

# U.S. POLICY IN NORTH AFRICA

---

## HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

---

NOVEMBER 4, 2015

---

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations



Available via the World Wide Web: <https://www.govinfo.gov>

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

38-542 PDF

WASHINGTON : 2019

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

BOB CORKER, TENNESSEE, *Chairman*

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho	BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
MARCO RUBIO, Florida	BARBARA BOXER, California
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin	ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona	JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
CORY GARDNER, Colorado	CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia	TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia	CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
RAND PAUL, Kentucky	TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming	EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts

LESTER MUNSON, *Staff Director*

JODI B. HERMAN, *Democratic Staff Director*

JOHN DUTTON, *Chief Clerk*

## CONTENTS

---

	Page
Hon. Bob Corker, U.S. Senator From Tennessee .....	1
Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, U.S. Senator From Maryland .....	2
Haim Malka, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Middle East Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC .....	3
Prepared Statement .....	5
William Lawrence, Visiting Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University, Washington, DC .....	11
Prepared Statement .....	13



## **U.S. POLICY IN NORTH AFRICA**

---

**WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 2015**

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,  
*Washington, DC.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Corker, Risch, Flake, Gardner, Perdue, Cardin, Shaheen, Murphy, and Kaine.

### **OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE**

The CHAIRMAN. Call the Foreign Relations meeting to order and thank you our witnesses for being here.

Today's hearing is the fifth in a series of hearings we have held looking at the role of the United States in the Middle East and North Africa. We have looked at Iraq and Syria, the Arabian Peninsula, the refugee crisis, and have heard from the administration. Today gives us an opportunity to look at the region in which the Arab Spring began: North Africa.

Almost 5 years after widespread protests began in Tunisia and spread across the region, North Africa remains a fragile and volatile region. Five years later, most of the region's economies are in serious trouble, violent insurgencies and terrorist groups have spread, and governance ranges from democracy to autocracy.

Tunisia, which may hold up as a model for the region, is struggling on both security and economic fronts. Tunisia deserves the admiration of all of us for what they have done, and they have received it through a Nobel Peace Prize. But, I would like to hear the views of our witnesses on what steps the United States should be taking in order to ensure Tunisia's continued success.

Libya, a country in the middle of a civil war, has been working through a U.N. process for a unity government for over a year at this point. I know the Libyan Chief of Mission is in the audience today, and we welcome her. And I would like to recognize the frustrations she must feel as terrorism and humanitarian crises spread across Libya.

In October, the U.N. Representative announced an agreement, which the two parties have not yet signed. We have been hearing for a year that U.S. policy in Libya is to support the U.N. process as the process drags on without resolution. I hope our witnesses can weigh on what steps we should be taking.

Egypt, a country that has seen some of the worst political turmoil in the region, continues to play a vital role as home to the largest population in the Arab world and their origin of many ideas and movements throughout the Middle East. But, U.S. policy there seems adrift, as it is in much of North Africa. I hope our witnesses today—I am sure you will—can help us focus on a U.S. strategic interest, what they are in North Africa, and what steps we should be taking to reach them.

I want to thank you again for appearing before the committee, and with that turn to our distinguished ranking member for his comments, and then I look forward to your testimony.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,  
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND**

Senator CARDIN. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you.

We have had a series of hearings focused on the Middle East. Obviously, it is an area of great importance to the United States. It has extreme challenges, and we very much want this committee to be engaged in our policies in the Middle East.

Now, northern Africa is very important to that. Although it has not been in the headlines as much as some of the other areas of the Middle East, it holds out tremendous consequences for U.S. interests.

So, I thank you very much for convening this hearing, and I thank our two witnesses for being here. As the chairman pointed out, Arab Spring started in northern Africa. In Tunisia, a street vendor set himself afire, the Jasmine Revolution, and now they are getting attention because of Nobel Peace Prize to the National Dialogue Quartet. But, Tunisia's stability is being threatened. Its democratic reforms and economic stability have been impacted by terrorism, affecting the country's overall stability.

In Libya, we have a civil war. It is not uncommon for that region to have civil wars. There is no military solution, here. The political solution is going to be critical, and we welcome our witnesses' views as to how we are progressing on achieving that political accord for the future of Libya.

In Egypt, a critically important country to the United States, President Sisi has had his challenges. There is no question about that. But, the one lesson I think we have learned here is, stability in that critically important country can only be reached if there is political reform that provides human rights for the people of Egypt. And we welcome your views in that regard.

Morocco and Algeria, two countries whose political stability did not really change much during Arab Spring, were able to weather that type of challenge, but they do have other challenges, no question. Political reform is still very much critically important to both of those countries. And the western Sahara region still has yet to have the type of stability that is necessary for the people of that region and its political future.

So, Mr. Chairman, as we look at northern Africa, we know that we have challenges. We have challenges dealing with terrorism. And how do we engage the countries of that region in an effective counterterrorism strategy? We have a problem of young people. The young people need economic opportunity, and they want political

reform. How do we channel that energy that exists in northern Africa in a positive way, considering the U.S. objectives?

So, for all those reasons, I think this hearing is particularly timely, and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Cardin.

We will now turn to our witnesses. Our first witness is Haim Malka, the deputy director and senior fellow for the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

We thank you for sharing your wisdom with us today.

And the second witness is Dr. William Lawrence, a visiting professor of political science, International Affairs, at the Elliott School of International Affairs of the George Washington University. Quite a title.

Dr. LAWRENCE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. We appreciate you being here, and I hope you will summarize your comments in about 5 minutes. If you have any written materials, it will be, without objection, part of the record.

And, with that, Mr. Malka, if you will begin, we would appreciate it.

**STATEMENT OF HAIM MALKA, DEPUTY DIRECTOR AND SENIOR FELLOW, MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC**

Mr. MALKA. Thank you. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and members of the committee.

It is an honor to sit here before you to speak about North Africa, a region which is undergoing historic change and poses risks and opportunities for the United States.

You have my written testimony, already, where I detail the importance of North Africa to core U.S. interests, analyze the state of play in the region, and set forth ideas for U.S. policy, moving forward. Rather than rehash that written statement, what I thought would be more helpful was to share my approach to North Africa with you and focus on Tunisia and Libya, two countries that highlight the risk and opportunity for the United States.

I like to think about North Africa as a long-term investment. When I first came to Washington, DC, in 2001, the area between the Navy Yard and South Capitol Street was pretty much a wasteland. It was full of empty lots, it was known for drugs, crime. Few people wanted to go there. But, despite seeming marginal to the city, and despite its many problems, the area held real promise. In 2004, Major League Baseball and the city of D.C. had a vision and were committed to building a ballpark there.

Fast-forward a decade, and the area around Nationals Stadium has created jobs, generated new business, housing, improved the city's security, and has become an important symbol of the city's progress. Vision, investment, risk, commitment, all changed the fate of that corner of the city in the Nation's Capital.

We should be thinking about North Africa as a similar investment for the United States. The Maghreb states of North Africa have been marginal to U.S. interests for decades, but, since 2011, the region has become central to many of the global issues we already care about and which you have mentioned at the beginning of this hearing. Most importantly, security and counterterrorism,

political change in the Arab world, and stability in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East.

I would like to briefly outline three important factors shaping the region which directly affect U.S. interests.

First, Libya has become the Islamic State's most important base outside of Syria and Iraq, and is emerging as a new hub for regional jihad. The fight between two competing governments in Libya creates a security vacuum that the Islamic State exploits. Islamic State is now recruiting in North Africa, and marketings Libya as a more accessible destination for jihad than Syria. An Islamic State several hundred miles from the shores of Europe would be devastating to U.S. interests and the surrounding countries.

Second, Tunisia is the best opportunity for an Arab State to transition from dictatorship to more representative and accountable government. The United States has been promoting political change globally and in the Arab world for decades. Helping Tunisia succeed would not only achieve long-standing U.S. objectives, but could be the most effective countermeasure to the jihadist narrative. Despite many positive steps forward, Tunisia remains vulnerable to political polarization, economic stagnation, terrorism, and deep socioeconomic challenges which fuel radicalism, especially among young people.

Third, it is important to understand that what happens in North Africa has an impact far beyond its borders. The region is deeply networked into Europe, the Middle East, and sub-Saharan Africa. Protests in Tunisia, as we already mentioned, spread throughout the Arab world. Jihadists from every neighboring region transit through Libya for arms, weapons, and sanctuary. And smuggling networks traffic weapons, goods, and people from across Africa through the region and onto Europe. This has created a new humanitarian disaster and refugee crisis, which is straining European infrastructure, policing, and fanning the flames of nationalist politics in Europe.

Now, there is no blueprint for how to meet these challenges, but there are several policy considerations and conclusions that can guide a more effective U.S. policy.

First, we must continue to invest in American diplomacy. U.S. engagement makes a difference, especially during pivotal moments. By extension, when the United States remains on the sidelines or unfocused, other governments fill the void and often pursue policies that undermine U.S. interests and perpetuate conflict. As a positive example, the U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia at the time played an important role at critical moments in Tunisia's transition, and helped make the difference between political compromise and more divisions and violence. In Libya, despite the many challenges that we face, the United States should continue pushing for a unity government, and it should consider, with the EU, more targeted sanctions against those Libyans in both governments that oppose the unity accord.

Second, we should be prioritizing investment and assistance to at-risk countries that show potential; most importantly, Tunisia. The importance of Tunisia's success requires a more consistent and robust aid package. Fully funding the administration's aid request for FY 16, rather than cutting it, would send an important message

of U.S. commitment to Tunisia. Speeding up the delivery of eight Black Hawk helicopters, which is being delayed, would also help Tunisia fight terrorism more effectively. At the same time, it is important to remember not to oversecritize our aid and partnership with Tunisia. Security is a crucial component, but it must be part of a comprehensive strategy.

Third and finally, we have to have realistic expectations about what is achievable in the short term. Many of the current challenges facing the region are chronic problems that do not have easy solutions. In the meantime, the security environment will likely deteriorate before it improves. Having realistic expectations about what is achievable in the short to medium term will help sustain a more effective policy.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, other members of the committee, this is a pivotal moment in the region. To reap the benefits of more effective engagement in North Africa, the United States must take a long-term investing approach. We need an investment strategy that sees the opportunity, clearly identifies our interests and objectives, acknowledges manageable risks, and has the staying power to ride out the inevitable fluctuations. If we stay that course, we position ourselves to ultimately strengthen American interests and to reap dividends long into the future.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Malka follows:]

#### PREPARED STATEMENT OF HAIM MALKA

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is an honor to talk with you about U.S. policy in North Africa. In a time of great historic change and uncertainty, North Africa poses both perils and opportunities for the United States. Future trends in this region will not only affect the people living there, but will also deeply affect global U.S. interests.

The Maghreb states of North Africa have been marginal to U.S. strategy for decades, yet changes in the region since early 2011 make it increasingly central to a wide range of U.S. interests. These include: security and the fight against violent extremism, political reform in the Arab world, and U.S. security and economic interests in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. The U.S. Government has acknowledged these shifts in North Africa through modest increases in foreign assistance, most importantly to Tunisia. The Tunisian people inspired millions after deposing a longtime dictator, and set in motion tectonic shifts across the Arab world. In my judgment, however, U.S. engagement has not yet matched the importance of the Maghreb. We ignore the region at our own risk.

Three core factors explain U.S. interests in North Africa:

##### *(1) Geography*

North Africa borders three regions that are vital to the United States: Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Trends in the region affect everything from Europe's migration crisis to U.S. forces in the Mediterranean to the safe passage of shipping through the Suez Canal.

The sheer volume of illegal migrants transiting through North Africa on their way to Europe is not only a humanitarian disaster, but it is straining infrastructure, budgets, and security in Europe. This trend could also strengthen extreme nationalist political forces in Europe. It challenges political stability in Europe and NATO's credibility as an effective collective security institution.

North Africa is also deeply intertwined with sub-Saharan Africa through diplomatic, trade, military, and religious ties. Moreover, vast smuggling networks which traffic in goods and people connect North Africa with Europe, the Middle East, and sub-Saharan Africa. When Malian mercenaries on Muammar el-Qaddafi's payroll fled Libya in 2011, they filled the ranks of militant groups in Mali. The political infighting that ensued led to al-Qaeda's takeover of northern Mali in mid-2012. Moreover, insecurity in North Africa directly affects developments in Sahelian countries where the United States has identified key security threats—for example in

Niger and Chad, where U.S. forces are helping to build more effective counterterrorism forces to battle Boko Haram and other militant groups.

Turning to the Middle East, while many see North Africa as marginal to the region, it is clear that what happens in the region is increasingly important to the Middle East's core. The Arab uprisings that swept across the region began in North Africa, and the governmental responses—both cracking down in the case of Egypt, and exploring more democratic openness in the case of Tunisia—have their locus in North Africa.

North Africans from Tunisia and Morocco especially are globally networked, primarily through expatriate communities in Europe, but also throughout the rest of North Africa and the Middle East. These networks transmit what happens in those countries far beyond their borders. The most worrying negative example of this is the large numbers of young Tunisians and Moroccans fighting with the Islamic State group (ISG) and jihadi-salafi militias in Syria, Iraq, and Libya.

Since 2011, Arab governments and Turkey have noticed these connections, and they have played a more active role in the region. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey have been the most assertive outside actors in the region. They seek to harness regional alliances to protect their core national interests and expand their spheres of influence at a time of greater regional polarization and conflict. Morocco for example, is now participating in the anti-ISG coalition in Syria and the Saudi-led military coalition in Yemen. External actors are also more willing than ever to act independently and expend significant political and financial capital to influence political outcomes in North Africa. Some, like the UAE, have even launched independent military air strikes in Libya. That Arab governments in the gulf see the region as central to the future of the Middle East should further alert us to its importance.

## *(2) Terrorism*

Libya is the ISG's most important base outside of Syria and Iraq, and it is emerging as a hub for jihad. Thousands of extremist fighters have come to Libya, where they train and network. Some trained fighters then return home, where they pose a security risk and launch terrorist attacks. An Islamic State outpost in the southern Mediterranean—only 100 miles from European shores—threatens American security and economic interests, puts neighboring states at risk, and makes it unlikely that a stable political order and economic development will emerge in Libya in the near future.

According to a U.N. Working Group, the Islamic State commands approximately 3,000 fighters in Libya, mostly in its base in Sirte. Almost half of those are believed to be Tunisian, but there are Moroccans, Sudanese, Nigerians, and other nationalities joining as well. Since revolutionaries overthrew the Qaddafi regime in August 2011, Libya has served as a training ground and transit point for Tunisians and other North African jihadists on their way to Syria and Iraq. While Syria remains the main destination for jihadi fighters, in time, Libya could eclipse Syria as the primary destination for jihadists from North Africa, Europe, and sub-Saharan Africa.

Evidence on social media suggests jihadists are debating the merits of joining the Islamic State in Libya versus Syria and Iraq. For North Africans and for many Europeans, Libya is closer and easier to reach than Syria. Libya shares 2,700 miles of land borders with six neighboring states. (By comparison, the U.S.-Mexico border is 2,000 miles long.) Crossing porous borders, especially from Tunisia and through the Sahara Desert, can be perilous, but is relatively straightforward.

Terrorists in Libya often do not stay in Libya. ISG operatives in Libya have already struck Western tourists in neighboring Tunisia, undermining its security and economy. Not only are jihadists from across North and sub-Saharan Africa joining the ISG in Libya, but weapons from the conflict have reached insurgents in Egypt's Sinai Peninsula as well as in the Gaza Strip. Putting this into perspective it is important to note that al-Qaeda was able to wreak havoc from its isolated base in the Afghan mountains. A jihadi stronghold off the shores of Europe poses direct long-term threats to U.S. interests.

Libya's role in regional and global jihad is not new. Libyans formed jihadi-salafi groups in the 1990s and 2000s, which fought alongside al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and later in Iraq. Following the overthrow of the Qaddafi regime in August 2011, many former jihadists returned to Libya and took advantage of the security vacuum, lack of government consensus, plentiful arms, and pools of young idle men. Libya quickly became a transit point for North African jihadists to train before reaching Syria, and an important hub for weapons, training, and sanctuary.

Algerian terrorist mastermind Mokhtar Belmokhtar's group transited through Libya on its way to attack Algeria's In Amenas gas facility in January 2013, where

it killed 40 people. As fighting and diplomacy in Syria begin to shift, more North African, sub-Saharan African, and European jihadists could seek to join the ISG in Libya. Their presence poses a long-term threat to Mediterranean shipping, border security in North Africa and the Mediterranean, tourism, economic growth, and political stability.

Terrorism is not only a central problem for Libya. The rise of terrorist violence in neighboring Tunisia, which shares a 275-mile border with Libya, has been a persistent threat. Tunisia's Ansar al-Sharia leadership fled to Libya and regrouped there after it was banned in the summer of 2013. Tunisian ISG members who were trained in Libya carried out attacks against Westerners at the Bardo Museum in Tunis in March 2015 and at a beach resort in Sousse in June 2015, killing more than 50 people combined. The attacks undermined Tunisia's security and weakened its economy, which relies on tourism for approximately 7 percent of its GDP.

Tunisia has its own domestic terrorism problem, even without spillover from Libya. By most accounts Tunisians make up the single largest foreign group of fighters in Syria and probably also in Libya. More than 4,000 Tunisians have joined jihadi groups in Syria since 2011 out of an estimated 30,000 foreign fighters. That is roughly 13 percent of foreign fighters in Syria from a relatively small country of only 11 million people. There is no single driver of radicalization. Young men are attracted to radical groups for a range of ideological, social, financial, and criminal reasons. As long as the deeper socioeconomic issues driving radicalization persist including youth marginalization, unemployment, and a broader sense of humiliation and despair, Tunisians will continue to join radical groups and pose a long-term challenge to the country's development.

### *(3) Political change in the Middle East*

Tunisia is an important example of how an Arab country can transition from autocracy to more representative and accountable government. Success stories are few, but Tunisia is a strong candidate to be one of them. Politics seem to be bringing people together out of necessity, and the population seems overwhelmingly committed to change through politics rather than through violence.

For more than a half-century, the United States has promoted good governance and reform globally, and in the Middle East and North Africa in particular. While the emphasis has shifted from administration to administration, promoting accountable and representative government remains a core objective of U.S. foreign policy. Congress has approved tens of billions of dollars in aid to meet that objective. Tunisia, despite its numerous challenges, remains the best opportunity for building a new kind of compact between an Arab Government and its citizens. In many ways, it has become a test case for U.S. commitment to the idea of reform, and other governments are watching.

Moreover, the United States has a unique opportunity to build a new kind of partnership with an Arab country. Over time Tunisia could become an important asset and partner in the region in counterterrorism cooperation, naval security, peace-keeping, and trade.

But it is much too early to celebrate. While Tunisia has made important strides forward, as recognized by the Nobel Prize Committee, it remains vulnerable to a host of threats and challenges including: political polarization; radicalized youth; deep socioeconomic problems; economic stagnation and corruption; and a wide gap between the country's coast and underdeveloped interior, any of which could precipitate crises that would make democratic consolidation more difficult.

With all this at stake, it is worth identifying the most important trends affecting North Africa right now. I would like to draw your attention to three key points concerning the situation in the area.

(1) *Libya's political conflict creates a security vacuum exploited by the Islamic State group and other militants, which destabilizes every country in the region.* Competition and rivalry between Libya's two governments is the biggest factor contributing to the ISG's expansion in Libya. These two competing governments—one based in Tripoli in the west and the other (recognized by the United States and Western governments) in the eastern town of Tobruk—are more interested in fighting each other than cooperating to defeat the ISG. Without a unified government Libya will be unable to begin the long process of building state institutions, renewing its oil exports, reviving its economy, and disarming hundreds of militias that undermine the idea of a unified state.

The disintegration of the Libyan state is one of North Africa's biggest challenges. The conflict is largely a question of legitimacy. Those who fought Qaddafi claim revolutionary legitimacy. Some claim legitimacy from elections or recognition by Western governments. Hundreds of militias claim legitimacy and authority by force of

arms and tribal affiliation. In the 4 years since Qaddafi's demise Libya has had three governing bodies: the National Transitional Council (NTC), which formed during the rebellion against Qaddafi; the General National Congress (GNC) which was elected in July 2012; and the Council of Deputies or House of Representatives (HOR) elected in June 2014. U.N.-led negotiations seek to create a national unity government, but that effort stalled in October when both Libyan governments objected. Both governments are equally responsible for the talks' failure.

It is tempting to reduce Libya's conflict to a battle between Islamist and nationalist forces. But the reality is more complicated. The country is divided along multiple fault lines which do not neatly fit into ideological categories but rather are based on intersecting tribal, ethnic, local, and regional dynamics. Moreover, neither government is unified. When the HOR Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni tried to leave Libya to join U.N.-led talks in Malta regarding the national unity government, he was blocked from traveling by forces commanded by Khalifa Hifter, who is nominally the military chief of the HOR government. The government in Tripoli is also divided between political factions and militias representing different ideological, tribal, and local forces.

Libya's ongoing conflict threatens all of its neighbors. After decades of Qaddafi meddling in the region's affairs, Libya has become an arena for proxy wars by external actors. The quandary is that even if a unity agreement is formed it will not solve Libya's deep problems. But without a unity government there is little possibility for any group to secure enough legitimacy to begin rebuilding Libya.

(2) *Tunisia remains vulnerable to political polarization, economic stagnation, terrorism, and deep socioeconomic challenges which help fuel radicalization.* The commitment of Tunisia's main political factions to compromise is an important achievement. Yet, this consensus is fragile and overshadowed by deep political divisions, which prevent the government from addressing controversial issues that could undermine the economic and political interests of nearly every key political actors. This includes the powerful labor unions and rival leading parties Ennahda, with Islamist ties, and Nidaa Tounes, which has ties to the former Ben Ali regime. The government's justifiable preoccupation with security has allowed it to sidestep a range of critical yet controversial debates. Rather than address a range of urgent economic issues such as investment, tax, and banking reform as well as job creation, corruption, and youth marginalization, the government has delayed any serious debate on these issues for fear of alienating powerful constituencies.

An economic reconciliation law intended to uncover past financial abuses and corruption that is under debate is an important example. The law is part of a broader transitional justice process aimed at uncovering past abuses under the old regime. Rather than prosecute past offenders, the law offers amnesty in exchange for admitting financial crimes in a secret tribunal and repaying any ill-gotten funds with a fine. Opponents of the law claim that it excuses crimes committed under Ben Ali and undermines the whole idea of breaking with Tunisia's authoritarian past. The government however, argues that the returned money will be used to create jobs and provides greater certainty for Tunisia's business community, which has been cautious of investing in the domestic economy for fear of prosecution. Every side in the debate has merit. The challenge for Tunisians is to decide the appropriate balance between investigating past abuses and avoiding new and potentially destabilizing political conflicts.

In all of this an unlikely coalition between Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes, which formed largely in opposition to Ennahda's rule, has allowed the government to pass legislation virtually unchallenged. So far the leaders of Ennahda have prioritized political consensus and compromise over a religious and conservative agenda.

The current government has largely focused on security, which is driven by three primary threats. First, since 2012 Tunisia has faced a low-level insurgency in the Chaambi Mountains on the eastern border with Algeria from the Okba ibn Nafaa Brigades, a loose group of militant cells largely affiliated with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Since the end of 2012 insurgents have killed dozens of Tunisian soldiers and security personnel near the Algerian border. According to some reports at least one Okba ibn Nafaa cell has pledged allegiance to the ISG.

The second threat is driven by the presence of the ISG in Libya and the growing role of Tunisians in Libyan jihadi groups. The ISG in Libya is aggressively recruiting Tunisians and is now marketing jihad in Libya to them as the gateway to Tunisia. For the ISG, Tunisia represents a low-cost opportunity to disrupt a neighboring state. This is important both to plant the flag of ISG operations in Tunisia in its competition with al-Qaeda, but also to undermine the narrative of Tunisia's democratic transition. It is still unclear to what extent the Libyan branch of the ISG's outreach to Tunisians is driven by the ISG's leadership in the Levant or a local ini-

tiative to take advantage of Tunisia's close proximity and pools of radicalized youth. In either case, Tunisians are responding, which escalates the threat to Tunisia.

Tunisia's future stability will be directly shaped by Libya, because the two countries are close neighbors that are deeply linked by family, historic, and economic ties. The two countries share a porous 275-mile border which is overrun by smugglers and criminal gangs which help facilitate the movement of goods and people. Many Libyans have family in Tunisia and before 2011, nearly a quarter-million Tunisians (out of a population of 11 million) lived and worked in Libya, where jobs were plentiful. After the Qaddafi regime fell between 750,000 and one million Libyans (out of a total population of approximately 6.5 million) fled to Tunisia.

More than 40,000 Tunisians currently live and work in Libya, which makes it difficult to distinguish between those who seek to fight jihad and those who seek legitimate jobs. Libya is also more accessible and easier to reach than Syria. It is relatively straightforward to cross the Libyan-Tunisian border and the ISG is deliberately reaching out to Tunisians and other would-be jihadists from the Maghreb to join the group in Libya. As long as the ISG remains active in Libya, Tunisia will be in the jihadi crosshairs.

Third, radical preachers urging violence have nurtured a homegrown jihadi-salafi movement in Tunisia. A legacy of state secularization dismantled Tunisia's religious institutions after independence in 1956, depriving religious scholars the intellectual tools to combat salafi and jihadi-salafi ideas that increasingly filtered into Tunisia over the past few decades. Following the overthrow of Ben Ali, radical preachers took control of nearly 20 percent of the country's mosques, though the government has reasserted control over most. Many young people are driven by the simplicity of the salafi message and the rebellion it poses to the limited Islamic teaching and practice that was tolerated under Ben Ali. Tunisia's Government and religious institutions will need to develop a long-term strategy to build more credible religious institutions that are relevant to the population, most importantly young people.

(3) *Algeria and Morocco have been spared the political violence and tumult plaguing their neighbors, but they face many of the same chronic socioeconomic problems and a number of potentially destabilizing long-term challenges.* Compared to their neighbors in Tunisia and Libya, Morocco and Algeria have enjoyed relative stability. Yet, their ongoing political conflict over the western Sahara prevents greater Algerian-Moroccan cooperation that is vital to addressing the region's broader security problems. Under the current circumstances it is unlikely that the Algerian-Moroccan rivalry can be mended in the immediate future.

Morocco remains politically stable compared to its neighbors largely due to cooperation between the monarchy and the Justice and Development Party (PJD), a political Islamist party integrated into politics for more than a decade that now heads the government. Each is dependent on the other, and each has an interest in cooperating to advance their interests. Meanwhile the economy has shown signs of improvement, and the instability in Tunisia and widespread violence in Libya remind many Moroccans that the alternative to the current predicament could be much worse. Still, Morocco faces many of the deep socioeconomic challenges and grievances that radicalize young people in other parts of the region. More than 1,500 Moroccans have joined jihadi groups in Syria, and local radicalized cells pose a persistent risk. Morocco's security forces have been vigilant against jihadi-salafists, but radicalization remains a long-term challenge. Moreover, a multifaceted grassroots opposition which called for widespread change in early 2011 has been divided and weakened, yet persistent calls for change could erupt again in the future.

Algeria is still enjoying more than a decade free of the widespread violence that gripped the country in the 1990s during its war on terrorism. That stability was largely fueled by high energy prices, which provided funds for massive public spending projects, subsidies, and government handouts used to address socioeconomic grievances and demands. But that stability may be only temporary. AQIM remains active in Algeria's mountains, and the attraction of the ISG could shift jihadi dynamics leading to a more aggressive jihadist campaign against the government. Lower oil prices have already depleted foreign reserves, and the government faced a \$50 billion shortfall in its 2015 budget. Politically, a long-lasting feud between the Presidency and certain military factions appears largely resolved in favor of the Presidency. Yet, President Bouteflika, who brought stability to Algeria after a decade of violence, is old and ailing. The lack of a clear succession plan creates uncertainty about Algeria's political stability in the next year. Instability in Algeria would negatively impact every country in the Maghreb and Sahel.

## THE U.S. APPROACH

The United States is more engaged in North Africa today than at any point in the last half-century. It has deep ties with Morocco stretching back to the cold war, growing relations with Algeria, and receptivity in Tunisia to building a new partnership. Yet, its engagement and commitment remains unfocused, underfunded, and not commensurate with the Maghreb's level of importance to vital U.S. interests. There is no blueprint for how to meet numerous challenges the region poses, in part because every country in North Africa is different, has its own historical experiences that influence society and politics, and is at a different stage of political development. Still there are a number of policy conclusions that can guide a more effective U.S. policy moving forward.

(1) *Continue to invest in diplomacy.* The U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia played an important role urging Tunisia's main political factions to cooperate at crucial junctures in the country's transition. That direct engagement likely made a difference between political compromise and stability instead of violence and division. In Libya, pushing the two competing governments toward a unity government is also important. The United States can ratchet up pressure on warring Libyan factions through the use of more targeted sanctions against Libyans actively blocking a unity government. The European Union is debating additional sanctions and the U.S. Government should coordinate more closely with Europe on this point. Ultimately, Tunisians and other North Africans must make their own decisions based on their own interests. But the record shows that U.S. diplomats and political engagement can have a positive impact under certain conditions. When the United States stays on the sidelines or is ambiguous about its desired outcomes, however, other governments fill the void and often advocate narrowly driven policies, which undermine U.S. interests and often perpetuate political conflict. Support by different U.S. allies for Libya's competing governments for example, has helped perpetuate Libya's political crisis.

(2) *Prioritize investment in and assistance to at-risk countries that show potential, most importantly Tunisia.* The United States has recognized Tunisia's progress, declaring it a major non-NATO ally, provided loan guarantees, and increased U.S. assistance since 2011. That aid has been an important sign of U.S. friendship. But the level of U.S. aid compared to other countries in the Middle East remains modest. The administration requested \$134 million in assistance for Tunisia in FY 2016. The Senate's recent appropriation bill cut nearly one-third of the requested aid for Tunisia, while increasing aid for a number of other countries. Of course, there are finite resources available for foreign aid, and taxpayer dollars must be carefully scrutinized. But the importance of Tunisia's success at a time of historical challenges requires a more consistent and robust aid package, which Tunisians and Americans should formulate together. At the very least, fully funding the requested aid for FY 2016 would send an important message of U.S. commitment.

(3) *Speed up military assistance and sales that we have promised.* In July 2014 Tunisia's Government requested to purchase 12 UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters to strengthen its border defenses and counterterrorism capabilities. The order was later changed to eight Black Hawks because Tunisia could not afford the full order, with an expected delivery date at the end of December 2016. (Four of the models were for modified versions with a number of weapons upgrades.) But in September 2015 Tunisia's Government was notified that the four modified versions would not be delivered until mid-2019, nearly 5 years after the initial request. Moreover, they were informed that the cost would nearly double from the original agreement. The Black Hawk sales were an important signal of U.S. commitment to Tunisia's fight against terrorism at a critical time. But the lengthy delay in delivery diminishes the value of U.S. support, because Tunisia faces an immediate threat. It not only limits Tunisia's military capabilities as the country is fighting an al-Qaeda insurgency on the western border and the ISG in Libya on its eastern border, but it could also push Tunisia to seek aircraft and military supplies from alternative sources. This would undermine an important opportunity to build long-term defense and servicing contracts with a professional military force in the region, which has proven itself to be apolitical and committed to civilian government. At the same time, it is important not to oversecuritize our aid and partnership. Security is a crucial component, but it must be part of a more comprehensive strategy to help Tunisia.

(4) *Have realistic expectations and a long-term investment approach.* Many of the challenges currently facing the region are chronic problems that do not have easy solutions, and in some cases will take more than a generation to improve. In the meantime the security environment will likely deteriorate before it improves, posing new challenges for U.S. interests and those of our partners. As the United States

clarifies its policy objectives and priorities in the region, taking a long-term investment approach while having reasonable expectations of what is achievable in the short to medium term will guide a more effective policy. Most importantly, the United States should seek to build long-term partnerships across a range of institutions and constituencies in the region beyond governments. Investing in student exchange programs, joint research and development initiatives in specific fields, and more diverse trade can overtime foster deeper, more resilient, and more valuable partnerships.

It is in the United States interest to invest in and forge deeper partnerships with the states of North Africa for the reasons argued above. There is great potential to create more stable societies, economies, and governments which are accountable to their people. Ultimately the people of the region must make their own decisions about the kind of future they want. The United States cannot force political decisions or set local agendas. But it can play a role in supporting these countries in the midst of historic changes.

Stability and progress in North Africa strengthens a wide range of global U.S. interests encompassing security, counterterrorism, and diplomacy. That requires a long-term investment approach that sees the opportunity, acknowledges the manageable risk, and has the willpower to ride out the inevitable fluctuations. If we stay that course, we position ourselves to ultimately strengthen America and to reap dividends long into the future.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for your testimony. We look forward to our questions.

Dr. Lawrence, if you would begin, we would appreciate it.

**STATEMENT OF WILLIAM LAWRENCE, VISITING PROFESSOR  
OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, EL-  
LIOTT SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE GEORGE  
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC**

Dr. LAWRENCE. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, distinguished members of the committee, 5 years ago next month, the Arab Spring erupted across North Africa and into our collective consciousness like a shot heard round the world, upsetting long-held notions about what was possible and likely in the region. One young Tunisian self-immolation lit a torch of change across the Middle East and North African region. And, to its credit, evidenced by the recent Nobel Peace Prize, Tunisia is considered the one last flame of hope in a region on fire. But, beneath the billowing smoke and raging fire, there are profound tectonic shifts that caused the Arab Spring that are continuing, producing, all at once, new challenges and new opportunities for the United States. As others have testified before you in recent weeks, powerful destructive forces are at work, but this is by no means the whole story.

As I testified before this committee, in the subcommittee, in November 2013, we are still living in the North Africa region in the wake of a world historical moment, where accelerated change continues in profound but cacophonous ways. So much is happening, we often miss most of what is going on because so much is happening in so many places at once, and we find great difficulty in adapting our traditional strategies to moving targets, oscillating between risk-averse reflexes to disengage and let them fight it out or, with the considerable resources of our powerful military at our disposable, a wishful desire to deliver a sledge hammer deathblow, a coup de grace to our mortal enemies and anyone allied with them, and be done with it. Neither approach will work. We have to think big and bold and, at times, venture outside of our comfort zone. But, like a cancer surgeon, we need a holistic, comprehensive,

and aggressive approach with microscopic precision to achieve the right macrolevel effects.

Many things remain unchanged from my 2013 testimony, so I will not reproduce all that, but, summarizing them.

Number one, Syria remains the biggest problem in North Africa. And, all of these, I am happy to answer questions about it during the Q&A.

Number two, the main causes that drove the profound changes we see in North Africa are economic more than political or security oriented, although there are political and security-oriented problems that we have to address.

Number three, North African young people made these revolutions, and we have to address our strategies towards these young people.

Number four, we must not get demography wrong. So, for example, Tunisia's problem is not a young bulge. They have already had a demographic transition. Tunisia's problem is unemployed university graduates who are unemployed at three, four times the rate of less-educated Tunisians, and so, we have to think about that.

Number five, the revolutionary forces that produced all this change are fed up with the very geopolitical—with our geopolitical foes and our geopolitical friends in the region, and we have to think about that.

Number six, North Africa is different. Of the 18 countries that rose up in the winter of 2011, the North African nations played a much larger role than nations of the east. They incubated this change over a longer period. They provided much of the political culture of protests, and continue to have the greatest chance of success in the region.

Number seven, major events go unreported—or underreported in the Western press. Two years ago, it was Bloody Friday in Tripoli. Now we are having a major leadership crisis in Nidaa Tunis. We have the aftermath of the sacking of the Algeria intelligence chief. A whole list of things that are causing major changes that are being reported, and we have to dial in and understand those.

We still suffer from the various ways information gets filtered to us. One of these, I have long called the “Egypt effect,” where, if Egypt is doing well, the region is doing well; and if Egypt is not doing well, the region is not doing well. And we have to get around that filter.

We tend to focus on the national, and not the subnational and the transnational.

We have to address the fact that more and more of these states are, in Yahia Zoubir's terms, becoming managers of violence rather than dealing with the underlying problems causing the violence.

And like Haim, the last point is, I continue to be concerned about our very light footprints, not just with regards to Libya, but in Tunisia and Algeria, as well.

To be sure, some things have changed since my last testimony. The primary one is, Libya got worse. And the second civil war broke out, in May 2014, launched by General Hefar in response to a string of political assassinations in Benghazi. And this has meant that Libya has transitioned from a country of 100 different communal conflicts to 100 different communal conflicts and now

one big conflict with coalitions fighting. And all of that will have to be addressed in the peace plan.

In Tunisia, we need to continue to support political reconciliation, but we also have to support real economic reconciliation, transitional justice, and reform in every sector, starting with the security—with security-sector reform. To get there, we need to increase our assistance to Tunisia to \$800 million annually as part of a \$5 billion package of grants and loans that Tunisia will need to succeed with its democratic transition. To reach this goal, we have been advocating for a donor conference for Tunisia to make up this shortfall. And, of course, the Senate must restore the \$50 million of multisecurity assistance cut following the two terrorist attacks in Tunisia and the President's visit to front-page disappointed headlines in the region. And it is worth noting, in a Zogby poll of 2014 in the region, there is a sharp decline in confidence that the United States is committed to democracy, because of our lack of assistance to Tunisia and democratic forces.

Supporting inclusive politics, however, is the solution, I believe, to all the problems. We need an inclusive solution to Libya that includes civil society and the two main factions. We need to continue to push for inclusive solutions for Tunisia, especially in the economic realm. We need to promote inclusive politics in Algeria, inclusive politics in Morocco, where there is a continuing—a new crackdown on civil society, and inclusive politics when it comes to western Sahara, where, I have long argued, power-sharing provides the best chance for success.

Right now, we are having opposite arguments being made. Zero-sum solutions for Libya. Zero-sum solutions for Egypt. And this very negative trend of all-or-nothing political—desire for political outcomes is alienating the very youth I began by talking about. That is why 90 percent of Egyptians stayed away from the polls in recent parliamentary elections. That is why 80 percent of young Tunisians stayed away in the 2014 elections.

The United States must support inclusive political outcomes. And, for Egypt, let me say that—start with 177 elected parliamentarians in jail, the most jailed Parliament in the world. Start with the hundreds on death row on trumped-up charges. Perhaps if Egypt can begin with these two groups, we can create the conditions for a political dialogue in Egypt that would get the current regime toward the type of political inclusivity that we all seek.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Lawrence follows:]

#### PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM LAWRENCE

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, distinguished members of the committee, 5 years ago next month, the Arab Spring erupted across North Africa and into our collective conscious, like a shot heard "round the world," upsetting long-held notions about what was possible, and likely, in the Middle East and North Africa region. One young Tunisian's self-immolation lit a torch of change across that region, and Tunisia, as evidenced by the recent Nobel Peace Prize, is considered the one last flame of hope in a region now on fire. But beneath the raging fire and billowing smoke, the profound tectonic shifts that caused the Arab Spring continue to move, producing both new challenges and new opportunities for the United States. As others have testified before you in recent weeks, powerful, destructive forces are at work, but this is by no means the whole story.

As I testified before this committee in November 2013, we are still living in the North African region in the wake of a world historical moment, where accelerated

change continues in profound but cacophonous ways. So much is happening that we often miss much of it, happening all at once, in so many places. We then find great difficulty in adapting our strategies to moving targets, oscillating between the risk averse isolationist reflex to disengage and “let them fight it out,” or, with the considerable resources of our powerful military at our disposal, a wishful desire to work with authoritarian friends to deliver sledgehammer death blows, coups de grace, to our mortal enemies and anyone allied with them, and be done with it. Generally speaking, neither approach will work. We do, however, have to think big and bold, and at times venture outside of our comfort zone, but like a cancer surgeon, we need a holistic, comprehensive and aggressive approaches, delivered with microscopic precision, to achieve healthy macro level effects.

Many things remained unchanged from my 2013 testimony before the Near East, South Asia, and Central Asia Subcommittee, including that:

(1) *Syria remains the biggest problem in North Africa.* (Syria has radicalizing effects and blowback effects. Thousands of North Africans are fighting there, thousands have died there, and many hundreds have returned, when they manage to escape the clutches of the so-called Islamic State or al-Nusra, only to fall usually into the same miserable contexts that propelled them to seek escape.)

(2) *The main drivers of these profound changes are economic, more than political or security-oriented.* (As a result, we have to be creative and aggressive economically—as well as with regards to security and politics. Economic growth strategies should not be limited to the oft-mentioned area of entrepreneurship and foreign direct investment, but should also address deep-seated issues economic justice and economic opportunity. There have been over 400 self-immolations across the region since Mohamed Bouazizi, including more self-immolation suicide in Tunisia just last month. Roughly half of the economic activity and over half of the labor force in all of these countries are in the informal sector. However, governments and traditional civil society still rail against the informal economy—the survival economy—as if it was the problem and not part of the solution. Building on the work of Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto, we should reenvision the informal sector as an engine of growth, rather than a problem to be eradicated. Excluding the informal sector and its actors is not the answer, and that very exclusionary approach is what started the Arab spring in the first place, with the crackdown on a street vendor.)

(3) *North African young people made these revolutions and continue to have high, dashed expectations.* (And they will continue to seek to force change. They are also not just “kids over there in the North Africa.” They are products of U.S. policy and generosity. It was our investments in vaccinations, our investments in mother-child health care, our investments in education and exchange programs, our investments in any number of areas that created the youth bulge in the first place. The youth bulge was not created by high fertility. It is created by dropping mortality rates, which dropped twice as quickly as fertility rates across the region in recent decades, due to modern medicine, modern nutrition, and modern sanitation, also influenced by American know-how and development largesse. Many of these kids, many of the revolutionaries, studied in American universities. They were our classmates, our students, and as things continue to unfold they are wondering why we are not more present in their time of need. They are plugged into U.S. technology, economics, politics and culture. But now the chickens of successful developmental policy and engagement have come home to roost, and we have not sufficiently adjusted our assistance policies to take account these new realities. Big investments in health and education and on training of women and youth are the old model that has helped create a new set of problems, largely by increasing lifespans, creating the youth bulge, and providing a workforce for often nonexistent jobs. Now, 10 million jobs need to be created in the coming years across the MENA region to absorb a dramatic surplus in vibrant, trained human capital, a surplus that our largesse and good will helped create in the first place.)

(4) Morocco, Algeria, Libya, and Egypt still have a youth bulge, but Tunisia does not. Tunisia has already turned the demographic corner with low mortality and low fertility and a median age of 31. Tunisia’s problem, rather, is unemployed university graduates—unemployed at several times the rate of those with much less education—and unemployment among marginal populations, especially in impoverished areas of the interior, and among women. (Following the two 2015 terrorist attacks, which caused a well-documented crisis in tourism, the attacks also caused foreign direct investment and local private investment to dry up. This has led to a situation of zero or negative growth; Tunisia may well suffer in 2015 its second year of recession since the revolution.)

(5) *As we slip back into familiar geopolitical analysis and comfortable pre-Arab-Spring geopolitical positions, we have to keep in mind that the revolutionary forces that will continue to cause unrest are fed up with both our geopolitical foes and our*

*geopolitical friends and are looking for new management.* (The comparison I made in 2013 to the 1848 Springtime of the Peoples in Europe, building on Dr. John Owen's work at University of Virginia, still applies. In 1848, only one monarchy was overturned, but the process to overturn all of Europe's monarchy's was set in motion, and we risk now siding again too closely with the monarchs and violent authoritarian leaders against the people who seek rights, dignity, and well-being.)

(6) *North Africa is different. Of the 18 countries rocked by the wave of protest in the winter of 2011, the North African nations played a much larger role than Middle Eastern nations. North Africa incubated this change over a long period, and it provided much of the political culture, the slogans, the songs, the rap lyrics, and the hybridic ideologies that challenged the status quo across the region.* (North Africa continues to be the place where most of the positive change is taking place in the wake of the Arab Spring and where the greatest post-Arab-Spring potential exists, in every one of its countries. It is also worth noting that in part because of common experiences and aspects of political culture, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco have produced the most cogent and reliable analyses and strategies to influence positive outcomes for Libya; to date, they have played a very positive role, and we should continue to follow their lead on Libya. This cannot be said for the countries east of Libya, all of which tend to choose sides, projecting on North Africa their own Middle Eastern conflicts and rivalries, which polarizes Libya further and prolongs Libya's second civil war.)

(7) *Major events go unreported or underreported in the Western press.* (Two years ago it was the tragic Bloody Friday massacre in Tripoli. Now, it is major unreported and underreported developments, including a leadership crisis within Tunisia's ruling party Nidaa Tunis which has caused 35 top members to "freeze" their participation in the party and could cause it to splinter, a scandal among Libyans regarding the U.N. envoy and emails sent to the UAE, the aftermath of the sacking of Algeria's intelligence chief—Bouteflika's longtime *raison d'être*, and worsening crack-downs on civil society across the region.)

(8) *We still suffer from various ways in which the information from the region gets filtered, with terrible distorting effects. One of these distorting filters, I have long called the Egypt effect, which posits (wrongly) that when Egypt is going well, the region is going well, and that when Egypt is doing badly, everyone else is suffering from whatever malady Egypt has.* (Tunisia in particular and North Africa in general are very much on their own trajectory and should not be viewed through that Egyptian lens.)

(9) *That said, we do ourselves a disservice when focusing too much on nation-state level changes and dynamics and ignoring the subnational and the transnational.* (Cross regional effects are complex and interwoven. For example, the ways in which regimes and protesters learn in real time from the experiences in neighboring countries significantly impacts what happens in the learning country. This is not a case of just Egypt influencing the region, but every country influencing every country in the region in complex ways.)

(10) *We increasingly have devolved into a situation of regime-managed violence rather than positive change.* (Restive populations with higher expectations because the Arab Spring and states creates a situation which forces regimes, in the words of leading expert Yahia Zoubir, to become "managers of violence." To whatever degree each of these states are to blame for that violence, or are simply victims of antiregime violence, varies from state to state. But there is no question that all five states need help quelling the post-Arab-Spring increase in turbulence and violence, some of it in the name of democratization and rights, some of it in the name of jobs and benefits—such as price subsidies—and some of it fomented by the more nefarious forces including dangerous hooligans and full-blown terrorists. But while helping these states manage violence, let us not get on the wrong side of the democratic change, as we did in some of the cases of the Arab Spring more than others, and always ask in our assistance and in our partnerships: how does this policy affect the majority of young people that are trying to emulate our democratic system of government, and with their efforts to make political change?)

(11) *I continue to be very concerned about our light footprint not just vis-a-vis Libya, to which we should have many more resources devoted, but in Tunisia and Algeria.*

To be sure, some things have changed since my 2013 testimony. The primary one that the situation in Libya worsened. With the launch of the second Libya civil war in May 2014 in response to and a string of political assassinations in Benghazi and gains by radical militias in a couple of communities, General Hefar has attempted, with limited success, to turn dozens of small Libyan communal conflicts into one large winnable one. Now this new large conflict pitting the Dignity coalition against

the Dawn coalition has to be resolved, along the with myriad communal conflicts that already blighted the Libya landscape.

The Arab Spring was about a lot of things: dignity, fighting corruption, creating jobs, development of less favored areas, and empathy and compassion for others across countries and across borders fighting for the same things. But as much as anything else it was about inclusivity. Young crowds were not just fighting for their own interests, they were fighting for the rights of every self-respecting and respectful citizen to have a seat at the democratic table, with no ideological or identitarian litmus tests. This included women, Islamists, secularists, ethnic groups such as Amazigh or Tebu, the marginalized poor and other subaltern groups, and a wide ideological spectrum, including everything from Muslim feminists to democratic Salafists, from democratic socialists to populist nationalists, and from local Trotskyist and Maoist labor leaders to free market liberals.

The new counterrevolutionary anti-inclusion politics—which has been previously justified for decades on security grounds—has returned and has devastated politics in Egypt and Libya, and threaten gains in Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. Exclusionary politics is also why 90 percent of Egyptians stayed away from the recent parliamentary polls and over 80 percent of young Tunisians away from the 2014 elections.

What does this mean for U.S. policy? It means not backing zero-sum politics and zero-sum outcomes. It means the U.S. must support an inclusive political outcome for Libya with a full role for civil society and both the Tripoli and Tobruk governments, and in particular, the Warfalla, Zintan, and the Misratans. It means the U.N. needs to refrain from declaring again and again the achievement of a new political deal, and then tweeting at everyone that they need to sign on. The U.N. needs to honestly broker a full comprehensive solution that represents the largest possible number of Libyans, excludes none of the major players, and does not triangulate and maneuver around key factions.

It means in Tunisia that we need to support continued political reconciliation, economic reconciliation, transitional justice, and reform in every sector, starting with security sector reform. Security reform needs to be baked into security assistance to the largest extent possible. To achieve a wide variety of goals in Tunisia, we need to increase our assistance to \$800 million annually, as a part of a \$5 billion package of grants and loans. The stakes in Tunisia are enormous for the region, and the Tunisian democratic transition, which is at a tipping point due in large part to terrorist attacks, must succeed. To reach this goal of \$5 billion in annual global assistance, we need to help organize a democracy donor conference for Tunisia, designed to raise \$25 billion over the next 5 years to make up Tunisia's budget shortfalls and extraordinary transitional needs. The Senate must also restore the \$50 million in mostly security assistance passed by the U.S. House of Representatives.

While admiration of the U.S. continues to rank much higher in North African states than in Middle Eastern states, a telling 2014 Zogby poll flagged a sharp decline in confidence that the U.S. is committed to democracy across the Middle East. Given the geopolitics of the Middle East, broadening and deepening support for Tunisian democracy sends a profound message not just to Tunisians, but to tens of millions of youth waiting for the U.S. to match its encouraging rhetoric in favor of democracy with concrete action.

Supporting inclusive politics also means we must continue to deepen our engagements with Algeria, particularly in the economic and cultural realms, while encouraging efforts within the Pouvoir to work with the opposition and introduce political and constitutional reforms. Supporting inclusive politics means working with Morocco to improve its human rights performance both in the north and in the Western Sahara, beginning by curtailing its current crackdown on civil society and working with Morocco on reform and on reopening spaces for healthy political contestation.

Pursuing inclusive politics for Egypt is probably the toughest nut to crack. We have to use every diplomatic and Track Two lever at our disposal, while maintaining Camp David-linked assistance, to facilitate eventual negotiations with hundreds of thousands of exiled and jailed revolutionary opposition leaders and rank and file, when the time is right, which may be sooner than we think. President Sisi did mention today en route to meetings in London that he is open to allowing the Muslim Brotherhood to play a role in Egypt, and this type of concession is to be encouraged. In the near future, Egypt must release 177 elected parliamentarians and release hundreds on death row for political reasons for crimes they did not commit. Releasing these two groups of several hundred individuals could set the stage for eventual political reconciliation with the forces that won the 2011–2 elections.

Zero sum politics gets us a nothing in Egypt, nothing in Libya, nothing in Tunisia, nothing in Algeria, nothing in Morocco, and nothing in Western Sahara, whether

zero sum warfare, zero sum elections, or zero sum negotiations. The solution in every case is powersharing—a concept advanced by Jacob Mundy—and we should be advocating this at every turn, endearing ourselves to majoritarian, democratic youth across the region. This is what North African democrats and young citizens expect from us, and this is what we need to do to help empower citizens to work with us on in favor of the same goal, a stable, prosperous North Africa with strong relations with the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you both.

I am going to reserve my time for interjections along the way, if that is okay, and we will start with Senator Cardin. Thank you very much.

Senator CARDIN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And let me thank, again, both of our witnesses.

And you both agree that an important part of our strategy in North Africa rests with our appropriation process, both of you saying that we should adhere to the President's request. In some actions already in Congress, they have already reduced those. If money was the sole issue here, obviously, looking at Egypt, that has not necessarily been an effective means of bringing about the types of reforms that we would have hoped to have seen.

So, I want to just concentrate on Libya for one moment, if I might. When we talk about Tunisia, and the ability of terrorists to be trained in Libya and then enter Tunisia, we are seeing that that terrorism is affecting their economy and tourism being dramatically reduced. Unless we can get some resolution on the issues in Libya, the instability in that region will continue. The Sahara Desert area is very difficult for us to be able to monitor. So, the United Nations brokered a unity agreement, which has not been embraced by either side of the civil war. Can you just share with us briefly your prognosis as to whether we have a reasonable chance to get an effective coalition government that can stand up to the challenges in Libya? And is the United States playing a strong enough role, here?

Mr. MALKA. Thank you, Senator Cardin.

I will start off by addressing your question about efforts to reach a Libyan unity government. Part of the challenge we face in Libya is that, even if a unity government is reached between the two different governments in Libya, that does not necessarily solve the problems in Libya, in terms of the multiple conflicts there. As Professor Lawrence mentioned, there is not just one binary conflict between the Tripoli government and the Tobruk government in Libya. There are multiple conflicts going on in Libya between different regions, between tribal groups, between cities. The conflict does not fit into two neat ideological, political packages.

So, there are many, many issues that Libya faces that we have to address. And even if an agreement is reached, it does not mean that the two competing governments are actually going to work together. And I think what we need to do, in terms of the U.S. Government, is ratchet up the pressure that we do have on those two governments—

Senator CARDIN. Well, as I understand, there is a framework for an agreement. It has not been embraced by either side yet. Is that—

Mr. MALKA. There is a framework. That is correct, sir, there is a framework—

Senator CARDIN. Do you have confidence that, if that is embraced, it can work?

Mr. MALKA. Well, as I said, even if it is embraced, there still remain challenges to effective cooperation, because the level of polarization and the other multiple conflicts could prevent real cooperation. I think the main objective before us is for the two competing governments to reach a unity agreement and then have a sustained counterterrorism campaign that targets the Islamic State and other jihadist militant groups in Libya. That should be the first objective, and that is what we should be trying to promote. And, in doing that, we need to ratchet up the pressure on both sides by making it clear that we will support additional sanctions against people in both governments that are blocking the unity government.

Senator CARDIN. And “we,” you mean United States.

Mr. MALKA. The U.S. Government, that is correct, working with the Europeans, who are currently debating that, as well.

Senator CARDIN. Dr. Lawrence, I am going to let you answer that question, but I want to expand it a little bit. In our hearings on the gulf countries, it was clear that they really cherished their relationship with the United States and felt that it was critically important for the stability of their own country, but they also wanted to see a more aggressive United States involvement in the problem areas, whether it was in Syria or dealing with the Iranian issues or in Iraq. They felt that the United States presence was critically important, more so than the other competing powers, particularly Iran, Russia, and even Europe. So, in northern Africa—that is, Tunisia and the other countries we are talking about—how important is the United States participation, relative to other regional powers, in bringing about a confidence of stability for their country?

Dr. LAWRENCE. Why do I not deal with the second question first and then go back to the—

Senator CARDIN. Okay.

Dr. LAWRENCE [continuing]. Libya-specific question.

The U.S. role has huge potential, and we have not—we are not doing enough. If you look at, for example, polling data from the MENA region, the United States is viewed more positively, generally, in North Africa than in the Middle East. If you look at institutional relationships, the close relationship between the Tunisian military and the U.S. military, even closer than to the French military, the large numbers of the Libyan political class that were educated in the United States, many of which did not return to the United States for decades, these communities that are pro-American are very upset, on a regular basis, about the lack of U.S. engagement in North Africa, whether it is helping democracy in Tunisia or seeking democracy for Libya. So, there is a feeling there, less caused, I would say, by U.S. disengagement, although that is part of the story, but more caused by the huge expectations built up by the revolutions and all of the rhetoric coming from the U.S. Government about how important these transitions were to the United States, and then lack of follow-through, in terms of helping these countries address all the challenges we have been talking about.

It is also worth nothing, I think, in answer to your first question, that Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco are playing very positive roles in Libya, and all three of them have taken a rigorously neutral

stand on Libya that is helpful. No country to the east of Libya is taking a neutral position on Libya, and they are taking polarizing positions, backing one faction or another in ways that will probably lower the chance for successful agreement or—once we have an agreement—success of that agreement, and lower—and increase the chance for a prolonged civil war in Libya.

So, the short answer is, regionally, look west. Algerians and Moroccans and Tunisians are doing a great job on Libya. And do not take much advice from the east, for the reasons that were included in the premise of your question.

Now, specifically on the deal, one of the interesting aspects of the U.N. process—let me talk about a bad thing and a good thing—one of the bad things is that Leon kept announcing success when he did not have buy-in. And so, literally, you would have the U.N. tweeting, asking that sides sign up to an agreement we just heard an announcement that he agreed to. So, there has been this—one diplomat described this as “crafty triangulation.” I see it as problematic, because if you keep declaring victory when you do not have victory, you create more problems than you solve. And I think the new Libya envoy that Ban Ki-moon has named, the new—a German, the name is escaping me right now—has an opportunity to start fresh with the negotiations because we do not have buy-in from either side yet.

But, one of the positive things that came out of the negotiations, which were well led—the negotiations were very good, and I have a white paper on it. I am—that I submitted to the State Department, I would be happy to share with the committee, about, you know, the nitty-gritty of the deal and what the various issues are for each side. But, what was very interesting is that Misrata, who are on one side of the major conflict in Libya right now, and Zintan, who are on the other side, started to peel away. Now, this was reported as the press—as fragmentation on each side, but was actually a positive development, that the two strongest military forces in Libya were seeking a middle ground. In addition to that, the Algerians have been advocating including the Warfalla, which was a pro-Qadhafi tribe, in a kind of three-way new force that stabilizes Libya and makes this unity agreement work.

But, I have to agree with Haim wholeheartedly that—and I—again, quoting another senior State Department official, he said his main concern was not that Libya gets a deal or does not get a deal, it was what was going to happen once there was a deal. And it is going to be very long, slow slog to make the deal work.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you very much.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Flake.

Senator FLAKE. Thank you.

Thanks for the testimony.

The conventional wisdom has been that Tunisia, at least, has some of the democratic institutions that will help it as it moves forward. Other than Tunisia, what other country in the Maghreb has that—I mean, are we just starting from scratch with the others? How long will it take? And, first, with Tunisia, is—you are talking about a robust aid package, and involvement there for the United

States. What else does Tunisia need? And then, address the issue of institutions—civil institutions in the other countries.

Mr. MALKA. Thank you. I agree that Tunisia does have a long history of institutions. Those institutions were not always effective. They were put to use by authoritarian governments. But, there is an educated and effective bureaucracy in Tunisia. Similarly, in Morocco and Algeria, there are also effective institutions and bureaucracies.

Morocco and Algeria have been relatively stable compared to their neighbors, for different reasons. In Morocco, there is a balance of power between the monarchy, which is the executive authority in Morocco, and an Islamist political party that has been integrated into parliamentary politics for more than a decade, which coexist. And the King of Morocco's reform package in early 2011 helped satisfy some of the minimal demands that people had for change.

Now, the other aspect of Morocco, and Algeria to some degree, is that people look around the region and see what has happening in Libya, they see what is happening further away, in Syria, they see the instability in Tunisia, and they think to themselves, that things could get a lot worse, so maybe the current situation is not so bad.

But, Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria all have institutions. They certainly need to be strengthened. There is a lot of work to be done in all three countries in the justice sector, in particular, in education. But, the problem that I see is that Morocco and Algeria face many of the same long-term challenges that drive radicalization and many of the same kind of socioeconomic problems that drive youth marginalization as their neighbors. And while they are stable now, we are not sure about what is going to happen down the road. In Algeria, for example, the President has consolidated his power, as far as we know, against certain elements of the military, but oil prices have declined, and Algeria is dependent on oil prices, on oil revenues, to sustain large public spending projects, to sustain subsidies, and other economic benefits that have helped buy stability in Algeria over the last decade.

So, there is a lot of uncertainty about what comes down the road in Algeria and Morocco. It is important to note that Morocco also—despite its stability, has also produced large numbers of foreign fighters that have gone to Syria. The current estimate is about 1,500 Moroccan fighters in Syria. The number is probably higher. There are also Moroccans turning up in Libya, as well, fighting with the Islamic State. So, a lot of the problems that we see in Tunisia and other parts of the Arab world are also present in Morocco and in Algeria.

In terms of what Tunisia needs, your second question, there is a long list of what it needs. I think the two immediate priorities are security and the economy. And that is what the government has been focused on almost exclusively. Security and the economy are deeply linked together, because Tunisia relies on tourism for about 7 percent of its GDP. And the terrorist attacks in March and June, which killed over 50 people in Tunis and a seaside resort, have hit the Tunisian economy very hard. A number of tourist resorts and hotels have closed down, impacting the Tunisian economy.

So, what Tunisia needs is jobs, economic growth; and, in order to get that, it needs to get a handle on its security. Once it starts getting a handle on the security, it can start dealing with the many other problems—education reform, youth marginalization, corruption—that also fuel discontent in Tunisia.

Senator FLAKE. Go ahead.

Dr. LAWRENCE. Building on what Haim ably outlined, I will add a few data points for you.

Number one, thousands of North Africans, including from Algeria, too, although in smaller numbers, and Libyans, have gone to fight in Syria. Hundreds have been killed from each of the countries, and hundreds have returned. And there is some very interesting anecdotal evidence that those returning from the conflicts are falling into the same miserable economic conditions that propelled them, and looking for new jihad. So, we literally have kids escaping from the battlefields in Iraq and Syria, at the threat of being shot for desertion, returning home and not finding any opportunities, and looking for a new struggle, a new fight. So, this is something that economic assistance to these countries and economic messaging from the regimes, you know, would clearly begin to address.

As Haim pointed out, tourism is the third-largest—well, he said—I am talking about—but, it is the third-largest industry in Tunisia, but the other thing that terrorist attacks in Tunisia did was, it dried up foreign direct investments and local private investment, which is not seeking to invest in Tunisia anymore, because of instability. Tunisia needs, as he mentioned, security help, but also security sector reform, as outlined very nicely in the Crisis Group report; economic help, but also economic reform; and it needs transitional justice. And all of these things are things the United States can help with.

On Libya, let me just mention that it is not that there are no institutions in Libya. We often hear that. There are institutions in Libya. There are lawyers, and there is a justice system, and there are ministries. The problem is that they were significantly weakened by the Qadhafi regime, and have not been built up since. Right now, the brightest hope—or the two brightest hopes in Libya are two things: a robust private sector, which is actually still growing and—in terms of, like, cafes and small service—that is still growing in Libya; and the other is municipalities. Municipalities are functioning, and a lot of the U.S. assistance has turned towards the municipalities upon which good things could be developed.

Two more data points. For Algeria, we did not not have an Arab Spring in Algeria. We had the largest protest since 1988. And, more importantly, according to Ministry of Interior statistics, we have over 10,000 microprotests in Algeria every year. In Morocco, we increasingly have microprotests. In their Arab Spring, we had a million in 80 cities simultaneously, unheard-of level of protests. They had a big Arab Spring. They are having thousands of microprotests in Morocco. These microprotests are mostly about economic issues, also health and other things, education. But, a—nuts-and-bolts, service-delivery issues that the crash in oil prices is not helping, and that is—there are small things we can help them do, and do better, to address the demands of youth.

Thank you.

Senator FLAKE. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murphy.

Senator MURPHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for your testimony. This is very helpful.

We had a hearing yesterday, in one of our subcommittees, on the response to the buildup of Russian propaganda, and a lot of the same phrases got used there that get used here, this lack of American focus, this lack of American attention, this lack of American leadership. Sometimes you do not really understand what those words mean, because we have got a lot of smart people at the State Department, and we have a lot of people that are spending a lot of time focused on these problems, trying to sort them out.

And so, Mr. Lawrence, I wanted to sort of drill down on a point you made. You talked about the fact that there were expectations built up, and then we did not make good on those expectations. And my sense is that that is not an expectation that there was going to be an extra two or three people at the State Department working every day on Tunisia, that that was an expectation that there were going to actually be resources that were going to be delivered on the ground to help support this transition.

Now, the President asked for double the amount that he had last year, but last year's amount of money that we delivered to Tunisia was about \$60 million, somewhere around that. This is a country with a GDP of \$47 billion. I mean, that is not a transformational amount of aid, that is not at a amount of money, wherever it goes, that is going to make a difference. So, I get the critique about whether our strategy is right, but is this not, at some level, when you are talking about both these countries, but, in particular, Tunisia, which is at the moment of making this swing—is this not really a matter of just not simply having the necessary resources to back up our talk with real action?

Dr. LAWRENCE. You have answered your own question, in many ways, but let me flesh out some of the points that you made and that I agree with wholeheartedly.

To quote Ann Patterson before this committee last week, I believe, or the week before, the State Department has been mostly focused on crisis management. And so, there is a certain amount of bandwidth that could have been oriented towards North Africa. That got sucked up in solving Syria, dealing with Yemen, massive refugee crises, increasing counterterrorism threats. And, frankly, at one level—and Haim mentioned this, and I mentioned it—we actually need more diplomats in the embassies and more people at the State Department focusing on North Africa. That actually matters. And one of the things—for example, at AID—I mean, AID has a pretty big Tunisia and Libya teams, but most of what AID does is farm out resources to NGOs that can do the heavy lifting, the hard work.

Let me mention, also, in passing, something I did not say in answer to the previous question, to keep myself short, but you have 1.2 million Libyans of a country, of 5½ million, living in Tunisia right now. And Tunisians and Libyans need almost identical types of training. So, you could—that is a twofer—you could start train-

ing Libyans and Tunisians in the same security sector-related, justice-sector-related, all these different fields—economic developments, entrepreneurship—in Tunisia right now, at very low cost—you know, we are talking about programs that cost millions, not billions—and taking advantage of the opportunity that we have there.

Now, in terms of the paltry U.S. aid, I could not agree more. I mean, Tunisia, before and after the revolution, was ninth in U.S. assistance to MENA. Now, Jordan needs a lot of money. They have a lot of Syrian refugees. Lebanon needs help. Other countries. But, everyone in the region knows we are not supporting Tunisia in a way that matches our rhetoric, and that is disturbing. It is disturbing when you see decreasing positive numbers for democracy among young people, when they see us, in their minds, abandoning our own rhetoric, and going back to the old tried and true ways of backing local authoritarian leaders on security grounds.

So, it is not that we cannot address security and counterterrorism issues, as Haim said, it is that we have to walk and chew gum at the same time. And that means engaging young people. There are many ways to do this. Let me mention one.

You have hundreds of thousands of unemployed university graduates in Tunisia that took part in a revolution. Some of them will be given public-sector jobs with no meaning, because the public sector does not have anything for them to do, right? The traditional private sector cannot absorb them. What do we do? How about national service projects, where you put young Tunisian university grads out in the field, like Peace Corps—this has been discussed; no one has done anything yet—to deal with literacy, to deal with public health, to deal with, to deal with. An ex-Peace Corps volunteer from Morocco started Corps Africa. She has been trying to get into Tunisia, and has not found a way in yet. She is starting a new branch in Mali. But, there is huge human capital potential in Tunisia, huge human capital potential in the Libyan diaspora, and we are not taking advantage of it.

Senator MURPHY. Mr. Malka, let me ask you a question specifically about Libya. This is yet another proxy war in the region in which you have Egypt and the UAE on one side, Qatar on the other side. Are we best off trying to increase our intervention inside the country, focus our resources on trying to solve the problem through direct intervention by talking to the sides of this conflict who, as I understand, are not always terribly interested in talking to us, or are we better off working with the funders and with the regional players, who seem to be digging in on opposite sides of the conflict? Which is—I mean, I know the answer is probably both, but let us just posit a world in which we do not have the resources or the bandwidth to do both. Which are we better off—where are we better off putting our resources?

Mr. MALKA. Sure. Well, we certainly need to be talking to our allies in the Middle East. Turkey also has been playing an active role in Libya and other parts of North Africa. And I think, you know, the fact that they are so engaged and invested in North Africa—as you mentioned, the Qataris, the Emiratis, the Egyptians—proves how important this region is to the core interests of the Middle East.

I think it would be a mistake to just pursue the policies of one side or the other side, because, as I mentioned in my oral testimony, oftentimes external actors are driving policies that actually undermine our own interests and perpetuate the conflict. And I would argue that, by having Libya as a proxy struggle between several Gulf States and Turkey on the other side perpetuates the conflict. And that is not in our interests. We are better served by supporting the U.N. process, pushing for a unity government, trying to get the different parties together, and branching out and reaching out to other elements of the two Libyan governments that we have not been actively engaged with, and trying to promote a unity government as a first step.

Senator MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Risch.

Senator RISCH. Gentlemen, I was in Morocco a few months ago, and I could not—the feel there is so much different than right next door in Tunisia. And I appreciate your statements about, “Well, they have problems, too. They have foreign fighters that have left, and they have these microprotests.” And I—you know, I guess I disagree a bit that there is some similarity. I mean, they are so different. I mean, look a microprotest is one thing. Taking up arms and killing people at a resort, and what have you, is something else. I mean, we have microprotests here in the United States, and live with it. We have microprotests in my own home every day, and somehow we get by. But, the situation in Morocco seems to me to be something that we can live with, the Moroccans can live with, with the world can live with, but the situation in Tunisia is so much different. And so, I guess I beg to differ with you to some degree in trying to equalize those countries. Tell me why I am wrong.

Mr. MALKA. Sir, I did not intend to indicate that all of the countries were similar. I think every country in the region is very different. And, in fact, in my written testimony, I actually detail how they are different, how each country has a different political model, a different economic model, different historical experiences that shape their society and their politics, and are at different stages of their political and economic development. So, I do not think either one of us thinks that Morocco is the same as Tunisia is the same as Algeria.

What I think is important to note about Morocco, and what sets it apart from the other countries in the region, is that Morocco, by and large, has a strategy to deal with the many problems that it faces. It has a strong Executive that can set policy and that has control of the bureaucracy—importantly, the security services, the economic structure—that can help implement that policy. The other—

Senator RISCH. And why is that not happening in Tunisia?

Mr. MALKA. Well, part of it is a problem of legitimacy. Who has legitimacy? Tunisia, still faces deep political polarization within the political establishment between Ennahda, and on the one side, and Nidaa Tounes, on the other, which has deep ties to the former regime, and also the labor unions, which are very strong. So, while they have come together toward political compromise and consensus, there are still these deep problems within Tunisia, and this deep political polarization. There are questions of authority, there

are questions of legitimacy, which you do not necessarily have in Morocco, where you have a strong executive.

Senator RISCH. Thank you.

Mr. Lawrence—Dr. Lawrence?

Dr. LAWRENCE. You are correct to point out that Morocco is different and Morocco is in better shape than its neighbors. We often have debates—this very debate, in academic circles, you know, about what is similar and what is different between the countries. And I am often arguing that there are important similarities that get overlooked.

I think the issues facing youth are very similar. The protests, slogans, and culture are very similar. The tactics of microprotests are very similar. The networks sending fighters to Libya are all connected. The huge informal sectors, 50 percent of the economy in everyone in the countries we are talking about and the majority of the people working in them, are all connected and all networked. So, we separate Morocco, or any of these countries, out at our own peril by not understanding what the connections are and what the differences are.

In terms of the amount of bandwidth that we should be applying to these problems, and, in agreeing with that sort of, I think, question beneath your question, I would say, between the four countries we are talking about today, we should be putting probably 40 percent of our effort on Tunisia and 40 percent on Libya and probably 10 percent on Algeria and 10 percent on Morocco, for precisely the reasons you are talking about. Morocco is a lot further along.

But, Morocco, as I said, had a huge Arab Spring, continues to have deep poverty and problems that need to be addressed. And do not forget—and this is important for Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia—the—Morocco has an Islamist party, a promonarchy Islamist party that is the largest party, and that the Prime Minister is controlled by, right? So, Morocco has kind of made its peace with the Islamists in its way. Tunisia is making its peace, although it is more deeply polarized. And Algeria has made its peace, but there are some problems there, in terms of the political class in general and the weakness of political parties. But, they have all had similar experiences, in terms of the secular Islamist dialogue, they are all learning from each other. And I do not think any of these countries really has the silver bullet or the perfect model for the others to follow. As Haim said, Morocco is on its own path. It is aware of its challenges. And the main concern of Morocco-watchers is that the reform process slows to such a glacial pace that there is no progress. And all friends of Morocco want to do is help accelerate that process.

So, for example—if you permit me, I have 10 more—15 more seconds—Morocco passed a wonderful new constitution. It has not passed most of the organic laws that put the constitution in motion. If you look at the most pro-Morocco Web sites, they are talking really only so far, including several packages of laws passed, about the increased participation of women in the decentralization organic law, but there is almost none of these post-new-constitution projects that have borne the fruit promised in 2011. So, this is the concern about the pace of reform in Morocco. If it slows too much, Morocco will suffer instability.

Senator RISCH. Thank you.

You know, my time is almost up, and I wanted to ask a bit about—I think—and maybe we will get this in another round, but we really need to drill down into the details in Libya. You know, I think the world is focused on these two groups that are trying to make peace. I think you—both of you have underscored that that is just the tip of the iceberg, that, because of the numerous other conflicts that are going on, even if that works out, there are going to be a lot more challenges there. And I would like to hear your thoughts on that, but my time is up, so I will yield the floor, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Kaine.

Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thanks, to the witness, for great testimony.

Question about Algeria. Question about Algeria and Morocco.

So, on Algeria, President Bouteflika is in his fourth term, I think, and relatively old. As you look forward, what do you think the post-Bouteflika political, kind of, status will be? What is your prediction about Algeria, post-Bouteflika?

Mr. MALKA. That is the huge question, because what happens in Algeria will affect every country in the Maghreb and every country in the Sahel and potentially Europe, as well. Algeria is a crucial country. And in the 1990s, it faced a—fought a brutal civil war, a war against terrorism, where more than 150,000 people were killed, and Algeria exported instability to the entire region, and even to Europe, where there were terror attacks linked to Algeria. So, what happens in Algeria is crucial.

President Bouteflika came to power and ushered in a decade of stability and security free of the widespread violence that we saw in the 1990s. Sure, there are still protests, socioeconomic protests, as Professor Lawrence has mentioned. There is still an al-Qaeda insurgency in the mountains of Algeria, which occasionally attacks civilians and security forces. But, by and large, President Bouteflika has brought stability to Algeria, in part because of high oil prices, which allowed him to promote an economic stabilization policy to provide for the needs of his population. It is not clear that whoever takes his place is going to have the same kind of assets, tools, and power to hold together the various constituent groups and power centers within Algeria. Oil prices are declining, so, for this year, the first year in a long time, Algeria has had a budget deficit, a \$50 billion deficit for 2015, where it had to tap into its reserves. That is a worrying sign for Algerians, most importantly, because it was in the 1980s when the price of oil collapsed that they began the process of political reform, which led to elections that were won by the Islamists, and then led to the civil war.

So, the Algerians carry a lot of historical baggage with them from that period. And my concern is that what comes after Bouteflika is not going to be as stable, it is not going to be as certain, and it could have a negative impact on the region, as well.

Dr. LAWRENCE. I do not have much to add, and I am curious to hear your Algerian-Morocco question. But, let me add, when Bouteflika came to power in 1999, he came to power on a reconciliatory platform. And one of the aspects of making Algerian politics

right that was important to him was getting control of the military and security forces. With the sacking of General Mediene—Toufik Mediene, in August, in many ways I believe he has accomplished the last thing he intended to accomplish. So, I am actually looking for—and I have even heard talk about a 4½-term Presidency. You know, I feel like Bouteflika feels—feels like he is just about done. That was, like, the last piece of the Bouteflika puzzle.

Now, if you are pro-Bouteflika, like a lot of Algerians are, this was getting control of occult forces in Algeria. If you are anti-Bouteflika and the corruption around Bouteflika, you saw the DRS as the last-standing institution strong enough to keep the Bouteflika clan in check, so you see the sacking as a problem. This just augers for more factional fighting among Algerian elites, following Bouteflika, and I do not see an accelerated push towards democratization in Algeria, in part because of what I was talking about, elite struggles.

If I can add one more point, the fact that you have so many microprotests in all these countries, including Algeria, means that politics does not work. Citizens with grievances do not go through political parties, and they do not go through NGOs, they go to the streets. And then a oil-rich regime responds with direct aid in response to protests. So, that is a broken political system. And it will not be until NGOs are given more room to maneuver, which they do not have yet, and political parties develop some strengthen in Algeria, that you will have real politics.

Senator Kaine. I agree with the points you made earlier about Tunisia, that we need to really help shore them up and help them succeed. I am also very worried about the next chapter in Algeria and your point, Mr. Malka, that Algeria will affect everything else.

Let me move on to the Algeria-Morocco—there are a lot of similarities between the countries, including that President Bouteflika was born in Morocco, so there are many similarities. There are some significant differences—oil rich versus, you know, not a lot of oil assets on the Moroccan side. But, the poor state of relations between those two countries, it just seems like, if we are interested in civility in the region, doing what we can to help better the state of relations between Algeria and Morocco is really important. So, what would your advice to us be on that?

Mr. Malka. That is a tough one, because both sides are entrenched in their position, and—

Senator Kaine. With respect to western Sahara and other issues—

Mr. Malka. With respect to western Sahara and a general regional rivalry, which, from our perspective, does not make a lot of sense.

Senator Kaine. Yes.

Mr. Malka. And with the security situation in the region being as it is, I think probably more difficult and challenging than it has been in at least 15 years, it would be in the interest of Algeria and Morocco and the region and the United States and Europe for the Algerians and Moroccans to work more closely together. It is in everyone's interests for that to happen.

Unfortunately, I do not see a lot of potential for progress on that front at the moment. I do not see a lot of potential for Algeria and

Morocco to resolve their differences and come together and start cooperating more closely. But, the U.S. Government, despite the fact that there is not a lot of progress, I think that it is something that the U.S. Government should continue to urge both sides to cooperate, even in small ways, to help improve security.

Dr. LAWRENCE. I will add two data points to that. And I agree with that. One is, there have been a lot of attempts for Morocco and Algeria to cooperate on energy, on borders, on other economic activities, and every time it seems like there is going to be a breakthrough, the western Sahara ship blows up. A Minister travels to Moscow, makes an offhanded comment, and the next thing you know everything falls apart again.

I have—a second point is, I have long argued that as Morocco democratizes, solutions for western Sahara get more—get possible. So, Nabila Mounib, the head of this delegation that is been dealing with the Sweden IKEA dispute and all that—right?—she said once in a conference I was at, that the problem with western Sahara and Morocco was not that Moroccans did not believe it was western Sahara, it was that the western Saharan issue had always been [speaking foreign language] and that Moroccan citizens really have no say in—and now that the political parties and civil society are given openings, and then it is shut down again, and openings again to go down in the western Sahara area, you are increasingly have—hearing more about human rights in the western Sahara area, and seeing political organization in the western Sahara area. And I think the more progress that is made in democratizing the north and the western Sahara region, the more chances we will have for an eventual opening downstream, in terms of the Algerian-Moroccan dispute over—

Senator KAINE. Great, thank you.

Thanks, Mr. Chair.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gardner.

Senator GARDNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Dr. Lawrence and Mr. Malka, for being here today.

Dr. Lawrence, you mentioned just talking about some of the challenges facing youth in Morocco as well as Algeria. Mr. Malka, in your testimony, you talked about radicalized youth issues. Can you lay out the demographic of the youth population in North Africa?

Dr. LAWRENCE. If I can just make—because I have the data—right?—and then I will defer to Haim, which I mispronounced. The median age in Tunisia is 31. That is past transition—you know, the—30 is the cutoff the demographers use. The median age in Algeria and Morocco is 27. The median age in Egypt and Libya is about 24. And then when you get down to the Mauritania-western Sahara, that area, you are talking about median age of 19. So, we have—

Senator GARDNER. The median age in Libya and Egypt is 24, you said?

Dr. LAWRENCE. Twenty four.

So, we have youth-bulge issues for the medium term in Morocco and Algeria, for a longer term in Algeria and Libya, and for a much longer term in the Sahel area. But, in Tunisia, we are dealing with a different demographic.

I do not—that is one data point—I do not know if, Haim, you want to say something more about that.

Mr. MALKA. Sure. I will just add that, the demographic issue is changing, also. I mean, we talk about unemployment, we talk about the lack of jobs. But, if we look at some of the other social factors that are going on—for example, the age of marriage has increased dramatically in North Africa, and it is comparable to that of Europe now. It is much higher than in other parts of the Middle East. In some places, in some countries, it is above 30 for a man to get married.

Now, that has an impact—a direct impact on social stability. If somebody does not have a job, if they do not have a family, then they have less responsibility; therefore, they can go off to Libya to get a job, they can go to Libya to fight with a——

Senator GARDNER. Right.

Mr. MALKA [continuing]. Jihadist group, they can go to Syria to seek adventure and get married. So, these issues are deeply tied to radicalization, to some of the other social issues that are going on in the region. And I think we need to understand better how these different social issues underneath the surface are affecting the politics, stability, and security.

Senator GARDNER. And so, that delay in starting a family, is that primarily economic-driven? No opportunity, and so they put that off just——

Mr. MALKA. It is directly linked to economic opportunity, to the lack of jobs, because, in order to get married, one has to have an apartment, one has to have money to pay for a wedding, to be able to pay a dowry and sustain a family.

Senator GARDNER. And so, in terms of our economic policies through State Department and others—public diplomacy efforts, trade, economic efforts—have we adjusted State Department policies to meet that challenge?

Mr. MALKA. Well, part of the challenge is not just what we are doing, it is what these countries——

Senator GARDNER. Yes.

Mr. MALKA [continuing]. Need to do. And we have talked a lot about U.S. strategy and objectives and what we need to do, but these countries need to do lots of different things to help us help them. So, Tunisia, for example, almost 5 years after the revolution, still does not have a coherent foreign investment law. So, it makes it difficult for us to want to invest in Tunisian companies, because there are no clear banking rules, there are no clear insurance regulations. Tunisian capital is sitting on the sidelines and unwilling to invest in the local economy, because they are uncertain about the economic reconciliation law and whether they are going to be prosecuted for past financial crimes committed under the Ben Ali regime.

So, it is not just about what we need to do. These countries also have to take certain steps to improve their economy, to disentangle the authoritarian economic systems that perpetuate unemployment, lack of education, monopolies, import regulations that support smuggling in the informal economy, and a long list of other economic reforms that they need to enact.

Senator GARDNER. Dr. Lawrence.

Dr. LAWRENCE. Just two quick data points, Tunisia-specific, which I think is the most important that we are dealing with today.

Tunisia is working on all these laws. Two MPs from the Finance Committee were here last week, and they are along the way, and they are having discussions, and there are drafts going up to Parliament, but democracy is slow, and these things take months to negotiate. And so, Tunisia will have an investment law, probably wintertime, maybe banking law next year. This economic reconciliation package has been taking forever, and it is caused a lot of consternation. So, we are talking about a 2-, 3-year window before Tunisian reforms begin to have the salutary impact that we are looking for to help us. So, we are going to have to support Tunisia, independent of their reform, and getting out ahead of the reform.

Another data point is, Tunisia is having a hard time meeting payroll. So, how do you reform, if you cannot even pay your government workers? So, let me give you—

Senator GARDNER. What percentage of the public in Tunisia is employed by the government?

Dr. LAWRENCE. Oh, it is 25 percent, in that range—20–25 percent.

Religious education. Tunisia has the weakest religious education infrastructure in the three countries, Tunisia to the west. Ten percent of imams and mosques have any religious training. Only half of them have college degrees. So, you have imams in the mosques who need to be trained—right?—who have received almost no training. And this is a legacy of the Ben Ali era, when there was no investment in religious education.

And this gets back to messaging, if you permit me just 10 more seconds. We are not doing well in messaging. There is that whole youth culture across the region—

Senator GARDNER. “We,” as in our—

Dr. LAWRENCE. Yes.

Senator GARDNER [continuing]. Public diplomacy efforts.

Dr. LAWRENCE. Yes. Yes. We have not really dipped in enough. We are doing a lot of, you know, counterterrorism messaging, but we are not engaging enough with our youth and their youth, you know, talking about common interests. We could do a lot in the area of cultural exchange and messaging to young people that we are not doing yet.

Senator GARDNER. Would love to follow up with you on how we can increase opportunities to engage in better public diplomacy efforts, particularly with that demographic. I think that is something that we could be very much involved with and effective with.

I want to shift a little bit to the Sinai Peninsula a little bit. Talk about Egypt’s counterterrorism efforts on the Sinai Peninsula and what the United States can do to help combat the threat of extremism in the Sinai.

Mr. MALKA. The Egyptians have a growing problem in the Sinai, and it is not just contained in Sinai, it is shifting over to the other side of the Suez Canal. We saw, just this morning, another attack in northern Sinai, but there have been attacks in Egypt proper, as well. So, this is an ongoing challenge for the Egyptians that is getting worse.

The problem in Sinai is not just an issue of simple counterterrorism, because Sinai has been a neglected region for decades. There is not one government that has been responsible for neglecting Sinai, but it is many, many of Egypt's past governments and policies that have largely alienated the population. So, there is not only a domestic or indigenous Bedouin population that supports radical groups, but there is a radicalized Palestinian population, primarily in northern Sinai, with connections to Gaza.

So, this seems to be a long-term challenge for the Egyptians, and the politics of exclusion in Egypt have fanned the flames and made this problem worse, because, as the Islamists that were in power have been weakened and divided, some of those Islamists who, at one point, may have chosen the path of politics are now choosing the path of violence, and that strengthens the ranks of jihadists and other militant groups in Sinai.

Senator GARDNER. And what should the United States policy would be to address that?

Mr. MALKA. Excuse me?

Senator GARDNER. What affects—changes should United States policy take—undertake to help Egypt address this?

Mr. MALKA. Well, we help with general counterterrorism and military cooperation, intelligence-sharing. That has been ongoing. I am not sure that we have a silver bullet for how the Egyptians can address that problem. This is a long-term threat that they face. We can try to encourage more political inclusion, more tolerance for political voices in Egyptian politics, but that is a long-term process that is not going to change the current environment in Sinai anytime soon.

Senator GARDNER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shaheen.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you both for being here this morning.

There have been a number of stories that I have read—news reports—about Tunisia's transition to democracy and the role that women played in that, the positive role. I wonder if you could talk a little bit about the role of women in Tunisia and compare that to, say, Morocco and Algeria, and what we can do to support a positive role for women in those societies.

Dr. LAWRENCE. Tunisia suffered, before the revolution, from the same problem all these states suffered. It is what call, in the Middle East studies business, "regime feminism," where feminists became so close to the regime to get political and economic rights guaranteed that, when the regimes themselves became disqualified, the women's movements were negatively affected. So, for example, the leading feminist organization in Tunisia took 6 to 9 months after the revolution to even have a fruitful meeting without a lot of, you know, clashing between the groups because of the closeness to the Ben Ali regime and the Trabelsi family and all the corruption that came before. They were reorganized enough by 2013 that they played a major role in the—keeping democracy on track in Tunisia and keeping women's rights a central focus in the summer of 2013. And there are some people that feel that Tunisian women should have gotten the Nobel Peace Prize along with others, and they played an important role.

Tunisia has a long history of parity for women. They have done an amazing job getting women into Parliament. I think it is 38 percent in Parliament, one of the highest in the world. They had gender parity, according to one UNDP metric, before the revolution. And so, for me, elite Tunisian women have done well in the past, they are doing well now. I think my main concern about women in the other countries, including Tunisia, is that poorer women, marginal women working in the informal sector are not doing well. And the Nobel prize-winning leader, Abbassi, yesterday, had some very interesting data on unemployment among rural Tunisian women, and it is pretty alarming.

Mr. MALKA. Thank you. I do not have much to add to that. I mean——

Senator SHAHEEN. Can you do the comparison to Morocco——

Mr. MALKA. To Morocco.

Senator SHAHEEN [continuing]. And Algeria?

Mr. MALKA. Sure. I think, at the elite level, again, in Morocco and Algeria you will also find women who are at the forefront, who are active, who are well educated, articulate, and play a role. I mean, you have government Ministers in Morocco that are women. So, at the elite level, I am always impressed when I go to Morocco and when I meet with Moroccan business leaders, Tunisian leaders. It is always a woman who is spearheading and leading the delegation. But, it is the lower level of society which is primarily uneducated, you have a large problem with rural illiteracy for women in many of these countries. And so, the problem is not that the elite are not progressing, but that the gap between the elite and the more underprivileged sectors of society is widening dramatically.

Senator SHAHEEN. And is it widening more for women than men in those societies?

Mr. MALKA. I would say it is, in part because of gaps in literacy, primarily, in a place like Morocco and Algeria.

Senator SHAHEEN. You talked about—or you alluded to ISIS fighters from Tunisia and Morocco and northern Africa. Is there a reason why those societies have served as fertile recruiting grounds, maybe more fertile even than some other more repressive societies?

Mr. MALKA. That is one of the huge questions that we——

Dr. LAWRENCE. We talk about that all the time.

Mr. MALKA [continuing]. Keep trying to answer and keep trying to figure out. I mean, it is really an irony that the country with the most hope for political progress, for changing the social, political, economic dynamics, Tunisia, has produced the largest number of foreign fighters in Syria, more than 4,000 foreign fighters in Syria since 2011, and the largest number of foreign fighters in Libya now fighting with ISIS. There is not one reason for this; there are many reasons. And we keep trying to analyze the drivers of radicalization in these countries. Some people join because of ideological reasons, some people join because of economic reasons, some people join because they want adventure and—or a sense of power. So, there are lots of reasons.

Senator SHAHEEN. When——

Mr. MALKA. I am sorry.

Senator SHAHEEN. Let me just dig down on that a little bit further. When you talk about “there are lots of reasons,” how do we determine what those reasons are? Are those based on—I mean, we have not done a poll, I assume, of ISIS fighters, so these are based on anecdotal interviews with people who have gone off to fight—

Dr. LAWRENCE. Before he continues, there has actually been some polling of “why your friend joined ISIS.” So—

Senator SHAHEEN. Okay.

Dr. LAWRENCE [continuing]. We actually have polling data on that, but go—continue—

Mr. MALKA. There is anecdotal evidence from—for example, I was recently in Tunisia and spoke with a young man who had a job at a production company. He had told us that two of his friends from high school, from his gang in the neighborhood—and I do not mean that in the negative sense, just his groups of friends—

Senator SHAHEEN. Right.

Mr. MALKA [continuing]. Went off to fight in Syria and were on Facebook with him, trying to encourage him to go to Syria. So, I asked him, “Why did they leave and go fight in Syria? And why did you stay?” And he did not really have a good answer. And security services are working very hard to try to build profiles of jihadist fighters and to try to understand why people are going to fight jihad. And they are having a tough time coming up with the profiles, as well, because there is no single profile.

One of the interesting things that I learned on my recent trip to Tunisia, I was going to speak with civil society activists in Tunis, and I was walking into the building, just sort of a decrepit, you know, nondescript building. I was walking up the hallway and into the office, and I saw lots of pictures and posters on the wall, of the revolution, people—young people waving Tunisian flags and out in the streets and protesting and demanding a better future. Those pictures demonstrated and captured the hope that many young people had of changing their societies, of changing their futures, changing their destinies. And when they saw that that reality was not changing as quickly as they expected it to change, they started to lose hope. And it is that despair—it is that despair which is driving people to Syria, to Libya.

And what is interesting is, it is not just Syria and Libya. Despair is driving people to take their lives into their own hands and try to cross the Mediterranean Sea and get to Europe. People are committing suicide in Tunisia, young people, in higher numbers. And it is very hard to get accurate numbers of this. But, jihadism and radicalization is one avenue for people who feel despair and hopelessness.

Senator SHAHEEN. Rising expectations.

Mr. MALKA. Yes.

Dr. LAWRENCE. If I may add, I think the simplest rubric to approximately everything he said, and why I focused on it in my oral testimony, is inclusion/exclusion. You are included politically, you are going to be more likely to not pursue these. You are included economically, you are more—

And just to offer some data points on what Haim just said at the end, there have been 400 self-immolations since Bouazizi, including more just last month in Tunisia. So, there is various types of escap-

ism. There is escapism through suicide, there is escapism through going to fight a jihad, there is escapism running to Europe, there is depression, there is—at one point, a Libyan expert said, “We do not need 10,000 U.N. peacekeepers in Libya, we need 10,000 psychiatrists.” You know, so there is society-wide——

Senator SHAHEEN. Yes.

Dr. LAWRENCE [continuing]. Youth dislocation and despair that need to be addressed. And so, as I say, in all of our strategizing and all of our thinking, think youth, think, “How does this program affect youth? How am I including youth into it?”

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you both.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Perdue.

Senator PERDUE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to go back to Egypt just a minute, if we may, and then I have one quick question on Tunisia. I would like to come back to that.

But, first, let us talk about Egypt. I am concerned. Secretary Kerry, just in August, had a dialogue over there, and is encouraging Congress to sort of turn a blind eye to some of the social concerns and governmental concern or governance concerns to continue to support them from a security cooperation perspective. Do you think we are finding the right balance between encouraging them to—Sisi, particularly—in the direction of good governance at the same time that we, obviously, are still supporting them, from a security cooperation perspective? Would you respond to that, Mr. Malka?

Dr. LAWRENCE. I heard Mr. Malka, so I——

Senator PERDUE. Oh, I am sorry, go ahead. I——

Dr. LAWRENCE. I will take the first stab and——

Senator PERDUE [continuing]. Thought you were telling him go ahead.

Dr. LAWRENCE. No, I will take the first stab and then I will——  
[Laughter.]

Dr. LAWRENCE. The short answer is no. I think, when it comes to these sort of authoritarian leaders, we have been hearing from civil society in the region for decades, and we know what you do. What you do is, you signal your displeasure in public and private ways, in ways that make things better. You—as I mentioned, there are 177 parliamentarians that we could get released from jail. There are hundreds with death penalties for crimes being committed we could help get out. Just as the beginning of the 40,000 Egyptians that have been jailed.

Senator PERDUE. So, you are—what you are saying, then, is——

Dr. LAWRENCE. Yes.

Senator PERDUE [continuing]. We are really sending conflicting messages. Is that right?

Dr. LAWRENCE. Yes. We are sending conflicting messages, and it is not only demoralizing Egyptians, the 90 percent that did not show up to vote, it is demoralizing the whole region, like, “What are you doing?” Right.

Senator PERDUE. So, are you concerned that Sisi turns to Moscow recently as a function of this, or is this related?

Dr. LAWRENCE. Absolutely. I mean, he turned to Moscow, in part, because he thought he could get support without strings. And this

is a real problem. And so, you used the word “balance.” “Balance” is the right word. I was the cochair of the U.S.-Egypt Science and Technology Fund for 4 years, and it was part of that 250 million—I do not know what it is at right now—of assistance that we benefit more from that program, or as much as the Egyptians do, right? A lot of our arms manufacturers—right?—our agriculture—you know, it is not that the Egyptian assistance—that is why there is a big lobby for it. It is not just that people love Sisi, right? This Egyptian assistance that goes back to Camp David benefits the United States in a number of ways—business community, science community, agriculture, military—

Senator PERDUE. And peace in the region, where their relationship with Israel, the—

Dr. LAWRENCE. Yes.

Senator PERDUE [continuing]. Last decade—

Dr. LAWRENCE. Yes.

Senator PERDUE [continuing]. Or so, and Jordan.

Dr. LAWRENCE. And so, I am all for full engagement with Egypt. It is more about signaling, right? Are you signaling that you are concerned? Are you helping getting some people out of jail? We recently spent a lot of political capital getting Mohamed Soltan out of jail. Mohamed Soltan is now outspoken, and the Egyptians may be regretting letting him out, but that sends an important message to everybody—to Islamists, modern Islamists, radical Islamists, non-Islamists, secular, opposition in Egypt, the 15,000 that have been arrested that are not Islamists in Egypt—you know, that we care about more than just geopolitical stability, and that we would—and that we understand that long-term geopolitical stability depends, in part, on democratization of these societies and opening up on human rights.

Senator PERDUE. And also that the economy is moving. Right now, Egypt’s economy is not.

Dr. LAWRENCE. All the indicators are terrible on the Egyptian economy. And there is only so many checks the gulf countries are going to be able to write—

Senator PERDUE. So, you create a disenfranchised—particularly young people coming into the workforce early in their career—

Dr. LAWRENCE. Yes.

Senator PERDUE [continuing]. They are disenfranchised. You have mentioned that in Tunisia, in the depression you are talking about—

Dr. LAWRENCE. Yes.

Senator PERDUE [continuing]. The suicide rates, and so forth.

Dr. LAWRENCE. Just as bad in Egypt.

Senator PERDUE. Just as bad in Egypt—

Dr. LAWRENCE. Yes.

Senator PERDUE [continuing]. Is that right?

Dr. LAWRENCE. Yes.

Senator PERDUE. Okay.

Dr. LAWRENCE. Haim, do you want to add something?

Mr. MALKA. It is difficult to strike—

Dr. LAWRENCE. Yes.

Mr. MALKA [continuing]. The right balance between our military cooperation and support for human rights. I mean, Sisi is playing

a different game. The Gulf States are playing a different game. The Russians are playing a different game. And the Egyptians know that they have alternatives. When we were debating here—and it is an important debate—whether there was a military coup in July 2013—when we were debating that, the gulf countries were writing checks for billions of dollars, saying, “Okay, if you are going to cut aid, if you are going to hold up transfer of weapons, no problem, we have other alternatives.” And that weakens the American hand, because Egypt is important, for lots of things, for the overflight rights, for the preferential treatment in the Suez Canal, for Arab-Israeli peace, for its center of gravity, not only in the Levant, but also in North Africa, as well. And that is important. And those serve a lot of global American interests. So, trying to promote human rights and trying to get President Sisi to do what he clearly does not want to do, when we do not have a lot of leverage, is difficult.

What I think we need to be focusing on in Egypt, and in other countries as well, is less about talking about democracy and more about promoting tolerance and inclusion and rethinking this tolerance that many countries, like Egypt, which used to be very cosmopolitan, multiethnic, multireligious societies once upheld, we need to promote this inclusivity and this tolerance in Egypt.

Senator PERDUE. When you have got Tunisia—and I would like to go back to that in the time remaining—that, you know, you—after the overthrow of President Ben Ali, something like 20 percent as—I have seen estimates as high as 20 percent of the mosques there were dominated by radical imams. And so, that throws another source of imbalance in Tunisia, which, so far, has been a model, in terms of what we can hope for in these countries in that area. Are we doing what we should be doing in Tunisia to—you know, to support the balance toward tolerance, as you say, and inclusion? I mean, I like those two words. I mean, are we—as a country with a very dominant foreign policy position in the region, are we doing what we should be to encourage Tunisia in the same vein?

Mr. MALKA. Well, I think—

Senator PERDUE. And to help them—not just encourage them, but to help them.

Mr. MALKA. Sure. There have been positive examples of how the United States has played a positive role urging political consensus and compromise in Tunisia. And I think the former Tunisian Ambassador played a critical role at different points in Tunisia’s crises in 2013, in 2015, and continuously urged the parties to come together, despite their differences. And that made a difference. And that is why it is so important that we are fully engaged, that we do have larger diplomatic staffs in the region, because U.S. engagement and diplomacy matters at critical junctures. And when we are not active, when we are on the sidelines, other countries with different interests will come in and promote narrow agendas that often time promote conflict and—sustained conflict rather than political unity that is so important for these countries to try to get beyond many of the problems that they face.

Dr. LAWRENCE. Let me add that, in Tunisia, they lost control of many of their mosques. I know Tunisians that just stopped going, because there was nothing there for them—

Senator PERDUE. Right.

Dr. LAWRENCE [continuing]. That they, you know, could tolerate. On both sides of this coin, either government-baked sermons that were just impossible to listen to, you know, scratching on the—or all the way to this—“What is this salafist saying? It does not represent my version of Islam.” Tunisian government is doing better at getting control of that, but the problem is that the government has been more focused on closing mosques and getting rid of certain imams than it has been on actually addressing the issue of what kind of Islam they want to have in Tunisia.

And, in terms of the other side of the inclusivity piece, the Islamists have included in Tunisia—and it is an example for the region, model for the region—but, the inclusivity question in Tunisia right now has more to do with economic security. So, how do we include old-regime elements—this is the economic reconciliation piece—without forgiving all of the sins that cannot all be forgiven? And how do we reform the security forces without sweeping everything under the rug? Algeria did that. Algeria had no transitional justice after their wonderful reconciliation ending the war. And a lot of Algeria’s problem is because they never did that. Tunisia has an opportunity to actually reform the security forces and actually reform the economy in ways that address constructively and proactively with the former regime elements that want to be a part of things, but some of them want to be a part of it with no cost and with no historical rendering.

Let me just say one more thing on Egypt that I think the—catch phrase is “holistic.” You can do counterterrorism, as Haim said, but you have to do it in a holistic manner that addresses economics, which Sisi is talking about before his trip to the U.K., and politics, which he is not talking about at all. The long-term social contract in all of these countries always was, before the revolutions, “Benefit economically from the—whatever we are doing, leave the politics to us.” The Arab Spring turned that upside-down and said, “No, actually, politics is a function of economics. Economics is a function of politics. And we need to do both politics and economics.”

Sisi is trying to go back to the old system, where, “It is a security argument. I am going to help you benefit economically, but leave the politics to me.” And—

Senator PERDUE. Well, it looks to me like we are losing influence over Sisi, too—

Dr. LAWRENCE. Yes.

Senator PERDUE [continuing]. Because of this power vacuum that I see being created—

Dr. LAWRENCE. So, we have to walk and chew gum. We have to continue to engage with him and find common ground, continue to push him. I mean, he may not even have had these elections if he had not been pressured, in part, by us.

Senator PERDUE. Right.

Dr. LAWRENCE. And so, we have to remain engaged. And, as I said, I do not think we should cut one dollar of assistance to Egypt,

but I do believe that we need to use other levers at our disposal to continue both the signal to the regime that it needs to get better, and to Egyptian civil society that all hope is not lost.

Senator PERDUE. Right.

Thank you both.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

To the issue of Egypt. And I know, Dr. Lawrence, you mentioned, "As Egypt goes, North Africa goes." I think that is what you said earlier. Go back, if you will, and explain, from your perspective, both of you—we had Mubarak that we cast aside quickly. We had the Muslim Brotherhood, and conflicting issues there. And now we have Sisi, that is a professional, that we withheld support from. Just walk through that and tell me the impression, if you will, that we have left in the region, relative to our varying support, if you will, for—and lack of support—for the entities that have come and gone, and where that leaves people to think about where we will go in the future.

Mr. MALKA. Thank you. I think it sends an ambiguous message. And people in the region are confused by U.S. foreign policy. I mean, in Egypt, in Tunisia, in lots of conversations I have had throughout the last 4–5 years, people will say to me, "Well, why is the United States supporting the Salafis? Why is the United States supporting the Muslim Brotherhood? Why does the United States not care about democracy and human rights? And why has the United States forgotten the liberals?" I mean, every different constituency in the region believes that the United States is shunning them and not paying enough attention to them, and not helping them. And that is a function of our policies, which have not necessarily been clear. We supported—first, we supported Mubarak stepping aside, we supported the Morsi government and the Muslim Brotherhood—or we did not necessarily support them, but we engaged with them. We accepted President Sissi, when he came to power. So, there does not seem to be, from the perspective of the region, a lot of coherence to this policy. And I think it leaves people confused and unsure about what the United States is going to do next.

Dr. LAWRENCE. Let me add to that, that—and I agree entirely with what Haim just said about confusion in the region. But, we can be clearer. We should have been clearer in dealing—in our dealings with the Muslim Brotherhood during the interim period. And for all of the economic problems that Egypt had during that period, it was actually the least violent period in Egyptian history in the last 10 years, was the—I mean, sorry, since the revolution—was the period that Morsi was in power. In part, for—another point I want to make here, and I call this the "chain of conversations." We need, in our rhetoric and our engagements, to support hardcore secularists talking to the secularists willing to engage with Islamists, talk to the moderate secularists and the moderate Islamists and encourage that conversation, encourage the conversation between the moderate Islamists and the democratic Salafists, encourage the conversation between the democratic Salafists and the violent Salafists, because the more people see hope in an inclusive democratic system, the less they are going to engage in spoiler

activities and violent activities at each end of the spectrum. And we have spoilers on both ends.

In Libya—to shift to Libya for a minute—Libya is a complicated place. If you look at Libya polling, most Libyans want Sharia on the constitution—right?—something that does not make sense to a lot of Americans. But, at the same time, most of the Libyans think the most important thing that a Libyan politician or a Libyan political party can do is have good relations with the West. So, how do you explain that? You explain that, because Libyans are both being revolutionary and reasserting their Islamic identity when Islam was manipulated—right?—in the Qadhafi years, and, at the same time, they were cut off from the West for decades by sanctions, and they want a robust engagement from the West, they do not feel they are getting.

Moving over to Tunisia, we had the same——

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute, I——

Dr. LAWRENCE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. I do not really want to do that. So——

Dr. LAWRENCE. Okay.

The CHAIRMAN. So, back to Egypt, though.

Dr. LAWRENCE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What I am trying to say about the Muslim Brotherhood, that they were the most inclusive government that has existed in recent times?

Dr. LAWRENCE. Absolutely not. They won with 51 percent of the vote, and they——

The CHAIRMAN. Well, what is your point, then?

Dr. LAWRENCE [continuing]. They ruled in a 50-percent—51-percent majoritarian way. They were just less violent and, by and large, more respectful——

The CHAIRMAN. But——

Dr. LAWRENCE [continuing]. Of their political adversaries than the precedent and the subsequent regimes——

The CHAIRMAN. But, to the question——

Dr. LAWRENCE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. What signals, through those various gyrations, have we sent to Egypt and, from your perspective, “as Egypt goes, North Africa goes”—what——

Dr. LAWRENCE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. What has been the message that has been heard there through these multiple gyrations?

Dr. LAWRENCE. Well, I think our biggest failing was not anything during the Morsi period. And I know the diplomats that worked hard in the April-to-June timeframe of 2013 trying to avert the coup. Morsi was offered a deal, similar to the deal the Ennahda Party got in Tunisia to step down. He got conflicting advice, so then Nushi told him to take the deal. Adderwan told him not to take the deal. And Morsi went with the “stick it out” philosophy, when he could have stepped down and—as the Tunisian Islamist Party did, and accept a transitional government. So, that was a piece of it.

I do not think, during the Morsi period, there is much more the United States could have done, except to make clear that we were

not favoring Islamists as Islamists. We were fading Islam—we were favoring Islamist democrats as democrats.

I think, come the coup in July 2013—and I was on BBC America July 4th, saying this is a coup, you know—it was a coup. And I think, by not calling it a coup and by reacting in a confusing way, we alienated the entirety of Egyptian youth. I mean, I was an election observer in 2013 and—or 2014, in Egypt, the last elections before this one, and everyone voting was over 40. I mean, Egyptian youth were just not there. And if you ask Egyptians under 35, you know, “What is your view of the United States?”—it is not just confusion, it is disgust about how the United States did not support democracy at a time that mattered. Now, these people did not know how hard U.S. diplomats tried to keep the Egyptian revolution on track. And it was a valiant effort. But, getting too cozy with Sisi too quickly sent messages that are problematic now——

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I did not think we got cozy enough. I will be honest.

Dr. LAWRENCE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. We withheld support. I did not think that indicated a lot of coziness. And so, I would disagree 180 degrees. I think we left them hanging out there. They did not know whether we supported them, or not. As was mentioned before, they got tremendous support from other people in the region, and, at a moment in time when we might have helped shape some of these issues that you are laying out, we were in a quasi-mode, where, you are right, we did not call it a coup, but, at the same time, we were withholding support for them, militarily, at a time when they needed some show of support from the United States. So, I could not disagree more. I mean, we did not cozy up very quickly. I mean, am I missing something?

Dr. LAWRENCE. Well, my view may be a little more nuanced than I have made it sound, but let me say this. Egypt gets a huge amount of military assistance. So, no withheld assistance during the period we were withholding it had much of an impact on Egypt. It had a big impact on U.S. interests, you know, that liked to have a certain amount of arms sold to Egypt, but it did not really have much of an impact on Egypt.

I think, at a moment of a coup, if you immediately line up with the coup-maker and say, “We are with you,” yeah, in a post-revolutionary country, that is an important issue. And, you know, we have had American citizens held in Egyptian jails, one of whom I mentioned. We have had a human rights catastrophe. And it is watched in 24/7 news cycles across the region. So, if our goal is only short-term geopolitical advantage, and if our only goal is having a strong ally in a region on fire, then you are right and I concede. But, if we want to have a policy that has medium- and long-term success and which captures the imaginations and the efforts of young people, withholding aid to Sisi for a little while, only to restore it, is the wrong message. It was not a strong——

The CHAIRMAN. So, the right message was? I have been confused by the testimony here. But, the right message——

Dr. LAWRENCE. Pushing for political inclusive outcome in Egypt as hard as we could.

The CHAIRMAN. Why would Sisi not see that to be in his interest now?

Dr. LAWRENCE. Well, I would say that he——

The CHAIRMAN. I mean, he is a smart guy.

Dr. LAWRENCE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. He is a smart guy. He is——

Dr. LAWRENCE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Educated. He is a leader. He——

Dr. LAWRENCE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Does want to be there for the long haul. Why would he not view greater inclusiveness, over time, in Egypt to be in his interest?

Dr. LAWRENCE. I would say—and I welcome Haim to chime in if he wants, but I would say that he chose the comfortable path, and the comfortable path was to demonize the half of Egyptian society that had voted for the FJP, the strong quarter of Egyptian society that supported them, and now stand, basically, completely alienated from Egyptian politics, and restore the pre-revolutionary order. And it is an order that worked, in his mind; it is an order that was successful in keeping occult forces at bay. If your main issue is the ideology of your adversary—right?—and excluding that ideology of—at all costs, then that is the reasonable course.

What I have been arguing all along is that the point of the Arab Spring was that everyone would have a seat at the table, and everyone who played the democratic game would get their seat. Right? That was not Sisi's view. Sisi's view was, "I will exclude my ideological enemies, en masse"—by the millions, in terms of voting, and by the tens of thousands in jail—"because I do not agree with them ideologically." It is a formula that can work, to some short-term degree, but I do not think it bodes well for Egypt's long-term political and economic development.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Malka.

Mr. MALKA. Yes, I think it is a little bit more complex. And what was interesting was, in July 2013, who President Sisi's allies were. There were Salafi political parties that supported President Sisi's takeover of Egypt. And——

Dr. LAWRENCE. As a survival tactic.

Mr. MALKA. Well, as a survival tactic, as a political tactic. Because they are also competing for Islamist votes against the Muslim Brotherhood, but that is sort of a separate issue. So, I think, inclusivity, yes, it is important for long-term stability, absolutely. But, it is not that Sisi excluded everyone, and there are different elements within Egypt that are playing a role. Granted, they have not done very well in recent parliamentary elections, but, I think, over time, the goal should be to expand space for other voices in the Egyptian political system. But, as long as opposition political forces believe that the game is already cooked, that the outcomes are already set, there is less of a willingness to participate. And that goes for Tunisia, it goes for Morocco, it goes for other countries, as well.

The CHAIRMAN. What did that signal—us going into Libya. We had worked with Qadhafi to rid the country of weapons of mass destruction. Certainly, he was not a good person. No question. That is an understatement. But, what signal did that send, when an up-

rising occurred there? We took him out. What signal did that send to the region? I am just curious.

Mr. MALKA. Well, I was in Morocco when the bombing campaign started, and everyone that I met with during that visit was warning us against what was happening, was warning not to get involved militarily in Libya, and to just leave the state as it was. I think the problem was going in without a strategy for how to put Libya back together after Qadhafi, and that is where things fell short. And I think that sends more of a signal, rather than the initial military intervention. What sends a signal is the lack of a strategy. And then, in the—the perception that, after deposing Qadhafi, that the United States walked away and left Libya to fall apart to its own devices. That sends a signal that the United States is not really committed, that it does not follow through, that it only has short-term interests, and not long-term interests. And this goes back to my initial point that, if we are going to be engaged, we need to be engaged for the long haul, we need to manage the risks, and we need to be committed to following through.

Dr. LAWRENCE. If I may add to that. Algerians felt very strongly that way, too, and gave us strong advice to stay out of Libya for these reasons. They predicted the outcome.

Moroccans and Tunisians, in terms of the population, by and large, were very much in favor, because they saw our action as a pro-Libyan population. What people often forget is, half of Libya had already broken away by the time NATO got involved. So, it was not an issue of us going in and toppling Qadhafi. We did not even take Qadhafi out. It was Libyan militias, after—the convoy was bombed, but the—when the convoy was bombed, it was not even bombed knowing Qadhafi was in it. The civil war that would have happened in Libya would have gone on for much longer without the NATO intervention, in my opinion, but I agree wholeheartedly with Haim's answer to your question and, insofar as that was the premise of your question, that going into Libya without a plan to stabilize Libya afterward was a mistake.

Now, let me add one thing. I was on all five of the State Department working groups on Libya in 2011. We had a great plan. What happened was—after the fact, is that a succession of Libyan governments were never ready, did not have the bandwidth, always wanted the sort of next iteration of the process—the minister be named, the vote, the—to happen. And, by the time Libyans had realized it was too late, it was too late. And now, a lot of Libyans have taken to blaming the United States for not having followed through.

But, I would argue wholeheartedly that, although the United States have—should have devoted more diplomatic bandwidth to Libya all along, the mistake, post-revolution, was primarily a Libyan mistake and a Libyan inability to accept international assistance, not primarily a Western mistaken in planning.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I thank you all for being here.

I asked the questions, not to in any way cast blame or anything else, but to—you know, here we are, the purpose of these hearings—and this is the last one—is to help us “develop,” as a committee, an approach to the Middle East. And yet, what I see, and what I see continuing to happen, is just a series of sort of ad hoc

steps—that have been going on for some time; again, I am not in any way—it is just an observation—a lack of any real consistencies. And the thought of maybe developing a Middle East policy with so many countervailing forces, if you will, at work, and each country being so different, relative to what they are dealing with, somewhat, you know, makes the task of “having a Middle East policy” somewhat daunting.

And I am getting ready to sign off, here, and thank you all for being here, but would either one of you all want to respond to that?

Dr. LAWRENCE. I think it was Yitzhak Rabin that used to say, “You have to fight terrorism like there is no dialogue, and you have to have dialogue like there is no terrorism problem.” And I think, you know, the degree to which, going forward, we can emphasize with vigor our commitment to democracy, human rights, and inclusive dialogue while, at the same time, going after the bad guys in an aggressive way—and, you know, bad guys who will stay bad guys; there is always bad guys.

And if I can add one more point, in—there is always—this—in every society throughout history, there is always very nasty people who want to do nasty things. For me, the main issue is, What sea are they swimming in? Is it a sea of population that is sympathetic because they have—they are using the same grievances that population has to justify their awfulness? Right? Or is it a population that is turning against them that is beginning to see dividends from the governments, local and national, and international assistance that seems to be taking their grievances seriously and at least beginning to address them? And if you tip that balance in the right direction, those bad guys have smaller and smaller areas to operate in. So, this is my—

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I would just add that some people would observe that our pursuit of democracy, when countries have not yet been ready for that, has helped create much of the chaos that exists in the region.

Dr. LAWRENCE. And I would argue it is coming anyway. See, democracy is coming anyway. And the analogy I used for the Arab Spring is 1848 Europe, where one monarchy flipped, but the momentum against monarchies began. That took decades. And there was a lot of chaos in mid-9th century Europe to—even if they are not ready for democracy, the youth populations are. See? And this is what we have to deal with. Hungary, youth populations wanting democracy, how do we deal with them?

Mr. MALKA. Thank you.

I think one of the things that we need to think about when we pursue a policy: first, clearly state what our interests are, clearly state what our objectives are, and not get bogged down in process, but also think about outcomes, as well, which is what our allies and our enemies often do in a much more focused way than we do. But, we need to show long-term commitment. We need to promote inclusive politics. But, we need to send a signal to the people of the region, to the governments in the region, that we care, that we have an interest, and that we have a long-term investment plan.

Part of that is also going to include understanding and acknowledging what we cannot change. There are lots of things that we are trying to change. There are a lot of outcomes we are trying to get

to. But, we also have to understand what our limitations are, in terms of persuading people like President Sisi or other governments that we deal with on a regular basis. So, understanding our limitations, but also setting realistic objectives, I think, will help guide a more effective policy.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you both. You have been very, very good witnesses and obviously interact with each other a lot. We appreciate that.

And the record will be open——

We want to welcome the Charge again for being here. She nodded in approval with some of the things you said, and was silent with others, so I do not know if you all want to talk with her about some input that she may wish to give, but you would have been a great witness today. We thank you for participating in the audience, anyway.

The record will be open, if it is okay, through the end of business on Friday. And you know the drill. If you get questions, please respond to them fairly quickly.

But, we thank you both. You have helped us. And, for that, we are very appreciative.

The meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

