[Senate Hearing 115-778]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-778
U.S. POLICY IN YEMEN
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 17, 2018
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web:
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
40-163 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BOB CORKER, Tennessee, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
MARCO RUBIO, Florida BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
CORY GARDNER, Colorado TOM UDALL, New Mexico
TODD YOUNG, Indiana CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
RAND PAUL, Kentucky CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
Todd Womack, Staff Director
Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator From Tennessee.................... 1
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey.............. 4
Satterfield, Hon. David M., Acting Assistant Secretary, Near
Eastern Affairs, United States Department of State, Washington,
DC............................................................. 7
Prepared Statement........................................... 8
Jenkins, Robert, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for
Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, United States
Agency for International Development, Washington, DC........... 10
Prepared Statement........................................... 12
Karem, Hon. Robert S., Assistant Secretary, International
Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC... 15
Prepared Statement........................................... 16
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Mr. Robert Jenkins to Questions Submitted by Senator
Marco Rubio.................................................... 43
Responses of Mr. Robert Jenkins to Questions Submitted by Senator
Todd Young..................................................... 43
Responses of Hon. Robert S. Karem to Questions Submitted by
Senator Marco Rubio............................................ 44
Responses of Hon. Robert S. Karem to Questions Submitted by
Senator Tim Kaine.............................................. 45
Responses of Hon. Robert S. Karem to Questions Submitted by
Senator Todd Young............................................. 46
Responses of Hon. Robert S. Karem to Questions Submitted by
Senator Cory Booker............................................ 46
(iii)
U.S. POLICY IN YEMEN
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TUESDAY, APRIL 17, 2018
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m. in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker,
chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Corker [presiding], Johnson, Flake,
Gardner, Isakson, Paul, Menendez, Cardin, Shaheen, Coons,
Udall, Murphy, Kaine, Markey, Merkley, and Booker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
The Chairman. Good morning.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee will come to order.
We might talk a little openly about another topic before we
introduce you, but thank you so much for being here.
We, as you know, introduced legislation last night to
update and replace the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs a week in advance of
when we planned to have a markup.
Senator Menendez and I talked at the last hearing about the
best way to make sure members were up to date. I do want to
point out that just this Congress we had a hearing on June the
20th about authorizations for the use of military force with
Bellinger and Hicks. On August the 2nd, we had a closed hearing
with Secretary Tillerson and Secretary Mattis on the same
topic, August 2nd. On October 30th, we had the authorization
for use of military force from the administration's perspective
by Secretary Tillerson and Secretary Mattis, and then on
December the 13th, we had another hearing with Stephen Hadley,
Christine Wormuth, and John Bellinger. It was those hearings
that then developed the principles that I then gave to Senator
Cardin at that time, and that is what we have been working off
to create an AUMF. So those hearings created the body of work
that we now have.
In addition, since I have been the lead Republican, we had
a hearing in 2015 with Secretary Kerry, Secretary Carter, and
General Dempsey. We had one in December of 2014 with Secretary
Kerry, and we had one again May 21, 2014, with Stephen Preston
and Mary McCloud.
So when we did the bipartisan Syria AUMF, we had a working
meeting where we all sat down and went through it and people
were able to talk openly about it. That is what we propose to
do here on Wednesday, to have an all-members meeting, staff
meeting, sit in a room and walk through it just like we did
last time we did a bipartisan AUMF which would give people time
to write amendments before amendment deadline.
So to me, having another hearing felt like to me--I know it
is and I have talked to Senator Menendez since--felt like a
stall tactic, when really we have hearing'ed this thing to
death. The hearings are what developed the principles that
caused us to come to this bipartisan agreement.
So I hear you, but I cannot imagine--we have got a week.
The text is out. I am glad to spend however many hours people
want to spend on Wednesday walking through in a closed session.
So I guess I am not understanding. When we did the Syria--when
we wrote it that day and passed it. Let me say one more time.
We wrote it that day and passed it. So I guess I am confused as
to why this appears--feels to be rushed.
Senator Menendez. Mr. Chairman, if I may.
The Chairman. Of course.
Senator Menendez. Mr. Chairman, you know, we have a history
of working collaboratively with you.
But an AUMF is the single most significant vote. An
authorization for the use of military force is the single most
significant vote a Member of Congress can take because it is
about sending and committing our sons and daughters to war and
to actions and risking their lives. So it is a very momentous
occasion.
Now, I appreciate the chairman's recital of hearings that
have been had in concept about what an AUMF should look like.
But the reality is in the past we have had specific hearings on
a specified AUMF to be marked up before we actually voted on
it.
We got the final version last night, and it seems to me
that the full implications and details of the text should be
publicly vetted before a vote, so that the Congress is not
creating unintended consequences or ways the AUMF could be
misused in the future, as some of us believe the ones in 2001
and 2002 have been used.
I think the administration should be heard on it. It must
take responsibility for executing war and sharing their views
on the text. And right now, we do not have their views at all.
We did when we voted on those other ones.
And I think the American people deserve the opportunity to
hear the full arguments about the implications of the text,
since it involves sending their sons and daughters into war for
possibly many years to come.
Now, I think that our request for a hearing is not
stalling. As I have said to you privately and I will say here
publicly, I have no problem getting to a markup on that AUMF. I
have cast votes for AUMFs. So I am not fearful of having a
determination. When I think the AUMF is a correct one, I will
vote for it, and when I think it is improper or not properly
drafted, I will vote against it. But I think this is the
singular most important thing we can do, and I do not think it
takes an inordinate amount of time to get some thoughts both
from the administration, as well as from non-administration
witnesses. All can be done at one hearing in one day, and then
members could think about the testimony they have heard on the
specific AUMF that is being voted on and have an opportunity to
prepare their amendments, should they believe there should be
some.
I compliment you and Senator Kaine on trying to come to a
draft that seeks to move the issue forward, but I think this is
a momentous vote and I think it needs the appropriate
attention. So it is not about stalling. Let us get that
straight. It is about a thoughtful consideration of what this
specific AUMF says, what it means, looking at all the
implications of it, coming to an understanding of it, and then
thoughtfully being able to draft amendments and cast the final
vote. I think I express the concern of many of my members on my
side who feel that way, and so that is why I wrote you the
letter that I did.
The Chairman. Let me see if I can get an administration
official up here on Wednesday, and we will see what we can do.
I think we might actually be better off having them maybe down
in the SCIF, which is what we did on the Syria piece. I do not
care where we do it. And then, obviously, when we have a
markup, the public will be watching, and everyone can
understand the implications. But let me see what I can do about
potentially having someone from the administration here on
Wednesday to walk through it.
Senator Menendez. I would urge you--it would be very good
to have an administration witness, and from my perspective, I
believe most of it can be done in public. We are not talking
about actions specific.
And secondly, I would urge you to consider some analysis
outside of the administration of the specific text. All could
be done at the same time, and I think that would be a good way
to move forward.
The Chairman. Duly noted, and we will see where it goes. We
will keep talking.
Again, I want to say one more time I doubt there has ever
been as many hearings in advance to develop principles to bring
people together around an AUMF in advance. Actually there has
been so much preparatory work done on this. I think people
understand the implications. We talked about all these
publicly. But I hear you and I understand you have members of
your caucus that are pushing for that to occur, and I realize
that.
So I thank you for the way you work with us most of the
time.
[Laughter.]
Senator Menendez. We feel the same way about you, Mr.
Chairman, most of the time.
The Chairman. I know you do. I know you do.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. So with love, we thank Acting Assistant
Secretary Satterfield, Assistant Secretary Karem, and Mr.
Jenkins for joining us here today. This hearing will examine
U.S. policy towards Yemen, particularly in light of the growing
concern within Congress regarding the civil war and its dire
humanitarian consequences.
According to the United Nations, more than 22 million
people, roughly three-quarters of the population, need
humanitarian aid and protection, and 18 million people are food
insecure. Last year, there were over 1 million suspected cases
of cholera.
While Yemen has always faced significant socioeconomic
challenges, a civil war, which began with the Houthis' armed
takeover of much of the country in 2014 and their overthrow of
Yemen's legitimate government in January 2015, has plunged the
country into a humanitarian crisis. Iran's support of the
Houthi rebels and the intervention of Saudi-led forces to
restore Yemen's deposed government, which began in March of
2015, have been particularly devastating. In over 3 years of
conflict, thousands of civilians have been killed. Airstrikes
have hit schools, weddings, and hospitals. Humanitarian groups
cannot reliably provide aid due to movement constraints, and
uncertain port access has slowed commercial imports of food and
fuel.
Of course, Saudi Arabia is a longtime U.S. partner, but
partners must be candid with each other. So I have raised my
concerns regarding--as many people here have--Saudi Arabia's
conduct in Yemen with senior Saudi officials, including the
Crown Prince, on multiple occasions in this last year. I know
that many of my colleagues have done the same thing, as I have
mentioned, and I urge them to continue doing so, as I will.
But at the same time, Saudi Arabia has a right to defend
itself from more spilling across its border. For nearly 2
years, the Houthis have fired Iranian-manufactured ballistic
missiles into Saudi territory. In recent months, they have
aimed these missiles at Riyadh. At least hundreds of Saudis
have been killed in the fighting, and millions live under
constant threat of attack. So resolving the conflict in Yemen
means helping Saudi Arabia address its legitimate security
concerns to prevent entrenchment of an Iranian-armed group on
its southern border.
As the committee considers ways to support effective U.S.
policy on Yemen, I look forward to hearing our witnesses
provide details on what the U.S. is doing diplomatically to
encourage resolution of the conflict. I also hope our witnesses
will explain the nature of U.S. support to the Saudi-led
coalition, including relevant authorities and what can be done
to address the humanitarian situation.
With that, I ask the ranking member if he wishes to make
any opening comments. I am sure he does, and I look forward to
hearing those.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening
this important hearing and inviting witnesses from the State
and Defense Departments, as well as USAID.
Given our committee's jurisdiction over the execution of
U.S. foreign policy and the State Department in particular, it
is fundamentally necessary that we receive testimony from the
very administration officials executing that policy, not just
outside experts.
Last month marked the third anniversary of the current
conflict in Yemen. Statistics of the scale of the human
suffering defy imagination. 22.2 million Yemenis, more than 80
percent of the entire population, require humanitarian
assistance. The loss of more than 50 percent of Yemen's
nighttime electricity, a key condition for maintaining
hospitals, water supply systems, and communications. Eight
million Yemenis are on the brink of starvation, the largest
cholera outbreak in modern history.
This hearing is particularly timely given the debate the
Senate recently held on the U.S. military support to the Saudi-
led coalition. This hearing is also relevant given the visit of
the new U.N. Special Envoy for Yemen, Martin Griffiths, to the
U.N. Security Council yesterday to brief on Yemen, as well as
the reports of a new Saudi coalition offensive.
As we consider U.S. policy on Yemen, we do so in a regional
context, acknowledging U.S. relations with critical partners.
Saudi Arabia has endured SCUD and ballistic missile attacks
from Yemen on a scale that no American would ever accept.
Iranian-backed Houthi fighters have launched attacks aimed at
Saudi populations, economic infrastructure, and defense
installations. There have also been attacks aimed at U.S. naval
craft. This is unacceptable, dangerous, and counter to U.S.
interests.
The threats coming from Yemen did not suddenly appear, but
after years of brewing tensions between various factions within
Yemen, Iranian fingerprints are all over the escalation in the
Houthi illicit terrorist activities.
To be clear, the terrorist threat in Yemen does not excuse
the conduct of the Saudi coalition, which bears significant
responsibility for the scale of civilian casualties and damage
to civilian infrastructure. But there are other actors and
stakeholders in this conflict, including Iran, al Qaeda, and
ISIS, and all are implicated in violations of the Law of Armed
Conflict, international humanitarian law, and human rights
abuses.
Instead of a comprehensive strategy to push back on Iranian
malign interference in Yemen and the spoiler role that Russia
is playing, as I have pointed out in numerous other contexts,
this administration is actively dismantling the State
Department and underfunding our assistance programs, the very
entities that have the potential to play critical roles in
moving towards a political settlement and addressing the
humanitarian crisis.
Last month, the Senate debated one element of U.S. policy,
the provision of limited military support, including refueling,
intelligence, and advice to the Saudi coalition. I appreciate
the commitment of Senators Lee, Sanders, and Murphy in calling
for a debate and vote on that one element.
In explaining my vote against discharging the resolution
from the committee, I encourage my colleagues to expand the
aperture of the debate. I want to understand our broader
operations and policy objectives before seeking to end or
change just one element. Absent a compelling articulation of
how continued U.S. military support to the coalition is
leveraging movement towards a political track and negotiation
to end the war, it is reasonable to expect that the next vote
on U.S. military support may have a different outcome.
Specifically, what steps is the administration taking
diplomatically and politically to end the war?
What types of assistance are appropriate in assisting our
partners in the legitimate defense needs?
What is the administration doing to alleviate the worst
humanitarian crisis in the world, and what more can the Saudi-
led coalition do?
Given the increasing lethality and sophistication of
Iranian support to the Houthis in Yemen, how does the conflict
in Yemen factor into the administration's strategy to counter
Iran?
Finally, I would like to hear some clear statements from
our witnesses as to whether there is a military solution to
this conflict. And unless our witnesses are going to surprise
us with a new announcement, the answer has been for years and
continues to be no.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, it would be difficult to consider
this hearing without addressing the administration's actions in
Syria over the weekend. In my view, what connects this
weekend's military strikes against Assad's chemical weapons
facilities and this administration's approach to Yemen is the
alarming absence of a strategy. President Trump's over-reliance
on the military arm of our government, coupled with his
antagonizing, defunding, and dismantling of our diplomatic and
assistance arms, will lead to only one dangerous outcome, that
we will have nothing left other than military force to address
conflict and promote our interests.
I am not opposed to the appropriate and authorized use of
military force, but before we send our uniformed men and women
into battle and ask them to be prepared to make the ultimate
sacrifice, we should always be able to tell them and the
American people what the stakes are and that we have exhausted
our diplomatic tools.
I am still waiting for the broad articulation of strategy
in the region and understanding how U.S. military support to
the Saudi coalition is helping us in moving towards the
ultimate goal of a negotiated settlement that prioritizes
saving lives and ending the suffering of innocent Yemeni
civilians. And I hope today's hearing can help us understand
that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Our first witness is Acting Assistant Secretary of State
for Near Eastern Affairs, Ambassador David Satterfield.
Ambassador Satterfield is one of our most distinguished
diplomats. He most recently served as Director General of the
Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai Peninsula and
previously served as U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon. Thank you for
being here.
Our second witness is Robert Jenkins who serves as the
Deputy Assistant Administrator for USAID's Bureau for
Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance. Mr. Jenkins
recently marked 20 years at USAID and previously served as the
Director of the Office of Transition Initiatives. Thank you for
being here.
And our third witness is Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, Robert Karem. Very protocol-
oriented. I wanted to make sure our civilian guys were first. I
want you all to know that. Prior to his Senate confirmation
last year, Mr. Karem served as national security staff of Vice
President Cheney and then as National Security Advisor to the
House Majority Leaders Eric Cantor and Kevin McCarthy.
We thank you, all three, for being here. If you would, if
you could summarize in about 5 minutes, we would appreciate it.
If you have any written materials that you would like to be
part of the record, we will make them so. And with that, if you
would just go in the order introduced, we would appreciate it.
And again, thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID M. SATTERFIELD, ACTING ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Satterfield. Thank you very much, Chairman
Corker, Ranking Member Menendez, members of the committee. I
appreciate this opportunity once again to appear to testify on
this important subject, and I would ask that the submitted
written remarks be entered into the record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
Ambassador Satterfield. Defeating ISIS in Yemen, al Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula, countering Iran's malign activities
in that region, and above all, reducing the extraordinary
suffering and hardship of the Yemeni people--all of these goals
hinge on the resolution to the Yemeni conflict. To that end,
the United States firmly believes that the only possible
solution to this conflict is a negotiated political settlement
under U.S. auspices.
I want to be clear on this point. Our military support to
the Saudi-led coalition advances important U.S. national
security and diplomatic objectives. Further, Iran's support,
its provision of sophisticated weaponry to the Houthis, both
exacerbates this conflict and its attendant suffering and
advances Iran's regional ambitions. The Houthis have repeatedly
used Iranian ballistic and cruise missile technology and, as we
saw as recently as April 11th, have targeted Riyadh's
international airport, Aramco facilities, and Red Sea shipping
lanes.
U.S. military support serves a clear and strategic purpose:
to reinforce Saudi and Emirati self-defense in the face of
intensifying Houthi and Iranian-enabled threats and to expand
the capability of our Gulf partners to push back against Iran's
regionally destabilizing actions. This support, in turn,
provides the United States access and influence to help press
for a political solution to the conflict.
Should we curtail U.S. military support, the Saudis could
well pursue defense relationships with countries that have no
interest in either ending the humanitarian crisis, minimizing
civilian casualties, or assisting and facilitating progress
towards a political solution. Critical U.S. access to support
for our own campaign against violent extremists could be placed
in jeopardy. Through diplomatic and military-to-military
engagements, we regularly emphasize the strategic importance
and legal obligations to comply with the Law of Armed Conflict,
including the obligation to take all reasonable precautions to
reduce the risk of harm to civilians. And we assess that
progress has been made as a result of our engagement and
efforts over the past 6 months.
During his meeting with President Trump, Saudi Crown Prince
Muhammad bin Salman agreed that a political resolution to this
conflict is ultimately necessary to bring greater stability to
the region and to meet the needs of the Yemeni people. The new
U.N. Special Envoy to Yemen, Martin Griffiths, has just
completed initial consultations with key parties to the
conflict, and we are welcoming him in the State Department very
shortly. I am and my colleagues will be meeting with him for a
discussion of where he sees how we assess next steps to
resolution of the conflict. Our goal collectively is to create
a framework before entering into comprehensive negotiations,
which the U.N. would then convene.
When those formal negotiations do begin, it is important to
note Saudi Arabia does have vital national security concerns
that have to be addressed by the Houthis. The Saudis will have
to make compromises of their own, and we have been quite clear
on this point. The Houthis will likely retain a political role
in Yemen. That is a fact and it has to be reflected in any
negotiating process. And a durable commitment to peace will
have to involve the buy-in of all key Yemeni parties.
We all agree the humanitarian crisis in Yemen is
unacceptable. The U.S. and its allies have worked assiduously
over the past 6 months to lead the coalition, led by the
Saudis, to take positive steps on this subject. Last month, the
Saudis and Emiratis provided nearly $1 billion to Yemen's
humanitarian response appeal.
On January 22nd, the Saudi-led coalition announced elements
of a plan that envisages the expansive use of other ports
beyond Hudaydah and Saleef and overland points of entry to
broaden options for importing humanitarian assistance and
commercial goods into Yemen. We support this. More has to be
done, and we are pressing the Saudis and the coalition to take
additional steps to facilitate and expedite access to the Port
of Hudaydah. We will do all in our power to assure humanitarian
and commercial needs are met in Yemen so that this crisis from
its humanitarian standpoint can be alleviated to the maximum
extent possible.
And I thank you again for the opportunity to respond to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Satterfield follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador David M. Satterfield
Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Menendez, Members of the Committee,
thank you for the opportunity to testify on this important issue. The
Administration shares your belief that ending the conflict in Yemen is
in our national security interests.
As you all have heard, as a response to the heinous and unlawful
use of chemical weapons, on April 13, the militaries of the United
States, France, and the United Kingdom executed strikes on three
chemical weapons facilities involved in the development, production,
and storage of chemical weapons in Syria. These strikes were focused on
degrading Syria's chemical weapons capabilities, setting back its
chemical weapons research and production program, and deterring the
further use of chemical weapons, consistent with U.S. and our allies'
policy on Syria, and were taken after considerable deliberation and
international consultations and coordination.
The United States has tried repeatedly to use all diplomatic,
economic, and political tools to stop the Assad regime's use of
chemical weapons as Assad's supporters turn a blind eye and has chosen
to use force as a last resort. Russia has stood in the way of every
effort, vetoed key accountability efforts, blocked the Joint
Investigative Mechanism, and has failed to live up to its guarantee in
regard to the 2013 Framework Agreement that Syria would cease all use
of chemical weapons and fully declare its entire stockpile for
verifiable destruction. And, Iran acts malignly in Syria--pouring
resources and militias to support Assad and advance its regional
ambitions. Against this backdrop, the targeted military action by the
United States, France, and the United Kingdom against military targets
connected to the Syrian chemical weapons program was justified and
legitimate as a measure to deter and prevent Syria's illegal and
unacceptable use of chemical weapons. This targeted military action
sends a powerful message to the Syrian regime, Russia, Iran, and
international community that chemical weapons will never be tolerated
and there will be consequences for their use.
Defeating ISIS-Yemen and AQAP, countering Iran's nefarious
activities in the region, and reducing the suffering of the Yemeni
people, all hinge on the resolution of this conflict. AQAP, ISIS-Yemen,
and the IRGC are manipulating the security vacuum created by the
conflict to expand their influence in Yemen. While the international
community must do all it can to mitigate humanitarian suffering, the
only way to truly end the humanitarian crisis is by ending the
conflict. To that end, the United States firmly believes that the only
possible solution to the conflict in Yemen is a negotiated political
settlement under U.N. auspices.
I wish to be clear; our military support to the Saudi-led Coalition
supports important U.S. national security and diplomatic objectives.
Further, Iran's provision of sophisticated weaponry to the Houthis both
exacerbates this conflict and advances Iran's regional ambitions. The
Houthis have repeatedly used Iranian ballistic missile and cruise
missile technology and, as we saw as recently as April 11, have
targeted Riyadh's international airport, Aramco facilities, and Red Sea
shipping lanes. Moreover, the Houthis launch rockets along and into
Saudi Arabia's southern border on an almost daily basis. Over 80,000
U.S. citizens live in Saudi Arabia. In this context, U.S. military
support serves a clear purpose: to reinforce Saudi and Emirati self-
defense in the face of intensifying Houthi threats and to expand the
capability of our Gulf partners to push back against Iran's regionally
destabilizing actions. This support, in turn, provides us access and
influence to push for a political solution to the conflict.
Curtailing U.S. military support would not persuade the Saudi-led
coalition to abandon its air campaign. If we curtail U.S. military
support, the Saudis could well pursue defense relationships with
countries that do not have an interest in ending the humanitarian
crisis, minimizing civilian casualties, or making progress towards a
political solution. Critical U.S. access to support for our own
campaign against violent extremists could be placed in jeopardy. We are
serious about working to reduce collateral casualties. U.S. advisors
have provided training to senior Saudi military personnel, including on
the importance of adhering to the law of armed conflict (LOAC). Through
diplomatic and military-to-military engagements, we regularly emphasize
the strategic importance and legal obligations to comply with the LOAC,
including the obligation to take all feasible precautions to reduce the
risk of harm to civilians. We assess that progress has been made over
the past 6 months.
The Saudis accept that a political solution to the conflict in
Yemen must be attempted and have asked for U.S. support in renewing a
political process. During his meeting with President Trump, Saudi Crown
Prince Muhammad bin Salman agreed that a political resolution to the
conflict is ultimately necessary to bring greater stability to the
region and meet the needs of the Yemeni people. New U.N. Special Envoy
to Yemen, Martin Griffiths, just completed initial consultations with
the key parties to the conflict, including the Republic of Yemen
Government and the Houthis. The goal is to create a framework for
success before entering into comprehensive negotiations, which the U.N.
would convene. Saudi leadership has engaged with Griffiths.
Martin Griffiths will be in Washington tomorrow. I will chair an
interagency meeting with him in which we get his views on the way
forward and then work with the Coalition to push ahead on a political
process. We will be consulting closely with the U.K., the Saudis, and
the Emiratis in coming weeks.
When formal negotiations do begin, it is important to note that
Saudi Arabia has vital national security concerns that must be
addressed by the Houthis. The Saudis have consistently articulated an
end-state for Yemen as a complete cessation to cross-border ballistic
missile attacks; a secure, stable Saudi-Yemeni border; blunting Iran's
influence in the country; and a stable Yemeni government able to
provide for its people. We support these ends as well. The Houthis, to
date and during several months of negotiations in 2016, have been
unwilling to provide meaningful assurances regarding Saudi Arabia's
legitimate security concerns.
The Saudis, of course, have to make compromises of their own, and
we will continue encouraging them to do so. The Houthis will likely
retain a political role in Yemen. However, it is important to note that
this is not a one-sided process. The Houthis will have to make clear
commitments to respect Saudi security. A durable commitment will have
to involve the buy-in of key Yemeni parties, including the Republic of
Yemen Government, the Houthis, and other local Yemeni actors.
We all agree the humanitarian crisis in Yemen is unacceptable.
However, the U.S. and its allies have persuaded the Coalition to take
incremental, but positive steps. Last month, the Saudis and Emiratis
provided nearly $1 billion to Yemen's humanitarian response. This
complements the U.S. government announcement of an additional $87
million (more than $854 million since the beginning of fiscal year
2017) and an additional $1 billion in pledges from other donors. We
also worked with the World Food Programme (WFP), the Saudi-led
Coalition's Evacuation and Humanitarian Operations Cell (EHOC),
authorities in Dubai, and others to facilitate delivery of the four
U.S.-funded WFP mobile cranes, which arrived in Hudaydah port on
January 15. The cranes began offloading supplies at the port on
February 9. These four 60-ton cranes have the potential to improve
throughput capacity at the port by as much as 40%, and may cut vessel
discharge time in half from approximately one week to 3-4 days. We also
welcomed the announcement on February 6 from the Saudi-led Coalition
that it had signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Republic of
Yemen Government to fund and install cranes at the ports of Aden,
Mukalla, and Al-Mokha. Beyond humanitarian assistance, we are also
providing economic and development assistance to help restore critical
health services, and access to education repair community
infrastructure, and provide help for the revival of production and
commercial activities, the collapse of which is a major factor
contributing to the wide-scale humanitarian disaster.
On January 22, the Coalition announced elements of its Yemen
Comprehensive Humanitarian Operations (YCHO) plan. Part of the YCHO
plan envisions expanding the use of other ports and overland points of
entry to broaden options for importing humanitarian assistance and
commercial goods to Yemen. Building the capacity of Yemen to import
more goods is a worthy long-term endeavor and we welcome the
Coalition's efforts on that front; meanwhile, we continue to stress
that increasing capacity through other ports or via land routes cannot
replace key Houthi-controlled ports such as Hudaydah and Saleef, given
immediate humanitarian needs. Of course, we agree that more must be
done and are pushing the Saudis to take additional steps to increase
access--not nearly enough ships are dropping off supplies at Hudaydah
port. This is due primarily to uncertainty regarding the port's status
and long clearance processes. We continue to urge the Coalition to make
a clear statement to shippers that Hudaydah port will remain open.
However, even here, progress is being made: The Saudis have increased
their engagement with the U.N. Verification and Inspection Mechanism
for Yemen (UNVIM) and are working to improve internal clearance times
and procedural hurdles in coordination with the U.N. and WFP. The head
of YCHO plan's implementation affirmed to us a continued commitment to
improve access.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify about ongoing efforts to
end the conflict and mitigate the humanitarian crisis in Yemen. I look
forward to answering your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you so much.
Mr. Jenkins.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT JENKINS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR,
BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE,
UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON,
DC
Mr. Jenkins. Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Menendez,
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
speak here today alongside my distinguished colleagues from
State and the Department of Defense.
I would ask that my written comments be submitted for the
record.
Administrator Green likes to paraphrase your fellow
Senator, John McCain, when he asks our agency, ``The world is
on fire. What are we going to do about it?'' At USAID, we
strive to put out those fires. Unfortunately, right now Yemen
is the single largest humanitarian crisis in the world, and we
are working hard to put the fires out there, along with our
interagency colleagues, other donors, and our partners on the
ground.
The humanitarian crisis in Yemen is manmade. The current
conflict has been ongoing for more than 3 years. Violence
between the Houthis and the Yemeni Government, both backed by
military support from regional powers, have devolved into a
civil war among multiple factions. Meanwhile, more than 75
percent of the country or more than 22 million people, need
humanitarian assistance. To put that into perspective, that is
more than the combined populations of Tennessee, New Jersey,
and Indiana.
For nearly 4 years, Yemen has wavered on the edge of
famine. 17.8 million Yemenis are food insecure, including more
than 460,000 children who are severely malnourished. Food that
does make it inside is prohibitively expensive, and as over
half the population is unemployed, this dramatically affects
what basics people can afford, basics such as food and water.
Many Yemenis must resort to increasingly severe coping
mechanisms such as child marriage just to get by.
This food crisis is made worse by the fact that Yemen is
currently facing the world's largest cholera outbreak with more
than 1 million suspected cases due to contaminated drinking
water, unsafe hygiene practices, the lack of sanitation
services, and a crippled health care system.
The conflict has also led to the collapse of the economy,
which was already one of the poorest in the region. The
government has not been able to regularly fund the operating
budgets of key ministries like the Ministry of Health,
degrading basic services like medical care, sanitation, and
education.
In the face of these needs, the United States continues to
mount a robust humanitarian response working with our partners
to reach millions with lifesaving aid. Over the last 6 months,
our partner, WFP, has reached an average of 7 million people
each month with emergency food assistance. We also worked to
deliver four U.S.-funded cranes to the Port of Hudaydah, which
was badly damaged by the conflict.
USAID is supporting medical services to people in need. We
are also providing hygiene kits, safe drinking water, and
improved access to sanitation services to fight malnutrition
and stave off disease.
For children especially, the toll of conflict can have
lasting effects. Our mobile protection teams provide treatment
to children throughout the country.
USAID is also providing technical assistance to the Central
Bank of Yemen to help restore basic functionality of core
services.
We are also rehabilitating water systems, getting children
back to school, and providing school supplies.
In addition, the U.S. coordinates closely with other
donors, including the United Kingdom, the European Union, and
we particularly welcome the recent pledges from Saudi Arabia,
the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait of more than $1 billion
towards the humanitarian response in Yemen.
Despite our best efforts, access remains a major challenge
in Yemen. To reach people in need, relief workers must navigate
active conflict zones, checkpoints, bureaucratic impediments,
and heavily damaged infrastructure. The vast majority of goods
come through Yemen's ports, so their operations are critical
for both humanitarian and commercial goods. We continue to call
on all parties in the conflict to allow free and unfettered
access for humanitarian goods into and throughout Yemen in
order to save lives and reduce suffering.
While the United States remains committed to relieving the
suffering of the Yemeni people, humanitarian alone cannot solve
this conflict. This will only come through a comprehensive
political agreement. We look forward to a day when there is a
lasting political solution in Yemen that will allow the
fighting to end and enable the country to develop its own path
to self-reliance.
Addressing the complex crisis in Yemen requires all of our
government's tools: humanitarian assistance, and the three D's
of development, diplomacy, and defense. That is why I am
grateful you have called all of us here today, and I am happy
to take your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jenkins follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert Jenkins
Senator Corker, Ranking Member Menendez, Members of the Committee,
thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today, alongside my
distinguished colleagues from the Departments of State and Defense. Our
Administrator, Mark Green, likes to paraphrase your fellow Senator John
McCain, when he asks of our Agency, ``The world is on fire. What are we
going to do about it?'' We at USAID strive to put out those fires.
Unfortunately Yemen is now the single largest humanitarian crisis in
the world and we are working hard to put out the fires there. Along
with our interagency colleagues, other donors and our implementing
partners who work tirelessly every day in Sana'a, in Taiz, in Aden, we
have sought to address these dire needs, which I will speak to today.
We are also looking towards a day when there is a lasting, political
solution in Yemen that will allow the fighting to end and enable the
country to develop its own path towards self-reliance. Until that day
comes, we must do all that we can to alleviate the human suffering we
see in Yemen, as both a moral and national security imperative.
The humanitarian crisis we see in Yemen today is exacerbated by the
Yemeni Government's collapse in parts of the country. The current
conflict has been ongoing since Houthi attacks against the Yemeni
Government began nearly four years ago. This violence between the
Houthis, armed by the Iranian regime, and Yemeni Government forces,
backed by military support from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates, has devolved into a civil war amongst multiple, growing
factions, driven in part by regional powers. Political instability, a
security vacuum, and fractured governance have allowed extremist groups
to expand their areas of influence. Meanwhile, more than 75 percent of
the country--or more than 22 million people--need humanitarian
assistance. To put that into perspective, that's more than one and a
half times the entire populations of Tennessee and New Jersey,
combined.
The ongoing conflict has resulted in an estimated 10,000 civilian
deaths and is also the reason why 2 million people are still unable to
return home after fleeing for safety. Fighting has hampered commercial
trade, which is devastating in a country that traditionally imports 90
percent of its food and most of its fuel and medicine. Infrastructure
has been destroyed, leaving 16 million people without access to clean
water or working toilets. Salaries aren't getting paid. These
conditions are unlikely to change unless until there is durable
political resolution to the conflict. It is imperative that all parties
to the conflict protect civilians and aid workers, who work at great
personal risk to assist people in need.
looming famine in a man-made crisis
Food insecurity in Yemen has wavered on the edge of famine for more
than 3 years largely due to the war's impact on import trade and
financial system. Of the 17.8 million Yemenis who are food insecure,
there are more than 460,000 children who are severely malnourished.
Food that does make it to market is increasingly expensive, with some
items doubling in price as supplies are unpredictable. As over half the
population is unemployed, these price increases dramatically affect the
amount of basic necessities people can afford, including food and
water. As the conflict goes on, the worst-affected households are
forced to take sell assets and incur debt; eventually, they could
experience famine conditions even without additional disruptions to
imports and humanitarian assistance.
Despite these dire conditions, humanitarian actors on the ground
are providing food assistance to millions every month, across the
country, and this has helped keep Yemen from falling over that edge.
For all the hungry Yemenis, who do not know how they will afford bread
or who are dependent on food aid, being on the edge is tragic enough.
health impacts of the crisis
Four years of conflict have disrupted more than Yemen's food
supply. During a major food crisis like this, preventable disease is
often the leading cause of death. In many cases, diseases like cholera
also inhibit the ability to treat malnutrition, and must be treated
first.
The ongoing conflict has left Yemen's health system heavily reliant
on humanitarian aid to maintain routine services. Half of the health
facilities are not fully operational and more than 16 million people
are unable to access basic health care.
Yemen is currently facing the world's largest cholera outbreak.
There are more than 1 million suspected cases and the outbreak has
claimed the lives of nearly 2,300 people. Contaminated drinking water,
unsafe hygiene practices, a lack of sanitation services, and a crippled
health care system are big contributors to the rise of cholera in
Yemen. Although new cases have been declining since October, the rainy
season could lead to resurgence. And while there are considerable
emergency efforts to contain the current outbreak, until the conflict
subsides and longer-term prevention programs can address these
underlying conditions that enable cholera to spread, the probability of
future outbreaks remains high. These conditions also make fertile
ground for the spread of other diseases. Diphtheria--a highly
infectious respiratory disease that mainly affects children--has also
taken hold and has reached more than 1,400 suspected cases.
erosion of infrastructure and financial system
The conflict has eroded Yemen's infrastructure and financial
system, in a country that was already amongst the poorest in the region
before the recent crisis. Between 2015 and 2017, Yemen's economy
contracted by over 47 percent, according to official Yemeni government
sources. Yemen is facing a major liquidity crisis and the banking
system is in turmoil. Oil and gas exports, which were previously a key
source of foreign exchange, have largely come to a halt and public
expenditure has fallen steeply. Vulnerable Yemenis are forced to resort
to increasingly desperate measures, such as child marriage, in order to
secure household financial needs. This is aggravated by the Central
Bank of Yemen's (CBY) lack of capacity and connectivity with Houthi-
controlled Sana'a, which precludes it from performing basic functions
and addressing larger monetary policy challenges. For example, the CBY
is unable to manage monetary circulation across the country, perform
basic banking supervision functions, or conduct transparent foreign
exchange operations. As a result, salaries to more than 1 million
government workers, including doctors and sanitation workers, haven't
been paid consistently in 20 months, leaving a quarter of the
population without a regular income. The government hasn't been able to
regularly fund the operating budgets of key ministries, like the
Ministry of Health, severely degrading the very fabric of basic
services like medical care, sanitation, and education.
The effect on Yemenis' livelihoods and ability to support
themselves and their families has been dire. Businesses have laid off
over half their workers and agricultural activity--one of the main
sources of employment for Yemenis--has been slashed in half. According
to the U.N.'s Food and Agriculture Organization, up to 45 percent of
households have lost livestock, either selling them off intentionally
to cover other basic or due to animal diseases.
The conflict is also throwing the future of Yemen's youth into
jeopardy: Up to 2,500 schools can no longer be used because they are
destroyed, damaged, host displaced families, or are occupied by the
warring parties. These and other challenges have left 2 million
children--over a quarter of Yemen's school-aged children--without
access to schooling.
united states response
In the face of these needs, the United States and our partners are
able to reach millions of people with life-saving aid, and the United
States continues to mount a robust humanitarian response. Since the
start of Fiscal Year 2017, USAID has provided more than $800 million in
humanitarian assistance. Over the last 6 months, USAID's partner the
World Food Programme (WFP) has consistently reached an average of 7
million people each month with emergency food assistance. These
programs provide in-kind food aid, food vouchers, and nutrition
services.
We also helped deliver four U.S.-funded mobile cranes to assist in
throughput at Hudaydah port to replace cranes that were damaged from
the conflict. The cranes arrived in Hudaydah port on January 15th and
after obtaining required customs clearance and insurance, they
offloaded their first supplies on February 9th. These cranes can
increase port capacity by as much as 40 percent and cut vessel
discharge time in half.
In response to the ongoing health crisis in Yemen, USAID is
providing medical supplies, and supporting mobile health clinics to
bring much-needed emergency medical services to people in need. We are
also providing hygiene kits, safe drinking water, and improved access
to sanitation services to fight malnutrition and stave off disease.
USAID is supporting 70 cholera treatment centers and 110 oral
rehydration centers to ensure that people get the medical attention
they need, and has provided nearly 7.4 million water purification
tablets--enough to provide safe drinking water to nearly 838,000 people
for one month.
For children especially, the toll of conflict can have lasting
effects. Our mobile protection teams provide treatment to children
throughout the country.
In addition, the U.S. coordinates closely with other donors,
including the United Kingdom's Department for International Development
(DFID) and The European Committee on Humanitarian Operations (ECHO).
The U.S. particularly welcomes the recent pledges from the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait of more than $1 billion
to fund the humanitarian response in Yemen. Contributions from other
countries ensure that more needy Yemenis receive life-saving aid and
complement the support provided by the United States.
There is no doubt that our humanitarian programs are saving lives.
According to the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET),
without the large-scale, international humanitarian assistance
currently being provided to partners in Yemen, the food security
situation would be significantly worse across Yemen. FEWSNET also
predicts a credible threat of famine this year, if imports decrease and
markets are further restricted.
Humanitarian assistance is critical in Yemen, but on its own will
not prevent the collapse of key social and economic institutions, stem
the tide of conflict, or build the resilience of Yemen to future
shocks. For this reason, USAID is also expanding its assistance beyond
emergency needs to better align with the scale of the crisis and help
put the country on a path to recovery and prevent continued dependence
on humanitarian aid. We are doing so under the umbrella of a flexible,
strategic approach that emphasizes adaptability and learning and in
close coordination with USAID's humanitarian offices and with other
donors.
To address the financial and longer-term needs, USAID is providing
technical assistance to the CBY to help restore basic functionality in
its core services. We are also working at the local level to help
Yemenis restore their access to income in sustainable ways through
livelihood and employment generation activities. Through our partners,
we're helping improve basic health services like childhood
immunization, primary and health care for mothers and children. We're
also rehabilitating water systems, restoring access and re-entry to
basic education along with providing school supplies, and providing
psychosocial support for children impacted by the crisis that has
interrupted their childhood.
Looking forward, if there are openings in the future, we are
preparing a series of additional activities that would support
stabilization and restoration of essential services in Yemen, as well
as address community level fragility and social cohesion. By addressing
these underlying conditions, we can empower Yemenis to build a
sustainable future.
ongoing challenges to providing aid
Despite the efforts by USAID and its partners operating on the
ground, we face significant challenges in providing assistance to those
in need. To reach these people, our humanitarian partners navigate
active conflict zones, checkpoints, bureaucratic impediments, and
heavily damaged infrastructure. The biggest challenge we face is
access. Because of the security concerns, armed actors, and shifting
lines of conflict, relief workers have a very difficult time gaining
access to those who need help the most.
Another challenge is the ability for importers to bring in
commercial goods, critical to the meet the needs in this country that
relies so heavily on commodities from elsewhere. Since Yemen has
traditionally imported 90 percent of its food and most of its fuel and
medicines, overall and imported the majority through Yemen's largest
port, Hudaydah, keeping this port open is critical to both humanitarian
response and commercial imports. With millions of people in Yemen on
the brink of famine, a closure of the largest port Hudaydah would have
dire consequences in an already critical situation. While the port is
now open, import levels at all of Yemen's Red Sea ports have yet to
recover following November 2017 Coalition-imposed closures, as
commercial shipping companies remain concerned about the potential
reinstatement of port restrictions and the Houthis continue attacks
against Red Sea shipping. We continue to call on all parties to the
conflict to allow unfettered humanitarian access into and throughout
Yemen, in order to save lives and reduce suffering.
the path forward for yemen
While the United States remains committed to relieving the
suffering of the Yemeni people, humanitarian assistance alone cannot
provide a solution to this conflict. This solution will only come
through a comprehensive political agreement, and we fully support the
work of our colleagues at the State Department, and the U.N. Special
Envoy to Yemen toward that end. Addressing the complex crisis in Yemen
requires all of the U.S. Government's tools: humanitarian assistance,
and the three D's of development, defense, and diplomacy, so I'm
grateful that you've called us all before you today. Thank you for your
time, and I look forward to answering your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Secretary Karem.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT S. KAREM, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Karem. Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Menendez, and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify here today. As a former Senate and House
staffer, it is a particular honor to get to appear before you,
although I must say it is somewhat more nerve-wracking to
appear on this side of the dais.
I would ask that my prepared opening statement be
introduced for the record. I have what is, I hope, a mercifully
brief introductory comment to make.
As Secretary Mattis has said many times, our goal in Yemen
is an end to the conflict through a United Nations-brokered
settlement. The conflict in Yemen affects regional security
across the Middle East and threatens U.S. national security
interests, including the free flow of commerce in the Red Sea.
Just this month, the Houthis attacked a Saudi oil tanker in the
Red Sea, threatening commercial shipping and freedom of
navigation in the world's fourth busiest maritime chokepoint,
the Bab el Mandeb.
This conflict has unleashed a humanitarian toll on Yemeni
civilians, as my colleagues from the State Department and USAID
have already mentioned. This is why Secretary Mattis believes
strongly that the efforts of the new U.N. Special Envoy, Martin
Griffiths, to bring all sides of the conflict to the
negotiating table are so important. Indeed, we need a stable,
inclusive government in Yemen to provide security to the Yemeni
people and to reduce and ultimately eliminate terrorist state
safe havens that are being used by al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula, AQAP, and ISIS in Yemen.
A political solution to the Yemen conflict will also reduce
the chaos that Iran has exploited to advance its malign agenda.
With help from Iran, the Houthis have launched more than 100
ballistic missiles and countless rockets into Saudi Arabia
directed at major population centers, international airports,
military installations, and oil infrastructure. In the last
month alone, the Houthis have launched more than 13 ballistic
missiles and long-range rockets into Saudi Arabia.
Mr. Chairman, I would invite you and all of the members of
the committee to visit the Iranian materiel display at Joint
Base Anacostia-Bolling to see firsthand the Iranian-
manufactured ballistic missile that was launched at Riyadh
International Airport in November 2017, as well as other
evidence of Iran's support to the Houthis and its efforts to
destabilize the region. Yemen has become a test bed for Iran's
malign activities.
Mr. Chairman, the Defense Department is currently engaged
in two lines of effort in Yemen. Our first line of effort and
our priority is the fight against al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula and ISIS in Yemen, two terrorist organizations that
directly threaten the United States, our allies, and our
partners.
To combat AQAP and ISIS, U.S. forces, in coordination with
the U.N.-recognized Government of Yemen, are supporting our
regional counterterrorism partners in ongoing operations to
disrupt and degrade their ability to coordinate, plot, and
recruit for external terrorist operations. Additionally, U.S.
military forces are conducting airstrikes against AQAP and ISIS
in Yemen, pursuant to the 2001 authorization for the use of
military force, to disrupt and destroy terrorist networks.
Our second line of effort is the provision of limited, non-
combat support to the Saudi-led coalition in support of the UN-
recognized Government of Yemen. This support began in 2015
under President Obama, and in 2017, President Trump reaffirmed
America's commitment to our partners in these efforts. Fewer
than 50 U.S. military personnel work in Saudi Arabia with the
Saudi-led coalition advising and assisting with the defense of
Saudi territory, sharing intelligence, and providing logistical
support, including aerial refueling. The objective of this
support is to build our partners' capacity and enable them to
defend themselves and maintain their own security.
As I noted before, Houthi missile attacks pose a very real
threat to Saudi Arabia and the UAE and to freedom of navigation
in the Red Sea. The Houthi rebellion, facilitated by Iran, also
continues to pose a threat to the Yemeni people. In addition to
exacerbating the civil conflict, the Houthis use child
soldiers, disrupt and commandeer the distribution of
humanitarian aid and commercial goods, and exploit the
deliveries of aid for their own financial purposes.
With regard to noncombatant casualties, U.S. military
support to our partners is always geared towards mitigating
noncombatant casualties. U.S. advisors provide best practices
on avoiding collateral damage and U.S. aerial refueling allows
coalition aircraft to spend more time in the air giving our
partners time to validate targets, practice tactical patience,
and reduce the risk of noncombatant casualties. We also
continue to urge the coalition to allow full access to
humanitarian and commercial goods and are encouraged by recent
steps that our partners have taken to provide more than $1
billion in humanitarian relief.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Karem follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert Karem
Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Menendez, and distinguished Members
of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on our Yemen
policy. I welcome discussion on this important issue.
strategic overview
As Secretary Mattis has said many times, our goal in Yemen is an
end to the conflict through a United Nations (U.N.)-brokered
settlement. The conflict in Yemen affects regional security across the
Middle East and threatens U.S. national security interests. We need a
stable, inclusive government in Yemen to provide security to the Yemeni
people and to reduce and ultimately eliminate terrorist safe havens
that are being used by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in Yemen (ISIS-Y) to plot against the
American people and our allies and partners. Finding a political
solution to the Yemen conflict will also help counter Iran by reducing
the chaos in which it thrives. Ultimately, Iran has fueled and
exploited this conflict, and ending it will help to reduce
opportunities for Iran's malign activities.
The Administration's policy goals in Yemen are to prevent terrorist
attacks on U.S. interests and allies, end the civil war, avoid a
regional conflict, mitigate the humanitarian crisis, help defend Saudi
Arabia's territorial integrity, and protect the free flow of commerce
in the Red Sea. We support the new U.N. Special Envoy, Martin
Griffiths, in his attempts to revive the U.N.-led peace process in
Yemen.
President Obama first directed U.S. military support to the Saudi-
led Coalition in 2015, after the Houthis, along with forces aligned
with former Yemen President Saleh, broke their truce with the
internationally-recognized President of Yemen Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi,
and stormed the Presidential palace in Sana'a. President Hadi escaped
and fled to Aden and ultimately to Saudi Arabia. At President Hadi's
request, Saudi Arabia formed an international coalition to help restore
government control, and DoD began providing limited, non-combat support
to that Coalition. The U.N. Security Council also passed Resolution
2216, condemning the takeover of Sana'a and calling on Houthi-Saleh
forces to turn over looted weapons, withdraw from Sana'a, and begin
political discussions.
The Houthis, supported by Iran, continue to pose a threat to the
Yemeni people, to the Coalition, to Americans in the region, and to
regional security. In addition to exacerbating the civil conflict, the
Houthis use child soldiers, disrupt the flow of commercial goods, and
charge additional tariffs and taxes on essential goods for their own
financial gain. The Houthis also directly threaten the security of
Saudi Arabia. To date, the Houthis have launched more than 100
ballistic missiles into Saudi Arabia, directed at major population
centers, international airports, and military installations, including
bases where U.S. forces are present. They have also fired countless
rockets into southern Saudi Arabia and continue to occupy Saudi
territory along the Yemeni border. Just this month, the Houthis
attacked another Saudi oil tanker in the Red Sea, threatening
commercial shipping and freedom of navigation in the world's fourth
busiest maritime chokepoint. For Saudis and Emiratis, whose citizens
are under attack or threat of attack from Iranian-backed forces, the
conflict in Yemen is a core national security interest.
counterterrorism efforts
The Department's first line of effort in Yemen is the fight against
terrorist organizations that threaten U.S. national security interests
in the region and at home. AQAP continues to pose a significant threat
to the American people by plotting attacks against the homeland, while
ISIS-Y aims to use the ungoverned spaces of Yemen to plot, direct,
instigate, supply, and recruit for attacks in the region.
To combat AQAP and ISIS-Y, a small number of U.S. forces, in
coordination with the internationally-recognized Government of Yemen,
are supporting our regional counterterrorism partners in ongoing
operations to degrade the groups' abilities to coordinate external
terrorist operations and blunt their aspirations to use Yemen as a safe
haven for terror plotting. Additionally, U.S. forces are conducting
airstrikes against AQAP and ISIS-Y pursuant to the 2001 Authorization
for Use of Military Force, to disrupt and destroy terrorist leadership
networks and limit their freedom of maneuver within the region. Our
partners provide critical assistance to our counterterrorism efforts
and, like us, they are determined to rid Yemen of these terrorist
groups while setting the conditions for a stable environment that does
not provide safe haven for terrorist groups or activity.
u.s. support to the saudi-led coalition
Our second line of effort includes providing limited, non-combat
support to the Saudi-led Coalition in support of the internationally-
recognized Government of Yemen. This support began in 2015 under
President Obama, and in 2017, President Trump reaffirmed our commitment
to our partners in their efforts. Fewer than 50 U.S. military personnel
work in Saudi Arabia with the Saudi-led Coalition advising and
assisting with the defense of Saudi territory, sharing intelligence,
and providing logistical support, including aerial refueling.
U.S. forces are not participants in the civil conflict in Yemen and
are not engaged in hostilities against the Houthis. U.S. military
support to the Coalition is consistent with the National Defense
Strategy. We are working to support our partners' military efforts to
defend themselves and maintain their own security. This support helps
improve our bilateral and regional partnerships, bolster our partners'
defense, and increase burden sharing.
We are focused on helping the Coalition avoid civilian casualties
in Yemen. We recognize that this conflict has taken a drastic toll on
the Yemeni people. We believe that working with our Saudi and Emirati
counterparts helps mitigate the risk of civilian casualties. U.S.
military advisors are focused on helping Coalition forces implement
best practices and procedures to reduce civilian casualties and
collateral damage. Aerial refueling allows Coalition aircraft to spend
more time in the air, thus giving our partners time to validate
targets, practice tactical patience, and reduce the risk of civilian
casualties.
We are seeing incremental improvements to our partners' processes
and procedures. The Coalition has incorporated the No Strike List into
its target development procedures, stopped the use of cluster
munitions, changed its rules of engagement to incorporate U.S. best
practices, and increased its use of precision-guided munitions, which
help decrease civilian casualties and collateral damage. We can only
help avoid unnecessary loss of life if we continue to engage with these
partners to improve their practices.
u.s. efforts to mitigate the humanitarian crisis
The U.S. government is also working to mitigate the humanitarian
crisis caused by the conflict. The United States has provided more than
$854 million in humanitarian assistance since October 2016, including
nearly $87 million in additional funding this month. We are also
providing $55 million in economic and development assistance, which
have been notified to Congress, to help lay a foundation for Yemen's
recovery, including through programs to support livelihoods,
rehabilitate critical infrastructure, such as water systems, and
restore access to education so children can learn and prepare for their
future. The U.S. government continues to urge all parties to allow
humanitarian and commercial goods, including fuel, to enter Yemen and
move unhindered throughout the country, while also allowing
humanitarian workers to move freely and safely to deliver assistance.
consequences of reducing or withdrawing u.s. support
DoD strongly opposes any reduction or withdrawal of U.S. support to
the Saudi-led Coalition. It bears repeating: we can only help influence
a positive outcome in Yemen by engaging with our partners. To leave our
partners to face this threat without our support would risk greater
escalation and attendant harm to civilians. Further, if we hope to
encourage a political settlement, we must have influence with our
partners in the region. Our support shows we take seriously our
partners' struggle against a real security threat to the region--
thereby strengthening our broader argument that only a political
solution will end the conflict.
With Iran's support, the Houthis have exacerbated this civil war
and raised the risk of a larger regional conflict. The Houthis have
used, with Iranian material and expertise: (1) sophisticated ballistic
missiles to attack major Saudi population centers; (2) missiles to
attack commercial vessels in the Red Sea; (3) explosive boats to attack
military vessels in the Red Sea; and (4) explosive UAV attacks against
civilian targets in Saudi Arabia. Consistent with the National Security
Strategy's call to neutralize Iran's destabilizing activities, DoD is
committed to working with our partners and allies to prevent
proliferation from Iran. Mr. Chairman, I invite you and the other
members of the committee to see first-hand evidence of Iranian
complicity by visiting the Iranian Material Display at Joint Base
Anacostia-Bolling. This display includes the Iranian-manufactured
ballistic missile launched at Riyadh International Airport in November
2017, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, and explosive boat components.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by emphasizing our respect for
Congress's important oversight role in the use of military force. We
have shared the Administration's legal analysis regarding U.S. non-
combat support to the Saudi-led coalition, and I would like to
reiterate that U.S. forces are not engaged in hostilities in the civil
conflict in Yemen.
Instead, we view our U.S. military support to the Saudi-led
Coalition in Yemen through the lens of the National Defense Strategy.
As our partners help us with our strategic priorities in the region--
especially in countering AQAP, ISIS-Y, and other violent extremist
organizations--we enable them to combat the current highest threat to
their security, attacks against their territory. Working with our
partners to mitigate and reduce the risks of a regional conflict will
also create opportunities to counter the regional purveyors of
instability, namely Iran.
In this light, withdrawing our support to the Saudi-led Coalition
could threaten our other defense relationships and weaken our global
reputation as a reliable partner. This would constrain the U.S.
military's ability to foster long-term relationships, to increase
interoperability, to promote burden sharing, and to build strong
security partnerships throughout the world.
I ask for your continued support to the Department as we work to
enable our partners.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to
your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you all for being here.
And with that, I will defer for interjections along the
way. Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Well, thank you.
I want to thank all three of our witnesses from State,
USAID, and the Department of Defense for your work. You have
outlined goals for the United States, including ending the
civil war through diplomacy, because as you point out, that is
the only way we are going to have a lasting peace in Yemen, the
security of our partners, particularly the security of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and to recognize the Iran malign
influence and dealing with that, and addressing the
humanitarian crisis, including civilian casualties, and the
response to the civilian population.
So, Mr. Karem, I want to start with you in regards to the
U.S. military assistance that we give to the Kingdom. You said
that is to embolden their capacity and to reduce noncombatant
casualties.
Last March, the CENTCOM Commander, General Votel, stated
that the United States Government does not track the end
results of the coalition missions it refuels and supports with
targeting assistance.
So my question to you is how do you determine that we are
effectively reducing the noncombatant casualties if we do not,
in fact, track the results of the Kingdom's military actions?
Mr. Karem. Senator, thank you.
It is correct that we do not monitor and track all of the
Saudi aircraft aloft over Yemen. We have limited personnel and
assets in order to do that, and CENTCOM's focus has obviously
been on our own operations in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and in
Syria.
Senator Cardin. I understand that. But my question is our
stated mission is to reduce noncombatant casualties. If we do
not track, how do we determine that?
Mr. Karem. So I think one of our stated missions is
precisely that. There are multiple ways that I think we do have
insight into Saudi targeting behavior. We have helped them with
their processes. We have seen them implement a no strike list,
and we have seen their capabilities improve.
Senator Cardin. So the information is based upon what the
Saudis tell you how they are conducting the mission rather than
the after-impact of the mission?
Mr. Karem. I think our military officers who are resident
in Saudi Arabia are seeing how the Saudis approach this effort.
Senator Cardin. You know, obviously, the proof is in the
results, and we do not know whether the results are there or
not. Is that a fair statement?
Mr. Karem. I think we do see a difference in how the Saudis
have operated in Yemen.
Senator Cardin. I understand how they operate, but we do
not know whether in fact that has been effective. The United
Nations Security Council Panel of Experts on Yemen concluded in
recent reports that the cumulative effect of these airstrikes
on civilian infrastructure demonstrates that even when
precautionary measures were taken, they were largely inadequate
and ineffective. Do you have any information that disagrees
with that assessment?
Mr. Karem. Senator, I think the assessment of our Central
Command is that the Saudi and Emirati targeting efforts have
improved with the steps that they have taken. We do not have
perfect understanding because we are not using all of our
assets to monitor their aircraft, but we do get reporting from
the ground on what is taking place inside Yemen.
Senator Cardin. I understand that. And I would just caution
you to be reserved as to how effective you are in that if you
do not have direct information about it. The U.S. reputation is
on the line, and we expect you to know if you report something.
If you cannot report it, fine, but do not make statements that
you cannot back up. That would be my caution to the way you
advertise it.
I want to ask you one other question, if I might, on Iran's
influence. How effective have we been in stopping the Iranian
influence in that region? It seems like they are extremely
active.
Mr. Karem. I think it is extraordinarily difficult given
the breadth of Iran's access throughout the region and how
aggressive the Iranians have been over many, many years to put
in place surrogates and access and influence and----
Senator Cardin. So we are not effective?
Mr. Karem. No. I think we are increasingly effective. The
United States cannot do it alone, and in the case of Yemen, we
are trying to help our partners better combat----
Senator Cardin. So we think the Iranians are less effective
supporting the Houthis today than they were 3 months ago or 6
months ago or a year ago?
Mr. Karem. I think we are getting better at mobilizing an
international effort to put pressure on Iran----
Senator Cardin. Are we better today than a year ago with
the Iranians?
Mr. Karem. I think the Iranians are under more pressure
today, but their ability to operate remains a significant point
of concern for the United States.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Paul.
Senator Paul. Thank you for your testimony.
Ambassador Satterfield, I guess some people, when they
think about our strategy, might question the idea of our
strategy. If your son was shooting off his pistol in the back
yard and doing it indiscriminately and endangering the
neighbors, would you give him more bullets or less? And we see
the Saudis acting in an indiscriminate manner. They have bombed
funeral processions. They have killed a lot of civilians. And
so our strategy is to give them more bombs not less. And we
say, well, if we do not give them the bombs, somebody else
will. And that is sort of this global strategy that many in the
bipartisan foreign policy consensus have. We have to always be
involved, and we always have to provide weapons or someone else
will and they will act even worse.
But there is, I guess, a lot of examples it does not seem
to be improving their behavior. You can argue that it is
marginally better since we have been giving them more weapons,
but it seems the opposite of logic. You would think you would
give people less or you might withhold aid or withhold
assistance to the Saudis to get them to behave. But we do sort
of the opposite. We give them more aid.
What would your response be to that?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, when I noted in my remarks
that progress had been made on this issue of targeting,
minimizing, or mitigating civilian casualties, that phrase was
carefully chosen.
And to elaborate further on my colleague's remarks, Robert
Karem, we do work with the Saudis and have particularly over
the last 6 to 9 months worked intensively on the types of
munitions the Saudis are using, how they are using, how to
discriminate target sets, how to assure through increased
loiter time by aircraft that the targets sought are, indeed,
clear of collateral or civilian damage. This is new. This is
not the type of interaction that we had with the Saudis during
the time when those----
Senator Paul. And yet, the overall situation in Yemen is a
disaster.
Ambassador Satterfield. The overall situation is extremely
bad, Senator.
Senator Paul. So I guess that is really my question. We
ought to rethink, and I think from a common sense point of
view, a lot of people would question giving people who
misbehave more weapons instead of giving them less.
On another question, which I think is a broad question
about what we are doing in the Middle East in general, you
admitted that there is not really a military solution in Yemen.
Most people say it is going to be a political solution. The
Houthis will still remain. We are not going to have Hiroshima.
We are not going to have unconditional surrender and the good
guys win and the bad guys are vanquished.
The same with Syria. Most people said for years, both the
Obama administration and this administration, probably even the
Bush administration, this situation will probably be a
political solution. It is not going to be complete vanquishment
of the enemy.
We are also saying that in Afghanistan. I guess my point,
as I think about that, as I think about the recruiter at the
station in Omaha, Nebraska, trying to get somebody to sign up
for the military and saying, please join. We are going to send
you to three different wars where there is no military
solution. We are hoping to make it maybe a little bit better. I
think back to Vietnam. Oh, we are going to take one more
village. If we take one more village, they are going to
negotiate and we got a little bit better negotiation. I just
cannot see sending our young men and women to die for that, for
one more village.
You know, the Taliban have 40 percent in Afghanistan. When
they get to 30 percent, they will negotiate; and it will have
been worth it for the people who have to go in and die and take
those villages? I do not think it is worth one more life.
The war in Yemen is not ours. We talk all about the
Iranians have launched hundreds of missiles. Well, yes, and the
Saudis have launched 16,000 attacks. Who started it? It is a
little bit murky back and forth. The Houthis may have started
taking over their government, but that was a civil war. Now we
are involved in it. Who are the good guys? Are the Saudis the
good guys? Are the others the bad guys? Thousands of civilians
are dying. Seventeen million people live on the edge of
starvation.
I think we need to rethink whether or not military
intervention, supplying the Saudis with weapons, whether all of
this makes any sense at all or whether we have made the
situation worse.
I mean, humanitarian crisis. We are talking about, oh, we
are giving them money. The Saudis are giving them money, and I
am like, okay, so we bomb the crap out of them and then Saudis
give them $1 billion. Maybe we could bomb less. Maybe part of
the humanitarian answer is supplying less weapons to a war.
There is a huge arms race going on. Why do the Iranians do what
they do? They are evil, or maybe they are responding to the
Saudis. Who responded first? Who started it? Where did the arms
race start? But if we sell $300 billion of weapons to Saudi
Arabia, what are the Iranians going to do? They react. It is
action and reaction throughout the Middle East. And so we paint
the Iranians as the evil monster, and we just have to correct
the evil monster. But the world is a much more complicated
place back and forth.
And all I would ask is that we try to get outside our
mindset that what we are doing is working because I think what
we are doing has not worked, and we have made a lot of things
worse. And we are partly responsible for the humanitarian
crisis in Yemen.
There is nothing like making a small speech.
The Chairman. That was very small by Senate standards, but
thank you.
Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Karem, after hearing the answers to Senator
Cardin's line of questioning, I come to the conclusion that we
are not measuring success in a way that is meaningful. If you
do not know what civilian casualties are--we do not measure it,
as General Votel says--and you said, yes, we do not track all
civilian casualties from Saudi operations, but we have seen
them improve targeting behavior. Well, that in and of itself is
not a way to define a measurement of how we are succeeding in
reducing civilian casualties. So I find that pretty alarming.
It is information I wish I had known before.
Let me ask Secretary Satterfield. Why has the
administration not used CAATSA authority to impose sanctions on
Iran for its weapons transfer to the Houthis?
Ambassador Satterfield. We have sanctioned extensively all
of the Iranian entities and individuals who are associated with
the proliferating behaviors that include the transfer of
weaponry----
Senator Menendez. Telling me about all the ways we have
sanctioned Iran--of course, I am very familiar with that. But
can you cite to me the specific CAATSA authority that was used
to sanction Iran for weapons transfers to the Houthis?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, they were sanctioned under
other extant authorities.
Senator Menendez. Well, I would like you to submit that for
the record to see what that is.
Ambassador Satterfield. We can do that, Senator.
[The Committee Received No Response From Ambassador
Satterfield.]
Senator Menendez. Do you believe that U.S. support for
coalition bombings in Yemen have been an effective way to
counter Iranian influence in the region?
Ambassador Satterfield. I believe that the support that we
have provided to the Saudi-led coalition has advanced the
Saudis' ability to defend themselves against Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps-enabled Houthi launches into the
heartland of Saudi Arabia. Yes, sir.
Senator Menendez. So helping the Saudis is how we, in part,
counter Iranian influence is what you are telling me.
Ambassador Satterfield. It is indeed, Senator.
Senator Menendez. Let me ask you this. Secretary Mattis
recently said that U.S. policy is calibrated to achieve a
negotiated settlement in Yemen. I would like to understand more
about this calibration. There are reports that the Saudi
coalition will soon start operations to seize the Port of
Hudaydah, the main port of humanitarian and commercial goods
into Yemen. Would this operation accelerate prospects for a
political solution in your view?
Ambassador Satterfield. It would not, Senator, and we have
been exceedingly clear with the governments of Saudi Arabia, as
well as the Emirates.
Senator Menendez. Will the administration provide military
support to the coalition if it starts operations to seize the
port?
Ambassador Satterfield. We have made clear that the port is
to be left fully operational.
Senator Menendez. Other than the rhetorical support for a
negotiated settlement, what is the administration specifically
doing to facilitate a negotiated settlement?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, over the course of the
past year, but particularly since October of last year, we have
worked extensively with the United Nations, with the Saudis,
with the Emiratis, as well as with all Yemeni parties to try to
establish the basis for a resumption of talks, the talks that
collapsed in 2016. The political picture on the ground in Yemen
has changed radically with the death, the killing, of Ali
Abdullah Saleh, with the fragmentation of the General People's
Congress. All of that, while tragic in many of its dimensions,
has provided a certain reshuffling of the deck that may, we
hope, allow the United Nations to be more effective in its
efforts.
But throughout this, we have underscored to all the
parties, the Saudis and the Emiratis in particular, the UN must
have the ability to conduct negotiations as it chooses with
those whom it chooses and where it chooses to try to advance a
political settlement, and we will provide all possible support
for that.
Senator Menendez. So we are depending upon the UN to be the
solution to this process.
Ambassador Satterfield. The international community has
placed its support in the United Nations as the best party
positioned to try to broker a resolution.
Senator Menendez. And the administration endorses that U.N.
process.
Ambassador Satterfield. We do, indeed, Senator.
Senator Menendez. Okay. It is a new day for the U.N. and
the United States.
Now, let me ask you this. While significant culpability is
attributable to the Saudi coalition for the role in the
deepening humanitarian crisis in Yemen, the Houthis also bear
responsibility. Do you agree with that?
Ambassador Satterfield. I do, sir.
Senator Menendez. In your view, what actions have the
Houthis undertaken in Yemen that block humanitarian access and
violate international humanitarian law?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, the Houthis routinely
predate aid deliveries coming through land crossings as well as
through the ports of Hudaydah and Saleef. By predation, I mean
a variety of measures: skimming, removing, looting aid from
convoys, taking taxes repeatedly from the drivers and personnel
of the convoys. The Houthis profit mightily from all commercial
as well as humanitarian goods that enter Yemen from any
sources.
The Houthis, in addition, control the telecommunications
networks of Yemen from which they also extract revenues. They
are a predatory body, but they are also part of the political
situation and must be part of the political solution.
Senator Menendez. Finally, have the Houthis demonstrated
commitment or will to proceed with a negotiated settlement of
the conflict, to your knowledge?
Ambassador Satterfield. The Houthis have told the United
Nations, they have told other parties that they do wish to
participate in a political resolution. It is the testing of
that proposition that is the challenge before the United
Nations and all of us.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, they say the most dangerous person in Washington
is a Senator that just returned from a fact finding mission
overseas. More dangerous is a Senator who has a Yemeni out in
the anteroom that he has been talking to all morning long. So a
lot of the things I am going to ask I am going to act like I
know what I am talking about, and I think I do. But I have a
young lady out there who works with CARE USA, which is
headquartered in Georgia, who has been working with me on this,
and some of the things I want to bring out I think will help
answer some of the questions that have been referred to by
these gentlemen.
Number one, apparently there are about 22 million Yemenis
who are in need of aid, either medical aid or nutritional aid
or some type of other assistance in aid. And there are only 26
million people there. So it is almost 90 percent of the
population. Would you agree with that? Anybody? Is that about
right?
Mr. Jenkins. Yes. All the numbers that we have for Yemen
are imprecise given the situation. And we look at about 29
million people as the full population, and over 76 percent of
them need humanitarian assistance.
Senator Isakson. Whatever the numbers, it is big and it is
the vast majority of the country.
And the port is the biggest single problem in getting
humanitarian aid into Yemen. Is that not correct?
Mr. Jenkins. We have been calling on all parties to make
sure we can have free and unfettered access through all roads
and all ports, but Hudaydah Port is the primary point of access
for up to 80 percent of the cargo that goes into the country.
Senator Isakson. I am told it is the biggest problem, and
it is getting bigger.
Mr. Jenkins. It is not getting bigger, sir. In fact, the
worst moment came in November of last year when there was a
coalition-led, coalition-enforced closure of the Red Sea ports.
Since then, we have seen improvements. There is a ways to go,
but things have been improving as of late.
Senator Isakson. Mr. Karem, at the end of the long speech
made by Senator Paul, who I have great respect for--we disagree
on certain things, but he was making a good speech and I
enjoyed it. But he did not ask questions.
I want to ask a question following up on what he said. He
was basically saying we have sent a lot of our soldiers into
battle and battles--winning or losing did not make any
difference because we never finished the drill and that we have
in Afghanistan and we have in Yemen and we have other soldiers
deployed right now who are in battles that we are not going to
win but we are going to just bring it to a draw. Is that a fair
way to say it?
Is there any other way to get a recalcitrant people or
people who are working against political solutions to the table
other than a military challenge if you do not have a military
challenge to force them to the table?
Mr. Karem. I think you have to use all elements of power to
bring people to the negotiating table. Sometimes that will be
predominantly military. Sometimes it can be financial.
Sometimes it can be diplomatic. In the case of Yemen, I think
all of these things probably apply.
But I think there is a difference between Afghanistan,
where the United States has tens of thousands of soldiers who
are supporting the Afghan Government, and Yemen, where we are
not a party to the conflict and are not engaged in hostilities
except for our relatively narrow counterterrorism efforts.
Senator Isakson. But there is no question--I am speaking
for myself now--that at some point in time when you get to
solving the problems of a conflict overseas that we are in one
way or the other or observe one way or another through the
U.N., that some ability for military force, to be an effective
force to bring about a solution, helps you get to the table to
get a diplomatic solution rather than ending up having a war to
solve it or, worse than that, some kind of civil war to solve
it.
Mr. Karem. Yes, I agree. And more importantly, all of the
parties who are fighting in Yemen believe----
Senator Isakson. What is the background of the U.N. Special
Envoy that has just been named? Is it an American?
Ambassador Satterfield. No. He is a U.K. national, Senator.
He has been involved throughout his life in international peace
work, a variety of institutions, most of them in the UK who
bring together negotiators, work on international solutions to
problems like this.
Senator Isakson. We need to give him and the U.N. the help
and encouragement we can to get that done because ultimately
that is going to--you know, special envoys usually are an
alternative to solving the problem. They just say we did
something like what happened in South Sudan and the PCA there.
But I hope we will work in every way possible to move them
forward at the U.N. and move the Special Envoy forward to help
bring that to a conclusion.
Ambassador Satterfield. That is our intent, sir.
Senator Isakson. And just on behalf of the USAID people--I
mean, the CARE USA people are out in the anteroom and my
friends from Atlanta. CARE does a tremendous humanitarian NGO
mission all over the world in lots of places, and they are
doing a tremendous one in Yemen. It is horrible when you get a
situation where they cannot even get well-intended aid and
medical supplies to the people who need it because we do not
have enough security to even get them that access. I have been
to Darfur and seen what that can mean. It is horrible. So I
hope we will do everything we can to get the NGOs that are
trying to get the aid to the 23 million Yemenis who are deep
trouble nutritionally and health-wise to them as quickly and
expeditiously as possible.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing and thank you to our witnesses for being here to
testify and for your efforts to address the crisis in Yemen,
which has truly taken a horrific toll on millions of innocent
men and women there and particularly children.
I am disappointed that the Senate has not yet made a
decisive statement about the need to influence Saudi-led
operations and to protect those innocent civilians in Yemen. I
think it is long past time we send a message to the leadership
of Saudi Arabia that we have high expectations for our allies,
particularly those who are receiving military support.
So, Ambassador Satterfield, do you believe that the Saudi-
led coalition is engaged in urgent and good faith efforts to
negotiate an end to the civil war in Yemen?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, the Saudi-led coalition,
primarily Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, accept at
the highest levels the proposition that there is only
ultimately a political solution to this conflict. And that was
reiterated most recently by Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman
during his visits here in Washington.
We operationally try to implement that rhetorical
understanding in terms of the active support which the U.N.
needs from both the Emirates and the Saudis for their mission
to be successful. Now, over the course of the past 6 months,
from a crisis point in October and November when things looked
very dark indeed, we have, indeed, seen a more receptive
approach by the Saudis, by the Emiratis certainly to this
concept of supporting, genuinely supporting and facilitating
the UN's mediating efforts. Yes.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. That is good to hear.
Mr. Jenkins, you talked about pledges I think you said from
the UAE and the Saudis--did you mention anyone else--of $1
billion in aid. Has any of that aid actually been forthcoming
to date?
Mr. Jenkins. Yes, thank you for the question.
On April 3rd in Geneva, there was a pledging conference
where over $2 billion was pledged against the $3 billion that
the United Nations is looking for, for this year. Of that,
Saudi Arabia and UAE pledged $920 million, and as of this week,
all of that has arrived within the bank accounts of the United
Nations, which we are very happy to see. Kuwait also pledged a
significant amount, as well as the UK and the EU. All of this
is very heartening for us as we look at the vast needs to see
that now with all the pledges, when they come in--that is two-
thirds of the appeal. This long into the year, that is very
heartening. However, there is going to continue to be great
needs and need for more assistance.
Senator Shaheen. And how long is it going to take to get
that aid out into the field so it is helping people?
Mr. Jenkins. So we are very thankful, particularly because
the Saudis and the Emirates have provided all of this money to
the United Nations Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian
Assistance, UNOCHA. UNOCHA is now going to disburse it among
the various U.N. agencies, which they will do very quickly.
Senator Shaheen. I think you all talked about the
importance of a political solution in Yemen as being the
ultimate goal. Ambassador Satterfield, you talked about the
Houthis needing to be part of any negotiation. Who else needs
to be at the table in order for a political solution to really
work?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, I have, over the past 40
years, seen many complex, almost Hobbesian crises in the Middle
East. I have to tell you the Yemen situation is one of the most
complex in terms of the numbers of parties, sub-parties, and
then fundamental internal divisions, the south, the north, the
legacy of the 1993 forced reunification. All of them in one way
or another are going to need to have a voice. They are going to
need to be represented. The Houthis are but one, in the north a
very significant one, but one of those parties.
Senator Shaheen. Mr. Jenkins, Secretary Karem, who else do
you think should be at the table in addition to the Houthis and
the Yemenis?
Mr. Jenkins. I would echo what U.N. Secretary-General
Guterres has said. What is necessary right now is a dialogue
across Yemen, an intra-Yemen dialogue that can help support a
larger peace negotiation.
Senator Shaheen. And who is going to lead the dialogue?
Mr. Jenkins. We are very happy that Martin Griffiths has
started his work. We think he needs time and space to show
results, and we want to be as supportive as we can across the
interagency of his efforts.
Senator Shaheen. Secretary Karem.
Mr. Karem. I agree with Secretary Satterfield and Mr.
Jenkins that you are going to need to bring a number of parties
resident inside Yemen together, and then there are also the
external players who I think are already in touch with Mr.
Griffiths.
Senator Shaheen. So does that include Iran as being one of
the players at the table to negotiate?
Mr. Karem. I have seen precious little evidence that Iran
is interested in a negotiated solution in Yemen or in Syria or
elsewhere.
Senator Shaheen. And do we think that the Houthis will
actually negotiate in good faith if they continue to believe
that Iran is going to support them in their activities?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, our policy has been
premised on two things: the first, creating that all-
encompassing, all-embracing political process in which the
Houthis do have a voice and will participate in the outcome as
well. The second is to curtail, constrain, mitigate, roll back
the extraordinary Iranian support being provided to the Houthis
directed at Saudi Arabia. It only emboldens a party not to
negotiate as effectively as possible. So we are working on both
those lines at once.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Young--and before going to him, since
you brought up this hearing is in response to requests by
members, we will mark up before the Memorial Day holiday the
bill that you all put forth. Thank you for your leadership on
that and on the AUMF itself and know that from my perspective,
it is getting in a very, very good place. We thank you all for
working with both of us and for taking leadership on making
sure we do speak strongly, as you mentioned.
Senator Young.
Senator Young. Secretary Satterfield, I would like to pick
up on Senator Menendez's line of questioning about the
administration's support for the coalition should an attack
occur on the Port of Hudaydah. You did not respond directly to
that answer. You indicated you have repeatedly encouraged--the
United States has repeatedly encouraged the Saudis, the
Emiratis, and other members of the coalition not to strike the
Port of Hudaydah. Is our support conditional upon a non-attack
on the Port of Hudaydah? Yes or no, sir.
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, I will be quite explicit.
We have told the Emirates and the Saudis there is to be no
action undertaken that could threaten the ports of Hudaydah and
Saleef----
Senator Young. It sounds like encouragement to me.
Ambassador Satterfield. ----or any routes to and from the
port for delivery of assistance.
Senator Young. Will our support continue should the Saudis
or Emiratis bomb the Port of Hudaydah?
Ambassador Satterfield. We would not view such an action as
consistent with our own policy upon which our support is based.
Senator Young. Will our support continue should the Saudis
or Emiratis or another member of the coalition bomb the Port of
Hudaydah?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, you are posing, with all
due respect, a hypothetical. We would have to see the
circumstances in order to give a response to that question
beyond what I have already told you.
Senator Young. So it is not conditional. Our support would
not be conditional on the continued allowance of food, fuel,
medical supplies, and other humanitarian assistance into the
primary port of Yemen.
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, you and I have talked back
in those dark days of October and early November. When we told
the Saudis explicitly that if there was not an immediate
lifting and a sustained lifting of any constraints on access
through Hudaydah and Saleef Port, not just of humanitarian
goods but commercial goods as well, that it would be
exceedingly difficult to maintain the type of support for the
coalition that had existed, and that view has not changed.
Senator Young. I will continue.
Mr. Jenkins, your testimony is compelling. You put forward
a number of facts and figures, which I would like you to
underscore. Perhaps I can elicit a few more. This will go very
quickly, but I think it is very important for all listeners to
fully appreciate the gravity of the situation in Yemen.
Approximately how many people, Mr. Jenkins, require
humanitarian assistance in Yemen?
Mr. Jenkins. 22 million people.
Senator Young. What percent of the population is that?
Mr. Jenkins. Approximately 75 percent.
Senator Young. Was the number of people requiring
humanitarian assistance increased from last year?
Mr. Jenkins. It increased by, we are estimating, 3.5
million people.
Senator Young. And how much has it increased?
Mr. Jenkins. About 3.5 million people.
Senator Young. How many are severely food insecure?
Mr. Jenkins. 17.8 million.
Senator Young. How many children are severely malnourished?
Mr. Jenkins. 460,000.
Senator Young. How many people lack access to clean water
and working toilets?
Mr. Jenkins. We estimate it to be around 16 million people.
Senator Young. Does Yemen face the largest cholera outbreak
in the world?
Mr. Jenkins. It does.
Senator Young. How many cholera cases have we seen in
Yemen?
Mr. Jenkins. A suspected over 1 million cases.
Senator Young. And how many lives has that cholera outbreak
claimed?
Mr. Jenkins. Almost 2,300.
Senator Young. And, Ambassador Satterfield, do you agree
with Mr. Jenkins' assessment of the humanitarian crisis in
Yemen?
Ambassador Satterfield. Absolutely, sir.
Senator Young. So when we confront such horrible
humanitarian suffering, I think we feel a moral imperative to
act. I certainly do.
Mr. Jenkins, in your prepared statement, you go further
than that, echoing testimony of David Beasley, Matt Nims, and
others. You write we have a national security imperative to do
all we can to alleviate the humanitarian suffering in Yemen.
Mr. Jenkins, very briefly, why do you believe we have a
national security imperative to alleviate this humanitarian
crisis?
Mr. Jenkins. So when USAID provides humanitarian
assistance, we are projecting both the generosity of the United
States and also what our government and people are all about.
We do that because it is the right thing to do but also because
it does protect our national security to make sure that these
places are stabilized, that deaths are kept at a minimum, and
that suffering is alleviated.
Senator Young. So on March 14, I convened a subcommittee
hearing on why food security matters. I encourage anyone
interested in Yemen and food security issues to review the
transcript of that hearing or the video of that hearing.
The hearing made clear there is a strong evidentiary and
scholarly basis to conclude it is in America's clear national
security interest to address food insecurity, among other types
of--you know, whether it is medical aid and so forth.
Retired Marine Corps Lieutenant General Castellaw testified
at that hearing that food crises grow terrorists.
Mr. Jenkins, do you agree we should expect all parties to
the conflict to undertake measures to alleviate the
humanitarian crisis in Yemen by increasing access for Yemenis
to food, fuel, and medicine, including through Yemen's Red Sea
ports, the airport in Sanaa, and external border crossings?
Mr. Jenkins. Absolutely.
Senator Young. And to be clear, does that include the
Saudis?
Mr. Jenkins. Absolutely.
Senator Young. Ambassador Satterfield, you write in your
prepared statement, quote, ``the administration shares your
belief that ending the conflict in Yemen is in our national
security interest.'' Mr. Ambassador, based on this
administration position, do you believe we should expect all
parties to the conflict to undertake an urgent and good faith
effort to conduct diplomatic negotiations to end the civil war
in Yemen?
Ambassador Satterfield. We do, sir.
Senator Young. And should that include the Saudis, sir?
Ambassador Satterfield. Absolutely it should.
Senator Young. And then lastly, Ambassador Satterfield, in
your prepared statement, you emphasize the importance of
adhering to the Law of Armed Conflict, including the obligation
to take all feasible precautions to reduce the risk of harm to
civilians.
Mr. Ambassador, do you agree it is important and
appropriate for the U.S. to continue to press the Saudi-led
coalition to take demonstrable action to reduce the risk of
harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure resulting from
its military operations in Yemen?
Ambassador Satterfield. I do, sir.
Senator Young. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Corker, Ranking Member
Menendez, for holding this important hearing on the world's
greatest humanitarian crisis caused by the ongoing conflict in
Yemen.
And I would like thank our three witnesses both for
appearing before the committee and for your service in this
difficult challenge confronting us with so many other pressing
challenges in the Middle East, not just this crisis in Yemen
but also our military action against Syria over the weekend.
I am just going to echo what Senator Menendez said at the
outset, that it is more important than ever that the
administration formulate and deliver a comprehensive strategy
to the Congress and the American people so that we can better
engage with and understand and judge what is the path forward
in terms of confronting and restraining Iran's aggressive
behavior, which I think is a central cause of this ongoing
conflict in Yemen and is a critical driver of Bashar al Assad's
barbarism in Syria. And I will insist that we need to hear more
from the President and his team represented here by way of a
comprehensive strategy in the near future. But let us today
continue to drill down on some of the specifics of this
particular conflict if we could.
Humanitarian access first. Senator Young asked a number of
questions admirably. He has been very engaged on the issue of
humanitarian access through ports. Let me just add, if I could,
a question about the closure of Sanaa's airport because of
military strikes led by the Saudi coalition. Sanaa's airport
has largely been closed to humanitarian relief and assistance
and to those who might seek to leave for medical purposes.
How can we address Saudi Arabia's legitimate security
concerns around that airport and its use for the importation of
weapons while at the same time making it possible for civilians
trapped in Houthi-controlled areas to get medical care, to get
food, to get clean water. Ambassador Satterfield, if you would
start us off.
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, you have singled out
exactly the reasons why Sanaa airport should be fully opened
for movements in and out, not just for humanitarian, so
labeled, purposes but general purposes as well. How best to
assure that the genuine concerns of Saudi Arabia are met? There
are a variety of regimes that have been put successfully in
place to, for lack of a better word, sterilize or assure that
cargos and people moving in and out of the airport are what
they ought to be without significantly diminishing the ability
of the airport to function.
We, the United Nations have repeatedly proposed such
regimes. Some have worked partially. The airport has a greater
level of operation today than it did if we go back to early and
mid-November, but more needs to be done. We believe the
mechanisms are out there. The U.N. is willing to participate in
them, and we think they can be made to work.
Senator Coons. Thank you for that answer.
Let me talk just a little bit more about water shortages,
as several of you have spoken to. Both the Houthis and the
Saudis have blocked deliveries of water to civilians and
destroyed water infrastructure, which has, in large part,
contributed to water scarcity, to the world's greatest cholera
outbreak. Do you believe access to and control over water is
one of the drivers of the conflict in Yemen? And how does that
exacerbate the humanitarian crisis, and what can we best do to
tackle the access to clean water challenges?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, in Yemen control over
water resources is not one of the primary drivers of the
conflict. Yemen is blessed with a variety of water supplies not
found elsewhere in the Middle East.
The problem with water--and I will defer to my colleague
from AID--is the elimination of reliable electricity supplies
to purification in water treatment plants, appropriate sewage
disposal. It is a very basic phenomenon, but it stems from
restrictions on electricity delivery which, in turn, are the
product of some damage to transmittal lines, but more
importantly, lack of consistent supplies of affordable fuel.
Senator Coons. Mr. Jenkins.
Mr. Jenkins. The Ambassador nailed it on that one.
Basically when you see or hear about fuel not getting to
where it needs to go in Yemen, that immediately correlates
itself to people not being able to pump the water that they
need, not being able to fuel the generators that keep the
lights on in hospitals. And water is a critical, critical
problem for the humanitarian situation.
Senator Coons. Let me ask, if I might, one last question.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, AQAP, has been cited as one
of the more lethal terrorist organizations in the world. Do you
think AQAP is a greater threat to the United States now than it
was at the beginning of the conflict back in September of 2015?
Have we had any successes in degrading their capabilities? And
most importantly I think from a security perspective, given the
quote Senator Young just shared with us that food crises grow
terrorists, what about our alignment, our strategy, our
engagement might make us less secure today as a result of the
conduct of the last 3 years?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, as you know, we had a
relatively sizeable presence in Yemen prior to the conflict
focused with the legitimate Government of Yemen in going after
AQAP because of the specific threat it poses to the homeland.
That presence and our activities were significantly undermined
by the collapse of the government and the outbreak of civil war
in 2014 and 2015. We have made strides in reconstituting our
efforts through our local partnerships, first with the
legitimate Government of Yemen, as well as with other partner
forces who are on the ground.
But AQAP remains a significant threat. They have benefited
from the civil war that has created open territory and safe
areas for them. But as the Emiratis in particular have made
progress in helping the Government of Yemen maintain control in
certain areas, it has denied more area to AQAP. We,
nevertheless, have continued to have to take a number of
strikes against this very significant terrorist threat, and so
it remains a challenge. But we are making progress.
Senator Coons. Thank you all. The same conclusion is it is
clearly both in our humanitarian interest and in our national
security interest to reach a resolution of this conflict as
soon as is possible. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Gardner.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to the witnesses for your testimony.
In the briefing documents that we were given for this
hearing today, a comment was made, as the war continues, the
risk of it spreading beyond Yemeni territory appears to be
growing. You would agree with that, Ambassador Satterfield?
Ambassador Satterfield. Only in the sense that Iranian
proliferation, which has taken advantage of this conflict, is a
broader threat than just in Yemen.
Senator Gardner. Secretary Karem, would you agree with
that?
Mr. Karem. I agree with Ambassador Satterfield.
Senator Gardner. In a letter from, I think, General Counsel
William Castle, Department of Defense Acting General Counsel,
to Senator Schumer and McConnell, it was talking about the
extent of U.S. involvement. To quote the letter, ``the United
States provides the KSA-led coalition defense articles and
services, including air-to-air refueling, certain intelligence
support and military advice, including advice regarding
compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict and best practices
for reducing the risk of civilian casualties.'' Is this the
extent of our involvement?
Mr. Karem. That is the extent of our involvement with
respect to the support of the coalition's efforts in the civil
war. We obviously provide different support with respect to CT
operations using different authorities.
Senator Gardner. Ambassador Satterfield?
Ambassador Satterfield. We provide a variety of
humanitarian, as well as political support and engagement. But,
yes, it is an accurate accounting of our military support and
intel support for the coalition.
Senator Gardner. What is a ballpark personnel figure that
we have right now involved with Yemen?
Mr. Karem. I believe we have roughly 50 personnel in Saudi
Arabia, but they are conducting a variety of activities,
including I think largely helping on the ballistic missile
threat.
Senator Gardner. Ambassador Satterfield, I was late to the
hearing. We schedule hearings around here at the same exact
time, so I had a couple of other hearings to attend prior to
joining this one.
Ambassador Satterfield, so you may have done this already.
Could you just lay out quickly our administration's goals as it
relates to the conflict in Yemen?
Ambassador Satterfield. Our goals are to facilitate
primarily through support for the United Nations but also
through our own direct engagement with key Yemeni parties, with
the Saudis, with the Emiratis a comprehensive political
resolution or a process which has the prospect of producing
such a resolution and, in that process, reduces the level of
conflict.
It is also a policy goal to limit, roll back Iranian
influence and projection of Iranian force through the
Revolutionary Guard Corps, particularly in the form of support
for Houthi challenges to Saudi sovereignty.
Senator Gardner. Secretary Karem, I think you had made a
comment. I want to make sure I get it right here. So you can
correct me if I am wrong. You said there is precious little
evidence that Iran is interested in any kind of a settlement.
Does that kind of paraphrase what you said?
Mr. Karem. Yes, although I would really say Iran benefits
from continuing the conflict. They are fueling the conflict as
they are in Syria and elsewhere.
Senator Gardner. So, Ambassador Satterfield, given what
Secretary Karem has said and our objectives, we do not really
seem to be gaining anywhere at this point.
Ambassador Satterfield. We have, in fact, a more promising
political scene in Yemen today. We believe it is a better
prospect for the new U.N. Special Envoy, Martin Griffiths, to
work in. We see a greater degree of Emirati and Saudi support,
genuine support, being proffered for him than was the case a
year ago with his predecessor.
On the Iranian side, we are working actively to address the
ability of the Iranians to proliferate particularly missiles
into Houthi hands. That is an ongoing process, which we hope
can bear fruit in the not distant future.
Senator Gardner. The United Nations report recently said
that the authority of the legitimate Government of Yemen has
now eroded to the point that it is doubtful whether it will
ever be able to reunite Yemen as a single country. Do you agree
with that?
Ambassador Satterfield. The future of Yemen on that macro
level, single country, two states as it was prior to 1993, is a
matter for Yemenis to decide and undoubtedly will be one of the
issues addressed in any comprehensive peace process is one of
the issues which the UN has been grappling with. But more
fundamentally than that meta question is the simple issue of
how do you construct a political process that brings and keeps
all of the parties, including the Houthis, in the game, offers
them a stake in the outcome of the game, and sees through the
process a diminishing of the level of violence and disruption
to civilian life. That is the challenge.
Senator Gardner. Ambassador, you mentioned proliferation.
Could you describe for me the entities inside Iran that are
engaged in weapons proliferation? Or actually a better question
is have they been designated or sanctioned under the May 2012
Yemen executive order?
Ambassador Satterfield. They have, indeed, sir. It is the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and the associated entities
working through and with the Corps.
Senator Gardner. The Jerusalem Post recently reported a
German company provided Iran with dual-use goods that
ultimately were used in the recent Syrian chemical weapons
attack. Is there a risk of Iran proliferating this kind of
attack in Yemen as well or in Saudi Arabia?
Ambassador Satterfield. I am not sure in this forum we
could go into significant detail about Iran's potential
chemical weapons capabilities. We are obviously very concerned
that they have taken the step that they have to provide long-
range ballistic missile capabilities for the Houthis to fire at
civilian populations.
Senator Gardner. Have we seen evidence of chemical agents
in Yemen?
Ambassador Satterfield. We would have to brief you in a
closed session I think, sir.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Murphy.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Admitting that you made a mistake is a very difficult
thing. America's biggest foreign policy mistakes come when we
make a decision for military engagement and then we do not
allow for facts on the ground to educate us about a mistake
that we have made. The definition of insanity is doing the same
thing over and over again and expecting a different set of
results. And I feel like that is where we are 5 years into a
conflict in which nothing has changed except for the worse. The
Houthis control effectively the same amount of the country that
they did at the outset. The humanitarian nightmare has gotten
even worse, and yet we are still sitting here today talking
about a peace process blossoming out of a reality on the ground
that does not look very different than it did a year or 2 years
ago.
And so, Mr. Satterfield, let me pose this theory of the
case to you. I have great respect for you, but I really do
think that this impression that you are giving the committee
that the Iranians do not want to come to the table and the
Saudis and the Emiratis do is spin because the reason that we
are asking you questions about reports of an assault on
Hudaydah is that the Saudis have made it pretty clear to
everyone that has asked them that they are not going to come to
the table until the military battle lines on the ground inside
Yemen change and that until they get the Houthis back on their
heels militarily, they are not going to come to the negotiating
table. And yet, you are telling us that you think that the
Saudis are going to engage even if, after 5 years of trying to
get the battle lines to be different, they have no success.
So why are the Saudis going to come to the table today if
for 5 years they have trying to move the battle lines without
success? The reason we are asking you these questions about
Hudaydah is that they have communicated to us that they are
planning an assault on Hudaydah as a means of trying to change
the dynamics in anticipation of a negotiation.
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, the last 3 years that this
conflict has endured have not just shown a status quo. It has
been a worsening of the situation with respect to military
picture. The posture of the Houthis is strengthened today in
comparison to what it was 3 years ago. The presence of opposing
non-Houthi forces, Ali Abdullah Saleh, the General People's
Congress, is significantly more diminished or fragmented. The
presence of other elements, Islah, other actors, Ali Mohsen, in
this conflict have less influence to bring to bear. Now, that
may appear to be more of a chaotic mix and thus more difficult
to bring to a resolution. Perhaps out of some sense of
optimism, I choose to see it differently. It is a situation in
which the hope that somehow military force alone could compel
the Houthis as a unique party to come to the table on reduced
terms is illusory. And we use exactly those terms with the
Saudis and Emiratis.
Senator Murphy. But that has been the Saudi position for
the last 5 years, that military pressure, continued military
pressure, an average of 15 airstrikes a day for 3 years
consecutive is going to bring the Houthis to the table. That
has been the theory of the case from the Saudi coalition's
perspective. Correct?
Ambassador Satterfield. It is the Saudi position that
military force needs to be continued to apply. Our response to
the Saudis at the highest levels has been that application of
force has not been and is not predictably likely to be
successful in achieving that----
Senator Murphy. And we have been unsuccessful in changing
their mind for 5 years, and we expect things to change.
Mr. Jenkins, we are comparing the current state of
humanitarian relief to a moment in time last fall when
virtually no relief was getting through. That is not the proper
comparison or at least a useful comparison.
So let me just quote from a recent U.N. report that
suggests that today half as many vessels are getting into
Hudaydah and Saleef as before the blockade and that on average,
the Saudi inspection process is adding 100 days to relief
supplies getting into these ports despite the fact that we have
a U.N. verification process that is taking a look at these
ships as well.
Why do the Saudis need to continue to look at every single
ship that comes in, chilling the interest in humanitarian
supplies, adding additional time when we have a U.N. process
that so far has shown no evidence of not actually being able to
conduct these inspections?
Mr. Jenkins. So, Senator, it is true that throughput at the
Port of Hudaydah has not yet gotten back to the level we saw
before the October-November enclosure. And there has been a
very chilling effect on shippers, particularly shippers using
containerized vessels who do not want to take the risk of going
to Hudaydah and also because they do not know how long it will
take to go through clearance.
However, we have been working very carefully--the State
Department, USAID, other donors--with the coalition to reduce
the time that the EHOC process--that is the coalition's
Evacuation Humanitarian Assistance Operations Cell. In the
month of April 3rd, we got that down to about 3 to 4 days. So
it is not 100 days. There has been a lot of work done getting
the communication between that process and the U.N.
verification and inspection mechanism process together. The
U.N. system, UNVIM, gets back within 48 hours on a
determination of whether or not a vessel actually needs to be
searched or not, and then it goes through the EHOC process. We
have seen, particularly in the last 6 weeks, significant
progress on that, and we are looking forward to reducing those
times even more.
What we do need is we need shippers in the region to know
how long it will take and that will, hopefully, get more
shipping back into Hudaydah Port, particularly
compartmentalized cargo.
Senator Murphy. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Flake.
Senator Flake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding the
hearing.
And thank you for the testimony.
Following up on Senator Coons' questions with regard to
AQAP, it strikes me--it is difficult. We are working at kind of
cross purposes there. Can somebody give me an assessment of
AQAP and their position relative to their ability to project
force for the homeland, as was mentioned, now versus 2 years
ago? What position are they in?
Mr. Karem. Senator, off the top of my head, I cannot give
you a good indication of their current strength now versus 2
years ago. I think we did see at the beginning of the conflict
and in the early years of the conflict a real diminution of the
pressure we were able to apply on them. In the last year, we
have been able to apply much more pressure. As General Votel
testified just last month, we took over 100 strikes, in
coordination with our partners, against AQAP in Yemen last
year. So we are putting significant pressure on them, but as I
said, they continue to plot and plan to conduct terrorist
attacks.
Senator Flake. We have been able to do that still without
impacting the effort against the Houthis.
Mr. Karem. There is some geographical separation in where
these threats are based, and so my understanding is that they
are separated. But, nevertheless, because we require support
from the Government of Yemen and other local partners,
everything is connected. And so it is a very complicated
situation. It is also why we are worried about the longer this
civil war rages, the harder it will be to establish the
conditions for us to bring it in to the threat that AQAP poses.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
Ambassador Satterfield, as you know, the Senate has taken
several votes in recent history that would impact our ability
to work with our Saudi partners on this issue. Most recently we
voted on a resolution that would have required the President to
withdraw all forces deployed in support of the Saudi coalition.
The chairman just mentioned new legislation that we will be
considering that looks to certain certifications that will be
met.
What is your view on this legislation? Will it help? Is it
a hindrance? How is it viewed by the administration?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, I have just seen the text
of the proposed resolution and we will be reviewing that and
responding.
Senator Flake. Any other thoughts on this type of
certification? Sometimes some say it is easy to have a
certification list depending on what snapshot in time you look
at. You mentioned you wanted to comment.
Mr. Karem. I have not seen the text of the legislation. I
would say I think there are some concerns that we have had with
hard conditionality. I think we are very happy to come up here
to talk about the progress we are making and the kinds of
pressure and conversations we are having with our partners to
improve their targeting and their application of the Law of
Armed Conflict, but worry that hard conditionality, in part
because the Houthis get a vote, could negatively affect our
efforts to influence their behavior.
Senator Flake. Ambassador Satterfield, if we were asked to
certify right now if Saudi Arabia was working earnestly to
achieve a political settlement allowing humanitarian aid to
pass into Yemen and protecting civilians in Yemen in order for
U.S. support for their efforts, could we make that
certification now?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, you will understand if I
respond to that hypothetical were that a condition of
assistance, the administration would carefully consider on all
bases how best to respond. But I am not able to do so now.
Senator Flake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Markey.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Karem, General Votel, the Commander of the U.S.
Central Command, recently called Iran's arming of the Yemeni
rebels with ballistic missiles a, quote, ``growing threat,
which I think poses a significant danger not just to Saudis and
Emiratis, but poses a risk to us.'' Can you explain why we
should accept DoD's circular logic that once the administration
at the political level inserts itself into a conflict, American
service members are exposed to risks which then justifies
continued U.S. participation in the conflict? It is a never-
ending circle.
Mr. Karem. Senator, I think that even if the United States
was not involved in helping our partners in Yemen, even if we
were not involved in conducting efforts against AQAP in Yemen,
Iran's development of ballistic missile capabilities,
transference of these ballistic missile capabilities would pose
a threat to the United States, not just because it poses a
threat to our partners in the region, be that the UAE or Saudi
Arabia or Israel, but because there are hundreds of thousands
of Americans who live in the Middle East. I believe there are
nearly 100,000 Americans who live in Saudi Arabia. So the
Iranian-backed Houthis' willingness to fire ballistic missiles
at populated areas in the Middle East I think poses a threat
not just to our partners but to us.
Senator Markey. Okay, but when we provide refueling service
to Saudi coalition aircraft, do we have any say in the
operation that those aircraft are conducting? In other words,
do we know for a fact or can we assert that the Saudi coalition
aircraft we refuel are engaging only in counterterrorism
strikes and not in anti-Houthi operations?
Mr. Karem. Senator, I believe we know that they are
conducting counter-Houthi operations. As I mentioned earlier
and as I think General Votel testified, we do not monitor every
flight. We do not have the personnel or assets to do that given
our other obligations.
I would want to correct the impression that we do not
follow and do not track civilian casualties in Yemen.
Obviously, we have intelligence reporting and also reporting
from NGOs who are on the ground. And it is a range of
information we have that leads us to believe that our partners
have improved their capacity in limiting civilian casualties.
Senator Markey. Yes, but of course, the more that we are
involved, the more at risk--as General Votel says, it poses a
risk to us. So we are getting in deeper and deeper here. And we
again we have not had the decision made by Congress in terms of
the level of our intervention.
Does the United States in any way provide advice on what
targets Saudi coalition aircraft target?
Mr. Karem. We provide advice with respect to how to conduct
targeting. We do not provide advice on specific targets is my
understanding.
Senator Markey. It is your understanding that when the
planes take off after being refueled by the U.S. and that you
are helping them make general targeting decisions, that you do
not think that the United States has any idea where these
planes are going and what they are going to hit. Is that what
you are saying?
Mr. Karem. As I said, we do not monitor and track
individual aircraft. We have a general idea, obviously, that--
--
Senator Markey. Do we have a policy which we express to the
Saudis with regard to the targets that we do not want to have
hit? Do we tell them expressly?
Mr. Karem. I think we have been very clear with our
partners about their obligations under the Law of Armed
Conflict to avoid non-combatant casualties----
Senator Markey. And what level of confidence do you have
that they have abided by that?
Mr. Karem. I think we have a growing level of confidence. I
would, though, defer to assessments from our intelligence
services who I believe----
Senator Markey. So you are saying it is a high confidence
that they do not do it. Is that what you are saying?
Mr. Karem. I think we have a high degree of confidence that
their targeting processes have improved----
Senator Markey. No, no. Is it a high level of confidence
that they are not hitting civilian targets? So you have a high
level of confidence that they are not hitting civilian targets.
Mr. Karem. I think, unfortunately, our experience is that
it is impossible to have a 100 percent record at avoiding
civilian casualties in war.
Senator Markey. So you think there is only a 1 percent
chance that they are hitting civilians. Is that what you are
saying? Because it is not 100 percent you are saying, but 99
percent confident that they are not?
Mr. Karem. I am saying they have made improvements in their
efforts to avoid civilian casualties in large part because of
the support that we have provided. In the absence of U.S.
support, I would not be so confident that that level of
assurance would continue.
Senator Markey. Do you have any sort of quantitative
evidence to support that assertion?
Mr. Karem. Yes. I believe that we have reporting about the
number of strikes that have been taken, and I think there is
intelligence reporting and public reporting about the level of
civilian casualties.
Senator Markey. So that is quantitatively determined and
available to this committee?
Mr. Karem. I am sure in closed session that there are
materials that are available.
Senator Markey. Materials that go to the quantitative
evidence.
Mr. Karem. I believe so, yes, sir.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gardner. [presiding]: Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all for your service.
An estimated 10,000 Yemeni civilians have been killed by
Saudi airstrikes. Last year, Saudi Arabia claimed it would
engage in a $750 million multiyear training program through the
American military to help prevent the accidental killing of
civilians in the Saudi-led air campaign against the Houthi.
When the Saudis say multiyear, how long is it going to take to
get the Saudi military to stop accidentally killing civilians?
Mr. Karem. Senator, as I said, I think we have seen clear
indications that they are making progress, but war is
incredibly difficult and it is impossible for any military to
promise it can conduct military operations without any risk to
civilian casualties. Our belief is that by continued
partnership with the Saudis, that we can help improve their
capabilities. If we do not provide that kind of support, there
are others who will who do not care about civilian casualties.
The Russians do not similarly provide the kind of training and
advice with respect to civilian casualties that the United
States does.
Senator Udall. Thank you.
Do any of the other panelists want to comment on that?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, yes. Building on Secretary
Karem's remarks, there are two challenges posed through
coalition military activities in Yemen. One is collateral
civilian casualties. We have worked over this past year in a
manner that from both an anecdotal and a qualitative fashion we
believe have achieved demonstrable progress. And there is,
indeed, in another setting summary information available on why
we make that statement.
But there is another aspect, which has been addressed by
many of the members of this committee as well, which is the
military campaign against the Houthis--that is, against
military Houthi targets--and whether that is an effective means
of producing a peace resolution. We do all in our power as a
partner of the Saudis in mitigating civilian casualties, but we
also counsel the Saudis and have done so at the highest levels
of the government that the military campaign against Houthi
military targets is not, in our view, an effective way of
bringing about a peace settlement.
They are two different issues, but they combine to the same
place, which is a political resolution vice a military
resolution is necessary here.
Senator Udall. Thank you.
Mr. Satterfield and Mr. Jenkins mentioned that the lack of
access to clean water is due to the lack of fuel or energy to
pump the water. How much would the international community need
to contribute to fix this problem and restore access to clean
water and meet basic nutrition and sanitation needs?
Mr. Jenkins. Thank you. Not being able to put an amount on
it, the issue is the access. If access is free and unfettered
through both the ports and road networks inside and in the road
networks throughout, shortages of fuel should not exist.
Senator Udall. Are there currently requests in the foreign
operations budget to help provide these resources to do what I
was asking about?
Mr. Jenkins. There is no request specifically. We use
contingency funding in the International Disaster Assistance
account, and we do not specify even by country, leaving us
maximum flexibility to respond to whatever needs we can
globally and within Yemen. So there is no specific request for
that.
There is a fuel mechanism now set up through the United
Nations specifically for the importation of fuel through
Hudaydah Port for the use by humanitarian actors on the ground.
Senator Udall. Please let us know if additional resources
are needed.
There have been considerable reports from human rights
watchdogs and the Associated Press that detainees have been
tortured. The United Arab Emirates have been implicated in
these allegations. What is your assessment of the UAE
involvement in the torture of detainees, and what action has
the State Department taken to address this issue?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, in this session, we are
engaged with the UAE authorities on these allegations with
respect to what may or may not have occurred and what steps
need to be taken to provide a satisfactory level of assurance
that there is no such practice going on.
Senator Udall. Thank you.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Senator Udall.
Senator Menendez for a follow-up question.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Ambassador Satterfield, the Countering America's
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act directed the administration
to mandatorily impose sanctions on Iran for its violation of
the international arms embargo. In the past year, the U.N.
Panel of Experts on Yemen informed the Security Council of Iran
violating the arms embargo.
As a result of the U.N. information, has the administration
imposed any additional sanctions as required by CAATSA?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, I will respond to your
question in writing.
[The Committee Received No Response From Ambassador
Satterfield]
Senator Menendez. Okay. Is that because you do not know the
answer?
Ambassador Satterfield. I do not know the specific answer.
We will respond in detail.
Senator Menendez. Okay, because your earlier answer to me
is unsatisfactory insofar as that from my view, since you gave
me that answer is that there have been no specific mandatory
sanctions placed on Iran as a result of the violations of arms
embargo, this being one element of it. So I am of the view that
when we pass something here in the Senate 98 to 2, and
overwhelmingly in the House, that that is the law of the land
and the law needs to be implemented, especially against an
adversary which we are so concerned about in the region. So I
look forward to that answer.
Senator Gardner. Senator Young.
Senator Young. Mr. Jenkins, historically roughly 90 percent
of the food that goes into the country of Yemen has come in
from the outside. It is imported into the country, and a
significant amount of their fuel and medicine is as well. 70 to
80 percent of those imports come in through the Port of
Hudaydah.
With that in mind, what would be the implications, the
humanitarian consequences of an attack on the Port of Hudaydah
by the Saudi-led coalition?
Mr. Jenkins. With the temporary closure of Hudaydah back in
October and November, we saw that an extended closure of the
port would be catastrophic to the humanitarian needs in the
country.
Senator Young. Can you throw some numbers? I do not know if
there are internal projections about, over a certain period of
time, the impact that would have on the number of people that
would succumb to disease and hunger and so forth.
Mr. Jenkins. So I do not have numbers offhand. I do know
that the vast majority of people within that--or the majority
of people in need in that 22 million number live in the
northern part of the country that are accessible best and
easiest by Hudaydah Port. There is no way to take Hudaydah out
of the equation and get anywhere near the amount of
humanitarian and, more importantly even, commercial goods into
the country.
Senator Young. I have a related question to both you, Mr.
Jenkins, and Ambassador Satterfield relating to the clearance
process, which was discussed a bit earlier. But what more can
I, as a Member of the United States Senate, do to be helpful in
ensuring that there is a more expeditious delivery of food,
fuel, and medicine through the ports?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, your efforts, the efforts
of your colleagues in this body and on this committee have been
exceedingly helpful in allowing the administration to send a
message from whole of government regarding the very specific
concerns we have over any limitations, restrictions,
constraints on the ability of both humanitarian and commercial
goods, specifically to include fuel, to have unrestricted and
expeditious entry into Yemen. And that messaging, which comes
from us, the executive branch, also comes from this body, is
extremely important.
Senator Young. Well, I want to thank you personally,
Ambassador Satterfield. You did reference our previous
conversations and work on this. And I am glad you are on the
beat. You bring great credit upon yourself and the Department
of State and represent our country quite well in this difficult
situation.
I would like to summarize some of the things I elicited in
my earlier round of questioning. Mr. Jenkins agreed we should
expect all parties to the conflict to undertake measures to
alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Yemen. Ambassador
Satterfield said we should expect all parties to undertake an
urgent and good faith effort to conduct diplomatic negotiations
to end the civil war there. And Ambassador Satterfield said we
are right to continue to press the Saudi-led coalition to take
demonstrable action to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and
civilian infrastructure resulting from its military operations
in Yemen.
So for my colleagues, as they review the transcript of this
hearing, I think it is important that they note that all three
of those statements reflect the certification requirements in
Senate joint resolution 58, which Senator Shaheen, Collins, and
Coons helped me introduce last week.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Senator Young.
Thank you, Ambassador Satterfield. Secretary Karem, thank
you very much. And, Mr. Jenkins, thank you for your time and
testimony and sharing your expertise with us.
For the information of Senators, the record will remain
open until the close of business on Thursday, including for
members to submit questions for the record. We would ask the
witnesses to return answers to those questions submitted for
the record as quickly as possible.
With the thanks of this committee, this hearing is now
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Mr. Robert Jenkins to Questions
Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. As was noted in the hearing, the U.N.'s Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimates that 75% of Yemen's
population of 30 million needs assistance, an increase of 3.4 million
from last year. How is U.S. foreign assistance being spent in Yemen?
How much is actually needed to address the humanitarian crisis? Do NGOs
have the access they need to provide humanitarian aid? How is the Saudi
government reacting to the humanitarian crisis?
Answer. As one of the largest donors of humanitarian aid to Yemen,
the United States has provided more than $854 million in humanitarian
assistance since the beginning of Fiscal Year 2017. This life-saving
assistance includes food, safe drinking water, treatment for
malnutrition, emergency medical care, shelter, legal aid, psychosocial
support, and improved sanitation and hygiene kits to fight the spread
of diseases, among other assistance.
According to the U.N., approximately $2.96 billion is needed to
provide assistance to the 13.1 million people targeted for assistance
in 2018, out of the 22 million people who are in need of humanitarian
aid. On April 3, international donors pledged more than $2 billion to
support the U.N. Humanitarian Response Plan. If realized, the pledges
would account for two-thirds of the response plan. The United States
welcomes the Saudi-led Coalition's $930 million contribution to the
U.N. in early April. However, the U.S. Government continues to
emphasize that unrestricted access for all humanitarian and commercial
imports through all ports is necessary for averting famine and helping
millions of people in need.
Ongoing conflict, general insecurity, and bureaucratic access
impediments--including restrictions on ground movements and on the
importation of humanitarian and commercial goods--pose the most
significant challenges to relief operations. Although Red Sea ports
have re-opened, concerns about future restrictions and clearance delays
have created a chilling effect, stopping shipments from returning to a
level that can meet needs. The flow of commercial goods is also a
humanitarian imperative. Given the scale of the crisis and that Yemen
traditionally imports 90 percent of its food and most of its fuel and
medicines, humanitarian aid alone cannot address the needs--commercial
imports must continue and increase to pre-conflict levels. Despite
these challenges, the U.S. Government's partners continue to provide
life-saving assistance to millions of people.
______
Responses of Mr. Robert Jenkins to Questions
Submitted by Senator Todd Young
Question. Is there any evidence of large scale diversion of
humanitarian assistance going into Yemen by any party to the conflict--
including the Houthis?
Answer. Diversion occurs when cash or in-kind assistance does not
reach the intended recipient. While there are access constraints in
Yemen, including delays in clearing humanitarian aid through the ports,
the U.S. Government has not received evidence of any large-scale
diversions. Information received from the U.S. Government's trusted
U.N. and non-governmental organization partners and other sources does
not support, and in many cases refutes, allegations of systemic
diversions of humanitarian aid.
Humanitarian aid provided by the United States is intended for the
millions of children, women, and men in need in Yemen, and there is no
acceptable level of aid diversion. The United States takes any
allegations of diversion of humanitarian assistance very seriously, and
we follow up with every alleged incident of diversion reported. The
U.S. Government requires implementing partners to have proper
safeguards and risk mitigation systems in place to ensure that
humanitarian aid reaches those who need it most. USAID also supports a
third-party monitor--an oversight tool in countries where we have a
restricted presence--conducting independent verification of
humanitarian activities and reporting back directly to USAID.
______
Responses of Hon. Robert S. Karem to Questions
Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. According to a March 2016 piece in Foreign Affairs, a
Hezbollah commander told the authors ``After we are done with Syria, we
will start with Yemen, Hezbollah is already there,'' and added, ``Who
do you think fires Tochka missiles into Saudi Arabia? It's not the
Houthis in their sandals, it's us.'' Is Hezbollah supporting the
Houthis? If so, how? Do you believe that once the Syrian civil war
ends, Hezbollah will shift its focus to Yemen? Is Hezbollah in Yemen at
the direction of Tehran?
Answer. As we have seen with Iran's support to Lebanese Hizballah,
Tehran is providing advanced weaponry to the Houthis in violation of
United Nations Security Council Resolutions. With Iranian support, the
Houthis are launching increasingly sophisticated missiles at Saudi
civilian sites and population centers, increasing the risk of a broader
regional conflict. I can provide additional details in a classified
setting.
Question. As was noted in the hearing, the U.N.'s Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimates that 75% of Yemen's
population of 30 million needs assistance, an increase of 3.4 million
from last year. How is U.S. foreign assistance being spent in Yemen?
How much is actually needed to address the humanitarian crisis? Do NGOs
have the access they need to provide humanitarian aid? How is the Saudi
government reacting to the humanitarian crisis?
Answer. The U.S. Government is providing life-saving humanitarian
assistance to internally displaced persons and other conflict-affected
populations in Yemen. U.S. Government activities focus on addressing
the health and nutritional needs of those most affected by the
conflict. Access remains a key impediment to the provision of
humanitarian aid. In addition to exacerbating the civil conflict, the
Houthis disrupt and commandeer the distribution of humanitarian aid and
commercial goods, and exploit aid deliveries for their own political
and financial gain. Saudi Arabia is one of the largest humanitarian
assistance donors to the people in Yemen. Just last month, Saudi Arabia
and the UAE provided nearly $1 billion in assistance to the U.N.'s
Yemen Humanitarian Fund. We do believe the Saudis can do more to
address Yemen's humanitarian concerns and we continue to work closely
with them on this important issue.
Question. Up to this point, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has
committed very few ground forces to its fight in Yemen, focusing almost
exclusively on the air war. It is starting to look like this approach
has accomplished as much as it can and it might be time for the Saudi
government to reconsider its approach to the situation. Are we now in a
stalemate, with neither the Saudis nor Houthis able to defeat
decisively the other? Could an introduction of Saudi ground forces
change the situation? Does a lack of Saudi ground forces indicate that
Riyadh lacks the resolve to do what it would take to win the conflict
and end the humanitarian crisis?
Answer. We continue to reiterate to our partners that there is not
a military solution to this conflict, and we are hopeful that the new
U.N. Special Envoy to Yemen, Martin Griffiths, will be able to revive
negotiations towards a political settlement that would preserve Yemen's
unity and end the humanitarian crisis. At the same time, we are working
with Saudi Arabia to improve its capacity to defend its own sovereignty
and security as the Houthis continue to launch missile attacks on major
Saudi population centers.
Question. Is a unitary Yemen possible after years of civil war?
What would need to happen to create a stable and unitary Yemen? What
would be the consequences for Yemen and the region if the country re-
split?
Answer. We continue to believe that a unified Yemen is in U.S.
interests, and essential to closing the political and security vacuum
that AQAP and ISIS are exploiting. A split would divide the majority of
Yemen's population from its natural resources, which risks creating
incentives for future conflict and would undercut U.S. counterterrorism
efforts. DoD strongly supports the efforts of U.N. Special Envoy for
Yemen Martin Griffiths as he works to advance a political resolution to
the conflict that addresses the core concerns of key Yemeni political
actors.
______
Responses of Hon. Robert S. Karem to Questions
Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
Question. Has the Houthi threat to U.S. naval vessels in the
Persian Gulf increased or decreased over the course of the Saudi-led
war in Yemen?
Answer. Houthi forces, with Iranian backing, remain a significant
threat to both commercial and naval vessels in the Red Sea. Iran has
expanded its support to the Houthis since the start of the war and
allowed the Houthis access to new technologies. As recently as April 3,
Houthi forces attacked a Saudi oil tanker off the coast of Yemen. DoD
continues to work closely with our partners in the region to counter
this threat.
Question. Has U.S. involvement in the Yemen war increased the
threat of Houthi direct fire on U.S. forces or U.S. naval vessels? Has
the U.S. taken direct fire from Houthi targets?
Answer. The Houthis have attempted to broaden the conflict to a
regional war, including with missile attacks on major Saudi population
centers and on commercial and naval vessels in the Red Sea. U.S. forces
reserve the right to act in self-defense, and DoD responded to an
incident in October 2016 when Houthi insurgents launched anti-ship
cruise missiles that threatened U.S. navy warships in the international
waters of the Red Sea. U.S. forces have not been introduced into
hostilities or situations where hostilities are imminent in the civil
conflict in Yemen. Aerial refueling of Coalition aircraft conducting
counter-Houthi operations occurs outside of Yemeni airspace. U.S.
military forces do not accompany or participate in the movement of
Coalition forces in counter-Houthi operations in Yemen. U.S. military
forces conducting counterterrorism operations in Yemen are
geographically isolated from Houthi-controlled areas.
Question. In October 2016, the U.S. took strikes against radar
facilities in Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen to defend U.S. naval
ships in international waters. These strikes were justified based on
Article II, self-defense. The Administration has also said that U.S.
engagement in support of the Saudi war against the Houthis does not
constitute hostilities because the U.S. is not taking direct fire. Can
you explain the Administration's reasoning that it does not need an
AUMF to support the Houthi war in Yemen because U.S. forces are not
taking fire and then justify a response to the threat direct fire under
Article II?
Answer. The exchange of fire in October 2016 was an isolated
instance. U.S. personnel have not engaged in such exchanges of fire
against Houthi forces since October 2016. Acting DoD General Counsel
provided a detailed analysis to Senator McConnell on February 27
outlining the legal authorities underpinning DoD activities in Yemen.
Additional legal analysis on the radar strikes was communicated in a
letter from President Obama to Congress on October 14, 2016.
Question. Should these episodes increase in frequency, will the
Administration request an AUMF from Congress? In the counter-Houthi
context, how does the Administration define U.S. ``engagement in
hostilities?''
Answer. The United States does not seek to become an active
combatant in the Yemen civil war. Were that policy to change, the
Department would urge consultation with the Congress on the nature of
any future involvement. It has been the longstanding view of the
Executive Branch that ``hostilities'' for the purposes of the War
Powers Resolution refers to ``a situation in which units of U.S. armed
forces are actively engaged in exchanges of fire with opposing units of
hostile forces.'' U.S. forces have not engaged in any such exchanges of
fire with Houthi forces since acting in self-defense in October 2016.
U.S. forces always retain the right to respond in self-defense to
hostile acts or demonstrations of hostile intent, including any such
threats or attacks by Houthi insurgents.
Question. Does the Department of Defense believe that mid-flight
refueling and aerial targeting assistance constitutes the accompaniment
of ``regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or
government when such military forces are engaged'' per the War Powers
Resolution? Does refueling help the movement of foreign forces engaged
in a military conflict?
Answer. U.S. forces do not currently command, coordinate,
accompany, or participate in the movement of Coalition forces in
counter-Houthi operations in Yemen. No U.S. forces accompany the Saudi-
led Coalition when its military forces are engaged, or when an imminent
threat exists such that they could become engaged in hostilities.
Accordingly, U.S. forces supporting the Saudi-led Coalition in its
counter-Houthi operations have not been introduced into hostilities or
situations where hostilities are imminent.
Question. Are U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia participating in
assisting, advising, or refueling missions eligible for combat awards
or imminent danger pay, deemed in a tax-free status, or accruing
``combat leave?'' Does DoD's administrative system view them as being
in a ``peacetime'' or ``wartime'' environment in their current
assignment?
Answer. For certain administrative pay and benefits purposes, Saudi
Arabia has been regarded as a combat zone since January 1991. The
Internal Revenue Service considers all combat zones, as declared by the
President, to be tax-exclusion zones. Personnel supporting U.S.
military efforts in the Arabian Peninsula are in a tax-free status.
Combat awards are conditions-based awards. U.S. forces advising the
Saudi-led Coalition are not involved in hostilities, therefore are not
eligible for combat awards for this mission.
______
Responses of Hon. Robert S. Karem to Questions
Submitted by Senator Todd Young
Question. Compared to the previous year, has the number of civilian
casualties from the Saudi-led coalition air campaign increased or
decreased?
Answer. All parties to the conflict are responsible for civilian
casualties. We are aware of NGO and media reports of alleged civilian
casualty events, but we are unable to independently verify all of these
reports. We assess the Saudi-led coalition air campaign resulted in
fewer casualties than it otherwise would have without U.S. advisory
support. DoD continues to work with Saudi Arabia to improve its
capacity to defend itself while mitigating the risk to noncombatants.
U.S. advisers assess Saudi Arabia has made improvements in its conduct
of the war over the past year, including use of an expanded No-Strike
List and more stringent rules of engagement and increased attention to
efforts to mitigate risk of harm to civilians.
______
Responses of Hon. Robert S. Karem to Questions
Submitted by Senator Cory Booker
Question. Compared to the previous year, has the number of civilian
casualties from the Saudi-led coalition air campaign increased or
decreased?
Answer. All parties to the conflict are responsible for civilian
casualties. We are aware of NGO and media reports of alleged civilian
casualty events, but we are unable to independently verify all of these
reports. We assess the Saudi-led coalition air campaign resulted in
fewer casualties than it otherwise would have without U.S. advisory
support. DoD continues to work with Saudi Arabia to improve its
capacity to defend itself while mitigating the risk to noncombatants.
U.S. advisers assess Saudi Arabia has made improvements in its conduct
of the war over the past year, including use of an expanded No-Strike
List and more stringent rules of engagement and increased attention to
efforts to mitigate risk of harm to civilians.
Question. There are multiple reports that the UAE is training
thousands of local militia fighters. Who are the local forces that UAE
is training? Are there any indications that they have ties to Al Qaeda
(AQAP) or ISIS? What are threats to U.S. interests from the Emirati
support to these Salafist militias?
Answer. The UAE has longstanding ties to southern Yemeni tribes,
some of which have been recruited in an effort to counter AQAP and
ISIS. This bottom-up security approach has produced notable
counterterrorism successes. U.S. counter-AQAP and counter-ISIS efforts
in Yemen are facilitated by our close cooperation with Emirati and
partner forces.
Question. On March 20, several members of the Senate Armed Services
Committee sent a letter to Secretary Mattis indicating they were not
given a notification DoD is required to submit to SASC and to this
committee, concerning the 2016 promulgation of an Acquisition and
Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) between the United States and Saudi
Arabia. This ACSA is the legal basis for U.S. refueling assistance to
the Saudi air campaign in Yemen, is it not? If not, what is the legal
underpinning of the assistance? A 1998 letter from DoD to then Senate
Armed Services Chairman Nunn says only that Saudi is eligible for an
ACSA, not that DoD has signed one. When did DoD notify Congress of its
ACSA with Saudi Arabia? Although the ACSA was promulgated in May 2016,
U.S. support to the Saudi coalition's air campaign began in March 2015.
What bilateral agreement governed U.S. logistical assistance for the
first year of the Saudi coalition's intervention in Yemen? Was Congress
consulted on this previous agreement? Why did DoD fail to notify all
members of the Senate Armed Services Committee about this ACSA, given
its direct relevance to ongoing U.S. involvement in the Yemen conflict?
The law requires that any assistance provided pursuant to this
authority be reimbursed with ``reciprocal provisions of logistic
support, supplies, and services by such government.'' According to
public reports, DoD has been unable to account for reimbursement of the
inflight refueling assistance that has been provided to the Saudi-led
coalition. Can you provide a full accounting of reimbursements by both
the UAE and Saudi Arabia for inflight refueling assistance provided
since March 2015?
Answer. The Department is currently gathering information so we can
provide a response to Senator Blumenthal's letter on this issue.