee who must live in a deed restricted community currently
will almost inevitably be subject to either (1) a complete prohibition
of his or her Amateur Radio operation, or (2) the unlimited
jurisdiction of a community association or architectural control
committee or board which makes decisions concerning Amateur Radio
antennas without any standards or limits whatsoever.
8. There is now pending before this Committee the Amateur Radio
Parity Act of 2017. The House version of this Bill, H.R. 555 passed the
House unanimously in January of 2017. The current Senate Bill, S. 1534
was introduced in July of 2017 by Senators Wicker and Blumenthal. This
is a balanced, completely bipartisan bill that would fully protect both
the entitlement of Amateur Radio volunteers to be able to utilize their
FCC-issued licenses to provide emergency, disaster relief and public
service communications, while at the same time protecting the aesthetic
concerns and the jurisdiction of homeowners' associations. The Bill is
supported by ARRL and the Community Associations Institute (CAI) which
is the only national association of homeowners' associations. ARRL and
CAI, at the urging of members of this Committee, cooperatively and
carefully negotiated the precise, current language of the Bill, and
both organizations have stated their support for it. Homeowner's
associations can enact reasonable written rules governing height,
location, size and aesthetic impact of, and installation requirements
for, outdoor antennas and support structures for amateur
communications. Absent this legislation, the volunteer emergency
communications services provided by Amateur Radio will be precluded. We
urge the Committee in the strongest terms to please approve and send
this legislation forward without delay.
Statement of Michael Lisenco on behalf of ARRL, the national
association for Amateur Radio
``. . . After sheltering in place, you basically turn on AM/FM
radio for word from Hawaii Civil Defense and other authorities. The
story we are working on for MSNBC Left Field is that, in the case of
electromagnetic pulse from a blast, and they expect. . .90 percent of
the people will be without communication, and ham radio is actually one
of the ways that you will be able to hear what is happening throughout
the islands, whether or not people are OK, who is alive, where that
might be. Again, let's be very clear, this is a false alarm, but if it
were to happen they have a system in place, a very specific, stringent,
structured system for this, if this was to happen.''
Joel Soboroff, reporting for MSNBC's Left Field from Waikiki Beach
on Saturday, January 13, 2018. http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/watch/
breaking-down-the-false-alarm-hawaii-missile-threat-1136479811623
******
Thank you, Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson and other members
of the Committee for this opportunity to testify on the topic of
emergency alerting and emergency communications.
The Amateur Radio Service
I have had the privilege of serving for the past 5 years as a
member of the Board of Directors of ARRL, the national association for
Amateur Radio (formally known as the American Radio Relay League,
Incorporated). I also chair its legislative advocacy committee. ARRL is
a Connecticut non-profit association which has for more than a century
represented and advocated the interests of the Nation's 750,000 Amateur
Radio operators, all of whom are licensed by the Federal Communications
Commission to serve the public, especially in times of natural and
other disasters. Amateur Radio exists for a number of reasons,
principal among which (as the FCC regulations put it) is its value ``to
the public as a voluntary noncommercial communication service,
particularly with respect to providing emergency communications.'' The
FCC has at various times described the Amateur Service as a ``model of
volunteerism'' and a ``priceless public benefit.''
Amateur Radio operators are not first responders. But in
emergencies, and during disasters and their immediate aftermath, when
other communications systems have failed, volunteer amateur radio
operators are ready, willing, able and prepared to provide restoration
communications; interoperable communications for first responders which
lack that capability; operations and support communications for
disaster relief organizations and served agencies such as the American
National Red Cross and the Salvation Army, and as ubiquitous sources of
information for emergency alerting. Amateur Radio is durable and is not
susceptible to the same disruptions caused by disasters as are
broadband networks; cellular networks; and even public safety dispatch
systems. This is because Amateur Radio does not rely on centralized or
decentralized infrastructure. Because of Amateur Radio operators'
technical self-training and flexibility, they can and do provide
emergency communications with no infrastructure at all. Amateur Radio
mobile and portable facilities can be established on site and at
strategic locations off-site to provide reliable, immediate disaster
relief communications instantly, within or outside the disaster area,
over any path distance and to any location whatsoever. This flexibility
makes it possible to provide communications for first responders and
served agencies, as well as temporary interoperability facilities for
first responders. As but a single example, in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina, Amateur Radio operators provided communications from
helicopters to first responders on the ground to facilitate rescue
operations.
Amateurs are best known for their immediate responses to
hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, snow and ice storms, floods and
other natural disasters, and their preparedness for immediate,
organized deployment in large numbers. They are immediately available
in large numbers during and in the aftermath of such events, and they
provide communications in support of public safety and disaster relief
agencies and state emergency response agencies without any advance
request to do so. The level of organization and preparedness comes from
regular drills, exercises and emergency simulations and they are
integrated into emergency planning at all levels of government. ARRL
conducts emergency communications certification courses that provide
the educational background necessary for such serious work.
The large volume of public-spirited volunteer communicators in the
Service stems from the fact that reliable, hardened Amateur Radio
stations capable of local, regional or worldwide communications, with
effective, outdoor antennas are widely and evenly distributed
throughout the country, located in the residences of the licensees.
There are, as the result, always going to be radio Amateurs inside and
outside a disaster area, already on site before the disaster strikes,
ready to transmit local conditions to first responders and state
offices of emergency management. Because of this ubiquity, Amateur
Radio serves as an early weather alerting service through programs
designed to prepare the public for natural disasters and weather-
related emergencies.
Emergency Alerting Via Amateur Radio
The Amateur Radio Service interfaces with the National Weather
Service (NWS) and the National Hurricane Center (NHC). The SKYWARN
program of the NWS provides thousands of volunteers nationwide to serve
as the ``eyes'' of the NWS using Amateur Radio stations at their
residences when severe weather is imminent. These spotters also provide
critical meteorological data that cannot be observed at ground level by
NWS radar systems. While there are some trained SKYWARN spotters who
participate from their personal vehicles as mobile units positioned at
certain strategic locations, the majority of SKYWARN participants
provide their detailed observations from their home station locations.
Effective and reliable stations and antennas are needed in order for
these home stations to provide these detailed observations to NWS and
NHC. The timeliness of SKYWARN reports submitted via Amateur Radio
confirms what NWS sees on weather radars; it substantially increases
the precision of severe weather forecasting; and it allows NWS to
increase the warning and preparation times for those citizens in harm's
way. The program works very well: according to statistics from the NWS,
approximately 290,000 trained SKYWARN spotters--the majority being
licensed Amateur Radio operators--assist the NWS in providing accurate,
reliable and immediate information on approximately 10,000 severe
thunderstorms, 5,000 floods and 1,000 tornadoes on average each year.
The NHC, on the campus of Florida International University in
Miami, is the second major National Weather Service program supported
by Amateur Radio. For the past 32 years, volunteer operators at the
NHC's dedicated Amateur Radio station (FCC callsign WX4NHC) have been
present during any hurricane activation. Because reports arrive from
the Atlantic and Pacific basins, High Frequency (HF) communication
serves as a core component of this valuable NWS tool. The utility of HF
communications in this life-saving effort requires that Amateur
stations provide their information to the NHC via effective, reliable
HF stations from the residences of licensees.
The Resiliency of Amateur Radio Disaster Relief Communications
Radio Amateurs have proved over and over again that because of
their training and their willingness to bring personal radio gear into
disaster areas that they can quickly re-establish communications during
that critical window of time between a disaster's occurrence and the
re-establishment of normal communications. These are the times of great
threat to life and property: the ``hottest'' phase of the disaster's
aftermath. Radio Amateurs are also trained and prepared to provide
supplementary communications after normal communications have been
restored. We have always been interoperable. For us it is not a goal,
it is a fact. Although we are not first responders, we have a long
history of cooperating with first responders when needed to help them
perform their essential tasks for the public.
The absence of disaster-susceptible communications infrastructure
inherent in Amateur Radio insures a unique level of resilience in times
of disaster and afterward. This is not found in broadband networks,
conventional or trunked public safety communications systems or
cellular architecture. Surely enough, improvements in public safety
systems and interoperability permit more reliable communications and a
better level of organization among disparate public safety agencies and
at different levels of government. That said, however, no one should
believe that current generation public safety interoperable networks,
be they broadband or narrowband, and regardless of the way these
networks are designed, will be sufficiently durable in all disaster
incidents. Because of their system architecture, all are subject to
disruptions, overload, or failure under certain circumstances. It will
continue to be necessary in the future for Amateur Radio operators to
provide emergency alerting data, temporary communications and
facilities for first responders and disaster recovery agencies at the
outset of local and regional disasters and it will be necessary to
provide temporary interoperability between and among first responders
and disaster relief agencies. Former Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) Director Craig Fugate, at an FCC earthquake forum
concerning emergency communications planning several years ago, stated
that:
``Finally, I have got to get back to Amateur Radio. . .They are
the first ones in the first days getting the word out as the
other systems come back up. I think that there is a tendency
(to believe) that we have done so much to build infrastructure
and resiliency in all of our other systems, we have tended to
dismiss that role -when everything else fails, Amateur Radio
often times is our last line of defense. And I think at times
we get so sophisticated, and we have gotten so used to the
reliability and resilience in our wireless and wired and our
broadcast industry, and in all our public safety
communications, that we can never fathom that they will fail.
They do. They have. They will. When you need Amateur Radio
(operators), you really need them.''
Amateur Radio is available, ready, willing and able to do provide
these services at no cost to anyone. As former FEMA Administrator
Fugate noted, Amateur Radio operators are always there, using their own
radios, on their own frequencies, and ``nobody pays them.'' Indeed, we
will be there ``when all else fails.''
The Hawaii Missile Alert
It is indeed an instructive time to discuss the value of Amateur
radio in emergency alerting, emergency communications generally and
disaster relief communications. Amateur Radio was involved in the
effort to achieve normalcy in Hawaii after the recent ballistic missile
alert. The Hawaii State Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES)
network was activated on UHF frequencies and also using a VHF inter-
island repeater network. Amateur stations monitored the alert/
cancellation activity. Only 20 hours earlier, the RACES network had
completed an Amateur Radio communications exercise State Emergency
Operations Center. The phone lines into the State EOC were soon
overwhelmed and congested, and the website was overwhelmed with public
inquiries. At these times, Amateur radio volunteers are normally
present at either or both of the state or county EOC offices and at the
State Warning Point, Hawaii Emergency Management Agency.
The Hawaii false alert notice (i.e., the cancellation notice) was
circulated on various information mechanisms after 13 minutes. That was
picked up and relayed through the Amateur Radio networks. The cellphone
alert system could not be used for the cancellation notice until prior
FEMA approval was obtained. Once that was obtained, the cancellation
alert went out to the cellphone network after 38 minutes from the
initial alert. There were lessons learned by the Hawaii Amateur Radio
community from this event. The emergency communications certification
training that Amateurs in Hawaii are given urges use of the warning
siren as an alerting mechanism to trigger for Amateur Radio emergency
communications networks, but in this case the sirens were not
activated, thus causing some confusion. Amateur Radio emergency
communications certification classes specifically teach about warnings,
the three kinds of siren warning sounding in Hawaii (including the
attack or wailing sound) and about preparedness for all hazards. This
incident has expanded discussions in Hawaii about the means by which
Amateur Radio networks are activated.
Hawaii Amateur Radio operators report that Amateur Radio played an
important role in relaying the cancellation notice. For example, an
early Coast Guard cancellation notice was relayed by an Amateur Radio
operator to the Amateur Radio networks and disseminated very quickly.
The State Warning Point waited to obtain FEMA authorization to send out
a particular type of message that would show up on cellular phones
similarly to the original alert message. Many people had received the
warning first on their cell phones through the Wireless Emergency Alert
(WEA) system, but a cancellation on that same system was substantially
delayed; the result was that Amateur Radio networks disseminated
validated cancellation information long before the cellular networks
were able to do so.
There is no single model for effective communications in advance
of, during and after disasters and emergencies. Emergencies range from
a localized situation affecting one community, or an insular area such
as Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands, to regional events affecting
multiple counties or larger areas. Wide area disasters may affect
multiple states or entire regions of the country (such as a hurricane
which, in its course, can impact states from Florida up the entire
Eastern portion of the United States to Maine, as occurred in Hurricane
Sandy, and/or the entire Gulf coast and southern United States into
Texas as occurred with Hurricanes Katrina and Rita). Because of the
differences in propagation at various times of the day and the
distances and paths that emergency communications may need to cover,
the ability for Amateurs to utilize any and all of their authorized
frequency allocations [from medium-frequency (MF) through ultra-high
frequency (UHF) and above] efficiently is necessary in order for the
Service to be fully effective in disasters and emergency relief. All of
these allocations require the use of an effective outdoor antenna.
Hurricane Maria and Amateur Radio's Role in Recovery Operations in
Puerto Rico
Because of the utter devastation that occurred in Puerto Rico from
Hurricane Maria recently, the approximately 500 local Amateur Radio
operators who are actively and regularly available there for emergency
communications purposes were not all available to provide restorative
and other emergency communications because many of the operators were
concerned at the outset with basic survival for themselves and their
families. ARRL estimates that there were approximately 75 Amateur Radio
stations throughout the Island providing communications at all times
during the entire process--from before the Hurricane hit until very
late in the recovery effort. Indeed, even today, local Amateur Radio
operators are providing communications for power utility workers doing
power grid restoration. However, it was obvious at the outset that
additional resources were going to be needed. ARRL called upon the
mainland Amateur Radio community to provide up to 25 two-person teams
of highly qualified licensees. Amateur Radio volunteers responded
immediately, without hesitation. Fifty of the Nation's most
accomplished Amateur Radio operators responded within 24 hours to the
call to deploy to Puerto Rico and provide emergency communications for
a three-week tour of duty, sponsored by the American National Red
Cross.
The group's principal mission was to move health-and-welfare
information from the Island back to the U.S. mainland, where that data
was used by the Red Cross. The group remained on the island for 3
weeks. ARRL equipped each two-person team with a modern digital HF
transceiver, special software, a wire antenna, a power supply and all
the connecting cables, fitted in a rugged waterproof container. In
addition, ARRL sent a number of small, 2,000-Watt portable generators
as well as solar-powered battery chargers of the variety the U.S.
military uses on extended deployments, and some VHF and UHF equipment
for local use. ARRL's Ham Aid program adapted and provided nearly
$75,000 in Amateur Radio equipment to the volunteers that deployed to
Puerto Rico and to the ARRL members resident in Puerto Rico. Some of
this equipment is still being used in Puerto Rico for the recovery
effort. Because Hurricane Maria devastated the island's communications
infrastructure, without electricity and telephone service, and with
most of the cell sites inoperative, millions of Americans were cut off
from communicating. Shelters were unable to reach local emergency
services. Nor could people check on the welfare of their family
members. The situation was dire and the Amateur Radio response was
timely in order to address the crisis. Referred to as the ``Force of
50,'' the Amateur Radio volunteers provided communications for local
law enforcement and utility managers; island-to-mainland health-and-
welfare traffic, and outgoing communications from the more remote areas
of Puerto Rico in the mountains to San Juan and other municipios. Fire
officials in Puerto Rico facilitated safe passage, food, shelter, and
water for the volunteers at fire stations on the island, as needed. The
volunteers initially gathered at the convention center in San Juan,
which served as the Puerto Rico Emergency Management Agency (PREMA)
headquarters. The Force of 50 and local radio Amateurs staffed VHF and
HF nets at the American Red Cross temporary headquarters, despite
severe damage to their own homes. The nets covered nearly two-thirds of
the island. In addition to the health and welfare traffic and Red Cross
information transfer, the volunteers handled traffic to and from the
power company, Autoridad de Energia Electrica (AEE), and state and
local authorities relative to power restoration efforts. Twelve team
members were assigned to provide communication for engineers tasked
with repair to the island's power distribution centers.
The Red Cross Headquarters net, staffed by radio Amateurs, provided
24-hour operation in preparation for an anticipated emergency involving
the Guajataca hydroelectric dam. Amateurs provided notices to residents
in the districts of Quebradillas, Isabela, and San Sebastian of the
danger. An Amateur volunteer was stationed in Quebradillas to provide
emergency communication if needed and to maintain contact between AEE
and its Monacillo control center. An Amateur Radio station was
installed and an operator embedded at the Puerto Rico Emergency
Operations Center (PREOC). Local radio Amateurs established VHF
communication capabilities at 51 hospitals throughout the island, so
they could have direct contact with the PREOC. The Amateur embedded at
the PREOC served as liaison between the PREOC and the FEMA Emergency
Support Function (ESF-2) task force, relaying information among the Red
Cross, ARRL, FEMA, and the ESF-2 task force.
Two team members deployed in the westernmost end of the Island.
``Team Oeste (Mayaguez)'' were stationed at a Red Cross shelter in
Mayaguez, providing the only emergency communication link from that
city to San Juan initially. That team relayed needs and conditions of
those living in and around Mayaguez and coordinated water delivery and
other urgent necessities, such as non-perishable food items, extended-
life dry milk, blankets, baby formula, and dust masks. They provided
communications for the medical staff set up at the Palacio de
Recreacion y Deportes, a sports facility in Mayaguez converted to a
medical facility. Lists of medical needs were relayed to the Red Cross
as well as to FEMA and Puerto Rico's Emergency Management Agency. An HF
station with data transfer capability and a VHF/UHF station were set up
in the FEMA disaster field office, and volunteers reported in by radio
from around the island to post situation reports. Amateur operators
were also posted at four power-generation facilities, at the request of
the power company. Superacueducto, the water utility, asked for several
Amateur Radio Operators to help in re-establishing water flow from
Arecibo to San Juan. Four Amateur Radio volunteers were positioned to
accompany and provide VHF communication at Red Cross distribution
centers on a daily basis. Two volunteers also were sent to Culebra
Island to establish VHF and HF communication there. Those volunteers
provided the first communications from Culebra following the storm.
Critical to the value of the Amateur Radio response to Hurricane
Maria were the partnerships that had been established long before the
event. ARRL has national partnerships with, inter alia, the American
Red Cross, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and The Salvation
Army. ARRL worked closely with the Red Cross in Puerto Rico and, due to
the work of local volunteers associated with ARRL in Puerto Rico, a
network of relationships across the island has been in place for many
years. Amateur Radio emergency and disaster preparedness through
building partnerships allows our volunteers to be integrated into
response in an effective way on exceptionally short notice. The radio
Amateurs in Puerto Rico are extremely well-organized, and, given the
severity of the damage and personal deprivations suffered by everyone,
including the vast majority of local Amateur Radio licensees, they
responded in large, and sufficient, numbers. They are deserving of a
great deal of credit for their performance in the face of tremendous
personal loss and sacrifice.
ARRL worked with partners such as U.S. Army Military Affiliate
Radio Service members, the National Hurricane Center, and the Salvation
Army Team Emergency Radio Network (SATERN) so the broader Amateur Radio
response was coordinated and made effective use of each group's
strengths and assets.
There were several lessons learned from this extensive test of
Amateur Radio's emergency capabilities. Throughout Puerto Rico, normal
communications were disrupted, isolating communities and hampering
emergency response. Amateur Radio operators extensively utilized
conventional, analog VHF systems and HF radio e-mail systems to
successfully pass lifesaving messages between government and non-
government entities. Through our volunteers deployed from the mainland
to Puerto Rico and the resident ARRL Puerto Rico Section, radio
Amateurs effectively integrated into the FEMA Joint Field Office (JFO)
in ESF-2 (Communications). This allowed for an effective flow of
information between Amateur Radio volunteers throughout the island and
Federal responders responsible for communications restoration. The
Department of Homeland Security SHARES program also played a key role
in providing Amateur Radio support to JFO ESF-2 when the volunteers
there were at the end of their tour. Finally, radio Amateurs provided
support to military responders when clear channel HF communications
were needed for military missions. Among other things, Amateur Radio
operators provided HF communications for the military when helicopters
were out of line-of-sight range and needed to communicate with base
stations obscured by the extremely mountainous terrain in Puerto Rico.
Effective Outdoor Antennas are Critical to the Amateur Radio Response
in Disasters
The expertise radio amateurs have with HF communications is
tremendously valuable when frequency selection, interference and
propagation hinder response and where, as in Hurricane Maria, there is
a large volume of message traffic between the U.S. Mainland and
geographically separated Caribbean islands. In this case perhaps the
most urgent lesson learned is that the value of an active and engaged
group of local Amateur Radio operators with pre-existing effective
outdoor antennas cannot be overstated. Local radio amateurs understand
their communities, the threats faced, and the response culture better
than do volunteers from the outside. The ``Force of 50'' would not have
been successful but for the exceptional spirit of volunteerism by
Puerto Rico radio Amateurs and their relatively unfettered ability to
erect effective outdoor antennas, and the fact that those local Amateur
stations were in place and ready to provide communications long before
the 2017 hurricane season. It was local radio Amateurs, using stations
at their residences and portable stations who initiated restorative
communications operations before the Force of 50 arrived, and they
continued those efforts many weeks after the Hurricane.
Amateur Radio operators need very little from the Federal
Government. We do what we do because we love the medium and we are
public spirited volunteers who derive personal satisfaction from using
our avocation for the benefit of people in need of help. We do,
however, have a very urgent need that will cost no one anything, nor
create any controversy whatsoever. The Amateur Service, in order to
ensure the continuation of emergency communications readiness,
absolutely requires some relief from the ubiquitous presence of, and
the exponential increase in unreasonable and unnecessary private land
use regulations in the United States that, essentially universally
preclude the ability of licensed radio amateurs to erect and maintain
any effective outdoor antenna at all. This is without any doubt the
largest threat to the Amateur Radio community's ability to respond to
disasters, severe weather, and other threats to lives and property in
the United States.
Perhaps the most important element of the ability of local radio
Amateurs throughout Puerto Rico to be immediately ready to provide the
restorative communications that they did provide very effectively is
that they had the ability, long before the Hurricane arrived, to
install and maintain effective outdoor antennas for the HF and VHF and
UHF bands at their residences. There is not yet in Puerto Rico the
prevalence of preclusive private land use regulations that now exists
in the rest of the United States, but the situation is dire in most
other suburban, urban and exurban areas. It is important in analyzing
this issue to view the Amateur Service as a decentralized network of
individual stations working together in emergency situations and in
preparing for the same. The essentially uniform distribution of Amateur
Radio stations in residential areas makes those individual stations
very important in a given weather disaster in the area where those
stations are located when commercial communications systems are
disabled or overloaded, or in other areas for purposes of relay of
message traffic. Amateur stations are often called on to report severe
weather, and the geographic distribution of stations in residential
areas is critical for this function as well. Furthermore, while modern
Amateur stations are portable, and transportable to remote disaster
locations, it is critical to have stations located at one's residence
in order to regularly participate in disaster preparedness training
exercises and drills. It is impossible to prepare adequately for the
use of Amateur Radio communications in emergencies when the ability to
self-train and self-educate by means of an effective, reliable Amateur
Radio station at one's residence is precluded by the inability to
install a functional outdoor antenna.
Private Land Use Regulations Increasingly Preclude Amateur Radio
Disaster Response
There is no substitute for the ready availability of a residential
Amateur Radio station in daily operation from a licensee's residence.
The licensee cannot be expected to have the ability to communicate into
or from a disaster site unless he or she has a station with an
effective outdoor antenna capable of operation on multiple frequency
bands at once, which is ready to be pressed into service from the
licensee's residence at a moment's notice. The major value of Amateur
Radio emergency communications is during the first hours, days or weeks
of a disaster when commercial and public safety communications
facilities are not functional or are overloaded. Stations must be ready
to operate when needed and emergency communications are most often
conducted from a licensee's residence. For some disabled persons, home
stations represent their only opportunity to participate in emergency
communications. Private land use regulations which exclude Amateur
Radio stations from entire communities preclude emergency
communications readiness.
According to the Community Associations Institute, 90 percent of
new housing starts in the United States are subject to private land use
regulations. This is because, now, essentially all lenders for land
developers in the United States require, as a condition for funding a
new housing development, all require a declaration of covenants be
filed with the subdivision plat. Given the prevalence and increasing
numbers of private land use regulated communities in the United States,
residential Amateur Radio antennas cannot be installed or maintained in
most of them. An Amateur Radio licensee who must live in a deed
restricted community currently will almost inevitably be subject to
either (1) a complete prohibition of his or her Amateur Radio
operation, or (2) the unlimited jurisdiction of a community association
or architectural control committee or board which makes decisions
concerning Amateur Radio antennas without any standards or limits
whatsoever. Those private land use regulations (or the application of
them) which prohibit outdoor Amateur Radio antennas or transmissions,
and thus preclude Amateur Radio entirely; those which fail to permit
the installation of effective outdoor Amateur Radio antennas; and those
which do not constitute the minimum practicable regulation to
accomplish the (aesthetic) goals of a homeowner's association are
unreasonable and unnecessary.
The Amateur Radio Parity Act of 2017
There is now pending before this Committee the Amateur Radio Parity
Act of 2017. The House version of this Bill, H.R. 555 passed the House
unanimously in January of 2017. An identical predecessor House Bill,
H.R. 1301 passed the House unanimously in the 114th Congress. The
current Senate Bill, S. 1534 was introduced in July of 2017 by Senators
Wicker and Blumenthal. This is a balanced, completely bipartisan bill
that would fully protect both the entitlement of Amateur Radio
volunteers to be able to utilize their FCC-issued licenses to provide
emergency, disaster relief and public service communications, while at
the same time protecting the aesthetic concerns and the jurisdiction of
homeowners' associations. The Bill is unopposed: it has the support--in
writing--of both ARRL and the Community Associations Institute (CAI)
which is the only national association of homeowners' associations.
ARRL and CAI, at the urging of members of this Committee, cooperatively
and carefully negotiated the precise, current language of the Bill, and
both organizations have stated their support for the present version.
The Bill calls on the Commission to enact rules that prohibit the
application to Amateur Radio stations of deed restrictions which
preclude Amateur Radio communications. Also prohibited are those deed
restrictions which do not permit an Amateur Radio operator living in a
deed-restricted community to install and maintain an effective outdoor
antenna on property under the exclusive use or control of the licensee;
and those restrictions which do not impose the minimum practicable
restriction on Amateur communications to accomplish the lawful purposes
of a Homeowner's Association (HOA) seeking to enforce the restriction.
Amateurs who wish to install an antenna in a deed restricted community
may be required to notify and obtain prior approval of the HOA. HOAs
can preclude Amateur antennas in common areas (i.e., property not under
the exclusive use of the licensee). HOAs can enact reasonable written
rules governing height, location, size and aesthetic impact of, and
installation requirements for, outdoor antennas and support structures
for amateur communications but the effective outdoor antenna
requirement is paramount. We are in desperate need of this legislation,
and without it, the volunteer emergency communications services
provided by Amateur Radio will be precluded. We urge the Committee in
the strongest terms to please approve and send this legislation forward
without delay.
ARRL is grateful for the opportunity to submit this testimony and
to make our concerns known to the Committee. We look forward to the
opportunity to bring to your attention the good work of a large number
of volunteers who look forward to every chance to serve their country
whenever and wherever they are needed.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Lisenco.
Mr. Matheny.
STATEMENT OF SAM MATHENY, CHIEF TECHNOLOGY OFFICER, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS
Mr. Matheny. Good morning, Chairman Thune, Ranking Members
Nelson and Schatz, and members of the Committee. My name is Sam
Matheny, and I am the Chief Technology Officer at the National
Association of Broadcasters.
On behalf of the thousands of free local television and
radio broadcasters in your hometowns, thank you for inviting me
to testify on the Emergency Alert System and how broadcasters
fulfill their roles as first informers and how innovation will
allow broadcasters to do even more to keep viewers and
listeners safe during emergencies.
Broadcasters take seriously their role as the most trusted
source of news and emergency updates. Whether it's preparing
listeners and viewers for the coming storm, directing them to
needed supplies and shelter during the disaster, or helping
rebuild in the aftermath, local stations are part of the
communities they serve, and broadcasting is sometimes the only
available communications medium in an emergency when wireless
networks fail. Morning Consult recently found that the American
people turn to broadcasters in times of emergency by a factor
of more than three to one.
Broadcasting is unique for the following reasons. First,
broadcasting covers virtually everyone. Broadcast signals reach
more of the U.S. population than any other communications
medium. Broadcasting is localized. Local broadcast stations can
deliver market-specific information as well as national alerts.
Broadcasting has no bottlenecks. An emergency alert can reach
millions of people simultaneously without concern over network
congestion.
Broadcasting is redundant. There are numerous independently
operated stations in each market that deliver alerts.
Broadcasting is resilient. Stations often operate with backup
equipment, generators, and fuel supplies to keep stations on
the air.
Broadcaster information is actionable. Radio and television
can provide enough information to enable people to understand
what is happening and what steps they should take. And,
finally, broadcasters are trusted. They are members of the
local community and speak not just as an authority, but as a
neighbor.
But broadcasters do more than just deliver messages to the
public. Broadcasters are also the backbone of the Emergency
Alert System. Working with the government since the 1950s,
broadcasters have operated and evolved a nationwide wireless
network to deliver emergency alerts. This daisy chain of
broadcast stations ensures that emergency alerts can be
delivered independent of internet connectivity and even when
power outages disrupt other forms of communication. In fact,
broadcasters serve as primary entry points for emergency
communications to the public and are thus part of the solution
from beginning to end.
Because broadcasting plays such an important role in this
critical communications infrastructure, it is vital that the
government support and foster broadcasting. I'd like to briefly
outline three key areas for your consideration.
First, the Next Generation Television Standard, ATSC 3.0,
which was recently approved by the FCC, has many features that
will improve emergency alerting, including the ability to wake
up sleeping devices, more precise geo-targeted alerts, and
sending rich multimedia files such as weather radar images,
evaluation maps, and even video files with detailed
explanations about the emergency and what to do. New regulatory
hurdles should not be placed in our way as we deploy Next Gen
TV.
Second, broadcasters are in the final and most complicated
phase of the incentive auction, the repack phase. Nearly 1,000
television stations will be moving to new channel assignments,
and this will also impact over 700 FM radio stations on co-
located towers. Broadcasters need the time and money required
to make these moves successfully and without impairing the
public's ability to access emergency alerts. I ask for your
support of the Viewer and Listener Protection Act, sponsored by
Senators Moran, Schatz, and eight of their colleagues, and urge
its passage, as no station should be forced off the air due to
a lack of funds or unreasonable time constraints.
And, third, broadcasters have been working with the
wireless phone manufacturers and service providers on market-
based solutions to activate FM chips in smartphones. Our market
efforts have been successful with one very notable exception--
Apple. We believe Apple should be encouraged to activate FM,
the FM tuner, in future models of their iPhone as it will
improve people's access to vital information in times of
disaster.
In conclusion, in emergencies large and small, our nation
and your hometowns benefit from a strong and vibrant broadcast
industry. FEMA calls broadcasting a redundant, resilient, and
necessary alerting pathway. I agree.
Thank you for having me here today. I look forward to
answering any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Matheny follows:]
Prepared Statement of Sam Matheny, Chief Technology Officer,
National Association of Broadcasters
Introduction
Good morning, Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson and members of
the Committee. My name is Sam Matheny and I am the chief technology
officer at the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB). On behalf of
the thousands of free, local television and radio broadcasters in your
hometowns, thank you for inviting me to testify on the Emergency Alert
System (EAS), how broadcasters fulfill their role as first informers
and how innovation will allow broadcasters to do even more to keep
viewers and listeners safe during emergencies. In addition to my role
at NAB, I bring another perspective to these issues having spent nearly
20 years with Capitol Broadcasting Company, parent to WRAL-TV in
Raleigh, North Carolina. There I worked directly with state emergency
officials to help develop demonstrations of mobile alerts and warnings.
Additionally, I have experience serving on committees that advise the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) on a wide variety of network security,
reliability and public safety issues, and specifically on how to
improve our Nation's Integrated Public Alert and Warning System
(IPAWS).
Broadcasters' Unique Role and Experience in Emergency Alerting
As the most trusted source of news and emergency updates,
Americans' first choice is to turn to local television and radio
stations to get the information they need to keep safe during
emergencies. Local stations are part of the communities they serve, and
broadcasters do not hesitate to put themselves in harm's way to bring
critical information to their neighbors. Whether it is preparing
listeners and viewers for the coming storm, helping them access needed
supplies and shelter during the disaster or helping towns and cities
rebuild in the aftermath, local broadcasters take seriously their
commitment to protect the public.
Recent fires and mudslides on the West Coast and hurricanes in
Texas, Florida and Puerto Rico have once again shined a bright light on
our Nation's emergency preparedness and response abilities. While this
is obviously true for first responders and all levels of government, it
is also true for broadcasters. FCC Chairman Ajit Pai reminded us just
last week that in times of crisis first responders and first informers
work hand in hand, noting that ``[b]roadcasting and public safety have
been lifelong companions.'' While this sort of cooperation received
national attention during the recent hurricanes and wildfires, it was
just as true two years ago when over 60 tornados ravaged parts of 11
states across the southeast and just a few months later when quick and
devastating floods overtook large parts of West Virginia and Virginia
in what the National Weather Service (NWS) referred to as a One
Thousand Year Event. In each of these cases and in countless others,
broadcasters were there, serving their listeners, viewers and
communities.
Broadcasters invest heavily to ensure they remain on the air in
times of disaster. Facilities often have redundant power sources,
automatic fail-over processes, auxiliary transmission systems,
generator back-up and substantial fuel reserves. Because of the
strength of the broadcast infrastructure and the power of the airwaves,
local radio and TV stations are often the only available communications
medium during disasters, even when cell phone and wireless networks can
be unreliable. FEMA officials have noted that in times of emergency
there is no more reliable source of information than local
broadcasters. To give just one example, last year after Hurricane Maria
moved through Puerto Rico and left much of the island without power and
access to even basic information, not only were local television and
radio stations continuing to provide lifesaving alerts and information
all throughout the ordeal, but afterward NAB partnered with numerous
state broadcaster associations, FEMA and local officials in Puerto Rico
to deliver 10,000 battery-powered radios to island residents who had no
other lifeline.
This unique combination of trust and reliability is why, in
addition to our ongoing, comprehensive news coverage of emergencies,
broadcasters form the backbone of the Emergency Alert System. We have
all seen or heard the familiar announcement ``The following is a test
of the Emergency Alert System. This is only a test.'' EAS connects
over-the-air broadcast radio, television and cable systems, and is used
during sudden, unpredictable or unforeseen events. EAS participation is
technically voluntary, yet virtually all radio and television stations
participate, and do so proudly, even purchasing EAS equipment at their
own expense. Today, the EAS, along with Wireless Emergency Alerts
(WEAs) and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
Weather Radio, is part of the IPAWS umbrella, enabling state and local
emergency managers to integrate with the national alert and warning
infrastructure.
Lessons Learned from Nationwide EAS Test and Recent Events
In September 2017, FEMA, in coordination with the FCC and the NWS,
conducted a nationwide test of the reliability and effectiveness of the
EAS. Generally, the results of the test were positive, as a majority of
EAS participants received and retransmitted the message, and
participation improved compared to a previous test in 2016.
However, as the residents of and visitors to Hawaii know all too
well after this month's false alert of a nuclear attack, our Nation's
public alert and warning system and the emergency managers that
originate messages are not always perfect. In an instant, one emergency
manager's accidental mouse click triggered a local and national panic,
compounded by a lack of information and delay in disseminating correct
information via official channels. Several items arising out of this
unfortunate incident are worth discussing.
First, the most important takeaway is that the EAS system worked;
radio and television broadcasters were on the case. The mistaken EAS
alert was immediately relayed by broadcasters, who verified the source
of the message but must rely on emergency managers for validation of
the emergency. Broadcasters also stood by to disseminate the All Clear
message. Unfortunately, it took emergency managers 38 minutes to issue
the needed follow-up EAS message. In the meantime, broadcasters used
other means to confirm and report that it was a false alarm as soon as
possible. The EAS system is a critical part of the trust that people
place in broadcasters during an emergency, but human error in the
issuance of EAS alerts can impair that trust. Going forward, NAB hopes
to work with all the relevant stakeholders to minimize, if not
eliminate, any vulnerabilities in the EAS process that may hinder
broadcasters from carrying out their duty as first informers.
Second, broadcasters support the continued implementation by FEMA
of the IPAWS Modernization Act, legislation authored by Senators Ron
Johnson (WI) and Claire McCaskill (MO) and passed by Congress in 2016.
This legislation recognized that the continued success of EAS will
depend on the expertise and ability of local authorities to fully and
effectively deploy it. Broadcasters applaud FEMA's ongoing efforts to
train state and local authorities on the proper use of the system, and
support this legislative effort to incentivize state and local
officials to participate in training. Especially after Hawaii, it is
more important than ever that local emergency managers know exactly how
and when to trigger an EAS alert.
Third, this Committee and the FCC should consider whether current
WEAs provided by the wireless industry are sufficient to adequately
alert and warn recipients in times of emergency. Twenty years after the
pager was supplanted by the brick phone, then the flip phone and now
the smartphone, a WEA delivers text only emergency information to
recipients, often with fewer characters than a tweet. Often, these
alerts simply direct recipients to ``check local media.'' A multi-
stakeholder FCC advisory committee that I served on recommended that
WEA be improved by increasing the number of characters from 90 to 360
so the alerts would be more informative and useful. Further, this
committee also recommended that WEA include embedded links and phone
numbers so recipients could quickly gain access to additional
information. These suggested enhancements were opposed by the wireless
industry before the FCC, but were ultimately authorized in September of
2016 and are awaiting implementation. In contrast, I will detail below
several ways in which radio and television broadcasters are innovating
to better inform their communities when it matters most.
Policy Choices Critical to Broadcasters' Current and Future
Capabilities
It is important that Congress be mindful of several policy choices
that will enable broadcasters to continue and improve upon this
important emergency role.
A. Next Generation TV
Broadcasters are pleased that the FCC recently approved a joint
petition of the NAB, Consumer Technology Association, America's Public
Television Stations and the Advanced Warning and Response Network
Alliance, requesting permission for stations and television receiver
manufacturers to voluntarily adopt the world's first Internet Protocol
(IP)-based terrestrial television transmission standard, ATSC 3.0, also
known as Next Gen TV. Not only will Next Gen TV allow broadcasters to
deliver sharp ultra HD images, multichannel immersive sound,
interactive features and customizable content, but more importantly it
will enable an even more effective distribution of information to the
public during disasters and in times of crisis.
With the advanced alerting capabilities of Next Gen TV, a
television broadcaster will be able to simultaneously deliver geo-
targeted, rich media alerts to an unlimited number of enabled fixed,
mobile and handheld devices across their entire coverage area. For
example, and at the consumer's discretion, rather than simply running
an EAS alert or crawl over regularly scheduled broadcast programming
for an entire market's viewing audience (and then only reaching those
who are watching), a Next Gen TV signal could wake up enabled devices
and reach the entire universe of devices within its television signal
contour. Using the rich-media capabilities of Next Gen TV, broadcasters
can provide targeted neighborhood-specific alerts that include text,
graphics (such as Doppler radar animations or an evacuation route),
pictures and even detailed video-on-demand descriptions. The public
will have access to all of this actionable, life-saving information
even if the power goes out or cellular wireless networks fail.
As broadcasters, we are simply planning to use our spectrum
licenses more efficiently and to better serve our viewers. We are not
asking for any additional spectrum, government funds or mandates.
Unlike other communications providers, broadcasters are the only
licensees that must ask the FCC for permission to innovate with regard
to our transmission standard. However, by adopting Next Gen TV,
broadcasters will have much greater flexibility to innovate going
forward. As long as new regulatory hurdles are not placed in our way,
more and more viewers across the country will benefit from these
innovations and the advanced emergency alerting systems that Next Gen
TV will enable.
B. Spectrum Incentive Auction Repack
While broadcasters are innovating for the future, there are also
near-term obstacles that without action could prevent emergency alerts
from reaching local broadcast viewers and listeners. I'm referring to
relocating--or repacking--nearly 1,000 broadcast television stations in
the final and most complicated phase of the broadcast spectrum
incentive auction. Additionally, in the process of full-power
television stations moving frequencies, this will also negatively
impact more than seven hundred FM radio stations and countless low-
power television and translator stations that are critical to bringing
service to rural America. Quite simply, if a television or radio
station is forced off the air for any period of time due to
circumstances outside of their control, it will diminish the ability of
the public to receive critical EAS information.
FCC Chairman Pai testified before this Committee in July that the
funds Congress set aside to reimburse broadcasters for relocating are
woefully inadequate. Not only does this funding shortfall violate
Congress' promise to hold broadcasters harmless but, in some cases, the
shortfall is actually preventing stations from making the advanced
purchases required to complete their moves in a timely fashion. In
fact, according to the most recent quarterly status reports filed with
the FCC, 11 percent of stations changing channels are already behind,
despite their best efforts to complete their moves. Accordingly, NAB
salutes Senators Jerry Moran (KS) and Brian Schatz (HI) for their
bipartisan legislation, the Viewer and Listener Protection Act (S.
1632), and urge its passage to ensure that your constituents do not
lose access to local television and radio stations during these
mandated frequency moves due to a lack of funds or unreasonable time
constraints.
C. FM Chip Activation
The radio broadcast industry has continued to take a leading role
in ensuring that a life-saving technology is available to millions of
Americans through their smartphones. Over the past several years,
broadcasters developed marketplace partnerships with wireless phone
manufacturers and providers to turn on--or at least not deactivate--FM
receivers that are already installed in devices. This endeavor has
grown exponentially over the past few years and, with one notable
exception--Apple's iPhone, many Americans are able to access FM radio
through their smartphones during times of emergency, even when the
cellular network may be down due to congestion or physical damage.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I would like to thank you again for having me here
today to speak about the critical role that broadcasters play in the
Emergency Alert System and ensuring the public's safety. This is a
mission our industry takes very seriously and we have a track record of
fulfilling. We look forward to working with Congress, state and local
governments and other industry partners to strengthen the entire system
going forward. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Matheny.
I appreciate all of you talking about the important roles
that each of the organizations you're here on behalf of play in
this overall process.
I'd like to start with Ms. Fowlkes and ask you if you could
describe or explain to us the role the FCC plays in the
Emergency Alert System and how that interacts with the larger--
what they refer to as the IPAWS Communication System. How does
the FCC--that's sort of where this committee's jurisdiction and
interest is. How do they relate in this whole sequence of
events?
Ms. Fowlkes. The FCC is responsible for the distribution
part of the EAS and WEA. In other words, we adopt and
administer rules that apply to the communication service
providers that participate in those two systems. For example,
with respect to WEA, we have rules that would apply to the
participating wireless carriers in terms of how their
infrastructure is to react when it receives the alert, and,
certainly, issues like geo-targeting are the types of things
that we would govern. With respect to the EAS, how their--what
capabilities their EAS equipment must have in order to receive
and transmit an EAS alert.
We do not have authority over the alert origination piece,
which is the part of the system where government agencies
decide whether to issue an alert, what the alert is going to--
what information the alert is going to include, the target
area. That's not within our purview. FEMA oversees the
Integrated Public Alert and Warning System. So, basically, you
can kind of think of it as three pieces, the alert origination
piece; the IPAWS piece, which is FEMA; the distribution by the
communication service provider--they are participating under
rules that are adopted and administered by the FCC.
The Chairman. Do you see any need to change the rules based
on this incident?
Ms. Fowlkes. That's something that I really can't answer.
The FCC doesn't have a position on that. I think in terms of
that, it wouldn't be so much changing a rule. It would be
something that would have to change in terms of our authority.
Certainly, if Congress decided it wanted to make changes, we
would stand ready to provide technical assistance with any
draft legislation, and, obviously, if Congress enacted some
legislation, we'd obviously implement it.
The Chairman. Well, has the FCC, to that point, ever
exerted jurisdiction over alerting authorities to require that
there are best practices used and to make sure that there are
adequate safeguards in place to prevent false alerts?
Ms. Fowlkes. No.
The Chairman. Do you believe the Commission has the
authority or tools that it needs to ensure that an incident
like the one that happened in Hawaii never happens again,
currently?
Ms. Fowlkes. Given the fact that the problem was on the
alert origination piece, the FCC does not have authority in
that area.
The Chairman. Right. OK. So just to ask, I guess, the
obvious question, at least the one intuitively that I thought
of when I heard about all this, and that is after you describe
this as a three-part process, and the FCC is on the
distribution part of it, the origination alert, and then the
FEMA clearinghouse function. It seems to me--why, then, did--
this is a ballistic missile threat. I mean, this is a DoD--this
is like a nuclear war type thing. Why was a state agency
involved in that alert?
I understand--you know, we have a lot of experience in my
part of the country with weather. The National Weather Service
works closely with FEMA, and all those alerts go out if there's
a potential tornado threat. But it seems to me, at least in
this case--I'm still at a loss as to how--origination of the
alert, and then sort of a clearinghouse--how that got so messed
up. Does anybody want to take a stab at that?
Ms. Fowlkes. Well, from the FCC's perspective, we really
can't give an opinion on that. We are not involved in any way
in deciding who issues what alert. That is a decision that's
purely on the alert origination side. In terms of this specific
incident, I would have to refer you to FEMA and DHS.
The Chairman. Mr. Bergmann, could you just briefly talk
about the wireless industry's role in that Emergency Alert
System? I know you talked about it generally in terms of the
role that you all play but, particularly, in light of this
recent discussion and whether it has been a success, in your
view?
Mr. Bergmann. Thank you, Chairman Thune. I think time and
again we've seen over the last 5 years that Wireless Emergency
Alerts are a lifesaver. They've helped return kids who have
been abducted, they've helped folks avoid tornados that are
rolling through their town, and now we're starting to see them
used for Blue Alerts to help identify and locate suspects, and
there are a couple of key reasons why.
Geo-targeting--Wireless Emergency Alerts are the only tool
in our toolbox right now that helps find you where you are and
get that message to you right then. Now, as we continue to
improve Wireless Emergency Alerts, we've given the ability to
access URLs and embedded links and content so that you can get
that information and act on it, and that's a powerful
combination.
The Chairman. OK.
Senator Schatz.
Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Fowlkes, thank you for everything that you and the FCC
have been doing. I have a number of questions. I'm going to
give them to you all at once, and you can either take them for
the record, to the extent that you're still undergoing the
investigation in Hawaii, but whatever you can answer would be
great.
The first question is, you know, who gets an alert and who
doesn't? And in that category, you have the people who turn off
the push notifications. So my first question--and, again, I'm
going to try to run through them in the interest of time--is if
on television, a broadcast TV or cable TV watcher doesn't have
the opportunity in settings to turn off those alerts, we
presume that everyone must know over the airwaves. Why do we
allow people to turn off alerts of that magnitude? Maybe a Blue
Alert or an Amber Alert is another matter. But in terms of a
missile--an incoming ballistic missile--it seems to me that we
should have a system that doesn't give anybody discretion about
whether or not they get told that an alert is coming. That's
number one.
Number two is that my understanding is that although this
is a voluntary system with the providers, the push alerts, that
is, we still have about 99 percent coverage. I just want to
confirm that's true.
And, then, number three is we now have a bunch of people
who are watching TV in different ways, and we still depend
heavily, as we should, on our broadcast partners in TV, and
let's not forget the importance of radio, especially in rural
America. But we also have cord cutters who are on YouTube or
Hulu or whatever it may be on their iPad, and no alert comes
over that system. So I'm wondering whether the FCC has done any
thinking about how to make sure that people who are watching
television in a nontraditional way get those alerts?
Ms. Fowlkes. On the first question, I believe you're
referring to the opt-out option. Under the WARN Act, people can
opt out of all but an alert that is issued by the President. So
the ability to--and I should point out with WEA, unlike some
other types of subscription-based alerting system, it's an opt-
out function versus an opt-in. But with the exception of
anything that's coming from the President, the statute allows
wireless carriers to offer the option to opt out.
Senator Schatz. Right. And one of the questions we have
into the National Security Council is why is this not--just
very clearly, either by executive order or executive memorandum
or by practice, why is an incoming missile not absolutely the
kind of thing that would be--that would ride on that President
alert? Because although in the drafting of the WARN Act, I'm
not sure that that, specifically, was contemplated. This seems
to me to be the highest priority alert and, therefore, perfect
for a Presidential alert.
Ms. Fowlkes. That's a question that the FCC, again, would
not be able to answer.
Senator Schatz. Sure. Not your lane. I got it.
Ms. Fowlkes. In terms of----
Senator Schatz. Carriers.
Ms. Fowlkes.--the second question, which I believe was
about whether it's voluntary----
Senator Schatz. No. The second question was carriers, and I
believe we have about 99 percent coverage, even though it's a
voluntary program. Then the last question is how do we reach
cord cutters? How do we reach people who are watching TV in
nontraditional ways, not cable, not broadcast?
Ms. Fowlkes. That's a very good question, and that's
something that the FCC, you know, can--that's something that we
can certainly look at within our authority.
Senator Schatz. That's what I was going to ask. Could you
get back to us about whether you need additional authorities to
try to move that along, or whether you have existing--and if
you do have existing authority, I'd like to know what you're
going to do to kind of solve that problem? And if you don't,
then I think that it's incumbent on the Commerce Committee and
the Congress to try to fix that.
And then just a quick clarification--did the Hawaii
Emergency Management Agency need FEMA to sign off on a
correction to the first push notification?
Ms. Fowlkes. No.
Senator Schatz. There were some----
Ms. Fowlkes. They did not need permission from either FEMA
or the FCC.
Senator Schatz. OK. And then my final question for Ms.
Fowlkes is, you know, one of the challenges with our broadcast
partners--KSSK is the radio station that is responsible for
getting out emergency information. They couldn't get on the
phone with the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency. They
couldn't get on the phone with PACOM. The Governor was having
difficulty getting through to DoD. I was having difficulty
getting through to the Governor.
What do we do about the phone line problem when everybody
is panicking and trying to communicate with each other--text
messages, you know, spotty--and we need to have phone
conversations? It seems to me that the FCC, at least in their
investigatory process, has to assess the extent to which we had
problems, not just in terms of the systems for communicating
with each other, in terms of who calls whom, but also that,
literally, people who really needed some sort of red phone to
be able to talk to each other were not in a position to do so
at the technical level.
Ms. Fowlkes. That's something that we can take back and
look at as part of the investigation.
Senator Schatz. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Schatz.
Next up is Senator Klobuchar.
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank Senator Schatz for his leadership. I can't
imagine what that must have been like in your state. Of course,
many Minnesotans like to go to Hawaii--I wonder why--and I
had--my State Director was actually there when this happened
and told the story of how he was in a hotel condo with no
basement and didn't know what to do. They're taking things,
like anything they can find, for an emergency packet. And when
you think about that story repeated for families with kids and
how scared they were, clearly, changes have to be made.
So I wanted to focus on the legislation that we've been
working on with Senator Nelson, and I think it's very important
that we upgrade--and I'm Co-Chair of the Next Gen 911 Caucus.
First of all, I introduced last Congress with Senator Fischer--
and this is more on the rural focus--the Rural Spectrum
Accessibility Act, and it was included in the MOBILE NOW Act
that passed the Senate.
Mr. Bergmann, how can spectrum disaggregation and other
incentives be used to increase wireless coverage in rural
areas?
Mr. Bergmann. So thank you, Senator Klobuchar. We really
commend you and appreciate your work on that Rural Spectrum
Accessibility Act. As anyone from rural America knows, there
are real challenges in making sure that we have service out
there in the hardest to serve areas. Geography is challenging.
Topography is challenging. Sparse populations make it
difficult.
So we need to do things to make it easier to serve out
there, and by creating incentives to put spectrum to use in
rural areas, we can give providers greater incentive and lower
the barriers to building out networks. That's a perfect tie-in
to our focus here today, making sure, you know, as you talked
about, that we have the most recent 911 services, that we have
Wireless Emergency Alerts. All of that is dependent on making
sure that we can build out to those rural areas, and we believe
that legislation will help advance that goal.
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you.
Ms. Fowlkes, ensuring that the right people receive an
emergency alert, as Senator Schatz has pointed out--the FCC
will be voting soon on an order that would require wireless
providers to target alerts within one-tenth of a mile. How will
the FCC verify that the wireless alerts being sent out satisfy
these new requirements?
Ms. Fowlkes. At this point, because the proposal hasn't
been voted on by the Commission, I can't get into more details
about what the order may or may not say.
Senator Klobuchar. Could you talk about--as Senator Nelson
and I worked to pass this bill--how would interoperability
between systems increase effectiveness in advanced alert
systems?
Ms. Fowlkes. That's an issue I will have to take back.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. The order that the FCC will soon
consider will allow local public safety officials to better
target emergency alerts. The FCC order will require
participating providers to shift from a network-based approach
to one that also uses the location capabilities within cell
phones to target messages. Once operational, this will minimize
the likelihood that someone outside of a disaster area receives
an unnecessary alert.
Mr. Bergmann, how will wireless providers work with device
manufacturers to ensure this new functionality?
Mr. Bergmann. Thank you, Senator. I really looked hard at
the--of the FCC's order that will be considered next week and
something that public safety is identified as the single most
important improvement in Wireless Emergency Alerts that we can
have. If you sort of turn back the clock when Wireless
Emergency Alerts were first launched, you could target to the
county level. Today, now, we've improved that. You can target
down to the cell sector, to the individual cell tower, and what
this capability will let us do is not only use that targeting
of the network, but also to use intelligence in the device, to
try to figure out whether the device is within that target area
that's identified by the alert authorities.
So we think this is going to be a really significant
improvement, that it will help address that over-alerting and
benefit public safety and consumers.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. Very good.
Mr. Matheny, one last question here. Alerts over
traditional broadcast networks have long been a reliable way,
and, certainly, these broadcast all the time in Minnesota for
floods. When we have floods, daily reports get out there for
people. Broadcasters are often able to continue operating
during and after severe weather, which we often have in the
Midwest.
With new technology, broadcasters may soon be able to
deliver additional information to viewers on fixed mobile and
handheld devices. What level of targeting will this new
capability provide, and what additional alerting measures can
broadcasters make available?
Mr. Matheny. So I believe--thank you, first of all. I
believe you're speaking of the Next Gen TV Standard, ATSC 3.0,
and the advanced alerting capabilities that are therein. First
of all----
Senator Klobuchar. That's a nice way of describing what I
said in words. Thank you. Yes, that's exactly what I was
talking about.
Mr. Matheny. The Next Gen TV Standard, first of all, allows
for waking up devices. So if a device is asleep, it can be
woken up. That is a distinct feature that was designed in. Once
the device is woken up, you have the ability to do targeting.
The standard has just been completed, and the actual
implementation of that is still being developed. But it will be
similar to the--what Mr. Bergmann just described, in using the
location of the device to determine if it's in the affected
area. We are still talking about a one-way broadcast delivery
of the alert.
Additionally, the Next Gen Standard allows for sending
multimedia content. So you could think of an evacuation map.
You could think of--if it's a tornado, a tornado track map. You
could think of an evacuation--like I said, an evacuation, or
even a video file that would come down and tell you explicitly
what is happening, and that would be a video on demand file.
This would be in addition to the normal coverage that our
stations provide.
Senator Klobuchar. Very good. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar. And Senator
Klobuchar is looking for the Vikings 3.0, too.
[Laughter.]
Senator Klobuchar. OK. Really, did you--I mean, this has
nothing to do with the Vikings. This is like about Hawaii that
doesn't have an NFL team, I'd like to point out.
The Chairman. Oh?
Senator Klobuchar. Or South Dakota, for that matter. But
then you decide you can take pot shots at my team, but let us
not forget that catch.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. OK. We've got to go back to the good stuff.
Senator Udall is next, but Senator Sullivan has to preside
on the floor. Could he ask his questions next? Would that be
OK?
Senator Udall. Yes.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAN SULLIVAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Udall. And I'll just
come clean. We don't have an NFL team, either.
[Laughter.]
Senator Sullivan. And thank you, Senator Capito.
I just have a couple of questions, but I'm just going to
ask them at the same time for Ms. Fowlkes. It relates to--in a
very kind of--a big event that occurred in Alaska just on
Tuesday morning. Very early in the morning, a 7.9 magnitude
earthquake hit in the Gulf of Alaska. As a result of this
earthquake, many of my constituents in coastal communities were
alerted to the threat of a tsunami and told to relocate inland.
Many did. It was pretty much in the middle of the night.
However, some of our carriers were not able to send the
notification because of the lengthy and complicated process
required by the FCC to set up emergency alerts on their
systems. This is particularly the case with regard to some of
our--many of the carriers in Alaska are small companies, so
going through the lengthy process--complicated process that the
FCC--puts a big burden on them. Are there things that you are
looking at with regard to streamlining the process to take into
account some of the smaller companies that can participate?
Also related, there have been reports that several coastal
Alaska radio stations did not get their EAS signal after the
earthquake at all or got it 30 minutes after the wireless
alerts went out on cell phones. Can you speak to that and what
you're trying to do on those issues?
And I know I've asked a couple of questions. I thank my
colleagues again for indulging me here. It's an important issue
for my state and others.
Ms. Fowlkes. I'm not sure what they mean by a long process
of the FCC. Under the FCC's rules, if a wireless carrier wants
to participate in WEA, they send us a notification saying that
they're electing to participate in part, which may mean some of
their geographic service areas but not others, or in part could
also mean they're not offering WEA on all of their cell phones.
Or they can elect to participate in full, which basically means
they're participating across all their devices and all their
geographic areas.
Once they've done that, the only thing for them to do is
what other carriers would be required to do, which is to have
the WEA--to be able to offer the WEA capable phones and to be
able to make sure that their network is set up to receive WEA
alerts. But other than the election itself, there isn't some
drawn out process with the FCC that they would have to go
through.
Senator Sullivan. OK. Well, maybe what we can do is work
with you and some of our smaller carriers who have had
concerns. And then on the question of the radio stations?
Ms. Fowlkes. That's something we actually are looking into.
The tsunami alert that occurred up in Alaska--that's something
that we can certainly look into and include in our
investigation.
Senator Sullivan. Good, because if we can learn from this--
I mean, fortunately, there was no tsunami, but it was very
scary for hundreds if not thousands of my constituents. It
would be good to be able to learn from this so we can be ready
next time. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
Senator Udall.
STATEMENT OF HON. TOM UDALL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO
Senator Udall. Thank you, Chairman Thune, and thanks to you
and Senator Schatz for focusing on these very important
questions. My understanding--some of your questions probably
could have been answered by FEMA, and FEMA is not at this
hearing. I know that you requested them. But it seems to me we
should try to get some answers some way. I'm happy to
participate in a letter or however you want to do that. But I
think we need the answers to your questions.
Based on the answers we've received from this panel--which
they don't seem to have the information, especially Ms.
Fowlkes--it's FEMA we should be directing things to, don't you
think, on some of those questions you were unable to answer?
You said you didn't have authority?
Ms. Fowlkes. To the extent that you're asking about
anything other than our authority or our regulation of the
communication service providers' participation, I would agree.
Senator Udall. Yes. Ms. Fowlkes, it's my understanding that
the states are required to file Emergency Alert System plans
with the FCC?
Ms. Fowlkes. Yes.
Senator Udall. There are a few tribal nations whose
reservations cross at least one state line. In the case of New
Mexico, we have the Navajo nation, which is in three different
states. Are tribal nations under that same requirement of
filing?
Ms. Fowlkes. No. The tribal nations do not have to file
separate EAS plans. What typically happens is to the extent
that there are parts of tribal nations in states, those states
take into account the need of those tribal nations. That's
certainly how the New Mexico state EAS plan is set up.
Senator Udall. Good, good. Thank you.
It's important to every bureau of the FCC to engage
directly with tribal nations. Have you had the opportunity to
work with tribal nations on their unique public safety needs?
Ms. Fowlkes. Certainly. For example, the Public Safety and
Homeland Security Bureau oversees an advisory committee, the
Communications Security, Reliability, and Operability Council.
We have had representatives of tribal nations serving on that
committee, in addition to which we had a separate committee of
911 Centers focused on Next Generation 911. We had
representatives of tribal nations on that committee as well.
Senator Udall. And as all of you probably know, it's very
important to get these alerts out if you have wireless
coverage. But many of these tribal nations don't have it at
all, and so you're dealing with an additional huge hurdle in
terms of getting emergency alerts and those kinds of things
into tribal nations territory.
Mr. Matheny, I appreciate the work that our local
broadcasters do every day, but particularly in times of threats
to public safety, such as during wildfire season, which we have
in the Southwest and we've seen at various places around the
country. As you're aware, broadcasters in New Mexico rely
heavily on translators to serve rural communities, and I'm
concerned that the ongoing spectrum repack process could leave
these rural consumers behind.
It's my understanding that the current allocation of $1.75
billion is inadequate to meet the needs of the broadcasters
relocating. Is there a better estimate of the amount of money
that's needed, including the funds needed to ensure that
translators do not go offline in rural areas?
Mr. Matheny. Thank you, Senator Udall. So you are certainly
correct that $1.75 billion was allocated----
Senator Udall. And that's the number that I believe
Chairman Pai testified to.
Mr. Matheny. Yes, and so Chairman Pai has testified that
there is not enough money.
Senator Udall. Yes.
Mr. Matheny. So he is on the record with that as well, and
we certainly don't believe there's enough money, either. Based
on the initial results of the cost estimates submitted by TV
stations, the real number is going to end up being around $3
billion. So there's a substantial disconnect in the funds
available and what's really going to be needed.
So we are certainly keen to see the Viewer and Listener
Protection Act that Senators Moran and Schatz have sponsored to
take hold and get approved, because we think it's going to be
necessary to make sure that stations stay on the air and are
able to continue to operate, including translators. And in the
context of this hearing, that certainly means that emergency
alerts are still going to be available to those populations.
Senator Udall. Yes, and I'm also an original co-sponsor of
that bill. I think we have to make this investment. I don't
think there's any doubt about it. I've got a couple of
additional questions, but I'll submit them for the record.
Thank you to the panel very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Udall, and your point is a
good one. We did attempt to get FEMA here. They need more lead
time, evidently, to prepare for this. Maybe in light of what
happened, they need it. I do think that there are questions
that--obviously, FCC is this committee's jurisdiction, and FEMA
is DHS--but that only they and others can answer, and I'm
hoping that we'll be able by the time the field hearing in
Hawaii occurs to get the other parties to this discussion
involved and engaged and, hopefully, able to answer some of
those questions. I mean, there are still, to me, unanswered
questions. I know there are attempts already, legislatively, to
cure some of the problems that we had this time around.
Senator Capito.
STATEMENT OF HON. SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
Senator Capito. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the
Ranking Member.
I know it has been a difficult several days and weeks since
this occurred, and I'm kind of going to go on the FEMA thing. I
just want to get this question on the record, Ms. Fowlkes. I'm
pretty sure you don't know the answer to this question or you
don't have it.
But I think it's the one question that many people, when
they read the story, at least at a cursory level, sort of
wondered, and that is: How is it that a single government
employee could trigger an alert without any kind of meaningful
mechanism to sort of override or--you know, do you want to
delete, do you want to delete? Was there any? And do you have
any light to shed on that basic question?
Ms. Fowlkes. That's actually one of the issues that we're
exploring as part of our investigation, what Hawaii's process--
what happens and what Hawaii's process was.
Senator Capito. I think we'll all be interested in hearing
that.
Mr. Matheny, were the warnings broadcast over TV?
Mr. Matheny. Yes, they were.
Senator Capito. In a scrawl kind of thing? Or how was that
presented to the viewers?
Mr. Matheny. Yes, they were. There were scrawls on TV, and
then it was an audio played on radio.
Senator Capito. OK, because I actually was talking with
somebody yesterday who was there in a hotel room, and they must
have missed the first scrawl on the TV, but they did get the
warning system through their phone, both of them. They were
visitors.
But I wanted to tell Senator Schatz that the hotel they
were staying in was right on top of it. They were--a warning
system to the entire hotel with directions as to what they
should do, encouraging everybody to come in and go--I mean, I'm
sure it was frantic--but to go to the basement. So I would say
since you have so many tourists and so many people staying in
hotels, that's good to know that you're tourism industry is
reacting quickly to something like this. That's one of the best
practices that came through.
I also want to thank Mr. Matheny, too, for the broadcasters
when we had our thousand year flood in June 2 years ago. I am
convinced we would have lost more lives than we did had we not
had the rapid response, both through the radio and certainly
social media, but also through our broadcasters. So thank you
for that and also thank you for--the broadcasters for staying
on the story. It wasn't a one-day story for us, and it wasn't
treated as such by the broadcasters.
Mr. Matheny. Sure, and thank you for recognizing that. I
think that is one of the key elements of broadcasters, is that
they are local and part of the community and committed to
helping prepare for weather and recover.
Senator Capito. Right.
Mr. Bergmann, let me ask you a real simple question here.
If you're in a no-service area on your phone, do you get these
alerts?
Mr. Bergmann. You need to be within the coverage area in
order to receive a wireless emergency alert, which really does
put a premium on the conversation we were having earlier about
making sure that we're doing everything we can to make coverage
available in rural areas.
Senator Capito. This is a major issue for us, not just on
the wireless side but, obviously, on the broadband side, and we
have, in our state, particular challenges because of the rural
nature, but also the geographic nature of the state of West
Virginia makes it difficult. But when I can drive eight miles
outside of my capital city and lose coverage, there's still a
lot of work that needs to be done. I know you know this. I just
wanted to reemphasize that.
Last, I'll just tell a little story. On December 7, 1941,
my uncle was stationed at the Schofield Barracks in Hawaii when
Pearl Harbor was attacked, and my mother was 15 at the time.
One story that she told us that was kind of interesting,
especially in this day and time when you're talking about
instantaneous messages and instantaneous retraction of messages
within 40 minutes, which sounds like a lifetime--but she told
me that if it weren't for the ham radio operators, her parents
would have never known that their son was okay.
It took days for it to come across the country, and I'm
sure some of those messages were not quite as positive as the
ones my grandparents and my mother received that day. So, Mr.
Lisenco, your organization's long history is well appreciated.
Mr. Lisenco. Thank you very much, Senator. And, if I may,
amateur radio was also involved in the effort to achieve
normalcy in Hawaii after the false alarm. As a matter of fact,
Hawaii--the Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service in Hawaii
activated a UHF and VHF repeater system, and they monitored the
alerts and the cancellations. Ironically, 20 hours earlier,
they had drilled with the Hawaii State Emergency Management
this kind of scenario, and so 20 hours later, there it was
right in our face.
We had operators present at the Emergency Operations Center
and at the state warning point for Hawaii Emergency Management.
The false alarm was on various information mechanisms within 13
minutes, and amateur radio operators started to pass that
message along, whereas the full false alarm notice came 38
minutes from the initial alarm.
Amateur radio operators were trained in Hawaii to listen to
specific types of siren wailings, and each one would determine
what kind of emergency there was. There was no siren, and so
that led to a tremendous amount of confusion. They also
received reports from a Coast Guard vessel relaying the
cancellation notice before the official cancellation notice
came out. So amateur radio operators knew pretty much earlier
than anybody else as to what was going on and did start sending
that message along.
Senator Capito. The other issue, I'll just say briefly--if
I could take just a few more seconds--that I think is real in
relaying the stories of the folks that were in Hawaii visiting
was their skepticism over this is a test and this is real, even
though it was explained that it was real. I do think if we
perfect a system, we won't have this testing fatigue, you know,
where you're getting tested and you know nothing's really
happening. I think that's our immediate response sometimes.
I think the better the system gets and more reliable, the
less frequently it needs to be tested, or you can test it in
different places and don't have to test it always at the same
site--will really go to this sort of mentality of, ``Well, this
is a false alarm. It's not really happening. I'm going to wait
it out and wait and see what happens.'' So I encourage all your
efforts in that.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Capito.
Senator Markey.
STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. I'm
just referring back to an earlier conversation on the
Committee. I just want everyone to know that there is actually
a professional football team from Massachusetts, and it will be
playing in about 10 days in a game out in Minnesota. So I just
wanted everyone to be on notice to be looking for that.
[Laughter.]
Senator Markey. Mr. Bergmann, you said that the rule will
be implemented in 2019 to increase the character count for
mobile emergency alerts from 90 to 360. Can we get it done more
quickly than 2019? How can we telescope the timeframe to get
this done? It's obviously a big problem.
Mr. Bergmann. Thanks, Senator, and, certainly, we do think
that additional capability, having those additional characters,
will be helpful and will let us pass on more information to
consumers, let public safety explain situations better to
consumers. We are certainly an industry about over-delivering,
so we've hit every deadline so far in terms of WARN Act
implementation. We certainly want to try to do that again here
as well.
Senator Markey. So you could set a goal of completing it in
2018?
Mr. Bergmann. Well, you know, I wouldn't want to get ahead
of the FCC's current deadline, which is May 2019, but I can
tell you that we'll be doing everything that we can to hit that
deadline and, if we can, beat it.
Senator Markey. I think we already saw that deadline as a
little bit too far out. We definitely need, obviously, to deal
with the problem. So let's just talk, for example, about what
could happen at a meltdown at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant
in Massachusetts, which is at the bottom of the list of best
managed nuclear power plants in the United States, and, of
course, people on Cape Cod would have to actually ride past the
plant to evacuate, so it gets a little bit more complicated.
So I guess my question to you would be when this event just
occurred in Hawaii, the message was ``Ballistic missile threat
inbound to Hawaii. Seek immediate shelter. This is not a
drill.'' So what would be the message that went off the
emergency--what would be the information that was communicated
to people if there was a nuclear power plant meltdown, and
where would they be told to go? Would they be told to shelter
in place, or would they be told to evacuate? Here, there was no
additional information. Where do you go? What do you do? People
are just wandering crazily around town.
So if there is a nuclear meltdown--and we still have 100
plants in America, and it's clear that an accident can happen.
Fukushima was the most recent. But it is possible. Should there
be more information, Ms. Fowlkes, that is part of the message
which is sent out, so it not only warns people but gives them
kind of a little bit of guidance as well with more than 90--
perhaps with as many as 360 characters so that there's guidance
that families receive?
Ms. Fowlkes. The main reason why the Commission expanded
the character limit of the WEA alerts from 90 to 360 was
because of the need to provide more information, in addition to
which the Commission also adopted rules that would allow for
the WEA alerts to include embedded references. Originally, the
rules did not allow telephone numbers or a URL link into the
WEA alert. The Commission has now, given the advancement in
technology, decided to allow those to be included. There are
certainly other issues that are before the Commission that we
are considering in terms of other types of information or
additional information that can be provided.
Senator Markey. I think that's very important, and I think
it has to be tailored, because people would want to know, ``Do
I shelter in place, or do I just run crazily out into the
street and head toward what could be the problem?'' And I think
that's really one of the big issues that has been identified,
and we're going to have to clarify that.
Just going back to the Hawaii incident, I don't know how
much thought has been put into this question of State control
versus Federal control, because, obviously, the North Koreans
could also make a miscalculation if they think that we are
preparing for nuclear war, if they think that the United States
might have a hair trigger response capacity, you know, that is
going to be triggered by this emergency evacuation plan that
has been triggered. So has anyone thought through that reality,
that the North Koreans could completely misinterpret what is
going on and actually move them closer to their own hair
trigger just to prepare because the United States might be
actually on the verge of attacking? Has anyone thought through
that issue as well?
Ms. Fowlkes. From the FCC's standpoint, as you know, we're
focused on the communication distribution side. That's another
issue where I would have to refer you to FEMA and DHS for
decisions.
Senator Markey. And I think decisions like that should be
made by the President and by the Pentagon and not by State
officials. I think it's absolutely imperative that it be put in
that larger context of understanding how the North Koreans
might be responding, because it's already too close. They have
trigger--between our two countries. Too many threats have
already been issued. So a misreading of that by the North
Koreans could have actually resulted in a much more
catastrophic situation. So thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Markey.
Senator Cantwell is next.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
Member. Thank you for holding this hearing.
When it comes to the Pacific Northwest, I guarantee you,
with tsunamis and earthquakes and volcanoes, flooding, worrying
about lahars, you name it, we pay a lot of attention to
disaster issues. I'm reminded, having been on the Committee for
some time, that our former colleagues, Senators Stevens and
Inouye, spent a lot of time on the development of what is the
Buoy System, which is our earliest detection on the waves so
that we can have this information, and now NOAA is working very
diligently on interpretation of that activity so that we can
get the information to handheld devices. So it is--I think we
need to be thankful that we've made the investment in
technology.
I think the question becomes who in the Federal Government
owns the protocols for making sure that the coordination
happens at the state and local level. If so many of the
partners in the development of that communication or the
communication itself, for example, the Weather Service, who I
know isn't with us this morning--how do we make sure that that
information is there?
So, for us, out on the Long Beach peninsula, this issue is
a very big issue. We have established warning sirens and
warning information, and I think the scientists at NOAA would
tell us this is what we should be developing. But now we have a
very rural, isolated community trying to figure out how to deal
with a tsunami. Many people may remember the story that the New
Yorker wrote a few years back, The Big One. I never heard from
so many of my friends around the United States when that
article appeared, because they all woke up and said, ``This is
really what's going to happen?''
So we train constantly, constantly, on this as a
coordinated effort between Homeland Security, our National
Guard, our local responders. But who owns at the Federal level
thinking through what this communication protocol should
actually look like and how we establish safeguards within the
protocol so that these kinds of mistakes or information gaps
are avoided in the future? Because we want to continue with the
information. That's for sure. So does anybody have a thought on
that?
Ms. Fowlkes.
Ms. Fowlkes. In terms of the communication service provider
side, certainly, the FCC works with the service providers. We
have rules that apply in terms of how they're supposed to
react, in terms of receiving and transmitting the alerts. On
the alert origination side, on the FEMA side, I'd have to refer
more to them. I will say that just in terms of general
coordination, the FCC has at times--well, not just at times,
but regularly coordinates with FEMA in terms of things such as
testing or dealing with some of the issues that go to our
rulemakings.
To give you an example, with respect to the EAS, there are
a lot of states, particularly on the western side of the
country, who do tsunami and earthquake tests, and they want to
use the live code EAS, which, under our rules, you can't use
unless it's an actual emergency. We have, working with
broadcasters and other EAS participants, waived our rules to
allow the broadcasters, the cable operators, to transmit that
live code test as part of the broader tsunami exercise that
FEMA may be doing with the state or local government.
Senator Cantwell. This isn't--you know, I'm not trying to
stump the panel. It's more that I think we have a gap here, and
I know in our state, because the National Guard and the tech
sector are so strong, they've established what they call
``hygiene issues'' for cybersecurity--here are the 10 things
that you should follow for good cybersecurity hygiene.
Somewhere, it seems to me, we need this protocol list of
here's what emergency response should look like, and here are
the safeguards that should be in place, whether you're talking
about a county or a state or the Federal system, because we're
going to keep marching ahead. We need the information. We
desperately want this kind of--when it's an earthquake, you
only have--you might only have minutes to respond and because,
as I said, this article about ``The Big One'' in the
Northwest--we want to see this data and information. But we
also want to make sure that, like the things that happened in
Hawaii, we also have new safeguards for false alarms.
I remember Senator Inouye talking about a previous moment
in Hawaii's history prior to all this technology where they
had--I think it went on for hours, he said. They thought a
tsunami wave was going to hit, and so this went on for hours
and hours, and that's why we developed the Buoy System. So the
Buoy System did work the other night in Kodiak, and it gave
people--even though it went off, it gave people time to then
understand from the science level that the wave was not going
to be that great.
So we want the technology, but we need some protocols as to
how it's used and how to make sure that there are some
safeguards there for the public.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cantwell.
Senator Cortez Masto.
STATEMENT OF HON. CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA
Senator Cortez Masto. Thank you.
Thank you for being here today, and I do wish that FEMA had
been here. I think they would have been an integral part of
this discussion. I echo a lot of the concerns from my
colleagues that I've heard today and appreciate your candid
comments as well about the challenges we still have moving
forward, but the good things that are happening with the
alerts.
One of the things I do have concerns about sometimes,
particularly in the state of Nevada where we have a very
diverse and growing population, are language barriers. I know,
Ms. Fowlkes and Mr. Bergmann, you talked a little bit about
this and the actions that were taken in 2016 to enable Spanish
language alerts.
Can you talk a little bit more about that and describe how
that works to ensure understandable alerts are sent to everyone
and not just Spanish language alone? In Nevada, particularly in
southern Nevada, we have a large Filipino population, and
Tagalog is an important language, obviously, and that's a
barrier for those who do not speak Spanish. So can you talk a
little bit about language barriers and how you address those
and where the gaps are and what we should be doing to also keep
that in mind when we're talking about reaching out to everyone
in our communities when there is a crisis or a concern of a
natural disaster?
Ms. Fowlkes. As you noted, the Commission back in 2016
adopted rules to facilitate Spanish language WEA alerts. We do
currently have the broader issue that is pending before us that
we're still considering regarding other languages and to what
extent we should be looking at WEA alerts in other types of
languages.
Senator Cortez Masto. Not there yet, though.
Ms. Fowlkes. Not there. It's pending.
Senator Cortez Masto. And, then, Mr. Bergmann, if you don't
mind talking a little bit about how you--particularly with
Spanish, how you overcome that barrier with the technology?
Mr. Bergmann. Sure, Senator. I think we certainly agree
with you and think that's an important improvement. It's one
that we're working diligently to implement. And then I would
just flag again the addition of URLs plays an important role,
too, because we think often of WEA as a bell ringer. The idea
is that you're letting folks know there's an issue and then
giving them the opportunity to go and get additional
information. So, together, those two tools, we think, will be
very valuable for consumers, particularly for those who speak
languages other than English as well.
Senator Cortez Masto. Thank you. And besides language
barriers--and I echo my colleagues again--there are geographic
barriers, rural communities, particularly, in Nevada and across
the country that are still struggling to have broadband access
and access to be able to use some of the technology that's out
there that's providing this information. I know this is an area
where we've talked and will continue to support to bring
resources and funding to our rural communities to connect them.
But, to me, this is just a crisis as well, that they are not
connected right now, and it's a focus for many of us.
Let me ask you this. Cybersecurity--is there any concern
about hackers hacking into an alert system in any manner
whatsoever? Have we seen any of that, or is there something
that you're thinking about or making sure you're addressing in
the infrastructure?
Ms. Fowlkes. The FCC has addressed the issue of
cybersecurity, particularly with respect to the EAS, through
its advisory committee. You may or may not recall that back in
2013, a hacker gained access to EAS equipment at various
broadcast stations across the country. We conducted an
investigation, and we asked our advisory committee to come up
with best practices that EAS participants could use to make
their equipment more secure, in addition to which the FCC,
through its advisory committee, has developed best practices
for really all the communication sectors to address security
risk management, specifically, how to implement the NIST
framework.
Senator Cortez Masto. The best practices are there, but
there's no guarantee that they're going to be adopted.
Ms. Fowlkes. We have taken steps to strongly encourage
communication service providers to implement those best
practices. We also work with industry organizations, and many
of the industry organizations, for example, NAB, has done a lot
to encourage its members to implement those best practices.
Senator Cortez Masto. Right, but we're still at the stage
of encouragement and not necessarily mandated that the use is
being implemented.
Ms. Fowlkes. Yes.
Senator Cortez Masto. Thank you. I appreciate the
conversation today.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cortez Masto.
Senator Duckworth.
STATEMENT OF HON. TAMMY DUCKWORTH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I want to thank the Chair and
the Ranking Member for today's hearing. I also want to thank
our witnesses for participating in this very important
discussion.
As a proud graduate of the University of Hawaii at Manoa--
go Rainbows--no one else? No one else in the room. There's
never anybody from my----
Senator Schatz. Not even me.
Senator Duckworth. Not even you. Not even you. What does
that say?
[Laughter.]
Senator Duckworth. But Hawaii's recent false alarm is a
fascinating test case, I think, for Federal and state and local
policymakers. On the one hand, it worked exactly the way it was
supposed to. It was a false alarm, but the execution of the
alarm actually worked as it was designed. A message was sent by
an alerting authority and effectively disseminated to the
targeted population.
On the other hand, it was sent in error, terrifying the
entire state for nearly an hour. I actually landed in South
Korea on my way to the DMZ when it popped up on my phone saying
that this had happened. So the situation really exposed some
gaps in the training processes and ergonomics of the software
of the alerting authority.
Mr. Bergmann and Mr. Matheny, it seems to me that the
questions raised and the gaps identified in the Hawaii case
focus more on alerting authorities and FEMA jurisdiction than
the FCC and the alerting disseminators. Would you agree with
that?
Mr. Matheny. Yes, I would. I agree with the way you
outlined it, which is that the broadcast infrastructure worked.
The transmission worked. The message did get out.
Unfortunately, in this case, it was a mistaken message. So I
think that, as we've been discussing today, it requires us all,
in particular on the FEMA side, to revisit who can generate an
alert and how that alert is generated. But as it relates to the
dissemination and the transmission, I think, as you've stated,
that piece of the process worked as designed.
Mr. Bergmann. Senator Duckworth, I would agree as well,
too. On the wireless side, the alert was delivered exactly as
intended, and I think one of the key focuses of this hearing is
making sure that we have public trust and confidence in the
system, and I think we can certainly say we have that on the
delivery side. I understand the Committee's appropriate focus
on making sure that that trust extends across the entire
system. But the system performed well on the wireless side.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. So I want to sort of contrast
that with something that my colleague, Senator Sullivan, talked
about, the recent tsunami warning in Alaska. I think that's
more of an appropriate test case where an emergency alert was
sent to a wide swath of residents, many who were in the danger
zone, but then a lot of folks who were outside of the danger
zone and probably did not need to be alerted. The Alaska
example exposes a potential gap in the Wireless Emergency Alert
system's effectiveness in large rural environments. I have this
situation in Illinois where I have Chicago--we have a couple of
major metropolitan areas, but then large rural communities.
So my understanding is that in Anchorage, residents
received an alert at 12:36 a.m., even though they were not in
the danger zone, geographically, and I can appreciate alerting
authorities' interest in erring on the side of caution. But it
seems more likely that forecast boundaries and census
boundaries, combined with technology limitations, also played a
role in those folks in Anchorage receiving the alert.
Ms. Fowlkes, Senator Sullivan touched on this. But has FCC
done any after-action analysis of Alaska's recent tsunami
warning to determine the WEA's effectiveness in this instance?
Ms. Fowlkes. We are in the process of looking into it, yes.
Senator Duckworth. You are. Do you have any idea how long
that review might take, or if we'll be able to see the results?
Ms. Fowlkes. At this point, I can't give a specific
timeline. But, as always, my team moves very carefully and very
expeditiously.
Senator Duckworth. Wonderful.
Mr. Bergmann, what can you tell us about the effectiveness
of geo-targeting technology, and where are the gaps? Which
emergency situation is WEA least suited, and where should
industry, the FCC, and Congress focus our attention? And is
there an issue with somebody who may have their GPS locator
turned off on their phones?
Mr. Bergmann. Thanks, Senator. I think you've put your
finger on one of the most important improvements that we're
poised to make, which is improving the geo-targeting of
Wireless Emergency Alerts, and the example that you talked
about--this is exactly why we think about alerts as trying to
target it to the folks who are actually in danger and not over-
alerting.
So there are two components to that. One we've implemented
now, which is taking advantage of greater capabilities within
the network to go below the county level so that alert
originators can draw the polygon, the geographic area that they
want to reach, and so they can do that today. The next step in
that will be taking advantage not just of the network, but also
of the capabilities in the device. So their turning on features
like location is, obviously, critically important to that. You
want to make sure that you can take advantage of that location
information in order to appropriately geo-target it.
Now, I think a comforting piece of information there is if
the geo-targeting is turned off, they'll still receive the
message. So it's not as if the consumer would not receive the
message in that circumstance.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, and I'm out of time.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Duckworth.
Senator Wicker.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER F. WICKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI
Senator Wicker. Mr. Lisenco, thank you for being here and
thank you for your written testimony. On page nine of your
written testimony, you talk about the Hawaii amateur radio
operators during the recent false alarm. How were these
operators able to disseminate a cancellation notice about
Hawaii's ballistic missile false alarm before others were able
to do so? Can you explain how amateur radios were able to
provide that notice before others?
Mr. Lisenco. Senator Wicker, first, let me start by
thanking you for your continuing support of amateur radio and
your bill, S. 1534.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, and I might point out that
Senator Blumenthal is a co-sponsor of that, and I appreciate
his bipartisan support for this.
Mr. Lisenco. Thank you. As I had mentioned earlier,
ironically, amateur radio members in Hawaii had just been
drilling 20 hours before the actual false alarm, so everything
was fresh on their minds. Now, because they are able to work
outside of the local infrastructure and they were not
participants within the actual initial notification, they got
word out through various VHF and UHF repeaters about the false
alarm within 13 minutes after the initial alarm.
They were picking up information from various sources,
including a Coast Guard vessel that was just outside of the
area. And as a result, because they were able to disseminate
that information freely within the 13 minutes, they were able
to get that word out right away. Whereas there was a lot of
confusion in the area to them as well, because they were taught
to listen for a certain type of siren warning that never came,
so they were dependent upon information that they were gleaning
from within the community itself.
Senator Wicker. Well, let me then switch to Katrina. Why,
in situations like Hurricane Katrina, are the amateur radios so
much more resilient and able to be there as a backup to the
more well known forms?
Mr. Lisenco. Well, for a number of reasons. First of all,
we're not dependent upon the infrastructure to operate. If the
power goes down, we're able to use generators, solar power
panels, batteries, what have you, and because we understand how
radio works, we're able to adapt very quickly to any situation,
whereas most first responders are using technology that they
really can't adapt to a given situation because they don't have
a basic understanding.
We're able to walk into a situation, take notice of the
surroundings, what kind of operation would be effective at that
point, and then move along those lines very quickly. The big
thing is that when all else fails, we really are able to
provide emergency communications as required.
Senator Wicker. So things are OK. But why is the new
legislation so important? What would it give us that we don't
have?
Mr. Lisenco. Well, you have to remember that amateur radio
is unique in that we are disseminated geographically throughout
the entire country. So, very often, what will happen is we'll
have amateur radio operators both within and outside of a
disaster area. That gives us a unique ability to disseminate
information from within a disaster zone that others don't have.
The fact that we're not dependent upon the infrastructure then
gives us the ability to work outside of it.
So, for instance, during Sandy--I'm from--if you can't tell
from my accent, I'm from Brooklyn. We had devastation
throughout the coast of both New Jersey and New York going out
to Long Island. The flooding was so severe that we had people
who were stuck in their homes, obviously, waiting for help. We
had amateur radio operators who were inside of the flood zone
and were able to send messages to first responders outside of
the flood zone as to where people needed help, and very often
in an emergency of that nature, it's as important to know where
you need help and where you don't need help so you don't waste
the resources that you have, which are limited during a
disaster. So you don't want to send a first responder to the
wrong address when there's nobody there to save. We learned
that it's that dissemination of resources that is a strong
point for us.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Schatz, anything else?
[Nonverbal response.]
The Chairman. Well, I think we've pretty well covered the
subject today with the folks that are here, and, as I mentioned
earlier, there are some folks who are not here who I think
could shed considerable light on some of the other aspects of
the way this process works. But it's clear to me, at least, and
I think most of the members of this committee, that we need to
make some changes, at least with respect to the kind of alert
that was issued in Hawaii. When it's a nuclear attack, I think
the chain in that alert system needs to be modified to reflect
the seriousness of the threat, not that any of them aren't
serious, but, obviously, this is a very different sort of
threat.
Thank you so much for the work that your various
organizations do in alerting the public, and I encourage you to
continue to work to develop and refine those processes and
technologies so that we can become even better and, hopefully,
more efficient in seeing that people have the notifications
they need in the face of various disasters that come our way.
So thank you.
We will keep the record open for members on the Committee
who would like to submit questions for the record for a couple
of weeks and would ask the witnesses, as soon as they can, to
get those responses in, preferably in a couple of weeks' time
so we can close out the record of the hearing. We, again,
appreciate all of you being here today.
With that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Big City Emergency Managers
National Emergency Management Association
International Association of Emergency Managers
January 23, 2018
Chairman Ajit Pai,
Commissioner Mignon Clyburn,
Commissioner Michael O'Rielly,
Commissioner Brendan Carr,
Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel,
Washington, DC.
Mr. Chairman and Commissioners,
First, we wish to share our appreciation and thanks to Chairman
Pai, Commission staff, and public safety stakeholders for their efforts
to date, and thank you to Commissioners Clyburn, O'Rielly, Carr,
Rosenworcel and your staff for your consideration of this item. We
believe that the proposed changes to the Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA)
service will save lives. With respect, we have included several changes
to the proposed rules for your consideration.
As APCO stated in its January 12th ex parte to the Commission, ``in
addition to expressing support for requiring geo-targeting enhancements
by 2019, we recommend the incorporation of rule language to add clarity
to the obligations of participating WEA service providers. For example,
the language of Final Rule Section 10.450 could specify that, ``No
later than November 30, 2019,'' participating CMS providers must match
the target area. Section 10.450 could also reflect the language of the
draft Order specifying that this deadline is to apply to ``new mobile
devices offered for sale after the rule's effective date and to
existing devices capable of being upgraded.''
APCO also stated, and we agree, that ``[t]he rules could also
clarify the narrow intent of what it means to be technically incapable
of matching the specified target area.'' Based on the record, it is
technically feasible to achieve the geo-targeting goal by November 30,
2019, through software upgrades to many existing devices and with the
introduction of new devices. Thus, the rules should be clear that
``technically incapable'' should not apply where providers have failed
to develop standards, implement network and device changes, or pursue
other technological solutions. After November 2019, CMS providers may
only fall back to the ``best approximates'' standard in a narrow set of
circumstances. While we expect participating CMS providers to continue
serving as good partners in this trusted and official public safety
alerting system, the FCC's rules should minimize the potential for any
confusion with respect to the carriers' obligations to achieve geo-
targeting improvements.
Accordingly, we respectfully request the following changes to the
proposed rules:
(a) [REVISED SECTION 10.450 (a)] This section establishes minimum
requirements for the geographic targeting of Alert Messages. A
Participating CMS Provider will determine which of its network
facilities, elements, and locations will be used to
geographically target Alert Messages. A Participating CMS
Provider must deliver any Alert Message that is specified by a
geocode, circle, or polygon to an area that matches the
specified geocode, circle, or polygon. A Participating CMS
Provider is considered to have matched the target area when
they deliver an Alert Message to 100 percent of the target area
with no more than 0.1 of a mile overshoot. If some or all of a
Participating CMS Provider's network infrastructure is
technically incapable of matching the specified target area,
then that Participating CMS Provider must deliver the Alert
Message to an area that best approximates the specified target
area on and only on those aspects of its network infrastructure
that are incapable of matching the target area. [NEW LANGUAGE
FOLLOWS] [A CMS Provider's ability to claim that its network
infrastructure is technically incapable of matching the
specified target area is limited to instances described in the
Order, including when the target area is outside of the
Participating CMS Provider's network coverage area, when mobile
devices have location services disabled, and when legacy
networks cannot be updated to support this functionality. In
all other instances, the CMS Provider must deliver an Alert
Message to 100 percent of the target area with no more than 0.1
of a mile overshoot.]
(b) Leave as existing in Section 10.450 (b)
(c) [NEW SECTION 10.450 (c)] Participating CMS Providers are
required to transmit Alert Message polygon coordinates to
mobile devices without affecting the 360 character allotment
for displayable Alert Message text.
(d) [NEW SECTION 10.450 (d) Participating CMS Providers shall comply
with these Geo-targeting rules no later than November 30, 2019.
These rules shall apply to new mobile devices offered for sale
after the rule's effective date and to existing devices capable
of being upgraded.
In response to the proposed rule changes, CTIA submitted an Ex-
Parte on 1/17/18 discussing several of the same concerns around the
definitions related to the new rules. While CTIA suggests that the
Commission simplify the definition of ``WEA-capable'' devices to any
mobile wireless device that can receive a WEA message and noted that
the Commission could suggest that CMS providers and equipment vendors
disclose that a device may not support all WEA features. This
simplification is misleading to consumers and will allow providers and
device manufacturers a loophole to not provide the much needed WEA
enhancements to some wireless users. While we hope that our industry
partners will continue to work with us on providing all of the life-
saving WEA enhancements, we find CTIA's proposed definition for WEA-
capable devices to be too simplified. We respectfully request that the
Commission clearly define WEA-capable devices as those that are fully
capable of receiving all WEA messages and associated content.
In summary, we believe the existing proposed Order with these
changes to the Rules will result in a significantly improved Wireless
Emergency Alert system.
Thank you again for your consideration of these changes.
Sincerely,
Barb Graff,
Chair,
Big City Emergency Managers,
Director,
City of Seattle Office of Emergency Management.
Ron Prater,
Executive Director,
Big City Emergency Managers.
https://www.bigcityem.org
Mike Sprayberry,
National Emergency Management Association (NEMA),
President and Director,
North Carolina Division of Emergency Management.
https://www.nemaweb.org/
Nick Crossley,
President,
U.S. Council of the International
Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM).
https://www.iaem.com/
______
Competitive Carriers Association
Washington, DC, January 25, 2018
Hon. John Thune,
Chairman,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Bill Nelson,
Ranking Member,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Thune and Ranking Member Nelson:
Competitive Carriers Association (``CCA'') \1\ commends the
Committee for its timely oversight of emergency alerting with today's
hearing on ``This is Not a Drill: An Examination of Emergency Alert
Systems.'' Recent events and natural disasters have brought public
focus on emergency alerting, and the Federal Communications Commission
(``FCC'') will vote on an item updating the Wireless Emergency Alert
(``WEA'') system next week. As policymakers and industry leaders
continue to work to make alerts more effective and accurate, CCA
appreciates the recognition of unique challenges facing competitive
carriers and providers serving rural communities. Updates to the WEA
system should promote the most effective and efficient means for
providing WEA messages in consideration of technology that is both
capable of executing the requirements and available to all providers
and consumers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ CCA is the Nation's leading association for competitive
wireless providers and stakeholders across the United States. CCA's
membership includes nearly 100 competitive wireless providers ranging
from small, rural carriers serving fewer than 5,000 customers to
regional and national providers serving millions of customers. CCA also
represents associate members including vendors and suppliers that
provide products and services throughout the mobile communications
supply chain.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CCA carrier members' ongoing goal is to provide their customers
with the latest information, especially during disasters and
emergencies. Competitive carriers take their obligations to provide
these services seriously, particularly as many competitive carriers
connect the communities where they live. Proposed WEA updates,
including refining the delivery location, will improve the quality of
information that consumers receive, limit network impacts, and reduce
the potential for over-alerting. CCA's members continue to work to
implement enhanced WEA standards. While industry's work continues,
however, Congress can take steps to ensure alerts are available to all
consumers, especially in rural America, with a focus on ubiquitous
availability of devices and deployment of the latest mobile networks
that power them.
Alerts Depend on Consumer Devices
While underlying network technology and services are critical to
providing emergency alerts, consumers ultimately rely on their devices
to provide refined geo-targeted location and to receive the alert
itself. As the FCC adopts new regulatory requirements, device
manufacturers will need sufficient time to analyze changes and
incorporate new standards into devices, especially when embedding new
technology for next generation devices. Further, as wireless industry
groups and Apple have publicly recognized, some devices will not be
able to meet new requirements via a software upgrade and some legacy
devices do not support geo-targeting for WEA messages. As Congress and
the FCC consider new WEA requirements, they must also consider
carriers' access to the latest devices and the requisite technology
upgrades necessary to incorporate enhanced alerting standards.
What's more, smaller rural and regional carriers do not have access
to the latest devices on the same timeline as the largest carriers, if
at all. This not only diminishes competition in the wireless industry,
it also may delay availability of the latest WEA technology, including
device-based geo-location capabilities. CCA members are committed to
providing consumers with the most accurate and up-to-date information
in times of emergency, and will continue to upgrade their networks to
handle the enhanced requirements; however, they often are hamstrung
from doing so if the latest device or network technology is
unavailable. Regulatory updates to the WEA system and timelines for
implementation must reflect this reality.
We commend the FCC for its continued work to ensure that WEA
messages will be delivered using ``best approximates'' location in
circumstances where the target area is outside a carrier's network
coverage area, when location services are disabled on a device, or when
legacy networks or devices cannot be updated to support the
functionality. Continued oversight is necessary to ensure that carriers
serving rural America are not forced to seek waivers of overly
ambitious rules, or worse, opt-out of the voluntary WEA program.
Enhanced Alerting Requires Ubiquitous Mobile Broadband Coverage
Emergencies and disasters occur irrespective of geography, in both
densely populated urban centers and the remote wilderness. Timely WEA
messages can save lives in all of these areas, but only where consumers
have a sufficient mobile broadband connection to deliver the alert.
Without robust, seamless mobile coverage, citizens must rely on
traditional and potentially less-effective methods of communication
from public safety officials during a crisis. This Committee is all too
familiar with the persistent digital divide that plagues rural America,
and CCA supports continued work to close the gap and connect all
Americans with robust mobile broadband service.
With continued leadership from this Committee, CCA is optimistic
that Congress is moving towards implementing policies that support
mobile broadband deployment and ubiquitous connectivity. For example,
S. 19, the ``Making Opportunities for Broadband Investment and Limiting
Excessive and Needless Obstacles to Wireless Act'' or the ``MOBILE NOW
Act'' proposes steps to support deployment, especially in rural
America. CCA supports this bill, and encourages the House of
Representatives to send MOBILE NOW to the President's desk for
enactment. Additional bipartisan legislative proposals, including S.
1988, the ``Streamlining Permitting to Enable Efficient Deployment of
Broadband Infrastructure Act'' or the ``SPEED Act'' and S. 1363, the
``Rural Broadband Deployment Streamlining Act,'' will promote mobile
broadband deployment and support advanced services. Congress should
continue to champion these and other anticipated bills to reduce
barriers to deployment and increase investment certainty.
Additionally, CCA appreciates the Committee's work to ensure that
Universal Service Fund programs, including Mobility Fund Phase II,
provide support based on reliable data and deliver on Congress's
mandate to provide reasonably comparable services in urban and rural
areas. Emergency alerts are yet another example of why this program is
so important for connecting our Nation.
CCA thanks the Committee for continued oversight of these critical
issues and for holding this important hearing. Please do not hesitate
to contact CCA with any questions.
Sincerely,
Steven K. Berry,
President and CEO,
Competitive Carriers Association.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
Lisa M. Fowlkes
Question. What actions can the FCC take to work with other agencies
like FEMA to create best practices for Emergency Alert Systems?
Answer. Upon the completion of the Public Safety and Homeland
Security Bureau's investigation into the false alert incident in Hawaii
on January 13th, the Bureau will issue a final report on its findings.
The final report will include recommended measures to safeguard against
false alerts and to mitigate their harmful effects if they do occur.
Once these recommended measures are developed, the Bureau will partner
with FEMA to engage in stakeholder outreach and encourage
implementation of these measures. Among other avenues, the FCC is
considering convening a roundtable with stakeholders in the emergency
alerting ecosystem to discuss the lessons that should be learned from
this incident as well as developing a joint webinar with FEMA to
further educate stakeholders.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Brian Schatz to
Lisa M. Fowlkes
Question 1. On January 30, 2018, a few days after you appeared
before this Committee, the FCC's Public Safety and Homeland Security
Bureau provided a preliminary report on its investigation at the FCC's
Open Meeting. In order to ensure the most up to date record of the
FCC's findings is reflected in the hearing record, please provide a
detailed summary of the FCC's preliminary report including additional
information the FCC discovered after the hearing. In addition, provide
the expected date of completion of the FCC's investigation and when it
expects to complete the final report.
Answer. The Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau's
investigation is ongoing, but I am pleased to provide you with the
attached report, presented at the January 30, 2018, FCC Open Meeting,
which summarizes our preliminary findings.
The Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau is continuing the
investigation and will issue a final report upon the completion of the
investigation. The final report, which we expect to release later this
spring, will also include recommended measures to safeguard against
false alerts and to mitigate their harmful effects if they do occur.
Question 2. Please confirm that the FCC will, as part of its
investigation, examine whether HI-EMA's or other officials' phone lines
became congested and, if so, whether phone line congestion hindered the
ability of government officials to communicate during the incident.
Answer. Yes.
Question 3. As part of the investigation, will the FCC examine
whether and the extent to which officials engaged the
Telecommunications Priority Service, Government Emergency
Telecommunications Service, or Wireless Priority Service to communicate
during the incident and, if used, whether the systems operated as
expected?
Answer. Yes.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Gary Peters to
Lisa M. Fowlkes
Question 1. As your testimony indicates, the Commission places the
highest priority on ensuring that emergency management authorities and
first responders have up-to-date tools available to respond to
disasters. What coordination structures are in place to adjudicate any
challenges or work through issues that cross jurisdiction between your
agency and FEMA and how often are you meeting or speaking with FEMA
officials?
Answer. FEMA, the FCC, and the National Weather Service work
together to maintain the Emergency Alert System (EAS) and Wireless
Emergency Alerts.
The FCC's role includes establishing technical and operational
standards for EAS Participants (radio and television broadcasters,
cable systems, satellite radio and television providers, wireline video
providers), and for those wireless providers that elect to participate
in the Wireless Emergency Alert system. For example, the Commission has
worked closely with FEMA to conduct nationwide tests of the Emergency
Alert System to assess its reliability and effectiveness, with the most
recent test occurring in September 2017. Additionally, Commission staff
regularly interact and coordinate with partners at FEMA and are
participating members of the congressionally mandated IPAWS
Subcommittee to the FEMA National Advisory Committee.
Question 2. How are you at the FCC working with FEMA to communicate
with one voice and purpose to the varied stakeholders you need to
engage--from state and local emergency managers and public safety
officials in towns across the country all the way up to large
broadcasting or wireless companies?
Answer. After the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau
releases its final report on the January 13 false alert, which will
contain recommended best practices to safeguard against false alerts
and mitigate the effects of false alerts if they do occur, we plan to
partner with FEMA to engage in stakeholder outreach and encourage
implementation of these best practices. Among other avenues, we are
considering convening a roundtable with stakeholders in the emergency
alerting ecosystem to discuss the lessons that should be learned from
the false missile alert incident as well as developing a joint webinar
with FEMA to further educate stakeholders. We also have worked closely
with FEMA on a range of public events, such as Presidential and state
event preparations, nationwide EAS tests, and disaster relief efforts.
Question 3. As I understand from reading the timeline of the Hawaii
incident and follow up conversations, had Hawaii EMA not called for
FEMA for advice, FEMA, absent news reports, would not have immediately
been notified of the incident. Does the FCC have a monitoring
capability or central alert repository that receives alerts in real
time from around the country? What I'm getting at, and what we have
asked FEMA as well, is whether the FCC has awareness of critical alerts
as they are sent or whether you rely on external updates for
situational awareness?
Answer. The Federal Communications Commission does not monitor the
origination of emergency alerts. The origination and transmission of
emergency alerts, either via broadcast emergency alerts (EAS) or
wireless emergency alerts (WEA) is outside the purview of the FCC. As
such, the FCC only has notification of an alert being sent through
public reporting methods.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Brian Schatz to
Scott Bergmann
Question. Please provide relevant wireless industry data collected
by CTIA or available to CTIA from other sources to describe Wireless
Emergency Alert system availability and coverage including, for
example, by geographic region (e.g., state, MSA, rural vs. urban areas,
etc.), percentage of devices in use by customers, and number of
carriers offering vs. not offering WEA.
Answer. CTIA and its member companies are proud of the wireless
industry's role in the Wireless Emergency Alerts system.
All four national wireless providers and dozens of regional
providers, serving more than 99 percent of all U.S.
subscribers, are voluntarily participating in the Wireless
Emergency Alert system, transmitting thousands of alerts each
year and helping our public safety professionals save lives.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Wireless Emergency Alerts, Order on Reconsideration, 32 FCC Rcd
9621, 9625, n.28 (2017); see also, FCC, Master WEA Carrier Registry
File, https://www.fcc.gov/general/commercial-mobile-telephone-alerts-
cmas (last visited Feb. 18, 2018).
CTIA estimates that more than 500 million wireless handsets
that can receive WEA messages were sold in the U.S. since
2013.\2\ As AT&T has noted, ``most smartphones and features
phone released in the last few years are WEA-capable.'' \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See, e.g., IDC Worldwide Quarterly Mobile Phone Tracker (1Q
2013-3Q 2016), www.idc.com (last viewed Feb. 20, 2018); Counterpoint,
Apple Sells a Record 22 Million iPhones in USA During 4Q17 (rel. Jan.
31, 2018), (https://www.counterpointresearch.com/apple-sells-record-22-
million-iphones-usa-4q17/); Statista, Number of smartphones sold to end
users worldwide from 2007 to 2016 (in million units), https://
www.statista.com/statistics/263437/global-smartphone-sales-to-end-
users-since-2007/) (last viewed Feb. 20, 2018).
\3\ AT&T, Wireless Emergency Alerts, https://www.att.com/esupport/
article.html#!/wireless/KM1009041) (last viewed Feb. 21, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tom Udall to
Scott Bergmann
Question 1. The Wireless Alert system is effective and important,
but I remain concerned about the lack of infrastructure in rural and
tribal areas, and the inability of these areas to receive wireless
alerts in emergencies. I understand that cellular companies use geo-
targeting for the Wireless Alert System. But I also understand that, in
areas with a ``low tower density,'' companies may have to over-warn the
communities--that is, they will have to send the notice out to a
broader area--and this could lead to confusion. Can you address how
geo-targeting works in areas with low tower density?
Answer. Wireless Emergency Alerts play a unique role in our
national emergency alert system that enables authorized federal, state,
and local authorities (``alert originators'') to distribute emergency
information directly to consumers' wireless devices. In accordance with
FCC rules, participating wireless providers support the ability of
alert originators to determine the content and target area of WEA
messages.
Today, participating wireless providers support alert originators'
ability to target messages down to the cell-sector level. However,
cell-site density is a key factor in the granularity of these WEA geo-
targeting capabilities. To further enhance the geo-targeting
capabilities of Wireless Emergency Alerts, the FCC recently adopted new
rules that will utilize location capabilities in mobile devices to
allow more precise targeting of alerts, even in areas with low tower
density. In addition, CTIA welcomes efforts by Congress, the FCC, and
other relevant federal, state, and local agencies to modernize the
processes for deploying wireless infrastructure, particularly in rural
and tribal areas.
Question 2. In your testimony, you state that under the FCC's
proposed enhanced geo-targeting plan, providers will rely on the
technology in mobile devices. But many people disable this technology.
Can you speak to how the alerts would work if the technology is
disabled?
Answer. The geo-targeting capabilities of the Wireless Emergency
Alerts system play a vital role in disseminating emergency messages
directly to consumers affected by an emergency. Generally, even when
the enhanced WEA geo-targeting capabilities the FCC recently adopted
become available next year, consumers who have disabled location
services on their mobile device will still receive a WEA message so
long as the device is within the cell-broadcast area determined by
alert originators.
Specifically, participating wireless providers are currently
required by the FCC to deliver WEA messages to an alert area specified
by an alert originator subject to where mobile wireless coverage is
available.\4\ These existing geo-targeting capabilities enable alert
originators to target WEA down to the cell-sector level.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ See, 47 C.F.R. 10.450; Wireless Emergency Alerts; Amendments to
Part 11 of the Commission's Rules Regarding the Emergency Alert System,
PS Docket Nos. 15-91, 15-94, Report and Order and Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 31 FCC Rcd 11112 (2016) (WEA R&O and WEA FNPRM).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the ability to geo-target Wireless Emergency Alerts down to
the cell-sector level will remain a constant feature of the system, we
share the expressed goal of public safety leaders to harness innovative
location technologies to further improve the targeting of alerts. To
achieve this goal, the FCC recently adopted an Order to enhance the
geo-targeting capabilities of WEA through device-based technologies
that harness the location capabilities of a mobile device.\5\ The FCC's
recent Order requires participating wireless providers to minimize the
extent to which a WEA alert is presented to consumers outside of the
alert area to no more than 0.10 mile for devices with such capability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Wireless Emergency Alerts; Amendments to Part 11 of the
Commission's Rules Regarding the Emergency Alert System, Second Report
and Order and Second Order on Reconsideration, FCC 18-4, PS Docket Nos.
15-91, 15-94 (rel. Jan. 31, 2018) (Second WEA R&O), available at
https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-improves-wireless-emergency-alerts-0.
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It is commonly understood that a device's location determination
ability is subject to a number of factors, including whether the
device's location capabilities are enabled by the consumer. For this
reason, the FCC acknowledged that the enhanced WEA geo-targeting
capabilities may be infeasible in certain circumstances, including when
a consumer has chosen to disable location services on their mobile
device.\6\
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\6\ Id. at 9.
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In circumstances where enhanced WEA geo-targeting capabilities are
infeasible, the FCC requires participating wireless providers to
utilize the existing WEA geo-targeting capabilities to best approximate
the alert originators' target area, which enables alert originators to
target down the cell-sector level. Further, when consumers have chosen
to disable location services, the FCC requires that mobile devices
display the WEA message by default to ensure consumers who have
disabled location services on their devices can still act on important
WEA messages.\7\
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\7\ Id. at 10.
Question 3. Have any of your members engaged with tribal nations to
work on ways to help deploy wireless service or help build capacity on
their lands?
Answer. CTIA's members have worked diligently over the last ten
years to deploy 4G LTE to more than 99 percent of people living across
the country, but they recognize that the work is not done to reach all
communities, including those living on Tribal lands. Indeed, many CTIA
members offer service on Tribal lands and recognize that many Tribal
lands face unique and challenging obstacles. Like all consumers, people
living on Tribal lands would greatly benefit from wireless broadband
connectivity, not only to have access to a means of communicating with
friends and family, but for critical public safety services and access
to business and employment opportunities.
For that reason, we were encouraged by the FCC's recent renewal of
the Native Nations Communications Task Force, which will explore the
unique needs of consumers living on Tribal lands and the best means of
ensuring they have access to broadband capabilities.\8\ While wireless
providers have strong incentives to expand their networks to make these
services available to consumers, it is important to recognize that the
most remote and sparsely populated areas remain a challenge for
buildout. CTIA supports the FCC's efforts to coordinate with Tribal
leaders and develop ways to reduce barriers to deployment on Tribal
lands.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ See FCC Seeks Nominations for Tribal Government Representatives
to Serve on Renewed FCC Native Nations Communications Task Force,
Public Notice, DA 18-127 (rel. Feb. 8, 2018), https://
transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2018/db0208/DA-18-
127A1.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In order to reach the remaining unserved areas, including Tribal
lands, stable funding initiatives are critical. The Universal Service
Fund and Rural Utilities Service programs in particular are critical
for Tribal deployments. In 2011, the FCC also proposed a specific
Tribal component to Mobility Fund Phase II. CTIA supports a permanent
and robust Mobility Fund and urges Congress to encourage the FCC to
move forward with Mobility Fund Phase II implementation so that the
benefits of wireless connectivity can be attained by consumers across
the country. These incentives are the most appropriate approach in
order to incentivize buildout in rural and hard to serve areas,
including Tribal lands.
Question 4. According to your membership list on the website
www.ctia.org, Apple, Nokia, and Samsung are all current members of
CTIA. I have heard from small carriers that they are concerned that
their customers will not have access to the devices with the latest
technology to enable wireless alerts. Have you worked with any mobile
device manufacturers to ensure that all citizens, regardless of their
carrier, will have access to devices with the most up-to-date software
and hardware?
Answer. The FCC's recent enhanced WEA geo-targeting Order adopted
an aggressive implementation timeline that will present a challenge for
all participating wireless providers and device manufacturers. As the
Order notes, significant standards, deployment and testing work remains
to support the enhanced WEA geo-targeting capability throughout the
chain of the alert--from alert originators to FEMA's gateway to
wireless networks to mobile devices.\9\ However, the wireless
industry--including participating national and regional wireless
providers and device manufacturers--will work intently, as it always
has, in an effort to meet the FCC's aggressive deadline.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Second WEA R&O 12-14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Gary Peters to
Scott Bergmann
Question 1. Your testimonies both highlighted the fact that the
Hawaii incident, while unfortunate, illustrated a fairly flawless
execution of the backend alerting protocol supported by the wireless
and broadcasting community. How, if at all, do the decisions made by
states and localities when it comes to software or hardware impact the
operations of the wireless and broadcasting communities?
Answer. WEA is part of our Nation's emergency alert system managed
by FEMA through IPAWS. As part of this system, WEA messages and
associated information, including the geographic target area, are
received from alert originators through FEMA in a common format using a
secure process. By centralizing and standardizing the delivery of WEA
messages to participating wireless providers through FEMA's IPAWS,
individual alert originator software or hardware has minimal impact on
the delivery of Wireless Emergency Alerts over wireless networks.
However, CTIA agrees with Congressional and Federal leaders who have
highlighted the importance of alert originator training and
proficiency, including appropriate software and hardware capabilities,
which are essential to maintaining public confidence in WEA messages.
Notably, Congress recognized the need to train and equip alert
originators on ways to more effectively use our Nation's emergency
alert system when the IPAWS Modernization Act became law in 2015. And
in 2016, the FCC encouraged emergency management agencies to engage in
proficiency training exercises that could help minimize system failures
and ensure that any failures are corrected during a period when no real
emergency exists.\10\ Further, FCC Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel
recently called for new best practices around the training and use of
our Nation's emergency alert system.\11\ CTIA strongly supports all of
these efforts and encourages FEMA and other public safety leaders to
offer training opportunities for alert originators that promise to
bolster WEA's utility and credibility going forward.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ WEA R&O and WEA FNPRM 67.
\11\ Remarks of FCC Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel at Eye of the
Storm: Broadcasters' Role in Emergencies, Jan. 18, 2018 available at
https://www.fcc.gov/document/commr-rosenworcel-remarks-broadcasters-
role-emergencies-event.
Question 2. Have your members developed relationships with State
and local emergency management/EAS operators and shared challenges or
opportunities to work together in pursuit of your common goals?
Answer. At the Federal level, the WARN Act bi-furcated oversight
and administration of the Wireless Emergency Alert system between the
FCC and FEMA. This approach reflects the different roles and entities
that make up our national emergency alert system. The FCC oversees and
requires participating providers to support capabilities that ensure a
nationally consistent WEA experience. While FEMA oversees and manages
the relationships with authorized state and local alert originators,
CTIA and our member companies participate in various Federal efforts to
collaborate with state and local alert originators.
For example, CTIA and our member companies have participated in the
FCC's Communications, Security, Interoperability and Reliability
Council, which has evaluated various enhancements to WEA in
collaboration with state and local alert originators. CTIA also
participates in FEMA's National Advisory Committee, which Congress
tasked in 2015 with developing best practices to ensure the continued
effectiveness of IPAWS, including WEA. Through these efforts,
stakeholders can exchange ideas and seek consensus on steps that can be
taken to enhance the utility of and maintain public confidence in WEA.
Question 3. What are some of the avenues or coordination structures
your organizations participate in with FEMA? Do you have insight into
working groups or advisory councils that help facilitate conversations
around best practices, challenges, etc.?
Answer. While FEMA oversees and manages the relationships with
authorized state and local alert originators, CTIA and our member
companies participate in various Federal efforts to collaborate with
state and local alert originators. For example, CTIA and our member
companies have participated in the FCC's Communications, Security,
Interoperability and Reliability Council, which has evaluated various
enhancements to WEA in collaboration with state and local alert
originators. CTIA also participates in FEMA's National Advisory
Committee, which Congress tasked in 2015 with developing best practices
to ensure the continued effectiveness of IPAWS, including WEA. Through
these efforts, stakeholders can exchange ideas and seek consensus on
steps that can be taken to enhance the utility of and maintain public
confidence in WEA.
Question 4. As we know from recent events, the resilience of our
institutions, and particularly those that provide critical services, is
essential for the swift response and recovery from natural and man-made
disasters. Obviously as we talk about infrastructure and resilience in
the face of changing threats, understanding best practices and
investments industries are currently making is important. Are you
required to meet specific resilience or redundancy standards to ensure
you can continue to serve your critical role in the alert and warning
cycle if disaster strikes?
Answer. Wireless network resiliency is one of CTIA and our member
companies' highest priorities because wireless supports critical
emergency services during disasters, including WEA and 9-1-1. As noted
in my testimony, WEAs have been used extensively to warn the public of
severe weather emergencies. This past fall, more than 300 Wireless
Emergency Alerts warned people around Houston, Texas about Hurricane
Harvey and its rising floodwaters, more than 200 Wireless Emergency
Alerts warned Floridians about the strong winds of Hurricane Irma, and
Wireless Emergency Alerts played a critical role in warning many
Californians about the devastating wildfires.\12\ In 2013, 29 children
were saved from a tornado ripping through a soccer building in Windsor,
Connecticut when the camp manager received a Wireless Emergency Alert
seconds before the tornado touched down.\13\ Even as the system was
only months old in 2012, public safety officials were using Wireless
Emergency Alerts to warn the people in the path of Superstorm
Sandy.\14\
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\12\ See generally CTIA, Hurricane Harvey: Resiliency & Relief,
https://www.ctia.org/hurricane-harvey/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2018);
Aaron C. Davis & Sandhya Somashekhar, The only California county that
sent a warning to residents' cellphones has no reported fatalities,
Wash. Post, Oct. 13 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
investigations/the-only-california-county-that-sent-a-warning-to-
residents-cellphones-has-no-reported-fatalities/2017/10/13/b28b5af4-
b01f-11e
7-a908-a3470754bbb9_story.html?utm_term=.cd24bb9ecf9chttps://
www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/the-only-california-county-that-
sent-a-warning-to-residents-cellphones-has-no-report
ed-fatalities-/2017/10/13/b28b5af4-b01f-11e7-a908-
a3470754bbb9_story.html?utm_term=.cd24b
b9ecf9c; Richard Perez-Pena, Fire Alert Sent to Millions of Cellphones
Was California's Largest Warning Yet, N.Y. Times (Dec. 7, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/07/us/cellphone-alerts-california-
fires.html.
\13\ Rick Wimberly, Powerful Wireless Emergency Alerts Success
Stories at Congressional Hearing, Emergency Management (Oct. 24, 2013),
http://www.govtech.com/em/emergency-blogs/alerts/Powerful-Wireless-
Emergency-Alerts-Success-Stories-at-Congressional-Hearing.html; see
also, David Owens & Chloe Miller, National Weather Service Confirms Two
Tornadoes Monday, Hartford Courant (July 2, 2013), http://
articles.courant.com/2013-07-02/news/hc-tornado-warning-0702-
20130701_1_windsor-locks-dome-national-weather-service-confirms
\14\ Id.
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The availability of WEA during emergencies and disasters is due to
the resilience of wireless networks. In addition to individual network
resiliency practices of our member companies, CTIA's voluntary Wireless
Network Resiliency Cooperative Framework and associated best practices
are helping to make wireless networks more resilient to a variety of
threats. Notably, 95 percent of wireless cell sites were operational
throughout Hurricane Harvey in 2017. CTIA's member companies will
continue working hard to maintain wireless networks to support WEA and
other emergency communications during disaster situations.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Gary Peters to
Sam Matheny
Question 1. Your testimonies both highlighted the fact that the
Hawaii incident, while unfortunate, illustrated a fairly flawless
execution of the backend alerting protocol supported by the wireless
and broadcasting community. How, if at all, do the decisions made by
states and localities when it comes to software or hardware impact the
operations of the wireless and broadcasting communities?
Answer. As a general matter, the decisions made by states and
localities with regard to software and hardware have little impact on
the operations of the broadcasting community. Broadcasters are
generally made aware of EAS alerts via one of two systems: The Common
Alerting Protocol (CAP) system, which is an international standard
employed by the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS), and
the Specific Area Message Encoding (SAME) protocol, which is the legacy
notification system originally developed by NOAA, later adopted by the
FCC, and which is still used in many areas. Regardless of how the
message is sent to broadcasters, it will be transmitted to viewers and
listeners so long as it is authenticated. Alternatively, in some
states, EAS communications are administered by a third party
distributor contracted by the state or locality. In these cases, it is
possible that broadcasters may have to deploy an additional system or
piece of equipment to receive and relay EAS messages.
Question 2. Have your members developed relationships with State
and local emergency management/EAS operators and shared challenges or
opportunities to work together in pursuit of your common goals?
Answer. Yes, broadcasters have developed close relationships with
local emergency managers to ensure reliable communications during
emergencies. As a practical matter, the emergency managers are ``news
sources,'' and broadcasters, in turn, take this information and
disseminate it during emergencies. Regarding EAS specifically,
broadcasters are closely involved in State Emergency Coordinating
Committees (SECCs), which are the state organizations that construct
the state EAS plans. Broadcasters are often the lead members on the
SECCs, and work closely with emergency managers on drafting the plans.
Question 3. What are some of the avenues or coordination structures
your organizations participate in with FEMA? Do you have insight into
working groups or advisory councils that help facilitate conversations
around best practices, challenges, etc.?
Answer. I am a member of FEMA's Integrated Public Alert and Warning
System (IPAWS) Advisory Committee, which evaluates current emergency
notification protocols, standards, and procedures, and ultimately
develops recommendations for an improved EAS system. In addition, the
National Association of State Broadcast Associations (NASBA) and the
National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) coordinate with FEMA, both
formally and informally, during an annual EAS summit, which takes place
every February in Washington, DC. NAB staff also work with FEMA staff
on FCC advisory councils, including the Communications Security,
Reliability, and Interoperability Council (CSRIC). For example, I
personally participated in both CSRIC IV and V, and Kelly Williams, a
senior director in the technology department at NAB, is currently
participating in CSRIC VI. The CSRIC has created best practices and
guidelines for disaster preparation and recovery, and considered ways
to improve the EAS during multiple iterations of the CSRIC. FEMA also
makes several presentations each year at the NAB Show, the broadcast
industry's largest annual conference, which will be taking place again
in April of this year. Finally, NAB coordinates directly with FEMA on
an ad hoc basis when disasters arise, such as the recent hurricane in
Puerto Rico. This public-private partnership can help to bolster the
disaster response of both FEMA and local broadcasters.
Question 4. As we know from recent events, the resilience of our
institutions, and particularly those that provide critical services, is
essential for the swift response and recovery from natural and man-made
disasters. Obviously as we talk about infrastructure and resilience in
the face of changing threats, understanding best practices and
investments industries are currently making is important. Are you
required to meet specific resilience or redundancy standards to ensure
you can continue to serve your critical role in the alert and warning
cycle if disaster strikes?
Answer. As I noted in my testimony, resiliency and redundancy are
essential considerations for any broadcaster and uniquely position us
as first informers during times of crisis when other communications
infrastructure fails. Broadcasters invest heavily to ensure they remain
on the air in times of disaster, and broadcast facilities often have
redundant power sources, automatic fail-over processes, auxiliary
transmission systems, generator back-up, and substantial fuel reserves.
FEMA officials have noted that in times of emergency there is no more
reliable source of information than local broadcasters. Stations can be
fined by the FCC if their EAS equipment is not functional, but unlike
with telephone services, there are no outage reports required for
broadcasters if they are forced off the air. In addition, some
broadcasters voluntarily participate in a cooperative program with FEMA
to serve as Primary Entry Point (PEP) stations, and act as the source
of messages initiated by the Presidential Emergency Alert System.
Stations that participate in the PEP program have their own set of
resiliency requirements as set forth by FEMA. Due to intense
competition in the industry, however, broadcasters have incredibly
strong incentives to remain on the air, regardless of any specific
external requirements. Put simply, if a broadcaster goes off the air,
listeners and viewers will just change the channel.
[all]