[Senate Hearing 115-779]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-779
THE CRISIS IN LIBYA: NEXT STEPS
AND U.S. POLICY OPTIONS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 25, 2017
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
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Available via the World Wide Web:
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
40-164 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BOB CORKER, Tennessee, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
MARCO RUBIO, Florida ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
CORY GARDNER, Colorado TOM UDALL, New Mexico
TODD YOUNG, Indiana CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
RAND PAUL, Kentucky CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
Todd Womack, Staff Director
Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator From Tennessee.................... 1
Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator From Maryland............. 2
Wehrey, Dr. Frederic, Senior Fellow, Middle East Program,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC..... 3
Prepared Statement........................................... 5
Jones, Hon. Deborah K., U.S. Ambassador to Libya, 2013-2015,
McLean, Virginia............................................... 7
Prepared Statement........................................... 10
(iii)
THE CRISIS IN LIBYA: NEXT STEPS
AND U.S. POLICY OPTIONS
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TUESDAY, APRIL 25, 2017
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:45 a.m. in room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker,
chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Corker [presiding], Rubio, Johnson,
Flake, Gardner, Young, Cardin, Menendez, Udall, Murphy, Markey,
Merkley, and Booker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
The Chairman. I am going to go ahead and start. I know our
other witness will be out in just a moment.
The Foreign Relations Committee will come to order.
We thank all those for being here.
In today's hearing, we will examine the crisis in Libya. I
would like to thank our witnesses for again appearing before
the committee on this important issue.
Unfortunately, 6 years ago, after the NATO intervention,
Libya remains on the brink of civil war. Like many of its
neighbors, Libya failed to transition into a stable,
representative democracy hoped for by citizens following the
Arab Spring. And sadly, it is the Libyan people who have paid
the price.
Fighting between militias has undermined internal security,
weakened government institutions, and damaged the economy. It
is also posing substantial risk to the U.S. and to our allies.
Infighting has created a permissive environment for terrorist
groups like ISIS. The organization's gains in Libya have led to
U.S.-supported military operations last year in places like
Sirte. We have had some successes there, but the conditions
allowing extremists to thrive remain.
I think many of us agree that the Libyan political
agreement needs to be altered as the current government lacks
the power to actually govern the entire country. But that is
only the beginning. Until the array of militias come under some
type of central political control, no government will be able
to provide essential services across the country. And even
then, Libya will still face enormous challenges to fix weak
government institutions and turn around the struggling economy.
I look forward to our discussion today and hearing from our
two witnesses on the views of the crisis and what needs to be
done to bring about its peaceful resolution. We would be
particularly interested to hear your views on what the U.S. can
do to help achieve these goals and what we should expect if
ISIS or other radical groups regain ground in Libya.
Again, we thank you both for being here.
Ambassador, I did not want you to have to hear all of my
opening statement. So I went ahead and began.
And with that, I will turn it over to our distinguished
ranking member, Senator Cardin.
STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
Senator Cardin. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thought
your opening statement was very important to be heard by all.
So I just want you to know that. Thank you very much for
convening this hearing on Libya.
Yesterday, I had the opportunity to represent this
committee, along with Senator Graham who was representing the
Appropriations Committee, and we met with the ambassadors to
the United Nations Security Council. We had about a 2-hour
discussion. I thought it was a very helpful discussion. And we
talked about a whole range of issues from North Korea to reform
within the United Nations.
Ambassador Haley is doing an incredible job of representing
our interests. I think her leadership as now the President of
the Security Council for this month will be important. She is
focusing on the issues of reform. She is focusing on the issues
of North Korea and other areas that the United States has
national security interests.
But one of the issues that came up during that discussion
by our friends in Europe and our friends in Africa and the
Middle East is what will be America's engagement. Will America
be a power for the values that we stand for in dealing with
global challenges? And that was raised by both friends in
Europe and the Middle East and Africa.
And I say that because I start with the fact that the
United States must be engaged. It is in our national security
interests to have representative governments in countries like
Libya that represent all of the population because when we do
not have representative governments, what happens is it creates
a void. And that void is filled by ISIS, as we have seen in
Northern Africa. It is filled by Russia, and we see now
Russia's engagement in Libya, which has not been helpful. And
we recognize that it is in America's national security interest
to get engaged.
So as you know, we have a private panel of witnesses. The
Trump administration has yet to be able to fill its critical
positions, and we are still not exactly clear what his policies
are in regards to Libya. I was disappointed, Mr. Chairman, in
the meeting with the Prime Minister of Italy that President
Trump said--I will paraphrase it--but that we do not really
have a role in Libya. I think we do have a role in Libya, and I
think this hearing is an important indication by the Congress
that we do expect a role to be played.
I want to just underscore the importance of a
representative, inclusive government. There is no military
solution. We have seen this all too frequently in so many
countries in that region. There is really no military solution
to Libya. We need an inclusive government, a government that
represents all of the different factions. We saw, as the
chairman pointed out, that under the leadership of GNA, we were
able to make progress in Sirte. That was important. But we also
see with Moscow's involvement, Mr. Putin's involvement, that
General Haftar in the eastern part of Libya is causing all
types of problems for civilian control of the country and is
also participating in activities that, in my mind, raise
concern about human rights violations and war crimes.
So there is a role for us to play. If it is done right, we
not only can have a representative government. The management
of their oil resources can inure to the benefit of the people
of Libya and give them a growing economy and a growing standard
of living. That is our goal. And I think this hearing can play
an important part in the Senate's oversight of that
responsibility. And I look forward to hearing from our two
witnesses.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much for those comments.
And we will now turn to our witnesses. The first witness is
Dr. Fred Wehrey, Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace. Thank you so much for being here, sir. Our
second witness is the Honorable Deborah Jones, U.S. Ambassador
to Libya from 2013 to 2015. Thank you for bringing your
expertise and knowledge.
If you would just give your opening comments in the order I
just introduced you. If could summarize in about 5 minutes, we
would appreciate it. Without objection, your written testimony
will be entered into the record. You have been here many times.
So please proceed.
STATEMENT OF DR. FREDERIC WEHREY, SENIOR FELLOW, MIDDLE EAST
PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Wehrey. Thank you. Chairman Corker, Ranking Member
Cardin, committee members, I am grateful for this opportunity
to speak with you here today about Libya's political crisis and
the way forward for U.S. policy.
I am also honored to be joined by my distinguished co-
panelist.
For those of us who have followed Libya since the
revolution, its unraveling has been harrowing to watch. Today
the U.N.-backed Presidency Council in Tripoli is failing in
basic governance, unable to establish itself and its feuding
militias and internal paralysis.
More importantly, the council confronts an existential
challenge from an eastern faction led by General Khalifa
Haftar, backed by Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and,
increasingly, Russia. The Haftar-allied parliament in the east
has refused to endorse the Presidency Council, with its key
objection being the issue of control over Libya's military.
Meanwhile, the country slides toward economic ruin. The
surge of migrants across Libya's deserts and shores remains
unchecked, and jihadist militancy, whether in the form of the
Islamic State, Al Qaeda, or some new mutation, could still take
root.
These looming dangers, Mr. Chairman, demand immediate
engagement from the United States. At the most basic level, the
United States faces two imperatives: first, preventing a
resurgence of terrorist activity; and second, supporting the
formation of an inclusive, representative, stable government.
On the counterterrorism front, the Libyan-led campaign in
Sirte last summer and fall deprived the Islamic State of any
real territory. The remaining Islamic State militants,
estimated in the low hundreds, are currently pooling in the
center, west, and south, and they may try to mount a high
visibility attack to show their continued viability.
What struck me the most during my visits last year to
Libyan areas afflicted by a jihadist presence, whether Sirte,
Benghazi, or the west, is that any traction the Islamic State
got was often highly transactional. It was the result of poor
governance. And this points to the importance of a broad-based
approach in denying the jihadists sanctuary. Here, non-military
strategies are essential. Promoting of economic development,
municipal governance, education, and civil society form a vital
adjunct to counterterrorism tools.
In the effort to identify and assist local Libyan partners
to defeat terrorism, the United States must proceed carefully.
Given the absence of a truly national, cohesive military,
American aid to a particular armed group could upset the
balance of power and cause greater factional conflict. Moving
forward, the United States should only back those forces
controlled by the internationally recognized government, and
even this support should be limited in scope and geared toward
specific threats.
The second area where American diplomatic engagement is
crucial is the formation of a new government. A starting point
for doing this is a new, Libyan-led dialogue backed by the
United States with European partners and regional states. And
the goal of the talks should be the amendment of the Libyan
political agreement of 2015, specifically the composition of
the Presidency Council. The new talks should also focus on two
tracks absent in the first agreement.
First, they should include the leaders of Libya's armed
groups who must agree on a road map for building a national
level military structure. Here, an American red line must
continue to be the elected civilian control over the military.
Proposals for military rule or a military council are hardly a
recipe for enduring stability. And for most Libyans, they run
counter to the values for which they fought in the 2011
revolution.
Second, the talks must also set up a mechanism for the
transparent distribution of oil revenues, especially to
municipal authorities.
Once such an agreement is in place, the United States and
its allies must stand ready to assist whatever government
emerges, and not just on counterterrorism. With its formal
institutions gutted by years of dictatorial rule, Libya's
citizens remain its greatest resource. And this is why it is so
important that the United States preserve its capacity to
engage directly with the Libyan people.
Mr. Chairman, committee members, my travels across Libya
during the past years have underscored the desperation of its
plight. Yes, the Islamic State was dealt a significant blow,
thanks in large measure to the sacrifices of brave Libyans. But
Libya is now more polarized than ever, and the growing vacuum
could breed future radicalism. Now is the time for American
leadership to avert an impending collapse, safeguard American
interests, and to help the country realize the early promise of
its revolution.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you here today.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Wehrey follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Frederic Wehrey
Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, Committee members, I am
grateful for this opportunity to speak with you about Libya's political
crisis and a way forward for U.S. policy.
For those of us who've followed and visited the country since 2011,
its unraveling has been heart wrenching. There is perhaps no more
painful testament to Libya's dashed hopes than the eastern city of
Benghazi, the birthplace of the revolution. Swathes of the city are now
a shambles of spilled concrete and twisted iron, scarred by heavy-
caliber rounds, including the sites of the early anti-Qadhafi protests.
Many Libyans who gathered here in the heady first days of the uprising
now find themselves on opposing sides of a civil conflict that has torn
apart families and killed or wounded thousands. In the past months,
stability has returned to Benghazi, but the costs have been
considerable: displacement and destruction, a rupturing of the city's
social fabric, and worsening divisions across the country.
Amidst Libya's collapsed authority, it was not surprising that the
self-proclaimed Islamic State found room to expand, starting in 2014.
The United States and its allies had hoped that fighting the menace
posed by the terrorist group could serve as a springboard for unity
among the country's warring political camps. In fact, the opposite has
happened; Libya is more divided than ever. Campaigns against the
Islamic State's strongholds in the west, center, and east proceeded
pell-mell by local armed groups, without any oversight by a central
authority. Even those militias that defeated the terrorist group in its
coastal stronghold in Sirte, aided by American airpower, were only
loosely tied to the United Nations-backed Presidency Council in
Tripoli--and many have now turned against that government.
Today, the Presidency Council is failing in basic functions of
governance. It is paralyzed by internal feuding and by a dispute with
the central bank. It is unable to fully establish itself in the capital
amidst a myriad of militias. More importantly, the Council confronts an
existential challenge from an eastern faction led by Field Marshal
Khalifa Hifter, backed by Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and,
increasingly, Russia. The Hifter-allied parliament in the east has
refused to lend its endorsement to a new Government of National Accord
presented by the Presidency Council, with its key objection being the
issue of control over Libya's military. Leaders in this camp have also
made alarming statements about moving their forces west to Tripoli and
settling Libya's political differences through military force. For
their part, Islamist-leaning figures ejected from Benghazi have vowed
to continue the fight against Hifter's forces. The two sides have
clashed over oil facilities in the Sirte Basin and, more recently,
airfields and supply lines in the southern desert.
Meanwhile, the country is sliding into economic ruin. Oil
production has plummeted and the Libyan central bank is quickly burning
through its reserves. Ordinary citizens are afflicted with untold
suffering: shortages of medical care, fuel and electricity, and the
collapse of the Libyan dinar. The surge of African migrants across
Libya's deserts remains unchecked, abetted by a lucrative and abusive
trade in smuggling. Jihadist militancy, whether in the form of the
Islamic State, al-Qaeda, or some new mutation, could still find
purchase.
These dangers, Mr. Chairman, demand immediate engagement from the
United States. Having expended considerable military effort in helping
Libyan forces wrest territory from the Islamic State last year, the
United States should now turn its diplomatic attention to ensuring the
country does not slip into greater chaos. The following observations
and recommendations for how to do this stem from multiple visits over
the past few years to Tripoli, Misrata and the west; Benghazi and the
east; Sirte and the oil crescent, and the oft-neglected southern
region.
navigating the landscape
Part of what makes Libya so confounding is that multiple crises are
interlinked. At the most basic level, the United States faces two broad
imperatives: preventing the resurgence of terrorist activity and
supporting the formation of an inclusive, stable government. To ensure
that these two lines of effort are mutually reinforcing the new U.S.
administration must first understand the complexities of Libya's
political map.
First, it should shun the easy and incorrect categorizations of
Libya's players as ``nationalist,'' ``Islamist,'' and ``secular.'' All
of Libya's actors believe they are serving the national interest, all
agree on some role for Islam in political and social life, and many
would reject the secular label. Even Hifter's side, commonly typecast
as secular, counts among its allies doctrinaire Salafi Islamists who
have exerted influence over policing and social affairs in the east.
The administration should also reject the wrongheaded fantasies of
fixing Libya through partition, for the simple reason that the vast
majority of Libyans do not want this, to say nothing of its sheer
unworkability. Similarly, it should rebuff the beguiling overtures of
would-be Libyan saviors--whether exiles or ex-regime figures who
promise to ``deliver'' the country or its tribes and regions from the
chaos. Libya has few real power brokers, and their influence does not
extend very far into what has become a fragmented and hyper-localized
landscape.
Finally, the United States must avoid subcontracting its Libya
policy to regional states, especially Egypt and the United Arab
Emirates, whose exclusionary and securitized approach will only produce
more division and radicalization. Punting the Libya file to Europe is
also a non-starter; without U.S. muscle, a European role will lack
credibility, inviting Russia to be the key power broker.
With these caveats in mind, the United States and its allies must
redouble their efforts along several fronts.
smart counterterrorism
The Libyan-led campaign in Sirte last summer and fall deprived the
Islamic State of any real territorial control. That said, the specter
of a jihadist resurgence looms. The remaining Islamic State militants--
estimated in the low hundreds--are currently ``pooling'' in the center,
west, and south. The likely next strategy will be one of dispersal to
underground cells in and around cities, where militants may try to
mount a high-visibility attack on an oil facility or government asset
to demonstrate continued viability. A more worrisome trend is the
growth of al-Qaeda linked groups in the southwest corner and in the
northeast--buoyed in part by defections from the Islamic State.
What struck me during my visits to a number of areas afflicted by a
jihadist presence, whether Sirte, the southwest desert, Sabratha, or
Benghazi, is that any traction the Islamic State received often
resulted from poor or non-existent governance and was highly
transactional: smugglers welcomed the terrorist group out of a shared
interest in illicit profits; marginalized tribes saw it as useful
protection against rivals; some Islamist militias in Benghazi forged an
alliance with it against the common enemy of Hifter's forces. These
dynamics highlight the importance of denying jihadists sanctuary
through a broad-based approach.Here, non-military strategies are
essential. The promotion of economic development and entrepreneurship,
municipal-level governance, education, and civil society is a vital
adjunct to traditional counter-terrorism tools like intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance, border control, train-and-equip, and
direct action. Prison reform is especially important to prevent
radicalization and recidivism.
In the effort to identify and assist Libyan partners to defeat
terrorism, the United States must proceed carefully. Given the absence
of a national, cohesive military, Western assistance to a particular
armed group--whether the provision of intelligence or a train-and-equip
program--could upset the balance-of-power and cause more factional
conflict. Moving forward, the United States should only back those
forces subordinate to the internationally recognized government and
even this support should be limited in scope and targeted toward
specific threats. In the past, more ambitious efforts to stand up
Libyan military forces, whether the conventional ``general purpose
force'' or specialized counter-terrorism units, failed because Libya
lacked the institutional structure to absorb new trainees and, more
importantly, because of political divisions.
All of this points to the urgency of inclusive reconciliation and
an enduring political settlement in preventing jihadists from gaining
further traction.
towards a lasting reconciliation
In recent months, near-universal consensus has emerged that the
December 2015 Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) that produced the
Government of National Accord needs to be amended. While some of these
failures were inherent in the power-sharing formula of the agreement,
obstruction from the eastern, Hifter-allied bloc also contributed.
Here, interference by the Emirates and Egypt was pivotal--despite
endorsing the LPA in principle, they continued to ``hedge'' against it,
with military and financial assistance to Hifter's faction. Increased
Russian support to the east, which included, among other things,
printing much-needed currency, further eroded the prospects for unity.
Recently, some of Libya's regional patrons have pushed for new
negotiations. The question now is what kind of government will emerge
from these maneuverings.
The American red line must continue to be elected civilian control
over the military. Proposals for a military council to govern Libya are
hardly a recipe for enduring stability and, for most Libyans, run
counter to the values for which they fought in 2011. Already the
eastern areas under Hifter's control have witnessed a militarization of
governance, marked by the replacement of elected municipal leaders with
uniformed military officers. Attempts to apply this rule across the
country would cause more conflict and would be a boon to the jihadists'
narrative.
On the flip side, the bedlam that afflicts Tripoli and parts of
western Libya is equally deleterious. Here, local militia bosses hold
sway, skirmish with their rivals, run their own prisons, and are often
deeply involved in the criminal underworld. Many are aligned with the
Presidency Council.
A starting point to resolve the impasse is a new Libyan-led
negotiation supported by the United States, European partners and
regional states. The goal of the talks should be the revision of the
political structures created by the LPA, specifically the composition
of the Presidency Council. But they should also include two important
tracks absent in the first agreement.
First, the new dialogue should include the leaders of major armed
groups who must formulate a roadmap for building a national-level
military and police, while at the same time demobilizing and
reintegrating militia members. Second, the talks must set up a
mechanism for the transparent distribution of oil revenues, especially
to municipal-level authorities. On this track, the United States must
continue to lead the diplomatic effort to safeguard the integrity of
Libya's financial institutions; namely, the central bank, the oil
corporation, and the investment authority. Relatedly, the negotiations
should explore such confidence-building measures as the
demilitarization of strategic assets like the oil crescent, airports
and ports that have been the targets of chronic factional wrangling.
American diplomatic leadership is essential to persuading the foreign
patrons of Libya's camps to play a constructive role in this process.
Once such an agreement is in place, the United States and its
allies must stand ready to assist whatever Libyan government emerges--
and not just on counter-terrorism. With its formal institutions gutted
by dictatorial rule, Libya's citizens are its greatest resource--and
that is why it is so important that the United States preserve its
capacity to engage directly with the Libyan people.
Mr. Chairman, Committee members, my travels across Libya over the
past few years have underscored the desperation of its plight. Yes, the
Islamic State was dealt a significant blow, thanks in large measure to
the sacrifices of brave Libyans. But Libya is now more polarized than
ever and the growing vacuum could breed more radicalism. Now is the
time for American leadership to resolve the crisis, safeguard American
interests, and help the country realize the early promise of its
revolution.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you here today.
STATEMENT OF HON. DEBORAH K. JONES, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO LIBYA,
2013-2015, MCLEAN, VIRGINIA
Ambassador Jones. Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Senator
Cardin, distinguished members of the committee, first, my
apologies. As a retiree, I have never dealt with the parking
downtown coming in from McLean before on a Tuesday morning.
But it is my distinct honor to appear before you today on
this important and vexing matter. And I am pleased to appear
with a colleague that I consider a real authority and one of
the most honest authorities, or the most honest voices, on
Libya today that I hear.
Libya, obviously, has confounded and frustrated and
exhausted policymakers and diplomatic practitioners alike with
its stubborn resistance to the obvious political math of 1.2
million barrels of oil a day and a mere 6 million citizens.
Caught up in the endorphins of revolution, many assumed that
Libya, like Athena from the head of Zeus, would turn into Dubai
on the Mediterranean and that we could all go away. In
hindsight, clearly it was wishful thinking because Libya was
not--the landscape was not a tabula rasa. Libya has a history
like any other place, and that history is one of fragmentation,
even preceding Qaddafi.
What I have often said to people is that Qaddafi was not
the creator of Libya's fragmentation. He certainly exploited it
using the oil wealth that he had at his disposal, and I think
it is important to remember that he deposed King Idris without
firing a shot when he came in. He used that oil wealth much as
a cartel warlord would do to extort, to bribe, to bring into
power actually very disparate parts of the country. Libya has
always existed. As Julius Caesar said, like Gaul, it is three
separate entities--Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan--with
different historical and political backgrounds, and which
explain to us often the different influences at play to this
day in each of those regions from international partners.
When Qaddafi died, in effect Libya was a mafia without a
don, and that is the challenge that we have now. Qaddafi was
gone, but his legacy remained.
Understanding this backdrop is very important to
comprehending the deep divides and political antagonisms that
followed the revolution, which I concluded not long after my
arrival in Tripoli in 2013 was for all intents and purposes
unfinished. There had been a highly touted parliamentary vote
in 2012, in July 2012, but essentially that is the equivalent
of purchasing a nib for a fountain pen that does not exist.
There was no government behind it and there still remains no
effective government behind that.
I do not want to repeat a lot of what is said here. I have
submitted rather lengthy background notes, which I hope people
will read because it contains a bit of a different narrative.
Many people have described the lines, the splits in Libya as
somehow secular nationalist versus Islamist. Others, myself
included--and I suspect that Dr. Wehrey would agree--view the
situation more in terms of status quo ante elements, some who
were pro-Qaddafi versus democratic revolutionary elements, some
Islamists with ideological extremists on both sides. The
revolution revealed, together with true patriots, a significant
number of whom were educated in the United States and elsewhere
in the West and some unabashed ideologues, a number of, as Dr.
Wehrey has said, opportunistic bedfellows whose political
promiscuity for material gain often blurred distinctions.
I will not go into the whole narrative of the talks and the
long talks there, but I would agree with Fred and as we have
looked over it, that over time, as we were there observing on
the ground and working to advance our mutual interests, that it
soon became very clear to us that when we were dealing with
areas that did not affect the national patrimony or the
appearance of giving advantage to either military side, we were
able to accomplish things. On the other hand, efforts to train
elite special forces and then to respond to then Prime Minister
Ali Zeidan's April 2013 appeal to G7 leaders to help him build
a general purpose force, we were frustrated due to that
competition, that fractiousness, and the lack of any unified
command and control system.
Interestingly, throughout the Qaddafi-era, technocrats who
were entrusted with the Central Bank, with the National Oil
Company, and with the Libyan Investment Authority, were left
largely alone to do their business, indicating to me that
Libyans in fact did not want to disturb their wealth, their
national wealth. And in fact, we worked pretty closely behind
the scenes with them to ensure that that remained the case.
Now, unfortunately, in the latter years and following the
negotiations, as the competition has become more fierce, there
have been efforts by some to create competing authorities to
the dismay, I would say, of the average Libyan whose primary
concern is that he or she have enough to eat, to communicate,
and, ideally, to travel.
I would only say against this background of Tripoli's
political disarray, which was significant, Benghazi continued
to suffer a spate of brazen assassinations and lawlessness. The
government had, for all intents and purposes, removed itself
from Benghazi with the international community. And this is
when Khalifa Haftar first appeared at the time in February,
February of 2014, at the time of the dissolution basically, or
the agreed dissolution of the GNC, or that it would be, and
went on the television what we always called an electron coup,
calling on Libyans to rise up and join him against the illegal,
unlawful GNC, and corrupt. He did not stir much response in
that effect. He went back underground, only reappearing in May
in Benina in Benghazi when he declared his basically vigilante
war against individuals he constituted responsible, or he
condemned as responsible, for Benghazi's blood-soaked anarchy.
Together with this, we had--again, you know the story--the
narrative of the national elections that were held in 2014. I
hope you will read carefully my paragraph on that because my
narrative, my understanding--and I was on the ground--was a bit
different in response to counter-threats and threats of Haftar
moving into Tripoli and the declaration by this time of the
people on the Tobruk side that the dialogue was no longer
necessary. The Misratan militias acted preemptively and, of
course, encircled to drive the Zintan militias out of Tripoli,
which meant taking them out of areas that they had conquered
during the revolution. This was a lot again and again and again
about booty, about revolutionary booty, people holding onto
assets, whether it be the airport, the Tripoli tower that held
the Libyan Investment Authority, the Islamic Call Center that
was an important center under Qaddafi and later on in terms of
territory. This fighting over this Zintan-occupied territory
that others felt they had no right to is what led to our
withdrawal and led to eventual withdrawal of all diplomatic
members or diplomatic institutions or missions in Libya at the
time.
I will not get into the boycott. I will offer a couple of
things. Against this chaotic background, despite the political
disarray, the United States, during my tenure as chief of
mission, did conduct a number of missions successfully, to
include the capture of both Anas Al-Libi and Benghazi suspect,
Abu Khatallah, while engaging credibly with all sides in the
political reconciliation talks and with the support of
successive Libyan governments. In other words, this is not a
matter that requires us to pick and choose. Libyans were the
first to assert the presence of ISIL and Daesh in Derna and to
seek U.S. assistance in removing them. The Misratans were the
first to draw our attention to the growing ISIL presence in
Sirte, a presence reportedly accommodated by members of the
Gaddaf ad-Dam tribe, who were historical enemies of the
Misratans who earlier had affiliated for similarly
opportunistic reasons with Ansar al-Sharia, another terrorist
group.
We can talk about ISIL later, but I think you have covered
the road map there.
Let me just say in conclusion--and we can get into the
questions later--that Libya is not engaged in a traditional
civil war based on intractable ideological differences. This is
a war of attrition aimed at controlling, not destroying,
critical infrastructure in the absence of a trusted
administrator of national wealth. Historically, exhaustion,
impoverishment, or physical hurt have proven the prime
motivators for arriving at negotiated solutions. But as long as
different factions, who thus far have been fairly evenly
matched in terms of holding their turf, continue to believe
they can count on external support to tip the scales and avoid
reaching the limits of that impoverishment, hurt, or
exhaustion, intermittent, low-intensity warfare will continue,
contributing to human suffering, refugee flows, and penetration
of Libya's vast territory by foreign fighters, Al Qaeda, and
ISIL and Daesh. This is good neither for Libya, nor for us, nor
for our European partners.
But any Libyan solution will require buy-in at the lowest
levels, at the municipal levels for a governing regime that
ensures the equitable distribution of national wealth--in this
case, oil revenues--a certain degree of autonomy, including on
security matters, at local and regional levels, and the
reintegration of militias and the rehabilitation of their
members. It must be inclusive and allow for the return and
rehabilitation of all Libyans, no matter who they supported in
the revolution. It must begin with a ceasefire, monitored by
the international community with Libyan acquiescence and
support, as well as the gathering of heavy weapons throughout
the country and continued cooperation in the war against ISIL,
Daesh, and others wishing to exploit Libyan territory. Libyans
must agree to all of this. And I would note here that----
The Chairman. If we could come to a conclusion here.
Ambassador Jones. Okay. I will conclude.
Let me just say a civil conflict--Libya is not easy, but it
is a worthwhile project. There is no alternative. Legitimacy
cannot be imposed. It must be earned. Libyans have not asked us
to fight their battles for them. The least we can do is support
their dreams, which were inspired frankly by our example.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Jones follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Deborah K. Jones
Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Members of the Committee, Honored
Guests: It is my distinct honor to appear before you today to address
the important and vexing matter of Libya, a country that since being
voted into existence by the United Nations General Assembly in 1949 has
both faced and presented an array of challenges along its difficult
path towards responsible, durable statehood. I preface my remarks by
underscoring that, having retired from the Foreign Service in November
last year, my observations are my own and do not necessarily reflect
current U.S. policy, nor do I have access to current intelligence and
operational plans. Finally, I am ever mindful of the cautionary note
proffered by the last British governor of Jerusalem, Sir Ronald Storrs,
who said ``the Near East is a university from which the scholar never
takes his degree.'' Or hers, I would add, after 34 years serving
largely in that part of the world.
Libya confounds policy makers and diplomatic practitioners alike
with its stubborn resistance to the ``obvious'' political math of 1.2
million barrels of oil a day and a mere 6,000,000 citizens. Caught up
in the endorphins of revolution, many presumed that--like Athena from
the head of Zeus--a sort of ``Dubai on the Mediterranean'' would emerge
following the overthrow of Gaddafi. In hindsight it was wishful
thinking, as though the Libyan landscape were some sort of tabula rasa,
separate from its history. Competing narratives and a certain tactical
impatience, combined with urgent humanitarian concerns, have challenged
the patient policy that has tried to accommodate both the inherently
organic nature of political institution building and our very real
national security concerns. I believe this remains the correct policy,
presuming our national security objective remains a stable, secure
Libya that is evolving into a nation-state both protective of and
accountable to its citizens and compliant with international law.
Geography is destiny, the saying goes. Strategically located in the
heart of north Africa, closer to Rome than to Mecca, Libya's vast,
largely arid expanse includes 1,000 miles of Mediterranean coastline
that favored imperial trade and piracy alike. Like Caesar's Gaul, Libya
is divided into three parts--Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and the Fezzan,
each with its own political history and external alliances. The area
has a long history of being traversed, ruled and occupied by others,
most notably the Italian Fascists whose ``demographic occupation''
resulted in nearly 150,000 Italian citizens--at the time approximately
one fifth of Libya's population--appropriating much of the country's
only fertile region, along the coastline. A crucial WWII battleground,
devastated Libya found new tenants in the allied victors, the United
States appropriating, with payment, what had been an Italian airbase,
renaming it Wheelus and remaining with nearly 15,000 DoD personnel and
family members, hospital, housing, school, cinema and bowling alley--in
essence a Little America, as one former ambassador put it--until 1970.
With this history, it's no surprise that Libyans were highly resistant
to foreign military presence following the 2011 revolution.
When Colonel Gaddafi emerged from Benghazi in 1969, displacing
(without firing a shot) the U.N.-designated monarch, Mohammed Idriss
Senussi (he too from Cyrenaica, the leader of a religious order
established by the then-Ottoman rulers of Libya, tapped by the British
to lead Libyan resistance to the encroaching Italians; history indeed
rhymes), he deployed Libya's newly found oil wealth to assert his rule
over a nation of three disparate regions and a motley political
landscape of city-states, tribes and oases. Raising the banner of Pan
Arab nationalism, Gaddafi bought allegiance, stifled competition and
kept potential foes at each other's throats in the manner of a criminal
cartel lord. Gaddafi did not create the fragmentation that was Libya
but he most assuredly exacerbated its vulnerabilities with his ``spoils
system.'' To survive in the absence of independent institutions and any
neutral ``rule of law,'' Libyans learned to be ethically fluid,
transactional and opportunistic. When Gaddafi departed the scene,
Libya, by now both fragmented but heavily networked, became essentially
a mafia without a Don. Gaddafi was gone but his legacy remained.
Understanding this backdrop is important to comprehending the deep
divides and political antagonisms that followed the revolution, which I
concluded not long after my arrival in Tripoli in June 2013 was, for
all intents and purposes, unfinished. Despite highly touted
parliamentary elections in July 2012, the government was sharply split
along lines some described as ``nationalist'' vs ``Islamist.'' Others
(myself included) viewed the situation more in terms of ``status quo
ante'' elements, some pro-Gaddafi, vs ``democratic revolutionary''
elements, some Islamist, with marginal ideological extremists on both
sides. The revolution had revealed, together with true patriots (a
significant number of whom educated in the U.S. and elsewhere in the
West) and some unabashed ideologues, such as the mufti, a number of
opportunistic bedfellows, whose political promiscuity for material gain
often blurred distinctions.
The parliament, or General National Congress (GNC) was gridlocked
over matters involving the distribution of power between executive and
legislative authorities, while heavily armed militias, increasingly
affiliated with political wings, behaved as rival gangs, patrolling
physical turf gained during the revolution. Militias opposed to
allowing former Gaddafi-era officials access to political office, and
the accompanying distributive control of national wealth, pressured the
GNC into adopting the controversial Political Isolation Law (PIL) in
May 2013, while the rival Zintan were accused of kidnappings, theft and
the extortion of travelers from Misrata wishing to fly out of Tripoli's
international airport, which they held. But lethal exchanges were rare.
It appeared to observers on the ground that these frictions were driven
by a desire for control of national assets, not by any ideological
divide in a country 98% of whose inhabitants adhere to the same
conservative Maliki school of Sunni Islam.
We were able to advance mutual interests in those areas not
involving the national patrimony or perceived, in hindsight, to tilt
the balance between rival security forces. In my first six months on
the ground, we signed bilateral agreements to preserve Libya's rich
cultural heritage; create a bilateral commission for Higher Education;
enhance law enforcement cooperation; prepare for future investment
(Trade and Investment Framework Agreement); and continue important work
together with the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons
and others to destroy Libya's precursor stockpiles. On the other hand,
efforts to train elite special forces and to respond to then-Prime
Minister Ali Zeidan's April 2013 appeal to G-7 leaders to help him
build a General Purpose Force were frustrated due in large part to
Libyan fractiousness and the lack of any unified command and control
system.
Interestingly, those Gaddafi-era technocrats entrusted with
overseeing the operations of Libya's most important national assets,
the Central Bank, the National Oil Company, and the Libyan Investment
Authority, were left largely free to do their work. Oil revenues,
occasionally affected by extortionate tribal interference with
pipelines, continued to flow into the Bank which in turn distributed
salaries and subsidies to all, including rival militias and eventually
governments. Similarly, Libya's ministry of Communications continued to
provide full service, including mobile Wifi, throughout the country. I
understand there have since been efforts by some to create competing
authorities, to the dismay of the average Libyan whose primary concern
is that he or she have enough to eat, to communicate and ideally to
travel.
Sometime following my arrival, my diplomatic colleagues and I
discovered that the Special Representative of the Secretary General
(SRSG) Tarek Mitri, who headed the U.N. Special Mission in Libya, or
UNSMIL, had quietly engaged with the two largest blocs in the GNC, the
National Forces Alliance led by ``nationalist, secularist'' Mahmoud
Jibril and the Justice and Construction Party, associated with the
Muslim Brotherhood, to negotiate a modus vivendi. This soon morphed
into a group of nearly 40 GNC political actors, who after nearly 5
months of confidential dialogue could agree only that they wanted a
government that was ``not central,'' a system that was ``somewhat
presidential'' in nature, and that ``sharia was an acceptable basis for
Libya's constitutional law.'' By February 2014, which many interpreted
as the deadline implicit in the 2012 constitutional declaration for the
GNC to have completed a series of actions or yield to new elections,
the SRSG declared a strategic pause as the talks broke down.
While Tripoli was dealing with political disarray and occasional
militia shenanigans, to include the brief abduction of PM Zeidan on
October 10, 2013 (shortly following the U.S. capture of Al Qaeda
affiliate Abu Anas Al-Libi for his role in the 1998 bombings of U.S.
embassies in Nairobi and Dar es-Salaam), Benghazi continued to suffer a
spate of brazen assassinations in the absence of any state judicial or
effective law enforcement authorities. In February 2014, retired
General Khalifa Heftar appeared on Libyan TV in a professionally
produced video, dressed in military uniform, calling on the Libyan
people to rise up and throw out the ``corrupt'' GNC and to show their
support for him by rallying in public squares. Reaction was muted and
Heftar--whose location was unknown--quietly disappeared. Meanwhile,
under increasing pressure, a GNC political committee agreed to hold new
elections in June 2014.
Frustration with the slow pace of the SRSG's dialog efforts led the
U.K. and U.S. to initiate our own, independently negotiating ``Ten
Principles'' with Libyan political actors, capped by a March 2014 visit
from then-Deputy Secretary of State Bill Burns, who gathered for the
first time at the same table eight parties representing the spectrum of
Libya's political divisions. As was often the case, success was soon
followed by crisis when Libyan petroleum guards in the eastern sector
facilitated the illicit offloading of oil to a mystery tanker of North
Korean registry, leading to the ship's interdiction by U.S. SEAL team,
the forced resignation of PM Zeidan, and his replacement by Abdullah
al-Thinni (who remains Prime Minister). In May, Heftar re-emerged, this
time in Benina military airport in Benghazi, with a reconstituted
``Libyan National Army'' (LNA) vowing to defeat within 2 weeks the
Islamist militias he declared responsible for Benghazi's blood-soaked
anarchy. In Tripoli, PM al-Thinni enjoined foreign missions to avoid
contact with Heftar, whom he accused of a coup attempt against the
government, reportedly issuing a warrant for his arrest.
National elections were held in June 2014, with approximately 22%
of the qualified electorate voting. As in July 2012, there was a clear
majority for non-aligned ``technocrats.'' Jubilant in their victory,
the self-styled ``nationalists'' declared the dialogue process
unnecessary, refusing any formal handover by the outgoing GNC that
would imply that body's legitimacy. Reconciliation talks ceased and
rumors spread that Heftar--who was finding it more difficult than
anticipated to defeat the Benghazi Revolutionary Council militias--
would soon enter Tripoli, accompanied by various tribal allies, to
forcibly expel rival militias, in particular the ``Shields'' empowered
by the GNC to ``protect Tripoli.'' Acting pre-emptively in response to
these rumors, following a lethal exchange between rival militias near
the U.N. headquarters (which led to the withdrawal of U.N. personnel),
a group of Misratan militias, led by GNC supporter Saleh Badi, entered
Tripoli at several points, dislodging the pro-Tobruk Zintan militia
from their various strongholds at Tripoli's International Airport
(which was severely damaged in the fighting and planes destroyed), the
Islamic Call Center, Tripoli Tower (home to the Libyan Investment
Authority) and several other military sites held by the Zintan. This
resulted in the eventual departure of most foreign missions from
Tripoli in July 2014. The newly elected and internationally recognized
House of Representatives (HoR), minus its boycotting members from
Tripoli and Misrata, decamped in early August to Tobruk, a plan I was
told had been in the making even prior to the outbreak of hostilities,
funded by a wealthy Libyan with ties to the Gaddafi family.
U.N.-led talks continued, now focused on bringing together
boycotting HoR members and those in Tobruk, led by a newly-appointed
Bernardino Leon, whose energetic and creative engagement included
regional players whose historical ties or political interests were
entwined with Libya, and often at cross purposes with one another,
affecting Libya's natural political valence and contributing to a
volatile situation. In November 2014, Libya's Supreme Court deemed the
process by which the June 2014 elections were held to have been
illegal, which meant the nominally defunct GNC had to be brought back
into the process. The long and the short of it is that following long
months and nearly two and a half years of increasingly focused and
inclusive negotiations, with the support of all permanent members of
the U.N. Security Council (the U.S. having proposed and facilitated the
inclusion of Russia and China in May 2015), and the involvement of
three separate SRSG's, Libyans reached agreement in December 2015 on a
compromise formula for creating a Government of National Accord (GNA)
and a Presidency Council entered Tripoli in 2016 but has failed to
consolidate control, in large part because armed groups on either side
refuse to yield to civilian authorities.
counterterrorism operations in libya
Against this chaotic backdrop and despite the political disarray,
the U.S. during my tenure as Chief of Mission conducted a number of
missions successfully, to include the capture of both Anas Al-Libi and
Benghazi suspect Abu Khatallah, while engaging credibly with all sides
in the political reconciliation talks and with the support of
successive Libyan governments. Libya's complex political terrain
requires careful navigation. For example, many Libyans were prepared to
disregard Libyan Ansar al-Sharia (AAS), who in their view provided
largely social assistance, while welcoming action against Tunisian AAS,
who they considered extremists exploiting Libyan resources to conduct
their missions. Libyans were only too happy to have the U.S. take out
foreign terrorists operating on their soil, but were dismayed when we
apprehended Anas Al-Libi and Abu Khattala. Libyans were the first to
assert the presence of ISIL/Daesh in Derna and to seek U.S. assistance
in removing them. Misratan individuals associated with the nominally
``Islamist'' side of this conflict were the first to draw our attention
to the growing ISIL presence in Sirte, a presence reportedly
accommodated by members of the Gaddaf ad-Dam tribe, historical enemies
of the Misratans who earlier had affiliated for similarly opportunistic
reasons with AAS. Misratan military personnel led efforts to destroy
ISIL in Sirte (and were later accused by Sirte elders of looting and
other negative behaviors).
isil in libya
ISIL's first declaration in Libya appeared in June 2014 in Derna,
where extremists had returned from fighting in Syria and Iraq. Taking
advantage of Libya's chaotic situation, elements later appeared in
Sabratha in the west, in Sirte and in Benghazi, with ISIL claiming
attacks in Tripoli in January and September of 2015, the first taking
the life of a private American security contractor. By 2015 ISIL in
Libya had reached its peak, with some 2000 fighters, many of them from
Tunisia, sub-Saharan Africa (Mali) and elsewhere in the Maghreb, as
well as several hundred returnees in the east from fighting in Syria
and Iraq. By mid-2015, with the help of AFRICOM, the ``Sabratha
Revolutionaries'' earlier associated with Libya Dawn (the western
coalition assembled in reaction to Heftar's Dignity movement) were able
to defeat ISIL elements in Sabratha. ISIL was also expelled by
revolutionary fighters from Derna. Libyans opposed to Heftar suggest
that his forces allowed ISIL members safe passage from Benghazi and
Derna to relocate in Gaddafi's former stronghold of Sirte, questioning
how they otherwise were able to slip through LNA checkpoints. In Sirte,
they eventually were defeated by Misratan forces in cooperation with
the GNA and AFRICOM airstrikes in an extended operation known as ``Al-
Bunyan al-Marsous,'' or ``Impenetrable Foundation,'' carried out over
an extended period.
khalifa heftar
Heftar's role is also complex and has complicated the
reconciliation process. His initial emergence in Benghazi, taking a
vigilante approach to defeating those he considered Islamist
extremists, was cheered by some and decried by others who noted that
his polarizing tactics had pushed many moderates into the extremist
camp for the sole purpose of preventing his rise to power. At the same
time, they argue, he created an opening for ISIL/Daesh to exploit the
chaotic situation by prolonging the political vacuum. His prolonged
and--according to many--frankly incompetent campaign was marked by
conflict and a lack of cohesion within his ranks, and floundered
without significant external assistance, leading many to fear he is
merely a tool in foreign hands. Others assert he is prepared to resort
to opportunistic alliances (for e.g. with the Salafist Madkhalis) and
to engage in severe human rights violations against Libyans for the
sake of gaining power.
In any event, as a practical matter, at no time during my
engagement with Libya did Heftar control more than 12% of Libyan
territory. Libya is too vast to rely on one partner, particularly in
such a politically fraught environment. It was my policy advice that to
defeat Daesh/ISIL in Libya, we needed to partner with Libyans across
the spectrum, an approach agreed to by the Obama Administration.
Embassy Tripoli facilitated many of the contacts between AFRICOM and
western militia leaders that enabled this successful collaboration. I
am not aware of Heftar's contributions to combating ISIL in Libya.
conclusion
Libya is not engaged in a traditional civil war, based on
intractable ideological difference. This is a war of attrition aimed at
controlling--not destroying--critical infrastructure in the absence of
a trusted administrator of national wealth. Historically, exhaustion,
impoverishment, or physical hurt have proven the prime motivators for
arriving at negotiated solutions. As long as different factions--who
thus far have been fairly evenly matched in terms of holding their
turf--continue to believe they can count on external support to tip the
scales and avoid reaching the limits of their impoverishment, hurt or
exhaustion, intermittent, low intensity warfare will continue,
contributing to human suffering, refugee flows, and penetration of
Libya's vast territory by foreign fighters, Al Qaeda and ISIL/Daesh.
This is good neither for Libya nor for us.
Stability requires good governance. The fundamental role of any
government is to provide its citizens equitable access to the nation's
wealth, however defined, through the provision of security, a
regulatory framework for commerce, and rule of law. Any ``Libyan
Solution'' will require buy-in at the municipal levels for a governing
regime that ensures the equitable distribution of national wealth (in
this case oil revenues); a certain degree of autonomy (including on
security matters) at local and regional levels; and the reintegration
of militias or the rehabilitation of their members. It must be
inclusive and allow for the return and rehabilitation of all Libyans.
It must begin with a ceasefire, monitored by the international
community with Libyan acquiescence and support, as well as the
gathering of heavy weapons throughout the country and continued
cooperation in the war against ISIL/Daesh and others wishing to exploit
Libyan territory. Libyans must agree to all of this. Otherwise, they
must accept that the international powers will increasingly act in
their own immediate, short-term national interest. But ``hit and run''
is not a viable long-term strategy.
Libya is not easy. Civil conflict creates deep and lasting scars,
as we have seen in our own experience. But it is a worthwhile project,
and there is no alternative. As our Founding Fathers knew so well,
legitimacy cannot be imposed; it must be earned. I have shared with
Libyans both enormous joy and tremendous sorrow, deep frustration and
moments of profound emotion and reconciliation during the negotiation
process that brought me to tears. I cannot forget the optimism and hope
of Libya's youth and their desire to create a modern Libya that is
inclusive and nurturing of that hope; I cannot forget my conversations
with former ``thewar,'' or revolutionaries, young men, brave, scruffy
and unsure, demanding of the politicians wise leadership and good
governance so that they can raise families and work with dignity in a
safe environment.
Libyans have not asked us to fight their battles for them; the
least we can do is support their dreams, dreams inspired by our
example.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you so much.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Well, let me thank both of our witnesses.
There are clearly great differences between Syria and
Libya. Syria has ethnic clashes that are very deep and
historic, whereas Libya does not have that burden. But we saw
where Russia intervened in Syria and the damage it caused by
Mr. Putin's engagement in Syria, making it extremely difficult
to get all sides together in a peace process, which is the
ultimate answer in Syria, as it is the ultimate answer in
Libya.
So now we see very disturbing trends about Russia's
engagement in Libya. We see where they are actively engaged in
supporting this General Haftar, who has been extremely
difficult in recognizing a civilian government and, according
to Human Rights Watch, has committed war crimes.
So my question first would be what is Russia's intentions
in Libya. Why have they been able to get the cooperation of
Egypt, one of our partners, in allowing the use of Egypt's
facilities in the military operations in Libya? And what is the
U.S. interest in dealing with Russia's engagement in Libya?
So, Dr. Wehrey, do you have some suggestions here to try to
help me understand the road map here?
Dr. Wehrey. Sure. Thank you.
Well, again, I think it is one of Libya's saving graces
that it is not serious. So the level of regional interference,
international interference I think pales compared to Syria.
That regional interference is not simply Russia. And I would
point to the Gulf States as the most harmful actors in a lot
this, stemming back to the 2011 revolution where you had two
Gulf States playing out their regional rivalry on Libyan soil.
The Egyptian role I think came before Russia. The Egyptians
have had longstanding economic and security interests in Libya.
They were among the first backers of General Khalifa Haftar's
Operation Dignity when it started in 2014. And indeed, when
General el-Sisi took power in Egypt, that really was felt in
Libya. So again, the Egyptian policy toward Libya really
shifted after Sisi.
Senator Cardin. Is it your testimony that the respect for
civilian controls is critical to the stability of that country?
General Haftar has certainly not been helpful in that regard.
Dr. Wehrey. Correct.
Senator Cardin. So Russia seems to be siding up with
General Haftar.
Dr. Wehrey. Exactly.
So, enter Russia. And so again, I think Russia's interest
in Libya stems back to the Qaddafi era. They had enormous arms
contracts. They had infrastructure projects. They explored a
naval base. But General Haftar is a useful ally to them. They
sensed a vacuum. It is very useful for their narrative. NATO
broke the country. Here comes Russia to clean it up, so to
speak. They are backing him reportedly with spare parts, with
training, with medical care. They printed currency for the
Eastern government. And this is one of the alarming things
about Libya: the parallel institutions. So this Eastern,
unrecognized faction has its own central bank. Russia was
printing Libyan currency to help prop it up.
So again, I think their role has been unhelpful. It has
been theatrical at times. This visit of General Haftar to the
aircraft carrier was highly theatrical. But the question is,
can they really pull a Syria in Libya, and do they want basing
or do they want to present themselves as an indispensable
broker? They want to be the ones that forge a new government
that is favorable to their strategic and economic interests.
Senator Cardin. So if the United States were to withdraw
interest in Libya, would that give a greater opening for
Russia?
Dr. Wehrey. I think so, Senator, yes. And again, my
conversations with Libya, with the United Nations chief last
week is everyone is on edge waiting for the U.S. to give a
signal. So the absence of a signal creates a freeze. It creates
a vacuum, and that is an invitation for other powers to----
Senator Cardin. And I have heard that also. What type of
signal are they waiting for?
Dr. Wehrey. Well, I think a high visibility signal about
our diplomatic engagement, about our support for the
government, I mean, the role of special envoys from the State
Department, of supporting the Europeans, I think just a more
visible and vocal signal, and certainly not a signal that we
are washing our hands of this country.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. If I could, before I turn to Senator Johnson.
I have saved time for interjections.
But, I mean a signal. I am sorry. I heard your two points
and our staff was in yesterday talking about that. And I
realize we were certainly very helpful in Sirte with what
happened with ISIS. But I am not understanding what that really
means relative to our leadership there. I am truly seeking an
answer. I know that Italy, France, and other countries are very
involved. But tell me what it is specifically that the United
States should do to move towards a political agreement here.
Dr. Wehrey. Again, I think just a more visible support to
these regional initiatives, statements, I think convening some
sort of new negotiating track in tandem with the United
Nations, in tandem with these regional partners, and signaling
I think also to the Libyan people, to the Libyan political
actors that we are prepared to engage along a broad spectrum of
initiatives to really help Libyan society, to help the Libyan
government.
I think one example of what I am talking about was when the
Libyan factions moved their fighting to the south, when they
started clashing south of the oil crescent, the P5 issued a
statement all together, all five of the P5, saying that this
was bad for Libya. And that is the sort of consensus where the
U.S. needs to play a leading role, not just a background role.
The Chairman. Senator Johnson.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the witnesses.
Just in my notes, I am seeing political disarray. I see
Libyan technocrats. Do they still exist? Is there any hope of
reassembling the Libyan technocrats to provide kind of a
governing authority? I will ask the Ambassador.
Ambassador Jones. I think when it comes to the National Oil
Company, to the bank, and to others, there are technocrats.
However, the political leadership is in disarray and needs
guidance. It needs support. And we were able to do that as long
as we were engaged with that. And I think that is important to
remember. We have not had physical presence of a diplomatic
nature in Libya since we withdrew in July of 2014. That sends a
huge message to the Libyans. And unfortunately, obviously, for
political sensitivities and the rest, the U.S. was very
hesitant to reinsert following the second withdrawal personnel
into Libya, worried about the paralysis that might cause at
home. But in fact, we brought the Russians and the Chinese into
the dialogue process. We were very actively engaged in that.
And having the U.S. on board signaling that it supports a
political, as well as a military solution is extremely
important.
On a purely practical note, Haftar has never, at least in
my time there and I do not think yet--Fred will know this--
controlled more than 12 percent of the country at any given
time. It is huge. You are never going to defeat ISIS or any
other group that is there unless you have cooperation across
the board. If you go into supporting Haftar wholeheartedly, you
will have a civil war. It will turn into something existential
for Libyans I am afraid.
Senator Johnson. How many significant militias are there?
How many significant groups are there competing?
Dr. Wehrey. I would say there are thousands. I mean, one of
the tragedies of Libya is that power is so fragmented. So it is
neighborhood by neighborhood. It is town. Even within the town
of Misrata, there are 100. But within Tripoli, there are
probably four or five.
Senator Johnson. Are there major ones? We hear the same
thing in Syria, 1,200. But I mean, are there 10 major groups,
or is it really that----
Dr. Wehrey. It really is that fragmented. I mean, there are
talks now about, with this track of security dialogue, of
bringing in--you know, who would be the maybe--you probably
could get 12 to 15 leaders of the armed groups, and that would
get you there. But again, the chance for spoilers to play a
role is very high.
Senator Johnson. So with that level of fragmentation, I
mean, what role has diplomacy? You really do have to start with
military control. Correct? I mean, somebody is going to have to
control the ground militarily. Somebody is going to have to
bring these factions together.
Dr. Wehrey. I mean, in certain areas and towns, a lot of
these militias are tied to towns, and they have arrangements
with municipal councils, so in Zintan, Misrata, even in the
east in Tobruk and Benghazi. So there is a measure of control.
It is negotiated control between businessmen, between municipal
councils. So the notion that you would have one actor unify the
country through a conquest is fanciful. I think what we need to
look at is sort of growing it from the ground up.
Senator Johnson. Who is going to be the countervailing
force to, right now, Haftar and Egypt and UAE and Russia? Who
would be the most trusted foreign power to try and exert some
level of stability and control?
Dr. Wehrey. Foreign power?
Senator Johnson. I mean, for example, was Italy not the
primary trading partner prior to the----
Dr. Wehrey. Italy is playing a huge role right now in terms
of brokering a dialogue. They are playing a role in Tripoli and
Misrata. They have offered help to the east.
Senator Johnson. What kind of military presence does Italy
have in Libya right now? Do they have troops?
Dr. Wehrey. Sorry?
Senator Johnson. Does any foreign power have troops there?
Dr. Wehrey. There is a contingent of Italian soldiers at a
hospital in Misrata. There are reportedly troops in Tripoli
doing some very low-level training.
Senator Johnson. But they are very limited numbers.
Correct? Nothing to exert control. Just kind of help and
advice.
Dr. Wehrey. Correct.
Senator Johnson. Do they need more? I mean, should we be
encouraging European allies to step up to the plate? Somebody
is going to have to insert some kind of military power to try
and gain control. Are they not?
Dr. Wehrey. I do not think so, no. I mean, this is not
something--I mean, at the invitation of Libyans--this is
something that needs to be agreed upon, a stabilization force
under the mandate of the U.N. or EU. But that needs to be
worked out with Libyans. I think any foreign presence--you
know, it could be an antibody. It could play into the jihadist
narrative. I think what needs to happen first is the Libyans
need to agree upon a road map for their military. There needs
to be a plan for the security of Tripoli.
Senator Johnson. It is in political disarray, and there are
thousands of militias. Again, I am trying to come up with what
is it really going to take. It is going to require some kind of
international coalition invited in by the Libyans to try and
stabilize the situation first. Correct?
Dr. Wehrey. I do not think so, no.
Ambassador Jones. No.
Dr. Wehrey. I think what is happening is there are talks
underway, including a security track, to try to get these armed
group actors on board for organization, for a structure, for
leadership, for who gets to stay in the military, for which
militias have to leave, for demobilizing the young men. A lot
of these young men want to go back to jobs and schooling. So
there needs to be a Libyan-led strategy for doing this.
Senator Johnson. Okay.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. And the Libyans are asking for that?
Dr. Wehrey. They are, yes.
The Chairman. Including Haftar?
Dr. Wehrey. Sorry?
Ambassador Jones. No. Haftar is not asking for that.
Dr. Wehrey. Haftar is talking to the U.N. about a military
structure. The problem, though, is that he wants to be part of
this Presidency Council. He wants to be supreme commander.
The Chairman. It is kind of reality, not a problem. Is it
not?
Ambassador Jones. It is a problem.
Dr. Wehrey. It is a problem.
Ambassador Jones. Because the reality is that the dispersal
of heavy weapons and also the opposition to Haftar is so deep
and the Misratans do have the capability, as we saw in July and
August of 2014. They do have the command and control, and they
do have the sense of protecting their own turf that will drive
them to combat this if Heftar is in the lead. They have said
before, when we were engaged with them in dialogue, that they
were prepared to work with others in a command and control
system. But Haftar's restated opposition to living with--to be
subordinate to civilian command creates a lot of discomfort
with people, particularly given some of his ties and the
supporters outside of Libya where people do not know what the
point is.
I think all countries in the Security Council were in
agreement that we wanted a stable Libya. But there are other
factors here. We do have friends. We do have partners,
including Egypt and others, who are adamantly opposed to the
notion that any Islamist group or Muslim Brother group have any
access to Libyans' wealth, which they believe will lead
eventually to some kind of Islamist takeover and competition
for their own principalities or their own governments. And so,
therefore, their objective has been to do something that
stabilizes it, that keeps it away, and Haftar has been a bit of
a tool for them in that regard. Everyone recognizes that he has
been unable to consolidate his gains outside of the Benghazi
area essentially, and this has been going on now for 3 years.
So I agree with Dr. Wehrey, with Fred, completely on this.
Unless you have a Libyan agreement, again, on distribution, on
an organization that is going to ensure transparent
distribution of national wealth under a more localized
government, they are not going to accept anything else. And
they do not want foreign troops on the ground. This is a
country that was devastated during World War II----
The Chairman. I got it. Thank you so much.
Senator Booker.
Senator Booker. Yes. Dr. Wehrey, you write in your
testimony--and I want to just read a portion. You said that the
promotion of economic development and entrepreneurship,
multilevel governance, education, and civil society is a vital
adjunct to traditional counterterrorism tools like
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, border control,
train and equip, and direct action. And you seem to describe an
environment where ISIS is thriving in areas where there is no
government, no civil society, and they are taking advantage of
the vacuum.
And I just want to put that in the context of what seems to
be administration policy right now in reducing State Department
resources to build civil society. I mean, it is very shocking
to me the sort of budget that they have outlined in light of
what you seem to be indicating as a prescription to ultimately
bring stability back to Libya.
Could you comment on that?
Dr. Wehrey. Well, I agree, Senator. And where ISIS set up
camp in Libya, it was these marginalized areas that had fallen
off the map of post-revolutionary Libya. So you look at a city
like Sirte, Qaddafi's hometown, that was brutalized and
neglected after the revolution; it was lacking services,
lacking governance, lacking representation. There were tribes
there that welcomed the Islamic State simply as protection,
simply for what they provided. So it's very expedient.
The same thing in the West. You had smugglers sort of doing
deals with the Islamic State because there was no local
economy. Down in the south, there is absolutely no governance.
This is where AQIM thrives. The same thing in Benghazi.
So, again, how do you deny the sanctuary? How do you
fortify the resilience of Libyan society to jihadist
penetration? And that is where a civil society, that is where
municipal governance comes in and it is so essential.
Senator Booker. Whatever the strategy is, once this
administration presents one, part of that is essential that it
is us doing that kind of civil society investments and building
that the State Department is critically able to do.
Dr. Wehrey. I think so, Senator, and us, along with local
partners, along with the UNDP.
I went down to southern Libya to a town called Ubari that
is a very remote town that was wracked by tribal fighting. It
has really just fallen off the map. There is nothing there. But
the young people there talked about a USAID computer center
that was set up that basically connected them to the globe. It
gave them critical computer skills, and they were pointing to
this. Unfortunately, the center was destroyed in fighting, but
they look at that as a visible indication of U.S. commitment.
Senator Booker. And another thing that sort of disturbs me
is that we seem to be operating under an AUMF from 2001. And I
am just curious. Is our intervention, both military and I hope
to see more sort of civil society work--do you think the
administration wants to continue to use the AUMF in 2001 as a
justification for their intervention militarily? I will open
that to either one.
Ambassador Jones. I cannot say because I am not involved
anymore because I am no longer in the government. But I am
hearing from contacts on the special forces side and others
that they are hearing signals that in fact we are essentially
going to go to a hit and run policy in Libya as opposed to
trying to knit together the kind of enduring solution that you
were talking about.
The Chairman. So let me, if I could. So what you are saying
is it is going to be an ISIS-specific whack-a-mole issue. It is
not going to be an enduring presence which would mean the 2001
AUMF is operative. You do not hear any plans of any long-term
ground. And you all are just saying it is unnecessary anyway. I
am hearing nothing to that end.
Ambassador Jones. Right. I am hearing what I call tactical
impatience. People want to act against what they see there,
really not considering the overall Libyan context, which is
that Libyans, unlike Syrians or Iraq, do not have indigenous
ISIS by and large. It is opportunistic, as Dr. Wehrey has said.
And they do not want to share their wealth and will not allow--
they have been the ones to call ISIL out in their own country.
Senator Booker. That is problematic for me on a number of
levels. But I just want to jump real quick in my remaining few
seconds.
Human trafficking is a serious concern in this country. The
IOM reported last month that migrants are being held hostage
through slave markets in Libya, Niger, furthermore trafficking
and smuggling from militias in Libya which are driving the
conflict there. I just want to know if you have any input for
us--either one--about what we should do to address this larger
humanitarian crisis. Obviously, I imagine quelling the conflict
that is allowing this to proliferate. But if this was a
critical objective for the United States, what should we be
doing?
Ambassador Jones. Well, first, I am sorry to say that human
trafficking, piracy, and slavery has been part and parcel of
Libya's history even when you had a strong authoritarian
government in Qaddafi, such as it was, because it is not
something that they have really paid the kind of attention that
the international community would like for them to pay.
So, again, this is one of the areas that when you have a
political dialogue and you have a government that engages
across the country and makes the distribution of wealth part
and parcel of working against those kinds of things, replacing
those activities, smuggling, which has long been the bread and
butter for many Libyans particularly in the south but also for
those on the borders who have brought in sub-Saharan Africans
especially and traded them and others. This is precisely the
kind of thing that you can only address with civil society and
with governance.
Dr. Wehrey. Just to add to that, it is a symptom of Libya's
economic collapse that the circle of complicity in this
lucrative smuggling trade has really widened. So, again, down
in the south, it is how people make their living. The same
thing in the north. Promoting programs for alternative
livelihoods down in the south--I mean, fixing Libya's economic
crisis, but then again being careful who we partner with. The
notion of training a Libyan coast guard--who are we talking
about? Many of the coast guards are militia-run. They are, in
fact, complicit with the smuggling trade. Returning these
migrants to these horrendous detention centers--and I have seen
several of them--is just simply inhumane and immoral.
Senator Booker. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
Senator Young.
Senator Young. Thank you, Chairman.
Ambassador, Doctor, thanks so much for your testimony here
today.
I just want to highlight the importance of the United
States working on multiple fronts to defeat ISIS in Libya. You
have spoken some to this. But on April 20th, President Trump,
as you know, held a joint press conference with the Italian
foreign minister. And at that press conference, he said he does
not see a role for the United States in Libya apart from
defeating Islamic State militants. And that was actually a
press conference with the prime minister.
Do you both agree that defeating ISIS in Libya or anywhere
else, for that matter, is going to require the establishment of
inclusive and effective governance, not just CT strikes?
Dr. Wehrey. I do agree, Senator, absolutely 100 percent. As
I outlined in my testimony, who joins ISIS? It is the losers in
the political order. It is people that are shut out of the
political process. So any government that excludes people on
the basis of ideology or belief--those people are going to get
radicalized, and it is going to increase the pool of terrorism.
Senator Young. And that in turn has some ramifications for
our needs to invest in USAID, State Department, and the civil
society that they can help facilitate, bring to bear on some of
the challenges in the region and the municipal administration
that you spoke to that are necessary to bring stability. Is
that correct?
Dr. Wehrey. Absolutely, Senator. I mean, I think one of the
bright spots in Libya is the fact the municipal authorities
enjoy elected legitimacy. When you go around to towns, there
are certain cases where they have had success. So I think one
of the strategies that I am seeing from the United Nations and
others is going straight to those municipal authorities,
including the budget, I mean, helping them finance themselves.
What is so worrisome about the Haftar-controlled east or the
areas under General Khalifa Haftar's control is that he has
replaced elected municipal officials with uniformed military
governors.
Senator Young. Ambassador?
Ambassador Jones. I would only say again that in Sirte, for
example, what we saw was support that was opportunistic for
Sirte from groups who were politically opposed to the
Misratans. It had nothing ideologically to do with it. It was
all about competition for resources. So until you have a
government that does what governments are supposed to do, which
is to ensure equitable access to national resources through
security, regulatory framework, rule of law, you are going to
have this kind of problem in Libya.
Senator Young. So, Ambassador, my previous line of
questioning was prospective. Being a little retrospective here,
let us think about the lessons learned and whether there are
some broader applications to the Middle East.
In your prepared remarks, you note that many thought a
Dubai on the Mediterranean would emerge following the overthrow
of Qaddafi. And you comment that such an expectation was, in
hindsight, wishful thinking.
The Powell doctrine poses eight questions we should
consider before taking any sort of military action. Number six
of those was whether the consequences of our action have been
fully considered. This really applies to both of you, but
first, Ambassador.
In 2011, do you believe there was a failure to ask the
question what comes next, and, more broadly, what broader
lessons for U.S. policy in the Middle East, based on the
experiences in Libya, might we draw?
Ambassador Jones. Senator, I do think--and I was not part
of the decision-making process then, of course--but I do
believe that it was a very different situation. I think people
forget that it was, in fact, the Arab League that came to us
and asked us to take action to provide a no-fly zone because
Qaddafi, unlike leaders in Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen where
similar uprisings were taking place, the so-called Arab Spring
uprisings, the leaders were not attacking their own
populations, but whereas Qaddafi had threatened to do so, to
kill those rats. And so when you had a situation like that,
particularly on the heels of events like Rwanda or other
things, I think politically it would have been very difficult
to stand by and do nothing and watch a dictator who we had
dealt with as a dictator who had been responsible for a number
of terrorist actions throughout the world, to stand by and say,
well, we prefer the stability to supporting those who are
trying to overthrow him.
And again, remember, we were speaking to people on the
revolutionary side like Dr. Gebril, who presented a very
articulate vision of what they could do. There was a lot of
over-promising. So, yes, we did not understand the situation
well. I will accept that. However, I do not know that we would
have changed or that we could have known it differently because
we were not involved in Libya for a long period of time as the
United States.
Senator Young. So it sounds as though the political
imperative to intervene was strong based on a number of reasons
you put forth. But the planning took place in an atmosphere
where we had limited information, not just lack of critical
thinking. It sounds as though that is what you have said.
Ambassador Jones. I think also that people were surprised.
It is not that we did not allocate resources or go in with our
international partners and European partners to try to assist
Libya. It is important to remember that Libyans, A, did not
want foreign military on the ground. B, they did not want a lot
of foreign presence, period. What they asked for was the U.N.
special mission in Libya, and that is what they got with Tarek
Mitri who did begin by writing a white paper on organizing some
kind of security structure and military.
I think it was only later that people on the Western side
realized the depth of the fragmentation and, as I said before,
that the revolution was, in fact, unfinished because successive
transitional governments in Libya proved entirely incapable of
de-arming the militias, rehabilitating, taking away their areas
of control. And it was clear that they were not all that
interested in having any Western groups, who would have been,
frankly, injured--I mean, killed--I think in the process, come
in and do so.
The Chairman. I will say retrospectively one of the things
that has occurred is the young leader of North Korea has
learned that if you give up your weapons of mass destruction,
then you likely will be taken out. And we are having to deal
with that dynamic right now.
Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for your testimony.
The Government of National Accord, the proposed U.N.-
facilitated agreement supported by some factions, has failed to
achieve broad support in the country. Does that still represent
the best way forward for Libya? As you talk about trying to put
all the factions together, is that really an avenue still?
Dr. Wehrey. Senator, I think the Libyan political agreement
really remains the touchstone, and most Libyans would agree
upon that. According to a lot of polls that have been done,
they still see that agreement that was signed in December 2015
as the foundation.
Now, the question is what kind of political structure. So
it is the Government of National Accord, but you are talking
about the composition of the Presidency Council. You are
talking about the other bodies, the state council. That is what
is being worked out. There was a five-person Presidency Council
that was tremendously unwieldy that was rife with divisions.
There were other sort of structural problems. And so the talks
now are how do you revise that.
But, again, the key question--and this has been the
sticking point--is elected civilian control over the military,
and the question is, are these new negotiations sort of a
covert way for General Haftar to come on to some sort of new
council where he would be, de facto, ruler of the country?
Senator Menendez. Well, then it seems to me if that is a
fundamental question, do we not have leverage? I mean, we give
Egypt an enormous amount of money. The Saudis are our ally. Are
we leveraging our relationship with those two countries vis-a-
vis the support they are giving Haftar and the circumstances in
Libya in a way that we should be? You are both smiling. I do
not know what that means.
Ambassador Jones. This is one of those ``thank you for that
question, Senator.''
Senator Menendez. We hear that at confirmation hearings:
``thank you for that question.''
Ambassador Jones. As you know, no relationship is purely
bilateral. We have many engagements in different areas in the
region, and the nature of our relationships with Egypt, with
the United Arab Emirates, with Turkey, with Qatar, and others
are deep and they are multilayered. And I think that when it
comes to priorities or how much leverage you actually have in
some areas, it is quite limited, you find, because what is
existential for others is not necessarily seen as such by us
and vice versa. And so I think that some of our friends have
made a decision that they believe they live in the neighborhood
and they cannot tolerate what they believe we naively think is
the ability to have Islamists in a government that has access
to a lot of money and a location.
And so there are ways around this I think, building in
safeguards, building in transparent systems, I mean, that we
would say as Americans you have institutional ways around this
in these settings where institutions are not always the
predominant feature. I mean, they see things differently.
Senator Menendez. The bottom line is you are saying that
their interests are going to trump any influence that we may
have over this because we have a multilayered interest with
them. So therefore, this is not at the top of their pole. I
mean, it just seems what we are resigned to, if we do not use
leverage with countries that can influence the situation in
Libya and continue to exacerbate the circumstances as they
exist, is that what we are destined to is a continuing internal
conflict and us, on occasion, striking ISIS targets as we see
it necessary. But that is a long-term proposition for failure
at the end of the day.
Ambassador Jones. I am not sure failure. I think that is
just the nature of U.S. international relations and diplomacy
is that it is a matter of priorities and trying to influence
others when your priorities do not always jibe on these things.
Senator Menendez. Dr. Wehrey, do you see it the same way?
Dr. Wehrey. I do. I think the Egyptians, for instance, are
in fact coming around. And so they have actually pushed for
negotiations between General Haftar and the West. And so they
have an interest on their border. They do not want the division
of Libya. I do not think they want military conquest of the
country. So, again, they have certain security interests.
I do think the U.S., especially this new administration,
has more leverage since we are sending these signals to certain
Gulf States that we have your back on Iran. I think that can
translate into more leverage on Libya. I mean, Libya is a
country whose spillover affects multiple U.S. allies, perhaps
even more than Yemen, and yet we are not getting involved in
Libya.
So I think in the case of the UAE--and I am going to call
them out--I mean, their interference has been almost purely
ideological, driven by this phobia of the Muslim Brotherhood.
And that is not a recipe for a country that is going to be
immune to terrorism. So, again, I think we need to have
stronger leverage with these states.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
And I would point out, I mean, Egypt has certainly from a
security interest standpoint been very aligned with Israel
recently. So our interests in the region are complex, and I do
agree that there is some leverage right now that we have not
had in the past that hopefully will be useful as we move ahead
in Libya.
Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for being here.
Let me begin with a specific question and then kind of a
broader one because Libya is often pointed to as an example of
a foreign policy mistake or what have you. And I want to
revisit that for a moment. You are both keen observers of it.
Obviously, the Ambassador was there in the aftermath.
But I want to talk about the Benghazi Defense Brigade. As
you know, Libya has become a terrorist safe haven, and a
veritable alphabet soup of organizations are fighting for
control of the country. What are your views regarding
cooperation between the Benghazi Defense Brigade and elements
like Al Qaeda or AQIM? I think that they have attempted to deny
links to terrorism, but is it not the fact that they are a
well-known coalition of Islamic militias and extremists? So how
would you characterize the BDB and, in particular, whether we
believe that the Libyan National Army has the capability to
defeat them?
Dr. Wehrey. The BDB at its core was formed by Islamist
figures who were ejected from Benghazi. So many of them were
leaders in Benghazi. They came out. They got support from the
City of Misrata, from other sources, from Tripoli, allegedly
from Qatar as well.
At its core, what the BDB is a symptom of is the massive
displacement from Benghazi, the fact that they are fighting,
they say, to return families to Benghazi. Many of them have
families.
The Al Qaeda element--I mean, look, this is a small country
of 6 million. If you go to any Islamist leader, chances are he
is going to know someone in Al Qaeda. He is going to be
affiliated with Al Qaeda. There is a 6 degrees of separation.
Are there people that had Al Qaeda pasts in the BDB? Probably.
But is the group itself an Al Qaeda affiliate or organization?
No. Is its involvement and escalation unhelpful? Yes. And I do
not think that the Libyan National Army has the ability to
fully defeat a force that could challenge it in the oil
crescent. The key thing is that oil crescent is going to be a
site of contention for years. It has been ever since 2015 at
least.
Ambassador Jones. And I would only add that there were many
who argued that when Haftar engaged in Benghazi, that in fact
he undid the work that had been done of parsing off the
extremists from the core of some of these militias and in fact
drove them all back together because their sole objective
became to defeat him instead of what they had been doing before
is paring off coming back into the national grouping after the
revolution and marginalizing the extremists.
But, again, as Dr. Wehrey says, just about every Libyan
family--it is like rebels and Yankees--they have got somebody
in it that they would rather not see at the table that they
admit to, and then they feel sorry when that person passes away
too. I mean, I have watched Libyans who are pro-Haftar weep
over the death of Benghazi revolutionaries because they are
cousins or they are someone else.
I would say the hard-core Al Qaeda group has been in
Derna--a lot of them--or the affiliates. And Derna historically
has been kind of a refuge for people because it is filled with
caves. It is isolated and it is easily cut off, so even when
Qaddafi was there, people were there. The Christian saints used
to hang out there in the 4th century and 5th century because it
was so isolated.
So that is, yes, a problem. Benghazi is a mix. But I think
it is hard to say that the whole group of the revolutionaries
is part of this problem. They drove out ISIL, by the way, from
Derna--a lot of them--and from Benghazi.
Senator Rubio. On the broader question about Libya, this is
what I hear from a lot of people, and I am simplifying it.
Qaddafi was a really bad person, but at least he kept the
country stable. He was overthrown, and now all the Islamists
are there and it has become a playground.
My counter to that argument has been, number one, the
Islamists, the jihadists are not the people that overthrew
Qaddafi. It was the Libyan people. That was driven by the
Libyan people who wanted to get rid of him. He was gone one way
or the other. The choice before us at the time was not whether
or not Qaddafi stayed, but whether or not a vacuum would
follow.
Is my assessment of what happened back in the beginning of
this revolution accurate? And the reason why that is relevant
is it is now being extrapolated to Syria and to other parts of
the world. The fact of the matter is that the uprising that led
to the ouster of Qaddafi was not led by the radical elements as
much as it was by the Libyan people who did not want to live
under this lunatic criminal.
Ambassador Jones. I think you are absolutely right,
Senator. But what happened was that immediately following the
revolution--it gets back to what we were saying before--the
infighting over control of the nation's assets have led to
these divides that are not fundamentally ideological in nature.
I mean, this is a country, again, 98 percent of whom are
Malachi Sunnis, Sunni Malachi school of Islam. That is not the
issue. The issue is who controls the wealth. And that it why I
say I see it more--and I think Fred does too--in terms of
status quo ante, who owned the goods versus distributive
democracy of people who felt that it was time now to share the
wealth and also have a democratic group.
Now, I think there are some who are--indeed, they are
Salafists, but they are still democrats, small ``d'' democrats.
There are those who are, in fact, ideologues and who are
extremists, and they have always been there around and they are
dabbling now, fishing in very troubled waters. But at the end
of the day, I still believe in my heart of hearts that a
political reconciliation that provides for equitable
distribution of national wealth in a transparent way will bring
people together against those narrow group of extremists. I
believe that, naively perhaps, but I believe it.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
Senator Markey.
Senator Markey. Thank you.
So let us go to this diplomatic breakthrough that the
Italians have made bringing together the GNA and Tobruk
factions in some kind of preliminary negotiation to reach a
negotiation with Donald Trump saying I do not want to have any
part of getting the United States in the middle of this. But
like you are saying, at the end of the day, a diplomatic
resolution is the only way that we are going to be able to
resolve these difficulties, including splitting up the oil
revenues or whatever. And so it is all going to be on the
table.
So can you talk a little bit about this Italian initiative
and what hopes you may have for it to be a building block to
actually have a resolution reached that is diplomatic and not
military?
Dr. Wehrey. Senator, I think the Italians deserve enormous
credit for brokering this. I think it is a start. I am not sure
if I would herald it as a breakthrough. What it is is the head
of the state council, the head of the HOR agreeing to talk,
meeting for the first time.
The question is what is next, and the devil is in the
details. And so what new body emerges from this. But then,
again, I have to underscore this question about who controls
military force. And this was what led to the fighting back in
2014, the monopoly on the use of force. And the question will
be what is General Haftar's willingness to engage in this
process.
Senator Markey. Do you think this indicates that he is
willing to participate in the process, given the fact that both
factions are now going to be talking? What do you think this
portends?
Dr. Wehrey. I do not know, Senator. I mean, we have seen
these things happen before, these initiatives, and then there
is always room for spoilers in Libya. So I just do not know at
the moment what his stance on this is. I know the Algerians and
the Tunisians have their own initiative going. I think it is
encouraging that he is starting to meet with a number of high-
level officials as well. But as I understand it in his
communications with the U.N., he wants a seat at the table that
could be the head of the table.
Senator Markey. Ms. Jones.
Ambassador Jones. I was just going to say that talks in a
good way--process is the opposite of conflict. So that is a
good thing. However, the political valence of these kinds of
negotiations is really thrown off when you have external
elements making promises to people or giving them added weight
in the equation that then leads to them staying out of the
process. And I think that is the case with Haftar right now and
with other groups, unfortunately.
Senator Markey. Reports are that Sarraj is coming to the
United States to meet with President Trump, and reports also
are out there that Sarraj is going to talk to Haftar before he
comes to Washington to meet with Trump. So does that give you
some reason to believe that the United States, President Trump,
should play a hands-on role and not a hands-off role in terms
of trying to resolve this view?
Ambassador Jones. Of course, I think that the President can
play a helpful role in that if he underscores the importance of
a political solution and civilian authorities over the
military. If anyone can make a deal, I think he probably
believes he can.
Senator Markey. So you are saying this is for President
Trump to try to make a deal. So he should play a hands-on role
in trying to bring these two parties together?
Ambassador Jones. If it is, indeed, the case that Sarraj
has met with Haftar and is coming to see the President, I do
believe that the President should offer something more than
saying this is an Italian problem and we are going to help you
militarily and that is it. Yes.
Senator Markey. Thank you.
Doctor.
Dr. Wehrey. I would agree with that. And, you know, it is
not simply the deal, but it is what comes next. It is the
guarantees. It is the involvement to make the deal stick. And
so that is where this sort of whole-of-government approach is
so important. So we should be ready to engage beyond this
handshake.
Senator Markey. But do you see this as a big moment, that
you have a number of events that are all kind of converging
heading towards this meeting in the White House with President
Trump?
Dr. Wehrey. Again, I do not want to sound pessimistic, but
I am guardedly optimistic maybe. But, again, it is something
that we have seen--and this is where the regional states are so
important. The role of the Emirates, of Egypt, the fact that
they, in principle, agreed to the 2015 agreement, they said
yes, and we thought that was a breakthrough. But meanwhile,
they hedged. They hedged. So the role of regional spoilers and
especially spoilers on the ground. So can Sarraj deliver the
rejectionists in his camp? Are there going to be people in
Haftar's camp that feel left out? How much control does Haftar
really have?
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Gardner.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thanks to both of you for being here today.
And I apologize if I am asking you a repetitive question
here. But with the rising tension between Libya's House of
Representatives and the Government of National Accord, there
was a report from The Guardian on March 14th that stated--and I
quote--``Russia appeared to have deployed special forces to an
airbase in western Egypt near the border.'' It goes on in the
article to explain that ``U.S. and diplomatic officials have
said any such Russian involvement might be part of an attempt
to support the Libyan military commander, Khalifa Haftar.''
Could you provide any insight into involvement of Russia's
special forces perhaps in Libya and what you have seen and
heard?
Ambassador Jones. I am going to yield because I have no
information on that.
Dr. Wehrey. I have no information beyond what I have read,
Senator.
Senator Gardner. If Russia were to do that--open source
reports talked about the special forces deployed in Libya--what
role do you think these special forces, should they be there,
be playing?
Dr. Wehrey. Senator, again, we know foreign special forces
have played a role with General Haftar in the past in his
campaign in Benghazi. There have been Russian offers of
training in Russia. There have been offers of medical help. I
am not sure what value added those get him right now. His
principal theater of combat is almost over in Benghazi, save
for a few neighborhoods. He has not shown a willingness to go
after the terrorists in Derna. So I think the question is, is
this a symbolic gesture, yet another arrow in the quiver of
Russia that they are using to sort of signal their involvement?
Senator Gardner. And I guess I would follow up on that. Is
it then in the national security interest of the United
States--a concern of our national security interest--that there
are Russian special forces, if they are in Libya indeed?
Ambassador Jones. You know, I think this is one of those
where we have to be very cautious. I mean, we have had special
forces in Libya. The British have had special forces in Libya.
The Italians, others have had. This is all a matter of common
knowledge now. I am not giving anything away. I think it all
depends on what their intent is, as Dr. Wehrey says, what is
their purpose there. And I think a lot of it may be, again,
Russia putting in our face that they are there. I think we have
to be careful in how we respond to it.
Senator Gardner. But so far we have seen no increase in or
concern of migration, refugee flows out of Libya that could
jeopardize Italy, Greece stability?
Dr. Wehrey. Concern from--sorry, Senator?
Senator Gardner. Is there a concern that Russian special
forces or activities could spur a refugee crisis or migration
again into Greece or Italy?
Dr. Wehrey. I do not think so, Senator. I mean, most of
those migrant flows are coming up through the central area, the
desert, the west. So I do not think that would have any
consequence for the flow of migrants at all.
Senator Gardner. And according to the 2017 USAFRICOM
posture statement, the instability in Libya and North Africa
may be the most significant near-term threat to the U.S. Could
you talk a little bit about that statement, how you feel about
it, perhaps what your concerns are in terms of agreeing with
that posture statement?
Dr. Wehrey. Senator, I think the notion of the problems in
Libya spilling over is really profound. And so we are talking
about a number of U.S. interests in the region, whether it is
the success and stability of Tunisia. We know that terrorists
have plotted attacks on Libyan soil in Tunisia. The security of
U.S. ally Egypt. There is huge concern about the spillover of
arms and jihadists into the Sahel to the south. So, again, I
think Libya is really this epicenter that affects the
surrounding region.
Senator Gardner. Ambassador.
Ambassador Jones. Can I add, Senator, though that I think
it is important to remember, though, too that particularly
Tripoli and Misrata have a fairly normal day-to-day life on the
scale of things. What I am saying is a lot of the refugees, as
Dr. Wehrey said, are coming from other places and flowing
through Libya because it is not governed properly. There is
internal displacement in Libya, but the wealthy Libyans have
other places to live. But it is the planning that goes on
there. It is the smuggling of weapons. It is the flow of these
other groups that is really problematic. Libyans will point out
to you that the terrorists, Ansar al Sharia, were Tunisian not
Libyans. But that is the problem, that Libya provides a playing
field particularly in the south. On the other side of that
coin, though, they do not provide in the south the kind of
urban centers that ISIL or Daesh typically exploit to extort
from people, to steal oil or things like that. And we have
already seen that Libyans in the city states are prepared to
fight. Particularly Misrata and Tripoli are not prepared to
allow those kinds of inroads there.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
I may have to step out for a moment and may not be here at
the end. I want to thank you both for being here and for your
testimony. It has been very, very helpful, and we look forward
to following up again with questions afterwards.
With that, Senator Merkley.
Senator Merkley. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I want to start by returning back to the conversation about
the U.S. intervention initially being requested by the Arab
League to provide a no-fly zone. It seems like at some point we
went beyond providing a no-fly zone to merely becoming the air
force of the opposition. And in that transition, did we
adequately, in terms of our national security analysis,
evaluate the consequences of that and thoroughly understand the
challenge that would be faced in filling the vacuum following
the demise of Qaddafi's regime?
Ambassador Jones. Again, I was not part of the planning,
and I think the military would have to address that, as well as
people in the Security Council and the State Department at the
time.
However, I do believe that we did not believe that there
was a vacuum in the sense that we were speaking to people,
Libyan so-called leaders, some of them quite articulate
supporters of the revolution who, I think, assured people that
they were prepared to come in and take over and provide the
kind of institutional replacement for Qaddafi that would allow
them to organize the country.
I do not think the Libyans themselves were even aware of
what a mess this would become, to be honest.
Dr. Wehrey. I would agree with that. I think there was this
overly optimistic assessment that Libya would get back on its
feet. I mean, a small country, oil reserves, the infrastructure
was not destroyed. I think there was this sense that, okay, we
have handed this off to the Europeans and the United Nations.
Now there is Syria happening. Again, the Libyan role was
essential here in the sense that they told us--you know, we got
this as well--they did not want a large presence on the ground.
I think there was an excessive focus on elections as a success
marker that we got to get these elections right. Meanwhile, the
security piece of it is not addressed. So there is a lot of
lessons learned here in terms of how we do this.
And I will also add the regional role. Regional states had
their own security plans for Tripoli. They had their own
proxies. They had their own allies, and they were doing things
on the ground that were ultimately unhelpful for unity later
on.
Senator Merkley. I do think it is something we should keep
in mind as situations arise around the world. We have very
articulate spokespersons in Iraq who assured us that there
would be, following Saddam Hussein, no challenge there in terms
of the transition. And those individuals will always exist. But
when there is a long-term dictator, if it is Tito, if it is
Qaddafi, Saddam Hussein, the transition can be extraordinarily
difficult afterwards. And I just feel like we should give that
full analysis.
I want to turn to the nonproliferation side. Following Pan
Am 103, years of negotiations with Libya, Libya decides to try
to rectify that. Out of those negotiations comes a lot of
conversations that also address their nuclear program. Bush had
said that Qaddafi, if he followed through on his plans to
dismantle his nuclear program, could regain a secure and
respected place among nations and then touted this example as I
hope other leaders will find an example in Libya's action.
There were 10 nuclear-related sites that were addressed.
At the time that we were considering Libya, I asked the
administration what message this sent to Iran and to North
Korea. And they were extremely dismissive that there was any
reverberations in terms of how world leaders would perceive
Qaddafi's vulnerability following the agreement to dismantle
his nuclear program. I think that was a tremendous diminishment
of a potential message being sent to other countries we were
working on.
I just want to get your all's sense on that particular
point.
Ambassador Jones. Senator, again, these are probably
questions better directed to people like Bill Burns who were
engaged in those negotiations back in the day with Qaddafi.
But I would also say that I think there was a sense at the
time--and again, I am out of my lane on this, but there was a
lot of discussion with Saif al-Islam, Qaddafi's son. And there
was a lot of talk--and Saif was very close to Mahmoud Gebril,
who ended up leading part of the revolution and the head of the
first transitional national council that led the government
afterwards--where Libya was actually talking and doing, looking
at reforms, and looking at economic reforms and opening up in
certain ways. And I suspect that there was an element of hope.
First, there was the concern that it is never a good thing
for the United States to not talk to large, centrally placed,
strategically placed countries that can have a dangerous impact
on the rest of the region. But two, that Libya was at a point
where we might be seeing the openings of some sort of
transition to a more open system, more economically vibrant,
something that we would find ways to influence later on.
Obviously, the Libyan people did not feel the same way when it
came to 2011.
Senator Merkley. The question I am really asking is in the
context of the role that we and other nations played in
dismantling the Qaddafi regime and the messages that that sent
both to North Korea and to Iran.
Ambassador Jones. Well, I cannot speak for the leaders of
North Korea. I mean, I could probably speak more to the
thinking of the Iranians because it strikes me they have a far
more rational system of governance than the Koreans do.
Obviously, they are weighing their own survival success in
that, but very different situations, I think, and
circumstances. But I am not qualified to address that here.
Dr. Wehrey. I would just echo that, Senator. I think it is
a very different context. Again, North Korea and Iran--totally
different strategic contexts, histories, traditions. So I just
do not know what lessons they took from that.
Senator Merkley. Okay. I just find it a bit of a dodge
really, at a time we are trying to persuade other countries to
dismantle their nuclear programs, to not recognize that
dismantling a nation that gave up their nuclear program would
be seriously--the other countries would pay very serious
attention to that. So I do not really accept that you are not
all qualified to address the question. I think you are being
very tactful and polite.
Dr. Wehrey. Senator, can I just add the notion of
dismantling, the U.S. dismantling a country--what happened was
there was a failing government in Libya that was unable to meet
the needs of its people. And the reform project was dead by
2010, and there were serious problems. You had an uprising.
Senator Merkley. I did not refer to dismantling the nation.
I referred to Libya dismantling their nuclear program.
Dr. Wehrey. But you were talking about 2011. The result of
that was he did not have the ability to deter the intervention
or that this led to his downfall. That is the lesson----
Senator Merkley. I am really talking about the message that
it sent to have worked with a nation to have them forgo their
nuclear program, dismantle their nuclear program, a nuclear
weapon program, and then be vulnerable to outside intervention.
That is kind of the core issue that drives a lot of nations
like North Korea and Iran to want to secure a nuclear weapon is
to say it kind of gives them a bit of a guarantee. Our actions
in regards to North Korea would probably be very different if
they did not already have nuclear weapons in existence.
Ambassador Jones. With all respect, Senator--and I am
really not trying to dodge, but I think that a similar
situation would only be if the North Korean people themselves
were rising up against their leader and being slaughtered.
Senator Merkley. I did not describe it as a similar
situation. So I think that is a change in the context.
Ambassador Jones. Right, but I think that that is what
makes it difficult to say because, again, the United States and
the international community's choice was, yes, maybe they are
taking a message from this. Would Qaddafi have used nuclear
weapons on his own people? I am not so sure. And frankly having
participated in the final destruction of the precursors for
chemical weapons, I am pretty glad that we actually went in
there and were able to clean up a lot of that stuff because the
last thing you want is to have it in the hands of the militias
or other groups now. So I do not know.
Senator Merkley. Well, on that point, we do agree. Thank
you.
Senator Cardin [presiding]. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to our panelists. I am sorry. I was at a
hearing on North Korea. So I am sorry to be late and miss your
testimony, which certainly is another threat facing the United
States.
I wonder if either of you could speak to--and again, I
apologize if some of these questions have been answered. But
can you speak to the current status of the Government of
National Accord? My understanding is that while they have not
been able to govern very well, that they do seem to still have
support from a lot of Libyans. Is that the case, and how long
would we expect that to continue if the current chaos extends
for a long period of time?
Dr. Wehrey. I think again the support from Libyans is for
this agreement. And I was in Libya last year, and you sense it
in the capital. There is tremendous frustration with the
government in Tripoli, with the Government of National Accord,
with the Presidency Council. They are not able to meet people's
basic needs. I mean, long lines in front of the banks, rolling
electricity blackouts. They have not been able to get their
budget under control. There is a dispute with the Central Bank.
They really do not control security in the capital. These
militia flare-ups happen and people are diving for cover. So
there is a sense that something needs to be renegotiated. But,
again, I think the foundational accord still sticks, and I
think a lot of Libyans recognize that. You better not jump into
the darkness unless you have got something to replace this.
Senator Shaheen. So are you optimistic that there might be
progress as a result of the discussions in Rome and the
potential--what appears to be maybe they are getting close to a
compromise agreement? Is that something that is promising that
may offer some hope for people?
Ambassador Jones. I would agree, Senator, with Dr. Wehrey
that people do not want to throw out the baby with the
bathwater in this case, and the fact that the international
community and the United Nations endorsed this agreement and
supported it after a long time--it took a long time. And in the
process Libyans actually learned a lot about political
dialogue. It was a politically illiterate country in so many
ways, and having been part of that process for those years, I
saw this firsthand.
So I think, again, they want to modify, they want to
extend. They would like to see--my sense is and what I hear
from Libyans--they would like to see a final integration
between the House of Representatives with an authority that is
not overly overwhelming. They do not want a strong central
authority like Qaddafi. They do not want a dictator. But they
would like to see a unified authority and they would like to
see General Haftar under the civilian authority or even
marginalized quite frankly. A lot of people would like to see
him in some kind of honorary role on the outside, promoted up
and out as it were. But Libyans want stability. They want
predictability, and they want their economy to go again. That
is what they really want.
Senator Shaheen. And so what about the discussions in Rome?
Are they really making progress?
Ambassador Jones. You know, I am not privy to a lot of the
details of that right now. I think discussion is always better
than the opposite. But as Dr. Wehrey said before you came in,
Senator, we have seen a lot of discussions in the past. Libyans
are very good at talking and throwing chaff and then going back
and fragmenting even more so that you come back with a whole
new ball game. But I think at least it is a step. And the
Italians do know Libya very, very well, and Libyans I have
spoken to do believe that the Italians are taking the correct
approach. I will say that.
Senator Shaheen. And how concerned are you that the United
States seems to be missing from the discussions and from a
leadership role right now in what is going on?
Ambassador Jones. Very.
Senator Shaheen. And what does that mean? You talked about
the economy of Libya and how people want to see the economy
going again. And as they are beginning to get their oil
reserves producing again and we are looking at other nations
coming in, Russia, I assume China, to come in and provide
assistance with those oil reserves, what does that mean for the
United States in the future?
Ambassador Jones. I will say only that if the perception
becomes and spreads that the only time the United States was
interested in post-revolutionary Libya was when we thought we
could make a lot of deals and make a lot of money and the
minute that it became difficult, we pulled out and focused
solely on military instead of what we believe as Americans or
claim to believe, you know, the four freedoms the principles of
those, then we have a problem.
Senator Shaheen. So you would both like to see the United
States take more of a leadership role there? That is a
question.
Ambassador Jones. I think we need to be present, and we
need to make clear what our vision is. I think that we have
very successfully--Libya was one of these first situations,
certainly in my 34-year career, where it was a bilateral
assignment as Ambassador, but it was a multilateral process
throughout where we were supporting buttressing U.N. positions
but also having to work and coordinate very closely with
Security Council permanent representative allies and our other
allies across the board and deal with regional powers and
parties as well. So Libya has got many parties in it. The U.S.
needs to play a signature role and a very important symbolic
role there certainly, and then it needs to be--presence
matters. Our presence matters. Our absence sends a message.
Senator Shaheen. Dr. Wehrey, do you agree with that?
Dr. Wehrey. Completely. I mean, that was a great
characterization. Again, it is not us leading the charge on
this but playing a coordinating function, and we are, in many
senses, sort of the glue that keeps it together with many of
these different players, the leverage with regional states,
relationships with the Europeans. So, again, just being present
at the table is so essential.
And again, just to echo from my conversations on the ground
with Libyans across the country, whether the south, Benghazi, I
mean, this notion that we are there simply for counterterrorism
or we are there for the oil--these narratives are out there. So
these visible initiatives that signal that we do care about the
Libyan people, about progress are so important.
Senator Shaheen. I know I am over my time, Mr. Chairman.
But as we look at the future of Africa, North Africa, and
the Middle East, do we not have to include Libya as part of
whatever strategy we come up with with respect to this region?
Ambassador Jones. That is a simple one. Yes, because Libya,
of many of the states, has the potential again to be a resource
and a really important boundary for a lot of Africa. It should
be a major tourist area for Europe, I mean, with five World
Heritage sites. It is beautiful and great fish and all these
things. It should be a major medical center for sub-Saharan
Africa and other places around. It should be a place of
universities. It has a history. It has a presence. It has a
place. As I tell people, it is closer to Rome than Mecca. Libya
is actually closer to some parts of Italy than it is to its
neighbors or the capital. So it is important. It cannot be
dismissed because it is not just Libya.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cardin. Thank you for your questions.
Let me just ask one or two questions, if I might.
The Commander of the U.S. Africa Command, General
Waldhauser, before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March
9th warned that Libya--we must carefully choose where and with
whom we work in order to counter ISIS and not shift the balance
between factions and risks sparking greater conflict in Libya.
So what lessons have we learned from the Sirte campaign
last year that should guide us in any of our operations that we
support in Libya today?
Ambassador Jones. I will say very briefly--Fred has been
there more recently--it was our policy prescription back in
March of 2015 that the only way that we could defeat Daesh or
ISIL in Libya was to partner across the board because of the
land mass of Libya and the current fragmentation right now. We
cannot choose one partner. And I think at the time the chairman
agreed that anyone who shared our views on ISIS and Daesh could
be a partner with us in this fight in Libya to deny them any
toehold in that country. And to do so, you have to partner with
likeminded or with people who share your views on Daesh and
ISIL. And we found those partners across the board. We worked
and we found them. So I think it has been successful in that
regard.
Dr. Wehrey. I would just add to that, Senator, and I was
there in Sirte last summer. Again, the very loose constellation
of militias that attacked Sirte and drove out the Islamic State
were, in fact, tied to the Government of National Accord, but
only very loosely--very loosely. And some of them were opposed
to it, and they have now turned on that government.
So, again, we did form a partnership, but I think it was a
very limited and target-specific partnership where we assisted
them on a specific geographic threat. Now, we are not talking
about training militias, you know, writing them a blank check,
giving them aid because that could really upset the factional
balance, and that was what was mentioned in the testimony, that
if we side with one faction against terrorism, that could cause
the other faction to go against us, to turn to another regional
patron. So there are all sorts of second and third order
effects of this.
And we have seen this also in the east where certain
countries were giving support to the LNA, which was an
unrecognized force, and that had a political effect on
negotiations.
Senator Cardin. If the head of the Presidency Council, Mr.
Sarraj, actually comes to Washington, if that were to take
place as there are some rumors--I want to follow up on Chairman
Corker's follow-up to my question--what should the United
States expect in deliverables from the leader of the Presidency
Council, if he were to come to the United States, as a
prerequisite for a visit here in America?
Ambassador Jones. Mr. Chairman, I was going to turn that
around and say my advice to Mr. Sarraj would be that he needs
to come prepared to firmly articulate what he needs, one, but
also what he can do right now, what the situation is, but what
he is prepared to do as well in terms of either compromise or
political deal-making or what have you to bring things to
closure.
But so often we find that when the Libyans come, again, due
to this kind of what I call a political immaturity in a way,
they are kind of looking for someone else to tell them what to
do, and then they want to bicker with it. You know, then they
want to quibble with it. They cannot do this; they cannot do
that.
So he needs to come with a clear, articulate vision of
where he sees the process going. He should be prepared to lay
out what the Italian dialogue is producing, and he should be
prepared to put out there de minimis their red line, you know,
what their minimum standards are for any kind of compromise or
for expanding and also revising the agreement I think.
The U.S. should not be put in a position of having to offer
something larger, but he should be able to articulate what it
is they need to do.
Senator Cardin. So he should come with a specific game
plan. Is there something more we could expect from that type of
a high visible opportunity?
Dr. Wehrey. No. Unfortunately, I think he is not in a
position of strength to really deliver. So, again, it has to
be, okay, this visit happens within the context of a broader
consensus that includes other players, that includes the HOR,
the state council. So it is not simply the visit alone. He may
ask for a million things, and we have seen these visits before.
But then they go back. They cannot execute the programs. They
cannot write the check for them. We have seen this movie
before. So, again, we need to demand, when he comes, that who
is on board with this project, what is the consensus, what is
the road map.
The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you. Listen, this has been
very informative and we appreciate your insights and hope the
upcoming visits do create some opportunities for us. But we
thank you both for sharing your deep knowledge of the
situation.
We will keep the record open until the close of business on
Thursday. I know both of you have busy lives, but if you could
respond to questions fairly promptly, we would appreciate it.
We look forward to seeing you back here in the near future.
And again, thank you very much for your testimony.
The meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
[all]