[Senate Hearing 115-830]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-830
REVIEW OF THE FISCAL YEAR 2019 STATE
DEPARTMENT BUDGET REQUEST
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 24, 2018
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web:
http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
40-669 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BOB CORKER, Tennessee, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
MARCO RUBIO, Florida BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
CORY GARDNER, Colorado TOM UDALL, New Mexico
TODD YOUNG, Indiana CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
RAND PAUL, Kentucky CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
Todd Womack, Staff Director
Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator From Tennessee.................... 1
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey.............. 3
Pompeo, Hon. Mike, Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State.. 1
Prepared Statement........................................... 6
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions
Submitted by Senator Bob Corker................................ 73
Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez........................... 74
Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions
Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio............................... 102
Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions
Submitted by Senator Ben Cardin................................ 108
Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions
Submitted by Senator Todd Young................................ 115
Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions
Submitted by Senator Tom Udall................................. 116
Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions
Submitted by Senator John Barrasso............................. 120
Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions
Submitted by Senator Cory Booker............................... 122
Statement From Refugees International............................ 128
Statement From Catholic Relief Services OPED in the HILL
Newspaper...................................................... 129
Letter Submitted by Senator Young to the Appropriations Committee
Reiterating Bipartisan Support for the Fiscal Year 2019
International Affairs Budget................................... 130
(iii)
REVIEW OF THE FISCAL YEAR 2019 STATE
DEPARTMENT BUDGET REQUEST
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THURSDAY, MAY 24, 2018
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker,
chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Corker [presiding], Johnson, Gardner,
Young, Barrasso, Isakson, Portman, Paul, Menendez, Cardin,
Shaheen, Coons, Udall, Murphy, Kaine, Markey, Merkley, and
Booker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
The Chairman. Foreign Relations Committee will come to
order. I thank everybody for being here.
Because of developments that have occurred, we are going to
go a little out of order, if it is okay, and let Secretary
Pompeo read a letter. I want to thank him for his service. I
really, truly believe he has the opportunity to be a historic
Secretary of State. And I thank him for all the things he has
been doing since he was sworn in, immediately going to the NATO
Summit.
But, with that, Mr. Secretary, out of respect for what has
just occurred, if you would like to read the letter, I would
appreciate it.
STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE POMPEO, SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Secretary Pompeo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Senator Menendez, for allowing me to do this. The President
asked that I begin this hearing today by reading a letter that
the State Department recently transmitted to Chairman Kim and
North Korea.
The letter is to Chairman Kim Jong Un, Chairman of the
State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea, and it reads as follows:
``Dear Mr. Chairman, We greatly appreciate your time,
patience, and effort with respect to our recent
negotiations and discussions relative to a summit long
sought by both parties which was scheduled to take
place on June 12th in Singapore. We are informed that
the meeting was requested by North Korea, but that to
us is totally irrelevant. I was very much looking
forward to being there with you. Sadly, based on the
tremendous anger and open hostility displayed in your
most recent statement, I feel it is appropriate at this
time to have this long-planned meeting''--or
``inappropriate,'' excuse me--``I feel it is
inappropriate at this time to have this long-planned
meeting. Therefore, please let this letter serve to
represent that the Singapore Summit, for the good of
both parties but to the detriment of the world, will
not take place. You talk about your nuclear
capabilities, but ours are so massive and powerful that
I pray to God they will never have to be used. I felt
that a wonderful dialogue was building up between you
and me, and ultimately it is only that dialogue that
matters. Someday, I look very much forward to meeting
you. In the meantime, I want to thank you for the
release of the hostages, who are now home with their
families. That was a beautiful gesture and was very
much appreciated. If you change your mind having to do
with this important summit, please do not hesitate to
call me or write. The world, and North Korea in
particular, has lost a great opportunity for lasting
peace and great prosperity and wealth. This missed
opportunity is a truly sad moment in history. Sincerely
yours, Donald J. Trump, President of the United States
of America.''
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir
We want to thank you for joining us today. And, you were
here just 6 weeks ago for your confirmation hearing. Now you
are back in just a month, again, and I want to commend you on
an energetic and forceful start to your tenure.
We hold a budget hearing each year, and that is the formal
subject of today's meeting. But, as you and I have discussed,
budgets coming from an administration, these days and for many
years, are not really focused on that much. As you know, there
is a process we go through here to really determine what
expenditures are going to be made. So, since it really does not
have a great effect on the outcomes here, it would be my guess
that there really will not be many questions around the budget.
And I think you know that, even though you are going to present
it, fulfilling your responsibilities.
While discussing the budget is not a productive use of our
time today, in all likelihood, I am hopeful that your remarks
will outline your management plan for the State Department and
steps that you have taken thus far on that front. I also want
to discuss with you our efforts to update authorities we use to
fight terror abroad. And, just for members on both sides of the
aisle, today we have agreed to two rounds of questions, if
necessary. And we realize that there have been questions around
the AUMF. And so, I know many questions may focus on the AUMF
we have been discussing in recent times.
Our bipartisan legislation would replace 2001 and 2002
AUMFs with an updated AUMF against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and
the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. It provides the
administration the flexibility necessary to win this fight
while strengthening the rightful and necessary role of
Congress. And I believe it is the best chance we have to
finally address this issue in a constructive way for the first
time in almost 17 years.
Since last June, our committee has held four public
hearings, a classified briefing, and a number of meetings on
authorizing the use of military force. We have heard testimony
from legal scholars, policy experts, and Secretaries of State
and Defense twice. During your confirmation hearing, you
testified that you believe that we should update the AUMF and
that you would welcome continuing to work with us towards that
end. I know you have had experience working on this topic when
you served in the House, and I appreciate your support for
Congress's appropriate role with respect to this important
issue.
I also hope while you are here that you can speak to our
strategy to get a new and better Iran deal now that we have
withdrawn from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. As you
know, along with a majority of the colleagues on this
committee, we staunchly opposed the JCPOA because it allowed
Iran to maintain an enrichment capacity, and the limits on that
enrichment capacity expired after only 10 or 15 years. While I
am disappointed, no doubt, that the Europeans were unable to
reach an arrangement with the administration to address the
serious flaws in the JCPOA, I am hopeful that moving forward a
new agreement that addresses Iran's nefarious nuclear and non-
nuclear activities can be reached. With Iran's proxies
performing well in the recent Iraqi and Lebanese elections;
Iran's rising threat to our partner, Israel; and the war in
Syria; transatlantic alignment and countering Iran
comprehensively have never been more important. I know you
share that belief and have spoken to that recently. So, I am
eager to hear your thoughts on what can be done to build on the
negotiations with the Europeans that preceded the decision to
withdraw from the JCPOA.
We thank you again for appearing before us. I thank you
very much for accessibility and transparency, and look forward
to your testimony.
Thank you very much.
And I will turn to our distinguished Ranking Member, my
friend, Senator Bob Menendez.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for coming to the committee again
and agreeing to two rounds of questions so we can discuss the
budget, the administration's views on the new proposed AUMF,
and other pressing issues.
As you know, I strongly believe that frequent, open, and
frank exchanges are critical for this body to conduct effective
oversight and for informing the American people. And, to that
end, I appreciate our call of last week.
Let me depart, for a moment, because, since we started this
hearing with current events, let me just remark on them
briefly.
The art of diplomacy is a lot harder than the art of the
deal. The reality is, is that it is pretty amazing that the
administration might be shocked that North Korea is acting as
North Korea might very well normally act. And, while we applaud
robust diplomatic efforts to try to denuclearize the Korean
Peninsula, many of us were deeply concerned that the lack of
deep preparation that is necessary before such a summit is even
agreed to was not taking place. And now we see the consequences
of that. And I am not sure that constantly quoting the Libya
model is the diplomatic way to try to get to the results that
we seek in North Korea, because that did not work out too well
for Gaddafi. So, I look forward to having an opportunity--I am
sure other members will, as well--to discuss that further.
I was pleased to hear, Mr. Secretary, that a recent town
hall at the State Department, you said that we are--quote, ``We
are fortunate that our President values and understands the
power of diplomacy and knows that we must use every tool in the
diplomatic toolkit.'' So, surely, Mr. Secretary--I am sure you
cannot be here to actually defend this budget, which runs
completely counter to that very assertion, runs counter to the
very goals and ideals that you championed in your confirmation
hearing and those that the administration defined in its own
National Security Strategy: robust diplomatic engagement,
maintaining our position of global leadership, and the
President's ambiguously defined political goal of putting
America first.
The budget that President Trump presented for promoting the
foreign policy interests of the United States is, instead,
stunningly irresponsible. In my view, it undermines our
abilities to promote American foreign policy, it betrays our
values, and it makes our citizens in the world less safe. Far
from America first, it will leave America isolated and behind.
I am sure I do not need to tell you that you have inherited
a Department with a prevailing sense of plummeting morale, a
corps of senior career diplomats whose expertise cannot be
replaced overnight, one career Ambassador left. So, I
completely support your efforts and will be a willing partner
to fully staff the Department with qualified, appropriate
nominees. However, as we discussed, Mr. Secretary, some of the
nominees who have been put forward are, themselves, the cause
of delays. We have a responsible, transparent vetting process.
Some of these nominees have failed to disclose not just
campaign donations or organizational affiliations, but some
have failed to disclose significant lawsuits of which they have
been the subject. It is extremely important that every nominee
be completely honest and straightforward with the committee.
And with a significant number so far, this simply has not been
the case.
So, I commend the initial steps you have taken to lift the
hiring freeze and open positions to eligible family members,
but I understand that some bureaus are still not hiring. And,
without a successfully operational agency, I do not know that
we can possibly successfully promote our national security
interests on behalf of all Americans.
But, we also cannot hope to secure our interests when our
senior administration officials contradict one another in
public, act impulsively, and offer more support to our
adversaries than our allies. Senior members of the intelligence
community, which were--which included you, until recently--
continue to point to incontrovertible proof of Russia's
interference in our 2016 elections. Yet, the President refuses
to even acknowledge their attack on our democracy, and the
budget request includes a 63-percent decrease in funding to
counter Russian aggression. The administration's National
Security Strategy talks about the challenge of a revisionist
China, yet the President charges the United States Department
of Commerce with saving Chinese jobs while the budget request
decreases funding for promoting American interests and
alliances in East Asia and the Pacific by nearly 50 percent. In
the Middle East, even as Iran's proxy fighters inch ever close
to the Israeli border from Syria and Lebanon, the budget
proposes massive cuts for critical assistance throughout the
region. And in the western hemisphere, while the President says
combating drug trafficking and confronting the opioid epidemic
are priorities, we have a derogatory, hateful, and racist set
of tweets and confounding reports that your predecessor ignored
warnings that rescinding TPS designations would leave the
United States and our citizens more at risk, while the budget
proposes cutting critical funding to Mexico and to
counternarcotic and law enforcement operations.
Let me just say, the administration takes alarming steps to
erase the importance of core American values, not only in terms
of what they are asking for in this budget, or not asking for,
but literally erasing the words, ``these values: democracy,
governance, labor, and human right.'' And so, Mr. Secretary, as
we discussed, these are not merely ideals, they are critical
enablers for our foreign policy success.
Let me just close. I do hope to hear from you on the AUMF.
I understand that the administration believes it has all the
authorities it needs. But, since the Chairman and other
distinguished members of the committee are moving forward on an
AUMF and there is a proposed AUMF, the Corker-Kaine AUMF, I
would like to hear the administration's views on that AUMF as
part of your presentation.
We look forward to your remarks, and thank you again for
joining us.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, again, thank you so much for
being back before us within a matter of 6 weeks. And we look
forward to your comments and, as you know, questions
thereafter.
Secretary Pompeo. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you, Senator Menendez, as well.
You were gracious enough to allow me to read that
statement. I will--I have prepared remarks. They have been
submitted for the record. I will save a couple of minutes here
this morning. A couple of other items that I want to mention
off the top, things that have happened recently that I think
are important to our diplomatic efforts around the world that I
want to share with you and explain to you. And then I want to
spend a couple of minutes--you asked, Senator Corker, about
what I have tried to do in my first, now, 3 weeks or 3 and a
half weeks, to get the team back on the field. And I am happy
to share both what we have done and what I have in the queue
and how I am thinking about that, that problem set, now that I
have had a chance to get onboard and see a little bit more of
the challenge that is in front of me.
First, you would have seen, in the last 48 hours, that we
had two officers declared persona non grata in Venezuela. We
have responded reciprocally by expelling two senior Venezuelan
officials from the United States. We are deeply worried about
what is taking place as a result of the sham election that
occurred on Sunday the 20th. We are doing all the right things.
We have an American there that we desperately want to get back:
Joshua Holt. And so, know that we are engaged. We are--we were
disappointed that the Maduro regime kicked our folks out,
although, frankly, not surprised. We have been trying to do the
good work that diplomacy brings to a country like--that is
occupied by the great people of Venezuela. And Maduro found
that unacceptable.
Second, also in the last 48 hours, there--we notified our
workforce in China about a medical incident that took place
there in Guangzhou. We had an officer who suffered a medical
incident that is consistent with what we had happen to American
officers that were serving in Havana. We informed the Chinese
government about that. They took--they said all the right
things and are--have demonstrated their willingness to help us
identify the vector which led to this medical incident. We have
medical teams heading there. We have all the appropriate folks
heading to help all of the officers--American officers serving
there in China, and doing the things we can to mitigate the
risk that we have another incident like this there or, frankly,
for that matter, anyplace else in the world.
And then, thirdly, my first 3 and a half weeks, we have
taken steps to allow our team to go effectively conduct their
jobs. Two actual announcements. We allowed the team to hire
family members, a very ready source of very capable officers to
serve alongside our--my current colleagues. We think that will
help our families a great deal.
And then the hiring freeze, itself, was lifted. Senator
Menendez said some of the bureaus are not hiring. We still have
a little bit of guidance that needs to be issued, but most of
that is now out. We have end-strength goals, we have a plan for
how we will do that in a thoughtful way so that resources are
expended appropriately. But, know that it is now the case that,
where there are demand signals, we need additional talent. The
State Department employees are empowered to bring those
additional team members on board.
The third piece is, I have spent a fair amount of my time,
personally, and have big teams working to get America's senior
officials on board. There are still big gaps at the Assistant
Secretary level, at the Under Secretary level. We are--where
there were nominees, we are pushing to make sure they move
quickly. And where there were not, we are working to develop
nominees to come across so that we can, in fact, engage all
over the world, sharing American ideals and values in the way
that the State Department has done historically well. And I
look forward to being the leader of the organization that is
back on the playing field leading America's diplomacy abroad.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Pompeo follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mike Pompeo
Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Menendez, and distinguished members
of the Committee: I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the
Administration's FY 2019 budget request for the State Department and
USAID.
Last December the Trump administration released the National
Security Strategy. The four pillars of the strategy are protecting the
American people, the homeland, and our way of life; promoting American
prosperity; preserving peace through strength; and advancing American
influence.
In order to achieve these national security objectives, the
Administration has submitted our FY 2019 budget request of $39.3
billion for the State Department and USAID. The proposed request
reflects our obligation to use taxpayer dollars wisely and effectively.
Our request also makes clear the United States must exert a
proportional financial commitment in the pursuit of goals shared by the
international community. It is time for other nations--especially those
with high GDP--to assume greater responsibilities and devote greater
resources toward common objectives, whether it's crushing terrorists,
stopping Iran's malign behavior, strengthening the NATO alliance,
eradicating infectious diseases, and so much more. We expect greater
burden sharing for our allies and partners.
The President is committed to diplomacy as the primary means of
achieving the United States' foreign policy objectives, which are
further detailed in our State/USAID Joint Strategic Plan. We will use
every dollar to deliver on our duty to serve the American people and
the enduring foreign policy victories that are within sight.
Our top national security priority has been the de-nuclearization
of North Korea. The maximum pressure campaign of diplomatic and
economic sanctions is bearing fruit with the historic meeting set to
take place on June 12th. This campaign has been undertaken in concert
with an unprecedented number of allies and partners. Our posture will
not change until we see credible steps taken toward the complete,
verifiable, and irreversible de-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula.
We are clear-eyed about the regime's history. It's time to solve this
once and for all. A bad deal is not an option. The American people are
counting on us to get this right. If the right deal is not on the
table, we will respectfully walk away.
On May 21st I unveiled a new direction for the President's Iran
strategy. We will apply financial pressure, coordinate with our DoD
colleagues on deterrence efforts, support the Iranian people, and hold
out the prospect of a new deal for Iran--if it changes its behavior. We
seek to work with as many partners, friends, and allies as possible to
achieve the common objective of stopping all of Iran's nuclear and non-
nuclear threats.
The progress against ISIS has been predominantly accomplished
through military action. But there is a very important role for
diplomacy and assistance in ensuring the permanent defeat of ISIS. We
must continue robust stabilization activities with our Coalition
partners in order to prevent ISIS from resurfacing. We are also
countering ISIS's attempts to gain safe havens in areas such as
Afghanistan, the Philippines, and Africa. In addition to providing
targeted security sector assistance funding, we are working with our
allies and partners to stop foreign fighter travel, cut off sources of
revenue, attack ISIS online, share intelligence, and prosecute those
who come off the battlefield.
We know Russia poses a challenge to our strategic interests and the
security of our allies. This is evident from the chemical weapons
attack in the UK, for which we imposed consequences in concert with
several partners and allies. We've been clear with Russia it must honor
its commitments under the Minsk Accords if peace is to prevail in
Ukraine. As a guarantor of the Assad regime, Russia has a
responsibility to be a constructive actor for stability and peace in
Syria, which includes stopping the regime's use of chemical weapons. We
are holding Russia accountable to its commitment to the Geneva process.
China is a rising strategic competitor. We must work constructively
with a nation of China's importance, as we are doing on North Korea,
but we cannot sacrifice the interests of the American people and our
economic competitiveness, relinquish freedom navigation and the law of
the sea in the South China Sea and elsewhere, or passively watch as
American intellectual property is stolen. We are making clear to China
that the protection of human rights is integral to any country that
wishes to be regarded as a great nation. Elsewhere in Asia, we are re-
affirming and expanding partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region with
nations that share our commitment to security, economic freedom,
sovereignty, and liberty.
Finally, in our own hemisphere, we are embracing the ``Year of the
Americas,'' by re-affirming our commitment to longstanding partnerships
grounded in shared interests and values. On Venezuela, we have imposed
new economic pressure on the Maduro regime to help steer that country
back toward democracy, and we are rallying like-minded regional
partners to do the same.
Across the world, we have encouraged nations to assume greater
responsibilities for maintaining their own and our shared security and
stability. In the face of a resurgent Russia, and in response to our
urging, many NATO members are newly meeting their commitments to
funding deterrence and defense initiatives. President Trump's call to
leaders of Middle East countries in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, rallied
leaders of those nations to more aggressively combat terrorism inside
their own borders and to counter violent extremism abroad. And as part
of the new South Asia strategy, we have been clear with Pakistan that
ensuring reconciliation, peace, and security in Afghanistan in large
part depends on Pakistan's willingness to crack down on terrorist safe
havens and instigators of terrorist activity in its own country.
Our highest priority is keeping the American people safe. The FY
2019 budget request for $7.3 billion in security assistance will help
protect Americans at home and overseas. The State Department will
continue to lead international efforts to denuclearize North Korea, and
to prevent Iran and other actors from unlawfully acquiring weapons of
mass destruction and their means of delivery, while strengthening the
capacity of partner nations to do so as well.
This budget request calls for $5.7 billion in support for Coalition
efforts to defeat ISIS and other transnational terrorist and criminal
groups that threaten the American homeland. The State Department and
USAID will sustain programs that address the conditions that give rise
to these threats, including poor governance, weak institutions, lack of
economic opportunity, corruption, and persistent human rights abuses,
and attract additional donor nations' support for these efforts.
America's prosperity and national security depends on a strong and
growing U.S. economy that can maximize trade and investment
opportunities in a free, fair, open and stable international market.
This budget request seeks $2.2 billion to help stimulate American
economic growth, expand markets for U.S. investment, and ensure partner
countries can fully participate in a global economy.
This budget request includes an important proposal for a new
standalone development finance institution (DFI) broadly consistent
with S. 2463, the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to
Development Act of 2018 (BUILD Act of 2018), being considered by this
Committee. Like the BUILD Act, the Administration proposal consolidates
existing functions now spread across various agencies to improve
efficiencies and better mobilize private sector resources. If approved
by Congress, the DFI will advance U.S. national security and
development objectives by deploying reformed and modernized development
finance tools that support, without displacing, the private sector. The
Administration shares the goals of this Committee to foster sustainable
development in developing countries and provide strong alternatives to
state-directed initiatives. With the consolidation we have both the
opportunity for greater impact but also the responsibility to create
strong interagency coordination with USAID and other development
agencies to advance development outcomes, promote self-reliance among
partner countries, and advance U.S. interests and values. To this end,
the budget requests $56 million for State and USAID to collaborate and
coordinate programming with the DFI and leverage its tools.
Americans benefit from sustained engagement with the rest of the
world that serves our interests and those of our allies. This budget
upholds our commitments to our allies, including $3.3 billion in
support of the recent, 10-year Memorandum of Understanding between the
United States and Israel regarding U.S. military assistance, a 6.5%
increase from last year's request. In recognition of our critical
strategic partnership and new 5-year Memorandum of Understanding with
Jordan, the budget also strengthens our high level of support by
requesting $1.275 billion for Jordan in FY 2019.
In light of continuing significant humanitarian needs, largely
driven by ongoing conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere, the FY 2019
request includes $6.4 billion for humanitarian assistance, an increase
of $1.1 billion, or 21 percent, from the FY 2018 request. We will use
these resources strategically as part of a new approach to relief to
increase burden sharing by other donors, improve U.S. government
internal humanitarian assistance coordination, and catalyze reforms and
efficiencies at the U.N. and other implementing partners. The ultimate
objective is to maximize the impact of hard-earned U.S. tax dollars and
deliver the best outcome for those dollars.
The President's budget continues global health funding at a level
that will sustain our work and our leadership in this area, including
through flagship programs like PEPFAR and the President's Malaria
Initiative.
We sustain our support for these assistance programs because we
know they are a projection of American leadership and they contribute
to economic growth, and social and political stability. They are not
only measures of the values of the American people, but they contribute
to our interests. As we have seen with outbreaks of Ebola and other
diseases in the past few years, these health programs have provided a
foundation to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious diseases of
epidemic potential, which helps protect the American people.
America's message must be shared with the world at all times. The
FY 2019 budget request further defends and advances America's values by
devoting $565 million to public diplomacy programs. These programs are
essential to informing public opinion abroad and communicating American
values like respect for human rights and the rule of law. The people of
the world must know not only the policies, but also the principles for
which the United States stands. Even as our public diplomacy budget
calls for greater burden-sharing of long-standing programs, the $55.4
million requested for the Global Engagement Center covers both its
original counter-extremist mission, plus an increase of $20 million to
counter state-sponsored disinformation campaigns. We will not tolerate
Russian interference in the 2018 elections, and we must take
countermeasures in response to an effort to do so.
Finally, I would like to update you on what is happening inside the
Department. The Department's workforce is our most valuable asset.
Since becoming Secretary, one of my highest priorities has been
ensuring that the finest diplomatic corps in the world is fully
prepared and empowered to achieve our mission. I am unleashing our
teams to do what they do best on behalf of the American people.
Just last week I held my first town hall in which I laid out my
leadership vision, and committed to working as one team with all our
personnel. I'm listening to their expertise and counsel.
With so many challenges before us, the State Department needs a
full team on the field, from locally employed staff around the world to
senior leaders in Washington. That's why I lifted the Eligible Family
Member hiring freeze as one of my first acts as Secretary, and also
lifted the hiring freeze for all Foreign Service and Civil Service
personnel last week. All Foreign Service and Civil Service hiring will
be consistent with the funding levels that Congress recently enacted.
Additionally, I know that our career professionals work best when
the goals are clear and the leadership team is at full strength. I have
devoted a great deal of time to filling vacancies at the Under
Secretary, Assistant Secretary, and Ambassador levels. We need our men
and women on the ground, executing American diplomacy with great vigor
and energy, and representing our great nation. We need the best tools
as well: this budget would also invest $150 million for IT
modernization. We need to work at the speed of 21st century diplomacy.
As I have said many times, my great goal is to restore the
trademark State Department swagger that has been instrumental in
advancing American security, prosperity, and liberty for centuries. I
define swagger this way: we must be everywhere with the best ideas. We
must create value during the policy formation process. We must outwork
and out-hustle others. We must be aggressive in working with our allies
and ferocious in defending American values against our adversaries.
Today I ask for your support to ensure that our diplomatic,
development and organizational initiatives are successful for the State
Department and USAID, and, most importantly, for the American people
Thank you for your time. I will be glad to answer any questions you
may have.
The Chairman. Thank you.
And I am going to yield for a moment and will interject
along the way. We turn to Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Mr. Secretary, thank you for the insights of the most
recent things.
Let me start with North Korea, understanding that the
summit is not going forward at this point, but hopefully at
some point there will be an opportunity to seek the appropriate
type of meetings necessary to denuclearize the Korean
Peninsula. But, since I have heard different statements coming
out of the administration, I want to see if we can go through a
sense of what it is that we might mutually agree is the essence
of the elements that are essential to any deal with North
Korea. So, I am going to ask you to give me a sense of ``yes or
no.'' Do you--on some of these questions--do you believe that
the current nuclear-test suspension must continue and that
denuclearization means the dismantlement and removal of all
nuclear weapons facilities, technology, and material from North
Korea?
Secretary Pompeo. There are two questions there. The second
one is with respect to dismantlement. I think the answer to
that is yes. You--we are looking for the complete dismantlement
of their weapon systems, the delivery capability associated
with that, and all of the elements of their program that would
lead them to have material--enriched material, fissile material
that could be used at some time to build out a weapon system.
Senator Menendez. So--but, I think----
Secretary Pompeo. I think the answer to that is yes, but I
wanted to make sure I clarified.
Senator Menendez. Okay. I appreciate that.
Do you believe that any deal must include an agreement that
North Korea must end the production and enrichment of uranium
and plutonium for military programs?
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, but, as we begin to head down this
path, I have to tell you, I have had discussions with Chairman
Kim personally. There have been other discussions. I am going
to reserve some space for us to be able to conduct these
discussions outside of the public sphere. I think that is
important. I think it is important for our eventual ability to
achieve the outcomes that I think everyone in this room hopes
we can achieve.
Senator Menendez. Well, I certainly want to give you
negotiating space, but I at least want to understand, as a
committee responsible for oversight, what is our standards that
we are going into? That is what I am trying to determine. What
is the standard that----
Secretary Pompeo. No. Sir, I think we have made very clear
what our objectives are.
Senator Menendez. Okay. So, let me ask you, then, further,
would a deal have to include an agreement that North Korea must
permanently dismantle and disable its nuclear weapons
infrastructure, including test sites, all nuclear weapons
research and development facilities, particularly with respect
to advanced centrifuges and nuclear weapons enrichment and
reprocessing facilities?
Secretary Pompeo. That is certainly our objective, Senator.
Senator Menendez. Would any deal have to include agreement
that North Korea put forward a full, complete, and verifiable
declaration of all its nuclear activities?
Secretary Pompeo. Yes. I only wish the Iranians had done
so.
Senator Menendez. Would any deal include robust
restrictions to assure that nuclear material, technology, and
expertise are not exported?
Secretary Pompeo. Sir, we have a deep aim, wholly apart
from denuclearization of the North Korean Peninsula, and a lot
of work underway to ensure that proliferation does not occur.
Senator Menendez. Does any deal have to include an
agreement that North Korea continue its current ballistic
missile test suspension, including any space launches, and that
any agreement must include the dismantlement of all ballistic
missiles and a prohibition on all ballistic missile
development?
Secretary Pompeo. Sir, I think I--I said this in my
confirmation hearing. I am happy to reiterate it. It is the
case that it is our objective--and I shared this with Chairman
Kim when I met with him, as well--that the missile program is a
central component of their capacity to hold America at risk,
and that it is our aim that, as part of this agreement that we
would reach, that they would no longer possess the capacity to
achieve those kinds of launches that I think you are speaking
to in your question.
Senator Menendez. And, to be truly, completely verifiable
and irreversible, any agreement with North Korea should be
permanent in nature, with no sunsets on its provisions?
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.
Senator Menendez. Okay.
Well, those are all very helpful, understanding the
standards of what we are trying to achieve.
Let me ask you. So, as we walk away from the summit, where
does that put us with the rest of the world? Do you believe
that somehow we are strengthened in this regard, or are we
weakened as a result of walking away, ourselves, because of
some statements?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I do not believe, in that sense,
that we are in a position to believe that there could be a
successful outcome. I think that is what the President
communicated pretty clearly in his letter. I can add to that.
Over the past many days, we have endeavored to do what Chairman
Kim and I had agreed, was to put teams--preparation teams
together to begin to work to prepare for the summit. And we had
received no response to our inquiries, from them. So, we--in
addition to what the President laid out in his letter, it is
also the case that the--I disagree what you said in your
opening statement. I think the American team is fully prepared.
I think we are rocking. I think we are ready. I think we are
prepared for this meeting. I think President Trump is prepared
for this meeting. We were fully, fully engaged over the past
weeks to prepare for this meeting. So, I disagree with your
assessment that the Americans are not ready. It----
Senator Menendez. Well, when I say ``not ready,'' I am
talking about, you know, the--we needed to test all of the
propositions and lay out all of the elements of what was----
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.
Senator Menendez. --ultimately to----
Secretary Pompeo. Yeah.
Senator Menendez. --to be decided in a way to find out
whether the North Koreans were truly true. But, I----
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir. That has been done----
Senator Menendez. --gather----
Secretary Pompeo. --that has been done three times before
in American history, and Kim Jung Un today possesses the most
robust nuclear program he has ever had.
Senator Menendez. And as a result of us canceling the
summit, he still possesses them.
Let me ask you this. In your confirmation hearing, you
noted that Russian bad behavior is the driver behind the
currently acrimonious bilateral relationship, and this behavior
presents a clear danger to the United States. We have seen a
whole host of actions, decisions, undisputed findings of the
intelligence community. We saw Russia deploy a chemical weapons
attack on the soil of a NATO ally. We saw a chemical attack,
that Russia supported, by Assad. Can you tell me why it is that
the President seems unable to speak of Russia in a way that
acknowledges that there was an attack against our own country,
in terms of a cyberattack on our elections, and actions that--
we have noted others that were active this way that were put as
a terrorist state, and yet we see no such action as it relates
to Russia. Give--I am trying to understand the administration's
views on Russia.
Secretary Pompeo. Yeah. Senator, you just said that there
have been no actions. I fundamentally disagree with that. I am
happy--I brought a list of the actions this administration has
taken to push back against Russian aggression of all forms--
their cyber efforts, their election-meddling efforts, their--
the chemical attack that took place in Skripal. The list is
long. I think the record ought to properly reflect that it is
far more than took place under the previous administration.
Indeed, most of this meddling took place during the previous
administration. And this administration is now working to deter
that from ever happening again. And I think our administration
ought to be very proud of the work we have taken, sanctions and
otherwise, against Russia.
Senator Menendez. I will be happy to----
The Chairman. Senator Johnson.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, thanks for your service.
In your answers to Secretary--or to Senator Menendez's
questions, you sure seemed to make clear what your definition
of ``dismantlement'' really means. You said you made it also
clear to Chairman Kim Jong Un. Did you?
Secretary Pompeo. Did I make it clear to him?
Senator Johnson. Yeah. I mean, how----
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.
Senator Johnson. --how clear? How many times did you repeat
it?
Secretary Pompeo. Sir, I spoke in English. There was a
translator. But, our team confirmed that the translator said
what I said. I do not know. I had two meetings, maybe 3 hours-
plus total, enough that I understood him to have understood
what it was I was saying. Indeed, put aside what I said. When I
heard back from him----
Senator Johnson. That is what I wanted to ask you.
Secretary Pompeo. --when I heard back from him, there was--
it was little doubt in my mind that he understood the scope of
what it was we were asking for, what it--the nature of what
would have to take place, the verification that we would need
to undertake in order to be comfortable that we could begin to
deliver the assurances that he, in return, asked for. And so, I
think we were having a real--a conversation where there was
real understanding between the two of us. It is what caused me
to recommend to the President that I thought the time would, in
fact, permit us to have a real opportunity to do something
historic. I am still optimistic that we will reach that point.
I know the President is, as well.
Senator Johnson. So, you have no doubt that you made it
crystal clear, and he fully understand exactly what
``dismantlement'' means, in terms of these negotiations.
Secretary Pompeo. To the best of my ability, Senator.
Senator Johnson. So, he understood it. Did he have any
reaction whatsoever?
Secretary Pompeo. Yes. And, while I have----
Senator Johnson. Did he resist it? Did he seem welcoming to
it? I mean, what was his--as best you can determine through
translators, what was his reaction to what really was table
stakes?
Secretary Pompeo. He was unsurprised. There would be no
surprise what Secretary Pompeo's brief was going to be when he
walked into that room. We had made this abundantly clear
through multiple channels over months of this administration.
So, there was no surprise. It was--the conversation revolved
around how it is we would achieve that, what the mechanisms
might be to begin to achieve that, and how the United States
would demonstrate, in return, that we were committed to the
assurances that we were prepared to provide to him.
Senator Johnson. So, you would say he, basically, accepted
those terms of a negotiation, that what he knew the U.S. side
would be pressing for was that--your definition of
``dismantlement.''
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, Senator. I do not know how--why--
yes, I believe that is true. I do not know how you would read
the administration's statements over the past months and then
have Secretary of State walk in and repeat them, and not at
least understand--be careful. Yes. Yes. I think the answer is
yes.
Senator Johnson. Okay. So, with that understanding, he
still released three hostages.
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, that is correct. And agreed to have
a summit on June 12th, as well. And agreed to send teams to
prepare for the June 12th meeting between the two leaders, as
well.
Senator Johnson. Well, the point I am trying to make is,
the administration has been crystal clear, completely
consistent. The result of your meeting was still the release of
three hostages. So, what has changed here is Kim Jong Un's
approach to this thing, correct? Very disappointingly so.
Secretary Pompeo. I regret the statements that the North
Koreans have made over the past few days, and the fact that we
have not been able to conduct the preparation between our two
teams that would be necessary to have a chance for a successful
summit.
Senator Johnson. Do you believe the Chairman also believed
President Trump's offer of assistance in return for that
complete dismantlement? Do you think--do you have doubt of
that, as well?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I always--my wife always reminds
me that I should be careful about knowing what is in someone
else's mind.
Senator Johnson. Mine, too. Yeah, I am just trying to get
your understanding of how those talks----
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, I communicated very clearly that
this was a sincere commitment on behalf of the President of the
United States, that we were prepared to make that transaction
happen in a way that would allow his regime to have the
assurances it needed in order to make this fundamental
strategic shift in the history of North Korea--in the North
Korean trajectory to make this fundamental shift, where, for
decades, it has been that these nuclear weapons were the thing
that provided them security, and to convince him that, in fact,
his security was best assured by going through this process and
working with the United States to achieve that.
Senator Johnson. So, what conversations now have you had
with the Chinese officials on this topic? Are you convinced
that they are going to continue to cooperate and maintain those
sanctions, which is the only thing that has been--or going to
bring Kim Jong Un to that negotiating table in good faith to
actually agree to dismantlement in exchange for all the
benefits to his economy and his people?
Secretary Pompeo. I met with the Chinese Foreign Minister
yesterday afternoon. He assured me that they would continue to
abide by all the U.N. Security Council resolutions relating to
this, and that they understood that those needed to remain in
place, not until June 12th--at this point, we were talking
about in the context of there being a summit on June 12th--but
not only through June 12th, but until such time as we achieved
what it was the Americans believed and, I think, frankly, that
China agrees would be the outcome that is best for the world
and the best for North Korea, as well.
Senator Johnson. Are you aware of--are you getting any
hints that there is any relaxation of those sanctions, more
goods crossing between the border between China and North
Korea?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, we have not seen anything to
suggest they have violated the Security Council resolutions in
a substantial way. I always--I am a--I worry about everyone.
The globe--the global pressure campaign that is put in place is
important and needs to continue, perhaps even this morning more
than yesterday, that that is--that is very important--so that
we can ultimately get to the right place there.
Senator Johnson. What gave me some measure of optimism is,
from my standpoint, I think it is entirely in China's best
interest to achieve exactly what the administration is
demanding, here.
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, that is what their Foreign
Minister told me yesterday, as well, unambiguously.
Unambiguously believes that--he told me that China believes
that the denuclearization of North Korea is in China's best
interest.
Senator Johnson. Well, let me just say, I support President
Trump's letter. I think it is an excellent letter. We need to
make sure that Kim Jong Un understands that this--we are
completely consistent, we will absolutely demand that, and that
all the benefits that can flow to North Korea will not occur
until we achieve our definition, that he is well aware of, you
know, crystal clear, the--of complete dismantlement.
So, again, thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
I would ask consent that statements from Refugees
International and Catholic Relief Services be made part of our
record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
[The information referred to above can be found at the end
of this document.]
Senator Cardin. Mr. Secretary, let me just follow up on
North Korea for one moment. And that is, in response to Senator
Johnson, you indicated that you are trying to convince the
North Koreans that their security is going to be better served
without nuclear weapons. And I fully support that. It is very
possible, if diplomacy is successful, it will require action by
the United States Congress in order to deal with some of these
issues.
During the discussions on the Iran nuclear agreement, my
Republican colleagues thought that this should be a treaty type
of an arrangement, which would require the two-thirds vote of
the United States Senate. My question to you is, how do you
intend to keep Congress informed during these negotiations,
considering the questions that Senator Menendez asked were ones
that I would have asked also, and we have not had the in-depth
type of briefings that would be, I think, required in these
types of negotiations? So, how do you envision keeping us
informed, recognizing that, during the Iran nuclear agreements,
Congress felt compelled to pass a statute in order to make sure
that we were kept informed?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I appreciate the question. I was
but a junior Member of Congress at the time. I do not remember
being kept informed at all, for the record, with respect to the
JCPOA, in spite of what I think the record would show were
constant efforts to be so informed. I am going to do better.
Senator Cardin. Yeah, I can tell you, speaking for--and I
would welcome my Republican colleagues--we had numerous
discussions with the Obama administration during the
negotiations. Does not mean we were satisfied with what we were
told. We had numerous discussions.
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, Senator, I point that out only
because I think the bar is low, and I am going to beat that. We
will do our best to keep you fully apprised. But, let me state
what I think is even more important. It is absolutely the case
that it is our intention to achieve an agreement that would be
put before the United States Senate. That is our goal. Our goal
is to actually do what I had hoped would happen with the Iran
deal if the United States Senate would get to----
Senator Cardin. Just to clarify, you are talking about----
Secretary Pompeo. --conduct its constitutionally
appropriate duty----
Senator Cardin. So, you are talking about submitting it to
the United States Senate as a treaty?
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.
Senator Cardin. Okay, thank you.
Secretary Pompeo. It is a--look, there is a lot of work to
do. We are--as you can see, we are at the early stages, here.
But, we believe that, if we get this right and we are
successful, that it would be appropriate to do----
Senator Cardin. I would just----
Secretary Pompeo. --and important for the North Koreans, as
well.
Senator Cardin. And I appreciate that response. I would
just caution you, as far as timing, that the record of the
Senate taking up treaties and passing them is----
Secretary Pompeo. I understand.
Senator Cardin. --it is----
Secretary Pompeo. I----
Senator Cardin. Just urge you to----
Secretary Pompeo. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Cardin. That is why I say it would be well-served
if we have the----
Secretary Pompeo. Yes.
Senator Cardin. --discussions during the course of these
negotiations----
Secretary Pompeo. I do appreciate that.
Senator Cardin. --in a venue where we can talk freely and--
--
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.
Senator Cardin. --openly.
Secretary Pompeo. I do appreciate that. And I get the
challenge. That is why I left a little room for an agreement
that did not quite make it there. But, I think--but, Senator,
you hit on an important point. It is important for America, it
is important for our constitutional democracy to try and do
that. It will also prove important for the North Koreans.
Senator Cardin. And let me change----
Secretary Pompeo. And so----
Senator Cardin. I agree.
Secretary Pompeo. --I just think it is important, among
multiple dimensions, sir.
Senator Cardin. I want to change focus to Iran for one
moment, if I might. President Trump was pretty clear that he
intended to terminate our involvement, but then listed three
conditions that, if the agreements were modified, one, to
include ballistic missiles within the agreement, even though
Congress had passed statutes giving the President the authority
to impose new sanctions against Iran for ballistic missile
violations; he also mentioned he wanted inspections more
intrusive, even though the IAEA had said that they were
satisfied with the inspection regime; and, lastly, he said that
we needed to deal with the sunset provisions, which dealt with
limitations, even though the agreement did--had no sunset on
it, but it was certainly unclear as to when tripwires would
cause violations of the agreement. Is the administration still
in that mode--these are the three changes that must be made in
the agreement for it to be satisfactory--or has there been a
change in position?
Secretary Pompeo. Let me speak to the former and then
latter. The first was, I was--I will concede, it was only a
couple of weeks the State Department had been working to try
and get those agreements from three European countries prior to
the President's decision. We were never able to get there. The
same problem that existed when I came in--on my--I guess it
would have been my fourth day in office, when I was briefed on
it, existed until the very end. We--it simply--there was no
evidence that the Europeans had any intention of actually
agreeing to those three provisions----
Senator Cardin. But, is that still our position, that these
are the three changes that must be made?
Secretary Pompeo. Sir, we have now laid out a series of
things that we are working diligently to get the whole world to
sign up for, a series of 12 things that we are demanding the
Iranians do. They are simple things, each of them. I think you
would agree with each of those 12 items. And that is what we
are looking for Iran to achieve, and that is the mission
statement the President set out for the State Department.
Senator Cardin. So, let me just drill down on that. Are
we--is regime change part of our objective, here?
Secretary Pompeo. No, sir.
Senator Cardin. Do we want to include, in a nuclear type or
JCPOA type of commitment, Iran's activities in regards to
terrorism?
Secretary Pompeo. Yes.
Senator Cardin. And is there a reason why the Trump
administration has not used the additional tools that Congress
provided to deal with terrorism and human rights violations?
Secretary Pompeo. I do not know the answer to that
question.
Senator Cardin. Is there a reason why we have not engaged
the Europeans, which have offered to join us in these matters
prior to us pulling out of the Iran agreement, where now we do
not have their attention?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I have to be honest with you,
the Europeans have told us, it is true, that they are prepared
to engage on missiles and, for 3 years--right?--through JCPOA,
almost 3 years--did nothing. Nothing.
Senator Cardin. I agree with----
Secretary Pompeo. And, second--I will give you a second:
terror. They have talked about agreeing to things on terror. We
said--they said they would do it. They are--what happened--and
this is my judgment--what happened is--and you saw this
yesterday--the Iranians made an announcement. I do not know
that you saw this. They said, ``If the Europeans do anything on
missiles, we will withdraw from the JCPOA.''
Senator Cardin. I saw their--I saw that----
Secretary Pompeo. This is what happened. The Iranians
viewed this JCPOA as not just nuclear.
Senator Cardin. I am not--my--the question----
Secretary Pompeo. That is important. That is very
important, Senator.
Senator Cardin. The question I am trying to get answered is
that--we gave you additional tools to deal with these areas.
They have not been used. And the Europeans, you had their
attention, because they did not want the United States to pull
out of the nuclear agreement. Now we do not have their
attention, because they are worrying as to whether there are
going to be sanctions imposed against companies located in
their country. So, I am not sure what the strategy is now in
regards to going after them for their terrorist activities and
their human rights violations and ballistic missile violations.
Secretary Pompeo. The strategy is to develop a global
consensus that says that we are simply asking the Iranian
regime to do what we ask every other country to do: behave like
a normal nation.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Gardner.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for your time and
testimony and the work that you have been able to carry out
over the brief tenure you have had there at the State
Department.
And congratulations on bringing home three Americans and
the work that was taking place to lead to the summit on June
12th. I think Kim Jong Un has walked away from a historic
opportunity for peace and should be held accountable for his
decision.
In the internal debate that must be taking place within Kim
Jong Un's mind, between Kim, the propagandist, and Kim, the
peacemaker, it is clear that Kim, the propagandist, prevailed
internally and that the peace lost out to that propaganda. I
believe President Trump acted with eyes wide open throughout
this entire process, knowing, at any point, he would have the
choice of continuing with a summit or walking away from it,
should denuclearization not be on the agenda, or at least not
be something that Kim Jong Un was willing to entertain at that
moment. He made the right choice, because clearly, in the past
weeks, we have seen Kim Jong Un walk away from what seemed to
be a commitment toward denuclearization.
It is the policy of the United States--and I think this
answers some of the questions that have been asked already on
this panel--when this body passed and this President signed--
President Obama signed into law the North Korea Policy
Sanctions Enhancement Act, it clearly lays out, under U.S. law,
when sanctions against North Korea can be terminated. Section
402 of that act, Termination of Sanctions and Other Measures:
Any sanction or other measure required under Title 1, 2, or 3
may only be lifted when the President determines and certifies
to the appropriate congressional committee that the Government
of North Korea has met the requirements set forth of complete,
verifiable, irreversible denuclearization. It goes on and on
and on. So, we have already put into law what we expect of
North Korea, and that sanctions--maximum pressure--cannot be
lifted until these conditions, under U.S. law, have been met.
Mr. Secretary, is it your opinion that this decision by Kim
Jong Un is a result of a weak leader who lacks the internal
support to go forward with a meeting on denuclearization, or
was this just poor negotiating strategies by Kim Jong Un?
Secretary Pompeo. I do not think it is the former. I do not
think it is a weak leader. In fact, he has demonstrated an
enormous capacity to lead his country and his team. So, I do
not think that it is. And I--and, frankly, I do not really know
that I want to speculate as to why it is they took the actions,
because I do not think we know. What I am hopeful is that we
can continue to have conversations and put this back on track
so that we can get to a place where we can achieve the outcome.
But, I think it is worth--we talk a lot about summits and
deals and the like. It is not about the deal. It is about the
outcome. Right? It is about achieving this permanent physical
change and transformation that will have the opportunity to
change the world. And it is--a corollary to that is a
fundamental change in North Korea that would lead North Korea
to have this opportunity for prosperity and good things, all
the things that their neighbors to the south have. There will
have to be a deal to get us to that point, but we should not
spend all our time thinking about ``the deal'' without focusing
on where you began your question, Senator, which is, here is
what this needs to look like in order to do what President has
said, to keep Americans safe from the threat that North Korea
presents today.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
And I think that the--I hope the North Korean people will
know what Kim Jong Un walked away from and what he should walk
back to, and that is this opportunity for peace and prosperity
on the Peninsula, the entire Peninsula, as they look to the
south and see the opportunities that they could have if they
rejoined the global community of responsible nations.
With this decision, though, is it the determination of the
State Department, the commitment of the President, to again
continue the full implementation of the maximum pressure
doctrine?
Secretary Pompeo. Yes.
Senator Gardner. Does Congress need to take additional
steps, including perhaps a full economic embargo of North
Korea?
Secretary Pompeo. I do think we should--I think Congress
and the executive branch should work together to do everything
we can to continue--I do not believe it ever ended--but to
continue the campaign, which I am hopeful will lead to the good
outcome that we have described here this morning.
Senator Gardner. And so, in addition to that economic
embargo on North Korea, that we must continue to pursue any
enablers who wish to help violate sanctions, or help North
Korea violate those sanctions.
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Senator Gardner. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, turning to the issue of Taiwan, quickly,
Burkina Faso has announced a decision, this morning I believe,
that it would no longer recognize Taiwan. The World Health
Assembly meeting has again excluded Taiwan. Senator Markey and
I have introduced legislation to encourage--to make it the
policy of this country that we will pursue involvement of
Taiwan in international organizations, and pursue high-level
visitation by the United States. The Asia Reassurance
Initiative Act, which you and I have talked about at length,
reiterates our important relationship with Taiwan and our full
support of Taiwan, and that we continue around the globe to
build support for Taiwan and their acceptance and involvement
in international organizations. What is your sense of what is
happening and how we can pursue such a policy with Taiwan?
Secretary Pompeo. I think your point about you and Senator
Markey working together demonstrates the long history of
consistent U.S. policy with respect to Taiwan over multiple
administrations from both parties. That has not changed under
President Trump. The same One China policy, along with the
three communiques, is still American policy. I am very aware of
the Taiwan Relations Act, which was passed during this
administration. I do not see that there has been any change
there in those commitments.
Senator Gardner. Thank you. And as it relates to China and
South China Sea activities, Mr. Secretary, could you talk a
little bit about the administration's actions as it relates to
China's further militarization?
Secretary Pompeo. So, I will leave the details to Secretary
Mattis, but yesterday this Department of Defense made the
decision to disinvite the Chinese from an exercise, RIMPAC,
that they had previously been invited to participate in, in a
direct response to the strategic weapon systems that have been
put on islands that the Chinese had agreed not to do. And so,
we are working along multiple fronts, not the least of which is
my diplomatic efforts to work to convince the Chinese that it
is not in their best interest, nor the world's, for them to
continue to expand throughout the South China Sea. It is an
important American interest to make sure that those sea lanes
and our access to them remain available to us.
Senator Gardner. Thanks, Mr. Secretary.
And finally, I look forward to working with you on passage
of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act, bipartisan legislation
introduced by members of this committee.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you for your work on
bringing Americans home from North Korea. One of them was a
Virginian, and we appreciate it. So, thank you for that.
Secretary Pompeo. Thank you, Senator Kaine. It was an
amazing day.
Senator Kaine. Yeah.
Secretary Pompeo. Three great Americans.
Senator Kaine. Very--I am--you were deservedly proud on
that day, and we were grateful.
I was listening to some of your testimony in response to
questions from Senator Cardin. So, to return to a conversation
that we have had before, I think you testified that regime
change in Iran is not an administration policy at this point.
Secretary Pompeo. That is correct.
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
When you were before us in April, at your hearing, I asked
you a question about trying to have this committee receive a
legal memo that had been done in April 2017 regarding U.S.
airstrikes in Syria. And you said, at that time, quote, ``I
promise I will work alongside you to do the best I can to get
you that information, and, if it is a classified version of it
that you have a right as a member of the legislative branch to
see, I will work to get you that. And if it is an unclassified
version, will work to get you that, as well.'' Two days after
that hearing, we once again carried out airstrikes in Syria
against the Assad regime. We have not received the memo, in any
version, yet. And I would like to ask why. And will you work
with us so that we can see the appropriate version of that
memo?
Secretary Pompeo. I will accept responsibility. I have not
turned to that.
Senator Kaine. Yeah.
Secretary Pompeo. I will.
Senator Kaine. You have been busy, but it----
Secretary Pompeo. Sir, I----
Senator Kaine. --I do want your commitment that we----
Secretary Pompeo. --I made a commitment to you that I would
do it. I will turn to it this week.
Senator Kaine. Thank----
Secretary Pompeo. I may have an extra day now.
Senator Kaine. Okay, thank you, Mr. Secretary.
I want to ask you about something you said in your opening.
You were talking, in your opening, about the recently reported
instance of an American serving in Guangzhou who was hit by
what appeared to be a sonic attack. You spoke yesterday and
said it bore signs that were very similar to those that were
inflicted upon Americans serving in Cuba.
Now, the Cuban situation has been very significantly
studied, including by a medical team at the University of
Pennsylvania. The reported incident in China apparently started
in Guangzhou in late 2017, and continued through just recently.
And the State Department, I guess, has done some study, and you
have reached the conclusion that the symptoms experienced by
this American are very similar to the symptoms experienced by
the Americans in Cuba. Is that correct?
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, Senator, that is correct. There has
been a great deal of work done. And I will try to stay inside
the technical term. The term is ``consistent with.'' That is,
the symptoms are very, very similar. That may be a Mike term
and not a medical term, but----
Senator Kaine. Yeah.
Secretary Pompeo. --but very consistent with----
Senator Kaine. So, here is a significant concern. When
these things were happening in Cuba, we were speculating about
what was going on, and the speculations were pretty naturally:
Is it the Cuban government that is doing it? Is it a rogue
element in the Cuban government that is doing it, maybe to try
to upset a bromance between Cuba and the United States? Or is
it some third party, a foreign government, possibly Russia,
that is trying to do it, maybe to achieve the same thing?
Now that something very similar has happened in China, the
question about motivation and attribution gets much more
complicated. We have been talking about this on the Armed
Services Committee, as well, and I know there has been an FBI
investigation, as well. State has got part of this, the DoD is
looking at this, the FBI is looking at it, the medical teams
from the University of Pennsylvania are looking at it. Who is
in charge, in the administration, of trying to figure out, (a)
what is going on? Who is behind it? And what advice should be
given to Congress? Or what we should be doing to counter it.
Secretary Pompeo. Right.
Senator Kaine. Because it seems like there is a lot of
cooks right now.
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, that is a very good question.
Opening up a second venue, where we have consistent--I do not
want to overstate----
Senator Kaine. Yeah.
Secretary Pompeo. --I do not want to overstate the nature
of that. They could be separate, independent activities. It is
possible. But, knowing what we know now, this has really
changed. It has gone from a localized incident to one that is
much broader. And now the question is, where? Where all might
we see this? I think those are reasonable questions to ask.
So, the State Department will lead the effort. Because it
is an overseas security issue, the State Department will lead
the effort. But, you should know we will lead that effort. My
Deputy will be in charge of the team. Deputy Secretary----
Senator Kaine. Sullivan.
Secretary Pompeo. --Sullivan will run the team. And we will
have it--soup to nuts, if you will--we will have it from what
was the vector that led to it. There will be folks from the
Department of Energy trying to do work to figure out what could
lead to these symptoms. There will be multiple agencies
involved. But, the responsibility ultimately will fall to the
State Department to lead this effort to resolve this and to
protect our officers serving overseas.
And, too, if it is the case this was a--bad behavior,
something that was intentionally done by someone, there will
be--others do a lot of that work, but the State Department will
lead the effort to identify----
Senator Kaine. Sitting here today, Mr. Secretary, are you
aware of U.S. diplomatic personnel in any countries other than
Cuba and China who have experienced attacks of this kind?
Secretary Pompeo. No, sir.
Senator Kaine. Well, I think this matter is really, really
critical. I just came from a closed briefing of the classified
portion of the NDAA annex. And, without getting into what was
said there, this was part of the discussion. And I asked the
same question there. Actually, I am not sure I asked them--it
might have been Senator McCaskill: Who is in charge of this? If
we have got----
Secretary Pompeo. Did we give the----
Senator Kaine. --the FBI----
Secretary Pompeo. --same answer?
Senator Kaine. Basically--they did not say you were in
charge of it, they did not say who was in charge of it. I am
glad you have said somebody is in charge of it, and it is going
to be the State Department, because it is very critical. But,
the ability to inflict damage upon U.S. personnel who are out
patriotically serving their country in a way that is sort of
hard to attribute and hard to measure should really, really
scare us. And again, happening in one country leads to a set of
hypotheses you have got to run down, but now happening in a
second country really raises the stakes, I think, in terms of
trying to get to the bottom of it.
And I would hope, Mr. Chair, that, as the State Department
investigation of this continues, that, in an appropriate
setting, we would be briefed upon this, because I think it
would have some significant bearing upon all kinds of decisions
we might need to make as a Foreign Relations Committee.
I do not have any other questions.
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I am personally prepared to do
that. I am prepared to do the piece that we can do in this
forum, and I am prepared to provide you information in
classified settings as we continue to develop what it is we
know.
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Young.
Senator Young. Mr. Secretary, welcome. Good to have you
here.
Let me start with Afghanistan. I support the goal of
ensuring that Afghanistan is never again used as a launching
pad for terrorist attacks, like those we saw on 9/11. I know
you support that objective, as well. I also support making sure
that we are constantly assessing our progress there and,
frankly, revisiting our objectives, as well.
And so, this morning, as you are likely aware, the Special
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction published a
report on stabilization efforts in Afghanistan. And the report
looks at 17 years of reconstruction efforts there. They
identify seven key findings, 10 lessons, 11 actions that be--
can be taken to increase the likelihood of success in future
stabilization missions.
My sense--I know how busy you are. You--it will take some
time, I suspect, to digest the findings and so forth. I only
ask that you review this and provide a written response to this
committee by the 1st of October on what actions the State
Department plans to take and not take in response to this
report. Can I get your agreement?
Secretary Pompeo. You can, sir. I have seen the
recommendations. We have a team. It is a report that is very
sobering.
Senator Young. So, by October----
Secretary Pompeo. Yes. You have my commitment, yes.
Senator Young. All right. Thank you so much.
Secretary Pompeo. Yeah.
Senator Young. I would like to pivot to China's predatory
economic policies. In your prepared testimony, you referenced
the National Security Strategy. And a couple of pillars of that
strategy relate to promoting American prosperity and preserving
peace through strength. I know you will agree that these are
related pillars on--there is a lot of overlap there. Our
economic competitiveness impacts our prosperity, but also our
national security.
I chaired a Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee hearing
on May 9th pertaining to predatory international economic
practices. We heard from three thoughtful witnesses and
discussed China's troubling use of force, technology transfer,
intellectual property theft, you know, denial of access to
Chinese markets, state-owned enterprises, and related topics. I
hear from Hoosiers at home about this topic all the time,
typically about the economic implications, but, as you know,
the--there are a major national security implications
associated with this.
The National Security Strategy says the Trump
administration will no longer tolerate economic aggression. And
I just want to know whether you agree that, for us to have an
effective response to these ongoing practices of the state
capitalist model, it is going to require a multilateral
approach, a strategic approach, and one that is understood not
just by those in the administration, but also those of us here
in Congress. To that end, first, do you agree with everything I
just said--multilateral, strategic, and understood by the
administration and those of us in Congress?
Secretary Pompeo. I do.
Senator Young. Okay. Well, based on that common
understanding and--of the nature of the threat and a consensus
about, sort of, generally, what needs to be doing--done, moving
forward, I introduced legislation, along with Senators Merkley,
Rubio, and Coons, the National Economic Security Strategy Act
of 2018, S. 2757. And so, I will just say, by--I would hope
that your team could review this legislation. I look forward to
working with you and your team, moving forward, to see if we
can advance this important legislation. This would create a
written strategy analogous to the National Security Strategy to
deal with predatory international economic practices, whether
they are--they emanate from China or other countries. So, look
forward to working on that with you, moving forward.
In my remaining time, I just want to emphasize what we are
here, in part, to discuss, which is the international affairs
budget funding. I know you agree that today's national security
challenges require the U.S. to utilize our full range of
nonmilitary tools to keep us safe and secure and to advance our
values and interests. I know you also agree that diplomacy and
development can help avert conflict, shorten its duration,
prevent its return, and, frankly, keep our men and women off of
the battlefield, wherever possible.
So, I helped lead a bipartisan letter to the Appropriations
Committee last month. I was encouraged that 42 Senators signed
on to it. They do not typically do that as it relates to State
Department funding. But, there is a growing sense, here in this
body, I know, that we need robust funding for FY19. And I just,
here again, look forward to working with you and your team to
do whatever we can to ensure that the State Department gets
that funding, moving forward.
Mr. Chairman, I request unanimous consent to enter this
letter into the record.
The Chairman. Without objection. Thank you.
[The information referred to above can be found at the end
of this document.]
Senator Young. Okay.
So, I just want to encourage you. And I will join the
others in congratulating you and the administration for the
recent prisoner release. That is--that was a great early
morning for our country.
Secretary Pompeo. Yeah.
Senator Young. Well done.
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir. Thank you.
Senator Young. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here.
Secretary Pompeo. Senator.
Senator Shaheen. And let me begin by thanking you for
lifting the hiring freeze at the State Department and moving to
address some of the morale issues there. That is a commitment
you made to this committee, and I appreciate you following
through on that.
I understand that you are going to be meeting with the
Turkish Foreign Minister in early June. And, as I am sure you
are aware, the Turkish Foreign Minister could decide to release
Pastor Brunson from jail and send him directly back to the
United States. Pastor Brunson has been held there since October
of 2016. Do you intend to raise that issue when you meet with
the Foreign Minister?
Secretary Pompeo. Yes.
Senator Shaheen. And can you also give us some insights
into how you might discuss the issue of Turkey's decision to
buy the Russian S-400 missile defense system?
Secretary Pompeo. Certainly, Senator Shaheen.
So, I have spoken with the Turkish Foreign Minister at
least once, maybe twice, in my first 3 weeks. On many topics
that we have covered, certainly, in each case, have talked
about the incredible need for them to return Pastor Brunson. It
is just deeply wrong, immoral, unjust. No success, so far, but
you can be assured that we are working diligently on that.
Second, we have spoken to them--I have spoken, in each
case, and will again next week, about the S-400. We have
implored them not to take that weapon system, for a host of
reasons I will not belabor today. You know them well. The
other--there are several, but the other major topic that we are
going to be working on is trying to achieve a resolution about
the Turkish activities in northern Syria in and around Afrin
and Manbij. My predecessor began a process, called the Roadmap,
and it is our effort to put the details together surrounding
that. We have a team--I think there is a team in Ankara now, or
this week, to work on that. And I am hopeful, during his visit
here, we can resolve that so that we do not end up in a
situation where we have two NATO allies too close together,
creating risk.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I appreciate that.
Mr. Secretary, were you part of the decision-making around
the President's letter this morning about pulling out of the
summit with North Korea? And were there discussions, as part of
that decision, about what should happen next? And what do you
expect to happen next? Are we going to see a return to the
volatile rhetoric that increased most Americans' concerns about
the potential for a threat of nuclear war with North Korea? Or
is there something else in mind for how to move forward next?
Secretary Pompeo. I was part of the discussion, both last
night and then this morning. Obviously, it was the President's
decision, ultimately. And we did talk about what the path
forward would look like, the negotiating path that is the path
that we hope will resolve this, as well as the things we would
need to do in the days and weeks ahead to prepare for the
eventuality that we were back where we were 6 or 8 or 12 weeks
ago. And I--there is still lots of discussion going on inside
the administration about exactly how to proceed on that. But, I
am confident, in the coming days, we will have laid that out in
some detail.
We always knew, too, that there could be a summit that did
not work, that ultimately was unsuccessful. And so, there has
been a great deal of work to think about what happens when you
are at a moment when you do not have the opportunity sitting
right in front of you. I hope that we do. I hope we quickly are
able to get back to that place. But, ultimately, Chairman Kim
will have that decision to make for himself. As the President
said, we welcome their call, their outreach to head back down
that path.
Senator Shaheen. So, can you share with us any other
insights about how the administration is looking at what should
happen next?
Secretary Pompeo. Yeah. In some ways, it is situation
normal. The pressure campaign continues.
Senator Shaheen. Not a lot of insight there.
Secretary Pompeo. Well, I mean, it is what--I do not know
what to say, other than there will--has been an incredibly
effective global campaign to create pressure on the North
Korean regime so that we could resolve the issue of Chairman
Kim's regime threatening the United States of America. That
existed yesterday, it exists today, it is likely to exist
tomorrow. And so, our process remains the same.
Senator Shaheen. There is a story that just came out that
said that the South Koreans were completely surprised by this
decision. Did we consult with our allies about the decision
before making it public?
Secretary Pompeo. I do not want to get----
Senator Shaheen. Or at least advise them that this was
coming?
Secretary Pompeo. I do not want to get into who all we
notified. The White House, I think, will speak to that at the
appropriate time.
Senator Shaheen. Well, apropos of that----
Secretary Pompeo. But, may I say just one more thing,
Senator Shaheen? I--Chairman Moon was here. We have had
extensive discussions. We are locked in with the Republic of
Korea. We have spoken to the Japanese. Foreign Minister Kono
was here. I spoke with him yesterday afternoon at 1630 hours.
We are----
Senator Shaheen. To advise him----
Secretary Pompeo. We are----
Senator Shaheen. --that this is----
Secretary Pompeo. We are in lockstep with them.
Senator Shaheen. And did----
Secretary Pompeo. And we----
Senator Shaheen. --we advise them that this was coming?
Secretary Pompeo. We told them that we hoped that the
summit would proceed, that there would be discussions, but we
always knew there was a risk that they would not move forward.
We have been consistent with that privately and, as you well
know, publicly, as well. President Trump has said repeatedly he
is very hopeful it would proceed, but----
Senator Shaheen. Sure. No, I understand that.
Secretary Pompeo. --but, it might not.
Senator Shaheen. But, that is a very different situation
than saying, ``This letter is coming tomorrow. The President is
pulling out of the summit.'' And that is the question that I am
really asking. And it goes to the approach to Iran's behavior,
as well, because, as America was trying to negotiate the Iran
deal, there was a real effort to work cooperatively with our
European allies. The President's response to pulling out of the
nuclear agreement with Iran has, to some extent, blamed our
European allies who are part of that negotiation for the
failure to get a stronger agreement. Do you think that is going
to have lasting impact on our relations with the Europeans?
Secretary Pompeo. A couple of hundred years of history
would suggest that the answer to that is no.
Senator Shaheen. So, we are moving forward with them on a
united front for how to approach Iran?
Secretary Pompeo. I think, throughout history, there have
been differences between not only Europe and the United States,
but individual European countries amongst themselves. This is
no exception. They are in a different place. They have stated
publicly their intent to work to try and remain inside of the
JCPOA framework. When I saw Foreign Minister Mas on Wednesday--
I think it was yesterday--of this week, he indicated that that
was continuing to be their policy. I explained to him why I
thought this makes sense. I urged him--I urged him to
acknowledge that the Iranians are launching missiles into
Riyadh, and there is a German going to get killed, and one
ought to think that that should be a condition that would be
unacceptable to the people of Germany. And I am hopeful that
they will join us to push back against what we would ask from
Iceland: Do not launch missiles into Riyadh. Right? We ask
this--this is--people have said that what the President laid
out and what I spoke to on Monday is a fantasy. If you go look
at the 12 items, it is nothing that we do not ask of every
civilized nation in the world. It is--join the league of normal
nations. This does not--it does not seem like too tall an order
for any European----
Senator Shaheen. Well, I am----
Secretary Pompeo. --country to join us----
Senator Shaheen. --I am not taking issue with what you----
Secretary Pompeo. Yeah, but I--but, to my----
Senator Shaheen. --would like to add.
Secretary Pompeo. --to your point, I think the Europeans
share our value set and our interests. I think they would agree
with our assessment of that bad behavior. And so, I am very
hopeful that they will join us in our effort to cease that bad
activity by the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Barrasso.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Appreciate you being
here.
You--we are so appreciative of your efforts and the
President's efforts to achieve complete, verifiable,
irreversible denuclearization of North Korea. And I know we are
going to continue to work toward that goal and continue our
efforts to impose maximum pressure on North Korea, especially
in light of the--today's announcement.
As we continue to impose sanctions and conduct joint
military exercises, keep the regime fully aware of the
consequences of their actions, I was just going to ask a little
bit about China. And do you believe China is embracing maximum-
pressure strategy in order to get North Korea to abandon its
nuclear weapons program and, just in terms of what we can
expect of China in regard to North Korea for future activities,
and have they responded in our efforts to continue along this
line?
Secretary Pompeo. So, I have not spoken to him since this
letter was released, but I did speak to him as recently as
yesterday afternoon. And they made every commitment that they
were prepared to continue in the way that they have. And I wish
we would give the Chinese full credit for what they have done.
It is historic. It is different than what they had done in
previous iterations of this. So, we are very appreciative of
that. I made clear we were going to need them to continue even
while these negotiations take place, and they agreed that that
made sense, for them and for the world.
Senator Barrasso. Yeah. You have been very clear on our
ultimate goal with regard to North Korea. Could you speculate
on what your view is on China's ultimate goal in North Korea or
what they have expressed to you?
Secretary Pompeo. Yeah. I can tell you precisely what they
said to me. They agree that CVID is the correct answer for the
Korean Peninsula.
Senator Barrasso. Okay, move to Iran. And I think, on
Monday, you really gave a--I thought, outstanding remarks at
The Heritage Foundation on Iran. Two weeks ago, the President
ended participation of the United States in this flawed Iranian
deal. I strongly support the decision. You know, you stated,
``First, we will apply unprecedented financial pressure on the
Iranian regime.'' You said, ``The leaders in Tehran will have
no doubt about our seriousness, and, thanks to our colleagues
at the Department of Treasury, sanctions are going back in full
effect, new ones are coming.'' So, will the administration be
on track to have these sanctions fully re-imposed by the
November deadline? And are there--can you talk a little bit
about what additional sanctions may be considered? And are
there things that Congress can do to be helpful?
Secretary Pompeo. So, the answer to the last one is always
yes. I am sure there are tools that we will contemplate, that
we will need assistance with. That is, there will be some
authority, although you have given us, through CAATSA and other
tools, enormous capability and breadth there. And we appreciate
that.
Second, I think the second question, Can I lay out for you
what the next set of actions will be? No, only to say that
there are--the preparations are well along for rolling those
out, here, before too long. You saw some initially against the
Central Bank of Iran and some of its officials in that same
vein. The effort--the core effort with respect to the sanctions
is to deny Iran the wealth to do the bad stuff that they have
been out doing during the JCPOA.
Senator Barrasso. Right.
Secretary Pompeo. People forget that all of this bad
activity took place during the JCPOA. And so, it is not the
case that the withdrawal caused the Iranians to launch missiles
into Riyadh and into the Golan Heights, but, rather, this
activity occurred during the JCPOA. And so, we have got a
serious on--we are hopeful. My task is to build a consensus
around the world so that the world begins to join in those
sanctions, as well, so they are not simply U.S. sanctions, but
global and U.N. sanctions, in addition to those that the United
States puts in place.
Senator Barrasso. In addition to--talk about some of the
bad things that you said Iran is doing, certainly in the
region. I have concerns about what is going on in Lebanon with
regard to Hezbollah, the recent elections. In May, Lebanon held
its first legislative election in 9 years, resulting in
electoral gains by Hezbollah. It is a--Hezbollah is a U.S.-
designated foreign terrorist organization. The leader of
Hezbollah has promised thousands of foreign fighters deploying
to Lebanon to fight Israel in the next war. Congress has put in
place restrictions on U.S. funding for the Lebanese internal
security forces in the Lebanese Armed Forces if either body, it
says, is controlled by a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist
organization.
So, has the Lebanese state become indistinguishable from
Hezbollah? And should we continue to provide assistance to the
Lebanese Armed Forces?
Secretary Pompeo. I do not believe that it is, although we
are reviewing that to be sure--to make sure that the actions
that we take, the funding that is provided, is provided
appropriately and consistent with the law. We have reviewed
that for our--well, certainly, the time that I have been in
service in this administration. So, we will continue to review
that.
The Lebanese election was not what America would have
hoped; I think, what most of the Lebanese people would have
hoped, either. But, I do hope that, when the--when it all
shakes out, that we can continue to provide support to the
Lebanese Armed Forces in a way that is appropriate, and do our
best to help return Lebanon to what everybody knows it once
was.
Senator Barrasso. The jewel of the Mediterranean, as it was
once called. So, yeah, things are different.
Could I move to Turkey? I think, during your testimony this
week before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, you said we
need to get Turkey to rejoin NATO. Others have called Turkey
and NATO a troubled marriage. Turkey has increasingly taken
steps, to me, that undermine the NATO alliance, from
cooperating with Russia to attacking the Kurds, fighting ISIS.
You know, in December, Turkey announced it is going to be
purchasing these S-400 antiaircraft defense system. It is not
compatible with the NATO system, like the Patriot system. Could
you talk a little bit about our strategy to bring NATO back--
Turkey back into the NATO fold and, you know, the areas where
we could actually be working cooperatively with President
Erdogan?
Secretary Pompeo. So, there are places, right? They were in
support of the efforts that we took in--some of the efforts we
took in Syria. There are pockets where we still are able
there--continue to allow us to operate out of airbases there,
so there are pieces that are very important to the Department
of Defense, as well. But, the trend is wrong, to be sure.
They--their actual possession of the S-400 causes multiple
levels of challenges between us and between Turkey and NATO. We
are pressing, diplomatically, to make clear we are trying to
offer them alternatives, as well. We are trying to provide for
what are legitimate defense needs, to assist them with
legitimate defense needs, as well. We are trying to do the
things that will encourage them to come back.
If I said ``rejoin NATO'' yesterday, I may have misspoken.
They are obviously still a member of NATO. I hope that their
actions will prove to be more consistent with what it is NATO's
primary objectives are.
Senator Barrasso. There is a whole question about their
request to buy 100, I think, F-35s, and how that would stand.
It is taking us in the wrong direction, and worth its way to
bring them back in.
Secretary Pompeo. It is still--and it is still very much a
live issue, the Turks' capacity to have access to the F-35.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Booker.
Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Corker, Ranking Member
Menendez.
Secretary Pompeo, it is good to be with you again. Thank
you for your service as Secretary.
I want to commend your recent decision to lift the ill-
considered State Department hiring freeze, and congratulate you
on securing the release of three American detainees from North
Korea.
Although I recognize you did not craft the State Department
budget for FY19, I will just second the terrific comments by
Ranking Member Menendez, who offered a detailed criticism of
how it undermines our values and our security. I am frustrated
that the administration ignored the bipartisan, bicameral will
of Congress and submitted, again, a budget request that would
cut, by 30 percent, much of the State Department and AID
activity that I think would weaken our global standing and
reverse bipartisan progress.
Today, I want to focus, not just on that budget request,
but on some important foreign policy issues challenging us. And
I also want to make sure I thank you for your strong
endorsement, in your written testimony today and in your spoken
testimony before House Foreign Affairs, of the BUILD Act, a
genuinely bipartisan bill that I think could help us step up
around the world to crowd in American private capital and to
confront the challenge of China's mercantile activity in the
developing world. I think that is a promising bipartisan
initiative. And I want to make sure we work together to use
that to strengthen international development and advance our
foreign policy interests.
Let me ask you about Ebola, if I might. In 2014, I visited
Liberia and saw the devastation of an epidemic that cost over
11,000 lives before it was finally halted, at a cost of more
than 5 billion to the United States. Thousands of volunteers
and government employees were deployed. Folks went there
because of their strengths and skills in medicine and nursing,
their religious faith, from across a wide range of groups and
countries. But, in the end, American action in Liberia was key
to turning the tide and to restoring some semblance of health
and stability to Liberia. And I think, in many ways, that
response represented the best of American leadership.
But, today I am concerned. The President is considering
rescinding funds to fight the new Ebola outbreak in the DRC.
There are cases, in a city of over a million people, that have
alarmed, I think, many of us who were involved in the response
in 2014. Reportedly, the President is close to closing part of
the NSC designed to help lead U.S. and international responses
to pandemics and cutting funding, as I mentioned, in the budget
for global health security. Do you agree with these steps? Do
you think this is a responsible response, including the
rescissions to Ebola funding?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator Coons, thanks for the question.
It is an important issue. The--we are watching closely. I think
the good news, with respect to the situation in the DRC, is, I
think we are further out in front than we were last time.
Having said that, as you well know, you are on top of it until
you are not. And so, we are deeply focused on making sure that
we try and stay out in front and do everything we can.
We also believe we have enough resources today. That is, we
do not think there are funding shortfalls that prevent us, in
the near term, from doing the things we need to do. So, we
think we are okay there.
You asked directly about the rescission. I have had many
discussions about that. And my push has been: This is
important, we need to make sure we have the resources, not only
for the current issue, the one that we know about, the one that
is in the news today, but, rather, for each of these global
health challenges, these risks, in a way that is appropriate.
And so, there are still live discussions. I was a little late--
I was a little late to the debate, but I am on the scene now.
And I did not receive any pushback, generically, from my
request to make sure we had the right number of resources.
Now----
Senator Coons. My----
Secretary Pompeo. --it is a matter of----
Senator Coons. My sense is that the rescission package
continues to include rescissions to the Complex Crises Fund,
which has been critical in allowing a rapid response to major
humanitarian crises, as well as funds from the Millennium
Challenge Corporation, despite the President just signing into
law a bipartisan bill that grants that agency new authorities.
I hope you will really look at these rescissions. My impression
is that our response, as of now, is significantly underfunded
and puts us at some risk of repeating what happened in 2014,
where, as you said, we thought we were on top of it, and then
it emerged, and then it----
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.
Senator Coons. --became a regional tragedy.
I will also just reference that President Trump, then a
private citizen, in 2014 tweeted that the U.S. cannot allow
Ebola-infected people back. Quote, ``People that go to faraway
places and help out are great, but must suffer the
consequences.'' Many of the folks who were on the front lines
in responding in 2014 were U.S. Public Health Service, USAID,
U.S. military. Do you think health and development
professionals who risk their lives to contain an outbreak
should bear the consequences and be kept out of the United
States, as that suggestion in a different context from our now-
President might lead one to believe?
Secretary Pompeo. Boy, there have been no discussions about
that. Yes, I think they need to, obviously, be able to come
back after doing the great work that they did.
Senator Coons. I would hope we could work together to
ensure that anybody who deploys is certain that they can safely
return home.
Now, let me move to Iran strategy. There has been a
vigorous discussion about it. You gave a speech Monday at The
Heritage Foundation. You laid out 12 demands of the Iranian
regime. I would agree with you that we should expect no less of
nations that are part of the community of civilized countries,
but I am struggling with exactly how we are going to get there.
This is an ambitious agenda, and, other than threats to impose
secondary sanctions that I am concerned will distance us from
our European allies, I am wondering about how exactly we are
going to push back on Iran in Syria, push back on Iran in other
places in the region, in Yemen.
One of the lines of effort you mentioned included
supporting the Iranian people, which I was intrigued by. Are
you advocating that President Trump remove Iran from the list
of countries whose citizens cannot come to the United States
through the travel ban? And help me with whether the Trump
administration's visa policy is consistent with outreach to the
Iranian people.
Secretary Pompeo. So, there are many pieces of this that I
will concede we still have work to do to figure out. I would
say that, more broadly, that set of policies is under review to
try and make sure we get that right. What I was speaking to was
not actually that. I was speaking to a broader understanding,
where it is important to know--for the Iranian people to
understand that they will not be on their own. It was--some
have suggested--there was a question from Senator Kaine earlier
about whether our motive is regime change. Right? Out--outside
external was implicit in that. It is certainly not. It is the
case that we are convinced that the Iranian people do not
support the adventurism that it has been engaged in. And so,
the efforts we have--we talked about the GEC, we talked about
other public diplomacy tools that America has and, I think, has
fallen into disrepair, getting those back out and being
effective communicating with the Iranian people there, as well.
But, I am happy to take onboard to consider what we ought
to do with respect to visa policy, as well. But, my--I would
have to think about the--there are second-order effects to
that, as well. But, I am happy to consider----
Senator Coons. I think it might send an important signal in
that area of effort. And I respect the complexity of the
undertaking, but look forward to asking more questions about
how we are going to move forward----
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.
Senator Coons. --with our European allies.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Portman.
Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Secretary, thank you for being back with us.
I am disappointed but, frankly, not surprised by the summit
being canceled, given the nature of the regime. And seems to me
that the reason they were willing to come to the table in the
first place was because of the maximum-pressure campaign,
because of the sanctions, and because you were able to
internationalize those sanctions; in particular, having China
play such a central role. I guess, a couple of questions.
First, it seems to me that the maximum-pressure campaign
has been somewhat paused over the last several weeks. Do you
intend to reengage, to ramp that back up? And what do you
intend to do with regard to our international sanctions,
specifically with regard to China getting back engaged?
Secretary Pompeo. So, I did not--my sense was, we had not
taken much of a pause. We were still out, working around the
world to convince others to do the things we needed them to do
to--when there were North Korean workers there, to send them
back to North Korea, to stop remittances, go back--there were
lots of activities. We still had extensive work on ship-to-ship
transfers. We were still building out that capacity, as well,
to stop refined products from entering North Korea, as well.
So, I think we have been continuing that even up and through
today in--as were contemplating the June 12th summit. That will
not change. We have still got work to do to build out each of
those. I am sure there are additional sanctions that we will
seek to put in place. The United States, I am sure, will go
back to others, asking them to do more, as well.
You had a second question. I am sorry, Senator Portman, it
slipped my mind.
Senator Portman. Yeah, I think--I think you had answered
it, with regard to the international pressure.
Secretary Pompeo. Senator Portman, if I can say----
Senator Portman. Yeah.
Secretary Pompeo. --one more thing. It is, Senator Portman,
very, very important that the world observes that this effort
continues. It is one thing for the United States to be out
after it. We need our partners, who have done so much good
work, at economics--at economic pain to their own countries but
stay with us until we achieve the outcome.
Senator Portman. I think that is absolutely essential and,
you know, again, key to the apparent success you had at one
point in getting them to talk. And you have had conversations,
direct negotiations. As you know, I spent a couple of years
trying to get Otto Warmbier back to the States, and, during
that time period, talked about the need for direct
negotiations. You have now done that. And so, there has been a
step forward, even though the summit has been canceled. And I
think that is appropriate. Again, given the nature of the
regime, it is not surprising that they have canceled.
You talked, at the State Department, about ``getting its
swagger back.'' And you and I talked about--a lot about this
during your confirmation process, private meetings and public
testimony. I think that is important. I think morale is higher.
One of the ways you can get your swagger back is to do exactly
what you said a moment ago in response to the question from
Senator Coons. You talked about using the GEC, which is the
Global Engagement Center, in an effort to communicate directly
to the Iranian people more aggressively.
You even said, a moment ago, that you thought that some of
our efforts to do so have fallen into disrepair. I could not
agree with you more, as you know. And, based on legislation,
Senator Murphy, who is with us today, and I wrote, a couple of
years ago, you now have the ability to do that, because we have
invested in the State Department this responsibility to
coordinate all of our international efforts on pushing back
against disinformation, propaganda, but also be more effective
at getting our narrative out. I am encouraged by your budget
request, 53.5 million bucks, also encouraged that DoD funding
is finally coming your way. I do think that DoD funding perhaps
should be looked at as a 2-year funding source now that we are
so close to the fiscal year. I hope you will look into that. I
think that would be helpful.
You also talked about ensuring that the right people are in
place, not just contractors, but having folks who are there who
are senior members of your Foreign Service organization who can
really make this GEC the effective body that I think you
believe it ought to be.
So, first, I appreciate your personal commitment to this
that you made during the confirmation process. And, second,
just want to ask you, Where are we with regard to GEC? What
more could we be doing here to help you?
Secretary Pompeo. I have, sadly, little progress to
identify for you this morning. But, we now--we now can hire.
There are 13 full-time positions that were frozen out from
being hired. We are working that. I agree with you, we need
career professionals working, leading parts of that
organization. It is going to take me a bit to get where we need
to be. So, a little forbearance. But, know that we are working
hard at it.
I want--I would like to put that in the context of what I
think is an incredible priority. So, it is not just the GEC.
That is an important place. It has a lot of money. As
publicly--public diplomacy goes, $60 million is a lot of money.
We should be able to do some incredibly effective work there.
But, we have got the BBG, which, too--right?--the Broadcasting
Board of Governors, that I am an ex officio member of--it, too,
has--there is just a lot of places. And I will tell you, I do
not believe it is well coordinated inside the State Department.
It sits in at least two different places--four bureaus, two
secretariats. There is a lot of work to be done to get that
right so that we can begin to--that important piece of American
diplomacy. And I am focused on it. I have got, oh, one of my
seniors coming to me with a plan. I have believed this for a
long time. When I was a young member from Kansas, I spent some
time thinking, trying to get it going, and it overwhelmed me.
Now I have the opportunity to do it. I am looking forward----
Senator Portman. Well, we----
Secretary Pompeo. --to building it out.
Senator Portman. --appreciate your prioritizing it, and we
do think, based on the fact that Congress has now given you
this mandate, that State Department is the right place to do
it. And so, let that swagger work. And let us go for it.
By the way, I was in the Czech Republic visiting Radio Free
Europe and Radio Liberty about a month ago. One of the issues
that came up there was CFIUS. And I know----
Secretary Pompeo. Yeah, sure.
Senator Portman. --you are on the CFIUS board. When I was
at--in the Trade Reps's office, I was on that board. I hope you
are involved in that. The ZTE sanctions issue has put more
light on the fact that, particularly with regard to China, and
also Russia and other countries, there is an effort to
influence and try to obtain more access to our key
technologies. One thing they said in the Czech Republic is,
they do not have a CFIUS there, and there can be backdoor, as
you know, efforts by China and other countries to get into our
technology through Europe.
One question I have for you is whether you would be willing
to work with our European allies so that the EU can have an
effective CFIUS regime in place, as well, and that we can work
with them and other allies. Because, by multilateralizing this,
I think it is going to be much more effective as we begin,
finally, to engage, not just on pushing back on the
disinformation and propaganda we talked about, and getting our
narrative out there, but dealing with the reality that the
technological race is on, and other countries are accessing our
technology in ways that is harmful to our national security.
Secretary Pompeo. Yes. Yes, sir, I agree. We should help
other countries get the same CFIUS-related--CFIUS regime put in
place, as well, much like ours. They are--some of them are
begging for help. We need to get out there and do it.
Senator Portman. Great.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Booker.
Senator Booker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, again, I want to echo some of the comments
that my colleagues have said in thanking you. You spoke to me
personally and privately, as well as publicly to the committee,
about doing things about the morale. As I was traveling around,
I heard a lot of disturbing comments, especially the effects
the hiring freeze was having on the families of people that
were committing themselves to serve our country. You have
addressed some of those things, and I just wanted to let you
know how grateful I am for you sticking to what you said you
would do.
Secretary Pompeo. There is a lot more work to be done. I
hope--a handful of things I hope I can roll out, here, in a
handful of weeks. There will be some that will take months.
But, I intend upon honoring the commitment that I made, not
only to this committee, but to the workforce, when I spoke to
them last week.
Senator Booker. Well, I expected you to fix all the
problems in the first 2 months, sir, and a little disappointed
that you have not moved that quickly.
[Laughter.]
Senator Booker. You and I both share a--not only a
patriotic bent, but a humanitarian bent, as well. And I know
that you are personally disturbed by what is going on in South
Sudan. Since 2013, the civil war, 50,000 human beings have been
killed. You have 4 million people displaced, 7 million people
who have had to receive aid to survive. And now we are seeing a
level of a humanitarian crisis where 5 million people are on
the brink of starvation. And what is painful in this is, it is
compounded by the challenges that we are seeing with epic
levels of violence against women. About 65 percent of the women
in the country have experienced violence of a sexual nature,
and rape and the like.
In addition to this, if you--the crisis in South Sudan has
allowed for almost a proxy battle between other regional
countries. It is causing destabilization in the entire area.
You have Uganda, you have Ethiopia, you have Kenya, who are all
now seeing effects of this civil war and undermining a lot of--
some of the important work that we are doing in a security
nature. This is just a situation that is growing worse and
worse and worse, both from the humanitarian concerns as well
as--I know you know this, as well, better than I do--as well
as, sort of, a--regional interests, counterterrorist interests
in the region, as well.
And I say all that to say I have had some constructive
conversations with Chairman Corker about our diplomatic focus
in the area. I know where there are some issues where we were
withholding support for an Ambassador in the region. But, I
just would like to get your frank opinion on some of the things
that the Chairman and I have been discussing, given the--sort
of the transnational nature of the crisis. I am just wondering
if you share our concerns that we do not have a special envoy
that is getting up every single day and focusing on this issue
and trying to address the grievous humanitarian, diplomatic,
political, and security consequences that this crisis is
causing.
Secretary Pompeo. Senator Booker, I cannot--your factual
statement about the situation is spot-on. You characterized the
risk and the--there are not words to capture a tragedy that is
taking place there perfectly. I will also say, I saw this issue
a little bit in my previous role. I have had a chance to dig
into it only a little bit here in this one. There may be some
fundamental rethinking--maybe this is your point--about our
approach to this. We have been at, sort of, the same diplomatic
line for an awfully long time, with--I do not know--I would say
marginal success. But, perhaps if we had not been doing that,
it would be far worse. But, somehow we have to create a
situation that is fundamentally different than the set of
incentives that sit on the ground today and spill over into the
regions that you describe. You talked about some Sudan, too.
This risk is real.
As for whether there is a requirement for a special envoy,
I have not given it any serious consideration, and I will do
so. We do need our team focused on this issue every day. And
whether it requires a special envoy to do that, I do not know
the answer to. I am certainly willing to consider it.
Senator Booker. I am grateful for that. And my team also
made me aware that the--a director--the previous director was
moved from the South Sudan office into a different office,
without explanation. So, at least from standing outside of your
agency and organization, it looks like we are pulling back on
the people that are--have the specialty and the focus, and not
sure what is filling that void at a time where I think, as you
have heard, sort of, my bias, we should be ramping up
attention, focus, energy into that region.
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, you are informationally ahead of
me. I regret that.
Senator Booker. Okay.
Secretary Pompeo. But, thank you. I will dig into it.
Senator Booker. I am grateful, sir.
And, again, I--you know, observing you and feeling like I
know your core values, and we had a--some private conversations
about this, the great power that your position holds. And I
know that there is --your attention--we all have the same 24
hours--with Asia and with Europe, with the Middle East, that
demand so much right now. Senator Coons, Senator Flake, a
number of the folks I have had the privilege of serving on this
committee, have shown me what attention to issues going on in
Africa can do in literally relieving human suffering. What we
have done--you know, PEPFAR, USAID, as I am now learning, and
as--joining this committee--is stunning. The--and every
American should be proud in understanding that not only is it
humanitarian, but you--as--what Martin Luther King said for our
Nation is true for the globe, injustice anywhere is a threat to
justice everywhere, that these issues, allowed to fester, do
become issues to our national security. And infectious
diseases, especially, we are now learning, with transnational
flights and the like, that injustice anywhere--we do not deal
with contagions in a proactive way, they have a chance of
spreading.
And so, I just want to echo what Senator Coons said with
more eloquence than me about, sort of, my grievous concerns
about the growing crises in--that we see in the DRC, in
general, which I think is an area in need of more diplomatic
attention, more American pressure, more guts and swagger that
we are talking about in other areas of the world that we should
be focusing in the same areas with some of our African nations
and brothers and sisters in humanity. And it does, to me, send
out a stunning reflection of our values--as you know, budgets
reflect values--when we are announcing rescission packages that
do things that just do not seem to make economic sense as well
as moral sense. And I know you operate with strong moral core
and also an understanding of fiscal conservatism about making
investments that can save our country money. And the rescission
of the 232 million for Ebola funding just took--struck me as
staggering, when we know, from past experience with outbreaks,
a small amount invested could save us a tremendous amount on
the back end on a fiscal manner, but just the human suffering
alone that the United States has something to do--and I just
appeal to you, not just as a fellow American, but a fellow
humanitarian, to give some focus to the DRC, give some focus to
what is going on with American posture and resources in dealing
with the Ebola virus. We have so much power in this country,
and this is a place where, if we make the investment, if we
apply the focus, we can make a tremendous impact on human
suffering. And it is not going to be on the front page of the
New York Times, will not be talked about in--on CNN when they
want to talk about what they seem to be distracted by these
days, but, when you and I are towards the end of our lives, you
are in a position right now where you can make a difference
in--on these issues in such a substantive way.
Secretary Pompeo. Thank you, Senator Booker.
Senator Booker. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Paul.
Senator Paul. I think many people would admit that the Iran
agreement had some deficiencies. One of the largest
deficiencies might have been that the $100 billion was released
all at once instead of maybe gradually to help modulate
behavior over a longer period of time. That being said, the
$100 billion that was released was a great inducement to get
Iran to sign the agreement. That was a carrot. And that carrot
is gone. They have gotten the good thing, and now we want
compliance. Now we are pulling out. And so, the question is,
you know, what are the next inducements to get them to sign
things, or will there not be?
I think there is a question with--there are two
possibilities, basically, of what will happen. So, you
reintroduce the strongest sanctions ever. They either do not
work--that is one possibility--because they are unilateral, and
some say unilateral sanctions will not work. Let us say they do
not work. That means Europe, China, and Russia continue to
trade with them, and Iran says, ``Well, they are going to
continue to trade with us, we will just keep abiding by the
agreement.'' They do not develop any more nuclear weapons or
technology towards that, but they do not do anything else that
you would like--ballistic missiles, less terrorism. So, really,
basically, we do not get what we want if the sanctions do not
work.
Second possibility. Let us say the sanctions do work. We
have enough manipulation of money that flows through us from
Europe, Europe does a lot of trade with us, Europe buckles. I
think Russia and China still will trade with them, but let us
say Europe buckles. And let us say it works and it puts enough
pressure on Iran. Then there are two possibilities of what Iran
does. The first possibility is, they say, ``Oh, Secretary
Pompeo--we love Secretary Pompeo's 12-point strategy, and we
are going to accept that.'' I think that is unlikely. The
second possibility, if the sanctions work and they put enough
pressure on them, Iran feels the pressure--is that they restart
their nuclear centrifuge program. So, those are two
possibilities.
But, what I would like to do is go through the 12 steps
that you would like Iran to do and sort of explore what these
would mean if we thought about them in terms bigger than Iran.
So, one of your first things is--and this was--came up
during JPOH, but nobody really could really get this done--
they--you want Iran to reveal the military dimensions of its
nuclear program. Well, let us substitute Israel for Iran there.
Does anybody think Israel is going to reveal the military
dimensions of their nuclear program? Well, you will say,
``Well, they are our friend.'' Well, yeah, but, from Iran's
perspective, they say--they see Israel as a rival, and a
regional rival. Let us put Saudi Arabia in there. Will Saudi
Arabia reveal the military dimensions of its nuclear program?
Well, some might say, ``Hmmm, they do not really have it.''
But, I am guessing there are files over at the CIA that say,
``Well, you know what? They have talked to people about
purchasing it. Some say they have purchased nuclear
technology.'' I guarantee we know that, and you probably cannot
admit it, but let us put Saudi Arabia in there. Are they
willing to discuss anything they have done to develop nuclear
weapons?
So, really what you are asking for is something that they
are never going to agree to. Okay? You can try to cripple them.
It is sort of like unconditional surrender. You are not getting
that.
Let us move on. Proliferation of ballistic missiles. I do
not like them threatening surrounding countries or us with
ballistic missiles. Nobody does. But, they respond, not just to
us, they respond to Saudi Arabia. There is 1,000-year-old war
over there, there is a 1,000-year-old religious war over there,
and there is hostility between the two. So, when we supply
weapons, and the Saudis buy ballistic missiles--the Saudis have
a ballistic missile program--they respond to that. The Saudis
and their allies, the Gulf shiekhdoms, spend eight times more
than Iran. So, when you tell Iran, ``Oh, well, you will have to
give up your ballistic missile program,'' but you do not say
anything to the Saudis, you think they are ever going to sign
that? They would have to be crippled and starving people in the
streets for them ever to agree to give up their ballistic
missile program.
Had we kept the Iran agreement with them, and you said to
the Iranians, ``Well, we want less of an arms race over there.
We would like to have peace with Saudi Arabia,'' could we get
Saudi Arabia to the table with Iran to discuss either a freeze
of ballistic missiles--you know, when we went to Russia, we did
not just succumb and say we would give up our weapons. Neither
did Russia. We did it in parity, we had an agreement. If you
leave Saudi Arabia out of it, and you leave Israel out of it,
and you look at Iran in isolation, that is not the way they
perceive it. So, I do not think they are going to jump at your
12 notions, here, of what you would----
Secretary Pompeo. Senator----
Senator Paul. --like them to do.
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, may I just make--may I make just
one----
Senator Paul. Go ahead.
Secretary Pompeo. --point? I think the example of Saudi
Arabia is a reasonable one. We have told the Saudis exactly
what I asked from the Iranians.
Senator Paul. To talk about their nuclear program?
Secretary Pompeo. We have--they have said they want a
peaceful nuclear energy program, and we have told them we want
a gold standard Section 123 agreement from them, which would
not permit them to enrich. That is simply all I have asked of
Iran, as well.
Senator Paul. Do we have information that the Saudis have
talked to actors in Pakistan and other places about purchasing
nuclear technology?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I cannot answer that here this
morning.
Senator Paul. Which is to say----
Secretary Pompeo. Senator----
Senator Paul. --we probably--in all likelihood do have that
information. And so, the thing is, it is a one-way playing
field. Unless we understand that there are two big players over
there--really, three big players--you have got Iran, you have
got Israel, and you got Saudi Arabia--we want Iran to do things
that we are not willing to ask anybody else to do, and that we
would never do.
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I----
Senator Paul. So----
Secretary Pompeo. --I disagree with you. I think we ask
most nations to do precisely what we are asking Iran to do.
Senator Paul. Let us move on to another one your 12 points.
End the military support for the Houthi rebels. Well, once
again, you are asking them to end it, but you are not asking
the Saudis to end their bombardment of Yemen. I mean, if you
look at the humanitarian disaster that is Yemen, it is squarely
on the shoulders of the Saudis. And so, we are going to ask the
Iranians to quit supplying it--and they, in all likelihood are
the ones supplying the missiles--and you--we get reports, and
the Defense Department comes in and says, ``There has been a--
you know, 32 missile strikes in Saudi Arabia.'' Well, there has
been like 16,000 bombings of Yemen by Saudi Arabia. Nobody even
mentions that. We act as if it did not even happen. If we are
so ignorant that there are two sides to this war, we are never
getting anywhere. Iran is not going to stop doing that. But,
they might, if you sat them down with the Saudi Arabians and
said, ``This arms race does not make sense,'' and Saudi Arabia
is willing to sit down at the table. You know, is Saudi Arabia
willing to stop--another one is ``withdraw all forces under
Iran's command throughout the entirety of Syria.'' Well, dozens
of groups in there, even ISIS, that were getting weapons from
Qatar and Saudi Arabia. In fact, one of the leaked emails from
WikiLeaks was from Podesta to--or from Clinton to Podesta,
saying, ``My goodness, we have got to stop Saudi Arabia and
Qatar from funding ISIS.'' That is a direct email. They were
acknowledging they knew about it, and they were acknowledging
it was a problem, but weapons were flowing in to all kinds of
radicals in there. So, if you want Iran to stop--and, I mean,
Saudi Arabia and Qatar, 10 times the problem. You know, the
whole Syrian war has all of these radical jihadists. The people
who attacked us came from Saudi Arabia. We ignore all that, and
we lavish them with more bombs.
So, really, until we acknowledge there are two sides to the
war--or three sides to the war in the Middle East, you are not
going to get the agreement. I think it was naive to pull out of
the Iran agreement, and I think, in the end, we will be worse
off for it.
The Chairman. Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Secretary Pompeo, for being here today with
us.
As you know, the--ZTE, the Chinese cellphone company, was
hit with a $1.9 billion fine for violating U.S. law. The
Department of Defense has also warned about the security
vulnerabilities in these phones. Soon after ZTE reported its
resulting financial problems, the Metallurgical Corporation of
China made a decision to support a half-billion-dollar project
in Indonesia, which included Trump-branded properties. Then,
soon after President Trump sounded the alarm on behalf of the
Chinese company ZTE, tweeting, and I quote here, ``President
Xi, of China, and I are working together to give massive
Chinese phone company ZTE a way to get back into business,
fast. Too many jobs in China lost. Commerce has been instructed
to get it done.'' That is the end of the quote on the tweet.
Many observers have found these events and their timing
strange. I would say, very strange. As you know, the Trump
organization owns assets around the world, in India, the Middle
East, Panama, and have pursued a project in Russia well into
2016. Members of Congress and the executive branch are under an
ethical duty to avoid even the appearance of a conflict of
interest. Do you agree that there is at least an appearance of
a conflict of interest with this sequence of events with China?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I have not seen any indication
that would support the connection that you seem to be drawing.
I was part of the conversation early and then, frankly, more
recently, about ZTE. I knew about ZTE in my previous role, I
knew about it when I was a Member of Congress, as well. This
administration takes the threat that ZTE poses incredibly
seriously. Indeed, it is the first administration to take any
action against ZTE, in spite of the fact that it has been a
known threat to the United States of America for years.
Previous administration chose to do literally nothing against
ZTE. And so, the critiques that this administration has done--
not done enough and the ``many others'' that you refer to--I do
not know who they are--are not reflective of the deliberations
that I have seen this administration undertake with respect to
how to respond to ZTE.
Senator Udall. Given that the President refuses to disclose
his tax returns, how can you assure the American people that
American foreign policy is free of his personal conflicts of
interest?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I find that question bizarre.
Senator Udall. I did not--you do not want to answer it,
then.
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, after you--you just said----
Senator Udall. You just want to describe it as bizarre----
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, I do. I think----
Senator Udall. --and not give me an answer.
Secretary Pompeo. --I think that is indicative of my
answer, Senator. I have been incredibly involved in this
administration's foreign policy now for some 16 months, and I
have seen literally no evidence of what you are----
Senator Udall. Well, that is what I want to ask you----
Secretary Pompeo. --spuriously suggesting.
Senator Udall. --ask you specifically----
Secretary Pompeo. Spuriously, Senator.
Senator Udall. No, it is not----
Secretary Pompeo. Is it----
Senator Udall. --spuriously----
Secretary Pompeo. It is an outrageous suggestion.
Senator Udall. My friend, it is not spuriously. This has
been raised by a number of people----
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.
Senator Udall. --out there.
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir, it has. You want me to tell you
who those folks are and what their----
Senator Udall. No, it is----
Secretary Pompeo. --political interests may well be?
Senator Udall. No, I know. It is fake news.
Now, let me ask my question.
Secretary Pompeo. Yeah.
Senator Udall. Okay. Back to the specific case with ZTE. Do
you believe that it is in the U.S. interest to help the
problematic ZTE phone company get back into business, fast?
That is the Trump tweet. And is the State Department using any
resources to work with the Commerce Department on this issue?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I do not know the question to--
the answer to your second question. I have certainly been
involved. So, yes, the State Department is using some resources
to work with the Department of Commerce, some part of my time,
for sure. There may be others. Certainly, my team members have
been involved in this along the way, as well.
Senator Udall. But, you--and then, the first question was,
do you believe that it is in the U.S. interest to help the
problematic ZTE phone company get back into business, fast?
Secretary Pompeo. I am convinced this administration will
make a decision that is in the best interest of the United
States of America with respect to ZTE and all things.
Senator Udall. Now, the former Ambassador to Panama
recently told The New Yorker that the President asked him,
quote, ``What about the hotel?'' That is the quote from the
Ambassador in the Oval Office meeting to discuss the U.S.-
Panama relationship. Does the President ever discuss overseas
Trump properties when discussing foreign policy issues with
you?
Secretary Pompeo. I have never seen us make any decision
based on anything like you are suggesting, Senator. So, I do
not know how else to answer that question.
Senator Udall. Well, good. I just want a straight answer.
Secretary Pompeo. Well----
Senator Udall. That is great. I want to offer my----
Secretary Pompeo. I am not sure----
Senator Udall. --condolences ----
Secretary Pompeo. --that is--I am not sure that was exactly
your point there, Senator----
Senator Udall. No, no. I wanted----
Secretary Pompeo. --to get a straight answer.
Senator Udall. I wanted a straight answer from you. We will
see how history plays this out.
I want to offer my condolences to the people of Cuba and to
those who perished on the flight from Havana last week. This is
the--yet another example, over 50 years, failed isolationist
policies towards Cuba. And it just continues on and on. The
United States embargo prevents Cuba from leasing U.S. planes
and parts. This is a safety hazard that may have led to a
disaster on the island last week. The plane--the crashed plane
was an inter-Cuba flight, a route that generally is not
serviced by U.S. air carriers. This means that Cubans and
American tourists alike are subject to the same dangers of a
poorly regulated airline industry. There is no doubt that the
U.S. companies would benefit from business with Cuban airlines.
And Cubans as well as American tourists, I think, would be
safer because of it. Unfortunately, this administration
continues to backtrack on efforts to engage with Cuban
officials. Would the State Department be open to a dialogue
with Cuban officials to help improve air safety and upgrade
aircraft to avoid another catastrophe?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, the implicit suggestion there is
somehow that the responsibility for this aircraft's failure did
not rest with Cuba and its people. I simply disagree with that.
I am happy to consider whether there are useful and appropriate
mechanisms for the State Department to engage with Cuba on
civil aviation. I do not know the answer to the question.
Senator Udall. Yeah. Well, the point the question was
trying to make is, when there is cooperation on all fronts in
Cuba, I think Americans do better and Cubans do better. And
that is what the last policy of the last administration was, to
uplift everyone. And I--and when I had a discussion with you in
my office, you talked about, ``We are going to try to have a--
have an engaged policy with Cuba. We are not going to go
backward.''
But, my time is up, Mr. Chairman, so I would wait for the
second round. Thank you.
Secretary Pompeo. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Thank you.
I--on the ZTE issue, we had a--there were a few of us that
were part of a briefing last night, and I do think that having
nothing to do with other countries' interests, I think that--I
do think the administration is using trade policy and some of
these other sanctions issues maybe too transactionally--I know
that does not happen at the State Department--and sometimes
based on just feelings about a--an individual that they are
dealing with. And I do think that inconsistency is creating
problems. I--the thing they have discussed over the last 24
hours relative to autos, to me, is an abuse of the authority
granted to the President in Section 232, absolutely an abuse of
that authority and, to me, feels like it has more to do with
domestic politics or some other issue. And I hope that will be
abandoned quickly. I think it is dangerous and destabilizing
and should end immediately.
But, I have to say, I would agree with the Secretary, I saw
nothing whatsoever enough that related to some kind of personal
conflict that may have taken place. But, I do think the
inconsistencies are creating problems for our Nation.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
It has been a long hearing, I know, and I am--my dad used
to tell me the mind can only absorb what the seat can ensure.
So, I think, if you are like me, we are both enduring a extra-
long hearing. But, it is an important hearing, and it is about
the budget, and I want to ask about that for--briefly, if I
can.
One, Senator Coons raised the question of the Ebola
outbreak in Liberia. And he was right on point, because the
rescission that the administration has put together includes
removing part of the emergency money that went to Ebola in the
crisis response of the United States, which, in part, the State
Department is responsible for. And, by reducing that, it raised
a point I want to make sure you were aware of, because I know,
since you and I talked, a month ago, when you were--we went
through a confirmation. You have had Iranian deals fall
through, you have had changes in the Korean deal, you have had
all kinds--you have been a busy man. I do not expect you to
know about all of it. This is important.
We had 16 isolation beds in the United States of America
that met the standard necessary to try and stop an Ebola
outbreak from expanding in the United States of America. We did
not have enough, but we had just enough. And we saved 16 lives
by having those isolation beds at--and they were at Emory
University, in Atlanta. They were at the National Institute of
Health, in Maryland. And there were two other locations. I
cannot remember where they were. But, there were four in each
place, where we brought back the Samaritans Purse doctors who
went in there and contracted Ebola, brought them back to the
United States, put them in those isolation chambers to ensure
that we were not spreading the disease around, and we curtailed
the growth of--potential growth of Ebola in the United States.
And a few months later, we stopped Ebola's outbreak in Nigeria,
which is a country of 50 million people. So, it is an important
response that you have got to have, and you cannot just all of
a sudden build it when the problem comes. You have to be
prepared for it. So, I would hope--I would just ask that, as
you go through all the many things you have to look at--in this
rescission, we are making--we are playing a dangerous game if
we are reducing our preparedness for something like Ebola or a
pandemic. We are just passing the pandemic bill out of the HELP
Committee this week, and we will get it to the floor soon. But,
I hope you will take a look at that. I think Senator Coons was
absolutely right to bring it up. And we have tangible proof
in--we know we have got the Democratic Republic of Congo having
a problem now with an outbreak--potential outbreak. And we know
how we stopped the last one, but we are going to need to be
prepared again. And being prepared early is going to be very
helpful.
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, Senator. I will absolutely look at
it.
Senator Isakson. And I would say--and that is a State
Department diplomatic issue. You talk about having----
Secretary Pompeo. It absolutely is.
Senator Isakson. --diplomatic problems. You need a--you get
a hunger--a famine or a disease pandemic, and you got a
problem. And it is a political problem to have. So, I wanted to
point that out.
The second thing I want to talk about, or just ask about,
is the--you lifted the hiring freeze, I think, in May 15th. Is
that not correct?
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, Senator, I believe that is correct--
15th or 16th, it went into effect.
Senator Isakson. I think the impact initiative that the
Department has got going, which is a $246 million request for
any number of areas you want to make changes in the State
Department, is that enough to do--implement the impact that you
want to have on the Department? And will you be able to get it
in place or--as quick as possible?
Secretary Pompeo. That is the right question, Senator. I do
not know the answer to that. There are pieces of that
initiative that are incredibly worthy and will have a high ROI,
that will get us a good return, for sure. I have not had a
chance to dig into it enough to know if we have hit the mark on
the number or if there is additional resources needed.
Senator Isakson. I asked you, in the--your confirmation
hearing--I have been told, and it has been reported by many
people, that the job you did at the CIA in restoring morale and
swagger, if you will, was remarkable. And you got high marks
for that. And I told you, on the confirmation hearing, that my
take on the State Department was that they were having a morale
problem, and you were going in to a second challenge on that
talent that you have. So, I know it has been--with all the
things you had going on, and you have not had a chance to
implement a lot of programs that you would like to that would
deal with that subject, but I do urge you to work on ensuring
that we have got the best morale possible in our diplomacy, in
our diplomats around the world, and on the responsibility of
the State Department. You are a great leader, and they need
that swagger, and they need it back quick.
Secretary Pompeo. Great. Thank you, Senator. I will work on
it. I work on it a little bit every day. There is important
components of getting that right, returning their authority to
them, giving them all the room they need to go do the great
work they came to State Department to do. And we are getting
along the way to achieving that.
Senator Isakson. Well, thank you for coming, and thanks for
a great start on your new challenge.
Secretary Pompeo. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. It is good to be with you all.
Senator Markey.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, were you involved in the drafting of this
letter?
Secretary Pompeo. Yes.
Senator Markey. Then maybe you can help me answer some
questions about it. The President wrote, quote, ``Based on the
tremendous anger and open hostility displayed in North Korea's
most recent statement, I feel it is inappropriate at this time
to have this long-planned meeting.'' Mr. Secretary, how did you
expect North Korea to react to comparisons between North Korea
and Libya, between the fates of Kim Jong Un and Gaddafi? Why
would you expect anything other than anger and hostility in
reaction to these comparisons?
Secretary Pompeo. I actually--I really appreciate this
question, because there is this misunderstanding that has taken
place with this idea of a Libya model. I have not had a chance
to go do the work to find out what that really was, what
transpired when the Libyans chose to give up their nuclear
weapons. It was quick, decisive diplomatic work negotiated
over--it is all--all things relative, a relative short period
of time in 2003. That is the Libya model.
Senator Markey. Well, the Libya----
Secretary Pompeo. That is the Libya model. It was some----
Senator Markey. The Libya model----
Secretary Pompeo. --it was some 8 years later----
Senator Markey. The Libya model, as Kim Jong Un has been
interpreting it, is that it is one where the leader of the
country surrenders their nuclear capability, only to then be
overthrown and killed. Why would you not think that Kim would
not interpret that, as it continued to escalate with John
Bolton on the Sunday shows, with the Vice President talking
about the Gaddafi model--why would you think that there would
be any other interpretation than what happened to Gaddafi at
the end of his denuclearization, which is that he wound up
dead? Why would you think that that would not, in fact, elicit
hostility from a negotiating partner only 3 weeks from sitting
down across the table from him?
Secretary Pompeo. There are probably several reasons that I
think that. The first is, that is not what they were talking
about when they spoke about Libya. Right? I----
Senator Markey. No, not right. Not----
Secretary Pompeo. It was----
Senator Markey. --right. Not right.
Secretary Pompeo. Ambassador Bolton----
Senator Markey. That is not how Kim would be interpreting--
this is----
Secretary Pompeo. Senator----
Senator Markey. --diplomacy.
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I am telling you what they said,
so we hope that they would--he would hear----
Senator Markey. I am sorry, what who--what who said?
Secretary Pompeo. Give me a second.
Senator Markey. With what who said?
Secretary Pompeo. I heard Ambassador Bolton speak to this.
I cannot quote them back, but he was speaking about the nuclear
negotiation, itself. Let me----
Senator Markey. But, what John Bolton said----
Secretary Pompeo. Let me----
Senator Markey. I will quote to you what he said. Here----
Secretary Pompeo. Okay.
Senator Markey. --is what John Bolton said. He said, ``We
have very much in mind the Libyan model of 2003-2004.'' That is
what he said.
Secretary Pompeo. Yes.
Senator Markey. Now, how----
Secretary Pompeo. Exactly.
Senator Markey. Well, how would you----
Secretary Pompeo. That is my point.
Senator Markey. How----
Secretary Pompeo. Do you recall when Gaddafi was killed?
Senator Markey. I think perhaps Donald Trump is the only
person in America who would not be interpreting that to mean
that, at the end of the story, the leader of that country dies.
So, why would President Trump think that that was a good model
to be used----
Secretary Pompeo. I actually think you made my point,
Senator.
Senator Markey. What is that?
Secretary Pompeo. 2003 and 2004. Gaddafi survived long
after 2004.
Senator Markey. Right.
Secretary Pompeo. Right. And, Senator--and Ambassador
Bolton spoke to 2003 and 2004. Let me give you the second
reason I think----
Senator Markey. No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no. The model
is, he gives up the weapons in 2003 and 2004, and then he
ultimately gets killed. Okay? That is what we are saying went
by using the Gaddafi model. Why would that be a good way of
having a conversation with someone who we are asking to engage
in denuclearization?
Secretary Pompeo. Let me----
Senator Markey. I do not understand what you are talking
about.
Secretary Pompeo. I do not--we apparently are having a--
difficulty in communicating this morning, Senator, because I am
doing my best to articulate, and I am clearly incapable of
communicating to you adequately. I apologize for that.
Senator Markey. I think you are. I think you are trying to
divide----
Secretary Pompeo. I am just----
Senator Markey. --this Gaddafi question----
Secretary Pompeo. I am describing----
Senator Markey. --into a negotiation in 2003 and 2004 to
give up the nuclear weapons, and then what happened to him
subsequently, as though it is two separate story lines. Well,
in the mind of Kim, it will not be two separate story lines. It
will be the Gaddafi story as it is understood by, I think,
everyone but this White House, that winds up with him dead. So,
I do not--why are we not understanding that that is the story
of Libya from 2003 and '04 on to the day he gets killed?
Secretary Pompeo. You will recall that is not what Senator
Bolton said. He talked about specifically to--if you quoted it
correctly--I do not have it; you have got it written down----
Senator Markey. Yeah.
Secretary Pompeo. --he spoke specifically to 2003 and '04.
But, let me give you one more reason that Chairman Kim should
understand it differently. He and I spoke about--he and I spoke
about what assurances were going to be provided to him. These
were assurances that would clearly have to be capable, in the
same way that we are demanding a permanent, irreversible
denuclearization--verifiable denuclearization. In that same
way, we have to provide him assurances that extend beyond the
end of the negotiations, as well. And so, we had exactly--we
had a discussion exactly in this vein. It is the case that we
are going to have to make commitments that will extend----
Senator Markey. All right. So----
Secretary Pompeo. --well beyond that. But, there----
Senator Markey. Did you----
Secretary Pompeo. --is a second reason that I think----
Senator Markey. Did you agree--did you agree that using the
Gaddafi model was a good way to incentivize Kim to
denuclearize? Did you agree with that decision?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I did not make that decision.
Senator Markey. No, I am asking you. Did you agree with the
decision to use the Gaddafi model as a way to get him to
denuclearize?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I think what--I do not want to
speak for--I have tried--I have----
Senator Markey. No, you are our chief diplomat, Mr.
Secretary. Did you agree with that approach?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I have given you my approach.
You are trying to characterize what Ambassador Bolton said. We
clearly have a disagreement about how----
Senator Markey. And Vice President Pence said--he made
reference to Gaddafi, as well. Does insulting, Mr. Secretary,
our negotiating partner now a pass for American diplomacy?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, we have done everything we can
to get us closer than America has been under previous
administrations to achieving a really good outcome. We are
determined to continue to work down that path.
Senator Markey. Right. Well, do you think moving from
``fire and fury'' to ``let us talk'' and then, in this letter,
moving to ``You talk about your nuclear capabilities, but ours
are so massive and powerful that I pray to God that we will
never have to use them''--that is talking about using nuclear
weapons again, as we were 3 weeks from sitting down with them,
based upon a response to our use of Gaddafi as a model for
denuclearization of the country. So, we should be negotiating
peace, Mr. Secretary, but you seem to want to negotiate war.
You seem to be--really to miss this opportunity to defend the
Gaddafi approach here before this committee today. And I just
think that you have missed an opportunity. You have missed a
chance to actually give some confidence to the American people
and the world that we are on a pathway towards reaching a
negotiated settlement with North Korea.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Yeah.
I want to use some of my time, here. I will say that one of
the reasons I oppose so strongly what the Obama administration
did in Libya was exactly the argument you are laying out right
now. I think you opposed it, too, if I remember correctly. I
may be wrong. But, to have someone like Gaddafi, who gave up
their nuclear weapons, and then to go kill him, to me, sent
exactly the signal that you are laying out right now. So, we
may be reprocessing his materials, maybe we are doing it in
Tennessee right now. Gaddafi is now a dead man, and it sent to
me a strong signal that Secretary Pompeo is having to overcome
right now to give assurances that, in the event Kim Jung-Un
gives up his weapons, the same thing will not happen to him.
So, I hear what you are saying, but it was, in fact, let us
face it, the doctrine of the last administration to take out a
leader that gave up their nuclear weapons. And that does make
it more difficult for us down the road. I stated that at the
time. I will state it again now.
I would like to give Secretary Pompeo the opportunity to
talk a little bit about what happened in '03 and '04, just to
edify a little bit what the Libya model could have meant if
that is what was referred to.
Secretary Pompeo. Yeah. So, we had a very robust
identification of the systems that were in place. Concededly, a
much smaller challenge than is faced in North Korea, so a more
difficult verification problem we are faced in North Korea than
we were in Libya. But, ultimately, weapons transshipped, left
the country, and we continued to believe successfully got all
of the nuclear capability out from Libya at that time. It was--
I know the negotiators that did really hard, painstaking work.
It was not straightforward, either. There were bumps and
hurdles along the way. But, they achieved that outcome, the
outcome that they had set out to achieve.
The Chairman. Senator Murphy.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
My only comment on this exchange is that I think you may be
providing a little bit more pushback than is necessary on
Senator Markey's foundational point, which is that, as much as
it matters what you think you mean, in the context of
diplomacy, it matters more what the actor on the other side
thinks you mean. And so, its relevance, but not dispositive, as
to what Ambassador Bolton thought he meant when he said that--
we need to think about what the other actor interprets that as.
And I just think it strains credibility to suggest that it is
outside of the realm of possibility or completely unfair or
unwarranted for Kim to read that as an advertisement that we
are going to repeat the mistake that we made years ago.
I want to come back to the budget for a second, and I will
probably go off the budget if I have time, as well.
I want to talk to you about the consequences of some of
these cuts. We regularly read reports of Russian money and
influence flowing into the Balkans at rates that, frankly, we
did not see before the Trump administration. They see an
opportunity, as we withdraw from the Balkans, to essentially
set up a new front, a new hybrid scenario, like we have seen in
Ukraine. They are buying up media companies, they are securing
contracts for oil and gas, they are bribing government
officials, they are funding biker gangs, martial arts clubs,
all sorts of pseudo-militaries. It really looks a lot like the
lead-up to what happened in eastern Ukraine. But, this budget
that you are presenting to us calls for governance funding cuts
of 91 percent in Albania, 75 percent cuts in Macedonia, 69
percent in Serbia, 67 percent in Bosnia. I mean, they are
catastrophic withdrawals of funding, and another signal, a very
clear signal, to the Russians that, ``We are out, and you
should fill the void.''
So, my question is, why? Why are you proposing these big
funding cuts to governance programs in the Balkans?
Secretary Pompeo. You are talking about the budget numbers,
the budget numbers that were sent out for FY 2019. Is that
where the DSF comes from?
Senator Murphy. Yeah.
Secretary Pompeo. Well, we have a 2-year agreement on what
we are going to spend, and I am confident that the Russians can
see that we are not, in fact, doing what you describe. We are--
we are active. I have had, I promise, per capita, more than its
fair share of time in my first 3 weeks spent on this set of
issues. They are very important. I know them well. They are not
just State Department issues. There are others involved, too.
But, I agree with you, the threat there of the Russians
continuing to move aggressively is very real, and one that we
have an obligation to counter.
Senator Murphy. But, how can you do that when you are
cutting----
Secretary Pompeo. But, we are not going----
Senator Murphy. --funding to those programs?
Secretary Pompeo. But, we are not going to, Senator. We are
going to have the resources we need.
Senator Murphy. But, why propose it?
Secretary Pompeo. I--FY 2020. I was not around. I cannot--I
can only speak to what I am going to endeavor to do. I am going
to try and make sure we have every dollar we need to deliver,
not only on that mission in the Balkans, but each of our
missions around the world.
Senator Murphy. I want to bring you--and I appreciate your
verbal commitment to the region. I think if we do not pay some
attention to it now, we are going to be really sorry.
Secretary Pompeo. I completely agree.
Senator Murphy. Let me bring you back to Yemen. You have
had a couple of questions on Yemen. Maybe let me ask the
questions Senator Paul might not have gotten to.
So, there is no evidence that we have had any success in
changing the trajectory of civilian deaths on the ground. In
fact, it is the exact opposite. April was the worst month for
civilian deaths inside Yemen. Since we had the debate on the
Senate floor, a private residence in Sa'dah was bombed, killing
20; a residence in Hudaydah was bombed, killing 12--seven kids;
a gas station in Najah, killing 24; a commuter bus in Taiz,
killing 20. The civilian death count is getting worse, not
better. And so, what evidence can you provide to the committee
that we are having success in our efforts to try to make sure
that civilians are not the casualties of a bombing campaign
that we continue to assist the Saudis and the Emirates in?
Secretary Pompeo. I do not know the data the same way you
did. I will take it at its face value. There is a lot of work
to do. There is no doubt about that. We still have risks. We
have humanitarian risks, too, that remain. You talked about the
civilians deaths. There are still real risks of outbreaks of
disease. Those are all very real. I have met with the new Envoy
there. It is a long, hard negotiation road that is in front of
him. I am hopeful that some of the things that have transpired,
that he has been able to do with all the parties, both the
Houthi government, the Saudis, the Emirates, will yield a
political outcome that will stop this death, which, at the end
of the day, is the only way that really gets fixed.
Senator Murphy. But, with all due respect, there is no
political process. In fact, very much the opposite. We had a
hearing with your Acting Assistant Secretary for the region,
Mr. Satterfield, in which we asked about the planned assault on
Hudaydah. The coalition has been wanting, for a long time, to
march on Hudaydah. The United States has pressed the coalition
to refrain from taking that course, because 80 percent of the
humanitarian relief supplies come through Hudaydah. Mr.
Satterfield said, in front of this committee, we would not view
such an action as consistent with our own policy upon which our
support is based, suggesting that we might pull our support if
they go for Hudaydah. They are going for Hudaydah. They are
marching on Hudaydah as we speak. They are planning to launch
an assault. So, why were we not successful in convincing them
to refrain from an assault on Hudaydah? And will we contemplate
pulling our support if they continue with a military campaign
that will turn a nightmare into a cataclysm, from a
humanitarian perspective?
Secretary Pompeo. So, we have made clear our view on that.
I think Ambassador Satterfield sounds like he adequately
communicated that to you. Our primary objective there--well,
there is multiple, but we certainly are concerned about what
the humanitarian outcomes are of such a thing, and we have
articulated that to them, as well.
Senator Murphy. But, why continue to be part of this
coalition if we have no effect on the most important decisions
that are being made by the coalition?
Secretary Pompeo. You assume a status quo, absent our
involvement, that might not be the case. Right? It is the case
that our involvement may well--however bad things are today, it
could be that our involvement has made them less worse than
they would be. That is bad grammar, but the truth.
Senator Murphy. Yeah, it is a--it is--I----
Secretary Pompeo. You have to concede that there have been
many cases where our involvement has absolutely improved the
lives, reduced the humanitarian catastrophe that was taking
place. There are absolutely places where our involvement has
made a material difference. And so, as bad as it is, it is our
judgment today that it is still worth engaging.
Senator Murphy. I think that is a hard case to be made,
given the reality of the conflict on the ground in Yemen, that
our involvement has made things better for the Yemeni people.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Menendez [presiding]. Thank you.
Senator Corker has asked me to preside while he is voting.
And, since I believe in democracy and not coups, I will not ask
for unanimous consent to do something I want to do. So, with
that, I will just simply do what he would have done, which is
recognize Senator Merkley.
Senator Merkley. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Just to follow up. In terms of our involvement in refueling
both Saudi bombers that are dropping bombs in Yemen, it makes
sense, if we are providing this assistance, for us to
understand what is being hit. Could you work with us to provide
a monthly report of the--our best understanding of the impact
of those bombs on either civilians or civilian installations,
infrastructure?
Secretary Pompeo. I am pausing, Senator. Certainly work
with you on that. It may be that there--I will need help from
the Department of Defense to get that, as well as their--some
of that information would probably be only in their possession,
but I will personally work with you to try and see if we can
get the information that you are looking for.
Senator Merkley. Thank you very much. I sure appreciate
that.
And during your nomination hearing, I raised a question
about the work of the UNFPA and how important it was around the
world to the health of women. We have cut off its funding,
based on concern that they are involved in providing abortions.
Every evidence is that that is not the case. And I had asked if
you would consider looking into that. And you responded that
you would be willing to look into it. And I realize you have
been on the position a very short period of time. In the State
Department Human Rights Report, there is no mention of the
UNFPA in the pages that address China's coercive family
planning practices. And I may be wrong in assuming you have not
had time to look into this yet, but would you be able to follow
up on that in the weeks ahead?
Secretary Pompeo. Yes. I will do so in a timely manner. We
are now at the end of May. It seems, by the end of June, I
could have a response to you.
Senator Merkley. Thank you very much.
We have, currently, Ambassador Brownback, who is working
hard, in partnership with the Bureau of Populations, Refugees,
and Migrations--and I think they are the lead--to put together
a report on the atrocities that occurred on the Rohingya
villages, Rohingya people, in Burma. I would like to get a
sense of when that report is going to be completed, if we have
a date for that.
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I do not know the answer to
that.
Senator Merkley. I have heard that it could well be very,
very soon. And when it--we do receive that report, will that be
a public report, or is there a reason it could not be made
public?
Secretary Pompeo. Sir, there is no reason that I know of
that it could not be made public.
Senator Merkley. I think that may be a moment for us to
retake up this discussion, to have that report from the State
Department. This committee has voted out sanctions against the
military, based on all the reports that we had about what had
occurred. We have also voted out a resolution related to
standards for repatriation so that there is not
revictimization. And we are sitting right now with more than
700,000 new refugees--and by that, I mean from this last
conflict, from August through now, in Bangladesh. Bangladesh
needs a lot of support to help provide services. And can the
U.S. be--the U.S. has been a significant factor of that--can
the U.S. continue to be of assistance?
Secretary Pompeo. Yes. And may I say one more thing? I
think I answered the question incompletely about the report.
Not only do I see no reason it could not be published--and I am
happy to be told I am wrong for some reason--but it would be
important that it be published. I actually think--I agree with
you, I think it would be very, very important that we make that
public.
Senator Merkley. And I move that--well, let me just express
it this way. We have the humanitarian conflict or--that is of--
ethnic cleansing that is enormous in its scale. And I am hoping
the U.S. will help summon an international response after this
report comes out, because to fail to do so is to fail in our
moral leadership in the world. And also, to fail to do so
encourages other countries that may have belittled and
denigrated a minority to proceed to engage in ethnic cleansing
if they do not see the world respond to this situation. Do you
anticipate being in this dialogue as we go forward?
Secretary Pompeo. I do.
Senator Merkley. Thank you very much.
And, finally, I wanted to turn to special immigrant visas.
Last year, Congress worked together to authorize additional
visas for qualified Afghans who come under threat because of
their service to the United States. But, over this fiscal year,
admissions have plummeted from roughly 1800 Afghan wartime
partners and their families per month to roughly 500 per month.
Do you have any sense of the reason for this sudden drop-off?
Secretary Pompeo. I do not.
Senator Merkley. These are the folks who were the key
partners to our ability to function.
Secretary Pompeo. Yeah.
Senator Merkley. And is there a possibility that the State
Department could work to accelerate their ability to come to
the U.S.? Because, quite frankly, they are at enormous risk.
Secretary Pompeo. I know the--I mean, I know the--who these
folks are. I know the service they have provided. I am happy to
dig in and figure out. I am sorry I do not have the answer. I
do not know the answer. But, I will certainly come to
understand the answer, and then work towards resolving it.
Senator Merkley. I appreciate that. And I mentioned the
Afghans, but there is also a tremendous----
Secretary Pompeo. Absolutely.
Senator Merkley. --number of Iraqis that are in the same
exact situation. And they knew that, when they signed up, that,
if we did not partner with them to protect them and their
families afterwards, they were in deep trouble. And I do not
know what sort of explicit support or assurances we have, but
it was kind of an implicit understanding from previous
conflicts of our responsibility. So, I would really appreciate
your attention to this.
Thank you.
Secretary Pompeo. Thank you, Senator Merkley.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Senator Merkley.
So, as I understand it, there are no members who have not
had a first round, so, in the interest of time, we will start
the second round.
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.
Senator Menendez. And--as the Chairman comes back. So, I
will recognize myself.
Mr. Secretary, before I ask you a question, let me just say
I join in the expression of sympathy for those who were lost on
the airplane in Cuba, with Senator Udall. But, for the record,
that plane was a Boeing 737 leased to Cuba's flagship carrier,
Cubana, by a Mexican company, which clearly could have kept it
updated. And so, I think we have to recognize that reality.
And one other comment before I return to some questions I
would like to ask you, Mr. Secretary. I have listened to my
Republican colleagues question you, Mr. Secretary, on North
Korea. And I have heard your responses. And it seems to me that
there is an effort here to create alternative facts in which
North Korea walked away. But, it is rather clear to me that
this was President Trump's decision. He walked away and, from
my perspective, my only observation is, likely because he maybe
finally came to the conclusion that the challenges that dawn on
him of the full nature of the negotiations with the North, and
that his approach was setting us up for failure. And I think,
again, as I expressed earlier, this was a direct failure of the
administration to have a credible and pragmatic policy and
strategy and lay out the foundations before you ever got to
that point. And I am afraid that the--that failure and the
President's impulsive decisions have lost us leverage. I hope
we can regain it, as well as reassure allies.
I would like to go to the AUMF, because part of the reason
we asked you for two rounds was to be able to deal with that.
So, let me ask you, Mr. Secretary, knowing, as a premise, that
the administration fully believes it has all of the authorities
it needs and, therefore, does not need an AUMF, but also having
heard, as my good friend Senator Kaine has said various times,
that Secretary Mattis and others have said, that it would be
good to have the United States Congress in full support of the
actions being taken across the globe by having Congress weigh
in. So, recognizing that, that you feel you have all the
authorities, but if Congress is going to vote on an AUMF, does
the State Department support the Corker-Kaine AUMF?
Secretary Pompeo. We still are seeking some additional
changes to it. I will give you Mike's view, which is, it is
better than what we have seen before, but we are still hopeful
that some of the terms--there is a lower threshold for the
quadrennial review, there are issues surrounding associated
forces, and a couple of others that we would still like to work
on language. Maybe it is just technical, but certainly things
that we would like to work on you before we say that we support
it.
Senator Menendez. Okay. So, let me ask you this.
Specifically under the text as it is, it theoretically is
possible that Congress could pass a resolution disapproving the
use of force against a new associated force after kinetic
action by the administration has begun. Would the
administration comply with such a congressional resolution of
disapproval, if this was the law?
Secretary Pompeo. I do not know the answer, Senator. I do
not know the answer. I mean, if it is the law, well, we always
comply with the law, if that is your point. But, I--but, you
are asking me to interpret a piece of legislation--to give a
legal interpretation of a piece of legislation----
Senator Menendez. No, I am not asking your legal
interpretation. So, it is very----
Secretary Pompeo. But, if you are asking----
Senator Menendez. --clear that----
Secretary Pompeo. --we would comply with the law----
Senator Menendez. --comply with the law----
Secretary Pompeo. --sign me up.
Senator Menendez. Okay. Well--all right, good, because I am
afraid----
Secretary Pompeo. Try to do that every day, sir.
Senator Menendez. Well, good. I appreciate that. But, we
also have the ability to have interpretations or to invoke
other powers--other powers--to suggest that that action is
going to take place. So, I worry about that. It is the same
type of question that I would ask you about the administration
complying--it is possible, under this text, that the Congress
could pass a resolution disapproving the use of force in a new
country----
Secretary Pompeo. Country, sure.
Senator Menendez. --after kinetic action. And so, when you
said you are not ready to give your unqualified support, I was
wondering--and you mentioned associated forces--I am wondering
----
Secretary Pompeo. The new-country provision is----
Senator Menendez. --whether that----
Secretary Pompeo. --is identically troubling.
Senator Menendez. Okay.
Let me ask you--let me go back, finally, to Russia. So,
from my own point, let me be clear that, until the President
publicly declares that Russia interfered in our election and
lays out a clear strategy to counter Russian aggression,
questions will remain about his commitment to promoting the
U.S. national security interests, vis-a-vis Russian. Now, you
say the administration has taken actions against Russia. But,
Section 1239(a) of the FY18 National Defense Authorization Act
required the Departments of Defense and State to produce a
strategy to counter Russian malign influence. I understand the
Department of Defense has finalized its portions of the
strategy, but State has yet to complete it. It was due on April
12th of this year. Now, I recognize you have not been here that
long. Will you commit to completing this report? And can you
give us a sense of the timeframe?
Secretary Pompeo. I will commit to repeat--completing the
report. And if you will give me until the beginning of next
week, I will get you a date.
Senator Menendez. I appreciate that.
Secretary Pompeo. I am happy----
Senator Menendez. Fair enough.
Secretary Pompeo. I am happy to commit to working
diligently on it and not dragging it out, but----
Senator Menendez. Good.
Secretary Pompeo. --I try to give dates to folks when I
know it is in my control. This one is bigger than me.
Senator Menendez. That is fair enough.
Let me just say, I understand the administration has
designated, under authorities laid out in the Obama era,
executive orders some individuals--and we are still speaking
about Russia--but, in my view, the administration has ignored
the will of Congress and the CAATSA law by not imposing
sanctions under the new mandatory provisions of the law.
And, to make sure everyone is on the same page, let me run
through the mandatory provisions that I believe have been
ignored. Section 225, sanctions on special Russian crude oil
products. Section 226, sanctions on Russia and other foreign
financial institutions. Section 227, sanctions on significant
corruption in the Russian Federation. Section 228, sanctions on
certain transactions with sanctions evaders and serious human
rights abusers. Sanctions--Section 231, sanctions on persons
engaging in transactions with the intelligence and defense
sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation. And 233
and 234, just not to belabor, sanctions on the transfer of arms
and related material to Syria. This is pretty clear.
Can you commit to us that you will follow the law--I
appreciated what you said earlier, in a different question--
follow the law--that you seek to follow the law every day--and
impose sanctions under these mandatory provisions? Let me tell
you, as someone who has been the architect of a lot of the
sanctions policy, both on Iran and Russia and others, I never
saw the Congress actually come to moment where they made it
mandatory without waivers. They did here. And yet, those
mandatory provisions are not being followed. Will you commit to
pursuing them?
Secretary Pompeo. I will. Will you make a commitment that
you will help Secretary Mattis get the waivers that he needs in
order to make sure that these sanctions do not hit folks that,
I think, were not intended to be harmed by these sanctions? I
know it is not my day to ask questions, but it is my day----
Senator Menendez. I am----
Secretary Pompeo. --it is my day to ask for things that I
think----
Senator Menendez. I am happy----
Secretary Pompeo. --we need.
Senator Menendez. --to have you ask questions. I do not
know how well the Chairman would let me get--to that. But, in
any event, I will just--the quick response is that, look, I
have to see the specifics----
Secretary Pompeo. I understand.
Senator Menendez. --that Secretary Mattis wants.
Secretary Pompeo. Yeah.
Senator Menendez. But, I also have to say, if we are going
to allow countries that are sanctioned because we believe in
the sanctions policy, and they want to get off the hook because
there is some other benefit, well, then we begin to erode the
sanction policies, and we pick and choose, and other countries
will seek the same question. So, I am open to listen to it, but
it has to follow, in essence, what our policy is trying to
achieve.
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I appreciate it, and I hope I
answered your first question with respect to my commitment to--
--
Senator Menendez. You did.
Secretary Pompeo. --those sanctions.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, Senator Kaine asked you about, and you
announced, the attack in China that is consistent, or seems to
be consistent, in terms of symptoms, with what we have seen
from Embassy personnel in Cuba, and also pointed out that you
were the person in charge of that investigation. I assume that
you are working with our intelligence agencies in that
investigation. Are you also working with the Department of
Defense?
Secretary Pompeo. Yes. Indeed, I had--I guess, this week, I
had my former agency in to brief me on the situation, because--
anyway, I had them in to brief me, yes. Department of Defense
will be working alongside of us, as well, to be sure. It could
well be that we end up with other agencies, too. It could be
that there are----
Senator Shaheen. Good.
Secretary Pompeo. --other investigative bodies that will
need to be part of it, as well.
Senator Shaheen. It seems to me that this is the kind of
situation where it is very important to have interagency
cooperation to see what----
Secretary Pompeo. We have had great----
Senator Shaheen. --how we find out as much information as
possible.
Secretary Pompeo. We have actually received great help from
across the Department of Energy, and some of their lobs are
trying to figure out. So, there are--it is a multi-agency
process.
Senator Shaheen. Okay, thank you.
This week, there were reports of renewed fighting in
eastern Ukraine between Russian-backed separatists and the
Ukrainian military. How are we working to de-escalate this
situation? And how did--how does the current unrest in eastern
Ukraine factor into the budget request?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I do not know--that budget
request would have preceded that timing. But, there has been
unrest there for a significant period.
Senator Shaheen. No, I understand.
Secretary Pompeo. Yeah. Not----
Senator Shaheen. But, this is some renewed----
Secretary Pompeo. Yeah.
Senator Shaheen. --fighting in a way that we have not seen
for a little while.
Secretary Pompeo. Yeah. So, there are--the State Department
has a part of this, other agencies do, as well, working,
frankly--trying to work with all sides to get the violence to
stop. It has proven intractable for a long time. There has
been--I am not familiar with what happened this week, but
sporadic violence----
Senator Shaheen. Right.
Secretary Pompeo. --for an extended period of time. I do
not know if you can characterize this as sporadic today, but
suffice it to say there are diplomatic efforts with all the
parties. There are U.N. agencies that are hard at work at it,
as well. It is a multilateral effort. I wish we could get even
more support from our European partners to help us take down
this effort, as well. It is going to take a lot of us to
resolve the conflict there in southeast Ukraine.
Senator Shaheen. And does that not also speak to continuing
to implement the CAATSA sanctions as expeditiously as possible?
Secretary Pompeo. It does, yes, ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. And I--are you pushing to do that?
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. You may be aware that, in the Senate, we
have restarted the Senate NATO Observer Group to try and
continue to support efforts in--that NATO is undertaking, given
the renewed threat from Russia and cyber and other threats we
are facing. And there is an upcoming NATO summit in Brussels.
Can you----
Secretary Pompeo. Well, I----
Senator Shaheen. --talk about what the U.S. goals are, what
we are hoping to achieve, and how you think we might be helpful
in the Senate?
Secretary Pompeo. Sure, although I will leave you all to
make your own choices. But, I can talk to you about what we are
hoping to achieve.
First--so, my first trip, literally 13 hours after I was
sworn in, was to the----
Senator Shaheen. Right.
Secretary Pompeo. --Foreign Ministers' meeting there in
Brussels, spent a day and a half on the ground there. Really,
maybe half a dozen things, three or four of which are worth
recounting.
First, lots of discussion about everyone's continued
commitment that has a burden-sharing element to it, so a real
focus on making sure that people are honoring the commitments
that they have made, including getting to the levels of support
for NATO that they have committed to.
Second, there are other NATO missions being contemplated--a
training mission in Iraq. There was a lot of talk about how we
would put that together, what that ought to look like, what the
external face of that ought to look like, as well.
I certainly went there to make a statement about my
personal commitment--indeed, to America's commitment--to
Article 5 and to NATO. And then there are a number of
discussions about new potential members and how to successfully
continue to keep an open door at NATO. And so, there will be
discussions around each of those.
I think Secretary Mattis is either there or going there
soon for the Defense run-up to the leaders meeting. And then,
in July, there will be the NATO summit itself, where I am very
hopeful we will get some of those accomplished.
Senator Shaheen. Great, thank you.
I know that several Senators asked you about Yemen and what
is happening there. I am not going to reiterate that. I was
part of the effort to try and get something done in this
committee. But, I do hope that, if this legislation is signed
into law, and even if it is not, that you will take the
opportunity to try and continue to work with our allies to
encourage them to think about how they can help with the
humanitarian situation there and bring the various parties to
the table in Yemen. Because, ultimately, there is no military
solution, there is only a political solution there. And
whatever we can do to encourage that, I think will be very
important. So, I will take your nodding as a yes, that you will
work----
Secretary Pompeo. I am happy----
Senator Shaheen. --at that.
Secretary Pompeo. --for the record, yes, ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
We saw, over the last couple of weeks, a lot of unrest in
the Middle East as the result of the move--moving our Embassy
to Jerusalem. And I know that President Trump has suggested
that moving our Embassy has brought us closer to peace. But,
given what we have seen, in terms of the unrest, given the
administration's efforts to stop bilateral assistance to the
West Bank and Gaza, to cut off our contributions to the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees, I do
not understand how this is helping to move us closer to a
lasting peace between the Israelis and Palestinians. So, can
you try and share with us the strategy of how this helps?
Secretary Pompeo. Well, I think the decision that many on
this panel voted for to move the Embassy was what the President
just simply felt was the right thing to do. He felt like the
recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel was the right
thing to do. And, frankly, vast majority of Members of Congress
have voted that way, some of them many times. So, I think that
is what the aim was.
Senator Shaheen. But, the President has said that that has,
in fact, moved us closer to peace. Can----
Secretary Pompeo. So ----
Senator Shaheen. --you explain how ----
Secretary Pompeo. I will walk you ----
Senator Shaheen. --how that ----
Secretary Pompeo. I will walk you through the efforts that
the administration is engaged in. So, it is fair to say that,
for decades, the existing policies when this administration
took office had failed. I do not think--I think that is
indisputable. Lots of efforts, a lot of energy, lots of people
running around, lots of envoys, and a lot of time in airplanes,
and each of those had failed. So, this administration is
seeking to take an approach that is different to try and work
quietly to develop an outline of a solution, and then to find
partners--certainly, the Israelis and Palestinians will
ultimately be the decision-makers here--to find willing
partners who are prepared to--and we have talked about this in
other regions before--to conclude that there is a better way--
that there is a better way, that these fights over these
historic things are perhaps worthy and important, but that
there is a better solution, that people everywhere--the Gaza,
West Bank, Israel--can all be better if we achieve an outcome.
And so, we are working diligently. Mr. Kushner is still in the
lead and working on the project. But, this administration is
committed to finding a solution that the Israelis and
Palestinians can ultimately each sign up for. You have to have
willing partners from each of those two places.
Senator Shaheen. Well, I am out of time, but I would argue
that, so far, we have not seen that the move has suggested that
that has been an improvement for the peace process.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. You are welcome.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I just checked with our staffs in regards to
the consultations during the Iran nuclear agreement, and there
were regular updates to the committee and to staffs after each
of the negotiating sessions. There was also classified
briefings that we were part of. There were part of the
negotiators who came in for classified briefings for us, and we
had many meetings in the White House at the National Security
Council level, bipartisan, with both Democrats and Republicans.
So, just pointing that out.
Secretary Pompeo. I do remember them. Sound and fury,
signifying not a whole lot of learning, as I recall them.
Senator Cardin. Well, we may have different views on that.
But, look, I--at the end of the day, you know, I voted against
the agreement, but I think it is critically important that we
speak as one voice as strongly as we can, and you are going to
need--we are going to need to be on the same page. I would
just----
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.
Senator Cardin. --urge us to understand your strategies as
you are going through it, and have confidence, as you used to
be a member of the House, as to the appropriate roles between
the administration and the legislative branch.
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.
Senator Cardin. What--in regards to the AUMF, the
Authorization for Use of Military Force, the plain reading of
the 2001 authorization, it is impossible to understand how that
was intended to apply to our military campaign against Syria.
That is a statement. I am not asking your view on that. I do
understand that President Bush, after he got the authorization
for the use of force in regards to those who were responsible
for the attack on our country, came to Congress shortly
thereafter to seek another Authorization for Use of Military
Force in regards to Iraq, because President Bush understood
that the 2001 did not apply to Iraq. And yet, there is a closer
nexus between the 9/11 attack and our military campaign in Iraq
than there is between one now in Syria against ISIS.
So, my point is this. We need an Authorization for Use of
Military Force in regards ISIS. Three administrations now have
taken the convenient way out in saying, ``Look, if we can get
our lawyers to say we have the authority, why bother with
Congress?'' And I understand that. And there is no way that we
can enforce the interpretation of the 2001 authorization.
Congress cannot do that. But, now the administrations are
running into problems with court cases in regards to detainees,
so now there is--we are getting your attention. We should pass
a new AUMF. I think everyone agrees on that. But, I am just
going to make a plea, because I voted for the 2001
authorization, and I never thought, in my wildest
interpretations, it would be used 18 years later, in a campaign
against ISIS, particularly since al-Qaeda has disavowed any
interest in ISIS.
So, we need to pass an AUMF, but I am very concerned about
voting for any AUMF as to how it will be interpreted three
administrations from now in regards to campaigns somewhere else
than in Syria. So, I would just urge you to consider this
offer. And that is to give the authority you need, without
restrictions, to conduct your campaign in Syria or a campaign
against ISIS, but put a hard sunset on it so that we do not put
into place an authorization that will be--could be
misinterpreted and will never get off the books, with plenty of
lead time so that we are not putting you against any deadline,
so it is not clear--it is clearly not a deadline, but a way in
which we can keep these authorizations currently available.
That is a plea I make to you. And if you want to respond, fine.
But, I would just urge us to find a common ground, where we can
do what is right for the American people.
Secretary Pompeo. I would only respond, Senator, by saying
that--maybe it is because of my previous role--I have
enormous--sympathy is not the right word, but I have a deep
understanding of why you feel this way, why you think it is
important. There is no recourse for enforcement of the
definition, which presents a conundrum for our constitutional
democracy. I accept that as a fact. I am happy to try and work
to get to a place where we get what we think we, collectively,
need to move this forward.
Senator Cardin. And I thank you for that. And I am not
going to----
Secretary Pompeo. Yeah.
Senator Cardin. --drill down more than that at this
particular hearing, other than to say there is a lot of us who
want to vote for an authorization, and we hope we could find a
time and a place--we can, but currently we are not heading in
that direction. And I am afraid we are going to end up doing
nothing, and there will be this legal issue that will be
hanging over. But, worse than that, we are using a contorted
interpretation that, in history, will show that it was just not
what should have been done by administrations or Congress.
One last question, if I might, and that deals with the
Syrian--with President Assad being held accountable for his war
crimes. And there is legislation that is pending here, that has
passed throughout this--through this committee on bipartisan
basis. There has been appropriations made. I know you were
asked, on the House side, about the funds that were made
available in regards to our cooperation with the United Nations
in collecting the information necessary. And we have had
hearings in this committee before with administration
witnesses, and we have always said, ``You have got to hold
these people accountable, otherwise we are just going to repeat
history.'' The--President Assad needs to be held accountable
for what he has done. And the United States needs to be in the
leadership of making sure that option is available, because, as
we move through this campaign, it is--becomes more and more
difficult to preserve information. So, I would just like to get
your help in regards to making sure we hold those who commit
these war crimes accountable.
Secretary Pompeo. You have my commitment. I agree, there
are lots of challenges. We now do not--we no longer have even
the joint investigative mechanism available, because of Russian
bad behavior at the U.N. So, yes, we need to find a mechanism,
a process by which accountability can be achieved. Assad is a
good example. There are many others around the world, as well.
Senator Cardin. I thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
I have some questions that I would have done in writing to
keep this from going much longer, but as a courtesy, Senator
Kaine wanted to come back and ask a few questions. So, I have a
series of questions that, again, I would have sent in by
writing. But, before I do so, is there anything you wish you
clarify about any comments you have made over the last almost 3
hours?
Secretary Pompeo. No. Just that I--I did not get a chance
to fully respond to Senator Menendez's statement he views the
United States as having made the decision to withdraw from the
summit. I just--just for the record, I have a fundamentally
different view of how it came to be that we, unfortunately,
cannot have a meeting between our two leaders on June 12th.
The Chairman. And I would like to emphasize what you
briefly passed over earlier. It was your sense, as we were
moving along, that--you can tell when something is coming
together and people are getting back quickly and the logistics
are all being worked out--it was your sense, over the course of
the last week or so, that that was diminishing. Is that
correct?
Secretary Pompeo. We got a lot of dial tones, Senator.
The Chairman. So, obviously, there was not a lot of
momentum towards this prior to some of the things that have
happened over the last 48 hours.
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir, that is correct.
The Chairman. If I could--I know you said, to Senator
Menendez or maybe Senator Cardin, that you understood where he
was coming from on a sunset. On the other hand, as I understand
it, there were three things that the administration had put
forth, that a new AUMF must not sunset, it must not be
geographically constrained, and it must be enacted before the
repeal of the 2001 or 2002 AUMFs--it must be enacted before the
repeal of those. Are those still the three major premises that
the administration is looking for in an AUMF?
Secretary Pompeo. They are. What I think Senator Cardin was
driving to, and what I am sympathetic to, as well, is to try
and find a mechanism that is a forcing mechanism that sort of
does not let this sit out in perpetuity. We have to do that.
And he suggested this, at least a bit, which is, you cannot
have a hard stop, you cannot run into something where, you
know, we now have a--we have the clock running at the lower
right-hand screen of TVs all across America, where there is a
hard stop and the authorities go away, when we have got folks
committed. We cannot tolerate that. That is why the sunset
provision is something that does not work. And so, somewhere in
there, if there is a way to drive that these do not just sit
out there forever while not risking pulling the rug out, that
was what I was trying to get to.
The Chairman. Yeah. So, something like a quadrennial
review--something along those lines, where Congress weighs in
periodically.
Secretary Pompeo. Yes. And so long as it is the case that
the authorities, as they exist at that time, continue until
such time as there has been a change in that. Right? That is
a--that is the sunset risk, is that we have got an active
effort ongoing, and we hit a hard stop. That just does not
work.
The Chairman. Is it your understanding that the AUMF that
we have presented includes express language to avoid any legal
uncertainty following the repeal of the 2001 AUMF, including
language stating that our new AUMF shall provide uninterrupted
authority for ongoing military operations?
Secretary Pompeo. I believe that is correct. Yes, Senator.
The Chairman. And I understand that lawyers can always file
lawsuits, but have you considered the legal risks of continuing
to rely upon the 2001? I think we have preferred to just being
able to hold people. Is that correct?
Secretary Pompeo. Yeah, that is where--we are concerned
about the shift, when it jumps, that we will have some
discontinuity that will be--that will present legal challenges.
The Chairman. But, there are risks that are starting to
build on relying solely on the 2001, too. Is that correct?
Secretary Pompeo. That is also correct. Yes, sir
The Chairman. And it is true that the President's authority
to detain a member of ISIS, and whether the 2001 AUMF applies
to ISIS, is currently being challenged in court today. Is that
correct?
Secretary Pompeo. Believe that is correct. Yes, Senator.
The Chairman. Is there not a growing risk, the further we
get from September 11, 2001, that the courts could call into
question or limit the authority provided by the 2001 AUMF?
Secretary Pompeo. Yes. We would argue vigorously against
that, but----
The Chairman. So----
Secretary Pompeo. --I have----
The Chairman. --there are some significant legal risks with
the status quo.
Secretary Pompeo. Yeah. Senator, I--having been around this
long enough, there is legal risk, yes.
The Chairman. And let me say this. I agree that the
administration has the legal authorities necessary to conduct
operations against ISIS. Would you agree that enacting our new
AUMF providing refreshed statutory authority for the use of
force against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces, and
explicitly authorizing the detention of members of ISIS, would
help put to rest these legal uncertainties?
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, I think that is true, Senator.
The Chairman. So, I will stop here. Thank you for that.
And I will turn to Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Corker.
And thank you, Secretary Pompeo. You have shown great
endurance in engaging with this committee today, and I look
forward to continued rigorous engagement with you.
Let me--on the topic of the AUMF, the particular issue I
want to talk through for a moment is guidance around drone
strikes. President Obama provided an unclassified fact sheet to
summarize his policy guidance on drone strikes overseas in
support of our counterterrorism operations. News outlets have
reported that President Trump signed off on a revised guidance
last year, but he has not made any version or summary of that
public. I would be interested in whether you think that is wise
or unwise, and whether you would commit to publishing an
unclassified fact sheet so that the American people and our
allies would understand these operations and their constraints.
And I intend to offer this as an amendment if and when we take
up and debate an AUMF.
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I would rather not--I will say
only this. I know that there--it has not been published. It
will not be the Secretary of State's decision whether or not to
do so. I am happy to talk to you about issues surrounding that.
Senator Coons. I would welcome that, in whatever----
Secretary Pompeo. Yeah.
Senator Coons. --setting is appropriate. I just am
concerned that, in the absence of our making a public
pronouncement on what we are doing, where, when, and why, that
less charitable views of our actions proliferate in ways that
are not helpful to us.
I know this has been covered, but I think it bears
repeating. I think we are currently, as a country, ill-served
by the absence of Ambassadors in dozens of posts around the
world. The country of Zimbabwe has just emerged from the
strongman rule of Robert Mugabe for decades. There is a new
President there. A group of us went, a number of months ago, to
both South Africa and Zimbabwe. These are counties that would
significantly benefit from the presence of an American
Ambassador. South Korea, Egypt, Honduras, Turkey, Saudi
Arabia--there is a long list. Chairman Corker has done a great
job, with the Ranking Member, of moving nominees quickly. I
just wanted to see if you had any views on whether we are going
to be able to move forward, in a timely way, nominees,
particularly in countries like Zimbabwe, where there is an
upcoming election and a critical opportunity for the voice of
the United States in a country that has at times looked to
China and at times looked to the West, and where I think we can
and should play a real role in their transition to restoring a
real democracy there.
Secretary Pompeo. Careful what you ask for.
Senator Coons. Yup.
Secretary Pompeo. I am hoping to make you all real busy.
Senator Coons. Look forward to being busy.
Secretary Pompeo. That is a little bit too jovial. It is a
serious matter. We need to get the Ambassadors out in place. I
am working through them. I have prioritized to try and make
sure that places like South Korea and Saudi Arabia are front
and center.
Senator Coons. And South Africa and Zimbabwe.
Secretary Pompeo. There you go. Yes, Senator, absolutely.
Senator Coons. Two other----
The Chairman. If I could--and we agreed to what we agreed
to. I know there is beginning to be a little bit of a freakout
by staff as it relates to time, not by the Secretary, himself,
I am sure. But, if there are things that we really need to
ask--I agreed to have two rounds--let us ask them. If there are
things that we might do by QFR, that would be great, too. If we
could just realize we have been going for about 3 hours. I am
not reprimanding anyone. I am saying that, to the extent they
really do not need to be asked in person, if we could not do
so, that would be great.
Senator Coons. I have a number of questions I wanted to ask
about China. I will submit them as QFRs.
Could I simply say, we have not discussed the U.S.-India
relationship at all. I think it has huge strategic
significance. I will make my closing question, Mr. Secretary,
if you would like to say anything about how we can work with
this most populous democracy, a potential strategic partner, to
strengthen that relationship. I will make that my last
question.
Secretary Pompeo. For scores of reason, India needs to be
central to what we do. Issues--Pacific issues, Asia--South-
Central Asia issues, Southeast Asia issues, they ought to be
one of our closest partners, and we ought to do everything we
can to make sure that we achieve that. Secretary Mattis and I
will jointly meet with our Indian counterparts in a dialogue
that the two countries have had. I do not know that the date
has been set, but we are looking to do it. I think it is yet
this summer. Very important.
Senator Coons. Great. I think sustaining a strategic
dialogue and then closing our partnership with them is
something that would enjoy strong support here.
Let me yield to Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you very much.
And thank you for being with us so long and an extended
time here.
I am going to stick, Mr. Chairman, to the AUMF sequence
that I have, and give everything else on the record.
Mr. Chairman, we have a presidency that has not only pushed
back on the oversight responsibilities of Congress, which many
administrations have done, but that is actively hostile to any
sort of congressional oversight, including a new Authorization
for Use of Military Force. Congress has failed to exert its
legitimate constitutional authority, even in the face of the
most clearly unauthorized use of military force to date. This
administration's use of military force against the Government
of Syria, Congress has not declared war on, or authorized the
use of military force against, this nation's government. The
executive's legal analysis justifying force is still being
withheld from the public. While lobbing cruise missiles at
Syrian targets may have a short-term political gain, the risk
of escalation was absolutely unacceptable and could have
dragged the U.S. into a wider war with greater--with great
policy implications.
And now, Mr. Secretary, you laid down points of contention,
at The Heritage Foundation, which could lead to an even wider
war in the Middle East against Iran. I tend to agree with Susan
Maloney, at The Brookings Institution, who said this strategy
is, quote, ``not a strategy at all, but rather a grab bag of
wishful thinking wrapped in a thinly veiled exhortation for
regime change in Iran,'' end quote.
Of course, Congress has not approved the use of military
action against Iran, but, more importantly, the power to wage
war was intentionally restrained by writers of the
Constitution. Neither you nor the Secretary of Defense nor the
President have the constitutional power to declare war on Iran
or any other country.
I spoke to the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Milley,
recently, and he had the opportunity--and had the opportunity
to question him during the Defense Subcommittee hearings on
appropriations. As a threshold, he reminded all of us of the
nature and character of war, that the traditional idea is that
war, at its base, is an extension of politics. War forces our
will on an opponent or through military means to reach a
political objective. And taking an expansive view of what we
approved after 9/11, the political objective is to stop
terrorism at a broad level. However, at a more restricted view,
and the view that was sold to Congress when I voted in favor of
the 9/11 AUMF, was that we aimed to punish and deter the
perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, specifically al-Qaeda and the
Taliban.
Which view do you believe is the appropriate political
objective for today, or is there something in between that
Congress should consider? We must be clear about the baseline
we are considered--considering approving so that we do not end
up in the situation where we are today with AUMFs being
stretched to the point of breaking.
Secretary Pompeo. Thank you. I am sorry, which point of
view, with respect to Iran?
Senator Udall. Yeah. The--yeah. Yeah.
Secretary Pompeo. So, there--I--trying to recall--I do not
recall any of the items that I spoke of that day having
anything to do with the U.S. strikes in Iran.
Senator Udall. Well--okay. Well, then let me----
Secretary Pompeo. And I spoke for some half hour.
Senator Udall. Yeah. Let me rephrase it here. In your
opinion, do you believe that the 12 points you laid out earlier
this week represent political objectives worthy of war? Should
the United States send its sons and daughters to war to coerce
Iran to capitulate on these demands if the President's
violation of the JCPOA fails to garner worldwide support?
Secretary Pompeo. I spoke at great length, as the Secretary
of State, talking about how I am going to diplomatically
achieve each of the 12 things that I laid out.
Senator Udall. Yeah. And, as a matter of sequence, should
the President seek the assent of Congress before engaging in
hostilities inside countries, especially where such actions
could lead to a wider conflict, such as in Syria or Iran? Is
that not the role of Congress that the Constitution calls for?
Secretary Pompeo. Well, it is a little more complicated
than a yes-or-no question.
Senator Udall. Please. Explain it.
Secretary Pompeo. So, there is--there are volumes of
articles written on the intersection between the power between
these two branches. And yes, it is very clear what the
Constitution says about the power to declare war, but multiple
administrations have taken similar positions, certainly with
respect to the actions we have taken in Syria, very similar
activities undertaken across a broad swath of previous
administrations. I think what--this administration was wholly
lawful and wholly consistent with past practices.
Senator Udall. And the--and is the President going to ask
Congress, if he wants to go to war with Syria? As President
Obama did? Is--if he is deciding to engage in a war with Syria,
is he going to ask Congress to declare war?
Secretary Pompeo. I have seen no indication the President
has any intention of going to war with Syria. What the
President did was to respond to the use of chemical weapons,
which was, in my judgment, in--I--certainly lawful, but, in my
judgment, the right thing to have done.
Senator Udall. Since President Trump announced the United
States withdrawal from the JCPOA, there has been a lot of talk
about the possibility of the U.S. using military force against
Iran, a possibility that is concerning to me and many of my
colleagues. In your view, does the 2002 or 2001 AUMF provide
President Trump with the congressional authorization to use
military force against Iranian militias present in Iraq or
Syria?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I would--someone would have to--
I would have to take a look. I do not know the answer to that.
Senator Udall. Okay. Well, if you could answer that----
Secretary Pompeo. Happy to----
Senator Udall. --for the record----
Secretary Pompeo. Happy to have----
Senator Udall. --for me----
Secretary Pompeo. --lawyers stare at it----
Senator Udall. --that would be great.
Secretary Pompeo. --and----
Senator Udall. Yeah.
Secretary Pompeo. --solve it. Yeah.
Senator Udall. Thank you.
Senator Coons [presiding]. Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
We covered a little bit of this ground during your hearing
a month or so ago, and I do not need----
Secretary Pompeo. I hope I give the same----
Senator Kaine. --to repeat it.
Secretary Pompeo. --answers to you.
Senator Kaine. Yeah. Well, I am actually not going to make
you even try to give the same answers. But, basically, if I
could sort of summarize where we are as a committee. We have
heard from both administrations, the Obama and now the Trump
administrations, fairly similar things from diplomats and
military leaders, that--and the basic message has been this,
while we think we have the authority to do what we need to do,
the idea of a--an updated authorization for military activities
against non-state terrorists would be a good thing, if we could
agree upon----
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.
Senator Kaine. --the basic language. And your predecessor,
Secretary Tillerson, and Secretary Mattis delivered a letter to
us--I think Senator Corker talked about it--where they sort of
put out ``thou shalt nots'' while, again----
Secretary Pompeo. Yeah.
Senator Kaine. --supporting the notion their ``thou shalt
nots'' they did not want to have a hard sunset, they did not
want to have a hard geographic limitation, and they wanted the
2001-2002 authorizations to be in place until something--until
a replacement was passed. And I gather that Secretary--Senator
Corker has asked you that question, and you said that is your
general point of view.
Secretary Pompeo. It is. May I just say----
Senator Kaine. Absolutely.
Secretary Pompeo. --the solution you have drafted has taken
an--it is a--it is an approach that has moved considerable way
towards that. I--what is the right word?--I applaud that,
slash, concede that.
Senator Kaine. And I understand, from your earlier
testimony, that you are sharing with staff some thoughts that
the State Department or administration, more generally, might
have about the draft. And this is a good time to do it.
Because, I will tell you where we are right now on this
committee. And my colleagues will speak for themselves. But, I
think there is near unity--maybe not unanimity, but near
unity--that we should be engaged in military action still
against ISIS, the Taliban, and al-Qaeda. There is near unity
that it would be a good idea to have an updated authorization.
Some of us believe it is legally mandatory, others believe it
may not be, but that it would be a good idea. There is near
unity on the proposition that, if we are going to do an
authorization, it should be bipartisan rather than just one
side supporting military action and one side not, for purposes
of the troops. You served in the military, you understand why
that is important. And there is near unity--and this is the
hardest one--that, of course, if we are going to do it, we
should try to do as good a job as we can, because we could be
living with it for a long time, there are consequences that we
can predict, there are consequences we might not predict. And I
would suffice to say, based upon my knowledge of your record
when you were a House member and your testimony last month, you
sort of share those propositions: We ought to be engaging in
military action, it would be a good idea to update the
authorization, it ought to be bipartisan, and we ought to take
the time to get it right. Is that fair?
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir. I am part of the community.
Senator Kaine. Yeah. Great. Well, then here is where we are
right now. We had a hearing last week with, sort of,
constitutional experts who like--you know, one who liked--sort
of liked the proposal, but had some suggestions, one who did
not like the proposal, but had suggestions. It was a very
productive discussion. I think members of this committee have a
lot of ideas about things they might want to do to make it
better. Some might want to move it left or right, some might
want to--or maybe some might want to be more restrictive of the
administration, some less, and some want to add in provisions
that are not in now that probably are not either more or less
restrictive, but just more comprehensive. The Chair has
indicated a willingness, after we have a hearing and hear from
the administration, to sort of tackle this.
The suggestions that you referenced earlier, are you
communicating those to the committee, sort of, in writing so
that if--we are going to be on recess next week, but, if we
come back the following week and we want to start grappling
with amendments by members--I do not believe that Congress
needs to play ``Mother may I?'' with the administration on
anything, but----
Secretary Pompeo. But----
Senator Kaine. --but we want your advice and suggestions.
Are you communicating those in some kind of a formal way to us?
Secretary Pompeo. If we have not, we will.
Senator Kaine. Okay. That would be very helpful. And again,
it is the Chair and Ranking that will decide when we might take
it up, but I think that--that day may be coming, and we would
want to know what your points of view are.
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.
Senator Kaine. And--good. If we could get your commitment
on that, that is really, again, all we need. And I state the
point that I made earlier. We--our Article 1 job is not to play
``Mother may I?'' with the Article 2 branch. We need not ask
permission to exercise oversight. However, the advice of our
diplomats, the advice of our military leadership about ongoing
conflict, what would be helpful, what would be harmful, is very
important to us. So, we will take those under consideration.
The last thing I want to say, just switching back to an
earlier topic. Both Senator Shaheen and I have now had the
experience on the sonic-disturbance issue, Cuba and China, of
sitting in a closed meeting with Armed Services staff and them
not knowing who is in charge of this investigation. There are
investigative agencies, at least two, there is the Department
of Defense, there is the State Department. And when we asked,
in that setting--and I am not revealing any classified
information--but just who is in charge, they basically said
nobody was in charge. We--both Senator Shaheen and I are very
heartened that, at this hearing, you said--because it is your
personnel, it is your personnel who have been involved--that--
--
Secretary Pompeo. Those security issues are my
responsibility.
Senator Kaine. Yeah. And Embassy security of these
personnel is paramount. But, then also what it might say about
activities and technologies and expertise of our adversaries is
paramount for us to know. So, that----
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.
Senator Kaine. --that was a heartening part of the take
testimony. I appreciate it.
The Chairman [presiding]. So, I just had a discussion with
the Secretary's staff. I know he is late--15 minutes late for a
meeting now. He has been here for 3 hours and 15 minutes. I am
glad to let a couple of comments be made, but I am going to
hard stop it in 5 minutes. Okay?
Senator Markey. I do not think that--what is the--who is
the meeting with, Mr. Secretary----
Secretary Pompeo. I----
Senator Markey. --that you are not going to stay here and
answer questions from us?
Secretary Pompeo. I do not know.
Senator Markey. Can you not push that back 15 more minutes?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I would--I will go look and see.
Let us proceed, if we may.
Senator Markey. Well, he is only giving us 5 minutes. You
have----
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, can we----
The Chairman. You are burning up your 5 minutes right now,
and I--look, this is getting a little bit--this type of
discourse--I am sorry, I am the one doing this. I have been
very generous.
Senator Markey. But, we agreed to two 7-minute question
periods, Mr. Chairman. And it is just being ended here for the
two members at the end. Okay, thank you.
Mr. Secretary, I would like to go back to our earlier
conversation, which I think is a microcosm of this
administration's approach to foreign policy. Diplomacy is not
simply sharing your position and demanding that the other party
accept it. Diplomacy is a process of working with others to
create real leverage that can meaningful change the status quo.
So, let us be clear. North Korea is a significant and
pressing threat, and we need to get them to denuclearize. And
we share that goal. In the letter that was sent by the Trump
administration, with your participation, as you testify, in
drafting it, the letter says, at the end, ``If you change your
mind having to do with this most important summit, please do
not hesitate to call me or write.'' Well, President Trump is
the one who pulled out of the summit. So, what does President
Kim have to change his mind about in order to get back to a
summit? Does he have to change his mind about whether or not
the Gaddafi model in Libya is an apt analogy to use for a
negotiation on the denuclearization of North Korea, Mr.
Secretary? What does he have to change--what does he have to
change his mind on?
Secretary Pompeo. He--we are hopeful that we will see
behavior that indicates that there is some real opportunity for
a successful summit. I think you were here, perhaps you were
not, when I indicated that we had reached out, in accordance
with what Chairman Kim and I had agreed to, to conduct the work
that would prepare our teams across a broad spectrum of issues
for that summit. And we did not get responses, indicating that
the opportunity for a successful summit was significantly
reduced. And we are hopeful that he will engage in a way, and
use language in a way, that is indicative of there being a real
opportunity, not just to meet, but to achieve a historic
outcome that----
Senator Markey. Well, Vice--the----
Secretary Pompeo. --that I know that--and that I know you
share, Senator.
Senator Markey. Well, the Vice Foreign Minister of North
Korea said that Mr. Pence had made unbridled and impudent
remarks that North Korea might end up like Libya. Does he have
to change his mind about that? Does Kim have to accept that
analogy?
Secretary Pompeo. I----
Senator Markey. Would you recommend that the--that Mr.
Bolton and the President continue to use Libya as an analogy
that would further our ability to reach a negotiated settlement
with this issue with North Korea? Would you recommend that?
Secretary Pompeo. We have been very clear about what we are
asking Chairman Kim to do. Unambiguous, I believe.
Senator Markey. Do you want him to accept this analogy? And
do you feel that you should be continuing to use it as an
analogy? That is all I am asking you.
Secretary Pompeo. And I am telling you what we have
communicated.
Senator Markey. No, you have not.
Secretary Pompeo. Yes----
Senator Markey. Should--no. Answer my question. Do you----
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I was in Pyongyang. I know
precisely what I communicated.
Senator Markey. No--you communicated. Would----
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.
Senator Markey. --you recommend that Mr. Bolton and
President Trump not communicate a Libyan analogy, a Gaddafi
analogy, as something that is helpful to your efforts to
negotiate?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I think this administration has
behaved incredibly well with respect to encouraging and get us
closer to a solution, certainly than the last administration
did. Certainly. There was the previous administration--Senator,
just for the record, this guy built this out and had the
infrastructure to build this out over the last 15 months that
occurred over the last 8 years. This just--this is just simply
factually indisputable, Senator.
Senator Markey. Wait, who is debating that? No one is
debating that. We are debating----
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, we are----
Senator Markey. --we are not----
Secretary Pompeo. The diplomacy this administration is
engaged in has gotten us this far. I am confident that we will
move forward in a way that will continue to give us the
opportunity to achieve this.
Senator Markey. Well, where did it get us? We are not going
to the table. We are walking away from the table. We are
walking away from the table----
Secretary Pompeo. We did not----
Senator Markey. --in the week----
Secretary Pompeo. Senator----
Senator Markey. --in which there has been----
Secretary Pompeo. --we did not walk away from this.
Senator Markey. --a Gaddafi-Libya analogy used, a
repudiation by the North Korean government, and then President
Trump saying, ``Well, we are walking away, because we are not
happy with the North Korean response to that language,''
meaning the North--the Libyan and Gaddafi language. So, I do
not understand what you are talking about, the progress that we
have made up until this point. The whole world was looking
forward, with great anticipation, to this summit, and it has
collapsed over a misuse, in my opinion, of an analogy that has
the likelihood of precisely zero of getting to the result which
we all sincerely hope is the case.
The Chairman. Time expired.
Senator Merkley.
Senator Merkley. Thank you, Mr. Secretary and Mr. Chairman.
So, during the confirmation hearing, I asked a question
about whether there--whether the War Powers Act, which lays out
three foundations for the President to take the country to war,
represented the spectrum of activity; and that is a declaration
of war, a specific authorization for a specific action, or a
third, emergency powers that involve an attack directly on U.S.
assets, military, so on and so forth. And you said, no, that
you--that Article 2 exceeded that. Can you give us a sense of
how broad Article 2 is, in your opinion?
Secretary Pompeo. Boy, sitting here today, I hate to give
you my legal analysis in 2 minutes on the scope and breadth of
Article 2.
Senator Merkley. Okay.
Secretary Pompeo. It is a power that is clearly enumerated.
It is broad. But, to begin to scope that and define that in--I
do not think I can do that for you.
Senator Merkley. Okay. I would love to follow up on that,
because, essentially, the witness we had on the--in support of
a new drafted AUMF, the Corker-Kaine AUMF, indicated that there
were virtually no limits on it, but he liked the idea of us
doing an AUMF specifically because it is helpful to have the
backstop, if you will, of congressional sanction of support.
So, that--in essence, if it is completely broad, then it makes
our whole discussion of authorization of war, as envisioned
under the Constitution, kind of irrelevant. But, I will just
make that point and move on.
We have the 2001 AUMF that was very specific, in terms of
attacks on us on 9/11, or those who harbored those attackers on
9/11, but it has now been stretched, as people say, to
activities by different counts in 14 to 18 different countries,
some of--in some cases, forces that had no known association or
connection with 9/11 and no connection with the forces who
attacked us on 9/11 or who harbored it--harbored the forces
that attacked us on 9/11. So, when we look at that, stretching,
and now we are looking at a new AUMF that has a much broader
definition than the 2001 AUMF, what is to prevent future
Presidents from simply stretching that authorization in a
similar fashion?
Secretary Pompeo. Well, there are always constraints. I am
not sure I would characterize the stretching of the current one
in the same way you do, as egregious as you do. I know it has
occurred across both administrations, in your view. I think you
shared that with me last time. But, I am not sure I would
characterize it that way.
Look, there are all sorts of political constraints on
political actors' power, including the President of the United
States. That power is not unbridled. We have elections, we have
all kinds of things that continue to provide constraints. So,
it is--no, it is not unlimited. The founders clearly understood
that. You can read it in the Federalist Papers. They understood
precisely the language they were using in the Constitution. And
I will concede, as a former Member of Congress, I saw a piece
of legislation that I thought had been grossly misinterpreted.
I sat on the Energy and Commerce Committee and watched the EPA
walk over language that was very clear about carbon and issues
that I did not like and I thought they had used
inappropriately.
Senator Merkley. Okay.
Secretary Pompeo. So, what constrains executives from doing
that? Politics.
Senator Merkley. Okay. So, very clear uncertainty about
what constraints exist on that and how an administration could
stretch that definition in the future.
Let me ask you this. If the Quds Force or the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard were to transport themselves into Syria and
be engaged in activities that are hostile to our forces
currently there, would you see that as a situation where they
are now in a--potentially, an associated force under the
Corker-Kaine draft of an AUMF?
Secretary Pompeo. Well, we do not have to imagine the Quds
Force in Syria. There is no need to transport them. They are
there as we sit. I do not know. I would have to think about the
legal ramifications.
Senator Merkley. Okay. It would be completely----
Secretary Pompeo. Certainly would have the right to
defend--our forces would have the right to defend themselves. I
would have to have someone----
Senator Merkley. Okay.
Secretary Pompeo. --help me through the legal framework.
Senator Merkley. Okay. Because the point I would make here
is that it is very easy to imagine that this could be--a
President could say that this does meet the definition of
associated forces in the legislation we are considering, which
means we would have given clear authorization for unlimited
action in Syria, which is a challenge. It is a challenge on
where we draw these lines. The----
The Chairman. Time is up.
Senator Murphy. And I know he is late for a meeting. And
you said you wanted to talk just a little bit, if that is----
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Just one question. I know you have heard some concern from
this committee, not unsurprising, about some of the
extraordinary means by which foreign governments may be trying
to gain influence in this administration. I just wanted to
raise one report with you and get your response to it.
There is a report from the BBC that the Ukrainian
government paid $400,000 to Michael Cohen as a means of
securing a meeting with the President. The--I--my question is
simply, Have you looked into that report? I know the Ukrainians
have denied it. And what would be your message to governments
that were considering trying to pay nonregistered lobbyists,
friends of the President, to gain access to you or to the
President? I imagine you would not look on that kindly, but I
think, given that the report is out there, and that others are
maybe thinking that that is the way that business is done, it
might be important for you to comment on that.
Secretary Pompeo. It is not how business is done. I have
not seen that be the way business is done, certainly with me,
but I have not seen it in this administration, either. I saw
the report. I--going to try to--I think there is an
investigation related to that. I am going to try not to talk
about it. But, yes, I would tell the world that this is not how
one engages with America.
Senator Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
You have some closing comments?
We thank you very much for your----
Secretary Pompeo. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. --generosity of time.
The meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:28 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions
Submitted by Senator Bob Corker
Question. With regard to the lifting of the hiring freeze, can you
please tell me precisely how many FTEs were assigned to the Office to
Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons prior to the hiring freeze
and how many FTEs are now assigned to the TIP Office?
Answer. Consistent with FY 2017 hiring plans, prior to the hiring
freeze there was a total of 63 FTEs assigned to J/TIP (56 Civil Service
and 7 Foreign Service). Currently J/TIP is authorized to hire up to 49
FTEs (42 are Civil Service and 7 Foreign Service), consistent with FY
2018 Ceiling Allocations.
Question. As you finalize the Trafficking in Persons Report, will
you ensure that the situation of Rohingya in Bangladesh is fully and
accurately reflected in the report?
Answer. The annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report reflects the
State Department's assessment of whether foreign governments' efforts
comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking in
persons established under U.S. law. The Department strives to make the
report as objective and accurate as possible, documenting the successes
and shortcomings of government anti-trafficking efforts measured
against the minimum standards. We remain concerned about Rohingya
communities' vulnerability to human trafficking and continue to address
those issues. As in prior years, this critical issue and the relevant
government responses to the crisis will be covered in this year's
Report.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. North Korea: I would like to ask you some yes/no
questions today about elements that I see as being essential to any
deal with North Korea. So, yes or no, do you believe: a) That any
agreement must include sufficient safeguards to assure that no
ballistic missiles and associated technology are proliferated or
exported?
Answer. Our goal for a diplomatic solution is to achieve the
complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula including delivery systems. Any agreement must also include
carrying forward the restrictions, as contained in relevant DPRK-
related U.N. resolutions (beginning with UNSCR 1718), prohibiting the
export of ballistic missiles and associated technology from North
Korea.
Question. b) That any deal must include a commitment by North Korea
to robust compliance inspections including a verification regime for
its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, including complete access
to all nuclear related sites and facilities with real time verification
including ``anywhere, anytime'' inspections and snap-back sanctions if
North Korea is not in full compliance?
Answer. Our goal is to achieve the complete, verifiable,
irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula including
delivery systems.
Question. c) That to be truly complete, verifiable and
irreversible, any agreement with North Korea must be permanent in
nature, with no sunsets on its provisions?
Answer. Complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula including delivery systems is the goal of the
diplomatic efforts. Irreversible is, by nature, permanent.
Question. d) That progress on sanctions relief should be dependent
on dismantlement and removal of North Korea's nuclear weapons and
ballistic missile programs?
Answer. We are not interested in granting concessions for every
North Korean action and will maintain the maximum pressure campaign
until North Korea denuclearizes.
Question. e) That any deal that gives North Korea sanctions relief
for anything other than the verifiable performance of its obligations
to dismantle its nuclear and missile arsenal is a bad deal?
Answer. We are not interested in granting concessions for every
North Korean action and will maintain the maximum pressure campaign
until North Korea denuclearizes.
Question. China, I believe, will continue to play a critical role
as North Korea moves to halt, dismantle, and remove its nuclear
weapons. Will you maintain a tough approach to China to assure that it,
in turn, delivers North Korean performance?
Answer. Acknowledging China's unique leverage and influence on this
issue, I will continue to engage with China as we work towards the goal
of denuclearizing the DPRK. The United States will continue to hold all
nations including China accountable to fully implement UNSCRs and keep
the pressure on North Korea until denuclearization is achieved.
Question. To be successful in such an ambitious undertaking our
regional allies--in particular the Republic of Korea and Japan--are
foundational . . . to our success. No concessions should be granted
that threaten to undermine our core alliance commitments or our posture
in the region. Do you agree with that principle?
Answer. Our commitment to our regional allies--the Republic of
Korea (ROK) and Japan--remains unwavering. It is through our continued
joint commitment to further strengthen these alliances that we can
address together the significant security challenges we face in the
region. I look forward to enhancing our relationships with the ROK and
Japan as we work together even more closely on regional and global
issues of concern.
Question. Will you commit to establishing a full and robust set of
regular congressional briefings, consultations, and engagements [on our
DPRK efforts]?
Answer. The Department is fully committed to ensuring Congress has
the information necessary on the North Korea summit discussion and
negotiations to conduct its oversight role.
Question. Mr. Secretary, as we have discussed, I strongly support
diplomatic efforts to pursue a peaceful denuclearization of the Korean
peninsula. I have expressed concerns, however, that there was not
enough careful, thoughtful and smart diplomatic groundwork in place
before the hastily announced summit with North Korean dictator Kim Jong
Un. The Administration has been adamant that it has not made any
``concessions'' to North Korea for this meeting, which seems to ignore
that the meeting itself is the concession by granting the acceptance
and legitimacy Kim Jong-un is seeking for his brutal, evil, dangerous
regime. He has already benefitted from an enormous propaganda victory,
and as we have watched the President second guess his meeting and the
Administration scramble this week to develop a strategy, Kim seems to
be calling all the shots. In the meantime, I agree that it's essential
we maintain maximum pressure on North Korea until and unless they take
concrete steps to verifiably denuclearize.
a) So, please explain to me your diplomatic strategy and where you
are in your negotiations with Kim Jong Un?
Answer. The United States and North Korea have been holding direct
talks in preparation for a summit and North Korea has confirmed to us
its willingness to talk about denuclearization. Now is the time for
bold action and concrete steps toward denuclearization. The Trump
administration has been working to create the conditions so that the
President and Kim Jong Un can sit together to begin to resolve this
incredibly difficult challenge. We hope this will set us down the
course of achieving a diplomatic outcome that America and the world are
seeking. If North Korea is unwilling to denuclearize, we will be ready
to intensify the maximum pressure campaign.
Question. b) Is it still your position that North Korea must
completely dismantle its nuclear program?
Answer. Our goal is to achieve the complete, verifiable,
irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula including
delivery systems.
Question. c) Can you be specific about what that means?
Answer. Denuclearization means the complete, verifiable, and
irreversible abandonment by North Korea of its nuclear weapons and all
existing nuclear and delivery programs.
Question. Since President Trump took office, North Korea has
conducted three ICBM tests (which it had never done before) and their
largest nuclear test, which some experts have stated was a hydrogen
bomb.
d) Would you say over the last 12 months under President Trump the
threat to the United States from North Korea has increased, decreased,
or stayed the same?
Answer. North Korea's unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile
programs pose a grave threat to the United States and to the world.
This threat has grown more serious with time. The Administration is
making efforts to maintain pressure on North Korea while holding direct
talks to address this threat.
Question. e) How meaningful is the proposed test moratorium North
Korea has proposed given their declaration after their last IBCM test
that ``we have finally realized the great historic cause of completing
the state nuclear force''?
Answer. The United States and North Korea have been holding direct
talks in preparation for a meeting between our two leaders, and North
Korea has confirmed to us its willingness to talk about
denuclearization. The Administration has been working to create the
conditions so that the President and Kim Jong Un can sit together to
begin to resolve this incredibly complex and difficult challenge. The
moratorium declared by North Korea is a welcome development and has
helped created an environment conducive to dialogue, but much work
remains to keep our nation and the world safe.
Question. f) Isn't North Korea beginning these talks from a greatly
strengthened position due to the technological breakthroughs it has
achieved over the last 12 months? As you look at significant steps that
North Korea can undertake, isn't it a concern that because of the size
of their current program they actually have a lot more now that they
can ``give away'', making denuclearization look real, while retaining
core capabilities?
Answer. The United States and North Korea have been holding direct
talks in preparation for a meeting between our two leaders, and North
Korea has confirmed to us its willingness to talk about
denuclearization. Our goal for a diplomatic solution is to achieve the
complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula including delivery systems. We are not interested in granting
concessions for every North Korean action and will maintain the
pressure campaign until North Korea denuclearizes.
Question. Just 4 days after your confirmation hearing on April 16,
Washington and London issued a joint alert about continued Russian
cyber-attacks on governments, businesses, and critical infrastructure
around the globe. Also in April, Russia supported a chemical weapon
attack by the Assad regime in Syria that killed at least 70 people. In
March, Russia deployed a chemical weapons attack on the soil of a NATO
ally which injured several people; when a chemical weapon was used by
the North Korean government against Kim Jong Un's half-brother, the
Trump administration quickly designated the DPRK a state sponsor of
terrorism. And in February, reports indicate that the Kremlin was
directly involved in authorizing an attack against American forces in
Syria. Threats emanating from the Russian government against democratic
processes and U.S. national interests around the globe are acute,
constant, and lethal--begging the question, what is the State
Department doing about it?
a) Do you consider the Russian government responsible for the
incidents I have just described?
Answer. Yes. The U.S. government has been clear in both its
statements and its actions that Russia is responsible for all forms of
destabilizing behavior. Our long-term goal is for Russia to choose to
play a constructive role internationally and not to be the revisionist
power it is today. The Administration has made clear to President Putin
that if Russia is serious about ending the Syrian conflict, it must
stop fueling Assad's ruthless assault on his own people and stop
shielding its ally at the United Nations, the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and in other international
fora. In response to the April 4 attack on a UK citizen and his
daughter, the United States along with the UK, 27 other countries, and
NATO collectively expelled more than 150 Russian intelligence officers.
We will continue to work with allies and partners to hold the Russian
government to account over its failure to fulfill its international
commitments.
Question. b) Has President Trump convened any cabinet level
meetings to design a strategy to stop these Russian threats?
Answer. The Administration is actively working to counter Russia's
aggressive behavior through numerous strategies. The Department is
strengthening deterrence and defense for NATO Allies in the Baltic
region and working with partners and allies to strengthen their
resilience to malign influence and hybrid threats. The Department also
currently participates in NSC-led interagency efforts to counter
Russian malign influence abroad and at home and leads efforts to
strengthen our partnerships and alliances across Europe, the Middle
East, and Asia. As seen with the coordinated international response to
the Salisbury attack, we are strongest when we resist Russian
aggression through collective action with our allies.
Question. c) Has the Trump administration developed any responses
to punish and prevent Russian attacks on U.S. service members? Russian
support for Assad regime atrocities in Syria? Russian cyber-attacks on
the U.S. or other countries? Russian interference in our 2018 elections
or electoral processes in our European allies?
Answer. From Russia's flagrant violation of international law in
the March 4 Salisbury attack to its continued support for the Syrian
regime and ongoing malign activities across Europe, Moscow's behavior
is a serious threat. The Administration is actively working to counter
Russia's aggressive behavior through numerous strategies such as the
March sanctions against 5 entities and 19 individuals for a wide range
of Russia's destabilizing activities, ranging from interference in the
2016 U.S. election to conducting destructive cyber-attacks, including
NotPetya, the most costly cyber-attack in history. The U.S. government
has been clear with the Russian government at the highest levels that
there will not be an improvement in the bilateral relationship if
Russia continues its destabilizing activities, including interference
in U.S. elections. I will continue to press Russian officials against
further intrusion in the democratic processes of the United States and
those of our allies and to adhere to its international commitments.
Question. d) Using the same logic applied to the North Korea case,
has President Trump determined that Russia is a state sponsor of
terrorism?
Answer. As a matter of law, in order for any country to be
designated as a state sponsor of terrorism, the Secretary of State must
determine that the government of that country has repeatedly provided
support for acts of international terrorism. State sponsor of terrorism
designations are made after careful review of all available evidence to
determine if a country meets the statutory criteria for designation. I
have not determined that Russia meets the statutory criteria for
designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. The U.S. government has
already taken a number of significant and effective steps to indicate
our concern and respond to Russian aggression and destabilizing
behavior. We will continue applying pressure against this behavior
until Russia chooses to become a responsible member of the
international community.
Question. The last time this Committee held a hearing on Russia was
on February 9th of last year and there was not one administration
witness at that hearing.
e) Mr. Secretary, can you commit to me that you will return as a
witness for a hearing on Russia policy?
Answer. I support the work of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, which covers many important foreign policy issues around the
world to include Russia. The Department's leadership has fielded
numerous questions and provided written questions for the record on
this key priority. Additionally, I responded to the committee's
invitation to testify on the FY 2019 budget within 3 weeks of assuming
office and look forward to continuing engaging with the Committee for
meetings, briefings, and hearings on topics of importance to the
Committee.
Question. This Administration's budget is an outright assault on
democracy and governance funding . . . . For example, you slash funding
for the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) by 60 percent. Congress
has viewed the NED as a vital instrument in the global competition for
ideas and values . . . . a) At a time when competitors like China and
Russia are seeking to fill power vacuums and weak and failed states
offer fertile openings for our adversaries and for extremists seeking
to exploit despair, why would you deconstruct and defund the NED?
Answer. Democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) programs are
critical for defending national security, fostering economic
opportunities for the American people, and asserting U.S. leadership
and influence. The National Security Strategy (NSS) makes clear that
respect for human rights and democracy is more likely to produce peace,
stability, and prosperity at home and abroad, and is therefore integral
to our national security. Furthermore, the Department values the good
work of the NED and its commitment to advancing democracy, human
rights, and good governance. The President's FY 2019 budget request
factors in the Administration's commitment to restraining overall non-
defense discretionary spending, including foreign assistance resources.
Therefore, the FY 2019 budget request is a reflection of U.S. national
priorities while remaining within an overall budget topline. The
request for DRG assistance encourages the four core institutes to
compete for U.S. government funding in alignment with the
Administration's goal to centrally manage and streamline how 501(c)(3)
organizations are funded. The FY 2019 budget request upholds U.S.
commitments to key partners and allies through strategic, selective
investments that enable America to retain its position as a global
leader while relying on other nations to make greater contributions
toward shared objectives, including advancing democracy worldwide.
Question. b) Why take an ax to an organization that has made
successful long-term investments in like-minded civil society actors,
political parties, workers and business entrepreneurs in almost every
country in the world?
Answer. The FY 2019 President's Budget Request supports the value
that the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and its four core
institutes provide, evidenced by substantial government funding from
the Department of State and USAID. The budget request recognizes that
the core institutes' regional expertise and presence are valued by the
international community and are used by many organizations, including
the U.S. government, to achieve programmatic objectives. The FY 2019
request continues to support NED's competitive grant making programs.
The NED's four core institutes are separate non-profit organizations,
which are eligible to compete for the $1.4 billion in U.S. democracy,
human rights, and governance foreign assistance requested as a part of
the FY 2019 budget.
Question. Mr. Secretary, CAATSA also required that the
Administration transmit a comprehensive Iran strategy to Congress by
January 2018. I am aware of the speech you made earlier this week, and,
like your predecessors, you lay out a series of objectives: contain
Iran, go after supporters of terrorism, stop Iran from getting a
nuclear weapon. I share all those goals. We all do, but they require an
operational strategy.
a) When will we get that strategy?
Answer. The Regional Strategy for Countering Asymmetric Iranian
Threats in the Middle East and North Africa is in the final stages of
clearance by the interagency. The Department apologizes for the delay.
The Administration's commitment to the Iran strategy President Trump
laid down in October 2017 remains. It will now be executed outside of
the JCPOA. We will bring unprecedented financial pressure to bear on
Iran, coordinate with DoD on deterrence efforts, support the Iranian
people, and perhaps most importantly, hold out the prospect for a new
deal with Iran if it changes its behavior. We seek to work with as many
partners, friends, and allies as possible to achieve the common
objective of stopping Iran's nuclear and non-nuclear threats.
Question. As I look at President Trump's approach to Syria, Mr.
Secretary, I am concerned that although it may not be his intent, the
effect of his Administration's approach is to empower Iran throughout
the region and to create space that has allowed Iranian proxies to
operate ever-closer and with ever-greater impunity and lethality
against Israel. As Prime Minister Netanyahu stated at the Munich
security conference just this past weekend, ``Through its proxies,
Shiite militias in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon,
Hamas in Gaza, Iran is devouring huge swaths of the Middle East.''
b) Can you help me to understand how your approach is leading to a
diminution of Iranian power and reach in the region, as opposed to Iran
devouring ever-larger swaths of it?
Answer. We will contain, constrain, and roll back Iranian influence
throughout the region. Crucial to pushing back on Iran's regional
ambitions will be shoring up Iraq's unity and realizing sustainable and
genuine political solutions in Syria and Yemen. We continue to work
extensively with our Gulf partners and Israel to deter and disrupt
Iranian threats. Examples of such cooperation include military and
diplomatic efforts to prevent Iranian weapons shipments from going into
Yemen. We also have numerous domestic authorities--including
sanctions--to counter Iran's support for terrorism and its
destabilizing activities in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. We will continue to
vigorously use these authorities.
Question. Conflict in South Sudan has resulted in a humanitarian
and human rights catastrophe. People are dying every day, and the
prospects for a diplomatic solution seem grim. The Administration has
announced its plans to ``review assistance.'' You committed to evaluate
the need for a Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan in your response
to questions in advance of your confirmation, and yet all that seems to
have happened is the departure from the Sudan and South Sudan team of
the Senior Advisor, who was leading our diplomatic efforts. a) What is
our plan for South Sudan and how does this budget support that plan?
Answer. The United States is working with regional leaders to bring
peace and stability to South Sudan. We support regional efforts to
conclude a negotiated arrangement for an inclusive transitional
government that reflects South Sudan's diversity and provides checks
and balances on political and economic power. As announced by the White
House on May 8, the United States is undertaking a comprehensive review
of its assistance programs to South Sudan to ensure our assistance does
not contribute to or prolong the conflict or facilitate predatory or
corrupt behavior. The FY 2019 request reflects the U.S. commitment to
helping the people of South Sudan and provides resources to advance
U.S. foreign policy goals.
Question. b) You mentioned in a response to a question during
today's hearing that you had not looked into the issue of a Special
Envoy. When do you plan to look into the issue, and when will you begin
consultations with Congress about the need for a Special Envoy?
Answer. I am committed to helping the people of Sudan and South
Sudan achieve the security, stability, and development they deserve. I
will analyze the diplomatic tools available to achieve this goal
effectively and efficiently, including by analyzing the value and
impact of a special envoy.
Question. The U.N. Secretary General warned late last year that
``violent extremist and radical armed groups are asserting control over
increasingly large areas'' of Mali. In your response to questions in
advance of your confirmation, you stated that you would ``urge all
Malian parties to fully implement the peace accord, especially through
good governance, respect for human rights, and provision of services to
affected populations.'' That's a bit vague, and seems like exactly what
we've been doing for 3 years with no effect. Can you be more specific
about what efforts you will undertake to support implementation of the
2015 peace agreement and counter violent extremism, and how does this
budget support it?
Answer. Establishing sustainable peace and reconciliation in Mali
and countering the terrorist threat in that country are long-term
projects that require commitment over time. Together with our
international partners, we continue to press the parties to implement
their obligations under the Algiers Accord. Our embassy in Bamako is
particularly active as an observer to the international mediation, and
we send representatives to engage in the Accord Monitoring Commission's
subcommittees. We also provide assistance to strengthen defense
institutions and build the capacity of Mali's security forces so the
Government of Mali is better able to respond to the grave and growing
terrorist threats it faces.
Question. DRC: The U.N. said earlier this year that the situation
in the Democratic Republic of Congo is a ``humanitarian disaster of
extraordinary proportions.'' UNICEF released a report on May 11 that
said that as a result of violence between the government and militia,
up to 400,000 children are at risk of starving to death unless
humanitarian aid efforts are ramped up. World Health Organization
officials have sounded the alarm at the spread of Ebola from a rural
area to a city with a population of over 1 million. Twenty-three deaths
are reported thus far. Aside from actively pushing a reduction in the
number of U.N. peacekeepers, what is our plan to address the political
and humanitarian disaster in DRC and how does this budget request
support it?
Answer. I share your concerns about the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC). The Administration seeks to consolidate peace and
security, provide humanitarian assistance, foster good governance,
reduce extreme poverty, improve health and education outcomes, ensure
accountability for human rights violations, and respond to serious
pandemic threats in the DRC such as the recent Ebola outbreak. These
priorities are reflected in our FY 2019 budget request, which totals
approximately $214 million for our work in the DRC. The United States
is the largest bilateral humanitarian donor in the DRC, having provided
a total of nearly $277 million in life-saving humanitarian aid for DRC
and Congolese refugees in the region since FY 2017. While the causes of
the humanitarian crisis are complex, the situation has been exacerbated
by the ongoing political impasse. We are actively pressing for credible
elections in December 2018, as now scheduled, leading to a democratic
transition that is key to averting violence and strengthening long-term
stability and development. While elections will not solve all of DRC's
challenges, they are essential to stabilize the country, support
development, create opportunities for U.S. businesses, and scale down
the most expensive U.N. peacekeeping mission in the world.
Question. Nigeria: In response to a question for the record
submitted in the wake of your confirmation hearing, you said that ``If
confirmed, I will underscore to the Nigerian government that human
rights abuses and impunity for such violations tarnish Nigeria's
international reputation, undermine the trust of its citizens, impede
counterterrorism efforts, and hinders U.S. ability to partner with
Nigeria.'' There is no indication in the public readout (attributable
to Spokesperson Heather Nauert) of your May 17 phone conversation with
President Buhari that you raised those issues. Have you looked into any
of the reports alleging human rights abuses by the Nigerian military?
Answer. I take all reports of human rights violations and abuses
seriously. The Department of State continues to raise our concerns
about human rights and accountability at all levels of the Nigerian
government and to offer assistance to support improvements in defense
institutions, security sector forces, and other institutions. The
Nigerian Army is taking some action to hold to account soldiers found
guilty of abuse, in particular through court-martial proceedings in the
northeast, though more needs to be done to improve the number and
quality of these proceedings. In his remarks in the Rose Garden on
April 30, President Buhari committed to ensuring accountability for
human rights violations. I will press the Nigerian government to live
up to that commitment.
Question. Did you discuss the need for accountability for human
rights abuses with President Buhari? In a question for the record
submitted in the wake of your confirmation hearing, I asked how you
would work with the Government of Nigeria to address bureaucratic
obstacles to the effective delivery of humanitarian aid to northeastern
Nigeria. Your answer was unclear.
Answer. The Nigerian government is taking some tangible steps to
improve accountability for human rights violations and protect
civilians. I am encouraged by the statements President Buhari made
during his April 30 official working visit to the White House
highlighting the importance of human rights and accountability and the
increased emphasis his administration seeks to place on transparency
and accountability for allegations of human rights violations and
abuses. Building on his leadership, I will continue to encourage the
Nigerian government to expand and improve efforts to protect human
rights and ensure accountability.
Question. Did you discuss this [bureaucratic obstacles to
humanitarian assistance] with President Buhari? Do you plan to raise
this issue through formal diplomatic channels?
Answer. U.S. officials frequently raise the important issue of
bureaucratic obstacles to humanitarian assistance with the Nigerian
government, including during President Buhari's April 30 visit to
Washington. Our Mission in Nigeria continues to work with the Nigerian
government to reduce bureaucratic impediments to the international
humanitarian response, in particular related to visas, work permits,
importation of relief supplies, and access to vulnerable populations.
The United States is the largest humanitarian donor to those affected
by terrorism in the Lake Chad region, providing more than $649 million
for the region in fiscal year 2017, and the Department of State will
continue to support this life-saving assistance.
Question. Staffing of the Africa Bureau: You mentioned in your
answer to a question for the record for your confirmation that you
``support full staffing of positions in the Africa Bureau.'' You
committed to work ``to identify qualified candidates.'' Have you begun
work on this issue?
If not, when will you do so?
Answer. I support full staffing in the Bureau of African Affairs
(AF). Of AF's 46 missions, the bureau has 36 confirmed ambassadors, two
missions to which we do not send ambassadors but have permanent Charges
d'Affaires in place, and eight missions for which I am working with the
White House to identify candidates. The President has nominated Tibor
Nagy to serve as Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. I recently
announced an end to the Department's hiring freeze on Foreign Service
and Civil Service positions, in accordance with the law to hire to
attrition and maintain the onboard Foreign Service and Civil Service
staff levels at the Department of State and USAID as of December 31,
2017.
Question. You mentioned in your answer to a question for the record
for your confirmation that you would ``examine staffing needs . . .
including in the Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator and Health
Diplomacy.'' a) Have you met with Ambassador Birx yet? b) Have you
begun the process of examining vacancies in the Office of the U.S.
Global AIDS Coordinator and Health Diplomacy? If not, when will that
process begin?
Answer. I recently met with Ambassador Birx to receive an update on
the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). We also
discussed what support and resources are needed to continue our
trajectory toward epidemic control, including filling vacancies in the
Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator and Health Diplomacy (S/
GAC). I lifted the hiring freeze on May 15 and am addressing vacancies
at the Department of State to fill critical staffing gaps.
Question. Your lifting of the hiring freeze earlier this month was
a welcomed positive first step in starting to rebuild the morale and
capacity of the State Department. We understand, however, that hiring
managers still cannot hire and fill gaps in their respective bureaus
thanks to a December 2017 cap on all positions mandated by then-
Secretary Tillerson. Will you be raising these position caps now that
you have lifted the hiring freeze so that bureaus can hire and fill
positions that were previously frozen? If not, why?
Answer. My intention is to comply with the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2018, allowing us to return to Foreign and Civil
Service staffing levels that were in place on December 31, 2017.
Bureaus were notified of employment caps, or ceilings, based on the
Act. Bureaus now have the flexibility to hire the most qualified people
with the right skills in positions that are essential to promoting the
Department's mission and the United States' foreign policy goals. The
lifting of the hiring freeze will result in hiring at or above
attrition levels for the remainder of FY 2018.
Question. Will you work with Congress to ensure that the Department
can hire civil service positions as well as Foreign Service positions?
Answer. The Civil Service is critical to the State Department's
operations. The lifting of the hiring freeze will result in hiring at
or above attrition levels for the remainder of FY 2018. Within the
funded level, as determined by the Consolidated Appropriations Act,
Bureaus may laterally hire Civil Service employees, hire from outside
(e.g., Presidential Management Fellows), or convert Pathways interns to
meet mission priorities. It is essential that we ensure that both our
domestic bureaus and overseas missions have the flexibility to hire the
most qualified people with the right skills in positions that are
essential to promoting the Department's mission and the United States'
foreign policy goals. I will continue to consult and work with Congress
to ensure that all critical priorities are met within the funded levels
for FY 2018, and as Congress considers the FY 2019 budget.
Question. Last month, when the State Department released its annual
human rights report, a State Department spokesperson justified the
elimination of a long-standing section on Reproductive Rights by
stating that this term is not derived from treaty law and that
reproductive rights as used in the U.S. means only freedom from
coercion and involuntary sterilization . . . . Can you explain why the
State Department is now taking a position on reproductive rights that
appears to be in direct conflict with international human rights law?
Answer. In the 2017 Human Rights Report, the ``Reproductive
Rights'' subsection was renamed to ``Coercion in Population Control''
in accordance with the requirement of U.S. law that we report on
``wherever applicable, practices regarding coercion in population
control, including coerced abortion and involuntary sterilization.''
Additional material on maternal mortality, contraception, etc., is
available via hyperlink in each country chapter and in an appendix to
the reports.
As every U.S. administration has said, the term ``reproductive
rights'' as used in the Cairo Program of Action and the Beijing
Platform for Action does not include a right to abortion. But activists
on both sides of the abortion issue have claimed it does, so we chose
not to use that term but revert to the requirements of U.S. law. There
is no incompatibility between the language of the reporting requirement
established in U.S. law and the terminology used in Cairo and Beijing.
The essence of the Cairo and Beijing usage of ``reproductive rights''
is the element in its definition (Cairo para 7.3 and Beijing para 95)
about the basic rights of all couples and individuals to decide freely
and responsibly the number and spacing of their children free of
discrimination, coercion, and violence. The revisions to this year's
Human Rights Report to bring it back to the requirement in U.S. law
that we report on ``practices regarding coercion . . . '' is fully
consistent with the Cairo and Beijing definitions of reproductive
rights.
Question. Global Gag Rule: During your confirmation process, you
were asked about the expanded Mexico City Policy, and your
understanding that the Secretary of State may authorize case-by-case
exemptions to the policy. a) What process are you putting in place to
regularly review service disruptions due to the policy?
Answer. The vast majority of foreign NGOs to which the U.S.
government has provided global health assistance funding subject to the
Protecting Life in Global Health Assistance (PLGHA) policy are
accepting the conditions on awards required under the policy and
continue to participate in U.S. government-funded global health
assistance programs. Departments and agencies providing global health
assistance routinely monitor all of their programming to ensure
transitions to different partners are as smooth as possible, regardless
of the reason for the transition.
Question. b) How will you determine the impact of the policy on
underserved, marginalized, or hard-to-reach populations?
Answer. Under the Department of State's leadership, the relevant
departments and agencies conducted a review of the first 6 months of
implementation of the policy. We plan to conduct another review of the
implementation of the policy by the end of 2018.
Question. How will you ensure transparency in the next review of
the policy, and will you publicly release stakeholder comments provided
for the 6-month review and in advance of the December 15 review?
Answer. It is our intention to continue to be transparent. The
review of the first 6 months of implementation of the policy was
published on the Department of State's website, as well as USAID's. We
do not plan to release stakeholder comments, as we did not inform
stakeholders that their comments would be made public when they
submitted them. Stakeholders, however, are free to make their own
comments public.
Question. What is the rationale for halting assistance intended to
help bring some semblance of safety to the people of Syria?
Answer. In line with the President's request to review all
bilateral foreign assistance for Syria, we continually reevaluate
stabilization assistance levels and how best they might be utilized. We
do this on an ongoing basis, as we do elsewhere around the world. The
Department of State and USAID continue to work with the international
community, members of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, and our
partners on the ground to provide much-needed stabilization support to
vulnerable areas in Syria.
Question. How does withholding this funding fit into the
administration's strategic objectives in Syria? This is not the first
time that Congressionally-approved funds and sanctions mechanisms have
gone unused or unimplemented by this administration.
Answer. In line with the President's request to review all
bilateral foreign assistance for Syria, we continually reevaluate
stabilization assistance levels and how best they might be utilized. We
do this on an ongoing basis, as we do elsewhere around the world. Our
objective in this review is to ensure our assistance is targeted,
effective, and set at the appropriate level.
Question. What guarantee can you offer that, once approved, funding
will be used as authorized/ appropriated?
Answer. We continually reevaluate appropriate bilateral assistance
levels and how best they might be utilized. We do this on an ongoing
basis. Our objective in these reviews is to ensure our assistance is
targeted, effective, and set at the appropriate level.
Question. Humanitarian Assistance for Iraq: Earlier this year the
Department announced a U.S. commitment to the private sector in Iraq
through a $3 billion MOU signed between the Iraqi government and the
Export-Import Bank, as well as $250 million in ongoing projects
supported by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC).
Although a healthy private sector is essential to creating the jobs and
stability that are needed in Iraq, the private sector alone cannot
address the country's ongoing long-term humanitarian needs. As you
correctly noted, ``We must continue to clear unexploded remnants of war
left behind by ISIS, enable hospitals to reopen, restore water and
electricity services, and get boys and girls back in school.'' a) How
much funding will the State Department provide to achieve those goals,
and in particular, will you commit U.S. funding and support to fulfill
Iraq's Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) in Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019?
Answer. The U.S. government is committed to supporting the
Government of Iraq's efforts to create the conditions for the safe and
voluntary return of Iraqis to their homes. Clearing explosive remnants
of war (ERW) is a top priority. The President's FY 2019 budget requests
$40.0 million to support these efforts. Our request also includes up to
$96.5 million in order to help the Iraqi government restore essential
services in areas liberated from ISIS. Since FY 2014, the U.S.
government has provided more than $1.7 billion in humanitarian
assistance for the Iraq response. We will continue to provide
assistance to help the displaced and returnees in the coming years,
including programs and needs outlined in the U.N. Humanitarian Response
Plan.
Question. Complex Crises Fund: The White House Budget recognized
the need for ``rapid response capabilities to prevent or respond to
emerging or unforeseen complex crises.'' However, the final budget
numbers indicate a diminishment of funding in this area as well as
generate obstacles that will limit rapid response capabilities,
particularly as it concerns the Complex Crises Fund (CCF). Given the
risks related to the outbreak of violence globally coupled with a
Budget request that decreases resources, how can you successfully
accomplish the stated goal of rapidly responding to emerging or
unforeseen complex crises?
Answer. The FY 2019 Request attempts to eliminate overlapping and
duplicative contingency accounts. The Department and USAID can and do
provide significant support to address complex crises from a variety of
funding accounts that Congress provides, including the Peacekeeping
Operations (PKO) and Transition Initiatives (TI) accounts. The FY 2019
Request for the TI account provides resources directly to the Office of
Transition Initiatives, which manages TI and has been an implementer of
the Complex Crisis Fund, which improves efficiency.
Question. The Administration recently announced that it is
withholding the bulk--approximately 83%--of the U.S.'s annual
contribution to the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
(UNRWA). Despite other countries pledging millions more than last year,
this is not enough to fill the gap, and UNRWA expects to shut down this
summer if new funding does not materialize. a) When does the
Administration plan to decide whether it will commit any more funding
to UNRWA?
Answer. U.S. assistance to the Palestinians remains under review.
Despite the generosity of the United States, which has been UNRWA's
largest single donor for decades and provided $60 million to UNRWA in
January, UNRWA continues to face financial crises year after year. It
is essential that donors work together to create a fairer, more
equitable, and more predictable funding mechanism for UNRWA. UNRWA has
reported approximately $200 million in new voluntary pledges so far
this year as part of the ongoing work to increase and diversify its
funding. The United States welcomes the new voluntary pledges made to
UNRWA.
Question. b) If the U.S. does not provide more funding for UNRWA,
what is the Administration's plan to ensure services are not disrupted
for the 3.5 million Palestinians served by UNRWA's programming?
Answer. The United States remains committed to addressing the needs
of the most vulnerable, as demonstrated by a voluntary contribution of
$60 million to UNRWA in January to keep schools and health systems
operating in Jordan, the West Bank, and Gaza. The United States should
not be asked to bear a disproportionate share of these costs. The
Department of State has called on other donors to do their part and
respond as needed, including those that have contributed in the past as
well as those that have the means but have not yet lent their support.
Question. Refugee Resettlement: On January 29, new procedures were
announced to process refugees from certain countries for resettlement,
in addition to new data-collection and processing requirements put in
place over the last year. I would imagine all of these new systems, and
the lengthened time it takes to process refugees, takes resources.
a) How will the Department of State utilize federal funding for the
rest of FY18 to ensure the U.S. refugee admissions program resettles
45,000 refugees this fiscal year, including supporting refugee vetting
agencies where possible?
Answer. The President authorized the admission of up to 45,000
refugees in FY 2018. Over the 18 months, U.S. government agencies have
worked to strengthen the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program's security
measures. While necessary to improve national security and public
safety, these reviews and enhancements have lengthened processing times
for some cases, initially slowing the rate of admissions. In addition,
the United States is focusing resources on the domestic asylum backlog,
which is over 300,000 cases and growing. Vetting agencies have their
own budgets to conduct refugee security checks separate and apart from
the Department of State's budget.
Question. Rohingya Resettlement: What are your plans to use
resettlement to address the Rohingya refugee crisis?
Answer. I will continue to work with the international community in
the ongoing humanitarian efforts to support the many vulnerable
Rohingya in need as we search for durable solutions that include the
assurance that any returns to Rakhine State are fully voluntary, safe,
and dignified.
Question. Resettlement of Iraqis: More than 50,000 Iraqis who have
close affiliations with U.S. government in Iraq and who have faced
risks as a result are waiting for interviews in USRAP. a) How do the
Administration's plans for refugee resettlement ensure that these Iraqi
allies continue to have a path to safety, given that only 36 Iraqi P2s
have arrived this FY?
Answer. The United States continues to resettle vulnerable people
who are fleeing persecution and conflict while upholding the safety and
security of the American people. Additional vetting procedures
announced in October 2017 and January 2018 are enabling departments and
agencies to more thoroughly review applicants to identify threats to
public safety and national security. We continue to operate the Direct
Access Program for Iraqis who have a close affiliation with the United
States, although processing time may be slower as we implement
additional security vetting procedures.
Question. Lautenberg Program: For decades, the Lautenberg Program
has provided persecuted religious minorities with a path to
resettlement in the U.S. This year, an unprecedented percentage of
Lautenberg asylum-seekers are being rejected. In light of the
Administration's public commitment to aiding persecuted religious
minorities, what is your plan for continuing the Lautenberg Program?
Answer. Since FY 2004, Iranian religious minorities have fallen
within the scope of the Lautenberg Amendment. Applicants under this
program are subject to the same rigorous process for resettlement as
all refugee applicants. Since January 2017, more than 800 Iranian
religious minorities have been approved for admission in the United
States through this program and have been successfully resettled in the
United States. This Administration remains committed to supporting the
Iranian people and is deeply concerned about the situation of Iranian
religious minorities. The Lautenberg Amendment was renewed on March 23,
2018 and we continue to accept applications.
Question. Trafficking: The Trump administration has declared that
human trafficking is a priority issue. The Atlantic recently published
an article on the trafficking of domestic workers by diplomats in the
United States. Federal law requires suspension of countries from the A-
3/G-5 domestic worker visa program where there is: 1) evidence of
exploitation of a domestic worker; and 2) evidence that the diplomat's
sending state has tolerated the abuse. NGOs are calling for the
suspension of three countries: Malawi, Bangladesh, and India. a) Will
you suspend these countries from the A-3/G-5 visa program? The State
Department's Protocol Office deserves credit for the pilot program to
interview domestic workers in the United States on A-3/G-5 visas. These
welfare checks allow Protocol to screen for abuse and exploitation.
Answer. The Department is committed to implementing all applicable
provisions of the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection
Act of 2008 (``the Act'') and related law as reauthorized, including
those provisions relating to the suspension of A-3 and G-5 visas.
Although there has not yet been a case of visa suspension under the
Act, the law has been a factor in motivating foreign mission and
international organization personnel to address allegations of abuse,
and in some cases, to settle civil cases brought by former domestic
workers. Consistent with the expectation that mission members comply
with U.S. law, the Department is committed to diplomatic engagement
that assists in obtaining payment of final court judgments awarded to
A-3 and G-5 visa holders, including payment from sending states
directly to victims.
Question. b) When will this program [the domestic worker In-person
Registration Program] be expanded to cover New York? And when will the
program be expanded to cover the entire United States?
Answer. To strengthen protections for domestic workers employed by
foreign personnel at foreign missions and international organizations,
the Office of the Chief of Protocol manages an annual In-person
Registration Program. The program currently operates in the Washington,
DC area. A-3 and G-5 visa holders employed by accredited personnel in
the metropolitan region are registered with Protocol upon arrival and
annually thereafter. The launch of a national In-person Registration
program to include New York is under review, as the expansion of the
program would have budgetary implications.
Question. c) Expansion of this prevention program [the domestic
worker In-person Registration Program] is long overdue. Is there a
schedule for its expansion?
Answer. Now that the program is fully operational in Washington,
the Department is reviewing expansion to other cities, including New
York. The treatment of domestic workers employed by foreign mission
personnel in the United States is a matter of great importance, and the
Department of State is committed to protecting the welfare of these
workers, both to prevent abuse and to address allegations of
mistreatment when they arise. The In-person Registration Program serves
as an important prevention tool and provides domestic workers an avenue
by which they can bring to the Department's attention matters of
concern related to their employment.
Question. Trafficking in Persons: Secretary Pompeo, combatting
human trafficking has been a major bipartisan priority for this
committee. The President's budget proposes a drastic 68 percent cut for
anti-trafficking programs. a) How does the administration propose to
lead in fighting modern slavery while cutting those programs at the
same time? b) What signal about American priorities do you think your
proposed cut sends to the countries we are encouraging to more
vigorously fight human trafficking?
Answer. The Administration is committed to addressing human
trafficking, a crime that robs millions of their freedom, undermines
the rule of law, distorts global markets, and enriches transnational
criminal and terrorist organizations. The Department prioritizes
bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, targeted foreign assistance to
build sustainable capacity of foreign governments, and partnerships
with civil society and the private sector to lead the fight against
modern slavery. The reduced request for human trafficking as compared
to appropriated levels is partly because the Department has never
requested funds for the Program to End Modern Slavery, which was funded
from congressional directives in FY 2016, FY 2017, and FY 2018. The
Department appreciates the robust support Congress has shown for ending
modern slavery. The Department and the Administration will continue to
prioritize combating human trafficking as a key component of our
diplomatic efforts around the globe.
Question. Myanmar/Bangladesh: Recent reports show that the
government and military of Burma continue to destroy Rohingya villages
and have no accountability for the vast human rights violations that
have driven the Rohingya across the border into Bangladesh. What kinds
of accountability mechanisms will you support to ensure that military
and other leaders are held accountable for their actions and to ensure
that refugees are not forced to return to an unsafe context?
Answer. Justice and accountability are critical to changing the
behavior of bad actors in Burma to prevent future atrocities, abuses,
and violations and to help create the conditions for a safe, voluntary,
and dignified return of refugees and other internally displaced
persons. The United States is working with our allies and partners to
explore further all options to help ensure that those responsible for
ethnic cleansing, as well as other human rights violations and abuses,
face appropriate consequences, including consideration of all options
available under U.S. and international law. At the same time, we
continue to press the Government of Burma to cooperate with the
independent international U.N. Fact-Finding Mission and other U.N.
mechanisms.
Question. USAID's Disability Policy recognizes that development
programs are more impactful if the estimated 15% of the world's
population that has a disability are included. However, Special
Protection and Assistance Needs of Survivors is again zeroed out in the
President's budget request.
Please detail how the President's budget gives a voice to people
with disabilities, particularly through global democracy and governance
programs.
Answer. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
shares the Committee's commitment to giving voice to people with
disabilities. The President's FY 2019 budget request included funding
for activities directed at supporting children in adversity, victims of
war and torture, and people with disabilities. USAID is committed to
maximizing resources to further inclusive development practices and to
provide support to marginalized populations. USAID also strives to be
more efficient and effective with its resources and to leverage funding
from other sources. USAID continuously works to make our programming
inclusive not only in democracy, human rights and governance programs
but across all sectors. Our approaches to achieve this include
disability-related provisions required for contracts and grants;
disability-inclusive sector strategies and programming; the development
and dissemination of training materials; and designated expert staff
who serve as a resource to USAID on these important issues. Moreover,
USAID has recently decided to initiate a review and update of the
Agency's 20-year-old Disability Policy.
Question. U.S. leadership was critical in averting famine across
Africa last year. Despite some improvements, many of these same crises
persist, and new ones have arisen, such as with the Rohingya refugee
crisis. The President's budget request calls for cuts of roughly 18% as
compared to FY17 to key accounts funding agencies such as PRM and OFDA.
a) How can the administration ensure U.S. assistance continues to
reach those in need?
Answer. Under the FY 2019 request, the United States will continue
to show global leadership in responding to the needs of millions of
refugees, disaster and conflict victims, internally displaced persons
(IDPs), and other vulnerable populations around the world through
critical programs that provide protection, water, sanitation,
healthcare, food, and other essential services. However, to manage
taxpayer dollars properly while balancing competing priorities across
the federal budget, it is imperative we grow the global pool of
humanitarian resources by encouraging others to step up, do more, and
contribute their fair share. This is particularly important in light of
increasing humanitarian need. We will also continue to focus on
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian operations,
both that of our implementing partners, including international
organizations, as well as U.S. government agencies.
Question. b) Wouldn't a reduction in funds for the famine response,
for example, mean going backward on the investment, successes and lives
saved in the past year?
Answer. In FY 2017, the United States provided more than $2 billion
in humanitarian assistance to alleviate severe food insecurity in
Nigeria, Yemen, South Sudan, and Somalia, as well as in Kenya and
Ethiopia. On March 6, 2018, we announced more than $372 million in
additional assistance for humanitarian responses in South Sudan,
Somalia, and Nigeria. Additionally on April 3, 2018, we announced
nearly $87 million in additional humanitarian assistance for Yemen.
Through programs like Feed the Future, the U.S. government also
continues to make long-term investments in Nigeria, Somalia, South
Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, and other countries across East Africa and the
Sahel to strengthen the resilience of vulnerable communities and
improve their food security and nutrition. While humanitarian aid is
helping save lives, we urge leaders and political actors in countries
such as Nigeria, South Sudan, and Yemen to support and implement
resolutions that address the underlying drivers of conflict and end
violence.
Question. There continues to be a threat of famine in Nigeria,
South Sudan, Yemen, and Somalia, and that threat will remain until the
conflicts are resolved. While it is important that the U.S. provide
humanitarian assistance in these countries, we are expecting the needs
will continue to increase until peace is found. Can you provide the
committee with your diplomatic engagement plans to resolve these 4
conflicts?
Answer. In Nigeria, our diplomatic engagement seeks to strengthen
democratic institutions, improve transparency and accountability,
promote good governance, and professionalize security forces. In South
Sudan, we support regional efforts to conclude a negotiated arrangement
for an inclusive transitional government that reflects South Sudan's
diversity and provides checks and balances on political and economic
power. As announced by the White House on May 8, the United States is
undertaking a comprehensive review of our assistance programs in South
Sudan to ensure they do not contribute to or prolong the conflict, or
facilitate predatory or corrupt behavior.
In Yemen, we strongly support U.N. Special Envoy to Yemen Martin
Griffiths and his efforts to revive political negotiations on an
accelerated timeline. I have met with Special Envoy Griffiths and
offered him our full support. I will continue to engage with key
regional partners, including the Saudis and Emiratis, to reinforce his
work. Finally, in Somalia, the United States works closely with its
international partners to support the efforts of the Federal Government
of Somalia and its member states to expand legitimate governance,
promote reconciliation, develop capable security forces, and advance
economic growth and job creation.
Question. I am deeply concerned by what appears to be drastic cuts
from for funding for gender programs. These are critical investments to
ensure that development is effective, and that women and girls are
included and respected. How do you justify shrinking the request by 52%
from last year, which was already a large cut from FY17?
Answer. Societies that empower women to participate fully in civic
and economic life are more prosperous and peaceful. The United States
will continue to support efforts to advance women's equality, protect
the rights of women and girls, and promote women and girls' empowerment
programs across the globe. I look forward to leading the Department as
it continues to address critical issues including women's access to
finance and protection from violence. Even as we have to make difficult
trade-off decisions in a challenging budget environment, funding for
gender programs remain a priority.
The State-USAID's FY 2018 request for gender programs (including
all women's leadership; gender based violence; women, peace, and
security; and women's economic empowerment programs) totaled just more
than $781 million. The State-USAID FY 2019 request for the same array
of programs comes to more than $875 million, reflecting a 12 percent
increase. We look forward to continuing to that empower and protect the
rights of women and girls around the world through these invaluable
programs.
Question. As of January, the mention of gender equality integration
was taken out of the State Department's Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM).
This language is important because it enabled the Global Women's Office
Ambassador to coordinate with the Chief of Missions, Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretaries, and other leadership to ensure gender
considerations are integrated into our diplomacy and programs around
the world.
Why was this language taken out of the FAM?
Answer. The advancement of gender equality and the full empowerment
of women and girls remains a priority for this administration. The
section of the FAM that addresses the promotion of gender equality as a
foreign policy objective, like other sections of the FAM, is in the
process of being updated and streamlined through the standard internal
clearance processes. While this process is underway, the Office of
Global Women's Issues continues to play a central role in ensuring the
Department has the know-how and the appropriate processes to
strategically incorporate gender equality concerns into bilateral,
regional and multilateral diplomacy as well as public diplomacy and
programming. Department efforts strive to encourage our counterparts to
support progress toward gender equality and the advancement of the
status of women and girls.
Question. What will be done to include in the FAM guidance for
integrating the promotion of gender equality and the advancement of the
status of women and girls into the full range of Department planning
and activities?
Answer. I will continue to lead the Department in advancing the
status of women and girls and advancing gender equality through the
formulation and conduct of U.S. foreign policy. We are continuing to
incorporate gender-related issues into training at the Foreign Service
Institute. Such training ensures our officers gain the essential skills
and knowledge to apply these values in the field and operationally and
are able to make the essential connections between advancing women's
rights and foreign policy as fundamental to building peace, security,
and prosperity. These efforts, as well as the updated FAM guidance,
maximize the potential and effectiveness for U.S. diplomacy while
advancing American values of women's empowerment and equality.
Question. The National Security Strategy and the State-USAID Joint
Strategic Plan both recognize the need for the U.S. to advance gender
equality for global security and progress.
a) What are you doing as Secretary to nominate a highly qualified
and broadly supported Ambassador for Global Women's Issues and to
promote Gender Equality at the G-7?
Answer. The Secretary's Office of Global Women's issues (S/GWI)
leads the Department's work to empower women and girls socially,
politically, and economically in the communities and societies in which
they live. I am committed to finding a qualified person to serve as the
ambassador-at-large for global women's issues and working to ensure
his/her confirmation as quickly as possible.
In the G-7 and other multilateral fora, the Department continues a
long tradition of U.S. leadership in promoting the rights and
empowerment of women and girls. In coordination with the White House,
which leads on G-7 policy, the Department has advanced women's economic
empowerment as a U.S. priority for the G-7 this year, building on the
Administration's broader policy initiatives on this topic. In April, G-
7 foreign ministers also announced a new commitment to promoting women,
peace, and security (WPS), which will reinforce the Department's
implementation of the WPS Act of 2017.
Question. The United States has been a historic leader on providing
humanitarian assistance on the basis of need--if people face crises, we
generally respond.
a) As you look to allocate humanitarian assistance in FY18 and
beyond, will there be any adjustment to how vulnerable populations are
assessed?
Answer. As the National Security Strategy states, ``the United
States will continue to lead the world in humanitarian assistance.''
Providing lifesaving assistance to those who need it most has been and
will remain a commitment of the U.S. government, led by the Department
of State. In light of increasing humanitarian need, it is more
important than ever that we work to grow the global pool of
humanitarian resources by encouraging others to step up, do more, and
contribute their fair share.
Question. b) Is there any distinction to be made between the needs
of a persecuted Rohingya in Myanmar or Bangladesh, a persecuted Yazidi
in Iraq, and a child at risk of starvation in Yemen?
Answer. All are vulnerable populations that the U.S. government
seeks to assist.
Question. It is our understanding that the Central European
University (CEU) Board of Trustees will make its final determination on
moving all operations out of Hungary 1 month from now when they convene
in late June. As you know, since the Hungarian government's passage of
a law last year curtailing academic freedom and foreign institutions in
the country, CEU has sought the Hungarian government's agreement on a
Memorandum of Understanding with the state of New York that would allow
the university to remain in Budapest. But with no response from the
Hungarian government side, CEU has been forced to develop contingency
plans to relocate its campus to another country.
Do you commit at the earliest available opportunity to raising this
issue with Foreign Minister Szijjarto, and directing State officials to
raise with their Hungarian counterparts, to encourage an agreeable
resolution of this issue?
Answer. I commit to raising the issue of the Central European
University (CEU) with Foreign Minister Szijjarto. The State Department
Bureau of European Affairs and our embassy in Hungary have been in
regular contact with CEU and have raised this issue with Hungarian
officials for some time. We will continue to do so until CEU's status
is resolved. The United States relies on its Allies and partners to
uphold the values shared by members of NATO and of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe. I will encourage our Allies and
partners to stand by those commitments, both privately and, when
needed, publicly.
Question. There are growing concerns that the Good Friday Agreement
will be further jeopardized by the United Kingdom's departure from the
European Union, and U.S. engagement to encourage full implementation of
the agreement remains critical.
a) Will the Trump administration appoint a Special Envoy for
Northern Ireland, as we understand it has expressed intent to do?
Answer. The United States remains firmly committed to the Northern
Ireland Peace Process including the 1998 Good Friday Agreement and
subsequent agreements. We will continue to engage all parties and
communities to work together to build a better, shared future. Through
our consulate in Belfast we promote reconciliation, two-way trade and
investment, and cultural exchanges. We will work with the British and
Irish governments, as co-guarantors of the Good Friday Agreement, and
the European Union to ensure 20 years of gains in the peace process are
not sacrificed by the exit of the UK from the EU.
We are looking into the possibility of naming an envoy to the
region. No personnel decision has been made.
Question. Does this Administration commit to a policy to never
recognize the illegal annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation,
similar to the 1940 Welles Declaration in which the U.S. refused to
recognize the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States?
Answer. When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014 and announced its
purported annexation of Crimea, it directly challenged and undermined
bedrock international principles, including the obligation to refrain
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state. These principles constitute the
foundation upon which Europe's security and safety rests.
The United States will never recognize Russia's purported
annexation of the Crimean peninsula and never accept anything less than
the full restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity. Respective
U.S. sanctions on Russia for its aggression in Ukraine will remain in
place until Russia fully implements the Minsk agreements and returns
control of the Crimean peninsula to Ukraine. I will continue to work
closely with our European Allies and partners to maintain unity on
Russia sanctions and their implementation. Crimea is Ukraine.
Question. What will you do to raise human rights concerns in Crimea
with your counterparts in the Russian government, and to advocate
specifically for the release of political prisoners from Crimea?
Answer. The United States is deeply concerned by Russia's campaign
of coercion and violence in Crimea, targeting any voice that questions
Russia's occupation. Abuses have become increasingly frequent over the
past 4 years as Russia has further consolidated its occupation of the
peninsula. We recognize Russia uses its judicial system to suppress
dissent in Crimea and the number of political prisoners--now over 60--
is growing.
I will continue to work with allies and partners to call on the
government of Russia to uphold its international obligations to promote
and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including in
occupied Crimea. This includes continuing to raise concerns about the
health of filmmaker Oleh Sentsov and farmer Volodymyr Balukh, two
imprisoned Ukrainian patriots who are now on hunger strike, as well as
calling on Russia to release Ruslan Zeitullayev, Emir Ussain Kuku, and
the dozens of other Crimean Tatars it has imprisoned on baseless
terrorism charges.
Question. The Cuban people have long suffered under a regime that
suppresses their freedom and fails to respect human dignity. The
President has acknowledged this fact and yet your FY 2019 budget has
slashed democracy and human rights assistant funding for Cuba by 50%
from FY 2018 reducing it to $10 million. How do you expect to continue
the critical work of promoting free and democratic Cuba with such a
reduced budget?
Answer. The Department of State continues to support and engage
with human rights and democracy activists in Cuba and to work with
regional partners to support respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms for those in Cuba, including freedoms of expression, peaceful
assembly, and association. In announcing a new Cuba policy in June
2017, President Trump made clear his intention to show solidarity with
the Cuban people and promote human rights and democracy, while
maintaining engagement that serves U.S. national security and foreign
policy interests.
As the Department of State and USAID work within a reduced topline
funding level to ensure efficiency and effectiveness of U.S. taxpayer
dollars, we have had to make some tough choices about the programming
for which we requested funding in FY 2018. The requested foreign
assistance funding levels were reduced globally; Cuba was not singled
out. We plan to continue to support the above-described democracy and
human rights promotion efforts with the many tools we have, including
through our embassy, engagement in multilateral fora and with
international partners, and through bilateral talks.
Question. The Cuban people have long suffered under a regime that
suppresses their freedom and fails to respect human dignity. The
President has acknowledged this fact and yet your FY 2019 budget has
slashed democracy and human rights assistant funding for Cuba by 50%
from FY 2018 reducing it to $10 million. Does this represent a shift in
our support for democracy on the island and the region writ large?
Answer. No. Our priorities in promoting democracy and human rights
in Cuba, and in the entire Western Hemisphere, remain as strong as
ever. The requested foreign assistance funding levels were reduced
globally. Neither Cuba nor the region writ large was singled out. The
Administration's Cuba policy announced June 16, 2017 makes clear our
continued support of democracy and human rights on the island and the
intention to demonstrate solidarity with the Cuban people in the face
of a repressive regime.
Question. At your hearing on House Foreign Affairs Committee on May
21, you noted that the Accountability Review Board's report on the
Departments handling of the Cuba health attacks would be finalized in
the next week. Do you commit to briefing Congress on the results of the
ARB findings?
Answer. The Department will be happy to brief appropriate
Congressional committees regarding the Accountability Review Board's
(ARB) findings and recommendations as well as how the Department
intends to address the recommendations. In accordance with the law,
within 90 days of receiving the ARB's report, I will submit a report to
Congress summarizing the ARB's recommendations and providing an
overview of the actions the Department will take in response. If the
ARB determines that serious injury was a result of misconduct or
unsatisfactory performance of any individuals employed by the U.S.
government or any entities under contract with the U.S. government, the
Department or affected federal agency will report those findings to
Congress within 30 days of the ARB's report.
Question. At your hearing on House Foreign Affairs Committee on May
21, you noted that the Accountability Review Board's report on the
Departments handling of the Cuba health attacks would be finalized in
the next week. Do you commit to implementing any recommendations from
the Board to ensure the safety of our diplomats not just in Havana, but
worldwide?
Answer. The Department takes seriously all Accountability Review
Board (ARB) recommendations. As with prior ARBs, we will review the
Cuba ARB's findings and recommendations and assess how best to
implement them to ensure the safety of our diplomats worldwide.
Question. Do you assess that ending TPS for El Salvador, Honduras,
and Haiti poses a risk to U.S. national security?
Answer. No, the decision to end TPS does not pose a risk to U.S.
national security. We have longstanding relationships with these
countries. We will continue to work with these respective governments
to dismantle transnational criminal organizations, combat drug
trafficking, halt illegal immigration, and promote sustainable economic
growth by addressing the underlying causes of insecurity, impunity, and
lack of economic opportunity.
Question. Do you believe that the Governments of El Salvador,
Honduras, and Haiti have the capacity to effectively repatriate more
than 400,000 people, in total?
Answer. With respect to El Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti, the
Secretary of Homeland Security determined that the adverse conditions
that served as the basis for their respective TPS designations had
ceased to exist and therefore the designations had to be terminated.
DHS announced a delayed effective termination date of 18 months for El
Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti to permit an orderly transition, both for
those returning home and for the country receiving them. The phase-out
period will provide time for TPS beneficiaries to arrange for their
departure and for the countries to prepare for the reception and
reintegration of their citizens.
Question. Is it your assessment that the repatriation of more than
400,000 people to El Salvador, Honduras and Haiti--if not handled
effectively--would threaten the stability and security of these
countries?
Answer. It is unclear how many individuals with TPS ultimately will
return to their home countries as they may still receive other
protections under our immigration system for which they are eligible.
Further, I do not believe that the stability and security of El
Salvador, Honduras, or Haiti is threatened by the return of its
citizens. Our embassies in El Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti have met
with host government counterparts to encourage the further development
of programs to reintegrate their citizens. I will continue to encourage
strengthening the region's ability to reintegrate its returning
nationals, including former TPS beneficiaries.
Question. In the event that the more than 400,000 TPS beneficiaries
are accompanied by their more than 270,000 U.S. citizen children, do
you believe that the Governments of El Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti
can guarantee the safety and well-being of these American children?
Answer. Our embassies and consulates overseas stand ready to
provide appropriate consular services for U.S. citizens. We encourage
parents to apply for a passport for their U.S.-born children prior to
departing the United States to document citizenship and identity. We
are conducting outreach to foreign missions and other community
stakeholders in the United States about the importance of documenting
U.S. citizen children before traveling outside the United States. In
addition, we are engaging host governments on programs and resources
that can help reintegrate their returning citizens, including those
with U.S. citizen children.
Question. In his October 31, 2017 letter to Acting DHS Secretary
Duke, Secretary Tillerson cautioned that ending TPS for El Salvador and
Honduras could jeopardize U.S. foreign policy objectives in those two
countries. Do you agree with that assessment?
Answer. The United States' support for Central America remains
unchanged. A secure and stable Central America contributes to a safer
and more prosperous United States by helping to secure our borders,
protect U.S. citizens, and increase opportunities for U.S. and other
businesses. The multi-year U.S. Strategy for Central America addresses
the underlying economic development, security, and governance
challenges that contribute to illegal immigration. We will continue to
work with Central American governments to dismantle transnational
criminal organizations, combat drug trafficking, halt illegal
immigration, and promote sustainable economic growth.
Question. In his October 31, 2017 letter to Acting DHS Secretary
Duke, Secretary Tillerson cautioned that ending TPS for El Salvador and
Honduras could jeopardize U.S. cooperation with both governments to
combat transnational organized crime. Do you agree with that
assessment?
Answer. The United States' support for Central America remains
unchanged. A secure and stable Central America contributes to a safer
and more prosperous United States by helping to secure our borders,
protect U.S. citizens, and increase opportunities for U.S. and other
businesses. The U.S. government partners with law enforcement agencies
in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to facilitate real-time
information sharing and inform law enforcement operations to combat
transnational organized crime. We will continue to work with Central
American governments to dismantle transnational gangs, such as MS-13
and 18th Street, and other transnational criminal organizations.
Question. In diplomatic cable San Salvador 860, dated July 7, 2017,
the U.S. Embassy in El Salvador warned that U.S. citizen children
accompanying TPS beneficiaries returning to the country could be
vulnerable to gang recruitment or other forms of illicit employment. Do
you agree with that assessment?
Answer. I remain concerned with the security situation posed by
gangs in El Salvador and the region, including gang recruitment of
minors. Through the U.S. Strategy for Central America, the Department
of State and USAID implement programs to empower youth by supporting
educational, social, and employment opportunities for at-risk and
disadvantaged youth and violence prevention activities. We will
continue to work with our in-country partners on programs to address
gang recruitment of youth. We will continue to provide all available
consular services to U.S. citizens, including U.S. citizen children of
TPS beneficiaries.
Question. In diplomatic cable San Salvador 860, dates July 7, 2017,
the U.S. Embassy in El Salvador warned that repatriating more than
260,000 TPS beneficiaries to El Salvador could accelerate ``illegal
immigration'' to the United States. Do you agree with this assessment?
Answer. The multi-year U.S. Strategy for Central America addresses
the underlying economic development, security, and governance
challenges that contribute to illegal immigration. Our embassies in
Honduras and El Salvador have met with host government counterparts to
encourage the further development of programs and services that will
facilitate the effective reintegration of their citizens into their
respective societies. USAID has hosted migration workshops in El
Salvador and Honduras to explore challenges and best practices in
reintegration. We will continue to work with the Government of El
Salvador to strengthen its ability to reintegrate all migrants,
including TPS returnees.
Question. In diplomatic cable Tegucigalpa 618, dated June 29, 2017,
the U.S. Embassy in Honduras warned that U.S. citizen children
accompanying TPS beneficiaries returning to the country could be
vulnerable to gang recruitment or other forms of illicit employment. Do
you agree with that assessment?
Answer. I remain concerned with the security situation posed by
gangs in Honduras and the region, including gang recruitment of minors.
Through the U.S. Strategy for Central America, the State Department
implements programs to empower youth by supporting educational, social,
and employment opportunities for at-risk and disadvantaged youth and
violence prevention activities. One example of these programs aimed at
preventing youth from joining gangs is the Gang Resistance Education
and Training (GREAT) program. The GREAT program supports nationwide
prevention of violence and youth gang involvement through the
development of a positive relationship between Honduran law
enforcement, families, and young people. Since INL launched the GREAT
program in 2013, more than 375 Honduran National Police officers have
been trained as GREAT instructors and more than 240,000 students have
participated in the program. I will continue to work with our in-
country partners to continue GREAT and other similar programs to
address gang recruitment of youth.
We will continue to provide all available consular services to U.S.
citizens, including U.S. citizen children of Temporary Protected Status
beneficiaries.
Question. In general, what steps will you take to guarantee that
U.S. foreign policy objectives are not undermined by the decision to
end TPS for El Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti?
Answer. The multi-year U.S. Strategy for Central America addresses
the underlying economic development, security, and governance
challenges that contribute to illegal immigration, including a number
of the reasons why individuals with TPS left Central America in the
first place. I will continue to work with these governments to help
them dismantle transnational criminal organizations, combat drug
trafficking, halt illegal immigration, and promote sustainable economic
growth by addressing the underlying causes of insecurity, impunity, and
lack of economic opportunity.
Question. What resources and what amount of resources from the FY
2019 budget request will the State Department dedicate to ensuring the
effective repatriation of more than 400,000 TPS beneficiaries to El
Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti?
Answer. The Department does not pay for repatriations of
individuals from the United States and does not have estimated
repatriation costs.
Question. How is the State Department working with these three
governments to mitigate the massive upheaval if 400,000 people are
returned to their country of origin, as well as guarantee the safety of
these individuals and that of their U.S. citizen children that will be
accompanying them?
Answer. USAID has hosted migration workshops in El Salvador and
Honduras to assist both governments in their evaluation and adoption of
best practices in reintegration for their citizens. Our embassies in El
Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti have met with host government
counterparts to encourage the further development of programs to
reintegrate their citizens, particularly in light of the imminent
return of their citizens who have benefited from Temporary Protected
Status. Additionally, our embassies and consulates overseas stand ready
to provide appropriate consular services for U.S. citizens.
Question. Will you reconsider the recommendations of your
predecessor to DHS in order to draw on the expertise of the State
Department, as you stated in your response to the question for the
record from the Foreign Relations Committee?
Answer. No, I do not intend to reconsider the Department's
recommendations on decisions that DHS has already taken. The
Department's role in Temporary Protected Status (TPS) is advisory.
Section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act provides the DHS
Secretary with sole authority to designate a foreign state for TPS or
to extend or terminate its designation, after consultation with
appropriate government agencies. DHS has traditionally consulted with
the Department of State. As the Department develops its TPS input for
DHS, all relevant information received from different parts of the
Department is considered. The Department's internal TPS review process
is comprehensive and well established. As requested, the Department
will continue to contribute its input to DHS for use by Secretary
Nielsen as she makes future determinations.
Question. What contact did the State Department's Office of Policy
Planning and Secretary Tillerson's immediate Staff have with the White
House Domestic Policy Council prior to Secretary Tillerson issuing his
October 31, 2017 recommendations?
Answer. We do not comment on internal or interagency deliberations.
Question. Did the State Department's Office of Policy Planning and
Secretary Tillerson's immediate Staff lend more credence to the
recommendations and guidance of the White House Domestic Policy Council
than the recommendations and warnings of U.S. diplomatic personnel?
Answer. We do not comment on internal or interagency deliberations.
Question. Did the State Department's Office of Policy Planning and
Secretary Tillerson's immediate Staff provide direct policy guidance to
the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs as to how it should formulate
its recommendation to Secretary Tillerson? If so, what was the nature
of that guidance?
Answer. The Department of State has established internal processes
by which bureaus and offices, including the Bureau of Western
Hemisphere Affairs and the Office of Policy Planning, advise the
Secretary of State on foreign policy matters. We do not comment on
internal deliberations.
Question. You recently submitted a Congressional notification for
rebranding of the Broadcasting Board of Governors.
a) Do you commit to ensuring editorial independence at the BBG/U.S.
Agency for Global Media (or any successor name of this organization)?
Answer. Yes, I commit to working to ensure editorial independence
at the BBG/U.S. Agency for Global Media (or any successor name of this
organization) under the current structure, including respecting the
legislatively mandated firewall between BBG's management and its
independent journalists.
Question. b) Will you commit to ensuring that the CEO cannot breach
the ``firewall'' with political influence between journalists who work
under any of the BBG/U.S. Agency for Global Media/ any successor name
affiliate networks--Voice of America, RFE, RFA, OCB, and MEBN?
Answer. Yes, I commit to protecting the integrity of U.S. civilian
international broadcasting by maintaining the legislatively mandated
``firewall'' between the management of BBG/U.S. Agency for Global
Media, including its CEO, and its affiliated networks and independent
journalists, under the current structure.
Question. In a March 1st speech Russian President Vladimir revealed
several new nuclear weapons including a nuclear powered cruise missile
and a nuclear powered underwater drone. If deployed these weapons would
be dangerous and destabilizing. In addition, Russia recently cancelled
the latest round of the U.S.-Russian Strategic Dialogue. On the other
hand, last month Russia meet their obligations in the New START treaty
to limit their strategic nuclear forces.
a) Can you explain to me whether the nuclear systems President
Putin announced are covered under the New START Treaty?
Answer. Russian President Vladimir Putin's March 1 announcement of
new strategic nuclear weapons systems--including an intercontinental-
range nuclear-powered cruise missile, an intercontinental-range
underwater drone, and a maneuverable hypersonic glide vehicle--confirm
what we have long suspected: the Russian Federation has been developing
destabilizing strategic systems since at least 2004. The New START
Treaty permits parties to raise questions about potential ``new kinds
of strategic offensive arms'' within the Treaty format, should the need
arise. We will continue to monitor Russia's nuclear weapons
developments to assess its compliance with Russia's treaty obligations
and respond appropriately. This is an ongoing process.
Question. In a March 1st speech Russian President Vladimir revealed
several new nuclear weapons including a nuclear powered cruise missile
and a nuclear powered underwater drone. If deployed these weapons would
be dangerous and destabilizing. In addition, Russia recently cancelled
the latest round of the U.S.-Russian Strategic Dialogue. On the other
hand, last month Russia meet their obligations in the New START treaty
to limit their strategic nuclear forces.
b) Will these new systems impact the overall strategic balance
between the United States and Russia?
Answer. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review makes clear that the
highest priority of the Department of Defense is deterring nuclear
attack and maintaining the nuclear capabilities to do so. The United
States is committed to maintaining flexible, adaptable, and resilient
nuclear capabilities required to protect the United States and our
allies and partners and to promote strategic stability. President
Putin's announcement in no way changes this commitment. We have sought
to engage Russia in meaningful discussions to clarify our policies and
doctrines related to the strategic relationship but regret that Russia
decided to postpone the second round of these talks.
Question. In a March 1st speech Russian President Vladimir revealed
several new nuclear weapons including a nuclear powered cruise missile
and a nuclear powered underwater drone. If deployed these weapons would
be dangerous and destabilizing. In addition, Russia recently cancelled
the latest round of the U.S.-Russian Strategic Dialogue. On the other
hand, last month Russia meet their obligations in the New START treaty
to limit their strategic nuclear forces.
c) What steps should we take to maintain strategic stability with
Russia, should we extend the New START Treaty for another 5 years?
Answer. The Administration is committed to fully implementing New
START. The United States and Russia met the Treaty's central limits on
February 5. The Treaty contributes to strategic stability, as its
verification regime permits the United States to verify information
about Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal. We have offered to engage
Russia in discussions to clarify our policies related to the strategic
relationship but regret that Russia decided to postpone the second
round of these talks.
As the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review states, the United States will
consider effective and verifiable arms control measures with Russia
that benefit U.S. national security. The Administration will consider
next steps related to the New START Treaty at the appropriate time,
taking this into account.
Question. I am also concerned that the Administration has failed to
impose Iran-related sanctions under the mandatory provisions of The
Iran section of the Countering American Adversaries Through Sanctions
Act--CAATSA.
Section 104 Imposition of additional sanctions in response
to Iran's ballistic missile program. In particular, Section
104(b)(6) provides the authority to impose sanctions on any
person who knowingly provides or attempts to provide financial,
material, technological, or other support for goods or serves
related to Iran's ballistic missile program.
Section 107 Enforcement of arms embargos, which provides the
authority to impose sanctions on persons who have knowingly
engaged in activities that violate the arms embargo against
Iran.
Since the enactment of CAATSA, how has the Administration
specifically used these new authorities and what new designations have
been imposed?
Answer. The Administration continues to support the goals of the
Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) and is
actively implementing this legislation. With respect to Iran, we
implement CAATSA sanctions where possible through existing executive
orders, such as E.O. 13382, which we have continued to use to target
Iran's missile proliferation activities. Since the Administration took
office in 2017, State and Treasury have combined to designate more than
110 persons and entities for their involvement in Iran's malign
activities. These designations reflect our strong commitment to
imposing costs on Iran for these activities, including its support of
terrorism and its development of a ballistic missile program.
Question. Putin's aggressive foreign policy to undermine democratic
processes and values in Europe and the United States is a function of
his domestic policy to eliminate dissent and shore up his brittle,
corrupt regime. So part of our response to Russian aggression must be
to support to those Russians pushing for reform, transparency, and
human rights in their own country . . .. What is the State Department
specifically doing to engage the Russian people and support their human
rights and their hope for transparent, accountable governance?
Answer. Department officials at all levels, including officials at
the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, regularly meet with civil society groups.
We believe that the Russian people, like people everywhere, deserve a
government that supports an open marketplace of ideas, transparent and
accountable governance, equal treatment under the law, and the ability
to exercise their rights without fear of retribution. We will continue
to call on the Russian government to uphold its international
obligations and commitments to protect human rights and fundamental
freedoms and to cease restrictions on the work of civil society
organizations. We will also continue to support and uphold laws enacted
by Congress such as the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act
to hold human rights abusers in Russia accountable. Although the space
for civil society and free media in Russia has become increasingly
restricted, Russian organizations and individuals continue to express a
desire to engage with the United States. As long as this continues to
be the case, we will support opportunities for direct interactions
between Russians and Americans, including through peer-to-peer,
educational, cultural, and other regional programs that provide
exchanges of best practices and ideas on themes of mutual interest.
Question. State-USAID Relationship/F Bureau Holds: Mr. Secretary, I
will reiterate my steadfast support for a strong and independent USAID,
specifically their development efforts, which are a necessary and equal
element within the Diplomacy--Defense and Development approach to smart
power. That said, the State Department has had considerable impact on
this Agency's ability to successfully fulfill its mission. For example,
the Office of Foreign Assistance Resources, (F Bureau), is withholding
FY17 appropriated funds for a variety of USAID's Democracy, Conflict
and Humanitarian Assistance programs. In fact, there are several USAID
programs facing similar funding crises not for lack of congressional
appropriations for FY17 but because State Department, specifically F
Bureau, will not release the funds to USAID. Members of this committee
have heard you and others on your leadership team repeatedly profess
support for USAID's autonomy, yet over the course of the last 15 months
you've take actions to the contrary.
a) Why wasn't the original final draft Mission Statement the USAID
Administrator submitted to the Secretary in August approved?
Answer. USAID remains a critical part of achieving U.S. national
security goals. Since I became Secretary, Administrator Green and I
have had a productive dialogue on a wide range of issues. I fully
support USAID's mission and their new Mission Statement.
Question. b) What did State do to precipitate USAID's withdrawal
from participating in the development of the Joint Strategic Plan (JSP)
just weeks before the final JSP was due to OMB?
Answer. The JSP process was co-led by a joint State and USAID team
and every part of the process involved both State and USAID
participants as appropriate. USAID never withdrew from the JSP process.
At the working level, State staff continued to coordinate and work
closely with USAID representatives in Goal, Objective, and Performance
Goal Working Groups throughout every stage of the JSP process from
beginning through publication. The final draft of the JSP was reviewed
by USAID and approved by Administrator Green and Secretary Tillerson.
Even now, as we move forward tracking and reporting progress on our JSP
Performance Goals, our efforts remain closely coordinated.
Question. c) How many USAID FY17 Spend Plans and Operations Plans
remain unapproved at F Bureau? Are any of these delays related to
policy or political disagreements to congressionally-mandated programs?
Answer. The vast majority of the FY 2017 Operational Plans and
Spend Plans are approved and completed. The Department of State and
USAID will continue to work diligently to ensure that funds
appropriated by Congress are obligated as quickly as possible while
assuring compliance with applicable legal and other requirements.
Question. d) Has the State Department's Foreign Assistance Bureau
delayed the obligation of any FY17 funds at the request of the Office
of Management and Budget?
Answer. The Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources is working
quickly and diligently to ensure that FY 2017 funding appropriated by
Congress is obligated consistent with applicable law. The vast majority
of FY 2017 funds are currently in the process of being notified and
obligated.
Question. e) Will you provide a timeline outlining the State
Department's Foreign Assistance Bureau's steps to apportion and approve
operation plans for FY16 and FY17 funds?
Answer. The vast majority of the FY 2016 and FY 2017 Operational
Plans are completed and approved. The Department of State and USAID
will continue to work diligently to ensure that funds appropriated by
Congress are obligated as quickly as possible while assuring compliance
with applicable legal and other requirements.
Question. f) Explain how, based on the various delays in obligating
FY17 funding, the Administration has not violated the Impoundment
Control Act of 1974.
Answer. FY 2017 funding appropriated by Congress is in the process
of being obligated consistent with applicable law, including the
Impoundment Control Act.
Question. In January, Secretary Tillerson traveled to California
and announced the Trump administration's policy for Syria--which sounds
to me like the making of another ``forever war.'' He stated that U.S.
forces will remain indefinitely in Syria, using the term ``conditions-
based,'' which as many us who have been on this side of the oversight
effort know means whatever you want it to mean in order to keep U.S.
forces from returning home. The objectives, according to the
Administration, of U.S. military presence in Syria are (1) preventing
the re-emergence of ISIS and fighting Al Qaeda, (2) paving the way for
legitimate local governance and the departure of Assad, (3) denying
Iran the opportunity to further strengthen its position in Syria, and
(4) creating conditions for the safe return of refugees. Only one of
these objectives is arguably covered by the 2001 AUMF. In his State of
the Union address, President Trump said ``I'm proud to report that the
coalition to defeat ISIS has liberated very close to 100 percent of the
territory just recently held by these killers in Iraq and in Syria.''
a) If ISIS has been pushed out of the territory it used to control
like President Trump says, is it defeated?
Answer. The President has made clear and repeated on March 29 that
we are in Syria to defeat ISIS and that the group's enduring defeat
remains a top priority of the Administration. Although we are close to
recapturing the critical territory that ISIS used to claim as its so-
called physical ``caliphate,'' the mission is not over. ISIS remains in
pockets of Syria in regime-held territory and will continue to seek to
resurge in the areas liberated by the Coalition in a continuing threat
to Syrians in these areas. Once major operations are complete, the work
of stabilizing liberated communities and preventing ISIS resurgence
will continue as we ensure ISIS's enduring defeat. The U.S.-led Global
Coalition to Defeat ISIS is committed to helping to stabilize liberated
communities through activities, including restoring basic essential
services, de-mining, and facilitating our partners' transition to
sustainable, credible, inclusive governance.
Question. b) What is the Administration's working definition of
``defeat'' so that we have a benchmark against which to measure
progress?
Answer. ISIS will be defeated in Iraq and Syria when ISIS is no
longer able to exploit safe havens and control critical populations and
key terrain and when local governance, security, and law enforcement
can detect and disrupt its violent activities. ISIS as a global network
will be defeated when it can no longer direct or enable threats against
the U.S. homeland or U.S. persons or interests and no longer function
as a unified, global organization, including its ability to exploit
safe havens and control populations and terrain. For ISIS branches and
networks, we seek that these regress into smaller, disaggregated
organizations that can be disrupted by local and regional governance,
security, and law enforcement. Key to this definition are a range of
activities to prevent ISIS re-emergence by the Global Coalition to
Defeat ISIS, including stabilizing liberated communities and addressing
ISIS's narrative of hate.
Question. If we are so close to ISIS's defeat, does the
Administration plan to seek new authority from Congress in order to
keep U.S. forces in Syria to accomplish your non-ISIS objectives?
Answer. ISIS has not been fully defeated and the continued military
presence in Syria is critical to ensure that the Coalition can complete
the eradication of ISIS and prevent its resurgence. Our military's
purpose for being in Syria remains unchanged: defeating ISIS and
degrading al-Qa'ida.
The Administration has sufficient legal authority to prosecute the
campaign against al-Qa'ida and associated forces, including against
ISIS. Therefore, we have no plans to seek additional authority from
Congress.
Question. Our budget for the State Department Human Resources
bureau has a line about its responsibilities to recruit and manage a
talented diverse workforce. As you have said before, we need a State
Department that reflects the American people and unfortunately we
currently have a huge diversity gap in our Foreign and Civil Service
workforce, especially at the higher ranks.
a) How much of the State Department budget request prioritizes
diversity and inclusion efforts at the State Department?
Answer. The Department prioritizes its diversity and inclusion
efforts by funding hiring and recruitment programs, mentoring
initiatives, and outreach to veterans. For example, more than half of
the budget for the Office of Recruitment, Examination, and Employment
in the Bureau of Human Resources is focused on recruiting and including
diversity in our workforce. Funded programs include the U.S. Foreign
Service Internship program, Minority Summer Internship Opportunities,
Don Bosco High School Corporate Work Study Program, the IT Fellows
Program, the Workforce Recruitment Program for employees with
disabilities, the Pickering and Rangel Fellowships, and the
International Career Advancement Program.
Question. b) In particular how much of the human resources budget
focuses on retention at the State Department with professional
development, unconscious bias training, and career advancement
opportunities?
Answer. Funding for professional development, unconscious bias
training, and career advancement opportunities is spread across several
bureaus in the Department. The Bureau of Human Resources' budget funds
the Career Development Resource Center that provides professional
career counseling services to Department employees, professional
development courses not available through the Foreign Service Institute
(FSI), and funding to support travel so employees can take mandatory
training.
FSI offerings include several courses that address diversity and
mitigating unconscious bias as part of the broader leadership and
management curriculum. A stand-alone course on mitigating unconscious
bias will be rolled out in 2019.
Question. I am deeply concerned by this Administration's systematic
assault on women's rights and health. There appear to be drastic cuts
from the FY18's budget request for funding for gender programs. These
are critical investments to ensure that development is effective and
that women and girls are also included and respected. How can you
justify shrinking the request by 52% from last year, which was already
a large cut from FY17?
Answer. Societies that empower women to participate fully in civic
and economic life are more prosperous and peaceful. The United States
will continue to support efforts to advance women's equality, protect
the rights of women and girls, and promote women and girls' empowerment
programs across the globe. I look forward to leading the Department as
it continues to address critical issues, including women's access to
finance and protection from violence. Even as we have to make difficult
trade-off decisions in a challenging budget environment, funding for
gender programs across all sectors, including health, remains a
priority.
The Department and USAID's FY 2018 request for gender programs
(including all women's leadership; gender based violence; women, peace,
and security; and women's economic empowerment programs) totaled just
more than $781 million. The State and USAID FY 2019 request for the
same array of programs comes to more than $875 million, reflecting a 12
percent increase. We look forward to continuing to empower and protect
the rights of women and girls around the world through these invaluable
programs.
Question. The Trump administration has repeatedly appealed for
greater international burden-sharing. U.N. peacekeeping is a prime
example of this type of burden-sharing in action. The U.S. is the
largest financial contributor to U.N. peacekeeping operations,
currently assessed at 28% of the U.N.'s annual peacekeeping budget. At
the same time, as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, the
U.S. has final say over the decision to deploy peacekeeping missions in
the first place. In addition, we provide very few personnel to these
endeavors (currently just 57 personnel). This gap is filled by 120
other countries.
a) Do you agree that the deployment of U.N. peacekeeping operations
helps the U.S. to share the responsibility for protecting international
peace and security with other countries?
Answer. It is essential for other nations to share the burden for
protecting international peace and security and United Nations
peacekeeping is an important means of leveraging international support
to address these challenges. U.N. peacekeeping is an example of burden-
sharing by countries across the globe, and provides a collective
benefit to the entire international community. However, the shared
responsibility of peacekeeping also means shared burdens and shared
costs. One country should not shoulder more than one quarter of the
U.N. peacekeeping budget and I am committed to a more equitable
distribution of the budget among member states in a fair and sensible
manner that improves the efficiency and effectiveness of U.N.
peacekeeping.
Question. In light of the fact that the President is so keen to
ensure that the U.S. is not burdened with such responsibilities, do you
think it is in our national interest to continue to support U.N.
peacekeeping missions?
Answer. Peacekeeping is absolutely in the U.S. interest and remains
a national security priority. For 70 years, U.N. peacekeeping has
proven to be a powerful tool to address global challenges to
international peace and security, and an important mechanism for
sharing the costs of collective security. Today's peacekeepers are
addressing some of the most challenging conflicts across the globe
through missions that seek to protect civilians, prevent atrocities,
and create space for political solutions to take hold. However, reform
is needed to achieve better, smarter peacekeeping operations that are
able to more effectively and efficiently address conflicts, support
political solutions, and meet the needs of people on the ground.
Question. Currently, the State Department estimates that the United
States was likely to accumulate $274.6 million in peacekeeping arrears
in FY 2017.
Do you think failing to pay our bills in full and on time
undermines our ability to work constructively with other members and
with the U.N. management to pursue U.S. interests?
Answer. The United States is accumulating peacekeeping arrears as
the result of not exceeding the rate of 25 percent of total
peacekeeping assessments. This rate reflects the principle that no one
country should pay more than one quarter of U.N. peacekeeping
assessments. The 25 percent rate for peacekeeping assessments mandated
under U.S. law is not new, having been first enacted into law in 1994.
As long as the actual U.S. peacekeeping assessment rate exceeds 25
percent and current law caps U.S. contributions at 25 percent, U.S.
peacekeeping arrears will continue to grow. There is an effort underway
to obtain General Assembly agreement to place a 25 percent ceiling on
any country's peacekeeping assessment rate. This will not alleviate the
current level of U.S. peacekeeping arrears, but it will arrest any
further growth.
Question. Last month, the U.N. Panel of Experts on Yemen reported
to the Security Council that it had ``identified missile remnants,
related military equipment, and military unmanned aerial vehicles that
are of Iranian origin and were brought into Yemen after the imposition
of the targeted arms embargo.'' The experts concluded that Iran
violated sanctions by failing to prevent the supply, sale, or transfer
of the missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles to the Houthis in Yemen.
This seems like a clear opportunity where there is international
consensus that Iran has unclean hands in destabilizing the region, and
yet it does not appear that there is an action plan for imposing U.S.
or U.N. sanctions in response to the regime's violations beyond words
and tweets. Can you inform the Committee as to the Administration's
plan to ensure that there are consequences for Iranian violations of
the arms embargo?
Answer. We continue to ask the U.N. Security Council to hold Iran
accountable for weapons shipments into Yemen in defiance of U.N.
Security Council resolutions 2231 and 2216. On May 21, the United
States imposed sanctions on five Iranians (including four with ties to
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) who facilitated the transfer of
missile technology and expertise to the Houthis that was later used to
attack Saudi Arabia. We are working to expand missile defense
cooperation and interoperability with Israel, the GCC countries, and
others--many of whom are purchasing significant missile defense
capabilities from U.S. companies--and to deter and disrupt Iranian
threats and to interdict ballistic missile technology destined for
Iran.
Question. Mr. Secretary, the U.S. is currently suffering an opioid
epidemic that is one of the worst public health crises in our country's
history. According to the Center for Disease Control, more than 42,000
Americans lost their lives to opioid overdoses in 2016--more than
20,000 of those deaths were related to fentanyl and more than 15,000
were related to heroin. As you know, the majority of the heroin coming
into the U.S. originates from Mexico and much of illicit fentanyl
entering the U.S. comes from China. While the President signed an
emergency declaration on the opioid crisis, alarmingly, your budget
proposes a 30 percent cut of $375 million for our international
counternarcotics budget and, in the specific case of Mexico, you've
proposed a 38 percent cut. a) Can you explain to this Committee and the
American people why you want to cut funding to programs that seek to
stop illegal drugs before they get to our border--cuts that literally
put the lives of our fellow citizens at risk?
Answer. The FY 2019 budget request focuses resources on the highest
national security priorities, including combating the opioid epidemic.
Within the request for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
(INCLE), we increased funding to counter opioids for counternarcotics
programs targeted at reducing the flow of heroin and fentanyl to the
United States. These efforts focus on curtailing the sale of illicit
opioids on the internet, disrupting the supply via mail, attacking drug
trafficking organizations, and expanding the global tools available for
law enforcement to combat the opioid crisis. The Department of State
maintains strong cooperation with Mexico and China to disrupt the
production and trafficking of heroin and illicit fentanyl and I commit
to continue this effort and seek more opportunities where we can be
more effective.
Question. How do you plan to effectively address the opioid crisis
in our country with such a reduced budget?
Answer. The Department's FY 2019 budget request focuses resources
on U.S. national security priorities, including efforts to combat the
opioid epidemic. The request includes increased funding for countering
opioids by focusing on programming that can directly help reduce the
flow of heroin and fentanyl to the United States. The Department of
State continues to work closely with key international partners,
including Mexico and China, to reduce the production and availability
of heroin, fentanyl, and other illicit drugs and to dismantle
transnational criminal organizations fueling their illicit supply.
Question. Do you believe the United States and Mexico must have a
productive working relationship to address narcotics trafficking?
Answer. Mexico is a critically important partner on
counternarcotics and disrupting transnational organized crime. The
Department of State must work closely with Mexico to reduce the
availability and trafficking of heroin, fentanyl, and other illicit
drugs to the United States.
To protect American lives, we must curb U.S. demand that fuels the
illicit drug trade; disrupt networks that smuggle drugs, cash, and
weapons across our shared border with Mexico; partner with Mexico to
achieve meaningful criminal justice outcomes that deny transnational
criminal organizations the ability to act with impunity and profit from
their crimes; and fight the corruption that undermines our efforts.
Question. How will you ensure that the U.S. refugee resettlement
program is at a minimum reaching the Administration's cap and will you
advocate in favor of resettling the most vulnerable refugee
populations?
Answer. The President authorized the admission of up to 45,000
refugees in FY 2018. Over the last year and a half, U.S. government
agencies have worked to strengthen the U.S. Refugee Admissions
Program's security measures. While necessary to improve national
security and public safety, these reviews and enhancements have
lengthened processing times for some cases thus initially slowing the
rate of admissions. In addition, the United States is focusing
resources on the domestic asylum backlog, which is over 300,000 cases
and growing. Nevertheless, the United States continues to prioritize
the resettlement of the world's most vulnerable refugees. We work
closely with U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other partners to
identify the refugees at greatest risk and in most need of resettlement
in a third country.
Question. I understand there is a push to move core functions of
refugee resettlement into DHS and refugee funding from State into USAID
and out of the State Department's diplomatic and policy-making purview.
This would be a grave mistake. Do you believe that refugee support and
resettlement should be considered in concert with broader U.S. foreign
policy objectives?
Answer. Yes, I believe assistance to refugees and refugee
resettlement must be considered in concert with broader U.S. foreign
policy objectives. I support the important work of the Bureau of
Population, Refugees, and Migration, which manages U.S. refugee policy,
assistance, and resettlement. PRM fulfills a critical role in providing
humanitarian aid, durable solutions and other assistance for refugees,
conflict victims, and stateless people around the world and is an
integral part of State's efforts to prevent and respond to crises and
conflict.
Question. Should our refugee programs and policy therefore be
housed under the State Department, which is responsible for making and
executing foreign policy objectives?
Answer. As I noted, the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and
Migration, which manages U.S. refugee policy, assistance, and
resettlement, is an integral part of State's foreign policy efforts to
prevent and respond to crises and conflict, and promote regional
stability. I understand that as part of E.O. 13781, the Administration
is in the process of reviewing agencies throughout the executive branch
in pursuit of increased efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability.
The Department of State is working with USAID to optimize our overall
humanitarian assistance efforts.
Question. I look around the world and see humanitarian heartbreak .
. . but I know that OMB has withheld greater levels of humanitarian
assistance from one year to the next. a) How much of the funding that
Congress provided for humanitarian assistance is the administration
carrying over from FY17 to FY18 and FY18 to FY19?
Answer. In FY 2017 and FY 2018, Congress generously provided
significant resources to respond to humanitarian challenges and the
tremendous growth in needs. Due to the timing of the generous
appropriation that Congress provided in FY 2017, we carried over
roughly $1.1 billion into FY 2018 from the IDA and MRA accounts that,
when combined with this year's appropriation, will allow us to respond
adequately to humanitarian challenges in FY 2018. As for carryover into
FY 2019, the crises to which we are responding are evolving
continuously. As such, we will not have a sense of the level of
carryover until the end of the fiscal year. We will continue providing
humanitarian assistance based on need; bureaus are not carrying over a
specific amount of funding into FY 2019.
We appreciate the no-year availability of humanitarian assistance
funds and the flexibility it provides to respond to changing and
evolving emergency contexts. The availability of carryover is integral
to our ability to seamlessly continue ongoing responses or to mount a
humanitarian response to an unexpected disaster at the beginning of the
next fiscal year.
Question. b) What is your plan to get those funds out the door in a
responsible yet timely fashion to address the massive needs around the
world?
Answer. In FY 2017 and FY 2018, Congress generously provided
significant resources to respond to humanitarian challenges and the
tremendous growth in needs. The State Department and USAID will
continue use all resources made available to support populations with
the greatest humanitarian need while also focusing on improving the
efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian operations, both by the
U.S. agencies and implementing partners, including international
organizations. When making funding decisions, we carefully consider
many factors, including the severity of needs, funding availability,
contributions from other donors, access and security constraints in
affected countries, as well as the absorptive capacity of implementing
partners, all in order to ensure that humanitarian resources are
programmed responsible, effectively, and in a timely manner.
Question. China's official development assistance to African
countries has increased by more than 780% since 2003. And last year,
while the Trump administration proposed deep cuts in our diplomacy and
development budget, President Xi of China pledged $124 billion for a
new global infrastructure and development initiative called ``One Belt
One Road.'' At the same time, the Administration is proposing to close
USAID missions and eliminate economic and development assistance to
numerous countries in Asia and to slash the budget of the East Asia and
Pacific Bureau by over $380 million. Are you concerned that your
cutbacks could provide an opening for China to exert additional
influence in Asia and around the globe?
Answer. The United States is advancing economic development and
prosperity across the Indo-Pacific region and around the globe. The
Administration will remain engaged internationally to maintain U.S.
power and influence, work with allies and partners to address China's
growing influence and ambitions, and identify ways to ensure America's
continued presence and leadership.
Question. China and ZTE: What is your view, knowing what you know
from your previous position in this Administration, about the threat
that ZTE poses to U.S. national security, and their actions in
violating U.S. sanctions?
Answer. It is a longstanding practice of the Department of State
not to comment on matters of intelligence. ZTE's actions were clearly
laid out in the civil and criminal cases presented by the Departments
of Commerce, Treasury, and Justice. I refer you to those agencies for
further comment.
Question. Given that reality, do you think it is appropriate for
the U.S., as President Trump expressed, to seek to work to get ZTE
``back in business'' and to seek to support ZTE's Chinese jobs?
Answer. For information about the Administration's response to ZTE,
I refer you to the U.S. Department of Commerce.
Question. Was easing off ZTE was a quid pro quo for a trade deal
with China?
Answer. This was an enforcement action and not a part of a trade
deal. I refer you to the U.S. Department of Commerce for further
information.
Question. Was the President's action on ZTE an indication that we
need China so much on North Korea that we're willing to give up other
objectives?
Answer. North Korea is a shared security threat. It is in the
interests of America and China to work together on this issue.
Acknowledging China's unique leverage and influence on the DPRK, I will
continue to engage with China as we work towards the goal of
denuclearizing the DPRK. Our goal for a diplomatic solution is to
achieve the complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula. I would refer you to the White House for more
information regarding the President's action on ZTE.
Question. Do you think this sends a signal that the president is
not willing to enforce legally mandated sanctions?
Answer. No. The Administration is in the process of imposing the
strongest sanctions in history on Iran, and the sting of sanctions will
only grow more painful if the regime does not change course from the
unacceptable and unproductive path it has chosen for itself and the
people of Iran. Since President Trump took office in 2017, the
Department of State and the Department of the Treasury have combined to
sanction more than 110 individuals and entities for their involvement
in Iran's malign activities, including the designation of 18
individuals and entities this past week. The Administration has also
sanctioned more than 148 individuals and entities under the North Korea
sanctions program. These sanctions are part of the Administration's
global maximum pressure campaign against North Korea launched in April
2017, which will remain in force until complete denuclearization is
achieved.
Question. What implications does this have as we look to confront
Iran? Or other nefarious actors?
Answer. Our assessment is that the Administration's policies and
decisions with respect to ZTE will not affect our ability to work with
partners, allies, and others on Iran.
Question. Today Burkina Faso broke its diplomatic relationship with
Taiwan. This is now the third country to end its diplomatic ties to
Taiwan in the past year under pressure from Beijing, a very troubling
set of developments--and developments to which the Administration does
not yet appear to have developed an effective policy or response. a)
Can you share with me your perspective on these developments?
Answer. I am aware of China's efforts to alter the status quo
across the Taiwan Strait and undermine the framework that has enabled
peace, stability, and development for decades is concerning. I am
greatly disappointed in countries' decisions to switch diplomatic
recognition from Taipei to Beijing, as well as China's increased
efforts to entice Taiwan's remaining diplomatic partners to follow
suit.
Per longstanding policy, the United States opposes unilateral
actions by either side that alter the status quo across the Taiwan
Strait. Switching diplomatic recognition is destabilizing to that
delicate balance.
The United States continues to stand by Taiwan and to maintain
cooperative and friendly relations with Taiwan in accordance with our
one China policy set forth in the three Joint Communiques and Taiwan
Relations Act.
Question. b) What actions will you take to respond to and counter
China's efforts to constrain Taiwan's international space?
Answer. Although Beijing seeks to continue to constrain Taiwan's
involvement in global affairs, I am committed to supporting Taiwan as
it seeks to expand its already significant contributions to addressing
global challenges.
The United States supports Taiwan's membership in international
organizations that do not require statehood. In organizations that
require statehood for membership, we support Taiwan's meaningful
participation. The most recent example of this was a multi-country
effort to push for Taiwan's participation at the 2018 World Health
Assembly as an observer. While the proposal was blocked, it sent a
strong message to Beijing that the United States and like-minded
partners support Taiwan's meaningful participation in the World Health
Organization.
Moving forward, I will continue working to find creative ways to
expand Taiwan's international space, such as the Global Cooperation and
Training Framework (GCTF), a joint U.S.-Taiwan effort that addresses
emerging global and regional security challenges by providing training
to third country nationals. Since its launching, the GCTF has served as
a strong platform to advance common goals.
Question. c) What concrete actions will the Administration take to
engage with Taiwan's remaining diplomatic partners to encourage them to
continue to maintain relations with Taipei?
Answer. I have instructed our embassies to underscore the
importance of cross-Strait stability to the United States and express
our great disappointment with countries that fail to consider this
critical factor in their decision to switch diplomatic recognition and
destabilize the delicate balance in the Taiwan Strait.
We also cautioned that China's financing practices can come at a
steep price for recipient countries in terms of the negative effects on
local labor and environmental conditions, debt sustainability, and rule
of law.
Question. The Administration's approach to Africa--to the extent
that it has one--has for over a year appeared disjointed and
uncoordinated. In key countries on the continent, the Administration
does not appear to have embraced a whole of government approach which
places equal emphasis on the three D's: Defense, Diplomacy and
Development. The starkest example is Niger. We have troops there, we
are building a base in Agadez, and our military has suffered
casualties. What is not clear is our diplomatic strategy there. a) What
is our strategy, and how does this budget support it? How do you plan
to fill critical vacancies at Embassy Niamey?
Answer. The U.S. strategy in Niger seeks to improve the country's
ability to defend itself against terrorist and other transnational
threats; counter radicalization to violence; strengthen democracy;
promote good governance; and improve health, nutrition, and
agriculture. The Department works closely with the Department of
Defense and USAID to advance this strategy and coordinate programs with
regional and other partner nations such as through the Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership. Since I lifted the hiring freeze, the
Bureau of African Affairs and Embassy Niamey have been working to
identify potential candidates among qualified Civil Service and
Appointment Eligible Family Member applicants, in addition to Foreign
Service Officers. We are optimistic that critical vacancies will be
filled in the coming months.
Question. b) Given the need to ensure balance between the three
D's, will you support the establishment of a full USAID mission there?
Answer. We regularly review our posture at all our overseas
missions to facilitate appropriate allocation of resources and staff,
which is dependent on the unique circumstances of each location.
Question. The amount available for Democracy and Governance for
Africa in 2017 was approximately $330 million. The Administration's
request for the past 2 fiscal years has been less than half that
amount. In advance of your confirmation, I asked how you propose to
achieve the stated policy goals of the Administration for Africa in
working with promising nations to promote effective governance, improve
the rule of law, and develop institutions accountable and responsive to
citizens with such a drastic reduction in the democracy and governance
budget. You said, in part, that we would rely ``on other nations to
make greater contributions toward shared objectives, including
advancing democracy worldwide.'' a) Which nations were consulted about
their contributions in this area in advance of finalizing the Fiscal
Year 2019 budget request? What did they commit to provide?
Answer. Democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) programs are
key to safeguarding national security, fostering global prosperity,
asserting U.S. influence and leadership, and ensuring foreign
assistance programs are sustainable and effective. DRG programs support
rule of law and human rights, good governance, political competition
and consensus building, and civil society. The Administration continues
to have regular discussions with like-minded allies, including the EU,
France, and UK, to discuss the need for greater assistance to Africa to
support democracy, human rights, and good governance initiatives,
specifically the need to coordinate assistance between foreign
partners. Each of these countries has expressed a willingness to work
with us to achieve shared goals related to democratic strengthening in
the region.
Question. b) To your knowledge, were discussions about their doing
so held in advance of submitting the budget request?
Answer. The Administration's FY 2019 budget request was developed
over the course of many months of interagency deliberation, during
which a number of factors contributed to the final decision-making
process. Among the factors considered are the current development needs
being met by foreign partners that advance U.S. government objectives
across the globe. The FY 2019 request was submitted to Congress on
February 12, 2018, several weeks prior to my confirmation; however, I
know the Administration has had regular and ongoing discussions about
shared objectives with like-minded partners since the President took
office in January 2017.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions
Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. Do you believe that if the United States eases sanctions
penalties against ZTE, it would risk making sanctions enforcement more
difficult in the future?
Answer. No. Regardless of the outcome in ZTE's current situation,
ZTE has already experienced enormous consequences for its actions. For
specifics on the ZTE issue, I refer you to the Department of Commerce,
which has responsibility for enforcing denial orders. However, I do
note that the ZTE denial order is an example of the significant
consequences of violating or seeking to evade U.S. sanctions or export
controls. The United States intends to continue to vigorously enforce
our sanctions, including those related to Iran and North Korea, and has
repeatedly demonstrated willingness to impose penalties on those who
violate or seek to evade our sanctions, including third-country
companies. In light of this, I do not anticipate any negative impact on
our sanctions enforcement writ large.
Question. If we ease the penalties against ZTE, are Chinese
companies more likely to participate in U.S. sanctions-busting in the
future?
Answer. I am clear-eyed about Chinese companies' record on
sanctions compliance and ZTE's record in particular. No company in
China or elsewhere should be able to violate U.S. sanctions or export
controls without consequence; whatever the final outcome of ZTE's
current situation, they have experienced enormous consequences for
their actions. The unprecedented actions taken against ZTE send a
strong message to all companies worldwide that flout U.S. law that such
behavior will not be tolerated and can have severe consequences.
Question. A growing list of American companies have made
concessions to the Chinese government in hopes of protecting their
bottom lines, but doing so has only further emboldened Beijing.
American and United Airlines are in the throes of navigating this. Just
last week, Gap was forced to apologize for printing a T-shirt with a
map of China on it that did not include Taiwan and the South China Sea,
which Beijing illegally claims. How is the Department proactively
engaging with American companies on this issue?
Answer. I am very concerned by Beijing's attempts at economic
coercion. We have told the Chinese government that the United States
strongly objects to China's attempts to compel private firms, including
airlines, to use specific language of a political nature in their
publicly available context. We have called upon China to stop
threatening and coercing American companies and citizens and have
expressed concern over unspecified threats of punishment to airlines
that do not implement the changes China has requested.
We have requested consultations with China on the matter and also
requested that China delay implementation of its order to airlines
pending those consultations. We have also raised--and continue to
raise--this issue with partner governments, urging them to express
concerns to China as the United States has done. We remain in close
touch with U.S. airlines and other federal agencies.
Question. What, if anything, is the Administration willing and able
to do to defend U.S. companies from this type of inappropriate Chinese
aggression?
Answer. We regularly press China in support of U.S. business
interests. As part of our overall effort to ensure a fair and
reciprocal economic relationship between the United States and China,
we protest instances in which U.S. companies operating in China are
subject to opaque rules, arbitrary imposition of regulations, and
political interference in their business operations. As a general
principle, we advise companies to use international best practices and
their own internal procedures rather than allow China to dictate how
they conduct their internal business. We deplore China's efforts to
export its censorship and impose its political views on U.S. and other
foreign companies. We will consider additional steps in response to
coercion or pressure on a case-by-case basis.
Question. What are our red lines for when a U.S.-based employee for
Marriott is fired for accidentally liking a tweet on Tibet?
Answer. We deplore China's efforts to impose its political views on
U.S. and other foreign companies and advise companies to use
international best practices and their own internal procedures rather
than allow China to dictate how they conduct their internal business.
We have strongly urged Chinese authorities to work constructively with
company representatives to resolve business disputes in the spirit of
openness, transparency, and without resort to coercion or threat.
Official retaliation for clerical and other procedural issues sends a
chilling signal about China's ability to ensure fair and predictable
treatment for foreign investors and to sustain a welcoming investment
climate. American companies are major investors in China and support
millions of local jobs and other economic activity of direct benefit to
China.
Question. What is the State Department doing to encourage countries
with diplomatic relations with Taiwan not to concede to efforts by the
Chinese government and Communist Party to aggressively use their
coercive ``long arm'' to target or isolate Taiwan, especially after the
regrettable decisions by Panama, the Dominican Republic and Burkina
Faso?
Answer. China's efforts to alter the status quo across the Taiwan
Strait and undermine the framework that has enabled peace, stability,
and development for decades is concerning. I have instructed our
embassies to underscore the importance to the United States of cross-
Strait stability and express our great disappointment with countries
that fail to consider this critical factor in their decision to switch
diplomatic recognition and destabilize the delicate balance in the
Taiwan Strait.
We have also cautioned countries that China's financing practices
can come at a steep price for recipient countries in terms of the
negative effects on local labor and environmental conditions, debt
sustainability, and rule of law.
Taiwan is a vibrant democracy and reliable partner that has made
valuable contributions to addressing global challenges. The United
States continues to stand by Taiwan and to conduct cooperative and
friendly relations with Taiwan in accordance with our one China policy
set forth in the three Joint Communiques and Taiwan Relations Act.
Question. On May 23, 2018, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing acknowledged
that a State Department employee in China had experienced a ``mild
traumatic brain injury and permanent hearing loss, with such additional
symptoms as loss of balance, severe headaches, cognitive disruption,
and brain swelling.'' As you noted in your testimony, this is
consistent with what U.S. diplomatic personnel experienced in Havana.
Has a U.S. government employee been attacked in China?
Answer. The health, safety, and well-being of U.S. government
employees and their family members are our greatest concern. In March,
an employee at the U.S. Consulate General in Guangzhou reported
experiencing a variety of physical symptoms. The employee was screened
by medical personnel at the consulate and in April went to the United
States for further medical examination. On May 16, medical personnel in
the United States informed the State Department that the employee's
symptoms and clinical findings were consistent with the 24 previously
identified cases from the U.S. Embassy in Havana.
A State Department medical team is expected to arrive in Guangzhou
on May 31 to begin medical screening for employees and their family
members at the Consulate General, where more than 100 individuals have
requested screening. We do not know what caused the symptoms, and an
investigation is ongoing. The Department has undertaken a government-
wide effort to find the cause behind this incident.
Question. How is the State Department investigating the incident?
Does it plan to convene an Accountability Review Board (ARB) for this
incident in China?
Answer. The Department has undertaken a government-wide effort to
find the cause behind this incident. We continue to gather information
to determine whether the criteria have been met for convening an
Accountability Review Board.
Question. Are you viewing this as directly connected to the attacks
in Cuba?
Answer. The medical indications of the incident in Guangzhou are
very similar and entirely consistent with the medical indications that
have taken place to U.S. citizens in Cuba. However, a direct link among
cases has not been made.
Question. Have other U.S. government employees in China complained
of these symptoms?
Answer. A State Department medical team is expected to arrive in
Guangzhou on May 31 to begin medical screening for employees and their
family members at Consulate General Guangzhou, where more than 100
individuals have requested screening.
Question. How has the Chinese government responded to the situation
so far?
Answer. We have stressed our concern to the Chinese government,
which has offered its support. The Chinese government has also assured
us it will honor its commitments under the Vienna Convention to protect
our diplomats. We are working with the Chinese government to look into
this situation.
Question. The human rights abuses occurring daily in the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) of China are deeply disturbing and
include mass surveillance, the involuntary collection of biodata,
severe violations of religious freedom, and arbitrary arrests. Some
estimates have as many as 500,000 to 1 million Uyghurs, Kazaks, Kyrgyz,
and Hui currently detained in ``political education camps.'' Among
those detained are dozens of family members of Radio Free Asia Uyghur
Service journalists. The crackdown has intensified since Communist
Party Chief Chen Quanguo came to leadership in 2017, having previously
served in the same role in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, where he
imposed onerous restrictions on the Tibetan population, including the
imposition of so-called ``convenience police stations.'' Is the State
Department acting on my written request for Ambassador Branstad and the
U.S. Embassy in China to begin compiling relevant information regarding
specific XUAR officials who are responsible for the arbitrary mass
detention and abuse of Uyghurs, for possible sanctions under Global
Magnitsky?
Answer. I am deeply concerned by reports of an ongoing and
deepening crackdown on Uighurs and other Muslims in Xinjiang, China.
The Department of State has a variety of tools to press for progress on
human rights issues with China. We are looking at Global Magnitsky
sanctions to combat serious human rights abuses and corruption on a
global scale. We have used this authority in the past to sanction a
Chinese official implicated in serious human rights abuses. I can
assure you that we are committed to continuing our robust
implementation of this program.
Question. July 13 marks the 1-year anniversary of the death of
Chinese political prisoner and Nobel Laureate Liu Xiaobo. His widow,
Liu Xia, continues to languish unjustly under house arrest. A
devastating audio recording of a phone call that she had with a friend
in exile recently emerged in which she said: ``There is nothing I fear
now. If I can't leave, I'll just die at home. Xiaobo has already left,
there is nothing in this world for me. Dying is easier than living--
there is nothing simpler for me than to protest with death.'' What
specifically is the State Department doing to secure her release?
Answer. I remain deeply concerned about the well-being and freedom
of Liu Xiaobo's widow, Liu Xia. I am also troubled by reports that her
health is deteriorating. Ambassador Branstad and senior State
Department officials are engaged in sustained public and private
advocacy on behalf of Liu Xia in order to secure her freedom to
movement, including in coordination with U.S. allies and partners.
Question. Will you commit to issuing a public statement on the July
13th anniversary of Liu Xiaobo's death that calls for Liu Xia's
release?
Answer. Liu Xiaobo remains a powerful symbol for all who fight for
freedom, democracy, and a better world. I will continue to support
public advocacy to press for Liu Xia's well-being and freedom of
movement, including on the 1-year anniversary of Liu Xiaobo's passing.
Question. Has Ambassador Branstad invited her [Liu Xia] to visit
the embassy?
Answer. Ambassador Branstad and senior State Department officials
are engaged in sustained advocacy on behalf of Liu Xia in order to
secure her release from 8 years of unjustified house arrest and her
ability to leave the country according to her wishes. I am also willing
to leverage whatever requests for access and visits that will help Liu
Xia.
Question. Is the prospect of renaming the street in front of the
Chinese embassy after Liu Xiaobo under consideration if the Chinese
refuse to allow her [Liu Xia's] freedom of movement and travel?
Answer. I am committed to making use of all tools at my disposal to
press for Liu Xia's well-being and freedom of movement.
Question. In order to remove the Maduro regime from Venezuela and
return the country to the democratic order, we cannot be the lone voice
on the issue. I was heartened to see the Lima Group on May 21, 2018,
issue a declaration after the sham elections in Venezuela in which
members pledged not to recognize the election, to recall ambassadors
from Venezuela for consultations, and, critically, to warn other
countries from taking on Venezuelan debt that wasn't approved by the
National Assembly. Is the State Department coordinating efforts with
the Lima Group in order to place maximum pressure on the Maduro regime?
Answer. Yes. The Department is coordinating closely with like-
minded democracies, including the Lima Group, to intensify the
international community's efforts to urge the Maduro regime to restore
peacefully Venezuela's democracy and resolve quickly the political,
economic, social, and humanitarian crisis. We supported the Lima
Group's condemnation of the May 20 presidential elections, which
included concrete steps member countries will take to place additional
pressure on the regime. At the Lima Group's invitation, the Department
has participated in four of its six meetings, including my
participation in the most recent one on May 14. I will continue to
support future Lima Group activities as appropriate.
Question. Following the latest round of U.S. sanctions, do you
believe that countries like Russia and China will continue to take on
Venezuelan debt?
Answer. Russia and China have substantial investments in Venezuela.
Both countries publicly congratulated Maduro following the sham
election, making clear they intend to continue to protect and promote
their interests in Venezuela, possibly at the expense of the Venezuelan
people. Before this latest round of U.S. sanctions, however, and even
before the August 2017 U.S. financial sanctions, it appeared neither
China nor Russia was willing to take on large amounts of additional
debt under current circumstances given the uncertainty of repayment and
Venezuela's record of defaulting on debt. The Department follows this
issue closely and sees no willingness on the part of other countries to
add to Venezuela's unsustainable debt load. Other evidence, such as
Venezuela's use of IMF special drawing rights to pay creditors and
bartering natural resources for imports, indicates an absence of new
credit.
Question. Is the White House committed to not recognizing any debt
not approved by the legitimate National Assembly?
Answer. The Department is committed to supporting legitimate,
democratic actors in Venezuela including the National Assembly, which
is established under the Venezuelan constitution of 1999 and whose
members were democratically elected, as it seeks to fulfill its mandate
to review and approve any debt incurred by Venezuela. The Maduro regime
continues to undermine the National Assembly's constitutional role. I
support the Department's efforts to restore the National Assembly's
duties and those of other legitimate democratic actors and institutions
within Venezuela to help resolve the crisis.
Question. Venezuela's economy is in a total freefall. The IMF
forecasted in January that inflation would reach nearly 13,000% in
2018, while other measurements indicate that prices double every 17.5
days. The average Venezuelan has lost an average of 24 lbs. on the
``Maduro diet.'' Because they can't cast a legitimate ballot at home,
many Venezuelans have decided to vote with their feet, flee their
country's crisis, and seek refuge in neighboring countries. Over the
past 3 years, nearly 600,000 Venezuelans have sought asylum or received
an alternative legal status from other Western Hemisphere nations,
according to the U.N. Refugee Agency, which estimates that up to
900,000 more may be residing in Colombia and other countries in the
region without authorization. This massive migration is quickly burning
through the available resources of their host countries. Is the Trump
administration willing to provide assistance to the Venezuelan people?
Answer. Since 2017 the United States has committed nearly $40
million to the regional response to the Venezuelan crisis, mostly to
support Venezuelans in Colombia and Brazil. In coordination with the
Lima Group, the OAS, and others, I stand ready to do more to support
Venezuelans fleeing their country. The Department is also prepared to
offer humanitarian support within Venezuela should the Maduro regime
allow vital assistance to reach its people. I support ongoing
discussions regarding how the Department can increase its support and
urge others in the international community to do the same. The
Venezuelan people are the focal point of our assistance efforts, as
they suffer the most from this terrible crisis.
Question. Have you staffed a coordinated State Department and USAID
strategy to address the immediate humanitarian needs of Venezuelans,
both inside Venezuela and in neighboring countries?
Answer. The Department and USAID are working together to organize
our response to the humanitarian needs of Venezuelans inside and
outside the country. As you are aware, the United States is unable to
get urgently needed supplies into the country due to the regime's
rejection of humanitarian assistance. We are coordinating efforts with
our international partners to provide additional assistance beyond the
nearly $40 million we have offered since 2017, mostly to support
assistance to Venezuelans in Colombia and Brazil, and I will continue
to support these efforts.
Question. How are you working with our friends and neighbors in the
region to address the humanitarian crisis?
Answer. I support the Department's efforts to work alongside the
Lima Group, the EU, the Vatican, and other partners in the
international community to address the regime-orchestrated
humanitarian, economic, political, and social crises facing the
Venezuelan people. In order for our efforts to be successful, I will
continue to coordinate our humanitarian response with others to prevent
further regional instability. I also stand ready to support any Lima
Group efforts to discuss the migration and humanitarian crisis.
Question. Is there a plan for assisting the legitimate and
democratic future government of Venezuela with reconstruction efforts?
Answer. Yes. The Department is considering additional options to
support democratic actors who wish to develop an alternative vision for
Venezuela's future that would include political and economic
restructuring and support for a consensus plan to restore Venezuela's
democracy. I support this effort to ensure legitimate democratic actors
are coordinating with each other and have the necessary mechanisms in
place to promote an interim, inclusive government that would enable a
return to democracy, including free and fair elections. I am also
prepared to support the Venezuelan opposition and civil society as they
solidify a plan to provide a democratic future for the millions of
Venezuelans suffering under the regime.
Question. One of the unintended consequences of the flawed peace
deal in Colombia has been a large increase in cocaine coming towards
our borders. This was easy to see coming. President Santos, at the
request of the FARC, halted aerial eradication efforts. Jesus Santrich,
one of the FARC's leaders who is now a member of parliament, was
recently accused by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration of
planning to smuggle eleven tons of cocaine into the United States. The
FARC claims that if the Colombian government extradites Santrich, the
peace deal would be at risk of ``truly failing.'' Do you believe there
will be a large increase in cocaine entering the U.S. due to the
Colombia peace deal?
Answer. The success of the peace accord and our shared efforts
against drug trafficking are inextricably linked. Increased coca
cultivation can be attributed to multiple factors, including coca
growers moving plantings to areas where aerial eradication was more
difficult, FARC efforts to encourage new plantings from 2013 onwards,
and the increasing use and effectiveness of social protests to block
manual eradication. Colombia needs to do more to reverse the alarming
growth in coca cultivation and cocaine production in Colombia. We are
working with the Colombian government to reduce coca cultivation and
cocaine production in Colombia to 50 percent of current levels by 2023.
Question. Do you support the extradition of Jesus Santrich?
Answer. I strongly support U.S. efforts to seek extradition of
those who break U.S. laws wherever they might reside or travel so that
they can be held accountable in U.S. courts, including FARC Secretariat
member Seusis Pausivas Hernandez, alias Jesus Santrich. The United
States and Colombia enjoy an outstanding law enforcement, security, and
extradition relationship that has benefited the victims of
transnational crime in both countries. Colombia extradited 2,124
individuals to the United States from 1997 through April 2018--by far
the largest number of extraditions to the United States from any
country during that period.
Question. Do you support the continued robust foreign assistance to
Colombia in order to help stem the flow of cocaine to the United
States?
Answer. Yes. We are working with the Colombian government to reduce
cocaine production and coca cultivation in Colombia to 50 percent of
current levels by 2023. The Department will urge the incoming Colombian
government to enhance its counternarcotics policies, particularly
through approaches such as forced eradication and by expanding capable
government services and economic opportunities to vulnerable regions.
Question. By recognizing Jerusalem as Israel's eternal and
undivided capital and moving our embassy there, the United States
acknowledged reality and righted a historic wrong. Now that the embassy
has officially opened, what are the State Department's plans going
forward for a new permanent embassy facility in Jerusalem?
Answer. The Department of State has started the process of site
selection for a permanent U.S. Embassy to Israel in Jerusalem. We are
looking at all sites we currently lease or own as well as other
options. We expect site selection, design, planning and permitting, and
construction of a permanent embassy in Jerusalem to take 7 to 10 years.
That timeframe reflects our firm commitment to the safety and security
of U.S. diplomats and citizens abroad.
Question. Does the Administration intend to request funds in the FY
2020 budget for building a permanent embassy?
Answer. The construction of a new U.S. Embassy facility in
Jerusalem is a high priority for the Administration. While decisions on
the Administration's FY 2020 budget request have not yet been made,
planning for the construction of a permanent facility for Embassy
Jerusalem is ongoing and the Department intends to utilize available
funding from the Capital Security Cost Sharing program, as necessary,
to execute this project as design and construction plans are finalized.
Question. There have been multiple reports of the Administration
freezing about $200 million for Syria stabilization efforts, including
assistance for landmine and rubble removal, restoring basic services,
and to groups such as the White Helmets who are doing lifesaving work
every day in the face of Assad's brutality. What was the reasoning for
freezing these funds?
Answer. In line with the President's request to review all
bilateral foreign assistance for Syria, we continually reevaluate
stabilization assistance levels and how they might best be utilized. We
do this on an ongoing basis, as we do elsewhere around the world. The
United States continues to work with our partners in the Global
Coalition to Defeat ISIS to support immediate stabilization and early
recovery efforts in areas liberated from ISIS control, including
Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) removal, the restoration of essential
services, and building local capacity to support longer-term
sustainability. We appreciate the brave, life-saving humanitarian work
the White Helmets undertake for the Syrian people and the sacrifices
they have made.
Question. What are the Administration's plans for these funds?
Answer. In line with the President's request to review all
bilateral foreign assistance for Syria, we continually reevaluate
stabilization assistance levels and how best they might be utilized. We
do this on an ongoing basis, as we do elsewhere around the world. Our
objective in these reviews is to ensure our assistance is targeted,
effective, and set at the appropriate level.
Question. Do you expect assistance for stabilization efforts will
resume in the near future?
Answer. While we reevaluate appropriate assistance levels and how
best they might be utilized, the Department of State and USAID continue
to work with the international community, members of the Global
Coalition to Defeat ISIS, and our partners on the ground to provide
much-needed stabilization support to vulnerable areas in Syria.
Question. Raif Badawi is a prominent Saudi blogger who was arrested
in 2012 on charges of insulting religion through electronic channels
and was sentenced to 10 years in prison and 1,000 lashes. I have long
advocated for his release. If Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud
is serious about reform, releasing political prisoners such as Mr.
Badawi would be an important first step. Additionally, it would help
strengthen the strategic partnership between the United States and
Saudi Arabia as we confront a number of issues, including terrorism and
the growing threats from Iran. Have you raised Raif Badawi's case in
your meetings with senior Saudi officials?
Answer. Human rights issues are part of the Department of State's
conversations with the Saudi Arabian government, and Mr. Badawi's case
is raised in those discussions. U.S. officials encourage the Saudi
government to recognize and respect the rights of its citizens to
exercise freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. The Department
of State condemns any punishment for exercising those rights. I will
continue to raise these issues with the Saudi Arabian government and
encourage the government to afford all necessary legal and juridical
guarantees to protect the rule of law and fundamental human rights of
all citizens and residents.
Question. Will you commit to making Raif Badawi's case and those of
the many other political prisoners wrongfully detained by the Saudi
government a priority in our bilateral relationship with Saudi Arabia?
Answer. Human rights issues are part of the Department of State's
conversations with the Saudi Arabian government, and Mr. Badawi's case
is raised in those discussions. We also confer with like-minded
countries on this and other related human rights issues. No one should
be charged, prosecuted, or imprisoned for engaging in peaceful advocacy
or political activities or freedom of expression, even when that
expression is critical. We will continue to raise Mr. Badawi's case
with the Saudi government at the highest levels and encourage the
government to afford all necessary legal and judicial guarantees to
protect the rule of law and fundamental human rights of all citizens
and residents.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions
Submitted by Senator Ben Cardin
Question. What is your strategy to support the people of Iran? What
is the status of U.S. democracy and broadcasting programs in Iran? Do
you think we can do a better job of getting our message directly to the
Iranian people?
Answer. Supporting the long-suffering Iranian people is a top
priority for the U.S. government. We regularly speak out on Iran's
human rights abuses. We work with like-minded partners to raise
international pressure on Iran. We use every opportunity to speak
directly to the Iranian people, like my recent interview with VOA's
Persian language television service. We support the free flow of
information in Iran. Our democracy programming for Iran funds a range
of government accountability, civil society, anti-censorship, and human
rights initiatives. We continue to hold the Iranian government
accountable through sanctions for human rights abuses.
Question. In March of this year, the Treasury Department issued
sanctions against Russian oligarchs, officials, and entities in
response to Russia's meddling. Can you commit to us here today that you
will comply with the spirit and letter of the law and implement further
sanctions against Russia for its meddling in our election?
Answer. Together with the Department of the Treasury, the State
Department is implementing CAATSA to impose costs on Russia for the
totality of its malign behavior. We remain committed to the
comprehensive implementation of CAATSA to achieve this end. Since
January 2017, the U.S. government has sanctioned 205 individuals and
entities for their involvement in Russian malign activities; 136 of
these designations were made under Ukraine-related sanctions
authorities codified by CAATSA. This number includes the most recent
action on April 6, 2018, in which Treasury designated 7 Russian
oligarchs and 12 companies they own or control, along with 17 senior
Russian government officials. In addition, on March 15, 2018, Treasury
designated five entities and 19 individuals under relevant authorities,
including CAATSA Section 224 as well as Executive Order 13694,
``Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant
Malicious Cyber-Enable Activities'' for interference in the 2016 U.S.
election and other malicious cyber-enabled activities.
In coordination with the interagency, we continue to review
potentially sanctionable activity and make appropriate determinations
under mandatory provisions of CAATSA as well as related authorities.
Question. Last month, our Committee held a hearing to examine U.S.
policy in Yemen. During the hearing, I asked our Department of Defense
witness how we are ensuring that our assistance to the coalition is
helping to reduce civilian casualties when we don't in fact track those
casualties. Mr. Karem responded that we have ``insight into Saudi
targeting behavior,'' and that ``Saudi and Emirati targeting efforts
have improved.'' As Secretary of State, how do you think civilian
casualties impact our ability to help negotiate a political resolution
to the Yemen crisis?
Answer. We take all credible reports of civilian casualties
seriously and are proactively engaging with the Coalition to assist it
in reducing the likelihood of harm to civilians and civilian
infrastructure. We continue to press Saudi-led Coalition partners at
the highest levels to mitigate the conflict's impact on civilians.
Civilian casualties feed a cycle of violence between the parties,
worsening the crisis. Ending the conflict in Yemen is in the national
security interests of the United States and is the Administration's
ultimate goal. To that end, the United States firmly believes that the
only solution to the conflict in Yemen is a negotiated political
settlement under U.N. auspices.
Question. Do you agree that these casualties put America's
reputation at risk? How would you suggest the U.S. address this risk?
Answer. We take all credible reports of civilian casualties
seriously and are proactively engaging with the Coalition to reduce the
likelihood of harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure. We have
delivered courses for the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) that
specifically include training on law of armed conflict and air-to-
ground targeting processes. The Saudi Ministry of Defense has committed
to fund training for the RSAF from U.S. forces on minimizing civilian
casualties, including as part of a $750 million, multi-year Foreign
Military Sales training case. We continue to urge the Coalition and all
parties to the conflict to allow full access for humanitarian relief
and commercial goods to address Yemen's humanitarian crisis.
Question. What steps are you taking to ensure a political
resolution to this crisis?
Answer. The Administration strongly supports and is working closely
with U.N. Special Envoy to Yemen Martin Griffiths to revive political
negotiations on an accelerated timeline. Our support is not passive. I,
along with Secretary Mattis and senior White House officials, have met
with the Special Envoy. I offered him our full support and will
continue to engage with key regional partners, including the Saudis and
Emiratis, to reinforce the Envoy's work. All sides, including the
Houthis, will also have to make compromises in order to reach a
political solution.
Question. What is the status of the Administration's review of the
Gaza humanitarian funding that was allowed for by the Taylor Force act?
Answer. U.S. assistance to the Palestinians remains under review. I
can assure you that Congress will receive briefings on the conclusions
of the review when it is complete.
Question. What is the prospect for restarting the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process?
Answer. The Administration is committed to achieving a lasting and
comprehensive peace agreement and remains optimistic that progress can
be made.
Question. Do you expect the Administration to lay out its peace
plan in the near future? Are you involved in those discussions? If so,
what can you tell me about them?
Answer. The Administration is hard at work on a plan that would
offer a brighter future to both Israel and the Palestinians. That plan
will be presented to the parties when the time is right.
Question. How can we improve the situation for the majority of
people in Gaza who simply want peace, security and prosperity?
Answer. On March 13, the White House hosted a conference on Gaza
with representatives from 20 countries, including Israel and many Arab
states. Participants discussed a series of concrete proposals and
projects that would address the urgent challenges faced by Palestinians
in Gaza, including chronic shortages of electricity and water. Hamas
has consistently put its own destructive priorities above those of
Gaza's population. Despite that, the United States will continue to
work with our partners to find ways improve the lives of the people of
Gaza.
Question. Anti-Semitism: There has been an acute global increase in
anti-Semitic incidents over the last year, often taking place in the
form of violent attacks, bomb threats, vandalism, and hateful rhetoric
spanning all levels of society. It is critical that the United States
lead with action to combat anti-Semitism at home and abroad. Last week,
41 Senators sent a letter to President Trump urging him to appoint a
Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism at the U.S.
Department of State. The position has been vacant for over 15 months.
Do you believe this is an important position within the State
Department? If so, when do you expect to fill the position?
Answer. The Trump administration considers the Special Envoy to
Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism to be an important position in
documenting abuses against members of international Jewish communities
and developing and implementing policies to combat global anti-
Semitism. Combating anti-Semitism internationally is a critical human
rights issue, and is a priority for this administration. I share your
deep concern about rising anti-Semitism in Europe and elsewhere and I
agree with you that the United States must continue to lead on
combating this scourge.
I am working to get a Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-
Semitism appointed as soon as possible. Meanwhile, Ambassador at Large
for International Religious Freedom Sam Brownback and his team at the
Office of International Religious Freedom have been meeting with Jewish
leaders to hear their concerns, and urging governments in Europe and
elsewhere to condemn anti-Semitism, provide appropriate levels of
security to Jewish communities, and prosecute attacks on Jewish
communities and individuals around the world.
Question. Rule of Law: The Wilson Center recently published a
report on the rule of law that calls for more U.S. government strategic
investment and coordination of our rule of law programming across the
interagency process. The report made clear that we must do more on this
effort, because rule of law issues have an impact our national
security. Leadership at the State Department on this issue is not in
place. When can we expect to see the president nominate an Under
Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights at the
State Department?
Answer. Filling vacant leadership positions is a top priority of
mine, and I am working closely with the White House to fill this and
other leadership positions.
Question. Rule of Law: The Wilson Center recently published a
report on the rule of law that calls for more U.S. government strategic
investment and coordination of our rule of law programming across the
interagency process. The report made clear that we must do more on this
effort, because rule of law issues have an impact our national
security. Leadership at the State Department on this issue is not in
place. How does this the budget address this issue? Does the budget
prioritize rule of law, governance, and anticorruption programing?
Answer. Democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) assistance,
including rule of law, good governance, and anti-corruption programming
are critical for defending national security, fostering economic
opportunities for the American people, and asserting U.S. leadership
and influence. The National Security Strategy (NSS) makes clear that
respect for human rights, democracy, and the rule of law is more likely
to produce peace, stability, and prosperity at home and abroad and is
therefore integral to our national security. The President's FY 2019
Request includes $1.4 billion for DRG assistance, including $392.1
million for rule of law and human rights and $615.9 million for good
governance programming. The FY 2019 Request factors in the
Administration's commitment to restraining overall non-defense
discretionary spending, including foreign assistance resources.
Therefore, the FY 2019 budget request is a reflection of U.S. national
priorities while remaining within an overall budget topline.
Question. Addressing Violent Conflict/atrocities: The 2018
Worldwide Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community found that
``poor governance, weak national political institutions, economic
inequality, and the rise of violent non-state actors all undermine
states' abilities to project authority and elevate the risk of
violent--even regime-threatening--instability and mass atrocities.''
How does this budget prioritize efforts to address the root causes of
violent conflict like poor rule of law, governance, weak political
institutions, and economic inequality? What tools are your employing to
prevent atrocities that would impact our national security interests?
Answer. I believe it is in our national interest to work with
partners to mitigate conflict and prevent mass atrocities around the
world. These conflicts not only have dire consequences for the people
living in the affected regions but also impose a significant security
and financial burden on Americans and the international community. U.S.
foreign assistance programs, particularly when combined with diplomatic
efforts, can effectively help to mitigate and respond to these threats.
Our budget request includes dedicated funding to advance ongoing
conflict mitigation and stabilization efforts in key countries such as
Libya, Nigeria, and Iraq.
Question. The Department of State has a pivotal role in
implementing the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, the
United States' most cost-effective, far-reaching, and powerful tool for
keeping human rights abusers and corrupt officials out of our country
and financial system. Individuals sanctioned under this law have their
dollar-denominated assets frozen and are banned from entering the
United States. This enhances national security and increases deterrence
against these crimes. It also shows solidarity with those fighting for
human rights and democracy around the world by denying legitimacy to
their tormentors. Do you agree that it is critical to designate funding
towards implementing the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability
Act?
Answer. Yes. The Department of State's role in the implementation
of Global Magnitsky encompasses every embassy, regional bureau, and
many of our functional bureaus as well. Global Magnitsky is a powerful
sanctions program, and no individual or region is immune from being
held accountable for human rights abuse or corruption. The
Administration appreciates continued Congressional support for this
versatile tool.
Question. I was pleased to see your statement last week marking the
International Day Against Homophobia, Transphobia and Biphobia that the
administration U.S. ``opposes criminalization, violence and serious
acts of discrimination'' against LGBTI persons. I also appreciated the
administration using the Global Magnitsky law to sanction officials
responsible for the gruesome pogrom against gay men in Chechnya last
December. Over the last year, in a number of places around the globe,
LGBTQ people have been targeted, rounded up, tortured and even killed,
just for being who they are. We've seen it not just in Chechnya, but
also Egypt, Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Bangladesh and other places. Based
on that, what specifically will you commit to do to help LGBTQ people
in Chechnya, Egypt and other places to ensure they are not targeted for
abuse? What will you do to make your commitments a reality on a day-to-
day basis?
Answer. The horrible treatment of LGBTI persons is truly
despicable. As my statement for the International Day Against
Homophobia, Transphobia and Biphobia confirmed, ``the United States
stands with people around the world in affirming the dignity and
equality of all people regardless of sexual orientation, gender
identity or expression, or sex characteristics. Human rights are
universal, and LGBTI people are entitled to the same respect, freedoms,
and protections as everyone else.'' Under my leadership, the Department
will continue to use a range of public and private actions to counter
violence and severe discrimination against LGBTI persons including
through bilateral and multilateral channels, by offering emergency
assistance to LGBTI persons and organizations at risk, and by imposing
visa restrictions and economic sanctions, as appropriate, against those
who violate their human rights.
Question. As you know, the Bureau of Population, Refugees and
Migration (PRM) plays a critical role at the State Department. The
Department of State's efforts to respond to crises includes efforts to
address refugee flight and solutions require the integration of
diplomatic engagement and assistance. Moreover, most of the State's
provision of humanitarian assistance are through investments in a
network of international organizations, and the State Department's
strong role in governing bodies like UNHCR and ICRC, for example,
provide the United States with crucial influence over how those
institutions operate in areas of concern to the U.S. government. Will
you support the important work of the PRM bureau at the State
Department, including both the humanitarian responsibilities as well as
refugee resettlement?
Answer. I support the important work of the Bureau of Population,
Refugees, and Migration (PRM). PRM fulfills a critical role in
providing humanitarian aid and other assistance for refugees, conflict
victims, and stateless people around the world and is an integral part
of U.S. foreign policy efforts to prevent and respond to crises and
conflict and to promote regional stability. PRM's work strengthens our
worldwide diplomatic influence and gives the United States great impact
in shaping global humanitarian responses to conflict.
Question. We are hearing that USAID continues to experience unusual
program and funding delays. Confusion caused by the President's Budget
request and bureaucratic delays at the State Department risk rendering
aid less effective and causing increased suffering for people on the
ground. As a former Member of Congress, do you believe that when
Congress appropriates funds that those be spent as set forth in the
mandate in the Appropriations bills?
Answer. The Department and USAID will use the funds appropriated by
Congress consistent with the appropriations acts and other relevant
statutes. The Department of State and USAID will continue to work
diligently to ensure that funds appropriated by Congress are approved
and obligated as quickly as possible while assuring compliance with
applicable legal and other requirements.
Question. What are the challenges you face in ensuring that the
funds appropriated by Congress are moving quickly to the Missions to
help deliver assistance to those in need?
Answer. The Department of State and USAID work diligently to ensure
that funds appropriated by Congress move as quickly as possible to
embassies and missions to help them deliver assistance to those in
need. We will continue to look for opportunities to improve the
timeliness of this process while assuring compliance with applicable
legal and other requirements.
Question. What are your views on the Department spending $12
million on consultants for the 'redesign' process, while refusing to
spend funds appropriated for critical programs, like democracy and
governance funding, for example?
Answer. The Administration is committed to restraining overall non-
defense discretionary spending, including for the State Department and
USAID. I understand the Redesign surfaced a number of proposals
designed to improve efficiency and strengthen the tools available to
our staff, consistent with the President's Management Agenda. This
contract for analytical support was funded from the Department's
operating resources and had no effect on funding for democracy and
governance programs since they are funded from separate accounts. The
Department remains committed to ensuring effectiveness of U.S. taxpayer
dollars, driving efficiencies, and working on behalf of the American
people to advance national security objectives and foreign policy
goals. I look forward to continuing discussions with Congress on
funding for our diplomacy and foreign assistance programs.
Question. The President's budget request will leave the Department
of Defense without strong U.S. diplomatic or development partners.
Given the importance of cultivating institutional development expertise
within our civilian workforce, I am deeply concerned about the proposed
budget cuts to the State Department and USAID and the ongoing staffing
vacancies. Now that the State Department-imposed hiring freeze has been
lifted, are you confident that you will be able to put in place the
21st-century workforce your agency needs and demands?
Answer. The Department's workforce is our most valuable asset,
which is why on May 15 I lifted the Department's hiring freeze on the
Foreign Service and Civil Service and authorized the Department of
State to hire to the funded levels as determined by The Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2018. This will result in hiring at or above
attrition levels for the remainder of FY 2018. It is essential we
ensure that our domestic bureaus and overseas missions have the
flexibility to hire the most qualified people for positions that are
essential to promoting the Department's mission and the foreign policy
goals of the United States.
Question. After almost a decade of transparency from bipartisan
administrations (9 years) about country-by-country allocations for
foreign assistance, there will be no such information submitted by the
Administration as part of its FY19 budget request. The Administration
has put forth a 43% cut to development programs but failed to share how
various development sectors and priorities will be impacted by this and
other cuts. As the Administration targets specific countries to be
strategically transitioned away from foreign assistance this
information is absolutely critical to congressional oversight.
When will Congress have access to this information? We expect this
Administration to maintain some commitment to transparency.
Answer. The FY 2019 Congressional Budget Justification and the
accompanying appendices and supplementary tables include country-by-
country allocations for foreign assistance, as they have in previous
years. Please see web address for the documents here: https://
www.state.gov/s/d/rm/c6112.htm.
Please note that funds previously requested under the Development
Assistance (DA) and Economic Support Fund (ESF) accounts are being
requested as part of the Economic Support and Development Fund (ESDF)
account. The ESDF account is requested in the FY 2019 budget in an
effort to streamline accounts and ensure the most effective use of
foreign assistance funding. The ESDF account will continue to support
select programs and activities previously requested under the ESF and
DA accounts, allowing the Department and USAID to better assess,
prioritize, and target development-related activities in the context of
broader U.S. foreign policy objectives and partnerships around the
world.
Question. Are the State Department and USAID capable of submitting
country-by-country allocations for topline development and security
assistance accounts for the record? If yes, we formally request that be
submitted for the record.
Answer. The FY 2019 Congressional Budget Justification and the
accompanying appendices and supplementary tables include country-by-
country allocations for foreign assistance, including for development
and security assistance. Please see the web address for the documents
here: https://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/c6112.htm.
Please note that funds previously requested under the Development
Assistance (DA) and Economic Support Fund (ESF) accounts are being
requested as part of the Economic Support and Development Fund (ESDF)
account. The ESDF account is requested in the FY 2019 budget in an
effort to streamline accounts and ensure the most effective use of
foreign assistance funding. The ESDF account will continue to support
select programs and activities previously requested under the ESF and
DA accounts, allowing the Department and USAID to better assess,
prioritize, and target development-related activities in the context of
broader U.S. foreign policy objectives and partnerships around the
world.
Question. Which countries are being strategically transitioned away
from development assistance and under what timeline? How do these
timelines align, if at all, with the FY19 budget request?
Answer. The Administration is assessing how to optimize U.S.
foreign assistance, including how to reorient development around the
concept of ``self-reliance''--the ability for countries to plan,
finance, and implement solutions to solve their own development
challenges. USAID has identified a set of objective, third-party
metrics to help assess its partner countries' relative levels of self-
reliance. For the most self-reliant partners, USAID plans to have
conversations about a strategic transition toward a partnership beyond
the traditional donor-recipient paradigm. A strategic transition is not
the immediate closeout of a mission--it means making data-informed and
thoughtful decisions about the right role and footprint for USAID in
that country. The process will include consultations with the inter-
agency, Congress, the host country, and key stakeholders, which will
guide the selection of target countries and subsequent design of the
new partnership with selected countries. At present, in consultation
with the Department of State, USAID is examining countries for possible
strategic transitions. For example, one country selected is Albania,
where State and USAID are working closely on a plan.
The FY 2019 budget request was completed independently of this
broader effort around self-reliance strategic transition. USAID intends
to use the funding provided by Congress to advance self-reliance in all
the countries in which it operates and prepare for strategic
transitions in the ones deemed ready for a new type of partnership.
Question. I am deeply concerned by what appears to be drastic cuts
from FY18's budget request for funding for gender programs. These are
critical investments to ensure that development is effective, and that
women and girls are also included and respected. How do you justify
shrinking the request by 52% from last year, which was already a large
cut from FY17?
Answer. Societies that empower women to participate fully in civic
and economic life are more prosperous and peaceful. The United States
will continue to support efforts to advance women's equality, protect
the rights of women and girls, and promote women and girls' empowerment
programs across the globe. I look forward to leading the Department as
it continues to address critical issues including women's access to
finance and protection from violence. Even as we have to make difficult
trade-off decisions in a challenging budget environment, funding for
gender programs remain a priority.
The State-USAID's FY 2018 request for gender programs (including
all women's leadership; gender-based violence; women, peace, and
security; and women's economic empowerment programs) totaled just over
$781 million. The State-USAID FY 2019 request for the same array of
programs comes to over $875 million, reflecting a 12 percent increase.
We look forward to continuing to empower and protect the rights of
women and girls around the world through these invaluable programs.
Question. With the recent CDC directive to focus on national health
interests and the decision to not request any additional global health
security funds once the Ebola funds expire, it seems that the State
Department and USAID will need to do more to ensure HIV/AIDS and global
health security programs will continue to prevent the spread of
disease. With cuts to global health funding how do you plan to ensure
that HIV/AIDS and global health security programs will continue in a
robust manner?
Answer. The Department of State and USAID are committed to ensuring
that U.S. HIV/AIDS assistance and our global health security programs
continue to stem the spread of disease. This commitment is reflected in
the FY 2019 President's Budget, which requests significant funding for
the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and other U.S. global
health programs and proposes to redirect funding for global health
security from remaining FY 2015 Ebola supplemental funds. The request
for health assistance accounts for 25 percent of the Department of
State's and USAID's total foreign assistance request.
The United States will continue to lead international efforts that
support global health security and control the HIV/AIDS epidemic, but
these health challenges should not just be met by contributions from
the United States. U.S. assistance programs will continue leveraging
our dollars to ensure that other donor countries and local partners are
contributing their fair share.
Question. Just last week, the Democratic Republic of Congo declared
a new outbreak of Ebola, with dozens of suspected cases and 17 deaths
so far. Yet on the same day, the White House released its rescissions
package, which included the rescission of $252 million for critical
Ebola funding reserved for emergencies such as this. What message does
this rescissions package send regarding U.S. leadership in global
health, especially at a time of increasing global health crises and
humanitarian conflicts that threaten America's national security
interests?
Answer. The Administration has taken swift action in response to
the current Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC). On May 22, the Administration announced that USAID is
contributing $8 million towards interventions to help prevent the
spread of this deadly disease, including $5 million I released from the
international health emergency reserve fund. We commend the efforts of
the Congolese and our international partners to confront this outbreak
and help prevent a global health crisis and welcome future
contributions from international partners and other countries toward
this effort as well as long-term global health security efforts aimed
at preventing future crises. With respect to the proposed $252 million
rescission for Ebola, these funds were targeted for the West Africa
Ebola crisis, which the WHO declared to be over in 2016. Separate from
the funds being proposed for rescission, Congress has generously
provided other funds, including the emergency reserve fund, which
enable us to respond appropriately to emergency needs like the current
DRC outbreak, if needed.
Question. I was very concerned that this year's human rights report
failed to offer a complete picture of the abuses that women face by
censoring descriptions of reproductive rights violations. This year's
human rights report details only cases of coercion, such as forced
abortions or sterilizations--serious incidents that absolutely belong
in the report, but far from the full range of reproductive rights
violations that women face. Do you believe that denying women access to
contraception--which could help them to plan their families and reduce
maternal and infant deaths--is also violation of their rights?
Answer. I support the Administration's efforts to address the
maternal health and voluntary family planning needs of women around the
world. Enabling couples to determine whether, when, and how often to
have children is vital to safe motherhood and healthy families. The
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) finances programs
that help individuals make a free and informed choice about having
children by providing access to and information about a variety of
voluntary family planning options. The United States remains the
largest donor to women's health around the world, and the President's
Budget Request for FY 2019 includes $302 million for voluntary family-
planning programs.
Question. The White House has indicated that it will propose a
package of rescissions targeting funds appropriated by the FY18 Omnibus
bill at some point this year. I am concerned that, given the
Administration's recent budget proposals, these cuts will fall
disproportionately on the State Department and USAID, which make up
just over 1% of all federal spending. I am also concerned that the
submission of multiple rescissions packages is meant to, in part,
significantly delay FY 2018 appropriated funding.
Can you assure us that, as budget discussions in the Administration
move forward, you will advocate for State and USAID to receive the
funding they need to carry out their multifarious mandates?
Answer. As I said in my testimony before the House Foreign Affairs
Committee on May 23, I will ensure that the State Department has every
dollar it needs to achieve its mission around the world. The Department
remains committed to ensuring effectiveness of U.S. taxpayer dollars;
driving efficiencies; and working on behalf of the American people to
advance national security objectives and foreign policy goals.
Question. Will you commit to ensuring operating plans mandated by
law are transmitted to Congress in an expeditious matter and not slow-
walked under the guise of being part of potential future rescissions
packages?
Answer. Yes. The Department will seek to provide the operating
plans required under the annual appropriations act in a timely manner.
Question. U.N. peacekeeping operations have been shown to be more
cost-effective than other forms of military intervention. A report
published by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in February
2018 compared the cost of the current U.N. peacekeeping mission in the
Central African Republic (MINUSCA) with a hypothetical operation
undertaken by the U.S. military. Overall, the GAO analysis showed that
peacekeeping is eight times less expensive for U.S. taxpayers than the
U.S. going it alone, while also highlighting the positive burden-
sharing elements of U.N. peace operations. Isn't this an example of
what the Administration is repeatedly calling for--cost effective
investments in the U.N., which other countries participate in and
advance U.S. interest? Will you commit to taking the views of our
military into consideration with regards to future decisions you make
regarding U.N. peacekeeping operations?
Answer. U.N. peacekeeping is a powerful tool to share the burden of
addressing global challenges to international peace and security and
provides a collective benefit to the entire international community.
However, reform is necessary to achieve smarter peacekeeping operations
that can more effectively and efficiently address conflicts, support
political solutions, and meet the needs of people on the ground. I will
continue to work closely with Secretary Mattis on decisions regarding
the future of U.N. peacekeeping.
Question. In December 2017, the General Assembly approved the 2018-
2019 U.N. Regular Budget, which covers the organization's core
activities and expenses. Overall, the budget for this 2-year cycle
totals $5.397 billion, a reduction of $285 million (5%) from the final
2016-2017 appropriation. These savings are significant, and wouldn't
have been possible without strong U.S. engagement and creative
diplomatic maneuvering. However, despite the fact that the U.S. is
getting a lot of what it wants out of these budget negotiations, the
Administration's FY19 request fails to fully fund our Regular Budget
assessments. What message does it send to other countries--including
our allies--when they agree to cuts proposed by the U.S. and we then
fail to pay our bills?
Answer. The Administration proposed reductions in U.S.
contributions to the United Nations and other international
organizations. This is consistent with the stated objective of
achieving greater burden-sharing by other countries. The actual
contributions that the Department will pay depend on the amounts of
funding that Congress appropriates and any conditions or restrictions
that apply to those funds.
Question. Don't you think it makes it harder for us to generate the
goodwill necessary to push forward on our U.N. reform agenda over the
long term?
Answer. The President's budget proposal for FY 2019 reflects the
U.S. commitment to spur long-needed reforms and more equitable burden-
sharing among U.N. member states. As President Trump told U.N. Security
Council ambassadors on April 24, 2017, ``the United Nations has
tremendous potential,'' but ``for the United Nations to play an
effective role in solving challenges, big reforms will be required.''
By demanding fiscal discipline, the United States is leading the United
Nations to become more effective and efficient in achieving its mission
and reducing conflict and violence around the world.
Question. Earlier this year, the Administration announced that it
is withholding the bulk--approximately 83 percent--of the U.S.'s annual
contribution to the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
(UNRWA). Established by the U.N. General Assembly in 1949, UNRWA
provides an array of critical services to Palestinian refugees in the
West Bank, Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. As the U.S. has
traditionally seen it to be directly in our national interest and that
of Israel, we have been UNRWA's largest financial contributor. The loss
of U.S. funding puts all of these programs in jeopardy, threatening a
humanitarian crisis and leaving a vacuum that could fuel instability
and boost extremist groups like Hamas. How could such outcomes possibly
be positive for our national security interests in the region?
Answer. We are committed to promoting security and stability in the
Middle East, including the security of our allies Israel and Jordan.
The Administration regularly reviews our foreign assistance to identify
how to leverage it to achieve our policy objectives, including global
and regional security, and to ensure that it is providing value to the
U.S. taxpayer. The ongoing review of our assistance to the
Palestinians, including the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), is no different. The State
Department looks forward to briefing you when the review is completed.
The United States remains committed to addressing the needs of the
most vulnerable, as demonstrated by our voluntary contribution of $60
million to UNRWA in January; however, as across the U.N., the United
States should not be asked to bear a disproportionate share of UNRWA's
costs. The State Department has called on others donors to do their
part to advance regional security and stability.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions
Submitted by Senator Todd Young
Question. What is your assessment of Iran's current activities in
Syria (e.g. size, disposition, activities)?
Answer. Iran views Syria and its relationship with the Assad regime
as crucial to its supplying of weapons to Lebanese Hizballah and as key
to its regional influence. Iran supports the brutal Assad regime in
Syria with weapons, financing, and training. This assistance has
prolonged the conflict that has killed hundreds of thousands of
Syrians. Iran has funneled large numbers of Iraqi, Afghan, Pakistani,
and other foreign Shi'a fighters to the battlefield to support the
Syrian regime and has sent members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps-Quds Force to Syria as ``advisors,'' many of whom have taken part
in direct combat operations. Iran's continued support to the Assad
regime has enabled it to avoid seeking a constructive, negotiated end
to the conflict.
Question. How do those Iranian activities in Syria threaten Israel,
the United States, and our interests?
Answer. In Syria, Iranian-backed forces are perpetuating the Assad
regime's brutality against the Syrian people and contributing to
instability that spills into neighboring countries and floods Europe
with refugees. We are deeply concerned that Iran and Lebanese Hizballah
seek a long-term presence in Syria to threaten Israel and other
regional states. Their network to transfer arms from Tehran to
Hizballah increases the risk of war and contravenes several U.N.
Security Council resolutions. We are equally committed to ensuring that
Iran and Hizballah do not establish a presence in Syria from which to
threaten Israel. Our commitment to Israel's security remains rock
solid, as it has for decades.
Question. Does Iran rely on a logistical pipeline to sustain its
activities in Syria?
Answer. Iran continues to provide arms, financing, and training to
the Syrian regime and has sent large numbers of foreign fighters,
advisors, and weapons to assist in the fighting. Iran has also provided
financial support to Hizballah, which fuels Hizballah's extensive role
in the conflict. Iran's assistance has served to prolong the fighting
in Syria and impeded attempts at a lasting peace settlement. Iran has
utilized both an overland supply line and an air route to provide
support to its allies in Syria and the Levant.
Question. Can you describe that Iranian logistical pipeline to
Syria? Is it via ground routes through Iraq? Is it air or sea routes?
Answer. Iran continues to provide military equipment, financing,
and training to the Assad regime via several ground supply routes and
an air route over Iraq's air space.
Question. What more can the U.S. and our partners do to make it
more difficult for Iran to logistically support its malign activities
in Syria?
Answer. We will continue to work with key partners to prevent Iran
from establishing permanent overland routes through Iraq to supply its
allies in Syria. We continue to support Iraq's government in
implementing its plan to right-size, integrate, and professionalize the
Popular Mobilization Forces. We are working to help Iraq restore a
capable border security presence at Iraq's borders in an effort to
limit Iran's ability to transport material and manpower to the Syrian
regime and its allies.
Question. Consistent with international and U.S. law, precedent,
and Supreme Court rulings, in order to keep enemy combatants off the
battlefield and to gather necessary intelligence, do you agree that it
is important for the United States to have the means to conduct law of
war detention of enemy combatants for the duration of the military
conflict?
Answer. I believe the United States must have the means to conduct
law-of-war detention of enemy combatants. As the Supreme Court has
stated, the capture and detention of enemy belligerents to prevent
their return to the battlefield has long been recognized as an
``important incident[s] of war''. Today, the United States remains
engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qa'ida, the Taliban, and
associated forces, including with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.
Law-of-war detention and criminal prosecutions are important tools in
preventing members of these armed groups from returning to the
battlefield.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions
Submitted by Senator Tom Udall
Question. You stated that the State Department is using resources
to work with the Commerce Department on this issue. Please describe how
much of the budget and which offices within the State Department are
currently working with the Commerce Department to address the ZTE
issue.
Answer. The Department does not have a budget devoted to ZTE. Our
work with the Department of Commerce on ZTE issues is spread across
multiple bureaus as part of regular Department and embassy staff work.
Department of State bureaus with expertise on ZTE issues include
Economic and Business Affairs, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Legal
Adviser, Intelligence and Research, and International Security and
Nonproliferation.
Question. Would the State Department be open to a dialogue with
Cuban officials to help improve air safety and upgrade aircraft to
avoid another catastrophe? Are you currently or planning to work with
the FAA and commercial aerospace companies to address aviation safety
shortfall in order to avoid another tragedy in Cuba?
Answer. The National Security Presidential Memorandum
``Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba'' announced
by President Trump in June 2017 specifically identifies civil aviation
as a national interest for bilateral engagement with Cuba. The
Department therefore continues to support ongoing dialogues between
U.S. civil aviation technical agencies--such as the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and the Transportation Security Administration--
and Cuban counterparts to improve the safety and security of air travel
to and from Cuba. In addition, the National Transportation Safety Board
and the FAA have been working closely, and successfully, with Cuban
authorities on the May 18 B-737 crash investigation in Cuba.
I understand the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and
Security, which administers the Export Administration Regulation,
generally approves license applications for the export to Cuba of items
necessary to ensure the safety of civil aviation and the safe operation
of commercial aircraft engaged in international air transportation,
including the export of aircraft leased to Cuban state-owned
enterprises. I am also aware the Cuban Assets Control Regulations,
administered by the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign
Assets Control, authorize the provision of civil aviation safety-
related services to Cuba and Cuban nationals, wherever located, to
ensure the safety of civil aviation and the safe operation of
commercial aircraft.
Question. I want to express my strong support for Peace Colombia. I
had a productive discussion with the Colombian Ambassador recently, and
feel strongly that we need to ensure funding is robust to continue the
peace process and prevent a return to fighting in the region. Do you
plan to keep our agreements with the Colombian government and continue
our strong partnerships as part of this budget agreement?
Answer. The United States strongly supports Colombia's efforts to
secure a lasting peace. Colombia remains one of the United States'
strongest partners in the region, and successful implementation of the
peace accord is in the national interest of both nations. U.S.
assistance plays a key role in supporting implementation. The FY 2019
request provides important and necessary funds to advance U.S.
interests in Colombia, particularly on peace accord implementation and
counternarcotics. I will continue to work with the Colombian government
to support the implementation of the peace accord, strengthen rule of
law, and reverse the alarming growth in coca cultivation and cocaine
production in Colombia.
Question. You were not part of the decision to cut humanitarian
assistance when this budget was first announced. So will you support
Congressional efforts to increase these accounts to better meet the
humanitarian needs of displaced people around the world?
Answer. In FY 2017 and FY 2018, Congress generously provided
significant resources to respond to humanitarian challenges and the
tremendous growth in needs. However, this rate of growth is not
sustainable within broader fiscal constraints. We have worked to ensure
significant support for humanitarian assistance by keeping our
humanitarian assistance request proportionally the same amount as it
was in FY 2017 (25 percent) as in FY 2019 (24 percent). Over the last
10 years (FY 2008-FY 2017), funding for humanitarian assistance has
grown by $5.3 billion (almost 130 percent) while the rest of the
foreign assistance budget has not been able to keep pace, particularly
funding for our development efforts to prevent humanitarian crises from
occurring in the first place.
America will continue to show leadership on humanitarian response;
however, in a context of fiscal constraints and competing priorities
across the federal budget, it is imperative that others step up, do
more, and share this burden.
The State Department and USAID will continually use all resources
made available to support populations with the greatest humanitarian
need while also focusing on improving the efficiency and effectiveness
of humanitarian operations, both by the U.S. agencies and implementing
partners, including international organizations.
Question. You stated that the sonic attack reported in China
against a U.S. government employee was quote ``very similar'' and
``entirely consistent'' with the reported sonic attacks against
diplomats in Havana. The State Department's rush to judgment in Cuba
led to a cut in embassy staff in Cuba which ultimately hurts U.S.
citizens and companies visiting the island. Is the State Department
prepared to do the same in China, or are such rash decisions only
reserved for our dealings with Cuba? Yes or no?
Answer. The Department is taking this incident very seriously and
is working to determine the cause, scope, and impact of the incident.
We have stressed our concern to the Chinese government, which has
offered initial support. The Department has undertaken a government-
wide effort to find the cause behind this incident.
Question. Taking an expansive view of what we approved after 9/11,
the political objective is to stop terrorism at a broad level. However,
a more restrictive view--and the view that was sold to the Congress
when I voted in favor of the 9/11 AUMF--was that we aimed to punish and
deter the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, specifically Al Qaeda and
the Taliban. Which view do you believe is the appropriate political
objective for today, or is there something in between that the Congress
should consider?
Answer. Our most important obligation is to defend the Homeland,
including from terrorist attack. The President has said that we must
ensure the enduring defeat of terrorist organizations that threaten the
United States, including ISIS and al-Qa'ida. As the National Security
Strategy states, we will work to disrupt plots, take direct action,
eliminate safe havens, sever terrorists' sources of strength, combat
terrorist radicalization and recruitment, and we will work with our
partners to share the responsibility in fighting these barbaric groups.
Question. In your opinion, do you believe that the 12 points you
laid out earlier this week represent political objectives worthy of
war?
Answer. The Administration is committed to using diplomacy to help
solve the greatest challenges our nation faces, even with our
staunchest adversaries. The Administration is fully aware of Iran's
destabilizing behaviors in Syria and elsewhere in the region, which
includes providing arms, financing, and training to the regime, and
funneling foreign fighters, including Hizballah, to support the Assad
regime. Through diplomatic and economic pressures, the Administration
has strengthened its comprehensive strategy to counter malign Iranian
influence in the region including sanctions on the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force, countering Iran's cyber
aggression, and asking countries to pressure Iran to end its
destabilizing activities.
Question. Should the United States send its sons and daughters to
war to coerce Iran to capitulate on these demands if President Trump's
violation of the JCPOA fails to garner worldwide support?
Answer. The Administration is committed to using diplomacy to help
solve the challenges facing our nation. The President said he is ready,
willing, and able to negotiate a new deal with Iran. But the deal is
not the objective. Our goal is to protect the American people.
Question. As a matter of sequence, should the President seek the
assent of Congress before engaging in hostilities inside countries,
especially where such actions could lead to a wider conflict, such as
in Syria or Iran? Isn't that the role for Congress the Constitution
calls for?
Answer. I respect Congress's role in authorizing the use of
military force and in providing oversight on these issues. Generally, I
think the interests of the nation are best served when the President
and the Congress act together to provide a clear and unambiguous legal
authorization to support the military as they defend our national
security interests.
The efforts of the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS in
Syria aim to defeat ISIS. The legal authority to use military force
against ISIS in Syria includes the 2001 Authorization to Use Military
Force.
The United States does not seek to fight Iran. The Trump
administration is committed to using diplomacy to help solve the
greatest challenges our nation faces, even with our staunchest
adversaries.
Question. In your view, does the 2002 or 2001 AUMF provide
President Trump with Congressional authorization to use military force
against Iranian militias present in Iraq or Syria? I'm not referring to
a situation in which U.S. troops find themselves under attack and
clearly have the authority to fire back at their attackers.
Answer. The efforts of the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS
aim to defeat ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The United States does not seek
to fight the Syrian government or pro-Syrian-government forces,
including Iran.
While I am not in a position to speculate about how the authorities
provided in the 2001 and 2002 Authorizations to Use Military Force
(AUMFs) may apply to hypothetical situations, the Administration has
been clear that the 2001 AUMF authorizes the use of force against al-
Qa'ida and associated forces, including against ISIS, including in Iraq
and Syria. We have also been clear in indicating that the 2001 AUMF
also provides authority to use force to defend U.S., Coalition, and
partner forces engaged in the campaign to defeat ISIS to the extent
such use of force is a necessary and appropriate measure in support of
these counter-ISIS operations.
Question. In withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA), President Trump asserted that Iran ``supports terrorist
proxies and militias'' including ``the Taliban, and al-Qa'ida.''
Moreover, in your speech announcing a new strategy for Iran, you stated
that Iran ``continues to serve as sanctuary for al-Qa'ida.'' It is my
belief that neither the 2001 nor 2002 authorizations to use military
force, each passed over 15 years ago to deal with threats posed by al-
Qa'ida and the government of Iraq, do not authorize any future military
action against the government of Iran nor any Iranian governmental
entities in any way, shape of form. Is it the administration's view
that the 2001 or 2002 authorizations give the administration
authorization to use military force against Iran under any
circumstances? I'm not referring to a situation in which U.S. troops
find themselves under attack and clearly have the authority to fire
back at their attackers.
Answer. The Trump administration is committed to using diplomacy to
help solve the greatest challenges our nation faces, even with our
staunchest adversaries.
While I am not in a position to speculate about how the authorities
provided in the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs may apply to hypothetical
situations, the Administration has been clear that the 2001 AUMF
authorizes the use of force against al-Qa'ida and associated forces,
including against ISIS, including in Iraq and Syria. We have also been
clear in indicating that the 2001 AUMF also provides authority to use
force to defend U.S., Coalition, and partner forces engaged in the
campaign to defeat ISIS to the extent such use of force is a necessary
and appropriate measure in support of these counter-ISIS operations.
Question. You have repeatedly expressed your confidence that
governments in Europe and Russia would eventually join the U.S. in an
anti-Iran coalition, but our European allies have sharply criticized
Trump's decision to withdraw from the Iran deal. How do you envision
getting our allies to support the U.S. by honoring new U.S. sanctions?
Answer. The United States and Europe agree on the full range of
threats Iran poses to our collective interests, including aggressive
ballistic missile development and proliferation; support for terrorism,
extremism, and regional proxies; destabilizing behavior in the region;
and, human rights abuses against the Iranian people. Since the
President's announcement of U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, we have and
will continue to increase our engagement with our friends and allies in
Europe, believing our shared values and commitment to confront common
challenges should transcend any disagreements over the JCPOA. We
anticipate that our cooperative efforts to address Iran's destabilizing
behavior and its threats to regional stability will not only continue
but also expand. This is a period of real opportunity for the United
States and Europe to address our fundamental difficulties with the
Iranian government and together seek a new, stable security
architecture in the region.
Question. John Bellinger, who testified before this committee last
week wrote during the last Presidential campaign that, quote ``Trump
has urged other policies that are dangerous, if not illegal, from a
national security perspective.'' The President said he would target the
families of ISIS terrorists, threatening: ``you have to take out their
families.'' Targeting civilians not engaged in hostilities is a war
crime. The President's rhetoric is not only anti-American, but could be
used by other countries to justify torture. Secretary Pompeo, given
this rash rhetoric, should a new authorization for military force
specifically restrict the President from taking illegal action against
non-combatants, and ensure that basic legal rights are protected?
Answer. I firmly believe that the U.S. armed forces must comply
with the law of armed conflict and are fully committed to doing so. The
United States is also clear that torture and cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment are categorically prohibited under
domestic and international law, including international human rights
law and the law of armed conflict, and that these prohibitions exist
everywhere and at all times. I do not think it would be necessary or
appropriate for any new authorization for use of military force to
contain the restrictions you have described.
Question. We face legitimate terrorist threats and terrorist groups
that are continually evolving. How can the United States gather
intelligence on these groups and attack when necessary to protect the
homeland without placing us in increased danger or without authorizing
any president to take action against a country that could lead to wider
war? Can and should this be done utilizing air, space, sea-based, and
intelligence assets without placing troops directly into hostilities
that can spiral out of control?
Answer. The U.S. government's Intelligence Community (IC) marshals
the intelligence resources to monitor, evaluate, and analyze intentions
and capabilities of a variety of malign actors to provide warning, and
to assist in countering global threats. The Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, as the IC element within the Department of State, is charged
with ensuring foreign policy and international security equities are
appropriately represented within IC priorities. Issues regarding the
broader allocation and utilization of IC resources would be more
appropriately addressed by the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions
Submitted by Senator John Barrasso
Question. Yesterday, the State Department issued a warning to
Americans in China after a possible sonic attack against a U.S.
government employee. Media reports indicate that one U.S. government
employee in China reported ``subtle and vague, but abnormal, sensations
of sound and pressure.'' This sounds very similar to the medical issues
experienced by U.S. government personnel in Cuba, which resulted in
serious health problems for individuals. I am concerned about the
health, safety, and well-being of our Embassy diplomats and personnel.
When did the U.S. employee in China first report the medical problem?
Please describe the timeline of events and actions taken to respond to
the attack.
Answer. The health, safety, and well-being of U.S. government
employees and their family members are our greatest concern. In March,
an employee at the U.S. Consulate General in Guangzhou reported
experiencing a variety of physical symptoms. The employee was screened
by consulate medical personnel and in April went to the United States
for further examination. On May 16, medical personnel informed the
State Department that the clinical findings were consistent with
previous cases from the U.S. Embassy in Havana.
After coordination within the State Department and between the
State Department and Mission China, on May 23 Mission China published a
notice to employees and a consular alert, and convened ``town hall''
meetings for employees.
Question. Do we know the cause or source of the attack?
Answer. The Department has undertaken a government-wide effort to
find the cause behind this incident. We currently do not know the
underlying source of the incident.
Question. Have there been any other reports from Americans?
Answer. We have no verified reports that private U.S. citizens have
experienced these phenomena. The Department of State issued a Health
Alert on May 23, 2018. We disseminate alerts to inform U.S. citizens of
specific safety and security concerns in a country, such as health
conditions, and provide clear actions U.S. citizens should take if they
travel or reside there. We urge all travelers to review our information
on travel.state.gov before they travel. We will provide additional
updates as they are available.
Question. Who do we believe is responsible for the incidents in
China?
Answer. The Department is taking this incident very seriously and
is working to determine the cause and impact of the incident. We are
working with the Chinese government to look into this situation and
have no further information to provide at this time.
Question. What is the U.S. government's determination of the cause
and entity responsible for the sonic attacks that occurred in Cuba?
Answer. Criminal and medical investigations into the attacks in
Cuba are ongoing as part of a government-wide effort, but to date, we
have been unable to make a determination regarding the cause and
perpetrators of the attacks. We continue to demand Cuba fulfill its
obligations under the Vienna Conventions to take all appropriate steps
to protect our diplomats in Havana.
Question. The Palestinian Authority Foreign Minister submitted a
request to the International Criminal Court (ICC) to immediately open
an investigation against Israel dealing with the situation on the Gaza
border last week. Under a U.S. law enacted in 2015, the PLO office in
the United States must be closed if the Palestinians try to influence
the ICC to initiate a judicially authorized investigation or actively
support such an investigation that subjects Israeli nationals to an
investigation for alleged crimes against Palestinians. What is the
current status of the PLO office in Washington, DC?
Answer. The Secretary of State has been delegated authority to make
certain statutory certifications to waive restrictions on the PLO
Office in Washington. Following statements about the ICC made by
Palestinian leadership, a new waiver was not issued in November at the
time that the most recent waiver lapsed. The Department of State
advised the PLO Office to limit its activities to those related to
efforts to achieve a lasting, comprehensive peace between the Israelis
and Palestinians, and to not make any new long-term commitments such as
leases or contracts. The status of the PLO Office has not changed since
November. The Administration continues to evaluate the situation and
will determine next steps accordingly.
Question. Does the Administration plan to take action to close the
PLO office because the Palestinian Authority requested an investigation
against Israel at the ICC?
Answer. This Administration firmly opposes Palestinian actions
against Israel at the International Criminal Court (ICC), which are
counterproductive to the cause of peace. We have made our position
clear to the Palestinians and to members of the international
community. We do not believe the Palestinians were eligible to accede
to the Rome Statute and join the ICC. The Administration continues to
evaluate the situation and will determine next steps accordingly.
Question. Are the Palestinians engaging in direct and meaningful
negotiations with Israel?
Answer. The Palestinians are not currently engaging in direct and
meaningful negotiations with Israel. The Administration is firmly
committed to pursuing a comprehensive peace between Israelis and
Palestinians, and remains optimistic that progress can be made. We
continue to urge the Palestinians to engage constructively. The
Administration remains hard at work on a plan that would offer a
brighter future to both Israel and the Palestinians, and will present
that plan when the time is right.
Question. I appreciate the efforts of the United States to support
a stable, peaceful and prosperous Africa . . . . How does the State
Department manage its engagement on emerging threats and security
issues with African governments while also ensuring the same
governments are addressing the needs of their people, including the
rule of law, human rights and individual freedoms?
Answer. There is a critical link between democracy, human rights,
and governance (DRG) and peace and security within Africa. Without a
sustained diplomatic effort and programs emphasizing critical human
rights norms, democratic processes, and good governance, peace and
security in the region will remain unattainable. The State Department
and USAID continue to support core DRG programming in the region. The
Administration also seeks to address the underlying drivers of conflict
and hunger through programs including food security and resilience work
under USAID's Food for Peace, the U.S. Global Food Security Strategy,
implemented by Feed the Future, as well as other programs.
The Departments of State and Defense also recognize that human
rights-sensitive security assistance is important to efforts to
strengthen democracy and governance in Africa. Continued engagement
with our security partners enhances our ability to mitigate human
rights abuses and security force overreach by emphasizing professional,
human rights-respecting security forces and civil control of the
security sector. It also allows for an ongoing dialogue, and frank
conversations, about shared goals and objectives at high levels of
government that are often otherwise closed to international engagement
and cooperation.
Question. In 2012, the United States joined leaders of the Western
Hemisphere in committing to an initiative called ``Connecting the
Americas 2022.'' The initiative's aim was to achieve universal access
to electricity through enhanced electrical interconnection by 2022.
What is the status of this initiative and what progress has been made
in reaching the initiative's goals?
Answer. The Department continues to promote efforts under
Connecting the Americas 2022 through the U.S. Strategy for Central
America, which supports advancing electricity integration in the region
to help build stronger economies, as well as addressing the underlying
economic conditions contributing to illegal immigration and illicit
trafficking. U.S. engagement since 2012 has accelerated regional energy
integration, strengthened Central America's power sector, and advanced
electricity integration efforts with Mexico and between Andean region
countries. The Department will continue advancing efforts through
energy diplomacy and foreign assistance, which have helped promote
opportunities that created new markets for U.S. energy companies.
Question. What kind of technical assistance and capacity building
programs is the United States currently providing to strengthen
regional electricity market, power generation, and regulatory
institutions in Central America, the Caribbean, and the Andean region?
Answer. The Department manages a number of assistance programs in
the region. In Central America, U.S. programs aim to strengthen power
sector governance, regulation, and technical efficiency to strengthen
natural gas use and regional electricity integration. In the Caribbean,
we support efforts to reduce financial reliance on Venezuela, including
through the development of resilient and cost-effective power systems
in hurricane-impacted nations and development of geothermal power
generation in St. Kitts and Nevis. In the Andes, we continue to develop
a regional electricity market, including assessments of regional
interconnections and power market structures among Argentina, Chile,
and Peru.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions
Submitted by Senator Cory Booker
Question. ENVOY TO SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN: Mr. Secretary, I shared
with you my concerns about the dismantling of key positions and offices
in the State Department under this Administration. One such office that
has been unstaffed in this Administration is the Special Envoy for
Sudan and South Sudan. Since the start of the civil war in 2013, 50,000
people have been killed, 4 million people have been displaced, 7
million--over half the country have needed humanitarian assistance just
this year and 5 million are on the brink of starvation. Women and girls
continue to suffer the worst of the conflict. A report by the
International Rescue Committee and George Washington University found
up to 65 percent of women and girls said they had experienced sexual or
physical violence. The war in South Sudan is influenced by Kenya,
Uganda, and Ethiopia. This transnational nature of the crisis requires
a diplomat who has the mandate to work across borders. A Special Envoy
can bring the much needed focus and leadership to the crisis that would
be nearly impossible for the U.S. Ambassador to South Sudan. I
appreciated your commitment to give the issue serious consideration to
appointing a Special Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan during the hearing.
Now that you have had a chance to review these issues, can you commit
to appointing a special envoy for Sudan and South Sudan?
Answer. The people of South Sudan deserve a government that is able
and willing to lead the country to a stable future. The United States
supports regional efforts toward a negotiated arrangement for an
inclusive transitional government that reflects South Sudan's diversity
and provides checks and balances on political and economic power. I am
committed to analyzing the diplomatic tools available to achieve this
goal effectively and efficiently, including by analyzing the value and
impact of a special envoy.
Question. RESCISSION AND EBOLA: This month, the Democratic Republic
of Congo declared a new outbreak of Ebola, with dozens of suspected
cases and 28 deaths so far. Yet at on the same day as we learned about
this global health emergency, the White House released its rescissions
package, which included the rescission of $252 million for critical
Ebola funding reserved for an emergency such as this. What message does
this rescissions package send regarding U.S. leadership in global
health, especially at a time of increasing global health crises and
humanitarian conflicts that threaten America's national security
interests?
Answer. The Administration has taken swift action in response to
the current Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. On
May 22, Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar II announced a
contribution of $8 million towards interventions to help prevent the
spread of this deadly disease, including $3 million from Global Health
Security Agenda funds at USAID and $5 million I released from the
Emergency Reserve Fund for Contagious Infectious-Disease Outbreaks. We
commend the efforts of the Congolese and our international partners to
confront this outbreak to prevent a global health emergency and welcome
immediate contributions from other donors, as well as long-term
investments under the Global Health Security Agenda aimed at preventing
future crises. With respect to the proposed $252 million rescission,
Congress directed these funds for the West Africa Ebola crisis, which
the World Health Organization declared over in 2016. Congress has
generously provided other resources, separate from the funds proposed
for rescission, including the Emergency Reserve Fund, which enable us
to respond quickly to emergency needs like the current outbreak in the
DRC, if needed.
Question. In 2014, the Ebola epidemic cost the international
community around $4 billion, of which the U.S. contributed $2.5
billion. $252 million seems like a drop in the bucket compared to the
billions that will be needed if there is another major outbreak. If
this Administration is as concerned about making sure that we are using
our aid money efficiently, does it not make sense to maintain focus on
our response capabilities so that Congress is not back here approving
billions of dollars in an emergency supplemental?
Answer. We are committed to preventing, detecting, and responding
to emerging global health threats posed throughout the world, including
the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) have been working on global health
security and emerging health threats for many years. USAID and HHS have
excellent scientific and technical staff devoted to this work,
including experts deployed now to the DRC, and will continue to lead
efforts that support global health security. These investments have
already increased the ability of host-government partners to prepare
for and respond to dangerous infectious diseases, as evidenced by the
professional and coordinated response led by the Congolese government
to this and previous Ebola outbreaks. U.S. assistance programs will
continue to leverage our dollars to ensure other donor countries and
local partners are contributing to these truly global challenges.
Question. SYRIA: Last month, the President announced he would
freeze $200 million in stabilization assistance. Stabilizing gains
against ISIS through targeted programs to remove mines and explosive
devices, deploy electricity, and provide basic services is essential to
getting displaced Syrians back to their homes and to dealing the final
blow to ISIS. The military recognizes the critical role that these
programs play. U.S. Central Command Commander General Joseph Votel said
during a January visit to Raqqa that stabilizing areas formerly
controlled by ISIS, ``is also about removing the conditions that lead
to things like insurgency, that lead to instability. So, from a
military standpoint we're very keen to make sure that the follow-
through in our operations is completed as effectively as the military
operation.'' Freezing this funding also puts our approximately 2,000
troops in Syria and 8,000 troops in Iraq at greater risk. If ISIS
regains strength in Syria, its reach will quickly spread across the
porous Syria/Iraq border. Additionally, the absence of U.S. leadership
to help stabilize areas cleared of ISIS control could result in
others--including Russia, Iran, and the Assad regime--filling the
vacuum to the detriment of our national security objectives in Syria
and the region. What are your objectives for stabilization in Syria?
Answer. The United States is working with our partners in the
Global Coalition to Defeat-ISIS to support immediate stabilization and
early recovery efforts in areas liberated from ISIS control, including
Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) removal, the restoration of essential
services and building local capacity to support longer-term
sustainability. Our stabilization activities help ensure the lasting
defeat of ISIS through support for representative, legitimate local
governance and service provision in liberated areas. The Administration
has repeatedly emphasized that we are committed to completing the fight
against ISIS and rooting out its remaining havens.
Question. SYRIA: Last month, the President announced he would
freeze $200 million in stabilization assistance. Stabilizing gains
against ISIS through targeted programs to remove mines and explosive
devices, deploy electricity, and provide basic services is essential to
getting displaced Syrians back to their homes and to dealing the final
blow to ISIS. The military recognizes the critical role that these
programs play. U.S. Central Command Commander General Joseph Votel said
during a January visit to Raqqa that stabilizing areas formerly
controlled by ISIS, ``is also about removing the conditions that lead
to things like insurgency, that lead to instability. So, from a
military standpoint we're very keen to make sure that the follow-
through in our operations is completed as effectively as the military
operation.'' Freezing this funding also puts our approximately 2,000
troops in Syria and 8,000 troops in Iraq at greater risk. If ISIS
regains strength in Syria, its reach will quickly spread across the
porous Syria/Iraq border. Additionally, the absence of U.S. leadership
to help stabilize areas cleared of ISIS control could result in
others--including Russia, Iran, and the Assad regime--filling the
vacuum to the detriment of our national security objectives in Syria
and the region. Does the Administration plan to continue to withhold
this funding?
Answer. In line with the President's request to review all
bilateral foreign assistance for Syria, we continually reevaluate
stabilization assistance levels and their optimal utilization. We
conduct reevaluations on an ongoing basis, as we do elsewhere around
the world. The Department of State and USAID continue to work with the
international community, members of the Global Coalition to Defeat-
ISIS, and our partners on the ground to provide much-needed
stabilization support to vulnerable areas in Syria.
Question. SYRIA: Last month, the President announced he would
freeze $200 million in stabilization assistance. Stabilizing gains
against ISIS through targeted programs to remove mines and explosive
devices, deploy electricity, and provide basic services is essential to
getting displaced Syrians back to their homes and to dealing the final
blow to ISIS. The military recognizes the critical role that these
programs play. U.S. Central Command Commander General Joseph Votel said
during a January visit to Raqqa that stabilizing areas formerly
controlled by ISIS, ``is also about removing the conditions that lead
to things like insurgency, that lead to instability. So, from a
military standpoint we're very keen to make sure that the follow-
through in our operations is completed as effectively as the military
operation.'' Freezing this funding also puts our approximately 2,000
troops in Syria and 8,000 troops in Iraq at greater risk. If ISIS
regains strength in Syria, its reach will quickly spread across the
porous Syria/Iraq border. Additionally, the absence of U.S. leadership
to help stabilize areas cleared of ISIS control could result in
others--including Russia, Iran, and the Assad regime--filling the
vacuum to the detriment of our national security objectives in Syria
and the region. How does this funding freeze bolster Iranian and
Russian influence in Syria?
Answer. The hold on the approximately $200 million does not bolster
Iranian and Russian influence in Syria. The Administration has made
clear to President Putin that if Russia is serious about ending the
Syrian conflict, it must stop fueling Assad's ruthless assault on his
own people. However, we remain realistic regarding Russia's ability and
willingness to do this. The Administration also remains focused on
neutralizing Iran's threatening influence in Syria. Iran is subject to
a variety of U.S. sanctions, including a broad U.S. embargo on trade
with Iran, and we have used and continue to use targeted authorities to
impose sanctions related to Iran's support for terrorism, ballistic
missile program, and human rights abuses.
Question. PAKISTAN: After a New Year's Day tweet by President Trump
accusing Pakistan of ``deceit'' and of harboring terrorists, the State
Department caught up to the President's policy pronouncement a few days
later that the U.S. will suspend most security assistance to Islamabad.
Have there been any changes in behavior by the Pakistanis as a result
of withholding security assistance?
Answer. We have made clear both publicly and directly to the
highest levels of Pakistan's government that the Taliban, the Haqqani
Network, and other militant and terrorist groups must not be allowed to
use Pakistan's soil to plan or launch attacks against neighboring
countries. Our suspension of security assistance and security-related
payments to Pakistan reflected our assessment that, while Pakistan has
taken some initial constructive steps, we have not yet seen decisive,
sustained action on these requests. Our assessment has not changed. We
continue to engage with Pakistan's leadership in private and will use
the full range of tools at our disposal to encourage Pakistan to take
action against all militant and terrorist groups operating on its soil.
Question. Can you comment on whether the escalating violence in
Afghanistan is a signal from elements in Pakistan displeased by the
withholding of security assistance?
Answer. This year's level of violence in Afghanistan has been
broadly consistent with previous fighting seasons and is driven by a
range of factors, including the Taliban's Al Khandaq offensive, high
profile terrorist attacks by ISIS-Khorasan Province, local grievances,
and criminality. We see no evidence suggesting a linkage between the
levels of violence in Afghanistan and the withholding of security
assistance to Pakistan.
The President's South Asia strategy, announced last summer,
prioritized the bilateral security relationship between Afghanistan and
Pakistan as well as the need for Pakistan to take active measures in
support of peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan and regional
security. During an April 6 visit to Afghanistan, Pakistan's prime
minister affirmed his commitment to an Afghan peace process, saying
there was no military solution to the ongoing Afghan conflict and that
a political solution was the best option to stop the Taliban's violent
campaign. We continue to encourage Pakistan to take concrete steps to
support an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned peace and reconciliation process
that yields a negotiated settlement that will end the conflict and
ensure lasting stability in Afghanistan and the region.
Question. Earlier this month, The Daily Beast reported on a joint
operation of U.S. and Somali Special Forces in the Somali village of
Ma'alinka that resulted in several civilian casualties. This is now at
least the third reported incident of possible non-combatant casualties
in Somalia in which the U.S. military was involved. The first was in
August 2016 when an airstrike killed local militia forces instead of a
convoy of Al-Shabab militants that was the presumed target. The second
was in August of last year, where locals allege that civilians were
killed in a raid in Barire. Again, The Daily Beast, among other media
sources, reported that 10 civilians were killed. AFRICOM is yet to
release its assessment of what took place there and who was killed.
With Somalia's complex local dynamics, there is often a question of who
is and who isn't Al Shabab, and local rivalries complicate the
situation. Do you believe that there should be an independent auditor
that can provide an independent oversight review mechanism to look at
incidents of civilian casualties and its impacts?
Answer. We respectfully defer to the Department of Defense
regarding this matter.
Question. What role did the Chief of Mission have in approving the
May 10 mission in Ma'alinka? Do you believe he had adequate information
about what has been approved by the military chain of command and was
fully briefed in advance of the operation?
Answer. The Chief of Mission at the U.S. Mission to Somalia was
fully consulted on and concurred with regarding the May 10 operation in
which U.S. forces accompanied and assisted Somali partner forces.
Coordination between the Chief of Mission and U.S. military forces in
Somalia is excellent.
Question. What role do State Department personnel play in seeking
to avoid civilian casualties in U.S. strikes or U.S. ``accompany''
operations?
Answer. American values and U.S. legal imperatives guide U.S.
forces in the protection of civilians. Protecting civilians is
fundamentally consistent with mission accomplishment and the legitimacy
of U.S. counterterrorism operations. As such, the U.S. government takes
extraordinary measures to minimize harm to civilians. While authorities
for U.S. military operations fall under the responsible Combatant
Commander or his designee, Chiefs of Mission in countries where U.S.
military operations occur are in regular communication with military
representatives on a wide variety of issues, including on how
significant military operations can best support foreign policy
objectives.
Question. What role does the Chief of Mission play in approving
U.S. forces ``accompanying'' partner forces on operations where they
may come in contact with Al Shabaab?
Answer. The Chief of Mission's role in DoD operations depends on
the specific legal authorities and policies in play. In all cases,
under presidential directive, Chiefs of Mission and Geographic
Combatant Commanders must keep each other mutually informed and
cooperate on all matters of mutual interest. Legislation, presidential
directive, or DoD policy may also require Chief of Mission concurrence
before an operation can occur. In Somalia, our Chief of Mission is in
regular and frequent communication with military representatives,
including with respect to all military operations.
Question. SOMALIA--AIR STRIKES: Following up on Somalia, just a few
years ago, in 2014 and 2015, there were just three U.S. strikes per
year in Somalia, according to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism.
Because these strikes were so limited, our intelligence networks were
notionally able put a lot of effort into providing reliable information
on high value targets. In 2017, that number was over 30--a ten-fold
escalation in strikes (see graphic). It is important to remember that
there have been no changes to the authorities granted by Congress for
the use of military force in Somalia during this period. There have,
however, been changes made by the Executive in its justification for
the use of force in Somalia, and decisions to deploy U.S. forces to
accompany Somali partners on combat missions and expand the area of
``active hostilities.'' Should Congress have a role in approving
significant changes to the basis for the use of lethal force, such as
in Somalia, where operations have increasingly expanded since 2015 to
support and defend African partner forces?
Answer. The Department of State respects Congress' role in
authorizing the use of military force and in providing oversight on
these issues. The President has directed operations against al-Shabaab
and ISIS in Somalia pursuant to the domestic legal authority provided
by the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). The
Administration has sufficient legal authority to implement this
campaign and is not seeking any new or additional authority to use
military force.
Question. Are we ``at war'' in countries like Somalia in which the
existing or proposed AUMF grants authority for the use of force against
associated forces of Al Qaeda and ISIS?
Answer. The President has directed operations against al-Shabaab
and ISIS in Somalia pursuant to the domestic legal authority provided
by the 2001 AUMF. U.S. forces have countered the terrorist threat by
conducting a number of airstrikes against al-Shabaab as well as ISIS.
U.S. forces also advise, assist, and accompany regional forces during
counterterrorism operations, including those from Somalia and the
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).
Question. Is there a whole-of-government strategy for Somalia that
includes adequate emphasis on diplomacy and development? What are our
main diplomatic and development goals in Somalia and how do U.S. troops
support those goals?
Answer. Diplomacy and development are an integral part of the U.S.
government's whole-of-government approach in Somalia. Our primary
diplomatic and development goals are to assist Somali-led efforts to:
(1) build security forces that can combat terrorism and provide
stability; (2) advance the federalism and political reconciliation
processes, including completing the constitutional review and preparing
for one-person, one-vote elections in 2020/21; (3) promote economic
growth and job creation; and (4) provide lifesaving humanitarian
assistance while building resilience among Somalis to withstand future
shocks. U.S. military efforts in Somalia directly support these goals
by strengthening security and stability, which are fundamental to
opening up space for political and development efforts.
Question. NIGER-UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: I am concerned that under
the current legal framework for the use of military force against
terrorist targets abroad, the executive branch is able to justify
military strikes against nearly any armed group operating in the Sahel
by asserting that such group is an ``element of'' ISIS or Al Qaeda,
even if these groups have primarily local aims and do not present a
clear threat to the U.S. homeland. In the past few months, the
Administration has reached agreement with the government of Niger to
arm the U.S. drones stationed in that country--and in March, DoD
reportedly used a Niger-based drone to carry out a strike against a
terrorist target in southern Libya. What is your view of the potential
for regional blowback, mission creep, or any other negative unintended
consequence to emerge from the expanding U.S. military mission-set in
the Sahel region?
Answer. The State Department, including Chiefs of Mission, and the
DoD work closely to anticipate and mitigate risks associated with
military activities in the Sahel. We remain committed to minimizing the
U.S. military presence in the Sahel while focusing on building security
sector capacity among partner governments in Africa and supporting
their efforts to counter terrorism and other security threats. We also
recognize that our European partners, particularly France, play a lead
role in providing donor support for West African security activities.
The United States works with partners in Europe and Africa to identify
areas where we can provide unique expertise and capabilities. We are
focused on building security sector institutional capacity and
professionalism, and we intend for our ongoing work with militaries on
human rights and accountability to also minimize the risks of negative
repercussions.
Question. What would be the consequences of any future U.S.
unilateral strike in Niger, Mali, or Burkina Faso?
Answer. It is impossible to anticipate all the hypothetical
situations where military action may be taken.
Question. What role is the State Department--including our
embassies in the region--playing in shaping or constraining the U.S.
military footprint in the Sahel?
Answer. The State Department and Department of Defense coordinate
closely with each other and participate in the interagency process to
determine regional strategies in the Sahel. Such exchanges occur both
ad hoc and through more formal mechanisms, including the Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership, Sahel Maghreb Deputy Assistant
Secretaries' Committee, Africa Strategic Dialogue, Africa Strategic
Integration Conference, and others. Our ambassadors and country teams
in the field communicate daily and share policy guidance with the
defense attaches and other military personnel.
Question. What is the larger U.S. foreign policy strategy toward
the Sahel, to which these military activities are contributing?
Answer. Security, development, and political processes are linked
and must be part of our efforts to stabilize the Sahel. We strongly
support the Group of Five Sahel (G5) as a regional African-led solution
for security and development. Our significant and longstanding
development assistance through USAID continues to address root causes
of conflict. We will continue to coordinate closely with our
international partners in considering support to G5 initiatives in non-
security sectors. Improved governance--including respect for human
rights, anti-corruption initiatives, and accountability for security
forces--is an essential part of the solution across the region. We
remain strongly engaged in the Mali peace process to promote a
sustainable and lasting peace. We also seek to stop the flow of funds
to terrorist groups and recover hostages, including U.S. citizen
Jeffery Woodke.
Question. NIGER-ASSOCIATED FORCES: I would like to better
understand how the Administration makes determinations about
``associated forces'' or separate organizations. I am concerned that
the executive branch is currently able to justify military strikes
against nearly any armed group operating in the Sahel by asserting that
such group is an ``element of'' ISIS or Al Qaeda, even if these groups
have primarily local aims and do not present a clear threat to the U.S.
Homeland.
How does the Administration define what constitutes a separate
organization, versus an ``element'' of a global organization such as
ISIS or Al Qaeda, or a regional organization such as AQIM?
Answer. A determination of whether a group is covered by the 2001
AUMF is made at the most senior levels of the U.S. government after a
careful evaluation of the intelligence concerning each group's
organization, links with al-Qa'ida or the Taliban, and participation in
al-Qa'ida's or the Taliban's ongoing hostilities against the United
States or its coalition partners.
The U.S. government's definition of associated forces remains
unchanged from the prior administration. To be considered an associated
force, an entity must: (1) be an organized, armed group that has
entered the fight alongside al-Qa'ida or the Taliban; and (2) be a co-
belligerent with al-Qa'ida or the Taliban in hostilities against the
United States or its coalition partners. Thus, a group is not an
associated force simply because it aligns with al-Qa'ida or the Taliban
or embraces their ideology. Merely engaging in acts of terror or merely
sympathizing with al-Qa'ida or the Taliban is not enough to bring a
group within the scope of the 2001 AUMF.
Question. What precludes the Administration from adding associated
forces that may have some vague relationship with a designated group or
its existing associated forces without coming back to Congress?
Answer. The U.S. government's definition of associated forces
remains unchanged from the prior Administration. To be considered an
associated force, an entity must: (1) be an organized, armed group that
has entered the fight alongside al-Qa'ida or the Taliban; and (2) be a
co-belligerent with al-Qa'ida or the Taliban in hostilities against the
United States or its coalition partners. Thus, a group is not an
associated force simply because it aligns with al-Qa'ida or the Taliban
or embraces their ideology. Merely engaging in acts of terror or merely
sympathizing with al-Qa'ida or the Taliban is not enough to bring a
group within the scope of the 2001 AUMF.
Question. WEST BANK AND GAZA ASSISTANCE: With the ongoing
Administration review of Economic Support Funds to the West Bank and
Gaza, different humanitarian programs, programs that were explicitly
allowed under the Taylor Force Act, are currently suffering from the
lack of obligated funds especially in the context of the worsening
situation in Gaza. Is the review connected to the release of the
Administration's peace plan?
Answer. U.S. assistance to the Palestinians remains under review.
The Administration routinely conducts reviews of our foreign assistance
in order to ensure it is meeting our national security interests,
achieving our policy objectives, and providing value to U.S. taxpayers.
The Department of State looks forward to briefing Congress on the
conclusions of the review. Separately, the Administration continues to
work hard on a plan for peace that offers a brighter future to both
Israel and the Palestinians.
Question. If it is, does this mean if the time is not right
political to release the plan that the assistance to the West Bank and
Gaza could be held indefinitely?
Answer. U.S. assistance to the Palestinians is under review. I will
ensure that Congress receives briefings on the conclusions of that
review upon completion and that the Department of State obligates
funding appropriated by Congress consistent with applicable law.
Question. If the review is not connected to the Administration's
peace plan, can you commit that the review will be finished in time for
Congressional notifications can be made for the remaining of FY17
funding to ensure that humanitarian programs, people-to-people
programing and other programs permitted under the Taylor Force Act can
be obligated before the end of the fiscal year given the time taken for
Congressional oversight of these programs?
Answer. The Administration strongly supported the Taylor Force Act,
which also enjoyed strong bipartisan support in Congress. U.S.
assistance to the Palestinians is under review. I can assure you that
Congress receives briefings upon conclusion of the review and that the
Department of State will obligate funding appropriated by Congress
consistent with applicable law.
______
Statement From Refugees International
Refugees International (RI) remains alarmed by the significant
budget cuts proposed in the President's Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 budget,
which was released on February 12, 2018. Budgets define priorities and
this budget proposal, if approved by Congress, would be devastating to
lifesaving humanitarian work across the globe.
The FY 2019 budget request calls for major cuts to key humanitarian
accounts when compared to the FY 2018 omnibus funding levels. These
cuts will significantly undermine the capacity of the United States to
save lives and meet pressing humanitarian needs around the world.
Further, there is a very real danger that the proposed cuts would
amount to an abdication of U.S. global leadership in humanitarian
affairs.
Specifically, Refugees International is deeply concerned about the
proposed reductions in the FY 2019 budget to the following accounts:
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) cut by 17 percent; International
Disaster Assistance (IDA) cut by 40 percent; Peacekeeping Operations
(PKO) cut by 46 percent; and Contributions to International
Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) cut by 13 percent. The FY 2019 budget
also calls for the elimination of the Emergency Refugee and Migration
Assistance account (ERMA) and P.L. 480 Title II (Food for Peace) as
well as major cuts to global health programs and climate change
initiatives.
The impact of such dramatic funding cuts would put vulnerable
populations at risk. From U.N. peacekeeping mission support in Sub-
Saharan Africa to food assistance for communities still reeling from
famine-related drought impacts to natural disaster response capacity
and disaster risk reduction projects to global health support for women
and girls, such cuts would have severe consequences.
RI is a non-profit, non-governmental organization that advocates
for lifesaving assistance and protection for displaced people in parts
of the world impacted by conflict, persecution and forced displacement.
There are currently over 65 million people displaced, the most ever
recorded. Protracted crises, such as the horrors of Syria, and new
crises, such as the flight of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya
refugees from Myanmar to Bangladesh in 2017, make the maintaining of
robust U.S. assistance essential. Humanitarian and protection needs
demand U.S. leadership and engagement. And any effort to downplay the
humanitarian imperative of refugee resettlement, a fundamental
protection program, is unconscionable.
But the ability to assist and protect those in need isn't just
about funding. The State Department and USAID's organizational
structures, designated responsibilities, stated policy priorities, and
capacity is equally important. The ultimate result of a State
Department redesign will likely have significant consequences for U.S.
assistance and diplomacy.
RI convened a group of leading experts and former senior U.S.
government officials that published an August 2017 report on U.S.
government reorganization. The group recommended that the State
Department and USAID should retain essential functions while enhancing
``jointness,'' complementarity and coordination as opposed to
consolidation. The report underscored the key role of the State
Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM). PRM's
unique blend of senior diplomatic engagement and humanitarian
assistance has served to elevate the plight of the displaced and
directly benefited the lives of countless refugees. The bureau's
leadership has also been essential in addressing broader protection
challenges and supporting refugee resettlement.
Congress absolutely has an important role to play in any redesign
effort. The lack of transparency about the State Department's redesign
process to policy makers, NGOs, and key partners, as well as limited
substantive consultations with stakeholders, raise further questions
about the ultimate goals, particularly as key diplomatic posts remain
unfilled and troubling staffing gaps continue. Congress must hold the
administration accountable for the lack of senior appointments at the
State Department.
We thank the Congress for continued bipartisan efforts to support
lifesaving humanitarian assistance at this critical time of
international need and remain grateful that Congress previously
rejected similarly proposed cuts in the President's FY 2018 budget.
This aid is making a difference on the ground, as RI regularly
witnesses during our frequent field assessments. Members should be
proud of longstanding U.S. support of humanitarian and development
actors who are admirably working in difficult and insecure environments
to assist the world's most vulnerable populations. The only response to
this irresponsible and dangerous budget proposal is to ensure that
significant U.S. support must be and will be maintained and
strengthened.
______
Statement From Catholic Relief Services OPED in the HILL Newspaper
u.s. aid is critical to survival in gaza: lift the hold on humanitarian
funding
by sean callahan and bishop gregory j. mansour, opinion contributors--
05/03/18 11:30 a.m. edt
For the past month, the desperation and volatility that
characterize activity in the Gaza Strip have been evident in clashes
between Palestinian protesters and Israeli security forces. These
clashes have left more than 40 Palestinians dead and thousands injured.
For more than a decade, an air, land and sea blockade has choked
commerce and trapped roughly 2 million people in the area, which is
about half the size of New York City. On most days in Gaza, the
electricity lasts four hours or less. Ninety-five percent of the water
is contaminated. Without power to operate treatment facilities, people
dump raw sewage into the sea on a regular basis, raising the risks of a
cholera outbreak.
Gaza has an unemployment rate of 42 percent, which is among the
highest in the world, and a staggering 60 percent unemployment rate
among youths. It is no wonder that 80 percent of the population relies
on humanitarian aid for survival. With the blockade still in place,
this is not the time to pull back assistance.
U.S. funding in Gaza, which has been critical to providing
opportunities and hope to those in a desperate situation, is on hold
pending a policy review process by the Trump administration. While the
United States isn't the only country providing aid to the people of
Gaza, it is the largest, and any interruption of U.S. funding is
noticed in the daily lives of the most vulnerable Gazan families.
We see the good that the U.S. assistance has done for the people of
Gaza. With a grant from the U.S. government, Catholic Relief Services,
the international humanitarian agency of the U.S. Catholic Church, runs
a program--suspended at the moment--that has helped thousands of Gazans
find work. On a recent visit, we met with a man in his 50s who, through
the program, gained employment as a cleaner. He had been out of work
for more than a decade and was so proud to show us his worker ID badge
and excited to come to work each day.
One woman used the money she earned during a teaching internship to
start her own tutoring business. The mother of two young girls, she
hopes the self-confidence she has gained will be passed on to her
daughters. These people exemplify so many of the Gazans we've
encountered--eager to work, hopeful for a better future, and yearning
for a chance to support themselves and their families.
If the administration decides to end assistance to Palestinians,
the decision will impact not only these employment services but also
food distributions, schools and health services. All these things,
supported by U.S. aid, will be in jeopardy.
On Christmas Day, Pope Francis said that we see Jesus in the
children of the Middle East who continue to suffer because of
continuing tensions between Israelis and Palestinians. As Christians,
we are called to do what we can to end suffering and to preserve the
dignity of all people, no matter where they live. For our Palestinian
brothers and sisters, that means ensuring they have what they need to
survive, and giving them the means to provide for themselves and their
families.
Policymakers on both sides of the aisle long have recognized that
desperate conditions in Gaza are bad for Israeli security, and that
American aid plays an important role in stabilizing a tenuous
environment. We remain hopeful there will come a time when Gaza no
longer needs international aid, but we know that time will not come
about until the blockade of Gaza is lifted.
Until then, aid is the only way for the people of Gaza to survive,
and the United States must continue to do its part in keeping the
peace.
Sean Callahan is president and CEO of Catholic Relief Services, the
international humanitarian and development agency for the Catholic
community in the United States. Bishop Gregory J. Mansour is board
chairman for Catholic Relief Services.
------
Letter Submitted by Senator Young to the Appropriations Committee
Reiterating Bipartisan Support for the Fiscal Year 2019 International
Affairs Budget
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