[House Report 116-515]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


116th Congress    }                                      {     Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 2d Session       }                                      {     116-515

======================================================================



 
                       JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES ACT

                                _______
                                

 September 18, 2020.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on 
            the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

    Mr. Nadler, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                        [To accompany H.R. 5053]

    The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the 
bill (H.R. 5053) to exempt juveniles from the requirements for 
suits by prisoners, and for other purposes, having considered 
the same, reports favorably thereon without amendment and 
recommends that the bill do pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
Purpose and Summary..............................................     1
Background and Need for the Legislation..........................     2
Hearings.........................................................     4
Committee Consideration..........................................     5
Committee Votes..................................................     5
Committee Oversight Findings.....................................     5
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures and Congressional 
  Budget Office Cost Estimate....................................     5
Duplication of Federal Programs..................................     5
Performance Goals and Objectives.................................     5
Advisory on Earmarks.............................................     6
Section-by-Section Analysis......................................     6
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............     6

                          Purpose and Summary

    H.R. 5053, the ``Justice for Juveniles Act,'' is a 
bipartisan bill that would eliminate the administrative 
exhaustion requirement for youth before they may file a lawsuit 
that alleges violations concerning the conditions of their 
incarceration. The administrative grievance procedure, 
established by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 
requires inmates at federal, state, and local facilities to 
file administrative complaints through the prison in which they 
are detained. Under the proposed bill, youth could initiate 
legal action to address prison conditions without first filing 
administrative complaints. This legislation is all the more 
necessary during the current COVID-19 pandemic, which has 
highlighted the need for various criminal justice reforms. 
Conditions within prisons have further deteriorated and 
hundreds of incarcerated individuals have died. Even before the 
pandemic, incarcerated youth faced formidable barriers to 
challenging the conditions of their confinement or seeking 
redress for physical abuse. This legislation will help address 
these pressing problems.

                Background and Need for the Legislation


        I. ADMINISTRATIVE GRIEVANCE REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE PLRA

    The PLRA was designed to address the problem of the large 
numbers of pro se prisoner lawsuits that were being filed and 
inundating the federal courts.\1\ Before the enactment of the 
PLRA, the overwhelming majority of prisoner cases were civil 
rights cases filed by state prisoners in federal district 
courts and were filed pro se.\2\ The vast majority of the pre-
PLRA pro se cases were filed under 42 U.S.C. Sec.  1983.\3\ 
Generally, to establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec.  1983, a 
plaintiff must show that a person acting under color of state 
law deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the 
laws of the United States.\4\ Before Congress enacted the PLRA, 
incarcerated juveniles filed very few lawsuits.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\Bernard D. Reams, Jr. & William H. Manz, A Legislative History 
of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 iii (1997).
    \2\Howard B. Eisenberg, Rethinking Prisoner Civil Rights Cases and 
the Provision of Counsel, 17 S. Ill. U.L.J. 417, 420, 421 n.8 (1993) 
(citing William B. Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner 
Section 1983 Suits in the Federal Courts, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 610, 617 
(1979) (data based on a study of prisoner civil rights cases filed in 
five federal district courts in 1975, 1976, and the first half of 
1977)).
    \3\Lois Bloom & Helen Hershkoff, Federal Courts, Magistrate Judges, 
and the Pro Se Plaintiff, 16 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 475, 
480 (2002).
    \4\See Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805 (3d Cir. 2000).
    \5\Michael J. Dale, Lawsuits and Public Policy: The Role of 
Litigation in Correcting Conditions in Juvenile Detention Centers, 32 
U.S.F. L. Rev. 675, 681 (1998) (noting that in the first portion of 
1998 there were ``less than a dozen reported opinions directly 
involving challenges to conditions in juvenile detention centers'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Pursuant to the changes brought on by the PLRA, before an 
incarcerated individual can file a lawsuit, he or she must take 
the complaint through all levels of a correctional facility's 
grievance system.\6\ If a person fails to comply with these 
requirements, including missing a filing deadline that can be 
as short as a few days, he or she may no longer be able to 
bring a lawsuit.\7\ An incarcerated individual may also only 
recover compensation in cases where there has been a physical 
injury, so those who have been subjected to sexual assault 
without an obvious physical injury or mental abuse may be 
denied a remedy.\8\ Federal law also restricts the power of the 
federal courts to make and enforce orders that remedy unlawful 
prison or jail conditions.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\42 U.S.C. Sec.  1997e(a) (2018).
    \7\See e.g., Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006).
    \8\42 U.S.C. Sec.  1997e(e) (2018) (``No Federal civil action may 
be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other 
correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in 
custody without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of 
a sexual act.''). Sexual assaults frequently don't result in signs of 
physical harm and even those that do may not be documented given the 
limited medical treatment available in some correctional facilities.
    \9\18 U.S.C. Sec.  3626(a)(1)-(2) (2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

   II. YOUTH FACE UNIQUE CHALLENGES IN PURSUING CLAIMS UNDER THE PLRA

    The administrative remedy requirement is a high burden for 
children to meet, as it requires a sophisticated understanding 
of how to navigate technical procedures. ``Adolescents . . . 
are a highly vulnerable group and struggle particularly to 
satisfy the exhaustion requirement . . . [h]eld to the adult 
standard, minors are unduly prevented from litigating their 
abuses and thus deprived of a critical tool for improving their 
conditions of incarceration.''\10\ The problem is exacerbated 
because grievance procedures tend to rely on written 
communication and juveniles in the justice system typically 
have serious education deficits.\11\ Juveniles are also 
uniquely vulnerable to retaliation for filing grievances.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Nicola A. Cohen, Why Ross v. Black Opens a Door to Federal 
Courts for Incarcerated Adolescents, 51(2) Colum. J. L. & Soc. Probs. 
177, 179-180 (2017), http://jlsp.law.columbia.edu/wp-content/uploads/
sites/8/2018/04/Vol51-Cohen.pdf; See also Anna Rapa, One Brick Too 
Many: The Prison Litigation Reform Act As A Barrier to Legitimate 
Juvenile Lawsuits, 23 T.M. Cooley L. Rev. 263, 265 (2006) 
(``[J]uveniles are more vulnerable, less educated, and less able to 
advocate for themselves, so the interests of prison autonomy are 
outweighed by the juveniles' need for the government to provide extra 
protection while they are in custody.'').
    \11\See Center for Juvenile Justice Reform, Addressing the Unmet 
Needs of Children and Youth in the Child Welfare and Justice Systems 
(2012), https://cjjr.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/
EducationalNeedsofChildrenandYouth_May2010.pdf (finding youth in a 
juvenile correctional facility to score on average about four years 
below their age-equivalent person on standardized tests in reading and 
math); Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), 
Youth Needs and Services: Findings from the Survey of Youth in 
Residential Placements, Juv. Just. Bull. (Apr. 2010) at 5, http://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/227728.pdf (concluding that youth in the 
justice system are more likely to need evaluation and remedial 
services, perform below grade level, or have a disability that 
qualifies them for special education services than their peers).
    \12\ See, e.g., Lisa Gartner, Beaten, Then Silenced, Phila. 
Inquirer (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/crime/a/glen-mills-
schools-pa-abuse-juvenile-investigation-20190220.html (describing how 
youth were intimidated into keeping silent about abuses in a juvenile 
facility for decades).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Cases from around the country make clear that juveniles 
facing serious harm are deprived of legal protections because 
of the PLRA exhaustion requirements. In Hunter v. Corr. Corp., 
a 17-year-old was sexually assaulted in an adult facility.\13\ 
The case was dismissed because the court ruled he should have 
exhausted his administrative remedies first.\14\ In another 
case, from Kentucky, a juvenile filed a lawsuit alleging that 
staff had hit him, shocked him with a stun gun, and then led 
him down the hall by his testicles to an isolation cell.\15\ 
Although his lawyer had discussed the incident with the jail 
administrator, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the State 
Police, and the Kentucky Department of Juvenile Justice, the 
court ruled that this did not satisfy the PLRA and the suit was 
dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ 441 F. Supp. 2d 78, 80 (D.D.C. 2006).
    \14\ Id.
    \15\ Brock v. Kenton County, KY, 93 Fed.Appx. 793 (6th Cir. 2004).
    \16\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Even when there are multiple incidents to report, children 
still find a hard time seeking relief from a court. In one 
Indiana facility, a juvenile was repeatedly beaten, once with 
``padlock-laden socks,'' while in custody.\17\ After one 
beating, he suffered a seizure, but no one helped him, and he 
was beaten again the next day.\18\ He was raped and witnessed 
another child being sexually assaulted.\19\ The juvenile was 
afraid to report the assaults to staff--and his fear was 
natural enough in light of the fact that some of the staff were 
involved in arranging fights between juveniles, or would even 
``handcuff one juvenile so other juvenile detainees could beat 
him.''\20\ Although his mother spoke with staff and wrote to 
the juvenile judges in the jurisdiction, attempted to meet with 
the superintendent of one of the facilities, and contacted the 
Department of Corrections Deputy Commissioner and the Governor, 
the federal district court dismissed the family's federal 
claims under the PLRA's exhaustion rule because the juvenile 
had not himself filed a grievance in the juvenile facility.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ Minix v. Pazera, No. 1:04-CV-447, 2005 WL 1799538 (N.D. Ind. 
July 27, 2005).
    \18\ Id.
    \19\ Id.
    \20\ Id.
    \21\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    III. YOUTH SHOULD BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY UNDER THE PLRA DUE TO 
                         COGNITIVE DIFFERENCES

    In the past fifty years, the Supreme Court has concluded on 
a number of occasions that laws pertaining to juveniles should 
be evaluated through a prism that is developmentally 
appropriate.\22\ In a variety of circumstances the Court has 
held that juvenile defendants may be susceptible to outside 
pressure\23\ and ``often lack the experience, perspective, and 
judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be 
detrimental to them.''\24\ Further, the Supreme Court has long 
held that a child's immaturity and lack of knowledge can pose 
unique obstacles to navigating legal proceedings. In J.D.B. v. 
North Carolina, for example, the Supreme Court explained that 
failing to take age into account ``and thus to ignore the very 
real differences between children and adults--would be to deny 
children the full scope of the procedural safeguards'' to which 
they are entitled.\25\ Similarly, in Haley v. Ohio, the Supreme 
Court, holding an interrogation unconstitutional, noted that 
``when, as here, a mere child--an easy victim of the law--is 
before us, special care in scrutinizing the record must be 
used. . . . Age 15 is a tender and difficult age for a boy of 
any race. . . [; h]e cannot be judged by the more exacting 
standards of maturity.''\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (holding 
the death penalty unconstitutional as applied to youth because they are 
more susceptible to pressure, their character is not fully developed, 
and they are more impulsive); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 102, 115-16 
(holding death penalty unconstitutional when mitigating factors were 
not presented and noting that children ``generally are less mature and 
responsible than adults''); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S 48, 68 (2010) 
(children ``are more vulnerable or susceptible to . . . outside 
pressures'' than adults); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) 
(plurality opinion) (children ``often lack the experience, perspective, 
and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental 
to them.'').
    \23\ See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (holding the death penalty 
unconstitutional as applied to youth because they are more susceptible 
to pressure, their character is not fully developed, and they are more 
impulsive); Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115-16 (holding death penalty 
unconstitutional when mitigating factors were not presented and noting 
that children ``generally are less mature and responsible than 
adults''); Graham, 560 U.S at 48 (children ``are more vulnerable or 
susceptible to . . . outside pressures'' than adults).
    \24\ Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635 (plurality opinion).
    \25\ 564 U.S. 261, 272 (2011).
    \26\ 332 U.S. 596, 599-600 (1948).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                Hearings

    In compliance with section 103(i) of House Resolution 6, on 
July 16, 2019, the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, 
and Homeland Security held a hearing titled, Women and Girls in 
the Criminal Justice System,'' to examine pressing issues 
impacting women and young girls in the criminal justice system. 
The hearing included discussion of the PLRA's administrative 
burdens and their impact on upholding Constitutional standards.

                        Committee Consideration

    On September 9, 2020, the Committee met in open session and 
ordered the bill, H.R. 5053, favorably reported, by a voice 
vote, a quorum being present.

                            Committee Votes

    No record votes occurred during the Committee's 
consideration of H.R. 5053.

                      Committee Oversight Findings

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee advises that the 
findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on 
oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the 
descriptive portions of this report.

  New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures and Congressional Budget 
                          Office Cost Estimate

    With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule 
XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section 
308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and with respect 
to requirements of clause (3)(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives and section 402 of the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee has requested 
but not received a cost estimate for this bill from the 
Director of Congressional Budget Office (CBO). The Committee 
has requested but not received from the Director of the CBO a 
statement as to whether this bill contains any new budget 
authority, spending authority, credit authority, or an increase 
or decrease in revenues or tax expenditures.

                    Duplication of Federal Programs

    No provision of H.R. 5053 establishes or reauthorizes a 
program of the Federal government known to be duplicative of 
another federal program, a program that was included in any 
report from the Government Accountability Office to Congress 
pursuant to section 21 of Public Law 111-139, or a program 
related to a program identified in the most recent Catalog of 
Federal Domestic Assistance.

                    Performance Goals and Objectives

    The Committee states that pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of 
rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R. 
5053 does not have any performance goals or measures. Prior to 
the enactment of the PLRA, reports indicate that youth 
complaints and lawsuits comprised a very small percentage of 
the total suits brought by prisoners.

                          Advisory on Earmarks

    In accordance with clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, H.R. 5053 does not contain any 
congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff 
benefits as defined in clause 9(d), 9(e), or 9(f) of rule XXI.

                      Section-by-Section Analysis

    The following discussion describes the bill as reported by 
the Committee.
    Sec. 1. Short title. Section 1 sets forth the short title 
of the bill as the ``Justice for Juveniles Act.''
    Sec. 2. Exemption of juveniles from the requirements for 
suits by prisoners. Section 2 amends the definition of a 
``prisoner'' under Section 7 of the Civil Rights of 
Institutionalized Persons Act (Act) to remove persons 
adjudicated delinquent.
    In addition, Section 2 adds a new section, section (i), to 
Section 7 of the Act by exempting youth under the age of 22 
from the requirements of the Act, which sets forth the 
requirements an incarcerated individual must follow before he 
or she can file a lawsuit for allegations of abuse. Further, it 
exempts a person from the requirements of the Act for any 
prison condition that occurred before he or she reached the age 
of 22.

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

  In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new 
matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no 
change is proposed is shown in roman):

             CIVIL RIGHTS OF INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT




           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
SEC. 7. SUITS BY PRISONERS.

  (a) Applicability of Administrative Remedies.--No action 
shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under 
section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (42 
U.S.C. 1983), or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined 
in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such 
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.
  (b) Failure of State To Adopt or Adhere to Administrative 
Grievance Procedure.--The failure of a State to adopt or adhere 
to an administrative grievance procedure shall not constitute 
the basis for an action under section 3 or 5 of this Act.
  (c) Dismissal.--(1) The court shall on its own motion or on 
the motion of a party dismiss any action brought with respect 
to prison conditions under section 1979 of the Revised Statutes 
of the United States (42 U.S.C. 1983), or any other Federal 
law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other 
correctional facility if the court is satisfied that the action 
is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a 
defendant who is immune from such relief.
  (2) In the event that a claim is, on its face, frivolous, 
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is 
immune from such relief, the court may dismiss the underlying 
claim without first requiring the exhaustion of administrative 
remedies.
  (d) Attorney's Fees.--(1) In any action brought by a prisoner 
who is confined to any jail, prison, or other correctional 
facility, in which attorney's fees are authorized under section 
2 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (42 U.S.C. 
1988), such fees shall not be awarded, except to the extent 
that--
          (A) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in 
        proving an actual violation of the plaintiff's rights 
        protected by a statute pursuant to which a fee may be 
        awarded under section 2 of the Revised Statutes; and
          (B)(i) the amount of the fee is proportionately 
        related to the court ordered relief for the violation; 
        or
          (ii) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in 
        enforcing the relief ordered for the violation.
  (2) Whenever a monetary judgment is awarded in an action 
described in paragraph (1), a portion of the judgment (not to 
exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the amount of 
attorney's fees awarded against the defendant. If the award of 
attorney's fees is not greater than 150 percent of the 
judgment, the excess shall be paid by the defendant.
  (3) No award of attorney's fees in an action described in 
paragraph (1) shall be based on an hourly rate greater than 150 
percent of the hourly rate established under section 3006A of 
title 18, United States Code, for payment of court-appointed 
counsel.
  (4) Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit a prisoner from 
entering into an agreement to pay an attorney's fee in an 
amount greater than the amount authorized under this 
subsection, if the fee is paid by the individual rather than by 
the defendant pursuant to section 2 of the Revised Statutes of 
the United States (42 U.S.C. 1988).
  (e) Limitation on Recovery.--No Federal civil action may be 
brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other 
correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered 
while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or 
the commission of a sexual act (as defined in section 2246 of 
title 18, United States Code).
  (f) Hearings.--(1) To the extent practicable, in any action 
brought with respect to prison conditions in Federal court 
pursuant to section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of the United 
States (42 U.S.C. 1983), or any other Federal law, by a 
prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional 
facility, pretrial proceedings in which the prisoner's 
participation is required or permitted shall be conducted by 
telephone, video conference, or other telecommunications 
technology without removing the prisoner from the facility in 
which the prisoner is confined.
  (2) Subject to the agreement of the official of the Federal, 
State, or local unit of government with custody over the 
prisoner, hearings may be conducted at the facility in which 
the prisoner is confined. To the extent practicable, the court 
shall allow counsel to participate by telephone, video 
conference, or other communications technology in any hearing 
held at the facility.
  (g) Waiver of Reply.--(1) Any defendant may waive the right 
to reply to any action brought by a prisoner confined in any 
jail, prison, or other correctional facility under section 1979 
of the Revised Statutes of the United States (42 U.S.C. 1983) 
or any other Federal law. Notwithstanding any other law or rule 
of procedure, such waiver shall not constitute an admission of 
the allegations contained in the complaint. No relief shall be 
granted to the plaintiff unless a reply has been filed.
  (2) The court may require any defendant to reply to a 
complaint brought under this section if it finds that the 
plaintiff has a reasonable opportunity to prevail on the 
merits.
  (h) Definition.--As used in this section, the term 
``prisoner'' means any person incarcerated or detained in any 
facility who is accused of, convicted of, [sentenced for, or 
adjudicated delinquent for,] or sentenced for violations of 
criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, 
pretrial release, or diversionary program.
  (i) Exemption of Juvenile Prisoners.--This section shall not 
apply to an action pending on the date of enactment of the 
Justice for Juveniles Act or filed on or after such date if 
such action is--
          (1) brought by a prisoner who has not attained 22 
        years of age; or
          (2) brought by any prisoner with respect to a prison 
        condition that occurred before the prisoner attained 22 
        years of age.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                                  [all]