

[H.A.S.C. No. 112-14]

HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED
PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
—
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
**BUDGET REQUESTS FROM THE U.S. CENTRAL
COMMAND AND U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS
COMMAND**
—

HEARING HELD
MARCH 3, 2011



—
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

65-114

WASHINGTON : 2011

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. "BUCK" McKEON, California, *Chairman*

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland	ADAM SMITH, Washington
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas	SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina	LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri	MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia	ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JEFF MILLER, Florida	ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina	SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey	JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio	RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota	JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama	MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona	JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania	DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas	GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado	NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
ROB WITTMAN, Virginia	CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
DUNCAN HUNTER, California	LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana	MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado	BILL OWENS, New York
TOM ROONEY, Florida	JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania	MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania
SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia	TIM RYAN, Ohio
CHRIS GIBSON, New York	C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri	HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
JOE HECK, Nevada	KATHY CASTOR, Florida
BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois	BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey	COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia	
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas	
STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi	
ALLEN B. WEST, Florida	
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama	
MO BROOKS, Alabama	
TODD YOUNG, Indiana	

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, *Staff Director*
BEN RUNKLE, *Professional Staff Member*
MICHAEL CASEY, *Professional Staff Member*
MEGAN HOWARD, *Staff Assistant*

CONTENTS

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2011

	Page
HEARING:	
Thursday, March 3, 2011, Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization Budget Requests from the U.S. Central Command and U.S. Special Oper- ations Command	1
APPENDIX:	
Thursday, March 3, 2011	35

THURSDAY, MARCH 3, 2011

FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUESTS FROM THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AND U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. "Buck," a Representative from California, Chair- man, Committee on Armed Services	1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services	2

WITNESSES

Mattis, Gen. James N., USMC, Commander, U.S. Central Command	5
Olson, ADM Eric T., USN, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command	3

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Mattis, Gen. James N.	62
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. "Buck"	39
Olson, ADM Eric T.	43
Smith, Hon. Adam	41

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING:

[The information was not available at the time of printing.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING:

Mr. Coffman	119
Mr. Scott	121
Mr. Shuster	119
Ms. Sutton	116
Mr. Turner	116
Mr. Wilson	115

FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUESTS FROM THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AND U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Thursday, March 3, 2011.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:00 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. “BUCK” MCKEON,
A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We have been informed that there will be votes about 1:30 today, but it is just one vote, so maybe we can work out the—some can go vote and some can come back, and we can maybe do it without a break.

This afternoon, the House Armed Services Committee meets to receive testimony from commanders of the United States Central Command [CENTCOM] and the United States Special Operations Command [SOCOM] on the posture of their respective commands.

It is an understatement, perhaps, to say recent events give this hearing an even greater urgency. Developments in the past 6 months and especially in the past 6 weeks present new opportunities and new uncertainties for our Nation’s security and the environment in which CENTCOM and SOCOM operate.

Extremist Islamist groups and their use of terrorism directly threatens the physical security of American citizens at home and abroad. Consequently, in Afghanistan, 100,000 U.S. service men and women are fighting to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat Al Qaeda in the country from which it planned and conducted the 9/11 attacks.

In the past year, our forces have reduced Taliban influence and arrested the momentum of Al Qaeda’s allies, particularly in the Helmand and Kandahar provinces. Expanded Special Operations Forces’ targeting of Taliban leadership and expanded local security measures at the village and district level have been an integral part of this momentum shift.

Significant progress has also been made by the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] Training Mission in the development of the Afghan National Security Forces. Yet it remains to be determined whether these gains will be lasting. Nevertheless, the President remains committed to redeploying troops in just 4 months.

Similarly, uncertainty surrounds the recent uprising in the Middle East. While inspirational and likely to undermine extremism's appeal over the long term, they also potentially undermine several pillars of our strategic posture in the region in the near term. For example, I read with concern comments from opposition leaders in Egypt that the Camp David Accords are finished.

Instability may undermine efforts to build our partners' counterterrorism capacity, a particularly troubling scenario in Yemen, where Al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula [AQAP] continues to present the most significant risk to the U.S. homeland, according to the administration.

Against the backdrop of these dramatic events, Iran continues research on key components for a nuclear weapon, the development of which alter the regional balance of power and allow Tehran to increase its longstanding support of terrorist proxies without fear of military retaliation.

Also, we are scheduled to withdraw 50,000 U.S. forces from Iraq despite questions regarding that country's ability to defend itself from both internal and external threats.

The blistering pace of current events and the uncertainty they have created raise difficult and important questions for the future of our national security. To address these issues, we are fortunate to be joined today by two officers with long and distinguished careers of service to their Nation: General James Mattis, Commander, U.S. Central Command; and Admiral Eric T. Olson, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command.

Gentlemen, I thank you for appearing here today and for your many years of service, devotion to your country. I take great comfort in knowing that warriors such as yourself are at the helm of leadership over so many great people that are laying their lives on the line every day on behalf of freedom around the world. Thank you for your service.

Ranking Member Smith.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 39.]

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With votes coming up so quickly, I will be very brief.

I associate myself with the chairman's remarks. I think he perfectly summed up the challenges the two of you face.

I do want to give special recognition to Admiral Olson since he is from Tacoma. I always have to mention that. A graduate of Stadium High School—not in my district, but it is the high school that my children would go to, so very close by.

And I also, you know, really enjoyed working with you during my time as chair of what was then the Terrorism Subcommittee, which had jurisdiction over SOCOM. I have the highest admiration for the job you do and the job the people you command do, as well. And I appreciate that.

And, General Mattis, you have the greatest responsibility of the commanders right now in a very, very complicated part of the

world. And you are meeting those challenges very well and serving us well.

I look forward to hearing your testimony and hearing the questions of Members about how we can help you to meet the challenges that both of you face.

And, with that, I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 41.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Admiral Olson, this, I guess, is your last appearance before this committee. Is that correct? Last scheduled?

Admiral OLSON. It is the last scheduled appearance, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, maybe we will be fortunate and it won't be your last.

Would you please begin? And then we will hear from General Mattis.

**STATEMENT OF ADM ERIC T. OLSON, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND**

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir. Thank you.

Good morning, Chairman McKeon and Representative Smith and other distinguished members of the committee. I do thank you for this opportunity to appear before you to present the current posture of the United States Special Operations Command.

We at the Special Operations Command do recognize that we were created by Congress, and our ability to meet our Nation's high expectations is due in large part to this committee's continued strong support.

And I am especially pleased to share this hearing with my friend and teammate, General Jim Mattis. General Mattis' headquarters and mine are coincidentally located on the same base in Tampa, and we and our staffs work together quite closely.

So, with your permission, I will submit my written posture statement for the record and open with some brief remarks.

As Secretary Gates said in his speech at West Point last weekend and as you noted, Mr. Chairman, we do not know with certainty what the future of warfare will hold. The range of security challenges we face beyond Iraq and Afghanistan—the decentralization of Al Qaeda's network; revolutionary activity in the Middle East; destabilizing elements in Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia; increased intertwining of violent extremism and criminality; and persistence of piracy—tell us that it will be complex, unpredictable, and unstructured.

United States Special Operations Forces are universally recognized as key to our Nation's ability to address all of these challenges and others.

In many ways, USSOCOM is a microcosm of the Department of Defense, with ground, air, and maritime components, a global presence, and authorities and responsibilities that mirror the military departments, military services, and defense agencies. And we take pride in the diversity of our people and our mission.

As the commander, I am responsible and accountable for the readiness of all Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps Special Operations Forces. With a dedicated budget and through my com-

ponent commanders, I select, organize, train, equip, and deploy these forces to serve all of our geographic combatant commanders. With 85 percent of our deployed forces currently in the Central Command area of operations, my colleague to my left is by far the largest customer of our product.

We include many forces of legend: Green Berets, SEALs [Sea, Air, Land], Rangers, Air Force Air Commandos, Army Night Stalker aviators, combat controllers, pararescue jumpers, combatant-craft crewmen, today's version of Marine Raiders, and others. The Active Duty practitioners of civil-military operations and military information support operations are also in our ranks. These are Special Operations careerists.

They are backed by a talented and dedicated assortment of administrative, intelligence, communications, engineering, logistics, and other specialists who serve in Special Operations units on a less permanent basis. And our various headquarters also include over 300 representatives from at least 15 other agencies within and beyond the Department of Defense.

I am convinced that the forces we provide to the geographic combatant commanders are the most culturally attuned partners, most lethal hunter killers, and most responsive agile, innovative, and efficiently effective advisors, trainers, problem solvers, and warriors that any nation has to offer. In fact, we have become the model for many of our partners.

Our value comes from both our high level of skills and our non-traditional methods of applying them, which is to say that our principal asset is the quality of our people. Whether they are conducting a precision raid, organizing a village police force, arranging for a new school or clinic, or partnering with counterpart forces, they do so in a manner that has impressive effects.

In Afghanistan and Iraq especially, it is undeniable that they have impact far above their relatively small numbers. And they are in dozens of other countries every day, contributing to regional stability by advising and training with counterpart forces.

The balance of direct and indirect operations must be carefully managed, but, because Special Operations Forces live in both of those worlds, we become the force of first choice for many missions. As Admiral Mullen said in his testimony yesterday, Special Operations Forces are first in and last out.

I am proud of these forces, as we all should be, but I also acknowledge that there are challenges. Key among them is how to meet the increasing global requirement for their capabilities. The demand is outpacing the supply, but we can't grow them more than a very few percent per year.

Since 9/11, our total manpower has roughly doubled, our budget has roughly tripled, and our overseas deployments have quadrupled. And as I have said recently, this great force is beginning to fray around the edges. The fabric is strong, the weave is tight, it is not unraveling, but it is showing signs of wear. For some elements of our force, time at home has become the abnormal condition to which the family must adjust.

Partial solutions include finding a process that will habitually and predictably assign units from the services to train and deploy with Special Operations Forces, ensuring our needs for local train-

ing ranges are fully met, providing the buildings and facilities that our force needs and deserves, investing more heavily in capabilities that will relieve Special Operations Forces from duties that do not require our unique skills, expanding the services' inventory of specific assets that are so essential to today's complex and irregular warfare, and recognizing and incentivizing many nontraditional skills such as language and microregional expertise as essential military requirements.

We must ensure that our forces have the specialized equipment and advanced training they need to survive and succeed in the complex, ambiguous, and often violent environments in which we ask them to serve, which requires professionalizing the acquisition workforce and streamlining procurement processes.

Underlying all of this is the need to look after our people and their families. We must rehabilitate and return to duty those of our wounded who can, care for those of our wounded who can't, along with their families and caregivers, and provide enduring support to the families of those who have died in action.

I ask for your action to approve a defense budget for fiscal year 2011 and for your support for the fiscal year 2012 budget proposal. I also ask that you carefully watch the Special Operations budget, particularly as forces eventually begin to draw down from major operations, because our Special Operations Forces will most likely be reallocated at the same levels to areas with pent-up demand for our unique capabilities, a point reinforced in Secretary Gates' testimony just yesterday.

Thank you again for this opportunity to appear before you. You have reason to take great pride in what the men and women of Special Operations Forces are accomplishing around the world today and every day.

I remain humbled by my opportunity to command this formidable force and provide it to answer our Nation's most daunting security needs. And, as I appear before you in this capacity for the fourth and most likely the last time, I am thankful for the profound honor of serving my country in this way.

I stand ready for your questions.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Olson can be found in the Appendix on page 43.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Admiral.

General Mattis, I think this is your first time in this capacity.

General MATTIS. In this capacity, yes, Chairman, it is.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. The time is yours.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC, COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

General MATTIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Smith, distinguished members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the posture and priorities of U.S. Central Command, testifying alongside a friend and shipmate of many years, Admiral Eric Olson, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command.

I have submitted a written statement and request it be accepted into the record.

Thank you for supporting our troops and their families who have carried the brunt of the physical and emotional burden in this 10th year of war. Our forces today are among the most dedicated and skilled professionals I have served alongside in my 39 years in uniform, and they constitute a national treasure.

I also recognize the commitment and sacrifices of our international partners who operate with us, from the waters off Somalia to the mountains of Afghanistan, where the largest warfighting coalition in recent history is engaged with troops from 49 nations united in the fight against our common enemy.

The strategic landscape of the broader Middle East has been altered by recent events in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and elsewhere. We see pressure on government institutions from the aspirations of people seeking improved economic and social conditions. Young people born in the information age are exchanging ideas in real-time.

While the long-term impact of this unrest is unknown, it presents as many opportunities as it does challenges. The changes that we are seeing will manifest differently in each country. People are seeking their rights and, for the most part, doing so peacefully and bravely.

It is too early to say how it will all turn out. It is important that we work today with the people and the governments throughout the region. We don't want to see this change slide into a new form of authoritarianism. So, while there is both opportunity and danger, it requires unrelenting engagement by our Nation. The central challenge for us, I believe, is how to make common cause with our friends throughout the region.

There is one clear lesson we can draw from the dramatic changes under way: Now, more than ever, we must remain relentlessly engaged with our military partners across the region. While we know each country is different, we remain committed to strengthening our military bonds and advancing our mutual interests in peace and opportunity for all.

Notably, in Egypt we have clearly seen the benefit of mature military-to-military relationships. The Egyptian armed forces continue to demonstrate exceptional discipline and restraint under trying circumstances, serving honorably. As Admiral Mullen recently noted, our assistance has helped the Egyptian military become the professional force that it is today, just as our military, in turn, has learned a great deal from our Egyptian counterparts who have contributed a stabilizing influence in this time of transition.

Of course, we cannot achieve our broader objectives in the region through military means alone. Our efforts require coordination and a spirit of collaboration between highly integrated civilian military teams. Our civilian colleagues need your full support, even in this difficult fiscal environment, to undertake their essential role in today's complex environment.

Robust resourcing for the State Department's mission is one of the best investments for reducing the need for military forces to be employed. Together, our military leaders and diplomats not only represent a symbol of America's enduring commitment to this region, but they also build trust through partnerships that have an important stabilizing effect when trouble looms.

CENTCOM's main effort is in Afghanistan, where, along with our Afghan and coalition partners, we are making undeniable security progress, though some of our gains remain fragile and reversible. Al Qaeda in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan is under the most pressure they have experienced since 2001. Over the past year, our enemies have lost leaders, they have lost battle space, maneuver room, and the initiative. And the enemy's strategy has been undercut by the clear commitment of the international community and the Afghan Government to begin, this summer, a process of fully transitioning responsibility to Afghanistan lead by 2014.

I support the President's ongoing analysis of further growth for the Afghan National Security Forces. Their quantifiable and qualifiable growth in capability has been one of our greatest successes over this last year. With this improving quality in combat performance by the Afghan security forces, we are seeing the enemy's worst nightmare coming of age.

The transition process will start with a limited, conditions-based withdrawal this year. Our overall campaign is on track in Afghanistan. Our successes, as General Petraeus has stated, entailed hard fighting and tough losses, and there will be tough fighting ahead as the enemy tries this spring to regain the initiative. Finally, we must also redouble our efforts in order to address the challenges in the areas of governance and development.

Turning now to Pakistan, we are strengthening and deepening our security relationship with Islamabad, even as we work to overcome years of mistrust and misunderstanding on both sides. The Pakistanis have shifted a quarter of their army, 140,000 troops, to the western border. And we are now conducting hammer-and-anvil operations in close coordination with them on opposite sides of the border.

Pakistan's military has conducted significant counterinsurgency ops in the past decade, and having suffered 2,757 troops killed and 8,549 wounded while also responding to urgent humanitarian needs following devastating floods in 2010.

In Iraq, we are helping a new, more stable country emerge in a turbulent region. Our commitment there is transitioning from a military- to a civilian-led effort. I will note that the transition under way in Iraq has been enabled in large part thanks to the vital commitment and support of Congress for our troops on the ground, and I want to personally offer my thanks to you.

As we transition to civilian lead in Iraq, it is essential that the State Department be sufficiently resourced to solidify relationships between the U.S. and Iraq. At CENTCOM, we need congressional authorities that enable us to continue advising, training, and equipping our Iraqi partners through the new Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq.

Looking ahead, we will redeploy our military forces from Iraq this year, unless asked to stay by the Iraqi Government and the U.S. Government concurs. I anticipate Al Qaeda in Iraq and Iranian-sponsored proxies will attempt to execute sensational attacks against us in the coming months.

Next, Iran. The greatest threat to long-term regional stability is a defiant Iran in its current state. We are countering the malign

activities of the regime, while bolstering relationships with our partners. Iran continues to rebuff international efforts for engagement, continues to coerce its own population, and continues to pursue activities disruptive to regional peace and stability, including supplying arms to militant proxies in Iraq and Afghanistan and supporting Hezbollah in Lebanon.

But for the vibrant people of Iran, the regime is no giant. The regime's actions have thrown the economy into disarray, destroyed rapport with the bulk of the world, and spread hate and discontent across the region, steadily eroding any international support the regime could once muster.

Despite the shrinking stature of the regime, I have no reason for optimism about Iran's pursuit of a nuclear-weapons capability, of its growing ballistic missile arsenal, and present destabilizing course.

Across the region, we are disrupting Al Qaeda and other violent extremist organizations. We are actively focused on the threat of extremism in Yemen, especially Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the group that has twice attempted to attack our homeland in recent years.

With our international partners, our Special Operations Forces are putting our most violent enemies and related networks under increasingly intense pressure. At the same time, the populist-inspired changes that are taking place across the region undercut the message of Al Qaeda and other extremist groups, highlighting the bankrupt philosophies of terrorists who use violence and contribute nothing but mayhem to the innocent. In direct repudiation to violent extremists, young folks today have achieved more change in 10 weeks than 10 years of Al Qaeda's murderous campaigns.

So that is a snapshot of our major ongoing operations. We are focused on a number of other important mission areas, as well, to include countering piracy. There can be no more stark reminder about the need for more proactive diplomatic, legal, and military efforts against pirates than the brutal murder of four Americans by pirates last week.

This is a defining moment for the people in this region and, by extension, a critical moment for CENTCOM to remain engaged with our partners and to clear away obstacles to peace and prosperity.

On that note, while Israel and the Palestinian territories are not in my assigned theater, lack of progress toward a comprehensive Middle East peace affects U.S. and CENTCOM security interests in the region. I believe the only reliable path to lasting peace in this region is a viable two-state solution between Israel and Palestine.

The issue is one of many that is exploited by our adversaries in the region, and it is used as a recruiting tool for extremist groups. The lack of progress also creates friction with regional partners and creates political challenges for advancing our interests by marginalizing moderate voices in the region. By contrast, substantial progress on the peace process would improve CENTCOM's opportunities to work with our regional partners and support multilateral security efforts.

We know that you face tough decisions in this constrained fiscal environment, ladies and gentlemen. In all of our activities at

CENTCOM, we honor the obligation to be the best stewards possible of our Nation's monetary resources. CENTCOM has established stringent control mechanisms to execute our fiscal authorities and to apply increasingly effective oversight of all our programs.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, Congressmen, and Congresswomen, we must never forget the families of those who gave their last full measure in defense of liberty.

Thank you once again for your support of our men and women serving in the Central Command region. I am prepared to answer your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Mattis can be found in the Appendix on page 62.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Without objection, both of your statements will be entered in the record.

The vote schedule has changed. It is now two votes, so we will have to recess. But I will hold my questions until later, and I will turn now to Ranking Member Smith. And, after his questions, we will recess for 10 to 15 minutes, as soon as we can get back.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. I will endeavor to do this quickly, in light of that. And I just have four questions, and a couple of them—one of the things I am doing, with Congresswoman Giffords being out, I am working with her staff to ask questions that she has, as well. So two of these are hers, and two of these are mine.

But the first one that I do want you to get to, Admiral Olson, as quickly as possible: You have significant MILCON [military construction] challenges. We have grown your force a lot in the last 5 or 6 years. We have not grown the facilities to accommodate it.

Could you say just a couple quick words about your needs in the MILCON area?

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir. We do have significant needs. There were disconnects between the growth of the force and growth in MILCON.

And to add to that, we inherited buildings when Special Operations Command was created without inheriting a budget to recapitalize them. So we are in a period, a state over the next 10 to 15 years of having to swallow this large chunk of MILCON recapitalization.

Mr. SMITH. I just want the committee to be aware of that. And as we look at our budget efforts here, we should try to help out in any way we can.

General Mattis, I have two questions, one of them from me, one of them from Congresswoman Giffords. She has an interest in the—well, sorry. Her interest is in the energy area. And you have considerable fuel requirements. You have been quoted as saying that you need to be “unleashed from the tether of fuel” and the challenges that that presents.

Efforts at generating alternatives and efficiencies can make a huge difference in you being able to prosecute the fights you need to prosecute. Can you tell us a little about your efforts in CENTCOM to deal with the challenges you have in the fuel area?

And then, an area that I am particularly interested in is something that I read an article about just recently, and that is efforts to counter Al Qaeda's messaging over the Internet. CENTCOM seemed to have gotten out front on that. I think this is critical. This is where they are spreading their ideology, certainly in your region, but throughout the world. This is how they are recruiting the people. They are doing it in an incredibly sophisticated way that we are woefully behind on. You guys seem to be stepping up and trying to address that.

So could you talk a little bit about the fuel and about the Internet ideological battle?

General MATTIS. Yes, sir, I will.

On the fuel, it is a significant Achilles heel for us when you have to haul the amounts of fuel that we have to haul around the battlefield for the generators and for the vehicles.

We are working with DARPA [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency], we are working with a number of civilian organizations to try and find solutions. There are efforts under way to make more expeditionary bases which would actually generate some of their own energy requirements using, for example, solar power. In many of these places, there is a lot of sunshine. If we can get expeditionary capability to capture that and then basically recharge our batteries.

I mean, it is an amazingly complex effort to maintain the fuel lines. And it also gives the enemy an ability to choose the time and place of attacking us. We are engaged with Science and Technology, we are engaged with DARPA, and we are looking at very pragmatic ways of doing this.

We are also looking at what we can do to actually change how we distribute fuel, to reduce the enemy's opportunities to come after us. And I could meet privately with you on some of those matters that I would prefer not to speak about in open session.

On the Internet effort, the point I would make is that the enemy is using the Internet exactly along the lines that you defined. They use it for recruiting, is the one that comes immediately to mind. We can directly track some of this.

In broad terms, we challenged their propaganda. We disrupt the recruiting. We have showed that it is silly to go down this line, that it just doesn't make sense. We bring out the moderate voices; we amplify those. And in more detail, we detect and we flag if there is adversary, hostile, corrosive content in some open-source Web forum. We engage with the Web administrators to show that this violates Web site provider policies.

And probably more telling about how we engage here, we have a Digital Engagement Team at CENTCOM. It is fully attributable. But we engage with the people in the region who come up on the Web and start exchanging ideas. And we give factual and accurate information to counter enemy propaganda and lies through using the Web and the blog sites. We do this in Arabic, Farsi, Urdu, and Pashto.

But we are engaged in the Internet fight.

Mr. SMITH. And this is something that I think DOD-wide and intelligence-community-wide we have to be engaged in. Because the way Al Qaeda has changed since 9/11, certainly the AQ senior lead-

ership is still a threat, but the larger threat is the way they generate self-starters, sort of homegrown terrorists, who go on the Internet, get inspired by this stuff. And it has increased to a level that I think would shock a lot of people, and we need to be much more aggressive about that.

Now, the last question I have is on nonlethal means of subduing the enemy. I will take that one for the record. It is something Congresswoman Giffords is interested in, as well. If you could just update us a little bit, Admiral, you know, send something to us on the record about what you have been doing with nonlethal uses of force. There has been considerable advancement there.

[The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. SMITH. And I do just want to conclude by making a special thank you to the Special Operations Command, and the Navy SEAL team in particular, that, shortly after the incident in Tucson, went out on a mission in Congresswoman Giffords' honor. They actually flew a flag for that mission and then made sure that it got to her where she is rehabilitating. That means a great deal to her and to all of us.

Your dedication and support for her and this committee is very much appreciated. And, certainly, the work you do for our country is very much appreciated, as well.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

We will adjourn now for 10 to 15 minutes, in time to vote and get back. Mr. Bartlett will be the first questioner when we get back. Thank you.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

That 10 or 15 minutes, I think, became about a half-hour. We had a few other things that happened over there.

Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

General, on page 9 of your written testimony, you say that China pursues its many energy-related interests throughout the region. I have a couple of slides that may help put that in context.

If we can have the first one. Let's see if it shows up on the screen.

Three things of significance in this first slide while it is coming up. First of all, there is now general recognition—the large blue below—that we have reached the world's maximum production of oil; that, from now on, it is simply going down. This is in the oil fields we are now pumping oil from. By 2030, they say that we will be getting considerably less than half the oil from those fields that we are getting now.

There are two wedges there, the blue wedge and the red wedge, that say we are going to be getting a lot of oil from fields that we have now discovered but not developed and, surprisingly, fields yet to be discovered. This is a 2008 slide. And notice that they believe that, by 2030, they believe then that we would be getting about 106 million barrels per day.

The next slide, by the same people, the World Energy Outlook, they now have decreased their projection of what we will have. By

2035, 5 years later, they say we are only going to have 96 million barrels per day. They now believe that we are only going to be getting, what, about a fourth of the oil from the fields we are pumping now. We will only be getting about a fourth of that in 2035. And the wedges of the oil fields yet to be developed and fields yet to be discovered has grown even further.

The next chart kind of puts this in context and tells us what the probability is that we are going to find all that new oil. This is the oil chart, and what it shows, the vertical bars show the discovery of oil through the years, most of it in the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s, 1970s. And from 1980 on, we every year use more oil than we found. We were then dipping into reserves. This was a 2004 chart, and what it shows is that they predicted, quite correctly, that we would be peaking oil about now.

A 10-billion-barrel find of oil is pretty big, sir. Every 12 days, the world uses a billion barrels of oil. That means that 10-billion-barrel find will last the world 120 days. A big deal.

The next chart, General, really illuminates your area. It shows what the world would look like—and, boy, you own most of it—if the size of the countries were relative to the amount of oil they have. Now, you have to shrink Saudi Arabia a bit because WikiLeaks, a couple weeks ago, indicated they have been fibbing about how much oil they have. I suspect most of OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] has. But look at the size of China and India there, how small they are.

The next chart, again very relative to your area of responsibility, shows the chokepoints where the oil must flow through if they are going to get to other parts of the world.

The 2010, the next slide, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review makes a very sane statement: “Energy security means having assured access to reliable supplies of energy and the ability to protect and deliver sufficient energy to meet operational needs.”

The next chart, this is Joint Operating Environment 2010. It says, “Even assuming more effective conservation measures, the world would need to add roughly the equivalent of Saudi Arabia’s current energy production every 7 years.”

General, those two wedges of developing fields we have now found but not developed and fields yet to be discovered, that is pure wishful thinking, sir. That ain’t gonna happen.

The second statement there, “A severe energy crunch is inevitable,” put a period there, because there is no amount of money that you can spend to produce oil that isn’t there.

And the last statement is just plain wrong, because oil has already peaked, conventional oil, in 2006.

Sir, why is not this the perfect storm? The United States owns only 2 percent of the world’s oil; we use 25 percent of the world’s oil. We are not buying oil anywhere in the world. China is buying oil reserves everywhere in the world that they can find them.

The peaking of oil occurs just at the time the developed world, us and the rest of the developed world, needs more oil to come out of the recession. The developing world, India and China, are demanding hugely increased amounts of oil.

The WikiLeaks thing indicates there is less oil out there than we thought was out there, and there is huge unrest in your area of responsibility.

Sir, what do you think the odds are that we can avoid armed conflict over oil in the future?

General MATTIS. Congressman Bartlett, I have—because I am born an eternal optimist, I think it is always a matter of choice. That said, I think that you highlight a critical point. Certainly, history would give a more pessimistic response than I just gave if we studied the results of competition like this.

I think it does point to the need for looking at every energy resource that we have, not just oil, because this is, as you point out, inevitable.

But I think that there are different ways to solve problems. And I think we may actually be on the cusp of a time when, if all this change goes in a positive direction, you may find collaboration. If it goes otherwise, then we are going to have to be ready.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Johnson.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We have reached the period of peak oil, I think is what Mr. Bartlett was saying, and we are going to have to develop new sources of energy. What impact does it have if we are not doing basic research into that area? Either one of you, I would like a response. Because, of course, we have been cutting—we have been busy cutting Federal spending in every place other than defense.

How does our vulnerability increase commensurate with the cuts that are being proposed, the drastic cuts being proposed to the budget, science? Can you respond?

Admiral OLSON. Sir, from a Special Operations perspective, I will just tell you that we can shift to alternative energy measures as rapidly as they can be developed and operationalized. But I am not an expert on the pace of that or the probability of that. But we certainly would look forward to development that would move us in that direction.

General MATTIS. Congressman, I think that I can't draw a direct line, I am probably not competent to draw a direct line between basic research and developing new sources. But, clearly, developing new sources reduces our dependency on the oil. And, if we do so, it reduces the potential for the outcome that Congressman Bartlett just mentioned, of conflict over diminishing resources, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you.

We have a role that we have adopted—that is, of a global policeman. And our forward posture around the world will have to be curtailed as we adapt to the new realities of our time. And one of those realities is our energy—or our dependence on current means of energy production.

And, also, we have been nation-building for the last decade in one of the most inhospitable and lawless places on Earth. I am talking about Afghanistan. We have to accelerate the end game. We have to achieve an acceptable security environment soon. That means we cannot merely increase the capacity of the Afghan Gov-

ernment to kill its enemies; we have to aggressively shrink the ranks of its enemies by bringing them back into the political fold.

General Mattis, as General Petraeus, your predecessor at CENTCOM, has said, quote, "You don't end an industrial-strength insurgency by killing or capturing all the bad guys. You have to kill, capture, or turn the bad guys. And that means reintegration and reconciliation."

As we approach the 10th anniversary of the Bonn conference, where are we on the reconciliation piece of that strategy? What will a likely political settlement look like? And, General Mattis, do you anticipate that we will have a sizable military footprint in Afghanistan through 2014?

General MATTIS. Congressman, military success, such as we are seeing today, undeniable on the battlefield, sets the conditions for improved economics, improved governance. You cannot have those two unless you have military protection of the people.

So, once you have that, we have a multi-pronged approach here. One is transition, where we actually start transitioning this July to an Afghan-led security structure in certain districts and provinces based on conditions, as the commander in chief has said.

That transition is aided and abetted by reintegration of young men who are giving up the fight, recognizing they aren't on the winning side, they no longer want to be with people who simply cause mayhem, and they see this new government gaining traction. So, from the bottom up, you see reintegration. Reconciliation is top-down.

As we set the conditions where this enemy realizes they can't wait us out—and the Lisbon declaration, where we said that the united force that is on the battlefield will be there through 2014, has helped in this regard—it means that they have got to start reconciling. We don't reconcile with our friends; we reconcile with our enemies. So we are going to be working with the Taliban to bring them over as they sense they no longer have an opportunity for military victory.

In order to come over—you asked what the settlement would look like. I think it is very simple: The Taliban must abandon Al Qaeda, they must quit using violence, and they must accept the Afghan constitution. At that point, they are welcome back into the process, a process led by the Afghan people, as it must be.

But we will have significant military forces there for the near future. We will start bringing them down in July, but we are committed through 2014, by which time all of the districts and provinces will have transitioned over to Afghan lead.

I think that addressed your question, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, General.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Thornberry.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Chairman.

And thank you both for being here.

Admiral Olson, I want to join in the accolades and the gratitude for your service in this capacity at a very important time when you have headed Special Operations Command. The country has been fortunate to have you there, at this point in particular.

I notice in your written testimony you talk about the shortage of readily available local training ranges for SOCOM and even that, too often, our operators have to travel to train, which means that is even more time away from their families and away from their homes.

Does SOCOM have a plan to improve that situation? This is obviously an area where we can help, but we want to be consistent with what is in the long-term planning of SOCOM.

Admiral OLSON. Thank you, sir.

I would say our intent is larger than our plan, at this point. Special Operations Command at MILCON can build ranges, but we don't own them. We are building them in facilities that then we need to use. And, in many cases, we can't build the ranges that—we can't build all of the ranges that we need. We have to use ranges, preexisting ranges, that are controlled by the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

As you know well, we are in some places where those ranges are available nearby, but we are in some places where there just aren't ranges nearby. And so my intent is to provide for our force, as much as possible, ranges on which they can train in the day and be home that night, in order to reduce this pressure on the force, sir.

It is within our MILCON budget to make some progress on that, but we are also going to have to continue to work with each of the services to arrive at a better means of coordinating use.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, we want to assist in—I want to assist in that effort, anyway. And I think this committee can be of some help.

General Mattis, yesterday Secretary Clinton testified in front of the Senate Appropriations Committee that Iran is, quote, “very much involved,” end quote, with the opposition in Yemen, they are reaching out to the opposition movement in Bahrain, they are having contacts with some of the opposition groups in Egypt through Hezbollah and Hamas.

I guess the question is, have you seen reporting that would support that? And if there is increased Iranian influence in those places, what effect does that have on our counterterrorism efforts and our mil-to-mil connections?

General MATTIS. Thank you, sir.

I have seen the reporting that Secretary Clinton referred to. We have seen some influence in Yemen. In Bahrain, I think the Iranian, the Tehran regime—not the Iranian people, but the regime there—is incapable of not minding its own business, and I have no doubt that they are engaged in any way they can. That is not to say the bulk of the people in Bahrain are in any way stooges of the Iranians. The Bahraini people are quite capable of making up their own minds without malign influence out of Tehran.

I think what the effect of this is, is negative on our counterterrorism campaign. But I would also say that this simply gives more credence to us staying relentlessly engaged across the region so that we not allow vacuums. And this means we are going to have to stay engaged at times when we don't know the outcome of certain processes that these countries are going through in this transition time.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay.

Let me ask one other thing. Additionally, yesterday there was an article about Central Command and some information operations. I know there is not much we can talk about in that area, but I would be curious, for either of you, whether you have had your lawyers review the applicable laws and procedures to see whether they hamper your ability to do what you would like to do and might need some updating and modernizing.

This article, for example, cites some operators complaining that there are too many hoops to run through and so forth. And I think one area in our bailiwick is looking at the law and seeing if it is consistent with operations but, of course, also our values.

And my question is, have you had lawyers look at that issue?

General MATTIS. For CENTCOM, we have had our judge advocates and our lawyers look at this and the authorities we need to conduct these operations. We consider that, in today's changing world, these are now traditional military activities. They are no longer something that can only be handled by Voice of America or someone like that. So we do need the authorities. We are very careful right now to stay strictly within the guidelines of the law. And we do have ongoing blog fights, you know, where we go in and we contradict inaccurate information. And it is fully attributable, at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mrs. Castor.

Mrs. CASTOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Tampa Bay area is a very patriotic community, and we are very proud to host SOCOM and CENTCOM at MacDill Air Force Base.

And, particularly, Admiral Olson, being there for the past few years, you are just a beloved member of the community now. And they will be very sorry to see you transition out.

So I will be a little parochial just to begin my questions. Along with my colleague, Congressman Bill Young, over the past few years, there has been great investment that has matched the growth in missions of CENTCOM and SOCOM at MacDill, but it still appears to be unfinished—parking issues, other complications right there.

Can you spend just a quick moment on—I know that the greater MILCON needs for SOCOM are all across the country, but there on MacDill Air Force Base, what would be the top of your list that remains unfinished at this point?

Admiral OLSON. Ma'am, as you know, we have had a fair amount of construction over the last several years, and we have some programs in the future. We have just, as you mentioned, built a parking garage, which we probably should have built first, but in the end it is serving us quite well. And we are finishing up a couple of other projects.

I think that we are always—we are in the mode now of upgrading and recapitalizing, rather than expanding, within the base. And we are always interested in improvements to the base itself, on which we are tenants, that improve the quality of life and the quality of service for our people.

General MATTIS. Ma'am, as you know, thanks to the Congress, we are getting a new headquarters there to replace one that is really getting a little aged.

The only thing I think I need right now is an issue we are working on, and that is for quality of life, is a parking area so our folks don't have to walk a half-mile or further to get to work.

But Congress has taken very good care of us, and we have excellent facilities coming on line by spring.

Mrs. CASTOR. Thank you very much.

And I also wanted to ask you about Pakistan. We provide a lot of support to Pakistan through coalition support funds, through foreign military financing, Pakistan counterinsurgency and counterinsurgency capability funds. And yet we are still struggling to get the Pakistanis and the army to really be a better partner in helping us disrupt the Taliban headquarters or where they are meeting and plotting. They could be a better partner in the FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas] areas. They need to continue to reorient themselves from India toward Afghanistan and the other real threats in the area.

What are you doing to—you know, with this great investment that the U.S. puts up, with those funds I previously mentioned, what kind of conditions do you put on that military assistance in aid to continue to convince the Pakistanis to be a better, more attentive partner?

General MATTIS. That is an excellent question.

The funds themselves, we track them. We track them—I have some very keenly attentive field-grade officers in Islamabad. They work daily with the Pakistani counterparts. And we routinely require additional confirmation that, in fact, the equipment we are giving or the money we are giving is going to support those operations in the FATA against our common enemies. That money is tracked very, very carefully.

I think the growing rapport—especially with our hammer-and-anvil operation, where we are doing something on our side of the border, they are doing something on their side, collaborating now down to lower-ranking officers as they talk back and forth across the border. And we have had some dramatic successes lately.

I just came back from a meeting that Admiral Mullen and General Kayani held. We met in Oman with General Petraeus, Admiral Olson and I and several of General Kayani's officers and the American officers. And I was impressed by the level of rapport between General Petraeus and General Kayani.

I think the point to look at, ma'am, is that, after 1989 or 1990, we walked away from this area. During that period, history did not stand still. And when we came back in 2001, there was a sense of abandonment by the Americans. That has engendered a certain level of distrust that we have had to work to overcome.

It is not perfect. In any war, as a British Prime Minister put it, the only thing more difficult than fighting with allies is fighting without them. But we have 48 allies in this battle, and Pakistan is the key ally. And they have suffered right now over 2,700 killed, they have suffered over 8,600 wounded. Their civilians, they have lost a presidential candidate, Mrs. Bhutto. They have lost nearly 30,000 civilian casualties.

So it is not a perfect solution in the high country. Your question is valid. But I see it improving. And I think that is the trend line we have to be focused on, what they are doing up there.

Mrs. CASTOR. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Conaway.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Admiral Olson, let me also add thank you from a grateful Nation for what you have done, standing in the breach. And, actually, thank you for the men and women you lead, who do the toughest of what needs to be done out there.

Your comment—and I will get it wrong, but you said, “The fabric is strong, weave is tight, but it is showing some wear” on the team. In the rest of the forces, we understand dwell time and the standard that we set for deployments, and we are trying to get to 2:1 Active Duty, 4:1—I think that is a proper metric.

I am struggling with a metric for your team and the terms so that we can see what a standard would look like and then compare that to what you are actually doing. And I don’t know if you track operations per deployment or, you know, some—but in your realm, I don’t think just deployment is the same as a deployment in other areas, because of the every-night thing that your folks do.

And so, have you guys looked at some sort of a standard that says, if we had all the SOCOM folks we needed, they would be deployed, during that deployment they would have X number of operations, and then they would come home and be there for some period of time in order to heal the mind—heal the bodies quicker, but heal the mind for all the stuff that goes on? Is there some sort of metric you can help us understand so we can compare where we are with where we want to get to?

Admiral OLSON. Thank you, sir.

We have done a lot of work on metrics, and we are exceeding the pace of deployment against all of the metrics that we have worked up. There are a thousand different ways to get at this, no one solution. But we are trying to figure out all of the ways that we can chip away at each person gone each day, to see how we can back away from that in the many small ways that ultimately would make a real difference.

But the short answer is, yes, sir, we have worked the metrics hard.

Mr. CONAWAY. In the rest of the force, if they are doing 1:1 dwell time versus deployment and the goal is 2:1, I have a sense of where we have to get to. Can you share some of those metrics with us as to what the scope of the shortfall is, either the shortfall in folks and/or an over commitment of the team that—we work on both ends, but I don’t have any feel for what you are—

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir. We are working all ends, all sides. We try to build to 3:1. We understand surge deployments at 2:1. We have a red line of 1:1. But certain elements of our force are deployed more often than that.

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. Well, if there is a better way to help Members of—I know you understand it and you get it. If there is a better way for you to help us understand it, create a sense of urgency as to what is out there, it would be helpful.

General Mattis, working off Ms. Castor's comments, you may have said during your opening comments that the great benefit we had for 30 years of mil-to-mil interaction with the Egyptian military and the benefit that appears to have paid off in the way they have reacted throughout this change in government.

Can you talk to us—and you mentioned briefly that we basically ceased mil-to-mil conversations in Pakistan for a 10- or 12-year period. What is going on—we have been there now 10 years, or almost, so we maybe have recouped that. But there is a whole tranche of folks who grew up without having any contact with America. They are now in charge.

Can you talk to us just briefly about how that is impacting our mil-to-mil, as well as what the current dustup with our civilian with diplomatic immunity being held is having on your team?

General MATTIS. I can, sir. And it builds on Congresswoman Castor's question because, when you have from 1989 to 2001 broken contacts, those officers continue up in the ranks. Like I said, nothing stands still.

Fortunately, the officers right now in command are still ones who went to Leavenworth, who went to Maxwell, who we did have relations with. Unfortunately, when they move 140,000 of their troops, a quarter of their army, off the Indian border and up into the high country, the majority of them are led, of course, by lieutenants, captains, majors, lieutenant colonels who we did not have that rapport with.

Thanks to Admiral Olson's folks, we very quietly work with our Pakistan counterparts, and, one by one, we are rebuilding the bonds of trust. But it is going to take a while to recover from the very point that you made, years of basically disenchantment between—

Mr. CONAWAY. Yeah. Any direct impact on the issue with the diplomat who has immunity and being held, what you—the things you are trying to get done, day in and day out?

General MATTIS. No, sir, I don't believe so.

Mr. CONAWAY. All right.

Thank you, gentlemen. Appreciate it.

Yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Langevin.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Mattis and Admiral Olson, thank you for your testimony today. And the Congress and the American people certainly owe the both of you a great debt of gratitude, and the people that serve under you. And, obviously, you are very likely, currently and in the future, to remain the very tip of the spear in the fight against global terrorism. I want to thank you both for your service.

Admiral Olson, SOCOM sits at a unique juncture in the military structure, in that it can benefit from ongoing efforts throughout the services as well as find its own unique ways internally to accomplish the mission.

I would like to focus a little bit, if I could, on your science and technology efforts. In your testimony, you briefly mentioned SOCOM science and technology efforts. And I would like you to, if you could, take a moment to more fully explain how SOCOM con-

tributes to, and benefits from, science and technology efforts within DOD [Department of Defense]. Can you, in particular, explain instances where SOCOM undertook its own S&T [science and technology] efforts in the areas where time-sensitive requirements exist?

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir. Thank you.

Special Operations Command is a relatively small force, and our needs are often quite peculiar to Special Operations force requirements. So we do have an R&D—a research and development, a science and technology budget that we use to invest in some items that are, sort of, invented for Special Operations purposes. But we also use that to contribute to service investment in order to ensure that the services are making Special Operations considerations in some of their development projects.

I have a senior science and technology advisor on my staff. He is in good contact with all of the services and the laboratories to ensure that our investment in that is made as wisely as we can, sir.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. I see that your research and development, test and evaluation budget has been significantly increased this year, up to \$496 million. Can you describe some of the RDT&E [research, development, test and evaluation] efforts that you are undertaking?

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir, I do. These are—some of that is a general increase in R&D and science and technology, recognizing the Special Operations' peculiar needs for that. But this year is a bit of an anomaly. Much of this year's increase in the science and technology budget is directly related to an efficiency initiative that we made in order to back away from one, sort of, ponderous program and invest in a family of undersea mobility vehicles. And there is a peculiar requirement for science and technology R&D money this year for that.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Are there any other examples that you could cite for us?

Admiral OLSON. Sir, there are many examples. Most of them are quite small, but I think one that we are particularly proud of now is a solar energy panel project that we have installed in a remote village in Afghanistan as part of a very small presence of Special Forces in that region and the difficulty of getting fossil fuel supplies to that region. And so the success of that has been encouraging.

But there are any number of other projects that, again, are quite small, quite limited. No big appetite in the big services for what it is we are developing at the time. So our R&D budget is actually spread pretty thin across a number of projects.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Good. I am pleased to hear you mention the alternative energy project, in particular. I think that is important for a variety of reasons but, in particular, keeping our supply lines to a minimum if we don't have to transport fossil fuels, obviously, any more than necessary to the front lines. And it keeps people safe and keeps us more independent, mobile, and effective. So I know that the other services are looking at developing those tools, as well.

Before my time runs out, Admiral, let me just ask—you know, one of the most important distinctions with our Special Operations Command—our Special Operations community is the focus on irregular warfare. At the Naval War College in Portsmouth, Rhode Island, we are lucky enough to have the Center for Irregular Warfare, which works at educating our special operators on the culture and strategic insights into the very areas they are being deployed into. And they also host a yearly symposium which brings together some of the best irregular warfare education across the country.

Often, however, the educational training can be overlooked, especially in a year of budgetary constraints. What is SOCOM doing to ensure that special operators receive a high-quality training education background that is critical for them to remain the high-performance fighting force that we require?

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, the gentleman's time has expired. Could you please give that for the record?

Admiral OLSON. I can get that for the record.

Mr. LANGEVIN. I would appreciate it.

And I want to thank you both for your service, gentlemen. Thank you.

[The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Turner.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, General Mattis and Admiral Olson. Thank you for being here and for your leadership.

I have three questions that I am going to try to lump together and give to you, in hopes of getting answers to all three of them. Two are about Iraq, and one is about Afghanistan.

On Iraq, yesterday I met with some brave government leaders from the Iraqi International Visitor Leadership Program that represented local government and state—or canton-level government. And during their visit, one, they expressed great appreciation to the United States and also, then, great concern about what will occur as our forces are drawn from Iraq and voicing I know the concern that you have of interference that might arise from their neighbors, particularly Iran.

But, in doing so, they also indicated that the Provincial Reconstruction Teams [PRTs] that had been deployed throughout Iraq made a big impact and were of great assistance in their ability to ensure that they could make a transition and remain stable. They reported that several of those are closing, and they are very concerned about them. They wanted me to raise the issue with you gentlemen to see to what extent you see that the PRTs may be able to remain and continue to have a role.

Also yesterday, we had a hearing in the Government Reform National Security Subcommittee on the "U.S. Military Leaving Iraq: Is the State Department Ready?" I would love any comments that you have concerning the State Department's efforts and the significant amount of contractors that they are going to be employing for security forces, some 17,000.

My question on Afghanistan is I would like for you to comment on our efforts to reduce the drug trade.

In 2006, General James Jones, then the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, stated that, quote, "The Achilles heel of Afghanistan is the narcotics problem. I think the uncontrolled rise of the spread of narcotics, the business that it brings in, the money that it generates is being used to fund the insurgency, the criminal elements, aiming to bring chaos and disorder." He also says that it funds the corruption in the police, the corruption in local governments, corruption at high levels of government.

Now, I would love, gentlemen, to hold up this chart. This is a chart of the historical production of opium production in Afghanistan. And if you fold the chart, you can see that, looking at the years when we first got to Afghanistan, that the subsequent years, up through 2009, are almost double what has occurred prior.

When General James Jones made this quote in 2006, the level of 2006 is about the same it was in 2009. So, even though we say it is being reduced and coming down, it is still at astronomical levels and nearly double of our first 2 years in Afghanistan. I really think it gets to the heart of our ability to turn the circumstances around in Afghanistan.

And I would love to hear your comments on those issues. Thank you, gentlemen.

General MATTIS. Thank you.

On the PRTs, they have got to come out, sir. This is something that we did to help Iraq get back on their feet. They have an educated population. They now have a government that they voted in. It was a very close election, so it took a while to get it set up.

But these PRTs, as you know, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, were there to bring government services during the tumultuous period as we fought it out with the enemy. That period is pretty much over now. The enemy can still set off an explosion anywhere in the country. That is just the kind of mentality that they have. But the Iraqi security forces have proven themselves capable, I think, to maintain security to a point that it is now the responsibility of the Iraqi Government.

Is the State Department ready? Not yet, but I am confident they are on the right track. We have one of the finest ambassadors we have served with anywhere in Ambassador Jeffrey.

And I think the 17,000 number, while this is still tentative, I believe that number is the total number on the ground from Department of State, and the number of contracted security personnel will be less than half that. I am—excuse me, go ahead, sir.

Mr. TURNER. That was the number that was being used yesterday in the hearing. So I am not certain either, but we will see if—

General MATTIS. If I could get back to you for the record then. I need to also check the numbers and make sure I am giving you accurate data here.

[The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

General MATTIS. But I think that, right now, the State Department and the Defense Department are working very closely together. I co-hosted with the Deputy Secretary of State a conference here in late January, where we got together with all of the right people from the military and from Department of State. And we

are working right down to what issues still need resolution, who is going to be responsible for them. It is on the right track, sir. It is going to be difficult, but we are on the right track.

On Afghanistan, I will just tell you that we are making progress, significant progress, now that we have taken the Helmand River Valley away from the enemy.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Garamendi.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My apologies to Admiral and General for being late. It is one of those days. And I may pick up issues that you have already covered. If so, you can move quickly through them and go from there.

The first deals with what is presently taking place in the Levant—Egypt, Libya, Tunisia. What is our posture there? What can we expect? How does it relate to the work that both of you gentlemen do?

I understand the Navy is nearby now, and maybe one or the other of you want to take this one on.

General MATTIS. Sir, Libya is not in my region; Egypt is.

The Secretary has just given orders a few hours ago to commence an airlift of Egyptians who have been forced outside of Libya into Tunisia to help them get back home again. The reason we are doing this is, number one, we can; and, number two, I think it is indicative of the continuing close military-to-military relationship, that we are trusted in that part of the world to be the ones that can fly military airlift in, pick up refugees, fly them to another country, going past a country that is in disarray right now.

So we are helping where we can on the humanitarian side, sir.

Mr. GARAMENDI. That would be in the Tunisia and Libya situation.

General MATTIS. Correct.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Could you speak to the Egyptian situation, since that is your turf?

General MATTIS. I can, sir.

We have maintained close relations with the Egyptian military. They have served with honor. They continue to serve with honor. I spoke to our Ambassador yesterday. She explained to me that the military is carrying out its caretaker role. And our relationship with that military strengthens in that role that they will turn this over to a civilian, elected government. And we still anticipate 6 months. I think it is ambitious for any country to go through all that they have to go through to meet that timeline, but that is the military's commitment.

I talked to General Anan, the Chief of Defense of Egypt, a couple weeks ago. And he assured me that that is their intention, to keep the order, to not in any way restrict peaceful demonstration, to protect them in fact, and protect the process toward a democracy.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Apparently, the military-to-military relationship has been very beneficial.

General MATTIS. Yes, sir. Absolutely.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay.

Admiral, I don't know if you have anything to do with what is going on a little further to the west of Egypt. If so, you can maybe bring us up to date. If not, we will just let it go.

Admiral OLSON. Sir, from a Special Operations Command perspective, I will just say that we have offered the menu of capabilities Special Operations can contribute to either turn down the heat or respond to a flare-up. And so, the commander of CENTCOM, the commander of AFRICOM have those, sir.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Ready and willing to go—does that mean—well, we don't know what that means, do we? That is, the level of engagement that might be forthcoming. I will let that one go until we get some more information.

I do have a question about Pakistan. It seems to me that while Afghanistan remains our major area or theater of operation, Pakistan is becoming increasingly—increased concern. Could you brief us on Pakistan and the situation as you see it in Pakistan, particularly the destabilization that is apparently going on?

General MATTIS. Sir, frankly, I am concerned about Pakistan. We have very strong military-to-military links. We are working better than ever right now against our common enemies up along the border area. My concern with Pakistan is more along the lines of financial challenges for the government, of the disarray of the civilian government. It is more along the governance and economic lines, is my point.

That is not to say there is not a severe enemy problem there. They have killed thousands of Pakistani troops, wounded thousands more, and attacked and killed and wounded upwards of nearly 30,000 civilians. So it is a concern.

The Pakistan military is doing well. They have sustained for 24 months now an offensive against our enemies that has taken a quarter of their Army up into the high country, some of the most forbidding and difficult terrain I have ever operated in. But, at the same time, I think the problems are much deeper and much broader than purely military can solve.

Mr. GARAMENDI. And my time is up, but therein lies my basic concern. It is the radicalization of Pakistan by all that is going on within the country and around it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the extra 13 seconds.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Wittman.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Olson, General Mattis, thank you so much for joining us today, and thank you for your service to our Nation.

And, Admiral Olson, a special thanks to you, and the distinguished career—wow, what accomplishments. The first Navy SEAL to be SOCOM commander, the first Navy SEAL to attain the rank of four-star admiral. Thanks again for that distinguished service.

I want to begin with you, Admiral Olson. Looking at where we have come with our Special Forces over the years, we know in the last 37 years that force has grown significantly. It has expanded in its scope, in its expertise. You know, back in the 1970s, nobody really knew what a Navy SEAL was or a Green Beret or a PJ [Pararescue Jumper]. Today they have an expansive range of operations, and they have become the weapon of choice in this 21st century of asymmetric engagement.

So I wanted to, kind of, get your perspective on where will Special Operations go—Special Forces go in this next century? You

know, what are the challenges out there that we face? And, specifically, how do we make sure that we are doing all we can to recruit and train the best and brightest so we, indeed, have that force structure, that capability in years to come?

And, you know, we are in a pretty special time in this Nation's history, special in the sense that we have had now over 10 years of pretty high ops tempo deployment for our Special Forces. How do we make sure that that force is going to be structured to meet the challenges into the future?

Admiral OLSON. Thank you, sir. I have a lot of answer to that question. I will keep it brief.

First, our recruiting and training is going very well. We are getting people who are smarter, harder, fitter, stronger than ever before, and at least as motivated, and I am quite satisfied with the quality of the force and the quality of our training.

We need to do more to ensure that we are retaining them for as long as we need for them to serve. This is quite specialized work. We do invest heavily in their training. And the longer that we can keep them with us, the better, even well beyond the normal 20-year military retirement point.

In terms of the employment of Special Operations Forces, it is a big, complex world. I think the threat of massive army-versus-army, uniformed-formations-against-uniformed-formations kind of warfare is decreasing, and the probability of, as you said, asymmetric, cyber, nontraditional warfare is increasing. It is very much Special Operations Command's—within our portfolio to be out there around the world turning down the global heat. We are in many countries on any given day at the invitation of other nations to help provide them local capability that contributes to regional stability.

So, in my way of describing it, we have worked very hard in our, sort of, shoot, move, communicate network kind of skills. Our investment now is in our understanding, make sure that we are in the right places for the right reasons, doing the right things, with the ability to properly predict the outcomes.

Mr. WITTMAN. General Mattis, I want to ask a little bit about what we are facing in Iraq. As you know, we are right at the face of more drawdowns. That is quickly approaching. We are at 50,000 now, with no agreement past the end of 2011 as far as what our manning is going to be there in Iraq.

The inspector general for DOD pointed out some concerns about Iraqi capabilities and ISF [Iraqi Security Forces] capabilities going into the future. And they pointed out that, with that transition, there might be little time to develop logistical systems and industrial capabilities that may leave the ISF and Iraqi forces with a lack of readiness in what they are going to be facing down the road. And they also noted some additional gaps in military training, Special Operations, and airspace management.

Within that context, the question then becomes, how do we make sure that those forces are going to be ready? And what are our forces doing in making sure that that transition is going to be a smooth one and that we don't lose what we have gained there? And we want to make sure that the ISF and the Iraqi forces are able to maintain what we have worked so hard to build there.

So I want to get your perspective on what challenges we are facing with that transition.

General MATTIS. I think you summed up the challenges pretty well, sir. The three biggest challenges: logistics, including maintenance; intelligence and intelligence fusion and how they would use that for their special forces, their security forces, to continue an unrelenting attack against the enemies, the terrorists who are in the country and still capable of dramatic attacks; and, of course, air sovereignty. They will not have an air force yet.

But we are using every day, working with them every day. We have specialized training programs for certain units to bring—if we can't bring everyone up, can we bring up a cadre, certain units, up to full capability. That, too, is going to be challenging. Candidly, it is going to be very difficult.

I think there will still be loose ends by December, but, absent a request from the Iraqi Government and agreement by the U.S. Government to stay longer, we are projected to come out with pretty much 99.9 percent of our troops. There may be a small office of security cooperation that would try to carry on some of the things that you just mentioned.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Hanabusa.

Mrs. HANABUSA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Admiral, for your years of service.

And thank you, General Mattis, for being here.

I would like to first begin with General Mattis. You made an interesting comment when I was here earlier, and you said that though not within, I think, your region, the Israel-Palestinian situation really affects your ability within what you are trying to do. Could you expand that for me? What is it about it, and what kind of stability would you like to see?

General MATTIS. Yes, ma'am, I can.

The extremist elements have seized this issue, and they use it for recruiting. So, if Middle East peace can be achieved, a two-state solution, which has been proposed by several American administrations, embraced by many moderates across the region and in the U.N., if this two-state solution can be achieved, then what you do is you remove this issue from the extremists.

I think it is pretty clear to everyone that Iranian leaders in Tehran don't care a whit about Palestinian Arabs, but they use this issue, and because other extremists use it, it limits the ability of some of our friends in the region to come out and support us because of the lack of progress on this issue.

And I think that, in the terms of long-term security for Israel and for the Palestinian people to have their rights, we are going to have to make progress on the two-state solution.

Mrs. HANABUSA. General, we all know that there is such a strong sense about the relationship that we have with Egypt, especially the relationship the military has developed and nurtured for 30-some-odd years.

Do you see the potential for a similar kind of relationship developing in any of the other areas, like Lebanon, Yemen, Bahrain, any

of those areas? Do you see that we can do that or duplicate that relationship elsewhere?

General MATTIS. I think we had that relationship in a couple of nations in my region, ma'am.

I would start with Kuwait, where I was with Admiral Olson last week for the 20th anniversary of the battle that freed that country. I think that there were as many American flags flying at times in some parts of the young people out celebrating that night before as there were Kuwaiti flags.

In Bahrain, where we have had our fleet headquarters for 5th Fleet since the late 1940s, in the midst of all the turmoil going on there, as reformers and others peacefully protest by and large, there has been no anti-Americanism there. We have a very strong relationship.

We have very quiet and very robust mil-to-mil relationships with the United Arab Emirates, with Qatar. I can go on—the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

I think you mentioned Iran. I could not imagine it right now—

Mrs. HANABUSA. No, no, I mispronounced "Bahrain."

General MATTIS. Oh, okay. Right.

Mrs. HANABUSA. No, it wasn't Iran, sorry.

General MATTIS. Yes, ma'am.

But, yes, ma'am, we have very good mil-to-mil relationships, and there are more than that. I can go on at some length.

Mrs. HANABUSA. Thank you.

Admiral, one of the things I am looking at, because this is a budget briefing, is I am so accustomed to seeing end strength right up front, and I am also accustomed to seeing the concept of the OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations] budget versus the base budget.

I was wondering, can you tell me what the figures that I have seen—is it \$12.8 billion, which seems to be attributed to specific programs—what and how does this 2012 budget—what does it mean to what you are doing?

Admiral OLSON. Yes, ma'am. The 2012 budget request for Special Operations Command is actually \$10.5 billion. This is about a 7 percent growth over 2011. And it permits us to continue the rate of growth that we have been able to absorb. The demand is outpacing our ability to grow, continue in this relatively good pace of growth. It is essential to us.

This gives us a force structure of—we are at about 60,000 people now. Over the course of the next 4 or 5 years, we will grow to about 68,000 people total. About a third of those are careerists within our force. And about two-thirds are in our force for an assignment or two or three over the course of their careers.

In terms of OCO to base, we are, I think, the highest percentage user of OCO funds. We are about 36 percent of our total budget is in OCO. And, as Secretary Gates testified yesterday, that he is making moves to, in fact, transfer our entire OCO into our baseline budget over the next few years.

Mrs. HANABUSA. Thank you very much, Admiral.

Thank you both.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. West.

Mr. WEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Admiral Olson and General Mattis, it really is an honor to be here with you today because you two are the epitome of the American warrior.

My question, I think, is pretty simple. As I look across what is going on in the world right now—Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Bahrain, Lebanon, Somalia, Gaza Strip, Yemen, Oman, Pakistan, Syria, Iran—there was one geographical thing that each one of those share, and that is the littorals.

So, as we begin to move to away from this occupation/nation-building style of warfare, my concern really is, do we have the sufficient maritime forces? I know some of these countries may not be in your AOR [area of responsibility], but I am always concerned about the enemy being able to find the gaps and the seams by which he can exploit us.

Do we really have the maritime forces to be able to have the power projection and potentially the forcible-entry capability to contend with the rising threats that could come out of those nations?

Thank you.

General MATTIS. Thank you, sir.

We work the seams very closely, the combatant commanders. We speak to each other routinely. Our staffs are in constant contact. I get what I ask for.

The concern you have, I think, is the longer term, and I will just say that your instincts are on target. I think I am right now commanding an increasingly maritime naval theater. As these numbers of troops on the ground come down, we are going to have to maintain a very robust naval presence. It is welcome, it is reinforcing, it is reassuring, and it tempers any mischief by certain people who might want to get meddlesome in other people's issues.

Admiral OLSON. So, from a Special Operations perspective, we are generally consumers and customers of the larger maritime forces. We ride and operate from the ships when it is appropriate to do that. And, therefore, we depend on the geographic combatant commanders to request and provide those ships.

I will second what General Mattis said, is that generally when we are employed the priority is high enough that we will get the maritime assets that are required. But that is in the theater where we are now; it may not be the same around the rest of the world, sir.

Mr. WEST. Well, thank you, gentlemen, very much. And, of course, being an old soldier, it is very hard for me to understand that and admit that that is an important aspect.

But I yield back to the chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. By "old soldier," he means he served several years, when he is talking, compared to an old guy like me.

Mr. Coffman.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Mattis, first of all, thank you for your distinguished service as the U.S. Central Command combatant commander.

You had mentioned in an answer—and I want to clarify this—about the Pakistani military that the Pakistani military had been—words to the effect that you gave—had been conducting com-

bat operations for the last 2 years against our enemy. And I need to clarify that.

Is it that they are conducting combat operations against the Pakistani Taliban? Because it is my understanding that the Afghan Taliban has sanctuary inside of Pakistan and that they are not prosecuting operations against the Afghan Taliban.

General MATTIS. Yes, sir. And they have been conducting the operations more than 2 years. It is not against all of those that we are up against. There are some they have not gone after. They are going after more today. It is in the last 2 years that they have shifted 140,000 troops and have taken a much more aggressive role here. But you are quite correct. There are some that they have not engaged.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you.

Admiral Olson, I just want to thank you so much for your service as the combatant commander for Special Operations Command.

And I think you mentioned that, prospectively, you saw that, you know, this—that you saw future combat operations as probably not being conventional force-on-force but being of the more asymmetric variety that would, in fact, involve Special Operations Command.

And, in fact, the Secretary of Defense gave a recent speech at West Point where he talked about his doubts as to whether the United States in the future would engage in the kind of heavy-footprint operations as we are doing today in Iraq and Afghanistan. I think he said words to the effect that we are not—he didn't see us as invading, pacifying, and I think building countries in the future as we have done recently.

And, General Mattis, that goes to you. I am concerned that maybe we are too ambitious in Afghanistan. I see that we have two objectives there in order to meet U.S. security interests. I think number one is that we need to not allow the Taliban to control the country and that be a permissive environment for them in which they could leverage that in hopes of destabilizing Pakistan by aiding the Taliban on the other side of the Durand Line. And, secondly, the ability to use Afghanistan as a platform in which to, quite frankly, seek out targets in the tribal—in the FATA in Pakistan.

But yet, if I look at the current policy, it seems to me that we are establishing a governance that I am concerned doesn't necessarily reflect the political culture of the country but certainly reflects our values, that we are trying to restructure Afghan society, and that we are trying to build them the economy that they never had. And I refer to the Afghan infrastructure fund, certainly, as part of that.

And I wonder if you can address that, because I am just very concerned that we, perhaps, have a policy that is more robust than is necessary to meet our security interests.

General MATTIS. Thank you, sir.

I engaged in the President's policy review, strategy review in December. Your question was one of the critical ones that we examined there: Are we doing more than we need to do? Again, we are there for our reasons, our national security reasons. When we didn't pay attention to it, we were attacked. And the FATA area,

the borderland region there remains the epicenter of Osama bin Laden's efforts, obviously.

So we fall back and say, what do we need to do to deny future attacks such as this? And we have very strictly looked even down to what are the key districts that we need to be focused on. It is not that we are all over the country. We are looking in every way, how do we ensure that the ends we require, we only commit the means necessary to do that?

Now, it is not a precise science, and I think you can always find points where you might find where this doesn't quite seem to coincide. But, basically, fundamentally, we are looking at how do we deny the enemy a position from which they can attack us in the future.

Part of this is to ensure that, as we pull out, as we will, we leave in our wake something better than we left in 1989. It has to be designed with Afghan unique—Afghanistan's unique history, culture, geography, economic opportunity all in mind.

But right now I am confident that what we are doing is limited in scope to what needs to be done.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Brooks.

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for being here before this Armed Services Committee meeting.

I had the opportunity last week to participate in a congressional delegation trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan. As a freshman, I found it to be very eye-opening, very informative. I would like to, for the record, before I get to my questions, point out a few things that I observed.

First, I thought that our men and women in uniform, given the very challenging circumstances that they faced, were acting just as courageously and as professionally as anyone in America could hope for them to do. That is a credit to them, and it is also a credit to those, like you, who have trained them so that they are able to handle the situations that they face.

Similarly, I was impressed with our Foreign Service personnel, who, to a large degree, are responsible for the nation-building that we are trying to do in both of those two nations.

Third, in looking at the environment of Afghanistan in particular, I was struck by the poverty of the Afghan people. I was told that there are roughly 30 million people in Afghanistan. In the rural areas, people were living in huts, usually without windows. Fifteen percent literacy rate, i.e., 85 percent could neither read nor write. In the rural areas that I was fortunate to observe, there appeared to be no electricity. The roads in the rural areas were dirt.

And that brings me to the Afghan economy. It was quite clear that the Afghan economy is nowhere near capable of being able to pay for its own defense, either militarily or internal security forces, police, or what have you.

And with that as a backdrop, do you have a judgment as to how many years, in your opinion, it might be before the Afghan economy is strong enough for them to pay for their own internal security forces?

General MATTIS. Sir, I would have to give you an estimate.

Mr. BROOKS. I understand it would be an estimate. Please do.

General MATTIS. I would say it would be at least 10 years. And it will require international support throughout that 10-year period and perhaps longer.

Mr. BROOKS. Yeah, I was informed by some of the folks that we met with that it would be in that neighborhood, perhaps even as long as 15 or 20 years, which means it is basically going to be a long time. We hope for the best, but we have to be prepared for the worst.

With that as a backdrop, do you have any judgment as to how much America is going to have to pay over that next 10-year period of time out of our own Treasury to be able to pay for the cost of the Afghan security forces, the police, their military, or what have you?

General MATTIS. Sir, as we fight this enemy and as governance picks up in areas that were once held by the Taliban, there are economic opportunities—agricultural extraction, mineral extraction—there are opportunities for people there.

I think we will see a combination of the number of security forces needed dropping slightly as the enemy threat drops. And I think that right now we have 49 nations engaged there, and as some start coming out, our Foreign Service officers, who impressed you, as they have impressed me, will have to work with the foreign countries to make sure that, as they pull their troops out, they maintain the kind of fiscal support that the international community has to give to a nation that, with 30 years of warfare and hundreds of billions of dollars of damage to that country over those decades, simply it is going to take an international commitment to get them back on their feet. And I am very confident it cannot be the United States alone.

Mr. BROOKS. Well, do you have any judgment as to how much would be the United States share?

General MATTIS. I do not, sir. If it is just for the security forces, it will cost us \$12.8 billion this next year. That number will come down. I see that as a surge right now of their forces. And, at some point, once the enemy is beaten down, then they won't need that size of a force. So that amount should come down, too, as the enemy threat recedes somewhat.

But it is going to be a significant amount, I think is where I would agree with you. It is going to take an international effort, not America alone.

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you for your insight.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, General Mattis, Admiral Olson, thank you very much for your service. I was fortunate enough to be on the congressional delegation with Congressman Brooks. And I want to join with him in commending the servicemembers we met. General Austin gave us an excellent briefing, General Petraeus of course, there in Baghdad and in Kabul. We also had the opportunity to visit the sailors of the USS *Lake Champlain* in Bahrain. And it was just so encouraging to me to see our quality troops.

Also, I was encouraged because my former National Guard unit, the 218th Brigade of the South Carolina National Guard, had been there in 2007, 2008, training the Afghan National Security Forces. The progress that I saw of the personnel, the Afghan forces—and I know that the extraordinary defense minister, Abdul Wardak, has indicated that he wanted those forces to be increased, possibly to 378,000.

And so, General, do we have the capability to partner with a force that size with the current personnel we have?

General MATTIS. If the President makes the decision to support President Karzai's effort to grow the force, as Minister Wardak told you, yes, we have the capability to do so with the forces that we have there.

Mr. WILSON. And, in fact, I gave a floor speech Tuesday, or Monday, where I indicated that I have supported the President's surge by sending 30,000 troops. That has actually encouraged Afghans to have faith in their future. And now an additional 70,000 Afghan security forces.

Admiral Olson, on behalf of the Military Personnel Subcommittee, in your written testimony, you discussed the establishment of a pressure-on-the-force task force to survey and analyze the effects of repetitive combat deployment over nearly a decade. And I want to thank you for doing that.

Particularly, though, I am concerned that there has been a higher percentage of officers leaving at the 8- to 10-year mark. Can you provide detail of what this task force will do? And in the coming months, would you share the results with the committee?

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir.

The pressure-on-the-force task force is designed to get at what the data doesn't really present. Responses generally lag data; data lags reality. We are really trying to be predictive and preventive in our approach. And to do that, we have to be able to trust commanders' intuition, teammates' sense of what is happening in the team room, families, children, as they sense our force. And so we are really on a survey mission to understand the plethora of factors that do affect the overall health of our force.

I do expect that report in about 90 days, and I do—I would certainly be willing to share it.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much.

And, General Mattis, when we go, we go to encourage the troops, but we do fact-finding. On my last visit there prior to this, I was so impressed by the different teams that were performing route clearance, how brave they were. And I am really grateful to see the advances in technology, with the Mine Roller Program.

What is the level of providing those so that we can face the improvised explosive devices [IEDs]?

General MATTIS. Sir, the mine rollers work in most of the terrain where they can be employed on roads with the vehicles that carry the mine roller, that can use the mine rollers. As you know, not all vehicles can, because they are a very, very heavy piece of gear.

Ultimately, Mr. Wilson, what we are going to have to do is, this country is going to have find a way to prematurely detonate IEDs. Right now, attacking the network, we are either finding, or the people are turning in to us, about 70 percent of the IEDs that we

run into. But about 30 percent are still going off against us. And it is the primary casualty-inducing weapon the enemy has.

So this is a significant effort that we have under way to try and look at not just mine rollers but the entire scope of the problem, sir.

Mr. WILSON. Well, I want to thank you on behalf of my constituents. And I have had two sons serve in Iraq, and I want to thank you for your leadership in truly protecting our troops.

I yield the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

My turn.

Admiral Olson, as you noted in your opening statement, this is your fourth and final appearance in this capacity before this committee, in all likelihood. I want to thank you again for your years of service to the Nation.

And I would like to ask you, for a moment, to take the long view, for the benefit of the committee and the record, and outline for us some of the future challenges that you see facing the force. I know, as we visited last week, I believe it was, or week before, I know you put a great deal of thought into this issue.

In your opinion, what does the future hold for SOF, and what will the force look like? What challenges do you see, and what should Congress be concerned with?

Admiral OLSON. Thank you, sir.

I think the future requirements for Special Operations Command will be in smaller teams, in more places, at the invitation, at the request of host governments who believe that highly skilled teams with a relatively small footprint are of great value in their regions.

This does require a different kind of training program for us, it requires a different kind of education program for us, depending very heavily on the services, but understanding that we have to tailor some of that to our own requirements.

It also requires a different kind of career management. It has to, as I said in my opening statement, recognize some of the nontraditional skill sets, those that are not necessarily platform-oriented but more knowledge- and experience-oriented, as essential military skills can incentivize people to gain and move within paths that reward them for having done that.

I think that the force mix will remain relatively unchanged in terms of the balance across our force. I believe that our platform requirements as we have them programmed are relatively sufficient for our future needs.

We will continue to require the ability to move in a way that is quite traditional, quite obvious in our movements, and we also need to be able to retain the capability to move in a clandestine manner when that is necessary. And I think Special Operations Forces are unarguably the force of choice for any kind of clandestine activity where that might be required in the future.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

General Mattis, the LA Times reported that the President of Yemen, Ali Saleh, has agreed to a plan from opposition leaders that includes a demand that he step down by the end of the year. Can you comment at all on the accuracy of this report?

General MATTIS. I cannot right now, sir. I have seen the newspaper article, but I have not seen anything more than that. So I would prefer to learn a little more before I comment, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We all need to learn that skill.

Thank you very much, both of you, for your service, and all of those sitting behind you there that work with you every day. I wanted to talk to them and see how they—do they have special training for poker faces? I think they—I watched. They don't give a thing away. And that is a great skill.

Thank you all for your service. Appreciate it very much.

And this hearing now stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MARCH 3, 2011

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 3, 2011

**Opening Statement of Chairman Howard P. “Buck” McKeon
House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization Budget Requests from the
U.S. Central Command and U.S. Special Operations Command
March 3, 2011**

Good afternoon. The House Armed Services Committee meets this afternoon to receive testimony from the commanders of the United States Central Command and the United States Special Operations Command on the posture of their respective commands.

It is an understatement, perhaps, to say recent events give this hearing an even greater urgency. Developments in the past six months—and especially in the past six weeks—present new opportunities and new uncertainties for our nation’s security and the environment in which CENTCOM and SOCOM operate.

Extremist Islamist groups and their use of terrorism directly threaten the physical security of American citizens at home and abroad. Consequently, in Afghanistan, 100,000 U.S. servicemen and women are fighting to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al-Qaeda in the country from which it planned and conducted the 9/11 attacks. In the past year our forces have reduced Taliban influence and arrested the momentum of al-Qaeda’s allies, particularly in Helmand and Kandahar provinces. Expanded special operations forces’ targeting of Taliban leadership, and expanded local security measures at the village and district level have been an integral part of this momentum shift. Significant progress has also been made by the NATO Training Mission in the development of the Afghan National Security Forces. Yet it remains to be determined whether these gains will be lasting.

Similar uncertainty surrounds the recent uprisings in the Middle East. While inspirational and likely to undermine extremism’s appeal over the long-term, they also potentially undermine several pillars of our strategic posture in the region in the near-term.

Recent events have highlighted the precarious nature of the region’s balance of power and the need for continued engagement. For example, I read with concern comments from opposition leaders in Egypt that the Camp David Accords are “finished.” Similarly, instability may undermine efforts to build our partner’s counter-terrorism capacity, a particularly troubling scenario in Yemen, where al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula continues to present ‘the most significant risk to the U.S. homeland’ according to the Administration.

Against the backdrop of these dramatic events, Iran continues research on key components for a nuclear weapon, the development of which alter the regional balance of power and allow

Tehran to increase its long-standing support of terrorist proxies without fear of military retaliation. Also, we are scheduled to withdraw 50,000 U.S. forces from Iraq despite questions regarding that country's ability to defend itself from both internal and external threats.

The blistering pace of current events and the uncertainty they have created raise difficult and important questions for the future of our national security.

To address these issues, we are fortunate to be joined today by two officers with long and distinguished records of service to their nation: General James Mattis, Commander of U.S. Central Command, and Admiral Eric T. Olson, Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command.

Gentlemen, thank you for appearing before us today. I take great comfort in knowing our nation has warriors such as yourselves to help lead us in these dangerous times, and I look forward to hearing your testimony.

###

**Statement of Ranking Member Adam Smith
House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization Budget Requests
from the U.S. Central Command and U.S. Special Operations Command
March 3, 2011**

The two commands before us today have spent the better part of the last decade at war, leading the fight against the nation's enemies in Iraq and Afghanistan. These wars have stressed both of these commands and the brave men and women who have fought in them deserve our thanks for their sacrifices on our behalf.

The United States Central Command faces a dizzying array of challenges. While the redeployment from Iraq moves forward, the war in Afghanistan continues, Iran strives to develop a nuclear program, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula threatens the government of Yemen and terrorists in Pakistan threaten a regime critical to our success against al Qaeda. If that wasn't sufficient, the recent uprisings across the Middle East have the potential to upend our relationships with a number of critical allies.

I expect this hearing to address all these issues, but I want to take a moment to address a few specifically.

In Afghanistan, this spring begins the transition of some areas of the country to Afghan lead for security, with U.S. troop redeployments this summer. I think most members are interested in hearing more about how this process works. On the face of it, "transition" sounds easy, but in Afghanistan governance and Rule of Law are hard, and they are probably those factors that will determine our eventual success.

Pakistan is another challenging country. Areas in Pakistan dominated by violent extremists provide safe havens for Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. We have provided the Pakistani military with billions of dollars in military aid to enable them to combat these elements, but the capability to prosecute this counterinsurgency campaign fully continues to be a challenge. Although Pakistan has demonstrated some willingness to go after violent extremists, it has still not shown the urgency we think is necessary in pursuing the leadership of the Afghan Taliban, who we believe are hiding in Pakistani cities.

Redeploying the last fifty thousand troops out of Iraq will substantially reduce the stress on our Armed Services, but it could also as contribute to instability. I have said before and will say again, that if the Iraqis request a new Status of Forces

Agreement we should be prepared to listen. But even if they do not, we must explore alternate arrangements, such as regular joint exercises, that can help them overcome their gaps in capability, deter regional bad actors like Iran, and provide the reassurance to the population of Iraq that we have not forgotten them.

I am also hopeful that you, General Mattis, will take a moment to address CENTCOM's efforts to counter the online spread of extremism. Al Qaeda has taken to using the internet to spread its message, and the United States must think seriously about how to combat this. You are on the front lines of our efforts against al Qaeda and I welcome your thoughts on how we improve in this important area.

Admiral Olson, you lead the other major command combating violent extremists. While the men and women under your command bear a heavy burden in the war in Afghanistan, there are Special Operations Command personnel deployed all over the world, taking the fight to the extremists who threaten our country. I hope you will thank them for all of us here.

As a former chairman of the subcommittee that provided oversight to SOCOM, I know well the major contributions your command makes. I have spoken often this year about how spending more doesn't make us safe, but spending more wisely can. In SOCOM's case, spending more money more wisely can provide major returns, so I was pleased to see a modest increase in the SOCOM budget. I hope you can also take some time to talk about the \$2.3 billion in efficiencies you found under Secretary Gates' direction and talk about where these savings were reinvested.

I am concerned by reports that mid-career special operations personnel are increasingly leaving the force. The wars of the past ten years have put major strains on these forces, who we very much need to retain. I look forward to hearing what help we can provide to help you keep these personnel.

Finally, as with all of our Armed Forces, I understand that the current continuing resolution and the potential for a yearlong continuing resolution could undermine your ability to function effectively. While I am hopeful that we will be able to pass an FY11 defense appropriations bill soon, I would be interested in hearing in greater detail how a continuing resolution affects your respective commands.

###

POSTURE STATEMENT OF
ADMIRAL ERIC T. OLSON, USN
COMMANDER
UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
BEFORE THE 112th CONGRESS
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
MARCH 3, 2011

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to provide an update on the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Our Special Operations Forces give us much cause for great pride and it is my deep privilege to represent them to you, and especially to do so for the fourth time as their commander.

My intent today is to describe the current status, activities and requirements of Special Operations Forces. I'll begin by briefly describing USSOCOM and its assigned Special Operations Forces.

As many of you know, USSOCOM is a creation of Congress, legislated into being in 1986. A relatively small number of Army, Navy and Air Forces units designated as Special Operations Forces were assigned to USSOCOM, with Marine Corps forces joining the Command just over five years ago.

Before the establishment of USSOCOM, the Nation's Special Operations Forces had generally not been treated as a top

priority. They now thrive under the focused attention of a single headquarters and a dedicated budget. In the 24 years since USSOCOM was established, Special Operations Forces have repeatedly proven their value, often under extraordinarily demanding conditions.

In many ways, USSOCOM is a microcosm of the Department of Defense, with ground, air and maritime components, a global presence, and authorities and responsibilities that mirror the Military Departments, Military Services and Defense Agencies. We take pride in the diversity of our people and our mission.

One of our headquarter's functions is to synchronize Department of Defense planning against terrorists and their networks globally. This is complex work that connects us across DoD and into other U.S. Government departments and other nations' military forces. The effects of this are manifested in a series of planning documents that guide specific actions by the Services and Combatant Commands.

Primarily, USSOCOM organizes, trains and equips Special Operations Forces and provides those forces to the Geographic Combatant Commanders under whose operational control they serve. The Command also develops special operations strategy, doctrine and procedures for SOF employment and develops and procures specialized equipment for the force.

Our key subordinate commands are U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Naval Special Warfare Command, U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command, Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command and Joint Special Operations Command. Within these commands are the legendary Special Forces or Green Berets, SEALs, Air Commandos, Rangers, Night Stalker helicopter crews, and the modern version of yesterday's Marine Raiders. Our force also includes the active duty practitioners of Civil Affairs Operations and Military Information Support Operations, and all of the instructors, logisticians, administrators, analysts, planners, communicators, doctrine writers and other specialists who are key to our ability to meet our Nation's needs. Most are active duty military, but we depend heavily on our Guard and Reserve units and the government civilians and contractors who perform duties that don't require a uniformed service member.

We now total close to 60,000 people, about a third of whom are career members of Special Operations Forces, meaning those who have been selected, trained and qualified to earn the Military Occupational Specialty or skill code identifier of a SOF operator.

The activities of the force are as varied as its character. From high-risk, high-intensity counterterrorist raids; to meticulous intelligence analysis; to providing first response during a natural disaster; to launching from submerged

submarines; to training and accompanying foreign counterparts; to working with local leaders to determine what will bring value to their village; to providing supporting precision fires to fighting troops from orbiting aircraft - SOF personnel are in vital roles, in key places, performing essential tasks.

Our presence is generally small and agile, inherently joint and persistent. Our formations normally include an array of attached capabilities that are necessary to optimize the force - including female Cultural Support Teams, Tactical Air Controllers, Military Working Dogs, interpreters, maintenance and repair personnel, Explosive Ordnance Disposal technicians and others. SOF rarely dominate an area with their mass, so they must work with indigenous forces and the local civilian population to accomplish their missions. This is often complicated, demanding and high-risk.

Each of the Geographic Combatant Commanders who will appear before you is well served by the Special Operations Forces that are deployed to his region, although the balance is heavily weighted towards U.S. Central Command. In fact, about 85 percent of deployed SOF are directly engaged in Operations NEW DAWN and ENDURING FREEDOM. I will defer to the regional commanders to highlight the contributions of Special Operations Forces in their theaters. I will just say here that, although the precision counterterrorism missions certainly receive the

most attention, SOF are conducting a wide range of activities in dozens of countries around the world on any given day - at the request of the host government, with the approval of the U.S. Ambassador and under the operational control of the U.S. Geographic Combatant Commander.

To support these forces and activities, USSOCOM invested in many specialized programs and equipment. As the commander responsible for the preparation and readiness of SOF, I focus on developing and sustaining operational skills and capabilities, training and maintaining the quality of the force, caring for its families, and ensuring that our people have the right equipment in sufficient quantity. I also carefully monitor global military and political trends in my role as the senior advisor on the employment of SOF.

Among USSOCOM's most important functions is the management of Major Force Program-11 (MFP-11). MFP-11 is provided to the Commander of USSOCOM to address requirements that are "SOF-peculiar" in nature, and it is the essential fuel that enables Special Operations Forces to meet the Nation's needs. It provides for the conduct of advanced and unique training, the timely and flexible fielding of equipment, and the capability to rapidly and effectively project our force. In Fiscal Year 2012, the request for MFP-11 funds totals \$10.5 billion in baseline and Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding. This is an

increase of 7 percent over the FY11 request, and every dollar is necessary to meet the ever-increasing demands placed on our Special Operations Forces.

At the forefront of budget discussions is the acknowledgment that many of the current expenditures funded by OCO are, in fact, part of USSOCOM's baseline requirement in the "new normal." This was highlighted by the Department last year when a commitment was made to eventually move funding required to execute Overseas Contingency Operations into the baseline as part of the SECDEF's initiative to "rebalance" the force. However, USSOCOM will continue to rely on OCO funding over the next few years as the phased transfer to the base budget occurs. For example, in the FY 2012 budget submission thirty-four percent of the total MFP-11 request is OCO funding. For some higher intensity SOF elements, the OCO percentage is greater than 75 percent. USSOCOM will carefully prioritize and manage the OCO to base transition. Overall, we are in a fiscally satisfactory condition, but the force requires continued support. The President's Budget Request for FY12, if approved, is an essential step towards meeting the growing demand on our force by providing USSOCOM the resources required to sustain critical programs and initiatives. Now, I would like to highlight some of these key efforts.

Programs

USSOCOM continues to expand and recapitalize its rotary and fixed wing aviation fleets. This year we began modification of the last of the originally planned 61 MH-47G helicopters, while starting procurement of eight additional MH-47Gs. We are also fielding the first of 72 planned MH-60M helicopters as part of our recapitalization of MH-60 K/L platforms. The tilt-rotor CV-22, having demonstrated its capabilities on multiple deployments, must remain on plan to ensure enhanced future mobility capabilities for SOF. USSOCOM's MC-130Ws, rapidly modified with a Precision Strike Package utilizing SOF's Joint Acquisition Task Force, are providing armed overwatch and mobility to deployed SOF as an interim augmentation to our Vietnam-era AC-130 gunship fleet. We are on a path to ultimately recapitalize the gunships with AC-130J models. The MC-130J program is on track to replace our aging MC-130Es and MC-130Ps. Our Non-Standard Aviation Program is delivering a variety of smaller aircraft to provide intra-theater airlift capacity and we continue to grow our aviation foreign training capability in support of the Geographic Combatant Commanders' engagement plans.

USSOCOM is also modernizing its maritime mobility systems. We will award competitive prototype contracts later this year for Combatant Craft - Medium (CCM) as replacements for the Naval

Special Warfare Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB). We have realigned resources from the Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) and the Joint Multi-Mission Submersible (JMMS) to fund the development of a family of Dry Submersibles as part of our undersea mobility strategy. These will be launched from surface ships or Dry Deck Shelter-equipped submarines. As part of this modernization program, we will explore expansive and flexible approaches that are supportive of the Secretary of Defense's intent to streamline acquisition processes and accelerate delivery times.

Special Operations Forces continue to rely on a wide range of ground mobility vehicles, often leveraging Service and Department investments. Modified to meet the wide variety of SOF mission sets and provide enhanced crew protection, vehicles such as the MRAP have been essential to SOF teams operating in dispersed and rugged terrain throughout the USCENTCOM Area Of Responsibility. These vehicles, as well as our other ground mobility systems, will remain relevant well into the future as we synchronize our long-term sustainment strategy with the Services.

We continue to invest in airborne manned and unmanned Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) programs, relying heavily on the Services to expand capabilities and capacity that benefit DoD across the board. USSOCOM is moving

toward a relatively small number of manned and unmanned ISR systems; essential Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (PED) capabilities; and supporting communications architectures.

One of the most noteworthy improvements within special operations over the last few years has been the growth of advanced communications and networking capabilities through our expeditionary SOF Information Enterprise (SIE). As our portion of the Department's Global Information Grid, the SIE provides network independence while maintaining connectivity into the global interface, and links Special Operations Forces across the globe into a common network. This connectivity shortens the decision cycle for SOF operators worldwide and allows more rapid information sharing. The research and rapid development of these types of technologies is an inherent strength of special operations.

USSOCOM, inherently joint in all it does, is in a unique position to leverage and apply Service and Department Science and Technology (S&T) efforts to rapidly field new technologies on the battlefield. USSOCOM's "Rapid Exploitation of Innovative Technologies for SOF" (REITS) program, enables innovative new capabilities to be developed and inserted quickly into the battlefield - advanced "talk and jam" capabilities for SOF vehicles; mobile repair and maintenance "shops in a box"; to solar panel energy technology that supports SOF in remote

locations. USSOCOM also seeks to expand its biomedical research and development activities. To date, USSOCOM has pushed "state of the art" combat medicine with modest resources through the Tactical Combat Casualty Care program. However, we also have great need to explore innovative methods of treating our wounded members so that they may be reintegrated and returned to duty as rapidly as possible.

As a force that operates from the tropics to the Arctic regions, from under water to high elevations, and from peaceful areas to violent combat zones, Special Operations Forces serve as an ideal "control group" for Service R&D investments that can result in significant benefits across DoD.

USSOCOM's development of the Joint Acquisition Task Force (JATF) concept enabled accelerated acquisition and fielding of urgent SOF capabilities. First demonstrated on the MC-130W Dragon Spear program, USSOCOM expanded use of the JATF concept to address many emerging requirements of SOF warfighters. Innovative approaches such as the JATF, coupled with a professionally trained and certified SOF acquisition corps that stays in close and frequent contact with the operators, continue to ensure that USSOCOM remains as a vanguard of rapid acquisition within DoD.

USSOCOM's acquisition planning, collaboration, and continuing dialogue with the Services continues to improve as we become

more efficiently effective while rapidly moving capabilities to the warfighter. USSOCOM, in conjunction with USD AT&L, initiated a series of Acquisition Summits with the Military Department Acquisition Executives to minimize programmatic disconnects and to better align requirements, co-sponsorship opportunities, funding efficiencies, and contracting actions among MFP-11 programs and Service-related/dependent programs. These periodic meetings offer a level of transparency among all our accounts that enables us to seek common solutions for Service-wide requirements and to better invest in SOF-peculiar modifications or special capabilities. This forum identified several opportunities, which if supported by Congress, would enable more efficient execution of SOF unique acquisitions.

USSOCOM is making a significant investment in Military Construction (MILCON) to address shortfalls resulting from fielding new capabilities, a growing force structure and aging infrastructure that was inherited without a future recapitalization budget. To address the shortfall, the Command's 2012 budget submission is based on a MILCON roadmap that identifies over 300 prioritized requirements valued at more than \$5 billion between 2012 and 2025. Specifically, our FY12 budget submission includes 33 of these projects, valued at \$631M across eight states and representing 9 percent of the Command's projected base budget request - a near record level. This

investment demonstrates a commitment to addressing our critical infrastructure needs. To continue this effort, the Command's new Strategic Planning and Programming Guidance raised the MILCON funding minimum from 4 to 6 percent to support this priority in future budgets.

A Congressional action that enhanced the effectiveness of our force is our Section 1208 authority. This authority to reallocate limited MFP-11 funds remains a key tool used by widely dispersed SOF to leverage indigenous forces in support of counterterrorism operations. USSOCOM is appreciative of the increase to \$45 million provided by Congress in the FY11 National Defense Authorization Act, as it provides us the ability to support ongoing operations with a measure of flexibility should a contingency arise. Continuation of Section 1208 authority provides enhanced effectiveness to our force both strategically and tactically.

Initiatives

Our primary challenge is the need to carefully manage the growth of Special Operations Forces, even in these periods of high demand, in order to ensure the continued quality the nation expects. I have stated in my last three posture hearings that SOF's organic manpower growth should be in the range of 3-5 percent per year. That is the pace we have sustained to great effect over the past several years and our FY12 budget

submission continues this pace. But 3-5 percent growth within USSOCOM will not answer the increasing demand for our force unless it is matched by the Military Services' commitment to attach supporting and enabling forces at a commensurate rate. SOF units must include a limited amount of these enabling forces to ensure rapid response to emerging requirements, but we were designed and intended to rely on the Services to meet most of our combat support and combat service support requirements. In order to establish a predictable demand signal for these Service-provided capabilities, USSOCOM is proposing changes to the way we build, train, deploy and sustain a fully enabled force.

To better build the SOF team, we are developing a force generation system that engages the existing Service systems. In 2011, USSOCOM will strive to create a SOF Force Generation system that will be synchronized with the Services, matching their capabilities with our Special Operations core units in time to provide fully optimized force packages to the Geographic Combatant Commanders. For elements organic to SOF, such as our Civil Affairs and Military Information Support Operations, we will expand their capacities to meet the increasing demand for their capabilities.

Another challenge we face is how to effectively prepare and train the force to achieve enhanced interoperability with the

General Purpose Forces (GPF). Currently in the USCENTCOM AOR, SOF is executing the counterterrorist strike mission and the Village Stability Operations mission; two of the primary lines of operation underpinning the Afghanistan strategy. SOF's key role in both is creating opportunities for enhanced interoperability with the GPF such as the deployment of the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry, now assigned to the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force - Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A); a sea change in SOF-GPF relations. Currently, we are developing initiatives that will increase inter-operational effectiveness prior to the deployment phase of the operation.

In 2011, we will continue to review and coordinate changes to Service personnel policies to further incentivize language pay for key languages such as Pashto, Dari and Arabic. We will work to develop courses of action that allow SOF reliable and predictable access to Service resources such as training ranges for our ground and aviation elements. The shortage of readily available, local ranges currently hampers SOF's ability to meet deployment training timelines and causes our operators to "travel to train," further increasing their already excessive time away from home.

Understanding the operational context of the environments in which we operate is a hallmark of SOF. Developing this knowledge and experience within our force, and understanding the

value of "micro-regional" expertise allows SOF to conduct its activities with more predictable outcomes. While immersion opportunities enhance our regional sophistication, our training can never develop the level of nuanced understanding possessed by indigenous populations. To gain this high level of cultural knowledge, USSOCOM will continue to strongly support DoD's Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) and the Army's Intermediate and Advanced Language Programs (IALP) to recruit and access the requisite expertise provided by native speakers. Additionally, our attached female Cultural Support Teams (CSTs) allow us to reach key elements of the population in some environments which was not previously possible. This concept of attaching females to SOF units is effective and long overdue; we are urging the Services to recognize the capabilities of CSTs as essential military skills.

Finally, our efforts to become more innovative include studying the best practices of other organizations. For example, we are inspired by the ability of the World War II's Office of Strategic Services to rapidly recruit specialized talent, develop and acquire new technologies and conduct effective global operations within the period of its relatively brief existence.

To further our engagement with our international allies and partners, and within the U.S. interagency community, USSOCOM

will continue to expand the Special Operations Liaison Officer (SOLO) and Special Operations Support Team (SOST) programs. Both of these outreach efforts provide SOF experts to support and enhance their host organizations while serving as SOF liaisons. Our priority is to assign SOLO officers wherever a foreign partner has, or is planning to establish, a USSOCOM-like headquarters.

Joint operations and special operations are two growing trends in many of our partner nation military forces. One manifestation is the recent establishment of the NATO SOF Headquarters. In accordance with the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act, the Secretary of Defense designated USSOCOM as the lead component for this Headquarters - a role we will embrace and expand in an effort to advise and assist an interoperable network of global SOF.

Importantly, we remain committed to caring for our service members and their families. I am concerned about the effects of nine years of focus on combat operations on the well-being of our extended special operations community. To support the wounded and injured and their caregivers, the Command remains committed to our Special Operations Care Coalition and the Tactical Human Optimization, Rapid Rehabilitation and Reconditioning (THOR3) Program. Both programs are focused on long term care, rehabilitation and reintegration of our

warriors. In an additional effort to be predictive and preventive, I established a "Pressure on the Force" Task Force to survey and analyze the effects of repetitive combat deployments over nearly a decade. Necessarily relying on soft data, collective experiences and commanders' instincts, it will try to determine what initiatives might help ease the strain and contribute to long term retention and force stability. I expect to receive the recommendations from this team within 90 days.


In conclusion, I will reinforce what I believe are the top challenges to the Command. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently stated, "...the first forces in are typically Special Forces. And the last ones out are going to be Special Forces." As we expect to remain the force of first choice for many military operations, USSOCOM must:

1. Carefully and deliberately meet the ever-increasing demand for Special Operations Forces.
2. Improve and expand our tactical and operational level skills, equipment and systems.
3. Preserve our proposed budget levels and authorities.
4. Find better structures and processes to obtain Service-provided capabilities.
5. Continue to improve our acquisition speed and agility.
6. Better understand the people and conditions in the places we go, whether to assist or fight.

7. As our most solemn duty, look after the health and well-being of this magnificent force from whom we ask so much.

Today's Special Operations Forces are the most capable, best prepared SOF in history. Their ingenuity, perseverance, spirit and skill continue to inspire and amaze. In significant ways, they have emerged from the shadows to make visible and dramatic impacts of great magnitude. It is my honor to have served within SOF for the last 37 years and to represent this extraordinary force today before this committee.

As always, our success is only possible because of your continued support and advocacy. Your approval of the President's Budget Request will help ensure our continued ability to address some of our Nation's most daunting security challenges.




United States Navy Biography

Admiral Eric T. Olson Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command

Admiral Eric T. Olson is the eighth commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. USSOCOM ensures the readiness of joint special operations forces and, as directed, conducts operations worldwide.

A native of Tacoma, Wash., Olson graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1973 and qualified as a Naval Special Warfare (SEAL) officer in 1974. He has served operationally in an Underwater Demolition Team, SEAL Team, SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team, Special Boat Squadron, and at the Naval Special Warfare Development Group. He has commanded at every level.

Olson has participated in several conflicts and contingency operations, and has served as a SEAL instructor, strategy and tactics development officer and joint special operations staff officer. His overseas assignments include service as a United Nations military observer in Israel and Egypt, and as Navy Programs officer in Tunisia. He served on the Navy staff as assistant deputy chief of Naval Operations (Plans, Policy, and Operations).



Olson earned a Master of Arts degree in National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School and studied at the Defense Language Institute. He is a Joint Specialty officer and Political-Military Affairs sub-specialist with emphasis on Africa and the Middle East. His awards include the Distinguished Service Medal and Silver Star.

Updated: 29 June 2009

STATEMENT OF
GENERAL JAMES N. MATTIS, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
COMMANDER
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
ON
THE POSTURE OF U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
3 MAR 2011

I. Introduction

A Command at War: U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) oversees operations alongside our allies, partners, and friends in a critically important region of the world. CENTCOM is engaged throughout the greater Middle East and South Central Asia across the full spectrum of warfare, standing against violent aggression and the tyranny of militant extremists, while contributing to the broader conditions for peace, stability, and prosperity.

Recognizing our Troops, Civilians, and Partners: Our troops and their families carry the brunt of physical and emotional burdens in this tenth year of war. Today, over 200,000 American troops and tens of thousands of civilians are deployed to the CENTCOM AOR. These men and women – all volunteers, no less – defend our freedoms with great courage in the face of a murderous enemy on harsh terrain. And our troops stand together with tens of thousands of our international partners, conducting coalition operations from the waters off Somalia to the mountains of Afghanistan, where the largest war-fighting coalition in recent history is engaged.

Operating in a Dynamic Region: The CENTCOM AOR is more dynamic than I have seen it since first serving there in 1979. Across our theater, we are required to maintain a degree of military flexibility such as we have seldom seen before. At the same time, given the financial realities in Washington, we require ourselves to exercise the utmost degree of stewardship over every penny we spend. To operate in this context

successfully, we seek to build strong military-to-military relationships with our partners, recognizing that CENTCOM's actions represent a tangible signal of America's continued, long-term commitment to the security and prosperity of this area.

Throughout the region, we see institutions of government responding to the aspirations of youthful populations. As the people in the region have made their voices heard, regional militaries have so far demonstrated their professionalism, exercising a capability that did not arise by accident or overnight. The strong security relationship between the U.S. and our partners is decades in the making and has helped them become the professional forces they are today – and in the process made our forces better as well. While we seek to understand the unique circumstances that our partners confront, CENTCOM remains committed to supporting the efforts of our military counterparts and to strengthening the security partnerships that have proven critical during this period of political unrest. We do this first by listening, learning, and understanding, and continue by engaging with our partners based on mutual respect and shared interests.

Our Mission: Overall, amidst these conditions, we remain committed to carry out our mission:

With our national and international partners, CENTCOM promotes security cooperation among nations; responds to crises; deters or defeats state and non-state aggression; supports development and, when

necessary, reconstruction in order to establish the conditions for regional security, stability, and prosperity.

Snapshot of Operations: Our main effort is Afghanistan – and progress there is indisputable, even if some of our success is fragile and reversible. We and our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and coalition partners are conducting a comprehensive yet focused counterinsurgency campaign to ensure Afghanistan does not once again become a sanctuary for transnational extremists. Our forces are part of a 49-nation international coalition, led by the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and united behind President Karzai's goal of transitioning the lead of security tasks from the international community to Afghan security forces by the end of 2014. In full partnership with the Afghan government, we are inflicting unprecedented damage on al-Qaeda (AQ) and associated extremist groups – a reality recently affirmed by President Obama's Afghanistan-Pakistan Annual Review. Moreover, we confound our enemies by demonstrating our unambiguous commitment to our long-term strategic partnership with Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, in Pakistan, we continue supporting Pakistan's military efforts against extremists operating from and threatening that country and Afghanistan, while contributing to the broader U.S. goal of growing our strategic partnership with Islamabad. The recent U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue and a number of development assistance programs sponsored by the Department of State are good examples of how the U.S. is attempting to build trust with the Pakistani people and government.

In Iraq, following seven years of hard fought gains, we are drawing down our troops as we transition full security responsibilities to our Iraqi partners. The enemy in Iraq is capable of dramatic attacks but has proven unable to muster a significant threat to the Iraqi government. In coordination with the U.S. Department of State, CENTCOM is standing up the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq to conduct sustained security assistance and cooperation activities with the government of Iraq. We are planning an organization manned and positioned to support the long-term U.S. objectives in Iraq as determined by the Iraqi and American governments, in order to best advance our civilian-led relationship for the future.

In the broader CENTCOM region, our forces are conducting a theater-wide campaign alongside our partners in pursuit of AQ and its extremist allies. Meanwhile, we remain continuously poised and postured to respond to crises and to conduct contingency operations, while continuing to forge partnerships in the region and increase the security capacity of our partners. We continue to rely on our capable and flexible amphibious forces. For example, over a 36 hour period last September, the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit delivered aid to the flood-ravaged people of Pakistan, provided close air support from the skies over Afghanistan, and rescued pirated crews in the Gulf of Aden. Three months later, two-thirds of our Marines Expeditionary Unit deployed to Afghanistan on three day's notice.

I. Overview of the CENTCOM AOR

A. Nature of the AOR

The CENTCOM AOR is comprised of 20 countries spanning over four million square miles in three diverse sub-regions from Egypt and the Levant, to the Arabian Peninsula (including the Gulf nations), and Central and South Asia. These regions are home to a half-billion people practicing all of the world's major religions and speaking more than 18 major languages. Several countries with economic challenges have burgeoning populations – 184 million people in Pakistan, 80 million in Egypt, and 77 million in Iran. In 12 of the 20 countries in the region, 30 or more percent of the population is between the ages of 15 and 24 (at 39 percent, Yemen ranks at the top in this category). In most of those countries, another 30 percent of the overall population is under 15. This youth bulge represents tomorrow's future leadership and the region's greatest challenge in terms of education, employment and expectations.

The CENTCOM AOR is a region of rich history, distinct culture, and great potential, encompassing the proud traditions of a wide variety of ethnic groups, including: Arab, Azeri, Baluch, Gilaki, Hazara, Kurd, Lur, Mazandarani, Qashqai, Pashtun, Persian, Talysh, Turkmen, and Uzbek, among others. The AOR contains more than half of the world's proven oil reserves and nearly half of its natural gas. As a result, the region contains some of the world's busiest trading routes linking Europe, Africa, and East Asia to the Gulf. This trade is essential to continued global economic prosperity and growth. The region's trading routes contain three of the world's major maritime choke points,

including the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez Canal, and the Bab al Mandeb Strait joining the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. But while the region contains abundant energy resources, supplies of water and the availability of arable land are limited and increasingly scarce.

B. External Influences on the CENTCOM AOR

The region retains its historical tradition as a social, economic, and cultural crossroads, attracting nations and non-state actors seeking to advance their interests and influence regional events. Among a host of external influences on the CENTCOM AOR, the most significant include:

- **Middle East Peace:** Lack of progress in achieving comprehensive Middle East peace affects U.S. and CENTCOM security interests in the region. It is one of many issues that is exploited by our adversaries in the region and is used as a recruiting tool for extremist groups. The lack of progress also creates friction with regional partners and creates political challenges for advancing our interests by marginalizing moderate voices in the region. As Secretary Gates noted in July 2010, “the lack of progress in the peace process has provided political ammunition to our adversaries in the Middle East and in the region, and...progress in this arena will enable us not only to perhaps get others to support the peace process, but also support us in our efforts to try and impose effective sanctions against Iran.” In December 2010, Secretary Clinton observed “the conflict between Israel and Palestine and between Israel and its Arab neighbors is a source of tension and an obstacle to prosperity and opportunity for

all of the people in the region.” By contrast, substantive progress on Middle East peace would improve CENTCOM’s opportunities to work with our regional partners and support multilateral security efforts. Speaking about the need for Middle East peace at the Manama Dialogue in December 2010, King Abdullah of Jordan observed “Our region will not enjoy security and stability unless we solve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and Arabs and Israelis find peace. The stakes are high. As a solution continues to elude us, faith in negotiations, as the only path to peace and justice, is eroding. And if hope is killed, radical forces will prevail. The region will sink into more vicious warfare and instability...threatening security far beyond the borders of the Middle East.”

- **Bordering Powers.** China, Russia, Turkey, and India – each of which lie outside but border the CENTCOM region – represent four great gravitational forces influencing various countries in the AOR. China pursues its many energy-related interests throughout the region, extending influence from its traditional partnership with Pakistan, to a \$3.5B investment in Afghanistan’s Aynak Copper Mine, to building pipelines for oil and gas from Kazakhstan to Turkmenistan. Chinese activities in the region may begin to compete with the regional interests of Russia, which maintains a network of security, economic, and social ties with Central Asian nations and beyond. India’s influence impacts the strategic calculations of Pakistan and, to some extent, virtually every other country in the CENTCOM AOR. Turkey increasingly asserts its interests in the region in keeping with its emergence as a considerable force within the international

community. All four of these nations have unique relations with Iran, affecting the international approach to the Iranian situation. We remain attentive to these dynamics as we seek to ensure that we work effectively across U.S. government and Combatant Command seams to improve our unity of effort.

- **Somalia.** State failure in Somalia has enabled extremist and criminal elements to proliferate and spread northward into the Horn of Africa and Yemen and other areas of the CENTCOM AOR. At the same time, widespread poverty in Somalia creates incentives for young men to pursue the lucrative enterprise of piracy. Additionally, lack of governance permits extremists to freely migrate to Yemen, providing opportunities to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). In the past year, the Somalia-based terrorist group al-Shabaab successfully maintained control of most of southern Somalia and radicalized factions of this group have sought alignment with AQ in the Arabian Peninsula and in Pakistan.

C. U.S. Interests in the Region

Given the centrality and volatility of the CENTCOM AOR, the U.S. and nations around the world retain significant interests in the region. Among others, significant U.S. interests in the region include:

- Security of U.S. citizens and the U.S. homeland
- Regional stability
- Promotion of effective and legitimate governance, human rights, the rule of law, and sustained economic growth and opportunity, and

- Free flow of commerce and trade within the region, through strategic maritime chokepoints, and via land-based trade routes to international markets

D. Threats to U.S. Interests in the Region

Violence, instability, and underdevelopment represent the primary threats to U.S. interests in the region. Some areas face uneven or even dismal economic development, often coupled with endemic corruption. Social and economic friction have led to or exacerbated a number of deep-rooted and long-standing disputes over territory, resources, and power, many of which remain unresolved due to a lack of adequate security arrangements on the local or national level. Some areas will face increasing competition for food, water, mineral deposits, oil, and other natural resources. The region is also defined by tensions and sectarian rivalries between many ethnic, tribal, and religious groups. Such conditions create the potential for broader violence, particularly in the absence of effective governance and indigenous security forces, ultimately giving rise to violent extremist organizations that have attacked us and our friends. We have seen the dangers present within a security vacuum, where institutions fail to facilitate mediation, partnership-building, and open dialogue between feuding groups, or to put down violent extremists.

E. Connecting Our Strategic Challenges

The challenges of the CENTCOM AOR are inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing – and thus cannot be treated separately. We have seen a symbiosis, for example, between extremist groups and other factions that, in aggregate, tend to strengthen each other and

which, if left unchecked, tend to threaten wider areas of territory and the stability of civilian governments. Areas in the CENTCOM region, especially those with a rapidly expanding population of youth, are left vulnerable to (and often become the victim of) a worsening spiral of conditions, whereby young people forego meager, but legitimate opportunities for employment and turn, instead, to a range of criminal activities, including piracy, arms smuggling, human trafficking, and narcotics – fueling violent extremist organizations bent on destroying the lives of innocent people. State and non-state actors operating with malign intent can readily exploit such conditions, with the most dangerous scenarios involving a mix of insufficient governance, weapons proliferation – especially Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) – the influence of hostile states, and the free flow of extremist elements across national borders as well as free range in cyberspace. In some cases, disenchantment with globalization’s efforts coupled with a desire to belong to a movement with a clarion call of purpose can provide the excitement for young men (and increasingly women) to take on a violent role in an extremist organization.

II. Principal Tasks

In light of these many challenges, we continuously assess our strategic and operational approaches in order to achieve our desired national interests of security, stability, and prosperity in the CENTCOM AOR. CENTCOM is focused on the following tasks:

- Supporting the Mission in Afghanistan
- Partnering with Pakistan
- Countering the Destabilizing Activities of Iran

- Enabling Transition in Iraq
- Strengthening Partnerships in Central Asia
- Building Partner Capacity and Pursuing Cooperative Activities
- Disrupting Violent Extremist Organizations
- Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Countering Piracy

Supporting the Mission in Afghanistan

Instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan: Afghanistan and Pakistan are inextricably linked, connected by a porous border region historically providing free movement and safe haven to groups traversing the Durand Line. The senior leadership of AQ and associated extremists groups – groups that are intent on carrying out attacks on innocent civilians worldwide – plan, prepare, and direct operations from this region, making it of critical interest to the security of the U.S. and our allies. Currently AQ in the border region is under the most intense pressure they have experienced since 2001.

A Clear Objective and a Sound Strategy: With our NATO and coalition partners, we are working to achieve our core goal of preventing Afghanistan from once again becoming a sanctuary for al-Qaeda and associated transnational extremist groups. President Obama's Afghanistan-Pakistan Annual Review affirmed the core elements of our strategy in Afghanistan, the first imperative of which is to improve the overall security environment and to reduce violence levels in Afghanistan. After regaining the initiative from the

enemy, our forces act as a bulwark behind which the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and the roots of Afghan governance can grow.

Aiming Toward a Common Strategic Vision: Our military objectives and strategy in Afghanistan support the developing strategic vision between the political leadership of the U.S. and Afghanistan, as reflected in Vice President Biden's comments alongside President Karzai in January: "It is not our intention to govern or to nation-build. As President Karzai often points out, this is the responsibility of the Afghan people, and they are fully capable of it. We stand ready to help you in that effort. And we will continue to stand ready to help you in that effort after 2014." Success in Afghanistan is an Afghan security force able to protect the people with a government that meets the needs of the people and prevents safe haven for international terrorists.

The Campaign Plan: We have increased efforts in virtually every facet of the comprehensive yet focused civil-military campaign in Afghanistan. As one part of that effort, we have executed an unprecedented pace of counterterrorist operations to capture or kill insurgents using enhanced intelligence largely enabled by conventional ground forces. Our efforts range from major combat operations (in Helmand and elsewhere, for example), special mission unit operations allowing no safe haven to the enemy, and concurrent bottom-up and top-down initiatives (exemplified by expanding village stability operations).

The breadth of our current operations squelches the enemy's ability to recuperate and threaten the Afghan people. Our forces have partnered with the Afghan security forces to increase their capabilities; to expand border security; to conduct robust detainee operations and rule of law activities; to address and counter corruption by working with the Afghan government to target criminal patronage networks; and to interdict the flow of illegal weapons and narcotics to deny criminals and insurgent groups a critical source of their operational revenue. We are capitalizing on our expanded security footprint in the winter months to retain the initiative, suffocate the enemy, and increase momentum into the start of the traditional fighting season. Ultimately, we are working to create an Afghanistan that is hostile to our enemies and denies them the support of the population, making it untenable for insurgents to return from their winter safe havens. This is the essence of counterinsurgency operations. While we will face tough fighting this spring, the enemy's situation continues to worsen day-by-day.

The Right Inputs: The overall international effort in Afghanistan has transformed from an economy of force mission 3 years ago to a focused and reinforced civil-military counterinsurgency campaign, largely assuming its full strength in September of 2010. U.S., Coalition, and partner nations have worked hard to apply the right mix of organizations, approach, and resources in Afghanistan. Last year at this time, we had less than 270,000 American, coalition and Afghan forces on the ground in Afghanistan. This year, we have more than 370,000 total security forces (American, coalition and Afghan) in the fight, and 109,000 Afghan security forces are projected to be added by this time next year. Beyond the additional organizations put in place on the ground in Afghanistan,

the Pentagon's Joint Staff Pakistan Afghanistan Coordination Cell and CENTCOM's Afghanistan Pakistan Center of Excellence are better organizing our resources at home and providing mission-critical reach-back support to deployed forces. The CENTCOM Center of Excellence will provide the cadre of regional experts for the long haul as we transfer to Afghan lead in 2014 and commit to a long-term partnership with Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Enemy Violence and Coalition Progress: Despite the enemy's efforts to disrupt progress in Afghanistan, we have achieved the major military objectives we set out to accomplish in 2010 and made considerable progress with respect to governance and development. As Secretary Gates noted after his December 2010 trip to Afghanistan: "The bottom line is that in the last 12 months, we have come a long way. Frankly, progress—even in the last few months—has exceeded my expectations." We recognize, however, that progress and violence coexist in this type of war. Our enemies continue to conduct attacks heavily focused on non-combatants and to intimidate the population and maintain relevancy, albeit decreasing, in newly-cleared areas. And enemy-initiated violence is increasingly localized. From November 2010 until 31 January 2011, 57 percent of the violence in Afghanistan has been concentrated in 12 of 401 districts. Notably, the key districts of Maiwand in Kandahar Province and Lashkar Gah in Helmand Province – which are critical to our efforts to link the Helmand and Kandahar security bubbles – are no longer among the top-12 most violent districts. The elevated levels of violence is less a reflection of increased insurgent capability and more the result of increased Afghan and ISAF operations in areas previously considered insurgent

strongholds. The enemy is not adapting well to this development. While we make progress, our enemies continue to make grievous mistakes, to include: purposefully killing innocent Afghans; leaders fleeing into Pakistan and leaving subordinates to fight; and killing nearly 5,000 Afghans in the first ten months of 2010 (more than three quarters of all civilian casualties in that period). We highlight the ruthless actions of the enemy, and in recent months Afghan leaders and human rights groups have stepped forward to condemn insurgent-initiated violence.

Road to Transition in 2014: We and our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other Coalition and ANSF partners are improving security for the Afghan population, increasing the size and quality of the ANSF, and supporting efforts to improve governance and development throughout Afghanistan. At last November's NATO Summit in Lisbon, we undercut a key pillar of the Taliban's strategy by affirming the long-term resolve of the U.S. and international community to accomplish the mission in Afghanistan. We are united in support of President Karzai's goal of Afghan forces assuming security responsibilities from the international community by the end of 2014. In partnership with the Afghan government, we are working toward President Obama's goal of beginning a drawdown of U.S. forces from Afghanistan beginning in July of this year at a pace determined by conditions on the ground. The process for identifying, assessing, and transitioning areas of Afghanistan is based on recommendations from the Joint Afghan-NATO *Inteqal* (Transition) Board (JANIB) to the Government of Afghanistan. ISAF is working closely with JANIB as we begin the process of transition and methodically move forward in our campaign.

ANSF Support: Most importantly in the security arena, our investment in the ANSF is working and the growth of the force is on track. The remarkable quantity growth of ANSF (rising by an unprecedented 70,000 personnel while facing a determined enemy) is now being matched by quality improvements in the force. NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan is supporting the efforts of the Afghan government to build leaders at all levels, to increase literacy, and to improve capability and training capacity. Combined, these programs increase the quality of the force, ultimately helping to reduce attrition, enhance recruitment, and contribute to sustainability. Meanwhile, we are helping the ANSF to overcome remaining challenges in the recruitment of medical staff and other enablers, as well as increasing the participation of females and recruiting more southern Pashtuns. In league with Admiral Stavridis (Commander, U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe), we are trying to reduce our shortage of trainers.

ANSF in the Lead: The ANSF is increasingly in the lead of operations in many areas of Afghanistan. In southern Afghanistan, the ANSF took the lead in mid-2010 for an operation in Malajat, Kandahar City – with support from ISAF for additional combat power, close air support and other enablers – resulting in the capture or killing of several dozen insurgents and the establishment of a new model for Afghan-led operations. The ANSF also provided well over half of the combat power for the latter phases of Operation Hamkari, clearing the insurgency’s most vital safe havens in southern Afghanistan. In northern Afghanistan, Afghan National Army and Police conducted joint operations throughout December 2010 with ISAF forces in northern Balkh Province, and Afghan

National Police have demonstrated considerable capacity by capturing insurgents and discovering caches of weapons in U.S.-Afghan partnered operations in Kunduz Province. Additionally, ANSF now leads security efforts in 14 of 15 of Kabul's districts, and have executed coordinated security plans for several events, including the June Consultative Peace Jirga, the July Kabul conference, August Independence Day events and the January seating of the Parliament all without incident, at odds with the insurgents' claims that it would seek to disrupt them.

Local Security Initiatives: Beyond national level security efforts, the Afghan government has steadily expanded the local security initiatives designed to squeeze extremist elements from their traditional safe havens and cut off their lines of communication. Clearing operations in key terrain districts have shifted operational-level momentum and altered village-level calculus in remote areas. Local elders in dozens of villages throughout Afghanistan have conducted jirgas to assume increased responsibility for their own security, and U.S. and coalition forces have supported the Ministry of Interior's efforts to fortify Afghan villages. The Afghan Local Police (ALP) program represents one of the most promising endeavors to wrest local areas from insurgent influence. The ALP and other Village Stability Operation initiatives work from the bottom-up and the top-down, connecting the support of local communities with the capacity of the central government and coalition partnerships. The Taliban has revealed their concerns that the ALP represents a direct threat to their existence and operational ability. Today, there are a total of 63 ALP sites – 24 of which the Ministry of Interior has site validated – and approximately 4,000 ALP are now assigned. These local efforts

buttress security in areas with limited ANSF presence, complementing the progress made elsewhere (and in ALP locations) by conventional ISAF and ANSF. Given the initial success of the ALP program, the Ministry of Interior wants to increase the program beyond the current projected number of 10,000 with our reinforced special operations forces providing oversight and mentoring.

Popular Support: Since 2003, AQ and the Taliban have tried with some success to expand their strength and influence in much of the country. In 2010, coalition and Afghan forces applied additional resources in all aspects of the campaign to change the security landscape in much of the country. As security improves in key areas and we are better able to protect the people, Afghanistan's population has increasingly supported efforts to bring development and basic services to their areas. In recent months, in particular, Afghan security forces have assumed more of the load in the fight, village elders have encouraged young men to join the Afghan police, and insurgents in several areas have begun to put down their weapons and integrate into society. Reintegration efforts are bearing fruit due to the concerted effort of the Afghan government both at the local and national level and the support of coalition forces (aided, of course, by the momentum in our campaign). In terms of reconciliation, the process is led by Afghans, with ISAF partnering with ANSF to set security conditions and dash the enemy's hopes of victory. These are progressive steps toward building irreversible momentum in our overall campaign.

Rule of Law Progress: Unlike our enemies, we continue to support the legitimate efforts of the Afghan government to improve the Rule of Law for Afghanistan's more than 29 million inhabitants. U.S. Forces-Afghanistan's Joint Task Force / Combined Interagency Task Force 435 and our Afghan partners have achieved considerable progress in the last year: transferring detainees to the state-of-the-art detention facility in Parwan; implementing transparent and robust internment processes; strengthening judicial guarantees for detainees; and expanding robust reintegration programs that include literacy and vocational training. Moreover, we have established robust efforts to combat corruption at all levels, even as we implement best practices to reduce the challenge of corruption in contracting and in every aspect of our campaign.

Infrastructure Initiatives: We are also pursuing infrastructure initiatives – for example, building roads, rail, and installing electrical grids and transmission lines – to capitalize on Afghanistan's potential as a Central Asian economic hub. A regional transport network facilitates the creation of private sector jobs and provides additional incentives for reconcilable elements of the insurgency to abandon the fight. Ultimately, such economic development reduces the need for U.S. forces and underpins long-term transition activities and is fundamental to a sound counterinsurgency campaign.

Congressional Support: Congressional leadership continues to play a critical role in enabling our efforts in Afghanistan, including the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), the authorization of an infrastructure program, and the Afghanistan Reintegration Program (ARP). Above all,

we rely on the ASFF to enable the eventual full transition of security tasks to a robust, trained ANSF capable of preventing the resurgence of insurgent safe havens in Afghanistan. In terms of the CERP, our Commanders on the ground continually comment that the CERP funds are invaluable in carrying out operations toward our strategic objectives in Afghanistan, undercutting the enemy's information operations and legitimacy. In 2010, CERP funded more than 8,300 projects, including, for example, transportation initiatives to improve freedom of movement throughout Afghanistan; agriculture production across Afghanistan involving the repair and improvement of irrigation canals and wells and providing farmers with higher-quality seeds and fertilizers; education projects such as the services of more than 200 local Afghan education outreach coordinators; and water and sanitation projects to install three high-production groundwater wells that will increase the accessibility of potable water to over 850,000 Afghans in Kandahar City. Apart from CERP, the new Afghanistan infrastructure program enables us to work together with the U.S. State Department to undertake high-priority infrastructure projects to address critical needs for Afghan security, governance, and development. The Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund will be the vehicle for the Defense Department's contribution to this integrated program. To enable our reintegration efforts, we continue to execute the ARP using funds in support for the government of Afghanistan's Peace and Reintegration Program.

Challenges Ahead: Much work remains to achieve our goals in Afghanistan. We face a resilient and determined enemy. The U.S. and the international community are positioned to favorably influence reform and synchronize Rule of Law development to

counter corruption within the Afghan government. Despite considerable progress in many areas in 2010, we recognize that there will be hard work ahead as we continue to fight along with our Afghan partners. But, by progressively and steadily executing our sound and validated strategy, I believe we can set the conditions to succeed in Afghanistan.

Partnering with Pakistan

Strategic Partnership: We recognize, of course, that any solution in Afghanistan must address the regional context. CENTCOM supports President Obama's goal of strengthening the U.S.-Pakistan strategic partnership through nascent yet improving military-to-military cooperation with Pakistan. And as Secretary Clinton and other leadership has noted, we must concentrate on the efforts Pakistan is taking. They have made very significant moves for going after the terrorist within their own country.

Over the past year, CENTCOM has strengthened and deepened our security cooperation with Pakistan by supporting our counterparts through CENTCOM's Office of Defense Representative-Pakistan (ODRP). ODRP is focused on assisting Pakistan's counterinsurgency efforts and this past year, led the U.S. interagency effort to provide disaster relief and Humanitarian Assistance to areas affected by the flooding. Additionally, in support of our long-term partnership with Pakistan, the CENTCOM Center of Excellence continues to deploy subject matter experts and provide unique

reach-back support to ODRP and Special Operations Command-Pakistan (Forward) in order to deepen analysis and to provide greater interagency fidelity on critical issues.

Threats in Pakistan: The potential for instability in Pakistan and the free movement of extremists in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region continue to pose a serious threat to regional and global security. Pakistan's tribal areas remain the principal sanctuary for al-Qaeda and a safe haven for other extremist groups, enabling them to threaten the population and coalition forces in Afghanistan, the people and government in Pakistan, and US and Western interests globally. The Afghanistan-Pakistan region also faces significant humanitarian concerns, including refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from decades of conflict. Additionally, roughly three million Afghan refugees still live in Pakistan, having been displaced by the Russian invasion into Afghanistan thirty years ago.

U.S. Humanitarian Assistance: Last summer's historic flooding in Pakistan was devastating – effectively equivalent in scope to flooding the entire East Coast of the United States. The U.S. responded to the floods by providing historic levels of Humanitarian Assistance. In all, U.S. rotary and fixed wing aircraft transported more than 40,000 displaced persons and delivered more than 26 million pounds of aid supplies to the people of Pakistan. U.S. helicopters flew more than 5,000 flight hours during the relief operation. The U.S. government provided Zodiac boat kits to the Pakistan Military for use in rescue operations, and provided eight 50 meter bridges to replace bridges swept away by the floods.

U.S. Support to Pakistan Military: On the security front, continued U.S. assistance is critical to enabling Pakistan to conduct effective counterinsurgency operations. Our forces carry out important partnership and engagement activities in support of the Pakistan military's improving counterinsurgency capabilities. As one important example, ODRP supports Pakistan's Frontier Scouts by providing training support and enabling further counterinsurgency operations. U.S. personnel also assist in the procurement of materials and equipment needed to build infrastructure in support of education, power, and food.

Pakistan Operations and Sacrifice: Pakistan's military has made impressive strides in combating militants in the FATA, while dealing with the effects of large-scale flooding that devastated much of the country. Over the last year, the enemy has lost battlespace to the Pakistan military's sustained efforts to move against the enemy strongholds. Pakistan's military has suffered more than 2,500 casualties (enduring more than 500 personnel killed in action and more than 2000 wounded in action) since the start of offensive operations against extremist elements in the KPak and the FATA. Since June 2009, the Pakistan Military has been involved in nearly continuous operations against militants in the KPak and the FATA. In total, the Pakistan Military has deployed upwards of 140,000 troops along Pakistan's western border with Afghanistan, a significant portion of which were drawn from Pakistan's border with India.

Regional Context: Our efforts to support Pakistan fit well within the broader regional context. We recognize that Pakistan's long-standing tensions with India are an important part of Pakistan's strategic decision-making calculus and military force posture. However, the presence of extremist sanctuaries in Pakistan significantly impacts our progress in Afghanistan, and with the Pakistan military's help we are taking important steps to improve cross-border operations. To address existing challenges along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, coordination between ISAF, Afghan security forces, and the Pakistan Military continues to improve, especially in the area of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). In Regional Command East, we are planning coordinated operations with the Pakistan Military. The Pakistan Military recently began clearing insurgent safe havens in Mohmand Agency across the border from Kunar Province – where insurgents have initiated a number of attacks to undermine recent security gains in Afghanistan. While Pakistan's operations are acting as the "hammer" on their side of the border, combined Afghan and ISAF forces are poised to defeat displaced insurgents, acting as the "anvil." Afghan Border Police and other combined security forces are manning outposts along the border and armed drones and close combat aviation are monitoring previously-identified mountain passes that insurgents will likely use as they seek sanctuary in Afghanistan.

Congressional Support: Multi-year security assistance is critical to our efforts in Pakistan. We appreciate continued Congressional support for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund, which serves as a key enabler of the Pakistan's military operations against extremists. The fund also provides for a range of partnership

activities with potentially transformational long-term effects on our relationship with Pakistan if they can be sustained.

Countering Iran's Destabilizing Activities

Iran's Destabilizing Activities: In view of Iran's destabilizing behavior and its persistent pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, the Iranian regime's current stance represents the greatest long-term threat to the region. Iran continues to rebuff efforts for engagement, further alienating and isolating itself from much of the rest of the region and from much of the international community. The actions of Iran's leadership squander the potential of its own educated populace and sacrifice the free exchange of ideas for the short-sighted interest of preserving an increasingly harsh and oppressive regime. Recently, Tehran equated the Egyptian protests to the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, making a fanciful and wholly false connection.

The Iranian regime relies on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) to extend influence and create instability across the region through persuasion, coercion, aggression, and targeted messaging. In fact, Iran continues to fund, arm, train, and equip a network of agents, surrogates, and proxies in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, Afghanistan and elsewhere across the region. In the pivotal region of the Levant, Iran seeks to expand its influence, in part by enabling Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas in order to weaken legitimate governance, limit economic development, and undermine security partnerships. Additionally, Iran delivers weapons and provides military training

to surrogates in an effort to target Israel (a nation Iran's leadership have vowed to destroy) and undercut the Middle East Peace Process. Of urgent concern, the IRGC-QF continues to equip militants in Iraq and Afghanistan that attack U.S. and coalition forces and undermine stability and governance in each of these countries. The recent January 2011 large caliber improvised rocket assisted mortar (IRAM) attack against U.S. forces in Iraq demonstrated Iran's malicious intent, and ability to escalate violence when they desire.

Iran's Pursuit of Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Weapons: In spite of a fourth round of United Nations sponsored sanctions, Iran appears determined to mature its nuclear weapons program – an ambition that could lead to the proliferation of illicit nuclear materials and spark a nuclear arms race in the region. Admiral Mullen reinforced this point in December 2010, observing: “I see Iran continuing on this path to develop nuclear weapons, and I believe that developing and achieving that goal would be very destabilizing to the region.” Iran also continues to expand and improve its arsenal of over 2,200 ballistic missiles and long-range rockets, and of approximately 225 fixed and mobile launchers, making it the largest ballistic missile and long-range rocket force in the Middle East. Iran can use these ballistic missiles and rockets, combined with increasing naval capabilities, to threaten global commerce.

Countering Destabilizing Iranian Activities and Keeping Peace with our Partners:

Firmly nested within the broader approach of the U. S. government toward Iran, CENTCOM is committed to countering Iran's destabilizing and coercive activities by building confidence with our partners in the region. As one example, we are working

together with our Gulf Cooperation Council partners and other nations to advance Integrated Air and Missile Defense. We also conduct activities to reassure our friends in the region that we are with them, preclude conflict, and deter Iran's destabilizing activities, while at the same time standing ready to conduct contingency operations.

Enabling Transition in Iraq

Looking Ahead in Iraq: The year ahead in Iraq presents a significant opportunity for the U.S. to solidify our long-term support to this keystone of regional stability. Our continued investment in Iraq is critical at this juncture, especially given the significant commitment we have made in lives and treasure. Now is not the time to be penny wise and pound foolish with respect to our mission in Iraq. Nested firmly inside the State Department's vision for an enduring U.S.-Iraq strategic partnership, CENTCOM is setting conditions to build on the shared sacrifices between our countries.

The Situation in Iraq: Iraq faces lingering ethnic and sectarian mistrust, tensions between political parties, and strained governmental capacity to provide basic services. Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) remains committed to undermining the Iraqi government and is capable of carrying out orchestrated, high profile attacks. Likewise, Iranian-inspired and equipped proxies continue to be a threat to Iraqi security and governance. While the security situation in Iraq is vastly improved since the peak of sectarian violence there in mid-2007 (violence is currently at all-time lowest levels since 2003), Iraq continues to face significant political, economic, and security challenges. Over the coming year,

several factors will determine Iraq's strategic direction, including the continuing development of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), the effectiveness of the nascent governing coalition, and the degree to which the country is influenced by Iran and threatened by AQI and Shi'a militia elements.

United States Forces-Iraq: From now until the end of this year, United States Forces-Iraq (USF-I) is continuing to partner with ISF during this historic period of transition. USF-I is undertaking a range of activities, foremost among these strengthening the ISF, transitioning security-related activities to Iraq and the U.S. interagency, and contributing to border management and ministerial development.

Establishing OSC-I: Through USF-I and in partnership with the Embassy country team, we are planning the initial stand-up of the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) in June of this year and expect it to be fully operational by this October. OSC-I is the cornerstone of our long-term mission to build partner capacity with the ISF. Additionally, the OSC-I will ensure the continuation of the military-to-military relationships that advise, train, and assist Iraqi Security Forces.

Iraq's Regional Integration: Iraq is now at a crossroads, poised to emerge as a positive force for the region after posing security challenges for its neighbors in past decades. Baghdad's selection as the location to host the Arab League Summit is a significant testament to Iraq's re-emergence in the region. Iraq also accepted Egypt's invitation to participate as an observer in CENTCOM's largest exercise, BRIGHT STAR. Jordan has

also exerted considerable positive influence in Iraq, training over 1,500 Iraqi Army officers, a number of Iraqi Air Force pilots, and posting a Jordanian defense attaché in Baghdad, in addition to hosting a program to provide extensive training to Iraqi police. Additionally, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait have aided the economic reintegration of Iraq into commercial activity and regularly scheduled transportation networks. Finally, the United Arab Emirates have trained Iraqi police officers in a joint program with Japan and Germany.

Iraq's constructive integration into the region will also help blunt destabilizing Iranian influence. If left vulnerable to Tehran's meddling, Iraq's sovereign future would be imperiled. At the same time that Iran reconstructs shrines, provides electrical power, and constructs schools and clinics in Iraq, Iran also undermines Iraqi political processes, facilitates violence against innocent Iraqi civilians, and provides lethal support to extremist groups targeting U.S. forces. For the U.S. and the international community, a sovereign Iraq under a stable and inclusive government is fundamental to regional stability.

Congressional Support: The support of Congress is critical to facilitating an effective transition in Iraq and in setting the conditions for an enduring U.S.-Iraq partnership. We seek Congressional support in obtaining the appropriate authorities in FY11 to begin immediate facility and site work for the OSC-I to reach full operating capability by October 2011. This is an area of critical need as we work to meet our aggressive timelines. The Iraqi Security Forces Fund critically enables Iraq to set a foundation for

its internal and external defense capabilities and provides Iraqi Minister of Interior police forces the training and equipment necessary to maintain internal security without assistance from the Ministry of Defense. Additionally, the ISFF enables Iraqi Army counterinsurgency capabilities and enhances cooperation between the government of Iraq and Kurdish police forces to ensure the consistency of police training and equipment standards throughout Iraq.

Strengthening Central Asian Partnerships

In Central Asia, CENTCOM is committed to strengthening relationships based on those shared interests and goals that we have in common with the Central Asian States of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. While our nations seek to improve broader economic conditions, CENTCOM is working with our partners to address the migration of extremists in certain areas of Central Asia and to counter the trade of illicit narcotics and human trafficking. Often these activities are interrelated.

Northern Distribution Network: Over the past two years, the development of a robust transportation network has been the most expansive area of cooperation with our Central Asian partners. Our collective agreements with Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan together constitute a logistical system termed the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) used to supply coalition operations in Afghanistan and taking pressure off the Pakistan lines of supply. This diverse network supports the transit of about half of all sustainment cargo to Afghanistan using a variety of sea, air, and land routes. The

remaining supplies are flown directly into Afghanistan, trans-shipped from sealift to airlift, or arrive via surface routes through Pakistan. Ultimately, the development and expansion of the NDN and its associated infrastructure will facilitate long-term economic growth in the region, representing a new opportunity for export of Central and South Asia raw materials and exchange of goods in the international marketplace.

Enhancing the Northern Distribution Network: Future NDN efforts are centered on partnering with certain countries to permit two-way flow of all types of wheeled vehicles and associated repair parts, and to increase shipment of cargo already permitted on the NDN (such as building materials). In terms of airlift, Manas Transit Center in Kyrgyzstan is a key Central Asian location that supports aerial refueling and passenger transit missions.

Building Partner Capacity and Pursuing Cooperative Activities

Cooperation Based on Shared Interests: The investment we make in our military-to-military engagement to build the capabilities of our partner nation's security forces is a critical component of the whole-of-government efforts in the region. These cost-effective efforts properly place security responsibilities in the hands of other sovereign governments and help to prevent conflicts and instability. With a long-term perspective, CENTCOM carries out partnership activities designed to build strong security capacity and relationships with our friends in the region.

Training: CENTCOM's training and exchanges with our partners are critical to our regional cooperation. CENTCOM has spearheaded the establishment of several Training Centers of Excellence hosted in partner nations, providing world-class mission-specific training for our allies and partners. Existing Centers of Excellence include an Air Warfare Center and an Integrated Air and Missile Defense Center in the United Arab Emirates (UAE); the King Abdullah Special Operations Training Center in Jordan; a NATO Partnership for Peace Combat Engineering and INTERPOL Counter Narcotics Center hosted in Kazakhstan; and an extensive array of associations with the other countries' Professional Military Education programs. Developing Centers include a NAVCENT Maritime Center hosted in Bahrain; a new Explosives Ordinance Disposal school with future Center of Excellence in Saudi Arabia; a proposed Near East South Asia (NESA) branch Center of Excellence in Bahrain; and the Gulf Region Communications, Computer, Command, and Control (C4) Center of Excellence hosted by the Bahraini Minister of Communications.

Exchanges: CENTCOM manages and conducts focused engagement programs with specific partner nations located throughout the AOR in support of the CENTCOM Theater Security Cooperation Plan. The objective is to understand our friend's views and to strengthen relationships and regional organizations to defeat violent extremist networks or situations that threaten the security interests of the region and the U.S. This includes capacity building. Additionally, CENTCOM Headquarters in Tampa, FL is host to over 193 coalition partners from 58 allied nations who make significant contributions

to our efforts, and receive invaluable experience interacting with both US forces and our allies.

Equipping: We also provide equipment and security assistance to our regional partners. These activities are among the most important practical steps we can take to demonstrate CENTCOM's enduring commitment to our partners – and to enable interoperable forces in the fight. I ask for continued congressional support of these efforts, including Global Train and Equip, as well as the many security assistance programs managed by the Department of State, including Foreign Military Financing, Foreign Military Sales, and IMET program. As Admiral Mullen noted in his testimony, our security assistance authorities are inflexible, and process are too cumbersome to effectively address today's security challenges in a timely manner. We encourage ongoing efforts to streamline the Foreign Military Financing process in order to cement training and sustainment relations with our critical partners. Accomplishing our mission at CENTCOM requires that we demonstrate our responsiveness to the requests of our partners when we alone should not carry the increasing costs of defending the international order.

Exercises: The final pillar of CENTCOM's partnership activities is our military exercise program. Exercises bolster interoperability between our forces and those of our partners. Each year, our Component Commands conducts more than 50 exercises with our partner nations in the region, including five overseen by CENTCOM Component Commands.

The Long-Term Value of our Exercise Program: The Combatant Commanders

Exercise and Engagement program provides critical support to CENTCOM joint training support, exercise and engagement requirements in support of national-level strategic priorities, readiness, and building partnerships within the AOR. Since the beginning of our operations in Afghanistan in 2001, CENTCOM has seen reductions in our exercise program due to ongoing combat operations within the AOR. As combat operations are completed or reduced, restoring sufficient funding levels is critical to support engagement activities with our partners. Without restored funding levels, CENTCOM could lose the advantages gained from a robust exercise engagement program, affecting future access and presence within the AOR and our Theater Security Cooperation Plan. In the interim, we will work imaginatively to make the best use of our exercise budget.

Disrupting Violent Extremist Organizations across the Region

Terrorists in False Religious Garb: The CENTCOM AOR is home to numerous violent extremist organizations (VEOs) comprising a network that, in its own right, represents a considerable threat to the U.S. homeland, U.S. and Western interests, and our allies in the region. The most significant of these is AQ. AQ seeks to impose its morally bankrupt ideology worldwide, and has regional affiliates across the Arabian Peninsula, in Iraq, the Maghreb, and in Somalia (al-Shabaab), with associates including Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Afghanistan Taliban, and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT). The growing cross-organizational cooperation between VEOs replicates mafia syndicates. The

organizational success of VEOs is frequently abetted by operating with near impunity in cyberspace.

Attacking VEOs: Along with our interagency and regional partners, CENTCOM continues to develop and implement theater-wide responses in the cyber and physical domains to disrupt and degrade militant networks. Over the past year, interagency efforts have resulted in designating al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and TTP as foreign terrorist organizations, obtaining a number of Treasury designations, Justice Department arrest warrants, Interpol notices, and placing over 100 individuals and entities on the U.S. Department of Commerce Denial List. Thanks to Congressional funding, the Defense Department Rewards Program has been used by commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan in Fiscal Year 2010 to capture more than 700 high-value individuals, insurgents and terrorists.

Preventing Security Vacuums: In the long-term, CENTCOM is working as a part of an integrated civil-military effort to prevent security vacuums that foment extremism and provide sanctuary to VEOs.

In Yemen, we have forged a tight bond between CENTCOM and our Embassy team in Sana'a to address the heightened threat of AQAP through long-term counterterrorism capacity-building. AQAP cemented its role as a viable and enduring threat to the U.S. Homeland by following-up the failed attempt to bomb Northwest Airlines flight 253 on 25 December 2009 with the "printer cartridge" parcel bomb plot in late October 2010.

Radical cleric Anwar al-Aulaqi publicly spearheads AQAP's campaign against the West, most notably by creating *Inspire* magazine in an effort to encourage Western-based Muslims and enable "lone wolf" style attacks.

In Lebanon, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) has had to navigate a challenging environment in which it does not yet have the monopoly of violence in much of the country. Our assistance has had substantive impact on the ground to include helping the LAF deploy four brigades to the south since 2006 in support of UNHCR 1701 – taking up space where Hezbollah had been. Additionally we have increased the capacity of the LAF Special Operations Forces that won a hard fought battle in 2007 against the al-Qaeda affiliated Fatah al-Islam movement in the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp in Northern Lebanon. The LAF sustained almost 200 killed and 2000 wounded in this operation. We value our close relationship with the Lebanese Armed Forces officer corps based on mutual respect and confidence. We continue to monitor the government formation process in Lebanon and will need to examine the final composition, policies, and behaviors of the next government before making any decisions regarding our relationship, including security assistance, while recognizing that continued engagement with the LAF is an important step in securing its status as an apolitical, non-sectarian, and professional organization.

In Syria, the regime's continuing support for terrorist organizations prevents CENTCOM from developing a military-to-military relationship and limits the scope of U.S. engagement. Consequently, we view the recent return of a U.S. Ambassador to

Damascus as a vital piece of our regional security architecture. We stand ready to support Ambassador Ford's diplomatic efforts to produce a more constructive relationship with Syria however we can, and we urge the Senate to confirm his nomination so that he may continue his important work beyond 2011.

Across the region, Theater Security Cooperation activities work against the ability of Iran and extremist elements to destabilize the region. Absent these programs, there is an increasing potential for security vacuums to arise and open the door to greater influence from Iran or violent actors. Our cooperative efforts with regional partners are essential to the long-term effort to address these threats.

Countering the Enemy's Use of the Information Environment: Our enemies are using every available lever of the information environment to promulgate and reinforce their ideology – and, in league with our interagency partners, CENTCOM is committed to countering the efforts of our adversaries. Our enemies operate within cyberspace (and its associated relevant physical infrastructure) to plan, coordinate, recruit, train, equip, execute and garner support for operations against the U.S., its allies and interests. The recruitment of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the unsuccessful Christmas Day Bomber, demonstrates our adversaries' ability to reach across borders, promote their narrative, and defy traditional military constructs to achieve their objectives. Clearly, in the information age, our military must adapt to this new domain of warfare. We ask for the support of Congress to fund our programs that attempt to counter the enemy in the information domain, just as we need funding to disrupt violent extremists in the physical domain.

CENTCOM Activities in the Information Environment: Consistent with the guidance provided by Secretary Gates last December, we conduct Operation Earnest Voice (OEV), which synchronizes and oversees all of our Information Operations activities. OEV seeks to disrupt recruitment and training of suicide bombers; deny safe havens for our adversaries; and counter extremist ideology and propaganda. Full funding of OEV supports all activities associated with degrading the enemy narrative, including web engagement and web-based product distribution capabilities. The effective engagement of our enemies in cyberspace requires the ability for us to conduct a full-spectrum of traditional military activities against them in that domain, including all aspects of Information Operations and Strategic Communication. We coordinate with the Joint Staff, the Interagency, the Intelligence Community, and our coalition partners to examine the adversary's use of cyberspace and identify techniques, tactics and procedures we can use to counter the adversary in the cyber domain.

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Risk of WMD: At CENTCOM, we recognize the serious risk and potentially devastating ramifications of a terrorist group, violent extremist organization, or state actor acquiring, proliferating, or using WMD. The nexus between extremist groups, malign state actors, and WMD remains a critical concern throughout the AOR and presents a clear danger to our partners, allies, and the U.S. homeland. CENTCOM remains vigilant in executing

the nonproliferation, counter proliferation, and foreign consequence management pillars of America's National Strategy for Combating WMD.

Countering Proliferation and Combating WMD: Countering the proliferation of WMD-related material is a fundamental aspect of CENTCOM's overall efforts to combat WMD. In concert with our regional partners, CENTCOM is involved with the interagency effort to curtail the ability of adversaries to finance the acquisition of WMD-related items and to deny malign actors the ability to transport suspect dual-use materials across national borders. To this end, CENTCOM plays a key role in containing Iran's evident drive for nuclear weapons in violation of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty by actively enforcing United Nations Security Council Resolutions that sanction the Iranian regime. CENTCOM also supports the interdiction and counter proliferation framework under the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). CENTCOM's mainstay program for Combating WMD engagement is the Cooperative Defense Program (CDP). The CDP provides a series of bilateral and multilateral engagement activities to improve U.S. and partner nation interoperability while strengthening partner nations' combating WMD capabilities.

Countering Piracy

The Real and Growing Threat of Piracy: Somali-based pirates continue to prey upon international shipping in the Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, and on the high seas well into the Indian Ocean. Pirates are using previously captured vessels as mother ships to conduct successful attacks as far as 1400 nautical miles from the Somali coast. The number of

successful pirate attacks has risen from 42 in 2008, to 51 in 2009, to 68 in 2010. Pirates now hold nearly 700 hostages for ransom. Multi-million dollar per ship ransoms ensure piracy remains a lucrative for pirates and others involved in this criminal enterprise.

A Model for International Cooperation: CENTCOM works with international partners to help patrol the region and to work with interagency partners to gain the prosecution of captured pirates (though we currently lack an international legal framework to detain and prosecute pirates). Piracy is a threat to all, and has promoted international military cooperation that serves as a model for cooperation in other areas. We acknowledge, however, that military action is only one part of the solution, but an essential element nonetheless. NAVCENT coordinates the efforts of over 25 contributing nations to combat piracy at sea and coordinates with European Union Task Force ATALANTA and NATO Standing Naval Maritime Group in Operation OCEAN SHIELD. Pakistan is currently in command of Combined Task Force 151, the international coalition to combat piracy. NAVCENT also hosts a monthly Shared Awareness and De-confliction (SHADE) conference in Bahrain to foster multi-national cooperation and to encourage maritime industry to adopt best practices to defend vessels against piracy. In addition to Coalition, NATO, and EU representation, the conferences also include civilian maritime organizations, and delegates from China, Russia, Japan, and India.

III. Strategic Approach

Many of our challenges are interconnected and require comprehensive long-term solutions, prompting us to adopt an overall approach that is cooperative, integrated, and enduring. As we undertake a diverse range of operations and activities, three principles guide our efforts:

Adopting Cooperative Approaches by Partnering Based on Shared Interests: First, we must adopt cooperative approaches to solving shared challenges. America's strength and security depends on our ability to help our friends in the region defend themselves, underscoring the importance of CENTCOM's initiatives to build partner capacity and pursue bilateral and multilateral initiatives. Starting from our shared interests, we must capitalize on the comparative advantages of all participating nations – for instance, by taking advantage of unique geography or specialized capability. Ideally, such efforts would combine the political, economic, and security spheres of those who choose to participate, strengthening the whole to be greater than the sum of the parts. Our efforts to develop effective solutions for Integrated Air and Missile Defense in the Gulf Region represent a significant example of the kind of cooperative efforts that are necessary to deter and defeat our common threats. As mentioned above, the international coalition to counter piracy in the Somali Basin is a model for multilateral cooperation in the region that not only addresses piracy but also offers opportunities for engagement in other areas.

Our ability to cooperate with our partners depends to a great extent on trust. As a consequence of the confidential diplomatic and military reporting made public by Wikileaks, we must patiently strengthen trust with our partners over time. We are up

front with our partners about this episode – which has informed our enemies about supportive leaders as well as our tactics, techniques, and procedures. We remain committed, as ever, to forthright communication in pursuit of our shared objectives. We are reinforcing our efforts to ensure the security of our communications and focusing on enhancing mutually reinforcing objectives with allies and partners.

Integrating Our Efforts by Implementing Civil-Military Solutions: Second, the wars we are fighting today require intensively integrated, comprehensive approaches from the highest to the lowest levels, embracing diplomatic, information, military and economics in an interwoven effort that builds synergy. Promoting security and stability in the CENTCOM AOR cannot be achieved through military means alone. We must therefore look beyond just the traditional application of military power and integrate all elements of national power to address our many challenges. CENTCOM's experience has shown that military might alone is not sufficient to deal with the challenges we confront along with our partners. Diplomacy and Development are just as vital as Defense in securing our national interests. CENTCOM support efforts to address the underlying conditions of instability that fuel current conflicts. Successful application of these instruments of national power, in turn, depends on our ability to achieve harmony within our civil-military relationships. As such, it is a security concern for us when diplomatic posts go unfilled in the region.

The overlapping forces at work in the CENTCOM AOR – those originating from within and outside the region – require exceptional cross-Combatant Command cooperation and

coordination. We have achieved progress across AOR geographic seams, exemplified by cooperation with PACOM on matters dealing with China and India and cooperation with EUCOM on Russia, Turkey, and the MEPP. CENTCOM and PACOM regularly synchronize efforts to combat mutual challenges such as piracy, proliferation of WMD, and support to countering violent extremist organizations. Additionally, we continue to work closely with AFRICOM to address the state-failure in Somalia, as well as share critical assets to meet time-critical force requirements. Together we have established a counter-piracy Joint Operating Area in the Somali Basin. We team with U.S. Cyber Command to support global relationships in cyberspace and U.S. Northern Command to protect U.S. borders and domestic security. In all, the cross-Combatant Command effort is going very well.

Supporting Enduring Solutions by Demonstrating Long-term Commitment: Finally, our approach to the region must be enduring. Following through with our long-term commitments in the AOR improves the depth, breadth and quality of our relationships in the region and increases the likelihood of cooperation at the outset. In this region of the world, we are judged by our actions, not words. Individual instances of demonstrated trustworthiness on our part resonate throughout the region for decades. Enduring solutions to the problems that we face also depend on stability, steady economic growth and development in governance. To that end, CENTCOM supports our partners' long-term efforts to grow economically and to develop effective and legitimate institutions of government.

V. Resourcing the Fight

Beyond the critical funding authorities highlighted above, accomplishing our mission requires that we fully and efficiently resource the following critical enablers. We appreciate Congressional support to provide our warfighters on the battlefield with the tools they need to accomplish their challenging missions. As we adapt to a thinking adversary, we recognize the need to accelerate our acquisition processes to enable us to out-maneuver our enemies. We also recognize the obligation to be good stewards of our nation's monetary resources. CENTCOM has established stringent control mechanisms to execute our fiscal authorities and to apply the most effective oversight possible of all of our programs.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

An Indispensable Tool: There is a considerable and justifiable appetite for ISR capabilities in the CENTCOM AOR. In Afghanistan, persistent ISR capabilities represent one of the most important and effective force multipliers and contribute directly to protecting our troops from the threat of Improvised Explosive Devices through ISR. In cooperation with the ISR Task Force, we have augmented ISAF forces with a greatly increased capability to counter the Taliban and understand the environment in which we operate. Additionally, as we drawdown our forces from Iraq, we are adjusting the apportionment of ISR in a measured way to ensure that we retain adequate capability to support our force in Iraq while we provide the necessary resources to Afghanistan and

elsewhere. We continue to refine our ability to fully integrate U.S. and coalition ISR to deny transnational extremist organizations safe haven, training bases, or staging areas to conduct attacks.

Enhancing ISR Capabilities: We greatly appreciate the support of Congress and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions and Technology in meeting the ongoing demand for more rapidly delivered ISR collection, exploitation, and dissemination capabilities. Interrelated with our ISR needs, we recognize a need to further enhance integration and synergy between aviation and ground elements that is critical to Combat Air Support and counterinsurgency doctrine. We support a limited objective experiment to refine the requirement for a manned, armed ISR asset attuned to the unique challenges of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Continued investments in ISR technology, infrastructure, architecture, tools, and personnel (particularly trained ISR managers) help us to build on the significant gains we have achieved in the CENTCOM AOR – and enable us to use the arsenal of ISR capabilities currently in the field.

Critical Intelligence Capabilities: Human intelligence and counterintelligence are just as important as technical solutions to remotely gather intelligence, especially in the conduct of operations in wars among the people. Such intelligence activities are inherently government functions that require a long lead time to develop. CENTCOM is posturing for sustained application of our human intelligence capabilities to afford us insights into adversary plans and intentions. CENTCOM is posturing for sustained application of our human intelligence capabilities to afford us insights into adversary plans and intentions.

We are also reshaping our counterintelligence forces to face threats from hostile foreign intelligence services and VEOs that employ sophisticated cyber techniques and trusted insiders to penetrate our networks and compromise our operations.

Improving Force Protection and Countering Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)

The Enemy's Weapon of Choice: Now and for the foreseeable future, the enemy is using Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) to kill and maim our troops. These devices remain the greatest risk facing U.S. and Coalition forces deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as a threat to U.S. interests and regional stability throughout the CENTCOM area of responsibility. In Afghanistan, IED attacks account for more than 60 percent of the U.S. and Coalition force casualties, though IED casualties have steadily decreased over the past six months. The flow of lethal aid, migration of IED technology and materials, and development of new tactics techniques and procedures represents a global threat. Homemade explosives, which now account for an estimated 85% of all IEDs, coupled with the proliferation of commercially available IED materials and commercial grade explosives make them relatively cheap and easy to build and employ.

Ongoing Interagency C-IED Efforts: CENTCOM counters the threat of IEDs by working together with all Services and the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). The Services continue to equip U.S. and coalition forces with the latest technology to mitigate and defeat IEDs. Thanks to Congress and the Department of Defense, CENTCOM and our national and international partners have delivered and fielded an

unprecedented number of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected family of vehicles throughout Afghanistan. These vehicles have proven critical to safeguarding the tactical mobility of our warriors in harm's way. CENTCOM, in conjunction with the C-IED Senior Integration Group, and JIEDDO have recently fielded a variety of C-IED enablers that have proven to save lives on the battlefield. As a result, we are finding and clearing more IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan – at a rate above 60 percent for the last 12 months and 70 percent over the last quarter of 2010. These improvements are due in part to more tips from the population, better tactics, and additional enablers, including the effective use of additional ISR provided by the Services to counter this threat.

Attacking the Network: We are going after the entire IED network and insurgent supply lines. Many of our recent successes have come in the use of persistent systems emplaced throughout significant threat areas to help develop insights into the local area. We are concurrently protecting the force using trained dogs, mine rollers, jammers, and handheld devices; the Marines in southern Afghanistan now employ nearly one dog per squad, and soon we will have more than 200 working dogs in Afghanistan. Along with the Services, JIEDDO, and academia we will continue to do everything in our power to ensure our service members and coalition partners have the best technology and training available to defeat the IED threat.

Supporting Additional C-IED Efforts: We continue to call on the defense industry to provide innovative solutions to counter the threat of IEDs. Critical airlift and airdrop sorties dramatically reduce the number of service members exposed to the IED threat. In

fact, the number of pounds of supplies airdropped in Afghanistan has doubled every year since 2005, with an astonishing recovery rate of better than 98 percent. Not all critical movements can be completed by air however. We ask that Congress continue to fund those organizations that provide research and development for the evolution of new and existing counter-IED systems and technologies, especially in areas of pre-detonation, IED stand-off detection, and non-lethal weapons to deny the enemy the ability to deliver or emplace IEDs. We also ask that Congress provide the flexibility to rapidly and proactively counter new, emerging, and future threats that are either present on the battle field or potential threats that represent vulnerability and would be difficult to counter.

Unity of Command and Control of C5 Networks

Coalition, Command, Control, Communications and Computer (C5) networks that meet the challenging demands of our troops in theater are essential to CENTCOM. Currently, the command and control of networks available to our deployed forces is divided among Services, Agencies and Combatant Commands, resulting in degraded and delayed actions that have allowed our adversaries to exploit this fundamental cyber shortfall for too long. One bright network spot, however, is the Afghan Mission Network, which enables US and Coalition forces and civilians to remain connected and synchronized on the battlefield and linked to supporting assets throughout the world. We seek Congressional support to enable effective integration and extension of networks to wherever we fight, from maritime environments to the aerial layer and over rugged mountainous terrain.

VI. Conclusion

In closing, we greatly appreciate the support of Congress on behalf of America's military personnel serving in the CENTCOM region. The stalwart Americans in today's force have been fighting two wars for nearly ten years in the CENTCOM AOR. With remarkable spirit, they look beyond the ambiguity and longevity of today's complex, demanding operations and answer their country's call. Their courage, character and commitment in the face of repeated deployments are inspiring. As their Commander, I am proud to serve alongside them. Thank you very much for your unflagging support of our troops in harm's way and their families here at home.



Commander James N. Mattis
U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM)



Gen. James N. Mattis serves as commander, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), located in Tampa, FL.

Gen. Mattis has commanded at multiple levels. As a lieutenant, he served as a rifle and weapons platoon commander in the 3rd Marine Division. As a captain, he commanded a rifle company and a weapons company in the 1st Marine Brigade.

As a major, he commanded Recruiting Station Portland. As a lieutenant colonel, he commanded 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, one of Task Force Ripper's assault battalions in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. As a colonel, he commanded 7th Marines (Reinforced).



Upon becoming a brigadier general, he commanded first the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade and then Task Force 58, during Operation Enduring Freedom in southern Afghanistan. As a major general, he commanded the 1st Marine Division during the initial attack and subsequent stability operations in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

In his first tour as a lieutenant general, he commanded the Marine Corps Combat Development Command and served as the deputy commandant for combat development. He also commanded the I Marine Expeditionary Force and served as the commander of U.S. Marine Forces Central Command. Previous to this assignment, he served as both NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Transformation from 2007-2009 and as commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command from 2007-2010.

Gen. Mattis, a native of the Pacific Northwest, graduated from Central Washington State University in 1972. He is also a graduate of the Amphibious Warfare School, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and the National War College.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

MARCH 3, 2011

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON

Mr. WILSON. In 2004, SOCOM chose the SCAR as its new individual carbine from among nine vendors and a dozen submissions. Over the following six years, SOCOM shepherded the SCAR program through continued RDT&E while the awardee invested \$30M of its own capital in continuing to develop the program. Last summer SOCOM awarded full rate production.

Given that the SCAR meets the established requirement, why isn't SOCOM procuring the SCAR family of weapons in the quantities it originally intended and what has led to these delays in the acquisition of the system—were there mistakes in the acquisition process or is it a budget issue?

Admiral OLSON. Following extensive testing and in-theater Combat User Assessments, USSOCOM decided to pursue full fielding of the MK17 (7.62mm) rifle, the MK13 (40mm) grenade launcher, and the MK20 (7.62mm) Sniper Support Rifle variants. The vendor also developed a Common Upper Receiver (CUR) kit that will allow the MK17 to fire 5.56mm ammunition by changing out several components of the base rifle. This allows SOF operators to fire multiple calibers of ammunition from the same base weapon; an original objective requirement of this program. USSOCOM began procurement of the CUR kit beginning this FY. The stand-alone MK16 (5.56mm) rifle did not provide enough of a performance advantage over the service-common M4A1 (5.56mm) rifle to be considered a SOF-unique capability. The total required quantity of weapons was adjusted based on the results of the Combat User Assessments.

Mr. WILSON. If a lack of funding contributed to SOCOM's decision to not procure the SCAR at the original intended quantities, at what point did SOCOM know that it would not have the necessary funding to procure this weapon system?

Admiral OLSON. Lack of funding did not contribute to USSOCOM's decision.

Mr. WILSON. SOCOM competed a new carbine in order to field a weapon that allows our Special Operators to more effectively engage a target at greater distances. Have there been significant changes, over the last several years, in the way we are engaging the enemy that would cause SOCOM to revert back to their status quo capability?

Admiral OLSON. The MK17 rifle provides SOF operators the capability to engage enemy targets at greater distances than the M4 rifle or MK16 rifles.

Mr. WILSON. Did SOCOM, at any time, reprogram money from the SCAR program? If so, was Congress informed in a timely manner and what effect has that action had on your budget for the SCAR since the reprogramming action?

Admiral OLSON. Yes, \$26M of SCAR procurement funds were reprogrammed from the SCAR program and put towards higher command priorities. Yes, Congress was notified in a timely manner. The reprogramming did not negatively affect the SCAR budget due to the elimination of the MK16 procurement.

Mr. WILSON. What is the total amount of Major Force Program (MFP)-11 dollars does SOCOM spend from its own funding in order to make the Army-provided M4 SOF specific? How does this amount of MFP-11 dollars compare to the total cost of a SCAR?

Admiral OLSON. NAVSOC and AFSOC procure and sustain the M4A1 from the Army using Navy and Air Force MFP-2 dollars. USSOCOM does not procure or sustain the M4A1 with MFP-11 dollars.

Mr. WILSON. Did SOCOM conduct a total life-cycle cost comparison between the M4 and SCAR before making its decision to not procure the SCAR at the original intended quantities?

Admiral OLSON. No. USSOCOM decided not to procure the MK16 based on the decision that it did not provide a SOF-unique capability over the Service-common M4 and that more appropriate uses for MFP-11 funds existed within the command's priorities.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SUTTON

Ms. SUTTON. Recent developments in Northern Africa and the Middle East over the last few weeks have prompted significant discussion of our foreign policy objectives, as well as the importance of seeking stability in the region. At this particularly volatile time there also remains significant concern about Iran's nuclear progress.

How do you assess the internal stability of the Iranian regime in light of recent political change and uncertainty in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere? Do you believe this has had any impact on the likely time frame for when Iran could obtain a nuclear weapon?

General MATTIS. We do not assess that the larger Middle East unrest has significantly increased the threat to Iranian regime stability. Iranian public discontent, however, remains and rifts persist among the regime elite, as highlighted by a recent dispute between Supreme Leader Khamenei and President Ahmadi-Nejad over the firing of the Minister of Intelligence. Since February 2011, the regime has effectively eliminated opposition activity and placed its symbolic leaders, Mir-Hosein Musavi and Mehdi Karrubi, on indefinite house arrest. The Supreme Leader remains firmly in charge of Iran's nuclear portfolio, and Iran's nuclear program has not been impacted by internal stability concerns.

Ms. SUTTON. Our operations in Afghanistan certainly require significant logistical support to succeed, and we've had to rely heavily on Pakistan for much of this support. One aspect of sustaining this support is an alternative in the form of a Northern Distribution Network for transporting non-military goods to Afghanistan. What needs to be done to ensure the safety and viability of this network? What progress has been made so far and what issues do you foresee for the future?

General MATTIS. The Northern Distribution Network (NDN) supports the movement of military cargo via commercial shipments on standard shipping routes. The cargo is containerized and looks like all other commercial cargo moving along the same shipping routes which greatly contributes to the safety and viability of the network. Over 43,000 containers have transited the NDN en route to Afghanistan with no reported pilferage or attacks. Global commercial carriers, under contract with U.S. Transportation Command, provide the Department a commercial channel to ensure reliable and repeatable deliveries. The NDN is a sound alternative to other distribution routes.

Ms. SUTTON. You discussed in your prepared statement SOCOM's utilization of female Cultural Support Teams, as well as the importance of the special operations forces (SOF) working with indigenous groups and the local population to accomplish their mission. As you note, this is demanding, high-risk, and valuable work that helps our military achieve their goals. As you know there are currently military occupational specialties open to women in the general purpose forces, such as aviation, that are not open to women in special operations forces. Apart from the female Cultural Support Teams, how do you see the roles and opportunities for women evolving in a special operations capacity? As other parts of the force reexamine the role of women in combat, what can you share about similar efforts in SOCOM?

Admiral OLSON. USSOCOM views the roles and opportunities for women in a special operations capacity to continue to follow established Department policies. Women will continue to perform a supporting role to units whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground. Women may be attached to these units, but not assigned, in order to perform Combat Support and Combat Service Support missions. At this time, USSOCOM is not reexamining the role of women in combat.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER

Mr. TURNER. Are you seeing any impacts of the CR on the battlefield?

Admiral OLSON. There was minimal impact of the CR. The department was very supportive and provided adequate CR authority to support SOF deployed operations.

Mr. TURNER. Are you concerned about the Department's plans to reduce end strength? If so, please share those concerns.

Admiral OLSON. In order to maintain SOCOM's unique mission capabilities, the Command must have access to the Services for the brightest and most talented service members within the Department. Essentially, the men and women within the Army, Navy, USMC, and Air Force are SOCOM's recruiting pool. End strength reductions potentially affect the availability of future SOF Operators. Additionally, the Command monitors Service capabilities that assist in making SOCOM successful via regular SOCOM-to-Service talks. Force structure and end strength reductions are always addressed within the context of impact to the Department and the wider national defense enterprise.

SOCOM is directly dependent upon the Services to provide support to SOF forces. The level of support required is reflected in the Service levels which directly affect SOF mission capability and critical skill requirements (high demand/low density) that are not organic to SOCOM. Foremost within among all Service capabilities is their ability to Support and Sustain SOF (CONUS and OCONUS).

Mr. TURNER. In 2006 General James Jones (then the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe) stated that "the Achilles' heel of Afghanistan is the narcotics problem. I think the uncontrolled rise of the spread of narcotics, the business that it brings in, the money that it generates is being used to fund the insurgency, the criminal elements, anything to bring chaos and disorder." He further emphasized that the narcotics trade "funds the corruption in the police, the corruption in the local governments, corruption at high levels of government. And it actually is so pervasive that it's preventing the legitimate economy of Afghanistan from developing apace."

Last year UNODC (The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime) published a study showing that opium production has rapidly increased over the past five years. If you follow General Jones' reasoning, this would indicate that the enemy's funds are growing. What actions are we taking to reduce the opium production? Has it been successful?

Admiral OLSON. This is an issue that should be answered by the Combatant Commander, General Mattis, as he has the responsibility for this area of interest by the committee.

Mr. TURNER. Has the new Government of Iraq given any indication that it is interested in retaining a U.S. troop presence beyond 2011? If so, how many troops are we talking about and what functions would they undertake? If not, do you envision any sort of additional formal defense commitments between the United States and Iraq to provide protection for Iraq from external threats until they have such a capability?

Admiral OLSON. This is an issue that should be answered by the Combatant Commander, General Mattis, as he has the responsibility for this area of interest by the committee.

Mr. TURNER. What conditions will you consider, in July 2011, to determine the extent of a U.S. troop drawdown? When do you expect to reach the next "decision point," after July 2011, about possible further reductions in U.S. troop commitments?

Admiral OLSON. This is an issue that should be answered by the Combatant Commander, General Mattis, as he has the responsibility for this area of interest by the committee.

Mr. TURNER. What can be done to enhance the Northern Distribution Network?

Admiral OLSON. This is an issue that should be answered by both of the Combatant Commanders, General Mattis and ADM Stavridis, as they have shared responsibility for this area of interest by the committee.

Mr. TURNER. How do you assess the threat of Iranian supported extremism and terrorist organizations to U.S. interests and allies in the region?

Admiral OLSON. This is an issue that should be answered by the Combatant Commander, General Mattis, as he has the responsibility for this area of interest by the committee.

Mr. TURNER. Are you seeing any impacts of the CR on the battlefield?

General MATTIS. Yes, the CR had some impact on support activities, but did not affect the performance of combat units. To limit the CR's impact on our mission, we relied in some cases on incremental funding for our annual contracts. We also developed plans to address potential funding shortfalls absent CR extension or budget approval.

Mr. TURNER. Are you concerned about the Department's plans to reduce end strength? If so, please share those concerns.

General MATTIS. No. CENTCOM is prepared to successfully operate with reduced military end strength.

From the warfighter's perspective, it will be critical to transition seasoned active-duty military members into the Ready Reserve as end strength numbers are reduced. The Reserve and Guard provide an immediate surge capability and are combat multipliers that serve as a critical component of our all-volunteer force. The Services need continued support to retain this talent through benefits, incentives and appropriate Selected Reserve numbers in order to create sufficient dwell time between deployments. Reserve forces provide the "reach-back" capability necessary as our sight-picture evolves and as foreseen and unforeseen national-security scenarios emerge.

Mr. TURNER. In 2006 General James Jones (then the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe) stated that "the Achilles' heel of Afghanistan is the narcotics problem. I think the uncontrolled rise of the spread of narcotics, the business that it brings

in, the money that it generates is being used to fund the insurgency, the criminal elements, anything to bring chaos and disorder.” He further emphasized that the narcotics trade “funds the corruption in the police, the corruption in the local governments, corruption at high levels of government. And it actually is so pervasive that it’s preventing the legitimate economy of Afghanistan from developing apace.”

Last year UNODC (The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime) published a study showing that opium production has rapidly increased over the past five years. If you follow General Jones’ reasoning, this would indicate that the enemy’s funds are growing. What actions are we taking to reduce the opium production? Has it been successful?

General MATTIS. The U.S. Government and other international partners, including the Afghans, are reducing poppy cultivation and opium production in Afghanistan. UNODC’s Afghanistan opium survey reported poppy cultivation of 123,000 hectares in 2010, representing a significant reduction from the recorded high of 193,000 hectares in 2007. Moreover, UNODC’s April 2011 winter poppy assessment anticipates another small decrease in 2011 opium production.

Our interagency counternarcotics strategy supports a comprehensive set of actions to reduce opium production. In 2010, a pre-planting public information campaign was executed which targeted 44 provincial conferences and district jirgas in an effort to dissuade farmers from growing poppy in favor of licit crops. In concert with the public information campaign, the Good Performers Initiative awarded a total of \$25.7M to provinces that achieved poppy free status, reduced poppy cultivation by 10 percent or more, and/or demonstrated exemplary counternarcotics progress. Complementary efforts in law enforcement and justice reform have proven equally important in reducing opium production. DoD supports capacity building within the Counternarcotics Police-Afghanistan and specialized units such as the DEA-sponsored National Interdiction and Special Investigative Units. The Afghan Counternarcotics Tribunal and Criminal Justice Task Force are also in place to detain and prosecute offenders. Finally, USAID is heavily invested in activities that promote crop substitution and create viable markets for economic growth.

Mr. TURNER. Has the new Government of Iraq given any indication that it is interested in retaining a U.S. troop presence beyond 2011? If so, how many troops are we talking about and what functions would they undertake? If not, do you envision any sort of additional formal defense commitments between the United States and Iraq to provide protection for Iraq from external threats until they have such a capability?

General MATTIS. The Government of Iraq has not requested a U.S. troop presence beyond 2011. U.S. Forces in Iraq operate under two approved diplomatic agreements. The first agreement is a Security Agreement which dictates that all U.S. forces will be removed from Iraq by December 31, 2011. The second agreement is a Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA). This second agreement describes in broad terms the longer term strategic relationship between our two countries concerning security assistance and security cooperation. In addition to setting the stage for our enduring partnership, the SFA describes how we intend to normalize our relationship with Iraq with strong economic, cultural, and diplomatic ties.

Mr. TURNER. What conditions will you consider, in July 2011, to determine the extent of a U.S. troop drawdown? When do you expect to reach the next “decision point,” after July 2011, about possible further reductions in U.S. troop commitments?

General MATTIS. The conditions-based troop drawdown will be closely linked to the capacity of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to assume the lead for security tasks with less assistance from International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF). The President will decide the extent of the July 2011 troop drawdown based on recommendations from his military chain-of-command, including the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, myself, and GEN Petraeus. As always, I will continue to provide my best professional military advice regarding possible further reductions.

Mr. TURNER. What can be done to enhance the Northern Distribution Network?

General MATTIS. Enhancing the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) requires increased host nation permissions for bi-directional ground transportation of unqualified cargo to include wheeled armored vehicles. Additionally, improvement of key en route infrastructure would also bolster the NDN. This endeavor requires interagency support to work directly with the host nation governments. The State Department conducts the majority of negotiations with host nations on behalf of CENTCOM and U.S. Transportation Command, and we are actively working with them.

Mr. TURNER. How do you assess the threat of Iranian supported extremism and terrorist organizations to U.S. interests and allies in the region?

General MATTIS. Within the United States Central Command Area of Responsibility, threatening activity from Iranian-backed proxies is prevalent and increasing. Iran is exploiting vacuums and relationships in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, Egypt, Bahrain, and other Gulf states.

These threats are enduring and will persist after the anticipated draw-down of U.S. forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan. There is a high potential for miscalculation and provocations with Iran as our forces operate throughout the Central Command region.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER

Mr. SHUSTER. To accommodate this growth in demand and address ongoing concerns with Pakistani supply lines, U.S. planners opened the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), a commercially based logistical corridor connecting Baltic and Black Sea ports with Afghanistan via Russia, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The U.S. Transportation Command reports that about one-half of the non-lethal surface shipments to Afghanistan are being transported via the NDN. The importance of this route was illustrated in October 2010 when Pakistan closed a key border crossing into Afghanistan. The NDN South, beginning in Turkey or the European Union and moving on to the Georgian Black Sea port of Poti. Those supplies are then transported by rail to Baku, Azerbaijan, and across the Caspian Sea to the Kazakh ports of Atyrau and Aktau. Cargo then moves on to Uzbekistan and finally Afghanistan. The overall view among Georgian and Azerbaijani decision makers is that the Caucasus supply route is of mutual benefit to the United States, NATO, and the two national governments:

What can be done to enhance the Northern Distribution Network, specifically the Caucasus supply route?

Does a Caucasus centric supply route pose less risk and potential for greater efficiency?

General MATTIS. The Caucasus route, which requires the cooperation of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey (or bypassing Turkey via the port of Poti, Georgia) poses a challenge because of individual state restrictions—which vary from country to country. The most significant restriction affects cargo including vehicles that appear to be for military use. Successful State Department engagements aimed at expanding commodity types and bi-directional transits would significantly enhance the Caucasus supply route. The risk associated with the Caucasus route is similar to the excellent safety record demonstrated across other Northern Distribution Routes (NDN) routes.

Mr. SHUSTER. Allies and partners in the Middle East have shown a strong interest in acquiring missile defense assets and cooperating with the United States. CENTCOM conducts an annual ballistic missile defense exercise and the Missile Defense Agency is in discussions with Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia regarding missile defense cooperation. Patriot air and missile defense batteries and Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) ships with Standard missile (SM)-3 Block IA interceptors currently deploy to the CENTCOM AOR to support the command's missile defense requirements.

Please discuss CENTCOM's missile defense requirements; are they being met? What are your most significant missile defense capability gaps or shortfalls?

Discuss opportunities and challenges for missile defense cooperation and integration in the Middle East and what specific countries you feel would most adequately benefit from FMS sales of missile defense capabilities, specifically Patriot Missile systems.

General MATTIS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN

Mr. COFFMAN. General Mattis, what is your current assessment of the threat posed by Al Qaeda to the United States? Are they respected as a legitimate regional group? Do you see support for Al Qaeda growing in the Middle East? Are violent extremist organizations growing in the CENTCOM region? How many Al Qaeda members are left in CENTCOM's AOR? How is Al Qaeda marginalized by the uprisings occurring throughout the Middle East?

General MATTIS. Estimates on the number of Al Qaeda (AQ) members vary widely. We believe 50–100 AQ members are in Afghanistan, with approximately 100 currently operating in Pakistan. AQ affiliates in Iraq and Yemen have several hundred members respectively. While AQ remains a significant threat to our national secu-

rity, it is suffering through its most challenging period since late 2001. Al Qaeda has experienced considerable setbacks over the past three years, having lost numerous leaders, facilitators, and operatives in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and other areas in the Middle East. AQ is generally not recognized as legitimate, and its violent extremism is unfavorably viewed by the majority of people living in the region. In fact, it has only limited support from a very small minority of Muslims, and polling data suggests support for al Qaeda's ideology has been declining since 2003.

Many extremists and militants, including AQ leaders, were surprised by the Middle East/North Africa uprisings. These uprisings are contrary to what AQ desired, and we assess the group's leadership is struggling to make sense of them and react appropriately. We anticipate, however, that AQ leaders will attempt to frame these uprisings within their own skewed religious context and possibly claim AQ's revolutionary inactivity was the real catalyst for Middle East unrest.

Mr. COFFMAN. General Mattis, last year the Congress passed a requirement for a national military strategy to counter Iran as part of the National Defense Authorization Act. How is that plan progressing? Does Iran remain your single biggest concern in the region?

General MATTIS. Iran is my most pressing concern and Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions and arming of proxy fighters represent the greatest long-term challenges in the Middle East. We are keenly aware of these destabilizing efforts and are working assertively to build regional security and counter Iranian influence. The Gulf Cooperation Council is also taking significant steps towards building a regional security approach to counter Iran.

Like all Combatant Commands, CENTCOM is conducting prudent military planning to address the threats defined by the Secretary of Defense in the Guidance for the Employment of Forces. We update the Secretary of Defense regularly, and on our planning continues to mature based on our evolving assessment of the threat.

Mr. COFFMAN. There is clearly unrest throughout the Middle East. There have been numerous instances where a people have chosen to rise up and assert their right to the governance they choose. While this may be good in some sense, it can result in an unstable and uncertain security environment within the region and for U.S. citizens abroad. General Mattis—can you discuss the potential advantages you see an amphibious force bringing to an environment like this? How do you see these forces being used to prevent conflict and respond to crises? Admiral Olson—what are your thoughts on how SOCOM would work from the sea to contribute to our interests in this environment?

General MATTIS. The ongoing unrest throughout the Middle East presents unique challenges and opportunities for our command. The advantages of using an amphibious force are clear. They deliver a sea-based air ground taskforce capable of rapid and self-sustaining operations and provide operational flexibility across our region. Their ability to adapt to changing conditions while in support of these missions is without a suitable substitute and key to their effectiveness.

Mr. COFFMAN. Recently the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) put out a study titled "Tough Choices—Sustaining Amphibious Capabilities' Contributions to Strategic Shaping". "It represents an in depth examination of how U.S. amphibious capabilities contribute to strategic shaping activities..." The major findings of the report include:

- a. Amphibious capabilities—the ships, aircraft, "connectors", ground vehicles, and forces that enable and conduct sea-based operations on land—make substantial contributions to strategic shaping activities.
- b. The breadth, mobility, persistence, and responsiveness of these capabilities are highly relevant to the conduct of strategic shaping activities and suggests that if those capabilities were cut, most alternatives would likely involve higher operational risk and/or higher costs.
- c. The operational risk of alternative approaches are highest for regional assurance and deterrence missions in general, and for the full range of strategic shaping activities in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East in particular.
- d. If those risks are deemed acceptable and/or are mitigated in some way the alternative approaches are likely to involve, some and likely substantial, additional cost. These costs should be decremented from any cost savings expected to be realized from any reductions to amphibious capabilities.

Please share your perspective on these findings and how they apply to your responsibilities particularly in the prevention of conflict.

General MATTIS. These findings are an excellent highlight of a strategic imperative to maintain our full range of core military capabilities, including a fully-capable amphibious force to respond in any part of the world. Amphibious capability has long been a valuable component of our strategic deterrence message; one our potential foes understand well. It is the backbone of our strategic shaping activity. These

capabilities also allow us to conduct bilateral training and exercise events with our regional partners to further increase their own capabilities. These combined activities support the security assistance and cooperation requirements in the region.

Mr. COFFMAN. The United States has invested an incredible amount of blood and treasure in bringing stability to Iraq. On the cusp of peace in that nation, it seems we are more focused on the withdrawal of our forces rather than safeguarding our investment there. Other nations such as Turkey and Iran are greatly expanding their influence within Iraq, but they did not make commensurate investments in the security of Iraq; they are merely exploiting the stability our efforts have brought. What do you see as the optimal military footprint to remain in Iraq to support Iraqi Security Forces and maintain U.S. influence in Iraq? Please describe this military force in terms of numbers and capabilities.

General MATTIS. As we continue to shift to a State Department-led partnership with Iraq, we are drawing down our forces by the end of the year unless Iraqi leadership asks us to stay and President Obama directs. We remain committed to sustaining our strong military-to-military relationship with Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) through the establishment of our Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I).

OSC-I is intended to continue security assistance and security cooperation missions, and will be critical to creating a normal mil-to-mil relationship for the years ahead. With 157 permanent personnel and 763 trainers, OSC-I will leverage the service components, key senior leader relationships, and our unique Information Operations capacity to support interagency operations.

I believe ISF will be capable of handling most of the required security tasks beyond 2011, to include sustaining significant pressure on Al Qaeda in Iraq. At this time, however, Shia Extremist Groups are not currently under the same degree of restraint as Al Qaeda in Iraq.

Beyond 2011, any U.S. military presence in Iraq (in addition to the planned OSC-I) would be designed to address identified Iraqi capability gaps in the near- to medium-term. In concert with United States Forces-Iraq, CENTCOM is conducting prudent mission and risk analysis for extending the U.S. military footprint, if invited by the Government of Iraq and approved by the U.S. government. Specific force numbers will depend on the specific mission sets(s) to be conducted, which in turn depend on pending U.S. policy decisions.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. What is the command and control role of JSTARS in Afghanistan? Is it under-utilized?

General MATTIS. The JSTARS has no formal command and control role in Afghanistan; however, its inherent command and control capability is a key enabler of the Theater Air Control System within the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility. Consequently, crews flying missions in support of CENTCOM accomplish command and control/battle management tasks on a moment's notice. Moreover, JSTARS crews regularly assist other elements of the Theater Air Control System when Joint and Combined missions are conducted. JSTARS is extremely valuable and fully utilized in support of CENTCOM's missions.

Mr. SCOTT. As you assess your ISR requirements and the various systems available to you to fulfill these requirements, how critical is Joint Stars? Specifically, could you perform the wide area surveillance mission without it?

General MATTIS. CENTCOM could not adequately provide wide-area surveillance without Joint Star's (JSTARS) capability. The border regions between Iran and Iraq, the Gulf Coast of Iran, and Afghanistan and Pakistan require near-continuous collection that cannot be sustained via space-based systems and other airborne capabilities. JSTARS provides a unique capability for which there is no suitable alternative.

Mr. SCOTT. If more JSTARS were available in theater, could our warfighters and tactical intelligence units benefit from its wide area surveillance capability? In short, could you use more Joint Stars in theater?

General MATTIS. Yes. A shortfall in Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) support, which JSTARS provides, is the primary intelligence collection shortfall reported by commanders in the field.