[Senate Hearing 112-88]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-88
BREAKING THE CYCLE OF NORTH KOREAN PROVOCATIONS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 1, 2011
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JIM WEBB, Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MIKE LEE, Utah
Frank G. Lowenstein, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Bosworth, Hon. Stephen W., Special Representative for North Korea
Policy, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC............... 13
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Responses to questions submitted by Senator John F. Kerry.... 67
Campbell, Hon. Kurt, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC.. 7
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Responses to questions submitted by Senator John F. Kerry.... 70
Carlin, Robert, Center for International Security and
Cooperation, Stanford University, Stanford, CA................. 32
Prepared statement........................................... 34
Responses to questions submitted by Senator John F. Kerry.... 76
Flake, L. Gordon, executive director, the Mansfield Foundation,
Washington, DC................................................. 37
Prepared statement........................................... 41
Responses to questions submitted by Senator John F. Kerry.... 75
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 4
Noland, Dr. Marcus, deputy director, Peterson Institute for
International Economics, Washington, DC........................ 48
Prepared statement........................................... 50
Responses to questions submitted by Senator John F. Kerry.... 71
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Lee, Michael S., U.S. Senator from Utah, prepared statement...... 64
Letter and N.Y. Op-ed submitted by Ambassador Charles ``Jack''
Pritchard...................................................... 64
Responses of Special Representative Stephen Bosworth and
Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell to questions submitted by
Senator Mike Lee............................................... 79
(iii)
BREAKING THE CYCLE OF NORTH
KOREAN PROVOCATIONS
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 1, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:09 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Kerry, Lugar, Risch, and Rubio.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
The Chairman. Good morning. The hearing will come to order.
I appreciate everybody's patience. I'm sorry to be a couple
of minutes late. I appreciate everybody coming, particularly
our distinguished witnesses, both of whom could not be more
expert, or immersed in and thoughtful about, the subject of
North Korea and that part of the world.
I would like to say just a couple quick words, if I can,
about events that have been moving at an extraordinary pace in
the Middle East during the time that we've been out of session,
over the course of the last week or so. Obviously, these
demonstrations--these efforts by people to express their will
and to find freedom and the capacity to break out of years and
years of repression and humiliation--have really changed the
world already, no matter what the outcome in each of the
individual countries is.
While momentous special events, we've certainly been seeing
our own expressions of anger and frustration, whether it's in
Wisconsin or in other parts of the country; very different,
but, in some ways, their own expression of a frustration with
governance, or the absence thereof.
The lesson, however, from the Middle East and the Arab
world, is one that I think many of us have anticipated for some
period of time, without knowledge of specifically when it might
erupt. I had the privilege of speaking at the Islamic
Conference in Doha, a year ago, and talked about this question
of combined frustration and anger and humiliation that was felt
by many people in the streets of Arab countries. Across North
Africa and the Middle East, we've now seen people rising up, in
a remarkably peaceful way, in pursuit of fundamental human
rights and democracy, the freedom to express themselves, and to
have a role in choosing the policies that will impact their
lives.
We've seen the power of ordinary people to cast off the
restraints of autocracies. We've also seen how one individual,
used to exercising absolute power, has the ability to delude
himself and separate himself from the real interests of his
people. And we have seen, in the case of Muammar Gaddafi, a so-
called leader who has proven himself to be extraordinarily out
of touch with reality and so arrogant in his divorce from
reality that he's willing to turn weapons on his own people,
not to uphold some larger principle, but simply to reinforce
his own personal position and his own personal interests and
those of his family.
Colonel Gaddafi has proven himself to be a brutal human
being. The United States and its allies, I think, have an
enormous responsibility--I think every freedom-loving person on
the planet has a responsibility--to side with those who seek to
express themselves and to find a different form of government.
We have a responsibility to help the Libyan people end four
decades of Gaddafi's repressive and, at best, quixotic,
extraordinarily mercurial tenure as a so-called leader.
Events that are sweeping the Arab world have powerful
implications for America's foreign policy. And one of the
things I think we need to make certain is--I'm glad the ships
have been deployed, I'm glad that the allies are speaking with
one voice, but I don't think we should hesitate to make it
clear that if a leader thinks he's simply going to turn
mercenaries and powerful secret police on his own people and
slaughter them, we have an obligation, as we have in other
parts of the world, sometimes met and sometimes not met--I talk
of a Bosnia versus a Rwanda--we have an obligation to make
ourselves available to make a difference. Whether it's a no-fly
zone or some other kind of effort--I think that can tip the
balance. And I think that is a critical message, as well as a
measure to take, by the United States.
Now, we're here this morning to discuss another part of the
world, half a world away from the Middle East, on the Korean
Peninsula, where there are also the same kinds of repressive
challenges, but even more so because of the threat of nuclear
weapons. So, even as we grapple with the crisis of the moment--
and there seem to be more and more of them, more frequently--
even as we do that, we have an obligation to find the time to
deal with other pressing concerns. I don't think there can be
any such thing as a back burner, where nuclear weapons and the
challenges of a North Korea are concerned.
We need to find a way to break North Korea's cycle--and it
is a cycle--of provocation and nuclear expansion, in which they
kind of flex their muscles, then move back; they challenge us,
we get slightly engaged, something happens, and we go back
through the cycle again. That's the way it's been, even as they
continue to expand their weaponry and continue to threaten us
in other ways by proliferating that weaponry elsewhere in the
world.
So, working in concert with South Korea and with Japan, it
is a major challenge of the civilized world to persuade North
Korea to abandon its reckless behavior and legitimately meet
the needs of its people.
We're going to hear first from Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell. He was
leading a delegation to Christchurch just last week, when the
earthquake struck. And I want to take this opportunity, as I
know Senator Lugar joins me, in expressing our deepest
condolences to all of the folks in New Zealand, and express our
best wishes for a speedy recovery. I know this is an enormous
challenge. Secretary Campbell was just telling us that it may
take as much as 7 percent of their GDP to respond to it. It's
an enormous challenge. And we stand with our friends in New
Zealand.
Testifying alongside Assistant Secretary Campbell is
Ambassador Stephen Bosworth, the administration's special
representative for North Korea policy. He's a friend, a
constituent of mine, and dean of the Fletcher School of Tufts
University.
And we're delighted to see both of you here today.
Last year was the most dangerous in recent memory on the
Korean Peninsula, certainly the most dangerous since the end of
the Korean war, in 1953. I think we have to do everything
within our power to avoid further deterioration and put the
Peninsula back on the path to peace and stability. North Korea
is making that a hard objective. It's expanded its nuclear and
ballistic missile programs in defiance of the U.N. Security
Council. It has engaged in reckless attacks on U.S. friend and
treaty ally, South Korea. And we must not forget that 46 South
Korean seamen died when North Korea sank the Cheonan, a year
ago; and 4 people were killed later, in the shelling of
Yeonpyeong Island.
The U.S. response has been measured, but firm. We've
strengthened sanctions and intensified coordination with our
key allies, South Korea and Japan. We've also stepped up
efforts to convince China to help bring the North back to the
negotiating table. So far, international initiatives have not
stabilized the situation, much less brought about a change of
course in North Korea.
As Asia expert Dr. Victor Cha so aptly put it, ``North
Korea is the land of lousy options.'' But, lousy options don't
allow us to opt out. Instead, they increase our responsibility
to choose policies that will advance our vital national
security interests and those of our allies.
And that brings us to today's quandary, and that's the
purpose of this hearing. It's been more than 2 years since the
last round of the six-party talks on eliminating nuclear
weapons on the Korean Peninsula. It's no coincidence that this
long silence has been marked by North Korea's dangerous and
destabilizing conduct. So, we've all grown weary, if you will,
of North Korea's brinkmanship, this habit of ratcheting up the
tensions, followed by suggestions of ways to negotiate back
from the brink, followed by a few concessions, and then a
repetition of the process. I think we need to break this cycle.
And we look forward to discussing with our witnesses today: Is
that possible? Can one do that? And how do we do it?
The risks of maintaining the status quo, in my judgment,
are grave. North Korea is simply going to build more nuclear
weapons and missiles. It may well export nuclear technology and
fissile material. And the next violation of the armistice could
easily escalate into wider hostilities that threaten U.S.
allies and interests. So, given these very real risks, the best
option is to consult closely with South Korea and launch
bilateral talks with North Korea when we decide the time is
appropriate.
Let me make this clear. Fruitful talks between the United
States and North Korea could lay the groundwork for the
resumption of six-party talks. Right now, we cannot afford to
cede the initiative to North Korea and China, because neither
country's interests actually fully coincide with ours.
So, let me be clear. We have to get beyond the political
talking point that engaging North Korea is somehow ``rewarding
bad behavior.'' After all these years, that seems to be an
extraordinary canard. It is not rewarding bad behavior. We set
the time. We set the place. We can negotiate in good faith. We
determine what we're negotiating for. And we never have to say
yes to anything that we don't want to. But, if you don't engage
in that effort, you have no chance of changing the current
dynamic; you actually invite greater instability and greater
potential for confrontation.
I believe it's possible to have talks that are based on our
national security interests and those of our allies. That's
what talking is about. That's what negotiating is about. Nobody
forces us to say yes. But, in the absence of that, we don't
have a chance of even finding out what it's all about. We don't
know what renewed diplomatic engagement can accomplish. We do
know this: Our silence invites a dangerous situation to get
even more dangerous.
So, finally, I just want to say a quick word about our
compelling humanitarian concerns in North Korea. I'm glad that
Ambassador Bob King, our special envoy for North Korean human
rights issues, could be in the hearing room this morning. Our
country has long and wisely separated humanitarian concerns
from politics. Consistent with that tradition, we should
consider additional food aid to the North. But, that aid needs
to be based on a demonstrated need and our ability to verify
that food will actually reach the intended recipients. In fact,
a broader humanitarian engagement might hold the most long-term
promise of unlocking the other puzzles, the nuclear puzzle,
enhancing regional peace and security.
And one final comment. When President Hu was here, we
discussed this issue and urged him--in fact, asked him the
question--why it was not possible for China to take a stronger
position to be more engaged in this. And I got a striking
answer back that I think they are also finding their patience
tried, and are prepared, in fact, to be more engaged, and
recognize their own interests, similar to ours, are also at
stake. And I think that will be one of the keys to being able
to move forward more effectively.
Our first panel is going to be followed by three experts
from the private sector: Bob Carlin, a veteran career-watcher
with the Center for International Security and Cooperation at
Stanford University; Marcus Noland, an economist with the
Petersen Institute for International Economics; and Gordon
Flake, Northeast Asia expert and executive director of the
Mansfield Foundation.
So, again, thank you, both panels, for being here.
Senator Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I know I express the appreciation of all of your colleagues
on this committee for your work during the recess, in Pakistan.
We appreciate your stamina and your good counsel there.
Mr. Chairman, we are grateful for the safe return from New
Zealand of Assistant Secretary Campbell, Senator and Mrs. Bayh,
and others who were in that country at the time of the recent
earthquake. Our thoughts and prayers go out to the injured and
the families and friends of those who died in this tragic
event.
I also want to greet, especially, Ambassador Steve
Bosworth. And, as a point of personal privilege, I simply want
to recall that we were together 25 years ago, at a time in
which President Reagan and Secretary George Shultz, very
concerned about the Philippines and the transition there, and
the hopes for democracy, asked a delegation, that was headed by
the late Jack Murtha and myself, and included you, Mr.
Chairman, Senator Cochran of Mississippi, and other business
and religious leaders, 26 of us, who fanned out across the
islands, under the tutelage and counsel of a very distinguished
veteran Ambassador. It was a turning point, in my judgment, for
democracy in Asia, and certainly, perhaps, for the world. It
stimulated a great deal of interest in our own hemisphere as to
what occurred in that momentous time in the Philippines.
So, we welcome you, again, 25 years later, sir. And you're
still at it.
Today's hearing will consider ways of dealing with North
Korean provocations that have heightened tensions in Northeast
Asia. The sinking of a South Korean ship in March 2010, the
shelling of South Koreans last November, and the possibility of
another nuclear test, illustrate the cycle of North Korean
provocations.
In the broader context, today's hearing also provides an
opportunity to examine the Obama administration's plan for
addressing North Korea's weapons of mass destruction.
In testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee in
2009, Ambassador Bosworth stated, ``If North Korea does not
heed the unanimous call of the international community and
return to negotiations to achieve the irreversible
dismantlement of their nuclear and ballistic missile capacity,
the United States and our allies in the region will need to
take the necessary steps to assure our security in the face of
this growing threat.''
While the administration has worked closely with South
Korea in response to various North Korean provocations during
the last 2 years, it is less clear that the administration has
developed a strategy with the potential to dismantle North
Korea's nuclear weapons program. It is also unclear whether
addressing the security threat from North Korea is sufficiently
prioritized in our relationship with China. I look forward to
the insights of our panels on these questions.
Beyond the disposition of North Korea's nuclear weapons
program, the United States and our allies must be devoting
great effort to preventing proliferation from North Korea. The
North Koreans utilize a network of trading companies to secure
components for the North Korean military complex. This web
includes as many as 250 trading companies extending to dozens
of countries. These same companies reportedly have been used to
transfer North Korean nuclear technology to other countries.
The risk that sensitive nuclear technology, weapons components,
or even weapons themselves, might be transferred out of North
Korea for geopolitical objectives or personal profit is an
equal, if not greater, threat than North Korea's missile
capability.
Instability within the North Korean leadership associated
with a transfer of power heightens these concerns, both because
of what the regime might do in a time of upheaval, and because
individuals facing a purge that could result in loss of
personal income may be willing to take greater risks for
profit.
The United States and the global community pursue an array
of options, hoping to bring about change within North Korea and
convince the North Korean Government to eliminate its weapons
of mass destruction. Among those measures are economic
sanctions. Last year, I requested that the Congressional
Research Service assess the status and effectiveness of
economic sanctions targeting North Korea, specifically in
reference to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874.
CRS analysts determined that ``Implementation has been
uneven globally and in cases has diminished over time. An
important challenge has been encouraging nations with
substantial trade links to North Korea--particularly China, but
also a range of nations that serve as transshipment points for
North Korean goods, or that have financial institutions that
deal with North Korean entities, to implement U.N. sanctions.''
I invite any of our witnesses to comment on the sanctions
situation and provide insight on ways of enhancing sanctions
implementation. Mr. Chairman, I will submit the CRS report in
its entirety for inclusion in the record of today's hearing.
I am pleased that Ambassador Robert King, the United States
Envoy for North Korea Human Rights issues, is in the audience
today, as you have mentioned, Mr. Chairman.
I would ask Assistant Secretary Campbell or Ambassador
Bosworth to elaborate on Ambassador King's work and how it
conforms to the organizational matrix of the administration's
North Korea team.
Another point of ongoing interest for me is the POW/MIA
issue related to the Korean war. More than 8,000 Americans are
listed as missing. Until May 2005, the United States and North
Korea cooperated on a recovery program of the remains of United
States servicemen. More recently, the United States and China
signed a memorandum of understanding so that the United States
could receive information on Americans held in China during the
Korean war. I am hopeful that the Obama administration will
forcefully raise the issue of POWs and MIAs in future
communications with North Korea.
The witnesses on our second panel possess remarkable
experience and understanding with regard to North Korea. Few
Americans have spent as much time on the ground in North Korea
as Mr. Carlin. Dr. Noland continues to provide helpful analysis
on trends in North Korea's economy and food supply. Mr. Flake
has unique perspective on the regional dynamics and
implications of events within North Korea. I look forward to
their collective assessment of the present situation and
recommendations on how we should move forward.
I thank the Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar.
And, without objection, your report will be placed in the
record.
[Editor's note.--The CSR report referred to was too
voluminous to include in the printed hearing but will be
maintained in the permanent record of the committee.]
The Chairman. Secretary Campbell, we've got two panels, so
we want to try to keep matters moving, but thank you again for
being here, both of you. We'll go with Secretary Campbell
first, and then Ambassador Bosworth.
STATEMENT OF HON. KURT CAMPBELL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Campbell. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senator
Lugar. It's an honor to be before you today. I want to
associate myself with each of your statements and thank you for
holding this hearing today.
As you mentioned, Senator Kerry, although the United States
is decisively engaged in critical historic developments in the
Middle East, it's extraordinarily important for every element
of the U.S. Government to send a message to the world that we
recognize that we have global interests and that there are
critical issues that are playing out in Asia. And the United
States remains consequentially involved in these developments.
If you look at the 21st century, this will be a region and an
era of remarkable opportunity for the United States in Asia.
And we must keep our focus in Asia as we go forward, even with
dramatic developments playing out in the Middle East.
I want to also say how grateful I am to be here with my
friend and colleague Steve Bosworth and Bob King. Unlike
occasionally in previous administrations, I think we have tried
to approach extraordinarily challenging issues with a very high
degree of confidence and collegiality, and I think you will
hear that in our testimony today.
I would ask that my full statement be submitted for the
record. And I would just very quickly make some opening
comments to give you both, and others, the opportunity to ask
questions and to perhaps go into details as we go forward.
Let me just also thank both of you for your opening
comments about New Zealand. As you indicated, I was with a team
of Americans, both on the private side and also government
officials, in Christchurch during the devastating earthquake,
which has destroyed a large part of this lovely historic city.
I have to say, during this tragedy we were able to witness
firsthand the remarkable fortitude and courage, and indeed
humanity, of the people of New Zealand. And I just want to
commit to you both that the U.S. Government will do everything
possible to support New Zealand, a country which we are again
developing a very strong relationship, in making their way
through an enormous challenge, probably the biggest crisis ever
to hit New Zealand, in their history.
My primary job today, Senators, is to put the North Korean
situation in a larger regional context and give you a sense of
how we approach our overall strategy in the Asian-Pacific
region. I'll just skim through some of the key elements and
principles as we go forward.
I have to just underscore that one of the great benefits of
our Asia policy is that we are able to build on a remarkably
strong bipartisan consensus about what it takes to be
successful in the Asian-Pacific region. I think the Obama
administration has recognized that and has sought to build on a
succession of successful elements in our overall approach to
the Asian-Pacific region.
At the top of that list is continuing to build and maintain
very strong bilateral security ties and treaty alliances; and
that's with Japan, South Korea, Australia, our friends in
Thailand and the Philippines. Currently, I think it would be
fair to state that we are enjoying the strongest bilateral
relationship that we've ever enjoyed with South Korea. I think
our ties are remarkable and that the very strong relationship,
both between our two leaders and in our bureaucracies and
between our peoples, have allowed us to deal with the
extraordinary provocations that you have, I think, rightfully
underscored, Senators, when it comes to North Korea.
In addition to these security and political ties, we've
also sought to strengthen our overall engagement in Southeast
Asia and ASEAN. Clearly that will be a region of growing
importance to the United States in the period ahead. We have
sought to pursue a consistent and principled engagement with
China. At the core of that set of discussions has indeed been
North Korea. There are some areas of consensus, and we have had
areas of disagreement. We have sought to make a very strong
case to China that they need to play a more active role in
diplomacy with North Korea, along the lines that you have
described.
We are also committed to playing a larger role in the
international institutions that are growing in Asia, including
the East Asia summit. President Obama will attend the first
East Asia summit as a--first East Asia summit of an American
leader--later this year, in Bali, in Indonesia.
We're also committed to maintaining a strong and robust
military presence in the Asian-Pacific region, that we provide
security and stability for a region that is the engine room of
the global economy. And that role continues to be essential.
And then, frankly, the Asian-Pacific region continues to look
at the United States as a key player in the economy and the
macroeconomic issues in the Asian-Pacific region.
We are committed to engaging openly and consistently in the
trade agenda of Asia. I think, as you know, we will be
submitted, shortly, the Korea Free Trade Agreement for
consideration to the U.S. Congress. And obviously, we are
involved in very consequential diplomacy associated with the
TPP, which will be, if successful, one of the most important
trade agreements in Asia in many years.
These form the overall basis of our approach to Asia.
And I must say that, despite the tremendous opportunities
that we see in Asia, that have become part of our popular
discourse, one country, indeed, stands out as an outlier--and,
in fact, an impediment--to the region's promising future: the
DPRK, North Korea. And the DPRK's brazen attack on the South
Korean corvette Cheonan, which you have both referred to, in
March of last year, its recent disclosure of a uranium
enrichment program, its shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, with
civilians stationed there, that resulted in a large loss of
South Korean life, coupled with the Cheonan sinking and its
ongoing human rights violations, underscore the threat that
North Korea's policies and provocations, including its nuclear
and ballistic missile programs and proliferation activities,
pose to regional stability and, indeed, global security.
We are committed to addressing these issues through an
active and determined diplomacy, using all elements of our
policy at our disposal, with all the parties involved.
You stated at the outset, Senator Kerry, that our goal must
be to break the cycle. And that is, indeed, what the United
States is determined to do.
I look forward to exploring the various elements that each
of you have laid out in your opening statements in the
discussion subsequently.
Thank you both very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Campbell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Kurt M. Campbell
Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar, and members of the committee, thank
you for inviting me to testify today on North Korea, one of our most
enduring foreign policy challenges. I would also like to personally
thank this committee for its leadership in advancing discussion and
opportunities for American engagement in the Asia-Pacific region.
Today, I would like to use this occasion to focus on the
administration's North Korea policy through a broader regional context.
INTRODUCTION
The primary strategic objective for U.S. engagement in the Asia-
Pacific region is to promote a peaceful and stable security environment
that advances the interests of the United States, our allies, and
partners in the region. Essential to this approach is the security and
stability that our alliances with Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK),
Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines provide. These relationships
underwrite peace and security in the region and provide a context for
the region's tremendous economic dynamism and vitality. In addition,
our alliances are buttressed by a network of partnerships ranging from
Indonesia to New Zealand and an evolving regional political and
security architecture that will help create rules of the road for this
rapidly evolving and strategically critical region. China is also a key
U.S. partner in promoting peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region
and globally, and the joint statement issued during President Hu's
January 2011 to Washington underscored that ``in coordination with
other parties, the United States and China will endeavor to increase
cooperation to address common concerns and promote shared interests.''
Despite the tremendous opportunities in Asia that have become part
of our popular discourse, one country stands out as an outlier, and in
fact an impediment, to the region's promising future: the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK). The DPRK's brazen attack on the
ROK corvette Cheonan in March of last year, its recent disclosure of a
uranium enrichment program, its shelling of Yeonpyong Island that
resulted in the tragic loss of South Korean lives, and its ongoing
human rights violations underscore the threat that the DPRK's policies
and provocations, including its nuclear and ballistic missile programs
and proliferation activities, pose to regional stability and global
security.
The verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which is
the core objective of the 2005 joint statement of the six-party talks,
is an essential ingredient to the Asia-Pacific region's long-term
success and to our own security. Progress toward this goal requires
close coordination between the ROK, Japan, and the United States, as
well as with China and Russia. Our Northeast Asian alliances play an
essential role in maintaining regional security, deterring North Korean
provocations, providing a reliable and robust strategic deterrent
posture, and bringing maximum leverage to bear on the DPRK to change
its current course and become a member of the community of nations. To
this end, we have actively engaged our regional partners to ensure
robust implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1718
and 1874 on North Korea, and though there is still work to be done,
strong regional cooperation, particularly with Japan and South Korea,
has made it more difficult for North Korea to successfully engage in
proliferation and other illicit activities. We will continue to take
steps to enhance and broaden our bilateral political, economic, and
security relations, as well as make progress on key alliance
modernization initiatives. We will also work to develop a more
integrated trilateral framework for cooperation and coordination
between Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington. Furthermore, we are taking steps
to enhance coordination with China and Russia--both of which have
important relationships with North Korea--to create a more favorable
context for denuclearization and peace and security. In addition to the
aforementioned five key parties, we are working more closely with other
stakeholders like the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN), India,
and Australia to broaden regionwide efforts to compel North Korea to
abide by its denuclearization commitments and obligations, as well as
with the U.N. Security Council.
The Republic of Korea
The United States-ROK alliance is grounded in the threat that North
Korea poses to the ROK. However, over the course of the past few years,
the United States has undertaken steps to expand alliance cooperation
in both regional and global settings. In 2011, we will aggressively
pursue initiatives to increase collaboration in the peninsular,
regional, and global contexts.
The ROK's security is critically affected by North Korea due to
their complex historical relationship, geographic proximity, and the
tangible threat that North Korea's conventional military capabilities,
nuclear programs, and ballistic missile developments pose to South
Korea. As President Obama stated during his November 2010 visit to
Seoul, ``In the face of these threats, the U.S.-ROK alliance has never
been stronger . . . The United States will never waver in our
commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea.'' Following the
attack on Yeonpyong Island, President Obama stated that we will stand
``shoulder to shoulder'' with the ROK and reaffirmed our commitment to
its defense. This commitment is being translated through efforts to
bolster ROK defensive capabilities. For example, last November the ROK
participated in USS George Washington carrier group exercises. We
continue to hold regular joint military exercises to enhance extended
deterrence, interoperability, and the readiness of alliance forces to
respond to threats to peace.
Over the last 60 years, our alliance with the ROK has continued to
expand from its military roots into one of the most vibrant, full-
spectrum strategic partnerships in modern history, encompassing dynamic
political, economic, and social cooperation. The U.S.-Korea Free Trade
Agreement is a way not only to strengthen United States-ROK economic
ties and increase American jobs through exports to Korea but also to
enhance the enduring strength of this strategic relationship.
Regionally, we are working closely with the ROK on a number of key
issues, such as improving maritime security through the ASEAN Regional
Forum and advancing the capacities of countries in the Lower Mekong
region. We welcome and support the ROK Government's efforts to realize
its ``Global Korea'' vision, expanding its global reach to be
commensurate with its economic status. We applaud the ROK's leadership
in addressing global concerns, such as proliferation, counterpiracy,
and development assistance. Last year's G20 summit in Seoul and the
upcoming Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul in 2012 are a testament to
the ROK's global leadership.
Close coordination and the broadening and deepening of our security
commitments with the ROK are key guiding principles for how we approach
North Korea. The steps that our two militaries are taking, for example,
to enhance our joint interoperability and strategic deterrent, are
critical to creating a security environment that deters North Korean
provocations, increases our collective leverage on Pyongyang to change
course, and maintains peace and stability in the broader East Asia
environment. A United States-ROK relationship that will only grow
stronger and continued close bilateral coordination on our strategies
for the way forward on North Korea will reinforce our common message to
Pyongyang--that taking irreversible steps toward denuclearization,
abiding by the terms of the Armistice Agreement, and improving
relations with the ROK and its other neighbors is the only way for the
DPRK to break free from its isolation and enjoy the security,
political, and economic benefits that come with integrating into the
international community.
In the short-term, the United States supports direct talks between
the DPRK and the ROK to address the South's legitimate grievances,
including North Korea's sinking of the Cheonan and its shelling of
Yeonpyong Island. We believe that North-South dialogue is an important
initial step toward the resumption of the six-party talks. North
Korea's decision to walk out of the recent colonel-level North-South
military-to-military talks squandered a valuable opportunity to improve
North-South relations and demonstrate its commitment to dialogue. We
will carefully monitor events on the Korean Peninsula for evidence of a
North Korean commitment to improving inter-Korean relations.
Japan
President Obama underscored the importance of the United States-
Japan alliance during his November 2010 trip to Japan: ``As allies for
over half a century, the partnership between Japan and the United
States has been the foundation for our security and our prosperity--not
only for our two countries, but also for the region.'' Last year, we
celebrated the 50th anniversary of the United States-Japan alliance.
This year, we are working to create a roadmap for the next 50 years to
broaden and deepen this cornerstone alliance. In this context,
Secretaries Clinton and Gates will cohost their Japanese counterparts
in Washington, DC, for a 2+2 Security Consultative Committee meeting.
This meeting will focus on reaffirming the core mission of our
alliance--the security of Japan and maintaining peace and security in
the Asia-Pacific--as well as articulating new common strategic
objectives and approaches that demonstrates the expanse of our
relationship. Progress on key issues associated with modernizing our
military relationship will continue and is essential to adapt our
alliance to better manage the complex evolutions in the Asia-Pacific
strategic environment, as well as promote and protect the global
commons. We think that Japan should follow the ROK and take steps to
accede to the Hague Convention on International Parental Child
Abduction.
North Korea remains Japan's most immediate national security
concern and a key feature of our diplomatic engagement with Tokyo.
North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs and past abduction
of Japanese citizens underscore the tangible threat the DPRK poses to
Japan's national security. North Korea's recent provocative actions
have reinforced Japan's concerns and led to enhanced ROK-Japan
cooperation and closer trilateral U.S.-ROK-Japan coordination. We
welcome the commitment of ROK and Japanese leaders to deepen the ROK-
Japan bilateral relationship. We appreciate Japan's key role in working
to resolve the North Korea nuclear issue peacefully and its commitment
to implementing unilateral and multilateral sanctions against the DPRK
to curb its proliferation activities. The United States fully supports
Japanese efforts to resolve the issue of Japanese citizens abducted by
North Korea.
Trilateral U.S.-ROK-Japan Coordination
In addition to strengthening U.S. alliances with the ROK and Japan,
we will take ambitious steps to increase trilateral cooperation to
further develop a more integrated Northeast Asia security architecture.
Robust trilateralism is essential to deal with the DPRK's provocative
behavior and to shape the emerging regional strategic environment.
Trilateral engagement demonstrates to North Korea that its reckless
actions will be met with collective resolve. The benefits of trilateral
coordination were on full display when Secretary Clinton hosted
Japanese Foreign Minister Maehara and ROK Foreign Minister Kim in a
historic United States-Japan-ROK Trilateral Ministerial meeting in
December 2010. At this meeting, the three countries jointly affirmed
the importance of unity and ways to enhance policy coordination on
myriad issues from ASEAN to North Korea. On North Korea, they declared
that the DPRK's belligerent actions threaten all three countries and
will be met with solidarity from all three countries. The United States
reaffirmed its security alliances with both Japan and the ROK, and all
three countries jointly condemned the DPRK's uranium enrichment
facility as a violation of the DPRK's commitments under the September
2005 joint statement of the six-party talks and its obligations under
UNSCR 1718 and 1874. Institutionalization of trilateral cooperation
will be an important focus of U.S. diplomatic efforts in the coming
year and a point of conversation when Secretary Clinton meets with the
ROK and Japanese Foreign Ministers in the coming year. Additionally,
with our Japanese and South Korean allies, we are continually working
to enhance cooperation with China and Russia on ways to deal with the
DPRK--underscoring the strategic benefits of strong five-party unity
and coordination in denuclearization negotiations.
China
North Korea remains a key foreign policy issue in our bilateral
relationship with China. We share the same goals of peace and stability
on the Korean Peninsula, as well as North Korea's verifiable
denuclearization in a peaceful manner. China is uniquely positioned to
influence the DPRK because of its significant economic and humanitarian
aid to the DPRK, its shared border with the DPRK, and historical ties.
We have urged China to press North Korea to take appropriate steps to
improve relations with South Korea and to denuclearize. We also
continue to work with China to enhance effective implementation of
sanctions under UNSCR 1718 and 1874.
During the January 2011 China state visit, President Obama
emphasized to President Hu that North Korea's nuclear and ballistic
missile programs are increasingly a direct threat to the security of
the United States and our allies. The President also expressed
appreciation for China's role in reducing tensions on the Korean
Peninsula but underscored the need for China to leverage its unique
relationship with North Korea to compel Pyongyang to abide by its
commitment to the 2005 joint statement of the six-party talks as well
as its obligations under UNSCR 1718 and 1874. Both leaders agreed that
the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula remains our
paramount goal and that North Korea must avoid further provocations.
The joint statement issued during President Hu's visit also
reflects our shared concern over the DPRK's claimed uranium enrichment
program. The United States and China jointly ``expressed concern
regarding the DPRK's claimed uranium enrichment program . . . opposed
all activities inconsistent with the 2005 joint statement and relevant
international obligations and commitments . . . and . . . called for
the necessary steps that would allow for the early resumption of the
six-party talks process to address this and other relevant issues.'' We
are working closely with China and our other partners and allies at the
U.N. to develop an appropriate U.N. response to the DPRK's uranium
enrichment program.
Russia
We value our continuing cooperation with Russia, another key
partner in the six-party talks, to achieve our shared goal of
denuclearization in North Korea. As a result of its historical
relationship with the DPRK and its status as a Permanent Member of the
U.N. Security Council, like China, Russia is well positioned to
influence the DPRK through both direct bilateral diplomacy and
multilateral efforts.
In the wake of the DPRK's provocations over the last year, we
welcome the constructive role that Russia has played to press Pyongyang
to refrain from further destabilizing actions, to abide by its
international commitments and obligations, and to take irreversible
steps toward denuclearization. Russia has publicly stated that it backs
U.N. Security Council discussion of the North Korean uranium enrichment
program, and we seek further cooperation from Russia in our efforts to
affirm unequivocally that the DPRK's uranium enrichment activities
violate the relevant UNSCR.
Other Key Regional Players: ASEAN, India, Australia
Due to the security threats posed by North Korea to the entire
Asia-Pacific region, our deep diplomatic activity and coordination on
North Korea extend beyond the five parties to other key partners in the
region. As a fulcrum of regional multilateralism, ASEAN has been
actively engaged on regional security issues. The ASEAN-centered East
Asia summit presents a unique opportunity to engage with traditional
allies and new partners on a range of areas central to U.S. interests
in Asia, which may grow to include North Korea. We will continue to
work closely with ASEAN to identify ways for the organization to play a
more engaged role in denuclearization discussions.
India and Australia also share our goal of enhancing peace and
security in the Asia-Pacific. The United States and India have
discussed North Korea in our Strategic Dialogue and other bilateral and
multilateral exchanges. India's growing security and political
relations with Japan and South Korea will also enhance prospects for
security and stability in Northeast Asia. Australia has strongly
supported international implementation of UNSCR 1718 and 1874,
participated in the international investigation of the sinking Cheonan,
and supported efforts to bring the issue before the U.N. Security
Council.
CONCLUSION
The goal of the United States and our allies and partners remains a
stable, peaceful Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons. To achieve
this goal, the United States intends to maintain strong solidarity with
South Korea, Japan, and other states with a vested interest in the
future of the Korean Peninsula and the stability and prosperity of
Northeast Asia. We will continue to encourage the DPRK to engage in
meaningful negotiations on denuclearization and to honor its
commitments and international obligations. At the same time, we will
work to ensure the implementation of U.S. and international sanctions
against North Korea's nuclear, missile, and proliferation networks and
its involvement in other illicit activities. We will also carefully
watch internal political and economic developments in North Korea,
particularly as they relate to succession and the promotion of heir
apparent Kim Jong-un, the third son of Kim Jong-il.
The Obama administration has repeatedly stressed that there remains
a positive path open to North Korea. North Korea has the choice to take
a path that will lead to security and economic opportunity or to
continue in its pattern of confrontation and isolation. The United
States remains committed to meaningful dialogue, but we will not reward
North Korea for shattering the peace or defying the international
community. If North Korea improves relations with South Korea and
demonstrates a change in behavior, including taking irreversible steps
to denuclearize, complying with international law, and ceasing
provocative behavior, the United States will stand ready to move toward
normalization of our relationship. However, if it maintains its path of
defiance and provocative behavior and fails to comply with its
obligations and commitments, it stands no chance of becoming a strong
and prosperous nation.
Our concerns with North Korea are not limited to the threat it
poses to regional stability and global security. Human rights
violations harm the North Korea people and violate international norms
for the rule of law and respect for individual rights. Respect for
human rights by North Korea will also be necessary for it to fully
participate in the international community. Human rights are a top U.S.
priority and an addressing of human rights issues by the DPRK will have
a significant impact on the prospect for closer United States-DPRK
ties.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and I
welcome any questions that you may have.
The Chairman. Thank you, Secretary.
Mr. Ambassador.
STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN W. BOSWORTH, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
FOR NORTH KOREA POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON,
DC
Ambassador Bosworth. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
Senator Lugar. It's a pleasure to be here with you, both of
you, this morning. And I look forward to a useful exchange of
views and will try very hard to respond to all of your
questions.
The Chairman. Can you pull the mic a little closer, please?
Ambassador Bosworth. Sure.
The Chairman. Thanks.
Ambassador Bosworth. Is that better?
The Chairman. Yes.
Ambassador Bosworth. Oh, yes. Sorry. [Laughter.]
I would just, to sort of introduce this subject, supplement
the prepared statement that has been submitted and say that the
United States has been struggling with the issue of nuclear
weapons in North Korea for the past 25 years. There have been
times when we have made some progress, only, unfortunately, to
see it largely slip away. We have been able to deal with its
provocations, but North Korea poses an enduring challenge to
U.S. interests in the region and the interests of all other
countries in the region.
They are a pole of instability in the heart of what is
arguably the most important economic region of the world today.
They are also, of course, a major threat to American and other
norms regarding proliferation of nuclear weapons. So, this is a
challenge that must be dealt with. We do not have the option,
in my judgment, of simply biding our time and ignoring them.
In response to the provocations which Kurt Campbell has
described, what we have pursued is essentially a two-track
policy. On the one hand, working very closely with our allies
and our partners in the six-party talks, we have, through the
United Nations and bilaterally, tightened our sanctions on
North Korea. It is difficult to measure the exact effect of
those sanctions, but this is something we work at every day. We
are constantly coordinating with all of the partners in the
North--in the six-party process to ensure that the sanctions
achieve maximum effectiveness. And I think there is no question
that the sanctions have made life more complicated and more
difficult for the DPRK.
At the same time, however, we recognize that sanctions are
not, in and of themselves, a full policy toward this problem.
So, we have remained, and will remain, open to constructive
dialogue. And we view diplomacy, ultimately, as the best way of
solving these difficulties in this challenge.
We have been in constant coordination with our partners in
the region, particularly with South Korea and Japan, but also
with China and Russia. We are engaged in efforts to make sure
that, on the one hand, the sanctions remain effective,
tightened, and, on the other hand, to demonstrate that we are
serious about the use of diplomacy, but serious in the sense
that we want assurance that North Korea regards these
prospective talks seriously. We are not interested in talking
just for the sake of talking. We want talks which produce
concrete results. We remain committed, as do our other partners
in the six-party process, at least South Korea, Japan, China,
and Russia, to full implementation of the agreed statement--the
joint statement of September 2005, which pledged continued
concentration on nonproliferation and other elements to bring
about stability on the Korean Peninsula.
On the subject of food aid, which has been raised earlier,
we continue to pursue a longstanding U.S. policy on food aid.
We do separate humanitarian assistance from political issues,
but we provide food aid when we see a perceived need and in a
situation in which we can monitor how the food aid is used, who
are the recipients of that food aid, and does it go to the
people for whom we intend it.
On the subject of human rights and other humanitarian
issues, I am very pleased to be working very closely with my
friend and colleague, Bob King, who is part of our office. We
talk frequently and closely coordinate on all issues. Bob has
just returned from an extended trip to South Korea, where
subjects, including North Korean human rights performance, food
aid, the general situation on the Korean Peninsula, in North
Korea, have been very prominent on his agenda. So, I think that
this relationship gives evidence of the fact that, as we
approach the problems of North Korea and the challenges that it
poses, we are very concerned about human rights and we are very
concerned about the condition of the North Korean people.
So, I will stop there and, like my friend Kurt Campbell,
make myself available for your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Bosworth follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Stephen W. Bosworth
Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar, and members of the committee, thank
you for inviting me to testify today on Democratic People's Republic of
Korea (DPRK). The North Korea issue is one of the most important
foreign policy challenges of our time. North Korea's nuclear and
ballistic missile program and proliferation activity pose an acute
threat to a region of enormous economic vitality as well as to our
global nonproliferation efforts and to our security interests more
generally.
North Korea has repeatedly reneged on its commitments under the
September 2005 joint statement made in the context of the six-party
talks. It has also failed to comply with a number of U.N. Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) obligations. At the beginning of his
administration, President Obama expressed a willingness to engage North
Korea. It responded by conducting missile tests, expelling IAEA
inspectors, announcing a nuclear test, disclosing its uranium
enrichment program, and stating that the six-party talks were ``dead.''
It also expelled the U.S. personnel delivering food aid to the North
Korean people. The United States has been a leader of a unified
international response to these North Korean provocations. The U.N.
Security Council adopted UNSCRs 1718 and 1874, calling on North Korea
to immediately cease its nuclear activities and provocative actions.
North Korea's provocative actions have continued this past year,
with its sinking of the Republic of Korea (ROK) corvette Cheonan in
March and its artillery attack of South Korean Yeonpyong Island in
November. The United Nations Security Council issued a strong statement
condemning the attack which lead to the sinking of the Cheonan.
Following the attack on Yeonpyong Island, President Obama
reaffirmed our commitment to the defense of the ROK and emphasized that
we will stand ``shoulder to shoulder'' with our ally. The United States
continues to demonstrate our commitment to deter North Korean
provocations through joint military exercises with the ROK. For
instance, the ROK participated in the November 27-30 USS George
Washington carrier group exercises. We also continue to strengthen our
nonproliferation efforts with regard to North Korea, including the
adoption of new unilateral sanctions targeting DPRK illicit activities.
We strongly believe that North-South dialogue that takes meaningful
steps toward reducing inter-Korean tensions and improving relations
should precede a resumption of the six-party talks. We believe North-
South talks are an important opportunity for North Korea to demonstrate
its sincerity and willingness to engage in dialogue. Ultimately, if
North Korea fulfills its denuclearization commitments, the Five Parties
are prepared to provide economic assistance and help to integrate North
Korea into the international community.
In November, North Korea disclosed a uranium enrichment program and
claimed that it was building a light-water nuclear reactor. These
activities clearly violate North Korea's commitments under the 2005
joint statement and its obligations under UNSCRs 1718 and 1874. The
United States is working with Japan, South Korea, and the UNSC to make
clear that its Uranium Enrichment Program is prohibited by its
commitments and obligations to UNSC resolutions 17818 and 1874 and the
2005 joint statement.
Looking into the future, we continue to firmly believe that a dual-
track approach to North Korea offers the best prospects for achieving
denuclearization and a stable region. We are open to meaningful
engagement but will continue to pursue the full and transparent
implementation of sanctions. We are looking for demonstrable steps by
North Korea that it is prepared to meet its international obligations
and commitments to achieve the goal of the 2005 joint statement: the
verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful
manner.
In the meantime, the United States is continuing to consult closely
with our partners in the six-party process. President Obama and
Secretary Clinton have been at the forefront of this effort, reaching
out to leaders in Japan, South Korea, China, and Russia. In early
January, I led an interagency delegation to the Republic of Korea,
China, and Japan. In all three capitals, I met with senior government
officials to discuss next steps on the Korean Peninsula. I was
accompanied by special envoy for the six-party talks, Sung Kim, who
coordinates U.S. efforts on the six-party talks and leads day-to-day
engagement with six-party partners.
During a mid-January visit to the United States by PRC President Hu
Jintao, we made progress on greater cooperation with the Chinese on
North Korea issues. In a joint statement issued during the visit, both
sides agreed that the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
remains our paramount goal. The United States and China also jointly
``expressed concern regarding the DPRK's claimed uranium enrichment
program,'' ``opposed all activities inconsistent with the 2005 joint
statement and relevant international obligations and commitments,'' and
``called for the necessary steps that would allow for the early
resumption of the six-party talks process to address this and other
relevant issues.''
Immediately following this visit in late January, Deputy Secretary
Steinberg led a mission to Seoul, Tokyo, and Beijing to further
coordinate our approach to the Korean Peninsula.
In addition, we have further solidified our alliances with the ROK
and Japan and have improved trilateral cooperation among the three
countries in responding to the DPRK's provocative and belligerent
behavior. For example, at the December 6, 2010, U.S.-Japan-ROK
Trilateral Ministerial meeting, Secretary Clinton, Japanese Foreign
Minister Maehara, and ROK Foreign Minister Kim affirmed unity among the
three nations and declared that the DPRK's provocative and belligerent
behavior threatens all three countries and will be met with solidarity
from all three countries.
In the meantime, the United States continues to improve the
implementation of unilateral and international sanctions on North Korea
to constrain its nuclear and missile programs. On August 30, the
President signed Executive Order (E.O.) 13551, giving the U.S.
Government new authorities to target North Korea's conventional arms
proliferation and illicit activities. The new E.O. designated one North
Korean individual and five North Korean entities. The Departments of
State and Treasury also recently designated five additional entities
and three individuals under existing E.O. 13382, which targets North
Korean WMD-related proliferation activities. We continue to urge the
international community to implement UNSCRs 1718 and 1874 fully and
transparently. At the same time, we have stated unequivocally that we
will not lift sanctions on the DPRK just for their returning to talks.
In March 2009, the DPRK terminated the U.S. food aid program,
ordering our humanitarian personnel out of the country and requiring
that they leave behind 20,000 metric tons of undelivered U.S. food
items. The United States remains deeply concerned about the well-being
of the North Korean people, particularly in light of continuing reports
of chronic food shortages. The U.S. Government policy on humanitarian
assistance and food aid is based on three factors: (1) level of need;
(2) competing needs in other countries; and (3) our ability to ensure
that aid is reliably reaching the people in need. This policy is
consistent with our longstanding goal of providing emergency
humanitarian assistance to the people of countries around the world
where there are legitimate humanitarian needs. However, consistent with
our practices worldwide, the United States will not provide food aid
without a thorough assessment of actual needs and adequate program
management, monitoring, and access provisions to ensure that food aid
is not diverted or misused.
The United States also remains deeply concerned about the human
rights situation in North Korea. We work closely with the United
Nations, including the Human Rights Council, other international and
nongovernmental organizations, and other governments to try to improve
the human rights situation in North Korea. The State Department's 2009
Country Report on Human Rights Practices for North Korea reports that
the DPRK Government continued to commit numerous serious abuses.
Advancing human rights is a top U.S. priority in our North Korea
policy. Any long-term improvement in U.S.-DPRK relations will be
contingent, among several factors, on the DPRK making a serious effort
to address human rights issues. Special Envoy for North Korean Human
Rights Issues Robert King traveled to South Korea in early February to
meet with South Korean Government officials, as well as North Korean
defectors, civil society groups, and North Korea experts. Ambassador
King reports from his meetings that North Korea's human rights and
humanitarian situation continues to worsen.
We are also working closely with the U.N. and other organizations
to protect North Korean refugees. The United States has urged China to
adhere to its international obligations as a party to the 1951 Refugee
Convention and its 1967 Protocol, including by not expelling or
refouling North Koreans protected under those treaties and undertaking
to cooperate with UNHCR in the exercise of its functions. Although the
vast majority of North Korean refugees choose resettlement in the ROK,
the United States will consider resettling eligible North Korean
refugees who express an interest in resettlement to the United States
directly to U.S. Embassies and consulates or through the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). We support increasing the flow
of balanced information into the DPRK through independent broadcasters
based in the ROK and in collaboration with the Broadcasting Board of
Governors and its partners Voice of America and Radio Free Asia. The
United States considers remains recovery operations to be an important
humanitarian mission. We remain committed to achieving the fullest
possible accounting for U.S. POW/MIAs from the Korean war, as well as
from other conflicts.We are also carefully watching internal
developments in North Korea, particularly as they relate to leadership
succession and the promotion of heir apparent, Kim Jong-un, the
youngest son of Kim Jong-il, to key regime positions. In conclusion, we
continue to work closely with our six-party partners in an effort to
promote peace and stability on the Peninsula and achieve the goals of
the 2005 six-party joint statement. We believe we can make progress in
cooperation with our partners in Tokyo, Beijing, Moscow, and Seoul. We
are also working with our partners and the United Nations to advance
human rights in North Korea, protect the status of North Korean
refugees, and monitor the need for humanitarian assistance in North
Korea. The door is open to Pyongyang to join and benefit from such an
effort but only if it abandons the misguided notion that violence,
threats, and provocation are the path toward achievement of its goals.
We face enormous challenges when dealing with North Korea. The
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula will not be easy to achieve,
but we cannot abandon the goal. Through a strategy that combines
openness to dialogue with a continuation of bilateral and multilateral
sanctions, we believe we have an opportunity to bring about important
improvements to the global nonproliferation regime and to regional and
global security. We believe that our partners in the six-party process
share this assessment and we will continue to work closely with them as
we move forward.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I welcome
any questions you may have.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Ambassador, and thanks
for your continued service in this regard.
Let me try to probe this thing a little bit, get
underneath, if we can, what you've been talking about, in terms
of the efforts to strengthen our initiatives.
Mr. Secretary, some people suggest--you know they're the--
sort of these polar opposites: isolate them, don't talk to
them, basically let the regime collapse by bringing all this
external pressure on them, and then hopefully, there's
something new to get engaged with; versus, you know, getting
engaged now, going along with this cycle of concessions, which
you can't distinguish before the talks whether it is going to
occur or not. I mean, you just said, Mr. Ambassador, we don't
want to talk to them for the sake of talking, but, I mean, they
can come to us and say, ``Hey, we're really ready. Yes, we'll
sit down. Let's go talk. We'll go through this. We're
absolutely prepared to get good results.'' They're not going to
serve up the results until you have talked, correct? So, you're
going to have to go through some kind of measure of testing
whether or not it's real.
Ambassador Bosworth. I think that's correct. I mean, one of
the things that we are looking for, however, is evidence that
the agreements that we have reached with them in the past are
agreements which they are now prepared to carry out.
The Chairman. Do you want that evidence in terms of their
adhering to the agreement, or saying they will?
Ambassador Bosworth. Well, we want evidence that they treat
these things seriously and that they are not making agreements
just for the sake of getting talks started. We want to see
concrete results.
The Chairman. Does that----
Ambassador Bosworth. We also----
The Chairman. Does that put a hurdle in the way of getting
to the other talks?
Ambassador Bosworth. No, I don't believe it does.
The Chairman. What if they think that's part of the
bargain?
Ambassador Bosworth. Well, these are agreements they've
already made. It's very difficult to go forward with confidence
and make new agreements if they are not able to adhere to the
ones that we've already put in place.
The Chairman. And if they're not, do you give a deadline?
Is there a greater capacity to bring pressure on them to go the
regime-collapse route?
Ambassador Bosworth. Well, I'm not very confident about
regime collapse as a route toward stability on the Korean
Peninsula. One can argue that we've been waiting for that
regime to collapse for a long time, and it's still there. No, I
think we have to deal with North Korea as we find it, not as we
would like it to be perhaps at some point in the future.
The Chairman. Let me go further than that, if I can, for a
moment, both of you. Isn't it fair to say that regime collapse
is distinctly against China's interests?
Dr. Campbell. I would say so, Senator. In fact, I think one
of the things that has animated China's positions on North
Korea in recent years has been a concern about stability in
North Korea. And they have taken steps to strengthen their ties
militarily, at the party level, and economically with the
regime's elite. I think it would be fair to say, though, that,
in some of our discussions with our Chinese interlocutors,
they, too, have expressed concerns about developments in North
Korea.
The Chairman. But, this doesn't break us through yet. I
mean, my frustration, a little bit, is that they keep paying
lipservice to the notion that North Korea's activities are
threatening, and they don't want them to be an expansive
nuclear power, and they don't want them to proliferate, but
then they keep throwing this very traditional Chinese concern
about stability--I think, partly because of their own internal
politics and partly because of what the impact would be on
them, of refugees and collapse and other things.
So, there's a tension here. We just don't get beyond that.
And the question is whether or not you think China is prepared
to get beyond it. It seems to me China--if China wanted to flex
a little muscle here--could have a profound impact on what
North Korea's attitude is about its future.
Ambassador Bosworth. Well, clearly, China has enormous
interest in North Korea, in general. I am convinced that we
share one large common interest between the United States and
China, and that is that neither of us want to see North Korea
as a nuclear-weapon state on an ongoing basis.
North Korea is also, as you point out, Mr. Chairman, very
concerned about stability in North Korea; stability in
Northeast Asia, in general. And it is, I think, obvious that
there are, at times, understandable tensions between their
objective of denuclearization and their objective of reducing
or avoiding serious tension on the peninsula.
We work with China on this issue on an ongoing basis. I've
made, since I've been in this position, about seven trips to
Beijing. The Chinese have come here. It is a subject of primary
tension when our two Presidents meet, as they did in January of
this year. This is an issue which is at the very center of the
United States-China relationship.
So, we continue to work this problem. I have no magic
bullet that is going to align our interest and China's interest
entirely, with regard to North Korea. But, like so many other
problems in the world, we have to keep working at it, chipping
away, trying to advance the ball, if you will, because I am
also of the view that it's very difficult to see an acceptable
result to the challenges posed by North Korea without China's
active participation.
The Chairman. Do you----
Sorry, did you want to add to that?
Dr. Campbell. I would just add one thing to that, Senator,
if I could. You had the opportunity to visit with President Hu
Jintao when he visited Washington not long ago. In the
intensive diplomacy surrounding his visit and the release of
the United States-China joint statement, one of the central
issues of our discussion was the developments on the Korean
Peninsula.
And it's clear that the recent revelations associated with
the alleged UEP program in North Korea have caused anxiety in
Beijing. And they acknowledge that, for the first time, in our
joint statement. It is the case that China takes very seriously
the 2005 joint statement, whereby North Korea has made specific
commitments about what it's prepared to do in the nuclear
realm. And Chinese interlocutors view actions that North Korea
has taken with regard to this program as being inconsistent
with their declarations associated with the 2005 agreement.
The Chairman. Would you say that we have additional arrows
in our quiver?
Ambassador Bosworth. Well, we always have, I think, in
almost every situation, arrows in our quiver that we could
employ. The question is: Do those contribute to bringing about
a solution that is acceptable to us?
The Chairman. Well, if--I mean----
Ambassador Bosworth. But, I think--I don't mean to be----
The Chairman. No, but if you don't, then they're not
usable. Maybe, I should----
Ambassador Bosworth. Well----
The Chairman [continuing]. Say ``usable''----
[Laughter.]
Ambassador Bosworth. I think--and this is the way I kind of
approach this issue of China and North Korea--that both of us
have a major stake in demonstrating that working together with
our other partners in the region, we can solve this problem or
at least manage this problem over the longer term, because I
think, in some sense, it is a litmus test to the ability of the
United States and China to work together on broader issues.
The Chairman. To what do you attribute the increase of this
volatility, active events between the North and the South, over
the course of the last year or so?
Ambassador Bosworth. That's a very good question, and it's
one that our intelligence community has worked at very
assiduously. There is some belief that it is related to issues
regarding succession in North Korea. There is some belief that
it is related to jockeying among various factions in North
Korea. I think it's also very important to look at the
historical origins of these particular provocations as they
arise.
I don't have an overall explanation for why these things
have happened. I do think it is a useful reminder--an important
reminder--of the extraordinary tension that exists along that
border, along the DMZ, and of the importance of the United
States and all of our other partners in trying to work to
reduce that tension and manage the situation.
The Chairman. Last question, Secretary, if you don't mind.
With respect to the North, this tension, do you believe that if
we put the regime change/stability, whatever you want to call
it--longevity--in other words, if the end product were that if
they behave in XYZ ways, then we're not setting out to change
the regime, that there's an open thing, and if China were to
agree to that--is that the big, final enchilada for them? Is
that the big deal that----
Ambassador Bosworth. Well, I think, clearly, for the North
Koreans, regime continuity is the essential objective of
everything that they do. We have indicated to them strongly, on
a number of occasions over the last few years, that we do not
regard regime change as the outcome of our policy. But, we do
regard a change in regime behavior as necessary to any
fundamental improvement in the overall relationship. We have,
in the past, under various administrations in this country,
held out the prospect of negative security assurances. We have
repeatedly told them, particularly in the last 2 years, that
regime change is not the objective of our policy. I told my
interlocutors that when I visited North Korea in December 2009.
So, I think it may be that they don't believe us or that
they don't fully trust us. But, I don't think they should be
operating under the fear that somehow we are dedicated and
determined to undermine the regime.
The Chairman. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As I mentioned in my opening statement, I asked the
Congressional Research Service to evaluate the implementation
of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874, and they reported
that implementation with regard to the sanctions has been
uneven globally and, in cases, diminished over time. Now, in
addition to that problem, there is the problem of the trading
partners and the actual or potential proliferation of elements
of the nuclear program to other countries.
I would like for your comment on the Congressional Research
Service's finding about the uneven or even diminishing
application of sanctions.
Ambassador Bosworth. Well----
Senator Lugar [continuing]. And the sending out by the
North Koreans, either for profit in the regime or personally,
of elements of the nuclear program.
Ambassador Bosworth. Well, first of all, I would agree that
implementation has been uneven. But, to improve implementation
has been one of the fundamental goals of our multilateral
diplomacy. And we have a number of people, who travel the
world, in fact, talking to individual governments about the
need to tighten sanctions against North Korea and to fully
implement the sanctions resolutions of the U.N. Security
Council.
Dr. Campbell. Can I just--also, if I could, Senator, just
to add to that. I think it would be fair to say that North
Korea is probably the most heavily sanctioned country in the
world. As Ambassador Bosworth has indicated, we have a fairly
elaborate set of steps that we are taking in a variety of
countries.
And I would point to a number of successes that perhaps do
not get enough attention. In the last year, a number of states
who had previously never been involved in, shall we say,
interdicting or helping us with the transfer of illicit cargoes
from North Korea to sites either in Asia or in the Middle East
have assisted us in turning back shipments. We've also been
able to target some specific entities that are involved in
providing hard currency to elite groups around the leadership.
And our evidence suggests that, in fact, many of these efforts
do indeed bite and have created some difficulties, overall, for
the leadership.
I think it'd be fair to say that there is more to be done
and that this is an issue that we engage actively on,
particularly with our friends, not just in Japan and South
Korea, but also in China. As we speak right now, we have a
senior team in China discussing these very matters.
Senator Lugar. Well, there were some allegations, for
example, that North Korean nuclear materials reached Syria at
one point. I'm just curious--maybe these are only elements that
our intelligence services are examining, but are there periodic
reports, by the State Department or by somebody, as to how the
sanctions are working? In other words, reports that detail,
country by country, what the nature of the cooperation is. What
have we caught? What got away? This sort of thing.
Ambassador Bosworth. Sure. No, we look at all those issues
very carefully. And I think I can commit the administration--if
you would like us to follow up in an executive session, and
examine some of these specific cases, I think we would be very
happy to do so. For reasons I know you will understand, some of
these are a little too sensitive to discuss in an open hearing.
Senator Lugar. I do understand that, but I wanted to raise
the issue----
Ambassador Bosworth. Sure.
Senator Lugar [continuing]. Because I think it's a critical
one, not just in terms of our relations with North Korea, but
in terms of difficulties elsewhere in the world, where some of
this material may wind up.
Ambassador Bosworth. Without question. And I would say, for
the record, that proliferation of nuclear materials and missile
materials coming out of North Korea is one of our major
concerns and is one of the major factors driving American
policy in this regard.
Senator Lugar. I'd like to inquire about North Korea's work
with the Burmese military. There have been reports, from time
to time, that we have tried to dissuade a North Korean ship
from reaching a projective destination in Burma. But, what is
the general consensus as to where that relationship is? And how
does it affect the six-power talks or others in which Burma is
not a part?
Dr. Campbell. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate the
question.
I think it would be fair to say that, in the past, most of
North Korea's proliferation activities have affected the Middle
East. But, in the recent period, they have increased
substantially, we believe, the provision of certain
conventional technologies--small arms and also some missile
components--to Burma, in strict and clear violation of U.N.
Security Council resolutions. We continue to monitor other
allegations closely, associated with illicit activities between
North Korea and Burma.
This is a subject of enormous concern. And we have worked
closely with a number of countries in Southeast Asia to assist
us in establishing a greater degree of confidence about illicit
transfers, largely by ship, coming from North Korea.
This is one of those areas that Ambassador Bosworth has
indicated that we'd be pleased to perhaps engage with you in
private session. I will tell you, we've had some successes, but
this is an enormously challenging problem. And, in fact, North
Korea, in many of these areas, has demonstrated itself, that
they are a determined proliferator. And, as Ambassador Bosworth
has indicated, this is at the top of our list, in terms of our
overall concerns.
Senator Lugar. Well, I appreciate the sensitivity. Once
again, perhaps this could be more thoroughly discussed in a
classified session.
Let me, finally, ask: Recently, a South Korean lawmaker
suggested the United States redeploy tactical nuclear weapons
to South Korea as a deterrent to North Korea. What is the
perspective of either of you on that suggestion?
Ambassador Bosworth. Well, I've seen those reports. Let me
just say that our mission in South Korea is to deter any
aggression by North Korea. And we are very confident that we
have more than adequate tools at our disposal to accomplish
that mission of deterrence.
Senator Lugar. So, as a result of that, you----
Ambassador Bosworth. We have no--I mean, this is not an
issue that is under active consideration.
Senator Lugar. I thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Senator Kerry.
Gentlemen, thank you for your service. Certainly, you've
got one of the most difficult tasks of anybody in Foreign
Service.
And, you know, I've read your opening statements and
listened carefully. And I've been to South Korea and compared
the two governments. Obviously, I've never been to North Korea.
But, the one thing that, in my mind, makes this such a knotty
problem is, you can't really understand what makes these people
tick. You know, before you can resolve a problem, you've got to
understand the problem. And I'm at a loss as to an explanation
as to what motivates the North Korean regime. What is it that
makes them feel good? What is it that makes them feel bad? Why
do they do the things that they do?
I mean, you know, if they were an individual human being,
they'd probably be committed because of their inconsistencies
and what the psychiatrists call ``inappropriate behavior.''
It's just--it's nonunderstandable. Can you try to shed some
light on that for me?
Ambassador Bosworth. Well, I'm not sure that I can
illuminate that whole question, but what I would say is that
what I find useful in trying to understand North Korean
behavior is to understand that everything that the North Korean
Government does, domestically and internationally, is aimed at
one goal, and that is perpetuation of the regime.
Senator Risch. And I understand that. But, you know, that's
not unique to North Korea. I mean, there's----
Ambassador Bosworth. No----
Senator Risch [continuing]. There's many, many countries in
the world--now, I agree it's--that is there, on steroids, but
there's a lot of regimes in the world that are focused on----
Ambassador Bosworth. I think when you combine that singular
goal with the existence of what is probably one of the most
comprehensive police states in the history of the organized
world, you can get some insight into how that place operates.
But, it remains, as Churchill said about the Soviet Union in
the 1940s, ``an enigma wrapped in a mystery,'' or maybe it was
the other way around. We don't know that much about how North
Korea works, internally. We don't know that much about how
decisions are made. And, in the end, we don't know that much
about who makes them.
Senator Risch. Well, I appreciate that. And again, you
know, when you step back and you look at people who are in
power or in charge, and you look at the way they treat their
fellow human beings that are the same--their fellow
countrymen--I mean, it is just--it's just staggering to try to
get your arms around it and understand what--how they think.
And--Mr. Campbell, you want to take a run at it?
Dr. Campbell. Well, thank you, Senator. I would associate
myself with the comments of Ambassador Bosworth.
I will say that it is among our most difficult intelligence
challenges, to understand what goes on. And I would say that
it's not simply the survival of the regime; I'd be more
particular. It's the survival of the family, of Kim Jong-il and
its very, very narrow group of people at the very, very top of
the system.
And indeed, they have practiced internal brutality of a
kind that we've seen in very few places globally. And the level
of isolation that their population generally experiences is
probably unmatched anywhere else in the world. And that is a
very determined effort on the part of the leadership.
And I will tell you, one of the interesting tensions that
exists, I think, between China and North Korea is that for
years China has attempted to encourage the leadership to open
up economically, to practice a form of, shall we say,
authoritarian reform of the kind that the Soviet Union--that
China practiced after Deng Xiaoping came to power. And I think
they have been very discouraged by the fact that North Korea
has essentially chosen not to follow that path. It is still an
extraordinarily isolated country.
And I think that the general prism that Ambassador Bosworth
laid out, which is to try to think about every step they take
as part of a larger strategy to try to maintain and secure the
leadership of Kim Jong-il and his chosen successor.
Senator Risch. I understand the proposition that they want
to stay in power and they do everything they can--that's their
single objective. But, you know, really, what they do on these
brinksmanship things doesn't really mesh with that, because, I
mean, if you wanted to stay in power, what you'd want is to
keep the seas calm and keep things the way they are. Instead,
they go out and they sink a ship or they do an artillery attack
on South Korea. Why would you do that if you truly did want to
keep things just exactly as they were? I mean, it----
Ambassador Bosworth. Well----
Senator Risch [continuing]. Just doesn't make sense.
Ambassador Bosworth [continuing]. They want to preserve the
regime, but they also want the world's attention, because they
need things from the outside world. And so, they do this--these
provocations, both to demonstrate that they remain a force to
be reckoned with--they do not want to be ignored--and they do
them because they think, as the cycle advances, that our
response will provide them benefits.
Senator Risch. Thank you.
Again, gentlemen, thank you so much for your service. And I
can tell you, I sincerely appreciate the difficult Rubik's Cube
you're dealing with here.
Thank you.
Senator Lugar [presiding]. Well, thank you, Senator Risch.
Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you, Secretary and Ambassador.
I want to just kind of build on what Senator Risch was
talking about, and then maybe focus more tightly on the nuclear
ambitions of North Korea, which just takes so much of our
attention and energy.
It sounds--I'm neither an expert on Korea or on Asia, but
it sounds, from the testimony here today and what I read before
being here today, and following all the things that have been
written about the region leading up to this hearing here today,
that clearly at the core of the nuclear ambitions of this
country is survival, in essence. Most countries develop a
nuclear capacity, (a) because, for example, India and Pakistan
are largely focused on each other, and clearly the cold war is
something we fully understand. From North Korea's perspective,
it doesn't seem like they're in fear of a Japanese invasion or,
quite frankly, an American one. This is, basically--as far as I
can see, is an insurance policy. It is the--it is something
that they--their ability to have a nuclear program makes them,
not just a force to be reckoned with in the region, because of
the damage they can do, but, quite frankly, gives them some
level of security and fear that there's limits on what the
United States or any other actor can do against North Korea's
interests, because of their capacity to react with a nuclear
weapon. Is that a--I mean, is that basically a accurate
description of the purpose----
Ambassador Bosworth. Well, let me----
Senator Rubio [continuing]. Of the nuclear program?
Ambassador Bosworth. Let me try to respond to it, then
maybe Kurt Campbell will have something to add.
I think they view a nuclear weapons program as the ultimate
deterrent. This is a country that has, for 60 years or more,
lived in, sort of, day-to-day fear of being invaded or being
attacked from the outside. Rightly or wrongly--they may
exaggerate that, but, rightly or wrongly, that's what they
believe. So, for them, a stockpile of nuclear weapons
constitutes the ultimate deterrent. And they consider it
essential to their regime's survival.
Senator Rubio. If I could just touch upon that. They don't
actually even have to have the weapons, right? They just have
to show the capacity to build them and to deliver it, if they
ever wanted to.
Ambassador Bosworth. I think that's correct.
Senator Rubio. What I'm trying to get at is, is that we
spend all this time and energy trying to convince ourselves
that we're going to be able to ever talk them out of the
program. It sounds to me that, in essence, the program is the
regime. It is the core and essence of its existence and ability
to survive. I mean, they're certainly not going to stay in
power because they're doing a good job managing the economy.
They're not going to stay in power because they do a good job
of distributing justice. The one thing that keeps them in power
is the ability to crack down on internal dissent and the
ability to repel foreign intervention in their affairs, because
of this nuclear program. And so, it seems to me like this idea,
that we're going to somehow be able to pressure and/or convince
them to abandon this program--the price of pressuring them
seems like it's extraordinarily high, given the central
importance that this has on their regime; I mean, on its very
survival.
Ambassador Bosworth. I don't think anyone in the
administration--I certainly do not underestimate the difficulty
of negotiating on the path that we are on, toward a
comprehensive and irreversible, verifiable end to North Korea's
nuclear weapons program. I have some belief that, in the longer
term, as we pursue this program, if we can pursue this policy
effectively, that a mix of incentives and disincentives can be
found which will make North Korea more willing to contemplate
giving up the program. In the meantime, along the way, there
are important things that I think we can try to achieve
relating to the question of proliferation, relating to their
production of fissile material, both from their plutonium
program and from their uranium enrichment program.
So, I think simply to say now, ``Well, we'll never convince
them to give up these weapons,'' is probably an error, because,
as we pursue the ultimate goal--and I think, given our global
nonproliferation policy, we must pursue that ultimate goal--
but, as we pursue it, I think other things become achievable
and, in the end, we may actually get ``yes'' for an answer.
But, if we don't try, we're certainly not going to get ``yes''
for an answer.
Ambassador Bosworth. Yes.
Senator Rubio. But--and I'm not suggesting that we should--
but, the question, I guess, is there's two separate topics; one
is proliferation. And clearly, that's the one that I do believe
we could have some influence over. But, what I'm trying to
really kind of arrive at an answer--is this mix of incentives
versus disincentives of even having a program or having the
capacity to have a program. It's hard for me to envision what
that mix of disincentives that would lead to them abandoning
the program is.
Dr. Campbell. Can I, Senator, just take one other shot at
that? I like very much the way Ambassador Bosworth laid this
out. But, I will say, it was only a few years ago that a number
of people, who, for instance, were looking at some of the
developments in Libya, thought that it would be impossible to
create any kind of program whereby a very secretive but
determined program that Gaddafi was undertaking in the nuclear
realm would be stopped. But, through purposeful diplomacy in
the Bush administration, we achieved that. And just imagine the
circumstances today in Libya if there was a nuclear dimension.
There'd be--it's tremendously dangerous now, but it would be
horrifically so if there was an added nuclear dimension.
So, I think that the diplomacy aimed at this is a worthy
goal, overall. And I think that you have to take it in pieces.
And one of the most important elements here is on the matter of
proliferation, as Ambassador Bosworth indicated.
I will also say that, you know, North Korea is one of the
most militarized states in the world. And so, it not only has
the nuclear program that we have been discussing, but it has
one of the largest conventional forces, including artillery,
that is arrayed just above the DMZ within easy, and
unfortunately, ready striking distance of one of the largest
cities in the world: Seoul. And so, it has other means at its
disposal to be able to provide some form of deterrent.
I think the truth is that the risks, particularly on the
proliferation side, are so great, and the concerns associated
with other elements that are transpiring inside the country
suggest that this sort of determined approach to diplomacy is
the right course for the United States.
Senator Rubio. And I guess what I'm really trying to get
at--and I think it's going to be an ongoing dialogue--is, I'm
trying to picture, in my head, what that would look like. What
set of conditions or disincentives or incentives, what kind of
package of those would it take to tilt the scales for a regime
of this nature? And these are--this is not just a pragmatic--
this is not some sort of pragmatic government that's looking to
build its economy and grow its country. Above everything else,
according to the testimony here today and everything we've
seen, what they're really interested in is owning this country
for as long as they can, and staying in power, as a family. I'm
just trying to figure out what set of incentives/disincentives
it would take to tilt that scale toward abandonment of this
capacity and this program. Obviously, sitting here, it's not
a--you know, the ideal setting to, kind of, have a----
Ambassador Bosworth. Right.
Senator Rubio [continuing]. Conversation about that--but
how that's developed, and, in our mind, whether that's even
realistic. And I think we have a similar conversation going on
with regards to Iran and other parts of the world. But, this
one's even more problematic, because we know so little about
its decisionmaking process and things of that nature.
I don't know if I have time, Chairman, to ask a real quick
question, because I know I'm a little bit----
Senator Lugar. Go ahead.
Senator Rubio. Just, I wanted to talk briefly about the
humanitarian aid. Again, this is an issue of first impression,
to me, having--this is my second meeting on this committee. I'm
interested in the food program in the past. And how problematic
has it been, in terms of seeing those resources diverted to
elites or the military?
Ambassador Bosworth. Well, as I indicated earlier, Senator,
one of the conditions that we have imposed--I think,
successfully, for the most part--on our provision of food aid,
has been a very careful process of monitoring. Now, I wouldn't
want to exaggerate that. We don't have an outside monitor
following every bag of grain that is put into the country. But,
we agree with the North Koreans, in advance, on the recipients
of the USAID, which includes, of course, children, older
people, et cetera. And then, through frequent inspection, we
have been able to verify--quite effectively, we think--that the
aid has gone to the recipients for whom it was intended.
Now, we negotiated this monitoring arrangement back in
2007, I believe--2007/2008. In 2009, the North Koreans threw
out our food assistance team--some people believe, because they
became concerned that having Korean-speaking outsiders--and
many of the United States team were Korean speakers--was not in
their long-term interest, so they threw them out, which is
another indication that perhaps they were quite effective.
But, as we indicated in our respective testimonies, we are
currently assessing need. We have some other things that we
need to do in response to North Korea's request for renewed
food aid. And then we will talk to the North Koreans about a
monitoring system, which, at its minimum, would be as effective
as the one that we had there last time.
Dr. Campbell. Can I just add to that, Senator?
Just, as part of this, we would also be in very close
coordination with our colleagues on Capitol Hill, who have a
very keen interest in this and have provided very useful
context for how to think about this overall program.
I just want to underscore that no decisions have been made.
We are still in the study phase. And we are taking this matter
very seriously. And we're in close coordination with our South
Korean colleagues, as well.
I will say, one of the key conditions that I find most
powerful is that the packaging--and I've seen them myself and
would love to send one up to your office--makes very clear to
the recipients that this food assistance comes from the United
States, from the people of the United States. And so, it's very
clear, impossible to disguise, that when this food is
distributed, it is well understood that it comes from the
benevolence of United States people.
The Chairman [presiding]. Senator, thank you.
Just a couple of quick questions.
What's the impact of the uranium enrichment program
disclosure, in terms of our overall interests there?
Ambassador Bosworth. Well, first of all, this did not come
as a complete surprise to us. We have long--as you know, Mr.
Chairman--long suspected that North Korea was pursuing a
program of uranium enrichment. They then, of course, as we all
know, showed this facility to a group of visiting Americans,
including one of our more prominent nuclear scientists. We know
that the centrifuges are there. We cannot verify that they are
operating. And we cannot verify that they've had any production
of enriched uranium.
But, I would say, without question, two things. One, this
means that, assuming we do get back to the table with them,
that is very much going to be the No. 1 issue on our list of
concerns and things that we have to talk about. The other is
that a viable uranium enrichment program does present a
complication to our efforts to negotiate a denuclearization
agreement with the North Koreans, no question about it.
Verification becomes an even more difficult question. And
obviously, these are subjects that we're going to have to get
at with them.
The Chairman. To what degree do South Korean interests and/
or politics constrain what we might or might not want to do at
this point?
Ambassador Bosworth. On the matter of uranium enrichment?
The Chairman. No, on the matter of----
Ambassador Bosworth. Or just in general?
The Chairman [continuing]. In general, engagement/talks.
Bilateral.
Ambassador Bosworth. Well, I don't think they constrain our
reaction and our ability to act. We have said, to both the
South Koreans and, more importantly, to the North Koreans,
that, from our point of view, an improvement in South/North
relations, particularly after the blatant provocations of the
last year, is a necessary step before we can resume a more
multilaterally oriented negotiating process or dialogue. And we
saw, early last month, a tentative step forward in that regard,
on the part of the North and South Korean militaries. We are
optimistic--or hopeful, at least--that that step will be
followed by others. We've made it very clear to North Korea and
to China that South Korea is the aggrieved party in this
instance, and, as our ally, we're standing with them. And we
want to see some change and improvement in North Korean
attitude on key points of interest to South Korea.
Dr. Campbell. Let me just add to that, if I could, Senator,
very quickly.
I think it's very important for Americans to understand the
tremendous forbearance and, frankly, the courage that the South
Korean, particularly President Lee Myung-bak, have demonstrated
in the face of repeated outrageous provocations. And the fact
that they have been calm and not responded in a retaliatory way
is a tremendous testament to their leadership.
And I would probably even go further than what Ambassador
Bosworth has said, although I agree with everything he has
said, that very few countries in the world have demonstrated
how much they are prepared to work with the United States, not
just on the Peninsula, but globally. South Korea's foreign
assistance, their commitment to Afghanistan, to what we're
doing globally, is remarkable. They are emerging as a key
player on the international stage. They have played an
important role in the G20. I think this emerging partnership
between the United States and South Korea in this new phase is
one of the most important success stories of Northeast Asia.
So, I would say, overall, our diplomacy and our approaches
are reinforcing. And I think one of the reasons why South Korea
was able to respond so carefully to these provocations was
indeed the strength and confidence they had of the relationship
with the United States.
The Chairman. What could either of you share with us about
Japan's back-channel efforts with this--in this regard, over
the course of the last year?
Ambassador Bosworth. Let me first talk about the front-
channel efforts. One of the things that's been most important
over the course of the last year has been the extent to which
this new Japanese Government is prepared to work constructively
with South Korea. I think, as you know, we have some long
memories in Asia. There have been some historical differences
and challenges between Japan and South Korea. What we have seen
has been a forward-looking and progressive effort by Japan to
support South Korea in the face of these provocations.
Last December, Secretary Clinton hosted, for the first
time, a ministerial-level trilateral, with her colleagues from
Japan and South Korea, in which all three countries worked very
closely together to demonstrate cooperation with respect to
North Korea.
I think Japan is prepared to be extraordinarily supportive
within the context of the six-party framework. And they have
been very transparent in all their activities in Northeast
Asia, with both South Korea and the United States.
The Chairman. Ambassador, I mentioned, a little while ago,
you'd made seven trips to Beijing. But, it's my understanding
you've only made one to Pyongyang. Have we----
Ambassador Bosworth. That is correct.
The Chairman. Have we kind of isolated ourselves, here?
Ambassador Bosworth. No; I don't believe so. You know,
we've made it clear, I'm prepared to go to----
The Chairman. What's the seven-to-one ratio? Why wouldn't
you pop over----
Ambassador Bosworth. It's an even larger ratio with regard
to my trips to South Korea, because I think, at this stage in
our efforts to deal with this set of problems, we find that
it's, above all, first, important to coordinate our efforts
with our partners in the six-party process.
The Chairman. Somebody--I mean, is there a resistance,
here, to saying, ``Let's get back to the table''?
Ambassador Bosworth. No, I think we are very open to
getting back to the table, provided, as I indicated earlier,
that's done under the right set of circumstances and in the
right framework.
The Chairman. Who's going to figure that out?
Ambassador Bosworth. Well, we're all, collectively, trying
to figure that out. And I----
The Chairman. Do you have to talk to them to figure it out?
Ambassador Bosworth. Well, we are not without ways of
communicating with them. And we do communicate with them. But,
I think, ultimately, we may have to have further conversations
with them, bilaterally, in order to figure out how to move
forward multilaterally.
The Chairman. Senator Lugar, do you have any additional----
Senator Lugar. One short question, sort of referring back
to my mention of the 8,000 Americans from the Korean war that
are not accounted for. First of all, is there any information
on this matter coming from the North Koreans? And, second,
apparently there has been some search, in Chinese military
archives, as to who might have been taken into China from North
Korea during that conflict, and perhaps some cooperation with
the Chinese. On either front, do you have information or an
idea of whether this is being pursued?
Dr. Campbell. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
First of all, let me just underscore that we, in the U.S.
Government, have had a consistent policy that the recovery of
remains, the identification of Missing in Action, remains an
extraordinarily high priority for our activities. And we've
demonstrated that in Southeast Asia in other conflicts, and
also on the Korean Peninsula.
I think it would be fair to say that we view the program in
North Korea as a critical humanitarian effort. I think the
North Koreans view it largely as an opportunity to raise hard
currency. We are prepared, under the right circumstances, to
resume this overall effort.
I think, particularly when it relates to the interactions
that we've had with China over the course of many years
associated with the North Korean--excuse me, with the Korean
war--let me take that question for the record, and I will get
back to you directly with where this specifically stands. I
remember it very closely from my time working in the Department
of Defense, but I'm not sure where it stands currently. And I
will get back to you directly.
[Editor's note.--the information requested above was not
available when this hearing went to press.]
Senator Lugar. I would thank you for that report.
Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Senator Rubio, do you have any questions
for----
Senator Rubio. Just one more, kind of, question/
observation, to either one of you, and maybe both. You know,
I've read in a couple of places some--whether it's opposition
folks outside of North Korea or what have you--one of the
arguments that has been made is that, clearly, in a country
that's struggling with poverty and a lot of suffering, you have
a government willing to spend between 15 and 25 percent of its
gross domestic product on the military, particularly a very
expensive nuclear program, a nuclear ambition. And the argument
is that the--in a country that's willing to do that, that this
food assistance is basically going to be taken and used to feed
the elites and the military, and that, in essence--I've read
somewhere, and I'm not saying I agree with this--but that food
program, in many respects, relieves the pressure on the North
Korean Government to divert funds away from the nuclear program
and divert it toward--and place it to where it should be, which
is feeding and caring for its people. Do you have thought--and
you probably have read some of those statements that have been
made by some--and do you have any thoughts on that, in general?
Ambassador Bosworth. My general thoughts on that, Senator,
would be that it's, I think, indicative of the nature of that
regime that they're prepared to do this. My second observation
would be that, in my experience, the last group of people in
North Korea who will not have food are the military. So, if we
provide food, and if we can monitor it carefully and we know
that it's going to children, institutional needs, I think it's
the right thing to do.
Senator Rubio. I think that the argument that some have
made--and not that I'm making it today, but the argument that
some have made is that, the fact that we--that, to the extent
that food does get to people in North Korea--and it's a very
calloused approach, I understand--but someone have made the
argument that, to the extent that food and goods does gets to
people, what it does is, it takes pressure off the regime to
have to take that money away from its nuclear program and
instead divert it to its people, where it should be in the
first place.
Dr. Campbell. Can I say, Senator, I don't think--that would
be the kind of calculus that a Western government that heeds
the needs of its people would perhaps take into account--I
don't think the North Korean leadership believes in these kinds
of tradeoffs. I think they are committed to these programs that
you have described. And they have demonstrated, historically,
that they are prepared to allow enormous suffering. Very
substantial component of its population suffered through
starvation in parts of the 1990s. And so, the choice really,
here, is whether these people are allowed to starve. And
that's, frankly, a humanitarian issue, really not a one of
political discourse.
Ambassador Bosworth. North Korea's national strategy
continues to be, as it has been for several years, something
called a military-first strategy. And they allocate resources
accordingly.
Senator Rubio. It sounds like the testimony, basically, is
that they're willing to let their people starve. In essence,
they don't respond to that kind of pressure; it's not part of
their decisionmaking matrix.
My last question. And again, because this is kind of an
issue of first impression to me. Unification and--as a
realistic goal in the long term or midterm, you know, what--is
there a national identity that crosses from North to South? And
I--No. 2, my first impression on this--and you may be able to
elaborate more on it--is that a unification of North and South
Korea, from a pragmatic standpoint, looks like it would be even
more difficult than an East and West Germany unification was,
for example, just given the dramatic differences between the
two economies. But, what is the status of that? How realistic
is that? How much is that discussed? How much is that desired?
Ambassador Bosworth. Well, I think most South Koreans would
agree that the cost of reunifying the Korean Peninsula is going
to be enormous. That does not mean, however, that they do not
hold this, still, as a strongly desired national objective.
But, the sense of Koreanness between South and North remains
very deep, even though, over the last several decades, the two
countries have gone in such different directions that it is
very difficult to, sort of, automatically see the way in which
that will happen.
I think, quite clearly, it's not going to happen on the
basis of the North Korean political economic model. It is--and
the South Korean political economic model would be a more
feasible route. But, that presumes all sorts of things
happening, over which we have very little way to forecast right
now.
Dr. Campbell. Can I just----
Senator Rubio. Is there----
Dr. Campbell. Can I just----
Senator Rubio. I'm sorry.
Dr. Campbell. Sorry, Senator. I didn't mean to--I would say
the--what I find interesting, in interacting with Korean
friends, is I think they have both a bond--a deep, historical,
cultural bond--but it coexists with a deep alienation. So, I
think what's challenging about the Korean Peninsula is that,
for most, particularly South Korean citizens, they feel both--
both an attraction, a deep recognition of historical kinship,
and cultural sameness, but also a deep alienation. And spanning
that gap will be enormously challenging in the future.
Senator Rubio. My last question.
What is the Chinese view--is there an official Chinese view
on unification--officially, unofficially--your impressions on
how they would view that. Particularly since I think we would
all agree that any reunification would look more like South
Korea than North Korea, for obvious reasons.
Ambassador Bosworth. My impression is that, from Beijing,
the current organization on the Korean Peninsula looks about as
good as they would--they could imagine.
Senator Rubio. In essence, you think they like it just the
way it is.
Ambassador Bosworth. Yes. Not all aspects of it just the
way it is, but Korean reunification is not one of the major
objectives of the Chinese Government.
Senator Rubio. So, suffice it to say that a unified Korea
that looks like South Korea and has the kind of close
relationship with the United States that South Korea now has is
not high on their wish list.
Ambassador Bosworth. I would put it that way, yes.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Thank you, folks.
Mr. Secretary and Mr. Ambassador, thanks a lot for being
here.
We're going to leave the record open for a week. We had
some colleagues who wanted to be here, who couldn't be here.
So, if you don't mind, we'll try not to burden you, but we do
want to make sure the record is complete.
If I could ask for the second panel to come up while this
panel is departing: L. Gordon Flake, executive director of
Mansfield Foundation; Marcus Noland, Peterson Institute for
International Economics; and Robert Carlin, Center for
International Security and Cooperation, Stanford.
And if--I'd ask, Mr. Carlin, if you would lead off;
Director Noland, if you'd go second; and, Mr. Flake, if you'd
wrap up.
Thank you.
Can we keep order, please, in the hearing. I want to keep
moving forward.
Mr. Carlin.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT CARLIN, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
AND COOPERATION, STANFORD UNIVERSITY, STANFORD, CA
Mr. Carlin. Thank you, sir. It's a pleasure and an honor to
be here.
Once upon a time, we learned three useful lessons dealing
with North Korea: It was possible to advance key U.S. interests
through talks with them. In those talks, our negotiators could
break down complex problems into component parts, and then deal
with those parts in logical order. And finally, contrary to the
common wisdom, if an agreement was well conceived, constructed,
and implemented, the North Koreans would abide by the core of
it, as long as we did. We knew, of course, that they'd game the
process and hedge their bets.
These are not theoretical lessons; they come from hard
experience. But, we did a bad job explaining this to the
Congress and to the American people. And so, everything that we
learned and accomplished was buried under a mountain of myth.
Instead, today the phrase, ``We won't buy the same horse
twice,'' is considered wisdom. Though it is based on the
mistaken belief that negotiating with the DPRK is simple
flimflammery.
Some in Washington may remember, in the early 1990s, that
discussions on North Korea policy had, as part of the agenda,
preparing for something that was called a ``soft landing.'' The
goal was to prevent a calamity of the destabilizing situation
that would result from a collapse of the North.
This concept of a soft landing had a number of advantages
for us. Notably, it didn't handcuff us to fixed goals. It
allowed us room to maneuver, to protect and pursue our national
interests, as the situation warranted. Then, as now, many
people did not see the point in talking to the North Koreans,
because they considered our problems in Korea primarily
military. But, the North's development of a nuclear program in
the late 1980s meant that the issue for us had become as much
diplomatic as military. And it still is.
It was clear that the North Koreans wanted to talk. But,
why? We developed a fairly good understanding, over hundreds
and hundreds of hours, as we listened to them. But, then
abruptly in 2001, the talking stopped, and apparently so did
the listening. And, not incidentally, all of our previous gains
were cast overboard. As a result, the situation today is much
more difficult. Our leverage is smaller, not greater. And our
room for maneuver has become even more curtailed.
If there was a chance, 10 years ago, of stopping the North
from building a small nuclear arsenal, the gain has now
changed, and it has not changed in our favor.
I worked under seven U.S. Presidents. I don't think our
problem dealing with the North is confined to one
administration or one party. I think, in the deepest sense, the
problems reflect a very curious national inability to fathom
how states like North Korea work and how they see the world.
Our difficulties are compounded by the fact that our public
discourse in this country about North Korea has for too long
been condescending and irrelevant. The general impression in
the United States is that North Koreans live in a blasted
moonscape. And any observer contradicting that image, even
purely as a matter of fact, becomes suspect.
As we heard earlier, the word has gone out that we aim to
force the North to change its unacceptable behavior. If that is
our goal, I'm afraid that the climb is going to be steeper than
we imagine, because the North Koreans believe, if they behave
simply on our say-so, they will become part of the woodwork of
the great powers.
We constantly hear that the North Koreans inhabit the most
isolated country on Earth. Yet, in some ways, we are more
isolated from them than they are from the rest of the world.
DPRK officials travel. They tune in outside radio. And they
read outside books and newspapers detailing our politics and
our society. By contrast, at least at the official level, we
remain pristine. We don't go there. We rarely let them come
here. And overall, we seem to keep contact as limited as we
can.
The result? Well, to substitute for knowledge and
experience, we have developed a fog of myths about North Korea.
And amidst this fog, the North Koreans have learned to maneuver
like Drake's small ships among the galleons of the Spanish
Armada.
Ultimately, progress on the North Korean issue depends not
on the pressures we bring to bear, but on how well we
understand the regime. If we don't grasp that North Koreans
believe they have legitimate national interests, then we fall
into the trap of thinking we can force them, sweet-talk them,
or bribe them into doing as we want. Diplomacy worked with
North Korea when it's searched for those places where interests
overlap. But, when we signal the North Koreans that there is no
place for them in our vision of the future, we undermine the
basis for serious discussion of circumstances in which we
might, for now, coexist.
Do, in fact, such areas of overlapping interests still
exist? It's hard to imagine getting at an answer if we don't
actually sit down and explore the landscape.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carlin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert Carlin
Once upon a time, not so long ago, we learned three valuable
lessons about dealing with North Korea.
First, it is indeed possible to advance U.S. national security
interests through negotiations with Pyongyang. We even found that we
had considerable leverage with the North Koreans if we did more than
merely paint pictures for them of a sweet and fanciful future.
Second, in talks with the North it is possible to break down
complex, seemingly insurmountable problems into component parts and
then focus on the parts in a logical order, so that successfully
dealing with the first (usually the easiest) boosts the chances of
dealing with subsequent, more difficult items.
Third, contrary to the common wisdom, if an agreement is
thoughtfully constructed and implemented, the North Koreans will abide
by the core of it as long as we do. It should not be a surprise to
discover, however that they are likely to game the process, exploiting
ambiguities and hedging their bets.
These are not theoretical classroom lessons or the fruit of idle
speculation. They come from real experience over many years.
Yet we did a poor job of explaining this experience to the Congress
and to the American people. As a result, what we learned, as well as
what we accomplished, was buried under a mountain of myth, where it has
remained for many years.
Today, the catch phrase ``we won't buy the same horse twice'' is
taken as wisdom in dealing with the challenges posed by North Korea.
Unfortunately, it is based on the mistaken but all too easily accepted
belief that negotiating with the DPRK is an exercise in flimflammery.
Twinned with that is an assumption, fervently held by many who
should know better, that we have, or can garner, enough power to
dictate outcomes to the North Koreans. And if they don't do as we
insist, the thinking goes, we can wait until they collapse or the
Chinese make them come around.
There may be a few still in Washington who remember that in the
early 1990s, discussion about North Korea policy centered around the
idea of preparing for a ``soft landing''--that is, preventing the very
scenario that takes up so much nervous energy in various capitals these
days, a calamitous and highly destabilizing collapse of North Korea.
The concept of a soft landing had a number of advantages as a core
policy precept. Notably, it did not handcuff us to fixed and
unachievable goals. Instead, it provided necessary maneuver room to
pursue our national interests in dealing with the North as the
situation warranted. What it did not allow or envision was sitting and
waiting while another country shaped the future of Northeast Asia.
I am not attempting to describe a golden era of a lost age. For one
thing, in those days, we still had much to learn about dealing with
North Korea, at that point not having engaged the North except in the
Military Armistice Commission talks at Panmunjom. In fact, then as now
many people didn't see the point in even talking to the North Koreans.
Our problem on the peninsula was still seen as largely military.
A number of changes in the late 1980s, however, drove home that
sending an aircraft carrier to cow the North was no longer a sufficient
response. Inter-Korean dialogue and the North's development of a
nuclear program meant that the issues for Washington had multiplied and
that the challenges presented by the North had become as much
diplomatic as military.
It was clear to us that the North Koreans wanted to talk--but why?
We developed a pretty good idea 10 years ago as we listened to what
they said and observed their reactions over hundreds and hundreds of
hours of formal and informal contacts. Nor did we merely listen. We
explained, we educated, and on occasion, we pounded the table.
But then, abruptly in 2001, we stopped talking and, apparently,
stopped listening. As a result, we have lost a decade in which to deal
with the situation on the Korean Peninsula. Not only that, in the
bargain we tossed overboard all that we had previously gained. As a
result, the situation we face today is much more difficult, our
leverage is smaller not greater, and our room for maneuver is even more
curtailed. If there was a chance 10 years ago that we might have
stopped the North from conducting nuclear tests and building a small
nuclear arsenal--and I believe we did have a good chance--the game has
now changed, and not in our favor.
Let me be clear. Our problems dealing with North Korea are not
confined to one administration or one party. In the deepest sense, they
reflect our national inability, intellectually and emotionally, to
understand how states like North Korea work. We fall into overly
simplistic thinking. We trap ourselves into seeing only two dimensional
figures. Our difficulties are compounded by the fact that public
discourse about the North in the United States has long been crippled,
condescending, irrelevant, and, like heartburn, episodic. There is a
general impression in the United States that North Koreans live in a
blasted landscape similar to the moon, and that all but a privileged
few are hollow-eyed and slack-jawed. Any observer contradicting that
image, even purely as a matter of fact, becomes suspect.
The word has gone out that we and our allies aim to force the North
to change its ``unacceptable behavior.'' We will not negotiate until
the North creates the ``conditions'' for negotiations. If that is our
goal, the climb is steeper than we imagine. Years ago, the North
Koreans were taught, and the lesson has since been endlessly
reinforced, that the world rarely rewards them for good behavior,
because whatever they do is never deemed good enough. If they
``behave,'' many North Koreans have become convinced that they will
become part of the great power woodwork, something to be ignored and
scuffed by the furniture on the way out.
It is widely and confidently stated that North Koreans inhabit the
most isolated country on earth. How one would measure such a thing I
have no idea, but assuming it approaches the truth, then it must also
be true that we are isolated from them. Isolation, after all, is a two-
way street.
Yet, in fact, we are more isolated from the North Koreans than they
are from the rest of the world. Though the numbers are small in
comparison to what are now world standards, DPRK delegations are
constantly traveling abroad. DPRK officials tune in outside radio and
television, read outside books and newspapers detailing our politics
and society. By contrast, at the official level, we keep ourselves
largely pristine, don't go there, rarely let them come here, and
overall keep contact as limited as we can on the grounds that exposing
them to our thinking and our society, our culture and our values is a
benefit, a present, a gift. No visas for the DPRK State Orchestra
because . . . well, because. The result? The North Koreans reap
tactical benefit from our ignorance, while we develop as a substitute
for knowledge a fog of myths about them. And through this fog the North
Koreans have learned to maneuver pretty well, like Drake's small ships
among the galleons of the Spanish armada.
Now that Pluto is no longer a planet, some people seem to think it
has been replaced by North Korea in the universe of strange, cold, and
distant places. As it happens, we could define Pluto out of existence.
We cannot do the same with North Korea, even if at times our fondest
hope is to hold our breath until the country goes away.
Ultimately, progress toward our goals in dealing with North Korea
depends not so much on the weight of the force we bring to bear--
sanctions, U.N. resolutions--but on how well we understand the North
Korean regime and its views of domestic and foreign policy challenges.
If we fail to grasp that North Koreans believe they have their own
national interests, then we fall into the trap of thinking we can force
them, sweet talk them, or bribe them into doing what we want.
To return to my first point, diplomacy has proven it can work with
North Korea if it seeks to discover those places where interests
overlap. To the extent that we signal to the North Koreans that we
don't see a place for them in our vision of the future of the region,
we undermine the basis for realistic discussion of the circumstances in
which we might coexist. Do, in fact, such areas of overlapping
interests still exist? It is hard to imagine getting at an answer if we
don't actually sit down and explore the landscape. Insisting that the
North Koreans must first demonstrate a strategic decision to accept our
outcome is a sure way of going nowhere fast.
We don't have to know everything about the North to know enough to
operate intelligently and effectively in our dealings with them. Here
are five interrelated subjects on which a lot of homework remains to be
done.
The threat. Compared to where we used to be in our perception of
the North Korean military threat, I think we are now on firmer ground,
certainly more realistic. I applaud the careful assessment in DNI
Clapper's testimony earlier this month, as well as recent comments on
this subject by General Sharp, the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea.
North Korea is largely in deterrent-defensive mode--militarily,
diplomatically, and in every other way. That, indeed, has been the case
for quite a while, and to the extent we can factor that into our
calculations and our actions, I believe it more likely we can make
progress in dealing with the North. At the same time, and this is
crucial, we should not fool ourselves into thinking that we have the
North in a box. They have teeth, and as we have seen, they will use
them if they feel threatened or toyed with.
The economy. Certainly within the memory of many people in North
Korea, there was a time when the North was far ahead of China
economically and was, to some extent, seen by parts of the Third World
as a beacon of development. We tend to look at the North and see a
country hopelessly backward; they see themselves as capable and modern
thinking but down on their luck. They make occasional runs at fixing
things. Whether they can actually sustain economic revitalization
policies long enough to show results, I do not know. If history is a
guide, they seem unlikely to get very far on that path without
significant changes in how they formulate and apply such policies.
Nevertheless, they know very well their economy is not doing well, and
they are constantly looking for ways to do better. Again, taking this
into account in our own approach can pay dividends. We're not talking
here about ``bribes'' or a ``buyout,'' but rather using the North's own
momentum and goals in a way the helps us achieve our own.
The succession. At this point, there is no question that Kim Jong-
il's youngest son is being groomed and, more than that, moved into
position as the successor. Chinese visitors have met him several times.
I trust that we have asked them for their impressions of him. Given how
grossly inaccurate early assessments by many outside observers were of
Kim Jong-il, I would urge caution in accepting most of what appears in
the press (or even official reporting) about the son's personality or
potential. In the absence of very good information to the contrary, I
wouldn't operate on the assumption that the succession will fall apart,
especially if it has several more years to take root. It was an article
of faith of many analysts and governments in 1994 when Kim Jong-il took
over from Kim Il-sung that he wouldn't last a year. Nearly 17 years
later, one hopes they have learned from their mistakes.
The ``collapse.'' Anything is possible once the dam breaks in a
society that has for years been under extremely tight political and
social constraints, but I wouldn't put my money on the likelihood of
near-term North Korean collapse. Yes, of course it makes sense to think
about that possibility and to develop scenarios for dealing with such a
contingency. In my view, however, it does not make sense to base a
policy on the assumption that a collapse will happen soon--that is, in
the next 2-3 years. Even those in South Korea normally anxious to
portray the North Korean regime as fraying at the edges do not want to
lean too far forward at this moment in predicting the likelihood that
the uprising contagion from the Middle East will reach North Korea. One
thing that ought to be of concern, if we are to look at scenarios, is
the possibility that if and when serious social and political unrest
ever arrives in the North, it will quickly descend into violence that
could make Libya look like a tea party, dragging outsiders into a
prolonged, bloody struggle for power.
The role of China. One can get very cogent advice from any number
of China experts. All I can say is that having watched Sino-North
Korean relations for 30 years, my feeling is that many China experts
tend to miss the point that Beijing views North Korea differently than
how it views the rest of the world. Consequently, Beijing's policies
toward the North often do not track with its broader foreign policy.
Sino-Korean relations have had numerous ups and downs over the years.
They are very warm right now, perhaps the closest they have ever been.
They are unlikely to stay good forever, and we should not treat North
Korea as if it is (nor should we want it to be) in China's pocket. But
for several years to come, unless, South Korea or the United States do
something to provide the North with an alternate future, the Chinese
shadow over North Korea will grow more pronounced. Even if that
translates into increased Chinese leverage over the North (which I tend
to doubt), it doesn't mean we can breathe a sigh of relief.
North Korea obviously isn't the jewel in the crown in Northeast
Asia, but how the Korean issue is handled will probably be a decisive
factor influencing the region for decades to come. The basic problem we
face on the Peninsula today is a hangover from the first half of the
20th century. It is, or ought to be, a constant reminder of policy
missteps made many years ago by all sides.
I'd hope we would spare a little time and effort to ensure we don't
make similar mistakes again. As much as fires in the rest of the world
and issues at home loom large, there is no reason for us, through
inattention or ignorance, to sow the seeds of problems that could
bedevil East Asia for a long time to come.
Senator Lugar [presiding]. Mr. Flake, would you please
proceed.
STATEMENT OF L. GORDON FLAKE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE MANSFIELD
FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Flake. Thank you, Senator Lugar. It's my honor to be
here, as well.
First, let me extend my compliments on the particular focus
of this hearing. Rather than another kind of broad effort to
understand the entirety of the North Korean conundrum, I think
this focus on breaking out of the cycle of provocations is
extremely useful, particularly given the fact that there has
been a marked shift, over the last several years, that warrants
the attention of our government and this committee in
particular.
I would start by talking a little bit about where we stand.
The previous panel identified several specific recent North
Korean provocations which have been the cause for our
attention. But, I think if you step back and look at the last 2
years alone in a broader context, there's a very disturbing
trend.
For example: In early 2009, you had a North Korean long-
range missile test and a North Korean nuclear test, both of
which resulted in a very concerted response from the United
Nations Security Council. If North Korea goes that route again,
it's a pretty well-known and well-traveled road through which
the international community will respond.
Following that, there were notable inter-Korean incidents,
including the killing of a South Korean tourist in the Diamond
Mountain tourist zone; and in November 2009, what the South
Koreans call the Battle of Daecheong, another ship-to-ship
incident on the West Sea. In both of these cases the likely
South Korean response now is quite clear. And so, in some
respects, the door on those types of provocations are closed,
as well.
Of course, the events of last year are very well known.
Without the option to confront South Korea ship-to-ship, the
North Koreans proceeded to sink, in the dead of night, a South
Korean Corvette, the Cheonan. We have now spent 6 or 7 months
developing very strong antisubmarine warfare capabilities
between the United States and South Korea. So, again, in some
respects, that option is foreclosed to North Korea.
And yet, the fallacy remains that we are somehow deterring
North Korea when recent events would indicate that they're just
moving on to the next provocation. In this context, something
that nobody expected came completely out of the blue, the
shelling of Yeonpyeong Island and the dramatic declarations of
the week prior about North Korea's uranium enrichment program.
Again events which shocked the world and put us in the
situation where we are today.
While recognizing that there has, at the same time, been a
bit of a pendulum-swing between North Korean's inducements/
offers for talks, but also, at the same time, this gradual
escalation, I think, again, that the focus of this particular
hearing is very useful. How do you break that cycle of
provocations, given the trajectory that we see right now?
Rather than go down the rabbit's hole of trying to
interpret North Koreans' intentions or explain why they do what
they do, I think it's useful, in the short time I'm allotted
today, to focus on what's different. What has changed in the
region in particular vis-a-vis 2 or 3 years ago, that has
either caused or perhaps enabled this recent escalation of
North Korean provocations? I will make four short points in
this regard.
First and foremost, I think the influence of, and the role
of, the United States in this cycle of provocations is less
than we may want to think. There is a very compelling narrative
which holds each North Korean action is somehow ``all about
us,'' that they are reaching out to us, that they want talks
for us. Unfortunately, if you look at the last 2 years, no
matter what the action of North Korea, whether it is a charm
offensive or an attack or a provocation of some other sort,
they're always presumed to be influenced by the exact same
motivating factor in North Korea, which is a desire to talk to
the United States. I would think that domestic developments in
North Korea, changes in inter-Korean relations, and changes in
Chinese behavior have far greater explanatory power, in terms
of understanding what is going on inside of North Korea right
now.
The second major point I would make in this regard is
precisely that the primary driver of North Korean actions,
statements, and provocations is domestic, inside North Korea. I
think Dr. Noland will address some of that quite well,
following my remarks. While my assigned focus on the regional
picture doesn't allow me to dwell on this in depth, I would
point out that the more North Korean actions are linked to
domestic developments in North Korea, and the more they're
linked, in particular, to the question of succession, the less
influence we have on those, as the United States.
As such, I think our time today is well served on focusing
on those areas where we do have greater influence. And I will
spend the bulk of my short time focusing on two developments in
particular, those in South Korea and those in China.
In that regard, the third point upon which I would focus is
that the biggest change in the region, over the last 3 years in
particular, has been a change in inter-Korean relations, and in
particular a change in South Korean policy toward North Korea.
We had 10 years of progressive governments in South Korea; two
successive administrations who pursued a policy of sunshine and
active--proactive engagement with North Korea, where they
became a major source of fertilizer, of food, of economic
assistance, and of outright cash. That policy has changed
dramatically. And so, in many respects, I think what you see
right now is that, after 3 years of a remarkably principled and
consistent application of the Lee Myung-bak administration's
approach to North Korea, you've seen North Korea vacillating
back and forth between inducements or a charm offensive on the
one hand, and on the other hand threats and outright
provocations, in their openly stated attempt to break the Lee
Myung-bak policy.
The other factor that is related directly to South Korea
has been a historic and commendable amount of close
coordination and cooperation between the United States and
South Korea, which also includes Japan as a United States ally.
Secretary Campbell addressed this, but I think that that level
of such coordination is historic. I think it has served us very
well. Unfortunately, as we are consistent, that consistency
itself has been a factor in the rising cycle of North Korean
provocations, precisely because of that pendulum-swing. When
one day inducements do not work, North Korea returns to
provocations. I'm sorry to say that the failure of the North/
South military-to-military talks, at the preliminary level a
couple weeks ago now, do not bode well for where we are going.
In fact, just in the last 2 days, we've seen a new round of
North Korean vitriolic and threats coming out. That pendulum-
swing, in some respects, is the very definition of the cycle.
President Obama has repeatedly declared his intention to break
that pattern of behavior. If we go back into negotiations in
response to those threats, then obviously we're back in the
cycle.
I would argue, in some respects, for the last 2 years, and
from--in the North/South perspective, for the last 3 years--
that we really have broken that cycle. That cycle, that Senator
Kerry so eloquently described, of us going back into
negotiations in response to this escalation, really hasn't
taken place. But, in that refusal to go back to the cycle,
there is the inherent risk of further escalations. And I think
that is the situation we are facing right now.
The final point I'll deal with, really, is what I think is
perhaps the most important factor here, and the factor which
has seen the biggest change. That is a change in Chinese
behavior. If you look over the last 8 years, United States-
China cooperation on North Korea has been a major factor or a
major selling point for the importance of the United States-
China relationship. During the bulk of the Bush administration
and the early months of the Obama administration, such United
States-China cooperation on North Korea was, again, a
highlight. We cooperated very well in response to the missile
tests in early 2009, and in the United Nations, in response to
the nuclear test in early 2009, as well, agreeing, together, on
a historic U.N. Security Council Sanctions Resolution in June
15, 2009.
Somehow, in the summer of 2009 or the early fall of 2009,
that changed, in terms of China's perspective. And would argue
that China, as a nation, has always had three ``no''s, in
regarding North Korea: no collapse, no nukes, and no war. And
they've always
tried to balance those three priorities in regards to the
Korean Peninsula. But, beginning, I presume, with the questions
of Kim Jong-il's health, his stroke, succession, economic
problems in North Korea, Chinese leadership, I believe, has
prioritized the question of ``no collapse.'' They are more
concerned about collapse in North Korea than the other issues.
As such, beginning in August 2009, China stopped
cooperating with us actively on implementing sanctions
resolutions. And, if you look over the last year and a half,
they've been very proactive, in public, in their support of the
North Korean regime. One immediate impact of that has been to
encourage North Korea toward, I believe, further negative
behavior.
For example, even after the sinking of the Cheonan, the
Chinese leadership decided to double down on their bet on North
Korea. President Hu Jintao hosted Kim Jong-il, not just once,
but twice, and Chinese officials very publicly argued that
theirs was the appropriate approach. In late October, Chinese
diplomats were almost smug in their discussions with me about
the rectitude of their approach, saying that, because they had
publicly backed Kim
Jong-il during this time of instability with a risk of
collapse, that there had been no more nuclear tests, there had
been no missile tests, and there had been no disruption of the
G20 meetings in Seoul, in November.
Unfortunately for that approach, November of last year was
a very bad month. The North Korean revalation of a uranium
enrichment program, their construction of a new light-water
nuclear reactor, and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, I
think, exposed to all the impotence of, and the
counterproductive nature of, the Chinese approach.
In a nutshell, I think that's a fundamental factor. That's
something that is very different than was the situation 2 years
ago. And that has to be addressed, as we look at how to break
out of the cycle.
Let me just wrap up very quickly by looking at some of the
implications for policy. First and foremost, I would say that
there's a need to stay the course. If we are out of the cycle,
indeed, right now, then the continued emphasis on close
coordination and cooperation with our primary allies in the
region--in this case, South Korea and Japan--is the foundation
upon which any other approach will go. Second, based on the
strength of that approach, we have to continue to convince
China that its actions have been counterproductive to the
stability of the overall region; that by emphasizing overly on
avoiding a collapse in North Korea, they have actually caused
the risk of war in the region to go up, and actually let the
North Korean nuclear program to develop to a degree that it
should not have.
Essentially, what we're asking China to do is, not to
abandon its North Korean ally, but to recalibrate its
prioritization.
I must say that the events in the Middle East in the last
several weeks probably have reinforced the negative behavior
and negative perceptions in China. And so, I'm not overly
optimistic that China will recalibrate its approach. I would
say that if China does not do that, I think, just as the
President has said and Secretary Campbell said today, it is
incumbent upon the United States to make sure that we work
closely with our ally to respond to the provocations as they
come, again, as a way of breaking out of the cycle.
The final point I will make is that I do think there is a
wonderful roadmap for going forward, if we focus on it. During
the summit meeting, between President Obama and President Hu in
January of this year, there was only one paragraph in their
joint statement which was dedicated to North Korea. But, in
that one statement, three times they referenced the September
19, 2005, Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks. I think
that's extremely helpful, because what it has done is define
what ``denuclearization'' means, it has defined the parameters
of the six-party talks, and it has defined precisely what you,
Chairman Kerry, asked, in terms of: What are the basic
requirements of what North Korea needs to do to come back to
talks? I'm hopeful that such definition will lead us going
forward.
And I'll end my remarks there.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Flake follows:]
Prepared Statement of L. Gordon Flake
BEYOND THE BILATERAL: UNDERSTANDING THE CHALLENGE OF NORTH KOREA
IN A REGIONAL CONTEXT
One of the particular challenges in dealing with an opaque regime
like North Korea is the difficulty in assessing the intentions or
motivations behind particular policies or positions taken by the North
Korean Government. Absent reliable information on North Korea's
internal decisionmaking process, a common conceit in the United States
is to assume that North Korean actions and statements are somehow ``all
about us,'' motivated by and targeted to an audience in the United
States. Given the asymmetry of U.S. power globally, such assumptions
are not limited to U.S. dealings with North Korea. Yet in the absence
of alternative explanations from Pyongyang, this narrative often holds
sway as analysts, journalists, and government officials alike attempt
to interpret the most recent North Korean provocation or charm
offensive.
The problem with this approach is that the conclusion drawn
inevitably seems to be the same no matter what the North Korea action,
and again it is all about us. Thus, North Korea's long-range missile
tests and nuclear tests are purported to be attempts to force the
United States into direct bilateral talks. Pyongyang's August 2009
decision to divest itself of two imprisoned U.S. journalists for the
price of having former President Clinton pick them up is likewise seen
as a sign of outreach to the United States, as was the decision to turn
over the unfortunate Ajalon Gomes to former President Carter in August
2010.
More recently, in early November 2010 when North Korea showed
separate delegations from the United States evidence of construction on
a new light-water nuclear reactor and a surprisingly sophisticated
uranium enrichment facility, calls for the United States to resume
negotiations with North Korea were both immediate and predictable. Even
after North Korea shelled the South Korean coastal island of Yeonpyeong
on November 23, 2010, in a drastic and highly provocative escalation of
the longstanding inter-Korean tensions in the West Sea, some Americans
persisted in interpreting this action in context of United States-North
Korean relations. For example, former President Jimmy Carter authored a
New York Times op-ed entitled ``North Korea Wants to Make a Deal'' \1\
following his August visit to Pyongyang. He again urged the U.S. to
listen to ``North Korea's Consistent Message to the U.S.'' \2\ in a
Washington Post op-ed that described the North's unprecedented
provocation as ``designed to remind the world that they deserve respect
in negotiations'' and repeated North Korea's insistence on ``direct
talks with the United States.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/16/opinion/16carter.html.
\2\ http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/
23/AR2010112305808.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Of course, there are alternate if equally improvable
interpretations of North Korean intentions or the motivations behind
North Korean actions and statements. Given the fact that North Korea
has now repeatedly declared itself a nuclear power and declared its
intent to develop nuclear deterrence as well as nuclear energy, its
decision to test nuclear weapons and to construct both a light-water
nuclear reactor facility and a uranium enrichment facility might more
logically be understood in the context of North Korea's stated
intentions and goals. The notion that ``all politics is local'' is not
only applicable to democracies. The Democratic People's Republic of
Korea (DPRK) has made ample use of its nuclear tests and status in its
internal propaganda and there is increasing evidence to suggest that
with the continued decline of its conventional military capacity,
chronic food shortages, and a moribund economy, the legitimacy of the
Kim regime is increasingly tied to its nuclear status. This should
weigh heavily on the decades-old debate as to whether the North Korean
nuclear program is primarily--or at this point even possibly--a
bargaining chip.
In addition to such domestic factors, North Korean actions are also
far better understood in the context of the DPRK's more immediate
relationships with its primary patron China and its chief rival, the
Republic of Korea (ROK). Given the priority that China has placed upon
the moribund six-party talks, it would be foolish not to interpret
North Korea's reluctant references to the possibility of returning to
such talks squarely in the context of Chinese demands. Likewise, given
the relatively dramatic shift in South Korea's policy toward its
northern neighbor after a decade of ``sunshine'' (during which the
Government in ROK was a major source of food, fertilizer, and capital
for the DPRK), many of Pyongyang's actions and statements are better
explained by such immediate concerns than by any aspirations it might
have vis-a-vis the United States. Accordingly, this testimony focuses
primarily upon the regional context of recent North Korean actions and
upon the importance of a regional approach to responding to
developments in North Korea, regardless of their nature or direction.
While Japan and Russia have and continue to play important roles
related to North Korea and the six-party talks, this testimony focuses
primarily on changes in South Korea and in China that are most directly
related to the current cycle of North Korean provocations.
PENINSULAR PRIMACY: THE INTER-KOREAN DYNAMIC
The country with the most interest--and the most to lose--in
increased tensions with North Korea is undeniably its neighbor to the
south, the Republic of Korea. Changing political dynamics in South
Korea are also one of the most important factors in understanding the
changed inter-Korean political relationship. After the better part of
four decades of inter-Korean relations defined primarily by ongoing
hostility and deterrence, South Korea's policy toward the North shifted
dramatically after the costs of German unification became readily
apparent. Beginning with the inauguration of the Kim Dae-Jung
administration in 1998, South Korea began to pursue a policy of
``peaceful coexistence'' with North Korea. This was followed by a
policy of proactive engagement which was primarily manifest by the
rather one-sided provisions of South Korean investment, fertilizer, and
humanitarian aid to North Korea. This approach was initially intended
to affect change in North Korea in the manner of Aesop's famed fable of
``The North Wind and the Sun.'' However, over the next decade the
primary objective of ROK policy toward North Korea, particularly during
the Roh Moo-hyun administration, apparently shifted to one of ensuring
stability in North Korea--at least in the short run.
While the South Korean Presidential election of 2007 was primarily
a mandate on the management style and failings of the Roh
administration, it was also somewhat of a referendum on President Roh's
policy toward North Korea. Still, President Lee Myung-bak entered
office espousing a long-term vision for inter-Korean relations that
included significant South Korean investment in North Korea and a
stated goal of dramatically increasing North Korean per capita GNP.
This approach, however, was premised on changes on North Korean
behavior, particularly on progress toward denuclearizing North Korea,
an issue that had gained renewed salience following North Korea's
October 9, 2006, test of a nuclear device. In practice, President Lee's
policy was a sharp departure from that of his predecessors. The
President and his advisers more openly raised issues such as North
Korean human rights, participated in international efforts to curb
North Korea's illicit activities, and changed they manner in which they
handled development and humanitarian aid--all changes that were very
unwelcome in Pyongyang.
In another respect, President Lee's approach to North Korea was at
least in part a reflection of changing South Korean attitudes toward
Pyongyang. Not only was there a growing sense that South Korea's decade
of largess was unappreciated and unreciprocated, but during the first
years of the Lee administration, a series of North Korean actions
further influenced underlying South Korean public opinion and as a
result Seoul's policy toward the North. On July 11, 2008, North Korean
soldiers shot a South Korean tourist in the back at the Diamond
Mountain resort. North Korea's subsequent refusal to engage in a joint
investigation of the incident led to a shuttering of the Hyundai-Asan
operated tourist zone. The fact that this event took place in the
context of a North Korean long-range missile test and nuclear test on
April 5 and May 25, 2009, respectively, further hardened South Korean
public opinion. Despite these and subsequent events, South Korea has
yet to pull its support from the Kaesong Industrial Complex, however
the detention of a South Korean employee for 137 days during the summer
of 2009 further colored South Korean views of that project and the
prospects for engagement with North Korea. Tensions again rose in the
West Sea with a naval altercation \3\ South Korea calls the ``Battle of
Daecheong'' on November 10, 2009. This resulted in severe damage of a
North Korean patrol boat and North Korean threats of retaliation, which
may have found their realization in the sinking of the South Korean
corvette the Cheonan on March 26, 2010.
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\3\ After nearly 50 years of relative quiet on the West Sea, in
mid-1999 North Korea began a concerted effort to challenge the Northern
Limit Line (NLL), which it has never officially recognized, but which
has served as a de facto maritime border since the signing of the
armistice. Of the many subsequent naval clashes along the NLL, it is
worth noting that both the first and second ``Battle Yeonpyeong'' (June
15, 1999, and June 29, 2002) occurred despite the ROK's then-engagement
policy toward the North.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the sinking of the Cheonan and the tragic loss of 46 South
Korean sailors shocked the South Korean public, initial uncertainty
about the cause of the tragedy, the lengthy investigation, the fact
that the incident took place out of sight and at night, and the fact
that the initial findings of the investigation were announced shortly
before South Korean local elections all served to make this particular
incident politically divisive within South Korea. That was not the case
with the November 23, 2010, shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. The North
Korean artillery barrage took place in broad daylight, and if a picture
is worth a thousand words, live video must certainly be worth many
times more. Real time images of columns of smoke streaming skyward from
the island as panicked refugees fled the scene served to affect the
most fundamental shift in South Korean public opinion toward North
Korea in over a decade. Suddenly President Lee Myung-Bak who in some
circles was still considered to be a hard-liner was accused of failing
to protect the nation and threatened with impeachment by some members
of his party. President Lee, whose apparent first instinct and first
statements focused on avoiding an escalation of the crisis, was
gradually pushed by public outrage to revise the rules of engagement
and to state clearly that any future such incidents would be met with a
considerable show of force.
In this political context tensions on the Korea Peninsula rose
dramatically in December 2010 with South Korea's decision to proceed
with further live-fire exercises in the area surrounding Yeonpyeong
Island in the face of North Korean threats to retaliate. While these
exercises as well as joint U.S. and South Korean naval exercises went
forth without immediate North Korean retaliation, it is useful to
remember that North Korea's retaliation does not always take place at a
time and place of the allies' choosing and tensions on the peninsula
remain high. If the sinking of the Cheonan was indeed the promised
North Korean response to the Battle of Daecheong 5 months earlier, U.S.
and South Korean defense planners would be wise to watch for a
similarly out of the blue, seemingly unprovoked response to Seoul's
decision to continue its live-fire exercises in the face of North
Korean threats.
Perhaps encouraged by Chinese pressure in advance of President Hu
Jintao's January visit to Washington, Pyongyang began this year with
calls for ``unconditional'' talks with South Korea. On the surface,
this would seem to be a welcome development, particularly following the
tensions surrounding the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island last November.
However, even if one is inclined to take such diplomatic overtures from
North Korea at face value, this offer is anything but
``unconditional.'' To begin with, an unspoken condition of such talks
was that South Korea ignore what were by almost any measure two recent
acts of war by North Korea. Absent any reference to its actions, the
North Korean offer of talks seems less like a sincere offer for
negotiations and more like an attempt to cause political divisions in
South Korea by casting itself as the willing party and the Lee Myung-
bak administration as the obstacle to diplomacy.
The content of the talks proposed by North Korea provides further
indication of its intentions. In the initial North Korean offer, there
was scant mention of security issues, military-to-military dialogue, or
North Korea's nuclear program. Instead, Pyongyang proposed to talk
about economic cooperation with a transparent objective of seeking to
renew the flow of South Korea aid and the cash that accompanied past
cooperation. What North Korea has to gain from such talks is obvious,
the benefit for South Korea is less clear. Even during the decade of
engagement and summitry under two successive progressive governments in
South Korea, Pyongyang steadfastly resisted recognizing South Korea as
a legitimate partner for a meaningful dialogue on security issues on
the peninsula including the armistice, a potential peace agreement, or
North Korea's nuclear program.
In this context, North Korea's mid-January 2011 proposal for high-
level military-to-military talks with the South was certainly a
positive development. Given the events of the preceding months, South
Korea responded cautiously and proposed preparatory talks in early
February that broke off amidst mutual recriminations. Of note, the
question of North Korea's nuclear program was not on the agenda, and
South Korea's attempts to ensure that the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island
incidents were on the agenda for the senior-level meeting appears to
have been the primary area of dispute and the cause for breakdown of
the talks. Despite the apparent stalemate, South Korean officials have
repeatedly stated that an apology for the incidents is not a
precondition nor is it formally linked to the resumption of six-party
talks. While President Lee himself has repeatedly and recently
emphasized his desire for talks with the North and resumption of the
six-party talks, in the short-term progress on that front appears
unlikely.
South Korea's changing approach to North Korea has also had a
direct impact on United States-South Korean relations and upon the
United States ability to coordinate its own policies toward North
Korea. For example, much of the political difficulties experienced
between Washington and Seoul during the tenure of President Roh Moo-
hyun can be attributed to what were then rapidly diverging threat
perceptions regarding North Korea. Over the past 3 years, due in part
to the laundry list of provocations noted above, there has been a
dramatic reconvergence in U.S. and ROK perceptions of North Korea. This
alone, however, cannot explain the dramatic improvement in United
States-ROK relations. The improvement began with the election of
President Lee during the last year of the Bush administration and
accelerated dramatically given the high priority the incoming Obama
administration placed upon prior consultation and coordination with its
ally Seoul on all matters regarding North Korea. The June 19, 2009,
Joint Vision Statement for the U.S.-ROK Alliance \4\ is a historic
document. This, along with the Korea U.S.-Free Trade Agreement, the ROK
role in and hosting of the G20, and its role in and hosting of the next
Nuclear Security summit, lends substance to the claim that United
States-ROK relations are the best that they have ever been.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press office/Joint-vision-for-
the-alliance-of-the-United-States-of-America-and-the-Republic-of-
Korea/.
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The result of this convergence has been a remarkably principled,
consistent, and well-coordinated policy between Seoul, Washington, and
Tokyo in regards to North Korea. Historically both the U.S. and ROK
approaches toward North Korea have vacillated, while North Korea has
remained relatively consistent in its demands and intransigence. The
inevitable failure of one approach has led successive democratic
governments in both Seoul and Washington to try different approaches at
different times over the past two decades. One need only contrast the
vastly different approaches to North Korea during the first and second
term of the Bush administration for evidence of this tendency.
Ironically, one of the most immediate causes of the most recent
cycle of North Korean provocations may be the consistent and
coordinated approach with which the Obama and the Lee administrations
have responded to North Korea. President Obama has repeatedly framed
the joint United States-ROK approach in the context of the need to
``break the pattern'' of responding to North Korean provocations with
concessions and talks that do not make progress on core issues at hand.
In response, it is North Korea that has vacillated between threats,
inducements, provocations, charm offensives, and outright attacks in
their attempt to force or cajole the U.S. and South Korea to abandon
their current approach. While this approach may portend further
tensions in the months ahead, to abandon principles at this point would
be to surrender to the cycle.
CHINA: PARTNER OR PATRON
While somewhat simplistic, one way to understand Chinese priorities
in North Korea is to focus upon the more negative scenarios that China
clearly hopes to avoid on the peninsula. There are the three ``no's''--
no nukes, no collapse, and no war. China has long sought to balance
what have oftentimes been competing priorities in this regard. For the
better part of the past 8 years cooperation on addressing the
challenges posed by North Korea and in particular the North Korean
missile and nuclear programs has been a highlight of United States-
China cooperation. A perfunctory review of official U.S. statements
regarding China during the bulk of the Bush administration and the
early months of the Obama administration will turn up a veritable
mantra highlighting the importance of the United States-China
relationship in working together on North Korea. Indeed, in the early
months of the Obama administration, United States-China cooperation on
North Korea reached its arguable peak as, despite their initial
misgivings, China supported a strongly worded Presidential statement at
the U.N. Security Council in response to North Korea's testing of a
long-range missile. Shortly thereafter, on June 12, 2009, China signed
on to the most meaningful sanctions resolutions on North Korea to date,
UNSC 1874.
While the exact cause of the shift is as of yet unknown, after
initially cooperating with the United States and the international
community in implementing these sanctions, beginning sometime around
the early fall 2009 there appears to have been a marked shift in
Chinese priorities and views on how best to address the North Korean
problem. Not only did they scale back their cooperation on implementing
the U.N. Security Council sanctions, but they also began to be overtly
and actively supportive of the Kim Jong-il regime. One possible
explanation is that given the concern over North Korean leader Kim
Jong-il's health, the uncertainties surrounding the succession process
in North Korea, and evidence of ongoing economic turmoil in North
Korea, the Chinese leadership felt it necessary to place a higher
priority on its objective of avoiding collapse in North Korea. Stepped-
up Chinese support for North Korea continued over the fall, and even
when faced with the sinking of the Cheonan in March 2010, the Chinese
leadership decided to double their bet on the Kim Jong-il regime rather
than altering course. Chinese President Hu Juntao met with Kim Jong-il
not just once but twice in the aftermath of the Cheonan sinking and
China repeatedly refused to hear evidence on or except conclusion that
North Korea was responsible for this tragic event. As recently as
October 2000 Chinese officials were almost smug in their assessment of
the rectitude of their approach, noting with some satisfaction that
since China had begun to seek an easing of pressure on North Korea and
had become more overt in their backing for the Kim Jong-il regime,
North Korea had not tested another nuclear weapon, had not tested
another long-range missile and had not disrupted the G20 meetings with
President Hu in Seoul.
This defense of the Chinese approach unraveled dramatically in
November 2010 when in quick succession North Korea announced that it
had begun construction of light-water nuclear reactor and showed a
visiting U.S. delegation what appeared to be a uranium enrichment
facility replete with 2000 centrifuges in three different cascades and
what appeared to be highly sophisticated modern control facilities.
These were both developments that were clearly in violation not only of
three different sets of standing U.N. Security Council sanctions
resolutions, but more specifically in violation of the September 19,
2005, joint statement of the six-party talks. These disturbing
revelations were then capped by the North Korean shelling of
Yeongpyeong Island, an act that killed two South Korean marines and two
South Korean civilians. While North Korea claimed that its artillery
barrage was in response to a South Korean live-fire exercise in the
area earlier that morning, the shelling of the South Korean island
marks the first time since the end of hostilities in the Korean war
that artillery shells were fired and landed upon South Korean. Despite
the dramatic and shocking nature of these activities, China once again
prevaricated and called for calm on all sides.
It is notable that over the period of shifting Chinese priorities
in regards to North Korea there has also been a shift in U.S. views of
China's role, beginning with disappointment over Chinese implementation
of UNSC sanctions resolutions that China has voted for. By the summer
of 2010 these concerns were expressed as criticisms of China's willful
ignorance of North Korean behavior. U.S. views shifted further still
following the most recent revelations regarding North Korea's nuclear
program and its November artillery barrage. China was openly accused of
``enabling'' North Korean bad behavior--the implication being that
China's decision to shield North Korea from the consequences of its
actions was at least in part responsible for the continuation of such
provocations. Secretary of State Clinton perhaps said it best when,
immediately prior to the Obama-Hu summit, she openly questioned whether
China's failure to respond to the sinking of the South Korean corvette
was not in some way responsible for the North Korean willingness to go
forward with its artillery barrage: ``We fear and have discussed this
in depth with our Chinese friends, that failure to respond clearly to
the sinking of a South Korean military vessel might embolden North
Korea to continue on a dangerous course. The attack on Yeonpyeong
Island that took the lives of civilians soon followed.'' \5\ In short,
after the better part of a decade of being viewed as part of the
solution to North Korea there is a growing concern that absent a
readjustment of its priorities, China is increasingly part of the
problem.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/americas/prepared-
text-of-clintons-speech/article1870858/.
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In this context, there was particular importance placed upon the
January summit meeting between President Obama and Chinese President Hu
Jintao. While there were obviously many issues to be addressed in the
summit meeting given the risk of conflict on the Korean Peninsula and
the proximity of recent attacks, it is safe to presume that North Korea
was a high priority in discussions. While for his part President Hu
could not muster a willingness to even mention North Korea by name--
preferring instead to refer obliquely to the ``Korean Peninsula issue''
or the ``Korean nuclear problem''--there was some evidence of progress,
at least in examining how the issue was framed.
While it may seem arcane, there is some cause for optimism to be
found in the single paragraph of the joint statement issued by
President.
The United States and China agreed on the critical importance
of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula as
underscored by the joint statement of September 19, 2005, and
relevant U.N. Security Council Resolutions. Both sides
expressed concern over heightened tensions on the Peninsula
triggered by recent developments. The two sides noted their
continuing efforts to cooperate closely on matters concerning
the Peninsula. The United States and China emphasized the
importance of an improvement in North-South relations and
agreed that sincere and constructive inter-Korean dialogue is
an essential step. Agreeing on the crucial importance of
denuclearization of the Peninsula in order to preserve peace
and stability in Northeast Asia, the United States and China
reiterated the need for concrete and effective steps to achieve
the goal of denuclearization and for full implementation of the
other commitments made in the September 19, 2005, joint
statement of the six-party talks. In this context, the United
States and China expressed concern regarding the DPRK's claimed
uranium enrichment program. Both sides oppose all activities
inconsistent with the 2005 joint statement and relevant
international obligations and commitments. The two sides called
for the necessary steps that would allow for early resumption
of the Six-Party Talks process to address this and other
relevant issues.\6\
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\6\ http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/19/us-china-
joint-statement.
In that short statement the September 19, 2005, joint statement of
the six-party talks was mentioned three times. Such a reference to an
obscure unimplemented agreement of talks that increasingly appeared
defunct may seem a bit odd. However, one of the fundamental challenges
of dealing with North Korea has been its frequent and continued
assertion that it is a nuclear power and must be dealt with as such.
When North Korea makes vague references to its support of
denuclearization, its definition of denuclearization should be
clarified and challenged. The apparent North Korean interpretation is
that, as a nuclear power and an equal with the United States and the
other nuclear powers in the world, it is willing to discuss the
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, including the removal of the
U.S. nuclear umbrella, the end of the United States-ROK alliance, and
overall global disarmament of other nuclear powers' positions. This
interpretation understandably is not acceptable to the United States,
China, any other member of the six-party talks, or ostensibly any other
signatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) (from which
North Korea is the only country in history to withdraw). As such, a
clear reference to the September 19, 2005, joint statement in which
North Korea committed to ``abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing
nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards'' \7\ helps
set a clear definition of what the U.S. and China now jointly mean when
we refer to ``denuclearization'' including the denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula. Related to this is the question of the parameter of
the six-party talks. With the September 19 joint statement the six-
party talks are now more than format, but also have function and
content. Given that in the joint statement ``the six parties
unanimously reaffirmed that the goal of the six-party talks is the
verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful
manner,'' by focusing upon this joint statement the U.S. and China once
again jointly defined the parameters of--and indirectly a core
requirement for--the resumption of the six-party talks. Also of note,
the January 19, 2011, Obama-Hu joint statement also placed U.S. and
Chinese ``concern regarding the DPRK's claimed uranium enrichment
program'' clearly in the context of the September 19, 2005, joint
statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ http://www.state.gov/p/eap/regional/c15455.htm.
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Despite what appears to have been some progress during the January
summit, there is at present some frustration at China's apparent
refusal to allow the U.N. Security Council to take up the question of
the North Korea uranium enrichment program. Given the clarity of this
issue and its importance to the broader objective on denuclearization,
China's current position is if anything difficult to understand and
will be a key indicator of China's role going forward.
Few analysts realistically expect China to abandon its erstwhile
North Korean ally or to be proactive in putting major pressure on
Pyongyang. However, at a minimum it is reasonable to expect China to
recalibrate its position to make sure that it recognizes that in the
process of trying to avoid collapse in North Korea, its approach to
North Korea is actually increasing the risk of conflict and the
likelihood of the further advancement of North Korea's nuclear program.
At this point the key contribution China could make toward helping
break the cycle of North Korean provocations would be to simply stop
shielding North Korea from the consequences of its actions. In no small
part, the current cycle of North Korean provocations has been abetted
by, if not encouraged by, apparently unconditional support from China.
CONCLUSION
The particular focus of this hearing is helpful in that it
distinguishes between the much longer term task of solving the myriad
issues related to North Korea and its inherent insecurity and the more
immediate task of breaking free of the current cycle of North Korean
provocations. Any effort to seriously address the recent cycle of North
Korean provocations must begin with an attempt to understand the root
causes of North Korean actions.
Although these causes cannot be fully addressed in this testimony,
there is disturbing evidence that suggests that much of the current
crisis in North Korea is related to internal developments inside North
Korea. Following Kim Jong-il's apparent stroke in 2008, the process of
succession planning in North Korea appears to have been rushed. Given
the multitude of economic, societal, and security challenges faced by
the current regime in North Korea, the prospects for a smooth
transition to a third generation of Kims appears daunting. As much as
recent North Korean provocations are directly related to the succession
and the internal situation within North Korea, they may simply be
beyond our control. Just as recent events in the Middle East have
demonstrated the limits of American influence, even in countries where
we have overriding national security interests, so too are there very
real limitations on our ability to directly influence ongoing dynamics
within Pyongyang.
However, given that the primary context--and in some cases
facilitation--of many recent North Korean actions lies firmly in the
countries bordering North Korea, understanding this dynamic and working
together with American allies and other partners in the region offers
the best hope of breaking the cycle of North Korean provocations.
On a regional level, there are two factors most directly related to
North Korea's most recent cycle of provocation. First and foremost is
the change in South Korean policy toward the North, which now deprives
the North of key inputs to its economy and government upon which the
DPRK had come to rely. Related to this factor is, of course, the
remarkably well-coordinated approach between the United States, South
Korea and Japan and the consistency with which this approach has been
applied in response to North Korean actions. In some respects, the
pendulum swing of North Korean provocations and diplomatic initiatives
is an indication of the success of this approach. Perversely, however,
if the United States and its allies are serious about ``breaking the
pattern'' of North Korean negotiating behavior, there are inherent
risks of escalation and miscalculation related to that approach.
The best way to mitigate such risks is to ensure as close as
possible coordination with all other partners in the region. Here lies
the second factor related to the current escalatory cycle--China's
increased support for Pyongyang despite North Korean actions. This is
not to shift full responsibility to China or to imply that China has
either the will or the capacity to somehow ``solve'' the North Korean
problem. But in the current context there is ample evidence to suggest
that China's efforts to avoid the downside risk of instability in North
Korea are at least in part responsible for enabling recent North Korean
provocations, thereby increasing the risk of conflict. China's
disproportionate focus on internal stability in North Korea has made a
challenge related to North Korea's nuclear program infinitely more
complex.
China has already clearly demonstrated that, left to its own
devices, it is prepared to tolerate, if not actively support, the North
Korean regime despite the downside risks as long as it can avoid
instability. This is a tendency within China that is likely stronger
today after the dramatic events of the past month in the Middle East.
The question is thus how best might the United States and its
allies influence Chinese decisionmaking. While there is no easy answer,
the importance of a unified approach cannot be overstated. The U.S. and
its allies must continue to as clearly as possible make the case to
China that North Korea's actions are detrimental to the stability of
the region and to China's own strategic national interests. As long as
China is not willing to cooperate and continues to shield North Korea
from the consequences of its actions, the U.S. and its allies should
make clear that they must prepare to respond to likely future North
Korean provocations outside of the context of coordination with China,
a scenario which is in no one's interest.
While this conclusion may appear stark, it is also firmly grounded
in the political realities of a crisis with North Korea that appears to
offer fewer options with each passing day. For example, a fundamental
precondition for resumption of the six-party talks is a willingness on
North Korea's part to abandon its assertion that it is a nuclear power.
In their January 19 joint summit statement, President Obama and
President Hu rightly defined that precondition as adherence to the
September 19, 2005, joint statement of the six-party talks. Put simply,
if China continues to bolster the North Korean regime, there is little
hope that North Korea will make the minimum necessary compromises for
resumption of meaningful dialogue. At the same time, given the severity
of the acts perpetrated against South Korea, the United States cannot
help but be supportive of its allies, and the underlying fact remains
that it is impossible to conceive of progress in the six-party talks
framework or even in a bilateral United States-North Korea talks absent
meaningful progress in North-South relations.
In this process it is always useful to step back and remember that
the United States fundamental strategic interests in Northeast Asia are
the peace, prosperity, and economic progress of the region as a whole.
In some respects, North Korea is best understood as the hole in the
Northeast Asian donut. Our first priority is rightly placed on
strengthening our alliance relationships in the region. Based upon a
foundation of strong relations with Japan and Korea, the United States
has considerably more influence with China and Russia than it would
have otherwise. Likewise, the United States and its allies have a
shared interest in ensuring that no matter what happens in North
Korea--whether it collapses, instigates further conflict or, more
hopefully, chooses a different path--that North Korea does not become
an issue of contestation or conflict in the region more broadly.
The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you very much.
Dr. Noland.
STATEMENT OF DR. MARCUS NOLAND, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PETERSON
INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Noland. Thank you. It's an honor to appear before this
committee this morning.
I have provided a written statement to be entered into the
formal hearing record.
I would like to make four basic points.
The growing centrality of markets in the North Korean
economy over the past two decades is primarily due to state
failure, not proactive reform.
The market is emerging as a semiautonomous zone of social
communication and potentially political organizing. And, on its
own terms, the state is right to fear the market. It's this
fear of the market that prevents the North Korean authorities
from embracing the sorts of economic reforms that would allow
them to address their chronic food problems, which appear to be
worsening.
One aspect of the economy's unplanned marketization has
been the substantial growth in cross-border exchange,
particularly with China, which now accounts for a rising share
of North Korean trade. China, however, appears utterly
uninterested in implementing sanctions in response to North
Korean provocations.
The tragedy of North Korea is, the government is almost
wholly unaccountable for its manifest failures, and has an
almost unlimited capacity for inflicting misery on its people.
Under such circumstances, conditional on agreement on
procedural protocols, resumption in humanitarian aid is
warranted. It is reasonable, however, to require greater policy
conditionality on broader forms of engagement.
While attention is understandably focused on the high
diplomacy of the nuclear issue, it's worthwhile to examine what
is going on beneath the surface, as well. Research derived from
large-scale surveys of refugees, as well as surveys of Chinese
businesses doing business in North Korea, document a society
characterized by growing inequality, criminality, and
corruption. A significant share of the North Korean population
has effectively delinked from the state and now exists in a
kind of Hobbesian market economy.
And, paradoxically, while the state provides increasingly
meager benefits to its population, contact with the state
apparatus has grown ever more intimate. The government has
undertaken legal code changes, which have effectively
criminalized much of daily economic life, and facilitated the
use of the penal system for extortion. In addition to its
traditional role as an instrument of political repression, the
penal system now serves as a mechanism for economic predation
on the population, as well.
North Koreans have increasing access to foreign media
sources. And, importantly, inhibitions against consuming
foreign media have disappeared. As a consequence of obviously
self-inflicted catastrophe, such as the failed currency reform,
as well as increasing exposure to foreign media, the regime's
meta-narrative, which ascribes all the country's problems to
hostile foreign forces, is increasingly disbelieved. But, the
society remains atomized and characterized by low levels of
trust. While discontent is almost surely widespread, there
appears to be an almost complete absence of civil society
institutions capable of channeling that dissent into effective
political action. And while overt demands for political change
go unarticulated, the state retains a massive apparatus to
compel compliance.
North Korea experienced a famine in the 1990s that killed
perhaps 3 to 5 percent of the population, and has experienced
chronic food shortages since. At present the food situation
appears to be deteriorating as a result of an expected decline
in domestic harvests, together with North Korean provocations
and rising world food prices, which have contributed to a
reduction in both aid and commercial imports. Prices are rising
rapidly, internally, and a consortium of U.S. NGOs has now
produced a firsthand assessment, which documents acute
malnutrition among children and low-birth-weight newborns.
The North Korean Government has never exhibited any real
buy-in to the norms of humanitarian assistance, as practiced
elsewhere around the world, and establishing acceptable terms
for a humanitarian aid program remains an ongoing challenge.
Historically, North Korea's international trade was small
and politically determined. But, a byproduct of the famine and
the unplanned marketization of the economy has been an
expansion of decentralized trade, particularly with China,
which in 2009 accounted for approximately 35 percent of North
Korean trade, a figure that is likely to rise in 2010, once the
data are available.
As in the case of the domestic market economy, the North
Korean regime does not appear entirely comfortable with this
phenomenon of decentralized border exchange. And the government
appears to be attempting to execute a highly controlled
opening, in which North Korean state organs would engage in
cross-border commerce with China, but activities not controlled
by the state would be quashed. And, as I indicated earlier, the
Chinese have shown no interest in enforcing U.N. sanctions on
North Korea.
North Korea's chronic food insecurity once again appears to
be worsening. Externally, the country is increasingly relying
on China, which is reluctant to sanction North Korea in
response to its provocations. The regime faces a looming
succession, driven by Kim Jong-il's age and health. Surveys
document widespread discontent among the North Korean people,
but also a dearth of civil-society institutions capable of
channeling that mass discontent into constructive political
action.
Access to information plays an essential political role.
Connecting individuals to the outside world serves a crucial
function of undermining state propaganda, thereby encouraging
the government to respond to a more informed public. In this
context, the market represents a zone of personal autonomy and
freedom. We should be promoting its expansion through a process
of engagement, but engagement with our eyes open. The goal
would be not only to address North Korea's chronic material
needs, but to also encourage economic and political evolution
in constructive directions.
Information and markets alone will not immediately
transform the North Korean regime. But, they are a start. The
expansion of the market internally, exposure of more North
Koreans to new sources of information, new ways of doing
business and organizing their lives, even exposure to foreign
countries, will foster conditions amenable to the North Korean
people exerting greater constraints on the behavior of what is
now an effectively unaccountable regime.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Noland follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Marcus Noland
The North Korean regime resembles a surfer attempting to maintain
his balance on top of a changing, unstable foundation. While attention
has understandably focused on the nuclear issue, it is worthwhile to
examine the wave as well as the surfer to understand how the ride may
end.
I would like to make three basic points:
The growing centrality of markets in the North Korean
economy over the past two decades is primarily due to state
failure, not proactive reform. The market is emerging as a
semiautonomous zone of social communication and, potentially,
political organizing. On its own terms, the state is right to
fear the market.
This fear of the market prevents the North Korean
authorities from embracing economic reforms that would allow
them to address their chronic food problems, which appear to be
worsening.
One aspect of the economy's unplanned marketization has been
a substantial growth in cross-border exchange, particularly
with China, which accounts for a rising share of North Korean
trade. China appears utterly uninterested in implementing
sanctions in response to North Korean provocations. In turn,
North Korean authorities are attempting to recentralize trade,
eliminating the decentralized market-oriented participants, and
replacing them with intermediaries subject to greater direct
political control.
The tragedy of North Korea is that while the circumstances of many
are abysmal the government is almost wholly unaccountable for its
manifest failures.
changing economic practices and mores
North Korea historically has been a planned economy. The growing
centrality of markets over the last two decades is best interpreted as
a product of state failure, most conspicuously with respect to the
famine in the 1990s that killed perhaps 3-5 percent of the
population.\1\ Since then policy has been ambivalent, sometimes
acquiescing to facts on the ground, at other times attempting to roll
back these developments. Since roughly 2004-05, the policy trend has
been negative or illiberal, prioritizing control over deepening or
extending reform. A failed November 2009 currency reform and the
government's subsequent backtracking destroyed an unknown share of
household savings and accelerated inflation.\2\ Against the backdrop of
a failed agricultural policy and chronic food shortages, grain prices
are again rising rapidly in part due to renewed military procurements
and global market conditions.\3\ Official state media has already begun
to blame the rising prices on world markets.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, ``Famine in North Korea:
Markets, Aid, and Reform'' (Columbia University Press, 2007).
\2\ Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, ``The Winter of Our
Discontent: Pyongyang Attacks the Market,'' Policy Briefs in
International Economics 10-1 (Washington: Peterson Institute for
International Economics, 2010).
\3\ Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, ``Food Prices. Monetary
Policy, and Currency Reform (It's More Interesting Than It Sounds),''
January 28, 2011, http://www.piie.com/blogs/nk/?p=89.
\4\ Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, ``A Hostile Environment? The
Case of Food,'' February 17, 2011, http/www.piie.com/blogs/nk/?p=338.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Research derived from two large-scale refugee surveys, involving
more than 1,600 respondents, one conducted in China and the other in
South Korea, suggest that in some sense a significant share of the
population has effectively delinked from the state.\5\ Many people
derive most if not all of their income from market activities rather
than employment in the state sector, and when we asked the refugees
what was the best way to make money in North Korea, the majority
responded ``engage in market activities'' but a growing number said
``corrupt or criminal activities.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, ``Witness to Transformation:
Refugee Insights into North Korea'' (Washington: Peterson Institute for
International Economics, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When asked about the best way to get ahead, the dominant response
was state and party. But it appears that state positions are
increasingly desired not out of patriotism but rather as a platform for
corruption. Refugees who had formerly been employed in government or
party offices reported increased corruption among their former
colleagues. Similar accounts of corruption among state officials were
reported by more than 300 Chinese businesses interviewed about their
activities in North Korea.\6\ The central authorities have responded by
requiring party and government offices to devote more time to
ideological indoctrination.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Stephan Haggard, Jennifer Lee, and Marcus Noland, ``How China-
North Korea Trade Works,'' February 19, 2011, http://www.piie.com/
blogs/nk/?p=351.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paradoxically, while the state provides increasingly meager
benefits to the population, contact with the state apparatus has grown
ever more intimate. The government has undertaken legal code changes
that have in effect criminalized much of daily economic life and
facilitated the use of the penal system for economic predation. The
police are given extraordinary discretion with respect to whom to
arrest and detain, and conditions in detention facilities where many of
these ``economic criminals'' are confined are horrific, rivaling those
in felony prisons and the political gulag.
This system is a perfect instrument for extortion. The police can
arbitrarily place individuals and their families in institutions where
beatings, torture, and death in custody occur regularly.
Unsurprisingly, people will pay bribes to avoid getting entangled in
this system. In short, in addition to its traditional role as an
instrument of political repression, the penal system now serves as a
mechanism for economic predation as well.
POTENTIAL POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS
North Koreans have increasing access to foreign media sources, and
importantly, inhibitions against consuming foreign media have
disappeared. As a consequence of obviously self-inflicted catastrophes
such as the failed currency reform, as well as increasing exposure to
foreign media, the regime's meta-narrative, which ascribes all the
country's problems to hostile foreign forces, is increasingly
disbelieved.
But the society remains atomized, characterized by low levels of
trust. Even among the refugees, a self-selected group expected to have
both more negative views of the regime and a lower aversion to risk
than the remaining resident population, only a minority reported having
discussed or joked with their peers about their circumstances while in
North Korea. But this may be changing.
Participation in market activities is associated with a cluster of
characteristics:
A greater likelihood to cite ``political'' motives for
emigration;
A 50-percent higher likelihood of being arrested;
Distinctly negative views of the regime and crucially;
A greater propensity to communicate those views to peers.
In short, the market is emerging as a semiautonomous zone of social
communication and, potentially, political organizing. When asked at a
recent event what North Koreans are talking about in the market, former
U.K. Ambassador to North Korea, John Everhard, responded, ``Egypt.''
\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Ambassador John Everhard, ``The Markets of Pyongyang,'' Korea
Economic Institute of America, Washington, February, 2, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The question naturally arises as to how representative the refugees
are of the remaining resident population. At some level this is
unanswerable--there are no public opinion surveys in North Korea. But
extensive multivariate statistical testing of the results suggest that
while the raw pool of respondents may oversample individuals with
demographic characteristics or life experiences predisposing them to
hold negative views, the hypothesis that the results obtained
adequately represent the remaining resident population cannot be
rejected statistically. And the results line up with those reported
from other sources such as the survey of Chinese businesses, which are
not subject to the same concerns regarding bias. In short, the survey
results should be taken seriously.
While discontent is almost surely widespread, there appears to be
an almost complete absence of civil society institutions capable to
channeling dissent into effective political action. And while overt
demands for political change go unarticulated, the state retains a
massive apparatus to compel compliance.
THE FOOD SITUATION
North Korea suffers from chronic food shortages born of the state's
pursuit of the understandable goal of food security through an
inappropriate strategy of self-sufficiency. At present, driven by a
variety of factors, the situation appears to be deteriorating.
Roughly two-thirds of the grain consumed in North Korea is produced
locally, so the size of the domestic harvest matters for food security.
The harvest, in turn, depends on both the weather and the availability
of inputs such as fertilizer. During the last harvest cycle the weather
was suboptimal, and North Korea's poor diplomatic relations with South
Korea have resulted in a reduction in South Korean aid, in terms of
both food and agricultural inputs. Although the United Nations' Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimated that the 2010 fall harvest
was slightly above the previous year's, the 2011 spring harvest is now
expected to be significantly lower than initially projected, so that
heading into the ``lean months'' of mid-2011, domestically produced
supply will be down relative to the previous year.
North Korea receives food aid bilaterally from China and South
Korea and multilaterally through the World Food Programme (WFP), to
which the United States is the largest donor. Imports on commercial
terms are limited. However, both commercial imports and aid are
affected by global prices, which are now rising. Higher world prices
are likely to contribute to a reduction of commercial imports.
Aid could be affected as well. There is an understandable tendency
to interpret aid policy as a function of diplomatic maneuvering and as
a consequence ignore the role of domestic political considerations in
determining outcomes. A Chinese reduction in aid in 1993, undertaken in
response to rising grain prices at home, was the proverbial straw that
broke the camel's back and sent North Korea into famine. A similar
episode played out in December 2007, when in response to rapidly rising
grain prices, China embargoed exports, including those to North Korea,
contributing to the biggest intensification of hunger since the end of
the famine period.\8\ The current backdrop of rising world grain prices
does not augur well for the availability of external supply via any
channel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, ``Famine in North Korea
Redux?'' Journal of Asian Economics (September 2009): 384-95.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Local prices appear to be rising much more rapidly than world
prices, however, possibly due to high levels of inflation in the wake
of the failed currency reform, as well as removal of supply from the
market to restock inventories maintained by the North Korean military
and possibly to build up inventories for political celebrations.
It is impossible to know with any precision what this means for
food security. The FAO/WFP balance sheet exercises are flawed and at
the aggregate level overstate the actual level of distress.
Additionally, these balance sheet exercises ignore inventory destocking
or accumulation, which can have large immediate effects on supplies
actually available on the market, in either direction. If recent
reports are to be believed, the impact of such activities are likely to
be in the direction of reducing effective supply.
Moreover, the distribution of food insecurity is highly uneven in
North Korea, both geographically and socioeconomically, and even
apparently adequate supply at the macro level may disguise what could
be severe distress in specific locales or among particular population
groups. A recent assessment by a consortium of American nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) reports intensifying distress in three provinces
which were visited.\9\ Among other things, the report documents cuts in
rations delivered by the government run rationing system; extraordinary
shares of household income devoted to the purchase of food; and
eyewitness accounts of acute malnutrition among children and a
prevalence of low birth-weight newborns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Penelope Anderson and David Austin, ``Rapid Food Security
Assessment Democratic People's Republic of Korea,'' February 22, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unfortunately, the North Korean Government has never exhibited any
real ``buy-in'' to the norms of humanitarian assistance as practiced
elsewhere around the world. As a consequence of this fundamental lack
of cooperation by the recipient government, the quality of the official
multilateral aid program in North Korea has never met international
standards. Anecdotal accounts suggest that relative to the WFP, the
American NGOs were able to achieve a higher level of effectiveness
during their involvement in 2008. Recent North Korean provocations have
further undercut political support among major donors, with the
possible exception of China. In short, the food situation in North
Korea appears to be deteriorating once again, though our understanding
remains limited and as does our confidence in the quality of the aid
program.
The ultimate solution to North Korea's chronic food insecurity is a
revitalization of the North Korean economy, which would allow the
country to earn foreign exchange and purchase bulk grains from more
efficient producers worldwide. The regime is reluctant to embrace the
reforms necessary to achieve this outcome, however, and if anything,
economic policy is heading in a negative direction.
EXTERNAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
Historically, North Korea's international trade has been small and
politically determined. A byproduct of the famine was the development
of decentralized trade, mostly with China, which arose as a wide
variety of organizations including work units, local government and
party offices, and even military units initially engaged in barter
transactions to secure grain, a process that eventually broadened to
include monetized transactions over a wide range of products. In 2009
China accounted for approximately 35 percent of North Korean trade, a
figure that will likely rise when data are available, insofar as
bilateral trade expanded in 2010, while North Korea's trade with other
partners appears to have stagnated. (One sometimes reads accounts that
attribute to China 70 or 80 percent of North Korea's trade; these
statements involve a fundamental misunderstanding of the data.) \10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Marcus Noland, ``Just How Big are Those Lips and Teeth?''
February 10, 2011, http://www.
piie.com/blogs/nk/?p=281.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As in the case of the domestic market economy, the North Korean
regime does not appear to be entirely comfortable with this phenomenon
of decentralized cross-border exchange, which potentially poses
profound challenges to the North Korean leadership. When economic
circumstances deteriorate, the incentives rise to move into China
either permanently or in search of business opportunities and food.
Informal trade channels became important means of earning foreign
exchange and financing much-needed imports. This movement and trade
eroded the government's monopoly on information about the outside
world. Cross-border trade has also come to include an array of
communications and cultural products, which directly undermine the
government's monopoly on information: from small televisions capable of
receiving Chinese broadcasts in border areas to South Korean videos and
DVDs and even mobile phones. In response to these developments, in
recent months the government appears to be attempting to execute a
highly controlled opening in which North Korean state organs would
engage in cross-border commerce with China, but activities not
controlled by the state would be quashed.
In parallel, the government has established a supra-cabinet body
called the Joint Venture Investment Committee to act as a central
approvals agency for all incoming investment. It is possible that this
``one-stop shop'' could serve as a mechanism for disciplining the
cascading corruption at all levels that has deviled foreign investors.
However, the centralization of control may also simply serve to channel
bribery in politically approved directions, and as such, the
composition of the group could be read as a map of power relationships
within the regime. The committee is reportedly chaired by Ri Chol, a
former North Korean Ambassador to Switzerland, who in his 30 years
there was reputed to have been involved in the deposit in Swiss
institutions of Kim family wealth, as well as the Swiss schooling of
two of Kim
Jong-il's sons.\11\ Similarly, the Korea Taepung International
Investment Group, whose board is chaired by a Korean-Chinese with
commercial ties to the North Korean military but otherwise consists of
regime heavyweights, was awarded a central place in the recently
announced 10-year development plan, which notionally includes large
Chinese investments in the Rason area in extreme northeastern North
Korea. The government has also established a State Development Bank,
reputedly at Chinese urging. These moves could be interpreted as
indicating a renewed commitment to economic development and/or as a
means of disciplining corrupt practices that have deterred investment.
But there are also examples from other post-communist economies where
such centralization has been accompanied by an increase in corruption,
typically to the benefit of the leader, his family, and close
associates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Yonhap, North Korea Newsletter no. 142, January 27, 2011,
http://english.yonhapnews.co.
kr/northkorea/2011/01/26/52/0401000000AEN20110126010400325F.HTML.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONCLUSIONS
North Korea's chronic food insecurity once again appears to be
worsening. Externally, the country is increasingly reliant on China,
which is reluctant to sanction North Korea in response to its
provocations. The regime faces a looming succession driven by Kim Jong-
il's age and health. Our surveys document widespread discontent among
the North Korean people but also a dearth of civil society institutions
capable of channeling that mass discontent into constructive political
action.
Access to information plays an essential political role. All
societies, even democracies, are vulnerable to government propaganda
and misinformation. But in closed societies, authoritarian governments
have particular leeway to develop elaborate propaganda machines that
fundamentally distort information about the outside world. Connecting
individuals to the outside world serves the crucial function of
undermining these distortions by providing information, encouraging the
government to respond to a more informed public. Our surveys suggest
that the North Korean public is receptive to alternative, non-state-
controlled sources of information that not only expand freedom of
thought but potentially increase capabilities as well.
In this context, the market represents a zone of personal autonomy
and freedom. We should be promoting its expansion through a process of
engagement--but engagement with our eyes open. The goal would be not
only to address North Korea's chronic material needs but also to
encourage economic and political evolution in constructive directions.
Humanitarian aid should be divorced from politics. We should not
punish poor families in Chongjin or school children in Wonsan for the
behavior of a government over which they have no influence. In
practical terms this puts us back in the slog of trying to achieve the
best outcomes possible given the fundamentally uncooperative stance of
the North Korean Government. We appear to care more about vulnerable
North Koreans than their own government does.
Development assistance is a different matter, however, and policy
conditionality is justified. And while development assistance will be a
component of an eventual reconstruction of the North Korean economy
under whatever political circumstances prevail, official aid alone will
be not be sufficient. Bringing prosperity to North Korea will require
the establishment of a principled and sustainable basis for commercial
engagement. This outcome, in turn, depends first and foremost on the
stance of the North Korean Government, and recent developments in this
regard have not been auspicious.
Information and markets alone will not immediately transform the
North Korean regime. But they are a start. The expansion of the market
internally, exposure of more North Koreans to new sources of
information, new ways of doing business and organizing their lives,
even exposure to foreign countries, will foster conditions amenable to
the North Korean people exerting greater constraints on the behavior of
what is now an effectively unaccountable regime.
The Chairman. How do you get that exposure?
Dr. Noland. How do I get the----
The Chairman. Yes. I mean, it sounds good, but how do you--
how are you going to do that--create the exposure of the North
Korean people to these other things?
Dr. Noland. What we should be doing is encouraging North
Korean Government to get involved in institutions, such as the
World Bank. When those institutions are formulating their
economic policies, there should be an attempt to put an
emphasis on engagement with these sort of--I don't want to call
them ``nonstate institutions,'' because that would be an
exaggeration, but these economic actors that are effectively
operating outside central government control.
The Chairman. Why would they do that?
Dr. Noland. They don't want to do that, that's for sure.
And the question is----
The Chairman. Well, what leverage do we have to get them to
do that? I mean, I'm not sure where that beginning begins.
Dr. Noland. It begins in their current deteriorating
conditions. They are faced with a situation----
The Chairman. It seems to me--I mean, listening to both Mr.
Carlin and Mr. Flake, I get a sense that we're really
misinterpreting what our interests are, vis-a-vis them and how
they view us. And, if we are--if indeed everything they're
doing is regime-survival-based and stability-based--and it
seems, listening to Mr. Carlin, that they're not particularly
concerned about talking to us or being engaged with us; they're
kind of happy moving along and doing what they're doing--where
does our leverage come from?
Dr. Noland. I think----
The Chairman. Am I----
Dr. Noland [continuing]. The way----
The Chairman [continuing]. Misinterpreting what you said,
incidentally?
Mr. Carlin. A little bit.
The Chairman. A little bit. OK. Well, correct me. I mean, I
got a sense that you were saying that we're sort of presuming
they want to talk to us, and that we're kind of going along
this track of assumptions we're making that are incorrect.
Mr. Carlin. Then I apologize if I was unclear. I think they
are interested in talking to us, maybe less so than they were
several years ago, but that, as you have suggested, until we
sit down and explore what's possible, we can't know. We can't
make assumptions, because, in fact, there is a track record.
There is a history of a period when they were deeply engaged
with us. And there's always a possibility we could get back to
something like that again.
The Chairman. Yes, Mr. Flake.
Mr. Flake. The broader question of getting information into
North Korea is a very important one. While I would agree with
Dr. Noland about the utility of trying to do that on a
government level, the truth is, the real game is inter-Korean,
at this point. In fact, if you saw the media yesterday and this
morning, there is considerable North Korean angst about South
Koreans sending weather balloons over to North Korea with
propaganda leaflets, which is kind of a small scale way to do
it. But, the greater factor is that there are now 20,000 North
Korean defectors living in South Korea who are pumping back
money and information to their relatives all throughout North
Korea; and probably double/triple that number in China, doing
something very similar. You now have information flows in North
Korea that you've never had before. And that's a fundamentally
different dynamic than we were facing 20 years ago. And it's a
destabilizing dynamic for the regime, which is, I think, again,
part and parcel, wrapped up with the succession and other
instability issues, an explanatory factor in looking at their
recent provocations.
The Chairman. So, you were going to say--yes, Dr. Noland.
Dr. Noland. What I was going to say is, if they had the
capacity, if they had the resources, yes, they would shut
everything down. Everything would be centrally controlled. And
they would be back in the world of the 1970s. That's what they
would like to do. They don't have that capacity.
When the economy begins to deteriorate, they are forced,
out of necessity, to allow a certain loosening up of the
system. That's one dynamic. The other is, they're growing
increasingly reliant on China, which can't make them
comfortable.
So, while their preference clearly would be to exist in a
world in which they could exert unlimited control both
internally and in the organization of their external relations,
there are internal pressures for them to have a certain degree
of flexibility in how they organize both their internal economy
as well as their external relations.
The Chairman. So, would you all be in agreement that it's
important to get to this initial discussion, at least on a
bilateral basis, to explore what's possible in six-party talks?
Or are the six-party talks more of a tool and less critical to
determining where to go?
Mr. Carlin. I'll say something that a lot of people may not
agree with. But, I think the six-party talks are a dead-end.
And I don't think we should focus a lot of our attention and
emotional commitment to them. If they serve their purpose, well
and good, but we need something else, and getting to bilateral
faster is more important.
The Chairman. Well, actually, Mr. Carlin, I happen to agree
with you. I think if they happen to work and there's something
that--functions effectively, terrific. But, I think they've
tied our hands, to some degree. And I think they've become sort
of an outlier argument for not necessarily doing what we ought
to be doing that's in our interest.
Mr. Flake. I think, to be very frank, the six-party talks
are really not about the talks themselves. They are about
whether or not we accept North Korea as a nuclear power. There
is nothing magic about a big, round table with 30 people
convened around it. The plenary of the six-party talks, itself,
is a very inefficient format for negotiating. But, the problem
is that the only forum in which we have a standing commitment,
on North Korea's part, to denuclearize, unilaterally, is that
September 19, 2005, Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks.
As I mentioned, in my remarks--it might seem strange that
both President Obama and President Hu spent so much time
focusing on an arcane, unimplemented statement from talks which
are moribund. And the reason is, in that statement, North Korea
committed to its companions in the six-party talks, the other
countries in the region, that they would abandon all nuclear
weapons and all existing nuclear programs, and return, at an
early date, to the IAEA and NPT. And the moment we say, ``six-
party talks are dead. We're giving up on them.'' We have de
facto recognized their assertion that they are a nuclear power.
We have granted them that status.
The fundamental challenge of negotiating with North Korea,
no matter what the forum, is ``How do you deal with them when
they continue to assert that they will only negotiate a peace
treaty as a nuclear power?'' They assert that because they are
a nuclear power, they want to negotiate as a nuclear power.
Unless you secure some type of a reference from them,
disingenuous though it may be, that they are willing to abide
by that commitment, you validate their claim to nuclear status.
It's a very difficult diplomatic conundrum, because, while you
can have talks about talks; and you can exercise diplomacy,
which, again, about which I think we saw the previous panel
refer to the efficacy and the necessity of; but, in terms of
formal negotiations, there is a Catch 22 there, based on North
Korea's standing position, that we have to address.
Dr. Noland. I would say that of course we have to talk to
them bilaterally, if only to do the sorts of testing that you
were raising with the previous panel.
But, I would just align myself with Mr. Flakes' statement.
The real key to the six-party talks is not the talks
themselves, which appear to be somewhat awkward, but it's that
September 2005 statement. That's the one thing we have that
puts the North Koreans on the hook for denuclearization. And
that would seem to be a big thing to throw away.
The Chairman. I think that's smart. I think you don't want
to throw it away, but that doesn't mean you need to tie
yourself, as a methodology for getting forward, to that
particular structure, which I think is cumbersome, and which I
think, if you go back to its first days, was really put
together more as a mechanism, not really for having the talks,
but for handling certain politics. And I think we've been tied
down by that.
Mr. Carlin, I have additional questions I wanted to ask
you. I'd like to follow up. But, unfortunately, I have a
meeting coming up in a moment, and I've used up my time. And
Senator Lugar also has a thing. So, if we could--we're going to
leave the record open, as I said, and I'd like to get back to
you, if I can, to follow up on this a little bit, even since
we're a little time-pressed here today, if that's OK with you.
But, I really appreciate it. I thought all of your comments
were very perceptive. Your statements underscore, to some
degree, problems with our--the driving perceptions of how we've
been thinking about this. And I think we've got to really step
back and not deal with mythology or with a stereotype of what
the give-and-take is here. And I think your warnings are very
appropriate and helpful in that regard.
So, I thank you for coming in today. This will not be our
last conversation about this. And I appreciate your willingness
to share your thoughts and expertise with the committee today.
It's very helpful.
Senator Lugar, if you could----
Senator Lugar. May I----
The Chairman [continuing]. Close things out.
Senator Lugar [continuing]. Conclude the hearing by
asking----
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Lugar [continuing]. A few more questions?
The Chairman. No, no, no, that's absolutely your hearing.
Thank you.
Senator Lugar [presiding]. Thanks very much.
Now, I'm curious--because I think both you, Dr. Noland, and
Mr. Carlin, have mentioned that at least some persons in North
Korea have access to information from the outside world, press
accounts of some sort--but, I'm curious what information you
have about access to the Internet and social media. To what
extent are either the young people, the middle-aged, or anyone
in North Korea, on the Internet or, beyond that, using social
networking Web sites such as Twitter or what have you? Is this
something that's just simply not arrived in North Korea, or are
the people who have this access so embedded in the regime that
we're not seeing the same results that we're seeing in other
regimes that have had some problems with this?
Dr. Noland. The North Korean approach to these issues is
characteristic of highly authoritarian regimes. On the one
hand, there is a desire to show that they're a technologically
advanced society. On the other hand, there's an extreme concern
about the implications of these kinds of ways of communicating.
So, what the North Koreans have effectively done is,
they've created their own internal Internet. So, you have an
Internet that lots of people, at least in urban areas, can get
on to, but it's only within North Korea. Literally the number
of cables going out of the country that allow one to make
international calls or data transmissions is very limited. So,
the number of people who have access to the Internet, as we
would understand it, is a very small group of the elite, the
people that Mr. Carlin normally interacts with. There is some
ability, in the northern border areas, to use cell telephones
that work off the Chinese system. And presumably, a greater
degree of information can pass through that channel than
through the cellular system within the country.
On the one hand, there's a desire to show they're an
advanced country and that they have lots of technology. But, on
the other hand, there is also a very profound desire to control
the potential political implications of that technology.
Senator Lugar. Mr. Carlin, do you have a comment on this?
Mr. Carlin. Well, it's worth noting that the number of cell
phones in the country has increased significantly in the last
few years. This cell phone infrastructure has been improved and
built so that something like 70 or 80 percent of the country is
now covered, in terms of cell phone towers. And the number of
young people that they're training on how to use computers, and
how to sort of become computer literate at least, is really
quite remarkable, so that when and if this access ever is
opened up to the international-based Internet, I believe it's
going to spread rather quickly. And, in fact, if I were a North
Korean Ministry of Security officer, I'd be very nervous, at
this point, at what I see happening in this society.
Senator Lugar. To what extent can we help accelerate this
access through our broadcasts? You know, we've had hearings
with regard to our broadcasting mechanisms to China, for
example, as well as to other Asian countries, which have been
extremely interesting. And you've mentioned at least some ties
with China and the cell phone business. I'm just curious, along
purely the information line, the broadcasting line, what
possibilities do we have utilizing that, quite apart from the
economic sanctions or the punishment routes that we have
employed?
Dr. Noland. Well, right now we have Radio Free Asia, which
broadcasts into North Korea----
Senator Lugar. Yes.
Dr. Noland [continuing]. A Korean-language broadcast, but
they're on a shortwave and they're broadcast from transmitters
that are quite far away.
There are three things we could do to improve the
effectiveness. No. 1, increase the number of hours of
programming. No. 2, move to a.m. And No. 3, try to convince
some of our allies to allow the stationing of transmitters in
their countries, which would allow much more effective
transmission.
Senator Lugar. It would not appear to me that we have been
particularly aggressive in our own policies or our own
organization of this, but do you have any comments about that?
Yes, Mr. Flake.
Mr. Flake. I would just note that, here again, the real
game is inter-Korean. There is a very active civil society in
Korea operating both out of the borderlands on the Chinese
border, but also out of South Korea itself, which is
specifically strategizing about how to get information, in
Korean, into North Korea. Obviously, again, per the media
reports in the last few days, this is something that's of great
concern to the North Korean leadership.
Another interesting, kind of, factoid in this regard: The
cell phone provider in North Korea is Orascom, an Egyptian
company with close ties between Kim Jong-il and, of course,
Hosni Mubarak. As such, it will be very interesting to see how
things play out with that particular contract in the weeks to
come.
There are, by my understanding, some 260,000 to maybe
300,000 cell phones in operation in North Korea right now; the
vast majority within Pyongyang, itself, and among the elite.
But, that said, such phones are an information transmission
vehicle that did not exist before, particularly among the
elite, who are the most likely to be disillusioned, in terms of
recognizing the difference between expectations and reality.
This is a very important factor, in terms of understanding
where North Korea's likely to go in the near future.
Senator Lugar. Let me follow through on a comment that one
of you made, that there may be 20,000 North Koreans in South
Korea as refugees. In some past hearings we've heard that, by
and large, the South Koreans have not been particularly
receptive of people coming from North Korea. This may be a
broad generalization, but we perceived that South Koreans were
by and large in favor of unity in due course, but, at the same
time, that they had a desire to absorb only a few persons at a
time in order to avoid, in their view, inheriting all of the
problems of North Korea. On the other hand, given that now the
disparity in terms of wealth and economics between the two
Koreas is so great, why wouldn't the South Koreans as a matter
of policy, welcome more refugees from North Korea in order to
build more of a population that, in terms of either
communication or an interpretation of what's occurring, would
be helpful to South Korea?
Mr. Flake. I'll start off with that, and the others can
chime in, as well.
There has been a remarkable shift, in terms of how South
Korea views refugees or defectors coming out of North Korea,
that is commensurate with the shift in the Government in South
Korea. During 10 years of progressive governments in Seoul, the
national narrative was all about cooperation, working with
North Korea. And so, defectors, particularly those with
horrendous human rights stories, coming over, kind of, didn't
fit well----
Senator Lugar. Yes.
Mr. Flake [continuing]. Within that narrative, and they
didn't feel welcome, on a policy level. Obviously, there are
still deep problems of social integration for North Korean
refugees integrating into South Korean society. For the bulk of
the 50-some-odd years of national separation, the flow of
defectors was so small that South Korea could afford to give
them large sums of money, stipends to keep them living and
educate them and get them jobs, et cetera. In the last several
years, that number has continued to grow and this is becoming
in some respects, an immigration issue with all the budget
consequences that are related to that, as well.
But, that said, I would think that, at least in my mind,
compared to 3 years ago the environment right now is much
improved and continues to be so depending on the level of flow.
Dr. Noland. As Mr. Flake said, there are problems with
integration and assimilation, and one shouldn't underestimate
the traumas that these people have experienced. In our refugee
interviews, I would say that probably half the people we
interviewed, in a clinical setting, would be diagnosed with
post-traumatic stress disorder; the famine, incarceration in
the penal system, have profound psychological impact. So, it's
a traumatized population. And there is increasing understanding
of this in South Korea. The South Korean Government has passed
new legislation, which is, I think, really improving the
quality of services that it's providing to these people. And, I
think that there is hope that this population will be better
served, moving forward, than it perhaps has been in the past.
Senator Lugar. Mr. Carlin, I'd like to ask, from your very
vast knowledge of the internal workings of North Korea: What
are the specific steps, if we were to have a bilateral talk or
talks with North Korea, that would advance the denuclearization
situation?
Mr. Carlin. I'm afraid that--well, I would say, the steps
that we would take to advance denuclearization are not to talk
about it right away, quite frankly. I think the situation has
so deteriorated, in terms of our own position, that it would
not be a wise strategy to start off with that subject, because
we won't get anywhere and the negative result will poison the
entire process.
I think if, now, we want to get to denuclearization, it's
going to take us longer than it would have before. And we're
going to have to explore a broader horizon with the North
Koreans, in an effort to establish some sort of common ground
from which to speak to each other, and then eventually zero in
on that, since it is so important to us.
Senator Lugar. Well, one of the reasons often given for the
six-power talks is that they include Japan. And from time to
time, over, now, a couple of decades, quite apart from the last
few years, the Japanese, broadly, have indicated that they did
not pursue nuclear weapons because they had confidence in the
United States and our ability to work with them for their
protection. This was shaken, on occasion, when North Korea
apparently fired missiles that straddled Japan, or in some
geographical formation. And they came to us with considerable
anxiety, asking ``Where were you? And how can we count on
you?'' and so forth.
Maybe the other powers involved, particularly Japan,
perhaps the South Koreans, have some problems with this degree
of patience. But, your feeling still is, given the regime
problems, the potential changes, and so forth, that there just
are not persons presently in North Korea that are prepared if
the United States asked, today, if we could sit down to get to
that issue, except after a good number of intervening steps and
other issues.
Mr. Carlin. I'm afraid that every lesson that we've taught
to the North Koreans over the last 10 years is that they'd be
much better served by relying on a nuclear deterrent than on
our good word. And we have to teach them the opposite now. And
it's going to take us a while to do that. We're going to have
to follow through on agreements, as will they. I'm not
suggesting this is one-sided. But, we have a lot of homework to
do and a lot of brambles to clear in the path ahead of us,
because of some policies that we've followed in the past.
I would say it ill behooves the Japanese to worry about the
pacing of our talks with the North Koreans, when they are so
focused on a single domestic issue, which they consider quite
important--it's quite emotional; no one can second-guess them
on it. But, the fact is, they're so fixated on that, that
they're not being very helpful to us in our own attempts to
deal with this larger regional problem.
Senator Lugar. What if--I would ask of any of you--a
situation occurs in which the regime succession does not work
out quite in the pattern that has been prescribed, and, in
fact, just to use a cliche, a military government of some sort
succeeds this family situation? What is your prediction as to
how whatever leadership may arise in that form would deal with
the problems we've been talking about? Is it simply more of the
same? Are there any indications that, as a matter of fact, such
a government would have a different outlook toward South
Koreans, toward the Chinese, toward us, toward nuclear issues?
Mr. Carlin. To the extent that, as I think is true, that
North Koreans, at least at the level you're talking about,
really do see themselves as part of a legitimate country with
legitimate interests, I think we're fooling ourselves to think
that, when the family is replaced, that suddenly, you know,
Hosanna, they'll have a--they'll see the world as we do,
especially against the South Koreans. So, I wouldn't
necessarily look forward to that sort of a shift in regimes. I
wouldn't think, off the top of my head, that it would make the
situation better for us. Whether it's more dangerous or not
would--might depend a lot on the personalities involved.
Senator Lugar. Yes, sir. Mr. Flake.
Mr. Flake. I would very much agree with Mr. Carlin. It is
difficult to imagine almost any scenario where known factions
in North Korea taking over would make things better. If
anything, the instability and everything associated with that,
would probably make things worse, going forward.
That said, I'd like to take just a moment to talk about the
broader question that he was addressing, in terms of how you
move forward in facing that fundamental challenge of: ``How do
we deal with a North Korea that has declared itself a nuclear
power?'' I think the plan that Mr. Carlin outlined makes
perfect sense if you're looking at North Korea in a vacuum. I
mean, what he has described to you is exactly what we would
need to do if we were to get North Korea, themselves, to decide
that they eventually wanted to give up the nuclear weapons.
But, unfortunately, as you rightly pointed out, Mr.
Senator, that we're not dealing with North Korea in a vacuum.
You've got a lot of other countries in the immediate region,
and the world writ large, that are looking very closely at the
lessons we are drawing from North Korea. And, at this point,
North Korea is the only country ever to have pulled out of the
NPT and the IAEA. And, if a country of North Korea's status and
demonstrated past behavior, as the previous panel talked about
in quite great detail, talking about nonproliferation--if a
country with a demonstrated past of proliferation, of selling
any weapon system it can get its hands on, with all the human
rights and other issues we've discussed here--if they can
become recognized as a nuclear power, even a de facto
recognized as a nuclear power, who can't? What country in the
world today is not more acceptable to the international
community as a nuclear power than North Korea?
So, unfortunately, this is--while absolutely agreeing with
Mr. Carlin that this is what the North Korean leaders may want,
I think that the reality that the government today is faced
with, and that future governments will be faced with, is that
it's extremely challenging to move forward with North Korea
because of their statements and their nuclear tests. We are in
a very different stage of these negotiations than we were maybe
15 or 20 years ago.
Senator Lugar. Finally, I'll----
Dr. Noland. If I could----
Senator Lugar. Yes, Dr. Noland.
Dr. Noland. I think it's very difficult, or if not
impossible, to predict what some successor leadership might
want to do. I think what we probably can say is that there
won't be major changes while Kim Jong-il is still alive. The
problem, of course, is that this is a political culture that
creates enormous incentives for people to falsify their true
preferences. And when the situation changes, it may be possible
for individuals or factions to develop that actually take the
country in a somewhat different direction. I mean, it's not
impossible to imagine that some successor leadership would look
around at the wreckage and kind of decide there must be some
better way of doing things.
That said, even if such a faction were to come to power and
want to pursue some sorts of reforms, either internally or in
their external relations, doing so would not necessarily be
easy. The divided nature of the Peninsula creates a fundamental
legitimacy challenge for the North Korean regime. And once they
start moving closer to South Korea and looking more like South
Korea, then the whole justification for the maintenance of
North Korea as an independent state could be called into
question. So, I don't think that we can rule out the
possibility of a more enlightened leadership in the future, but
I don't think we can count on it, and I don't think we can
underestimate the difficulty that such a leadership might face
in trying to take the country in a different direction.
Senator Lugar. Well, my final question is: In the event of
some change, despite its cause, to what extent are extensive
Chinese investments in North Korea--we've already suggested
there may be some extensive South Korean investments--but, to
what extent would either party attempt to pursue protection of
its interests? Or are they large enough, in relationship to
their respective economies, to make that much of a difference?
Do people just simply take their losses and assume that this
was the luck of the draw?
Dr. Noland. I think that we can assume that there is a
rivalry between China and South Korea for economic influence in
North Korea, and that that would play into the behavior of both
of those governments. However, at least from a kind of
mathematical standpoint, if you look at the North Korean
economy today, and you look at the size of those investments,
in any kind of macroeconomic sense or broader sense, in terms
of either the Chinese or the South Korean Governments, these
investments are trivial. This is a country in which the
investments that will be needed to rehabilitate that economy
are vast, relative to the foreign investments that exist there
today.
Senator Lugar. Well, I thank each one of you very much for
your statements, that are a part of the record, and for your
remarkable testimony and your response to our questions. I
believe this has been a very productive hearing, and you have
certainly helped make that the case.
Let me make a final statement. I ask consent that a letter
written by Ambassador Charles ``Jack'' Pritchard, longtime East
Asia expert and current president of the Korean Economic
Institute, to myself and Senator Kerry in preparation for this
hearing, be submitted for the record.
Senator Lugar. And the record will remain open for QFRs
until the close of business on Friday, March the 4th.
And I would add that, in addition to this report, a short
opinion piece, likewise, be included in the record.
And, at least, since no one is going to object----
[Laughter.]
Senator Lugar [continuing]. I declare that this will be in
the record, to complete that record with our QFRs to be
submitted until March 4.
Senator Lugar. Thank you so very much. We appreciate your
coming.
And the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:32 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Hon. Michael S. Lee, U.S. Senator From Utah
Thank you Assistant Secretary Campbell, Representative Bosworth,
Mr. Carlin and Mr. Noland for your participation in this hearing.
Thank you, Senators Kerry and Lugar for your leadership in
discussing the volatile situation in North Korea. While events in Egypt
and Libya have commanded our attention over the past weeks and months,
circumstances in North Korea demand our vigilance and preparation to
ensure the safety and security of the United States and our allies in
Asia.
______
Letter and N.Y. Op-ed Submitted by Ambassador Charles ``Jack''
Pritchard
Korea Economic Institute,
Washington, DC, February 25, 2011.
Re Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on ``Breaking the Cycle
of North Korean Provocations''
Hon. John F. Kerry,
Chairman, U.S. Senate Committee On Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Hon. Richard G. Lugar,
Ranking Member, U.S. Senate Committee On Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Kerry and Senator Lugar: It is with deep appreciation
of the Committee's work on U.S. policy toward North Korea that I offer
a few observations in advance of the March 1, 2011 hearing on
``Breaking the Cycle of North Korean Provocations.''
With regard to breaking the cycle of provocations, 1 believe that
the worst-case military provocations that we witnessed in 2010 will not
be repeated except in extraordinary circumstances. In 2010, we
witnessed unacceptable North Korean provocative behavior: the sinking
of the Cheonan in March and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in
November. The first caused the deaths of 46 sailors; in the latter
case, 4 were killed. I also think it is important to try to understand
why 2010 was such a bad year when it comes to North Korea's
unacceptable behavior.
For North Korea, 2010 was a critical year. Kim Jong-il was still
recovering from his stroke in August 2008; the succession process was
high on their agenda; sanctions were creating difficulties; currency
revaluation had gone terribly wrong; and the North Koreans harbored
thoughts of revenge for the November 2009 West Sea incident that
humiliated the military.
On the international front, Pyongyang had a lot going against it;
intra-Korean relations were at a low point and the United States was
steadfastly ignoring its calls for bilateral engagement. In other
words, there was nothing positive going on to moderate Pyongyang's
worst tendencies. Domestically, Pyongyang needed a reason to rally the
nation around Kim Jong-il and his eventual successor. The easiest way
to do that was through the military.
I believe North Korea was prepared to react violently to any
perceived provocation or slight. They chose to take action around the
Northern Limit Line in the West Sea. As they thought through the
consequences, they determined that South Korea was unlikely to respond
in an overly aggressive manner and if they were successful, the
increased tensions would work in Kim's favor. After both the Cheonan
and Yeonpyeong incidents, we heard stories fabricated to embellish Kim
Jong-un's credibility within the military--key to his ultimate
successful succession to power.
And unfortunately, they correctly calculated that China would not
do anything that would substantially harm Pyongyang's interests.
So what does the current charm offensive by Pyongyang mean,
particularly when you think how quickly they have reversed course. They
went from attacking South Korea militarily to offering dialogue at
anytime, at anywhere and criticizing Seoul for not jumping at the
opportunity.
I think it is consistent with Pyongyang's 2 main objectives. First
and foremost is the need to reduce external tension in 2011 in the run
up to 2012--the 100th anniversary of Kim Il-Sung's birth. As you know,
North Korea has declared that it will be a strong and prosperous nation
in 2012. In order to do that, it needs foreign direct investment and
opportunities to create hard currency. The international community's
adverse reaction to the activities of 2010 proved that aggressive
behavior will not lead to achieving this goal.
Secondly, I believe enough overt attention has been given Kim Jong-
un; protective measures have been put in place to ensure the survival
of the Kim family after Kim Jong-il's death; and Kim Jong-un's legend
is off to a strong start--certainly in the minds of the North Korean
leadership. Any additional emphasis on Kim Jong-un now comes at the
direct expense of Kim Jong-il. He may be thinking of his eventual
demise, but he does not want to become irrelevant before his death. In
this regard, 2011 should be far less confrontational than 2010.
Additionally, I have attached a copy of a recently submitted op-ed
(to the NY Times) in which I propose a specific, comprehensive,
proactive U.S. policy toward North Korea. I hope these thoughts will be
of use in preparation for your upcoming hearing.
Sincerely,
Ambassador Charles L. (Jack) Pritchard,
President, Korea Economic Institute.
ATTACHMENT
NY Times Op-ed of Jack Pritchard, President of the Korea Economic
Institute
Last year I was privileged to co-chair the Council on Foreign
Relations Independent Task Force Report, ``U.S. Policy Toward the
Korean Peninsula.'' The Task Force was made up, as all CFR Task Forces,
of a prestigious group of experts who found that the ``Obama
administration's current approach does not go far enough in developing
a strategy to counter North Korea's continuing nuclear development or
potential for proliferation.'' The Task Force made several
recommendations that the administration has yet to implement.
One of the Task Force's observation was that there was
``significant risk that (the administration's ) `strategic patience'
will result in acquiescence to North Korea's nuclear status as a fait
accompli.'' Several months have transpired since the report was
published in June 2010 and ``strategic patience'' continues even in the
wake of the sinking of the South Korean naval vessel Cheonan and the
artillery shelling of the South Korean island which combined killed 50
South Koreans.
That is not to imply that U.S. policy should change in reaction to
bad behavior by North Korea, but rather it is meant to suggest that the
lack of a policy (or at best a passive policy) is not sufficient to
prevent proliferation or move us closer to denuclearization. Meanwhile
North Korean provocations have increased tension on the peninsula.
The emphasis the administration places on its solidarity with Seoul
and its insistence that Pyongyang first improve relations with South
Korea along with its ``at arms' length'' approach to North Korea served
an initial useful purpose. It changed the dynamic of past
administrations' knee jerk-like reaction to Pyongyang's every move. It
was healthy to reset the ground rules under which an American
administration would engage North Korea. However, there is a point when
this approach begins to be counterproductive to the ultimate goal of
denuclearization and nonproliferation. We have long since reached that
point.
Certainly, the administration should continue close consultations
with Seoul. The benefit to the alliance as a whole has been remarkable,
but it is time for the administration to put forth a proactive North
Korea policy.
Washington and Seoul have told Pyongyang that it must demonstrate
sincerity before they are willing to reengage in Six-Party Talks
designed to achieve denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. For its
part, North Korea has been clear in its message that it is willing to
return to talks (under gentle pressure from Beijing), but that the
agenda should be refocused on the ``root cause'' of the nuclear
problem--U.S. hostility towards Pyongyang. Because of the Kim regime's
narrow focus on promoting nationalism in support of the eventual
succession of power to a third generation Kim, actual denuclearization
is off the table. This is a formula for continued stalemate.
If U.S. policy remains on the current course, there is little
potential that our security concerns will be resolved and every chance
that North Korea will drift toward de facto nuclear weapons state
status.
This calls for a comprehensive, proactive policy toward North
Korea. This is best done by articulating an objective of absolute
denuclearization of North Korea using the robust application of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 as a means of shaping
Pyongyang's security environment. That requires continuous engagement
with Beijing to ensure that it does not deviate from our common
objective and that China willingly applies reasonable and sufficient
leverage on Pyongyang to ensure North Korea does not believe that there
is a viable Chinese loophole in UNSC sanctions.
Reengaging North Korea in a multilateral forum (Six-Party Talks)
will be of limited value as long as Pyongyang is overly concerned about
the long-term survivability of its regime. Its nuclear weapons program
is the equivalent of a night light. Take it away and they are not sure
they will survive the night.
Once the basics are in place, the United States needs to actively
engage North Korea on a host of issues for which we and they have
concerns. These issues roughly fall into the following broad
categories: humanitarian, security, confidence building, and economic.
Specifically, Washington should open up a distinct dialogue on
medical requirements such as tuberculosis management and family
reunions between Korean-Americans and North Korean relatives separated
by the Korean War. A discussion on best agricultural practices along
with sponsorship of student educational opportunities would go a long
way in addressing chronic North Korean problems associated with its
self-imposed isolation and contribute to the promotion of positive
external influences. A corollary discussion on disaster prevention and
the development of a regional response package led by the Red Cross
would assist in minimizing the impact natural and man-made disasters
have on the welfare of the North Korean people.
Engaging Pyongyang on its long-range missile program will not be
easy. More than ten years have elapsed since the last serious
discussion on this critical issue was held. At one point, a self-
imposed missile moratorium held North Korea's missile development and
proliferation ambitions in check. Pyongyang has used the desire to
orbit a satellite as a rationale for its recent missile tests. A
permutation of an idea that may have originated in a Putin-Kim Jong il
meeting in the summer of 2000 in which other countries would take on
the delivery of North Korean satellites in exchange for a permanent
moratorium on its testing and fielding of long-range missiles needs to
be re-examined as a potential starting point.
Likewise, the nuclear fuel cycle discussion that is gaining ground
elsewhere needs to be imported into a North Korean context. However
much the administration currently believes Pyongyang has violated
Security Council sanctions and inter-Korean agreements, it does not
change basic facts. North Korea is building an experimental light water
reactor which, if they are successful, could lead to larger, full scale
reactors which would rely on the fuel from the recently revealed
uranium enrichment facility. The administration may want to apply a new
set of sanctions for North Korea's entry into the fuel cycle business,
but it is not likely to happen (as we have seen from China's recent
blockage of a U.N. report on Pyongyang's uranium facility) and at the
end of the day we will be where we are now: suspecting that North Korea
has a secret highly enriched uranium facility capable of producing
bomb-grade enriched uranium and hoping that the claimed low enriched
uranium facility does not morph into a nuclear weapons related
facility. Bringing North Korea into the fuel cycle dialogue is the best
way to guard against this latter concern and perhaps open the door to
discussing Pyongyang's highly enriched uranium program.
With regard to confidence building, we should begin a preliminary
four party dialogue involving North Korea, China, South Korea and the
United States on replacing the current armistice for a more permanent
peace arrangement. The precedent for this was the original four party
peace talks more than a decade ago that had just such a goal. The
primary benefit of the discussion would be to lay the groundwork on
what both the south and north require before moving at an appropriate
time and venue to negotiate an actual peace treaty. The lead role
played by Seoul and Pyongyang would support the administration's desire
for improved North-South relations and enhance the near-term benefit of
identifying and implementing confidence building measures short of a
peace treaty that would inevitably reduce tension on the peninsula.
On the economic front, a serious energy survey of North Korea's
energy capacity is a necessary starting point to establish what types
of energy assistance other parties could provide should there ever be
the kind of progress in denuclearization talks that warranted
assistance. The precedence and promise of energy assistance is well
established. What is lacking is a current forum to ensure the best
empirical data is available for parties to make the right choices.
In anticipation of eventual success in denuclearizing North Korea
and as a tangible incentive to Pyongyang, a dialogue on practical
foreign direct investments in North Korea needs to get underway.
Sectors for promising joint ventures need to be identified, rules
clarified, and limits understood.
In all, there are over ten specific areas where we can begin work
with North Korea that reinforces the positive and gives Pyongyang the
impetus for seriously weighing the advantages for making the decision
to get rid of its nuclear weapons program. As long as the basic
framework of full application of UNSCR 1874 is in force, this approach
would not run the risk of creating non-humanitarian safety valves which
would unduly delay Pyongyang's ultimate decision to eliminate its
nuclear weapons program.
______
Responses of Special Representative Stephen Bosworth to Questions
Submitted by Senator John F. Kerry
Question. How likely is it that the North Korean Government will
collapse in the next 3-5 years? If the Kim Jong-il regime falters, do
you believe a new government will be more or less willing to abandon
the pursuit of nuclear weapons?
Answer. We are carefully watching developments in Pyongyang. North
Korea is one of the world's most closed societies, so it is difficult
to predict the future composition of the North Korean regime or its
policies.
Question. Do you believe U.S. diplomatic engagement with North
Korea makes economic reform and political reform more or less likely?
Answer. The United States remains open to diplomatically engaging
North Korea on denuclearization, but this process and its outcomes
depend on the decisions and actions of North Korea. If North Korea
improves relations with South Korea and demonstrates a change in
behavior, including taking irreversible steps to denuclearize,
complying with international law, and ceasing provocative behavior, it
can achieve security, economic opportunity, and respect from the
international community. However, if it continues on its pattern of
confrontation and isolation and fails to comply with its obligations
and commitments, it stands no chance of becoming a strong and
prosperous nation.
Question. Are North Korean provocations--nuclear tests, missile
tests, proliferation of nuclear and missile technology, and
demilitarized zone violations--more or less likely in the absence of
high-level U.S. diplomatic engagement?
Answer. We have maintained high-level engagement on this issue.
When North Korea sank the ROK naval vessel Cheonan in March 2010, the
United States had been seeking to resume serious negotiations on
denuclearization, as evidenced by my December 2009 trip to Pyongyang.
Following the DPRK's sinking of the Cheonan, disclosure of a uranium
enrichment program (UEP), and shelling of Yeonpyong Island, we have
continued to engage in intensive diplomatic activities building
consensus among our allies and Five-Party partners that the DPRK's
provocations are unacceptable and will not be rewarded.
Our diplomatic response has included the dispatch of several high-
level delegations to the region. Moreover, during a historic December 7
trilateral ministerial, the United States, ROK, and Japan declared that
the DPRK's provocative and belligerent behavior threatens all three
countries and will be met with solidarity from all three countries. We
have also continually consulted with China on how it can best use its
influence with North Korea. During Chinese President Hu's January
2011visit to Washington, the two sides issued a United States-China
Joint Statement which ``expressed concern regarding the DPRK's claimed
uranium enrichment program,'' ``opposed all activities inconsistent
with the 2005 Joint Statement and relevant international obligations
and commitments,'' and ``called for the necessary steps that would
allow for the early resumption of the six-party talks process to
address this and other relevant issues.'' In addition to fostering
unprecedented Five-Party coordination, these diplomatic efforts have
preserved regional stability.
Question. Looking ahead, is it possible to set the terms of our
diplomatic engagement in ways that will not reward North Korea's bad
behavior?
Answer. We have made it clear that we are open to diplomatically
engaging North Korea on denuclearization. However, this process depends
on the decisions and actions of North Korea. We are looking for
evidence that North Korea is not only seriously committed to
negotiations but also that such negotiations could be constructive. We
are working very closely with our Five-Party partners to identify a
path that we believe will lead to constructive engagement with the
DPRK. We have made clear that a path would be open if the DPRK took
steps to improve North-South relations and demonstrated a change in
behavior, including taking actions toward irreversible
denuclearization; complying with international law, including its
commitments under the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and
its obligations under U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874;
and ceasing provocative behavior.
Question. The September 19, 2005, Six Party Talks Joint Statement
contained six provisions reflecting overlapping mutual obligations. The
core pledges included the following:
North Korea pledged to abandon all nuclear weapons and
existing nuclear programs and return, at an early date, to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to
safeguards established by the International Atomic Energy
Agency;
The United States affirmed that it has no nuclear weapons on
the Korean Peninsula and has no intention to attack or invade
North Korea with nuclear or conventional weapons.
The United States and the other parties also agreed to
discuss, at an appropriate time, the subject of the provision
of a light water reactor to North Korea.
North Korea and the United States undertook to respect each
other's sovereignty, exist peacefully together, and take steps
to normalize their relations subject to their respective
bilateral policies.
China, Japan, South Korea, Russia and the United States
stated their willingness to provide energy assistance to North
Korea.
If the DPRK abides by all of its pledges, does the United States
remain willing to fulfill all of its commitments under the September
19, 2005, Joint Statement? If not, which pledges does the United States
intend to renegotiate in light of the changed circumstances on the
Korean Peninsula (such as the North's nuclear and missile tests, its
reported sensitive proliferation activities, its violations of the
armistice, and its independent pursuit of light water nuclear reactor
technology)?
Answer. If the DPRK fulfills its commitments under the 2005 Joint
Statement of the Six-Party Talks, including abandoning all nuclear
weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an early date,
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, the United States
remains willing to fulfill all of its joint statement commitments.
Question. The stated goal of U.S. policy remains accomplishing the
complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula.
Is there a benefit to establishing manageable benchmarks
toward this final objective? Are there interim goals such as
verifiably capping fissile material production, securing a
moratorium on nuclear and missile tests, and receiving
assurances on proliferation, for which the United States would
be willing to provide incentives and/or some sanctions relief?
Answer. The United States seeks the verifiable denuclearization of
the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner. However, verifiable capping
of fissile material production, securing a moratorium on nuclear and
missile tests, and receiving assurances on proliferation are among the
intermediate goals we are also pursuing in order to achieve the
ultimate objective.
Question. We know other countries, including Iran, are likely
watching events on the Korean Peninsula with considerable interest. Is
the above approach, which acknowledges the potential realities of the
situation, consistent with our global nonproliferation agenda?
Answer. Our approaches to nonproliferation challenges may vary
depending on the circumstances of each case, but our objectives are
consistent: to uphold and strengthen the nonproliferation regime and to
prevent and eliminate threats to international security caused by the
spread of nuclear weapons and proliferation-sensitive technologies. In
that regard, we expect North Korea to take irreversible steps toward
denuclearization, to return to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, and to comply
with its U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) obligations. In cases
where the IAEA Board of Governors or the U.N. Security Council has
required action, we expect states to comply with those obligations as
well. We have also actively urged all states to implement UNSCRs 1718
and 1874 fully and transparently to prevent proliferation to and from
the DPRK.
Question. The United States Government has historically supported a
broad range of humanitarian outreach to the DPRK, including food aid,
assistance on public health (such as tuberculosis control), POW-MIA
recovery operations, people-to-people initiatives, cultural and
educational exchanges, and even limited technical outreach to
bureaucrats. But over the past few years, such efforts have been
suspended.
What is the administration's position on broadening and
deepening our humanitarian engagement with the DPRK? Does
humanitarian outreach help promote gradual changes inside North
Korea that are advantageous in terms of U.S. interests?
Answer. Our humanitarian assistance is not linked to any political
or security issues.The United States remains concerned about the well-
being of the North Korean people. The U.S. Government's policy on the
provision of humanitarian assistance is based on three factors: (1) the
level of need in a given country; (2) competing needs in other
countries; and (3) our ability to ensure that aid is reliably reaching
the people in need. This policy is consistent with our longstanding
goal of providing emergency humanitarian assistance to the people of
countries around the world where there are legitimate humanitarian
needs. However, consistent with our practice worldwide, the United
States will not provide food aid without a needs assessment and
adequate program management, monitoring, and access provisions in
place.
Question. As a matter of policy, does the administration link food
aid and medical assistance to nonhumanitarian considerations?
Answer. The U.S. Government does not link food aid and medical
assistance to nonhumanitarian considerations. Our longstanding goal is
to provide emergency humanitarian assistance to the people of countries
around the world where there are legitimate humanitarian needs.
Question. What is the Obama administration's policy on the issuance
of visas to North Koreans interested in participating in humanitarian,
cultural, or scientific exchanges?
Answer. The United States believes that exchanges can help develop
technical knowledge in critical areas such as agriculture, energy, and
medicine, as well as encourage greater awareness of the outside world
by North Koreans. We look forward to North Korea taking actions that
will allow for the expansion of educational, cultural, and people-to-
people exchange programs.
Question. What impact has (i) rising global food prices; (ii) the
rising price of international crude oil; (iii) recent flooding and
droughts in North Korea; and (iv) the North Korean attempt at currency
reform had on the food situation in North Korea?
Answer. The North Korean Government's unwise economic policies,
including its failed attempt at currency reform in late 2009, are the
primary causes of the country's weakened food security situation.
Rising global food prices, the rising price of international crude oil,
and recent flooding and droughts in North Korea have only served to
exacerbate a situation resulting from the regime's poor choices. The
2010 DPRK Human Rights Report notes that food shortages initially
followed the currency reform. Chronic shortages in food supplies could
be addressed by the DPRK if the North Korean Government implemented
appropriate economic policies encouraging private sector-led growth and
development.
In the near term, rising global food prices are expected to further
reduce the North Korean Government's ability to import food to meet the
projected gap between food production and food needs in 2011. The
impact of the rising price of international crude oil, while difficult
to quantify, could also inhibit the purchase of essential agricultural
inputs and add costs to the North Korean Government's dispersal of food
through the Public Distribution System.
Question. From February 8-15, 2011, a rapid food security
assessment was completed in three North Korean provinces by a needs
assessment team that included five nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs): Christian Friends of Korea, Global Resource Services, Mercy
Corps, Samaritan's Purse, and World Vision. What were the principle
findings of this NGO delegation?
Answer. The visit was requested by the North Korean Government,
whose representatives informed the aid NGOs of claimed food shortages
in North Korea. The United States did not ask the five aid agencies to
conduct their recent food assessment nor act on behalf of the U.S.
Government. The United States continues to be concerned for the well-
being of the North Korean people.
According to their press release, the five aid agencies found
evidence of looming food shortages and acute malnutrition in the DPRK.
The seven-member team traveled to the provinces of North Pyongan, South
Pyongan, and Chagang from February 8-15. We understand that the team
visited 45 sites including hospitals, orphanages, citizens' homes,
cooperative farms and warehouses. We also understand that the team that
observed some evidence of malnutrition and food shortages, which were
particularly prevalent among families that depend on the North Korean
public food distribution system and most severely impact children, the
elderly, the chronically ill, and pregnant and nursing mothers.
Question. What is the Obama administration's assessment of the
monitoring and verification of food assistance that occurred during the
2008-09 period? As part of your answer, please evaluate the adequacy of
safeguards that were in place to prevent diversion of food assistance.
Answer. The United States remains concerned about the well-being of
the North Korean people. Our last food assistance program was abruptly
suspended by the North Koreans in March 2009, and our humanitarian
personnel were ordered to leave the country and forced to leave behind
over 20,000 metric tons of U.S. food items. The question of what
happened to the unmonitored aid is a key concern that must be addressed
before any discussion of providing future food aid is begun.
Consistent with our practices worldwide, the United States will not
provide food aid without a thorough needs assessment and adequate
program management, monitoring, and access provisions in place. Before
the start of the 2008-09 program, we negotiated the strongest
monitoring and verification safeguards in the history of international
humanitarian assistance programs in North Korea. These standards have
not been met since the program ended.
Question. Have North Korean officials made any representations
within the past year to their U.S. counterparts on adherence to
monitoring and verification arrangements for food assistance?
Answer. The United States works on this matter through diplomatic
channels. The details of our diplomatic conversations can be shared in
a classified setting.
Question. If there is a demonstrated need, if the United States
determines that the situation ranks serious enough compared to other
humanitarian crises, and if North Korea is willing to accede to robust
verification and monitoring arrangements to ensure that food is
distributed to those most in need, would the administration support the
resumption of food aid to North Korea?
Answer. The U.S. Government assesses that the DPRK suffers from a
chronic food shortage. We remain deeply concerned about the well-being
of the North Korean people, however, consistent with our practices
worldwide, U.S. food aid is contingent on a thorough needs assessment
as well as competing international needs and adequate program
management, monitoring, and access provisions. In addition to these
standard practices, the DPRK must also account for the over 20,000
metric tons of food left behind when the DPRK expelled U.S. food
monitors in March 2009.
______
Responses of Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell to Questions
Submitted by Senator John F. Kerry
Question. Some observers have asked whether North Korea policy has
taken a back seat to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Iranian
nuclear challenge, and the Middle East peace process, to say nothing of
pressing domestic and international economic priorities. In recent
weeks, our foreign policy establishment is justifiably focused on the
monumental developments still unfolding in the Middle East.
Given the crowded international and domestic agenda, what
priority do you attach to securing peace and stability on the
Korean Peninsula?
Have the recent disclosures of North Korea's uranium
enrichment program made North Korea an even more pressing
concern?
Answer. Maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and
the Asia-Pacific region and achieving the verifiable denuclearization
of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner remain key U.S. foreign
policy priorities.
We have long suspected North Korea of having a uranium enrichment
capability, and we have regularly raised it with the North Koreans and
with our partners. North Korea's claim to have a uranium enrichment
program (UEP) is yet another provocative act and, if true, contradicts
its own pledges and commitments under the 2005 Joint Statement of the
Six-Party Talks and its obligations under U.N. Security Council
Resolutions 1718 and 1874. The construction of uranium enrichment
facilities, as well as any related activity, is unacceptable and
inconsistent with the objective of the verifiable denuclearization of
the Korean Peninsula, which has long been the core goal of the six-
party talks.
North Korea's UEP disclosure underscores the threat that its
nuclear and ballistic missile programs and proliferation activities
pose to global security. We urge the international community to
implement U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874 fully and
transparently. We continue to coordinate with our allies and partners
to determine an appropriate response to the DPRK UEP, including at the
U.N.
Question. The wider area around the South Korean-North Korean
border is among the most militarized, if not the most militarized, in
the world. Last year tensions reached the highest level in decades as a
result of North Korea's provocative behavior.
Is the Obama administration concerned by the potential for
miscalculation or inadvertence producing a wider scale
conflict?
What steps is the Obama administration taking in concert
with our South Korean ally to preserve stability and minimize
the possibility of miscalculation or misunderstanding resulting
in wider scale conflict?
Answer. Following the DPRK's sinking of the Cheonan, its disclosure
of a uranium enrichment program, and its shelling of Yeonpyong Island,
the United States has engaged in intensive diplomatic activities and
policy coordination with the ROK and our other Five-Party partners. Our
actions have ensured clear communication, preserved regional stability,
and resulted in a constructive strategy for the way forward on North
Korea. The United States and the ROK continue to routinely conduct
joint military exercises to enhance interoperability and the readiness
of alliance forces to respond to threats to peace.
______
Responses of Dr. Marcus Noland to Questions Submitted by
Senator John F. Kerry
FOOD AID
The U.N. World Food Programme (WFP), which is responsible for much
of the food aid in North Korea, has reportedly said its current food
supply could sustain operations in the North for only another month.
Next month, the WFP plans to complete its assessment of North Korea's
food situation. But not many doubt that North Korea's 24 million people
need more food, and I note your observation that the situation appears
to be ``deteriorating'' once again and also that early spring
historically has often been a more challenging period in terms of food
security.
Question. It's imperative that international food aid reach hungry
North Korean children and their families--not the military and
supporters of the regime. Is it possible to take effective measures to
limit the diversion of food assistance and, if so, what can be done?
Answer. Diversion is a real and troubling phenomenon. The
fundamental issue
is that the North Korean Government has never ``bought in'' to
internationally accepted norms regarding humanitarian aid. In this
context there are three strategies that we can pursue to inhibit
diversion or limit its negative impact.
First, we need to implement the most rigorous monitoring program
possible. In 2005, the World Food Programme (WFP) touted an agreement
reached ``in principle'' with the North Korean Government that would
mark an enormous improvement in the monitoring regime:
Household food information. Every 4 months the WFP would
undertake baseline household surveys, interview local officials
and others (e.g., farmers, factory officials), hold focus group
discussions, and take observational walks. The first household
survey was conducted in June 2005.
Distribution monitoring. The WFP would shift at the margin
to monitoring distribution centers and food-for-work projects,
interview those receiving food aid there, and increase
monitoring visits to nonhousehold sites (e.g., county
warehouses, factories producing food products with WFP
commodities, institutions receiving food aid).
Ration cards. All WFP beneficiaries would be given a WFP-
designed and printed ration card that would be checked by WFP
at distributions. As of August 2005, the distribution of these
cards was nearly complete.
Commodity tracking. WFP staff would be allowed to physically
follow food aid from the port of entry, to county warehouses,
to three to six Public Distribution Centers (PDCs) per county,
as well as implement a more uniform and consistent system to
track commodities by waybill number, with the ultimate goal of
eventually introducing an electronic system that would allow
tracking of individual bags from port to final point of
delivery. The first visits to PDCs began in June 2005.
This program was never implemented. Increased bilateral assistance
and an improved harvest provided the North Koreans the opportunity to
backtrack.
The issue was rejoined in 2007-08 when the U.S. Government agreed
to provide up to 500,000 metric tons of grain, partially through the
WFP and partially through a consortium of U.S. nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs). The NGOs did not adopt the full technological
package that the WFP had laid out in 2005 but did appear to make
improvements in monitoring over previous practices, by using Korean
speakers in-country for instance, something that had been previously
prohibited. The WFP appears to have forgotten the 2005 agreement;
reverted to earlier, weaker monitoring protocols; and was ultimately
unable to mount a credible program to deliver the slated aid.
The 2005 agreement in principle stands as one benchmark, the
monitoring regime implemented by the NGOs in 2008 another. Any
monitoring program should try to go beyond these.
Even in the best circumstances, however, there is likely to be
diversion. But it is important to keep in mind and exploit the reality
that even if diverted, aid does not just disappear into the ether:
Someone consumes it. In this regard, there are two strategies that we
can pursue to limit the deleterious impact of aid diversion.
First, some forms of aid are more prone to diversion than others.
Among bulk grains, rice is preferred for elite consumption; corn is
less preferred, and barley and millet are the least preferred. If we
are going to provide aid in the form of bulk grains, it would be better
to provide it in forms that are not preferred for elite consumption.
Even if diverted and monetized, the grain will likely be consumed by
poor people.
Likewise, we should target aid delivery into the worst affected
regions, a policy USAID first began in 2005. The logic is of the
second-best: Even if the aid is diverted as it enters the country, it
is likely to pool in that catchment area and be sold in markets in the
worst affected regions; while it would be best for a aid to reach the
narrowly targeted population, like the case of providing aid in less
preferred forms, even if sold it is likely to be sold to a needy
population.
Finally, one should be careful in thinking about delivery of
specialized infant formulas or other therapeutic products; these may be
highly susceptible to diversion and potentially fatal if administered
incorrectly.
Question. What impact do you think food aid has on the Kim
government's control over the economy?
Answer. On the whole, aid almost surely benefits the state. The
issue is how one weighs that implication against the amelioration of
suffering. The impact of aid on political control (and ultimately
economic control) is partly a function of how the aid is delivered and,
as in the case of diversion, there is a hierarchy of approaches in
terms of their susceptibility to misuse. Direct delivery to targeted
populations such as infants or pregnant women is the most preferred;
the nature of the target and delivery method would seem largely to
insulate this approach from politicization.
Bulk aid delivered through the public distribution system (PDS)
reinforces government control: It comes through a state-controlled
channel, the public pays money to the government to receive it, and the
source of the aid can be obscured. (When the end-user receives the aid
at a PDC, it literally comes in bulk form through a chute; the consumer
does not see any bag with a U.S. flag or source information.) In the
past the government has given certain groups, such as workers at state-
owned enterprises, preferential access to the PDS (and hence aid),
indirectly tying access to food to loyalty to state institutions.
However, there are other forms of delivery that are less
susceptible to misuse. One is work-for-food projects in which people
engage in work (typically on infrastructural projects). This approach
is subject to state capture (the state can choose the project and
workers), but the aid is less prone to outright diversion and is
probably less effective in reinforcing state power than delivery of
bulk grains through the PDS.
Question. Can international food assistance help fuel the growth of
private markets in North Korea?
Answer. Ironically, international food aid has fueled the growth of
private markets in North Korea. During the famine period of the 1990s,
the real price of food was extraordinarily high. Control of aid
potentially conveyed astronomical rents--but only if markets existed
where these rents could be monetized and captured. The entry of large
scale aid into North Korea in the mid-1990s created an incentive within
at least parts of the elite--the military, for example--to allow the
development of markets as a platform for personal or group enrichment.
Aid was essentially a lubricant in the creation of markets. Diverted
aid, which we seek to limit for policy reasons, presumably continues to
play this role.
The conterminous existence of markets and aid contributes to a
symbiotic relationship between market participants and PDS managers
(who in some cases appear be one and the same) and the political
structure more generally. Middlemen need to know when aid shipments are
likely to arrive and push down prices, nationally and locally. In such
a situation it is difficult to parse the overlapping interests between
centrally placed officials, local PDS managers, and market
participants. One thing we can say is that aid creates greater price
volatility in the market (since it can represent a large increment of
marginal supply) and works against the interests of cultivators since
it depresses prices for their output.
political implications of economic struggles
You have described how state failure in the North Korean economy
has led to the spread of market activities that may represent
``semiautonomous zone(s) of social communication and, potentially,
political organizing.
Question. Does this development point to the prospect of near term
political instability in your view?
Answer. Given the dearth of civil society institutions in North
Korea capable of channeling mass discontent into constructive political
action, I am skeptical that the apparent increased personal autonomy
associated with the development of markets and new forms of
communication such as cell phones has proceeded to an extent that it
augurs political instability in the near term. This is a long-term
process that I do believe will impose increasing constraints on the
government, admittedly beginning from a point of near complete
unaccountability. In the near term, reforms
are more likely to emerge from intraelite competition following the
death of Kim
Jong-il than from a ground up movement.
Question. Are there ways that you think the United States and the
international community should position itself vis-a-vis the North
Korean people to leverage what you describe as the state failure of the
North Korean economy?
Answer. The rehabilitation of North Korea's failing economy poses
two interrelated challenges. The first is to raise per capita incomes
to address the country's widespread poverty and food insecurity. The
second is to encourage a fundamental reorientation away from the state
and toward effectively functioning market-oriented institutions. The
latter has a political dimension as well: Apart from improving the
functioning of the economy and better addressing the population's
material needs, the development of more market-oriented institutions,
even if not fully independent of state control, would ameliorate the
pervasive control over people's lives.
However, we cannot assume that any and all forms of economic
engagement will have similarly transformative effects. To the extent
that North Koreans have any interactions with foreigners, it is often
with government agencies or NGOs. Given the North Korean milieu, it is
quite natural for North Koreans to think of such engagement as a form
of political bargaining. But an important long-run task of engagement
is a sort of political-economic socialization: to educate North Koreans
about the functioning of market economics and to reorient their
conception of engagement away from politically driven resource
transfers or political tribute and toward mutually beneficial exchange.
The transformative potential of external economic integration will
depend crucially on the nature of the economic ties that develop
between North Korea and its partners and the extent to which such ties
can be appropriated by politically connected groups such as the Kim
family clique, the party, and/or the military.
In such a context, not all forms of public and private engagement
are equally transformative. One can imagine a hierarchy of modalities
of engagement that combine public involvement with private investment
and trade, each with differential effects on the long-run objective of
reform. From the standpoint of encouraging systemic transformation in
North Korea, energy pipelines or even transportation links would have
the least impact. Next in this hierarchy would be projects such as Mt.
Kumgang, which can literally and figuratively be fenced off from the
rest of the North Korean economy and society and as a result have
limited effects on institutional transformation. Industrial parks,
bonded warehouses, and other preferential investment zones in urban
areas would be preferable, and investment by foreign firms throughout
North Korea would be the best of all. Sadly, it is apparent that
Pyongyang understands the implications of these different modalities of
engagement and prefers precisely the ones that generate hard currency
earnings without requiring significant alteration of existing
practices.
Yet even under the most propitious conditions, it is evident that
the government will attempt to steer economic engagement through state-
controlled entities rather than the emerging nonsanctioned market-based
actors our surveys documented. One implication is the necessity of
developing Sullivan-type principles of labor standards, similar to
those implemented by U.S. investors during the apartheid period in
South Africa, to ensure that foreign investors do more than simply
exploit virtual slave-labor conditions. For investors from South Korea,
Japan, the United States, and other Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) members, adherence to the OECD's
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, including those ensuring that
North Korean workers are aware of their rights and how to exercise
them, would be another way of trying to ameliorate the impact that
engagement with state-owned entities in North Korea could have in terms
of reinforcing state control.
VIEWS OF NORTH KOREAN PEOPLE
Given the tight political and social control exerted by the North
Korean Government, we have very little insight into the everyday lives
of North Koreans and the nature of their relationship with their
government. Through the extensive interviews conducted by experts like
you and Barbara Demick, we have begun to acquire some insight into
their situations.
Question. How did most of the over 1,600 North Korean refugees you
interviewed for your recent book seem to view the North Korean
Government while they were living in North Korea?
Answer. In a strict sense this question is impossible to answer
because no one has been able to interview North Koreans while they were
in North Korea; our knowledge is based on self-reported retrospective
statements by refugees about their beliefs while in North Korea, which
are almost impossible to verify and subject to recollection bias. And,
there are differences between people. That said, on the whole, the
attitudes of the survey respondents might be summarized as follows. If
asked while in North Korea, the ``approval rating'' that they would
have generated would have been low. However, their understanding of
life beyond North Korea was incomplete and subject to huge gaps in
knowledge, some filled by myth and rumor. Once outside North Korea--
even in China, which we tend to think of as a less than fully free
information environment--as they began to learn more about the outside
world, North Korea's position in it, and by extension the relative
situation of loved ones left behind, their attitudes harden further, at
least at the margin.
Question. While living in North Korea, did many of the refugees you
interviewed seem to subscribe to the regime's central narrative that
hostile foreign forces are to be blamed for the country's problems?
Answer. Again, it is impossible to fully verify these self-reported
retrospective accounts. Nevertheless, it appears that an implication of
increasing access to nonstate news sources has contributed to growing
skepticism about the regime's central narrative. Over time, the share
of respondents who blamed foreigners for their situation steadily fell,
and the numbers who held their own government responsible formed a
large majority.
Question. Do you see signs that within the next 5 years, civil
society voices might emerge capable of channeling dissent into
effective political action?
Answer. I would be very modest about my ability to divine such
developments. There may be developments occurring beneath the surface
or that outsiders don't fully grasp that could give rise to some kind
of civil society voice that does not currently exist. I am thinking,
for example, of student or professional groups, or even public employee
networks that bring together people from different parts of the
country, create opportunities for ``comparing notes''--both within and
beyond their prescribed mandate, and could possibly serve as a
mechanism for group action across localities. I don't know that such
networks exist, but I would not be surprised if they do, and their
political relevance is unpredictable. Also perhaps not precisely
analogous in terms of their political implications, former United
Kingdom Ambassador John Everard argues that the supply networks that
bring goods from China to Pyongyang constitute an important
informational network, bringing people information about the outside
world and news of developments both inside and outside of North Korea
not provided through official channels.
Question. Based on your conversations with refugees, what policy
initiatives might contribute most toward increasing North Koreans'
knowledge and awareness of developments inside and outside their
country?
Answer. I think that there is a lot of role for exchanges; even if
the groups are hand-picked by the government, and even if there are
minders within these groups, there must be some value to getting larger
numbers of North Koreans out into the world and interacting with
foreigners.
The refugees say that while they were in North Korea they liked
listening to foreign radio broadcasts. One of the most rewarding
experiences I have ever had was after a talk that I had given in Seoul
being introduced to a young North Korean refugee graduate student who
had been in the audience and asked a mutual acquaintance for an
introduction. She told me that when she was in North Korea she used to
listen to my interviews on Radio Free Asia because I made the economic
developments within her country comprehensible--something that the
state was unwilling to do. There are people listening.
______
Responses of L. Gordon Flake to Questions Submitted by
Senator John F. Kerry
NORTH-SOUTH DYNAMICS
Question. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula remain high after the
shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. The North's recent behavior raises the
distinct possibility of further destabilizing conduct in 2011 and has
significantly hardened official views in Seoul.
Is the present situation significantly more dangerous than
what we have seen in recent years?
Answer. Yes; it is. The most important factor in this is the change
in South Korea's willingness to respond to North Korean provocations
with force. Not only has South Korea significantly revised its rules of
engagement for responding to North Korean actions, but President Lee
Myung Bak is now politically in a position where should he fail to
respond to a similar provocation he could very well face severe
political consequences. After the North Korean shelling of Yeongpyeong
Island in November there were already calls from some corners of the
Presidents own party for his impeachment for having failed to protect
the nation. It is unclear that the North Korean leadership understands
this change in South Korea, and as such the situation is dangerous
indeed.
What are the risks that South Korea and our alliance faces
should Seoul fight back against a future North Korean attack?
Answer. The most obvious risk is the one we have lived with for
nearly 60 years, the specter of another full scale war on the Korean
Peninsula. Though by most estimates, North Korean no longer possesses a
serious invasive capacity and absent outside assistant does not have
the ability to sustain a conflict, with its long range artillery, its
missiles, chemical and biological weapons and possibly a nuclear
device, Pyongyang does have the ability to hold Seoul hostage and to
make any conflict, regardless of the ultimate outcome, indescribably
costly. Our South Korean allies know this far better than we do and
feel the implications much more directly. As such I do not think that
we need to be overly worried about South Korea dragging us into a
conflict. In fact, should the United States appear to be holding South
Korea back--as we did in the years immediately after the signing of the
armistice--in the face of such egregious North Korea provocations, such
perceptions could undermine South Korean views of the reliability of
the United States as an ally when most needed. That said, perhaps the
greatest risk that the United States and the Republic of Korea jointly
face is that North Korea would be unable to calibrate its counter-
response to a South Korean response and that communication channels
with and within North Korea would not be sufficient to prevent a full
scale escalation.
CHINA'S ROLE/IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
Question. You have recently written about China's efforts ``to
shield[] North Korea from the consequences of its actions.'' Senior
government officials have used words such as ``enabled'' and
``emboldened'' to discuss the impact of China's tolerance of North
Korea's aggressive conduct. Any effort to wait out North Korea by
increasing pressure, withholding economic benefits, and dangling the
prospect of large-scale aid and diplomatic benefits in return for
fundamentally different behavior would seem to require enhanced Chinese
cooperation.
Is China, over time, willing to make this kind of a shift in
approach?
Answer. While I am hopeful that over time, China will be willing to
recalibrate its approach to North Korea, recent events in the Middle
East have increased China's own sense of vulnerability and thus
reinforced the most conservative elements in the Chinese leadership. As
such, at least for the next year or so it is difficult to imaging China
taking steps which might raise the risk of instability in North Korea.
In the longer term, however, North Korea's actions and trajectory are
so fundamentally antithetical to China's own direction and national
interest that some shift in China's approach to North Korea is
inevitable.
How much do concerns about Northeast Asia realigning in ways
that run counter to China's interests (in response to North
Korean behavior) influence Beijing's thinking?
Answer. I am no longer convinced by the conventional argument that
China needs North Korea as a ``buffer.'' While China would be concerned
about U.S. troops North of the 38th parallel, by almost any measure,
China's interests and positions are far better aligned with a modern
South Korea than with its troublesome and anachronistic ally North
Korea. Furthermore, North Korea's actions have actually served to
bolster the U.S.-ROK alliance, the United States-Japan alliance, and
even nascent security cooperation between South Korea and Japan. It is
hard to imagine a scenario in which fundamental change in North Korea
and the related realignment of Northeast Asia could be worse for
China's interest.
How much have concerns in Beijing about such a realignment
contributed to a tighter Chinese embrace of North Korea over
the past year?
Answer. Although it may be a factor, I think it is misguided.
Moreover, I think the primary factor behind China's tighter embrace of
North Korea has less to do with long-term concerns about regional
realignment and more to do with immediate concerns about the stability
of the Kim regime.
JAPAN'S ROLE
Question. In recent months, our ally Japan has taken noticeable
steps to show solidarity with the United States and South Korea after a
tense year on the Korean Peninsula. For the first time, Tokyo sent
observers to U.S.-ROK military exercises in November and later
announced plans to develop closer security cooperation with South
Korea. In December, a trilateral summit to discuss the situation on the
Peninsula confirmed Japan's strong support for a unified response to
the North. What do these welcomed developments say about the way that
Japan perceives the North Korean challenge?
Answer. The 1998 North Korean long-range missile test which flew
over Japan served to make North Korea a focal point of Japanese public
opinion. Furthermore, the tragic case of Japanese abductees has put a
human face on the issue as felt by ordinary Japanese. In last year, the
sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island have
served to further highlight the immediacy of the North Korean threat.
As such, in terms of United States-Japan alliance coordination and
cooperation, North Korea is the gift that keeps on giving. One other
element that should be understood is that for Japan, North Korea is
also increasingly tied up in the broader question of China's rise and
role in the region. The naval class near the Senkaku/ Diaoyu islands
last year brought security concerns about China to the fore in an
unprecedented manner. As such, as matters develop it is likely that
Japan will increasingly view the North Korea issue in the context of
Chinese support for North Korea.
______
Responses of Robert Carlin to Questions Submitted by
Senator John F. Kerry
NORTH KOREAN POLITICS: REGIME STABILITY AND LEADERSHIP SUCCESSION
You are one of this country's most experienced North Korea
watchers. Even prior to Kim Jong-il succeeding his father Kim Il-Sung
in 1994, analysts have been predicting the collapse of the North Korean
Government. We are still waiting and rightly planning for potential
changes to come.
Question. In your written testimony, you say, however that ``[i]t
does not make sense to base a policy on the assumption that a collapse
will happen soon--that is, in the next 2-3 years.'' Why, and what are
the dangers of laboring under such an assumption?
Answer. Many like to think we can assess the health and expected
longevity of political systems with an approach similar to what doctors
use for living beings. Political science delights in charts and graphs
to plot ``regime health'' and predict collapse. In truth, the track
record is much better in identifying the warning signs after the event
than in advance.
Over the past 30 years, we've been through numerous episodes when
analysts predicted the end was nigh for the DPRK. North Korea is still
with us.
There have been several times when some in Washington convinced
themselves that the North was near or on the road to collapse. These
officials have moved on; Pyongyang is still a going concern.
The problem with basing a policy on the assumption that North
Korean collapse is around the corner is that it leads us down any one
of several dead-end roads, convincing us to: sit patiently on our
haunches and do nothing; adopt a shortsighted approach designed to
chase after the will-o'-wisp of collapse; or make unrealistic
commitments that one hopes will never have to be met because the North
will disappear before the bill comes due. The result in each case is
that the situation grows worse, the problem more complicated. The only
constant is the refrain from Washington, ``What do we do now?'' Once
it's too late, what we can't do is to go back and take those steps that
might have protected U.S. national interests at an earlier point but
have now been overtaken by events.
Question. You also warn that if and when social and political
unrest occurs in the North, it could ``quickly descend into violence
that could make Libya look like a tea party.'' Why, and what are the
implications of this statement for U.S. policy?
Answer. The North has a large army and numerous security forces,
huge quantities of weapons with a population trained to use them, and
enough loyalists to ensure that any sort of internal fighting will be
intense. In such a situation, the United States will find itself in a
dangerous position. Unlike in Libya, where external forces have been
able to act with relative impunity under the mantle of a U.N.
resolution, in the case of North Korea both China and Russia will
almost certainly block a similar sort of mandate. A ``no fly zone''
over the DPRK--especially given the fact that several major North
Korean cities are either on the border or less than 20 miles from
China--is out of the question for Beijing. The result will very likely
be a lengthy, destructive, and destabilizing internal conflict right on
the doorstep of our treaty allies: the ROK and Japan. In those
circumstances, to the extent Seoul feels it can or must influence the
outcome, that will only add fuel to the fire and put enormous strains
on U.S.-ROK relations.
Question. There appears to be increasingly little question that Kim
Jong-il's youngest son Kim Jong-un is being groomed to succeed his
father. What are your observations with regard to how the succession
process is proceeding in North Korea? What are the implications for
regional peace and security?
Answer. From the point that Kim Jong-un was formally revealed in
public (certainly to the external audience) in September 2010, the
succession process has appeared to move quickly and smoothly. Since we
don't know for sure when the process actually began for the internal
audience, however, we can't very well say whether it is ahead of
schedule or moving at a forced pace.
Perhaps the better questions to ask are whether the younger Kim yet
has a cadre of his own loyalists in place, how much experience he has
had or still needs in key positions in the party's Central Committee,
and whether he has the intestinal fortitude to rule. Obviously, a
botched succession raises the dangers of the sort of situation
discussed above. Some observers believe that the succession process
itself brings with it a period of uncertainty and a likelihood of
increased tensions (not to mention military clashes) as the successor
seeks to win his spurs and those around him act to prove their loyalty.
This is the stuff of TV drama, but I don't know of any evidence that it
is actually the case in North Korea. Rather than look on the succession
only as a period of heightened danger, it makes as much sense for the
U.S. to view it as a time of opportunity, a period when it becomes
possible to search for new openings and, with equal measures of luck
and perseverance, to create new realities less dangerous, more
manageable, and hopefully more amenable to our own national security
interests.
NORTH KOREA: MOTIVATIONS AND THREAT PERCEPTIONS
Question. Within the past year, North Korea has sunk the ROK
frigate Cheonan, shelled Yeonpyeong Island, announced a clandestine
uranium enrichment facility to the world, and, according to recent
reports, readied a second missile launch facility that might be capable
of launching long-range missiles. Despite these developments, you wrote
in your testimony that ``North Korea is largely in deterrent-defensive
mode--militarily, diplomatically, and in every other way.'' How does
this square with widely held perceptions of the North's recent
behavior, and who and what does Pyongyang feel the need to deter/defend
against?
Answer. The North Koreans have a siege mentality, as well they
might. They see themselves as inhabiting a small, weak country put upon
and threatened on all sides, with not a single, solitary reliable ally.
Small countries that survive over time usually do so by adopting one of
two basic postures toward their larger neighbors--bended knee or
hedgehog. The North has chosen the latter. Its prickliness is not just
with the United States, but also with the PRC and, when it existed, the
USSR. The Wilson Center's ``Cold War History'' series of documents
illustrate for anyone interested just how exasperating the North has
long been to friend and foe alike.
It is worth bearing in mind that the North is not an expansionist
power and has no territorial ambitions outside the Korean Peninsula.
How serious it even continues to pursue reunification is an open
question. I think the evidence suggests it hasn't had much stomach for
a military solution to that question for at least 30 years. Instead,
the two Koreas have settled into a long, sometimes violent, political
struggle. By virtue of its political vitality and economic success,
South Korea is much more of a threat to the North's existence than the
other way around. The result is that the North--by far the weaker
party--feels it imperative to push back, keep the South off balance,
and continuously assert its right to survive. Sometime this takes the
form of diplomatic initiatives, sometimes of limited military moves. In
Pyongyang's view, nothing could be worse than a peace and quiet in
which the world could forget that North Korea exists. The greatest
danger for the past 20 years has not been a large-scale North Korean
military move against the South but a small military incident spiraling
into something bigger and more dangerous. The North's shelling of
Yeonpyeong Island, as bad as it was, seemed to bring us very close to
the threshold of something much worse. Indeed, the situation in the
West Sea--with conflicting North-South Korean claims and escalating
military reinforcements by both sides--is more and more a powder keg.
CHINA'S ROLE
Question. In your written testimony, you warn against ``sitting and
waiting while another country shape[s] the future of Northeast Asia.''
Can you elaborate on this statement and its implications for peace and
stability on the Korean Peninsula?
Answer. North Korea is not the jewel in the crown, but how the
Korean issue is eventually resolved will help set the stage for
developments in Northeast Asia for decades to come. There was a time
not so long ago when the United States had an active, not simply
reactive, policy toward North Korea. Washington's leadership on the
issue made it easier for both Japan and South Korea (to the extent they
chose to do so) to engage Pyongyang. There was impressive, ongoing
coordination between Tokyo, Seoul, and Washington on a positive program
to deal with the North. And, wonder of wonders, Pyongyang was a willing
participant because it saw establishing a positive relationship with
the United States as a way to retain maximum independence from its big
neighbor across the Yalu River.
The situation today is completely different, and dangerously so.
Under any circumstances we know that China will insist on--and must
have--a voice in eventual resolution of the Korean question. But these
days the Chinese role has been magnified as the United States has
removed itself from any serious dealings with the DPRK. With nothing
standing in its way, China seems to be moving to insure that the weight
and breadth of its presence in North Korea--and by extension its
influence on the entire peninsula--will only grow larger and more
permanent in the future.
That doesn't augur well for peace and stability either in Korea or
the region. I do not mean this as a criticism of China, nor should it
be taken to imply that we must be suspicious of Chinese motives. It is
a simple fact, however, that the United States still has treaty
commitments as well as important economic and political interests that
demand our full-time involvement in Korea--the whole of Korea. Absent
our serious, sustained, and effective involvement on the peninsula, the
impression will grow that ours is no longer the vital presence in the
area. Military exercises and displays of armed might only go so far. By
themselves, they cannot overcome the dangerous notion--and let's not
fool ourselves, such a notion is afoot--that the United States is a
waning power, at least in Northeast Asia, and that China's star is
rising. The expanding Chinese presence in North Korea, we should
reckon, may come to symbolize the new day, demonstrating China's
growing ability to shape the future on a crucial regional issue in a
way, some will argue, that the United States no longer seeks to do.
______
Responses of Special Representative Stephen Bosworth and Assistant
Secretary Kurt Campbell to Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Lee
Question. In light of the past year, which has been a tense one for
North Korean relations with South Korea and the United States, (North
Korea torpedoed and sank the South Korean Cheonan, directly attacked
South Korea and announced new nuclear facilities) do you stand by the
Obama administration's policy of ``strategic patience''?
Answer. The Obama administration has made clear from the start that
there is a path open to North Korea to achieve the security and
international respect it seeks and that we are open to serious dialogue
with North Korea on denuclearization. However, this process depends on
the decisions and actions of North Korea. We are looking for evidence
that North Korea now not only regards the possibility of negotiations
seriously but also that such negotiations could be constructive. We
want negotiations to achieve the core goal of the 2005 joint statement:
the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful
manner. We are not interested in negotiations for the sake of talking.
We do not believe it will be fruitful or productive to resume six-
party talks until North Korea demonstrates it is committed to dialogue
and serious about honoring its denuclearization commitments. We believe
the DPRK must improve North-South relations and demonstrate a change in
behavior, including ceasing provocative actions, taking steps toward
irreversible denuclearization, and complying with its commitments under
the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and its obligations
under U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874.
Question. What evidence, if any, have you seen indicating that the
third prong of ``strategic patience'' (a gradual altering of China's
relationship with North Korea) has come to pass?
Answer. China is a vital partner in the six-party talks with a key
role due to its influence with North Korea. Given its unique
relationship with North Korea, we have called on China to urge the DPRK
to refrain from provocative actions, to abide by its commitments and
obligations, and to act responsibly in the interests of peace and
stability of the Northeast Asian region. In the United States-China
Joint Statement from President Hu Jintao's January 19-20 state visit,
both countries ``expressed concern regarding the DPRK's claimed uranium
enrichment program,'' ``opposed all activities inconsistent with the
2005 Joint Statement and relevant international obligations and
commitments,'' and ``called for the necessary steps that would allow
for the early resumption of the six-party talks process to address this
and other relevant issues.''
Question. How closely does the State Department work with the U.S.
Department of Defense in North Korean relations? I understand that the
United States has about 30,000 troops stationed in South Korea. What is
the plan to increase U.S. military presence if/when necessary?
Answer. The Department of State and Department of Defense work
together closely to maintain and strengthen our robust military
alliance with the ROK in our mission of defending the ROK and deterring
North Korean aggression. Our military is prepared to deal with many
different scenarios and can bring many capabilities to bear.
Question. What evidence, if any, have you seen to suggest that Kim
Jong-un could emerge as a reformer in North Korea, and one who might be
open to political and social reform?
Answer. North Korea is one of the world's most closed societies, so
it is difficult to predict the future of the North Korean regime. We
are carefully watching the situation in Pyongyang, especially as Kim
Jong-un, Kim Jong-il's third son and heir apparent, advances within the
regime's hierarchy.
Question. The relatively peaceful revolt (and hopefully subsequent
democratization) in Egypt began with and spread partly because of
prodemocracy messages sent via the Internet and social media outlets.
What access do the average North Korean people have to outside media?
Answer. The DPRK government tightly controls the media and its
citizens' access to information. The State Department's ``2009 Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices'' notes that there is no independent
media in North Korea and Internet access in North Korea is limited to
high-ranking officials and other designated elites. However, the U.S.
Government is working to increase the flow of independent information
into, out of, and within the country. The Broadcasting Board of
Governors supports a robust North Korea program, implemented by the
Voice of America and Radio Free Asia. In addition, the Department of
State supports nongovernmental organizations in their efforts to
increase access to information in North Korea, including support to
independent broadcasters based in South Korea.
Question. How active has Russia been in diplomatic discussions
regarding North Korea or in military support and training for South
Korea?
Answer. We value our continuing cooperation with Russia, a key
partner in the six-party talks, to achieve our shared goal of
denuclearization in North Korea. In the wake of the DPRK's provocations
over the last year, we welcome the constructive role that Russia has
played to press Pyongyang to refrain from further destabilizing
actions, to abide by its international commitments and obligations, and
to take irreversible steps toward denuclearization. Russia has publicly
stated that it backs U.N. Security Council discussion of the North
Korean uranium enrichment program.
Question. In 1994, the United States and North Korea signed the
Agreed Framework. Under this agreement, North Korea committed to
freezing its illicit plutonium weapons program in exchange for aid.
What benefits did the United States receive from the Agreed
Framework?
What is the current state of North Korea's plutonium weapons
program?
In short, what has the United States received from the
hundreds of millions of dollars in aid we've given to North
Korea?
Answer. As a result of the Agreed Framework of October 1994, North
Korea halted construction of two large reactors and froze its existing
plutonium production facilities at Yongbyon, including its reprocessing
facilities, putting them under continuous monitoring by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). That continuously monitored
freeze lasted for over 8 years until late 2002 and helped prevent what
could have resulted in a much larger plutonium stockpile than North
Korea is currently assessed to possess. Building on the results of the
Agreed Framework process in 1999, the United States and North Korea
also negotiated a moratorium on North Korean ballistic missile
launches, which stayed in effect until 2006.
North Korea announced on April 14, 2009, its withdrawal from the
six-party talks, the expulsion of IAEA monitors and U.S. disablement
experts, and its intention to reverse disablement actions taken at the
Yongbyon nuclear complex. Since then, according to official statements
issued by the DPRK, many of the disablement tasks completed between
November 2007 and April 2009 have been reversed. For example, in
November 2009, the DPRK announced that it had completed reprocessing
8,000 spent nuclear fuel roads at Yongbyon in August 2009. However,
these claims have not independently been verified.
For over 8 years under the Agreed Framework, North Korea was
prevented from making weapons grade plutonium. With the Agreed
Framework's collapse, North Korea restarted the reactor and separated
plutonium three times--enough for several weapons, as well as the
devices it announced it had tested in 2006 and 2009. The prolonged
disruption to the production of plutonium for North Korea's nuclear
weapons program was a key tangible benefit of the Agreed Framework. In
addition, the 1999 to 2006 moratorium on North Korean ballistic missile
launches was a significant brake on its missile program.