

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NEW START TREATY

HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NEW START TREATY

Wednesday, December 4, 2019

House of Representatives

Committee on Foreign Affairs

Washington, DC

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Eliot Engel (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Chairman ENGEL. The committee will come to order.

Without objection, all members will have 5 days to submit statements, extraneous material, and questions for the record subject to the length limitation in the rules.

We have a major operation here to do. We have got to put a pillow here.

[Laughter.]

Chairman ENGEL. Without objection, all members will have 5 days to submit statements, extraneous material, and questions for the record subject to the length limitation in the rules.

We are here this afternoon to discuss the importance of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, what we call New START, as a tool for limiting the most destructive weapons ever created as well as the implications of that treaty expiring, which is set to happen in just over a year.

To our panel of distinguished witnesses, welcome to the Foreign Affairs Committee. Welcome to members of the public and the press as well.

I now recognize myself for an opening statement.

Since a strong bipartisan majority in the Senate ratified New START in 2010, the treaty has served American interests well.

It put in place tough limits on Russia's nuclear arsenal. Its strong verification measures have allowed us to make sure Putin does not cheat, as he has done on other agreements, and the treaty gave us the flexibility to maintain an effectively safe nuclear deterrent to allow us to deal with any threats America faces.

But to understand the full importance of New START, we have to go back to the start of the cold war. Roughly a quarter century after the end of World War II the standoff between the United States, along with our allies, and the Soviet Union was marked by an arms race.

Both sides stockpiled enough devastating weapons to destroy the world many times over. My age is the age where we thought the Soviet Union would live forever and be our enemy forever.

Then 50 years ago, the Nixon Administration launched the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, or SALT. These talks were based on

the notion that arms control rather than an arms race is the best way to keep the Soviet Union, now known as Russia, in check while avoiding a calamitous nuclear war.

The SALT talks produced two groundbreaking agreements that were ratified in 1972 and in the years that followed. A bipartisan consensus formed around prudent arms control agreements as a key tool in advancing American security and keeping the Soviets at bay.

Virtually every president since then has recognized the importance of arms control. President Carter signed the SALT II agreement, the first President Bush signed the original START treaty with Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991, and President Obama negotiated its successor, the New START treaty.

At the time New START was signed, that strong bipartisan consensus supporting arms control still prevailed. Seventy-one senators voted to ratify. Former secretaries of State of both parties spoke out in favor of it.

It was a clear reflection of the old adage that guides our committee's work, and Mr. McCaul and I have said this many times, that politics should stop at the water's edge.

But in the years since then, we have seen a few strains of criticism. Some people just do not like arms control for ideological or political reasons.

Some would welcome a new arms race and some just seem intent on undoing anything that President Obama touched. If the treaty's opponents get their way, it will draw its last breath in February 2021.

At that point, absent some extension, Russia's nuclear forces would be completely unconstrained for the first time since 1972.

Some of us here remember those days I mentioned before. We remember air raid drills and duck-and-cover. We remember Soviet nuclear weapons based 90 miles off the coast of Florida in Cuba.

We remember when the threat of nuclear annihilation loomed over our lives. And when I look at Russia today, I see an unpredictable adversary. I see an autocratic leader in Vladimir Putin, hell bent on undermining democracy, splintering the West, and restoring some 21st century version of the Soviet empire.

The president suggested yesterday that Russia might not be a foe. Well, guess what? I believe he is wrong. The last thing that we should want is for Vladimir Putin to massively expand his nuclear arsenal without any limits.

No treaty is perfect. But with the clock ticking on New START, we need to ask whether we are better off with or without it. The answer is obvious to me and I hope the Trump Administration does the right thing and extends the treaty.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on these issues. I look forward to their testimony, pending which I recognize my friend, the ranking member, Mr. McCaul of Texas, for any opening remarks.

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing. This committee and you and I personally have worked extensively in a bipartisan manner over the years to highlight the continued threat that Vladimir Putin poses to the United States and to our interests abroad.

Under the Putin regime, Russia has invaded Georgia and Ukraine, leveled devastating cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns against our Western allies and meddled in our last Presidential election.

The Kremlin has also imprisoned and assassinated political opponents like Boris Nemtsov, attacked protestors, propped up the bloodthirsty Assad regime in Syria, sent submarine warfare capabilities to spy off of our coasts, and aided socialist dictator Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela.

In addition to all this, Putin is developing new weapons systems that violate international agreements that Russia claims to adhere to.

In light of this, I agreed with President Trump's decision to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty earlier this year after Russia's longstanding and clear violations.

Arms control treaties are some of the most important international agreements that Congress is called upon to consider. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or New START, is the latest of these agreements, having entered into force in 2011.

Unless extended in some manner, it is set to expire in February 2021. New START is not perfect. It only considers deployed nuclear weapons and does not limit or reduce the number of non-deployed warheads.

In addition, it has not stopped Russia from modernizing its weapon delivery systems or prevented China from building up its nuclear stockpile.

However, the treaty has been successful, resulting in a 30 percent reduction in deployed nuclear warheads and a 50 percent reduction in deployed launched vehicles.

Jointly, the United States and Russia have exchanged more than 16,000 notifications about the movement of launchers and conducted close to 300 onsite inspections in both countries.

According to the State Department's most recent New START implementation report, with the treaty there, quote, "would be a decrease in our knowledge of Russia's strategic forces," end of quote, and I find that very instructive here today.

It also contributes to the national security of the United States. Yesterday, the lead arms control official at the State Department confirmed that Russia remains in compliance with the treaty.

Despite these successes, we must be realistic about the future. Putin has proudly announced weapons systems that Russia's developing and deploying, such as the SS-30, Satan 2 ICBM, and the Avangard hypersonic reentry vehicle that will be included under the rubric of the treaty.

But Russia's advances in hypersonics and other so-called exotics have also resulted in new weapons systems that were not feasible when New START was negotiated and, thus, would not be subject to the treaty's restrictions.

I know that a few of my colleagues have strong concerns about extending New START. I understand and share some of these concerns and, as they have noted, the treaty places no limits on the deployment or stockpile of Russian tactical nuclear weapons or some of their new hypersonic missiles which would—may not be covered by the treaty itself.

I also understand the concern that China is not part of the New START or any similar treaty restricting its nuclear hypersonic weapons.

And while I would like to examine the feasibility of expanding New START to address China's nuclear arsenal and Russia and Chinese exotic weapons, they have made it clear that they are not interested in doing so.

And so because of this, we need to ensure that New START is extended in a responsible manner and that a strategic dialog begin as soon as possible to negotiate a new arms control agreement with Russia and possibly China that addresses these outstanding issues.

Mr. Chairman, I know our offices have had extensive discussions about the future of New START and I understand that portions of your amendment and the amendment I helped to co-sponsor have now been included in the NDAA Conference Report, which is good news, and I look forward to seeing what comes out of that and continuing our conversations as we move forward.

And with that, I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. McCaul.

I will now introduce our witnesses before asking them to summarize their testimony. Everything will be submitted for the record.

Admiral Michael Mullen served in the United States Navy for more than four decades, having a distinguished career by serving as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 2007 to 2011 and chief of Naval Operations from 2005 to 2007.

Last year, he joined the Board of Directors of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, and since his retirement he also has taught national security decisionmaking and policy at Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School and is president of MGM Consulting.

Rose Gottemoeller recently completed 3 years as the Deputy Secretary General of NATO, where she devoted significant attention to NATO's relations with the EU, United Nations, Russia, and China.

Prior to that, she served at the State Department as the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, and as the Assistant Secretary for Arms Control Verification and Compliance, in which position she was the chief U.S. negotiator of the New START Treaty.

Pranay Vaddi is a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Previously, Vaddi was a civil servant in the Office of Strategic Stability and Deterrence Affairs, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance at the State Department.

He served at the Interagency New START Treaty Bilateral Consultative Commission, backstopping policy committee chair, and on the New START Treaty BCC delegation, and worked on the suite of U.S.-Russian arms control and deterrence issues.

Kenneth Myers is the former director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, an agency charged with providing the military and combatant commands with expertise acknowledging capabilities to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction.

Prior to that, he served on the staff of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and worked for Senator Richard Lugar, whom we

all remember warmly as the leading Statesman on these issues. Mr. Myers now works as Senior Vice President for Defense and Security at PAE.

I will now recognize our witnesses for 5 minutes each, starting with you, Admiral Mullen.

**STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN (RET.),
NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE, FORMER CHAIRMAN OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

Admiral MULLEN. Thank you, Chairman, Ranking Member McCaul, members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today on a vital issue that affects the lives of every American and, indeed, I think, the security of the world.

I would like to submit for the record my full statement in support of extending the New START Treaty and, in addition, highlight for you now what I see as the key points in favor of extending New START.

Chairman ENGEL. Without objection, so ordered.

Admiral MULLEN. Based on my firsthand knowledge of the treaty and its successful implementation today, my belief that the strategic arms control agreements are an integral element of our overall nuclear policy and posture. I want to make six key points today.

First, the New START Treaty contributes substantially to the U.S. national security by providing limits, verification, predictability, and transparency about Russian strategic nuclear forces.

New START limits the U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems and contains a robust verification and transparency set of measures including extensive exchanges of data, notifications regarding the number and status of each side's strategic offensive arms and facilities, and onsite inspections to confirm that data.

As of August 2019, the U.S. and Russia have exchanged approximately 18,500 notifications and U.S. inspectors have conducted more than 150 onsite inspections in Russia, providing us a high confidence that Russia is complying with the treaty's limits and other provisions, and vice versa.

New START also contains provisions to facilitate the use of national technical means for treaty monitoring. Indeed, without the treaty and its verification provisions, we would be flying blind.

Second, it is strongly in the U.S. national interest to extend New START for 5 years so that the United States and Russia can continue to realize the mutual benefits and stability it provides.

I support a straightforward extension of the treaty. Measures that change or add new obligations to the treaty such as bringing in another country like China or new categories of weapons such as nonstrategic nuclear weapons cannot, as a legal matter, be pursued through the extension. Such measures would require a new agreement and a new Senate advising consent process.

That said, it is certainly appropriate for the United States to seek an understanding with Russia about how the treaty will apply to any new strategic systems it deploys while the extended treaty is in force.

This can be done in the treaty's Bilateral Consultative Commission, or BCC.

Let me now address some of the specific concerns that have been raised in the United States in the debate over the extension of New START, Russia's new systems, and bringing China into the negotiations.

New START will apply to the new strategic weapons systems Russia is most likely to deploy during the treaty's extended lifetime and it provides the best means for discussing Russia's novel and emerging systems that could be deployed later.

In the near term, we have very effective means to address the new Russian strategic systems that are most likely to be deployed in the next 5 years and that is to extend New START.

Both the Sarmat heavy ICBM and the Avangard hypersonic vehicle deployed on a Russian ICBM will be accountable under the treaty, as recently confirmed by Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov and by the Russian commissioner of the New START Bilateral Consultative Commission.

Getting that commitment in writing in the context of extension would be a great accomplishment for the administration.

With respect to other strategic systems that are much less likely to be deployed during a lifetime of an extended New START, the treaty includes a provision stating the party can raise in the BCC questions about the emergence of a new kind of strategic offensive arms.

If New START lapses we will lose the limits and verification we have on our Russian—Russia's existing strategic systems as well as the only available vehicle for subjecting limits and verification to the two new systems most likely to be deployed.

The alternative to New START extension is a nuclear free for all—no limits, no verification, and no predictability regarding Russian strategic nuclear forces.

Any additional steps or agreements the United States wants to pursue with Russia or other countries like China will have a better prospect for success if the foundation of New START remains in place.

It is critical to conduct a strategic stability dialog with China, pursue transparency and confidence-building measures, and lay the groundwork for future arms control measures.

But it would be an unconscionable mistake to sacrifice the benefits to national security of mutual restraints with Russia to the pursuit of an unlikely near-term arms control agreement with China.

Regular and sustained bilateral nuclear dialog between the United States and China is also essential for building transparency and trust and reducing risk of miscalculation and blunder.

Robust U.S.-Russia dialog on strategic stability and bilateral and multilateral crisis management mechanisms with Russia are essential and should be reinvigorated.

Congress should encourage and support this. I urge you to support and encourage the expansion and deepening of these channels of communication with Russia to enhance the security of the American people and our allies.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Mullen follows:]

ADMIRAL MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN (RET.)
FORMER CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WRITTEN STATEMENT FOR HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE
HEARING ON THE NEW START TREATY
DECEMBER 5, 2019

Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today on a vital issue that affects the lives of every American and indeed the security of our world.

That issue is the solemn responsibility of the United States to be a responsible steward of a safe, secure and reliable nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist, and to protect the American people and our allies from the risk of nuclear weapons. In my view, this necessitates seeking cooperation with Russia where possible to reduce the risk of nuclear use and avoid a costly and destabilizing nuclear arms race. Despite significant reductions since the height of the Cold War, the United States and Russia together still own over 90% of the world's nuclear stockpile. This means that despite significant differences in values, political systems and geopolitical objectives, our two countries have an undeniable mutual interest and joint responsibility to reduce nuclear risks and provide global leadership to prevent and discourage nuclear proliferation to other states and non-state actors.

I appear before you today as a private citizen, following a 43-year career in the U.S. Navy that culminated in my service as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 2007-2011. During my tenure, I was privileged to serve as the principal military advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council throughout the negotiation of the New START Treaty. Indeed, I was personally involved in negotiating with my Russian counterpart – Chief of the General Staff General Nikolai Makarov - some of the final issues leading to the conclusion and signature of the Treaty in April 2010.

Based on my firsthand knowledge of the Treaty and its successful implementation to date, and my belief that strategic arms control agreements are an integral

element of our overall nuclear policy and posture, I want to make six key points to you today:

1. The New START Treaty contributes substantially to U.S. national security by providing limits, robust verification and predictability about Russian strategic nuclear forces.
2. It is strongly in the U.S. national interest to extend New START for five years so that the United States and Russia can continue to realize the mutual benefits and stability it provides.
3. New START will apply to the new strategic systems Russia is most likely to deploy during the Treaty's extended lifetime, and it provides the best means for discussing Russia's novel and emerging systems that could be deployed later.
4. Any additional steps or agreements the United States wants to pursue with Russia or other countries like China will have a better prospect for success if the foundation of New START remains in place.
5. It is critical to conduct a strategic stability dialogue with China, pursue transparency and confidence building measures, and lay the groundwork for future arms control measures, but it would be an unconscionable mistake to sacrifice the benefits to national security of mutual restraints with Russia to the pursuit of an unlikely near term arms control agreement with China.
6. Robust U.S.-Russia dialogue on strategic stability and bilateral and multilateral crisis management mechanisms with Russia are essential and should be reinvigorated. Congress should encourage and support this.

I will elaborate briefly on these six points.

The New START Treaty contributes substantially to U.S. national security by providing limits, robust verification and predictability about Russian strategic nuclear forces.

For fifty years, the United States and the Russia have relied on verifiable nuclear arms control to constrain competition in nuclear arms, enhance strategic stability, and maintain transparency and predictability regarding each side's strategic nuclear forces. The most recent of these agreements – the New Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (New START) – was signed in April 2010 by President Obama and then-Russian President Medvedev, approved in December 2010 by the U.S. Senate with a large bipartisan vote, and entered into force on February 5, 2011. The Treaty limits U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems, and provides robust, intrusive verification mechanisms to ensure compliance.

Limits: New START limits the United States and Russia to a total of 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads; 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments; and 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. Both sides met these limits as required by February 4, 2018, and both sides are complying with the Treaty's terms.

Verification and Transparency: The Treaty contains robust verification and transparency measures. The Treaty is quite remarkable in this respect, and we don't talk enough about what this means in practice and how the United States benefits. The Treaty requires extensive exchanges of data and notifications regarding the number and status of each side's strategic offensive arms and facilities. Each side has the right to conduct up to 18 on-site inspections annually in the other country to confirm that data. This includes the right – which was a first in any nuclear arms control agreement – for the on-site inspection teams to select for inspection an individual launcher at an operational ICBM or submarine base to confirm that the actual number of reentry vehicles (warheads) deployed on it corresponds to the data provided to the team when it arrived at the base. No other treaty has ever provided that level of intrusive verification to visually inspect and confirm the actual warheads on an individual deployed launcher. The point of this, of course, is to deter cheating, and to detect it if it occurs. The treaty also provides for exhibition of each type of weapon covered by the Treaty. Notably, this

requirement for an exhibition where on-site inspectors can see and confirm the distinguishing features of the weapon system will apply to any new types of strategic offensive arms Russia deploys during the life of the Treaty.

As of August 2019, the U.S. and Russia have exchanged approximately 18,500 notifications and U.S. inspectors have conducted more than 150 on-site inspections in Russia. New START also contains provisions to facilitate the use of national technical means for Treaty monitoring.

Why is this important to our national security? Because these verification and transparency measures provide us high confidence that Russia is complying with the Treaty's limits and other provisions, and vice versa. Moreover, it is hard to overstate, from my perspective as a senior military leader, how much we benefit from the knowledge and predictability the treaty provides about Russia's nuclear forces and operational practices. The same is true for Russia about our strategic forces. This enhances mutual confidence and understanding and goes a long way to avoid "worst case" military planning. Without the Treaty and its verification provisions, we'd be "flying blind."

It is strongly in the U.S. national interest to extend New START's duration for five years so that the United States and Russia can continue to realize the mutual benefits and stability it provides.

New START has a duration of 10 years (until February 4, 2021), but includes a provision for extending the Treaty by executive agreement for up to five additional years (until February 4, 2026). For all of the reasons I just outlined above, I think it is essential to our national security that the United States and Russia agree to extend the treaty for five years to continue to benefit from its limits, verification and predictability.

President Putin has indicated that Russia is ready to discuss extension with the United States, and I hope President Trump will decide to pursue extension as well. The sooner our countries can discuss and agree to extend the Treaty the better, in order to remove the uncertainty that exists now and to lay the foundation for additional steps to address nuclear threats and enhance strategic stability.

I support a straightforward extension of the Treaty. Measures that change or add new obligations to the Treaty, such as bringing in another country such as China, or new categories of weapons such as nonstrategic nuclear weapons, cannot as a

legal matter be pursued through extension. Such measures would require a new agreement and a new Senate advise and consent process.

That said, it is certainly appropriate for the United States to seek an understanding with Russia about how the Treaty will apply to any new strategic systems it deploys while the extended Treaty is in force. Russia has indicated it wants to discuss implementation concerns about the conversion procedures the United States uses to take certain systems out of Treaty accountability. I would urge both sides to agree as soon as possible to extend the Treaty, and use the its implementing commission (the Bilateral Consultative Commission- or BCC) to continue working on questions of implementation and the potential emergence of new strategic weapons systems in the future.

Let me now address some of the specific concerns that have been raised in the United States in the debate over extension of New START: 1) Russia's new systems and 2) bringing China into the negotiations.

New START will apply to the new strategic systems Russia is most likely to deploy during the Treaty's extended lifetime, and it provides the best means for discussing Russia's novel and emerging systems that could be deployed later.

President Putin has made public pronouncements in the past few years regarding new nuclear weapon delivery systems Russia is developing. Some of these are novel systems based on new technologies, others are modernized versions of existing capabilities. Some are much closer to realization and deployment than others. Russia's continuing pursuit of nuclear modernization and innovation underscores the need for our countries to continue the arms limitation and reduction process, and the need for reinvigorated strategic stability talks in diplomatic and military channels. It is vital that we have a real and sustained dialogue to understand each side's perceptions of how new technologies and weapons affect strategic stability. The goal should be to identify additional steps we could take together to enhance stability and constrain competition in nuclear arms and related capabilities.

In the near term, we have a very effective means to address the new Russian strategic systems that are most likely to be deployed in the next five years, and that is to extend New START. Some who have opposed extension based their argument in part on a concern that Russia's new systems won't be covered by the Treaty.

To the contrary, my reading is that both the Sarmat heavy ICBM and the Avangard hypersonic vehicle deployed on a Russian ICBM will be accountable under the Treaty. The Sarmat is a new type of ICBM that clearly meets the Treaty's definition of an ICBM. The Avangard hypersonic vehicle, if deployed on an ICBM as Russia plans to do, will be accountable under the Treaty as a nuclear warhead on a deployed ICBM. In early November, 2019, Vladimir Leontiev, the Russian Commissioner of the BCC — stated publicly that both of these systems would in fact be covered by the Treaty. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov then publicly reiterated that point. This is a significant clarification from senior Russian officials that should give us confidence that these new systems will not run free of the Treaty's limits and verification provisions. Getting that commitment in writing in the context of extension would be a great accomplishment for the administration.

There are two other strategic systems that President Putin has discussed that are, in terms of their technical development, much less likely to be deployed during the lifetime of even an extended New START. One is the Poseidon strategic range nuclear powered nuclear torpedo, the other is the Burevestnik nuclear powered air launched strategic range cruise missile. Neither of these systems fits the definition of the types of strategic offensive arms that are covered under the Treaty.

However, the Treaty includes a provision stating that a party can raise in the BCC questions about the emergence of a "new kind" of strategic offensive arm. The United States can and should use this treaty mechanism to raise questions about these systems, and how the Treaty might apply to them in the event that either is deployed before the extended Treaty expires. Even better would be if the United States and Russia could agree in principle now that if these systems are deployed while New START is in force, they will discuss and agree on how to include them under the Treaty's limits and verification provisions. Given the state of development of these two systems, there is ample time to address them. In my view they are not a compelling reason for not extending New START. To the contrary, New START provides a mechanism and forum for discussing them.

If New START lapses, we will lose the limits and verification we have on Russia's existing strategic systems, as well as the only available vehicle for subjecting to limits and verification the two new systems likely to be deployed within the next five years: the Sarmat ICBM and the Avangard hypersonic vehicle. The alternative to New START extension is a nuclear free for all: No limits, no verification, and no predictability regarding Russian strategic nuclear forces. My best advice to you

and to the country as a former senior military leader is: We can and should avoid that worst case outcome by agreeing with Russia to extend the New START Treaty for five years.

Any additional steps or agreements the United States wants to pursue with Russia or other countries like China will have a better prospect for success if the foundation of New START remains in place.

President Trump has expressed an interest in negotiating a new and more ambitious agreement with Russia, and in bringing China into the negotiations. I support both of those goals, though I would advise pursuing them sequentially, not simultaneously. Both of those goals can best be advanced by first extending New START to retain and build on its essential foundation of limits and verification.

The next agreement with Russia is likely to be much more complex than START or New START because it will likely need to address systems and technologies not covered by those earlier agreements. For instance, we may want it to address additional classes of weapons – perhaps intermediate-range delivery systems along with strategic-range systems, perhaps non-strategic nuclear warheads which the Senate has made clear it wants the next bilateral agreement to address. The Russians have made clear for years that they have their own ideas about broadening the range of issues to be addressed in the context of future nuclear reductions, citing conventional prompt strikes systems and missile defense.

Even agreeing on the subjects for negotiation, let alone the content, will be complicated. Negotiations may result in a set of agreements or understandings -- some legally binding, some more akin to transparency measures or rules of the road. We might want the option of relying on New START and its verification provisions running in parallel with a new agreement.

The bottom line is that there simply isn't time to develop a detailed U.S. negotiating position, which by the way may require new verification procedures to accompany limits on a broader range of systems and weapons; let alone to negotiate one or more agreements with Russia; and complete the Senate advise and consent process before New START lapses in February 2021. We should not put ourselves in a position of negotiating against an artificial and self-imposed deadline because New START is expiring.

In my view, therefore, the optimal course at this time is to extend the Treaty and allow time to carefully work through the details of what we think should come next

and how to achieve it. This will ensure some stability in the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship and provide a platform from which we can build future agreements to supplement or supersede New START. To let it lapse with nothing to put in its place would be profoundly unwise and could in addition poison the atmosphere for negotiating a new agreement with Russia.

It is critical to conduct a strategic stability dialogue with China, pursue transparency and confidence building measures, and lay the groundwork for future arms control measures, but it would be an unconscionable mistake to sacrifice the benefits to national security of mutual restraints with Russia to the pursuit of an unlikely near term arms control agreement with China.

Regular and sustained bilateral nuclear dialogue between the United States and China is also essential for building transparency and trust and reducing risks of miscalculation and blunder. This is all the more important as China modernizes its nuclear forces, and in light of the potential for miscalculation or conflict with regard to the South China Sea or Taiwan.

I fully support bringing China eventually into the nuclear arms control and reduction process. But we must recognize that the United States and Russia still hold over 90% of the world's nuclear weapons. China has a much smaller though significant stockpile of a few hundred nuclear weapons. China has made clear that it is not prepared to join nuclear reduction talks with the United States and Russia, given our respective arsenals of more than 4000 nuclear warheads. Moreover, unless we are prepared to reduce to the levels China is at, we should not pursue an agreement that could legitimize China coming up to level of U.S. and Russian nuclear forces. And let's not forget that Russia will insist on inclusion of our allies the UK and France in any nuclear negotiation that also includes China.

More realistic in the near term is to continue efforts bilaterally and within the P-5 context to engage China in discussions of strategic stability, and to encourage enhanced transparency about its nuclear policies, doctrine and posture and plans. There are some confidence building measures we could pursue, such as ballistic missile test launch notifications. We should be aiming to bring all of the P-5 into the nuclear reductions process, consistent with our collective obligation under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but this will take time, and realistically will need to be preceded by greater progress on reductions by the United States and Russia.

I also fully support developing ideas for regional arms control in the Asia-Pacific, to help address the concerns of our allies and partners, and by this I mean

conventional as well as nuclear capabilities. My sense is that we have internal homework to do to identify our goals for any negotiations, to take into account concerns and interest of our allies, and to develop ideas that might be negotiable with China and others.

In sum, we should be thinking about how to include China in multilateral conventional and nuclear arms control discussions, but including China in a nuclear reduction negotiation with Russia and the United States is not likely to happen in the near term.

We certainly should not hold the maintenance of significant restraints and verification on Russian strategic nuclear forces hostage to a demand for China to join in negotiations that have no prospect of success in the time before New START expires.

We can extend new START and intensify dialogue with China on nuclear transparency, confidence-building measures, and strategic stability.

Robust U.S.-Russia dialogue on strategic stability and bilateral and multilateral crisis management mechanisms with Russia are essential and should be reinvigorated.

Everyone in this room understands that the backdrop for this discussion of New START is a badly deteriorated and increasingly fraught relationship between Russia and the West. The erosion of trust between Russia and the West is profound and corrosive, and steps must be taken on both sides to reverse this tide.

There are profound differences in values, perspectives and geopolitical interests that cannot be waved away or solved in a kumbaya conversation. Russian interference in the U.S. election process is unacceptable.

We do nonetheless share with Russia an existential interest in not blundering into war or devastating the world with a nuclear conflict.

Crisis management mechanisms can help avoid conflict and the risk of military escalation. Strategic stability dialogue is essential to reducing nuclear risks, and is an important means to understanding each side's security concerns and identifying potential areas of overlapping interest that could be advanced through future agreements.

Crisis management mechanisms and strategic stability dialogue with Russia have atrophied to a dangerous point. Either because we choose to strictly interpret a

policy of “no business as usual” to stifle such interactions bilaterally or in the NATO context, or because in the current domestic political atmosphere the congress does not trust the administration to engage diplomatically with Russia, or for other reasons including a dangerously misguided complacency about the risks, we have gotten to a dangerous point of insufficient communication with Russia.

Thus, my final advice today to you and to the American people is that our security depends on the ability to engage regularly with Russia in military and diplomatic channels to prevent and manage crises and to discuss and agree on measures to increase strategic stability and reduce nuclear risks. New START extension is a necessary but insufficient step in this regard.

I urge you to support and encourage the expansion and deepening of these channels of communication with Russia to enhance the security of the American people and our allies.

Conclusion

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to your questions.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you.

Ms. Gottemoeller.

Am I butchering your name? If I am, please correct me.

No? Okay.

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. No, sir. Just perfect. I have been called a lot of things but you are pronouncing my name right.

So thank you very much indeed.

STATEMENT OF ROSE GOTTEMOELLER, FORMER NATO DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL AND FORMER UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify before you today on the importance of the New START Treaty as well as broader arms control issues of importance to NATO allies.

Having departed the position of NATO deputy secretary general only in October, I am very aware of the interest and concerns of the allies in this strategically significant arena.

I will give a few highlights of my testimony and ask, please, that the whole of it be placed on the record.

Today, I would like to focus on two aspects of contemporary arms control. First, one that Admiral Mullen has already introduced, the importance of the New START Treaty.

I will focus on its importance in regulating parity. That is, the equivalence of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces.

The second issue I would like to tackle is the problem of dual and nuclear and conventional capability in ground-launched intermediate range missiles, an issue that has become especially acute in Eurasia with the demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty—INF—and, thus, affects U.S. allies in both Europe and in Asia.

First, on New START, I know and, as Admiral Mullen has just discussed, a debate has been underway as to whether to extend the New START treaty for 5 years from February 21 to February 26, as is permitted by the treaty.

A number of arguments have been advanced against this step, including that the treaty does not control the new nuclear systems that Russian President Putin has announced on several occasions, most prominently in his speech on March 1, 2018.

I do not find these arguments convincing, in part because, in fact, New START can play a role in regulating these systems, as Admiral Mullen has described.

More importantly, we need to take a bold look at the question of whether New START benefits U.S. national security and what blows to U.S. national security would accrue, should New START abruptly go out of force on February 5 of 2021.

Without the treaty, let me just underscore the answer is clear to me. During the coming decade, the United States will be modernizing its nuclear forces.

If the treaty is extended until 2026, it will continue to cap Russian-deployed warheads at 1,550, and delivery systems—missiles

and bombers—at 700, giving the United States a stable environment in which to carry out the modernization of our nuclear forces.

Without the treaty, things could change drastically and quickly. There is no faster way for the Russians to outrun us than to deploy more nuclear warheads on their missiles.

This is not a new issue. Starting in the 1970's, the Soviets and now the Russians have built larger and heavier intercontinental ballistic missiles on which they can load more warheads at will and they have plenty of them in storage.

If released from the current 1,550 limit on deployed warheads, the Russians could readily add several hundred, by some account 1,000 more warheads to their ICBMs, forcing the United States into a difficult targeting problem at best and a strategic crisis at worst.

The Russians, with their highly capable missiles might be tempted to try to knock out the strategic command and control systems of the United States.

Stability depends on such a temptation never taking shape. As farfetched as it seems, that very scenario drove both sides in the arms reduction negotiations of the 1980's and 1990's to acknowledge that we must ensure parity in numbers of deployed warheads and delivery vehicles.

We cannot afford to lose this parity or to cease regulating it. But if New START lapses, that outcome could happen fast, an outcome dangerous for U.S. national security.

Therefore, I believe it is in our national security interest to extend the treaty to February 2026.

Before I leave the New START Treaty, I would just like to mention that the NATO allies, as well as our allies in Asia, do support extension of the New START Treaty.

Now, I would like to speak briefly to the dual capability challenge. The problem of dual nuclear and the conventional capability and intermediate-range systems is an issue that has become especially acute in Eurasia with the demise of the intermediate-range nuclear forces, or INF.

It does affect allies in both Europe and Asia. NATO allies have been clear in voicing their concerns about it and Tokyo and Seoul have also begun to do so.

To begin, the unique difficulty that emerges from dual capable intermediate-range missiles that are ground lodged is that they have either very short flight time to target, as in ballistic systems, or operate in a stealthy mode difficult for radar to detect as in cruise missiles.

Warning time for those under attack is either very short or totally lacking. The missiles, thus, face decisionmakers with the nightmarish dilemma of a no-warning attack that could be either nuclear or conventional.

This is the very dilemma that led Soviet and U.S. negotiators to reach the INF treaty in the period of 1987 and it did sustain stability by banning all intermediate-range ground-launched deployed by the parties.

Now the dilemma remains but the INF treaty does not and I know this hearing is not about reversing the U.S. withdrawal from the INF.

But I want to state clearly that I supported it, having personally been involved in 4 years of diplomacy to try to get the Russians back into compliance with the treaty.

So I am not condoning Russian behavior but I do want to say that the Russians have spoken out to say, from a leadership aspect, both their minister of defense, Sergei Ivanov, and also President Putin that they see the proliferation of these kinds of systems across Eurasia in the hands of the Chinese, the Indians, the Pakistanis, the North Koreans, and then the Iranians as being destabilizing for them. Why they never attempted to resolve it at the negotiating table I do not know. But we saw them violating the treaty and so have withdrawn.

So I think it will be important to get China to the table and I think we can—we can pursue a phased approach with them, with China and Russia together, pursuing, for example, early talks on the issues and dilemmas that these systems represent, then moving on to statements of restraint and, finally, moving in the direction of actual limitations and reductions on these systems.

But I see the necessity of a phased approach to bring China to the table and to make it clear to them that their interests too will be served by constraints and restraints on these kinds of weapons systems.

So with that, Mr. Chairman, thank you for your patience. I look forward to further discussion.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Gottemoeller follows:]

**Testimony of Rose Gottemoeller before
The U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Foreign Affairs
December 4, 2019
“The Importance of the New START Treaty”**

Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on “The Importance of the New START Treaty,” as well as broader arms control issues of importance to the NATO alliance. Having departed the position of NATO Deputy Secretary General only in October, I am very aware of the interests and concerns of the Allies in this strategically significant arena.

I would like to begin by stressing a message that I fear sometimes gets lost in the debate: arms control, including the New START Treaty, is not a good in and of itself. It is only valuable insofar as it enhances U.S. national security and the security of our Allies. Arms control is not worth pursuing if it does not contribute to our security and indeed facilitate our ability to defend ourselves. In that way, arms control is a part of the spectrum of deterrence and defense, just as are capable conventional forces, strong nuclear forces, and reliable missile and air defenses.

Today I would like to focus on two aspects of contemporary arms control: first, the New START Treaty and its importance in regulating parity, that is, the equivalence of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces; and second, tackling the problem of dual nuclear and conventional capability in ground-launched intermediate-range missiles, an issue that has become especially acute in Eurasia with the demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and thus affects U.S. allies in both Europe and Asia.

New START and Parity

First, I know that a debate has been underway as to whether to extend the New START Treaty for five years, from February 2021 to February 2026, as is permitted by the Treaty. A number of arguments have been advanced against this step, including that the Treaty does not control the new nuclear systems that Russian President Putin has announced on several occasions, but most prominently in a speech on March 1, 2018. I do not find these arguments convincing, in part because in fact New START can play a role in regulating these systems, about which I’ll say more in a moment.

More importantly, we need to take a bald look at the question of whether New START benefits U.S. national security, and what blows to our security would accrue should New START abruptly go out of force on February 5, 2021. To me, the answer is clear: during the coming

decade, the United States will be modernizing its nuclear forces. If the treaty is extended until 2026, it will continue to cap Russian deployed warheads at 1,550 and delivery systems—missiles and bombers—at 700, giving the United States a stable environment in which to modernize.

Without the treaty, things could change drastically and quickly. There is no faster way for the Russians to outrun us than to deploy more nuclear warheads on their missiles. This is not a new issue. Starting in the 1970s, the Soviets and now the Russians have built larger and heavier intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs, on which they can load more warheads at will—and they have plenty of them in storage. If released from the current 1,550 limit on deployed warheads, the Russians could readily add several hundred—by some accounts, one thousand—more warheads to their ICBMs, forcing the United States into a difficult targeting problem at best, and a strategic crisis at worst:

The Russians, with their highly capable missiles, might be tempted to try to knock out the strategic command and control systems of the United States. Stability depends on such a temptation never taking shape. As far-fetched as it seems, that very scenario drove both sides in the arms reduction negotiations in the 1980s and 1990s to acknowledge that we must ensure parity in numbers of deployed warheads and delivery vehicles.

We cannot afford to lose this parity, or to stop regulating it. But if New START lapses, that outcome could happen fast, an outcome dangerous for our national security. Therefore, I believe it is in the national security interest of the United States to extend the treaty to February 2026. Such an extension will provide a stable environment both to modernize the U.S. nuclear triad, and to negotiate a new strategic nuclear reduction treaty.

Before I leave the New START Treaty, I would like to mention that it will control several of the new nuclear missile systems that President Putin has announced. The new heavy missile, for example, which the Russians call the Sarmat, meets the definition of an ICBM under the treaty and would therefore fall under it without any additional negotiation. The new boost-glide missile system, the Avangard, might also be brought under the treaty, since it is launched on a version of an existing Russian ICBM. The Russians have all but said that this system will be accountable under the treaty, and they exhibited it to a U.S. inspection team during their visit to Russia on November 24-26, an important treaty procedure. However, if New START is not extended, Russia would be able to field both the heavy missile—on which so many more warheads can be quickly deployed—and the boost-glide system, without any constraints.

I must note that the New START Treaty has provisions to address new kinds of strategic nuclear weapons, systems that have not been seen before such as the Burevestnik nuclear-armed cruise missile. However, bringing such systems under the treaty would not be accomplished without additional negotiation.

The Dual-Capability Challenge

Now I would like to turn to my second subject, tackling the problem of dual nuclear and conventional capability in intermediate-range missiles, an issue that has become especially acute in Eurasia with the demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). It thus affects U.S. allies in both Asia and Europe: NATO allies have been clear in voicing their concerns about it, and Tokyo and Seoul have also begun to do so.

It is worth noting that the problem of dual capability is not new. The Soviet Union made it routine to design ballistic as well as cruise missiles to carry either nuclear or conventional warheads, a practice which Russia continues today. The United States began deploying dual-capable Tomahawk cruise missiles in the 1980s. The unique difficulty that emerges from dual-capable intermediate-range missiles that are ground-launched is that they have either a very short flight time to target, as in the ballistic systems, or operate in a stealthy mode difficult for radar to detect, as in the cruise missiles. Warning time for those under attack is either very short, or totally lacking. The missiles thus face decision-makers with the nightmarish dilemma of a no-warning attack that could be either nuclear or conventional.

This dilemma drove U.S. and Soviet negotiators to the table to negotiate the INF Treaty, which was agreed in 1987 and sustained stability by banning *all* intermediate-range ground-launched missiles deployed by the parties—the so-called zero option. It was important to ban all such missiles, because verification regimes were dependent at that time on national technical means of verification (e.g. satellites, surveillance planes, radars deployed on national territory). On-site inspection techniques were just taking shape, and the negotiators concluded that it would be impossible to undertake the delicate, intrusive inspections needed to determine if a nuclear warhead was deployed on a particular missile.

Now, the dilemma remains, but the INF Treaty does not. The United States withdrew from the treaty in August 2019 after many years of diplomatic effort, trying to get the Russians to cease violating it through their deployment of the 9M729 intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile, which is called the SSC-8 in NATO parlance. This hearing is not about rehearsing the U.S. withdrawal from INF. I will only say that I supported it, having personally been involved in four years of that diplomacy. I can state clearly that a treaty that one party is violating so as to undermine its object and purpose is a treaty that is hollowed out—it no longer serves U.S. national security interests. When the Russians began to operationally deploy the missiles in some numbers, they began to defeat the object and purpose of the INF Treaty.

Although I am not condoning the behavior, it has become clear why the Russians decided that they needed a new ground-launched intermediate-range missile system: over a decade ago, then Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov told Donald Rumsfeld that they were worried about the proliferation of ground-launched intermediate-range missiles systems in Eurasia. In the years since, Putin has stated publicly that Russia is concerned about such missiles being deployed by

China, North Korea, India, Pakistan, Iran—states all along Russia’s Eurasian land borders. The Russians have thus far chosen not to try to fix the problem at the negotiating table, but instead deployed their own missiles in violation of the INF Treaty.

That is why I have applauded the efforts of the current Administration to highlight the development and deployment of intermediate-range ground-launched missiles by the Chinese, and to begin negotiations with both them and the Russians. However, there are several problems with the Administration’s initiative, at least from the evidence available in the media: First, it has not gone far enough to incentivize participation in a process—no one will come to the table unless they see their own interests served. Second, it has not considered how to get the other relevant actors beyond the Chinese engaged. These are tricky matters to pursue with countries who have not before engaged in negotiated arms control and limitation, who do not have the experience accumulated by the United States and Russia through over fifty years of negotiations.

In confronting these problems, I suggest pursuing a phased approach. China, for example, might be engaged early in talks aimed at high-lighting the decision-making dilemmas and stability challenges posed by such missiles deployed close to their borders. Scenario-based discussions and tabletop exercises could help to bring home the issues, as could a frank review of the history from both U.S. and Russian perspectives. Herein might be the incentive for Beijing: the proliferation of highly accurate and capable ground-launched intermediate-range missiles on Chinese borders is bad for Chinese national security.

The second phase might then develop a normative basis for further negotiations to build on—statements of restraint of various kinds. These might include declarations of missile numbers and locations; assurances that certain bases would not deploy nuclear-armed missiles; or statements of limitations on use. Such unilateral declarations, of course, are never enough in the arms control policy world, but they can begin to familiarize a country’s military and national security establishment with the value of restraint.

The third phase would then move on to designing a mutually beneficial regime for limitation of such systems. Here I am convinced that we are in a better place than we were when the INF Treaty was negotiated. My view is formed on the basis of the fact that we no longer think it impossible to determine via inspection whether a nuclear warhead is absent or present on a given missile. Already in New START Treaty implementation, we and the Russians have been working in that direction with the reentry vehicle on-site inspections, confirming that objects on the front ends of missiles are non-nuclear. Of course, such techniques can be intrusive and would require significant development and negotiation. However, I am convinced that it will be possible to ban or limit nuclear warheads on intermediate-range ground-launched missiles, an option that was not available to us in 1987.

Such an approach might also be an incentive for the Chinese: Since the majority of their modern and capable missiles are ground-launched and intermediate-range, experts have been insisting

they will never come to the negotiating table to negotiate a new “zero option.” However, if they would be able to keep some number of the missiles that they calculate to be necessary for their military requirements, the picture may be different. The Chinese need not be required to accept a zero option, nor will anyone else.

The limitation process could either ban nuclear missiles on ground-launched intermediate-range systems, sometimes called “putting the ‘N’ back in INF”, or it could place a limit on the number of nuclear missiles allowed in this range. The latter approach would require a more complicated and intrusive inspection regime, but it is feasible and worth exploring.

I do not believe that everyone has to be around the table at once, but I do believe that it is important to begin to discuss these matters with the Indians and Pakistanis, in the interest of developing long-term stability in South Asia and in Eurasia as a whole. The Iranians and North Koreans are the subject of bilateral processes that the United States has in train, and so I will not discuss them further here.

I do believe that it will be vital to engage the NATO allies in helping to scope the discussion, recall the history, and establish new control techniques. Not only do they have the experience and the knowledge to make a significant contribution, but they have their own national security interests to safeguard. Thus it is welcome that French President Macron has said in recent days that he would like France to be involved in future arms control policy-making involving such systems in Europe. Likewise, I think it will be important to involve Japan and the Republic of Korea, as their national security interests are also engaged, and they too have experience and knowledge to contribute.

An important question to confront is who would run the process, who would take the lead in designing a new regime. Clearly the United States and Russia have an enormous amount of experience in arms control negotiations and could make major contributions. However, I think that it is worth considering how to engage the so-called P-5, the nuclear weapon states under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—the U.S., Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom. These countries are also the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and as such, have a special role and responsibility in international security matters. A process has already existed for the past ten years that brings the P-5 together to discuss strategic stability matters. However, for the P-5 to play a role in developing a new arms control regime, they would have to be invested with further political authority than has thus far been the case.

In addition, India and Pakistan pose specific problems as states possessing nuclear weapons outside the NPT system. Engaging them could depend initially on long-standing bilateral contacts—for example, U.S., U.K., Russian—but in the end, the greatest progress is likely to come from engaging them in a process involving the P-5 countries, a kind of “P-5+”. I know from past experience that such an effort would not be easy, but here too, the case can be made that the national security interests of India and Pakistan would be served by greater regulation of

intermediate-range ground-launched missiles in Eurasia. The proliferation of such missiles across Eurasia is bad for the security interests of both India and Pakistan.

Concluding Remarks

As I conclude, I would like to mention that I am not at all pessimistic about the future of arms control and limitation, but we must be careful not to throw out the baby with the bathwater. Many experts are saying today that we have run out the string on traditional measures that control weapon hardware. Instead, they assert, we must confront the difficult, nay unprecedented, problems posed by cyber weapons, artificial intelligence, and other new and emerging technologies.

These are indeed important challenges to confront, but we cannot at the same time afford to drop constraints on hardware, particularly missiles and nuclear warheads. They are plenty potent threats, and will remain so. Thus, while we look for ways to control and regulate new technologies, we must continue improving how we control and regulate hardware—especially nuclear hardware. For the time being, nuclear weapons are and will remain weapons of mass destruction like no others.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to discuss these important matters with the Committee. I look forward to our discussion and to answering your questions.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you very much.
Mr. Vaddi.

**STATEMENT OF PRANAY VADDI, FELLOW, NUCLEAR POLICY
PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL
PEACE**

Mr. VADDI. Thank you, Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul, and esteemed members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

I have submitted detailed written testimony for the record and will summarize my main points now.

I hope to leave you with two main conclusions today. First, New START expiration exacerbates security threats facing the United States.

Chairman ENGEL. Could you pull your mic a little closer? Yes.

Mr. VADDI. It risks an increase in Russia's strategic nuclear forces and losing insights into Russia's nuclear operations. Further, treaty expiration will not address Stated U.S. goals, like limiting Russia's tactical nuclear weapons stockpile or bringing China into an arms control process. These problems will remain unresolved after expiration of New START.

Second, extending New START is valuable to U.S. security. Extension continues limits on Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal, which is modernizing as we speak. It also enhances U.S. allied relations. Extension will not create any new security problems for the United States.

New START provides information on Russia's nuclear weapons for the U.S. intelligence community and military that is unlikely to be otherwise obtained. This information comes from data exchanges, notifications, and onsite inspections, which all show that Russia is complying with the treaty today.

Under New START, the United States and Russia exchange a full accounting of their strategic nuclear forces and facilities through major data exchanges twice per year.

They also exchange notifications, by latest count by the State Department over 19,000 to date. Any time a missile moves from one base to another, a new missile is produced or flight tested or additional warheads are deployed on a system within days of that event occurring.

Of course, the U.S. Government simply does not take Russia's word of these data exchanges. Onsite inspections provide short notice spot checks with just over 1 day of advanced notice.

Russia is left with some uncertainty regarding what nuclear base may be inspected when an inspection is announced, which helps promote Russian compliance.

These measures help U.S. defense planners design the appropriate sized nuclear posture to deter Russia, which is by far the largest nuclear power of any potential U.S. adversary.

Verification also deters future compliance challenges and provides information not based on sensitive U.S. intelligence sources. This is useful information to have when engaging Russian diplomats on nuclear weapons issues.

Russia's novel or exotic nuclear weapons have been in the news recently. I cover these systems in detail in my written testimony and welcome any additional questions you may have on them.

I want to make clear that New START is actually a good story in this respect. Only two new long-range nuclear systems—the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile, and the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle—will likely be deployed before the treaty expires.

Russian officials have agreed to bring both weapons into New START accountability, which is a credit to the administration's experts who pushed for their inclusion in the treaty.

Already Russia has shown the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle to U.S. inspectors. Thanks to New START, U.S. personnel have laid eyes on the very first known deployed strategic range hypersonic glide vehicle Russia has ever fielded.

They will do the same with the Sarmat ICBM once it is deployed. The bottom line is the new Russian weapons that matter most to U.S. security between now and 2026—the furthest expiration date should New START be extended for 5 years—will be constrained.

Failing to extend New START will undo the limits achieved by the Trump Administration on these two new systems.

Yes, there are yet to be deployed nuclear weapons, which do not neatly fit into the treaty's definitions. However, it makes little sense to release constraints on the bulk of Russia's strategic nuclear force to try and limit a few developmental systems which are unlikely to be relevant to the United States before New START ever expires.

Additionally, the Trump Administration has argued that China should be brought into the arms control process. This is a worthy long-term goal.

According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, China's warhead stockpile is in the low couple of hundreds, compared to the thousands of warheads that the U.S. and Russia maintain.

Instead of attempting to limit China with the New START treaty, U.S. diplomats should prioritize keeping China from building up its currently small nuclear arsenal to challenge the United States numerically.

This is not what New START was designed to do. Our differing goals with respect to China and Russia and their respective nuclear forces can be pursued more effectively after New START is extended.

To conclude, let me state unambiguously that New START extension is in U.S. interests. Letting New START expire will undermine U.S. security. Extending New START will not create any new security problems.

The treaty will continue to support U.S. national security goals, constrain Russia's nuclear arsenal and provide a stable basis for the planned U.S. nuclear modernization, which will shift from development to producing new U.S. nuclear systems after the treaty expires.

In addition, expiration would harm U.S. relations with its allies.

For members here today, Congress has an important role to play in arms control policy. I encourage Congress to look seriously at the U.S. government's arms control work force. Promoting diplo-

macy in this area and hiring and retaining the next generation of arms control experts are important missions the committee can embark on.

The president can extend New START with the stroke of a pen. I hope that today's hearing will move the House and Senate to take up bipartisan legislation and further messaging to signal Congress's strong interest in New START extension.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify and I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Vaddi follows:]



CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR
INTERNATIONAL PEACE

Congressional Testimony

**Hearing on the Importance of the New
START Treaty**

Pranay R. Vaddi

Fellow

Nuclear Policy Program

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Testimony before the House of Representatives

Foreign Affairs Committee

December 4, 2019

Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul, and esteemed members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs: Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the value of the New START Treaty to U.S. national security. My testimony will cover three specific areas related to New START and arms control in general: First, the way in which U.S. and allied security is enhanced through the Treaty's verification and monitoring regime; second, the potential for New START to constrain Russia's new nuclear-armed delivery systems; and, third, a proposed way forward on arms control with China.

As the Committee is examining the value that the New START Treaty provides to the national security of the United States and its allies, especially in NATO, I hope to leave you with two clear conclusions:

- (1) New START's expiration will undermine U.S. security by removing all limits on Russia's modernizing nuclear arsenal, by reducing our visibility into that arsenal, and by damaging the cohesion of the trans-Atlantic Alliance. NATO places great stock in continuing the U.S.-Russia arms control process.
- (2) Extending New START will not create any new problems; the Treaty will continue to support U.S. national security goals.

Over the Information Barrier: New START Verification and Monitoring

New START not only allows the United States to monitor Russian compliance with the Treaty, but also provides the United States Intelligence Community (USIC) with information that it is unlikely to obtain in any other way. As General Hyten noted with regard to New START inspections, "there is really nothing that can replace the eyes-on/hands on ability to look at something."¹ At the very least, without New START in place, the Intelligence Community would need substantially more resources so it could maintain the same degree of confidence in its knowledge of Russia's nuclear forces. The incoming STRATCOM Commander, Admiral Richard, confirmed this in response to questions following his nomination hearing last month: "The Intelligence Community would likely

¹ "Testimony on U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Northern Command in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2020 and the Future Years Defense Program." Senate Armed Services Committee. February 26, 2019. https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/19-14_02-26-19.pdf

have to adjust its collection priorities and capability investments to compensate for the loss of information provided by data exchanges and inspections.”²

In reality, it is unlikely that the Intelligence Community could fully replicate our insight into Russia’s nuclear arsenal. Over time, the uncertainty may grow much higher. New START also permits the USIC to optimize its collection against priority targets, such as monitoring the missile programs of Iran, China, and North Korea. When New START was negotiated, the USIC made clear that information gained through verification provisions was an important complement to information from other sources. While some characteristics or procedures of Russian nuclear forces, such as the locations of missile silos or movements of large weapons are simpler to monitor through national intelligence capabilities,³ notifications and inspections are uniquely useful for gaining others types of information, such as the number of warheads on missiles and confirmation of the non-deployed status of nuclear armaments.

Let me briefly describe three New START information mechanisms and what the U.S. learns through them: data exchanges, notifications, and on-site inspections.

Twice per year, the United States and Russia exchange data on Treaty-accountable ballistic missiles, heavy bombers, nuclear bases, test sites, and storage facilities. This information is maintained in a common database on each country’s nuclear forces and serves as a valuable source of information for U.S. policy makers, military personnel, and intelligence analysts, and is used in diplomatic discussions with Russian counterparts. The United States also makes data related to Russia’s deployed strategic delivery vehicles and weapons publicly available on the State Department website, providing a snapshot to members of Congress, outside government analysts, and the interested public of Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal and its compliance record.

In addition to the semi-annual aggregate data exchange, the parties exchange notifications about other Treaty matters on a much more frequent basis. These notifications are sent confidentially and securely through the U.S. and Russian Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRC). If a party undertakes an action which requires updates to the database, such as moving a missile from one base

² Response to Questions for the Record following Senate Armed Services Committee nomination hearing to be Admiral and Commander, U.S. Strategic Command.

<https://twitter.com/KingstonARef/status/1201715545214726144?s=20>. See <https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/19-10-24-nomination--richard>

³ Helms, Richard. “Strategic Arms Limitation and Intelligence.” Central Intelligence Agency.

https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol16no4/humbly17ila01p_0001.htm

to another, producing a new missile, or deploying additional warheads on a system, the party must send a notification within five days. As each accountable weapon has a unique identification number, the constant flow of notifications provides the U.S. government with a very current picture of Russian nuclear force activities on a system-by-system basis. By the State Department's latest count,⁴ more than 19,000 notifications have been exchanged since the Treaty entered into force in 2011.

On-site inspections are central to New START verification. Inspections—"spot checks" of nuclear forces—are used to confirm the data declared through the exchanges and notifications previously described. The Russian military receives just 32 hours' notice before a U.S. inspection team's arrival on Russian soil, making it difficult to engage in a deception. Moreover, Russia is unaware of the chosen military site until the inspectors arrive in-country. The short notice and uncertainty increase the chances of detecting inappropriate activity, thus deterring noncompliance.

There are two types of inspections: "Type One"—inspections of deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons systems at operational military bases—ten of which may be conducted each year by each side; and "Type Two"—inspections of non-deployed systems at storage facilities and test ranges—with an allowance of eight per year for each party. These inspections are designed to confirm the accuracy of Russia's data declarations, including the number of nuclear weapons emplaced on ballistic missiles and bombers and to ensure non-operational sites and non-deployed nuclear systems are not secretly being kept in an operational state.

During an inspection, the U.S. team has an opportunity to select any system of its choice for inspection. For example, at an ICBM base, U.S. inspectors may choose a deployed ICBM and launcher for inspection, during which the inspection team will confirm that the number of warheads on the missile equals the number declared by Russia in information exchanges. Inspectors may choose a non-deployed ICBM to confirm that "offline" missiles are, in fact, unavailable for operations.

Finally, inspections facilitate conversations between U.S. and Russian military officers and allow direct observations of Russian military operations on active nuclear bases. The regular discussions between U.S. and Russian diplomats and military officials on strategic nuclear weapons are only possible because of the information obtained through the Treaty. It is unimaginable for the same, relatively open conversation conducted during New START diplomatic meetings to occur when the only available information is collected through national intelligence means.

⁴ "New START at a Glance." U.S. Department of State. <https://www.state.gov/new-start/>

Russia's New Nuclear Weapons and New START

New START limits both Russia's operational force—nuclear weapons which can be employed against the United States at short notice—as well as its large non-operational force which could be made operational over time. These limits enhance U.S. and allied security by capping the potential growth of Russia's large nuclear arsenal, which is largely composed of land-based ballistic missiles capable of deploying with additional warheads. As Russia is far along in its nuclear modernization program, New START's numerical limits are vitally important. This is especially true as Russia is now producing new nuclear systems under its modernization plan, whereas the United States has yet to begin deployment of its own modernized force. Looking forward, New START will limit the most immediately threatening of the five new long-range nuclear-armed weapons unveiled by Vladimir Putin in March 2018.

The only two new long-range nuclear systems—the *Sarmat* heavy ICBM and the *Avangard* hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV)—will likely be deployed before the Treaty expires, if extended, (and they may well be deployed much sooner). Russian officials have confirmed both new systems will count under New START's limits and will be inspectable.⁵ Other systems, which are likely to be deployed after 2026, should be considered in the context of negotiating a future agreement to restrict Russia's nuclear arms.

Limiting *Sarmat* and *Avangard* is important to U.S. and allied national security. The *Sarmat* ICBM will be capable of carrying multiple nuclear warheads, perhaps more than 10 on each missile.⁶ Without New START in place, Russia could greatly exceed the current 1,550 deployed warhead limit simply by deploying a handful of *Sarmat* missiles. With New START in force, Russia will not be able to take full advantage of the *Sarmat's* large payload capacity. ICBMs are already limited under New START, so bringing *Sarmat* into Treaty accountability is relatively straightforward. The inclusion of these systems into New START should be of interest to Congress, given members' concerns regarding the direction of the U.S.-Russia relationship and Russia's continued development of new nuclear capabilities.

⁵ "Foreign Ministry: Sarmat, Avangard systems may be included in New START treaty," Nov 1, 2019. <https://tass.com/defense/1086515>

⁶ "Russia's 'Invulnerable' Satan 2 Nuclear Missile Will Be Ready to Fire by the End of 2020, Space Agency Official Says," July 8, 2019. <https://www.newsweek.com/russia-satan-2-nuclear-missile-rs-28-sarmat-ready-fire-2020-1447994>

The *Avangard* HGV will be deployed on an ICBM delivery platform. The system is designed to evade U.S. missile defenses; Russia publicly detailed *Avangard*'s maneuverability after release from a ballistic missile. Russia recently held a Treaty-mandated exhibition of the *Avangard* to provide baseline information (photographs and measurements) to be used in future inspections.⁷ In other words, thanks to the New START Treaty, the United States was able to put inspectors' eyes on the very first known strategic HGV Russia has ever fielded.

Two other new Russian weapons, an undersea autonomous nuclear delivery system (*Poseidon*) and nuclear-powered cruise missile (*Burevestnik*), pose a real threat to the United States, but given problems encountered during research and development, they are unlikely to be deployed in the term of New START, even if the Treaty is extended.

A final system, the *Kinzhal* hypersonic air-launched ballistic missile, is worth keeping an eye on, but in its current configuration it is a theater-strike weapon and not an intercontinental-range system which the Treaty limits. New START was designed to maintain the central strategic balance between the United States and Russia, limiting the nuclear weapons readily able to strike one national territory from the other. These are the weapons which would be used against priority targets—nuclear weapons, population centers, and political leadership—and would be indicative of a global nuclear conflict between the two countries. It's no surprise that the strategic arms control process has been focused on these types of weapons for decades.

If *Kinzhal* were deployed on a heavy bomber, it would be a "nuclear armament" under the Treaty and that aircraft would count against New START's numerical limits. However, *Kinzhal* is currently deployed on a modified fighter aircraft, the Mig-31. The aircraft has a relatively short range, and even when armed with the long-range *Kinzhal*, is not an intercontinental weapon. However, Russia is also modernizing a medium bomber, the Backfire, which could carry *Kinzhal* in the future. New START has very specific range and payload requirements for the type of aircraft that are Treaty-accountable. Backfire does not meet those requirements, and it is unlikely the modernized version will either.

If, however, the modernized Backfire is armed with *Kinzhal*, it may have the capability to strike valuable targets in the U.S. homeland, in which case, it should be considered a strategic weapon.

⁷ "Demonstration of Russia's new Avangard system to US specialists was expected - expert." Nov 26, 2019. <https://rass.com/world/1093045>

Anticipating such a scenario, New START provides each party with the opportunity to raise concerns when it believes a “new kind” of strategic offensive arm is emerging, that is to say, a nuclear-armed weapon of long-range that is not an ICBM, SLBM, or heavy bomber. This provision gives the United States a powerful argument that the modernized Backfire—if armed with *Kinzhal*—should be included in the Treaty and gives U.S. diplomats a Treaty basis for raising the issue during New START dialogues.

If New START is extended, then the United States can and should focus its diplomatic efforts on limiting new, unconstrained Russian nuclear weapons, such as *Poseidon*, *Burevestnik*, and *Kinzhal*. If New START is not extended, U.S. arms control policy will have to grapple not only with limiting these niche systems, but with managing all of Russia’s nuclear forces. It makes little sense, therefore, to release Russia from constraints on most of its nuclear weapons that are readily available to strike the United States over concerns about developmental weapons that will, in all likelihood, not be deployed before 2026.

U.S. Arms Control Policy Toward China

The Trump Administration has argued that China should be brought into the arms control process. Administration officials have expressed concern about “China’s lack of transparency regarding the scope and scale of its nuclear modernization program” and unwillingness to discuss nuclear weapons issues with the United States.⁸ Certainly, limiting China’s nuclear forces by bringing them into a strategic arms control agreement is a worthy long-term goal. However, New START is a poor model for a U.S.-China treaty, and the benefits of the Administration’s current tactic—threatening New START’s expiration to pressure China into negotiating—are unclear, while the risks are obvious.

According to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), China’s warhead stockpile is in the “the low couple of hundreds.”⁹ Moreover, China possesses significantly fewer ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers than the United States and Russia. This large numerical imbalance reduces the urgency of bringing China into legally binding arms control, certainly compared to the urgency of preserving the

⁸ “Trump Arms Control Plan Draws Criticism.” *Arms Control Today*. June 2019.

<https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-06/news/trump-arms-control-plans-draw-criticism>

⁹ “DIA Estimates for Chinese Nuclear Weapons.” *Federation of American Scientists*. May 31, 2019.

<https://fas.org/blogs/security/2019/05/chinese-nuclear-stockpile>

limits on Russia's nuclear forces. Looking at the historical parity in nuclear forces, at no point since the arms reduction process began did either the U.S. or Russia face a significant quantitative disparity in strategic nuclear weapons with the other party (see *Fig. 1*).

Fig 1: Estimates of New START Accountable Systems
in the United States, Russia, and China

Deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers ¹⁰	
United States	668
Russia	513
China ¹¹	172
Warheads for Strategic Delivery Systems	
United States	1356 (deployed), 3,570 (stockpile) ¹²
Russia	1426 (deployed), 2,670 (stockpile) ¹³
China	Low 200s (total) ^{14, 15}

It is unclear how China could be incorporated into New START with such a stark difference in numbers. It is unlikely that China, despite its long history of maintaining a small nuclear arsenal, would be interested in agreeing to legally binding limits which codify a status as a second-class nuclear power. Unlike the United States and Russia, China does not maintain its warheads on alert ICBMs, ready to launch within minutes. This is a drastically different posture from the alert U.S. and Russian

¹⁰ Where available, U.S. and Russian numbers drawn from <https://www.state.gov/new-start-treaty-aggregate-numbers-of-strategic-offensive-arms-11>.

¹¹ "Chinese nuclear forces, 2019." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. Jun 28, 2019.

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2019.1628511>

¹² "US nuclear forces, 2019." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. Apr 29, 2019.

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2019.1606503?needAccess=true>

¹³ "Russian nuclear forces, 2019." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. Mar 4, 2019.

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2019.1580891?needAccess=true>

¹⁴ Recently, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency Lt. Gen. Ashley stated the Chinese nuclear warhead count is "in the low couple of hundreds." See <https://fas.org/blogs/security/2019/05/chinese-nuclear-stockpile>. This is lower than FAS' estimate of 290. See Footnote 11.

ICBM forces. In New START, the verification regime emphasizes reentry vehicle inspections for alert ballistic missiles: the fastest possible means of delivering a nuclear warhead from one territory to the other.

Finally, China has not participated in a formal arms control process before. Beijing does not have a Nuclear Risk Reduction Center and has not hosted treaty inspectors on nuclear bases. The infrastructure for implementing a treaty like New START simply doesn't exist.

Instead of attempting to limit China through New START, U.S. diplomats should focus on ensuring that China does not build up its arsenal and challenge the United States numerically. China's current stockpile of fissile material is estimated to be insufficient to allow a militarily significant increase in warhead numbers. Moreover, China is believed to have cut off the production of more fissile material. Accordingly, U.S. policy should focus on gaining first, a clear commitment that China will not produce more fissile material, and second, transparency about the size of its current stockpile. Other subjects, such as enhancing regional crisis stability and mitigating potential escalation risks should a conflict occur are also possibilities for future negotiations. But China is unlikely to enter negotiations if the U.S.-Russia arms control process has ended.

Conclusion

To conclude, let me state unequivocally that New START extension is clearly in the U.S. interest. Let me return to two key points which make that clear:

- (1) New START's expiration will undermine U.S. security by removing limits on Russia's nuclear arsenal, reducing our visibility into that arsenal, and damaging NATO cohesion. Allies do not want to face an unconstrained Russia and believe strongly in a continuing U.S.-Russia arms control process.
- (2) Extending New START will not create any new problems; it will continue to support U.S. national security goals, including by continuing limits on and providing insights into Russia's nuclear arsenal and providing a stable basis for the United States' planned nuclear modernization.

The information that New START provides about Russia's nuclear forces is invaluable to U.S. intelligence and shows that Russia has complied with New START; Russia's compliance record in New START stands in contrast to its record in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and demonstrates the value of an active verification and monitoring regime.¹⁶ New START is invaluable for our defense planners; without Treaty-mandated information, we would be unable to plan over the long term, crucial for the decades-long U.S. nuclear modernization plan. Expiration will likely lead to more military planning based on worst case scenarios with Russia and reduced resources for other priorities, including the growing military competition with China.

New START constrains Russia's modernizing nuclear force to the lowest level since the 1960s. These limits will also apply to the most immediately concerning of Russia's new nuclear systems—the *Sarmat* ICBM and *Avangard* HGV—which are yet to be deployed. Further, the United States enjoys an advantage by staying in the Treaty as it is just beginning its own modernization efforts. New U.S. systems are unlikely to be deployed until the late 2020s, years after New START would expire even if it is extended for the maximum five years. This means that the Treaty constrains only legacy U.S. systems while limiting Russia's modernized weapons, potentially through 2026.

While incorporating China into legally binding arms control should not be an immediate priority—not least because refusing to extend New START unless China joins will risk undermining U.S. security relative to both Russia and China—it is a worthy long-term goal. But there is no chance for arms control with China if New START is permitted to expire. It is unimaginable that China would join the arms control process if the U.S. and Russia walked away. In fact, this goal is ultimately best served by preserving arms control with Russia to create a foundation for future multilateral efforts. New START extension may be key to bringing China into a future negotiation.

Even while debating the merits of New START extension, the U.S. government must be poised to address the arms control challenges of the future, including dealing with remaining unconstrained Russian nuclear-armed delivery systems, addressing the disparity in non-strategic nuclear weapons between the United States and Russia, and bringing China into an arms control process. Through your funding decisions and engagement with the State Department and White House, you should encourage and resource our diplomats to focus on these tasks. Addressing dangerous weapons and policies of potential adversaries through sensible arms control policy requires

¹⁶ Though the INF Treaty was an agreement without an expiration date, the verification and monitoring activities, including on-site inspections, ended in 2001, after all Treaty-prohibited missiles had been eliminated.

technical expertise and resources. I encourage Congress to look seriously at the U.S. government's arms control workforce; hiring and retaining the next generation of arms control experts is an important mission this Committee can embark on.

The president can extend the New START Treaty with the stroke of a pen. This committee, in a bipartisan fashion, has already taken important legislative action to declare the importance of extending New START to American national security. I hope that today's hearing and the conversations and debate it may create among your esteemed colleagues will move the House and the Senate to take up bipartisan legislation which signals Congress' strong interest in the Trump Administration extending this Treaty.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you very much.
Mr. Myers.

**STATEMENT OF KENNETH MYERS, FORMER DIRECTOR OF
THE DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY AND U.S. STRA-
TEGIC COMMAND CENTER FOR COMBATING WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION**

Mr. MYERS. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McCaul, and members of the committee, it is an honor to testify on the future of the New START treaty. I would like to summarize my written statement and have it submitted for the record.

The views I will express here today are my own and not necessarily those of my company, PAE. I believe the New START treaty should be extended before it expires in 2021.

I reached this conclusion for two reasons. First, while the New START treaty is not perfect, it limits Russia's ability to deploy nuclear weapons and as long as Russia remains in compliance, it is in U.S. national interest to prevent Russian expansion of its nuclear arsenal.

Second, the 5-year extension can and should be used to address recent technological developments and it will include China in expanded negotiations and commitments.

The Russians are testing nuclear delivery systems not captured by the New START treaty and the Chinese are making significant investments to expand and modernize their nuclear weapons capabilities.

As a result, I believe it is necessary to extend in order to expand.

On a personal note, I would like to thank the chairman and ranking member for naming the bill after Senator Richard Lugar and Representative Ellen Tauscher. I had the privilege to serve on Senator Lugar's staff for 15 years and I am thankful to have worked for a true American Statesman who made the United States more secure and the world a safer place.

Mr. Chairman, treaties will never be perfect and they are not panaceas. By their very nature they are compromises between governments.

As a result, they alone cannot ensure American security. During my time in the Senate, I participated in the consideration of many treaties. The concern heard most often was a level of certainty to detect cheating.

President Reagan's famous dictum of trust but verify is heard regularly, and rightfully so. In large part, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or DTRA, is the entity charged with responding to President Reagan's challenge.

DTRA conducts the inspections in Russia and escorts Russian inspectors in the U.S. The treaty and technical weapons experts at DTRA are the very best in the world. They train and exercise regularly to maximize the verification opportunities under New START and other treaties.

After leaving the Senate, I had the pleasure to serve as the director of DTRA for 7 years and testified in support of the New START treaty in 2010.

The agency supported the New START treaty negotiations, providing analytical, technical, and linguistic support to then Under

Secretary Gottemoeller and her team of negotiators to then Chairman Mullen and the Department of Defense and the U.S. inter-agency.

Of the 56 members of Dr. Gottemoeller's negotiating team in Geneva, 18 were DTRA personnel. It provided decades of experience and expertise to the delegation and played a critical role in the development of the treaty.

DTRA was confident in and ready to make full use of the treaty provisions because they helped develop them.

Mr. Chairman, I believe a rigorous verification regime is crucial to a treaty's success. I have no doubt that Russia will seek to ensure weapons, such as the boost glide missile system, remain outside the treaty while also seeking to make it harder for the U.S. to verify compliance.

I will defer to my colleagues as to the best negotiating strategy. But the technical skills of DTRA will be required to successfully capture the necessary delivery systems and avert loopholes that could be utilized by Russia and China.

Engaging China will also complicate negotiations. But I believe their inclusion is necessary. Beijing's nuclear modernization and expansion cannot be ignored.

The U.S. must not allow Moscow and Beijing to negotiate us into a corner or leverage gaps in the treaty's verification regime.

U.S. national security will benefit from an expanded treaty that includes newly developed delivery systems, a growing nuclear-capable China, and a verification regime that ensures our ability to determine compliance.

Reasonable people can disagree on what compromises need to be struck to achieve an agreement. But I believe a treaty that limits the threats to the U.S. to be inherently in our interests.

Mr. Chairman, I fully support the ongoing nuclear modernization process here in the United States. But we must also understand that Russia and China are doing the same.

Our deterrence and defense strategies are supported not only by aggressive modernization and continued investment in missile defense but also by reducing the number of threats facing the United States.

It is time that the U.S. get to work to extend New START in order to expand it.

I want to thank the committee for the invitation to appear today. I applaud your leadership and I stand ready to support the committee in the future.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Myers follows:]

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STATEMENT OF MR. KENNETH A. MYERS
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR DEFENSE AND SECURITY AT
PAE NATIONAL SECURITY SOLUTIONS

ON

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NEW START TREATY

BEFORE

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DECEMBER 5, 2019

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McCaul, and members of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you today to testify on the future of the New START Treaty. The views I will express here today are my own and not necessarily those of PAE.

I believe the New START Treaty should be extended before it expires in 2021. I reach this conclusion for two reasons. First, while the New START Treaty is not perfect, it limits Russia's ability to deploy nuclear weapons and as long as Russia remains in compliance, it's in US national interests to prevent Russian expansion of its nuclear arsenal. Second, the five-year extension can and should be used to address recent technological developments and include China in expanded negotiations and commitments. The Russians are testing nuclear delivery systems not captured by the New START Treaty and the Chinese are making significant investments to expand and modernize their nuclear weapons capabilities. As a result, I believe it is necessary to EXTEND in order to EXPAND!

On a personal note, I would like to thank the Chairman and the Ranking Member for naming their bill supporting the New START Treaty in honor of Senator Richard Lugar and Representative Ellen Tauscher. I had the privilege to serve on Senator Lugar's staff for 15 years. I am thankful to have worked for a true American statesman who made the United States more secure and the world a safer place. I also had the opportunity to work closely with Ms. Tauscher in the House and during her time in the State Department. You couldn't have picked two better Americans to name your bill after.

Mr. Chairman, treaties will never be perfect and they are not panaceas. By their very nature they are compromises between governments. As a result, they alone cannot ensure American security.

During my time in the Senate, I participated in the consideration of many treaties. The concern heard most often is the level of US certainty to detect cheating through a rigorous verification regime. President Reagan's famous dictum of "trust but verify" is heard regularly and rightfully so.

In large part, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency or DTRA, is the entity charged with responding to President Reagan's challenge. DTRA conducts on-site inspections in Russia as well as escort Russian inspectors during inspections in the US. The treaty and technical weapons experts at DTRA are the best in the world. They train and exercise regularly to maximize the verification opportunities under New START and other treaties. These experts were ready when the treaty came into force and I am confident they will be ready when the treaty is extended and expanded.

After leaving the Senate, I had the pleasure to serve as the Director of the DTRA for seven years and testified in support of New START in 2010. The agency supported the New START Treaty negotiations by providing analytical, technical and linguistic support to then Under Secretary Gottemoeller and her team of negotiators; to then Chairman Mullen and the DOD; and the US inter-agency. Of the 56 members of Dr. Gottemoeller's negotiating team in Geneva, 18 were DTRA personnel. The DTRA team provided decades of experience and expertise to the delegation and played a critical role in the development of the treaty.

During Senate debate some expressed concern that the types of inspections under the New START Treaty were reduced to two as opposed to previous treaties. Under the treaty each side has the right to conduct ten Type One inspections and eight Type Two inspections per year. Type One inspections focus on sites with deployed and non-deployed strategic systems, for instance operational ICBM, submarine, and bomber bases; and Type Two inspections focus on sites with nondeployed

strategic systems such as storage and training facilities and can also be used to confirm conversions or eliminations of items subject to the Treaty. DTRA inspectors were confident in and ready to make full use of the treaty provisions because they helped develop them. The reduction in the types of inspections did not have any material impact on our ability to verify Russian compliance. I believe this continues to be the case today and I have full confidence that DTRA inspectors are the most capable in the world and this should give US leaders confidence in their ability to detect cheating.

DTRA inspectors and escorts are responsible for observing, documenting, and reporting the findings of their inspection activities to the interagency policy community responsible for making judgments concerning verification and compliance. Let me be clear, DTRA personnel are technical experts they are not policy-makers. They report their findings but ultimately actions in response to their findings are the work of our political leadership.

Mr. Chairman, I believe a rigorous verification regime is crucial to a treaty's success. I have no doubt that as a part of any negotiation to expand the New START Treaty the Russians will seek to ensure weapons such as the boost-glide missile system remain outside the treaty's verification regime and include other provisions to make it harder for the US to verify compliance. I will defer to my colleagues as to the best negotiating strategy but the technical skills of DTRA will be required to successfully capture the necessary delivery systems and avert loopholes that could be utilized by Russia and China.

Engaging China will also complicate negotiations but I believe their inclusion is necessary. Beijing's nuclear modernization and expansion cannot be ignored. The US must not allow Moscow and Beijing to negotiate us into a corner or leverage gaps into the treaty's verification regime. While Beijing has engaged in multilateral arms control negotiations in the past, negotiating with them on a bilateral or trilateral level will be a very different experience for US diplomats.

Expanding the New START Treaty will be difficult diplomatic work but I'm confident that with the right strategy and technical expertise it can be done. US national security will benefit from an expanded treaty that includes newly developed delivery systems, a growing nuclear capable China, and a verification regime that ensures our ability to determine compliance. Reasonable people can disagree on where and what compromises need to be struck to achieve an agreement but I believe the overall value of an agreement that limits the threats to the US to be inherently in our interests.

Mr. Chairman, I fully support the ongoing nuclear modernization process here in the US. But we must also understand that Russia and China are doing the same. Our modernization efforts coupled with continued investment in missile defense makes it clear that reducing the number of threats facing the US makes our deterrence and defense strategies more effective.

It is time that the US get to work to EXTEND New START in order to EXPAND it. I believe this is in the best interests of the US and our allies. I want to thank the committee once again for the invitation to appear today. I applaud your leadership and I stand ready to support the committee in the future.

Chairman ENGEL. Well, thank you all very much.

I will now recognize members for 5 minutes each. All time yielded is for purposes of questioning our witnesses and I will start by recognizing myself.

Let me start with you, Admiral. You held the most senior position in our armed forces and dealt with countless threats to our Nation's security throughout your career.

On the topic of arms control, we often hear people suggest that negotiating with an adversary is somehow a sign of weakness.

Can you address this question? Do you think arms control negotiations can help strengthen our position vis-a-vis adversaries like Vladimir Putin's Russia?

Admiral MULLEN. Chairman, certainly the evidence in the last decade or two indicates that the relationship with—our relationship with Russia is a very difficult relationship.

I do not think that is going to change. One administration after another has tried to establish it and it is very tough.

What is striking to me is that in this regime, though, it has actually been pretty strong over a long period of time. Sometimes it is difficult to really understand why that happens at a very high level.

I think actually both sides, going back to the beginning of SALT, do not want to destroy the world and that continues.

So I actually think we are in a position of strength with respect to these capabilities. We both possess—still possess the weapons which could, in great part, destroy the world and I think there is underlying, beneath all this, the desire to make sure that that never happens.

We have—we have had strong negotiations with them before. They are difficult. They call for compromises, but not so far, at least the one I negotiated, not so much that we would compromise our security or the security and stability of the world with respect to these weapons.

The worry that I have is outside those negotiations or outside these requirements we have no way of understanding what they are doing and we sort of opened the door to a new arms race.

In addition to, and it has been brought up several times, how do we get China into this, when I negotiated this in 2010 along with Rose, China was obvious at that time and the question was at what point in time do we bring them in. We did not try to answer it back then.

At some point, we need to do that in a very structured way. The fact that we've been able to control these weapons in this way indicates we can in the future, and as China continues to emerge, be a player on the global stage, there is an opportunity to do that.

But that is long, detailed. It takes expertise and there is no way that we could bring them in in the short period of time that we have right now before this expires.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you, Admiral.

Ms. Gottemoeller, you recently returned from Brussels after years of working directly with our closest allies. I would like to explore the importance our allies place on arms control.

New START is, of course, a bilateral treaty with Russia. But does it have an impact on NATO security, more broadly?

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Yes, Mr. Chairman, it does because it provides for predictability and mutual stability with the Russians, and right at the heart of NATO defense ultimately are the central strategic systems of the United States of America.

So it is the ultimate guarantee of the security of the alliance. And so to the degree to which there is stable predictability to which we know what the Russians are doing, and vice versa, I want to stress that this is mutual.

These are reciprocal arrangements. This kind of predictability is seen of great benefit by the allies and, as I mentioned in my remarks, they fully support the extension of the New START treaty.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you.

Mr. Vaddi, let me ask you this question about China because members of our committee are concerned about China, and we understand the Trump Administration is anxious to include China in future arms control talks.

Can you go into more detail on the state of China's nuclear arsenal? How concerned should we be about China's nuclear weapons at this stage as compared to Russia's?

Mr. VADDI. Thank you for your question, Chairman Engel.

So China has a nearly tenfold smaller nuclear arsenal than the United States and Russia.

Chairman ENGEL. Can you pull your microphone a little closer please? Yes.

Mr. VADDI. China has a nearly tenfold smaller nuclear arsenal than the United States and Russia. Estimates from the U.S. Government and nongovernment organizations put the Chinese stockpile number between 200 and 300.

China has a declared no first use policy, meaning they would not—they have stated a commitment not to use nuclear weapons first, and they are satisfied with the purely retaliatory nuclear posture.

China does not have any alert nuclear weapons. It keeps warheads de-mated from its ICBMs, though there is a debate in Beijing whether that should change based on actions by the United States as the relationship grows more competitive.

In contrast to China, Russia is a nuclear peer of the United States. They, roughly, have the same numbers and types of nuclear weapons as the United States, especially in their strategic nuclear force, a greater overall number of nonstrategic nuclear weapons but a lesser stockpile of strategic nuclear weapons.

Beyond the numbers, the U.S.-Russian nuclear weapons relationship is a relatively stable one. Each country has the means to annihilate the other through a survivable retaliatory strike.

And the size of Russia's arsenal it is interested in qualitative improvements and its offensive capabilities, its commitment to funding nuclear weapons development even while its economy is in a weak state. It is not a problem that is going away. The United States should and will continue to treat Russia as the preeminent driver of U.S. nuclear policy.

I think we should ask ourselves what could drive China to perceive a need to increase its nuclear arsenal and that should be the driving element of U.S. arms control policy toward China.

If this is a core tenet of the U.S. arms control approach to China, that is to say, not to spook Beijing and raising to parity, abandoning all first-use, alerting its ICBMs, then signalling that the United States and Russia are going to maintain an arms control relationship is especially important to engaging China in arms control.

We should not allow New START to expire and potentially invite China to raise to parity with the United States because they have the capability to do so and they have the financial means to do so because that will make China a much larger challenge down the road.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you. My time has expired so I will call on Mr. McCaul.

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, to Admiral Mullen, thank you for your service to our Nation over the many years. We all have a great deal of respect for you, sir.

And I just want to ask you first, there are many who say, you know, you cannot trust the Russians and I do not. But our State Department did say that they are in compliance with New START.

What would be the negative consequences of pulling out of the New START agreement?

Admiral MULLEN. If I were to go back to the negotiations, and Ms. Gottemoeller here has spent most of her life in these kind of negotiations, this was really my first.

But the difficulty of the negotiations were the technical details—you know, how many inspections, what were the national technical means, we need you to leave a certain site that you have been able to inspect alone in the future.

They were really hard-nosed negotiations. That said, once we reached agreement on the details, they have been very, very—seemingly, very, very compliant.

Certainly, all the evidence seems to speak to that. We lose all that, quite frankly. We lose the opportunity to, basically, you know, do the verify side of trust but verify and if we cannot verify it there's no way we can know, and I think in the opening—some of the opening statements from—in Rose's opening statement what Russia is doing in terms of developing new capability, you know, larger warheads, larger missiles, what they could actually put to use beyond these limits very quickly—it is pretty scary.

And then we are in a position where are we back in the arms race that we thought we sort of up through, you know, the end of the cold war we sort of left behind and we are not—we are much closer to that than I thought we ever would be again and that is why this treaty in particular is so critical. We just—we are in the dark, basically, if we walk away.

Mr. MCCAUL. And that was exactly the point I was going to make. It seems to me we do get intelligence out of this and without this we would go dark and, potentially, an arms race would start.

Admiral MULLEN. We do get it and everybody knows it. They also get intelligence out of this. That's part of the negotiations of how much of that are you going to give away. But we, clearly—we, clearly, had visibility in these systems into what they are doing.

Mr. McCAUL. So the other arguments we hear is, you know, as you talked about China, I agree that we need to look at China and but the fact is, as you point out, Admiral, they are not part of this agreement and they are not a signatory to this agreement, although I do think we need to look at China and these other expansive weapons that are not part of the agreement but more the exotic, the hypersonic weapons, for instance.

Secretary Gottemoeller and, perhaps, to the three of you, how can we accommodate those critics? In other words, would it make some sense to have as maybe a precondition to an extension of New START to have conversations and a strategic dialog with Russia and China on these new weapons and also on China's nuclear capability?

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. The biggest issue now, I think, sir, is to look for ways to incentivize China to come to the negotiating table and to my mind that kind of strategic stability discussion on trying to exercise some kind of leverage out of the extension of New START on China they will simply not be levered in that way, in my mind.

And so I think it is more important to look for what will incentivize them to come to the negotiating table and, to my mind, they are in a position where they could—they could be essentially convinced that they are facing a major proliferation of particularly intermediate-range missile systems in Eurasia and they are going to have to, if they want to address that, what will be a severe threat to Beijing over time.

They are going to have to come to the negotiating table. So it is a bit of a long game with China and I think there is a role for a strategic stability type discussion with them. But I do not think they will be levered by extension of New START.

I think what they will be levered at is that they are going to be scared at the notion that they will facing more missiles pointed at them.

Not only they are worried about the United States, of course, and I do not know what the plans are by the United States to deploy intermediate-range systems in Asia particularly but Russia, their nemesis in South Asia, India.

These are countries who have very capable missiles and that is what is going to bring them to the table, thinking about what the threats to them are.

Mr. McCAUL. And Mr. Vaddi and Mr. Myers?

Mr. VADDI. I will be brief.

I think there are actually some things the administration has done that it can take credit for that have not been tied to the New START extension question.

So, you know, I believe the United States has approached China about a strategic dialog in this administration. The United States has engaged in the permanent five strategic stability process. That's the five permanent nuclear powers of the U.N.—U.K., France, United States, Russia, and China.

So there have been—there has been some importance placed on discussing multilateral strategic stability in that way.

Now, as far as making it a precondition to extension, I find it hard to believe that Russia would refuse to extend the treaty if it

is based on needing to engage China in some kind of diplomatic dialog. So I think it is completely appropriate.

If that is something that the administration can take credit for and then extend the New START treaty as well, that is, to me, an appropriate policy decision.

Mr. McCAUL. I think that is a great idea.

Mr. Myers.

Mr. MYERS. Let me be very clear. I am not suggesting that engaging the Chinese is a precondition to extending New START. In fact, just the opposite.

I think we need to extend and use that opportunity to engage not only on the new delivery systems but, potentially, on China. Whether or not they become a member of the New START treaty or its extension or what have you is almost immaterial.

The engagement in the negotiations, whether that comes out as part of a trilateral or a separate bilateral, to me, it makes no difference.

But extension has to happen for us to be in a position to accomplish those additional goals. That is why I really believe we have to extend first before we really get into a serious discussion—

Mr. McCAUL. And I think this president he likes bilateral talks, not multilateral, and that would fall in line with what you are saying.

Mr. MYERS. Correct.

Mr. McCAUL. This would be a separate—and he is having separate negotiations with President Xi as we talk, this week anyway. Yes.

Mr. MYERS. Certainly. Yes, sir.

Mr. McCAUL. Okay. I yield whatever time I have left, which is none.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you.

Mr. Keating.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to thank our witnesses for being here.

About 4 months ago in the subcommittee of this committee dealing with Europe and Eurasia, we did have a similar hearing on whether to, you know, extend START or start over, and I think it is important to note that the witnesses we had at that hearing underscored absolutely everything you are saying here today.

The former State and former defence officials—you all know them—people like Tom Countryman and Madelyn Creed on and folks like Brian McKeon.

So that much we know. But they mentioned, as you mentioned, the issue that Russia has not cheated on this. They have been in compliance.

And I would like to ask you all why do you think Russia has done this with this treaty, which it did not do with INF and other treaties. What is in it for them that they have not violated this treaty?

Admiral MULLEN. I do not have a better answer than the one I already gave. They have been—they have negotiated these treaties for decades. They have by and large been very compliant.

I am, obviously, very familiar with the details of this, which they have, as far as I can tell, complied with, and they have committed,

in effect listening to some of their public statements they have committed that they had agreed to continue it.

It is hard, very difficult for me to understand the Russian mind in that regard, why they are that way and then why they were cheating on the other ones. But they have not—as best we can tell, they have not cheated on this and I think we have to assume, at least based on what we know, that they are not, even though it is always possible. But they have been—if I regressively look at this over decades they have, basically, complied.

Mr. KEATING. Ms. Gottemoeller.

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. So the Russians have an enormous regard for our strategic nuclear arsenal. They see it as a potent force, one that is targeted at them, and that at the heart of it is the same reason why we engage in these negotiated strategic arms limitations and reductions in order to ensure that we keep under control that most significant threat of weapons of mass destruction attack.

So I think that is right, front, and center in what motivates the Russians to engage in these kinds of treaties and to continue to implement them.

But, furthermore, there are some really bread and butter issues. We have talked about the notification regime providing us a real-time look at the Russian nuclear arsenal.

These notifications provide them a real-time look at our strategic nuclear arsenals. So they know when our submarines are getting ready to deploy.

They know when our ICBMs are getting ready to go into maintenance. This kind of mutual predictability has been mutually stabilizing. And so I think they have an important reason and rationale in that realm as well.

Mr. KEATING. Could I followup with one of your other statements that you said in your opening remarks? You mentioned our NATO allies.

After the INF treaty moved away from that, which NATO did agree with, although they agreed—I could tell you that there were great concerns and disappointments with our allies that we did not consult with them during that process and bring them in the loop more than we did, how important—hopefully, as we begin these discussions, how important is it to bring those allies of ours into the loop and make sure they know what is going on from our perspective.

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. I want to begin my remarks, sir, by giving some good credit to this current administration who did provide a significant amount of information including intelligence information that enabled our allies to determine that Russia independently that the Russians indeed are in violation of the INF treaty with this new SSC-8 missile.

So there was a good deal of consultation. It took some time and there were some frustrations just as you have said. But in the end of the day, a good deal of information was provided and the allies did independently determine the violation.

That said, going forward, New START, obviously, is a bilateral treaty between the Russian federation and the United States.

But, as I mentioned a few moments ago, allies see it as part and parcel of their deterrence and defense agenda as well and so they

will be very keen to have tight consultations both on the extension of the treaty and what goes forward as well in terms of further reduction negotiations.

Mr. KEATING. Any other comment?

Mr. VADDI. Sure, I will agree with the previous two witnesses' statements.

The one thing I will add is New START has a effective operational verification regime, which sets it apart from the INF treaty.

The INF treaty's verification regime expired in 2001. New START, meanwhile, inspectors from Mr. Myers' former organization have the opportunity to crawl over Russian nuclear bases 18 times a year.

They are confirming data that Russia provides to the United States through the data exchanges and notifications, and making sure that the warhead counts, the locations of missiles on a system-by-system basis are where the Russians are saying they are.

As a result, I think Russia is deterred from cheating on the New START treaty. The broader point is that I think, as Ms. Gottemoeller said, Russia would be scared to death of a strategic arms race with the United States. They cannot keep pace financially or technologically with the United States on these types of technologies.

Mr. KEATING. I agree.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the panel for your expertise and your leadership for decades.

You know, the 18 short-term—short notice onsite inspections each year, maybe you can give us a little further insight what the approximate causes is when we decide, on a short-term basis we are going to go and we are going to look at this, what often triggers that, how sure are we and what's the degree of confidence that somehow we are seeing what we think we are seeing—I mean, are very adept at hiding and concealing.

Let me ask you too, if the U.S. were to push China's inclusion, how serious would Russia's demands be that France, with its 300 nuclear weapons and the U.K. with 200 or so nuclear warheads be included as well?

Would that become like a make or break and the next thing you know the whole thing implodes because of that expansion? The mega tonnage—when warheads are being replaced is that part of this as well?

Is it just not the number of MIRV nuclear weapons going on ICBM or is it how big are they, how lethal they are?

And then when it comes to modernization, how does extending or not extending New START affect each nation's modernization plans?

I know from everything I have read and have been following and you have kind of said it today, you know, they would be unleashed to do even more. So would we be in like fashion.

But, to me, modernization means more lethal, more accurate, maybe safer and that is a good component, but more lethal.

I mean, again, getting back to the mega tonnage, if we are looking at something that just manages the old MAD theory or, you

know, and what has ever happened to that. We know the mutual assured security concept during Carter and into Reagan became very much, you know, a better talking point than just obliterate both sides.

And where are we on that? How does that factor into all of this? But, again, those first questions, if you could.

Admiral Mullen.

Admiral MULLEN. Actually, what I would like to do is just get at the modernization issue because that became such a big part of the last negotiation, although as far as I know, basically it was were we going to be able to carve out enough money to commit to the modernization of our systems, which was badly in need at the time, and it was about more capability. It was about technically—it was also about upgrading them and being able to test them, obviously, in a nonexplosive way to make sure that actually the systems could respond.

And there was an awful lot of that which was in play, a lot of money that was set aside in the budget to be able to do that.

I know that that has been in great part invested but I could not tell you today that we are where we want to be. I know we are very committed to that, and that was part of what, in listening to General Mattis or to Secretary Mattis's testimony, I know he was committed to that as well.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Myers.

Mr. MYERS. Yes, sir. With regard to the inspections, the first part of your question, I am going to be a little bit careful here in terms of how we pick targets because that is done by an interagency process.

But let me make two points. First and foremost, everything is done very, very deliberately. Everything is done in a very informed way, whether that is being informed by national technical means or whether it is being done by the very data exchanges and notifications that we have discussed.

The data exchanges and the notification give us kind of a basis of evidence that we try to prove or disprove. But the goal, obviously, is whatever you do under these inspections you are going to try to accomplish multiple things all at the same time, whether it be verifying a data exchange, a notification, an inspection—whatever the case might be.

And the way the treaty provisions are written up the team goes in and does not have to announce where they want to go in Russia and to a considerable amount of time has gone by, and we are able to watch what happens as a result of that and we are able to adjust and we are able to make an awful lot of decisions on the fly, if you will.

And the one thing I want to assure you is none of that is haphazard. None of it. The teams train, the teams exercise, and the teams deploy in a very, very militaristic way, if you will.

They train like a military unit to carry out these events. And as a result, I have no doubt whatsoever that the quality of the information that we are getting is head and shoulders above what others are doing.

But if I could take one second, going back to one of the earlier questions, the Russians do not have the national technical means that we do.

They are relying on these inspections even more than we are. But I will tell you, even with that in mind, we are bringing back, because of the quality, because of the investment, because of the training exercise, better information to our decisionmakers.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you.

Mr. Bera.

Mr. SMITH. If at some point, Mr. Chairman, if they could speak whether or not the U.K. and France, is that something Russia would require as part of an expansion of China.

Chairman ENGEL. Mr. Bera.

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I agree with and associate myself with a lot of the comments that have already been discussed and the importance of and extension of New START.

But if we look backward, when the START treaty expired in 2009 without a replacement there was a close to 1 year gap between the expiration of START and the coming into force of New START.

Maybe, Ms. Gottemoeller, what did we lose in that gap and what lessons can we learn from looking back at that 1-year gap?

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Thank you, sir. That is a good question. We were concerned about it at the time.

We were engaged in a very active negotiation. We were pushing hard, both Moscow and Washington, with clear political guidance to get this treaty done.

And so there was a real incentive during that hiatus year between December 2009 and when New START entered into force in February 2011. There was a real incentive not to undermine the principles that were inherent in START.

So we did take care to ensure that, for example, one of us did not rush to deploy a lot of new warheads which is what I mentioned in my testimony I am concerned about.

The question in my mind comes not when we are engaged in active negotiations when we are pressing forward. There is clear political guidance. We know both sides want to get this treaty done.

It is if, you know, there is nothing replacing it and no process replacing it, and then do we descent into an arms race. So that is the real worry in that case.

If I may address very quickly the question about U.K. and France, in fact we have always been assiduous at the negotiating table not to allow the independent nuclear arsenals of the U.K. and France to fall onto the table and that has been a clear and really unrelenting position of the United States at the negotiating table now for several decades.

And so we would want to keep them off the table. I do have some concern, frankly, of China's in the mix, that all of a sudden, Okay, why do not we bring U.K. and France into the mix as well. So that is a concern but it has not been our policy up to this point.

Mr. BERA. So, you know, going back to my original question, circumstances have changed between 2009 and 2010 and if we fast forward to U.S.-Russian relations in 2020 timeframe, would you say Russia still has that same posture where if New START were

to expire that there would be an urgency of continuing negotiation to come up with a new agreement?

Or is Russia looking at this scenario differently today?

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. From what I hear from Mr. Putin, sir, I would not be confident of that. I would think more that they would be enthusiastic about continuing to develop a pace new nuclear capability unconstrained by any treaty.

Mr. BERA. So they would be—again, circumstances have changed. Russia would be in favor of seeing an expiration here?

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. At this moment, they too are concerned about the U.S. arsenal modernization. So I think there is an interest in Moscow in New START extended. We hear that time and again from the Russians.

They see an interest—a security interest—in the treaty. But should the treaty go away, my only point is that, as my colleague Mr. Vaddi said, they will put the necessary resources into doing what they think they need to do to maintain a nuclear edge and even perhaps some nuclear—beyond the nuclear edge, some nuclear superiority.

Mr. BERA. Right, and the danger there is if we see that they are advancing that prompts us to then redeploy. So there is a necessary urgency right now to have that negotiation start moving forward, et cetera.

If—I am an optimist and to work in this body at this particular moment in time you have to be an optimist and think about what that future looks like.

Obviously, it is not in China's interest to see a nuclear arms race taking place between the United States and Russia intermediary strategic assets.

When I think about India, and we do not have an accurate number of what their capabilities are but what I can find on the internet is anywhere from 130 to 140 nuclear weapons. Whether that's accurate or not, I imagine China has concerns about India's expansion. I know, certainly, India and Pakistan have their intentions there.

What are the possibilities of, you know, getting—making sure there's not a nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan? And maybe, Mr. Vaddi, you could touch on that briefly.

Mr. VADDI. Sure, and I won't be—I won't pretend to be an expert on South Asia nuclear affairs. But I think to relate it back to the U.S.-China arms control policy debate, one of the issues that we will face in approaching China once you get past this argument that China has so many fewer nuclear weapons is going to be China taking a look at its own regional security situation and that will necessary drag in China's worries about India, China's concerns about our allies in East Asia.

And what I am trying to convey is that this is—this becomes a very, very complicated negotiation very quickly as opposed to this question of extension between the U.S. and Russia for a bilateral agreement which, again, has the two largest nuclear powers. It just makes sense to continue to have that process in place.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you very much.

Mr. Mast.

Mr. MAST. Thank you, Chairman. I appreciate it.

As I am sitting here trying to think about and analyze what's going on with New START I want to ask a question a little bit outside of that, that however feels they are most apt, most educated, can offer the most profound statements on—whoever wants to answer this answer it.

As we sit here and think about China and Russia and we think about our history of nuclear policy, whether it be mutually assured destruction or letters of escalation or selective ambiguity, can you explain to us right now what is the—what is the posture of Russia and of China today?

And, obviously, this does not exist in a vacuum where we are only talking about unconventional weapons. They have conventional weapons as well and, you know, totally different world now, what we deal with China compared to the cold war with Russia and the engagement in the global economy and what is going on out there with global militaries or regional militaries.

Can you talk a little bit about that? So as we think about New START we think a little bit about how did they think of nuclear weapons, defensively, offensively, not just as a first use weapon or not, but more broadly?

Admiral MULLEN. it is a great question. I mean, I have come to believe that in this century the most important relationship—bilateral relationship is going to be between the U.S. and China and that is principally driven by the economy and everything that sort of follows to that.

What I have been most—one of my biggest concerns with our relationship with Russia is it has gotten so bad that it has actually pushed Russia and China together in a way that I could not normally or have ever imagined.

They have got, you know, I think it is 1,100 kilometers that they have been fighting across for a long time. They are not natural friends.

And yet, in this environment that I find ourselves with—struggling with our relationship with China for lots of reasons and I do not—I am not critical of that. They are tough—they are going to be a tough country to engage and move forward constructively.

But I see Russia more and more aligned with China. Just the other day there was a—I think they signed a contract for, you know, an energy bill that was unimaginable just a few years ago as a relationship.

I do not know how far that's going to go. That, to me, speaks to the vital requirement to figure out to work with Russia in a way that does not cement that relationship for the better part of the century, which I think would be bad for us and bad for the world.

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. If I may, I will just add that Admiral Mullen is quite right. There has been a long history of conflict between Russia and China. We do not see it at the moment.

They are in a significant, I would say, more than a marriage of convenience at the moment and it is related to economic cooperation also because Russia is under a lot of sanctions and so it deals with China instead of with Europe and the United States and the rest of the world. So there are a lot of reasons for them to be close together now.

My view, though, of the intermediate-range nuclear weapon, the 9M729 that the Russians have now built and deployed, is that it had an aspect to it of being a response to the deployment of these systems in Asia.

And so it is if, although the Russians will never say this outright—they will never admit it—but they have talked about the proliferation of these systems across Eurasia beginning with China as being a reason why they themselves need these missiles.

So there is that aspect, I think that we need to keep in the back of our minds even as we watch a strong marriage at the present moment.

Mr. VADDI. I will just add one fact to that point. When Russia first started modernizing its cold war era short-range ballistic missile systems with the new Iskander system it deployed in the mid-2000's the first areas of deployment were actually in East Asia.

It was not that long ago in that 2005 to 2007 timeframe that a former Russian defense minister complained publicly about there being more Chinese-speaking citizens in Siberia in the east of Russia than there were Russian-speaking citizens. So they are very aware of the threat that China posed as its defense military capabilities were growing over time.

So for now the relationship to be warming, to me, is both good for them and international bodies because they are presenting a front against the United States in playing spoiler, more often than not, but also complicates U.S. arms control policy and U.S. arms control thinking when it applies to East Asia.

Mr. MYERS. Not to be overly dramatic, but both want them—both want to end the American century. They want a multi-polar world. They want their own spheres of influence and they want to make sure they keep the United States out.

To me, I know it is rather brusque to say it that way, but at the end of the day I think that's the basis.

Mr. MAST. Thank you all for your analysis.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you very—thank you very much.

Ms. Wild.

Ms. WILD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This is really directed to any of you who feel that you are able to help me out and I am going to ask you a few different questions.

I am very, very concerned about what appears to be an implicit coordination or approval of a new arms race. On December 22d of 2016, President Trump tweeted that the United States—this is a quote—quote, “United States must greatly strengthen and expand its nuclear capability until such time as the world comes to its senses regarding nukes,” end quote.

On that very same day during a defense ministry board meeting Vladimir Putin said that, quote, “There is a need to strengthen Russia's strategic nuclear forces and develop missiles capable of penetrating any current and prospective missile defense systems,” end quote.

I guess my first question is whether you would agree with me that that—those two statements taken together almost appear to imply steps toward a 21st century nuclear arms race between the United States and Russia.

Admiral Mullen.

Admiral MULLEN. I mean, tied specifically to the purpose of this hearing and whether we should renew—sorry, extend New START, I think the chances of igniting that kind of race go up exponentially if we do not extend, first point.

Second, actually—and I think you were talking about 2016—I’ve seen reports in the media as recently as this morning that Putin and President Trump have actually talked in a constructive positive way about getting together on this treaty.

So it is difficult to know, as in—as it oftentimes is, you know, what is real here. I am encouraged by that, quite frankly, because if they send that signal I think it will be relatively easy to do that.

So I am—maybe I am more optimistic than pessimistic at this point because of their recent public statements about where they should go.

Ms. WILD. Assuming that they maintain those positions?

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, ma’am.

Ms. WILD. Anybody else care to comment?

Mr. Vaddi.

Mr. VADDI. Sure. Thank you for your question.

Ms. WILD. Thank you.

Mr. VADDI. I think that there has been and maybe always will be an incipient qualitative arms race, even when the U.S.-Russia nuclear relationship is governed by a treaty.

You know, past arms control treaties such as the START treaty banned specific types of technologies like air-launched ballistic missiles, strange basing arrangements for ICBMs. New START permits a little bit more flexibility on both sides because both parties are modernizing their nuclear forces.

What is important about New START is it caps the quantitative arms race. Each country can only deploy so many operational readily available for use nuclear weapons at a given moment and that’s why continuing New START is important to curbing the arms race where possible.

I mean, again, going back to my previous comments, the U.S. has technological capabilities and know-how that Russia does not, and I find it hard to believe that the U.S. would not approach a negotiation for a new arms control agreement, whether that is bilateral or multilateral, without seeking to preserve some of those advantages.

Ms. WILD. Thank you. Anybody else want to comment on that?

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. If I may, I will just briefly comment.

Ms. WILD. Thank you.

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. I have been—I have been concerned that there is, clearly, a—well, there are competing budgetary demands and Admiral Mullen already referred to how we have had to think carefully about how we will get the right support, the degree of support needed for the modernization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal over the next decade. Very important debates in this country about that, budgetary concerns to focus on.

I begin to worry that Mr. Putin does not face any of those same constraints and if he chooses to put in place an continue a pretty irrational program like the so-called Burevestnik, the nuclear arms cruise missile that is so dangerous because it is highly radio-

active—the propulsion system is highly radioactive so difficult to operate.

We abandoned these kinds of systems in the 1950's because they were so dangerous to operate. So there—here we have a certain discipline that the budgetary process applies, which I fear does not apply in the Russian Federation.

Ms. WILD. And if I could just stay with you—is mutual assured destruction still a legitimate deterrent?

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. I think the importance we have now is that we have the parity, the balance of forces, and that we both have a good reliability and redundancy in our forces and so they know that they cannot get away with a first strike, that in fact they would suffer a devastating retaliatory strike. So in that way they are deterred. And it is the same for us.

Ms. WILD. Thank you. With that I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you.

Mrs. Wagner.

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Over here.

Russian officials have said they agree that arms control treaties should include other nuclear arms nations. Although the statement seemed to have been aimed at the inclusion of U.S. allies like the U.K. and France.

Ms. Gottemoeller, given Russia and China's fraught recent history and physical proximity, does Russia have a national security interest in drawing China into New START and other arms control treaties and can we expect Russia to take an active role in bringing China to the table?

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. it is a good question, ma'am. They have taken China's part in these periods while China has been holding everyone at arm's length in this administration and saying, we do not want to participate.

Mrs. WAGNER. Right.

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. And the Russians have essentially said, well, you hear what China says. They do not want to participate.

So up to this point, they have not in any way tried to press China to come to the negotiating table. I do think, just as you say, that there are certain incentives on the Russian side for them to help get the Chinese into a process.

The Chinese have never had to negotiate on limits or reductions of any kind in this sphere. So I can see the rationale there. But at the moment, they have not been pressing them.

Mrs. WAGNER. Admiral Mullen, has the United States nuclear force posture been based on the treaty's extension and certainty that it provides and, if so, how would a failure to extend New START impact the military's strategic stability planning? How much effective existing nuclear modernization plans and such?

Admiral MULLEN. I would—first of all, I literally do not have the details because I am not on the inside anymore. But my expectation would be that we've been very much in compliance, first of all.

Second, and it is come up a couple times, I think it is really important to make sure that we have the resources dedicated to the upgrading of our—and modernizing of our industry—of our nuclear arsenal, if you will.

I really do not know where that stands. That was actually negotiated as a part of the ratification process so it is not cemented into the treaty itself and it was a commitment on both sides to provide the resources. And so committing to that would put us in a position, and I think as Ms. Gottemoeller has Stated, put us in a position—any other witnesses—to actually move ahead if this thing just—if this stopped.

I do not advocate for that because I think there are lots of down sides associated with that. So I think we are fully in compliance. We are as ready as we are required to be and I wouldn't be overly concerned about that. If I were concerned about one thing, it'd be where we stand in the modernization and upgrade.

Mrs. WAGNER. Yes. That—I am just wondering how does it affect our existing nuclear modernization plans.

Admiral MULLEN. You mean if we walk from this?

Mrs. WAGNER. Yes.

Admiral MULLEN. I think—I mean, it is, quite frankly, going to depend on the priority for the administration. it is a lot of money. I think my recollection was back in 2010 the number was about \$5 billion that we needed to put into it to commit to in the FIDP at that particular point in time. So it is billions.

How much of it is—and I know we have invested a lot. It would be based on the status and the priorities for the administration to upgrade and commit—continue to commit resources to the entirety of the nuclear capability.

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you, Admiral Mullen.

Mrs. WAGNER. Mr. Myers, do you believe there are any gaps in the verification regime and, if so, what can we do to improve them as part of the talks more and extension?

Mr. MYERS. Well, thank you for the question.

it is a hard question to answer because you do not know what you do not know. But the level of confidence here in the United States on our ability to detect noncompliance on the Russian side is very, very high. That's No. 1.

No. 2, over the life of the New START treaty we have no evidence of cheating on their part.

Three—and to me this is the most important—the individuals charged with carrying out the verification missions were also involved in the drafting of the verification procedures and the language.

I commend Under Secretary Gottemoeller at the time and Chairman Mullen at the time for having the DTRA inspectors at the table with them because it was not an issue of some things negotiated and it is delivered to the inspectors and say, now go do it. They were actually—

Mrs. WAGNER. Verifiers were there at the table during—

Mr. MYERS. Absolutely. So at the end of the day, treaties are compromises. You never get everything you want. But I will tell you, having talked and walked and watched these individuals do their job and exercise, they were very confident.

Mrs. WAGNER. Right. Thank you. My time has expired.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you.

Mr. Levin.

Mr. LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend you and ranking member for your leadership on this issue for holding this hearing and for doing it in a bipartisan way.

I want to followup on my good colleague from Missouri's questions—Mrs. Wagner—about what if this goes away. I mean, if New START went away, if we, for whichever reason, we would have no limits on Russia's nuclear forces for the first time since 1972 and this would come at a time when Russia has been modernizing its nuclear forces.

So what would happen if either New START expires without it being extended or if the U.S. withdraws from the treaty? I am asking you in a broader sense and, in particular, about, you know, what Russia would do, in your estimation.

Mr. Vaddi.

Mr. VADDI. Sure. Thank you for your question.

Maybe I will focus my remarks on what we lose in terms of information—

Mr. LEVIN. Yes.

Mr. VADDI [continuing]. And I am happy for others to, hopefully, chime in on the broader Russia strategic intentions question. So as I mentioned before, New START verification and monitoring works hand in hand with the intelligence community.

You know, Admiral Richard, who is the new incoming strategic command commander, mentioned in responding to hearing questions that the intelligence community would likely have to adjust its collection priorities and capability investments to compensate for the loss of information provided by data exchanges and inspections if New START were to go away.

In reality, it is unlikely that the intelligence community could replicate the information gained through New START and, you know, we are not talking about the U.S. Government, which publicly declares information related to its strategic nuclear forces.

In 2014, the U.S. military put on the DoD website our plan for a New START force structure. We are talking about the Russian government and it is unlikely the Kremlin is going to publicly share information regarding its nuclear forces. Right now, it is forced to share that information with U.S. Government experts as part of the New START treaty.

The effects may not be immediate. It may not be February 6th or 7th of 2021. We see the problem, the lack of confidence that starts to emerge. It will be in the years afterwards and as others have spoken about, and Ms. Gottemoeller made this comment specifically, we do not necessarily know what Russia may do if the treaty is allowed to expire.

But given Vladimir Putin's behavior over the past decade plus, one, we can be sure that there is some contingency plan. I think the Russians are long-term planners.

And two, what that will likely result in is the U.S. having to take another look at its own modernization planning, its own intelligence collection assets, and moving priorities away from other collection targets like North Korea, Iran, China, and other countries that have missile programs.

Mr. LEVIN. Admiral Mullen, you have been—I know you are not on the inside anymore but, you know, I just wonder—I just have

grave concern about the situation for nuclear proliferation and for what happens between our country and Russia if this goes away. What are your thoughts?

Admiral MULLEN. This is almost a signal that it is okay to increase—around the world, quite frankly—anybody that's got nuclear weapons to increase the size of their arsenal, one.

The other is strategically in could not tell you the exact year but 2002, 2003, 2004 Putin made a very conscious decision to invest in this strategic forces and he continues to do that. And yes, he's got limited resources. We know that.

But he's been very consistent here over what is now almost two decades to continue to make that investment and there is—I mean, we do not know for sure what would happen. But, certainly, based on—based on what I know or what I think I know about him, he would continue to invest and, quite frankly, can we take the risk that leaving the New START would generate in terms of a future arms race and then try to get a handle on that.

I think the risk of that is far too high, despite the fact we wouldn't know for sure what he would do.

Mr. LEVIN. And what does it do to our ability to get China and others to the table to reduce nuclear arsenals, you know, across the board?

Ms. Gottemoeller?

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. I do not—oh, I am sorry.

Mr. LEVIN. No, go ahead. Go ahead.

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Sir, I do not see any impetus or leverage for the Chinese to join in a negotiation should New START go away.

And furthermore, I wanted to stress the point I made in my opening remarks that the Russians have a capability to upload warheads and do it rather quickly. So without deploying a single additional missile they could go from 1,550 deployed warheads possibly to as many as 2,550 deployed warheads. That's a big targeting problem for our strategic command and could result in some significant difficulties and crises in terms of stability.

Mr. LEVIN. My time has—go ahead, Mr. Myers.

Mr. MYERS. Yes.

Mr. LEVIN. Briefly, I guess, since my time has expired.

[Laughter.]

Mr. MYERS. Yes, sir. So—yes, sir. One of my concerns, to add on to everything else that was said, the longer gap would extend the greater chances for miscalculation because we—you have heard already about our concerns about how much we would see, how much we would know without the data exchanges—

Mr. LEVIN. Right.

Mr. MYERS [continuing]. Without the inspections. The Russians do not have anywhere near the capabilities that we do beyond those things to make any kind of determination on intent and without those types of things the chances of miscalculations inevitably go higher as time goes on.

Mr. LEVIN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you.

Mr. Perry?

Mr. PERRY. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I thank the panel for their attendance today. Just listening to my good friend and his questions, Ms. Gottemoeller, I was going to ask a question about China.

Assuming that we do a New START treaty which encumbers the United States and Russia, what is the—what is the impetus for China to constrain themselves? What is the impetus for Pakistan to constrain or anybody?

And you said that without this that—without the treaty there would be constraint. There would be no leverage. But what is—what is the leverage if those other countries aren't included but America and Russia are constrained?

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. As my colleague, Mr. Vaddi, pointed out, sir, the Chinese have so many fewer strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, very much smaller strategic nuclear arsenal.

I really think the incentive for the Chinese can be developed in the near-term period. Getting a handle on their intermediate-range systems, which are the ones that are the so-called carrier busters, they are the ones that really concern our military as well.

So if we can create an incentive for the Chinese to start to constrain those systems because they are worried about proliferation—Russian proliferation of such systems, perhaps the United States, India, Pakistan, et cetera, that is where I think we could begin to get some traction with the Chinese on limitations and constraint.

But because their arsenal is so much smaller in terms of strategic nuclear weapons it is very hard to think about how they would agree to constrain when the U.S. and Russia are up at 700 delivery vehicles and they are way, way down in terms of numbers of ICBMs.

Forgive me, sir. I do not have the numbers at my fingertips. But very, very few numbers by comparison with ours.

Mr. PERRY. does not it give them kind of a blank check if we are constrained and they do not have to be concerned with any constraints at all? does not it give them kind of a blank check to work on both?

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. I think we have to be very alert to them. We call it rushing to parity, that they would try to rush to parity with—

Mr. PERRY. What would stop them? I do not see anything that would stop them except resources.

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Yes. Well, at the time their doctrine stops them. They say they are committed to only no first use and a second strike, you know, capability and that is it. But we have to keep a very sharp eye to see if they are changing that policy.

Admiral MULLEN. Sir, if I could—

Mr. PERRY. Yes, sir.

Admiral MULLEN [continuing]. Just make a quick comment because Pakistan has come up a couple times. I mean, the deficit that Pakistan has militarily with respect to India, and India is their existential threat, can only be made up to some extent with their nuclear arsenal.

That is their ticket to the future and that's how they see it, and getting at that long term. That's not going to happen quickly. I spent—I spent a lot of time in Pakistan tied to the Afghan war specifically. And so it is a huge challenge.

My own view of that is this is the responsibility of a country like India to figure out how they are going to make that work and until we see them starting to work together in a way that incentivizes both of their future, Pakistan is going to continue to build them just to take care of itself. Otherwise, and it is a deterrent for them because on the conventional side India could overwhelm Pakistan just like that.

Mr. PERRY. So it seems to me, based on the conversation—and I am trying to figure out what the right answer is on New START because I hate to constrain ourselves and I understand from Mr. Myers and from others that there have not been infractions on the current treaty that we know of, which is—which is curious but good.

But I am concerned about leaving some of the other actors out while we pursue this—constrain ourselves and do not engage them at all and I wonder if this is an opportunity that we should take to maybe they are not included in New START but maybe they are engaged in something separately at the same time since it is going to be topical.

They are going to—everybody is going to be watching and it is an opportunity to say, you know, we are not absolving you folks either.

And I agree, Ms. Gottemoeller, they are not going to—they might rush to parity and they are certainly not going to want to be constrained where they are knowing—China, in particular—where we are.

But I am not sure we see the entire picture—we are looking at the entire picture right now and I think that that's a little concerning.

Just out of curiosity, because there have been infractions from Russia on other—on other agreements, why do you suppose that we—there either are none or we have found none and we, I think, generally the consensus is we feel they have been good actors.

Why is that? Because they put their attention elsewhere? Because they—I just—I do not believe it is all good will. Sorry, I just do not.

Yes, sir?

Mr. MYERS. I will get us started. I know the admiral has discussed this a little bit earlier and I will leave time for him to respond. But they were—they have as much to gain from this arms control process as we do. They truly do.

They are extremely worried and concerned about our strategic systems. They understand and, I think, make a differentiation between intermediate and strategic. I also think that there is a level of recognition that, given our capabilities, that we would catch them.

None of these are definitive and none of these are the exact—you know, no questions asked. That's the answer to the question. But I think these all make up part of the Russian psyche.

I think it is all part of their decisionmaking. I think, at the end of the day, they also understand the benefit of the United States being constrained and having that helps them.

No matter how they are always trying to get the edge just like we are, no matter how they are always trying to come up with a

new, improved, better, what have you, I think at the end of the day they have as many benefits of this as we do and they do not want to see it go, either.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you very much.

Ms. Spanberger?

Ms. SPANBERGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you so much to our witnesses today for being here.

And I would like to start with a question for you, Ms. Gottemoeller. Former National Security Advisor John Bolton suggested that if there were political will on both sides the United States and Russia would be able to extend New START or even negotiate a new treaty before the February 2021 deadline.

So my question is actually a feasibility question, because recent press reports indicate that the State Department's Office of Strategic Stability and Deterrence Affairs has declined from 14 staffers in 2017 to four currently, and this is the office that is generally considered to house much of State Department's expertise regarding U.S.-Russian arms control agreements.

Similarly, many of the remaining senior leadership members and political appointees at the State Department do, in fact, not have the same level of experience in arms control negotiations that we have seen over the years.

So my question is do you believe that if the administration at this time decided to renegotiate New START that the State Department would, in fact, have the necessary resources and personnel and background of experience to restart these discussions—sorry, no pun intended there—and to best represent U.S. interests?

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Ma'am, I have taken note of comments of this type in the press and in speaking with people in the administration I know that there is a view that there has to be a rebuilding of some of those capabilities and capacities, particularly in the State Department, because they have—they have been whittled away in recent years.

I will emphasize, though, and I want to refer to a point that Mr. Myers has made several times. The degree to which I benefited, we benefited, during the New START negotiations and having a huge amount of basic expertise among our inspectors, who have worked now not only on New START but back into the INF period from the last 1980's so years of experience accumulated there, and also weapons operators. They turned out to be some of the finest diplomats we had working on the negotiations.

Those guys would have been—and gals—who have been down in the ICBM silos or operating the submarines, the bombers. So we have a lot of natural diplomats in our government.

So in the end of the day I do agree and believe that the rebuilding of the State Department capacity in this regard should be effected, should be carried forward. But we also have a lot of natural talent in the government.

Ms. SPANBERGER. And if you were to go about beginning to renegotiate or begin these discussions, what sort of buildup—and if this is something you can estimate—do you think that it would require to put the necessary personnel in place to begin really meaningful discussions?

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Well, as I recollect from my time as under secretary, that there is a certain amount of authority that is invested in the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security and that I think that that authority to hire on a rather expedited basis could be put to good use in this regard.

Ms. SPANBERGER. Thank you very much, ma'am.

Mr. Myers, would you like to comment or add anything to that?

Mr. MYERS. No, ma'am, other than to confirm what Ms. Gottemoeller just said. The under secretary—harkening back to my days as a staffer on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the under secretary does have significant amount of authority.

it is a brilliantly written piece of legislation and she—he or she would have the ability to staff up quickly if needed.

Ms. SPANBERGER. And Mr. Myers or to anyone else who is serving as a witness today, are there any additional authorities or anything else from a brilliant legislative perspective that you might recommend for the future for things for us to consider, those of us with oversight over the State Department, that would be helpful to either these sorts of negotiations in the future or others?

Admiral MULLEN. I think the question on people is a great question and I would stay with that. I agree that if this were to happen the people are out there.

They may not be working for the government right but there are incredible professionals and many of them would come back if they knew this was going to be a very viable negotiation and with the potential outcome.

The other thing I would—it is not—it is legislation but it isn't, is, you know, where is the money and that is always an interesting question, and where is it being spent, what are the priorities for in the Pentagon, quite frankly, for the arsenal overall and where do we stand in getting a chalk line drawn on exactly where we are right now I think is really key and there is an opportunity with the discussion of this to be able to understand that a whole lot better.

Ms. SPANBERGER. Thank you very much. I appreciate all of your participation today. Thank you so much for your comments and I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you.

Mr. Malinowski?

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Gottemoeller, you spoke in your testimony about the importance of the principle of parity in past and present arms control agreements between the United States and Russia, or the Soviet Union, in those days.

How would that principle even begin to apply to United States bringing China into this kind of an arms control agreement. I mean, would they have to come up to our level? I cannot imagine us going down to their level very quickly. Does the principle apply?

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Parity was very much a decision that was made—Soviet Union and the United States—in earlier phases of negotiation, about two equals who are deterring each other and deterring each other from a first strike on their—on their forces on their country.

And in the case of China, we have not, as the United States of America, had that same approach or policy. In fact, Chinese doc-

trine supports a so-called retaliatory approach where they want to have an assured second strike and they say they have a no first use policy.

But they do not seek in the same way to, so to say, threaten us as nuclear equals in the way the Soviet Union did historically and now Russia does.

So we are locked in this kind of nuclear embrace with the Russian Federation in the way we have not ever been with China before. So I, at the moment, would look for ways to avoid that.

Mr. MALINOWSKI. So this would be one of, potentially, many complicating factors in bringing China into this framework, which I think brings me back to the question of time. We only have a few months here.

Are you or any other witnesses aware that the administration has actually done the ground work either with China or if our goal is to renegotiate the agreement with Russia to actually begin to be—have any chance of completing this process in that timeframe?

Mr. MYERS. Congressman, I am aware of several comments that members of the administration and I think the president have indicated. I do not—I do not believe there have been any cold hard negotiations or deep discussions and I—again, just to be clear, I think not to speak for the whole panel but I think most of us are trying to say extension has to come first and only then can you create the conditions to bring in additional systems or bring in additional countries.

So I think it is not a is there time to do—to bring in China or include X, Y, and Z. Extend and then use that time period to expand.

Mr. MALINOWSKI. When you say it has to, it is not just a preference. it is a necessity. it is a practical necessity. I mean, there is really no other alternative other than the treaty lapsing.

Mr. MYERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Right. Okay. And were it to lapse, Admiral Mullen, you said essentially we would be left with a free for all between the United States and Russia.

When was the last time there were no treaty constraints on the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals?

Admiral MULLEN. Well, I mean, Rose is the expert here. But when we get to the first ones in 1972, you know, pretty much everything before that was some version of a free for all and I do not have to—you are a young guy. I do not have to remind you of 1962—

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I want you to. Actually, that was my next question.

Admiral MULLEN [continuing]. And what happened.

Mr. MALINOWSKI. We have a broader audience. Say a little bit about the world before we had these treaty—those constraints.

Admiral MULLEN. Yes. I mean—I mean, back—and I was a relatively young lad at the time but, you know, there are—many people believe that we came very, very close to destroying each other and then you could argue how much of the world—that we almost went to nuclear war without any—obviously, without any constraints and there's no guarantee it going in either direction.

it is just that if we let this go I think the risk goes up enormously if we cannot get it right for the future and the danger that's associated with that. From my perspective, it is not worth it.

Mr. MALINOWSKI. And we, therefore, chose to make these kinds of agreements with a Soviet Union that was our sworn enemy, rightly so, and it did not actually in any way constrain us from confronting the Soviets on other issues. Arguably, it actually freed us to confront them more safely. Isn't that correct?

Admiral MULLEN. It is, and what's important is they chose as well to do the same thing.

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Thank you. I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you.

Ms. Omar?

Ms. OMAR. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you to our panellists for coming and being part of this important discussion.

It is my understanding that every president since Kennedy has started or completed an arms control agreement in their first term and our current president is on track to break that streak.

So I am curious if you all would talk to, I think—talk to us about what are the implications of this particular agreement, the New START, for allowing it to expire.

What are—what are the implications? Is it nuclear war? Is there a narrative implication for arms control around the world? And please chime in. I would love to hear from all four of you.

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Perhaps I will start, ma'am.

I think this is the year when a non-proliferation treaty is being reviewed—2020. This—we were discussing a moment ago the Cuban Missile Crisis. It started entering a number of both multi-lateral and bilateral negotiations involving the Soviet Union.

The NPT was a signal accomplishment that entered into force in the early 1970's and has kept a number of nuclear weapons States sharply constrained in that time.

So I think that this is a very important year to send a signal to the whole NPT family that nuclear arms control and reduction still matters.

I am concerned, frankly, if New START goes out of force or is seen as unlikely to be extended that this will deal a significant blow to this larger non-proliferation system that keeps an explosion of nuclear weapons States from occurring on a global basis.

So that's the point we have not gotten to yet today but I thank you for the opportunity to make it. Extending New START will be a good signal to the international community that we and the Russians still mean business about nuclear arms reduction.

Mr. VADDI. Just one brief comment to add on. Thank you for your question.

I think long term if the United States signals it is not going to use arms control as a security tool any more as a way to sort of peacefully manage relations with adversaries, the intention that signals to adversaries today and potential adversaries tomorrow is that the United States is going to favor freedom of movement for its military and unilateralism as opposed to security cooperation to resolve some of these security challenges that face the U.S. and other countries together.

And as Ms. Gottemoeller pointed out, with the review conference next year for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty where there is already an impatience among several non-nuclear-armed States that the United States is not doing enough—that other nuclear powers is not doing enough to reduce their stockpiles.

There is always potential that countries that are facing regional stability and security issues, such as in the Middle East or in South Asia, will take this as a sign that in fact nuclear weapons are going to be around for a very, very long time and we need to also take steps to increase our own arsenals. That is always the worry.

Ms. OMAR. Admiral—Mr. Mullen?

Admiral MULLEN. I do not have a lot to add with respect to that. I worry a great deal that sort of the race is on. You do not know for sure, but the risk of that happening goes up enormously. This has been a very extensive long-term controlled regime to control the most devastating weapons man has ever put on Earth and we need to continue to do that, and then send the signals.

And it is really complex stuff, but send the signals we continue to reduce them. And in that, because this was part of my mind set in 2010 when I negotiated this, with China coming we are going to have to figure that out.

That is a great question, because they are going to continue to build and they are policy limited right now. And then what happens to the other countries—U.K., France, et cetera.

Those things need to be—need to be negotiated or figured out in the future. But the centerpiece for this for decades for safety in the world have been the Soviets, now Russians, and us in a very stable agreement over an extended period of time to handle these most dangerous devastating weapons.

Ms. OMAR. So control through negotiations and making sure that these deals are implemented is important because I think for a lot of the public who might be watching today—hopefully, they are tuning in—they are not easily following this conversation, right.

They do not understand that this is a deal that just needs to be extended and it is one that needs to happen only between the presidents. It is not that Congress is an obstacle to this deal taking place.

And so when we hear the president talk about how he is capable of making deals, this is one of those really simple situations where he can make a deal and he's choosing not to because, you know, these are deals that are made by Obama and in many cases we are getting out of international deals because the previous president is not one that this current president likes to follow, and our world is being placed in danger because of a political spat.

And so I thank you all for urgently talking about the need to not allow for this to expire and for the chairman for allowing this conversation to take place.

Thank you. I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you very much.

Well, this is the moment you have all been waiting for. We have—as you can tell, there was enormous interest in this subject and I want to thank the four of you for being excellent witnesses. I know I learned a great deal and I know others did as well.

And with all the things going on in Washington today we certainly had a lot of members here listening to what you have to say.

So I thank you for all the work you have done in the past and the work you will be doing in the future, and I am always amazed at the wonderful talent we have. I guess that's why things keep working well, despite us raising our hands sometimes and fretting.

But we have nothing to fret about because what I heard today was a lot of clarity and a lot of common sense, and I just hope that we will heed the suggestions and the discussions that you had today. So thank you so much for coming.

We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:34 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128

Eliot L. Engel (D-NY), Chairman

December 4, 2019

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to be held in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at <https://foreignaffairs.house.gov>):

DATE: Wednesday, December 4, 2019

TIME: 2:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: The Importance of the New START Treaty

WITNESSES: Admiral Michael G. Mullen, USN (ret.)
Nuclear Threat Initiative
(Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)

Ms. Rose Gottemoeller
(Former NATO Deputy Secretary General and Former Under Secretary of
State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs)

Mr. Pranay Vaddi
Fellow
Nuclear Policy Program
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Mr. Kenneth Myers
(Former Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and U.S.
Strategic Command Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction)

By Direction of the Chairman

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202/225-5021 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MINUTES OF FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

Day Wednesday Date 12/04/2019 Room 2172 RHOB

Starting Time 2:42 p.m. Ending Time 4:34 p.m.

Recesses 0 (____ to ____) (____ to ____) (____ to ____) (____ to ____) (____ to ____) (____ to ____)

Presiding Member(s)

Chairman Elliot L. Engel

Check all of the following that apply:

Open Session ☒

Executive (closed) Session ☐

Televised ☒

Electronically Recorded (taped) ☒

Stenographic Record ☒

TITLE OF HEARING:

The Importance of the New START Treaty

COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

See attached.

NON-COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

N/A

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes ☒ No ☐

(If "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.)

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: *(List any statements submitted for the record.)*

SFR - Connolly

QFR - Engel, Guest, Allred

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE _____

or

TIME ADJOURNED 4:34 p.m.

Evan B. W. Sef
Full Committee Hearing Coordinator

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
FULL COMMITTEE ATTENDANCE

<i>PRESENT</i>	<i>MEMBER</i>
X	Eliot L. Engel, NY
	Brad Sherman, CA
	Gregory W. Meeks, NY
	Albio Sires, NJ
X	Gerald E. Connolly, VA
	Theodore E. Deutch, FL
	Karen Bass, CA
X	William Keating, MA
	David Cicilline, RI
X	Ami Bera, CA
	Joaquin Castro, TX
X	Dina Titus, NV
	Adriano Espaillat, NY
	Ted Lieu, CA
X	Susan Wild, PA
X	Dean Phillips, MN
X	Ilhan Omar, MN
	Colin Allred, TX
X	Andy Levin, MI
X	Abigail Spanberger, VA
X	Chrissy Houlahan, PA
X	Tom Malinowski, NJ
X	David Trone, MD
X	Jim Costa, CA
X	Juan Vargas, CA
X	Vicente Gonzalez, TX

<i>PRESENT</i>	<i>MEMBER</i>
X	Michael T. McCaul, TX
X	Christopher H. Smith, NJ
	Steve Chabot, OH
X	Joe Wilson, SC
X	Scott Perry, PA
	Ted Yoho, FL
X	Adam Kinzinger, IL
X	Lee Zeldin, NY
	James Sensenbrenner, Jr., WI
X	Ann Wagner, MO
X	Brian J. Mast, FL
	Francis Rooney, FL
X	Brian K. Fitzpatrick, PA
	John Curtis, UT
	Ken Buck, CO
X	Ron Wright, TX
	Guy Reschenthaler, PA
X	Tim Burchett, TN
X	Greg Pence, IN
	Steve Watkins, KS
X	Michael Guest, MS

STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD FROM COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Statement for the Record from Representative Gerry Connolly The Importance of the New START Treaty December 4, 2019

The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) is the centerpiece of U.S. arms control treaties with Russia. If allowed to expire without a replacement, it would be the first time since 1972 that Russian nuclear forces could operate without constraint. President Trump has indicated interest in pursuing a broader agreement that includes China and other Russian strategic nuclear systems, which is a laudable goal. However, given that the current New START Treaty will expire in February 2021, there is limited time to engage in such a comprehensive rewrite of this critical agreement. The Trump Administration also lacks the cadre of senior officials needed to conduct serious arms control negotiations. Given these realities, the United States should pursue an extension of New START and focus on filling these critical senior vacancies in order to ensure a stable nonproliferation regime between the United States and Russia.

To put it simply, New START works. The agreement includes three central limits on U.S. and Russian strategic offensive nuclear forces: 1) it limits each side to no more than 800 deployed and nondeployed launchers for land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and deployed and nondeployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments; 2) within that total, it limits each side to no more than 700 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments; and 3) it limits each side to no more than 1,550 deployed warheads. The United States and Russia both completed the requisite disarmament to meet these limits by the deadline in February 2018, and both parties have remained in compliance throughout 2018 and 2019. Under the treaty, the United States also has access to a vast amount of information regarding the numbers and locations of Russia's strategic forces, and vice versa.

Despite mutual compliance and transparency under New START, Trump Administration officials have been unwilling to commit to an extension. In June 2019, then National Security Advisor John Bolton expressed the view that extension was unlikely due to the treaty's inability to constrain Russia's shorter-range nonstrategic nuclear weapons, Russia's new strategic nuclear systems, or China's nuclear weapons. While such a comprehensive and multilateral treaty would be advantageous for the United States, it is unrealistic to expect that one could be reached before New START expires in early 2021, especially considering the dearth of senior arms control officials in the Trump Administration. According to recent news reports, the State department office responsible for negotiating and implementing arms control treaties "has lost more than 70 percent of its staff over the past two years," while the key office with knowledge of U.S.-Russian arms control agreements, the Office of Strategic Stability and Deterrence Affairs, has declined "from 14 staffers at the start of the Trump administration to four" at the present time.

The architecture of U.S. non-proliferation agreements around the globe has protected Americans for more than half a century. If we allow the expiration of New START – the last remaining vestige of U.S. arms control with Russia – we will be left to rely solely on deterrence to avoid a nuclear conflict. But deterrence without arms control is dangerous. If the United States and Russia no longer have insight into the size, structure, and capabilities of each other's forces, then each party is more likely to misinterpret or overestimate the other, which could lead to perilous escalation on both sides.

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

**Questions for the Record from Chairman Eliot L. Engel
The Importance of the New START Treaty
December 4, 2019**

Question:

“During the debate around funding for the U.S. nuclear weapons complex during the Obama Administration, we reached a bipartisan consensus to spend the money on nuclear modernization, but only if we kept treaties like New START in place. Can you describe how the New START Treaty impacts the costs of our nuclear deterrent? Does it limit our ability to modernize our nuclear forces?”

Answer:

Mr. Pranay Vaddi: The cost of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is determined in large part by what is needed to deter threats posed by U.S. adversaries. New START manages the potential strategic threat from Russia by limiting its strategic nuclear arsenal to the lowest levels since the U.S.-Soviet bilateral strategic arms limitation process began during the Cold War. The Treaty’s combination of legally binding limits on the quantity of each party’s strategic nuclear weapons, intrusive verification and monitoring procedures, and mandatory dialogue on Treaty implementation issues increase insights into the Russian nuclear arsenal and its ongoing modernization for U.S. policy makers, military personnel, and intelligence analysts. The information Russia provides through New START’s verification requirements -- information the United States would unlikely be able to replicate easily -- helps the Pentagon appropriately design the U.S. nuclear arsenal, determining the right numbers and types of nuclear weapons needed to deter Russia. Without New START, and in light of the new types of nuclear systems that Russia is developing, the United States may feel compelled to plan for worst case scenarios, resulting in greater expenses in acquiring more nuclear weapons and maintenance of those weapons. In conjunction with the U.S. nuclear arsenal, New START enables a stable deterrence relationship with Russia at a time when the bilateral political relationship is in bad shape.

The Treaty does not prevent the modernization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. The Treaty was designed to preserve the essential features of the U.S. nuclear force structure. The strategic Triad provides a framework for New START’s central limits on intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers. It further permits the maintenance of the U.S. arsenal and the introduction of new nuclear delivery systems as the modernization program progresses. The Trump Administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review continued these commitments. Both administrations committed to modernizing the U.S. nuclear architecture while New START’s central limits on the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal remain in force.

Question:

“We have heard that the Trump Administration wants to somehow expand New START to include China. Of course, our allies the United Kingdom and France have their own nuclear

arsenals that are roughly the same size as China's. How would the idea of including China impact our allies? Has the UK or France expressed any concern about this idea? How would NATO strategic stability be affected by including UK and/or France in a multilateral arrangement?"

Answer:

Mr. Pranay Vaddi: It is likely that in response to a U.S. effort to expand New START to China, Moscow and Beijing would seek to also limit the arsenals of the United Kingdom and France. While I'm unaware of any specific proposals by the U.S. government for including China, let alone the United Kingdom and France, we should expect London and Paris to oppose inclusion in a nuclear arms control agreement with Russia and China.

The United Kingdom and France possess small nuclear arsenals, tailored to their respective deterrence requirements. In the absence of a specific proposal from the Trump Administration, the impacts of a multilateral arms control proposal involving the U.K. and France on their deterrence requirements, or NATO's deterrence requirements, are unclear.

**Questions for the Record from Representative Michael Guest
The Importance of the New START Treaty
December 4, 2019**

Question:

“There have been many discussions regarding the inclusion of Chinese nuclear modernization in any New START negotiations. Mr. Myers, you said in your testimony that, “Engaging China will also complicate negotiations, but I believe their inclusion is necessary.”:

Can you expand on how China’s inclusion will complicate these negotiations? Is there any mechanism by which New Start can be expanded to include China?”

Answer:

Mr. Kenneth Myers: China has participated in multilateral arms control negotiations but rarely has engaged on a bilateral or trilateral level. Their inclusion will complicate discussions because trying to find compromise between three governments will be exponentially harder than bilateral negotiations. We must also be very careful to ensure that Moscow and Beijing do not coordinate strategies to negotiate us into a corner or leverage gaps into the treaty’s verification regime.

Question:

“In your experience, would it be possible to negotiate a new, multilateral agreement that includes China and Russia before New START expiration?”

Answer:

Mr. Kenneth Myers: No. I do not believe that a trilateral agreement can be reached before February 2021.

Question:

“If we were to continue negotiations of New START with Beijing included, could that result in leverage that may not favor the United States’ position?”

Answer:

Mr. Kenneth Myers: It is possible that Beijing and Moscow could coordinate their strategies to argue positions that are advantageous to them but not to the United States. While this is possible, I don’t believe it is a reason not to try. US diplomats are knowledgeable and fully capable of negotiating an agreement that meets the national security interests of the US. If it is not possible to do so, the US should exit negotiations and not conclude an agreement that is less than ideal for US national security.

**Questions for the Record from Representative Colin Allred
The Importance of the New START Treaty
December 4, 2019**

Question:

“What actions has the Trump Administration taken to prepare for negotiations for an extension of New START or a renegotiation for a completely new strategic arms reduction treaty?

- a) If you see that this Administration is not adequately prepared, do you think the lack of preparation undermines the prospect for an extension of New START?
- b) What role can Congress play to ensure the State Department is prepared for New START negotiations?”

Answer:

Ms. Rose Gottemoeller: I understand that the Trump Administration has had internal reviews going on to consider the options for extending the New START Treaty or negotiating a completely new strategic arms reduction treaty. Looking in from the outside, I believe that those reviews have been impacted by the departure of key personnel from the White House and from other government agencies. The interagency process has been interrupted in its work. At this time, I do not know the status of the reviews. However, I do know that the Administration is continuing to pursue strategic stability talks with the Russians, which is a positive step.

- a) As a result of the interruptions in the interagency process, I do not believe that today, the Administration is completely prepared for further detailed negotiations. The Russians are disciplined and knowledgeable negotiators, and preparations for facing them across the table must be thorough and take advantage of the best knowledge and experience that the U.S. government can bring to bear, brought together in the interagency process.
- b) I believe that Congress can play two roles in ensuring the State Department and the rest of the interagency community is prepared for New START negotiations. First, the Congress can continue to take bipartisan action to support progress, for example, by calling hearings such as the HFAC hearing on December 4, 2019, on the importance of the New START Treaty; and pursuing legislation such as the Engel-McCaul New START bill. Such actions serve the purpose of engaging Members of Congress and the public, and also make clear the importance of the matter to the Administration and to foreign counterparts, most prominently, U.S. allies. NATO Allies are strongly seized of this matter and would like to be supportive of U.S. efforts. Bipartisan attention from Congress also makes an important point to the Russians, who have already declared their willingness to extend New START. Furthermore, bipartisan Congressional actions signal to the broader global community continued U.S. commitment to the norms and obligations laid out in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which is especially important in 2020, the year of the NPT Review Conference.

Second, Congress can support Administration actions to build up expertise inside the executive branch for conducting the negotiations, whether through swift bipartisan action in the Senate on senior personnel put forward for confirmation, or Congressional support for particular authorities that are available to the State Department for the hiring of special technical personnel. These authorities are often known by reference to their earlier association with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as “ACDA authorities.” They can be a valuable means for swiftly onboarding technical experts on monitoring and verification and weapon system technologies. I would like to note that the State Department has a significant corps of experienced negotiators among both its senior Foreign Service personnel and professional civil servants. I do not believe the problem is so much in finding a seasoned negotiator as in finding adequate technical personnel to back him or her up.

Mr. Pranay Vaddi: I believe the Trump Administration has been weighing the merits of New START extension since taking office, as well as assessing U.S. participation in all arms control agreements to which it is currently a party. This type of review is commonplace for new administrations. The Obama Administration also considered the merits of New START extension late in its tenure; much of that interagency analysis is still relevant today, so the Trump Administration did not need to “reinvent the wheel” in January 2017.

Since late 2018, with the Trump Administration’s decision to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the details of President Trump’s arms control agenda have begun to take shape. As it withdrew from the INF Treaty, Trump Administration officials indicated that China needed to be a party to a framework to limit nuclear armaments,¹ expanding the bilateral strategic arms control between the United States and Russia. The Trump Administration later confirmed its nuclear arms control vision requires two “new” attributes: (1) inclusion of China as a party and (2) limits on additional or all types of nuclear weapons, beyond those constrained by the New START Treaty. This is likely directed at Russia’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons arsenal.²

It is unclear what if any internal work the administration conducted in 2018 to prepare for New START extension or to negotiate a new arms control construct. A 2019 media report suggested that internal work may be ongoing.³ However, when providing testimony to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on December 3, 2019, State Department witnesses suggested that the Trump Administration’s interagency process to prepare a new arms control initiative was still in its early stages. Basic, early procedural steps appear not to be complete. These include an Intelligence Community assessment of Beijing’s interest in participating in nuclear arms control negotiations, development of a desired U.S. framework for a trilateral arms control agreement

¹ “INF nuclear treaty: Trump says new pact should include China.” BBC News. August 3, 2019. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-49213892>

² Sonne, Paul and Hudson, John. “Trump orders staff to prepare arms-control push with Russia and China.” Washington Post. April 25, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-orders-staff-to-prepare-arms-control-push-with-russia-and-china/2019/04/25/c7f05e04-6076-11e9-9412-daf3d2e67c6d_story.htm

³ Mohammed, Arshad and Landay, Jonathan. “U.S. Congress pressures Trump to renew Russia arms control pact.” Reuters. December 17, 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia-nuclear/u-s-congress-pressure-trump-to-renew-russia-arms-control-pact-idUSKBN1YL2LY>

including China and Russia, and analysis of the impact the loss of information obtained through New START inspections may have on U.S. insights into Russia's nuclear forces.⁴ For these reasons, it is difficult to assess how well prepared the Trump Administration is to embark on a negotiating process that will successfully bring Russia and China into a single arms control agreement. The lack of preparation may cause difficulty in the Administration's analysis of the merits of New START extension; and ultimately, the success of a bottom-up interagency policy process that recommends Treaty extension, but President Trump can still quickly conclude that extension is a good idea and reach an agreement with President Putin to extend.

Congress has an essential oversight role to play as the Administration prepares for new arms control negotiations. In particular, this oversight can help ensure all relevant agencies and personnel are involved in an inclusive, open, analytical, fact-based and structured process. Through communications with the executive branch, including hearings, letters, and questions for the record, Congress can suggest its own policy rationale – avoiding arms racing and the potential for high defense costs that come with it, the intelligence value of the Treaty, the need to maintain allied support for U.S. defense and foreign policy initiatives, for example -- for extending New START.

The U.S. Senate provided advice and consent to the ratification of New START in bipartisan fashion. It is crucial that this bipartisan support continue to signal an apolitical congressional approach to arms control and deterrence issues. Welcome examples of congressional efforts to support New START include the committee's own "Richard G. Lugar and Ellen O. Tauscher Act to Maintain Limits on Russian Nuclear Force," and its Senate counterpart legislation. HFAC and SFRC have also held hearings in recent months to examine the Trump Administration's arms control policy, providing much needed oversight at a time when little detailed information has been made public.

Finally, Congress can ensure that the State Department is equipped with the personnel and resources required to achieve the president's arms control agenda. Negotiating a multilateral arms control agreement which legally constrains Chinese and Russian nuclear forces would be an unprecedented exercise for this administration. Assembling knowledgeable policy, legal, and technical experts drawn from the U.S. interagency, under the direction of a qualified chief negotiator, is the foundation upon which an arms control agreement are negotiated.

Mr. Kenneth Myers: The administration has testified that they "have convened teams of experts to explore the way forward, including the question of possibly extending the New START".

- a) The action required to extend the New START Treaty is relatively simple and straightforward and would not require significant preparation to execute.
- b) I believe the hearing that the Chairman and the Ranking Member hosted as well as the legislation they offered are important means for Congress to engage and express their views.

⁴ "The Future of U.S. Policy Towards Russia." Hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. December 3, 2019. <https://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/the-future-of-us-policy-towards-russia-11-20-19>

Admiral Michael G. Mullen did not submit a response in time for printing.

Question:

“Does New START prevent the U.S. from properly updating our nuclear arsenal?”

Answer:

Ms. Rose Gottemoeller: No, the New START Treaty does not prevent the U.S. from properly updating our nuclear arsenal. The program of record for strategic forces modernization was reconfirmed in the current Administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review and its accompanying documents. That program of record can be carried out without impediment from the New START Treaty. In fact, if extended, the New START Treaty will provide a stable and predictable environment for the updating of the nuclear arsenal to go forward in this decade.

Mr. Pranay Vaddi: No, New START does not prevent the modernization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal or maintenance of robust deterrence.

Under the nuclear modernization plan (Section 1251 Report to Congress of 2010) submitted to Congress by former President Obama in advance of the Senate’s consideration of the New START Treaty, the White House outlined a ten-year commitment to modernize the U.S. nuclear arsenal, weapons complex, scientific base and relevant infrastructure.⁵ In 2014, the Pentagon detailed the planned force structure for U.S. Treaty-accountable strategic weapons.⁶ These plans continue a long-standing bipartisan tradition of ensuring the United States maintains a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent in coordination with sound, proactive arms control policy to limit and reduce nuclear threats. The Trump Administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review continued these commitments. Both administrations committed to modernizing the U.S. nuclear architecture while New START’s central limits on the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal remain in force.

Mr. Kenneth Myers: No it does not. It does prevent the US from expanding the quantity beyond the limits established by the treaty but not the quality.

Admiral Michael G. Mullen did not submit a response in time for printing.

Question:

“Would it be possible to bring China into the New START extension?”

a) If yes, what would the State Department need to conduct that negotiation?

⁵ Fact Sheet: An Enduring Commitment to the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent, White House, November 17, 2010.
<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010-11-17/fact-sheet-enduring-commitment-us-nuclear-deterrent>

⁶ Fact Sheet on U.S. Nuclear Force Structure under the New START Treaty.
<https://archive.defense.gov/documents/Fact-Sheet-on-US-Nuclear-Force-Structure-under-the-New-START-Treaty.pdf>

- b) If no, would the U.S. have to wait until after 2026 to bring China into an arms control agreement?
- c) Would it be possible to have a separate, bilateral arms control treaty with China outside of New START?"

Answer:

Ms. Rose Gottemoeller: I do not believe it would be possible to bring China into a New START extension for the simple reason that China's strategic nuclear arsenal is so much smaller than those of the Russian Federation and the United States. Under New START, Russia and the U.S. are each deploying 1,500 strategic nuclear warheads, with several thousand additional warheads held in reserve. Although China has never officially acknowledged its warhead numbers, reliable public estimates place their total warhead inventory, deployed or in storage, at well below 500.⁷ There is no incentive for China to come to the negotiating table to lower its deployed strategic nuclear warhead numbers. To the contrary, there could be a possible negative impact, in that the U.S. could be seen as encouraging China to build up its warhead numbers to achieve parity with the United State and Russia, thus to proceed on an equal basis in nuclear reduction negotiations.

a) In order to negotiate in future with China on arms control matters, the State Department and the rest of the U.S. interagency should do the same that they are doing to prepare for negotiations with Russia: build up adequate technical expertise and experience, in this case in negotiating with the Chinese. They are also very canny at the negotiating table although their style is somewhat different from the Russians'. The United States must be adequately prepared to deal with them in the arms control arena.

b) The United States need not wait until after 2026 to bring China into an arms control agreement. Much will depend on how willing Beijing is to begin the process of discussing negotiated restraint on its nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles. The United States and the Soviet Union, afterwards Russia, have been negotiating restraint on nuclear forces since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and understand well the advantages of doing so for their own national security interests. The Chinese must also understand that such restraint will be advantageous for their national security interests, and until they do, they will have scant incentive to negotiate. Nevertheless, beginning now to discuss how their interests will be served by nuclear and missile restraint could very well bear such fruit in the not-too-distant future. These are the discussions that it is important to begin now, with the idea that they will bring China to the table, once they see their interests served by negotiations.

c) A separate, bilateral arms control treaty with China outside of New START is certainly possible, but it would not focus on strategic nuclear forces because of the disparity in arsenal size. The destabilizing proliferation of intermediate-range ground-launched missiles in Eurasia may be one place to consider starting. China is deploying a number of such missiles, which are

⁷ See, for example, Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, "Status of World Nuclear Forces," Federation of American Scientists, May 2019, fas.org.

very capable and threaten U.S. assets, particularly carrier battle groups in the Pacific. With the demise of the INF Treaty, the United States is considering its options for deploying intermediate-range, highly accurate ground-launched cruise missiles in Asia, to deter and defend against such missiles attacking U.S. Allies or military assets in the region. In this environment, both the U.S. and China may find national security incentives for seeking a bilateral agreement to constrain ground-launched, intermediate-range missiles. However, it must also be noted that Russia is deploying very capable intermediate-range ground-based missiles in Eurasia, the 9M729 (NATO terminology SSC-8), the missile that violates the INF Treaty and led to its demise. Whether the United States or China would agree to enter into a bilateral treaty constraining INF-range missiles without Russia involved is a good question. They would be highly unlikely to do so on a long-term basis. However, a time-limited U.S.-China bilateral agreement to begin a process of mutual restraint may be worth considering. It should build in pressure on the Russians to also begin negotiating, lest they face unconstrained missile proliferation on their own borders.

Mr. Pranay Vaddi: The United States and Russia can extend the New START Treaty solely through executive action. In contrast, including China as a party to New START would require first and foremost complicated negotiations with both China and Russia, as well as an amendment to the Treaty triggering the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate. As a result, including China in an extension of New START would complicate otherwise simple executive actions for the United States and Russia to extend the Treaty.

However, there is no requirement for the United States to amend New START to include China, if it so desires, before extending the Treaty with Russia. If the Trump Administration seeks to include China in New START, it can first extend the Treaty, and then begin the complicated negotiations with China. If agreement to include China in New START could be reached, then the parties could amend the Treaty as required, and then the Administration could submit such an amendment to the U.S. Senate for advice and consent. Thus, there would be no need to wait until 2026 to bring China into a strategic arms control agreement, if it could be negotiated.

It is theoretically possible for the United States and China to conclude a separate, bilateral arms control treaty or agreement outside of New START. Pursuing a bilateral agreement that limits China's military expansion while extending New START with Russia would be a prudent use of U.S. arms control policy to manage its security competitions with each country.

Mr. Kenneth Myers: Yes, it is possible but I believe highly unlikely that there is enough time between now and February 2021 to successfully engage China on New START. I believe the preferable path would be to extend the treaty to expand it by engaging China and capturing Russian delivery systems not currently accounted for in the treaty.

- a) The State Department would need to engage Russia and together we could invite China to join in in discussions on a path forward.
- b) No. I believe it would be best to extend the New START Treaty and then engage China. China's participation would require a significant reworking and rewriting of the existing treaty and would most likely require a new treaty document.

c) Yes. It is possible but it would most likely be a more effective and efficient process to engage on a trilateral basis to ensure that the US-Russia and the US-China strategic relationships move forward in parallel.

Admiral Michael G. Mullen did not submit a response in time for printing.