[Senate Hearing 116-220]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 116-220
INTERMEDIATE RANGE
NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 15, 2019
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web:
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______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
40-682 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho, Chairman
MARCO RUBIO, Florida ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
CORY GARDNER, Colorado JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MITT ROMNEY, Utah CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming TIM KAINE, Virginia
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
RAND PAUL, Kentucky JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
TODD, YOUNG, Indiana CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
TED CRUZ, Texas
Christopher M. Socha, Staff Director
Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho.................... 1
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey.............. 3
Thompson, Hon. Andrea L., Under Secretary for Arms Control and
International Security, U.S. Department of State, Washington,
DC............................................................. 6
Prepared Statement........................................... 7
Trachtenberg, Hon. David J., Deputy Under Secretary for Policy,
U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC..................... 11
Prepared Statement........................................... 13
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Washington Post Article Dated January 23, 2019 Entitled ``Can
Saudi Arabia Produce Ballistic Missiles? Satellite Imagery
Raises Suspicions.''........................................... 40
Responses of Hon. Andrea L. Thompson to Questions Submitted by
Senator James Risch............................................ 43
Responses of Hon. Andrea L. Thompson to Questions Submitted by
Senator Benjamin L. Cardin..................................... 44
Responses of Hon. Andrea L. Thompson to Questions Submitted by
Senator Tim Kaine.............................................. 45
Responses of Hon. Andrea L. Thompson to Questions Submitted by
Senator Edward J. Markey....................................... 45
Responses of Hon. Andrea L. Thompson to Questions Submitted by
Senator Jeff Merkley........................................... 49
Responses of Hon. David J. Trachtenberg to Questions Submitted by
Senator James Risch............................................ 50
Responses of Hon. David J. Trachtenberg to Questions Submitted by
Senator Benjamin L. Cardin..................................... 51
Responses of Hon. David J. Trachtenberg to Questions Submitted by
Senator Tim Kaine.............................................. 53
Responses of Hon. David J. Trachtenberg to Questions Submitted by
Senator Edward J. Markey....................................... 53
(iii)
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE
NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY
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WEDNESDAY, MAY 15, 2019
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 a.m. in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. James E.
Risch, chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Risch [presiding], Johnson, Gardner,
Romney, Barrasso, Paul, Cruz, Menendez, Shaheen, Murphy, Kaine,
and Markey.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Today we are going to talk about arms control, and we have
very distinguished witnesses to help us through this. I have a
semi-brief opening statement to make. I will then turn it over
to Senator Menendez, and we will then talk about questioning
from the committee and do a round of questions.
So with that, we are going to talk about arms control
today, and treaties, particularly arms control treaties, which
can be very, very successful but only--and only--if all parties
have a common objective and the parties act in good faith. Arms
control is only successful when treaties are honored, and
confidence is only achievable when countries behave in a
responsible and transparent way.
It is in this context that I commend the administration for
its actions regarding Russia's blatant violation of the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. I also want to thank
our NATO allies for their strong support for the U.S. decision
to withdraw.
For the past several years, the Russian Government has
systematically violated the INF Treaty and deployed systems
that undermine the stability that the treaty helped create.
Violations of treaty obligations must have consequences. These
violations have gone on for a long period of time. They were
classified for a period of time, and those of us who wanted to
bring these to the public's attention were very frustrated by
the fact that we could not talk about them because they were
classified, particularly in light of the fact that those
violations help people think through what our relationship
should be with a country and how we should or should not deal
with the ongoing treaty negotiations, which were ongoing at
that time.
Russia's violations are part of a pattern of aggressive and
dishonest behavior that must be taken into account in any
future arms control efforts. We have had four agreements with
Russia: New START, the INF Treaty, the Open Skies Treaty, and
the Chemical Weapons Convention. Russian compliance is
problematic across the board with all of these treaties.
On the Open Skies Treaty, Russia continues to illegally
limit our ability to overflight key military areas. Russia
changes the subject when it comes to the Chemical Weapons
Convention. They have yet to take responsibility for killing a
British citizen with an undeclared nerve agent on British soil
last year or for their complicity when their ally, Bashar
Assad, used chemical weapons against Syrian civilians.
Given this behavior, the U.S. needs to consider more
carefully than ever now how we engage Russia regarding any
treaty.
Russia is modernizing and growing the size and capacity of
its nuclear forces. Putin's arsenal of non-strategic nuclear
weapons is being revamped to make it more useful not just for
deterrence but for coercion in support of Russia's aggressive
foreign policy.
Russia currently possesses roughly 2,000 such tactical
nuclear warheads and refuses to share vital information on
these weapons, which creates an unacceptable level of ambiguity
about these capabilities.
Russia also claims to be enhancing their strategic systems,
developing a new high-yield warhead and new delivery systems
that can carry multiple warheads. Why would Russia build a new
ballistic missile that can carry more heads than allowed by New
START unless they have no regard for New START and no intent of
complying with New START?
In fact, Russia's modernization is almost 70 percent
complete. By comparison, U.S. modernization is well behind
that.
Even further, Russia is developing new systems like a
nuclear underwater drone, a nuclear-armed intercontinental
range cruise missile, and air-launched cruise missiles. These
systems are limited by New START, but Russia rejects even the
assertion that they are limited. This is not good faith.
These improvements present significant threats to strategic
stability of the United States and our allies.
Going forward, it is important for Putin to understand that
we will not allow actions to go unchallenged and that alliance
unity on these topics remains strong.
At the same time, the world has changed in the past decade,
and U.S. policy must recognize China's increasingly aggressive
pursuit of regional challenges and to U.S. interests. China's
growing capabilities and its even greater lack of transparency
create uncertainty about Chinese intentions in the Pacific and
raise important questions about the role of U.S.-extended
nuclear deterrence in the region.
Reports indicate China is on track to double its nuclear
stockpile over the next decade. Last year, they launched more
ballistic missiles for testing and training than the rest of
the world combined. More troubling are China's plans to deploy
tactical nuclear weapons while constantly refusing to even
discuss arms control.
This threat is real, and I am disappointed by those who
argue that including China in arms control discussions is a
poison pill to new agreements with Russia. The opposite is
true. A responsible approach to arms control must account for
all nuclear threats to the United States, and it is
indisputable that Russia is no longer the only nuclear threat
to the United States and to global stability.
Arms control is a critical part of addressing these
threats, but a strong, modern U.S. nuclear deterrent is also
essential to strategic stability. As we consider new approaches
to arms control, Congress needs to fully fund, and the
administration needs to vigorously implement, all programs
needed to modernize our nuclear forces.
In closing, I repeat that the challenges to arms control
emanate not from the U.S. but from the numerous and continuing
Russian violations, from growing Russian and Chinese
capabilities, and from China's unwillingness to even discuss
these topics. Arms control is not an end in and of itself and
cannot protect the United States if our treaty partners refuse
to abide by their treaty obligations and do not act in good
faith.
I thank our witnesses for joining us today and look forward
to hearing their clear-eyed assessment of the current status of
these issues and the administration's views on future
approaches.
With that, I will turn it over to the ranking member,
Senator Menendez, for his opening remarks on arms control.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Before I turn to the topic of the hearing, I feel compelled
to address the Trump administration's latest actions on Iraq
and Iran.
This morning I woke up to the news that the administration
announced it was ordering the departure of U.S. embassy staff
from our embassy in Baghdad and our consulate in Erbil.
There are only two reasons for ordering their departure: we
have credible intelligence that our people are at risk or in
preparation for military action in Iran.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is charged with
writing the laws that authorize the use of military force and
of the oversight of the State Department and the safety of
those who work there. And yet, the Trump administration has not
provided any information to this committee on the intelligence
behind their decisions or what they plan to do in Iraq or Iran.
And I have repeatedly reminded the administration of its
responsibilities to this committee.
Mr. Chairman, I hope you will join me in asking the
administration to immediately provide this committee with a
briefing on the decision to order the departure of the embassy
staff, the intelligence on what Iran may be planning to do, and
any plans to go to war with Iran.
I would add that while a briefing for all Senators is
rumored for next week, that is no substitute for directly
briefing the committee today when there is clearly actionable
intelligence available. Nor is that timeline itself acceptable.
Finally, I want to make two points absolutely clear on the
policy towards Iran.
First, we need a diplomatic surge on Iran to meaningfully
engage our allies and Iran in serious negotiations to end its
pathway towards nuclear weapons and its malign activities.
And second, Congress has not authorized war with Iran, and
the administration, if it were contemplating military action
with Iran, it must come to Congress to seek approval.
I have spent the better part of two decades focused on
stopping Iran's quest for a nuclear weapon and attacks against
our allies, including Israel. There is a right way to pursue
that policy and that goal, which I believe we all share and I
know that the chairman and I in that respect have common cause.
And there is a wrong way to do it, a way that endangers our
allies, our interests, and our people. And I am deeply
concerned the administration is pursuing a policy that leads us
to that wrong way.
Now, let me thank you, as it relates to this hearing, for
convening this on the future of arms control policy. It seems
especially appropriate to hold this hearing on a day that we
are honoring Senator Richard Lugar, whose civil and effective
leadership of this committee is a model that we should all
strive to follow in our efforts to advance U.S. interests
around the world. Our country and the entire world are safer
thanks to Senator Lugar, as well as his ranking Democratic
colleague, Senator Sam Nunn, and their collective efforts to
promote sustained tough diplomacy that led to the destruction
of thousands of nuclear warheads in the former Soviet Union.
Under Secretary Thompson and Deputy Under Secretary
Trachtenberg, we welcome you back to committee, but I hope you
will be more forthcoming than you were the last time you
visited.
In September, you testified that Russia continued to
violate the INF Treaty. You provided no indication that the
United States was immediately considering withdrawing from the
treaty nor that there were any near-term military operational
benefits for doing so. Yet, just one month later, after a
campaign rally, President Trump suddenly announced, without any
notice or consultation with the Senate, that the United States
was unilaterally withdrawing.
Unfortunately, this is a part of a troubling pattern with
the State Department failing to comply with fundamental legal
congressional requirements.
Just last month, the administration submitted an
unclassified version of the annual Arms Control Reliance Report
which, quote, assesses the U.S.'s and other nations' compliance
to all arms control nonproliferation and disarmament agreements
that the United States is a party to. This year's report fails
to even mention a variety of critical arms agreements and was
only 12 pages long in comparison to last year's report which
was 45 pages. In your submission to Congress, the Department
promises to provide a longer version of the report after a
declassification process has occurred. That is unacceptable.
The administration has legal requirements it must fulfill.
Given the lack of strategic forethought and planning
apparent in the administration's hasty decision to withdraw
from the INF Treaty, it is vital that the U.S. Government
reemphasizes effective arms control as an integral part of
nuclear deterrence and strategic stability. That is why, along
with Senator Reed and Senator Warner, I introduced the New
START Policy Act of 2019, which calls for a 5-year extension of
the treaty until February 2026 unless the President determines
Russia is in material breach of the treaty.
I was very pleased to see a similar bipartisan bill
introduced in the House cosponsored by House Foreign Affairs
Chairman Engel and his Republican counterpart, Ranking Member
McCaul. And I am hopeful we can forge a similar bipartisan
approach to arms control here in the Senate.
Extending New START would be, in my mind, an easy decision.
Intelligence officials have explained how the treaty's
verification regime, including short-notice and on-site
inspections at military bases and facilities, provide the
United States with important insight into Russia's core
capabilities, including its strategic nuclear delivery systems,
warheads, and facilities. The Commander of the United States
Strategic Command, General John Hyten, testified that he was a
big supporter of New START and that the treaty provides, quote,
insights into the Russians' capabilities which are hugely
beneficial to him.
It is very difficult to understand why the administration
would discard the robust constraints, transparency, and
verification measures of New START with nothing to replace
them.
Finally, I am looking forward to hearing additional details
on two other important issues.
First, we continue to wait for the imposition of chemical
weapons sanctions on Russia for the assassination attempt on
Sergei and Yulia Skripal in the United Kingdom. These sanctions
are more than 5 months overdue, and I would like to know why.
Second, I was pleased to hear that the Secretary raised
election meddling in his recent meeting with President Putin,
and I hope you will provide some insights into whether the
Secretary discussed the administration's new effort to bring
both China and Russia into a new arms control effort.
To be clear, I welcome the administration's efforts to
expand the scope of arms control negotiations.
However, given the challenges inherent in reaching new
agreements with Russia and China, I strongly believe the
limitations and verification measures of New START must remain
in place while any such negotiation occurs, and this new
initiative must not serve as an excuse for suddenly withdrawing
from another international agreement. If new agreements can be
reached, they should add, not subtract from our existing arms
control architecture.
So I look forward to the witnesses' testimony and our
discussion today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Menendez.
Like you, I look forward to hearing our witnesses testify.
I respectfully disagree regarding the 5-year extension. I
was opposed to the New START when it was enacted, as you will
recall. I remain opposed to it, and under current
circumstances, I cannot fathom why we would extend it another 5
years.
With that, we have Andrea Thompson, Under Secretary for
Arms Control and International Security. Ms. Thompson has been
leading State Department efforts on arms control for more than
a year. She previously served as Deputy Assistant to the
President and National Security Advisor to the Vice President.
Ms. Thompson also served more than 25 years in the United
States Army and retired with the rank of colonel. We look
forward to her perspective on how the State Department's arms
control efforts have progressed and what steps the
administration is considering for the future.
And with that, Ms. Thompson, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREA L. THOMPSON, UNDER SECRETARY FOR ARMS
CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Thompson. Thank you very much, Chairman Risch, Senator
Menendez, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you
for hosting this hearing and welcoming me here today. I look
forward to continuing our discussion from September when I had
the honor of appearing before this committee. There have been
important developments, none more so than the U.S. suspension
of its obligations and 6-month notice of withdrawal for the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, or INF Treaty, in
response to Russia's longstanding violation.
I would like to begin by recalling a passage from the 2018
Nuclear Posture Review, which states that progress in arms
control is not an end in and of itself and depends on the
security environment and the participation of willing partners.
For arms control to be an effective tool, it must advance U.S.,
allied, and partner security, be verifiable and enforceable,
and include partners that comply responsibly with their
obligations.
As you know, Moscow continues to violate a series of
obligations that undermine the trust the United States can
place in treaties with Russia, including some that have served
global security interests for years. The United States has
invested 6 years of diplomatic effort to engage the Russians,
including at the highest levels, to convince them to return to
compliance with the INF Treaty. I personally have been involved
in many of these engagements, including leading a U.S.
interagency delegation to Geneva this past January to meet with
Russian experts.
In sum, since I last addressed the committee, I have met
with Russian counterparts six times and more than 20 times with
NATO allies and partners. I can assure you that throughout our
years of efforts, we have stressed that Russia's continuing
violation and failure to take concrete steps to return to
compliance create an untenable situation whereby the United
States complied with the INF Treaty, while Russia violated it.
Our allies have been united that Russia's actions are to blame
for the pending demise of the INF Treaty.
If Russia fails to return to full and verifiable compliance
before August 2nd, our decision to withdraw will stand and the
treaty will terminate. Russia will bear sole responsibility.
Going forward, this administration will continue to work
with Congress and our allies to deny Russia any military
advantage from its development of ground-launched intermediate-
range missiles.
Turning now to the New START treaty, we are implementing
under the treaty and verifying Russia's compliance. The
administration has not made any decision on a potential
extension of New START and will continue to consult with
Congress as this administration determines next steps.
Central to the administration's review is whether New START
extension is in the U.S. national interest and how the treaty's
expiration would impact U.S. national security in the
deteriorating security environment where Russia is developing
new strategic offensive arms and expanding its non-strategic
nuclear forces and China is modernizing and building up its
nuclear forces.
China currently benefits from having the two largest
nuclear powers restrained while it can pursue competition on
its own terms. China's lack of transparency regarding the scope
and scale of its nuclear modernization program also raises
questions regarding its future intent.
As President Trump and Secretary Pompeo have highlighted,
China's growing capabilities, coupled with its increasingly
assertive posture, pose growing threats to the United States
and its allies and partners.
We need a new era of arms control to address new and
emerging threats that reflect modern reality. Make no mistake,
we are in an era of revived great power competition. While we
seek to bring Russia and China to the arms control table to
deliver meaningful results, we will be relentless in our
efforts to advance U.S. and allied interests, ensure our
security, and deny our adversaries advantages.
Modern and effective U.S. nuclear capabilities as called
for in the NPR are critical. As stated in the NPR's preface,
ensuring our nuclear deterrent remains strong will provide the
best opportunity for convincing other nuclear powers to engage
in meaningful arms control initiatives.
I thank you all for convening this important hearing and
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Thompson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Andrea L. Thompson
Chairman Risch, Senator Menendez, and distinguished members of the
Committee--thank you for hosting this hearing and welcoming me here
today. I look forward to continuing our discussion from last September,
when I had the honor of appearing before this Committee. There have
been important developments, none more so than the U.S. suspension of
its obligations and announcement of withdrawal from the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in response to Russia's longstanding
violation.
I would like to begin by reminding everyone of a passage from the
2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which states that ``progress in arms
control is not an end in and of itself, and depends on the security
environment and the participation of willing partners.'' The value of
any agreement is derived from our treaty partners maintaining
compliance with their obligations, and avoiding actions that result in
mistrust and miscalculation. As you know, Russia has taken actions over
the past several years that have posed real challenges to our bilateral
relationship and deepened the deficit of trust we have with Russia. In
the arms control sphere, Moscow continues to violate a series of
obligations that undermine the trust the United States can place in
treaties with Russia, including some that have served global security
interests for years. Russia is not alone in challenging U.S. interests.
As President Trump and Secretary Pompeo have highlighted, China's
growing capabilities, coupled with its increasingly assertive posture,
pose growing threats to the United States and its allies and partners.
The United States must look at the world as it is, not as the world
we wish to see. The 2018 NPR detailed the deteriorating security
environment we face. Effective arms control can help us address this
worsening security environment, but for it to be an effective tool,
arms control must advance U.S., allied, and partner security; be
verifiable and enforceable; and include partners that comply
responsibly with their obligations.
At times, arms control measures have benefited the United States by
providing mutual transparency and predictability, constraining certain
destabilizing weapons, and enhancing stability. With Russia, we want to
continue to leverage these benefits by seeking to utilize a strong
military deterrent in combination with arms control to maintain
stability. While we have a long established arms control relationship
with Russia, China's continued lack of willingness to engage in
bilateral discussions on nuclear risk reduction, confidence building,
and arms control, coupled with its plans to grow its nuclear force,
requires our attention.
In this environment, the President has charged his national
security team to think more broadly about arms control, both in terms
of the countries and the weapons systems involved. The President has
made clear that he wants arms control agreements that reflect modern
reality--we should pursue serious arms control that delivers real
security to the American people and our allies. In order to achieve
this, Russia and China must be brought to the table. The world has
moved on from the Cold War and its bilateral treaties that cover
limited types of nuclear weapons or only certain ranges of missiles.
Moving into the future, we need to be creative and agile in how we
approach and manage strategic competition, and that includes an
evaluation of where we stand with respect to our arms control
agreements, and their interrelationship with our deterrence and defense
requirements as well as those of our allies and partners.
In this testimony, I will discuss developments with regard to the
INF and New START Treaties, and will close with a few remarks regarding
the outlook for arms control in a changing security environment.
the inf treaty
I will start with the INF Treaty, and specifically how our
diplomatic process has played out. First, I would point out what
appears to be Russia's longstanding desire to get out of the INF
Treaty. As early as 2004, senior Russian officials approached the
United States about mutually withdrawing from the INF Treaty. When the
United States did not respond the way Russia wanted, the United States
assesses that the Russian government began covert development of an
INF-noncompliant missile, the SSC-8, probably in the mid-2000s.
The United States started privately raising concerns with the
Russians about their INF Treaty noncompliance in 2013 before publicly
announcing Russia's violation in the 2014 version of the Department of
State's annual Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control,
Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments. Russia
initially denied, for several years, that the missile described by the
United States existed before acknowledging in late 2017 that the
missile existed but claimed it could not fly to ranges prohibited by
the Treaty.
The United States has invested 6 years of diplomatic effort to
engage the Russians and convince them to return to Treaty compliance.
U.S. officials under two administrations have raised concerns on
repeated occasions and at various levels and departments within the
Russian Government, including at the highest levels, and provided
detailed information to Russia outlining its violation. U.S. efforts
continue, numbering more than 30 engagements with Russian officials,
six-expert level meetings with Russia, more than a dozen meetings
within NATO regarding the INF issue, and Treaty-compliant research and
development on potential U.S. conventional, ground-launched,
intermediate-range systems to show Russia the cost of endangering the
INF Treaty. Senators, I assure you that diplomatic engagement remains
my priority. Since I last addressed the Committee in September, I have
met with Russian counterparts six times; and more than 20 times with
NATO allies and partners. Thanks to this engagement, we had unanimous
Allied support for our decision to notify Russia of our intent to
withdraw from the INF Treaty. Allies continue to fully support our
position that Russia must return to full and verifiable compliance to
preserve the INF Treaty.
Throughout our years of efforts, we stressed that Russia's
continuing violation and failure to take concrete steps to return to
compliance created an untenable situation whereby the United States
complied with the INF Treaty while Russia violated it. On December 4,
2018, the Secretary of State declared Russia's continuing violation to
be a material breach of the Treaty and announced the United States
would suspend its obligations under the Treaty as a remedy in 60 days
unless Russia returned to full and verifiable compliance. I led a U.S.
interagency delegation to Geneva on January 15 to meet with Russian
experts led by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov. Instead of
taking advantage of this opportunity, Russia doubled down on denying
its violation and making false allegations against the United States.
As a result of Russia's continued refusal to correct its noncompliance
and reverse course, the United States on February 2 suspended its
obligations under the Treaty and provided six-month notice of U.S.
withdrawal from the Treaty.
As the Secretary of State has said, remaining in a treaty that
restricts only one side, while the other side cheats with impunity,
does not enhance the security interests of the United States and its
allies. The United States abided by its INF Treaty obligations, while
Russia cheated. During this time, of course, China, Iran, and North
Korea, who are not parties to the INF Treaty, were unconstrained to
develop formidable arsenals of intermediate-range missiles. If we had
maintained the status quo despite Russia's persistent violation, the
future credibility of arms control would have been undercut by
demonstrating that there are no real consequences for cheating on
agreements.
During our several years of diplomacy, Russia made clear it
preferred keeping its INFnoncompliant missile system over preserving
the Treaty. Rather than move toward compliance, Russia actually moved
in the opposite direction. Russia went from producing and testing the
SSC-8 to fielding multiple battalions of the system as of late 2018--a
system that poses a direct threat to European and global security. Even
as recently as this February, President Putin publicly endorsed
converting a sea-based, intermediate-range missile of the Kalibr class
into a ground-launched missile, which would be inconsistent with the
INF Treaty. This is a clear sign that Russia has no intent to try and
save the Treaty prior to August 2, the effective date of U.S.
withdrawal.
We have been clear to the Russians that returning to compliance
requires the verifiable destruction of all SSC-8 missiles, their
launchers, and associated support equipment. If Russia fails to return
to full and verifiable compliance before August 2, our decision to
withdraw will stand, and the Treaty will terminate. Russia will bear
sole responsibility for the Treaty's end.
Our allies are united that Russian actions are to blame for the
pending demise of the INF Treaty. When the United States declared
Russia in material breach back in December, NATO strongly supported the
announcement and agreed ``the situation whereby the United States and
other parties fully abide by the Treaty and Russia does not, is not
sustainable.'' Allies, again, ``fully supported'' the U.S. suspension
in February. NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg has reiterated that ``A
treaty that is respected by only one side cannot be effective and will
not keep us safe. If a treaty no longer affects the reality on the
ground, then it is nothing more than a piece of paper.''
If the Russians do not return to compliance with the INF Treaty and
we find ourselves in a world without its restrictions, we must be ready
to ensure U.S. and allied security. To ensure that our adversaries
receive no military advantage, the United States is developing its own
intermediate-range, conventionally-armed, ground-launched missile
systems. To reiterate, these systems are conventional only--not
nuclear. This research and development is designed to be reversible,
should Russia return to full and verifiable compliance before August 2.
Because the United States has been abiding by the Treaty, we are not in
a position to immediately field a ground-launched, INF-range system. We
are committed to consulting with allies as we move forward, although it
is too early to discuss any potential basing at this stage.
If Russia fails to return to full and verifiable compliance, the
result will be the demise of the Treaty. As Secretary Pompeo stated on
February 2, ``Regrettably, the INF Treaty is no longer effective due to
Russia's ongoing material breach.'' The deployment of multiple
battalions of SSC-8 missiles by Russia poses a threat to international
peace and security which this administration takes very seriously.
Going forward, this administration will continue to work with Congress
and our allies to deny Russia any military advantage from its
development of ground-launched intermediate-range missiles.
the new start treaty
We are implementing the New START Treaty and verifying Russian
compliance. In February 2018, each country confirmed its compliance
with the Treaty's central limits on ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers and
their associated warheads and launchers.
I know this Committee has sought the Trump administration's view of
extending the New START Treaty, which is scheduled to expire February
5, 2021. While some might argue that there is an urgent need to extend
right now, we must be careful to assess all of the complexities and
changes in the evolving security environment since the Treaty was
signed in 2010. To be direct: the administration has not made any
decision on a potential extension of New START. Since there are many
aspects of our review, I will take time now to walk through some of the
considerations.
First, while Russia is complying with the New START Treaty,
Russia's strategic forces are currently undergoing a comprehensive
modernization in their force structure, operations, and planning. In a
March 1, 2018 speech, President Putin spoke about the development of
five new nuclear-armed systems: a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed cruise
missile; a nuclear-powered unmanned underwater vehicle with
intercontinental range; an air-launched ballistic missile; a ``gliding
wing unit''; and a heavy ICBM. Russian official commentary and media
reports indicate that some of these systems could be fielded before New
START is scheduled to expire in February 2021. We assess at least two
of them, the Sarmat heavy ICBM and Avangard hypersonic system would
count as existing types and be subject to New START at the appropriate
point in their development cycle. Further, we assess that the other
three systems meet the U.S. criteria for what constitutes a ``new kind
of strategic offensive arms'' for purposes of New START. The United
States is monitoring the development of these systems and has raised
them with Russian officials. Meanwhile, as was noted in the New START
Resolution of Ratification, Russia's large stockpile of nonstrategic
nuclear weapons is not subject to the Treaty's limits and verification
regime, and Russia potentially views this stockpile as providing
coercive advantage in a crisis or at lower levels of conflict.
Second, we cannot ignore Russia's record of being a serial violator
and selective implementer of the arms control obligations and
commitments that it undertakes. Russia has violated the Chemical
Weapons Convention, the Open Skies Treaty, the Conventional Forces in
Europe (CFE) Treaty, and the INF Treaty. Its actions have raised
serious concerns about its compliance with the Biological Weapons
Convention. It also has acted inconsistent with its Vienna Document
commitments and the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992.
Russia also professes to support arms control for preventing an arms
race in outer space while developing anti-satellite systems.
Third, our decision on extension will carefully consider U.S. and
allied security needs. When the Treaty was negotiated, we were in a
more benign security environment, where relations between the great
powers were less tense and mistrustful. However, in the intervening
years, the security environment deteriorated significantly, and
increased uncertainty and risk pervade. Russia's malign actions,
including invading and seeking to annex part of Ukraine's territory,
have contributed substantially to this deterioration. We are carefully
considering how our deterrence requirements are shaped by the
geostrategic realities of today and the future.
Finally, China's lack of transparency regarding the scope and scale
of its nuclear modernization program raises questions regarding its
future intent. China has been investing considerable resources to
modernize and expand its nuclear arsenal, which is resulting in an
increasingly diverse force with next generation missiles, submarines,
and a stealthy, long-range strategic bomber. China also appears to be
considering how new types of weapons might fit into its posture, such
as low-yield capabilities and hypersonics. These developments, paired
with China's assertive behavior towards its neighbors, disregard for
binding international norms, and its unwillingness to engage in
meaningful dialogue with the United States on issues of nuclear weapons
policy and risk reduction, raise the risks of miscalculation, and
instability. The United States has tried to raise mechanisms with the
Chinese to discuss these issues but our efforts have so far been
rebuffed. China currently benefits from having the two largest nuclear
powers restrained while it can pursue competition on its own terms.
That status quo is unacceptable.
Central to the U.S. review is whether a New START extension is in
the U.S. national interest and how the Treaty's expiration would impact
U.S. national security in the deteriorating security environment, where
Russia is developing new strategic and nonstrategic offensive arms and
China is modernizing and building up its nuclear forces. We will
continue to consult with Congress as this administration determines its
next steps.
conclusion
There is much work ahead to ensure that our arms control agreements
deliver the best security to the United States and our allies and
partners. The value of any agreement is derived from our treaty
partners maintaining compliance with their obligations, and avoiding
actions that result in mistrust and miscalculation. Russia,
unfortunately, has created a trust deficit that leads the United States
to question Russia's commitment to arms control. Done correctly, arms
control will manage and stabilize our strategic relationship and
promote greater transparency and predictability in how our countries
address weapons of mass destruction issues and policies. The President
and the Secretary of State have been clear: we need a new era of arms
control to address new and emerging threats. In the current security
environment, we also must consider how we can bring other countries
into our agreements so that the United States is not limited while
others, such as China, are unconstrained.
Make no mistake, we are in an era of revived Great Power
competition. While we seek to bring Russia and China to the arms
control table to deliver meaningful results, we will be relentless in
our efforts to advance U.S. and allied interests, ensure our security,
and deny our adversaries advantages. Modern and effective U.S. nuclear
capabilities as called for in the NPR are critical. As the NPR's
preface stated: ensuring our nuclear deterrent remains strong will
provide the best opportunity for convincing other nuclear powers to
engage in meaningful arms control initiatives. I thank you for
convening this important hearing, and look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you, Ms. Thompson.
We will now turn to Mr. Trachtenberg. Mr. Trachtenberg is
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Having served in
various roles throughout the Department of Defense, Mr.
Trachtenberg has deep experience and expertise with NATO,
Europe, Russia, and Eurasia nuclear forces and arms control. He
is well suited to provide a comprehensive assessment of the
current dynamics surrounding arms control and to share with us
the actions that the Department of Defense is taking in this
area.
Mr. Trachtenberg, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID J. TRACHTENBERG, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY
FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Trachtenberg. Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Menendez,
and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify on the current state of arms control.
For decades, the United States has led the world in efforts
to reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons. Overall, the
U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile has drawn down by more than 85
percent from its Cold War high. In addition, the United States
is committed to its long-held arms control nonproliferation and
nuclear security objectives, particularly our commitment to the
goals of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons.
Unfortunately, Russia and China have chosen a different
path and have increased the role of nuclear weapons and their
strategies and actively increased the size and sophistication
of their nuclear forces.
For this reason, a robust and modern U.S. nuclear deterrent
helps ensure that the United States can deter a nuclear attack
and large-scale conventional warfare between nuclear-armed
states. It also allows us to negotiate from a position of
strength.
Arms control can contribute to U.S. security by helping to
manage strategic competition among states, and we are committed
to meaningful arms control that decreases the chances of
misperception and miscalculation that can lead to conflict.
The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review reflects the Department of
Defense's strategic priority to maintain a safe, secure,
survivable, and effective nuclear deterrent. The NPR also
declares the U.S. commitment to arms control efforts that
advance U.S., allied, and partner security, are verifiable and
enforceable, and include partners that comply responsibly with
their obligations.
The current security environment makes arms control
extremely challenging in the near term. Any future arms control
arrangement must be pursued in the context of the broader
security environment, which has changed significantly in the
past decade.
For example, Russia continues to prioritize modernizing its
nuclear forces, including every leg of its strategic triad.
Just this past Monday, President Vladimir Putin reportedly
announced that 82 percent of Russia's strategic nuclear forces
have now been upgraded. And according to the Russian defense
minister, this figure will reach 90 percent by 2020.
In March 2018, Putin announced that Russia is developing
even more new nuclear weapons capabilities. Moreover, Russia is
modernizing and expanding an active stockpile of approximately
2,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons that can be deployed on
ships, bombers, tactical aircraft, and with ground forces.
China continues its expansive military modernization,
including deploying advanced sea-based weapons, developing a
new generation of road-mobile missiles, improving its silo-
based weapons, testing hypersonic glide vehicles, and
developing a nuclear-capable next generation bomber.
These developments make arms control more complex and
challenging than nearly a decade ago when the New START treaty
was signed.
While we assess Russia to be in compliance with the central
limits of New START, the history of Russia's arms control
behavior is sobering. And I will not recount here Russia's many
violations of its treaty obligations and other political
commitments.
It is instructive, however, that only a month after the
United States and Russia reached the central limits on
strategic nuclear systems prescribed by the New START treaty,
President Putin with great fanfare announced Russia was
developing new long-range nuclear delivery systems. This is
troubling given that Russia is also modernizing its growing and
increasingly capable arsenal of shorter-range, non-strategic
nuclear weapons which are not covered by New START. Members of
this committee will remember that Russia's non-strategic
arsenal was of great concern when the New START treaty was
ratified and it remains a concern today.
With respect to the INF Treaty, as a consequence of
Russia's clear violation and consistent with the sense of
Congress expressed in the fiscal year 2019 National Defense
Authorization Act, the United States suspended its obligations
under the treaty. We also gave notice of our intent to withdraw
from it. Let me be clear. It is Russia that has abandoned the
treaty as a result of its violation, and our allies fully
support these U.S. actions in response.
Consequently, the United States is moving forward with
developing conventionally armed ground-launched intermediate-
range missile capabilities. What sort of system we ultimately
develop will be driven by our assessment of military
requirements and in consultation with Congress and with our
allies and partners.
Let me conclude by stating that our nuclear deterrent is
the bedrock of U.S. national security and underwrites all U.S.
military operations and diplomacy across the globe. It is the
backstop and foundation of our national defense enabling us to
negotiate arms control agreements from a position of strength.
The DOD supports pursuing a prudent arms control agenda, which
could include extending the New START treaty, provided the
outcome improves the security of the United States and our
allies and partners.
The President wants serious arms control that delivers real
security to the American people and our allies. To achieve
this, we are thinking more broadly both in terms of the
countries and weapons systems involved. This may include
addressing Russia's newer strategic systems not captured by New
START, seeking to address the significant imbalance in non-
strategic nuclear weapons currently in Russia's favor, and
encouraging China to join in efforts to increase transparency
and limit its nuclear weapons ambitions.
Above all, future arms control agreements must make the
world more secure and include the willing participation and
compliance of all parties.
I thank you for the opportunity to testify and look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Trachtenberg follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. David J. Trachtenberg
Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Menendez, and distinguished Members
of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the
current state of arms control with Russia.
Today, the United States faces an extraordinarily complex and
dangerous global security environment, in which the central challenge
to our prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term
strategic competition with China and Russia, which seek to overturn the
long-standing rules-based international order and change territorial
borders.
For decades, the United States led the world in efforts to reduce
the role and number of nuclear weapons. Successive treaties enabled
reductions in accountable strategic U.S. nuclear warheads, first to
6,000, and ultimately to 1,550. Thousands of short-range nuclear
weapons not covered by any treaty were almost entirely eliminated from
the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Overall, the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile
has drawn down by more than 85 percent from its Cold War high. The
United States is committed to its long-held arms control, non-
proliferation, and nuclear security objectives, particularly our
commitment to the goals of the Treaty on the NonProliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
Unfortunately, Russia and China have chosen a different path and
have increased the role of nuclear weapons in their strategies and
actively increased the size and sophistication of their nuclear forces.
For this reason, a robust and modern U.S. nuclear deterrent helps
ensure the United States competes from a position of strength and can
deter nuclear attack and large-scale conventional warfare between
nuclear-armed states.
the nuclear threat
The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) reflects DoD's strategic
priority to maintain a safe, secure, survivable and effective nuclear
deterrent. The NPR also declares the United States' commitment to arms
control efforts that advance U.S., allied, and partner security; are
verifiable and enforceable; and include partners that comply
responsibly with their obligations.
The current security environment makes arms control extremely
challenging in the near term. Any future arms control arrangement must
be pursued in the context of the broader security environment, which
has changed significantly in the past decade.
russia
For example, over the past decade, Russia has been upgrading the
capacity of its nuclear forces.
Russia continues to prioritize high levels of defense spending to
upgrade its nuclear forces and pursue advanced weapons specifically
designed to counter U.S. military capabilities. Russia's nuclear
modernization program covers every leg of its strategic triad and
includes advanced modern road-mobile and silo-based intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs), new submarine- launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs), and long-range strategic bombers. According to Russia's TASS
News Agency, Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu announced on
February 21, 2017, that 90 percent of the country's strategic nuclear
forces will be armed with modern weaponry by 2020.
In March 2018, only a month after the United States and Russia
reached the limits on strategic systems established under the New START
Treaty, President Vladimir Putin announced--with great fanfare--that
Russia is developing even more new nuclear weapons capabilities, which
include: 1) an intercontinental-range, nuclear armed hypersonic glide
vehicle; 2) a maneuverable, nuclear-armed air-launched ballistic
missile; 3) a long-range, nuclear-powered cruise missile; 4) a nuclear-
powered, nuclear-armed underwater unmanned vehicle; and 5) a new heavy
intercontinental range ballistic missile, called the SARMAT. President
Putin, during this same speech, also announced that Russia developed
new laser weapons systems ``that have been supplied to the troops since
last year.''
This past February (2019), President Putin declared that Russia had
successfully tested nuclearpropulsion engines that would allow the
nuclear-tipped cruise missiles and underwater drones to travel for
unlimited distances and evade traditional defenses.
On top of all of this, Russia is modernizing and expanding an
active stockpile of approximately 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear weapons--
often referred to as tactical nuclear weapons--that can be deployed on
ships, bombers, tactical aircraft, and with ground forces. None of
these are limited by any arms control treaty. In contrast, the United
States forward deploys to Europe a small number of just one type of
nonstrategic nuclear weapon--the B61 nuclear gravity bomb--which is
delivered by dual-capable tactical aircraft. Both the B61 and its
delivery aircraft are being modernized, but not increased in number.
Russia's military doctrine emphasizes the coercive nature and
military value of nuclear weapons. During its military operation
against Crimea, President Putin was getting ready to raise the alert
level of Russian nuclear forces, effectively issuing veiled nuclear
threats to ensure the West did not intervene. Russia has repeatedly
brandished its nuclear sword towards our NATO Allies in recent years.
In July 2017, Russian President Putin signed a new naval doctrine that
stated, ``under conditions of escalation of a military conflict,
demonstration of readiness and determination to use force, including
the use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, is an effective deterrent
factor.'' And, more recently, in his annual state-of-the-nation address
on February 20, 2019, Putin said that if Washington deployed
intermediate-range missiles in Europe, Moscow would target the
countries hosting the U.S. weapons.
china
Russia is not the United States' only strategic competitor pursuing
nuclear increases. China continues its expansive military modernization
and is focused on establishing regional dominance and expanding its
ability to coerce U.S. allies and partners.
China is developing a new generation of mobile missiles, with
warheads consisting of multiple independently targetable reentry
vehicles (MIRVs) and penetration aids. In particular, China has
developed a new road-mobile strategic ICBM and its most advanced
ballistic missile submarine armed with new submarine-launched ballistic
missiles (SLBM).
China has also announced development of a new nuclear-capable
strategic bomber, indicating China's intent to develop a nuclear triad,
and has deployed a nuclear-capable precision guided DF-26 intermediate-
range ballistic missile capable of attacking land and naval targets.
China also tested a hypersonic glide vehicle in 2014.
China's nuclear forces include a mix of strategic-range systems
capable of striking the U.S. homeland as well as theater-range forces
capable of threatening allies, U.S. bases, and forces in the region. As
China's capabilities both diversify and improve, there is risk China
may perceive that these weapons provide it with coercive options in a
crisis or conflict. China's modernization is troubling, and the lack of
transparency combined with growing Chinese assertiveness in the region
is one of the most serious risks to regional stability in the Indo-
Pacific.
China is modernizing and rapidly expanding its already considerable
nuclear forces, with little to no transparency regarding the scope and
scale of its nuclear modernization program, and has rebuffed multiple
U.S. attempts to engage in a meaningful bilateral dialogue on nuclear
posture and risk reduction issues.
intermediate-range nuclear forces (inf) treaty developments
The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was once a
cornerstone of security in Europe. By removing an entire class of
weapons from the arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union,
and subsequently Russia and other Soviet successor states, Europe and
much of the world enjoyed increased security. But the INF Treaty no
longer provided that security when Russia intentionally and blatantly
produced, flight-tested, and fielded a missile system subject to the
Treaty in direct violation of its legal obligation not to do so. When
Russia produced the SSC-8 cruise missile and, after getting caught,
fielded it and refused to destroy it, Russia removed a pillar of
security for the United States and for our allies. At that point, as a
practical matter, the INF Treaty bound our hands while Russia decided
it could freely develop what the treaty prohibited.
On February 2, 2019, as a consequence of Russia's material breach
of the INF Treaty, after exhausting every reasonable diplomatic,
economic, and military effort to persuade Russia to comply with its
treaty obligations, and consistent with the Sense of Congress expressed
in the Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, the United
States suspended its obligations under the Treaty. We also gave notice
of our withdrawal from it. As NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
asserted, ``Russia is in material breach of the INF Treaty and must use
the next 6 months to return to full and verifiable compliance or bear
sole responsibility for its demise.'' Allies fully support the U.S.
decision to suspend its obligations under INF and withdraw from the
Treaty.
To be clear, what prompted the U.S. suspension was not a minor
violation or an interpretive difference, but Russia's production,
flight-testing, and fielding of multiple battalions of a ground-
launched cruise missile system specifically banned by the INF Treaty.
For those concerned that our suspension will cause Russia to develop
these systems further, I can only say Russia's legal obligations under
the INF Treaty proved no practical barrier to its pursuit and fielding
of a banned system in the first place. To assert that Russia is
reacting to our suspension is to ignore the reality of Russia's conduct
under the INF Treaty.
As the President stated in February 2019, the United States is
moving forward with developing ground-launched, INF-range missile
capabilities. This is a direct consequence of Russia's violation of the
INF Treaty. Now that our Treaty obligations are suspended, the United
States is developing systems that are conventional in nature, and this
work is designed to be reversible should Russia return to compliance by
verifiably destroying its INF Treaty-violating missiles, launchers, and
associated support equipment. What sort of system we ultimately develop
will be driven by our assessment of military requirements and in
consultation with Congress and with our allies and partners.
the new start treaty
As stated in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the United States is
committed to arms control efforts that advance U.S., allied, and
partner security; are verifiable and enforceable; and include partners
that comply responsibly with their obligations. As both the 2018 NPR
and the 2018 NATO Brussels Summit Communique noted, we must take
account of the prevailing international security environment. In the
arms control context, this means Russia and, increasingly, China.
While we assess Russia to be in compliance with the central limits
of New START, the history of Russia's arms control behavior is
sobering. In addition to its violation of the INF Treaty, Russia has
violated the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, the Chemical
Weapons Convention, and the Open Skies Treaty, the Budapest Memorandum,
and the Helsinki Accords. In addition, Russia is selectively
implementing the Vienna Document and acted inconsistently with the
Presidential Nuclear Initiatives.
Moreover, Russia is modernizing its growing and increasingly
capable arsenal of shorter-range, nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which
are also not covered by New START. Members of this Committee will
remember that Russia's nonstrategic arsenal was of great concern when
the New START Treaty was ratified, and it remains a concern today.
That said, the Department supports pursuing a prudent arms control
agenda, which could include extending the New START Treaty, provided
the outcomes improve the security of the United States and our allies
and partners, and effectively help manage strategic competition among
states.
future arms control efforts
Arms control can contribute to U.S. security by helping to manage
strategic competition among states, and we are committed to meaningful
arms control that decreases the chances of misperception and
miscalculation that can lead to conflict. Arms control agreements are
not something we sign onto for the sake of arms control. We do so to
increase our national security.
The President wants serious arms control that delivers real
security to the American people and our allies. So the President has
charged his national security team to think more broadly about arms
control, both in terms of the countries and the weapons systems
involved. This may include addressing Russia's newer strategic systems
that are not captured by New START; seeking to redress the significant
imbalance in non-strategic nuclear weapons currently in Russia's favor;
and encouraging China to join in efforts to increase transparency and
limit its nuclear weapons ambitions. The Department of Defense is
supporting the National Security Council's efforts to provide the
President with the best options.
conclusion
As a reliable ally and partner, the United States must advocate for
effective arms control agreements that make the world more secure and
include the willing participation and compliance of all parties.
We appreciate the attention of this Committee and the rest of the
Congress to these issues, and we will keep you informed of
developments. Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward
to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Trachtenberg.
We are now going to do a round of questions, and we will
start with Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Thompson, if Russia is in compliance, do you
believe it is in the best of the U.S. to extend New START?
Ms. Thompson. Senator, thanks for that question.
I can tell you that under New START at present, both
countries are in compliance. We continue to have success with
the treaty. I will also tell you that we are undergoing the
interagency process on next steps with New START, and we are
also engaged with our partners and allies. I just got back----
Senator Menendez. I am sorry. I did not ask you that. I
asked you a simple question.
If Russia is in compliance, is it in the best interest of
the United States to extend New START? Yes or no.
Ms. Thompson. Too soon to tell, Senator. We are in an
interagency process. I would tell you that the treaty, as it
stands, is postured for today. Is the treaty, as it stands,
postured for the safety and security of the American people for
the next 5 to 10 years? That I cannot answer today.
Senator Menendez. Well, what would it need?
Ms. Thompson. Pardon, Senator?
Senator Menendez. What would it need to be postured for the
next 5 or 10 years?
Ms. Thompson. That is the discussions that we are having
right now, Senator.
Senator Menendez. Well, can you give me an insight as to
what it is?
Ms. Thompson. I am not going to go through our interagency
process in public, Senator, but I can tell you that it is a
rigorous process. We are working with the intelligence
agencies.
Senator Menendez. I do not know about an interagency
process. I mean, you could give insights as to the benchmarks
that would be needed, and that is not an interagency process. I
am asking you as a representative of the Department of State
here, what are the elements of that. And you cannot give it to
me.
Have you had a conversation with Russian officials about
extending the treaty?
Ms. Thompson. We have had discussions with our Russian
counterparts on the treaty.
Senator Menendez. Let me ask you, if New START expires,
could Russia target the United States with hundreds or perhaps
even thousands of additional nuclear warheads?
Ms. Thompson. That is a good question for Russia, Senator.
Senator Menendez. No. It is a good question for you.
You know, the disdain that the State Department has when
they come here--I do not appreciate it. I am asking legitimate
questions with answers so that I can make policy decisions. I
am not asking Russia about our national defense. I am asking
you.
Ms. Thompson. Yes, Senator. As our staff----
Senator Menendez. Is it possible that, in fact, if there
was no New START, that in fact Russia could aim hundreds or
thousands of new weapons? Is that possible?
Ms. Thompson. That is a hypothetical, Senator, and I am not
going to answer that.
Senator Menendez. Oh, my God.
Ms. Thompson. That is a hypothetical. That is not a fair
question.
Senator Menendez. It is not a hypothetical. It is what
would happen if we cannot verify what they are doing.
If Russia expanded its strategic nuclear forces in a post
New START environment, what would be the implications for U.S.
nuclear strategy and force posture?
Ms. Thompson. Again, Senator, if we are looking to the
future here, it depends where the security situation is in the
world, what our partners and allies are doing, what our R&D
efforts through the Department of Defense are doing. That is
all being taken into consideration now as we look through next
steps. It is always the safety and security of the American
people. It is always about the readiness of our military
forces. It is always the security of our partners and allies in
those discussions.
Senator Menendez. I am asking you to help me understand--of
course, it is the safety and security of the American people.
We are on common ground on all of that. That goes without
saying. The question is how does one achieve that at the end of
the day.
Let me ask you, Deputy Secretary Trachtenberg. My
understanding is that China has a total nuclear arsenal of
approximately 300 weapons. And the United States and Russia
retain at least 6,000 nuclear weapons in their arsenal, 20
times the size of China's arsenal. Is that about right?
Mr. Trachtenberg. Well, there have been a number of
unclassified estimates, Senator, which clearly show that the
Chinese nuclear arsenal is significantly less than those of
either the United States or Russia.
Senator Menendez. And my understanding is the Department of
Defense in a recent report stated that China has between 50 to
75 strategic delivery systems capable of targeting the United
States. Under the New START treaty, the U.S. and Russia are
limited to 700 deployed and a total of 800 deployed and non-
deployed strategic nuclear systems. Is that about right?
Mr. Trachtenberg. That sounds about right, Senator. The
difficulty we have with respect to China's arsenal is that
China, among the major nuclear powers, is, I would say, the
least transparent in terms of the size of its nuclear arsenal.
Senator Menendez. Well, let me ask you then, if those are
about right, given this current imbalance, can you explain to
me under what circumstances China would be willing to sign up
to a multilateral arms control regime?
Mr. Trachtenberg. Oh, I think it is very much in our
national security interests to engage with China on----
Senator Menendez. I did not ask you that. I am asking you
what would compel China, who is so disproportionately under-
represented in terms of its nuclear arsenal, to agree to
something in which we are 20 times larger than them.
Mr. Trachtenberg. Senator, I cannot speak to what would
compel China because I cannot get into the mind of the Chinese
leadership.
Senator Menendez. We have to be thinking, if we are going
to negotiate with them, what would induce them. Right?
Mr. Trachtenberg. Well, I can tell you I do believe that
China is, of course, modernizing and expanding its nuclear
arsenal and its nuclear capabilities and does pose a threat to
the United States. And therefore, under those conditions, it
seems to me entirely legitimate and proper for us to seek to
engage China in this endeavor.
The Chairman. Ms. Thompson, would you agree with me that in
order for New START to give us the protections that we want and
expect from it that Russia would have to allow the kind of
surveillance and the kind of verifications that are given to us
under the Open Skies Treaty? Would you agree with that?
Ms. Thompson. Senator, I would agree that the verification
underscores every treaty we have, and if we have those
discussions to extend New START or have a different type of New
START, the verification is the foundation of it. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. I assume you are familiar with the
limitations Russia has put on our use of the Open Skies Treaty
to verify.
Ms. Thompson. Yes, sir, very familiar with that.
The Chairman. Would you in your position recommend that we
have an extension while they continue to limit our ability to
verify under Open Skies?
Ms. Thompson. That has been one of the points we have
raised within our process, Senator. When you look at all the
other treaties, whether it is CFE, INF, the list that you
reviewed in the opening remarks, that Russia is in violation of
those treaties, that is always at the table when we have those
discussions with our Russian counterparts.
The Chairman. Big problem.
Ms. Thompson. It is, sir.
The Chairman. And especially if you are talking about
giving them a gratuitous 5-year extension when they are not
allowing us to verify the things we need to verify under New
START. Fair statement?
Ms. Thompson. Fair statement, Senator.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Romney, you are up.
Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just note at the outset that I agree with the
ranking member about the need for a classified briefing on the
matters in Iraq and hope that either the entire committee or
perhaps just the chair and the ranking member would be able to
have that kind of briefing.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Romney. The chair has had
that kind of briefing. And in the works is a full briefing of
the entire United States Senate because this is a very critical
issue. There is no question about that.
Senator Romney. Thank you. That gives me a heartened
feeling. Thank you.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. I want you to be heartened.
Senator Romney. Yes. Thank you. Thank you.
Of course, our objective--and we speak about this
regularly--is to see a world without nukes. But unfortunately,
what seems to be occurring is a buildup of nuclear capacity, a
proliferation of nuclear weapons. China seeks, based on my
reading--I did not mean China. I meant Russia seeks not a
balanced nuclear capacity to deter action, but it has got
superiority. You indicated that as much as 90 percent of their
triad will be modernized by 2021.
Do you have any sense of what--or can you give us an
estimate of what percentage of our nuclear triad has been
modernized and is in a modern state at this stage?
Mr. Trachtenberg. Sure, Senator Romney. I would say very
little of our triad has currently been modernized. We have a
modernization program which, if funded, would allow us to
modernize all three of the legs, so-called legs, of our
something triad, the ICBMs, the sub-launched ballistic
missiles, as well as the bombers.
We have, in essence, skipped a generation when it comes to
modernization. The last two cycles of our strategic
modernization program took place in the 1980s and before that,
in the 1960s. And so we are well behind where I believe we
should be in terms of the modernization of our own strategic
systems which I would assert is essential to maintain our
nuclear deterrent.
Senator Romney. I am distressed to hear that and recall
that at a time when I was one of the vocal opponents of the New
START treaty, those that were in favor of it said you have to
understand that we are going to be modernizing our triad. This
deal we are doing on New START is associated with this
modernization effort, and we still have not funded that. And as
a result, we have a nuclear deterrent which is in inferior
capacity with regard to its modernization than that of a
potential foe.
Another area that concerned me during the time that New
START was being negotiated was the fact that Russia had a very
dramatic lead in terms of non-strategic nukes. And I made the
point that we had a lead on strategic. We had 2,500 strategic
nuclear weapons. They had 1,500. We agreed to make 1,500 the
new limit. So we cut out 1,000 of ours and they did not change
a thing. And the argument was made, well, we will move on to
the non-strategic next.
Have we moved on to the non-strategic weapons? Have we been
able to limit their stockpile of non-strategic nuclear weapons?
Mr. Trachtenberg. We have not, Senator. Despite our efforts
to engage the Russians in discussions with respect to their
non-strategic nuclear forces, they have been unwilling to
discuss that.
I would say, if I might, while we did reduce--you are
absolutely correct. We did reduce to meet the New START levels.
The Russians did take an action as well. The action they took
was they built up their levels of nuclear forces in order to
meet the limits of the New START treaty. When New START was
signed, they were below the limits, we were above the limits.
And therefore, this was a treaty that required us to reduce
while simultaneously it allowed the Russians to increase.
Senator Romney. Yes. One more reason that I was very, very
opposed to the agreement as it was negotiated.
One more matter in that regard. I just wanted to raise a
question, and that is the concern about bombers. And, as I
understand it, the classification of bombers was that if a
bomber had, let us say, 10 nuclear warheads on it, it still
only counted as one nuclear warhead, which was a strange
element at least in my view at that time.
Am I remembering that correctly? And has Russia taken
advantage of this loophole in the New START treaty to arm their
bombers with substantially more than one nuclear warhead?
Ms. Thompson. Senator, you are correct in the math. They
are in compliance with New START. But you raise a great point
not only with the count, but as the chairman raised in his
opening remarks, equipment has evolved and we have hypersonic
glide vehicles and a series of the five systems that Secretary
Trachtenberg raised that will not fall under the treaty at this
point. And that is why the President has been clear, as has the
Secretary, about the need to modernize our discussions and have
these discussions with our Russian counterparts to include the
systems that we have and, more importantly, the systems that
will be fielded shortly.
Senator Romney. Thank you.
It is my hope that as we negotiate towards a nuclear
agreement with Russia and potentially with China as well that
it is fully encompassing of new technologies, as well as
technologies that might be developed in the future, and that we
are not in a setting where once again we are agreeing to major
reductions in our capacity and allowing potential opponents to
have major increases in their capacity.
I would also note that I think it is a high priority for
this body to make the substantial investment that was promised
in our triad. Our ground-based nuclear deterrent is very, very
old. It is decades old and needs to be completely updated, and
I hope that we will get about that in very short order.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Romney.
Nine years ago at this table Senator Kerry was sitting in
this chair and Senator Lugar was sitting in this chair. I was
sitting down there somewhere. And we had these discussions
regarding the New START. And a number of us were adamantly
opposed to it for a lot of the reasons that you have suggested.
And one of them that was incredibly important to us was
modernization, and we were promised--they did not have enough
votes to get over the hump so they promised these modernization
efforts. And it has been a real disaster in that regard. We
just have not followed through on it, and it is very
unfortunate, one of the many reasons why I oppose a gratuitous
5-year extension given where we are.
So thank you for that.
Senator Murphy.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I share the ranking member's grave concern about the
announcement this morning regarding the withdrawal of non-
emergency personnel from Iraq. It is a vague announcement. This
could be consular services. It could be all non-military
personnel. We have no idea about the details.
Ms. Thompson, can you share any details with us this
morning about exactly what personnel are being withdrawn from
Baghdad and other parts of Iraq?
Ms. Thompson. Senator, I do not receive diplomatic
security, but I assure you the team will take the questions
back for our leadership.
Senator Murphy. Ms. Thompson, I want to talk to you about
Iran for a moment. I just want to confirm what the purpose of
our pressure campaign is. Many of us feel that it has been ham-
handed without a well-defined end game. But I assume that the
purpose of this maximum pressure campaign is, in the end, to
compel the Iranians back to the negotiating table, to enter
into a new negotiation over a set of U.S. objectives. Is that
the purpose of this campaign?
Ms. Thompson. That is an element of the campaign, yes,
Senator.
Senator Murphy. What do you mean that it is an element?
Ms. Thompson. The strategy has more details than that. I
mean, that is one portion of it. It is also to prevent the
continued expansion of their malign activity through the
region, and the list that the Secretary has been forthcoming
with with the 12 items. So that is certainly an element of it.
Senator Murphy. But we do not imagine that they are going
to fulfill those 12 objectives on their own. There will have to
be a negotiation with the Iranians over our desire to have them
fulfill those 12 U.S.-stated goals.
Ms. Thompson. That is correct. The Secretary has stated he
prefers a diplomatic solution on that.
Senator Murphy. And so this set of goals that the Secretary
has laid out, which calls on the Iranians to stop enrichment
and never pursue plutonium processing and their ballistic
missile program, release all prisoners, end support for
Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic jihad, end support for the
Houthis, withdraw forces from Syria, end support for the
Taliban, end the IRGC support for militant terrorist groups,
and stop threatening behavior--that list remains our bottom
line. That is what we expect the Iranians to produce either on
their own unilaterally or through a negotiated process.
Ms. Thompson. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Murphy. Let me ask another question of you, Mr.
Trachtenberg. Let me try to ask the same question that Senator
Menendez asked. A negotiation requires two willing parties.
Nobody enters into a negotiation if they are told at the outset
that they are going to get nothing from it. And so let me ask
the same question that he asked regarding why China would enter
into a negotiation with the United States and perhaps with
Russia when today reportedly China has 300 warheads and between
the United States and Russia, we have thousands.
I am not asking you to sort of lay out what our concessions
would be, but give us an idea that you have some plan to make
the case to China that there would be a benefit to them to
limit their nuclear capability. What general area of
concessions might we offer them?
Mr. Trachtenberg. Well, Senator, I appreciate your
question. We are at the beginning of a process right now. And I
would say China has envisioned itself as a major power on the
world stage. China has been flexing its military muscle. China
has been undertaking a number of actions in order to garner
respect and attention as a major player.
Now, if China wishes to be treated as a major player, then
China should accept the responsibilities of a major power in
the world today and that includes engaging with respect to its
nuclear arsenal and its nuclear capabilities.
So while we are at the start of this process, I believe
that it is entirely legitimate for us to seek ways to engage
the Chinese such that they understand if they are going to be a
responsible player on the world stage, that they should address
these issues in a responsible manner.
Senator Murphy. So I ask these questions because it appears
to me as if the preconditions for negotiations with Iran and
what seems to me a very ill-thought-out strategy for engaging
China is just an excuse to get no agreement. If you set up a
list of requirements for negotiations with Iran that are wholly
and completely unrealistic, if you believe that the Chinese
should negotiate with us just because they are a great power,
you are setting up the negotiations for failure. In fact, you
are setting up the inevitability that the negotiations will
never begin. And so that is what I think you hear as a worry
from many members of this committee, that while we would love
for Iran to give up their support for Hezbollah, Hamas, the
Houthis, we would love for them to abandon their ballistic
missile program, I would love for the Chinese just to decide
that because they are a great power, that they should start
negotiations with us, when it comes to arms control, hope is
not a strategy. And I worry in the end that these are just all
excuses for why we are never going to enter into a meaningful
dialogue with either. That is why to many of us this seems like
escalation with no end game. But I appreciate your candor
before the committee.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Murphy.
Senator Paul.
Senator Paul. I agree with Senator Murphy. I mean, you want
a ballistic missile deal with Iran. We got rid of the nuclear
deal, which took years and years of pressure with international
sanctions. We got a nuclear deal, and you say you want a
ballistic missile deal. Well, they are not going to do a
ballistic missile deal with you ever as long as Saudi Arabia is
spending like eight times as much as they do and the Gulf
sheikhdoms surrounding them. It is a complete non-starter. So
if that is our goal, it is sort of like saying we are no longer
going to have any kind of diplomatic solution with Iran.
With regard to Iran, Mr. Trachtenberg, do you believe the
President has the authority to wage war with Iran without
congressional authorization?
Mr. Trachtenberg. I believe that every nation has a right
to self-defense, and that if attacked, the United States has
the ability----
Senator Paul. That is not the question. The question is not
on defending against an attack of sailors on a boat or people
in an embassy. I think we all agree with that. We are talking
about war. Let us say they attack one of our boats and we
defend ourselves. We all agree we should defend ourselves.
Can the President continue to a full-scale war with 120,000
troops? Can we have a full-scale waging of war with Iran
without congressional authorization?
Mr. Trachtenberg. Only the Congress has the responsibility
to declare war--has the authority to declare war.
Senator Paul. Right. So the answer is the President cannot
do it, and that would be the explicit answer I would hope we
would get from the policy person at the State Department.
Ms. Thompson, the Aegis Ashore--is it essentially run by
the same system as the Aegis Afloat?
Ms. Thompson. Sir, I would actually defer the particulars
of the Aegis since it is a military piece of equipment to my
DOD counterpart. I can tell you that we have had discussions on
the Aegis system with my Russian counterparts, but the ins and
outs of the Aegis really is----
Senator Paul. Are they essentially run by the same system?
Mr. Trachtenberg. I believe the essential components are
similar.
Senator Paul. So this is also what Lockheed Martin says.
They make it and they say it is essentially the same system.
We also have folks at--I think it is--the U.S. Naval
Institute saying that basically Aegis Ashore could be easily
turned into an offensive cruise missile system.
And so I guess my problem is if you really are serious
about talking to Russia, it is not that we have to accept that
they are telling the truth or that we agree with their points.
But, Ms. Thompson, when you say that their response that we are
in violation is laughable and the world sees it as a fraud, it
sounds to me like you are not really interested in negotiating
with the Russians because I think it is a debatable point. It
is an arguable point. It has technical details. That is what
nuclear arms negotiators and real diplomats are supposed to be
discussing.
So if it is essentially the same system and it got
converted to a system of offense and we could launch cruise
missiles from it, it sounds like the Russians have a point. And
it sounds like it is at least a debatable point that we should
be discussing before we say, oh, well, it is all the Russian
side. That is not what diplomacy is about. Diplomacy is about
figuring out what the other side is saying and not just saying
they are a bunch of crazy, laughable people and we cannot talk
to them. That is a recipe for no diplomacy.
And I think that is what you have set up in Iran, but it is
also what you are setting up in Russia in that we are not even
willing to discuss whether Aegis Ashore is similar to Aegis
Afloat and whether they have an argument or not. I would think
that is where we would set down technical people at a table and
have a discussion.
Ms. Thompson. Is that a question? May I respond to that,
Senator?
Senator Paul. Well, I mean, the question--you say it is
laughable. Is that something a diplomat should be saying about
something that is the main point Russia is bringing up? I am
not saying we accept it. I am not saying it is true. But if
that is their main complaint about us and our main complaint is
the SSC-8, we would hear each other's complaints, but we would
not say to the other side, we would not say in public that
their argument is laughable if we wanted to come to an
agreement.
Ms. Thompson. I can tell, you, Senator, in my six
engagements with my Russian counterparts since September, I
have said that there is a professional discussion. I said that
about the Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, whom I have
met multiple times. We have met and had candid discussions. We
have had technical experts meet. We just had the BCC--and we
have given readouts on that about 2 and a half weeks ago up to
the Hill--where we have had the discussions, and they have
raised the intelligence and we have countered that intelligence
with our technical experts----
Senator Paul. My advice to you is I would not say in public
that your adversary's response is laughable. That really goes a
long way towards setting back any kind of possible diplomatic
solution. And this is important. We are talking about whether
or not the world could be destroyed by nuclear weapons, whether
we should limit the amount of nuclear weapons. When we say our
adversary is laughable, you do a great injustice to the idea of
diplomacy. So I hope you will reconsider things you say in
public.
The Chairman. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think it is fitting that this committee today is holding
a hearing on arms control when you are also celebrating our
friend and colleague, Senator Lugar, whose leadership was such
a critical step toward limiting nuclear arsenals.
One of the things that I think is important to remember is
that one of the benefits of the New START treaty is that it
provided a mechanism for us to continue to communicate with
Russia and to understand what their capabilities are and for
them to understand our capabilities and that that is important
as we think about the potential to misread or misunderstand the
messages that one nuclear power is sending to another.
But I want to begin actually by sharing the concerns that
have already been expressed about the failure to brief this
committee and Congress about what is happening with Iran and
the decision to withdraw all non-essential personnel from Iraq.
And while I appreciate the chair of this committee and probably
the chair of other committees have been briefed, I think it is
important and a critical enough issue, given the potential
threat of war, that everybody on this committee and everybody
in Congress should be briefed about that because I agree with
you, Mr. Trachtenberg. I think Congress does have the authority
to determine whether we go to war or not.
So let me ask you, Under Secretary Thompson, have you been
briefed by the State Department or the administration on the
decision to withdraw our personnel from Iraq? I am not asking
you what that briefing contained. I am asking you have you been
briefed?
Ms. Thompson. As it does not pertain to my portfolio at the
State Department, no, ma'am, I have not.
Senator Shaheen. Have you been briefed, Mr. Trachtenberg?
Mr. Trachtenberg. No, ma'am, I have not.
Senator Shaheen. Do you have any idea who has been briefed
on this decision, Under Secretary Thompson?
Ms. Thompson. It would be speculation. I know the process.
We have had it in other posts where our diplomatic security
professionals brief the Secretary, provide them with the
intelligence, and they make the call.
Again, with overseeing arms control, foreign military
sales, and nonproliferation, my portfolio does not include the
diplomatic security. But I know that the process involves
intelligence information presented to the Secretary, ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
So can you tell me, Under Secretary Thompson, under this
administration, is it still part of U.S. strategy not only to
limit nuclear arsenals in the world but also to ensure that
there is never a mistake that results in a catastrophic
response in error?
Ms. Thompson. Yes, ma'am. This is a zero defects part of my
portfolio, and engaging with partners and allies, sharing best
practices on lessons learned so we ensure every nuclear power
has that same safety and security and where others do not, to
encourage them to do so. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. So I understood in your testimony that,
first, you acknowledged that Russia is complying with the New
START treaty, but then you raise some concerns about other
nuclear arms systems that they are developing. Did I understand
that accurately?
Ms. Thompson. Yes, ma'am. The five systems that President
Putin alluded to in his 2018 statement.
Senator Shaheen. So under the New START treaty, if the
United States wanted to, we could also develop those systems--
could we not--and still be in compliance?
Ms. Thompson. I defer to DOD, but we have not done the R&D
efforts because we have remained in compliance with all of our
treaties, ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. Well, I am still trying to figure out--you
are saying that Russia is in compliance and we are in
compliance. So if Russia is doing this development and they are
in compliance, then we could do the same development and still
be in compliance. Is that not true, Mr. Trachtenberg?
Mr. Trachtenberg. Theoretically, we could do any number of
things, Senator. But we certainly have no intention of doing
the kinds of things that President Putin has announced that the
Russians are going forward with.
And in terms of compliance, we have assessed that some of
those new systems would fall under the category of
accountability.
Senator Shaheen. Right, but we are not at the point at
which those systems have been developed in a way that would
require they fall under that.
Mr. Trachtenberg. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Shaheen. So I am just pointing out that for those
people who say that New START prohibits us from doing the kind
of R&D that we think we need to do to defend this country, that
in fact, it does not. That is a statement. That is not a
question.
But I do have a question about how much information the
United States receives from Russia through data exchanges,
through on-site inspections, and what that benefit is to our
understanding of what Russia is doing. Mr. Trachtenberg, can
you speak to that?
Mr. Trachtenberg. I can tell you that the verification
procedures have been useful, but I would defer to Under
Secretary Thompson for specific details on that.
Senator Shaheen. Good. Would you like to respond?
Ms. Thompson. Yes, ma'am. They are in compliance. We do get
access. Because of the nature of the access, we do get insight
into their systems, and they, in turn, get access into ours.
Yes, ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. So if New START were to lapse, how would
the Pentagon and the intelligence community replace the
information that we are getting from the New START verification
agreement?
Mr. Trachtenberg. I think that would be subject to
negotiation, Senator. In terms of our approach to future
negotiations with Russia and potentially China as well, we
would obviously look for any agreement to contain verification
and compliance measures in there or measures where we could be
reasonably certain the parties would be willing to comply and
would, in fact, comply. So that would be part and parcel I
believe of any future negotiation.
Senator Shaheen. Well, that makes sense to me. That is if
we decide we are going to renegotiate the New START treaty. But
based on the testimony and the questioning, it sounds like
there are real questions about whether the administration has
made that decision. And given the fact that if that happens,
the treaty lapses, we no longer have that verification program,
how do we then replace the information that we are getting
under that verification program?
Mr. Trachtenberg. Well, Senator, I would say again that the
decision has not been made in terms of the approach to New
START, whether it should be extended or should not be extended,
if extended, for how long it should be extended, or what to do
if it is not extended. This is part of an ongoing interagency
discussion that we are having with our State Department
colleagues and others in terms of trying to figure out, as I
said in my opening statement, sort of the broader strategic
context in which we need to look at arms control going forward
to incorporate concerns over a number of factors, not just
strategic weapons but non-strategic weapons as well.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate your letting me go over my time.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Those are really
important points that you are making. As with all these
treaties, like I said at the outset, good faith is absolutely
critical. And one of the things also that we all know is
verification is essential. Without verification, you do not
have anything. And with their violation of the Open Skies
Treaty, it causes real problems as far as our ability to
verify. Those two are interrelated. The New START just does not
stand by itself. You got to have the good faith. But those are
good points that you raised regarding verification. Absolutely
critical.
Senator Johnson.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Trachtenberg, I want to drill down. I really want to
get specific about what we mean by modernization and where we
are at a disadvantage to Russia currently in their
modernization. So specifically, what do we mean by
modernization? What have we not modernized? What have they?
Mr. Trachtenberg. Senator, what we are talking about is
essentially upgrading and replacing the existing generation of
land-based missiles with a ground-based strategic deterrent it
is called and developing a new strategic bomber, as well as the
Columbia class strategic submarine, ballistic missile firing
submarine. So it would be taking those existing systems which
have been actually in place literally for decades and that have
had their life extended already, in some cases several times,
well beyond their original life expectancy, and moving forward
and replacing them with more modern systems.
Senator Johnson. So it is really the delivery system that
is primarily what is in need of upgrade.
Mr. Trachtenberg. Absolutely, Senator. Our nuclear
capabilities are based on several things. It is not just the
nuclear weapons themselves, but it is the delivery systems that
carry those weapons.
Senator Johnson. So is Russia more advanced in terms of
their missile technology? Are they more advanced in their
submarine technology? Are they more advanced in their bomber
technology?
Mr. Trachtenberg. Well, I think it is clear that Russia has
invested in developing more systems and more types of systems,
ICBMs, stationary silo-based, mobile, SSBNs, new strategic
ballistic missile submarines, and basically all of the three
legs of its strategic triad. They have gone forward with a
rather aggressive modernization program to date.
Senator Johnson. What about the nuclear warhead itself?
When Senator Kyl was here--I am not on Armed Services, so I
would attend regularly his meetings on modernization. What
about the warhead itself and our ability to make sure that that
is modern and will be capable?
Mr. Trachtenberg. Well, Russia continues to develop and
produce new nuclear weapons. I believe the United States is the
only country of the five major nuclear powers that has not
produced a new nuclear weapon in quite some time. So we rely on
our existing stockpile of weapons, which need to be certified
as reliable and safe on an annual basis.
Senator Johnson. And how well are we keeping up with that?
One of the things I learned with Senator Kyl's meetings is when
you are not building new weapons, you are kind of losing the
ability to even theoretically determine how good your current
weapons are.
Mr. Trachtenberg. Well, it is true, Senator, that our
weapons are aging as much as the delivery platforms have been
aging. But I would respectfully defer to the Department of
Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration, the NNSA,
that is responsible for our stockpile program and for
assessments as to the continued reliability and safety and
efficacy of the existing stockpile.
Senator Johnson. So it has been my understanding in
Congress certainly even under the Obama administration, they
were appropriating funds for modernization. Is that simply not
the case? I mean, why were those funds not used to modernize?
Mr. Trachtenberg. No. Those funds were appropriated. The
Obama administration did support the nuclear modernization
program. The difficulty is that the modernization process
itself takes a significant amount of time. We are talking about
many years, perhaps in some cases decades, to actually fulfill
and complete the current modernization program of record. So
there is a long tail to that funding, which is why we very
strongly believe and hope that the Congress will continue to
provide the resources necessary in order for us to take the
actions we need to take to see the modernization program
continue.
Senator Johnson. So what do we spend the money on? What did
we modernize? What did we get out of the money we spent?
Mr. Trachtenberg. My understanding is we have upgraded some
of the guidance control systems in some of the systems that we
currently have. But again, the delivery platforms themselves--
there is only so much life extension that you can invest in to
keep them reliably operational. And that is the difficulty that
we are currently facing.
Senator Johnson. Do we still have vacuum tubes in some of
these control systems?
Mr. Trachtenberg. That I do not know, Senator. I would have
to take that one for the record. But it is clear that because
of the age of these systems, I would reiterate that we are in,
I think, critical need of moving forward and moving forward
deliberately and robustly with the full scope of the
modernization effort.
Senator Johnson. Well, consider that a question for the
record. I do want some details in terms of where we are, what
we are lacking in terms of our modernization program.
Mr. Trachtenberg. Absolutely.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Johnson. Those are all
good points that you have made.
So to the American people that are watching, let there be
no mistake. The United States of America is in a position to be
able to defend itself. We do have aging infrastructure in our
nuclear arsenal, but having said that, a trip through the labs
in New Mexico would be very enlightening for you, and it would
leave you with no question that anyone who is thinking that we
cannot take appropriate actions to defend ourselves is making a
really, really bad mistake.
So with that, Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And thanks to the witnesses.
I want to ask about an important issue in the future of
arms control and that is part 810 authorizations. My staff
reached out to each of your staffs 2 days ago to tell you I was
going to ask about this, so hopefully you will be prepared to
answer my questions.
I am a member of the Armed Services and Foreign Relations
Committees.
A part 810 authorization, as you know, is a legally
mandated approval that the Department of Energy must give to an
American company that wants to transfer nuclear know-how to a
foreign country. The DOE is required to get the concurrence of
the Department of State prior to such transfers, and they are
also required to consult with the Department of Defense before
such transfers.
On March 28th, we had a hearing in the Armed Services
Committee where I asked Secretary of Energy Perry to provide me
information about part 810 transfers that the United States has
done during the Trump administration, not proprietary
information, but the dates of transfers, the companies who were
given permission to transfer, and the countries to whom they
were transferring. In the hearing, he committed to do that.
That was 48 days ago.
I submitted a question for the record on April 2nd, 43 days
ago. Thus far, the Department of Energy has refused to provide
any information in response.
On April 10, Mr. Chair, we had a hearing with Secretary
Pompeo. He and I talked about it at the hearing. I pointed out
that the State Department is required to concur in such
transfers, and I asked Secretary Pompeo the same question about
when did the State Department concur in the transfers, did the
State Department agree that the transfers should be held secret
and private contrary to early practice. He committed in the
hearing to get me an answer on the Saudi Arabian transfers.
At the close of the hearing, Mr. Chair, you directed the
witnesses to answers questions submitted for the record. So the
following day, April 11, 34 days ago, I submitted questions for
the record to the Department of State asking them to answer the
questions that I had directed to Secretary Pompeo during the
hearing in this committee. And thus far, I have received no
answer from the Department of State either to my oral questions
to Secretary Pompeo or in response to my questions for the
record.
So I want to start with Secretary Thompson. This is very
important for arms control. The reason there is a part 810
process is you would not want to allow unlimited transfers of
nuclear know-how to other nations that might be used to
proliferate nuclear arms. And that is why the legal requirement
is the Department of State has to concur and there has to be
consultation with the Department of Defense and other
stakeholders.
Can you give me the dates that the Department of State
concurred in transfers of nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia
pursuant to the part 810 requirement?
Ms. Thompson. I do not have those dates available, but I
will take that back to get the answer for you, Senator.
Senator Kaine. Well, we reached out 2 days ago to say I was
going to ask exactly this question, which I asked of the
Department of State on April 10th in a hearing and on April
11th in a letter. And the chair of the committee directed the
Secretary to answer my question.
So when we reached out 2 days ago and asked you to prepare,
did you not do anything? Did you ask whether you were allowed
to share that information to me? Or are you now just telling me
what everybody is telling me that they will get back to me in
the infinite future?
Ms. Thompson. No, sir. I am well aware of what the 810
process with our Department of Energy counterparts. I know that
we concurred. I did not receive the information that you were
going to ask which dates we concurred. So I owe you that
answer.
Senator Kaine. Is your office involved in the part 810
process?
Ms. Thompson. It is, Senator. I send my Assistant Secretary
as part of that concurrence process.
Senator Kaine. So your office would have been involved in
the concurrences that I am asking about.
Ms. Thompson. Yes, sir.
Senator Kaine. The Department of Energy has testified on
the record that there have been seven concurrences of transfers
to Saudi Arabia. Were you not aware that I had posed this
question to the Department of State in writing 35 days ago?
Ms. Thompson. I did, Senator. I did not get the feedback
that you needed, the dates, but I will get you the dates. I
will confirm those dates with you.
It is important also, as you know--and I do not want to use
up your time--that it is important to get U.S. companies in the
door. And that is a process, the first step in that data
exchange, and if we are not there, the Chinese are.
But I will get you that answer.
Senator Kaine. You are making a good editorial argument. I
am not arguing with the program. I am just arguing--why would
you keep it secret?
Ms. Thompson. It is not.
Senator Kaine. Earlier administrations have made this
information public, to the press, to Congress, to reporters.
Reuters had to break the story that you had done these secretly
and refused to give information to the press.
Mr. Chair, could I ask you--sometimes we are hearing from
agencies that they need not respond unless the request is from
the chairman. Could you ask them to answer my question and give
me the dates on which the State Department concurred in the
seven part 810 authorizations to Saudi Arabia?
The Chairman. I will, Senator.
Ms. Thompson. I will get you the dates, Senator. And if I
may, to my knowledge it is not secret. There is a process to
request that information through DOE. But I will get you the
dates, Senator.
Senator Kaine. Well, does the process include a Member of
the Senate asking the Secretary of Energy 48 days ago, please
give me this information? I mean, would you consider that a
fair process?
Ms. Thompson. I would assess it that I will get you the
answer, Senator.
Senator Kaine. Do you have any knowledge as to why the
State Department has not yet responded to my request, which is
now 35 days old? It is seven transfers, seven dates, lists of
companies, and they are all about Saudi Arabia. I am not asking
for any proprietary information. Do you know why I have not
received a response to this date?
Ms. Thompson. Sir, I will get you the answer. I can assure
you it is somewhere in a stack. It is one of many.
Senator Kaine. When will you get me the answer?
Ms. Thompson. It is not my answer to get, for me to
coordinate. As soon as I get back we will find out where it is
in the process through our Leg Affairs. I will get you the
answer.
The Chairman. Senator Kaine, let me help you out. I talk
regularly with Secretary Pompeo and have over these 48 days on
numerous occasions. I have not talked to him about your
question on the 810 process. I commit to you in my next
conversation with him that that will be on the list.
Senator Kaine. Thank you so much, Mr. Chair.
Thanks to the witnesses.
The Chairman. You are entitled to that information.
Senator Barrasso.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome back to the committee.
It was 8 months ago when we were here talking, and the
questions I had to you specifically had to do with Russia,
weaponry. So my concern is not will they or will they not, but
can they or can they not in terms of capacity and capability.
So kind of following up, the question I started then I am going
to start with again today.
In March of 2018, President Putin announced Russia was
developing several new nuclear delivery vehicles that could
evade or penetrate U.S. ballistic missile defenses. One of the
new weapons mentioned by President Putin at the time was a
large multiple warhead intercontinental ballistic missile
called the Sarmat. The others include a long-range nuclear-
powered cruise missile, a long-range nuclear-armed underwater
drone, and an air delivery hypersonic cruise missile.
Under article 5 of the New START, parties can raise their
concerns about new types of strategic offensive weapons under
the bilateral consultative commission.
So would these weapons be covered under the New START?
Ms. Thompson. Thanks, Senator. Good to see you again.
So two of the systems will. The Avant Garde and Sarmat
would be considered as existing types. We have raised that with
our Russian counterparts in discussions and the technical
experts. And the other three systems would be considered
basically new kinds, and we will have that discussion. We have
raised that as well and we will continue to raise it in our
engagement with the Russians, Senator.
Senator Barrasso. So along those lines, how would these new
weapons be counted under New START in terms of multiple
warheads, all the different components of that?
Ms. Thompson. It is early in the process with the two
systems if they continue on the glide path of their
development. But the technical experts are sitting down and
laying that out. The other three will be part of the
discussions.
The other takeaway I take, as the Under Secretary
overseeing this, is New START, as it stands, again was relevant
for its time and the systems that we have. Technology has
evolved at such an incredible rate that many of our arms
control treaties are no longer relevant. So it is incumbent
upon us--you heard it from the President. You heard it
yesterday with President Putin and Secretary Pompeo. We are
going to have these discussions. We must have these discussions
to ensure that we uphold our arms control responsibilities and
adapt to make sure we have the safety and security for the
American people. And it is a challenge I am up to. Thanks,
Senator.
Senator Barrasso. Because the question is how the inclusion
of these weapons--how critical that would be in our decision on
whether to extend New START.
Ms. Thompson. Absolutely. The systems that they have now
and the systems that they think they will have is being
integrated with those interagency discussions. We rely on our
DOD counterparts, on our DOE counterparts, the NSC, and the
intelligence agencies. And I can assure you that schedule is
rigorous and robust.
Senator Barrasso. So maybe turning over to Deputy Under
Secretary Trachtenberg, in terms of President Putin declaring
that these new additions to the Russian strategic nuclear
arsenal would render, I think he said, U.S. missile defense, in
his words, useless, what is our government's assessment of the
level of the maturity and accuracy of these weapons, if you can
give this under these settings? And if we have to go to a
secure setting, we can have that discussion.
Mr. Trachtenberg. I would prefer to address that in a
closed session, Senator Barrasso.
You do raise a very substantial and important point here in
terms of the capabilities that the Russians say they are
developing and the capabilities that they can develop and
whether, if, and how they would be accounted for under existing
arms control agreements. So you are absolutely right, which is
why I noted earlier that we believe it is important in looking
at how we approach arms control going forward, that we look at
the totality of national security concerns and issues that are
being raised in particular by what Russia is doing and factor
that into our interagency discussions on what is the best
course of action for the United States.
Senator Barrasso. In a follow-up to this--and I do not
know. Mr. Chairman, you may want to think about a closed
session so we can get to these specific answers because I want
to know what the United States has in terms of a current or
prospective missile defense system that could intercept these
weapons. And you may be in the same situation of not wanting to
discuss it in an open setting.
Mr. Trachtenberg. Yes, sir.
Senator Barrasso. In terms of what specific actions we as a
government can take or are taking to respond to and to counter
these new strategic nuclear weapons that Vladimir Putin
continues to brag about.
Mr. Trachtenberg. I agree with you, Senator. And that is
why I think it is critically important that we roll those into
the discussions that we are having within the interagency to
figure out what is the best approach to guarantee our security
and the security of our allies going forward in an arms control
context.
Senator Barrasso. Secretary Thompson, anything you would
like to add to that?
Ms. Thompson. I fully support the efforts of what we are
going through in the interagency, and I agree it should be in a
classified setting. I would not want our adversaries to know
what we have and what we do not have, Senator.
Senator Barrasso. Great. Thank you so much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator. You raise some good
points. For your information, the Senate National Security
Working Group explored that exact area at some time in the not
too distant past, and it is important that people have this
information. It is there but it has to be in a classified
setting.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Markey.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
Ms. Thompson, the Trump administration recently expressed
interest in engaging China on nuclear arms control. But I am
concerned about the Trump administration's approach in that
particular case. The administration seems to believe the best
way to engage China on nuclear arms control is to push it to
join a multilateral agreement with two countries whose nuclear
arsenals are of an order of magnitude larger than its own,
meaning the United States and Russia, just 10 times larger, 20
times larger than anything that China has right now. So I want
to talk about that further.
The Chinese foreign minister stated that Beijing will not
participate in three-way nuclear talks with the U.S. and
Russia. So why does the Trump administration think that it is a
viable path forward?
Ms. Thompson. Thank you, Senator. And if I could just build
upon the points that Secretary Trachtenberg raised earlier with
the importance of having that dialogue with China.
I have had dialogues with my Chinese counterparts. I was in
Beijing at the end of January, the beginning of February. I
just met a couple weeks ago--I do not remember the date; I need
to pull my calendar--up in New York with my Chinese
counterpart. We are having that discussion. They want to be a
responsible player on the world stage. They want to be part of
this great power competition. And with that, comes
responsibilities. So we have to have that discussion. The
important piece is we may not get there but we may. But we have
to have a dialogue.
I raised with my counterpart to have a working group--a
strategic working group--on some things that we might be able
to agree upon. They have declined at that juncture.
Senator Markey. So would you be averse if that just comes
to an end, that China will not accept that it is going to
engage in those kind of talks? Would you object then to
extending New START and separately engaging China on nuclear
arms control?
Ms. Thompson. We were just at the first step of our
engagement with China for its arms control discussions. In
fact, I would say it has not even taken a firm first step.
Coming back and having the discussions with the leadership on
how we want to go forward with that--I think we have an
obligation to have those discussions.
Senator Markey. I appreciate that.
Does the administration view China's participation or non-
participation as relevant to New START's extension?
Ms. Thompson. We recognize that to have a legitimate arms
control discussion going forward on next terms of arms control,
you have to have China in the mix.
Senator Markey. So you are saying that you will not extend
the New START treaty unless China participates.
Ms. Thompson. I did not say that, Senator. I am saying we
are early in the discussions with China. We are in the middle
of an interagency discussion on next steps with New START. Know
that those discussions are being had, but we have not reached a
conclusion as yet.
Senator Markey. I think it is pretty clear that the attempt
to move this to multilateral arms control talks with Russia and
then adding in China is really a poison pill to provide an
excuse for not extending New START. That is my concern. And the
reason that I believe that is that when I look at the
administration's intent to pull out of the Paris Agreement, the
Iran nuclear deal, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty, and the arms trade treaty, that this just follows on
part of that pattern.
So what confidence can you give us that the Trump
administration's never-ending review of New START or new
insistence that arms control be multilateralized is not really
just an excuse to kill the New START treaty?
Ms. Thompson. Senator, I can assure you, as I stated in
September, but can build on that because we had considerable
discussions since that point both with partners and allies and
with Russia. Our partners and allies have been very clear as to
who is at fault for the demise of the INF Treaty. I have a firm
statement from the Secretary-General--in fact, when he briefed
Congress during his visit last month--that Russia is at fault
for that. We continue to uphold our obligations.
So as the overseer of arms control for the State
Department, I am going to always maintain there are
consequences when you do not fulfill your obligation. You call
out that party. And that is what we have done with Russia and
will continue to do with all parties. Arms control only works
if you have a responsible partner on the other side.
Senator Markey. And I agree with that. But to the extent to
which we have an opportunity to extend the New START treaty,
then in my opinion we should take advantage of that. As
President Kennedy used to say, because you cannot make progress
on every front does not mean that you should not make progress
on any front. So we have an opportunity here with the New START
treaty, and that is our principal nuclear rival, and we have a
history of reaching agreements with them. And from my
perspective, I think that we should take this opportunity to
advance that goal and not allow a China problem, which it is,
to deter us from reaching that agreement.
And that is why I have introduced the SAVE Act to ensure
that the United States continue adhering to a functioning
bilateral nuclear arms control agreement that is in our
national security interest. I just think it makes the most
sense because that is where our biggest problem is, not to say
that we should not also engage with China on this issue.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Markey.
With all due respect--and I mean that seriously--I do not
think we need to have China as an excuse not to extend. I am
absolutely opposed to extension. It has nothing to do with
China. I mean, under present circumstances with their cheating
and other things that they do, I am opposed to extension. It
has nothing to do with China's participation. But in any event,
thank you for those points.
I know Senator Cruz has a couple questions. Senator
Menendez, go ahead.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Two comments and then two questions.
The first comment. When I was out, Mr. Chairman, because I
had another hearing to attend to, I understand that you stated
that you were briefed on the President's circumstances as it
relates to Iran and our embassy in Iraq, and I appreciate that
you were briefed. That still leaves the Democratic leader of
this committee and every other Democratic member and 49
Democratic Members of the Senate not briefed about what is
happening. And I just hope that when it comes to something of
such potentially consequential significance that we can be
briefed so we can understand what we are dealing with. So I
appreciate that the chairman was briefed, but I reiterate my
call for all of us to be briefed.
Madam Secretary, let me just say you responded to Senator
Kaine that it is not secret. Well, it is secret when you do not
know that it exists, because you cannot ask for something if
you do not know that it exists. So how does Senator Kaine know
to ask for something, in fact, if it was not but for a press
report that this transaction took place? We would have known
before because as Members of the Senate, we would have been
briefed that such a transaction took place. But we were not.
And so, therefore, as far as I am concerned, it is secret.
Let me ask Deputy Secretary Trachtenberg, do you agree with
Congress' directive that nuclear modernization is linked to the
strategic arms control progress?
Mr. Trachtenberg. I agree, Senator Menendez, that nuclear
modernization is important for arms control, but I also agree
and believe that our nuclear modernization program stands on
its own two legs--in this particular case, three legs.
Senator Menendez. Well, I do not dispute the triad basis.
But my question--let me reiterate it again because maybe my
English is not that good.
Congress' directive--directive--that nuclear modernization
is linked to the strategic arms control process--do you agree
that that is Congress' directive?
Mr. Trachtenberg. Forgive me, Senator. Are you talking
about a specific provision of law?
Senator Menendez. When the modernization efforts were done,
Congress specifically directed that that modernization is
linked to a strategic arms control process. Are you not aware
of that?
Mr. Trachtenberg. I think our modernization is linked to a
strategic arms control process in that it enables us to engage
in strategic arms control.
Senator Menendez. Do you agree that the current nuclear
modernization program is predicated on working within the
limits of New START?
Mr. Trachtenberg. I am sorry, Senator.
Senator Menendez. Do you agree that the current nuclear
modernization program is predicated on working within the
limits of New START?
Mr. Trachtenberg. I think the current nuclear modernization
program keeps the United States within the limits of New START.
I am not sure I would say it was predicated on the limits of
New START, but it is consistent.
Senator Menendez. Do you agree that allowing New START to
expire would require us to rethink our nuclear force structure
because of the predictability and insights New START provides
into Russian strategic nuclear forces?
Mr. Trachtenberg. I think the insight that New START
provides in terms of insight into Russian strategic nuclear
forces is in fact valuable, and I agree with you on that. But
again, I would suggest that our nuclear modernization program
is critically important and should be carried out----
Senator Menendez. But if we did not know anymore what the
Russians had, then we would have to think about our own
paradigm of what we think we would need in order to protect our
nation. Is that not a fair statement?
Mr. Trachtenberg. I think that is a fair statement,
Senator.
Senator Menendez. Secretary Thompson, last question. The
U.S. asserted Russia was responsible for the chemical weapons
attack in the U.K. The Chemical and Biological Weapons Act
mandates sanctions be placed on Russia. Those sanctions are now
more than 5 months late. Why has the administration failed to
implement the mandated second round of sanctions?
Ms. Thompson. We have done the analysis with the sanctions,
Senator. We have those teed up. I would defer to the Secretary
and the President, but my response would be it is part of a
larger Russia strategy. But we have done great work. We have
called them out. We have had the attribution mechanism, and we
continue to call them out with the work that is being done
with----
Senator Menendez. Do you believe that when Congress
mandates something, you have the discretion not to pursue it?
Ms. Thompson. No, Senator. We have teed up the sanctions--
--
Senator Menendez. The law is pretty clear. It mandates it.
It is not a question of a broader Russia policy. It mandates
it. And if we are consistently going to find that mandates mean
nothing to the administration, then we are going to have to
rethink our whole approach to the administration. There is a
reason that Congress mandates things.
Ms. Thompson. We have been extremely strong and vocal and
active on pushing back on Russia's heinous attack on the
Skripals in Salisbury, their work with the Assad regime----
Senator Menendez. It is not very significant when there is
a mandated sanction that should have been imposed 5 months ago,
and all you can tell me is we are still thinking about it.
The Chairman. Senator Cruz.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome.
Under Secretary Thompson, I would like to ask you some
questions about the State Department's policy towards Iran. The
State Department and, as I understand it, your bureau in
particular has advocated for civil nuclear waivers to continue
implementing parts of the catastrophic Obama Iran nuclear deal
that allowed Iran to conduct nuclear research. Top State
Department officials in your bureau have stated that it is your
policy to facilitate, quote, international cooperation with
Iran on a number of projects contemplated under the JCPOA that
provide Iran opportunities to benefit from nuclear technology
to signal our appreciation for the security benefits these
projects were intended to provide.
Elsewhere, officials, including those in your bureau, have
touted the benefits of the so-called transparency as promised
in the deal.
These positions appear to be in significant tension, if not
direct conflict, with the positions of President Trump. I find
it troubling that we are continuing to implement parts of the
nuclear deal, and I want to understand the basis for these
decisions.
Your predecessors in previous administrations suggested
that Iran's access to civil nuclear technology hinges on
whether Iran is a member in good standing in the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty. During the Bush administration, acting
Under Secretary John Rood said Iran was no longer a, quote,
member in good standing of the NPT. Under the Obama
administration, Under Secretary Rose Gottemoeller said that
Iran had been, quote, brought back into good standing with the
Non-Proliferation Treaty regime because of the Iran deal.
I am glad to note that recently the Trump administration
appears to have reversed the Obama administration's
whitewashing of Iran's conduct. Jeffrey Eberhardt, who has been
nominated to be Special Representative for Nuclear Non-
Proliferation, recently confirmed to this committee in writing
that, quote, Iran's standing as a non-nuclear weapon state
party to the NPT cannot be described as good. That is a step in
the right direction.
First of all, I would like to confirm that assessment. Do
you consider Iran to be a member in good standing of the NPT?
Ms. Thompson. Thank you, Senator. And I appreciate the
support for Jeff Eberhardt as his nomination process moves
forward. He will be a great representative of this
administration for our country as we have those key
discussions. I have known Jeff for quite a while now.
We have concerns, and we laid out those concerns. We have
laid them out publicly and would have more details if we talk
at the classified level on some of the concerns that we have
with the way Iran is going. And Jeff's reflection is a definite
reflection of where we are today.
Senator Cruz. Let me just try that again. Do you consider
Iran to be a member in good standing of the NPT?
Ms. Thompson. We have concerns, Senator. We have concerns
with where they are going.
Senator Cruz. Do you agree with Mr. Eberhardt's statement
in writing that, quote, Iran's standing as a non-nuclear
weapons state party to the NPT cannot be described as good?
Ms. Thompson. That is correct, and that is what we laid out
in the compliance report. And we can give you the background of
that in a classified setting. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Cruz. So why do you believe we should keep
implementing parts of the nuclear deal, allowing Iran to do
nuclear research even though Iran is not entitled to those
benefits and President Trump has correctly rejected this
foolhardy deal?
Ms. Thompson. Again, Senator, we have given the
information. Again, it is a rigorous interagency discussion
with intelligence, with policy, with where DOD is, with DOE, et
cetera. Then we make our recommendation to the Secretary, and
he informs that with the President. We can give you the
background on that on the classified version behind it. But in
some areas--and that is why the Secretary made the
determination some of the dates, you know, the length is not
the same in some of the areas on where it is our best interest
to have some of those waivers for a shorter duration.
Senator Cruz. How is it possibly in our best interests to
allow Iran to continue doing nuclear research in the Fordow
bunker that was built into the side of a mountain to be able to
develop nuclear weapons to use to murder Americans? How is that
in our best interest?
Ms. Thompson. Senator, again, this is a discussion that I
would prefer to have in the SCIF on what information we have
and what information we do not have.
Senator Cruz. With all respect, the American people care
deeply about this. So I am perfectly happy to have classified
briefings, but whether we are allowing Iran to do nuclear
weapons in a bunker designed to create weapons of mass
destruction to murder Americans is an issue of concern to 28
million Texans. And so the American people are entitled to get
an answer. If it is the State Department's position that that
is a good idea, the American people are entitled to know that.
Ms. Thompson. Absolutely, Senator. So I will give you the
answer to the American people, to all those in Texas, and to
friends and family back in South Dakota. This President, this
Secretary, myself, and everyone in this administration will
stand for what is right for the safety and security of the
American people, bar none.
Senator Cruz. With all due respect, that did not answer the
question remotely. Is it in our interest to allow Iran to
continue to do nuclear research in the Fordow facility?
Ms. Thompson. The decision made by this administration and
with the Secretary for this last round is always in the
interest of the American people, Senator. Thank you.
Senator Cruz. So it really is the position that every
decision State makes is always in the interest of the American
people?
Ms. Thompson. The safety and security? Yes, sir.
Senator Cruz. That is a stunning Orwellian position. And
let me be the first to say that I do not believe that is true
in any administration, that every decision an elected official
makes or an appointed official makes is by definition in the
interest of the American people. And that is one of the reasons
Congress has oversight responsibility.
Ms. Thompson. Senator, we will not do a challenge here in
public. I will tell you I took an oath, as did you, to the
Constitution and to the American people and to enemies, foreign
and domestic. My underlying going-in position is always the
safety and security of the American people. I did that as a
soldier. I did that as the National Security Advisor to the
Vice President, and I am doing it as the Under Secretary of
State.
Senator Cruz. As we now know, the nuclear archives seized
by the Israelis contained a wealth of new information about
Iran's nuclear program. We know that Western intelligence
agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency did not
know about these elements of Iran's nuclear program because the
IAEA declared in 2015 that Iran never conducted activities
which the archives now clearly show that Iran conducted. They
were keeping nuclear weapons blueprints on the shelf to use
later.
Do you consider Iran's past possession of the nuclear
archives seized by Israel last year, including the materials in
the archives relevant to the development of nuclear weapons, to
constitute noncompliance by Iran of any of its nonproliferation
obligations?
Ms. Thompson. Again, Senator, I would prefer to talk about
what is in those documents not to be done in an open forum.
Senator Cruz. Those documents are now public and have been
released to the world.
Ms. Thompson. Sir, there is information there that we are
protecting sources and methods, and in all candor, I will give
you that information.
Senator Cruz. I tell you what. Just refer to the public
part that you can go to the Internet and read. So I am not
asking for classified portions. I am asking for the public
portions of the archives that the Israelis seized that show
Iran in open defiance. Do you agree with that?
Ms. Thompson. I agree with the process that they had in the
past years of those documents was disconcerting. Absolutely.
Senator Cruz. Then why would the State Department continue
to give waivers to allow them to conduct nuclear research,
particularly in the Fordow site? That I find staggering. It is
a bunker built in the side of a mountain. It is not a medical
research facility. It is not a diaper factory. It is a bunker
built to make nuclear weapons. And the State Department has
signed waivers saying, Iran, the Ayatollah can continue to do
nuclear research there. How is that possibly in the interest of
the United States?
Ms. Thompson. I would say that is your assessment, Senator.
I would not characterize it as such.
Senator Cruz. Well, that is the problem.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cruz.
Senator Kaine, you had one more question?
Senator Kaine. I did. Thank you, Mr. Chair, for indulging.
And if I could, I would like to introduce in the record an
article from the ``Washington Post'' dated January 21--no--
January 23, 2019 entitled ``Can Saudi Arabia Produce Ballistic
Missiles? Satellite Imagery Raises Questions.''
[The information follows:]
Can Saudi Arabia Produce Ballistic Missiles? Satellite Imagery Raises
Suspicions \1\
Satellite images suggest that Saudi Arabia has constructed its
first known ballistic missile factory, according to weapons experts and
image analysts, a development that raises questions about the kingdom's
increasing military and nuclear ambitions under its 33-year-old crown
prince.
If operational, the suspected factory at a missile base in al-
Watah, southwest of Riyadh, would allow Saudi Arabia to manufacture its
own ballistic missiles, fueling fears of an arms race against its
regional rival Iran.
Saudi Arabia currently does not possess nuclear weapons, so any
missiles produced at the apparent factory are likely to be
conventionally armed. But a missile-making facility would be a critical
component of any eventual Saudi nuclear weapons program, hypothetically
giving the kingdom capability to produce the preferred delivery systems
for nuclear warheads.
``The possibility that Saudi Arabia is going to build longer-range
missiles and seek nuclear weapons--we imagine that they can't. But we
are maybe underestimating their desire and their capabilities,'' said
Jeffrey Lewis, a nuclear weapons expert at the Middlebury Institute of
International Studies at Monterey, who discovered the factory with his
team when analyzing satellite images from the region.
Two additional missile experts who reviewed the satellite images
for The Washington Post, Michael Elleman of the International Institute
for Strategic Studies and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. of the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, agreed that the high-resolution
photographs of the al-Watah site appear to depict a rocket-engine
production and test facility, probably using solid fuel.
It is unclear from the satellite images whether the facility has
been completed or is functionally capable of manufacturing missiles.
Regardless, the complex--which satellite images suggest broke ground in
2013 when King Salman was defense minister--highlights the nation's
intention to make its own advanced missiles after years of seeking to
purchase them abroad, at times successfully.
A spokesman for the Saudi Embassy in Washington declined to comment
on the nature of the facility at the missile base. The Pentagon, State
Department and CIA also declined to comment.
News of the facility's existence comes at an inflection point for
Saudi Arabia in international affairs. The kingdom has taken a more
aggressive approach to military power under its new crown prince,
Mohammed bin Salman, who warned in an interview last year with ``60
Minutes'' that Saudi Arabia would develop a nuclear bomb if Iran does.
The crown prince has been defense minister since 2015.
Saudi Arabia has been pursuing a nuclear power-plant deal with the
United States that would potentially include allowing it to produce
nuclear fuel. The kingdom's insistence on domestic fuel production has
raised worries among U.S. officials that the kingdom wants the atomic
power project not only for civil use but also for covert weapon-making
purposes.
The killing last October of Saudi dissident and Washington Post
contributing columnist Jamal Khashoggi at the hands of Saudi agents in
Istanbul has hardened opposition to the power plant deal in Congress.
A gambit by Saudi Arabia to build a ballistic missile factory would
make sense given the rivals in its neighborhood. The kingdom faces an
Israel armed with an advanced nuclear and missile program and an Iran
that has continued to perfect its own abilities to make ballistic
missiles. Should Iran stop abiding by the 2015 nuclear accord's
limitations, many analysts believe the country could attain nuclear
warheads in as little as a year.
The Trump administration pulled out of the Iran deal, in part
citing missile threats from Tehran that were not covered by the pact.
A functional ballistic missile production facility would allow
Saudi Arabia to begin matching some of the domestic missile-making
capabilities that Iran has developed over the years and tapped to
supply weapons to Houthi rebels fighting Saudi-backed forces in Yemen.
The existence of a Saudi strategic rocket base at al-Watah first
became public in mid-2013 after Jane's Defense Weekly published
satellite imagery of the military facility, which was suspected of
housing ballistic missiles purchased from China.
But when Lewis and his colleagues David Schmerler and Fabian Hinz
looked at satellite images of al-Watah captured by Planet Labs more
recently, they discovered, in Lewis's words: ``Whoa, that is not just a
missile base anymore.''
The base was still there--with its launchpad, underground tunnels
and administrative buildings--but across the road an entirely new
facility had emerged, and it looked a lot like a rocket-engine factory
designed to make ballistic missiles, they said.
The facility included high-bay buildings, which Lewis says appear
to be tall enough for a missile's motor case to stand on its end and be
filled with fuel. Another clue was a barrier around one of the
structures for protection against explosions. The site was also dotted
with lightning rods, because the tall metal structures can attract
lighting strikes that could ignite the propellant. That the facility is
in the same location as an existing Saudi missile base bolstered the
case.
Above all, what appears to be a rocket-engine test stand set off
alarm bells. The horizontal setup, Lewis said, coupled with the lack of
pipes or tanks in the images, suggests that the facility was probably
designed to produce solid-fuel rockets rather than liquid-fuel ones.
Solid-fuel missiles tend to be more sought after because they are
easier to conceal, can be launched more quickly and can be stored for a
long time, making them more survivable in a conflict. How the Saudis
obtained the technological expertise necessary to build the facility is
unclear. One potential supplier: China.
The Saudi engine test stand, according to Lewis, looks particularly
Chinese. While most countries test rocket engines out in the open,
Lewis said, China partially covers the flame shooting out of the engine
and cools the test building with water so it does not catch fire. The
Saudi test complex appears to replicate that setup, he noted, with a
trench for the water next to the stand and what appears to be water
runoff.
China has sold ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia in the past and
has helped supply ballistic missile production capabilities to other
nations. In the 1990s, Pakistan secretly built a plant for medium-range
missiles using blueprints and equipment supplied by China. The factory
in Pakistan has long drawn the attention of top Saudi officials.
What involvement, if any, China or Pakistan had in building the
Saudi facility is unclear. Nor is it clear what kind of ballistic
missiles Saudi Arabia is manufacturing or preparing to produce.
The Chinese and Pakistani embassies in Washington did not respond
to requests for comment.
The plant is smaller than those of other countries, suggesting it
could have a limited capacity, said Lewis, Elleman and Bermudez, and
recent satellite photos do not show any cars in the parking lot at the
site, raising the possibility that the plant is not yet operational. It
also has fewer barriers against explosions--earthen mounds known as
berms--than similar production facilities in other nations, they said.
Traditionally, the United States formally has sought to prevent the
proliferation of ballistic missile technology. Washington at one point
sanctioned China, for example, for delivering missile launchers and
components to Pakistan in the 1990s.
``Under normal circumstances, we would be doing everything we could
possibly do to constrain and convince the Saudis not to do this,''
Elleman said. ``The U.S. has always been opposed to the transfer of
missiles that are inherently capable of carrying nuclear weapons.''
The main way the United States seeks to prevent the spread of drone
and missile technology is through the Missile Technology Control
Regime, or the MTCR, an informal multicountry pact designed to prevent
the transfer of certain missile technologies. China is not a member but
has agreed to abide by some of its stipulations.
While the United States sells an array of weaponry to Saudi Arabia,
Washington has not sold ballistic missiles to Riyadh, in part because
such missiles traditionally have been seen as destabilizing for the
region. Saudi Arabia has turned to China in the past when met with
refusals from the United States for certain weapons requests.
For example, the United States declined repeated Saudi requests to
purchase what are known as category-one American drones, including
Predators and Reapers, partly because of MTCR's regulations. Instead,
the kingdom turned to China, first purchasing drones and later striking
a deal in which China will build a drone factory that will produce a
Chinese copycat of the Predator in Saudi Arabia.
------------------
Note
\1\ Sonne, Paul, ``Can Saudi Arabia produce ballistic missiles?
Satellite imagery raises suspicions,'' Washington Post, (National
Security), January 23, 2019. Shane Harris contributed to this report.
Senator Kaine. The article opens: satellite images suggest
that Saudi Arabia has constructed its first known ballistic
missile factory, according to weapons experts and image
analysts, a development that raises questions about the
kingdom's increasing military and nuclear ambitions under its
33-year-old Crown Prince.
The article goes on to describe satellite imagery, quotes
various individuals suggesting that the design of the facility
appears to be of Chinese origin. It also recounts past history
of Saudi purchases or acquisition of missile technology from
both Pakistan and China.
What can you tell me from the DOD or the State Department
about your conclusions about Saudi Arabia developing a
ballistic missile capacity, including manufacture, of such
weapons and whether we know whether that is being done via
transfers of technology from Pakistan, China, or any other
nation?
Mr. Trachtenberg. Senator, that is a good question. From
DOD's perspective, I would, with your permission, want to take
that one for the record and refresh myself on that particular
article that you are citing and get some of the additional
background on it, if I may.
Senator Kaine. Fair enough.
[The information follows:]
[A classified response has been provided separately.]
Senator Kaine. How about from the State Department,
Secretary Thompson?
Ms. Thompson. Yes, sir. I will take that back. I can tell
you with our 123 discussions with that, we have been in
discussions with Saudi for, I think it has been 12 years now.
So not a new development. But we will take that back for the
record.
[The information follows:]
[A classified response has been provided separately.]
Senator Kaine. Great.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Well, this concludes our hearing this morning. A real
sincere thank you to our two witnesses. I think this has been a
very robust discussion that this body desperately needs to
have. We really appreciate your attendance here and your input
into this.
For the information of members, the record will remain open
until the close of business on Friday, and we would ask that,
as quickly as possible, you respond to any of those questions
so that we can move forward.
And with that, if there is no further business before the
committee, the committee will be adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Hon. Andrea L. Thompson to Questions Submitted by
Senator James Risch
china
The United States and Russia have obligated themselves under
treaties such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. China
meanwhile has fielded large numbers of INF-range missiles, and refused
to even discuss arms control. President Xi has directed the
modernization of China's nuclear forces and that the Chinese military
will be ``fully transformed into a first tier force'' by 2050. Chinese
stockpiles and delivery systems are growing, and their disposition and
posture is troubling.
Question. If it chooses to expand its arsenal, how soon could China
reach or exceed U.S. numbers for warheads and delivery systems?
Answer. China is engaged in an ongoing expansion of its nuclear
capabilities, presaging a more dangerous future of a considerably
larger number of sophisticated delivery systems able to reach the
United States and our allies and partners than in the past. China's
lack of transparency regarding the scope and scale of its nuclear
modernization program raises questions regarding its future intent and
poses challenges for efforts to ensure a peaceful security environment
and stable relations. Precisely because China is the least transparent
member of the P5 nuclear weapon states, accurate assessments of its
nuclear trajectory are difficult. We defer to the Intelligence
Community for specific assessments.
Question. What is the State Department doing to ensure that our
allies have accurate information on Chinese threats, and to maintain
alliance unity?
Answer. The Department of State and Department of Defense engage
regularly on deterrence and arms control matters with our Indo-Pacific
allies, including through the Extended Deterrence Dialogue with Japan,
the Deterrence Strategy Committee and the Extended Deterrence Strategy
and Consultation Group with the Republic of Korea, as well as the
recently initiated Strategic Policy Dialogue with Australia, as well as
our NATO partners/Allies. Discussions involve threat briefings and
policy updates. These forums provide critical venues to work with our
allies to improve a shared understanding of nuclear dangers and the
corresponding deterrence requirements, as well as advocate for expanded
burden sharing within our Alliances.
russia
Russia has a pattern of cheating on its treaty obligations. It has
also made major progress in modernizing its nuclear forces, and is
developing new capabilities that present new threats to the U.S. Its
tactical nuclear forces are not subject to any arms control limits and
threaten U.S. access and extended deterrence for our allies.
Question. How does the administration plan to incorporate Russia's
new technology and delivery systems into arms-control talks? To what
extent has the administration talked to Russia about these systems?
Answer. We believe that the ``Sarmat'' ICBM and the ``Avangard''
glide vehicle deployed on an existing type of ICBM will be subject to
the New START Treaty numerical limits and verification measures at the
appropriate time in their development cycle. We consider the other
three weapons announced by President Putin on March 1, 2018--the
``Poseidon'' nuclear torpedo, the ``Burevestnik'' ground-launched
nuclear-powered cruise missile, and the ``Kinzhal'' air-launched
ballistic missile--to be new kinds of strategic offensive arms. We are
discussing these systems with Russian officials in the appropriate
fora.
Question. What is the State Department doing to ensure our allies
have accurate information on Russian threats and violations, and to
prevent Russian disinformation from leading to the fracture of NATO and
other alliances?
Answer. The Department of State regularly keeps NATO and Indo-
Pacific allies apprised of developments regarding Russian threats and
violations, as was the case during Russia's violation of the INF
Treaty, and will continue to consult and coordinate regularly with
allies in Europe and Asia. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, as well as
the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy,
provide clear assessments of the Russian threat, and were informed by
consultations with and assessments from our allies and partners.
__________
Responses of Hon. Andrea L. Thompson to Questions Submitted by
Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
new start and beyond
President Trump has reportedly directed his administration to seek
a new arms control agreement with Russia and China. One official told
CNN a few weeks ago that the agreement should include ``all the
weapons, all the warheads, and all the missiles.'' The officials
criticized the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) for
only limiting U.S. and Russian deployed strategic nuclear weapons. I'm
glad that the president has recently announced that he wants to add
Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons in a future arms control
agreement and include China in an arms control discussion. But not at
the expense of or as a condition for extending New START:
Question. What does the White House have in mind with the arms
control outreach project they leaked last week? What is the
administration's strategy for achieving more comprehensive arms control
deals with Russia and China?
Answer. The President has charged his national security team to
think more broadly about arms control, both in terms of the countries
and the weapons systems involved. The President wants serious arms
control that delivers real security to the American people and our
allies. To achieve this, Russia and China must be brought to the table.
The world has moved on from the Cold War and its bilateral treaties
that cover limited types of nuclear weapons or only certain ranges of
adversary missiles.
Question. AVC clear with EUR, EAP and T. How long does the
administration expect it will take to negotiate such comprehensive
deals?
Answer. At this stage it would be premature for us to speculate
about the duration of any potential negotiations.
Question. What does the administration want China to do on arms
control?
Answer. China's lack of transparency regarding the scope and scale
of its nuclear build-up raises questions regarding its intent and poses
challenges for efforts to ensure a peaceful security environment and
stable relations. China has rebuffed calls to discuss our respective
nuclear postures to reduce risks, promote transparency, and avoid
misperception. At the same time, China has exploited the fact that the
two largest nuclear powers are constrained by arms control agreements,
while China can pursue competition on its own terms.
China's unwillingness to engage undermines the regional stability
that U.S. allies, partners, and others rely on. If China seeks to be a
great power, it needs to behave like one by demonstrating the will and
ability to alter the upward and destabilizing trajectory of its nuclear
build-up.
Question. Would China, which has only about 300 total nuclear
warheads compared to the roughly 6,500 total warheads possessed by the
United States and Russia, be allowed to build up to the much higher New
START levels were it to join the treaty?
Answer. The interagency is currently reviewing potential options to
include China in serious arms control that delivers real security to
the American people and our allies. At this stage, it would be
premature to speculate on the exact contours of any deal that we might
negotiate.
Question. What is the administration willing to put on the table in
talks with Russia and China on more comprehensive agreements?
Answer. As President Trump has said, we want serious arms control
that delivers real security to the American people and our allies, and
that must include Russia and China. The world has moved on from the
Cold War and its bilateral treaties that cover limited types of nuclear
weapons or only certain ranges of adversary missiles. The interagency
is reviewing options.
Question. Is the administration's position that Russia must agree
to limits on its tactical nuclear weapons or that China must limit its
nuclear forces in some way as a condition for extending New START?
Answer. The administration has long been concerned by Russia's
continued development and deployment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons,
as well as Russia's serial noncompliance with arms control obligations.
It is too early in the process to speculate on any potential conditions
for any New START Treaty extension. The administration is continuing
its review of the New START Treaty while also looking at further
options for serious arms control that deliver real security to the
American people and our allies.
Question. Wouldn't extending New START by 5 years buy additional
time to develop U.S. negotiating positions, address issues of mutual
concern that impact strategic stability, and avoid new risks from an
unconstrained and less transparent U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship?
Answer. The administration is evaluating whether extension of the
New START Treaty is in the U.S. national interest and how the Treaty's
expiration would affect U.S. national security in a deteriorating
security environment, where Russia is developing new strategic
offensive arms and is serially noncompliant with its arms control
obligations, and China is engaged in an ongoing nuclear build-up.
__________
Responses of Hon. Andrea L. Thompson to Questions Submitted by
Senator Tim Kaine
saudi arabia
Question. The Department of Energy has publically stated that
Secretary Perry has issued seven authorizations for exports to Saudi
Arabia. Please list the dates that the State Department concurred in
each of these seven Part 810 authorizations for a U.S. company to
conduct work in Saudi Arabia:
Please also provide the name of the company involved in conducting
this work. Who at the State Department provided concurrence for each of
these seven authorizations?
Answer. Part 810 authorizations differ from 123 agreements in that
they do not provide a legal basis to transfer nuclear material or
reactors as a 123 agreement does but rather authorize the transfer of
nuclear-related technical assistance, subject matter expertise, and
data. The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, which
has responsibility within the Department for civil nuclear cooperation
matters, oversaw the Department's review of the seven Saudi Arabia-
related Part 810 applications and provided concurrence on each of them
to the Department of Energy on November 29, 2017; March 28, 2018; May
31, 2018; and January 25, 2019. These reviews were conducted consistent
with U.S. law and standard Department of State practices.
Applications for Part 810 authorizations may contain commercial
proprietary information. I refer you to the Department of Energy for
questions regarding the specific contents of the authorizations.
Question. What awareness does the State Department have about the
Chinese supply of ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia and assistance in
building a ballistic missile production factory inside Saudi Arabia? Do
you share the assessment that Saudi Arabia maintains one of the largest
ballistic missile arsenals in the region? What is the Department doing
to address this extremely concerning issue? If necessary, provide a
classified response.
Answer. This response is classified and will be set separately via
secure correspondence.
__________
Responses of Hon. Andrea L. Thompson to Questions Submitted by
Senator Edward J. Markey
state department's role in arm control policy
Question. Please describe the State Department's role in the
interagency process on arms control policy?
Answer. The State Department's role is to guide the interagency
process involving the negotiation, implementation, and verification of
international agreements in arms control and international security.
This includes the development of arms control policies for the
implementation of existing agreements and the negotiation of future
agreements.
russia and new start treaty
Question. Has the State Department engaged in arms control
negotiations with Russia since the President and his team announced an
interest in new arms control agreements?
Answer. While the State Department has not engaged in formal arms
control treaty negotiations with Russia since the President's April 4
statement about arms control, since January I have met four times with
my Russian counterpart Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov to discuss a
variety of arms control issues to include how to modernize arms
control. The interagency is reviewing options on how best to proceed.
Question. Who will serve as the State Department's lead negotiator
in engaging Russia on extending New START? Will this same individual
serve as the administration's lead negotiator for other arms control
efforts?
Answer. At this stage, it would be premature to speculate about the
personnel involved in any potential negotiations.
Question. What percentage of Russia's deployed strategic nuclear
warheads are accountable under the New START Treaty? If New START
expires, what percentage of Russia's deployed strategic nuclear
warheads would be legally constrained?
Answer. All of Russia's currently deployed strategic nuclear
warheads are accountable under the New START Treaty. As of the March 1,
2019, data exchange, Russia's deployed strategic nuclear warheads
totaled 1,461, which is below the Treaty's relevant central limit of
1,550. It is too early to speculate about how Russia's deployed or
stockpiled strategic nuclear warheads might be addressed under any
potential new agreement.
Question. Please compare unclassified estimates of the number of
Russia's nuclear weapons deployed on the delivery systems Putin
announced on March 1, 2018 to those deployed on Russia's nuclear Triad
today:
Can you describe Russia's interests in U.S. concessions when
approached about Non-strategic nuclear weapons arms control or
reductions? What U.S. concessions would the State Department recommend
in order to achieve an agreement on non-strategic nuclear weapons with
Russia?
Answer. The delivery systems President Putin revealed on March 1,
2018, were in developmental stages at the time of the announcement. We
defer to the Intelligence Community for specific assessments regarding
the current status of those systems.
In the past, Russia has demanded that the United States return all
U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons to the United States, eliminate its
non-strategic nuclear weapons infrastructure abroad, and end long-
standing NATO arrangements with respect to U.S. nuclear weapons in
Europe. These preconditions are unacceptable to the United States and
NATO. It would be premature to speculate on the exact contours of any
deal that we might negotiate.
Question. Does the State Department view reducing or otherwise
limiting non-strategic nuclear weapons as a priority, compared to
maintaining the European Phased Adaptive Approach, or rotational
deployments of U.S. conventional forces in Europe?
Answer. The State Department views the European Phased Adaptive
Approach and rotational deployments of U.S. conventional forces in
Europe as ironclad commitments to protect deployed U.S. forces and NATO
Allies. The State Department also views limiting non-strategic nuclear
weapons as a priority.
Question. Is the State Department actively involved in
consultations with NATO regarding achieving a non-strategic nuclear
weapons agreement with Russia?
Answer. We consult regularly with our NATO Allies regarding arms
control and the threat from Russia, including Russia's non-strategic
nuclear weapons and how best to deter and defend against their
potential use.
Question. Do weapons which the U.S. government classifies as
Russia's ``non-strategic nuclear weapons'' use short- and -intermediate
range, ground based missiles as delivery systems?
Answer. The U.S. government currently considers ``non-strategic
nuclear weapons'' to comprise weapons, including those using ground-
based missiles as delivery systems, that have a range of less than
5,500 kilometers.
Question. In addition to the SSC-8, Putin and his Defense Minister,
Sergey Shoigu, described a new ground-based version of the Kalibr sea-
launched cruise missile, and a hypersonic ground-launched missile. How
does the U.S. government plan to respond to these new systems?
Answer. We have long recognized the challenge posed by Russia's
development of a wide variety of intermediate-range weapons, including
but not limited to the SSC-8. We are working with allies and partners
to address these threats comprehensively.
Question. Is it possible to dissuade Russia from deploying these
weapons, and what is your strategy for doing so?
Answer. We continue to press Russia to verifiably destroy the SSC-8
and call upon Russia to not take any steps to destabilize regional or
global stability. We continue to work with our allies and partners to
deny Russia any military advantage from its INF Treaty violation and,
more generally, its development of a wide variety of intermediate-range
weapons.
Question. Please provide a more detailed readout of what specific
arms control issues and initiatives Secretary of State Pompeo discussed
with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergey
Lavrov during their recent meeting in Sochi:
Does the State Department believe the New START Treaty remains in
[the] national security interest of the United States?
Answer. As Secretary Pompeo has said, the President has charged his
national security team to think more broadly about arms control, to
include countries beyond our traditional U.S.-Russia framework and a
broader range of weapon systems. Secretary Pompeo and other senior
officials regularly engage Russian leaders about arms control and
strategic security issues.
The New START Treaty's limits on Russia's strategic nuclear force,
establishment of data exchanges--including the locations, numbers, and
technical characteristics of weapons systems and facilities--and its
verification provisions contribute currently to the national security
of the United States. The administration is reviewing whether to seek
an extension of the Treaty with Russia. Central to that review is
evaluating whether extension is in the U.S. national interest and how
the Treaty's expiration would impact U.S. national security in the
evolving security environment. This includes considerations related to
Russia's ongoing development of new strategic offensive arms, non-
strategic nuclear weapons, and serial noncompliance with its arms
control obligations, as well as China's continuing nuclear
modernization.
intermediate-range nuclear forces (inf) treaty
Question. What does the State Department recommend as diplomatic
and economic counters to Russia's likely deployment of additional INF
systems after termination of the agreement?
Answer. Russia has already fielded multiple battalions of the INF-
violating SSC-8 ground-launched cruise missile. As we have been for the
past several years, we are working with our allies and partners to deny
Russia any military advantage from its INF Treaty violation and, more
generally, its development of a wide variety of intermediate-range
weapons.
Question. Did the State Department ever ask the Russian government
to consider codifying a ban on arming INF-range missiles with nuclear
warheads? If not, why not?
Answer. The INF Treaty banned the development and deployment of all
INF-range missiles, including those armed with nuclear warheads. Russia
has never disputed this. Beginning in May 2013, the United States
raised concerns about Russia's development of INF-range missiles on
more than 30 occasions at senior levels, including at the highest
levels of the Russian government. Despite 6 years of U.S. efforts to
return Russia to compliance with the INF Treaty, Russia has not taken
any demonstrable steps to do so.
nuclear cooperation with saudi arabia
Question. During the hearing, you indicated that you would be
working with your staff to provide further information about the part
810 authorizations issued to companies seeking to engage in nuclear
cooperation with entities within Saudi Arabia. Please provide the
following information about any 810 authorizations the Trump
administration has awarded to companies seeking to engage in nuclear
cooperation with Saudi Arabia:
The name of the entity
The date the 810 authorization was issued
A summary of the work covered by the entity
Should you choose to withhold this information, please provide both
the legal and policy rationale for withholding this information from
Congress.
Answer. Part 810 authorizations differ from 123 agreements in that
they do not provide a legal basis to transfer nuclear material or
reactors as a 123 agreement does but rather authorize the transfer of
nuclear-related technical assistance, subject matter expertise, and
data. The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, which
has responsibility within the Department for civil nuclear cooperation
matters, oversaw the Department's review of the seven Saudi Arabia-
related Part 810 applications and provided concurrence on each of them
to the Department of Energy on November 29, 2017; March 28, 2018; May
31, 2018 (included concurrence on four applications); and January 25,
2019. These reviews were conducted consistent with U.S. law and
standard Department of State practices.
Applications for Part 810 authorizations may contain commercial
proprietary information. I refer you to the Department of Energy for
questions regarding the specific contents of the authorizations.
Question. Congress has a responsibility to conduct rigorous
oversight of any potential nuclear cooperation with foreign governments
given nuclear energy's substantial foreign policy and national security
implications:
Therefore, please provide a date by which the State Department will
furnish to me and other members of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee the complete applications and all relevant paperwork for any
entities that have received 810 authorizations for potential
cooperation with Saudi Arabia or entities within Saudi Arabia. Should
you choose to ignore this request, please provide both the legal and
policy rationale for withholding this information from Congress.
Answer. Part 810 authorizations differ from 123 agreements in that
they do not provide a legal basis to transfer nuclear material or
reactors as a 123 agreement does but rather authorize the transfer of
nuclear-related technical assistance, subject matter expertise, and
data. The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, which
has responsibility within the Department for civil nuclear cooperation
matters, oversaw the Department's review of the seven Saudi Arabia-
related Part 810 applications and provided concurrence on each of them
to the Department of Energy on November 29, 2017; March 28, 2018; May
31, 2018 (included concurrence on four applications); and January 25,
2019. These reviews were conducted consistent with U.S. law and
standard Department of State practices.
I refer you to the Department of Energy for questions regarding the
specific contents of the authorizations.
2019 compliance report
The 2019 State Department compliance report recently provided to
Congress is woefully devoid of substance and depth. At just 12 pages
long, it is significantly shorter than previous reports and is alarming
in some of the longstanding arms control verification efforts it
chooses to omit:
Question. Did you approve the release of the summary of
unclassified version of the 2019 Compliance Report that was so
incomplete?
Answer. The 2019 Report was reviewed and approved by the Deputy
Secretary of State on behalf of the Department, and represents the
Department's views. As part of the clearance process, the Report was
reviewed and approved by the Under Secretary for Arms Control and
International Security. As indicated in the Department's April 15
transmittal letter to Congress, the 2019 Report consists of an
unclassified Trends section and a classified Annex. A more
comprehensive unclassified section of the Report will be submitted to
Congress after the appropriate classification downgrade review is
complete.
Question. Why did you approve a compliance report that fails to
mention even once the New START Treaty? Do you think it's appropriate
that the unclassified summary does not address New START, one of our
most important bilateral arms control treaties?
Answer. Consistent with past practice, the Department submitted its
annual New START Report to Congress on March 5 pursuant to Section
(a)(10) of the Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification
of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian
Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms, and referenced it in the 2019 Compliance
Report that was sent to Congress.
We also refer you to the classified Annex of the 2019 Report where
this treaty is discussed in detail.
Question. Did CIA Director Haspel concur on this report as required
by law?
Answer. In keeping with past precedent, the CIA's Weapons and
Counterproliferation Mission Center, on behalf of the Director of CIA
and in conjunction other CIA and Intelligence Community components,
reviewed the report for substantive accuracy and consistency with
relevant intelligence reporting, and cleared on that basis.
__________
Responses of Hon. Andrea L. Thompson to Questions Submitted by
Senator Jeff Merkley
Question. Does the administration share the view expressed by NATO
Secretary General Stoltenberg that NATO has ``no intention of deploying
ground-launched nuclear missiles in Europe?'' Will the United States
commit that any defense or deterrence steps the United States may make
in response to Russia's violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces (INF) Treaty will be a consensus decision agreed to by all NATO
Members?
Answer. U.S. research and development is focused on conventionally-
armed ground-launched missiles, not nuclear. Moreover, because we have
been abiding by the Treaty, we are not in a position to immediately
field such a ground-launched, INF-range system. As a result, it is too
early to discuss basing at this stage, but we are committed to
consulting with NATO Allies as we move forward.
Question. Has the United States sought or received an agreement
from a host state on NATO territory or the Indo-Pacific region to host
a conventional or nuclear armed U.S. ground-launched cruise missile
(GLCM) or another intermediate-range missile system accountable under
the INF Treaty?
Answer. Because we have been abiding by the Treaty, we are not in a
position to immediately field a ground-launched, INF-range system.
Therefore it is too early to discuss basing at this stage, but we are
committed to consulting with our allies and partners as we move
forward. U.S. research and development is focused on conventionally-
armed ground-launched missiles, not nuclear.
Question. In your written testimony you identify several
considerations guiding the U.S. interagency review into potential
extension of the New START Treaty. As one consideration, you referenced
the new ``kinds or types'' of Russian nuclear systems not yet deployed
that may be eventually accountable under the treaty:
If the treaty were to expire on February 5, 2021, would the United
States lose its ability through the Bilateral Consultative Commission
(BCC)--currently provided in Article V of the treaty--to argue that
these new Russian strategic systems should be made accountable under
the treaty?
Answer. Should the Treaty expire, the BCC would no longer exist.
However, the BCC is not the only appropriate forum for discussing these
systems with Russia. Any U.S. decision regarding a potential extension
of the Treaty will reflect considerations related to Russia's ongoing
development of new strategic offensive arms. Russia's ongoing
development of non-strategic nuclear weapons and new strategic
offensive arms not subject to New START are two factors motivating the
administration's consideration of a broader arms control approach.
Question. The S-28 ``Sarmat,'' a new Russian heavy intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) with a reported payload of up to 14 nuclear
warheads, will be accountable under New START. If the treaty expired,
how would the United States place binding limits on this system as well
as Russia's other nuclear systems already accountable under the treaty
(i.e., ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy
bombers)?
Answer. President Trump has charged his national security team to
think more broadly about arms control, both in terms of the countries
and the weapons systems involved. This includes constraining Russia's
new strategic arms. State Department officials regularly meet with
Russian officials bilaterally and multilaterally to discuss matters
relating to arms control. The United States Government has many
channels through which it can address concerns related to potential
Russian weapon systems. We will continue these discussions as
appropriate in the interest of U.S. national security.
Question. In the event of the treaty's expiration, would the loss
of insight into the location, movement, and disposition of Russia's
strategic nuclear forces be in the U.S. national security interest?
Answer. We are continuing to review how the Treaty's extension or
expiration would affect U.S. national security in the evolving security
environment, including by evaluating the impact of data exchanges and
access through on-site inspections to Russian facilities subject to the
Treaty.
Question. You also testified to the desire to include China in a
future arms control agreement. According to the 2019 Department of
Defense report on the Military and Security Developments Involving the
People's Republic of China, China currently has 90 deployed ICBMs and
48 deployed SLBMs and non-governmental estimates place China's number
of nuclear warheads at fewer than one-tenth of that possessed by each
the United States and Russia:
Given that China has significantly fewer strategic delivery
vehicles and nuclear warheads than the United States, what concessions
does the administration believe China, Russia and the United States
should be willing to make to bring the Chinese government into an
agreement related to its strategic nuclear arsenal?
Answer. China is investing considerable resources to modernize and
expand its nuclear arsenal, which is resulting in an increasingly
diverse and sophisticated force with an unknown end state. China's lack
of transparency regarding the scope and scale of its nuclear
modernization program raises questions regarding its future intent and
poses challenges for efforts to ensure a peaceful security environment
and stable relations. As President Trump has said, the United States
wants serious arms control that delivers real security to the American
people and our allies, and that means Russia and China must be brought
to the table to do so. The world has moved on from the Cold War and its
bilateral treaties that cover limited types of nuclear weapons or only
certain ranges of adversary missiles.
Question. As defined by the New START Treaty counting rules, how
many of China's warheads and strategic delivery vehicles would be
accountable under the treaty?
Answer. Any discussion of including China in an arms control
agreement is hypothetical at this time. Specifics regarding which
weapon systems would be limited and how they would be limited are key
questions that would have to be agreed upon by all Parties, should such
an option be pursued.
Question. Every U.S.-Russia bilateral arms control treaty took no
fewer than 2 years to successfully negotiate. Given the New START
Treaty expires in fewer than 21 months, and China does not share the
decades-long U.S.-Russia institutional history on arms control
agreements, how is it practical to conclude a treaty with China prior
to February 5, 2021?
Answer. At this stage it would be premature for us to speculate
about the duration of any potential negotiations.
Question. What steps has the administration taken to engage China
in discussions regarding strategic stability?
Answer. In pursuit of a peaceful security environment and stable
relations and following the release of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review,
the United States proposed establishing a Strategic Capabilities
Working Group with China, focused on risk reduction and transparency in
the nuclear and strategic capabilities arena. China has repeatedly
rejected U.S. efforts to broach these topics through meaningful
discussions. China's unwillingness to engage undermines the regional
stability that U.S. allies, partners, and others rely on.
Question. Your testimony says that a ``decision on extension will
carefully consider U.S. and allied security needs.'' Was the New START
Treaty among the issues on the April 3-4 NATO Ministerial agenda and if
so did allies express support for extending the treaty? Which allies
spoke at the 2019 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory
Committee in favor of extending New START?
Answer. The New START Treaty was not an agenda item at the April 3-
4, 2019, NATO Ministerial. At the 2019 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Preparatory Committee, many allies spoke in support of New START
extension. I personally engaged with several allies at the NPT PrepCom
where the extension of New START was a topic in our discussions. We
will continue to take into account allied and partner views as we
decide next steps on a potential extension of the Treaty, and I remain
committed to continued engagement with my diplomatic counterparts.
__________
Responses of Hon. David J. Trachtenberg to Questions Submitted by
Senator James Risch
Question. How is DoD addressing the threat of Chinese missiles?
Answer. The United States depends upon strategic deterrence to
address threats to the homeland from Chinese intercontinental-range
missiles. However, in the event of conflict, we will defend, to the
extent feasible, against any ballistic missile attack upon the homeland
from any source. With regard to Chinese regional missile forces, we
believe they are intended to restrict our ability to operate in the
Indo-Pacific region in support of our defense and security commitments.
Missile defenses are a key component within our broader regional
posture to protect deployed U.S. forces and allies and partners; to
preserve our freedom of action in the face of adversary anti-access/
area defense (A2/AD) capabilities; and to assure allies and partners.
To this end, we are pursuing a layered approach to address A2/AD that
includes additional Patriot, THAAD, and SM-3 missile defenses;
integrated air and missile defense (IAMD); attack operations to reduce
the scale of missile strikes; and passive defenses.
Question. What threat do Chinese tactical nuclear weapons pose to
our allies and interests?
Answer. During the next decade, China is likely to double the size
of its nuclear stockpile in the course of implementing the most rapid
expansion and diversification of is nuclear arsenal in its history. It
is improving its ground- and submarine-based nuclear capability and is
pursuing a viable nuclear ``triad'' with the development of a nuclear--
capable, strategic bomber. In addition, it is working to field nuclear,
theater-range precision-strike systems capable of reaching U.S.
territory, allies, partners, and U.S. forces and bases in the region.
The scope and scale of China's nuclear modernization program, combined
with China's lack of transparency, raise questions regarding its future
intent. This not only increases the threat of possible nuclear coercion
and conflict for the United States and its allies and partners, but
risks miscalculation and misperception.
Question. The Russians are chasing emerging technologies that have
potential to revolutionize undersea warfare and U.S. superiority in the
maritime domain. This includes the development of Artificial
Intelligence backed, maritime big-data networks. Moreover they are
pursuing hypersonic missile systems and a nuclear powered underwater
drone. The Commander of U.S. Strategic Command recently expressed
concern with Russia building nuclear capabilities outside the new START
Treaty. How might these new Russian weapons affect strategic stability?
Answer. Russia's new novel nuclear delivery systems are difficult
to manage under current arms control agreements and create a strategic
challenge for the United States. The United States has engaged Russia
on these systems in the context of the New START Treaty's Bilateral
Consultative Commission, and we continue to do so. However, the New
START Treaty requires that we protect the confidentiality of those
discussions.
Question. How do U.S. allies view the production of low-yield
nuclear weapons?
Answer. The United States consulted extensively with allies in
developing the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Allies are familiar
with the Russian doctrine and strategy that led to the U.S. call for
the low-yield supplemental capabilities referenced in the NPR, and they
appreciate the assurance and deterrence effects provided by such
capabilities.
Question. In light of this, why is nuclear modernization a critical
complement to arms control, and an essential component of strategic
stability?
Answer. Arms control can be an effective tool for managing
competition and reducing risk. Yet arms control is not an end in
itself, but must contribute to the security of the United States and
its allies and partners. Unfortunately, both Russia and China are well
along in their nuclear modernization programs. In contrast, our current
nuclear delivery systems, weapons, command and control systems, and
infrastructure are rapidly aging into obsolescence. Due to previous
deferrals, our nuclear forces are well beyond their original design
lives--some decades beyond--and must now be modernized. In this
context, it is critical that the United States continue its nuclear
modernization program both to ensure effective and credible deterrence,
and to posture the United States for possible arms control negotiations
when it has a willing partner.
__________
Responses of Hon. David J. Trachtenberg to Questions Submitted by
Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Question. President Trump has reportedly directed his
administration to seek a new arms control agreement with Russia and
China. One official told CNN a few weeks ago that the agreement should
include ``all the weapons, all the warheads, and all the missiles.''
The officials criticized the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(New START) for only limiting U.S. and Russian deployed strategic
nuclear weapons. I'm glad that the president has recently announced
that he wants to add Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons in a future
arms control agreement and include China in an arms control discussion.
But not at the expense of or as a condition for extending New START.
What does the White House have in mind with the arms control outreach
project they leaked last week? What is the administration's strategy
for achieving more comprehensive arms control deals with Russia and
China?
Answer. The President wants serious arms control that delivers real
security to the American people and our allies and partners. To achieve
this, he believes Russia and China must be brought to the table. The
world has moved on from the Cold War and its bilateral treaties that
applied to limited types of nuclear weapons or only certain ranges of
adversary missiles. Therefore, the President has charged his national
security team to think more broadly about arms control, both in terms
of the countries and the weapons systems involved. We are attempting to
address the core impediments to restoring trust with Russia and
reestablishing the conditions necessary for further nuclear arms
control initiatives. As for China, if it is the great power its leaders
claim it to be, it should increase transparency into Chinese nuclear
forces and limit China's growing nuclear weapons ambitions in order to
help manage strategic competition among States.
Question. President Trump has reportedly directed his
administration to seek a new arms control agreement with Russia and
China. One official told CNN a few weeks ago that the agreement should
include ``all the weapons, all the warheads, and all the missiles.''
The officials criticized the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(New START) for only limiting U.S. and Russian deployed strategic
nuclear weapons. I'm glad that the president has recently announced
that he wants to add Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons in a future
arms control agreement and include China in an arms control discussion.
But not at the expense of or as a condition for extending New START.
How long does the administration expect it will take to negotiate such
comprehensive deals?
Answer. Negotiating a new agreement that encompasses a broader
range of weapons than just strategic systems and includes an effective
verification regime will likely take time. Since no specific proposal
has been made, it is impossible to predict how long such a negotiation
would take.
Question. What does the administration want China to do on arms
control?
Answer. We expect China to act responsibly. China insists that it
is a great power and demands that it be accorded such a status. If that
is true, China must accept the responsibility of any great power--the
responsibility of reducing the overall nuclear threat and submitting
its forces to inspection and verification regimes similar to those
accepted by the United States and Russia. China's nuclear deterrent
cannot be verified as to numbers and the quality of its weapons. It
refuses to offer transparency into its nuclear force and refuses to
participate in any serious talks that would lead to any meaningful
transparency.
Question. Would China, which has only about 300 total nuclear
warheads compared to the roughly 6,500 total warheads possessed by the
United States and Russia, be allowed to build up to the much higher New
START levels were it to join the treaty?
Answer. Hypothetically, if China joined an agreement with the same
provisions as the New START Treaty, it would be subject to the same
numerical limits as the United States and Russia. However, we seek a
new agreement that is broader and better fits the security environment
we have today. If China wants the status of a great power, it needs to
place itself under the accountability of a treaty regime that would
verifiably limit its nuclear forces to a level sufficient for its
security, enhancing stability among all parties.
Question. What is the administration willing to put on the table in
talks with Russia and China on more comprehensive agreements?
Answer. The President has asked his national security team for
possible options on more comprehensive agreements with Russia and
China, and we are in the midst of developing such options. However, we
do not believe it is prudent to discuss our potential negotiating
strategies publicly.
Question. Is the administration's position that Russia must agree
to limits on its tactical nuclear weapons or that China must limit its
nuclear forces in some way as a condition for extending New START?
Answer. The President has asked for options from his national
security team, and we are working to support that process. Whether or
not to extend the New START Treaty is part of that discussion, but the
administration has not made any decision yet.
Question. Wouldn't extending New START by 5 years buy additional
time to develop U.S. negotiating positions, address issues of mutual
concern that impact strategic stability, and avoid new risks from an
unconstrained and less transparent U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship?
Answer. We are not just trying to buy time. We are attempting to
address the core impediments to restoring trust with Russia and
reestablishing the conditions necessary for further nuclear arms
control initiatives. We must consider a multitude of factors before
making any decision on whether or not to extend the New START Treaty--
for example, Russia's record of compliance with arms control
agreements, its overall malign behavior on other matters such as
Ukraine and election interference, and the fact that its nuclear
arsenal is growing in areas not covered under the New START Treaty.
__________
Responses of Hon. David J. Trachtenberg to Questions Submitted by
Senator Tim Kaine
Question. The Department of Energy has publically stated that
Secretary Perry has issued seven authorizations for exports to Saudi
Arabia. Before these Part 810 authorizations are approved by the
Department of Energy, the Department of Defense must be consulted. Who
at the Department of Defense was consulted by the Department of Energy
for each of these seven authorizations and on what dates?
Answer. The Department of Defense reviews Part 810 license
authorizations staffed to the Department by the Department of Energy
pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. The Defense
Technology Security administration (DTSA) is the entry point for these
license reviews under DoD Directive 5105.72. During the period November
3, 2017, to October 23, 2018, the Department of Defense was consulted
on all seven authorization requests approved by the Department of
Energy to transfer nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia. DTSA technical
experts; the Joint Staff; the Department of the Navy, Office of Naval
Reactors; and DoD Regional Policy experts reviewed the requests and
concurred with them.
Question. What awareness does the Department of Defense have about
the Chinese supply of ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia and assistance
in building a ballistic missile production factory inside Saudi Arabia?
Do you share the assessment that Saudi Arabia maintains one of the
largest ballistic missile arsenals in the region? What is the
Department doing to address this extremely concerning issue? If
necessary, provide a classified response.
Answer. A classified response has been provided separately.
__________
Responses of Hon. David J. Trachtenberg to Questions Submitted by
Senator Edward J. Markey
Question. How confident is the Defense Department in its assessment
of Russia's strategic nuclear warheads and launchers? From where does
the Defense Department draw this confidence?
Answer. The Department draws its confidence from the assessments
provided by the Intelligence Community. The Department cannot provide
an unclassified answer on the level of confidence in these assessments.
We could provide additional information in a closed setting or
classified response.
Question. Would losing New START's inspection and verifications
mechanisms impact U.S. confidence in its assessments of Russia's
strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems?
Answer. The end of the New START Treaty's verification regime would
end one source of information regarding Russia's strategic forces;
however, there are other sources such as national technical means. The
resulting impact on U.S. confidence in its assessments of Russia's
strategic forces would be best addressed by the Intelligence Community.
Question. If Russia was no longer constrained by the central limits
of the New START Treaty, would the Defense Department's planning for
nuclear contingencies with Russia be impacted? If yes, please describe
how. If no, please describe why U.S. planning would not be impacted.
Answer. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) states that one of
the enduring roles of nuclear weapons is to hedge against an uncertain
future. The NPR goes on to describe the importance of our strategic
capabilities remaining safe, secure, reliable, and flexible enough to
meet the ever-changing strategic environment.
Question. Has the Defense Department engaged in arms control
discussions with Russia since the President and his team announced an
interest in new arms control agreements?
Answer. In April 2019, a U.S. interagency delegation, including
representatives of the Defense Department, met with Russia counterparts
in a session of the New START Treaty's Bilateral Consultative
Commission (BCC) to discuss ongoing New START Treaty implementation
issues. The BCC usually convenes twice a year.
Question. What percentage of Russia's deployed strategic nuclear
warheads are accountable under the New START Treaty? If New START
expires, what percentage of Russia's deployed strategic nuclear
warheads would be legally constrained?
Answer. Under the New START Treaty, all of Russia's deployed
strategic nuclear warheads (those on deployed intercontinental
ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and those
counted for deployed heavy bombers) are accountable. This includes (as
of March 1, 2019) 517 launchers and 1,420 accountable warheads. In
addition, Russia is modernizing an active stockpile not accountable
under the New START Treaty of up to 2,000 NSNW employable by ships,
planes, and ground forces. If the New START Treaty expires, the
deployed strategic nuclear warheads of both Parties will no longer be
under any legal constraints created by the Treaty.
Question. Please compare unclassified estimates of the number of
Russia's nuclear weapons deployed on the delivery systems Putin
announced on March 1, 2018 to those deployed on Russia's nuclear Triad
today.
Answer. Since the systems described by Russian President Putin in
2018 are all in their developmental stages, we do not believe that any
nuclear warheads have been deployed on them yet. However, I would defer
to the Intelligence Community to provide a more detailed assessment of
when these systems could become operational.
Question. Can you describe Russia's interests in U.S. concessions
when approached about Non-strategic nuclear weapons arms control or
reductions? What U.S. concessions would the Defense Department
recommend in order to achieve a non-strategic nuclear weapons agreement
with Russia?
Answer. We do not believe it is prudent to discuss publicly our
potential negotiating strategy at this time. However, as stated in the
2018 Nuclear Posture Review, U.S. pursuit of a modern nuclear-armed
sea-launched cruise missile, once developed, may provide an incentive
for Russia to negotiate seriously a reduction of its non-strategic
nuclear weapons.
Question. Does the Defense Department view reducing or otherwise
limiting non-strategic nuclear weapons as a priority, compared to
maintaining the European Phased Adaptive Approach, or rotational
deployments of U.S. conventional forces in Europe?
Answer. During the last decade, Russia has upgraded the capacity of
its nuclear forces, as has China. Russia, in particular, is modernizing
and expanding an active stockpile of approximately 2,000 nonstrategic
nuclear weapons that can be deployed in a variety of ways, including on
ships, bombers, and tactical aircraft, and with ground forces. The
doctrine and exercises of Russia and China demonstrate their reliance
on such systems in both crisis and conflict. However, none of these
weapons are limited by any arms control treaty. Therefore, the
Department views the limitation or reduction of such weapons to be a
priority in any arms control negotiation. To be clear, the European
Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) is not directed against Russia, and is
irrelevant to the question of Russia's nuclear doctrine, capabilities,
and expanding non-strategic nuclear weapons stockpile. EPAA protects
our deployed forces and NATO Allies from missiles originating in the
Middle East. Despite all its rhetoric, Russia understands this, and is
unlikely to ever agree to trade away its non-strategic nuclear weapons
in exchange for Aegis Ashore in Europe.
Question. Is the Defense Department actively involved in
consultations with NATO regarding achieving an non-strategic nuclear
weapons agreement with Russia?
Answer. The United States briefs our NATO Allies on a routine and
continuing basis on arms control efforts that currently impact or could
potentially impact Alliance security. In addition, NATO's Committees on
Proliferation and on Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
have responsibility on behalf of all NATO Allies to examine issues
associated with the entire array of proliferation and arms control
issues potentially affecting the Alliance.
Question. Do weapons which the U.S. government classifies as
Russia's ``non-strategic nuclear weapons'' use short- and -intermediate
range, ground based missiles as delivery systems?
Answer. Yes, among other delivery systems as well.
Question. In addition to the SSC-8, Putin and his Defense Minister,
Sergey Shoigu, described a new ground-based version of the Kalibr sea-
launched cruise missile, and a hypersonic ground-launched missile. How
does the U.S. government plan to respond to these new systems?
Answer. The Department believes there is significant military
utility in developing conventional, ground-based missiles previously
prohibited by the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.
Fielding such systems is consistent with the National Defense
Strategy's direction to build lethality and enhance the combat
credibility and resilience of our forces.
In response to Russia's material breach, its fielding of the SSC-8
cruise missile, and its potential deployment of additional INF Treaty-
range systems, the Department is pursuing ground-based missiles, guided
by ongoing work involving all of the relevant DoD capability
development processes, so that DoD can determine how these systems best
fit within the broader portfolio of long-range strike options available
to the Joint Force.
Question. Is it possible to dissuade Russia from deploying these
weapons, and what is your strategy for doing so?
Answer. Considering that Russia continues to field the SSC-8 cruise
missile after almost 6 years of concerted U.S. diplomatic efforts to
convince it to return to compliance with the Intermediate-range Nuclear
Forces (INF) Treaty, it seems unlikely that Russia can be dissuaded
from deploying such systems.
Question. Does the Defense Department believe the New START Treaty
remains in national security interest of the United States?
Answer. Much has changed in the near-decade since the New START
Treaty was signed in 2010, including the expansion of Russian and
Chinese nuclear capabilities. A decision regarding extension of the New
START Treaty has not yet been made, but will be balanced against
changes in the strategic environment and broader concerns regarding
Russia's non-compliance with other arms control and nonproliferation
commitments. Any extension decision must weigh a variety of factors to
ensure the national security of the United States and that of our
allies and partners is maintained and strengthened.
Question. What possible responses might the Defense Department
recommend to counter Russia's likely deployment of additional INF
systems after termination of the agreement?
Answer. The Department believes there is significant military
utility in developing conventional, ground-based missiles previously
prohibited by the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.
Fielding such systems is consistent with the National Defense
Strategy's direction to build lethality and enhance the combat
credibility and resilience of our forces.
In response to Russia's material breach, its fielding of the SSC-8
cruise missile, and potential deployment of additional INF Treaty-range
systems, the Department is pursuing ground-based missiles, guided by
ongoing work involving all of the relevant DoD capability development
processes, so that it can determine how these systems best fit within
the broader portfolio of long-range strike options available to the
Joint Force.
Question. Did the State Department ever ask the Russian government
to consider codifying a ban on arming INF-range missiles with nuclear
warheads? If not, why not?
Answer. I am not aware of efforts by the State Department to ask
the Russian Government to consider establishing a ban on arming
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty-range missiles with
nuclear warheads. Since the INF Treaty prohibits the possession,
production, and flight-testing of INF Treaty-range, ground-launched
ballistic and cruise missiles, the type of warhead is irrelevant to
this core provision of the INF Treaty.
Question. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review states that Russia has an
``escalate to de-escalate'' policy in which it would threaten or
possibly use nuclear weapons first on a limited basis in crises or at
lower levels of conflict. Russia disputes this characterization of its
doctrine. Further, Lt. Gen. Robert Ashley, director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
in January that a Russian decision to use nuclear weapons first, on a
limited basis or otherwise, would be driven by ``the threshold they
think the Kremlin would be at risk.'' Do you agree with General
Ashley's assessment? If not, why not?
Answer. On May 29, 2019, Lt. Gen. Ashley publicly described Russian
nuclear doctrine and policy as follows: ``Russia's large and diverse
stockpile facilitates a doctrine that envisions the potential coercive
use of nuclear weapons. Russia assesses that the threat of nuclear
escalation or actual first use of nuclear weapons would serve to `de-
escalate' a conflict on terms favorable to Russia. Russian defense
officials have spoken publicly about `de-escalating' a conflict through
limited nuclear use and it is a fact that the Russian military has
prepared plans and is well trained to transition rapidly to nuclear use
in order to compel an end to a conventional conflict.'' I agree with
this assessment and can make additional detail available in a
classified forum.
Question. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review states that Russia has an
``escalate to de-escalate'' policy in which it would threaten or
possibly use nuclear weapons first on a limited basis in crises or at
lower levels of conflict. Russia disputes this characterization of its
doctrine. Further, Lt. Gen. Robert Ashley, director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
in January that a Russian decision to use nuclear weapons first, on a
limited basis or otherwise, would be driven by ``the threshold they
think the Kremlin would be at risk.'' Is it your position that this
constitutes an ``escalate to de-escalate'' nuclear doctrine?
Answer. On May 29, 2019, Lt. Gen. Ashley publicly described Russian
nuclear doctrine and policy as follows: ``Russia's large and diverse
stockpile facilitates a doctrine that envisions the potential coercive
use of nuclear weapons. Russia assesses that the threat of nuclear
escalation or actual first use of nuclear weapons would serve to `de-
escalate' a conflict on terms favorable to Russia. Russian defense
officials have spoken publicly about `de-escalating' a conflict through
limited nuclear use and it is a fact that the Russian military has
prepared plans and is well trained to transition rapidly to nuclear use
in order to compel an end to a conventional conflict.'' I believe Lt.
Gen. Ashley's assessment describes an ``escalate-to-deescalate''
doctrine, and his description is consistent with the text of the 2018
Nuclear Posture Review.