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Information Notice No. 81-29: Equipment Qualification Testing Experience
SSINS No.: 6835 Accession No.: 8103300414 IN 81-29 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 September 24, 1981 Information Notice No. 81-29: EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION TESTING EXPERIENCE The following Test Summary Report numbers 1 through 10 summarize information received by NRC during the period from April 1, to August 31, 1981 regarding adverse results from equipment testing. It should be noted that only the adverse test results that have come to the attention of NRC during this period are provided. Adverse test results obtained during the equipment development phase is not required to be reported to NRC. NRC does not intend to publish successful qualification test results except for equipment previously published as an adverse test result. Those successful tests will only be published as they are voluntarily brought to the attention of NRC by industry. . IN 81-29 September 24, 1981 Page 2 of 11 Equipment Qualification Notice No. 1 - Test Summary Report No. 1 Equipment: Limitorque Valve Operator, Type SMB, Size 00 Test Facility: Limitorque Corporation Cognizant Design and/or Test: Westinghouse Electric Corporation Failed Component: Valve Operator Drive Motor (manufactured by Reliance Electric Co.) Type of Test: Environmental Qualification of SMB Class Valve Operators per IEEE 323-1974 (Harsh Environment) and IEEE 382-1972 Description of Failure(s): Failures 1 & 2 (Dates: 2/28/81 and 4/7/81) Motors failed during attempted valve operator cycling 9 hours and 21 hours, respectively, after initiation of steam spray during performance of the high-energy line break (HELB) accident profile. Complete valve operators had been pre-aged in accordance with IEEE 323-1974. Failure 3 (Date: 5/1/81) Motor failed during attempted valve operator cycling 10 days after initiation of steam spray for HELB accident profile. No pre-aging had been performed. Failure Mode: Failures were mechanical (motor bearings) and electrical (stator winding). There was evidence of steam and chemical flow-through in the motor. Possible Corrective Action Considerations: Motor modifications, test chamber design environmental profile requirement review for possible reduction in maximum test temperature may be required for corrective action. Generic Implications: Similar units, including units in operation, have successfully passed environmental qualification in accordance with IEEE 323-1971 and earlier standards under less severe test conditions. . IN 81-29 September 24, 1981 Page 3 of 11 Equipment Qualification Notice No. 2 - Test Summary Report No. 1 Equipment: ITT Barton Lot 4 Transmitters, Group A Test Facility: Westinghouse - Forest Hills Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Westinghouse Electric Corporation Failed Component: Not determined Type of Test: Environmental Qualification of ITT Barton Lot 4 Transmitters, Group A (3 Pressure and 3 Differential Pressure Transmitters Tested, 4/6/81 through 4/27/81) Description of Failure(s): 1. Two DP transmitters exhibited noisy output followed by erroneous output during second temperature ramp of the HELB accident profile. Output returned to normal over the following 24 hours, but the failure recurred at end of postaccident period on one unit. 2. One pressure transmitter exhibited noise and erroneous output for forty minutes during the second temperature ramp of HELB accident profile. Its output then returned to normal for the remainder of the test. Possible Corrective Action Considerations: Manufacturer is investigating the failures, concentrating on aging methodology, test setup, and duplicating test conditions to establish failure mechanisms. Generic Implications: Units are identical to Lot 2 units that have successfully passed environmental qualification in accordance with IEEE 323-1971. . IN 81-29 September 24, 1981 Page 4 of 11 Equipment Qualification Notice No. 3 - Test Summary Report No. 1 Equipment: D. G. O'Brien Electrical Penetration Assembly, Model K Connectors Test Facility: Sandia National Laboratories/Division 4445 Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: NRC/RES, IE Failed Component: Conductors shorted at connector Type of Test: Simulated LOCA Environmental Test to Examine Methodology Description of Failure(s): The grommet used in the connector expanded as the result of exposure to high aging and loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) environmental temperatures. The extrusion of the grommet sealing material stripped insulation from the conductors resulting in electrical grounding during the steam/chemical spray test conditions. (See also IE Information Notice 81-20.) Failure Mode: Insulation was removed as a result of the force of the expanding grommet material. Connector assemblies were retightened prior and subsequent to thermal aging. This process contributed to the failure. Possible Corrective Action Considerations: Additional testing of the connector is being performed by Duke Power Co. and will be reviewed by NRC. No additional testing will be performed by NRC on the electrical penetration assembly. Generic Implications: Application of Model K connectors is limited to the Catawba, McGuire and Yankee Rowe facilities. qualification tests to earlier standards were successfully performed by Duke Power and D. G. O'Brien on the Model K connectors for the McGuire plant. (See IE Information Notice 81-20 for more detailed information regarding earlier qualification.) . IN 81-29 September 24, 1981 Page 5 of 11 Equipment Qualification Notice No. 4 - Test Summary Report No. 1 Equipment: Dresser Safety Valve, Model 317009NA Test Facility: Combustion Engineering (CE) Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Electrical Power Research Institute (EPRI) Failed Component: Not identified Type of Test: Performance Testing for Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) Relief and Safety Valves Description of Failure(s): On June 3, 1981, a full-pressure steam test was performed on the subject safety valve. During the test, the valve did not close at the predetermined pressure and reopened at a pressure below the original set point after the valve had closed. The valve did not meet EPRI's safety valve screening criteria. Failure Mode: Disassembly of the valve disclosed galling of guiding surfaces and damaged internal parts. Possible Corrective Action Considerations: Undergoing evaluation Generic Implications: EPRI advises the following: (1) no operating plant has this valve installed; and (2) the following unlicensed plants plan to utilize them -- Bellefonte 1 & 2; cherokee 1, 2,3; Palo Verde 1, 2, 3; Perkins 1, 2, 3; and WPPSS 2 & 4. . IN 81-29 September 24, 1981 Page 6 of 11 Equipment Qualification Notice No. 5 - Test Summary Report No. 1 Equipment: Dresser Safety Valve, Model 31739A Test Facility: Combustion Engineering Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Electrical Power Research Institute (EPRI) Failed Component: Not determined Type of Test: Performance Testing for PWR Relief and Safety Valves Description of Failure(s): On June 25, 1981, a high ramp rate, high back pressure steam test was performed on the subject valve. During the test, rated flow was not achieved. The valve did not meet the EPRI valve screening criteria. Failure Mode: Not determined Possible Corrective Action Considerations: Continue testing and data evaluation. Generic Implications: EPRI advises the following: the Dresser 31739A safety valve is being used or will be used on the following plants--Calvert Cliffs 1 & 2; Palisades, Midland 1 & 2; Oconee 1, 2, & 3; Crystal River 3; TMI-1; and Millstone 2. . IN 81-29 September 24, 1981 Page 7 of 11 Equipment Qualification Notice No. 6 - Test Summary Report No. 1 Equipment: Dresser Power-Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Model No. 31533VX-30 Test Facility: Wyle Laboratories Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Electrical Power Research Institute (EPRI) Failed Component: Not determined Type of Test: EPRI/PWR Safety and Relief Valve Test Program Description of Failure(s): On May 19 and 20, 1981, a full-pressure water seal simulation test was performed. On May 20, 1981, full-pressure steam and full-pressure water seal simulation tests were performed on the subject valve. During the water tests, the valve remained open for 2 seconds (5/19/81) and 75 seconds (5/20/81) after receipt of a closure signal. The valve did not meet the EPRI screening criteria (failure to close on demand). Failure Mode: Not determined. Disassembly and inspection did not reveal damage that might affect the ability of the valve to open or close on demand. Possible Corrective Action Considerations: Continue testing and data evaluation. Generic Implications:Information indicates the valve is to be installed in CE and B&W PWRs. Fort Calhoun has loop seals upstream of Dresser PORVs. . IN 81-29 September 24, 1981 Page 8 of 11 Equipment Qualification Notice No. 7 - Test Summary Report No. 1 Equipment: Target Rock Power-Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Mode 80X-006-1 Test Facility: Wyle Laboratories Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Electrical Power Research Institute (EPRI) Failed Component: Not determined Type of Test: EPRI/PWR Safety and Relief Valve Test Program Description of Failure(s): On April 29, 1981, a full-pressure (2500 psi) loop seal simulation test was performed on the subject valve. During the water test, the valve remained open for 12 seconds upon deenergizing the valve for closure, and then closed. The valve did not pass EPRI's screening criteria. Failure Mode: Not determined. Disassembly did not reveal any damage that would affect future testing. Possible Corrective Action Considerations: Continue testing and data evaluation. Generic Implications: Information indicates that there are presently no valves of this design in operating plants but they are planned for use in some plants under construction. . IN 81-29 September 24, 1981 Page 9 of 11 Equipment Qualification Notice No. 8 - Test Summary Report No. 1 Equipment: Control Components Inc. (CCI) PORV Test Facility: Wyle Laboratories Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Electrical Power Research Institute (EPRI) Failed Component: Not determined Type of Test: EPRI/PWR Safety and Relief Valve Program Description of Failure(s): On July 1 and 2, 1981, during steam tests utilizing spring force only for valve closure, valve remained open for approximately 3 seconds prior to closure. The valve did not pass EPRI's screening criteria. Failure Mode: Not determined Possible Corrective Action Considerations: Continue testing and data evaluation. Generic Implications: Information indicates that the CCI PORV is being used or will be used on McGuire 1 & 2 and Catawba 1 & 2. . IN 81-29 September 24, 1981 Page 10 of 11 Equipment Qualification Notice No. 9 - Test Summary Report No. 1 Equipment: Crosby Safety Valve 3K6 Test Facility: Combustion Engineering Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Electrical Power Research Institute (EPRI). Failed Component: Not determined Type of Test: Steam, Low and High Ramp Rate, High Back Pressure Test Description of Failure(s): 8/11/81 - Shortly after test initiation the valve experienced oscillations (chattering). 8/13/81 - During steam test, performed at low and high ramp rates, valve closed at a pressure lower than the EPRI blowdown criteria of 2250 psia (approx. 2210 psia). 8/7/81 - Valve oscillated during set-point check using air-assist devices. Failure Mode: Not determined Possible Corrective Action Considerations: Not determined Generic Implications: Information indicates that the Crosby Safety Valve 3K6 is being used or will be used on St. Lucie 1 & 2 and Fort Calhoun. . IN 81-29 September 24, 1981 Page 11 of 11 Equipment Qualification Notice No. 10 - Test Summary Report No. 1 Equipment: ASCO Solenoid Valves Test Facility: ASCO/Isomedix, Inc./Wyle Laboratories Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Automatic Switch Co. (ASCO) Failed Component: Viton Elastomer Seals in NP 8300 Series Valves Type of Test: Radiation Simulation for Design Basis Event (DBE) Description of Failure(s): Recent radiation simulation tests resulted in failure of the valves to shift position. The Viton seals break down when submitted to gamma radiation exposure in excess of 20 megarads, adhere to the brass surfaces, and prevent solenoid operation. Failure Mode: Solenoid valve will not shift position upon receipt of an operating signal. Possible Corrective Action Considerations: Replace Viton Elastomers with Ethylene Propylene elastomers on valves required to operate under accident conditions following a DBE. [Note: Ethylene Propylene Elastomers do not break down when exposed to postulated normal service plus DBE gamma radiation dose rates. Information Notice No. 80-11 addressed replacement of Ethylene Propylene Elastomers with Viton Elastomers because of failures resulting from inadvertent oil entrainment.]. Generic Implications: All ASCO Valves Series NP 8300 with Viton Elastomers use in Class 1E circuits and are exposed to gamma radiation in excess of 20 megarads. Additional information will be issued following receipt of the vendors final test report. Attachment: Recently issued IE Information Notices
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