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Information Notice No. 82-52: Equipment Environmental Qualification Testing Experience - Updating of Test Summaries Previously Published in 81-29
SSINS No.: IN 82-52 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, DC 20555 December 21, 1982 Information Notice No. 82-52: EQUIPMENT ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION TESTING EXPERIENCE - UPDATING OF TEST SUMMARIES PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED IN 81-29 Addressees: All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or construction permit (CP). Purpose: This information notice is provided to inform licensees of the status and test results on the series of environmental qualification testing published in Information Notice 81-29 dated September 24, 1981. It is expected that licensees will review the information for applicability to their facilities. Description of Circumstances: Information Notice 81-29 disseminated several adverse test results as they were brought to the attention of the NRC staff. Some of these results have now been evaluated by the involved testing organizations; others remain unresolved. The enclosed series of test summary reports (Attachment 1) will provide the latest status and progress of the environmental qualification tests described in IN 81-29. Other information notices relating to equipment environmental qualification matters that have been published during 1982 are also included in Attachment 1. Please note that information contained in Notice 4 through Notice 9 is not related to environmental testing and, therefore, will not be addressed in the future as part of the NRC Equipment Environmental Qualification Testing Experience Series. No specific response to this information notice is required. Since the purpose of this information notice is to provide a timely update of the adverse test results disseminated in IN 81-29, other test results that have been brought to the attention of the NRC during this period will be evaluated and considered for inclusion in the next information notice. The NRC does not intend to publish successful qualification test results, except for that equipment for which adverse test results have already been published. The results of those successful tests will only be published as they are voluntarily brought to the attention of NRC by industry. . IN 82-52 December 21, 1982 Page 2 of 2 Questions regarding the details of the enclosed test summary reports should be directed either to the manufacturer of the component or the organization that performed the testing (cognizant design and/or test agency). Both are listed on each report. Edward L. Jordan, Director Division of Engineering and Quality Assurance Office of Inspection and Enforcement Technical Contact: N. B. Le (301) 492-9673 Attachments: 1. Series of Environmental Qualification Test Summary Reports 2. List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices . Attachment 1 IN 82-52 December 21, 1982 Page 1 of 11 Equipment Environmental Qualification Notice No. 1 Test Summary Report No. 2 Equipment: Limitorque valve operator, type SMB, size 00 Test Facility: Limitorque Corporation Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Westinghouse Electric Corporation Failed Component: Valve operator drive motor (manufactured by Reliance Electric Co.) Type of Test: Environmental qualification of SMB class valve operators per IEEE 321-1974 (harsh environment) and IEEE 382-1972 Description of Failure(s): Update: This is an ongoing program. Failures were previously described in IN 81-29. Further tests were performed and Westinghouse Electric Corporation concluded that the present motor design will not successfully pass the Westinghouse specified test parameters. Failure Mode: Previous reported failures have been evaluated by further testing. Failure mode is now attributed to the severe requirement imposed by the Westinghouse specified temperature profile. Possible Corrective Action Considerations: Limitorque Corporation is pursuing the modification of the motor. This effort is under way to qualify the motor actuator assembly to a higher temperature profile. Generic Implications: Limitorque has successfully repeated a previously conducted environmental accident profile test on the SMB valve operator to the less severe IEEE 323-1971 and earlier standards. . Attachment 1 IN 82-52 December 21, 1982 Page 2 of 11 Equipment Environmental Qualification Notice No. 2 Test Summary Report No. 2 Equipment: ITT Barton Westinghouse lot 4 transmitters, group A Test Facility: Westinghouse - Forest Hills Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Westinghouse Electric Corporation Failed Component: Connector assembly Type of Test: Environmental qualification of ITT Barton Westinghouse lot 4 transmitters, group A Description of Failure(s): Update: Failures involved erroneous output during temperature ramps and were previously described in IN 81-29. Further testing was performed to evaluate failure mode. Satisfactory resolution of the failures has been established, according to Westinghouse. No further actions are indicated by the test agency. Failure Mode: Problem encountered during high-energy-line break as described in Summary report No. 1 has now been attributed to the inadequate contact in the connector assembly that apparently is sensitive to elevated temperature. Possible Corrective Action Considerations: Satisfactory modification was made to the connector assembly and the transmitter was successfully retested, according to Westinghouse. Generic Implications: According to Westinghouse the test program is completed Final reports have been submitted to the NRR for review. . Attachment 1 IN 82-52 December 21, 1982 Page 3 of 11 Equipment Environmental Qualification Notice No. 3 Test Summary Report No. 2 Equipment: D. G. O'Brien electrical penetration assembly, model K connectors Test Facility: Sandia National Laboratories Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: NRC/RES Failed Component: Conductors shorted at connector assembly Type of Test: Simulated loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) environmental test to examine methodology. Description of Failure(s): Update: Failures were previously described in IN 81-29. Sandia is currently running thermal expansion-compression tests on the silicone grommet to better understand the seal behavior during elevated temperature accelerated aging and LOCA environmental tests. The Duke Power Company reran the environmental qualification test of the D. G. O'Brien electrical penetrations at Wyle Laboratory in the period March/May of 1982. The Duke Program included testing model K as well as models C, D, E, F, and L electrical penetrations. In the Duke test program, silicone grommet and silicone interfacial seals were all thermally aged in an unassembled state. The seal parts were then assembled (but torqued) and irradiated; the seal was then torqued before LOCA testing. Failure-Mode Update: Test results are being evaluated by Duke. The model K exhibited no anomalies during the latest test according to Duke Power. However, some of the other models exhibited short circuits during the LOCA test phase. Possible Corrective Action Considerations: This program is an ongoing program. Evaluation of test results by Duke Tower Co. is in progress. Generic Implications: Application of model K connectors is limited to the Catawba, McGuire, and Yankee Rowe facilities. The qualification test previously performed by D. G. O'Brien for the McGuire plant and the recent Duke rerun test program indicate that model K connectors have successfully passed test criteria. . Attachment 1 IN 82-52 December 21, 1982 Page 4 of 11 Equipment Environmental Qualification Notice No. 4 Test Summary Report No. 2 Equipment: Dresser safety valve, model 31709NA Test Facility: Combustion Engineering Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Failed Component: Seat surface Type of Test: Performance testing for PWR relief and safety valves Description of Failure(s): Update: Failure to close/open at set points was previously described in IN 81-29. Test program is now complete. EPRI has issued an interim test report. Failure Mode: Problem appeared to be caused by steam from the blowdown operation. Scratches or marks were found on valve seat surface. Possible Corrective Action Considerations: The seat surfaces were lapped, the valve was reassembled, to allow the other tests to continue. No other corrective actions were indicated in the EPRI report. Generic Implications: The EPRI interim test report is under evaluation by NRR. . Attachment 1 IN 82-52 December 21, 1982 Page 5 of 11 Equipment Environmental Qualification Notice No. 5 Test Summary Report No. 2 Equipment: Dresser safety valve, model 31739 A Test Facility: Combustion Engineering Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Failed Component: Seat surface Type of Test: Performance testing for PWR relief and safety valves Description of Failure(s): Update: Failure to achieve rated flow with high back pressure was previously described in IN 81-29. Test program is now complete. EPRI has issued interim report which states that at one time during test, the rated lift of the valves was not maintained at pressure 6% above design set point. Seat surfaces were lapped and other tests were performed. Failure Mode: Scratches on the seat surfaces and galled guiding surfaces were observed, according to the EPRI report. Possible Corrective Action Considerations: Seat surfaces were lapped to minimize seat leakage to allow the other tests to continue. No other corrective actions were indicated in the EPRI report. Generic Implications: The EPRI interim test report is under evaluation by NRR. NRC is also currently reviewing information received from licensee owner groups in regard to a related matter identified at Oconee 1 and 2 pertaining to the ring setting issue. . Attachment 1 IN 82-52 December 21, 1982 Page 6 of 11 Equipment Environmental Qualification Notice No. 6 Test Summary Report No. 2 Equipment: Dresser power-operated relief valve (PORV), model 31533VX-30 Test Facility: Wyle Laboratories Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Failed Component: Valve bellows Type of Test: EPRI/PWR safety and relief valve test program Description of Failure(s): Update: Failure of valve to close on demand during water tests was previously described in IN 81-29. Evaluation test was performed, and steam was found to have leaked past the valve pilot stem. Valve was disassembled and bellows were found to have several partially failed welds. Valve was reassembled with new bellows and valve cycled successfully. Test program is now complete. EPRI has issued an interim test report. Failure Mode: Valve malfunction caused by leakage through the failed welds in bellows. Possible Corrective Action Considerations: No further action indicated in the report. Generic Implications: The EPRI report concludes that the partially failed welds in the bellow have no potential impact on valve operation. Interim test report on this valve is under evaluation by NRR. The damage was determined to have no potential impact on valve operation, according to EPRI. Interim test report on this test is under evaluation by NRR. . Attachment 1 IN 82-52 December 21, 1982 Page 7 of 11 Equipment Environmental Qualification Notice No. 7 Test Summary Report No. 2 Equipment: Target Rock power-operated relief valve (PORV), model 80X-006-1 Test Facility: Wyle Laboratories Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Failed Component: Not determined Type of Test: EPRI/PWR safety and relief valve test program Description of Failure(s): Update: Failure of valve to close after deenergization was previously described in IN 81-29. Test program is complete and an interim report has been issued by EPRI. Valves were disassembled after each test and no damage was observed, according to the EPRI report. Failure Mode: Not determined Possible Corrective Action Considerations: No corrective actions were indicated in the report. Generic Implications: The EPRI interim test report is under evaluation by NRR. Information indicates that there are presently no valves of this design in operating plants, but they are planned for use in some plants under construction. . Attachment 1 IN 82-52 December 21, 1982 Page 8 of 11 Equipment Environmental Qualification Notice No. 8 Test Summary Report No. 2 Equipment: Control Component Incorporated (CCI) power-operated relief valve (PORV) Test Facility: Wyle Laboratories Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Failed Component: Not determined Type of Test: EPRI/PWR safety and relief valve program Description of Failure(s): Update: Failures of valve to close during prescribed steam tests were previously described in IN 81-29. Closure delay times from 2 to 40 seconds were observed under various tests. Valve was disassembled and no internal damage was observed that might affect the ability of the valve to open or close on demand. Test program is complete and EPRI has issued an interim test report. Failure Mode: Not determined Possible Corrective Action Considerations: No corrective actions were indicated in the report. Generic Implications: The interim test report is under evaluation by NRR. Information indicates that the CCI PORV is being or will be used at McGuire 1 & 2, and Catawba 1 & 2. . Attachment 1 IN 82-52 December 21, 1982 Page 9 of 11 Equipment Environmental Qualification Notice No. 9 Test Summary Report No. 2 Equipment: Crosby safety valve 3K6 Test Facility: Combustion Engineering Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Failed Component: Not determined Type of Test: Steam, low and high ramp rate, high back pressure test Description of Failure(s): Update: Failures involving valve oscillations and closures outside of set points were previously described in IN 81-29. According to the test report, galled guiding surfaces and damaged internal parts were found. Damaged parts were either refurbished or replaced before continued testing. Test program is complete, and an interim test report has been issued by EPRI. Failure Mode: Not determined Possible Corrective Action Considerations: The report indicated that scratches or marks were found on surfaces; the scratched surfaces were lapped before reassembly for continued testing. No other corrective actions were identified in the report. Generic Implications: The EPRI interim report is under evaluation by NRR. Information indicates that the Crosby safety valve 3K6 is being used or will be used at St. Lucie 1 & 2 and Fort Calhoun. . Attachment 1 IN 82-52 December 21, 1982 Page 10 of 11 Equipment Environmental Qualification Notice No. 10 Test Summary Report No. 2 Equipment: ASCO solenoid valves, NP-1 series Test Facility: ASCO/Isomedix Inc./Wyle Laboratories Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Automatic Switch Co. (ASCO) Failed Component: Viton elastomer seals in NP-1 series valves Type of Test: Radiation simulation for design-basis event (DBE) Description of Failure(s): Update: Failure involved material deterioration at high radiation exposure and was previously described in IN 81-29. Detailed information is now available in ASCO Report No. AQR-67368/Re. 0, dated 8-82. This report concludes that the ASCO solenoid valve, NP-1 series containing Viton dynamic seals should not be used in application where the valves may be required to shift position following exposure to total gamma radiation doses in excess of 20 megarads. Failure Mode: Solenoid valve will not shift position upon receipt of a specified-operating signal (65 V DC or 0.080 amps) following a total gamma radiation exposure in excess of 20 megarads. Possible Corrective Action Considerations: Each licensee should review its system requirements to determine whether or not Viton elastomers are acceptable for its application. ASCO has recommended that Viton elastomers be replaced with ethylene propylene (EPDM) elastomers on valves required to operate under accident conditions following a DBE. Please note that NRC is in the process of proposing a bulletin requesting each licensee to assess the design of each facility and determine if equipment with Viton parts should be replaced with EPDM parts or other equally qualified parts, as recommended by ASCO. Generic Implications: The described failure is confined only to the ASCO NP-1 series where Viton elastomer seals are used, and not NP-8300 as was previously reported in IN 81-29. . Attachment 1 IN 82-52 December 21, 1982 Page 11 of 11 Equipment Environmental Qualification Notice No.11 Related Information Notices Information Notices relating to equipment environmental qualification matters that have been published during 1982 are: IN 82 - 03 Environmental Tests of Electrical Terminal Blocks. IN 82 - 11 Potential Inaccuracies in Wide Range Pressure Instruments Used in Westinghouse Designed Plants.
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