[House Report 116-565]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
116th Congress } { Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session } { 116-565
======================================================================
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021
_______
October 30, 2020.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Schiff, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
MINORITY VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 7856]
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was
referred the bill (H.R. 7856) to authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 2021 for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes,
having considered the same, reports favorably thereon without
amendment and recommends that the bill do pass.
Purpose
The purpose of H.R. 7856, the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 (the Act), is to authorize
funding for the activities of the 17 elements comprising the
U.S. Intelligence Community (the IC).
Compliance With Classified Schedule of Authorizations and With
Unclassified and Classified Committee Direction
Because most of the intelligence budget involves classified
programs, the bulk of the Committee's explanatory and directive
language for each fiscal year is found in the classified annex
accompanying the bill. The classified annex also includes the
classified schedule of authorizations as well as explanatory
and directive language.
The classified schedule of authorizations is incorporated
directly into the legislation by Section 102 of the bill. The
Executive Branch shall strictly comply with all Committee
direction and other guidance set forth in this report and in
the classified annex.
The classified annex and classified schedule of
authorizations shall be made available for review by all
Members of the House of Representatives, on conditions set by
the Committee at the time of its approval of H.R. 7856.
Scope of Committee Review
The bill authorizes U.S. intelligence and intelligence-
related activities within the jurisdiction of the Committee,
including the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and the
Military Intelligence Program (MIP), the Homeland Security
Intelligence Program (HSIP), and the Information Systems
Security Program (ISSP). The NIP consists of all activities of
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), as
well as intelligence, counterintelligence and related
activities conducted by: the Central Intelligence Agency; the
Department of Defense, including the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and
certain activities of the Departments of the Army, Navy, Air
Force, and Marine Corps; the Department of Energy; the
Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Administration; the
Department of Homeland Security, including the U.S. Coast Guard
and intelligence elements of DHS; Department of State; and the
Department of the Treasury. The Committee has exclusive or
concurrent jurisdiction of these activities--and exclusive
jurisdiction to study the sources and methods of the IC.
Committee Views
H.R. 7856 ensures the IC has the resources needed to
compete against the Nation's strategic adversaries--like a
rising China and a revanchist Russia. It invests in next-
generation technologies, like artificial intelligence and high-
performance computing, and promotes educational partnerships
with academic institutions to increase STEM talent and
diversity throughout the national security community.
The Committee also has sought to focus IC and public
attention on non-traditional threats, like climate change and
global pandemics. In that regard the bill makes permanent the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence's Climate
Security Advisory Council, which assists elements of the IC
that analyze the security impacts of climate change. H.R. 7856
also mandates an annual Worldwide Threat Briefing to Congress;
requires a National Intelligence Estimate on the threat of
global pandemics; makes permanent an annual requirement for the
IC to report on emerging infectious diseases; and directs a
study on creating an advisory council on global health threats.
National security threats are increasingly diffuse, and we must
take address what we are seeing every single day--from the
devastating wildfires affecting the West, to hurricanes
battering the Gulf coast, to the COVID-19 pandemic that has
killed over 200,000 Americans.
H.R. 7856 also prioritizes the protection of civil
liberties and human rights, at home and abroad. To that end,
the bill imposes limitations and transparency requirements on
intelligence support to domestic law enforcement responding to
protests or civil disturbances. It requires a report on the
People's Republic of China's intervention in Hong Kong. The
legislation also reaffirms an unmet statutory requirement for
the IC to produce an unclassified report on the murder of U.S.
resident and journalist, Jamal Khashoggi; and discontinues
intelligence support to the Saudi-led coalition's campaign in
Yemen.
We conclude with some observations about our Minority
colleagues' opposition to the bill. We believe the Committee's
Minority members voted ``no'' because a handful of the IAA's
provisions are intended to address abuses related to the
Intelligence Community and election security, which were
committed by or involved President Trump or his allies. Our
counterparts in the Minority do not seriously dispute that such
incidents took place. Yet legislating to prevent them from
recurring, in their view and that of the Trump Administration,
is a ``partisan'' act requiring firm opposition.
The provisions in question advance good-government
principles about which, until now, Republicans and Democrats
had agreed for years. Had we proposed such provisions during
any other presidency, they almost certainly would have been
endorsed without reservation by all the Committee's members,
for inclusion in the IAA. We hope the Minority has a change of
heart and decides to support H.R. 7856 during its consideration
on the floor of the House.
Committee Views Regarding China
China has used the past two decades to transform itself
into a nation potentially capable of supplanting the United
States as the leading power in the world. Its ascendance has
been spectacular in scale and far less benign than initially
expected. That has required special efforts by the U.S.
Government and the U.S. Intelligence Community. Accordingly,
the Committee in 2019 commenced a ``deep dive'', intended to
examine the IC's China activities comprehensively. The
Committee intends to issue a report containing its findings and
recommendations before the end of the 116th Congress; in the
meantime, H.R. 7856 contains provisions developed during the
Committee's study.
These proposals in part respond to the speed and nature of
China's rise--which caught the West off guard. During the 1990s
and 2000s the consensus in the West was that, as China became
more prosperous and developed, it would also eventually
liberalize at home and play a constructive role in its
relations abroad. Observers convinced themselves that, among
other things, leadership in Beijing had learned the ``right''
lessons from the reaction to the Tiananmen Square crackdown in
1989--and therefore would chart a reformist course. Confidence
in that view was central to the decisions to admit China to the
World Trade Organization and to award the 2008 Summer Olympics
to Beijing.
The last decade has shown those expectations to have been
deeply misplaced. Belief in the inevitability of democratic
liberalism blinded Western policymakers to the Chinese
Communist Party's overriding objective: seizing more and more
power. In the interim, the People's Republic of China has
increasingly sought to revise the international order in a way
that furthers its own strategic interests and undermines those
of the United States and other nations. Beijing has sought to
expand its economic and political influence through its ``One
Belt, One Road'' Initiative and the large-scale cooption of
media outlets throughout the world. Militarily, China has
embarked on a massive modernization drive--creating a ``blue
water'' navy, investing heavily in hypersonic weapons,
developing its own fifth-generation fighter, militarizing a
series of atolls and islets in the South China Sea to
strengthen its claims in the region, and building its first
overseas military base in Djibouti.
Perhaps most consequential of all, China has invested--and
continues to invest--great resources, technology, and political
will into the creation of a post-modern authoritarian state.
The country's people are monitored around the clock through
their phones and an ever-growing network of surveillance
cameras equipped with facial-recognition technology. Initially
fueled by stolen U.S. technology and intellectual property,
these advances are now increasingly driven by Chinese
innovation. Beijing's expanding technological prowess will
enable the Chinese Communist Party to improve its ability to
watch, and therefore control, China's population. This
``digital authoritarianism'' has not only been deployed at home
but has also been increasingly marketed to aspiring
authoritarians abroad.
Its authoritarianism is hardly the only threat emanating
from China. The emergence in 2019 of a novel coronavirus in
Wuhan also demonstrated the profound dangers posed by a
transnational health crisis originating within China's borders.
By seeking to preserve its domestic political stability and
international image--in lieu of fostering a transparent and
effective approach to public health--China has placed the
United States, our allies, and the world at risk. China's
public response has been to obfuscate the Chinese Communist
Party's role in the crisis, through the calculated promotion of
fringe conspiracy theories and misinformation. The latter seek
to shift blame to the United States, muddy the truth about the
virus's origins, and promote the image of China as a
responsible global leader. To date, the coronavirus has
infected at least 31 million people and resulted in over
962,000 deaths worldwide, of which the United States has over
203,000.
The confluence of the widespread, if not yet fully
understood, global impact of COVID-19, the prolonged, excessive
allocation of American intelligence resources to
counterterrorism, China's emergence as a global competitor, and
other transnational events make this an urgent moment to assess
the Nation's intelligence posture towards China; and to provide
strategic guidance to the IC as it repositions itself to better
understand China's domestic environment, capabilities, plans,
and intentions.
To that end, the Committee undertook its ``deep dive''
which sought to comprehensively review the IC's posture vis-a-
vis China. The Committee sought to assess the IC's ability to
execute, with respect to China, its core mission of
``collecting, analyzing, and delivering foreign intelligence
and counterintelligence'' to America's leaders so they can make
sound decisions. In support of this charge, staff reviewed
thousands of analytic assessments, spent hundreds of hours with
IC officers, and visited facilities operated by over a dozen IC
elements. The goals of the Committee's review were to: (1)
assess the IC's performance within the six phases of the so-
called ``intelligence cycle''; (2) provide recommendations to
increase the quality of raw intelligence reports and finished
analytic products; and (3) assess the adequacy of current IC
resource levels.
The Committee's central finding is that the IC has not
sufficiently adapted to a changing geopolitical and
technological environment increasingly shaped by a rising China
and the growing importance of interlocking non-military
transnational threats, such as global health, economic
security, and climate change. Absent a significant realignment
of resources, the U.S. government and intelligence community
will fail to achieve the outcomes required to enable continued
U.S. competition with China on the global stage for decades to
come, and to protect the U.S. health and security. This year's
bill seeks to address some of those resource challenges.
Committee Views Regarding the Middle East and South Asia
Even as the United States prioritizes meeting the unique
challenges posed by China and Russia, it continues to confront
a range of national security challenges in the Middle East and
South Asia. The IC will continue to play an important role in
addressing them.
At the same time, efforts by two successive Administrations
to end the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have led the
United States to seek deeper partnerships with various regional
actors, especially the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the
United Arab Emirates (UAE). Notwithstanding greater U.S.
engagement and offers of cooperation, both countries since 2017
have pursued policies that are at odds with U.S. regional
objectives--which complicate efforts at greater intelligence
and security cooperation. In fact, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi went so
far as to participate in a blockade of Qatar, an important U.S.
partner which hosts crucial U.S. military facilities and is
supporting U.S. efforts to achieve a political settlement of
the war in Afghanistan.
To this end, the bill includes several provisions drafted
to address some of the diplomatic, military, and economic
issues at the heart of the U.S.-KSA and U.S.-UAE relationships.
It directly addresses, for example, the disastrous Saudi-
led military campaign in Yemen. Now in its fifth year, the war
in Yemen has created new safe havens for international
terrorists, provided new opportunities for Iranian meddling in
the Gulf, and contributed to the creation of the worst man-made
humanitarian catastrophe in the world. The Committee is
concerned that the Administration's decision to bypass Congress
in May 2019 and sell additional arms to both Saudi Arabia and
the UAE will only exacerbate this crisis and undercut U.S.
security interests. Moreover, the Committee is disturbed by the
findings of the State Department Office of the Inspector
General, issued in August 2020, that the Administration
authorized weapons sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE without
conducting a required assessment of the potential for these
sales to contribute to civilian harm. This failure compounds
the Committee's longstanding concern that the Administration is
ignoring and withholding from Congress credible evidence that
the Saudi-led Coalition has engaged in repeated violations of
the law of armed conflict, including by bombing civilians and
civilian objects in Yemen.
Accordingly, the bill as approved by the Committee insists
that the Intelligence Community share this information with the
American people and Congress, so as to fully inform future
decision-making on arms sales and ongoing Congressional
investigations of whether executive branch officials violated
any relevant laws and procedures when authorizing such sales to
Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In addition, the bill requires that
the United States cease intelligence sharing with Saudi Arabia
for the purpose of supporting the Saudi-led coalition's
campaign against the Houthis in Yemen.
The past year also saw a resumption of Saudi-linked
terrorist attacks on American citizens, when in December 2019 a
Saudi military officer with significant ties to al-Qaeda killed
three American servicemembers and wounded eight other
individuals. This was the first successful foreign terrorist
attack on U.S. soil since Saudi and Emirati citizens
perpetrated the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Saudi and
Saudi-inspired individuals have been responsible for the
overwhelming number of foreign terrorist attacks against
Americans over the past two decades.
With that in mind, the Committee is concerned by reports
that the Saudi government is not cooperating fully with the
U.S. investigation into the Pensacola attack and supports the
Department of Justice's ongoing effort to fully investigate and
ensure accountability for the attack. The Committee also
questions the Department of Defense's June 2020 decision to
resume its training of Saudi military students in the United
States following only a brief review of the shortcomings in
U.S. vetting procedures, and in light of indications that Saudi
Arabia has not taken significant additional steps in
cooperation with the United States to enhance inadequate
vetting procedures. Furthermore, the Committee is concerned
that the Kingdom has not taken sufficient steps to curb the
propagation of extremist ideologies that inspire terrorist
attacks against U.S. citizens and has directed the Intelligence
Community to provide a report on this matter. Relatedly, the
Committee is troubled by the Administration's continued
reluctance to make available to Congress and families of the
September 11 victims additional details regarding the role of
Saudi nationals in those attacks. The Committee urges the
Department of Justice to fully cooperate with Congressional
requests and reach an accommodation for providing this long-
requested information in a timely manner.
While the Administration has focused on undermining the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran, which had
effectively constrained Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions,
public reporting indicates that Saudi Arabia is developing a
nuclear fuel cycle that some experts assess has no obvious
purpose other than to support a clandestine nuclear weapons
program. Saudi officials have previously said they want to
enrich uranium domestically. Despite being a member of the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Kingdom has refused
to conclude an Additional Protocol and Saudi Arabia's crown
prince has publicly stated a willingness to acquire nuclear
weapons ``as soon as possible'' if Iran were to develop a
nuclear weapon. Any clandestine Saudi push for a nuclear weapon
would have grave implications U.S. interests, to include the
security of U.S. partners, such as Israel, and the broader
region.
In that vein, the Committee-passed bill directs the
Intelligence Community to provide a detailed report assessing
Saudi Arabia's undeclared nuclear activities, as well as a
clear-eyed assessment of the Kingdom's willingness to forswear
a domestic enrichment capability and abide by the same ``gold
standard'' that the United States wisely required of the UAE.
Given the urgency of the issue, the Committee would urge the
Intelligence Community to dedicate additional resources to
scrutinizing Saudi Arabia's nuclear activities. The Committee
also reaffirms Congress' longstanding view that the United
States shall not conclude any civil nuclear cooperation
agreements with Saudi Arabia that do not include robust
safeguards and nonproliferation provisions, to include a strict
prohibition against uranium enrichment.
In the economic sphere, Saudi Arabia's leadership undercut
U.S. national security in March 2020 by pursuing an ill-
conceived oil price war with Russia. The Committee is troubled
by public reporting indicating that the United States lacked
advanced warning of Saudi Arabia's actions, which collapsed
global energy markets and contributed to a loss of tens of
thousands of American jobs. The Committee hopes that in light
of such tumult, the Intelligence Community would dedicate
additional resources to scrutinizing Saudi Arabia's energy
policy decisions.
Separately, the Committee is concerned that the UAE has
moved aggressively to expand economic and technological
cooperation with both Russia and China, including in the
defense sphere. This appears to have contributed to a decision
by the Trump Administration to send a team to UAE in August
2020 to discuss the UAE relationship with China.
Notwithstanding the potential for the UAE to share sensitive
U.S. defense technology and systems with America's adversaries,
the Administration has reportedly indicated a willingness to
transfer to the UAE the most advanced armed and unarmed U.S.
defense systems. Because of the proliferation risks and
unresolved concerns about technology transfer, the Committee
objects to these transfers, some of which violate and undermine
the Missile Technology Control Regime. The Committee-passed
bill also directs the Intelligence Community to provide a
report on UAE's defense activities with China, Russia, and
other peer competitors--especially with regard to unmanned
aerial vehicle systems (UAVs)--and believes the Intelligence
Community's assessment of the technology transfer concerns must
be a factor in future decisions to transfer or not transfer
these systems to the UAE.
U.S. efforts to strengthen security and intelligence
cooperation with Saudi Arabia and UAE also are undermined by
both countries' human rights abuses and efforts in recent years
to undermine inclusive, democratic governments in the region.
Of great concern, Saudi Arabia has failed to hold accountable
the Saudi officials responsible for the brutal murder of U.S.
resident and journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Equally troubling, the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence has not
provided Congress an unclassified report detailing Saudi
officials' culpability for the killing, as explicitly required
by the law. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence
has withheld this report despite a growing abundance of
publicly available information, and even as it has justified
the declassification of other documents requested by the
President's supporters in Congress that appear to reveal
sensitive U.S. intelligence sources. This apparent effort to
abuse the classification process for political purposes and
blatant contravention of a law supported by nearly every Member
of Congress is unacceptable. The Committee has therefore been
left with no choice but to direct, in the bill, the suspension
of certain activities with Saudi Arabia if and until the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence complies with the law
and provides the unclassified report, as specified under the
law.
Finally, public reporting in recent years, meanwhile, has
detailed the role of UAE personnel in allegedly torturing
detainees captured in Yemen, as well as efforts by entities
affiliated with the Emirati government to utilize former U.S.
intelligence personnel and technologies to surveil political
activists. These UAE activities are not consistent with U.S.
values or national security interests. They contrast with the
UAE's claims to be an open society that shares U.S. values of
tolerance and respect for human rights. The Committee-passed
legislation therefore directs changes to U.S. regulations and
laws aimed at helping to ensure that former U.S. Intelligence
Community personnel do not inadvertently aid or abet efforts by
the UAE or any other country to violate the human rights and
privacy of Americans or any other citizens.
Unclassified Committee Direction
Diversity and Inclusion
Significantly increasing diversity and inclusion within the
IC is vital to the protection of U.S. national security. It
thus long has been, and continues to be, a mission-critical
priority for the Committee.
While the Committee acknowledges the marginal increase in
overall representation of minorities, women, and Persons with
Disabilities (PWD) in the IC, such groups are scarcely
represented at pay grades above GS/GG-13, the full performance
marker. At the Senior Executive Service (SES) and Senior
Intelligence Service (SIS) pay levels, minorities are
practically non-existent. Only a handful of individuals from
diverse backgrounds occupy the top positions across the 17 IC
elements. And the percentage of individuals from diverse
backgrounds in the IC lags woefully behind that within other
departments of the federal government, as well as the private
sector.
Seeking to address such challenges, the IC has taken
various steps: conducting early outreach; expanding authorities
for grants to and partnerships with academic organizations from
the elementary school through the collegiate levels; holding
regional IC-wide recruitment events and virtual career fairs;
implementing a cloud-based platform; as well as accelerating
impactful security clearance reform. Senior leaders across the
IC also have committed to buttressing retention, promotion,
employee resource groups, and accountability programs.
Despite these efforts, the statistics continue to be bleak.
Among other things:
White males make up 84% of the IC's SIS and
SES positions, despite making up 70% of the top
leadership positions in the civilian labor force;
The number of minorities and women serving
as managers and supervisors within the IC has decreased
from 2017 to 2019;
Minority departures from the IC steadily
have increased from 2016 to 2019;
PWD departures from the IC increased in
2019, despite significant decreases since 2016.
Like the rest of the government, the IC must do far better.
It is imperative that the IC hire, retain, and promote diverse
candidates, including those with experience and expertise in
Science, Technology, Engineering, Arts and Mathematics (STEAM)
fields; in analysis; and in foreign languages necessary to
successful prosecution of the IC's mission.
Therefore, the Committee directs that, by no later than
April 30, 2021, the Director of National Intelligence shall
brief the Committee on the IC's 2020 Annual Demographics
Report. Such briefing shall, like the Report itself, include
the expanded reporting categories mandated by the FY2020
Intelligence Authorization Act.
Further, the Committee directs that the ODNI submit to the
Intelligence Committees by June 30, 2021 a written report
outlining the findings and variables that affect the IC
demographics noted above, including an attachment listing the
incumbents of the top three positions by IC element and
demographic categories.
Finally, the Committee directs the Director of National
Intelligence, by no later than June 30, 2021, to complete a
comprehensive review of promotions for calendar year 2020--
broken down by gender, race, PWD, grade, career category, and
tenure in both grade and in the federal government.
Emerging Technologies
This Committee remains dedicated to ensuring that the
Intelligence Community (IC) has the resources and authorities
necessary to maintain the United States' leadership in
scientific and technological discovery. Therefore, the
Committee directs that, no later than June 1, 2021, the ODNI,
in coordination with all relevant agencies of the IC, provide
to the Committee a written report that, at a minimum:
1. Proposes a plan for improved engagement with the
private sector and academic institutions;
2. Proposes a plan to launch a three-year pilot of
the Public-Private Talent Exchange, and annual reports
to the congressional intelligence committees on
progress of the pilot program;
3. Assesses the viability of a fellowship program for
recent graduates of science, technology, engineering,
and mathematics programs to work in the IC for a
limited period of time;
4. Identifies each IC element's use of Other
Transaction Authority in the previous three fiscal
years;
5. Identifies any gaps or limitations in the ability
of the IC to interact with academic institutions;
6. Addresses the sufficiency of the IC's
relationships with the Federally Funded Research and
Development Centers, and in particular with respect to
strategic management and coordination among relevant IC
elements which participate in the Department of
Energy's Strategic Intelligence Partnership Program, to
support the IC's scientific and technological research
and development priorities;
7. Identifies existing areas of collaboration with
foreign intelligence partners on scientific and
technological research and development activities, and
identifying areas for growth and any limitations
preventing further collaboration;
8. Proposes a plan to improve remote and telework
opportunities for the IC workforce, and specifically to
make such opportunities available to individuals who
have accepted an offer of employment but have not
completed the security clearance process; and
9. Assesses the viability of creating an advisory
board modeled after the Defense Intelligence Board.
Report to Congress on Release of Medical Records of Guantanamo Bay
Detainees
The Committee is concerned that the medical records of the
forty (40) remaining detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station
are not being made available to the detainees or their
representatives in sufficient scope or a timely fashion,
including because the Executive Branch takes the position that
some of the information in the records is properly classified
under Executive Order 13526. The Committee is particularly
concerned about claims, including by the Center for Victims of
Torture and Physicians for Human Rights, that ``medical needs
[of detainees] are subordinated to security functions.'' It is
important that complete medical information be made available
to detainees and their representatives in a timely fashion in a
way that protects any legitimately classified information.
Therefore, in order to assist its oversight of the
classification of medical records, the Committee directs that
the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security,
in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and
with such heads of elements of the Intelligence Community that
the Director deems appropriate, and by not later than June 1,
2021, shall submit to the Committee a comprehensive written
report on the handling, dissemination, and release of
Guantanamo detainee medical records.
The report shall include, at a minimum:
1. A list of every method that a Guantanamo Bay
detainee or his representative can use to request that
(a) medical records be provided to the detainee or his
representatives and (b) full and complete medical
records be provided to the detainee or his
representatives;
2. A detailed discussion of the purposes for which
medical records can be released to the detainee or his
representatives, including use in litigation, to inform
independent medical assessments of the detainee
unrelated to litigation, to enable a detainee's
representatives to advocate for more effective medical
care, or any other purpose;
3. Lists of (a) which of the above purposes would
allow for a detainee to receive full and complete
medical records, and in each case for which purposes
full and complete records were provided and (b)
detainees who have been provided full and complete
medical records, and in each case for which purposes
full and complete records were provided;
4. The number of detainees who have been provided
with full and complete copies of their medical records;
5. A description of how long each process for record
review takes from start to finish and potential changes
that could speed up the process;
6. A step-by-step description of the process for
review of detainee medical records for production to
the detainee or his representatives in habeas corpus
litigation;
7. A step-by-step description of the process for
review of detainee medical records for production to
the detainee or his representatives in military
commission litigation;
8. A step-by-step description of the process for
review of detainee medical records for production to
the detainee or his representatives pursuant to the
Freedom of Information Act;
9. A step-by-step description of the process for
review of detainee medical records for production to
the detainee or his representatives as part of the
Periodic Review process established pursuant to
Executive Order 13567;
10. A step-by-step description of the process for
review of detainee medical records for production to
the detainee or his representatives pursuant to any
other process that could result in the provision of
such records to the detainee or his representatives;
11. The risks and benefits of creating a separate
process by which a detainee or his representatives can
request medical records for the purpose of advocating
for more effective medical and psychological care of
the detainee during his continued detention;
12. A description of every basis for withholding
information pursuant to any of the processes described
in items 4-8, including classification, Controlled
Unclassified Information, executive privilege, or force
protection; and
13. A list of every category of classified
information used to redact information from medical
records, including an identification of which agency
`owns' the information redacted pursuant to the
category.
Any step-by-step description shall include identification
of who may make the request pursuant to the process, how the
request is made (and to whom), a description of how records are
gathered for processing, a description of each step that the
records make along the way to a final releasable product
(including the agency conducting the review, the specific
office tasked with the review, the type of information that
that office is tasked with redacting from the records), a
description of who receives the records at the conclusion of
the process, a description of any controls on further
dissemination that the records are subject to at the end of the
process, and a flow chart or other graphical depiction of the
process from start to finish.
The report shall be unclassified, but may include a
classified annex.
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security Program
Management
The Committee supports the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)) performing a limited
program management or incubation role for programs which may
provide unique value to the Defense Intelligence and Security
Enterprises. However, there is apparently limited guidance as
to how or when a program may be managed by USD(I&S) or shifted
to another DOD component to manage.
Therefore, the Committee directs the USD(I&S), by no later
than May 27, 2021, to submit to the Committee a written plan
for transitioning the management of all current programs to an
appropriate DOD component within 24 months of such report's
submission; to the extent USD(I&S) may wish to continue to
manage a particular program, the report shall provide the
committees with a justification for why its continued
management of the program is warranted. The written plan should
also set forth criteria that USD(I&S) will use going forward,
in determining whether to manage future programs.
IC/CSA Framework
Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act and
corresponding Intelligence Authorization Act directed the
USD(I&S) and ODNI to create a framework to more effectively
manage elements of the IC that are also Combat Support Agencies
(CSAs).
While the Committee strongly supports the GAMECHANGER tool
and is encouraged by its promising capabilities--which include
enabling interagency lexicon, policy reconciliation and
streamlining policy development--this tool alone does not
fulfill the FY 2018 direction to create a framework for
managing IC elements that are also CSAs.
The Committee is particularly interested in the validation
and refinement of such a framework; identification of any
necessary amendments to existing policies and relevant
processes, authorities, command and control constructs; and the
definitions underpinning the framework. Finally, the
reconciliation of variances in the definitions used by the DOD
and/or IC is a significant and important component of the 1626
direction and goes to the very core of congressional intent for
the provision.
Therefore, the Committee directs the USD(I&S) and ODNI to
present to the congressional intelligence and defense
committees, by no later than March 15, 2021, a written plan of
action and milestones for complete implementation of Section
1626 of the FY 2018 NDAA.
ISR Transfer Fund
The Committee is generally supportive of the flexibility
provided within the Intelligence Surveillance and
Reconnaissance Transfer Fund (ISR TF) and appreciated
engagement by USDI&S based on previous direction in the IAA for
FY 2018, 2019, and 2020. However, the Committee strongly
believes that funding provided in the ISR transfer fund should
be used to bolster Department of Defense ISR capabilities that
directly support the National Defense Strategy.
Therefore, the Committee directs that USD(I&S) prioritize
funding which may be made available from the ISR TF to
accelerate or facilitate projects, platforms, and capabilities
aligned with service or department strategy documents directly
or indirectly supporting the National Defense Strategy.
Defense Intelligence Analysis Program (DIAP) Staffing Levels
The Committee supports the Department of Defense's ongoing
efforts to shift its focus from counterterrorism and other
missions to those involving near-peer adversaries, including
China and Russia. However, many of the Defense Intelligence
Enterprise's (DIE) structures remain optimized for
counterterrorism and have not sufficiently adapted to reflect
the Department's change in emphasis. The Committee is
particularly interested in staffing levels within the Defense
Intelligence Analysis Program (DIAP).
Therefore, the Committee directs the USD(I&S), in
coordination with the Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA), to conduct a review of the DIAP's level of
effort, expressed in terms of Full Time Equivalents (FTEs),
both at DIA headquarters and at Combatant Commands. USD(I&S)
shall brief the Committee by no later than November 1, 2021 on
the results of this review. Such briefing shall include, at a
minimum, USD(I&S)'s recommendations to balance analytic level-
of-effort against the Department's current requirements, and
the steps USD(I&S) intends to take within fiscal year 2022 to
more effectively align FTEs against Department requirements,
particularly with respect to those regarding China and Russia.
Hypersonic Aircraft
Congress has long expressed concern about the threats posed
by hypersonic weapons and the imperative for the United States
of rapidly developing offensive and defensive hypersonic
weapons systems. The Fiscal Year 2020 Department of Defense
Appropriations Conference Report includes $100,000,000 to
establish a Joint Hypersonics Transition Office, and to develop
and implement a roadmap for hypersonics. Further, the report
accompanying H.R. 2968, the House-passed Department of Defense
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2020, included language
encouraging Air Force research into reusable hypersonic
propulsion technologies including high Mach turbines.
The Committee is also aware of ongoing private sector
efforts, independently and in partnership with federal agencies
and departments, to develop aircraft capable of flying at
speeds even beyond Mach 5. These aircraft have the potential to
enhance the IC's and the Defense Intelligence Enterprise's
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.
Therefore, the Committee directs the USD(I&S), in
coordination with the Secretary of the Air Force and the
Director of National Intelligence and by no later than March
21, 2021, to brief the Committee on:
1. The capability gaps that high Mach and hypersonic
aircraft can fill;
2. An acquisition strategy for such capabilities; and
3. An overview of the roles and responsibilities for
this strategy.
U.S. INDOPACOM China Strategic Initiative
The Department of Defense has sought to prioritize
preparing for the current and future threats posed by near-peer
adversaries, including the People's Republic of China, in the
Defense Wide Review and associated planning efforts. The
Committee is extremely supportive of the Department's efforts
to more effectively analyze and predict Chinese decision-
making.
The China Strategic Initiative is an effort within the
Department that seeks to inform and broaden the Department's
understanding of China. This program intends to provide a
rigorous, thoughtful study of the strategic environment. The
Committee notes that the Department will likely continue to
benefit from such thoughtful analyses, which should in turn
lead to more informed and judicious decision-making.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Department to analyze
requested funding levels for the China Strategic Initiative
across the future years defense program and to resource the
program at a level commensurate with the value that the program
provides to the Department.
ARMY
Army Foreign Language Training
In 2015, the military services agreed that linguists would
meet a 2+/2+ reading and listening standard before graduating
from the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Course
(DLIFLC). This will enable support to both Service-derived and
National Security Agency language requirements. Despite this
commitment, the Army has been met with a number of limiting
factors and may not meet the 2+/2+ graduation standard by the
Army's goal of Fiscal Year 2023.
Since 2016 the Army also has not met its recruitment and
retention goals for the Cryptologic Linguist and Human
Intelligence Collector specialties. While the Army has taken
steps to improve recruiting and retention of soldiers with
necessary foreign language skills, challenges persist--
including an inability to assess language proficiency easily,
as well as security clearance investigation and processing
delays.
1. Therefore, the Committee directs the Secretary of
the Army to complete a formal doctrine, organization,
training, materiel, leadership, education, personnel,
facilities, and policy assessment to evaluate:
2. The language training requirements for its
Cryptologic Linguist and Human Intelligence Collector
specialties; and
3. The Total Army Language Program's current and
anticipated requirements to support language-dependent
Soldiers upon their graduation from DLIFLC.
4. Additionally, the Army shall provide a report to
the intelligence committees on the ability for the Army
to meet the 2+/2+ standard requirement by Fiscal Year
2023. The report should include major limiting factors
inhibiting the Army from meeting the 2+/2+ requirement,
mitigation measures (including budget implications) or
a determination recommending a change to the
requirement by fiscal year 2023.
Finally, the Committee directs the Secretary of the Army to
conduct a study by May 2021 to identify methods other than the
Defense Language Aptitude Battery to determine a Soldier's
language aptitude.
Army Tactical SIGINT Payload
Since 2011, the Army has attempted to develop a pod, the
Tactical SIGINT Payload (TSP), capable of meeting documented
SIGINT collection requirements for counterinsurgency
environments. While initial developmental test results may have
warranted a low rate initial production decision, subsequent
operational test failures indicated that TSP could not meet the
program's original requirements. Consequently, the Army
reallocated TSP funds to other priorities. The Army then
conducted forward operational assessments in 2017 and 2019
which demonstrated some limited operational utility in
counterinsurgency environments and informed the decision to
transition the TSP program of record to a Quick Reaction
Capability (QRC) in support of Combatant Command (CCMD)
counterinsurgency requirements.
The Committee supports the Army's decision to transition
the TSP program to a QRC. However, the Committee is concerned
the Army has not allocated resources necessary to ensure that a
TSP pod can support emergent CCMD requirements. The Committee
is also concerned that the Army failed to partner with the
National Security Agency (NSA) before finalizing the TSP
requirements and developing a materiel solution.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Secretary of the Army,
by no later than January 27, 2021, to provide to the Committee
a written report regarding the TSP and its successor, the
Multi-Domain Sensor System (MDSS). The report shall address, at
a minimum, how the MDSS will utilize a suite of SIGINT sensors
to meet Army requirements; and set forth a plan for the Army to
partner closely with the NSA on SIGINT solutions for the
future, consistent with the requirements of 10 U.S.C 2337.
Military Intelligence Readiness Reporting
The Army assesses intelligence readiness at the strategic
and tactical levels in accordance with DoD Force Readiness
Reporting requirements (CJCSI 3401.02B), and in different
ways--including through monthly, quarterly and annual reviews
and assessments by the Army G2 and the G2 Staff. Through such
efforts, the Army is better able to track trends, highlight
deficiencies, enable the efficient application of resources,
and mitigate risk.
As part of its authorized jurisdiction and responsibilities
under House Rule X, clause 11(b)(1), the Committee oversees the
intelligence, intelligence-related, and tactical intelligence
activities of all Departments and agencies of the U.S.
government, to include those of the Department of Defense. That
mandate encompasses the Department's intelligence readiness and
related capabilities.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Senior Intelligence
Officer of the Army to provide to the Committee, by no later
than March 27, 2021, a written report outlining the readiness
of the Army personnel engaged in intelligence, intelligence-
related, or tactical intelligence activities. This report shall
include, at a minimum:
1. An overview of how the Army evaluates, in
quantitative, qualitative and any other applicable
terms, the readiness of its intelligence capabilities;
2. An assessment of whether Army intelligence
organizations and personnel are meeting readiness
objectives, including those regarding readiness to
[enable/engage in] multi-domain operations; and
3. An overview of how the Army has aligned its
intelligence forces' joint or mission-essential tasks
lists with the most recent National Defense Strategy
priorities, to include an increased focus on great
power competition with China and Russia.
NAVY
Navy Cable Ship Repair Replacement T-ARC(X)
The Navy's only cable laying and repair ship, the T-ARC 7
(USNS ZEUS), is nearing the end of its extended service life.
The USNS Zeus maintains primary missions to transport, deploy,
retrieve, and repair submarine cables and test underwater sound
devices, and is a key component of the Integrated Undersea
Surveillance System (IUSS).
A Maritime Surveillance System Capacity Study completed in
January 2017 determined that the program workload for cable
laying ships doubled in the last decade and will double again
soon. A single cable ship cannot continue to meet the demands
placed upon it, and project workload, system growth, and
additional systems exceed capacity. The Navy is capable of
bridging capacity gaps in the short term, but a long-term
solution and prioritization is necessary.
Therefore, the Committee directs, first, that the Navy
shall not retire the USNS ZEUS until the vessel's material
condition degrades beyond economic repair or the capability and
capacity currently provided by ZEUS is met or exceeded. The
Secretary of the Navy should prioritize the resources needed to
meet the current two cable ship requirement.
Additionally, The Navy shall submit to the Committee by no
later than February 1, 2021 a written report regarding the USNS
ZEUS which shall contain, at a minimum: (1) forecasting data
regarding when the USNS ZEUS's material condition may degrade
beyond economic repairs; and (2) a plan regarding the future of
cable laying capacity managed by the Navy.
MQ-4C Triton Multi-Intelligence Fleet
The Navy's MQ-4C Triton unmanned aerial system provides
persistent maritime intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) capability. The Committee strongly
supports the program's Multi-Intelligence (Multi-INT)
configuration. MQ-4C Multi-INT is integral to the
recapitalization of the Navy's maritime patrol and
reconnaissance force (P-3C and EP-3E).These capabilities are
especially critical given the Navy's increased focus on the
vast Indo-Pacific theater. Accordingly, the Committee is
concerned about the production pause in the MQ-4C Triton
included in the Fiscal Year 2021 budget and its potential
adverse impact on operational capabilities, suppliers, and
program costs.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Secretary of the Navy
to submit to the Committee, by no later than February 1, 2021,
a written report regarding plans for fielding the MQ-4C
Triton's Multi-INT capability as soon as possible, and on the
impact of the FY21 budget to the program. Such report shall
include:
1. A reaffirmation of the Navy's commitment to Multi-
INT and a detailed description on how it plans to
achieve Triton Multi-INT Initial Operational Capability
(IOC) in FY 2022;
2. A description of the Multi-INT capability, system
architecture, tasking, collection, processing,
exploitation, and dissemination (TCPED) processes and
infrastructure required to support operations;
3. The Navy's Maritime Intelligence Surveillance
Reconnaissance and Targeting (MISR&T) Plan detailing
how the Navy plans to build, deploy, and support world-
wide MQ-4C Triton Multi-INT system deployments; and
4. The impact of a production pause on the MQ-4C
Triton's industrial base, program costs, and any
mission gaps may create.
Navy ONI Infrastructure
The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) is the leading
provider of global maritime intelligence for the U.S. Navy and
other national IC organizations. It is headquartered in
Suitland, Maryland and employs approximately 3,000 military,
civilian, mobilized reservists and contractor personnel
worldwide. ONI also has the support of more than 800 Navy
Reservists providing an equivalent of 90+ man-years of
production during weekend drill and active duty periods.
The National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC), which
houses ONI, was designed and built with National Intelligence
Program funds and completed in 1993. Yet the aging building and
its surrounding structures badly need infrastructure upgrades.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Naval District
Washington, by no later than February 19, 2021, to brief the
Committee on any necessary infrastructure improvements for ONI/
NMIC over the future years defense plan.
AIR FORCE
Future of the U2 Dragon Lady
The Committee has long supported the U2 Dragon Lady
Aircraft and supported the Air Force as it seeks to utilize the
aircraft in support of the National Defense Strategy.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Air Force to
prioritize future sensor capability for the U2 Dragon Lady.
Further, the Committee directs the Air Force A2/6 to notify the
Committee of any significant challenges to future ISR
employment, including basing or sensor development.
Advanced Battle Management Family of Systems
The Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) aims to be a
cross-service next generation system-of-systems, which fill
fuse global air and space intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance information, and replace the command and control
capabilities of aging legacy systems. The Committee is
supportive of ABMS and pleased with the engagement and
responsiveness from the Air Force on this issue.
However, the Committee is concerned by the unclear scope of
the Air Force's ABMS requirements. Furthermore, the Committee
is aware of several instances of large technological
acquisition programs failing to properly build security
requirements into planning early and throughout the process.
The National Security Agency (NSA) is the U.S. Government's
lead on cybersecurity issues, with the most informed and
current analysis of adversaries' technical activities and
capabilities. Given the sensitive nature of the intelligence
information that will act as the backbone of ABMS, it is vital
that ABMS use only the most secure tools and technology--and
benefit from NSA's expertise.
Therefore, the Committee directs that, no later than
January 27, 2021, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics brief the committee on
the Air Force's plan to:
1. Consult with the NSA on minimum security
standards, and build these recommendations into the
requirements for ABMS;
2. Vet technologies to ensure that they meet such
standards; and
3. Engage with the NSA post-development to ensure
proper security procedures in the use of tools that
utilize intelligence information.
RC-26 Platform Review
The Committee supports the Department of Defense's efforts
to implement a routine process for assessing which programs it
includes within, or removes from, the Military Intelligence
Program (MIP) portfolio. The Air Force does not currently
consider the National Guard's RC-26 aircraft an intelligence
platform despite its ability to conduct surveillance and
reconnaissance operations. The Committee is concerned the Air
Force has not included a platform that shares many of the
features found in intelligence aircraft within its MIP
portfolio.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)), in
consultation with the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief
of the National Guard Bureau, to review the appropriateness of
including the RC-26 aircraft within the MIP portfolio. The
Committee further directs the USD(I&S) to brief the Committee
on the results of this review by no later than March 28, 2021.
MARINE CORPS
Marine Unmanned Expeditionary Aircraft
The report accompanying H.R. 3494, the House-passed
Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA) for Fiscal Years 2020,
2019, and 2018, among other things required the U.S. Marine
Corps to provide a briefing on the Marine Unmanned
Expeditionary Aircraft (MUX). Although the Marine Corps
provided the briefing, the current requirements, development
production, and deployment of group 4 and group 5 unmanned
aerial systems remains unclear.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Marine Corps to submit
to the Committee, by no later than February 27, 2021, a written
report regarding the MUX. It shall contain, at a minimum, an
updated summary of doctrine, organization, training, materiel,
leadership, personnel and facilities (DOTMILPF), as well as an
Analysis of Alternatives.
U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
SOF Intelligence Training Annex
Once completed, the Special Operations Command's Special
Operations Forces (SOF) Intelligence Training Annex (the
Annex), at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, will provide the 1st
Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne) a facility where it
can provide its forces with critically important training in
advanced intelligence techniques.
The Annex was funded initially in 2016. But construction
has not been finished, and the project has since required
additional funds. A second construction contract, with a cost
of approximately $15 million, will have to be awarded in order
to conclude the project. Absent this infusion of needed
resources--and the Annex's completion--the Group will have to
conduct training in undersized, leased facilities. These will
require significant infrastructure improvement to meet mission
requirements.
Therefore, the Committee directs an increase of $17,000,000
above the Fiscal Year 2021 budget request for the completion of
the SOF Intel Training Annex.
Special Operations Forces in Indo-Pacific
The Committee recognizes the sustained contributions of
Special Operations Forces in the Indo-Pacific area of
responsibility, as well as the roles and responsibilities the
353rd Special Operations Group.
The Committee is concerned with the current level of base
infrastructure support, and the availability of intelligence
and classified facilities available to the 320th Special
Tactics Squadron (STS). The Committee strongly supports
construction of a new STS operations facility, as part of the
consolidation of SOF facilities at Kadena Air Base, Japan. The
project should include all necessary and classified storage and
working facilities.
Therefore, the Committee directs the United States Special
Operations Command and Air Force Special Operations Command to
consider their respective military construction priorities in
light of emerging intelligence challenges from near-peer
competitors in the Indo-Pacific area of responsibility.
Particular consideration should be given to the construction of
a new STS operations facility as part of the consolidation at
Kadena Air Base.
U-28 Platform Modifications
The fiscal year 2021 budget request includes funding for
unique modifications to U-28 aircraft for United States Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM). Currently, USSOCOM is using
fiscal year 2019 and 2020 funds to upgrade certain U-28
aircraft to the EQ+ configuration--which will enable extended
stand-off operations and enhance the U-28's ISR capability.
The Committee strongly supports USSOCOM's U-28 modification
and upgrade program and expects that the platform will provide
operational capability into the 2040s.
USSOCOM should request in its Fiscal Year 2022 budget
sufficient resources to accelerate U-28 modifications and
standardize the EQ+ configuration across the U-28 fleet. It
should also resist potential courses of action inconsistent
with this approach, to include the replacement of the U-28 with
an inferior or dissimilar aircraft.
Therefore, the Committee directs USSOCOM to provide to the
Committee, by no later than January 27, 2021, a written
strategy to preserve national mission force ISR capability,
through continued sustainment of and upgrades to the U-28
platform.
NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Interaction with Socially and
Economically Disadvantaged Businesses and Minority Serving
Institutions
The Committee is supportive of the NRO's desire to build an
organization that embodies diversity and inclusion. The
Committee believes these efforts should include increasing the
NRO's outreach to socially and economically disadvantaged
businesses and minority serving institutions. The Committee,
however, is concerned the NRO has not appropriately prioritized
its relationship with these entities.
Therefore, the Committee directs the NRO to brief the
Committee, by no later than April 15, 2021, on its plan to
increase engagement with socially and economically
disadvantaged businesses and minority serving academic
institutions. This plan should include an assessment of the
resources required to accomplish this plan.
The Committee also directs the NRO to provide to the
Committee, by no later than February 10, 2021, a written list
of all contracts awarded to economically and socially
disadvantaged businesses in the prior year.
The National Reconnaissance Office's Role within the IC
The NRO is an integral component of the IC. Since its
inception in 1961, the NRO has faithfully supported national,
strategic, and tactical customers. The NRO's unique workforce
and organizational culture have ensured that the IC and
warfighters maintain an information advantage over the nation's
adversaries.
While the Committee is supportive of the Department of
Defense's (DOD) creation of U.S. Space Command and U.S. Space
Force, it believes the NRO must maintain its independence.
Therefore, the Committee directs the NRO, U.S. Space Command,
U.S. Space Force, and the IC Space Executive to brief the
Committee no later than January 30, 2021 on:
1. The DOD and IC's requirement to inform the
congressional intelligence committees before initiating
the transfer of elements or functions between the Space
Force and NRO;
2. The policies and procedures that govern IC-DOD
coordination of appropriate element or functional
transfers between the Space Force and NRO;
3. How the IC and DOD will ensure the NRO remains an
independent organization; and
4. How the IC and DOD will coordinate their space-
based activities during peacetime and conflict.
Data Centers as a Service
The Committee is aware the NRO is continuing to refine its
data center requirements. The Committee is supportive of any
efforts that allow the NRO to leverage commercial capabilities
where appropriate and whenever possible. Therefore, the
Committee directs the NRO, by no later than March 31, 2021, to
brief the Committee on:
1. Any efforts to develop data center requirements
that include:
a. service contract approaches;
b. facilities with access to renewable energy;
c. the location of facilities outside of major
metropolitan areas;
d. facilities' access to multiple cloud providers;
e. leveraging commercial providers that are wholly-US
owned, operated, and supported; or
f. the ability to support Top Secret collateral and
compartmented data; and
2. The use of other transaction authorities to award
service contracts that deliver immediate data center
capacity.
Comptroller General Review of NRO Commercial Systems Program Office
The Committee believes the NRO's Commercial System Program
Office's (CSPO) efforts as part of the GEOINT directorate have
provided tremendous value to the IC, DOD, and other customers.
CSPO has allowed the NRO to enhance both the resiliency and
capacity of its hybrid architecture. However, the Committee is
concerned the CSPO may not be optimally located within the NRO
to shape budget priorities.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Comptroller General of
the United States to submit to the Committee a written report,
which shall, at a minimum:
1. Describe the process the NRO uses to determine its
organizational structure and the CSPO's size, location,
and requirements;
2. Evaluate the extent to which the NRO's process met
best practices for such analyses;
3. Evaluate the utility of elevating the CSPO to an
independent directorate within the NRO;
4. Evaluate the NRO's efforts to integrate commercial
capabilities into a hybrid architecture;
5. Evaluate the NRO's statutory requirements to
maximize the use of commercially available services and
capabilities; and
6. Provide recommendations, including to improve
processes, authorities, or adjust resources to match
NRO, IC, or DOD requirements.
The Committee will confer with the Comptroller General
regarding a timeline for the report's completion and submission
to the Committee. However, the Comptroller General shall brief
the Committee on its preliminary findings by no later than
March 31, 2021.
SPACE-RELATED
Comptroller General Review of National Space Defense Center
Situational awareness is fundamental to conducting
operations in space--but maintaining it is increasingly
difficult. The space domain is increasingly complex and
contested. And no one U.S. department or agency holds all the
authorities and capabilities necessary to achieve comprehensive
situational awareness. Effective execution will require unity
of effort.
The National Space Defense Center (the Center) represents a
potential focus of integration and coordination. The Center was
established to improve the ability of the U.S. government to
rapidly detect, warn of, characterize, attribute, and defend
against threats vital to U.S. space systems. One of the
Center's key responsibilities is to maintain and distribute an
integrated common operational picture of the space domain.
However, over the years the Committee has observed that the
Center and its predecessor organization encountered challenges
in effectively integrating information from disparate sources.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Comptroller General of
the United States to provide the Committee with a written
report regarding the National Space Defense Center's space
situational needs. This Comptroller General's review should
address, a minimum, the extent to which the Center has:
1. Identified challenges to effective and timely
integration of space situational awareness information
and taken steps to mitigate those challenges;
2. Issued guidance to define roles and
responsibilities, established policies and procedures
to operate across agency boundaries, and promoted other
collaborative measures to better integrate and share
space situational awareness information;
3. Coordinated with relevant IC organizations and
military services to develop and implement effective
and timely acquisition approaches for integrating
situational awareness information that may reside at
various security classification levels;
4. Developed a plan to utilize best practices from
other governmental entities and the private sector to
refine its acquisition strategy or develop space
situational awareness requirements;
5. Developed a transition plan for the adoption of
any materiel solution that integrates data from new
applications and legacy capabilities; and
6. Planned for new capabilities and the corresponding
resources, to include funding and cost-share
implications.
The Committee will confer with the Comptroller General
regarding a timeline for the report's completion and submission
to the committees. However, the Comptroller General shall brief
the Committee on its preliminary findings by no later than
March 31, 2021.
The Committee expects that the IC and DOD will fully
cooperate with the Comptroller General, by promptly providing
the Comptroller General with access to all necessary documents
and other relevant information, to include all pertinent
budgetary and funding data.
Intelligence Community and Space Situational Awareness
Space situational awareness requirements are currently
being filled by the Department of Defense, IC elements, other
government agencies, and, increasingly, commercial providers.
While mission partners in the IC can contribute to the decision
calculus about the impact of actions resulting from a maneuver
necessitated by a conjunction assessment, various mission
partners make different contributions to this decision.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Directors of National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National
Reconnaissance Office, the Commander of U.S. Space Command, and
the Chief of Operations of the Space Force, by no later than
February 1, 2021, to brief the Committee on the current
contributions the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and
the National Reconnaissance Office make to operational
decisions regarding the necessity to maneuver national
technical means given a potential conjunction assessment, and
the coordination among the agencies, Space Command and Space
Force, in peacetime, in crisis, and during a conflict.
U.S. Space Industrial Base Support
Since 2009, the NRO, the Department of the Air Force, the
Missile Defense Agency, and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment have addressed supply
chain risks through the Space Industrial Base Working Group
(SIBWG). This working group allows the IC and DOD to make
investments that support the health of the U.S space industrial
base. In light of the ongoing pandemic, the Committee believes
SIBWG participants should increase their contributions to the
investment fund. Without additional support, the U.S. space
industrial base may become inappropriately reliant upon foreign
manufacturers.
Therefore, the Committee recommends that all SIBWG
participants increase their contributions for three years
beginning in FY21. The classified annex to this report contains
additional direction for the NRO on this subject.
Lunar Geospatial Intelligence and Situational Awareness
The Committee is concerned with the growing number of
cislunar and lunar surface missions near peers have
accomplished and continue to explore.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Director of National
Intelligence, by no later than March 31, 2021, to brief the
Committee on Chinese and Russian cislunar and lunar activity.
The briefing shall include:
1. An assessment of China's and Russia's military,
intelligence, economic, and research activities; and
2. An overview of China's and Russia's cislunar and
lunar surface strategic goals through 2030.
NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Metrics for Modern Best Practices in NGA Software Programs
Modern best practices for software development are
essential for NGA to modernize and innovate. The Committee
supports NGA's attempts, particularly through the office of
CIO-T, to adopt such practices. However, this adoption is
uneven across NGA's different software programs, with some
lagging greatly behind others.
Metrics such as lead time, deployment frequency, time to
restore, change fail percentage, and availability can help with
assessing software programs' adherence to best practices and
more accurately predicting their future success or failure.
Additionally, in a sufficiently modern software development
environment, the collection of such information can be largely
or entirely automated, helping to minimize costs.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Chief Information
Officer of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to
provide to the Committee, by no later than March 1, 2021, a
written report assessing the feasibility of tracking metrics on
all new major software programs' adherence to modern best
practices for software development. The report shall include,
at a minimum:
1. A recommendation on what set of metrics for
software programs' adherence to modern best practices
for software development would be most applicable to
the mission and operations of the NGA;
2. A discussion of any barriers preventing the
automatic collection such metrics across NGA; and
3. A discussion of resources required to track such
metrics on all of NGA's major new software programs.
Advancing NGA Product Management and Software Design
The Committee supports NGA's Data Corps and Dev Corps
programs to increase its native data science and software
engineering talent and to increase the adoption of best
practices within NGA. However, the Committee is concerned that
NGA has not sufficiently expanded these efforts to other areas
critical to successful software development outcomes,
especially in the career fields of product management and user-
experience design.
Therefore, the Committee directs NGA, by January 15, 2021,
to brief the Committee on NGA's plans to adopt best practices
in product management and user-experience design and to
increase NGA's native talent in these areas.
Further, the Committee directs NGA, by April 1, 2021, to
provide the Committee with an implementation plan for a
training program to educate NGA product managers, as well as
others who would benefit within NGA, in industry best practices
for software product management. The plan should outline any
additional resources necessary to carry out such a program and
describe further recommendations for how NGA can develop
product management as a core competency and career field within
the organization.
Diversity and Next NGA West
The Committee remains strongly supportive of the
construction of NGA's new Next NGA West (N2W) facility in St.
Louis, Missouri. The Committee believes that the project should
facilitate and be accompanied by greater interaction between
NGA and the surrounding St. Louis community. NGA also should
redouble its efforts to recruit, retain, and promote a diverse
workforce both in St. Louis and nationally; and take continued,
concrete steps to address its historical issues with diversity,
such as those flagged in the 2018 report, ``The State of Black
Promotions at NGA.''
Therefore, the Committee directs NGA to brief the
Committee, by no later than March 1, 2021, on NGA's current and
planned activities to:
1. Increase the recruitment, hiring, retention, and
promotion of underrepresented groups, including in the
St. Louis area;
2. Ensure equal treatment and access to pay,
retention, and promotion; and
3. Use N2W as a means for greater interaction with
the local St. Louis community.
IT System Recapitalization
The Committee is concerned that NGA's aging information
technology (IT) infrastructure is holding back NGA operations
and does not support critical user capabilities including the
visualization, analysis, and operational use of three-
dimensional (3D) data.
Therefore, the Committee directs NGA to provide the
Committee with its plan to recapitalize its aging IT systems
over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), as well as how
this recapitalization will enable capabilities for 3D data.
Unclassified Requirements for Additional Phenomenologies
The Committee commends NGA for its work in developing the
unclassified requirements for electro-optical (EO) in support
of users worldwide. The Committee would also like to see this
expand to include additional phenomenologies and synthetic
aperture radar (SAR) in particular.
Therefore, the Committee directs NGA to develop
unclassified requirements for SAR and provide to the Committee
by February 1, 2021 the proposed timeline and resources
necessary to achieve these requirements. NGA shall also brief
the Committee by that date on how it plans to take advantage of
other unclassified phenomenologies to include radio-frequency
mapping, hyperspectral, and LiDAR.
Timely & Unclassified Imagery Analysis
The Committee commends the expansion of NGA's Global
Enhanced GEOINT Delivery (G-EGD) service, which enables
worldwide access to timely, unclassified, and shareable imagery
to warfighters, other federal agencies, and foreign partners.
However, this expansion coincided with a reduction in the
commercial imagery and imagery analysis budgets for both NRO
and NGA due to ODNI's ``other IC priorities.'' The Committee
opposes this reduction and is concerned that in the future
NGA's funding for commercial services may again be sacrificed
in favor of other IC priorities.
Each year, new commercial constellations are delivering new
capabilities and phenomenologies both in the United States and
internationally. These new capabilities are diffusing access to
geospatial intelligence beyond the United States, but they also
offer the U.S. government new opportunities to collect and
share unclassified information in support of U.S. national
security.
The Committee is encouraged by NGA's proactive and diligent
market surveys of commercial capabilities and wants to see a
corresponding increase in funding to take advantage of emerging
unclassified opportunities.
Therefore, the committee recommends that NGA's commercial
imagery, services, and analysis budget be increased to leverage
this expanding marketplace and new phenomenologies. There is a
corresponding authorization in the classified annex.
Countering the Malicious Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the
United States
According to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the malicious use of UAS
in the United States can take several forms, including kinetic
attacks with payloads of firearms, explosives, or weapons of
mass destruction and cyber-attacks against wireless devices or
networks.
Congress has granted limited authorities to the Departments
of Justice, Homeland Security, Defense and Energy, to counter
the malicious, domestic use of UAS, while at once ensuring
aviation safety and protecting civil liberties and privacy. But
Congress has not yet granted such authorities to other federal
departments or agencies, U.S. airports, state and local law
enforcement, or critical infrastructure owners.
Therefore, the Committee directs that by no later than June
1, 2021, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination
with the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis of the
Department of Homeland Secretary and the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and as necessary, in
consultation with other appropriate agencies of the Federal
Government, State and local governments, and the private
sector, shall submit to the Committee an intelligence
assessment on the threat posed by the malicious use of UAS in
the United States. At a minimum, such assessment shall:
1. Describe the national security and criminal threat
actors seeking to use UAS in the United States,
including their intentions, plans, and capabilities;
2. Characterize the number and type of UAS incidents
in the United States from calendar year 2016 through
2020, differentiating those considered as malicious
use;
3. Evaluate the probability, impact, and risk of the
full range of malicious use categories including:
kinetic attacks with payloads of firearms, explosives,
or weapons of mass destruction, especially at mass
gatherings or public events; illicit surveillance of
sensitive facilities or personnel, whether government,
military, or critical infrastructure; theft of
intellectual property; cyber-attacks on unsecured
wireless devices or networks; illegal trafficking or
drugs or contraband; interference with defense, law
enforcement, and intelligence activities; and the
potential compromise of UAS supply chains by foreign
adversaries; and
4. Assess current trends and patterns, projected
evolution of the threat posed by the malicious use of
UAS, and implications for policy makers.
Not later than June 1, 2021, the Secretary for Homeland
Secretary and the Attorney General, in coordination with the
Secretary of Transportation (acting through the Administrator
for the Federal Aviation Administration) and the Director of
National Intelligence, and as necessary, in consultation with
other appropriate agencies of the Federal Government, State and
local governments, and the private sector, shall submit to the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on
Homeland Security, the Committee on Transportation, and the
House Committee on the Judiciary (for purposes of this
direction, the ``Committees'') a written report. Such report
shall, at a minimum:
1. Describe the current Federal authorities,
regulations, and policies authorizing departments and
agencies to counter the malicious use of UAS;
2. Identify and explain any gaps in such authorities,
regulations, and policies that impede the ability of
the Federal Government, State and local governments,
and critical infrastructure owners to counter the
threat posed by the malicious use of UAS;
3. Evaluate whether current Federal law, regulations,
and policies are sufficient to ensure the safe exercise
of Counter UAS authorities in the National Air Space
and adequate protections for civil liberties and
privacy; and
4. Recommend options to remedy any such gaps or
insufficiencies, including but not limited to necessary
changes in law, regulations, or policies;
5. Propose what the Federal Government would need--
with respect to authorities, regulations, policies,
protections for civil liberties and privacy, and
resources--to carry out feasibility studies and pilot
programs enabling U.S. airports, state and local law
enforcement, and critical infrastructure owners to
counter the malicious use of UAS; and
6. Provide a comprehensive strategy on countering the
malicious use of UAS in the United States, including as
necessary, recommendations to update the U.S. National
Strategy for Aviation Security or its supporting plans.
The intelligence assessment and report directed above shall
be unclassified, to the maximum extent possible, though one or
both may contain a non-public or classified annex, only if
necessary to protect intelligence sources or methods and any
other sensitive information protected from public disclosure by
Federal law. Any classified annex shall be submitted to the
Committees in an electronic form that is fully indexed and
searchable.
The unclassified portions of the intelligence assessment
and report further shall be made available on the public
internet websites of the Department of Homeland Security,
Department of Justice, Department of Transportation, Federal
Aviation Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, not later
than 30 days after submission to the Committee and in an
electronic format that is fully indexed and searchable.
Improving Information Sharing and Training for State, Local, Tribal,
and Territorial Law Enforcement on Matters of National Security
and Homeland Security
The Committee recognizes the continued importance of
improving information sharing and training on matters of
national security and homeland security for State, local,
Tribal, and Territorial law enforcement, consistent with
protections for classified information as well as those for
civil liberties and privacy.
Therefore, the Committee directs that the Secretary of
Homeland Security, Attorney General, Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, and Director of National Intelligence,
shall jointly submit to the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives (for
purposes of this direction, the ``Committees'') a written
report regarding information sharing and related opportunities
for each fiscal year. With respect to fiscal year 2021, such
report shall be submitted by not later than June 1, 2021; a
report as to the five following fiscal years also shall be
submitted, on annual basis by no later than the first day of
that fiscal year.
Each fiscal year's report shall contain, at a minimum, a
catalog that summarizes, relative to matters of national
security and homeland security, opportunities for training,
publications, programs, and services available to State, local,
Tribal, and Territorial law enforcement from their respective
departments, agencies, and all component agencies thereof.
Each fiscal year's report shall be unclassified, to the
maximum extent possible, but may be non-public or contain a
classified annex only if necessary to protect classified and
any other sensitive but unclassified information. Any such
annex shall be submitted to the Committees in an electronic
format that is fully indexed and searchable, and distributed to
State, local, Tribal, and Territorial law enforcement,
consistent with the protection of classified information.
Unclassified portions of the report shall be made available
to State, local, Tribal, and Territorial law enforcement by
posting it, in an electronic form that is fully indexed and
searchable, on the websites of the Department of Homeland
Security and Department of Justice; and on the Homeland
Security Information Network and the Law Enforcement Enterprise
Portal.
Use of Online Platforms to Further Acts of Targeted Violence Related to
Terrorism, or, Advance Foreign Influence Campaigns
The Committee recognizes that threat actors, including
terrorists and foreign governments, have leveraged online
platforms to further acts of targeted violence or advance
foreign influence campaigns against the United States or U.S.
persons. Understanding precisely how this activity occurs and
its implications are critical to developing legislation and
policy to effectively counter it, consistent with the rule of
law and the protection of civil rights, civil liberties, and
privacy.
Therefore, the Committee directs as follows:
Not later than June 1, 2021, the Secretary of Homeland
Security (acting through the Under Secretary for Science and
Technology), in coordination with the Director of National
Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, in a manner consistent with their authorities
shall--
1. Analyze existing research regarding previous acts
of targeted violence, including domestic terrorism or
international terrorism, and foreign influence
campaigns;
2. Carry out research to better understand whether
any connection exists between the use of online
platforms, particularly platforms used for social media
and social networking, and;
(A) Targeted violence, including domestic terrorism
and international terrorism, that takes into
consideration how the organization, structure, and
presentation of information on an online platform
contributes, or does not contribute, to acts of
targeted violence, including domestic terrorism or
international terrorism; and
(B) the effectiveness of foreign influence campaigns,
taking into consideration how the organization,
structure, and presentation of information on an online
platform contributes, or does not contribute, to
political or societal polarization or other societal
outcomes; and
3. Develop voluntary approaches that could be adopted
by owners and operators of online platforms to address
research findings under paragraph (2), while preserving
the individual civil rights, civil liberties, and
privacy of users; and
4. Submit a written report to the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Homeland
Security, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the
House of Representatives (for purposes of this
direction, the ``Committees'') summarizing the research
conducted and voluntary approaches developed; and
setting forth any further related implications or
recommendations.
Not later than June 1, 2021, the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the Secretary of Homeland Security
(acting through the Under Secretary for Intelligence and
Analysis), shall provide a written intelligence assessment to
Committees, regarding any use of online platforms to (1)
further acts of targeted violence, including domestic terrorism
and international terrorism; and (2) the use by foreign
governments (or their proxies) or other nonstate actors to
advance foreign influence campaigns, whether overt or covert,
against the United States or U.S. persons. This assessment
shall include--
1. An assessment of threat actors' use of online
platforms for purposes specified above, including their
plans, intentions, and capabilities relative to such
use;
2. An identification, comparison, analysis, and
assessment of key trends, as well as threat actors'
tactics, targets, and procedures in the use of online
platforms;
3. A discussion of whether (and if so, to what
extent) foreign governments have sufficient laws and
policies to counter threat actors' use of online
platforms, including best practices and gaps,
consistent with the protection of civil rights, civil
liberties, and privacy;
4. An assessment of the status and extent of any
information sharing, intelligence partnerships, foreign
police cooperation, and mutual legal assistance between
the United States and foreign governments, on threat
actors' use of online platforms;
5. An assessment of any intelligence gaps and
recommendations on remedying them; and
6. An opportunity analysis on countering threat
actors' use of online platforms.
In carrying out both the report and intelligence assessment
directed above, the Secretary of Homeland Security, Director of
National Intelligence, and the Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, to the maximum extent practicable, shall
consult with other appropriate agencies of the Federal
Government, State, local, and Tribal, and Territorial
governments, the private sector, and academic or non-government
organizations.
The report and intelligence assessment directive above
shall be--
1. Unclassified, to the maximum extent possible, but
may contain a non-public or classified annex to protect
sources or methods and any other information protected
from public disclosure by Federal law;
2. With respect to the unclassified portions of the
report and intelligence assessment, made available on
the public internet websites of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, Department of
Homeland Security, and Federal Bureau of Investigation
not later than 30 days after submission to the
Committees; and in an electronic format that is fully
indexed and searchable; and
3. With respect to a classified annex, submitted to
the Committees in an electronic format that is fully
indexed and searchable.
With respect to the report and intelligence assessment
directed above, the term ``online platform'' means internet-
based information services consisting of the storage and
processing of information by and at the request of a content
provider and the dissemination of such content to third
parties; but shall exclude
1. Platforms that offer journalistic or editorial
content (not including editorial decisions by online
platforms to rank and organize third party content),
unless they are owned or operated by a foreign
government, or in such cases that an excepted platform
publishes content that is assessed to be the result of
a foreign influence campaign; and
2. Online service providers at layers of the internet
infrastructure other than the application layer, and
cloud IT infrastructure service providers.
The term ``targeted violence'' means any incident of
violence in which an attacker selects a particular target prior
to the incident of violence so as to suggest an intent to
inflict mass injury or death and may be an act of domestic
terrorism or international terrorism, or an attack that
otherwise lacks a clearly discernible political or ideological
motivation, such as the June 12, 2016, nightclub mass shooting
in Orlando, Florida, the October 1, 2017, attack on concert-
goers at a music festival in Las Vegas, Nevada, and the August
3, 2019, mass shooting at a store in El Paso, Texas.
Pandemic Work Life Balance
The Committee takes a strong interest in ensuring the IC is
adequately prepared for future public health or other crises--
including with respect to initiatives intended to ensure the
safety of the IC workforce. Since the start of the novel
coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19), social distancing and work-
from-home measures were unable to be applied throughout the IC
due to numerous security requirements governing the usage of
classified information. The Committee recognizes that the IC
took quick, adaptive measures, such as staggered shifts for its
employees and facility procedural changes to reduce airborne
transmission.
As COVID-19 continues to cause extraordinary harms
throughout the nation and the globe, the Committee is concerned
that the IC may not be able to effectively accommodate the
increased needs of its personnel outside of the workplace that
arise as a result of this and future crises. Some of these
needs include, for example, those relating to telework and
transportation; emotional, behavioral, and mental health
services; childcare; and ensuring benefit coverage for
dependents and caregivers.
Therefore, the Committee directs the heads of elements of
the Intelligence Community, jointly with the Director of
National Intelligence and by no later than June 1, 2021, to
submit to the Committee:
1. A written report on the impacts of COVID-19 on the
IC workforce; and
2. A written long-term strategy to prepare for such
impacts in future crises.
The Committee further directs that, not later than 30 days
after submitting both reports to the Committee, the Director of
National Intelligence shall brief their findings to the
Committee.
Secured Access to State-of-the-Art Microelectronics
Continued U.S. leadership in microelectronics is necessary
to maintain its advantage in artificial intelligence, and
essential for its national security. The Intelligence Community
must also maintain trusted access to commercially produced
microelectronics to remain competitive, but it must do so in
the context of an increasingly globalized and capital-intensive
microelectronics supply chain over which it has limited
influence.
The Committee believes that maintaining an edge in
microelectronics will require the intelligence community to
pursue a concerted, multipronged effort that will include
partnering closely with the private sector to maintain a secure
supply chain, pursuing research into new computing paradigms,
and supporting U.S. commercial innovation in strategically
important parts of the microelectronics sector. Furthermore,
given the IC's role as a minority customer for
microelectronics, the IC should carefully coordinate its
efforts with the Department of Defense and other U.S.
government agencies.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Director of National
Intelligence to brief the congressional intelligence
committees, by February 1, 2021, on:
1. The status and future plans of the Intelligence
Community's efforts to assure secured access to
microelectronics, both for standard commercial products
and for niche Intelligence Community requirements;
2. Progress by the Intelligence Advanced Research
Projects Activity towards the initiation of a full
research and development program into next-generation
microelectronics that will extend advancements beyond
the end of Moore's law;
3. The feasibility of establishing an investment fund
to pursue strategic investments in commercial companies
innovating in areas relevant to the IC and to U.S.
national security; and
4. The IC's efforts to coordinate with other U.S.
government agencies on microelectronics efforts.
Committee Consideration and Roll Call Votes
On July 31, 2020, the Committee met in open session to
consider H.R. 7856 and ordered the bill favorably reported.
In open session, the Committee considered an amendment
offered by Mr. Nunes to H.R. 7856. The motion failed by a
recorded vote of 8 ayes to 11 noes:
Voting aye: Nunes; Conaway; Turner; Wenstrup;
Stewart; Crawford; Stefanik; Hurd
Voting no: Schiff; Himes; Sewell; Carson; Quigley;
Swalwell; Castro; Heck; Maloney; Demings;
Krishnamoorthi
Mr. Schiff then moved, pursuant to House Rule X, clause
11(d)(2) that the meeting be closed because testimony,
evidence, or other matters to be discussed would endanger
national security. The motion was agreed to by a recorded vote
of 19 ayes to 0 noes:
Voting aye: Schiff; Himes; Sewell; Carson; Quigley;
Swalwell; Castro; Heck; Maloney; Demings;
Krishnamoorthi; Nunes; Conaway; Turner; Wenstrup;
Stewart; Crawford; Stefanik; Hurd
Voting no: None
Following closed discussion, the Committee considered two
amendments offered by Mr. Nunes to the Classified Annex to H.R.
7856. Both failed by voice vote.
The Committee then considered amendment 3 offered by Mr.
Nunes to the Classified Annex to H.R. 7856. The amendment was
agreed to by voice vote.
Finally, the Committee voted to favorably report H.R. 7856,
as amended, to the House, including by reference the classified
schedule of authorizations. The motion was agreed to by a
recorded vote of 11 ayes.
Voting aye: Schiff; Himes; Sewell; Carson; Quigley;
Swalwell; Castro; Heck; Maloney; Demings;
Krishnamoorthi
Voting no: Nunes; Conaway; Turner; Wenstrup; Stewart;
Crawford; Stefanik; Hurd
Oversight Findings and Recommendations
With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, the Committee held multiple
hearings on the classified budgetary issues raised by H.R.
7856. The bill, as reported by the Committee, reflects
conclusions reached by the Committee in light of this oversight
activity.
General Performance Goals and Objectives
The goals and objectives of H.R. 7856 are to authorize the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United
States for Fiscal Year 2021. These activities enhance the
national security of the United States, support and assist the
armed forces of the United States, and support the President in
the execution of the foreign policy of the United States.
The classified annex that accompanies this report reflects
in great detail the Committee's specific performance goals and
objectives at the programmatic level with respect to classified
programs.
Statement on Congressional Earmarks
Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the House
of Representatives, the Committee states that the bill as
reported contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax
benefits, or limited tariff benefits.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no
change is proposed is shown in roman):
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
short title
That this Act may be cited as the ``National Security Act of
1947''.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Title I--Coordination for National Security
* * * * * * *
Sec. 108B. Annual reports on world-wide threats.
* * * * * * *
Title III--Miscellaneous
* * * * * * *
[Sec. 304. Reporting of certain employment activities by former
intelligence officers and employees.]
Sec. 304. Requirements for certain employment activities by former
intelligence officers and employees.
Sec. 305. Paid serious health condition leave.
* * * * * * *
Title V--Accountability for Intelligence Activities
* * * * * * *
Sec. 503A. Quarterly reports on cyber intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance activities of the Department of Defense.
* * * * * * *
513. Notice of provision of support for Federal, State, local, or Tribal
government response to civil disobedience or domestic civil
disturbances.
* * * * * * *
TITLE X--EDUCATION IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Subtitle A--Science and Technology
* * * * * * *
Sec. 1002. Framework for cross-disciplinary education and training.
Sec. 1003. Improvement of education in science, technology, engineering,
arts, and mathematics.
* * * * * * *
TITLE XI--OTHER PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
[Sec. 1104. Prohibited personnel practices in the intelligence
community.]
* * * * * * *
[Sec. 1106. Inspector General external review panel.]
* * * * * * *
Sec. 1107A. Annual reports on security services of the People's Republic
of China in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 1109. Requirement to buy certain satellite component from American
sources.
Sec. 1110. Annual reports on research and development for scientific and
technological advancements.
Sec. 1111. Annual intelligence assessments on relationship between women
and violent extremism.
Sec. 1112. Report on best practices to protect privacy, civil liberties,
and civil rights of Chinese Americans.
TITLE XII--MATTERS REGARDING INSPECTORS GENERAL OF ELEMENTS OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
SUBTITLE A--INSPECTORS GENERAL
Sec. 1201. Independence of inspectors general.
Sec. 1203. Designation of acting Inspectors General of the intelligence
community in cases of vacancies.
Sec. 1205. Determination of matters of urgent concern.
Sec. 1207. Coordination with other provisions of law.
SUBTITLE B--PROTECTIONS FOR WHISTLEBLOWERS
Sec. 1221. Prohibited personnel practices in the intelligence community.
Sec. 1223. Limitation on sharing of intelligence community whistleblower
complaints with persons named in such complaints.
Sec. 1225. Inspector General external review panel.
Sec. 1227. Procedures regarding disclosures to Congress.
* * * * * * *
DEFINITIONS
Sec. 3. As used in this Act:
(1) The term ``intelligence'' includes foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence.
(2) The term ``foreign intelligence'' means
information relating to the capabilities, intentions,
or activities of foreign governments or elements
thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or
international terrorist activities.
(3) The term ``counterintelligence'' means
information gathered, and activities conducted, to
protect against espionage, other intelligence
activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or
on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof,
foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or
international terrorist activities.
(4) The term ``intelligence community'' includes the
following:
(A) The Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
(B) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(C) The National Security Agency.
(D) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(E) The National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency.
(F) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(G) Other offices within the Department of
Defense for the collection of specialized
national intelligence through reconnaissance
programs.
(H) The intelligence elements of the Army,
the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the
Coast Guard, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Drug Enforcement
Administration, and the Department of Energy.
(I) The Bureau of Intelligence and Research
of the Department of State.
(J) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis
of the Department of the Treasury.
(K) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis
of the Department of Homeland Security.
(L) Such other elements of any department or
agency as may be designated by the President,
or designated jointly by the Director of
National Intelligence and the head of the
department or agency concerned, as an element
of the intelligence community.
(5) The terms ``national intelligence'' and
``intelligence related to national security'' refer to
all intelligence, regardless of the source from which
derived and including information gathered within or
outside the United States, that--
(A) pertains, as determined consistent with
any guidance issued by the President, to more
than one United States Government agency; and
(B) that involves--
(i) threats to the United States, its
people, property, or interests;
(ii) the development, proliferation,
or use of weapons of mass destruction;
or
(iii) any other matter bearing on
United States national or homeland
security.
(6) The term ``National Intelligence Program'' refers
to all programs, projects, and activities of the
intelligence community, as well as any other programs
of the intelligence community designated jointly by the
Director of National Intelligence and the head of a
United States department or agency or by the President.
Such term does not include programs, projects, or
activities of the military departments to acquire
intelligence solely for the planning and conduct of
tactical military operations by United States Armed
Forces.
(7) The term ``congressional intelligence
committees'' means--
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate; and
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(8) The term ``covered Inspector General'' means each
Inspector General of an element of the intelligence
community, including the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community.
(9) The term ``whistleblower'' means a person who
makes a whistleblower disclosure.
(10) The term ``whistleblower disclosure'' means a
disclosure that is protected under section 1221 of this
Act or section 3001(j)(1) of the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C.
3341(j)).
TITLE I--COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
* * * * * * *
responsibilities and authorities of the director of national
intelligence
Sec. 102A. (a) Provision of Intelligence.--(1) The Director
of National Intelligence shall be responsible for ensuring that
national intelligence is provided--
(A) to the President;
(B) to the heads of departments and agencies of the
executive branch;
(C) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
senior military commanders;
(D) to the Senate and House of Representatives and
the committees thereof; and
(E) to such other persons as the Director of National
Intelligence determines to be appropriate.
(2) Such national intelligence should be timely, objective,
independent of political considerations, and based upon all
sources available to the intelligence community and other
appropriate entities.
(b) Access to Intelligence.--Unless otherwise directed by the
President, the Director of National Intelligence shall have
access to all national intelligence and intelligence related to
the national security which is collected by any Federal
department, agency, or other entity, except as otherwise
provided by law or, as appropriate, under guidelines agreed
upon by the Attorney General and the Director of National
Intelligence.
(c) Budget Authorities.--(1) With respect to budget requests
and appropriations for the National Intelligence Program, the
Director of National Intelligence shall--
(A) based on intelligence priorities set by the
President, provide to the heads of departments
containing agencies or organizations within the
intelligence community, and to the heads of such
agencies and organizations, guidance for developing the
National Intelligence Program budget pertaining to such
agencies and organizations;
(B) based on budget proposals provided to the
Director of National Intelligence by the heads of
agencies and organizations within the intelligence
community and the heads of their respective departments
and, as appropriate, after obtaining the advice of the
Joint Intelligence Community Council, develop and
determine an annual consolidated National Intelligence
Program budget; and
(C) present such consolidated National Intelligence
Program budget, together with any comments from the
heads of departments containing agencies or
organizations within the intelligence community, to the
President for approval.
(2) In addition to the information provided under paragraph
(1)(B), the heads of agencies and organizations within the
intelligence community shall provide the Director of National
Intelligence such other information as the Director shall
request for the purpose of determining the annual consolidated
National Intelligence Program budget under that paragraph.
(3)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall
participate in the development by the Secretary of Defense of
the annual budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any
successor program or programs.
(B) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide
guidance for the development of the annual budget for each
element of the intelligence community that is not within the
National Intelligence Program.
(4) The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure the
effective execution of the annual budget for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities.
(5)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall be
responsible for managing appropriations for the National
Intelligence Program by directing the allotment or allocation
of such appropriations through the heads of the departments
containing agencies or organizations within the intelligence
community and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
with prior notice (including the provision of appropriate
supporting information) to the head of the department
containing an agency or organization receiving any such
allocation or allotment or the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
(B) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, pursuant to
relevant appropriations Acts for the National Intelligence
Program, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
shall exercise the authority of the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget to apportion funds, at the exclusive
direction of the Director of National Intelligence, for
allocation to the elements of the intelligence community
through the relevant host executive departments and the Central
Intelligence Agency. Department comptrollers or appropriate
budget execution officers shall allot, allocate, reprogram, or
transfer funds appropriated for the National Intelligence
Program in an expeditious manner.
(C) The Director of National Intelligence shall monitor the
implementation and execution of the National Intelligence
Program by the heads of the elements of the intelligence
community that manage programs and activities that are part of
the National Intelligence Program, which may include audits and
evaluations.
(6) Apportionment and allotment of funds under this
subsection shall be subject to chapter 13 and section 1517 of
title 31, United States Code, and the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 621 et seq.).
(7)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide a
semi-annual report, beginning April 1, 2005, and ending April
1, 2007, to the President and the Congress regarding
implementation of this section.
(B) The Director of National Intelligence shall report to the
President and the Congress not later than 15 days after
learning of any instance in which a departmental comptroller
acts in a manner inconsistent with the law (including permanent
statutes, authorization Acts, and appropriations Acts), or the
direction of the Director of National Intelligence, in carrying
out the National Intelligence Program.
(d) Role of Director of National Intelligence in Transfer and
Reprogramming of Funds.--(1)(A) No funds made available under
the National Intelligence Program may be transferred or
reprogrammed without the prior approval of the Director of
National Intelligence, except in accordance with procedures
prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence.
(B) The Secretary of Defense shall consult with the Director
of National Intelligence before transferring or reprogramming
funds made available under the Military Intelligence Program or
any successor program or programs.
(2) Subject to the succeeding provisions of this subsection,
the Director of National Intelligence may transfer or reprogram
funds appropriated for a program within the National
Intelligence Program--
(A) to another such program;
(B) to other departments or agencies of the United
States Government for the development and fielding of
systems of common concern related to the collection,
processing, analysis, exploitation, and dissemination
of intelligence information; or
(C) to a program funded by appropriations not within
the National Intelligence Program to address critical
gaps in intelligence information sharing or access
capabilities.
(3) The Director of National Intelligence may only transfer
or reprogram funds referred to in paragraph (1)(A)--
(A) with the approval of the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget; and
(B) after consultation with the heads of departments
containing agencies or organizations within the
intelligence community to the extent such agencies or
organizations are affected, and, in the case of the
Central Intelligence Agency, after consultation with
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(4) The amounts available for transfer or reprogramming in
the National Intelligence Program in any given fiscal year, and
the terms and conditions governing such transfers and
reprogrammings, are subject to the provisions of annual
appropriations Acts and this subsection.
(5)(A) A transfer or reprogramming of funds may be made under
this subsection only if--
(i) the funds are being transferred to an activity
that is a higher priority intelligence activity;
(ii) the transfer or reprogramming supports an
emergent need, improves program effectiveness, or
increases efficiency;
(iii) the transfer or reprogramming does not involve
a transfer or reprogramming of funds to a Reserve for
Contingencies of the Director of National Intelligence
or the Reserve for Contingencies of the Central
Intelligence Agency;
(iv) the transfer or reprogramming results in a
cumulative transfer or reprogramming of funds out of
any department or agency, as appropriate, funded in the
National Intelligence Program in a single fiscal year--
(I) that is less than $150,000,000, and
(II) that is less than 5 percent of amounts
available to a department or agency under the
National Intelligence Program; and
(v) the transfer or reprogramming does not terminate
an acquisition program.
(B) A transfer or reprogramming may be made without regard to
a limitation set forth in clause (iv) or (v) of subparagraph
(A) if the transfer has the concurrence of the head of the
department involved or the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency (in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency). The
authority to provide such concurrence may only be delegated by
the head of the department involved or the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency (in the case of the Central
Intelligence Agency) to the deputy of such officer.
(6) Funds transferred or reprogrammed under this subsection
shall remain available for the same period as the
appropriations account to which transferred or reprogrammed.
(7) Any transfer or reprogramming of funds under this
subsection shall be carried out in accordance with existing
procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications for the
appropriate congressional committees. Any proposed transfer or
reprogramming for which notice is given to the appropriate
congressional committees shall be accompanied by a report
explaining the nature of the proposed transfer or reprogramming
and how it satisfies the requirements of this subsection. In
addition, the congressional intelligence committees shall be
promptly notified of any transfer or reprogramming of funds
made pursuant to this subsection in any case in which the
transfer or reprogramming would not have otherwise required
reprogramming notification under procedures in effect as of the
date of the enactment of this subsection.
(e) Transfer of Personnel.--(1)(A) In addition to any other
authorities available under law for such purposes, in the first
twelve months after establishment of a new national
intelligence center, the Director of National Intelligence,
with the approval of the Director of the Office of Management
and Budget and in consultation with the congressional
committees of jurisdiction referred to in subparagraph (B), may
transfer not more than 100 personnel authorized for elements of
the intelligence community to such center.
(B) The Director of National Intelligence shall promptly
provide notice of any transfer of personnel made pursuant to
this paragraph to--
(i) the congressional intelligence committees;
(ii) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate
and the House of Representatives;
(iii) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or
from the Department of Defense, the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives; and
(iv) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or
from the Department of Justice, to the Committees on
the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of
Representatives.
(C) The Director shall include in any notice under
subparagraph (B) an explanation of the nature of the transfer
and how it satisfies the requirements of this subsection.
(2)(A) The Director of National Intelligence, with the
approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
and in accordance with procedures to be developed by the
Director of National Intelligence and the heads of the
departments and agencies concerned, may transfer personnel
authorized for an element of the intelligence community to
another such element for a period of not more than 2 years.
(B) A transfer of personnel may be made under this paragraph
only if--
(i) the personnel are being transferred to an
activity that is a higher priority intelligence
activity; and
(ii) the transfer supports an emergent need, improves
program effectiveness, or increases efficiency.
(C) The Director of National Intelligence shall promptly
provide notice of any transfer of personnel made pursuant to
this paragraph to--
(i) the congressional intelligence committees;
(ii) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or
from the Department of Defense, the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives; and
(iii) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or
from the Department of Justice, to the Committees on
the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of
Representatives.
(D) The Director shall include in any notice under
subparagraph (C) an explanation of the nature of the transfer
and how it satisfies the requirements of this paragraph.
(3)(A) In addition to the number of full-time equivalent
positions authorized for the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence for a fiscal year, there is authorized for such
Office for each fiscal year an additional 100 full-time
equivalent positions that may be used only for the purposes
described in subparagraph (B).
(B) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the Director of
National Intelligence may use a full-time equivalent position
authorized under subparagraph (A) only for the purpose of
providing a temporary transfer of personnel made in accordance
with paragraph (2) to an element of the intelligence community
to enable such element to increase the total number of
personnel authorized for such element, on a temporary basis--
(i) during a period in which a permanent employee of
such element is absent to participate in critical
language training; or
(ii) to accept a permanent employee of another
element of the intelligence community to provide
language-capable services.
(C) Paragraph (2)(B) shall not apply with respect to a
transfer of personnel made under subparagraph (B).
(D) For each of the fiscal years 2010, 2011, and 2012, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees an annual report on the
use of authorities under this paragraph. Each such report shall
include a description of--
(i) the number of transfers of personnel made by the
Director pursuant to subparagraph (B), disaggregated by
each element of the intelligence community;
(ii) the critical language needs that were fulfilled
or partially fulfilled through the use of such
transfers; and
(iii) the cost to carry out subparagraph (B).
(4) It is the sense of Congress that--
(A) the nature of the national security threats
facing the United States will continue to challenge the
intelligence community to respond rapidly and flexibly
to bring analytic resources to bear against emerging
and unforeseen requirements;
(B) both the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence and any analytic centers determined to be
necessary should be fully and properly supported with
appropriate levels of personnel resources and that the
President's yearly budget requests adequately support
those needs; and
(C) the President should utilize all legal and
administrative discretion to ensure that the Director
of National Intelligence and all other elements of the
intelligence community have the necessary resources and
procedures to respond promptly and effectively to
emerging and unforeseen national security challenges.
(f) Tasking and Other Authorities.--(1)(A) The Director of
National Intelligence shall--
(i) establish objectives, priorities, and guidance
for the intelligence community to ensure timely and
effective collection, processing, analysis, and
dissemination (including access by users to collected
data consistent with applicable law and, as
appropriate, the guidelines referred to in subsection
(b) and analytic products generated by or within the
intelligence community) of national intelligence;
(ii) determine requirements and priorities for, and
manage and direct the tasking of, collection, analysis,
production, and dissemination of national intelligence
by elements of the intelligence community, including--
(I) approving requirements (including those
requirements responding to needs provided by
consumers) for collection and analysis; and
(II) resolving conflicts in collection
requirements and in the tasking of national
collection assets of the elements of the
intelligence community; and
(iii) provide advisory tasking to intelligence
elements of those agencies and departments not within
the National Intelligence Program.
(B) The authority of the Director of National
Intelligence under subparagraph (A) includes
coordinating and supervising activities undertaken by
elements of the intelligence community for the purpose
of protecting the United States from any foreign
interference in elections in the United States.
[(B)] (C) The authority of the Director of National
Intelligence under subparagraph (A) shall not apply--
(i) insofar as the President so directs;
(ii) with respect to clause (ii) of subparagraph (A),
insofar as the Secretary of Defense exercises tasking
authority under plans or arrangements agreed upon by
the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National
Intelligence; or
(iii) to the direct dissemination of information to
State government and local government officials and
private sector entities pursuant to sections 201 and
892 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121,
482).
(2) The Director of National Intelligence shall oversee the
National Counterterrorism Center, the National
Counterproliferation Center, and the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center and may establish such
other national intelligence centers as the Director determines
necessary.
(3)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall prescribe,
in consultation with the heads of other agencies or elements of
the intelligence community, and the heads of their respective
departments, personnel policies and programs applicable to the
intelligence community that--
(i) encourage and facilitate assignments and details
of personnel to national intelligence centers, and
between elements of the intelligence community;
(ii) set standards for education, training, and
career development of personnel of the intelligence
community;
(iii) encourage and facilitate the recruitment and
retention by the intelligence community of highly
qualified individuals for the effective conduct of
intelligence activities;
(iv) ensure that the personnel of the intelligence
community are sufficiently diverse for purposes of the
collection and analysis of intelligence through the
recruitment and training of women, minorities, and
individuals with diverse ethnic, cultural, and
linguistic backgrounds;
(v) make service in more than one element of the
intelligence community a condition of promotion to such
positions within the intelligence community as the
Director shall specify; and
(vi) ensure the effective management of intelligence
community personnel who are responsible for
intelligence community-wide matters.
(B) Policies prescribed under subparagraph (A) shall not be
inconsistent with the personnel policies otherwise applicable
to members of the uniformed services.
(4) The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure
compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States
by the Central Intelligence Agency and shall ensure such
compliance by other elements of the intelligence community
through the host executive departments that manage the programs
and activities that are part of the National Intelligence
Program.
(5) The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure the
elimination of waste and unnecessary duplication within the
intelligence community.
(6) The Director of National Intelligence shall establish
requirements and priorities for foreign intelligence
information to be collected under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), and provide
assistance to the Attorney General to ensure that information
derived from electronic surveillance or physical searches under
that Act is disseminated so it may be used efficiently and
effectively for national intelligence purposes, except that the
Director shall have no authority to direct or undertake
electronic surveillance or physical search operations pursuant
to that Act unless authorized by statute or Executive order.
(7)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall, if the
Director determines it is necessary, or may, if requested by a
congressional intelligence committee, conduct an accountability
review of an element of the intelligence community or the
personnel of such element in relation to a failure or
deficiency within the intelligence community.
(B) The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation
with the Attorney General, shall establish guidelines and
procedures for conducting an accountability review under
subparagraph (A).
(C)(i) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide
the findings of an accountability review conducted under
subparagraph (A) and the Director's recommendations for
corrective or punitive action, if any, to the head of the
applicable element of the intelligence community. Such
recommendations may include a recommendation for dismissal of
personnel.
(ii) If the head of such element does not implement a
recommendation made by the Director under clause (i), the head
of such element shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a notice of the determination not to implement the
recommendation, including the reasons for the determination.
(D) The requirements of this paragraph shall not be construed
to limit any authority of the Director of National Intelligence
under subsection (m) or with respect to supervision of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
(8) The Director of National Intelligence shall perform such
other functions as the President may direct.
(9) Nothing in this title shall be construed as affecting the
role of the Department of Justice or the Attorney General under
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
(g) Intelligence Information Sharing.--(1) The Director of
National Intelligence shall have principal authority to ensure
maximum availability of and access to intelligence information
within the intelligence community consistent with national
security requirements. The Director of National Intelligence
shall--
(A) establish uniform security standards and
procedures;
(B) establish common information technology
standards, protocols, and interfaces;
(C) ensure development of information technology
systems that include multi-level security and
intelligence integration capabilities;
(D) establish policies and procedures to resolve
conflicts between the need to share intelligence
information and the need to protect intelligence
sources and methods;
(E) develop an enterprise architecture for the
intelligence community and ensure that elements of the
intelligence community comply with such architecture;
(F) have procurement approval authority over all
enterprise architecture-related information technology
items funded in the National Intelligence Program; and
(G) in accordance with Executive Order No. 13526 (75
Fed. Reg. 707; relating to classified national security
information) (or any subsequent corresponding executive
order), and part 2001 of title 32, Code of Federal
Regulations (or any subsequent corresponding
regulation), establish--
(i) guidance to standardize, in appropriate
cases, the formats for classified and
unclassified intelligence products created by
elements of the intelligence community for
purposes of promoting the sharing of
intelligence products; and
(ii) policies and procedures requiring the
increased use, in appropriate cases, and
including portion markings, of the
classification of portions of information
within one intelligence product.
(2) The President shall ensure that the Director of National
Intelligence has all necessary support and authorities to fully
and effectively implement paragraph (1).
(3) Except as otherwise directed by the President or with the
specific written agreement of the head of the department or
agency in question, a Federal agency or official shall not be
considered to have met any obligation to provide any
information, report, assessment, or other material (including
unevaluated intelligence information) to that department or
agency solely by virtue of having provided that information,
report, assessment, or other material to the Director of
National Intelligence or the National Counterterrorism Center.
(4) The Director of National Intelligence shall, in a timely
manner, report to Congress any statute, regulation, policy, or
practice that the Director believes impedes the ability of the
Director to fully and effectively ensure maximum availability
of access to intelligence information within the intelligence
community consistent with the protection of the national
security of the United States.
(h) Analysis.--To ensure the most accurate analysis of
intelligence is derived from all sources to support national
security needs, the Director of National Intelligence shall--
(1) implement policies and procedures--
(A) to encourage sound analytic methods and
tradecraft throughout the elements of the
intelligence community;
(B) to ensure that analysis is based upon all
sources available; and
(C) to ensure that the elements of the
intelligence community regularly conduct
competitive analysis of analytic products,
whether such products are produced by or
disseminated to such elements;
(2) ensure that resource allocation for intelligence
analysis is appropriately proportional to resource
allocation for intelligence collection systems and
operations in order to maximize analysis of all
collected data;
(3) ensure that differences in analytic judgment are
fully considered and brought to the attention of
policymakers; and
(4) ensure that sufficient relationships are
established between intelligence collectors and
analysts to facilitate greater understanding of the
needs of analysts.
(i) Protection of Intelligence Sources and Methods.--(1) The
Director of National Intelligence shall protect intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
(2) Consistent with paragraph (1), in order to maximize the
dissemination of intelligence, the Director of National
Intelligence shall establish and implement guidelines for the
intelligence community for the following purposes:
(A) Classification of information under applicable
law, Executive orders, or other Presidential
directives.
(B) Access to and dissemination of intelligence, both
in final form and in the form when initially gathered.
(C) Preparation of intelligence products in such a
way that source information is removed to allow for
dissemination at the lowest level of classification
possible or in unclassified form to the extent
practicable.
(3) The Director may only delegate a duty or authority given
the Director under this subsection to the Principal Deputy
Director of National Intelligence.
(j) Uniform Procedures for Classified Information.--The
Director of National Intelligence, subject to the direction of
the President, shall--
(1) establish uniform standards and procedures for
the grant of access to sensitive compartmented
information to any officer or employee of any agency or
department of the United States and to employees of
contractors of those agencies or departments;
(2) ensure the consistent implementation of those
standards and procedures throughout such agencies and
departments;
(3) ensure that security clearances granted by
individual elements of the intelligence community are
recognized by all elements of the intelligence
community, and under contracts entered into by those
agencies;
(4) ensure that the process for investigation and
adjudication of an application for access to sensitive
compartmented information is performed in the most
expeditious manner possible consistent with applicable
standards for national security;
(5) ensure that the background of each employee or
officer of an element of the intelligence community,
each contractor to an element of the intelligence
community, and each individual employee of such a
contractor who has been determined to be eligible for
access to classified information is monitored on a
continual basis under standards developed by the
Director, including with respect to the frequency of
evaluation, during the period of eligibility of such
employee or officer of an element of the intelligence
community, such contractor, or such individual employee
to such a contractor to determine whether such employee
or officer of an element of the intelligence community,
such contractor, and such individual employee of such a
contractor continues to meet the requirements for
eligibility for access to classified information; and
(6) develop procedures to require information sharing
between elements of the intelligence community
concerning potentially derogatory security information
regarding an employee or officer of an element of the
intelligence community, a contractor to an element of
the intelligence community, or an individual employee
of such a contractor that may impact the eligibility of
such employee or officer of an element of the
intelligence community, such contractor, or such
individual employee of such a contractor for a security
clearance.
(k) Coordination With Foreign Governments.--Under the
direction of the President and in a manner consistent with
section 207 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C.
3927), the Director of National Intelligence shall oversee the
coordination of the relationships between elements of the
intelligence community and the intelligence or security
services of foreign governments or international organizations
on all matters involving intelligence related to the national
security or involving intelligence acquired through clandestine
means.
(l) Enhanced Personnel Management.--(1)(A) The Director of
National Intelligence shall, under regulations prescribed by
the Director, provide incentives for personnel of elements of
the intelligence community to serve--
(i) on the staff of the Director of National
Intelligence;
(ii) on the staff of the national intelligence
centers;
(iii) on the staff of the National Counterterrorism
Center; and
(iv) in other positions in support of the
intelligence community management functions of the
Director.
(B) Incentives under subparagraph (A) may include financial
incentives, bonuses, and such other awards and incentives as
the Director considers appropriate.
(2)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
personnel of an element of the intelligence community who are
assigned or detailed under paragraph (1)(A) to service under
the Director of National Intelligence shall be promoted at
rates equivalent to or better than personnel of such element
who are not so assigned or detailed.
(B) The Director may prescribe regulations to carry out this
paragraph.
(3)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall prescribe
mechanisms to facilitate the rotation of personnel of the
intelligence community through various elements of the
intelligence community in the course of their careers in order
to facilitate the widest possible understanding by such
personnel of the variety of intelligence requirements, methods,
users, and capabilities.
(B) The mechanisms prescribed under subparagraph (A) may
include the following:
(i) The establishment of special occupational
categories involving service, over the course of a
career, in more than one element of the intelligence
community.
(ii) The provision of rewards for service in
positions undertaking analysis and planning of
operations involving two or more elements of the
intelligence community.
(iii) The establishment of requirements for
education, training, service, and evaluation for
service involving more than one element of the
intelligence community.
(C) It is the sense of Congress that the mechanisms
prescribed under this subsection should, to the extent
practical, seek to duplicate for civilian personnel within the
intelligence community the joint officer management policies
established by chapter 38 of title 10, United States Code, and
the other amendments made by title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law
99-433).
(D) The mechanisms prescribed under subparagraph (A) and any
other policies of the Director--
(i) may not require an employee of an office of
inspector general for an element of the intelligence
community, including the Office of the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community, to rotate to a
position in an office or organization of such an
element over which such office of inspector general
exercises jurisdiction; and
(ii) shall be implemented in a manner that exempts
employees of an office of inspector general from a
rotation that may impact the independence of such
office.
(4)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B) and
subparagraph (D), this subsection shall not apply with respect
to personnel of the elements of the intelligence community who
are members of the uniformed services.
(B) Mechanisms that establish requirements for education and
training pursuant to paragraph (3)(B)(iii) may apply with
respect to members of the uniformed services who are assigned
to an element of the intelligence community funded through the
National Intelligence Program, but such mechanisms shall not be
inconsistent with personnel policies and education and training
requirements otherwise applicable to members of the uniformed
services.
(C) The personnel policies and programs developed and
implemented under this subsection with respect to law
enforcement officers (as that term is defined in section
5541(3) of title 5, United States Code) shall not affect the
ability of law enforcement entities to conduct operations or,
through the applicable chain of command, to control the
activities of such law enforcement officers.
(D) Assignment to the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence of commissioned officers of the Armed Forces shall
be considered a joint-duty assignment for purposes of the joint
officer management policies prescribed by chapter 38 of title
10, United States Code, and other provisions of that title.
(m) Additional Authority With Respect to Personnel.--(1) In
addition to the authorities under subsection (f)(3), the
Director of National Intelligence may exercise with respect to
the personnel of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence any authority of the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency with respect to the personnel of the
Central Intelligence Agency under the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.), and other
applicable provisions of law, as of the date of the enactment
of this subsection to the same extent, and subject to the same
conditions and limitations, that the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency may exercise such authority with respect to
personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) Employees and applicants for employment of the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence shall have the same
rights and protections under the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence as employees of the Central Intelligence
Agency have under the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949,
and other applicable provisions of law, as of the date of the
enactment of this subsection.
(n) Acquisition and Other Authorities.--(1) In carrying out
the responsibilities and authorities under this section, the
Director of National Intelligence may exercise the acquisition
and appropriations authorities referred to in the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) other
than the authorities referred to in section 8(b) of that Act
(50 U.S.C. 403j(b)).
(2) For the purpose of the exercise of any authority referred
to in paragraph (1), a reference to the head of an agency shall
be deemed to be a reference to the Director of National
Intelligence or the Principal Deputy Director of National
Intelligence.
(3)(A) Any determination or decision to be made under an
authority referred to in paragraph (1) by the head of an agency
may be made with respect to individual purchases and contracts
or with respect to classes of purchases or contracts, and shall
be final.
(B) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the Director of
National Intelligence or the Principal Deputy Director of
National Intelligence may, in such official's discretion,
delegate to any officer or other official of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence any authority to make a
determination or decision as the head of the agency under an
authority referred to in paragraph (1).
(C) The limitations and conditions set forth in section 3(d)
of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C.
403c(d)) shall apply to the exercise by the Director of
National Intelligence of an authority referred to in paragraph
(1).
(D) Each determination or decision required by an authority
referred to in the second sentence of section 3(d) of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 shall be based upon
written findings made by the official making such determination
or decision, which findings shall be final and shall be
available within the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence for a period of at least six years following the
date of such determination or decision.
(4)(A) In addition to the authority referred to in paragraph
(1), the Director of National Intelligence may authorize the
head of an element of the intelligence community to exercise an
acquisition authority referred to in section 3 or 8(a) of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403c and
403j(a)) for an acquisition by such element that is more than
50 percent funded under the National Intelligence Program.
(B) The head of an element of the intelligence community may
not exercise an authority referred to in subparagraph (A)
until--
(i) the head of such element (without delegation)
submits to the Director of National Intelligence a
written request that includes--
(I) a description of such authority requested
to be exercised;
(II) an explanation of the need for such
authority, including an explanation of the
reasons that other authorities are
insufficient; and
(III) a certification that the mission of
such element would be--
(aa) impaired if such authority is
not exercised; or
(bb) significantly and measurably
enhanced if such authority is
exercised; and
(ii) the Director of National Intelligence issues a
written authorization that includes--
(I) a description of the authority referred
to in subparagraph (A) that is authorized to be
exercised; and
(II) a justification to support the exercise
of such authority.
(C) A request and authorization to exercise an authority
referred to in subparagraph (A) may be made with respect to an
individual acquisition or with respect to a specific class of
acquisitions described in the request and authorization
referred to in subparagraph (B).
(D)(i) A request from a head of an element of the
intelligence community located within one of the departments
described in clause (ii) to exercise an authority referred to
in subparagraph (A) shall be submitted to the Director of
National Intelligence in accordance with any procedures
established by the head of such department.
(ii) The departments described in this clause are the
Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department
of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the Department
of State, and the Department of the Treasury.
(E)(i) The head of an element of the intelligence community
may not be authorized to utilize an authority referred to in
subparagraph (A) for a class of acquisitions for a period of
more than 3 years, except that the Director of National
Intelligence (without delegation) may authorize the use of such
an authority for not more than 6 years.
(ii) Each authorization to utilize an authority referred to
in subparagraph (A) may be extended in accordance with the
requirements of subparagraph (B) for successive periods of not
more than 3 years, except that the Director of National
Intelligence (without delegation) may authorize an extension
period of not more than 6 years.
(F) Subject to clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (E), the
Director of National Intelligence may only delegate the
authority of the Director under subparagraphs (A) through (E)
to the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence or a
Deputy Director of National Intelligence.
(G) The Director of National Intelligence shall submit--
(i) to the congressional intelligence committees a
notification of an authorization to exercise an
authority referred to in subparagraph (A) or an
extension of such authorization that includes the
written authorization referred to in subparagraph
(B)(ii); and
(ii) to the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget a notification of an authorization to exercise
an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) for an
acquisition or class of acquisitions that will exceed
$50,000,000 annually.
(H) Requests and authorizations to exercise an authority
referred to in subparagraph (A) shall remain available within
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for a
period of at least 6 years following the date of such request
or authorization.
(I) Nothing in this paragraph may be construed to alter or
otherwise limit the authority of the Central Intelligence
Agency to independently exercise an authority under section 3
or 8(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C. 403c and 403j(a)).
(o) Consideration of Views of Elements of Intelligence
Community.--In carrying out the duties and responsibilities
under this section, the Director of National Intelligence shall
take into account the views of a head of a department
containing an element of the intelligence community and of the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(p) Responsibility of Director of National Intelligence
Regarding National Intelligence Program Budget Concerning the
Department of Defense.--Subject to the direction of the
President, the Director of National Intelligence shall, after
consultation with the Secretary of Defense, ensure that the
National Intelligence Program budgets for the elements of the
intelligence community that are within the Department of
Defense are adequate to satisfy the national intelligence needs
of the Department of Defense, including the needs of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of the
unified and specified commands, and wherever such elements are
performing Government-wide functions, the needs of other
Federal departments and agencies.
(q) Acquisitions of Major Systems.--(1) For each intelligence
program within the National Intelligence Program for the
acquisition of a major system, the Director of National
Intelligence shall--
(A) require the development and implementation of a
program management plan that includes cost, schedule,
security risks, and performance goals and program
milestone criteria, except that with respect to
Department of Defense programs the Director shall
consult with the Secretary of Defense;
(B) serve as exclusive milestone decision authority,
except that with respect to Department of Defense
programs the Director shall serve as milestone decision
authority jointly with the Secretary of Defense or the
designee of the Secretary; and
(C) periodically--
(i) review and assess the progress made
toward the achievement of the goals and
milestones established in such plan; and
(ii) submit to Congress a report on the
results of such review and assessment.
(2) If the Director of National Intelligence and the
Secretary of Defense are unable to reach an agreement on a
milestone decision under paragraph (1)(B), the President shall
resolve the conflict.
(3) Nothing in this subsection may be construed to limit the
authority of the Director of National Intelligence to delegate
to any other official any authority to perform the
responsibilities of the Director under this subsection.
(4) In this subsection:
(A) The term ``intelligence program'', with respect
to the acquisition of a major system, means a program
that--
(i) is carried out to acquire such major
system for an element of the intelligence
community; and
(ii) is funded in whole out of amounts
available for the National Intelligence
Program.
(B) The term ``major system'' has the meaning given
such term in section 4(9) of the Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act of 1949 (41 U.S.C. 403(9)).
(r) Performance of Common Services.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall, in consultation with the heads of
departments and agencies of the United States Government
containing elements within the intelligence community and with
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, coordinate the
performance by the elements of the intelligence community
within the National Intelligence Program of such services as
are of common concern to the intelligence community, which
services the Director of National Intelligence determines can
be more efficiently accomplished in a consolidated manner.
(s) Pay Authority for Critical Positions.--(1)
Notwithstanding any pay limitation established under any other
provision of law applicable to employees in elements of the
intelligence community, the Director of National Intelligence
may, in coordination with the Director of the Office of
Personnel Management and the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, grant authority to the head of a
department or agency to fix the rate of basic pay for one or
more positions within the intelligence community at a rate in
excess of any applicable limitation, subject to the provisions
of this subsection. The exercise of authority so granted is at
the discretion of the head of the department or agency
employing the individual in a position covered by such
authority, subject to the provisions of this subsection and any
conditions established by the Director of National Intelligence
when granting such authority.
(2) Authority under this subsection may be granted or
exercised only--
(A) with respect to a position that requires an
extremely high level of expertise and is critical to
successful accomplishment of an important mission; and
(B) to the extent necessary to recruit or retain an
individual exceptionally well qualified for the
position.
(3) The head of a department or agency may not fix a rate of
basic pay under this subsection at a rate greater than the rate
payable for level II of the Executive Schedule under section
5313 of title 5, United States Code, except upon written
approval of the Director of National Intelligence or as
otherwise authorized by law.
(4) The head of a department or agency may not fix a rate of
basic pay under this subsection at a rate greater than the rate
payable for level I of the Executive Schedule under section
5312 of title 5, United States Code, except upon written
approval of the President in response to a request by the
Director of National Intelligence or as otherwise authorized by
law.
(5) Any grant of authority under this subsection for a
position shall terminate at the discretion of the Director of
National Intelligence.
(6)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall notify the
congressional intelligence committees not later than 30 days
after the date on which the Director grants authority to the
head of a department or agency under this subsection.
(B) The head of a department or agency to which the Director
of National Intelligence grants authority under this subsection
shall notify the congressional intelligence committees and the
Director of the exercise of such authority not later than 30
days after the date on which such head exercises such
authority.
(t) Award of Rank to Members of the Senior National
Intelligence Service.--(1) The President, based on the
recommendation of the Director of National Intelligence, may
award a rank to a member of the Senior National Intelligence
Service or other intelligence community senior civilian officer
not already covered by such a rank award program in the same
manner in which a career appointee of an agency may be awarded
a rank under section 4507 of title 5, United States Code.
(2) The President may establish procedures to award a rank
under paragraph (1) to a member of the Senior National
Intelligence Service or a senior civilian officer of the
intelligence community whose identity as such a member or
officer is classified information (as defined in section
606(1)).
(u) Conflict of Interest Regulations.--The Director of
National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the
Office of Government Ethics, shall issue regulations
prohibiting an officer or employee of an element of the
intelligence community from engaging in outside employment if
such employment creates a conflict of interest or appearance
thereof.
(v) Authority To Establish Positions in Excepted Service.--
(1) The Director of National Intelligence, with the concurrence
of the head of the covered department concerned and in
consultation with the Director of the Office of Personnel
Management, may--
(A) convert competitive service positions, and the
incumbents of such positions, within an element of the
intelligence community in such department, to excepted
service positions as the Director of National
Intelligence determines necessary to carry out the
intelligence functions of such element; and
(B) establish new positions in the excepted service
within an element of the intelligence community in such
department, if the Director of National Intelligence
determines such positions are necessary to carry out
the intelligence functions of such element.
(2) An incumbent occupying a position on the date of the
enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2012 selected to be converted to the excepted service under
this section shall have the right to refuse such conversion.
Once such individual no longer occupies the position, the
position may be converted to the excepted service.
(3) A covered department may appoint an individual to a
position converted or established pursuant to this subsection
without regard to the civil-service laws, including parts II
and III of title 5, United States Code.
(4) In this subsection, the term ``covered department'' means
the Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security,
the Department of State, or the Department of the Treasury.
(w) Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statements Intelligence
Community Addendum.--The Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with the heads of the appropriate elements of the
intelligence community and the Secretary of State, shall
provide to the President, the congressional intelligence
committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate an addendum to each Nuclear Proliferation Assessment
Statement accompanying a civilian nuclear cooperation
agreement, containing a comprehensive analysis of the country's
export control system with respect to nuclear-related matters,
including interactions with other countries of proliferation
concern and the actual or suspected nuclear, dual-use, or
missile-related transfers to such countries.
(x) Requirements for Intelligence Community Contractors.--The
Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the
head of each department of the Federal Government that contains
an element of the intelligence community and the Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency, shall--
(1) ensure that--
(A) any contractor to an element of the
intelligence community with access to a
classified network or classified information
develops and operates a security plan that is
consistent with standards established by the
Director of National Intelligence for
intelligence community networks; and
(B) each contract awarded by an element of
the intelligence community includes provisions
requiring the contractor comply with such plan
and such standards;
(2) conduct periodic assessments of each security
plan required under paragraph (1)(A) to ensure such
security plan complies with the requirements of such
paragraph; and
(3) ensure that the insider threat detection
capabilities and insider threat policies of the
intelligence community apply to facilities of
contractors with access to a classified network.
(y) Fundraising.--(1) The Director of National Intelligence
may engage in fundraising in an official capacity for the
benefit of nonprofit organizations that--
(A) provide support to surviving family members of a
deceased employee of an element of the intelligence
community; or
(B) otherwise provide support for the welfare,
education, or recreation of employees of an element of
the intelligence community, former employees of an
element of the intelligence community, or family
members of such employees.
(2) In this subsection, the term ``fundraising'' means the
raising of funds through the active participation in the
promotion, production, or presentation of an event designed to
raise funds and does not include the direct solicitation of
money by any other means.
(3) Not later than 7 days after the date the Director engages
in fundraising authorized by this subsection or at the time the
decision is made to participate in such fundraising, the
Director shall notify the congressional intelligence committees
of such fundraising.
(4) The Director, in consultation with the Director of the
Office of Government Ethics, shall issue regulations to carry
out the authority provided in this subsection. Such regulations
shall ensure that such authority is exercised in a manner that
is consistent with all relevant ethical constraints and
principles, including the avoidance of any prohibited conflict
of interest or appearance of impropriety.
(z) Analyses and Impact Statements Regarding Proposed
Investment Into the United States.--(1) Not later than 20 days
after the completion of a review or an investigation of any
proposed investment into the United States for which the
Director has prepared analytic materials, the Director shall
submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representative copies of such analytic materials, including
any supplements or amendments to such analysis made by the
Director.
(2) Not later than 60 days after the completion of
consideration by the United States Government of any investment
described in paragraph (1), the Director shall determine
whether such investment will have an operational impact on the
intelligence community, and, if so, shall submit a report on
such impact to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of
the House of Representatives. Each such report shall--
(A) describe the operational impact of the investment
on the intelligence community; and
(B) describe any actions that have been or will be
taken to mitigate such impact.
* * * * * * *
[Director of Science and Technology
[Sec. 103E. (a) Director of Science and Technology.--There is
a Director of Science and Technology within the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence who shall be appointed by the
Director of National Intelligence.
[(b) Requirement Relating to Appointment.--An individual
appointed as Director of Science and Technology shall have a
professional background and experience appropriate for the
duties of the Director of Science and Technology.
[(c) Duties.--The Director of Science and Technology shall--
[(1) act as the chief representative of the Director
of National Intelligence for science and technology;
[(2) chair the Director of National Intelligence
Science and Technology Committee under subsection (d);
[(3) assist the Director in formulating a long-term
strategy for scientific advances in the field of
intelligence;
[(4) assist the Director on the science and
technology elements of the budget of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence; and
[(5) perform other such duties as may be prescribed
by the Director of National Intelligence or specified
by law.
[(d) Director of National Intelligence Science and Technology
Committee.--(1) There is within the Office of the Director of
Science and Technology a Director of National Intelligence
Science and Technology Committee.
[(2) The Committee shall be composed of the principal science
officers of the National Intelligence Program.
[(3) The Committee shall--
[(A) coordinate advances in research and development
related to intelligence; and
[(B) perform such other functions as the Director of
Science and Technology shall prescribe.]
SEC. 103E. DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.
(a) Director of Science and Technology.--
(1) Director of science and technology.--There is a
Director of Science and Technology within the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence who shall be
appointed by and shall report directly to the Director
of National Intelligence.
(2) Qualifications for appointment.--The Director of
Science and Technology shall be appointed from among
Federal employees and shall have a professional
background and experience appropriate for the duties of
the Director of Science and Technology.
(3) Responsibilities.--The Director of Science and
Technology shall be responsible for--
(A) leading the strategic vision for and
prioritization of covered activities of the
intelligence community; and
(B) providing science and technological
expertise for intelligence analyses conducted
by the intelligence community with respect to
covered activities of foreign adversaries, as
requested.
(b) Duties.--The Director of Science and Technology shall--
(1) act as the primary advisor to the Director of
National Intelligence regarding the science and
technology of the intelligence community;
(2) chair the National Intelligence Science and
Technology Committee under subsection (c);
(3) have access to any information relating to
covered activities of the intelligence community;
(4) assist the Director of National Intelligence in
developing elements of the budget of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence and the intelligence
community that relate to--
(A) covered activities of the intelligence
community; or
(B) covered activities of foreign
adversaries;
(5) on behalf of the Director of National
Intelligence--
(A) lead the development and oversee the
planning of a long-term strategy for covered
activities of the intelligence community; and
(B) lead the prioritization of such
activities;
(6) share knowledge to help ensure that the
intelligence community has the scientific and
technological expertise necessary to fulfill national
and military intelligence priorities relating to the
progress of foreign adversaries in covered activities;
and
(7) perform other such duties as may be assigned by
the Director of National Intelligence or specified by
law.
(c) National Intelligence Science and Technology Committee.--
(1) Committee.--There is within the Office of the
Director of Science and Technology a National
Intelligence Science and Technology Committee, which
shall be chaired by the Director of Science and
Technology.
(2) Composition.--The Committee shall be composed of
one representative from each element of the
intelligence community, who is--
(A) the principal science and technology
advisor to the head of the element; or
(B) an appropriate senior official designated
by the head of the element.
(3) Coordination.--The Committee shall coordinate the
covered activities of the intelligence community,
including by--
(A) identifying gaps in authorities or
resources that impact the ability of the
intelligence community to advance such
activities;
(B) assisting the Director of Science and
Technology in developing recommendations for
the Director of National Intelligence on the
prioritization of such activities;
(C) assisting the Director of Science and
Technology in identifying changes to existing
programs and resources necessary for the
advancement of such activities;
(D) developing and maintaining a centralized
process by which the Committee may--
(i) document the scientific and
technological needs of each element of
the intelligence community;
(ii) document any anticipated or
planned projects, programs, or related
activities to address such needs; and
(iii) provide information and regular
updates to other members of the
Committee on ongoing covered activities
of the intelligence community and
related projects and programs
(including information and updates on
work sponsored at federally funded
research and development centers), in
order to avoid duplicative efforts
among the elements of the intelligence
community; and
(E) maintaining comprehensive and persistent
visibility into capabilities, assets, and
talents in science, technology, or engineering
that--
(i) are available to the intelligence
community at federally funded research
and development centers; and
(ii) may address the needs documented
pursuant to subparagraph (D)(i).
(4) Intelligence analyses.--The Committee may provide
scientific and technological expertise and advice on
analyses conducted by the intelligence community on
scientific and technological research and development
achievements of foreign adversaries that affect the
national security of the United States, including by--
(A) coordinating with (and deconflicting with
as appropriate) the National Intelligence
Officer for Science and Technology of the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
with respect to threats posed by such
achievements;
(B) identifying investments and advancements
made by foreign adversaries in pursuit of such
achievements and communicating the
identifications to policymakers and the Armed
Forces of the United States;
(C) providing intelligence to assist national
and military customers in identifying and
prioritizing technically and operationally
feasible applications of such achievements;
(D) advising policymakers and the Armed
Forces of the United States on vulnerabilities
of the United States that may be revealed,
exploited, or otherwise implicated by foreign
adversaries through such achievements; and
(E) collaborating with the heads of
components of elements of the intelligence
community, including the Open Source Enterprise
and the Department of Defense Open Source
Council (or any related successor component)
and other appropriate entities, to analyze and
exploit open-source science and technology
intelligence.
(d) Reports.--
(1) Submission.--On an annual basis, the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees--
(A) a report on the efforts of the National
Intelligence Science and Technology Committee;
and
(B) a report that--
(i) addresses the status of covered
activities of the intelligence
community, including any advancements
made with respect to such activities;
and
(ii) includes a submission from the
head of each element of the
intelligence community describing any
covered activities sponsored by that
element at a federally funded research
and development center during the most
recent calendar year.
(2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1)(C) shall be
submitted in classified form.
(e) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Covered activities.--The term ``covered
activities'' means scientific and technological
research and development activities.
(2) Open-source science and technology
intelligence.--The term ``open-source science and
technology intelligence'' means information of
intelligence value regarding scientific and
technological developments that appears in print or
electronic form, including radio, television,
newspapers, journals, the internet, commercial
databases, videos, graphics, drawings, or any other
publicly available source.
* * * * * * *
inspector general of the intelligence community
Sec. 103H. (a) Office of Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community.--There is within the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence an Office of the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community.
(b) Purpose.--The purpose of the Office of the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community is--
(1) to create an objective and effective office,
appropriately accountable to Congress, to initiate and
conduct independent investigations, inspections,
audits, and reviews on programs and activities within
the responsibility and authority of the Director of
National Intelligence;
(2) to provide leadership and coordination and
recommend policies for activities designed--
(A) to promote economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness in the administration and
implementation of such programs and activities;
and
(B) to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in
such programs and activities;
(3) to provide a means for keeping the Director of
National Intelligence fully and currently informed
about--
(A) problems and deficiencies relating to the
administration of programs and activities
within the responsibility and authority of the
Director of National Intelligence; and
(B) the necessity for, and the progress of,
corrective actions; and
(4) in the manner prescribed by this section, to
ensure that the congressional intelligence committees
are kept similarly informed of--
(A) significant problems and deficiencies
relating to programs and activities within the
responsibility and authority of the Director of
National Intelligence; and
(B) the necessity for, and the progress of,
corrective actions.
(c) Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.--(1)
There is an Inspector General of the Intelligence Community,
who shall be the head of the Office of the Inspector General of
the Intelligence Community, who shall be appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(2) The nomination of an individual for appointment as
Inspector General shall be made--
(A) without regard to political affiliation;
(B) on the basis of integrity, compliance with
security standards of the intelligence community, and
prior experience in the field of intelligence or
national security; and
(C) on the basis of demonstrated ability in
accounting, financial analysis, law, management
analysis, public administration, or investigations.
(3) The Inspector General shall report directly to and be
under the general supervision of the Director of National
Intelligence.
[(4) The Inspector General may be removed from office only by
the President. The President shall communicate in writing to
the congressional intelligence committees the reasons for the
removal not later than 30 days prior to the effective date of
such removal. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to
prohibit a personnel action otherwise authorized by law, other
than transfer or removal.]
(4) The provisions of title XII shall apply to the Inspector
General with respect to the removal of the Inspector General, a
vacancy in the position of the Inspector General, and any other
matter relating to the Inspector General as specifically
provided for in such title.
(d) Assistant Inspectors General.--Subject to the policies of
the Director of National Intelligence, the Inspector General of
the Intelligence Community shall--
(1) appoint an Assistant Inspector General for Audit
who shall have the responsibility for supervising the
performance of auditing activities relating to programs
and activities within the responsibility and authority
of the Director;
(2) appoint an Assistant Inspector General for
Investigations who shall have the responsibility for
supervising the performance of investigative activities
relating to such programs and activities; and
(3) appoint other Assistant Inspectors General that,
in the judgment of the Inspector General, are necessary
to carry out the duties of the Inspector General.
(e) Duties and Responsibilities.--It shall be the duty and
responsibility of the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community--
(1) to provide policy direction for, and to plan,
conduct, supervise, and coordinate independently, the
investigations, inspections, audits, and reviews
relating to programs and activities within the
responsibility and authority of the Director of
National Intelligence;
(2) to keep the Director of National Intelligence
fully and currently informed concerning violations of
law and regulations, fraud, and other serious problems,
abuses, and deficiencies relating to the programs and
activities within the responsibility and authority of
the Director, to recommend corrective action concerning
such problems, and to report on the progress made in
implementing such corrective action;
(3) to take due regard for the protection of
intelligence sources and methods in the preparation of
all reports issued by the Inspector General, and, to
the extent consistent with the purpose and objective of
such reports, take such measures as may be appropriate
to minimize the disclosure of intelligence sources and
methods described in such reports; and
(4) in the execution of the duties and
responsibilities under this section, to comply with
generally accepted government auditing.
(f) Limitations on Activities.--(1) The Director of National
Intelligence may prohibit the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community from initiating, carrying out, or
completing any investigation, inspection, audit, or review if
the Director determines that such prohibition is necessary to
protect vital national security interests of the United States.
(2) Not later than seven days after the date on which the
Director exercises the authority under paragraph (1), the
Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees an appropriately classified statement of the reasons
for the exercise of such authority.
(3) The Director shall advise the Inspector General at the
time a statement under paragraph (2) is submitted, and, to the
extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources
and methods, provide the Inspector General with a copy of such
statement.
(4) The Inspector General may submit to the congressional
intelligence committees any comments on the statement of which
the Inspector General has notice under paragraph (3) that the
Inspector General considers appropriate.
(g) Authorities.--(1) The Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community shall have direct and prompt access to
the Director of National Intelligence when necessary for any
purpose pertaining to the performance of the duties of the
Inspector General.
(2)(A) The Inspector General shall, subject to the
limitations in subsection (f), make such investigations and
reports relating to the administration of the programs and
activities within the authorities and responsibilities of the
Director as are, in the judgment of the Inspector General,
necessary or desirable.
(B) The Inspector General shall have access to any employee,
or any employee of a contractor, of any element of the
intelligence community needed for the performance of the duties
of the Inspector General.
(C) The Inspector General shall have direct access to all
records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers,
recommendations, or other materials that relate to the programs
and activities with respect to which the Inspector General has
responsibilities under this section.
(D) The level of classification or compartmentation of
information shall not, in and of itself, provide a sufficient
rationale for denying the Inspector General access to any
materials under subparagraph (C).
(E) The Director, or on the recommendation of the Director,
another appropriate official of the intelligence community,
shall take appropriate administrative actions against an
employee, or an employee of a contractor, of an element of the
intelligence community that fails to cooperate with the
Inspector General. Such administrative action may include loss
of employment or the termination of an existing contractual
relationship.
(3) The Inspector General is authorized to receive and
investigate, pursuant to subsection (h), complaints or
information from any person concerning the existence of an
activity within the authorities and responsibilities of the
Director of National Intelligence constituting a violation of
laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement, gross waste of
funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger
to the public health and safety. Once such complaint or
information has been received from an employee of the
intelligence community--
(A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the
identity of the employee without the consent of the
employee, unless the Inspector General determines that
such disclosure is unavoidable during the course of the
investigation or the disclosure is made to an official
of the Department of Justice responsible for
determining whether a prosecution should be undertaken,
and this provision shall qualify as a withholding
statute pursuant to subsection (b)(3) of section 552 of
title 5, United States Code (commonly known as the
``Freedom of Information Act''); and
(B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of
reprisal, for making such complaint or disclosing such
information to the Inspector General may be taken by
any employee in a position to take such actions, unless
the complaint was made or the information was disclosed
with the knowledge that it was false or with willful
disregard for its truth or falsity.
(4) The Inspector General shall have the authority to
administer to or take from any person an oath, affirmation, or
affidavit, whenever necessary in the performance of the duties
of the Inspector General, which oath, affirmation, or affidavit
when administered or taken by or before an employee of the
Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
designated by the Inspector General shall have the same force
and effect as if administered or taken by, or before, an
officer having a seal.
(5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the Inspector
General is authorized to require by subpoena the production of
all information, documents, reports, answers, records,
accounts, papers, and other data in any medium (including
electronically stored information, as well as any tangible
thing) and documentary evidence necessary in the performance of
the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General.
(B) In the case of departments, agencies, and other elements
of the United States Government, the Inspector General shall
obtain information, documents, reports, answers, records,
accounts, papers, and other data and evidence for the purpose
specified in subparagraph (A) using procedures other than by
subpoenas.
(C) The Inspector General may not issue a subpoena for, or on
behalf of, any component of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence or any element of the intelligence
community, including the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
(D) In the case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena
issued under this paragraph, the subpoena shall be enforceable
by order of any appropriate district court of the United
States.
(6) The Inspector General may obtain services as authorized
by section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, at rates for
individuals not to exceed the daily equivalent of the maximum
annual rate of basic pay payable for grade GS-15 of the General
Schedule under section 5332 of title 5, United States Code.
(7) The Inspector General may, to the extent and in such
amounts as may be provided in appropriations, enter into
contracts and other arrangements for audits, studies, analyses,
and other services with public agencies and with private
persons, and to make such payments as may be necessary to carry
out the provisions of this section.
(h) Coordination Among Inspectors General.--(1)(A) In the
event of a matter within the jurisdiction of the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community that may be subject to an
investigation, inspection, audit, or review by both the
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community and an
inspector general with oversight responsibility for an element
of the intelligence community, the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community and such other inspector general shall
expeditiously resolve the question of which inspector general
shall conduct such investigation, inspection, audit, or review
to avoid unnecessary duplication of the activities of the
inspectors general.
(B) In attempting to resolve a question under subparagraph
(A), the inspectors general concerned may request the
assistance of the Intelligence Community Inspectors General
Forum established under paragraph (2). In the event of a
dispute between an inspector general within a department or
agency of the United States Government and the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community that has not been
resolved with the assistance of such Forum, the inspectors
general shall submit the question to the Director of National
Intelligence and the head of the affected department or agency
for resolution.
(2)(A) There is established the Intelligence Community
Inspectors General Forum, which shall consist of all statutory
or administrative inspectors general with oversight
responsibility for an element of the intelligence community.
(B) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall
serve as the Chair of the Forum established under subparagraph
(A). The Forum shall have no administrative authority over any
inspector general, but shall serve as a mechanism for informing
its members of the work of individual members of the Forum that
may be of common interest and discussing questions about
jurisdiction or access to employees, employees of contract
personnel, records, audits, reviews, documents,
recommendations, or other materials that may involve or be of
assistance to more than one of its members.
(3) The inspector general conducting an investigation,
inspection, audit, or review covered by paragraph (1) shall
submit the results of such investigation, inspection, audit, or
review to any other inspector general, including the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community, with jurisdiction to
conduct such investigation, inspection, audit, or review who
did not conduct such investigation, inspection, audit, or
review.
(i) Counsel to the Inspector General.--(1) The Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community shall--
(A) appoint a Counsel to the Inspector General who
shall report to the Inspector General; or
(B) obtain the services of a counsel appointed by and
directly reporting to another inspector general or the
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency on a reimbursable basis.
(2) The counsel appointed or obtained under paragraph (1)
shall perform such functions as the Inspector General may
prescribe.
(j) Staff and Other Support.--(1) The Director of National
Intelligence shall provide the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community with appropriate and adequate office
space at central and field office locations, together with such
equipment, office supplies, maintenance services, and
communications facilities and services as may be necessary for
the operation of such offices.
(2)(A) Subject to applicable law and the policies of the
Director of National Intelligence, the Inspector General shall
select, appoint, and employ such officers and employees as may
be necessary to carry out the functions, powers, and duties of
the Inspector General. The Inspector General shall ensure that
any officer or employee so selected, appointed, or employed has
security clearances appropriate for the assigned duties of such
officer or employee.
(B) In making selections under subparagraph (A), the
Inspector General shall ensure that such officers and employees
have the requisite training and experience to enable the
Inspector General to carry out the duties of the Inspector
General effectively.
(C) In meeting the requirements of this paragraph, the
Inspector General shall create within the Office of the
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community a career cadre
of sufficient size to provide appropriate continuity and
objectivity needed for the effective performance of the duties
of the Inspector General.
(3) Consistent with budgetary and personnel resources
allocated by the Director of National Intelligence, the
Inspector General has final approval of--
(A) the selection of internal and external candidates
for employment with the Office of the Inspector
General; and
(B) all other personnel decisions concerning
personnel permanently assigned to the Office of the
Inspector General, including selection and appointment
to the Senior Intelligence Service, but excluding all
security-based determinations that are not within the
authority of a head of a component of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence.
(4)(A) Subject to the concurrence of the Director of National
Intelligence, the Inspector General may request such
information or assistance as may be necessary for carrying out
the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General from
any Federal, State (as defined in section 805), or local
governmental agency or unit thereof.
(B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information or
assistance from a department, agency, or element of the Federal
Government under subparagraph (A), the head of the department,
agency, or element concerned shall, insofar as is practicable
and not in contravention of any existing statutory restriction
or regulation of the department, agency, or element, furnish to
the Inspector General, such information or assistance.
(C) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community may,
upon reasonable notice to the head of any element of the
intelligence community and in coordination with that element's
inspector general pursuant to subsection (h), conduct, as
authorized by this section, an investigation, inspection,
audit, or review of such element and may enter into any place
occupied by such element for purposes of the performance of the
duties of the Inspector General.
(k) Reports.--(1)(A) The Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community shall, not later than October 31 and
April 30 of each year, prepare and submit to the Director of
National Intelligence a classified, and, as appropriate,
unclassified semiannual report summarizing the activities of
the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community during the immediately preceding 6-month period
ending September 30 and March 31, respectively. The Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community shall provide any portion
of the report involving a component of a department of the
United States Government to the head of that department
simultaneously with submission of the report to the Director of
National Intelligence.
(B) Each report under this paragraph shall include, at a
minimum, the following:
(i) A list of the title or subject of each
investigation, inspection, audit, or review conducted
during the period covered by such report.
(ii) A description of significant problems, abuses,
and deficiencies relating to the administration of
programs and activities of the intelligence community
within the responsibility and authority of the Director
of National Intelligence, and in the relationships
between elements of the intelligence community,
identified by the Inspector General during the period
covered by such report.
(iii) A description of the recommendations for
corrective action made by the Inspector General during
the period covered by such report with respect to
significant problems, abuses, or deficiencies
identified in clause (ii).
(iv) A statement of whether or not corrective action
has been completed on each significant recommendation
described in previous semiannual reports, and, in a
case where corrective action has been completed, a
description of such corrective action.
(v) A certification of whether or not the Inspector
General has had full and direct access to all
information relevant to the performance of the
functions of the Inspector General.
(vi) A description of the exercise of the subpoena
authority under subsection (g)(5) by the Inspector
General during the period covered by such report.
(vii) Such recommendations as the Inspector General
considers appropriate for legislation to promote
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the
administration and implementation of programs and
activities within the responsibility and authority of
the Director of National Intelligence, and to detect
and eliminate fraud and abuse in such programs and
activities.
(C) Not later than 30 days after the date of receipt of a
report under subparagraph (A), the Director shall transmit the
report to the congressional intelligence committees together
with any comments the Director considers appropriate. The
Director shall transmit to the committees of the Senate and of
the House of Representatives with jurisdiction over a
department of the United States Government any portion of the
report involving a component of such department simultaneously
with submission of the report to the congressional intelligence
committees.
(2)(A) The Inspector General shall report immediately to the
Director whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of
particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or
deficiencies relating to programs and activities within the
responsibility and authority of the Director of National
Intelligence.
(B) The Director shall transmit to the congressional
intelligence committees each report under subparagraph (A)
within 7 calendar days of receipt of such report, together with
such comments as the Director considers appropriate. The
Director shall transmit to the committees of the Senate and of
the House of Representatives with jurisdiction over a
department of the United States Government any portion of each
report under subparagraph (A) that involves a problem, abuse,
or deficiency related to a component of such department
simultaneously with transmission of the report to the
congressional intelligence committees.
(3)(A) In the event that--
(i) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any
differences with the Director affecting the execution
of the duties or responsibilities of the Inspector
General;
(ii) an investigation, inspection, audit, or review
carried out by the Inspector General focuses on any
current or former intelligence community official who--
(I) holds or held a position in an element of
the intelligence community that is subject to
appointment by the President, whether or not by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
including such a position held on an acting
basis;
(II) holds or held a position in an element
of the intelligence community, including a
position held on an acting basis, that is
appointed by the Director of National
Intelligence; or
(III) holds or held a position as head of an
element of the intelligence community or a
position covered by subsection (b) or (c) of
section 106;
(iii) a matter requires a report by the Inspector
General to the Department of Justice on possible
criminal conduct by a current or former official
described in clause (ii);
(iv) the Inspector General receives notice from the
Department of Justice declining or approving
prosecution of possible criminal conduct of any current
or former official described in clause (ii); or
(v) the Inspector General, after exhausting all
possible alternatives, is unable to obtain significant
documentary information in the course of an
investigation, inspection, audit, or review,
the Inspector General shall immediately notify, and submit a
report to, the congressional intelligence committees on such
matter.
(B) The Inspector General shall submit to the committees of
the Senate and of the House of Representatives with
jurisdiction over a department of the United States Government
any portion of each report under subparagraph (A) that involves
an investigation, inspection, audit, or review carried out by
the Inspector General focused on any current or former official
of a component of such department simultaneously with
submission of the report to the congressional intelligence
committees.
(C) With respect to each report submitted pursuant to
paragraph (A)(i), the Inspector General shall include in the
report, at a minimum--
(i) a general description of the unresolved
differences, the particular duties or responsibilities
of the Inspector General involved, and, if such
differences relate to a complaint or information under
paragraph (5), a description of the complaint or
information and the entities or individuals identified
in the complaint or information; and
(ii) to the extent such differences can be attributed
not only to the Director but also to any other
official, department, agency, or office within the
executive branch, or a component thereof, the titles of
such official, department, agency, or office.
(4) The Director shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees any report or findings and
recommendations of an investigation, inspection, audit, or
review conducted by the office which has been requested by the
Chairman or Vice Chairman or ranking minority member of either
committee.
(5)(A) An employee of an element of the intelligence
community, an employee assigned or detailed to an element of
the intelligence community, or an employee of a contractor to
the intelligence community who intends to report to Congress a
complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern may
report such complaint or information to the Inspector General.
(B) Not later than the end of the 14-calendar-day period
beginning on the date of receipt from an employee of a
complaint or information under subparagraph (A), the Inspector
General shall determine whether the complaint or information
appears credible. Upon making such a determination, the
Inspector General shall transmit to the Director a notice of
that determination, together with the complaint or information.
(C) Upon receipt of a transmittal from the Inspector General
under subparagraph (B), the Director shall, within 7 calendar
days of such receipt, forward such transmittal to the
congressional intelligence committees, together with any
comments the Director considers appropriate.
(D)(i) If the Inspector General does not find credible under
subparagraph (B) a complaint or information submitted under
subparagraph (A), or does not transmit the complaint or
information to the Director in accurate form under subparagraph
(B), the employee (subject to clause (ii)) may submit the
complaint or information to Congress by contacting either or
both of the congressional intelligence committees directly. The
employee may request information pursuant to section 1227 with
respect to contacting such committees.
(ii) An employee may contact the congressional intelligence
committees directly as described in clause (i) only if the
employee--
(I) before making such a contact, furnishes to the
Director, through the Inspector General, a statement of
the employee's complaint or information and notice of
the employee's intent to contact the congressional
intelligence committees directly; and
(II) obtains and follows from the Director, through
the Inspector General, direction on how to contact the
congressional intelligence committees in accordance
with appropriate security practices.
(iii) A member or employee of one of the congressional
intelligence committees who receives a complaint or information
under this subparagraph does so in that member or employee's
official capacity as a member or employee of such committee.
(E) The Inspector General shall notify an employee who
reports a complaint or information to the Inspector General
under this paragraph of each action taken under this paragraph
with respect to the complaint or information. Such notice shall
be provided not later than 3 days after any such action is
taken.
(F) An action taken by the Director or the Inspector General
under this paragraph shall not be subject to judicial review.
(G) [In this paragraph] In accordance with section 1205, in
this paragraph, the term ``urgent concern'' means any of the
following:
(i) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation
of law or Executive order, or deficiency relating to
the funding, administration, or operation of an
intelligence activity within the responsibility and
authority of the Director of National Intelligence
involving classified information, but does not include
differences of opinions concerning public policy
matters.
(ii) A false statement to Congress, or a willful
withholding from Congress, on an issue of material fact
relating to the funding, administration, or operation
of an intelligence activity.
(iii) An action, including a personnel action
described in section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, United
States Code, constituting reprisal or threat of
reprisal prohibited under subsection (g)(3)(B) of this
section in response to an employee's reporting an
urgent concern in accordance with this paragraph.
(H) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the
protections afforded to an employee under section 17(d) of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)) or
section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C.
App.).
(I) An individual who has submitted a complaint or
information to the Inspector General under this section may
notify any member of either of the congressional intelligence
committees, or a staff member of either of such committees, of
the fact that such individual has made a submission to the
Inspector General, and of the date on which such submission was
made.
(6) In accordance with section 535 of title 28, United States
Code, the Inspector General shall expeditiously report to the
Attorney General any information, allegation, or complaint
received by the Inspector General relating to violations of
Federal criminal law that involves a program or operation of an
element of the intelligence community, or in the relationships
between the elements of the intelligence community, consistent
with such guidelines as may be issued by the Attorney General
pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of such section. A copy of each
such report shall be furnished to the Director.
(l) Construction of Duties Regarding Elements of Intelligence
Community.--Except as resolved pursuant to subsection (h), the
performance by the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community of any duty, responsibility, or function regarding an
element of the intelligence community shall not be construed to
modify or affect the duties and responsibilities of any other
inspector general having duties and responsibilities relating
to such element.
(m) Separate Budget Account.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall, in accordance with procedures issued by the
Director in consultation with the congressional intelligence
committees, include in the National Intelligence Program budget
a separate account for the Office of the Inspector General of
the Intelligence Community.
(n) Budget.--(1) For each fiscal year, the Inspector General
of the Intelligence Community shall transmit a budget estimate
and request to the Director of National Intelligence that
specifies for such fiscal year--
(A) the aggregate amount requested for the operations
of the Inspector General;
(B) the amount requested for all training
requirements of the Inspector General, including a
certification from the Inspector General that the
amount requested is sufficient to fund all training
requirements for the Office of the Inspector General;
and
(C) the amount requested to support the Council of
the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency,
including a justification for such amount.
(2) In transmitting a proposed budget to the President for a
fiscal year, the Director of National Intelligence shall
include for such fiscal year--
(A) the aggregate amount requested for the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community;
(B) the amount requested for Inspector General
training;
(C) the amount requested to support the Council of
the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency; and
(D) the comments of the Inspector General, if any,
with respect to such proposed budget.
(3) The Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives for each fiscal
year--
(A) a separate statement of the budget estimate
transmitted pursuant to paragraph (1);
(B) the amount requested by the Director for the
Inspector General pursuant to paragraph (2)(A);
(C) the amount requested by the Director for the
training of personnel of the Office of the Inspector
General pursuant to paragraph (2)(B);
(D) the amount requested by the Director for support
for the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity
and Efficiency pursuant to paragraph (2)(C); and
(E) the comments of the Inspector General under
paragraph (2)(D), if any, on the amounts requested
pursuant to paragraph (2), including whether such
amounts would substantially inhibit the Inspector
General from performing the duties of the Office of the
Inspector General.
(o) Information on Website.--(1) The Director of National
Intelligence shall establish and maintain on the homepage of
the publicly accessible website of the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence information relating to the Office of
the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community including
methods to contact the Inspector General.
(2) The information referred to in paragraph (1) shall be
obvious and facilitate accessibility to the information related
to the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 106A. DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.
(a) In General.--There is a Director of the National
Reconnaissance Office.
(b) Appointment.--The Director of the National Reconnaissance
Office shall be appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate.
(c) Functions and Duties.--The Director of the National
Reconnaissance Office shall be the head of the National
Reconnaissance Office and shall discharge such functions and
duties as are provided by this Act or otherwise by law or
executive order.
(d) Clarification of Authority.--The Director of National
Intelligence may not transfer any element of the National
Reconnaissance Office to the Space Force. Nothing in chapter
908 of title 10, United States Code, shall affect the
authorities, duties, or responsibilities of the Director of the
National Reconnaissance Office, including with respect to the
authority of the Director to operate a unified organization to
carry out the research, development, test, evaluation,
acquisition, launch, deployment, and operations of overhead
reconnaissance systems and related data processing facilities
of the National Reconnaissance Office.
[(d)] (e) Advisory Board.--
(1) Establishment.--There is established in the
National Reconnaissance Office an advisory board (in
this section referred to as the ``Board'').
(2) Duties.--The Board shall--
(A) study matters relating to the mission of
the National Reconnaissance Office, including
with respect to promoting innovation,
competition, and resilience in space, overhead
reconnaissance, acquisition, and other matters;
and
(B) advise and report directly to the
Director with respect to such matters.
(3) Members.--
(A) Number and appointment.--
(i) In general.--The Board shall be
composed of five members appointed by
the Director from among individuals
with demonstrated academic, government,
business, or other expertise relevant
to the mission and functions of the
National Reconnaissance Office.
(ii) Notification.--Not later than 30
days after the date on which the
Director appoints a member to the
Board, the Director shall notify the
congressional intelligence committees
and the congressional defense
committees (as defined in section
101(a) of title 10, United States Code)
of such appointment.
(B) Terms.--Each member shall be appointed
for a term of 2 years. Except as provided by
subparagraph (C), a member may not serve more
than three terms.
(C) Vacancy.--Any member appointed to fill a
vacancy occurring before the expiration of the
term for which the member's predecessor was
appointed shall be appointed only for the
remainder of that term. A member may serve
after the expiration of that member's term
until a successor has taken office.
(D) Chair.--The Board shall have a Chair, who
shall be appointed by the Director from among
the members.
(E) Travel expenses.--Each member shall
receive travel expenses, including per diem in
lieu of subsistence, in accordance with
applicable provisions under subchapter I of
chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code.
(F) Executive secretary.--The Director may
appoint an executive secretary, who shall be an
employee of the National Reconnaissance Office,
to support the Board.
(4) Meetings.--The Board shall meet not less than
quarterly, but may meet more frequently at the call of
the Director.
(5) Reports.--Not later than March 31 of each year,
the Board shall submit to the Director and to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the
activities and significant findings of the Board during
the preceding year.
(6) Nonapplicability of certain requirements.--The
Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall
not apply to the Board.
(7) Termination.--The Board shall terminate on the
date that is 3 years after the date of the first
meeting of the Board.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 108B. ANNUAL REPORTS ON WORLDWIDE THREATS.
(a) Annual Reports.--Not later than the first Monday in
February 2021, and each year thereafter, the Director of
National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of the
elements of the intelligence community, shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report containing an
assessment of the intelligence community with respect to
worldwide threats to the national security of the United
States.
(b) Form.--Each report under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex only for the protection of intelligence sources and
methods relating to the matters contained in the report.
(c) Hearings.--
(1) Open hearings.--Upon request by the appropriate
congressional committees, the Director (and any other
head of an element of the intelligence community
determined appropriate by the committees in
consultation with the Director) shall testify before
such committees in an open setting regarding a report
under subsection (a).
(2) Closed hearings.--Any information that may not be
disclosed during an open hearing under paragraph (1) in
order to protect intelligence sources and methods may
instead be discussed in a closed hearing that
immediately follows such open hearing.
(d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; and
(2) the Committees on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives and the Senate.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 120. CLIMATE SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL.
(a) Establishment.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall establish a Climate Security Advisory Council for the
purpose of--
(1) assisting intelligence analysts of various
elements of the intelligence community with respect to
analysis of climate security and its impact on the
areas of focus of such analysts;
(2) facilitating coordination between the elements of
the intelligence community and elements of the Federal
Government that are not elements of the intelligence
community in collecting data on, and conducting
analysis of, climate change and climate security; and
(3) ensuring that the intelligence community is
adequately prioritizing climate change in carrying out
its activities.
(b) Composition of Council.--
(1) Members.--The Council shall be composed of the
following individuals appointed by the Director of
National Intelligence:
(A) An appropriate official from the National
Intelligence Council, who shall chair the
Council.
(B) The lead official with respect to climate
and environmental security analysis from--
(i) the Central Intelligence Agency;
(ii) the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research of the Department of State;
(iii) the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency;
(iv) the Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence of the Department
of Energy;
(v) the Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Intelligence; and
(vi) the Defense Intelligence Agency.
(C) Three appropriate officials from elements
of the Federal Government that are not elements
of the intelligence community that are
responsible for--
(i) providing decision makers with a
predictive understanding of the
climate;
(ii) making observations of our Earth
system that can be used by the public,
policymakers, and to support strategic
decisions; or
(iii) coordinating Federal research
and investments in understanding the
forces shaping the global environment,
both human and natural, and their
impacts on society.
(D) Any other officials as the Director of
National Intelligence or the chair of the
Council may determine appropriate.
(2) Responsibilities of chair.--The chair of the
Council shall have responsibility for--
(A) identifying agencies to supply
individuals from elements of the Federal
Government that are not elements of the
intelligence community;
(B) securing the permission of the relevant
agency heads for the participation of such
individuals on the Council; and
(C) any other duties that the Director of
National Intelligence may direct.
(c) Duties and Responsibilities of Council.--The Council
shall carry out the following duties and responsibilities:
(1) To meet at least quarterly to--
(A) exchange appropriate data between
elements of the intelligence community and
elements of the Federal Government that are not
elements of the intelligence community;
(B) discuss processes for the routine
exchange of such data and implementation of
such processes; and
(C) prepare summaries of the business
conducted at each meeting.
(2) To assess and determine best practices with
respect to the analysis of climate security, including
identifying publicly available information and
intelligence acquired through clandestine means that
enables such analysis.
(3) To assess and identify best practices with
respect to prior efforts of the intelligence community
to analyze climate security.
(4) To assess and describe best practices for
identifying and disseminating climate [security
indicators] intelligence indications and warnings.
(5) To recommend methods of incorporating analysis of
climate security and the best practices identified
under paragraphs (2) through (4) into existing analytic
training programs.
(6) To consult, as appropriate, with other elements
of the intelligence community that conduct analysis of
climate change or climate security and elements of the
Federal Government that are not elements of the
intelligence community that conduct analysis of climate
change or climate security, for the purpose of sharing
information about ongoing efforts and avoiding
duplication of existing efforts.
(7) To work with elements of the intelligence
community that conduct analysis of climate change or
climate security and elements of the Federal Government
that are not elements of the intelligence community
that conduct analysis of climate change or climate
security--
(A) to exchange appropriate data between such
elements, establish processes, procedures and
practices for the routine exchange of such
data, discuss the implementation of such
processes; and
(B) to enable and facilitate the sharing of
findings and analysis between such elements.
(8) To assess whether the elements of the
intelligence community that conduct analysis of climate
change or climate security may inform the research
direction of academic work and the sponsored work of
the United States Government.
(9) At the discretion of the chair of the Council, to
convene conferences of analysts and nonintelligence
community personnel working on climate change or
climate security on subjects that the chair shall
direct.
(d) Annual Report.--Not later than January 31, 2021, and not
less frequently than annually thereafter, the chair of the
Council shall submit, on behalf of the Council, to the
congressional intelligence committees a report describing the
activities of the Council as described in subsection (c) during
the year preceding the year during which the report is
submitted.
[(d) Sunset.--The Council shall terminate on the date that is
4 years after the date of the enactment of this section.]
[(e)] (d) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Climate security.--The term ``climate security''
means the effects of climate change on the following:
(A) The national security of the United
States, including national security
infrastructure.
(B) Subnational, national, and regional
political stability.
(C) The security of allies and partners of
the United States.
(D) Ongoing or potential political violence,
including unrest, rioting, guerrilla warfare,
insurgency, terrorism, rebellion, revolution,
civil war, and interstate war.
(2) Climate intelligence indications and warnings.--
The term ``climate intelligence indications and
warnings'' means developments relating to climate
security with the potential to--
(A) imminently and substantially alter the
political stability or degree of human security
in a country or region; or
(B) imminently and substantially threaten--
(i) the national security of the
United States;
(ii) the military, political, or
economic interests of allies and
partners of the United States; or
(iii) citizens of the United States
abroad.
* * * * * * *
TITLE III--MISCELLANEOUS
* * * * * * *
[SEC. 304. REPORTING OF CERTAIN EMPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES BY FORMER
INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES.
[(a) In General.--The head of each element of the
intelligence community shall issue regulations requiring each
employee of such element occupying a covered position to sign a
written agreement requiring the regular reporting of covered
employment to the head of such element.
[(b) Agreement Elements.--The regulations required under
subsection (a) shall provide that an agreement contain
provisions requiring each employee occupying a covered position
to, during the two-year period beginning on the date on which
such employee ceases to occupy such covered position--
[(1) report covered employment to the head of the
element of the intelligence community that employed
such employee in such covered position upon accepting
such covered employment; and
[(2) annually (or more frequently if the head of such
element considers it appropriate) report covered
employment to the head of such element.
[(c) Definitions.--In this section:
[(1) Covered employment.--The term ``covered
employment'' means direct employment by, representation
of, or the provision of advice relating to national
security to the government of a foreign country or any
person whose activities are directly or indirectly
supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or
subsidized, in whole or in major part, by any
government of a foreign country.
[(2) Covered position.--The term ``covered position''
means a position within an element of the intelligence
community that, based on the level of access of a
person occupying such position to information regarding
sensitive intelligence sources or methods or other
exceptionally sensitive matters, the head of such
element determines should be subject to the
requirements of this section.
[(3) Government of a foreign country.--The term
``government of a foreign country'' has the meaning
given the term in section 1(e) of the Foreign Agents
Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611(e)).]
SEC. 304. REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTAIN EMPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES BY FORMER
INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES.
(a) Temporary Restriction.--An employee of an element of the
intelligence community who occupies a covered intelligence
position may not occupy a covered post-service position during
the 30-month period following the date on which the employee
ceases to occupy a covered intelligence position.
(b) Covered Post-Service Employment Reporting.--
(1) Requirement.--The head of each element of the
intelligence community shall issue regulations
requiring, as a condition of employment, each employee
of such element occupying a covered intelligence
position to sign a written agreement requiring the
regular reporting of covered post-service employment to
the head of such element.
(2) Agreement elements.--
(A) Reporting covered post-service
employment.--The regulations required under
paragraph (1) shall provide that an agreement
contain provisions requiring each employee
occupying a covered intelligence position to,
during the 5-year period beginning on the date
on which such employee ceases to occupy such
covered intelligence position--
(i) report covered post-service
employment to the head of the element
of the intelligence community that
employed such employee in such covered
intelligence position upon accepting
such covered post-service employment;
and
(ii) annually (or more frequently if
the head of such element considers it
appropriate) report covered post-
service employment to the head of such
element.
(B) Information included.--Each report by an
employee under subparagraph (A) shall include
the following information:
(i) The name of the employer.
(ii) The foreign government,
including the specific foreign
individual, agency, or entity, for whom
the covered post-service employment is
being performed.
(iii) The title and role of the
covered post-service position.
(iv) The nature of the services
provided as part of the covered post-
service employment.
(v) All financial compensation and
benefits received or promised for the
covered post-service employment.
(vi) A self-certification that none
of the services provided as part of the
covered post-service employment violate
Federal law, infringe upon the privacy
rights of United States persons, or
constitute abuses of human rights.
(c) Penalties.--
(1) Criminal penalties.--A former employee who
knowingly and willfully violates subsection (a) or who
knowingly and willfully fails to make a required report
under subsection (b) shall be fined under title 18,
United States Code, or imprisoned for not more than 5
years, or both. Each report under subsection (b) shall
be subject to section 1001 of title 18, United States
Code.
(2) Security clearances.--The head of an element of
the intelligence community shall revoke the security
clearance of a former employee if the former employee
knowingly and willfully fails to make a required report
under subsection (b) or knowingly and willfully makes a
false report under subsection.
(d) Training.--The head of each element of the intelligence
community shall provide training on the reporting requirements
under subsection (b) to each employee who ceases to occupy a
covered intelligence position.
(e) Annual Reports.--
(1) Requirement.--Not later than March 31 of each
year, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report on covered post-service employment occurring
during the year covered by the report.
(2) Elements.--Each report under paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) The number of former employees who occupy
a covered post-service position, broken down
by--
(i) the name of the employer;
(ii) the foreign government,
including by the specific foreign
individual, agency, or entity, for whom
the covered post-service employment is
being performed; and
(iii) the nature of the services
provided as part of the covered post-
service employment.
(B) A certification by the Director that--
(i) each element of the intelligence
community maintains adequate systems
and processes for ensuring that former
employees are submitting reports
required under subsection (b);
(ii) to the knowledge of the heads of
the elements of the intelligence
community, all former employees who
occupy a covered post-service position
are in compliance with this section;
(iii) the services provided by former
employees who occupy a covered post-
service position do not--
(I) pose a current or future
threat to the national security
of the United States; or
(II) pose a
counterintelligence risk; and
(iv) the Director and the heads of
such elements are not aware of any
credible information or reporting that
any individual described in clause
(iii) has engaged in activities that
violate Federal law, infringe upon the
privacy rights of United States
persons, or constitute abuses of human
rights.
(3) Form.--Each report under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
(f) Notification.--In addition to the annual reports under
subsection (e), if a head of an element of the intelligence
community determines that the circumstances described in either
clause (iii) or (iv) of paragraph (2) of such subsection occur
with respect to a former employee described in those clauses,
the head shall notify the congressional intelligence committees
of such determination by not later than 7 days after making
such determination. The notification shall include the
following:
(1) The name of the former employee.
(2) The name of the employer.
(3) The foreign government, including the specific
foreign individual, agency, or entity, for whom the
covered post-service employment is being performed.
(4) As applicable, a description of--
(A) the risk to national security, the
counterintelligence risk, or both; and
(B) the activities that may violate Federal
law, infringe upon the privacy rights of United
States persons, or constitute abuses of human
rights.
(g) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Covered intelligence position.--The term
``covered intelligence position'' means a position
within an element of the intelligence community that,
based on the level of access of a person occupying such
position to information regarding sensitive
intelligence sources or methods or other exceptionally
sensitive matters, the head of such element determines
should be subject to the requirements of this section.
(2) Covered post-service employment.--The term
``covered post-service employment'' means direct or
indirect employment by, representation of, or any
provision of advice or services relating to national
security, intelligence, the military, or internal
security to the government of a foreign country or any
company, entity, or other person whose activities are
directly or indirectly supervised, directed,
controlled, financed, or subsidized, in whole or in
major part, by any government of a foreign country.
(3) Covered post-service position.--The term
``covered post-service position'' means a position of
employment described in paragraph (2).
(4) Employee.--The term ``employee'', with respect to
an employee occupying a covered intelligence position,
includes an officer or official of an element of the
intelligence community, a contractor of such an
element, a detailee to such an element, or a member of
the Armed Forces assigned to such an element.
(5) Former employee.--The term ``former employee''
means an individual--
(A) who was an employee occupying a covered
intelligence position; and
(B) who is subject to the requirements under
subsections (a) or (b).
(6) Government of a foreign country.--The term
``government of a foreign country'' has the meaning
given the term in section 1(e) of the Foreign Agents
Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611(e)).
SEC. 305. PAID LEAVE FOR A SERIOUS HEALTH CONDITION.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Paid serious health condition leave.--The term
``paid serious health condition leave'' means paid
leave taken under subsection (b).
(2) Serious health condition.--The term ``serious
health condition'' has the meaning given the term in
section 6381 of title 5, United States Code.
(3) Son or daughter.--The term ``son or daughter''
has the meaning given the term in section 6381 of title
5, United States Code.
(b) Paid Serious Health Condition Leave.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, a civilian employee of an element of
the intelligence community shall have available a total of 12
administrative workweeks of paid leave during any 12-month
period for one or more of the following:
(1) In order to care for the spouse, or a son,
daughter, or parent, of the employee, if such spouse,
son, daughter, or parent has a serious health
condition.
(2) Because of a serious health condition that makes
the employee unable to perform the functions of the
employee's position.
(c) Treatment of Serious Health Condition Leave Request.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an element of the
intelligence community shall accommodate an employee's leave
schedule request under subsection (b), including a request to
use such leave intermittently or on a reduced leave schedule,
to the extent that the requested leave schedule does not unduly
disrupt agency operations.
(d) Rules Relating to Paid Leave.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law--
(1) an employee of an element of the intelligence
community may not be required to first use all or any
portion of any unpaid leave available to the employee
before being allowed to use paid serious health
condition leave; and
(2) paid serious health condition leave--
(A) shall be payable from any appropriation
or fund available for salaries or expenses for
positions within the employing element;
(B) may not be considered to be annual or
vacation leave for purposes of section 5551 or
5552 of title 5, United States Code, or for any
other purpose;
(C) if not used by the employee before the
end of the 12-month period described in
subsection (b) to which the leave relates, may
not be available for any subsequent use and may
not be converted into a cash payment;
(D) may be granted only to the extent that
the employee does not receive a total of more
than 12 weeks of paid serious health condition
leave in any 12-month period;
(E) shall be used in increments of hours (or
fractions thereof), with 12 administrative
workweeks equal to 480 hours for employees of
elements of the intelligence community with a
regular full-time work schedule and converted
to a proportional number of hours for employees
of such elements with part-time, seasonal, or
uncommon tours of duty; and
(F) may not be used during off-season (nonpay
status) periods for employees of such elements
with seasonal work schedules.
(e) Implementation.--
(1) Consistency with serious health condition leave
under title 5.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall carry out this section in a manner consistent, to
the extent appropriate, with the administration of
leave taken under section 6382 of title 5, United
States Code, for a reason described in subparagraph (C)
or (D) of subsection (a)(1) of that section.
(2) Implementation plan.--Not later than 1 year after
the date of enactment of this section, the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees an implementation plan that
includes--
(A) processes and procedures for implementing
the paid serious health condition leave
policies under subsections (b) through (d);
(B) an explanation of how the implementation
of subsections (b) through (d) will be
reconciled with policies of other elements of
the Federal Government, including the impact on
elements funded by the National Intelligence
Program that are housed within agencies outside
the intelligence community;
(C) the projected impact of the
implementation of subsections (b) through (d)
on the workforce of the intelligence community,
including take rates, retention, recruiting,
and morale, broken down by each element of the
intelligence community; and
(D) all costs or operational expenses
associated with the implementation of
subsections (b) through (d).
(3) Directive.--Not later than 90 days after the
Director of National Intelligence submits the
implementation plan under paragraph (2), the Director
of National Intelligence shall issue a written
directive to implement this section, which directive
shall take effect on the date of issuance.
(f) Annual Report.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees an
annual report that--
(1) details the number of employees of each element
of the intelligence community who applied for and took
paid serious health condition leave during the year
covered by the report; and
(2) includes updates on major implementation
challenges or costs associated with paid serious health
condition leave.
* * * * * * *
TITLE V--ACCOUNTABILITY FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
* * * * * * *
SEC. 503A. QUARTERLY REPORTS ON CYBER INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND
RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE.
On a quarterly basis, the Secretary of Defense shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees and the
congressional defense committees (as defined in section 101(a)
of title 10, United States Code) a report on the cyber
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities of
the Department of Defense, and any other matters the Secretary
determines appropriate, that occurred during the quarter
preceding the date of the submission of the report.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 513. NOTICE OF PROVISION OF SUPPORT FOR FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL, OR
TRIBAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE OR
DOMESTIC CIVIL DISTURBANCES.
(a) Notice Required.--Not later than 72 hours before a
covered agency provides support for any Federal, State, local,
or Tribal government response to a civil disobedience or
domestic civil disturbance, the head of the agency shall submit
to the appropriate congressional committees and the covered
recipients notice of the provision of such support.
(b) Content of Notice.--Notice provided under subsection (a)
with respect to the provision of support shall include each of
the following:
(1) The date on which the requested support was
approved.
(2) The entity requesting the support.
(3) The type of support requested.
(4) A detailed description of the support that the
select agency intends to provide.
(5) A brief description of the legal basis for
providing the support.
(6) If the provision of such support requires notice
to be provided under section 1055(b) of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public
Law 114-328), all the content of such notice.
(7) Any other facts or circumstances that the head of
the covered agency determines are relevant.
(c) Public Availability of Notice.--Not later than 72 hours
after the date on which any notice is provided under subsection
(a), the Director of National Intelligence shall make the
notice publicly available on the internet website of the
Director of National Intelligence and the internet website of
the agency or agencies making the notification. If the notice
is classified as provided under subsection (d), a redacted
unclassified notice shall be made publicly available under this
subsection.
(d) Form of Notice.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2),
a notice under subsection (a) shall be submitted in
unclassified form.
(2) Exception.--If the Director of National
Intelligence makes a determination in writing that the
protection of sources and methods requires that a
notice under subsection (a) be classified, the notice
may be submitted in classified form but shall be
accompanied by a notice redacted to remove classified
information. The authority to make a determination
under this paragraph may not be delegated.
(e) Emergency Waiver Authority.--
(1) In general.--The Director of National
Intelligence may waive the requirement to submit
advance notice under subsection (a) if the Director
determines that the support is to be provided in
association with any Federal, State, local, or Tribal
government response to--
(A) armed insurrection;
(B) an act of foreign terrorism;
(C) an act of domestic terrorism;
(D) a response to a natural disaster; or
(E) another extreme circumstance constituting
a grave threat.
(2) Notice.--If the Director issues a waiver under
paragraph (1), notice under subsection (a) shall be
provided as soon as practicable after the provision of
support and, in any event, no later than 48 hours after
the provision of such support.
(3) Nondelegation.--The authority to issue a waiver
and the authority to make a determination under
paragraph (1) may not be delegated.
(f) Quarterly Reports.--
(1) In general.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees quarterly reports that include
a description of any assistance provided by a covered
agency to law enforcement authorities.
(2) Contents of reports.--Each report required under
this subsection shall include, for each instance in
which assistance was provided--
(A) the date on which the assistance was
requested;
(B) the entity requesting the assistance;
(C) the type of assistance requested;
(D) detailed description of the assistance
that the covered agency intends to or did
provide;
(E) a brief description of the legal basis
for providing the assistance;
(F) the date on which notice for such
assistance was provided under subsection (a)
and the date on which such notice was made
publicly available under subsection (c); and
(G) any other facts or circumstances that the
Director determines are relevant.
(3) Form of report.--Each report required under this
subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
may include a classified annex.
(g) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) The term ``covered agency'' means any element of
the intelligence community.
(2) The term ``civil disobedience'' means--
(A) a protest, rally, march, demonstration;
or
(B) an active, professed refusal of a citizen
to obey a law, demand, order, or command of a
government.
(3) The term ``domestic civil disturbance'' means any
activity arising from a mass act (including a protest,
demonstration, riot, or strike) in which the
participants become hostile toward authority,
including--
(A) the exercise of first amendment rights by
protesters;
(B) violence or property destruction incident
to protests; and
(C) obstruction of publicly available spaces,
including obstruction of roads or camping
symbolically in public places.
(4) The term ``support'' includes pre-deployment
intelligence support provided to members of the Armed
Forces responding or preparing to respond to a civil
disobedience or domestic civil disturbance.
(5) The term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(A) the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Subcommittee on Defense of
the Committee on Appropriations;
(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence and
the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(C) in the case of support provided by a
select agency within the Department of Defense,
the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate
and House of Representatives.
(6) The term ``covered recipient'' means--
(A) the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community;
(B) the inspector general of the agency
providing support; and
(C) the Attorney General.
* * * * * * *
TITLE X--EDUCATION IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Subtitle A--Science and Technology
* * * * * * *
SEC. 1003. IMPROVEMENT OF EDUCATION IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY,
ENGINEERING, ARTS, AND MATHEMATICS.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Eligible entity.--The term ``eligible entity''
includes a department or agency of the Federal
Government, a State, a political subdivision of a
State, an individual, and a not-for-profit or other
organization in the private sector.
(2) Educational institution.--The term ``educational
institution'' includes any public or private elementary
school or secondary school, institution of higher
education, college, university, or any other profit or
nonprofit institution that is dedicated to improving
science, technology, engineering, the arts,
mathematics, business, law, medicine, or other fields
that promote development and education relating to
science, technology, engineering, the arts,
mathematics, business, law, and medicine.
(3) State.--The term ``State'' means each of the
several States, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands, and any other territory or
possession of the United States.
(b) Requirements.--Each head of an element of the
intelligence community shall, on a continuing basis--
(1) identify actions that the head may take to
improve education in the scientific, technology,
engineering, the arts, and mathematics (known as
``STEAM'') skills necessary to meet the long-term
national security needs of the United States for
personnel proficient in such skills; and
(2) establish and conduct programs to carry out such
actions.
(c) Authorities.--
(1) In general.--The head of an element of the
intelligence community, in support of educational
programs in science, technology, engineering, the arts,
and mathematics, may--
(A) award grants to eligible entities;
(B) provide cash awards and other items to
eligible entities;
(C) accept voluntary services from eligible
entities;
(D) support national competition judging,
other educational event activities, and
associated award ceremonies in connection with
such educational programs; and
(E) enter into one or more education
partnership agreements with educational
institutions in the United States for the
purpose of encouraging and enhancing study in
science, technology, engineering, the arts, and
mathematics disciplines at all levels of
education.
(2) Education partnership agreements.--
(A) Nature of assistance provided.--Under an
education partnership agreement entered into
with an educational institution under paragraph
(1)(E), the head of an element of the
intelligence community may provide assistance
to the educational institution by--
(i) loaning equipment to the
educational institution for any purpose
and duration in support of such
agreement that the head considers
appropriate;
(ii) making personnel available to
teach science courses or to assist in
the development of science courses and
materials for the educational
institution;
(iii) providing sabbatical
opportunities for faculty and
internship opportunities for students;
(iv) involving faculty and students
of the educational institution in
projects of that element of the
intelligence community, including
research and technology transfer or
transition projects;
(v) cooperating with the educational
institution in developing a program
under which students may be given
academic credit for work on projects of
that element of the intelligence
community, including research and
technology transfer for transition
projects; and
(vi) providing academic and career
advice and assistance to students of
the educational institution.
(B) Priorities.--In entering into education
partnership agreements under paragraph (1)(E),
the head of an element of the intelligence
community shall prioritize entering into
education partnership agreements with the
following:
(i) Historically Black colleges and
universities and other minority-serving
institutions, as described in section
371(a) of the Higher Education Act of
1965 (20 U.S.C. 1067q(a)).
(ii) Educational institutions serving
women, members of minority groups, and
other groups of individuals who
traditionally are involved in the
science, technology, engineering, arts,
and mathematics professions in
disproportionately low numbers.
(d) Designation of Advisor.--Each head of an element of the
intelligence community shall designate one or more individuals
within that element to advise and assist the head regarding
matters relating to science, technology, engineering, the arts,
and mathematics education and training.
(e) Coordination.--Each head of an element of the
intelligence community (other than the Director of National
Intelligence) shall carry out this section in coordination with
the Director of National Intelligence.
* * * * * * *
TITLE XI--ADDITIONAL MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
SEC. 1107A. ANNUAL REPORTS ON SECURITY SERVICES OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE HONG KONG SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION.
(a) Requirement.--On an annual basis through 2047, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees, and make publicly
available on the internet website of the Director, a report on
the presence and activities of Chinese security services
operating within the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
(b) Contents.--Each report under subsection (a) shall
include, with respect to the year covered by the report, the
following:
(1) Identification of the approximate number of
personnel affiliated with Chinese security services
operating within the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, including a breakdown of such personnel by the
specific security service and the division of the
security service, and (to the extent possible) an
identification of any such personnel associated with
the national security division of the Hong Kong Police
Force.
(2) A description of the command and control
structures of such security services, including
information regarding the extent to which such security
services are controlled by the Government of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region or the Government of
the People's Republic of China.
(3) A description of the working relationship and
coordination mechanisms of the Chinese security
services with the police force of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region.
(4) A description of the activities conducted by
Chinese security services operating within the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region, including--
(A) information regarding the extent to which
such security services, and officers associated
with the national security division of the Hong
Kong Police Force, are engaged in frontline
policing, serving in advisory and assistance
roles, or both;
(B) an assessment of the likelihood of such
security services conducting renditions of
individuals from the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region to China and a listing of
every known individual subject to such
rendition during the year covered by the
report; and
(C) an assessment of how such activities
conducted by Chinese security services
contribute to self-censorship and corruption
within the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region.
(5) A discussion of the doctrine and tactics employed
by Chinese security services operating within the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region, including an
overview of the extent to which such security services
employ surveillance, detection, and control methods,
including ``high-tech'' policing models and
``preventative policing tactics'', that are consistent
with the rise of digital authoritarianism, and used in
a manner similar to methods used in the Xinjiang region
of China.
(6) An overview of the funding for Chinese security
services operating within the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, including an assessment of the
extent to which funding is drawn locally from the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region Government or from
the Government of China.
(7) A discussion of the various surveillance
technologies used by security services operating within
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
including--
(A) a list of the key companies that provide
such technologies; and
(B) an assessment of the degree to which such
technologies can be accessed by Chinese
security services operating within the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region.
(c) Coordination.--In carrying out subsection (a), the
Director shall coordinate with the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security
Agency, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the
Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the
Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, and any other relevant head of an element of the
intelligence community.
(d) Form.--Each report submitted to the appropriate
congressional committees under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
(e) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence
committees;
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives; and
(C) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.
(2) Chinese security services.--The term ``Chinese
security services'' means--
(A) the security services of the Government
of the People's Republic of China, including
the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry
of Public Security; and
(B) any known front organizations or aliases
associated with such security services,
including officers associated with the national
security division of the Hong Kong Police Force
and other officers of the Hong Kong Police
Force selected by the Committee for
Safeguarding National Security to work on
matters relating to national security.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 1109. REQUIREMENT TO BUY CERTAIN SATELLITE COMPONENT FROM AMERICAN
SOURCES.
(a) Requirement.--Beginning January 1, 2021, except as
provided in subsection (b), a covered element of the
intelligence community may not award a contract for a national
security satellite if the satellite uses a star tracker that is
not produced in the United States, including with respect to
both the software and the hardware of the star tracker.
(b) Exception.--The head of a covered element of the
intelligence community may waive the requirement under
subsection (a) if, on a case-by-case basis, the head certifies
in writing to the congressional intelligence committees that--
(1) there is no available star tracker produced in
the United States that meets the mission and design
requirements of the national security satellite for
which the star tracker will be used;
(2) the cost of a star tracker produced in the United
States is unreasonable, based on a market survey; or
(3) such waiver is necessary for the national
security interests of the United States based on an
urgent and compelling need.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Covered element of the intelligence community.--
The term ``covered element of the intelligence
community'' means an element of the intelligence
community that is not an element of the Department of
Defense.
(2) National security satellite.--The term ``national
security satellite'' means a satellite weighing over
400 pounds whose principle purpose is to support the
national security or intelligence needs of the United
States Government.
(3) United states.--The term ``United States'' means
the several States, the District of Columbia, and the
territories and possessions of the United States.
SEC. 1110. ANNUAL REPORTS ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FOR SCIENTIFIC
AND TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENTS.
(a) Requirement.--On an annual basis, the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report on research and development
activities conducted by adversaries of the United States
regarding scientific and technological advancements.
(b) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted
in classified form.
(c) Appropriate Congressional Committee Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means the following:
(1) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives.
(2) The Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.
SEC. 1111. ANNUAL INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
WOMEN AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM.
(a) Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this section, the Director of National
Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense,
the Secretary of State, and the head of any element of the
intelligence community the Director determines appropriate,
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an
intelligence assessment on the relationship between women and
violent extremism and terrorism.
(b) Contents.--The intelligence assessment under subsection
(a) shall address the following:
(1) The historical trends and current state of the
roles of women in all aspects of violent extremism and
terrorism, including as recruiters, sympathizers,
perpetrators, and combatants, as well as peace-builders
and preventers of violent extremism and terrorism.
(2) How the roles of women in all aspects of violent
extremism and terrorism are likely to change in the
near- and medium-term.
(3) The extent to which the unequal status of women
affects the ability of armed combatants and terrorist
groups to enlist or conscript women and men as
combatants and perpetrators of violence.
(4) How terrorist groups violate the rights of women
and girls, including through child, early, and forced
marriage, abduction, sexual violence, and human
trafficking, and the extent to which such violations
contribute to the spread of conflict and terrorist
activities.
(5) Opportunities to address the security risk posed
by female extremists and leverage the roles of women in
counterterrorism efforts.
(6) Approaches and challenges to identify,
repatriate, and reintegrate women affiliated with
violent extremist or terrorist groups, including
through disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
programs.
(c) Annual Updates.--On an annual basis, the Director shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees an update to
the intelligence assessment under subsection (a).
(d) Form.--The assessment submitted to the appropriate
congressional committees under subsection (a), and each update
submitted under subsection (c), shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(e) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives; and
(3) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the
Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.
SEC. 1112. REPORT ON BEST PRACTICES TO PROTECT PRIVACY, CIVIL
LIBERTIES, AND CIVIL RIGHTS OF CHINESE AMERICANS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the People's Republic of China appears to be
specifically targeting the Chinese-American community
for intelligence purposes;
(2) such targeting carries a substantial risk that
the loyalty of such Americans may be generally
questioned and lead to unacceptable stereotyping,
targeting, and racial profiling;
(3) the United States Government has a duty to warn
and protect all Americans including those of Chinese
descent from these intelligence efforts by the People's
Republic of China;
(4) the broad stereotyping, targeting, and racial
profiling of Americans of Chinese descent is contrary
to the values of the United States and reinforces the
flawed narrative perpetuated by the People's Republic
of China that ethnically Chinese individuals worldwide
have a duty to support the People's Republic of China;
and
(5) the United States efforts to combat the People's
Republic of China's intelligence activities should
actively safeguard and promote the constitutional
rights of all Chinese Americans.
(b) Report.--On an annual basis, the Director of National
Intelligence, acting through the Office of Civil Liberties,
Privacy, and Transparency, in coordination with the civil
liberties and privacy officers of the elements of the
intelligence community, shall submit a report to the
congressional intelligence committees containing--
(1) a review of how the policies, procedures, and
practices of the intelligence community that govern the
intelligence activities and operations targeting the
People's Republic of China affect policies, procedures,
and practices relating to the privacy, civil liberties,
and civil rights of Americans of Chinese descent who
may be targets of espionage and influence operations by
China; and
(2) recommendations to ensure that the privacy, civil
liberties, and civil rights of Americans of Chinese
descent are sufficiently protected.
(c) Form.--The report under subsection (b) shall be submitted
in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
* * * * * * *
TITLE XII--MATTERS REGARDING INSPECTORS GENERAL OF ELEMENTS OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Inspectors General
SEC. 1201. INDEPENDENCE OF INSPECTORS GENERAL.
(a) Removal.--A covered Inspector General may be removed from
office only by the President. The President may remove a
covered Inspector General only for any of the following
grounds:
(1) Permanent incapacity.
(2) Inefficiency.
(3) Neglect of duty.
(4) Malfeasance.
(5) Conviction of a felony or conduct involving moral
turpitude.
(6) Substantial violations of laws, rules, or
regulations.
(7) Gross mismanagement.
(8) Gross waste of funds.
(9) Abuse of authority.
(b) Administrative Leave.--A covered Inspector General may be
placed on administrative leave only by the President. The
President may place a covered Inspector General on
administrative leave only for any of the grounds specified in
subsection (a).
(c) Notification.--The President may not remove a covered
Inspector General under subsection (a) or place a covered
Inspector General on administrative leave under subsection (b)
unless--
(1) the President transmits in writing to the
congressional intelligence committees a notification of
such removal or placement, including a detailed
explanation of the grounds for such removal or
placement and the evidence supporting such grounds; and
(2) with respect to the removal of a covered
Inspector General, a period of 30 days elapses
following the date of such transmittal.
(d) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the date on which
the President notifies a covered Inspector General of being
removed under subsection (a) or placed on administrative leave
under subsection (b), the office of that Inspector General
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report identifying--
(1) each complaint, investigation, inspection, audit,
or other review or inquiry, including any information,
allegation, or complaint reported to the Attorney
General in accordance with section 535 of title 28,
United States Code, that the Inspector General was
working on as of the date of such removal or placement;
and
(2) the status of each such complaint, investigation,
inspection, audit, or other review or inquiry.
(e) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to prohibit a personnel action of a covered Inspector
General otherwise authorized by law, other than transfer or
removal.
(f) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Administrative leave.--The term ``administrative
leave'' includes any other type of paid or unpaid non-
duty status.
(2) Covered inspector general.--The term ``covered
Inspector General'' includes an individual performing
the functions and duties of a covered Inspector General
in an acting capacity.
SEC. 1203. DESIGNATION OF ACTING INSPECTORS GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY IN CASES OF VACANCIES.
(a) Designation.--If a covered Inspector General dies,
resigns, is removed from office, or is otherwise unable to
perform the functions and duties of the office of that
Inspector General, the President may only direct an individual
specified in subsection (b) to perform the functions and duties
of that Inspector General in an acting capacity until an
individual is appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, to serve as Inspector
General.
(b) Individuals who Can Serve in Acting Capacity.--The
following individuals may serve as an acting Inspector General
pursuant to subsection (a):
(1) The individual who holds the most senior position
in that Office of the Inspector General as a career
appointee in the Senior Intelligence Service, the
Senior National Intelligence Service, or other
applicable senior executive service.
(2) An individual who is serving as an inspector
general of another department, agency, or other element
of the Federal Government whose appointment to that
position was made by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate.
SEC. 1205. DETERMINATION OF MATTERS OF URGENT CONCERN.
(a) Determination.--Each covered Inspector General shall have
sole authority to determine whether any complaint or
information reported to the Inspector General is a matter of
urgent concern. Such determination is final and conclusive.
(b) Foreign Interference in Elections.--In addition to any
other matter which is considered an urgent concern pursuant to
section 103H(k)(5)(G), section 17(d)(5)(G) of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(5)(G)), or
other applicable provision of law, the term ``urgent concern''
includes a serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of law
or Executive order, or deficiency relating to foreign
interference in elections in the United States.
SEC. 1207. COORDINATION WITH OTHER PROVISIONS OF LAW.
No provision of law that is inconsistent with any provision
of this title shall be considered to supersede, repeal, or
otherwise modify a provision of this title unless such other
provision of law specifically cites a provision of this title
in order to supersede, repeal, or otherwise modify that
provision of this title.
Subtitle B--Protections for Whistleblowers
SEC. [1104.] 1221. PROHIBITED PERSONNEL PRACTICES IN THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' means an executive
department or independent establishment, as defined
under sections 101 and 104 of title 5, United States
Code, that contains an intelligence community element,
except the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(2) Covered intelligence community element.--The term
``covered intelligence community element''--
(A) means--
(i) the Central Intelligence Agency,
the Defense Intelligence Agency, the
National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency, the National Security Agency,
the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, and the National
Reconnaissance Office; and
(ii) any executive agency or unit
thereof determined by the President
under section 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) of
title 5, United States Code, to have as
its principal function the conduct of
foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence activities; and
(B) does not include the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
(3) Personnel action.--The term ``personnel action''
means, with respect to an employee in a position in a
covered intelligence community element (other than a
position excepted from the competitive service due to
its confidential, policy-determining, policymaking, or
policy-advocating character) or a contractor employee--
(A) an appointment;
(B) a promotion;
(C) a disciplinary or corrective action;
(D) a detail, transfer, or reassignment;
(E) a demotion, suspension, or termination;
(F) a reinstatement or restoration;
(G) a performance evaluation;
(H) a decision concerning pay, benefits, or
awards;
(I) a decision concerning education or
training if such education or training may
reasonably be expected to lead to an
appointment, promotion, or performance
evaluation[; or];
(J) a knowing and willful disclosure
revealing the identity or other personally
identifiable information of such employee or
such contractor employee without the express
written consent of such employee or such
contractor employee or if the Inspector General
determines it is necessary for the exclusive
purpose of investigating a complaint or
information received under section 8H of the
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.
8H); or
[(J)] (K) any other significant change in
duties, responsibilities, or working
conditions.
(4) Contractor employee.--The term ``contractor
employee'' means an employee of a contractor,
subcontractor, grantee, subgrantee, or personal
services contractor, of a covered intelligence
community element.
(5) Employee.--The term ``employee'', with respect to
an agency or a covered intelligence community element,
includes an individual who has been detailed to such
agency or covered intelligence community element.
(b) Agency Employees.--Any employee of an agency who has
authority to take, direct others to take, recommend, or approve
any personnel action, shall not, with respect to such
authority, take or fail to take a personnel action with respect
to any employee of a covered intelligence community element as
a reprisal for a lawful disclosure of information by the
employee to the Director of National Intelligence (or an
employee designated by the Director of National Intelligence
for such purpose), the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community, the head of the employing agency (or an employee
designated by the head of that agency for such purpose), the
appropriate inspector general of the employing agency, a
congressional intelligence committee, or a member of a
congressional intelligence committee, which the employee
reasonably believes evidences--
(1) a violation of any Federal law, rule, or
regulation; or
(2) mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse
of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to
public health or safety.
(c) Contractor Employees.--(1) Any employee of a contractor,
subcontractor, grantee, subgrantee, or personal services
contractor, of a covered intelligence community element who has
authority to take, direct others to take, recommend, or approve
any personnel action, shall not, with respect to such
authority, take or fail to take a personnel action with respect
to any contractor employee as a reprisal for a lawful
disclosure of information by the contractor employee to the
Director of National Intelligence (or an employee designated by
the Director of National Intelligence for such purpose), the
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, the head of
the contracting agency (or an employee designated by the head
of that agency for such purpose), the appropriate inspector
general of the contracting agency, a congressional intelligence
committee, or a member of a congressional intelligence
committee, which the contractor employee reasonably believes
evidences--
(A) a violation of any Federal law, rule, or
regulation (including with respect to evidence of
another employee or contractor employee accessing or
sharing classified information without authorization);
or
(B) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an
abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific
danger to public health or safety.
(2) A personnel action under paragraph (1) is prohibited even
if the action is undertaken at the request of an agency
official, unless the request takes the form of a
nondiscretionary directive and is within the authority of the
agency official making the request.
[(d) Enforcement.--The President shall provide for the
enforcement of this section.]
(d) Enforcement.--
(1) In general.--Except as otherwise provided in this
subsection, the President shall provide for the
enforcement of this section.
(2) Private right of action for unlawful, willful
disclosure of whistleblower identity.--In a case in
which an employee of an agency, or other employee or
officer of the Federal Government, takes a personnel
action described in subsection (a)(3)(J) against an
employee of a covered intelligence community element as
a reprisal in violation of subsection (b) or in a case
in which a contractor employee takes a personnel action
described in such subsection against another contractor
employee as a reprisal in violation of subsection (c),
the employee or contractor employee against whom the
personnel action was taken may bring a private action
for all appropriate remedies, including injunctive
relief and compensatory and punitive damages, against
the employee or contractor employee who took the
personnel action, in a Federal district court of
competent jurisdiction within 180 days of when the
employee or contractor employee first learned of or
should have learned of the violation.
(e) Existing Rights Preserved.--Nothing in this section shall
be construed to--
(1) preempt or preclude any employee, contractor
employee, or applicant for employment, at the Federal
Bureau of Investigation from exercising rights provided
under any other law, rule, or regulation, including
section 2303 of title 5, United States Code; or
(2) repeal section 2303 of title 5, United States
Code.
SEC. 1223. LIMITATION ON SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
WHISTLEBLOWER COMPLAINTS WITH PERSONS NAMED IN SUCH
COMPLAINTS.
(a) In General.--It shall be unlawful for any employee or
officer of the Federal Government to knowingly and willfully
share any whistleblower disclosure information with any
individual named as a subject of the whistleblower disclosure
and alleged in the disclosure to have engaged in misconduct,
unless--
(1) the whistleblower consented, in writing, to such
sharing before the sharing occurs;
(2) a covered Inspector General to whom such
disclosure is made--
(A) determines that such sharing is
unavoidable and necessary to advance an
investigation, audit, inspection, or evaluation
by the Inspector General; and
(B) notifies the whistleblower of such
sharing before the sharing occurs; or
(3) an attorney for the Government--
(A) determines that such sharing is
unavoidable and necessary to advance an
investigation by the attorney; and
(B) notifies the whistleblower of such
sharing before the sharing occurs.
(b) Penalty.--Any person who violates subsection (a) shall be
fined in accordance with title 18, United States Code,
imprisoned for not more than 2 years, or both.
(c) Whistleblower Disclosure Information Defined.--In this
section, the term ``whistleblower disclosure information''
means, with respect to a whistleblower disclosure--
(1) the disclosure;
(2) confirmation of the fact of the existence of the
disclosure; or
(3) the identity, or other identifying information,
of the whistleblower who made the disclosure.
SEC. [1106.] 1225. INSPECTOR GENERAL EXTERNAL REVIEW PANEL.
(a) Request for Review.--An individual with a claim described
in subsection (b) may submit to the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community a request for a review of such claim by
an external review panel convened under subsection (c).
(b) Claims and Individuals Described.--A claim described in
this subsection is any--
(1) claim by an individual--
(A) that the individual has been subjected to
a personnel action that is prohibited under
[section 1104] section 1221; and
(B) who has exhausted the applicable review
process for the claim pursuant to enforcement
of such section; or
(2) claim by an individual--
(A) that he or she has been subjected to a
reprisal prohibited by paragraph (1) of section
3001(j) of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C.
3341(j)); and
(B) who received a decision on an appeal
regarding that claim under paragraph (4) of
such section.
(c) External Review Panel Convened.--
(1) Discretion to convene.--Upon receipt of a request
under subsection (a) regarding a claim, the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community may, at the
discretion of the Inspector General, convene an
external review panel under this subsection to review
the claim.
(2) Membership.--
(A) Composition.--An external review panel
convened under this subsection shall be
composed of three members as follows:
(i) The Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community.
(ii) Except as provided in
subparagraph (B), two members selected
by the Inspector General as the
Inspector General considers appropriate
on a case-by-case basis from among
inspectors general of the following:
(I) The Department of
Defense.
(II) The Department of
Energy.
(III) The Department of
Homeland Security.
(IV) The Department of
Justice.
(V) The Department of State.
(VI) The Department of the
Treasury.
(VII) The Central
Intelligence Agency.
(VIII) The Defense
Intelligence Agency.
(IX) The National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency.
(X) The National
Reconnaissance Office.
(XI) The National Security
Agency.
(B) Limitation.--An inspector general of an
agency may not be selected to sit on the panel
under subparagraph (A)(ii) to review any matter
relating to a decision made by such agency.
(C) Chairperson.--
(i) In general.--Except as provided
in clause (ii), the chairperson of any
panel convened under this subsection
shall be the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community.
(ii) Conflicts of interest.--If the
Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community finds cause to recuse himself
or herself from a panel convened under
this subsection, the Inspector General
of the Intelligence Community shall--
(I) select a chairperson from
inspectors general of the
elements listed under
subparagraph (A)(ii) whom the
Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community
considers appropriate; and
(II) notify the congressional
intelligence committees of such
selection.
(3) Period of review.--Each external review panel
convened under this subsection to review a claim shall
complete review of the claim no later than 270 days
after the date on which the Inspector General convenes
the external review panel.
(d) Remedies.--
(1) Panel recommendations.--If an external review
panel convened under subsection (c) determines,
pursuant to a review of a claim submitted by an
individual under subsection (a), that the individual
was the subject of a personnel action prohibited under
[section 1104] section 1221 or was subjected to a
reprisal prohibited by section 3001(j)(1) of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)(1)), the panel may recommend
that the agency head take corrective action--
(A) in the case of an employee or former
employee--
(i) to return the employee or former
employee, as nearly as practicable and
reasonable, to the position such
employee or former employee would have
held had the reprisal not occurred; or
(ii) reconsider the employee's or
former employee's eligibility for
access to classified information
consistent with national security; or
(B) in any other case, such other action as
the external review panel considers
appropriate.
(2) Agency action.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 90 days after
the date on which the head of an agency
receives a recommendation from an external
review panel under paragraph (1), the head
shall--
(i) give full consideration to such
recommendation; and
(ii) inform the panel and the
Director of National Intelligence of
what action the head has taken with
respect to the recommendation.
(B) Failure to inform.--The Director shall
notify the President of any failures to comply
with subparagraph (A)(ii).
(e) Annual Reports.--
(1) In general.--Not less frequently than once each
year, the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees and the Director of National
Intelligence a report on the activities under this
section during the previous year.
(2) Contents.--Subject to such limitations as the
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
considers necessary to protect the privacy of an
individual who has made a claim described in subsection
(b), each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall
include, for the period covered by the report, the
following:
(A) The determinations and recommendations
made by the external review panels convened
under this section.
(B) The responses of the heads of agencies
that received recommendations from the external
review panels.
SEC. 1227. PROCEDURES REGARDING DISCLOSURES TO CONGRESS.
(a) Guidance.--
(1) Obligation to provide security direction upon
request.--Upon the request of a whistleblower, the head
of the relevant element of the intelligence community,
acting through the covered Inspector General for that
element, shall furnish on a confidential basis to the
whistleblower information regarding how the
whistleblower may directly contact the congressional
intelligence committees, in accordance with appropriate
security practices, regarding a complaint or
information of the whistleblower pursuant to section
103H(k)(5)(D) or other appropriate provision of law.
(2) Nondisclosure.--Unless a whistleblower who makes
a request under paragraph (1) provides prior consent, a
covered Inspector General may not disclose to the head
of the relevant element of the intelligence community--
(A) the identity of the whistleblower; or
(B) the element at which such whistleblower
is employed, detailed, or assigned as a
contractor employee.
(b) Oversight of Obligation.--If a covered Inspector General
determines that the head of an element of the intelligence
community denied a request by a whistleblower under subsection
(a), directed the whistleblower not to contact the
congressional intelligence committees, or unreasonably delayed
in providing information under such subsection, the covered
Inspector General shall notify the congressional intelligence
committees of such denial, direction, or unreasonable delay.
(c) Permanent Security Officer.--The head of each element of
the intelligence community may designate a permanent security
officer in the element to provide to whistleblowers the
information under subsection (a).
----------
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995
* * * * * * *
TITLE VI--CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
* * * * * * *
SEC. 602. LIMITATION ON CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES TO BE USED PRIMARILY
BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) In General.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in subsection
(b), no project for the construction of any facility to
be used primarily by personnel of any component of the
intelligence community which has an estimated Federal
cost in excess of $5,000,000 may be undertaken in any
fiscal year unless such project is specifically
identified as a separate item in the President's annual
fiscal year budget request and is specifically
authorized by the Congress.
(2) Notification.--In the case of a project for the
construction of any facility to be used primarily by
personnel of any component of the intelligence
community which has an estimated Federal cost greater
than [$1,000,000] $2,000,000 but less than $5,000,000,
or where any project for the improvement, repair, or
modification of such a facility has an estimated
Federal cost greater than [$1,000,000] $2,000,000, [the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit a
notification] the head of such component, in
coordination with and subject to the approval of the
Director of National Intelligence, shall submit a
notification to the intelligence committees
specifically identifying such project.
(b) Exception.--
(1) In general.--Notwithstanding subsection (a) but
subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), a project for the
construction of a facility to be used primarily by
personnel of any component of the intelligence
community may be carried out if the Secretary of
Defense and the Director of National Intelligence
jointly determine--
(A) that the project is vital to the national
security or to the protection of health,
safety, or the quality of the environment, and
(B) that the requirement for the project is
so urgent that deferral of the project for
inclusion in the next Act authorizing
appropriations for the intelligence community
would be inconsistent with national security or
the protection of health, safety, or
environmental quality, as the case may be.
(2) Report.--(A) When a decision is made to carry out
a construction project under this subsection, the
Secretary of Defense and the Director of National
Intelligence jointly shall submit a report in writing
to the appropriate committees of Congress on that
decision. Each such report shall include (i) the
justification for the project and the current estimate
of the cost of the project, (ii) the justification for
carrying out the project under this subsection, and
(iii) a statement of the source of the funds to be used
to carry out the project. The project may then be
carried out only after the end of the 7-day period
beginning on the date the notification is received by
such committees.
(B) Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), a project
referred to in paragraph (1) may begin on the date the
notification is received by the appropriate committees
of Congress under that paragraph if the Director of
National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense
jointly determine that--
(i) an emergency exists with respect to the
national security or the protection of health,
safety, or environmental quality; and
(ii) any delay in the commencement of the
project would harm any or all of those
interests.
(3) Projects primarily for cia.--If a project
referred to in paragraph (1) is primarily for the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency shall make the
determination and submit the report required by
paragraphs (1) and (2).
(4) Limitation.--A project carried out under this
subsection shall be carried out within the total amount
of funds appropriated for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities that have not been
obligated.
(c) Application.--This section shall not apply to any project
which is subject to subsection (a)(1)(A) or (c) of section 601.
* * * * * * *
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949
* * * * * * *
SEC. 17. INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE AGENCY.
(a) Purpose; Establishment.--In order to--
(1) create an objective and effective office,
appropriately accountable to Congress, to initiate and
conduct independently inspections, investigations, and
audits relating to programs and operations of the
Agency;
(2) provide leadership and recommend policies
designed to promote economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness in the administration of such programs
and operations, and detect fraud and abuse in such
programs and operations;
(3) provide a means for keeping the Director fully
and currently informed about problems and deficiencies
relating to the administration of such programs and
operations, and the necessity for and the progress of
corrective actions; and
(4) in the manner prescribed by this section, ensure
that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
(hereafter in this section referred to collectively as
the ``intelligence committees'') are kept similarly
informed of significant problems and deficiencies as
well as the necessity for and the progress of
corrective actions,
there is hereby established in the Agency an Office of
Inspector General (hereafter in this section referred to as the
``Office'').
(b) Appointment; Supervision; Removal.--(1) There shall be at
the head of the Office an Inspector General who shall be
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate. This appointment shall be made without regard to
political affiliation and shall be on the basis of integrity
and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial
analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or
investigation. Such appointment shall also be made on the basis
of compliance with the security standards of the Agency and
prior experience in the field of foreign intelligence.
(2) The Inspector General shall report directly to and be
under the general supervision of the Director.
(3) The Director may prohibit the Inspector General from
initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit, inspection,
or investigation if the Director determines that such
prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security
interests of the United States.
(4) If the Director exercises any power under paragraph (3),
he shall submit an appropriately classified statement of the
reasons for the exercise of such power within seven days to the
intelligence committees. The Director shall advise the
Inspector General at the time such report is submitted, and, to
the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence
sources and methods, provide the Inspector General with a copy
of any such report. In such cases, the Inspector General may
submit such comments to the intelligence committees that he
considers appropriate.
(5) In accordance with section 535 of title 28, United States
Code, the Inspector General shall report to the Attorney
General any information, allegation, or complaint received by
the Inspector General relating to violations of Federal
criminal law that involve a program or operation of the Agency,
consistent with such guidelines as may be issued by the
Attorney General pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of such section.
A copy of all such reports shall be furnished to the Director.
[(6) The Inspector General may be removed from office only by
the President. The President shall communicate in writing to
the intelligence committees the reasons for any such removal
not later than 30 days prior to the effective date of such
removal. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to
prohibit a personnel action otherwise authorized by law, other
than transfer or removal.]
(6) The provisions of title XII of the National Security Act
of 1947 shall apply to the Inspector General with respect to
the removal of the Inspector General, a vacancy in the position
of the Inspector General, and any other matter relating to the
Inspector General as specifically provided for in such title.
(c) Duties and Responsibilities.--It shall be the duty and
responsibility of the Inspector General appointed under this
section--
(1) to provide policy direction for, and to plan,
conduct, supervise, and coordinate independently, the
inspections, investigations, and audits relating to the
programs and operations of the Agency to ensure they
are conducted efficiently and in accordance with
applicable law and regulations;
(2) to keep the Director fully and currently informed
concerning violations of law and regulations, fraud and
other serious problems, abuses and deficiencies that
may occur in such programs and operations, and to
report the progress made in implementing corrective
action;
(3) to take due regard for the protection of
intelligence sources and methods in the preparation of
all reports issued by the Office, and, to the extent
consistent with the purpose and objective of such
reports, take such measures as may be appropriate to
minimize the disclosure of intelligence sources and
methods described in such reports; and
(4) in the execution of his responsibilities, to
comply with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
(d) Semiannual Reports; Immediate Reports of Serious or
Flagrant Problems; Reports of Functional Problems; Reports to
Congress on Urgent Concerns.--(1) The Inspector General shall,
not later than October 31 and April 30 of each year, prepare
and submit to the Director a classified semiannual report
summarizing the activities of the Office during the immediately
preceding six-month periods ending September 30 and March 31,
respectively. Not later than 30 days after the date of the
receipt of such reports, the Director shall transmit such
reports to the intelligence committees with any comments he may
deem appropriate. Such reports shall, at a minimum, include a
list of the title or subject of each inspection, investigation,
review, or audit conducted during the reporting period and--
(A) a description of significant problems, abuses,
and deficiencies relating to the administration of
programs and operations of the Agency identified by the
Office during the reporting period;
(B) a description of the recommendations for
corrective action made by the Office during the
reporting period with respect to significant problems,
abuses, or deficiencies identified in subparagraph (A);
(C) a statement of whether corrective action has been
completed on each significant recommendation described
in previous semiannual reports, and, in a case where
corrective action has been completed, a description of
such corrective action;
(D) a certification that the Inspector General has
had full and direct access to all information relevant
to the performance of his functions;
(E) a description of the exercise of the subpoena
authority under subsection (e)(5) by the Inspector
General during the reporting period; and
(F) such recommendations as the Inspector General may
wish to make concerning legislation to promote economy
and efficiency in the administration of programs and
operations undertaken by the Agency, and to detect and
eliminate fraud and abuse in such programs and
operations.
(2) The Inspector General shall report immediately to the
Director whenever he becomes aware of particularly serious or
flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to the
administration of programs or operations. The Director shall
transmit such report to the intelligence committees within
seven calendar days, together with any comments he considers
appropriate.
(3) In the event that--
(A) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any
differences with the Director affecting the execution
of the Inspector General's duties or responsibilities;
(B) an investigation, inspection, or audit carried
out by the Inspector General should focus on any
current or former Agency official who--
(i) holds or held a position in the Agency
that is subject to appointment by the
President, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate, including such a position held
on an acting basis; or
(ii) holds or held the position in the
Agency, including such a position held on an
acting basis, of--
(I) Deputy Director;
(II) Associate Deputy Director;
(III) Director of the National
Clandestine Service;
(IV) Director of Intelligence;
(V) Director of Support; or
(VI) Director of Science and
Technology.
(C) a matter requires a report by the Inspector
General to the Department of Justice on possible
criminal conduct by a current or former Agency official
described or referred to in subparagraph (B);
(D) the Inspector General receives notice from the
Department of Justice declining or approving
prosecution of possible criminal conduct of any of the
officials described in subparagraph (B); or
(E) the Inspector General, after exhausting all
possible alternatives, is unable to obtain significant
documentary information in the course of an
investigation, inspection, or audit,
the Inspector General shall immediately notify and submit a
report on such matter to the intelligence committees.
(4) Pursuant to Title V of the National Security Act of 1947,
the Director shall submit to the intelligence committees any
report or findings and recommendations of an inspection,
investigation, or audit conducted by the office which has been
requested by the Chairman or Ranking Minority Member of either
committee.
(5)(A) An employee of the Agency, or of a contractor to the
Agency, who intends to report to Congress a complaint or
information with respect to an urgent concern may report such
complaint or information to the Inspector General.
(B)(i) Not later than the end of the 14-calendar day period
beginning on the date of receipt from an employee of a
complaint or information under subparagraph (A), the Inspector
General shall determine whether the complaint or information
appears credible. Upon making such a determination, the
Inspector General shall transmit to the Director notice of that
determination, together with the complaint or information.
(ii) If the Director determines that a complaint or
information transmitted under paragraph (1) would create a
conflict of interest for the Director, the Director shall
return the complaint or information to the Inspector General
with that determination and the Inspector General shall make
the transmission to the Director of National Intelligence. In
such a case, the requirements of this subsection for the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency apply to the
Director of National Intelligence
(C) Upon receipt of a transmittal from the Inspector General
under subparagraph (B), the Director shall, within 7 calendar
days of such receipt, forward such transmittal to the
intelligence committees, together with any comments the
Director considers appropriate.
(D)(i) If the Inspector General does not find credible under
subparagraph (B) a complaint or information submitted under
subparagraph (A), or does not transmit the complaint or
information to the Director in accurate form under subparagraph
(B), the employee (subject to clause (ii)) may submit the
complaint or information to Congress by contacting either or
both of the intelligence committees directly.
(ii) The employee may contact the intelligence committees
directly as described in clause (i) only if the employee--
(I) before making such a contact, furnishes to the
Director, through the Inspector General, a statement of
the employee's complaint or information and notice of
the employee's intent to contact the intelligence
committees directly; and
(II) obtains and follows from the Director, through
the Inspector General, direction on how to contact the
intelligence committees in accordance with appropriate
security practices.
(iii) A member or employee of one of the intelligence
committees who receives a complaint or information under clause
(i) does so in that member or employee's official capacity as a
member or employee of that committee.
(E) The Inspector General shall notify an employee who
reports a complaint or information to the Inspector General
under this paragraph of each action taken under this paragraph
with respect to the complaint or information. Such notice shall
be provided not later than 3 days after any such action is
taken.
(F) An action taken by the Director or the Inspector General
under this paragraph shall not be subject to judicial review.
(G) [In this paragraph] In accordance with section 1205 of
the National Security Act of 1947, in this paragraph:
(i) The term ``urgent concern'' means any of the
following:
(I) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse,
violation of law or Executive order, or
deficiency relating to the funding,
administration, or operations of an
intelligence activity involving classified
information, but does not include differences
of opinions concerning public policy matters.
(II) A false statement to Congress, or a
willful withholding from Congress, on an issue
of material fact relating to the funding,
administration, or operation of an intelligence
activity.
(III) An action, including a personnel action
described in section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5,
United States Code, constituting reprisal or
threat of reprisal prohibited under subsection
(e)(3)(B) in response to an employee's
reporting an urgent concern in accordance with
this paragraph.
(ii) The term ``intelligence committees'' means the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate.
(H) An individual who has submitted a complaint or
information to the Inspector General under this section may
notify any member of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives or the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, or a staff member of
either such Committee, of the fact that such individual has
made a submission to the Inspector General, and of the date on
which such submission was made.
(e) Authorities of the Inspector General.--(1) The Inspector
General shall have direct and prompt access to the Director
when necessary for any purpose pertaining to the performance of
his duties.
(2) The Inspector General shall have access to any employee
or any employee of a contractor of the Agency whose testimony
is needed for the performance of his duties. In addition, he
shall have direct access to all records, reports, audits,
reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, or other material
which relate to the programs and operations with respect to
which the Inspector General has responsibilities under this
section. Failure on the part of any employee or contractor to
cooperate with the Inspector General shall be grounds for
appropriate administrative actions by the Director, to include
loss of employment or the termination of an existing
contractual relationship.
(3) The Inspector General is authorized to receive and
investigate complaints or information from any person
concerning the existence of an activity constituting a
violation of laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement,
gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and
specific danger to the public health and safety. Once such
complaint or information has been received from an employee of
the Agency--
(A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the
identity of the employee without the consent of the
employee, unless the Inspector General determines that
such disclosure is unavoidable during the course of the
investigation or the disclosure is made to an official
of the Department of Justice responsible for
determining whether a prosecution should be undertaken;
and
(B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of
reprisal, for making such complaint or providing such
information may be taken by any employee of the Agency
in a position to take such actions, unless the
complaint was made or the information was disclosed
with the knowledge that it was false or with willful
disregard for its truth or falsity.
(4) The Inspector General shall have authority to administer
to or take from any person an oath, affirmation, or affidavit,
whenever necessary in the performance of his duties, which oath
affirmation, or affidavit when administered or taken by or
before an employee of the Office designated by the Inspector
General shall have the same force and effect as if administered
or taken by or before an officer having a seal.
(5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the Inspector
General is authorized to require by subpoena the production of
all information, documents, reports, answers, records,
accounts, papers, and other data in any medium (including
electronically stored information or any tangible thing) and
documentary evidence necessary in the performance of the duties
and responsibilities of the Inspector General.
(B) In the case of Government agencies, the Inspector General
shall obtain information, documents, reports, answers, records,
accounts, papers, and other data and evidence for the purpose
specified in subparagraph (A) using procedures other than by
subpoenas.
(C) The Inspector General may not issue a subpoena for or on
behalf of any other element or component of the Agency.
(D) In the case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena
issued under this paragraph, the subpoena shall be enforceable
by order of any appropriate district court of the United
States.
(6) The Inspector General shall be provided with appropriate
and adequate office space at central and field office
locations, together with such equipment, office supplies,
maintenance services, and communications facilities and
services as may be necessary for the operation of such offices.
(7)(A) Subject to applicable law and the policies of the
Director, the Inspector General shall select, appoint and
employ such officers and employees as may be necessary to carry
out his functions. In making such selections, the Inspector
General shall ensure that such officers and employees have the
requisite training and experience to enable him to carry out
his duties effectively. In this regard, the Inspector General
shall create within his organization a career cadre of
sufficient size to provide appropriate continuity and
objectivity needed for the effective performance of his duties.
(B) Consistent with budgetary and personnel resources
allocated by the Director, the Inspector General has final
approval of--
(i) the selection of internal and external candidates
for employment with the Office of Inspector General;
and
(ii) all other personnel decisions concerning
personnel permanently assigned to the Office of
Inspector General, including selection and appointment
to the Senior Intelligence Service, but excluding all
security-based determinations that are not within the
authority of a head of other Central Intelligence
Agency offices.
(C)(i) The Inspector General may designate an officer or
employee appointed in accordance with subparagraph (A) as a law
enforcement officer solely for purposes of subchapter III of
chapter 83 or chapter 84 of title 5, United States Code, if
such officer or employee is appointed to a position with
responsibility for investigating suspected offenses against the
criminal laws of the United States.
(ii) In carrying out clause (i), the Inspector General shall
ensure that any authority under such clause is exercised in a
manner consistent with section 3307 of title 5, United States
Code, as it relates to law enforcement officers.
(iii) For purposes of applying sections 3307(d), 8335(b), and
8425(b) of title 5, United States Code, the Inspector General
may exercise the functions, powers, and duties of an agency
head or appointing authority with respect to the Office.
(8)(A) The Inspector General shall--
(i) appoint a Counsel to the Inspector General who
shall report to the Inspector General; or
(ii) obtain the services of a counsel appointed by
and directly reporting to another Inspector General or
the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency on a reimbursable basis.
(B) The counsel appointed or obtained under subparagraph (A)
shall perform such functions as the Inspector General may
prescribe.
(9)(A) The Inspector General may request such information or
assistance as may be necessary for carrying out the duties and
responsibilities of the Inspector General provided by this
section from any Federal, State, or local governmental agency
or unit thereof.
(B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information or
assistance from a department or agency of the Federal
Government, the head of the department or agency involved,
insofar as practicable and not in contravention of any existing
statutory restriction or regulation of such department or
agency, shall furnish to the Inspector General, or to an
authorized designee, such information or assistance.
(C) Nothing in this paragraph may be construed to provide any
new authority to the Central Intelligence Agency to conduct
intelligence activity in the United States.
(D) In this paragraph, the term ``State'' means each of the
several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands,
and any territory or possession of the United States.
(f) Separate Budget Account.--(1) Beginning with fiscal year
1991, and in accordance with procedures to be issued by the
Director of National Intelligence in consultation with the
intelligence committees, the Director of National Intelligence
shall include in the National Intelligence Program budget a
separate account for the Office of Inspector General
established pursuant to this section.
(2) For each fiscal year, the Inspector General shall
transmit a budget estimate and request through the Director to
the Director of National Intelligence that specifies for such
fiscal year--
(A) the aggregate amount requested for the operations
of the Inspector General;
(B) the amount requested for all training
requirements of the Inspector General, including a
certification from the Inspector General that the
amount requested is sufficient to fund all training
requirements for the Office; and
(C) the amount requested to support the Council of
the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency,
including a justification for such amount.
(3) In transmitting a proposed budget to the President for a
fiscal year, the Director of National Intelligence shall
include for such fiscal year--
(A) the aggregate amount requested for the Inspector
General of the Central Intelligence Agency;
(B) the amount requested for Inspector General
training;
(C) the amount requested to support the Council of
the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency; and
(D) the comments of the Inspector General, if any,
with respect to such proposed budget.
(4) The Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
Committee on Appropriations and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on Appropriations
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives for each fiscal year--
(A) a separate statement of the budget estimate
transmitted pursuant to paragraph (2);
(B) the amount requested by the Director of National
Intelligence for the Inspector General pursuant to
paragraph (3)(A);
(C) the amount requested by the Director of National
Intelligence for training of personnel of the Office of
the Inspector General pursuant to paragraph (3)(B);
(D) the amount requested by the Director of National
Intelligence for support for the Council of the
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency pursuant
to paragraph (3)(C); and
(E) the comments of the Inspector General under
paragraph (3)(D), if any, on the amounts requested
pursuant to paragraph (3), including whether such
amounts would substantially inhibit the Inspector
General from performing the duties of the Office.
(g) Transfer.--There shall be transferred to the Office the
office of the Agency referred to as the ``Office of Inspector
General.'' The personnel, assets, liabilities, contracts,
property, records, and unexpended balances of appropriations,
authorizations, allocations, and other funds employed, held,
used, arising from, or available to such ``Office of Inspector
General'' are hereby transferred to the Office established
pursuant to this section.
(h) Information on Website.--(1) The Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency shall establish and maintain on the
homepage of the Agency's publicly accessible website
information relating to the Office of the Inspector General
including methods to contact the Inspector General.
(2) The information referred to in paragraph (1) shall be
obvious and facilitate accessibility to the information related
to the Office of the Inspector General.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 24. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FOR ANALYTIC OBJECTIVITY.
(a) Establishment.--There is established in the Agency an
Office of the Ombudsman for Analytic Objectivity (in this
section referred to as the ``Office''), which shall be headed
by an Ombudsman. The Ombudsman shall be appointed by the
Director from among the senior staff officers of the Agency.
(b) Duties and Responsibilities.--The Ombudsman shall--
(1) on an annual basis, conduct a survey of analytic
objectivity among officers and employees of the Agency;
(2) implement a procedure by which any officer or
employee of the Agency may submit to the Office a
complaint alleging politicization, bias, lack of
objectivity, or other issues relating to a failure of
tradecraft in analysis conducted by the Agency;
(3) except as provided in paragraph (4), upon
receiving a complaint submitted pursuant to paragraph
(2), take reasonable action to investigate the
complaint, make a determination as to whether the
incident described in the complaint involved
politicization, bias, or lack of objectivity, and
prepare a report that--
(A) summarizes the facts relevant to the
complaint;
(B) documents the determination of the
Ombudsman with respect to the complaint; and
(C) contains a recommendation for remedial
action;
(4) if a complaint submitted pursuant to paragraph
(2) alleges politicization, bias, or lack of
objectivity in the collection of intelligence
information, refer the complaint to the official
responsible for supervising collection operations of
the Agency; and
(5) continuously monitor changes in areas of analysis
that the Ombudsman determines involve a heightened risk
of politicization, bias, or lack of objectivity, to
ensure that any change in the analytic line arises from
proper application of analytic tradecraft and not as a
result of politicization, bias, or lack of objectivity.
(c) Reports.--(1) On an annual basis, the Ombudsman shall
submit to the intelligence committees a report on the results
of the survey conducted pursuant to subsection (b)(1) with
respect to the most recent fiscal year.
(2) On an annual basis, the Ombudsman shall submit to the
intelligence committees a report that includes--
(A) the number of complaints of submitted pursuant to
subsection (b)(2) during the most recent fiscal year;
and
(B) a description of the nature of such complaints,
the actions taken by the Office or any other relevant
element or component of the Agency with respect to such
complaints, and the resolution of such complaints.
(3) On a quarterly basis, the Ombudsman shall submit to the
intelligence committees a report that includes--
(A) a list of the areas of analysis monitored during
the most recent calendar quarter pursuant to subsection
(b)(5); and
(B) a brief description of the methods by which the
Office has conducted such monitoring.
(d) Intelligence Committees Defined.--In this section, the
term ``intelligence committees'' means the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
----------
TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE
* * * * * * *
PART III--EMPLOYEES
* * * * * * *
SUBPART D--PAY AND ALLOWANCES
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 53--PAY RATES AND SYSTEMS
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER II--EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE PAY RATES
* * * * * * *
Sec. 5314. Positions at level III
Level III of the Executive Schedule applies to the following
positions, for which the annual rate of basic pay shall be the
rate determined with respect to such level under chapter 11 of
title 2, as adjusted by section 5318 of this title:
Solicitor General of the United States.
Under Secretary of Commerce, Under Secretary of
Commerce for Economic Affairs, Under Secretary of
Commerce for Industry and Security, and Under Secretary
of Commerce for Travel and Tourism.
Under Secretaries of State (6).
Under Secretaries of the Treasury (3).
Administrator of General Services.
Administrator of the Small Business Administration.
Deputy Administrator, Agency for International
Development.
Chairman of the Merit Systems Protection Board.
Chairman, Federal Communications Commission.
Chairman, Board of Directors, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation.
Chairman, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
Chairman, Federal Trade Commission.
Chairman, Surface Transportation Board.
Chairman, National Labor Relations Board.
Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission.
Chairman, National Mediation Board.
Chairman, Railroad Retirement Board.
Chairman, Federal Maritime Commission.
Comptroller of the Currency.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment.
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness.
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and
Security.
Under Secretary of the Air Force.
Under Secretary of the Army.
Under Secretary of the Navy.
Deputy Administrator of the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration.
Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Director of the Office of Emergency Planning.
Director of the Peace Corps.
Deputy Director, National Science Foundation.
President of the Export-Import Bank of Washington.
Members, Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Members, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Department of Justice.
Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
Administrator of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration.
Administrator, Federal Railroad Administration.
Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board.
Chairman of the National Endowment for the Arts the
incumbent of which also serves as Chairman of the
National Council on the Arts.
Chairman of the National Endowment for the
Humanities.
Director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service.
Chairman, Postal Regulatory Commission.
Chairman, Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission.
Governor of the Farm Credit Administration.
Chairman, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
Chairman, Consumer Product Safety Commission.
Under Secretaries of Energy (3).
Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
Deputy United States Trade Representatives (3).
Chief Agricultural Negotiator, Office of the United
States Trade Representative.
Chief Innovation and Intellectual Property
Negotiator, Office of the United States Trade
Representative.
Chairman, United States International Trade
Commission.
Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and
Atmosphere, the incumbent of which also serves as
Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration.
Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and
Technology, who also serves as Director of the National
Institute of Standards and Technology.
Associate Attorney General.
Chairman, Federal Mine Safety and Health Review
Commission.
Chairman, National Credit Union Administration Board.
Deputy Director of the Office of Personnel
Management.
Under Secretary of Agriculture for Farm Production
and Conservation.
Under Secretary of Agriculture for Trade and Foreign
Agricultural Affairs.
Under Secretary of Agriculture for Food, Nutrition,
and Consumer Services.
Under Secretary of Agriculture for Natural Resources
and Environment.
Under Secretary of Agriculture for Research,
Education, and Economics.
Under Secretary of Agriculture for Food Safety.
Under Secretary of Agriculture for Marketing and
Regulatory Programs.
Director, Institute for Scientific and Technological
Cooperation.
Under Secretary of Agriculture for Rural Development.
Administrator, Maritime Administration.
Executive Director Property Review Board.
Deputy Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency.
Archivist of the United States.
Executive Director, Federal Retirement Thrift
Investment Board.
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
Director, Trade and Development Agency.
Under Secretary for Health, Department of Veterans
Affairs.
Under Secretary for Benefits, Department of Veterans
Affairs.
Under Secretary for Memorial Affairs, Department of
Veterans Affairs.
Under Secretaries, Department of Homeland Security.
Director, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency.
Director of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration
Services.
Director of the Office of Government Ethics.
Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy.
Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, Office of Management and Budget.
Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision.
Chairperson of the Federal Housing Finance Board.
Executive Secretary, National Space Council.
Director of the National Security Agency.
Director of the National Reconnaissance Office.
Controller, Office of Federal Financial Management,
Office of Management and Budget.
Administrator, Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Research and Technology of the Department of
Transportation.
Deputy Director for Demand Reduction, Office of
National Drug Control Policy.
Deputy Director for Supply Reduction, Office of
National Drug Control Policy.
Deputy Director for State and Local Affairs, Office
of National Drug Control Policy.
Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property
and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark
Office.
Register of Copyrights.
Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection,
Department of Homeland Security.
Under Secretary of Education
Administrator of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services.
Administrator of the Office of Electronic Government.
Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration.
Director, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
Deputy Administrators, Federal Emergency Management
Agency.
Deputy Administrator, Transportation Security
Administration.
Chief Executive Officer, International Clean Energy
Foundation.
Independent Member of the Financial Stability
Oversight Council (1).
Director of the Office of Financial Research.
* * * * * * *
----------
TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE
SUBTITLE A--GENERAL MILITARY LAW
* * * * * * *
PART I--ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL MILITARY POWERS
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 2--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
* * * * * * *
Sec. 119. Special access programs: congressional oversight
(a)(1) Not later than March 1 of each year, the Secretary of
Defense shall submit to the [defense committees] appropriate
congressional committees a report on special access programs.
(2) Each such report shall set forth--
(A) the total amount requested for special access
programs of the Department of Defense in the
President's budget for the next fiscal year submitted
under section 1105 of title 31; and
(B) for each program in that budget that is a special
access program--
(i) a brief description of the program;
(ii) a brief discussion of the major
milestones established for the program;
(iii) the actual cost of the program for each
fiscal year during which the program has been
conducted before the fiscal year during which
that budget is submitted; and
(iv) the estimated total cost of the program
and the estimated cost of the program for (I)
the current fiscal year, (II) the fiscal year
for which the budget is submitted, and (III)
each of the four succeeding fiscal years during
which the program is expected to be conducted.
(3) In the case of a report under paragraph (1) submitted in
a year during which the President's budget for the next fiscal
year, because of multiyear budgeting for the Department of
Defense, does not include a full budget request for the
Department of Defense, the report required by paragraph (1)
shall set forth--
(A) the total amount already appropriated for the
next fiscal year for special access programs of the
Department of Defense and any additional amount
requested in that budget for such programs for such
fiscal year; and
(B) for each program of the Department of Defense
that is a special access program, the information
specified in paragraph (2)(B).
(b)(1) Not later than February 1 of each year, the Secretary
of Defense shall submit to the [defense committees] appropriate
congressional committees a report that, with respect to each
new special access program, provides--
(A) notice of the designation of the program as a
special access program; and
(B) justification for such designation.
(2) A report under paragraph (1) with respect to a program
shall include--
(A) the current estimate of the total program cost
for the program; and
(B) an identification of existing programs or
technologies that are similar to the technology, or
that have a mission similar to the mission, of the
program that is the subject of the notice.
(3) In this subsection, the term ``new special access
program'' means a special access program that has not
previously been covered in a notice and justification under
this subsection.
(c)(1) Whenever a change in the classification of a special
access program of the Department of Defense is planned to be
made or whenever classified information concerning a special
access program of the Department of Defense is to be
declassified and made public, the Secretary of Defense shall
submit to the [defense committees] appropriate congressional
committees a report containing a description of the proposed
change, the reasons for the proposed change, and notice of any
public announcement planned to be made with respect to the
proposed change.
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (3), any report referred
to in paragraph (1) shall be submitted not less than 14 days
before the date on which the proposed change or public
announcement is to occur.
(3) If the Secretary determines that because of exceptional
circumstances the requirement of paragraph (2) cannot be met
with respect to a proposed change or public announcement
concerning a special access program of the Department of
Defense, the Secretary may submit the report required by
paragraph (1) regarding the proposed change or public
announcement at any time before the proposed change or public
announcement is made and shall include in the report an
explanation of the exceptional circumstances.
(d) Whenever there is a modification or termination of the
policy and criteria used for designating a program of the
Department of Defense as a special access program, the
Secretary of Defense shall promptly notify the [defense
committees] appropriate congressional committees of such
modification or termination. Any such notification shall
contain the reasons for the modification or termination and, in
the case of a modification, the provisions of the policy as
modified.
(e)(1) The Secretary of Defense may waive any requirement
under subsection (a), (b), or (c) that certain information be
included in a report under that subsection if the Secretary
determines that inclusion of that information in the report
would adversely affect the national security. Any such waiver
shall be made on a case-by-case basis.
(2) If the Secretary exercises the authority provided under
paragraph (1), the Secretary shall provide the information
described in that subsection with respect to the special access
program concerned, and the justification for the waiver,
jointly to the chairman and ranking minority member of each of
the [defense committees] appropriate congressional committees.
(f) A special access program may not be initiated until--
(1) the [defense committees] appropriate
congressional committees are notified of the program;
and
(2) a period of 30 days elapses after such
notification is received.
[(g) In this section, the term ``[defense committees]
appropriate congressional committees'' means--
[(1) the Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Appropriations, and the Defense
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, of the
Senate; and
[(2) the Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Appropriations, and the Subcommittee on
Defense of the Committee on Appropriations, of the
House of Representatives.]
(g) In this section, the term ``appropriate congressional
committees'' means the following:
(1) The Committee on Armed Services and the Committee
on Appropriations, and the Defense Subcommittee of the
Committee on Appropriations, of the Senate.
(2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Committee
on Appropriations, and the Subcommittee on Defense of
the Committee on Appropriations, of the House of
Representatives.
(3) With respect to a special access program or a new
special access program covered by a report or
notification under this section that the Secretary of
Defense determines to be an intelligence or
intelligence-related special access program, and with
respect to any other special access program or new
special access program covered by a report or
notification under this section or any other matters
that the Secretary determines appropriate, the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate.
* * * * * * *
PART II--PERSONNEL
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 81--CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES
* * * * * * *
Sec. 1599h. Personnel management authority to attract experts in
science and engineering
(a) Programs Authorized.--
(1) Laboratories of the military departments.--The
Secretary of Defense may carry out a program of
personnel management authority provided in subsection
(b) in order to facilitate recruitment of eminent
experts in science or engineering for such laboratories
of the military departments as the Secretary shall
designate for purposes of the program for research and
development projects of such laboratories.
(2) DARPA.--The Director of the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency may carry out a program of
personnel management authority provided in subsection
(b) in order to facilitate recruitment of eminent
experts in science or engineering for research and
development projects and to enhance the administration
and management of the Agency.
(3) DOTE.--The Director of the Office of Operational
Test and Evaluation may carry out a program of
personnel management authority provided in subsection
(b) in order to facilitate recruitment of eminent
experts in science or engineering to support
operational test and evaluation missions of the Office.
(4) Strategic capabilities office.--The Director of
the Strategic Capabilities Office may carry out a
program of personnel management authority provided in
subsection (b) in order to facilitate recruitment of
eminent experts in science or engineering for the
Office.
(5) DIU.--The Director of the Defense Innovation Unit
may carry out a program of personnel management
authority provided in subsection (b) in order to
facilitate recruitment of eminent experts in science or
engineering for the Unit.
(6) Joint artificial intelligence center.--The
Director of the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center
may carry out a program of personnel management
authority provided in subsection (b) in order to
facilitate recruitment of eminent experts in science or
engineering for the Center. The authority to carry out
the program under this paragraph shall terminate on
December 31, 2024.
(7) NGA.--The Director of the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency may carry out a program of
personnel management authority provided in subsection
(b) in order to facilitate recruitment of eminent
experts in science or engineering for research and
development projects and to enhance the administration
and management of the Agency.
(b) Personnel Management Authority.--Under a program under
subsection (a), the official responsible for administration of
the program may--
(1) without regard to any provision of title 5
governing the appointment of employees in the civil
service--
(A) in the case of the laboratories of the
military departments designated pursuant to
subsection (a)(1), appoint scientists and
engineers to a total of not more than 40
scientific and engineering positions in such
laboratories;
(B) in the case of the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency, appoint individuals
to a total of not more than 140 positions in
the Agency, of which not more than 5 such
positions may be positions of administration or
management of the Agency;
(C) in the case of the Office of Operational
Test and Evaluation, appoint scientists and
engineers to a total of not more than 10
scientific and engineering positions in the
Office;
(D) in the case of the Strategic Capabilities
Office, appoint scientists and engineers to a
total of not more than 5 scientific and
engineering positions in the Office;
(E) in the case of the Defense Innovation
Unit, appoint scientists and engineers to a
total of not more than 5 scientific and
engineering positions in the Unit[; and]
(F) in the case of the Joint Artificial
Intelligence Center, appoint scientists and
engineers to a total of not more than 5
scientific and engineering positions in the
Center[;]; and
(G) in the case of the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, appoint individuals to a
total of not more than 7 positions in the
Agency, of which not more than 2 such positions
may be positions of administration or
management in the Agency;
(2) notwithstanding any provision of title 5
governing the rates of pay or classification of
employees in the executive branch, prescribe the rates
of basic pay for positions to which employees are
appointed under paragraph (1)--
(A) in the case of employees appointed
pursuant to paragraph (1)(B) to any of 5
positions designated by the Director of the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency for
purposes of this subparagraph, at rates not in
excess of a rate equal to 150 percent of the
maximum rate of basic pay authorized for
positions at Level I of the Executive Schedule
under section 5312 of title 5; and
(B) in the case of any other employee
appointed pursuant to paragraph (1), at rates
not in excess of the maximum rate of basic pay
authorized for senior-level positions under
section 5376 of title 5; and
(3) pay any employee appointed under paragraph (1),
other than an employee appointed to a position
designated as described in paragraph (2)(A), payments
in addition to basic pay within the limit applicable to
the employee under subsection (d).
(c) Limitation on Term of Appointment.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2),
the service of an employee under an appointment under
subsection (b)(1) may not exceed four years.
(2) Extension.--The official responsible for the
administration of a program under subsection (a) may,
in the case of a particular employee under the program,
extend the period to which service is limited under
paragraph (1) by up to two years if the official
determines that such action is necessary to promote the
efficiency of a laboratory of a military department,
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the
Office of Operational Test and Evaluation, the
Strategic Capabilities Office, the Defense Innovation
Unit, [or the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center] the
Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, or the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, as applicable.
(d) Maximum Amount of Additional Payments Payable.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section or section
5307 of title 5, no additional payments may be paid to an
employee under subsection (b)(3) in any calendar year if, or to
the extent that, the employee's total annual compensation in
such calendar year will exceed the maximum amount of total
annual compensation payable at the salary set in accordance
with section 104 of title 3.
* * * * * * *
----------
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY ACT OF 1959
* * * * * * *
SEC. 21. SENIOR CHIEF PETTY OFFICER SHANNON KENT AWARD FOR
DISTINGUISHED FEMALE PERSONNEL.
(a) Establishment.--The Director of the National Security
Agency shall establish an honorary award for the recognition of
female personnel of the National Security Agency for
distinguished career contributions in support of the mission of
the Agency as civilian employees or members of the Armed Forces
assigned to the Agency. The award shall be known as the
``Senior Chief Petty Officer Shannon Kent Award'' and shall
consist of a design determined appropriate by the Director.
(b) Award.--The Director shall award the Senior Chief Petty
Officer Shannon Kent Award to female civilian employees,
members of the Armed Forces, or former civilian employees or
members, whom the Director determines meet the criteria under
subsection (a).
----------
HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Homeland
Security Act of 2002''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is
as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
* * * * * * *
TITLE XIII--FEDERAL WORKFORCE IMPROVEMENT
* * * * * * *
Subtitle D--Academic Training
* * * * * * *
Sec. 1331. Academic training.
Sec. 1332. Modifications to National Security Education Program.
Sec. 1333. Intelligence and cybersecurity diversity fellowship program.
* * * * * * *
TITLE XIII--FEDERAL WORKFORCE IMPROVEMENT
* * * * * * *
Subtitle D--Academic Training
* * * * * * *
SEC. 1333. INTELLIGENCE AND CYBERSECURITY DIVERSITY FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.
(a) Program.--The Secretary shall carry out an intelligence
and cybersecurity diversity fellowship program (in this section
referred to as the ``Program'') under which an eligible
individual may--
(1) participate in a paid internship at the
Department that relates to intelligence, cybersecurity,
or some combination thereof;
(2) receive tuition assistance from the Secretary;
and
(3) upon graduation from an institution of higher
education and successful completion of the Program (as
defined by the Secretary), receive an offer of
employment to work in an intelligence or cybersecurity
position of the Department that is in the excepted
service.
(b) Eligibility.--To be eligible to participate in the
Program, an individual shall--
(1) be a citizen of the United States; and
(2) as of the date of submitting the application to
participate in the Program--
(A) have a cumulative grade point average of
at least 3.2 on a 4.0 scale; and
(B) be a sophomore, junior, or senior at--
(i) a historically Black college or
university or a minority-serving
institution; or
(ii) an institution of higher
education that is not a historically
Black college or university or a
minority-serving institution and be an
active participant in a minority-
serving organization of such
institution.
(c) Direct Hire Authority.--If an individual who receives an
offer of employment under subsection (a)(3) accepts such offer,
the Secretary shall appoint, without regard to provisions of
subchapter I of chapter 33 of title 5, United States Code,
(except for section 3328 of such title) such individual to the
position specified in such offer.
(d) Reports.--
(1) Reports.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
the enactment of this section, and on an annual basis
thereafter, the Secretary shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a report on the
Program.
(2) Matters.--Each report under paragraph (1) shall
include, with respect to the most recent year, the
following:
(A) A description of outreach efforts by the
Secretary to raise awareness of the Program
among institutions of higher education in which
eligible individuals are enrolled.
(B) Information on specific recruiting
efforts conducted by the Secretary to increase
participation in the Program.
(C) The number of individuals participating
in the Program, listed by the institution of
higher education in which the individual is
enrolled at the time of participation, and
information on the nature of such
participation, including on whether the duties
of the individual under the Program relate
primarily to intelligence or to cybersecurity.
(D) The number of individuals who accepted an
offer of employment under the Program and an
identification of the element within the
Department to which each individual was
appointed.
(e) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the Committee on Homeland Security and
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
of the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs and the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate.
(2) Excepted service.--The term ``excepted service''
has the meaning given that term in section 2103 of
title 5, United States Code.
(3) Historically black college or university.--The
term ``historically Black college or university'' has
the meaning given the term ``part B institution'' in
section 322 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20
U.S.C. 1061).
(4) Institution of higher education.--The term
``institution of higher education'' has the meaning
given that term in section 101 of the Higher Education
Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001).
(5) Minority-serving institution.--The term
``minority-serving institution'' means an institution
of higher education described in section 371(a) of the
Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1067q(a)).
* * * * * * *
----------
DAMON PAUL NELSON AND MATTHEW YOUNG POLLARD INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION
ACT FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018, 2019, AND 2020
DIVISION E--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018, 2019,
AND 2020
SECTION 5001. SHORT TITLE
This division may be cited as the ``Damon Paul Nelson and
Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Years 2018, 2019, and 2020''.
* * * * * * *
TITLE LIII--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
* * * * * * *
Subtitle C--Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
SEC. 5331. DEFINITIONS.
In this subtitle:
(1) Whistleblower.--The term ``whistleblower'' means
a person who makes a whistleblower disclosure.
(2) Whistleblower disclosure.--The term
``whistleblower disclosure'' means a disclosure that is
protected under [section 1104 of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3234)] section 1221 of the
National Security Act of 1947 or section 3001(j)(1) of
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)).
* * * * * * *
TITLE LVII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
Subtitle A--Reports and Briefings
* * * * * * *
[SEC. 5712. REPORT ON BEST PRACTICES TO PROTECT PRIVACY AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES OF CHINESE AMERICANS.
[(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
[(1) the People's Republic of China appears to be
specifically targeting the Chinese-American community
for intelligence purposes;
[(2) such targeting carries a substantial risk that
the loyalty of such Americans may be generally
questioned and lead to unacceptable stereotyping,
targeting, and racial profiling;
[(3) the United States Government has a duty to warn
and protect all Americans including those of Chinese
descent from these intelligence efforts by the People's
Republic of China;
[(4) the broad stereotyping, targeting, and racial
profiling of Americans of Chinese descent is contrary
to the values of the United States and reinforces the
flawed narrative perpetuated by the People's Republic
of China that ethnically Chinese individuals worldwide
have a duty to support the People's Republic of China;
and
[(5) the United States efforts to combat the People's
Republic of China's intelligence activities should
actively safeguard and promote the constitutional
rights of all Chinese Americans.
[(b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence,
acting through the Office of Civil Liberties, Privacy, and
Transparency, in coordination with the civil liberties and
privacy officers of the elements of the intelligence community,
shall submit a report to the congressional intelligence
committees containing--
[(1) a review of how the policies, procedures, and
practices of the intelligence community that govern the
intelligence activities and operations targeting the
People's Republic of China affect policies, procedures,
and practices relating to the privacy and civil
liberties of Americans of Chinese descent who may be
targets of espionage and influence operations by China;
and
[(2) recommendations to ensure that the privacy and
civil liberties of Americans of Chinese descent are
sufficiently protected.
[(c) Form.--The report under subsection (b) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.]
* * * * * * *
TITLE LXVI--SECURITY CLEARANCES
* * * * * * *
Subtitle B--Reports
* * * * * * *
SEC. 6722. REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON NATIONAL SECURITY EFFECTS OF GLOBAL
WATER INSECURITY AND EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE
AND PANDEMICS.
(a) Global Water Insecurity.--
(1) Report.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the congressional intelligence
committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
the House of Representatives, and the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on
the implications of water insecurity on the
national security interests of the United
States, including consideration of social,
economic, agricultural, and environmental
factors.
(B) Assessment scope and focus.--The report
submitted under subparagraph (A) shall include
an assessment of water insecurity described in
such subsection with a global scope, but focus
on areas of the world--
(i) of strategic, economic, or
humanitarian interest to the United
States--
(I) that are, as of the date
of the report, at the greatest
risk of instability, conflict,
human insecurity, or mass
displacement; or
(II) where challenges
relating to water insecurity
are likely to emerge and become
significant during the 5-year
or the 20-year period beginning
on the date of the report; and
(ii) where challenges relating to
water insecurity are likely to imperil
the national security interests of the
United States or allies of the United
States.
(C) Consultation.--In researching the report
required by subparagraph (A), the Director
shall consult with--
(i) such stakeholders within the
intelligence community, the Department
of Defense, and the Department of State
as the Director considers appropriate;
and
(ii) such additional Federal agencies
and persons in the private sector as
the Director considers appropriate.
(D) Form.--The report submitted under
subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
(2) Quinquennial briefings.--Beginning on the date
that is 5 years after the date on which the Director
submits the report under paragraph (1), and every 5
years thereafter, the Director shall provide to the
committees specified in such paragraph a briefing that
updates the matters contained in the report.
(b) Emerging Infectious Disease and Pandemics.--
(1) Report.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 120 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report on the anticipated
geopolitical effects of emerging infectious
disease (including deliberate, accidental, and
naturally occurring infectious disease threats)
and pandemics, and their implications on the
national security of the United States.
(B) Contents.--The report under subparagraph
(A) shall include an assessment of--
(i) the economic, social, political,
and security risks, costs, and impacts
of emerging infectious diseases on the
United States and the international
political and economic system;
(ii) the economic, social, political,
and security risks, costs, and impacts
of a major transnational pandemic on
the United States and the international
political and economic system; and
(iii) contributing trends and factors
to the matters assessed under clauses
(i) and (ii).
(C) Examination of response capacity.--In
examining the risks, costs, and impacts of
emerging infectious disease and a possible
transnational pandemic under subparagraph (B),
the Director of National Intelligence shall
also examine in the report under subparagraph
(A) the response capacity within affected
countries and the international system. In
considering response capacity, the Director
shall include--
(i) the ability of affected nations
to effectively detect and manage
emerging infectious diseases and a
possible transnational pandemic;
(ii) the role and capacity of
international organizations and
nongovernmental organizations to
respond to emerging infectious disease
and a possible pandemic, and their
ability to coordinate with affected and
donor nations; and
(iii) the effectiveness of current
international frameworks, agreements,
and health systems to respond to
emerging infectious diseases and a
possible transnational pandemic.
(2) [Quinquennial] Annual briefings.--Beginning on
the date that is 5 years after the date on which the
Director submits the report under paragraph (1), and
every 5 years thereafter, the Director shall provide to
the congressional intelligence committees a briefing
that updates the matters contained in the report
required under paragraph (1).
(3) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) and the
briefings under paragraph (2) may be classified.
(4) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In
this subsection, the term ``appropriate congressional
committees'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence
committees;
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Energy and Commerce, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives;
and
(C) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, and the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
* * * * * * *
----------
FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT OF 1971
* * * * * * *
TITLE III--DISCLOSURE OF FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FUNDS
* * * * * * *
organization of political committees
Sec. 302. (a) Every political committee shall have a
treasurer. No contribution or expenditure shall be accepted or
made by or on behalf of a political committee during any period
in which the office of treasurer is vacant. No expenditures
shall be made for or on behalf of a political committee without
the authorization of the treasurer or his or her designated
agent.
(b)(1) Every person who receives a contribution for an
authorized political committee shall, no later than 10 days
after receiving such contribution, forward to the treasurer
such contribution, and if the amount of the contribution is in
excess of $50 the name and address of the person making the
contribution and the date of receipt.
(2) Every person who receives a contribution for a political
committee which is not an authorized committee shall--
(A) if the amount of the contribution is $50 or less,
forward to the treasurer such contribution no later
than 30 days after receiving the contribution; and
(B) if the amount of the contribution is in excess of
$50, forward to the treasurer such contribution, the
name and address of the person making the contribution,
and the date of receipt of the contribution, no later
than 10 days after receiving the contribution.
(3) All funds of a political committee shall be segregated
from, and may not be commingled with, the personal funds of any
individual.
(c) The treasurer of a political committee shall keep an
account of--
(1) all contributions received by or on behalf of
such political committee;
(2) the name and address of any person who makes any
contribution in excess of $50, together with the date
and amount of such contribution by any person;
(3) the identification of any person who makes a
contribution or contributions aggregating more than
$200 during a calendar year, together with the date and
amount of any such contribution;
(4) the identification of any political committee
which makes a contribution, together with the date and
amount of any such contribution; and
(5) the name and address of every person to whom any
disbursement is made, the date, amount, and purpose of
the disbursement, and the name of the candidate and the
office sought by the candidate, if any, for whom the
disbursement was made, including a receipt, invoice, or
canceled check for each disbursement in excess of $200.
(d) The treasurer shall preserve all records required to be
kept by this section and copies of all reports required to be
filed by this title for 3 years after the report is filed. For
any report filed in electronic format under section 304(a)(11),
the treasurer shall retain a machine-readable copy of the
report as the copy preserved under the preceding sentence.
(e)(1) Each candidate for Federal office (other than the
nominee for the office of Vice President) shall designate in
writing a political committee in accordance with paragraph (3)
to serve as the principal campaign committee of such candidate.
Such designation shall be made no later than 15 days after
becoming a candidate. A candidate may designate additional
political committees in accordance with paragraph (3) to serve
as authorized committees of such candidate. Such designation
shall be in writing and filed with the principal campaign
committee of such candidate in accordance with subsection
(f)(1).
(2) Any candidate described in paragraph (1) who receives a
contribution, or any loan for use in connection with the
campaign of such candidate for election, or makes a
disbursement in connection with such campaign, shall be
considered, for purposes of this Act, as having received the
contribution or loan, or as having made the disbursement, as
the case may be, as an agent of the authorized committee or
committees of such candidate.
(3)(A) No political committee which supports or has supported
more than one candidate may be designated as an authorized
committee, except that--
(i) the candidate for the office of President
nominated by a political party may designate the
national committee of such political party as a
principal campaign committee, but only if that national
committee maintains separate books of account with
respect to its function as a principal campaign
committee; and
(ii) candidates may designate a political committee
established solely for the purpose of joint fundraising
by such candidates as an authorized committee.
(B) As used in this section, the term ``support'' does not
include a contribution by any authorized committee in amounts
of $2,000 or less to an authorized committee of any other
candidate.
(4) The name of each authorized committee shall include the
name of the candidate who authorized such committee under
paragraph (1). In the case of any political committee which is
not an authorized committee, such political committee shall not
include the name of any candidate in its name.
(5) The name of any separate segregated fund established
pursuant to section 316(b) shall include the name of its
connected organization.
(f)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, each
designation, statement, or report of receipts or disbursements
made by an authorized committee of a candidate shall be filed
with the candidate's principal campaign committee.
(2) Each principal campaign committee shall receive all
designations, statements, and reports required to be filed with
it under paragraph (1) and shall compile and file such
designations, statements, and reports in accordance with this
Act.
(g) Filing With the Commission.--All designations,
statements, and reports required to be filed under this Act
shall be filed with the Commission.
(h)(1) Each political committee shall designate one or more
State banks, federally chartered depository institutions, or
depository institutions the deposits or accounts of which are
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, or the National
Credit Union Administration, as its campaign depository or
depositories. Each political committee shall maintain at least
one checking account and such other accounts as the committee
determines at a depository designated by such committee. All
receipts received by such committee shall be deposited in such
accounts. No disbursements may be made (other than petty cash
disbursements under paragraph (2)) by such committee except by
check drawn on such accounts in accordance with this section.
(2) A political committee may maintain a petty cash fund for
disbursements not in excess of $100 to any person in connection
with a single purchase or transaction. A record of all petty
cash disbursements shall be maintained in accordance with
subsection (c)(5).
(i) When the treasurer of a political committee shows that
best efforts have been used to obtain, maintain, and submit the
information required by this Act for the political committee,
any report or any records of such committee shall be considered
in compliance with this Act or chapter 95 or chapter 96 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
(j) Reportable Foreign Contacts Compliance Policy.--
(1) Reporting.--Each political committee shall
establish a policy that requires all officials,
employees, and agents of such committee to notify the
treasurer or other appropriate designated official of
the committee of any reportable foreign contact (as
defined in section 304(j)) not later than 3 days after
such contact was made.
(2) Retention and preservation of records.--Each
political committee shall establish a policy that
provides for the retention and preservation of records
and information related to reportable foreign contacts
(as so defined) for a period of not less than 3 years.
(3) Certification.--
(A) In general.--Upon filing its statement of
organization under section 303(a), and with
each report filed under section 304(a), the
treasurer of each political committee (other
than an authorized committee) shall certify
that--
(i) the committee has in place
policies that meet the requirements of
paragraphs (1) and (2);
(ii) the committee has designated an
official to monitor compliance with
such policies; and
(iii) not later than 1 week after the
beginning of any formal or informal
affiliation with the committee, all
officials, employees, and agents of
such committee will--
(I) receive notice of such
policies;
(II) be informed of the
prohibitions under section 319;
and
(III) sign a certification
affirming their understanding
of such policies and
prohibitions.
(B) Authorized committees.--With respect to
an authorized committee, the candidate shall
make the certification required under
subparagraph (A).
registration of political committees; statements
Sec. 303. (a) Each authorized campaign committee shall file a
statement of organization no later than 10 days after
designation pursuant to section 302(e)(1). Each separate
segregated fund established under the provisions of section
316(b) shall file a statement of organization no later than 10
days after establishment. All other committees shall file a
statement of organization within 10 days after becoming a
political committee within the meaning of section 301(4).
(b) The statement of organization of a political committee
shall include--
(1) the name, address, and type of committee;
(2) the name, address, relationship, and type of any
connected organization or affiliated committee;
(3) the name, address, and position of the custodian
of books and accounts of the committee;
(4) the name and address of the treasurer of the
committee;
(5) if the committee is authorized by a candidate,
the name, address, office sought, and party affiliation
of the candidate; and
(6) a listing of all banks, safety deposit boxes, or
other depositories used by the committee.
(c) Any change in information previously submitted in a
statement of organization shall be reported in accordance with
section 302(g) no later than 10 days after the date of the
change.
(d)(1) A political committee may terminate only when such a
committee files a written statement, in accordance with section
302(g), that it will no longer receive any contributions or
make any disbursements and that such committee has no
outstanding debts or obligations.
(2) Nothing contained in this subsection may be construed to
eliminate or limit the authority of the Commission to establish
procedures for--
(A) the determination of insolvency with respect to
any political committee;
(B) the orderly liquidation of an insolvent political
committee, and the orderly application of its assets
for the reduction of outstanding debts; and
(C) the termination of an insolvent political
committee after such liquidation and application of
assets.
(e) Acknowledgment of Foreign Money Ban.--
(1) Notification by commission.--Not later than 30
days after a political committee files its statement of
organization under subsection (a), and biennially
thereafter until the committee terminates, the
Commission shall provide the committee with a written
explanation of section 319.
(2) Acknowledgment by committee.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 30 days after
receiving the written explanation of section
319 under paragraph (1), the committee shall
transmit to the Commission a signed
certification that the committee has received
such written explanation and has provided a
copy of the explanation to all members,
employees, contractors, and volunteers of the
committee.
(B) Person responsible for signature.--The
certification required under subparagraph (A)
shall be signed--
(i) in the case of an authorized
committee of a candidate, by the
candidate; or
(ii) in the case of any other
political committee, by the treasurer
of the committee.
reports
Sec. 304. (a)(1) Each treasurer of a political committee
shall file reports of receipts and disbursements in accordance
with the provisions of this subsection. The treasurer shall
sign each such report.
(2) If the political committee is the principal campaign
committee of a candidate for the House of Representatives or
for the Senate--
(A) in any calendar year during which there is
regularly scheduled election for which such candidate
is seeking election, or nomination for election, the
treasurer shall file the following reports:
(i) a pre-election report, which shall be
filed no later than the 12th day before (or
posted by any of the following: registered
mail, certified mail, priority mail having a
delivery confirmation, or express mail having a
delivery confirmation, or delivered to an
overnight delivery service with an on-line
tracking system, if posted or delivered no
later than the 15th day before) any election in
which such candidate is seeking election, or
nomination for election, and which shall be
complete as of the 20th day before such
election;
(ii) a post-general election report, which
shall be filed no later than the 30th day after
any general election in which such candidate
has sought election, and which shall be
complete as of the 20th day after such general
election; and
(iii) additional quarterly reports, which
shall be filed no later than the 15th day after
the last day of each calendar quarter, and
which shall be complete as of the last day of
each calendar quarter: except that the report
for the quarter ending December 31 shall be
filed no later than January 31 of the following
calendar year; and
(B) in any other calendar year the treasurer shall
file quarterly reports, which shall be filed not later
than the 15th day after the last day of each calendar
quarter, and which shall be complete as of the last day
of each calendar quarter, except that the report for
the quarter ending December 31 shall be filed not later
than January 31 of the following calendar year.
(3) If the committee is the principal campaign committee of a
candidate for the office of President--
(A) in any calendar year during which a general
election is held to fill such office--
(i) the treasurer shall file monthly reports
if such committee has on January 1 of such
year, received contributions aggregating
$100,000 or made expenditures aggregating
$100,000 or anticipates receiving contributions
aggregating $100,000 or more or making
expenditures aggregating $100,000 or more
during such year: such monthly reports shall be
filed no later than the 20th day after the last
day of each month and shall be complete as of
the last day of the month, except that, in lieu
of filing the report otherwise due in November
and December, a pre-general election report
shall be filed in accordance with paragraph
(2)(A)(i), a post-general election report shall
be filed in accordance with paragraph
(2)(A)(ii), and a year end report shall be
filed no later than January 31 of the following
calendar year;
(ii) the treasurer of the other principal
campaign committees of a candidate for the
office of President shall file a pre-election
report or reports in accordance with paragraph
(2)(A)(i), a post-general election report in
accordance with paragraph (2)(A)(ii), and
quarterly reports in accordance with paragraph
(2)(A)(iii); and
(iii) if at any time during the election year
a committee filing under paragraph (3)(A)(ii)
receives contributions in excess of $100,000 or
makes expenditures in excess of $100,000, the
treasurer shall begin filing monthly reports
under paragraph (3)(A)(i) at the next reporting
period; and
(B) in any other calendar year, the treasurer shall
file either--
(i) monthly reports, which shall be filed no
later than the 20th day after the last day of
each month and shall be compete as of the last
day of the month; or
(ii) quarterly reports, which shall be filed
no later than the 15th day after the last day
of each calendar quarter and which shall be
complete as of the last day of each calendar
quarter.
(4) All political committees other than authorized committees
of a candidate shall file either--
(A)(i) quarterly reports, in a calendar year in which
a regularly scheduled general election is held, which
shall be filed no later than the 15th day after the
last day of each calendar quarter: except that the
report for the quarter ending on December 31 of such
calendar year shall be filed no later than January 31
of the following calendar year.
(ii) a pre-election report, which shall be filed no
later than the 12th day before (or posted by any of the
following: registered mail, certified mail, priority
mail having a delivery confirmation, or express mail
having a delivery confirmation, or delivered to an
overnight delivery service with an on-line tracking
system, if posted or delivered no later than the 15th
day before) any election in which the committee makes a
contribution to or expenditure on behalf of a candidate
in such election, and which shall be complete as of the
20th day before the election;
(iii) a post-general election report, which shall be
filed no later than the 30th day after the general
election and which shall be complete as of the 20th day
after such general election; and
(iv) in any other calendar year, a report covering
the period beginning January 1 and ending June 30,
which shall be filed no later than July 31 and a report
covering the period beginning July 1 and ending
December 31, which shall be filed no later than January
31 of the following calendar year; or
(B) monthly reports in all calendar years which shall
be filed no later than the 20th day after the last day
of the month and shall be complete as of the last day
of the month, except that, in lieu of filing the
reports otherwise due in November and December of any
year in which a regularly scheduled general election is
held, a pre-general election report shall be filed in
accordance with paragraph (2)(A)(i), a post-general
election report shall be filed in accordance with
paragraph (2)(A)(ii), and a year end report shall be
filed no later than January 31 of the following
calendar year.
Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, a national committee of
a political party shall file the reports required under
subparagraph (B).
(5) If a designation, report, or statement filed
pursuant to this Act (other than under paragraph
(2)(A)(i) or (4)(A)(ii) or subsection (g)(1)) is sent
by registered mail, certified mail, priority mail
having a delivery confirmation, or express mail having
a delivery confirmation, the United States postmark
shall be considered the date of filing the designation,
report or statement. If a designation, report or
statement filed pursuant to this Act (other than under
paragraph (2)(A)(i) or (4)(A)(ii), or subsection
(g)(1)) is sent by an overnight delivery service with
an on-line tracking system, the date on the proof of
delivery to the delivery service shall be considered
the date of filing of the designation, report, or
statement.
(6)(A) The principal campaign committee of a candidate shall
notify the Secretary or the Commission, and the Secretary of
State, as appropriate, in writing, of any contribution of
$1,000 or more received by any authorized committee of such
candidate after the 20th day, but more than 48 hours before,
any election. This notification shall be made within 48 hours
after the receipt of such contribution and shall include the
name of the candidate and the office sought by the candidate,
the identification of the contributor, and the date of receipt
and amount of the contribution.
(B) Notification of expenditure from personal funds.--
(i) Definition of expenditure from personal funds.--
In this subparagraph, the term ``expenditure from
personal funds'' means--
(I) an expenditure made by a candidate using
personal funds; and
(II) a contribution or loan made by a
candidate using personal funds or a loan
secured using such funds to the candidate's
authorized committee.
(ii) Declaration of intent.--Not later than the date
that is 15 days after the date on which an individual
becomes a candidate for the office of Senator, the
candidate shall file a declaration stating the total
amount of expenditures from personal funds that the
candidate intends to make, or to obligate to make, with
respect to the election that will exceed the State-by-
State competitive and fair campaign formula with--
(I) the Commission; and
(II) each candidate in the same election.
(iii) Initial notification.--Not later than 24 hours
after a candidate described in clause (ii) makes or
obligates to make an aggregate amount of expenditures
from personal funds in excess of 2 times the threshold
amount in connection with any election, the candidate
shall file a notification with--
(I) the Commission; and
(II) each candidate in the same election.
(iv) Additional notification.--After a candidate
files an initial notification under clause (iii), the
candidate shall file an additional notification each
time expenditures from personal funds are made or
obligated to be made in an aggregate amount that exceed
$10,000 with--
(I) the Commission; and
(II) each candidate in the same election.
Such notification shall be filed not later than 24
hours after the expenditure is made.
(v) Contents.--A notification under clause (iii) or
(iv) shall include--
(I) the name of the candidate and the office
sought by the candidate;
(II) the date and amount of each expenditure;
and
(III) the total amount of expenditures from
personal funds that the candidate has made, or
obligated to make, with respect to an election
as of the date of the expenditure that is the
subject of the notification.
(C) Notification of disposal of excess contributions.--In the
next regularly scheduled report after the date of the election
for which a candidate seeks nomination for election to, or
election to, Federal office, the candidate or the candidate's
authorized committee shall submit to the Commission a report
indicating the source and amount of any excess contributions
(as determined under paragraph (1) of section 315(i)) and the
manner in which the candidate or the candidate's authorized
committee used such funds.
(D) Enforcement.--For provisions providing for the
enforcement of the reporting requirements under this paragraph,
see section 309.
(E) The notification required under this paragraph shall be
in addition to all other reporting requirements under this Act.
(7) The reports required to be filed by this subsection shall
be cumulative during the calendar year to which they relate,
but where there has been no change in an item reported in a
previous report during such year, only the amount need be
carried forward.
(8) The requirement for a political committee to file a
quarterly report under paragraph (2)(A)(iii) or paragraph
(4)(A)(i) shall be waived if such committee is required to file
a pre-election report under paragraph (2)(A)(i), or paragraph
(4)(A)(ii) during the period beginning on the 5th day after the
close of the calendar quarter and ending on the 15th day after
the close of the calendar quarter.
(9) The Commission shall set filing dates for reports to be
filed by principal campaign committees of candidates seeking
election, or nomination for election, in special elections and
political committees filing under paragraph (4)(A) which make
contributions to or expenditures on behalf of a candidate or
candidates in special elections. The Commission shall require
no more than one pre-election report for each election and one
post-election report for the election which fills the vacancy.
The Commission may waive any reporting obligation of committees
required to file for special elections if any report required
by paragraph (2) or (4) is required to be filed within 10 days
of a report required under this subsection. The Commission
shall establish the reporting dates within 5 days of the
setting of such election and shall publish such dates and
notify the principal campaign committees of all candidates in
such election of the reporting dates.
(10) The treasurer of a committee supporting a candidate for
the office of Vice President (other than the nominee of a
political party) shall file reports in accordance with
paragraph (3).
(11)(A) The Commission shall promulgate a regulation under
which a person required to file a designation, statement, or
report under this Act--
(i) is required to maintain and file a designation,
statement, or report for any calendar year in
electronic form accessible by computers if the person
has, or has reason to expect to have, aggregate
contributions or expenditures in excess of a threshold
amount determined by the Commission; and
(ii) may maintain and file a designation, statement,
or report in electronic form or an alternative form if
not required to do so under the regulation promulgated
under clause (i).
(B) The Commission shall make a designation, statement,
report, or notification that is filed with the Commission under
this Act available for inspection by the public in the offices
of the Commission and accessible to the public on the Internet
not later than 48 hours (or not later than 24 hours in the case
of a designation, statement, report, or notification filed
electronically) after receipt by the Commission.
(C) In promulgating a regulation under this paragraph, the
Commission shall provide methods (other than requiring a
signature on the document being filed) for verifying
designations, statements, and reports covered by the
regulation. Any document verified under any of the methods
shall be treated for all purposes (including penalties for
perjury) in the same manner as a document verified by
signature.
(D) As used in this paragraph, the term ``report'' means,
with respect to the Commission, a report, designation, or
statement required by this Act to be filed with the Commission.
(12) Software for filing of reports.--
(A) In general.--The Commission shall--
(i) promulgate standards to be used
by vendors to develop software that--
(I) permits candidates to
easily record information
concerning receipts and
disbursements required to be
reported under this Act at the
time of the receipt or
disbursement;
(II) allows the information
recorded under subclause (I) to
be transmitted immediately to
the Commission; and
(III) allows the Commission
to post the information on the
Internet immediately upon
receipt; and
(ii) make a copy of software that
meets the standards promulgated under
clause (i) available to each person
required to file a designation,
statement, or report in electronic form
under this Act.
(B) Additional information.--To the extent
feasible, the Commission shall require vendors
to include in the software developed under the
standards under subparagraph (A) the ability
for any person to file any designation,
statement, or report required under this Act in
electronic form.
(C) Required use.--Notwithstanding any
provision of this Act relating to times for
filing reports, each candidate for Federal
office (or that candidate's authorized
committee) shall use software that meets the
standards promulgated under this paragraph once
such software is made available to such
candidate.
(D) Required posting.--The Commission shall,
as soon as practicable, post on the Internet
any information received under this paragraph.
(b) Each report under this section shall disclose--
(1) the amount of cash on hand at the beginning of
the reporting period;
(2) for the reporting period and the calendar year
(or election cycle, in the case of an authorized
committee of a candidate for Federal office), the total
amount of all receipts, and the total amount of all
receipts in the following categories:
(A) contributions from persons other than
political committees;
(B) for an authorized committee,
contributions from the candidate;
(C) contributions from political party
committees;
(D) contributions from other political
committees;
(E) for an authorized committee, transfers
from other authorized committees of the same
candidate;
(F) transfers from affiliated committees and,
where the reporting committee is a political
party committee, transfers from other political
party committees, regardless of whether such
committees are affiliated;
(G) for an authorized committee, loans made
by or guaranteed by the candidate;
(H) all other loans;
(I) rebates, refunds, and other offsets to
operating expenditures;
(J) dividends, interest, and other forms of
receipts; and
(K) for an authorized committee of a
candidate for the office of President, Federal
funds received under chapter 95 and chapter 96
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954;
(3) the identification of each--
(A) person (other than a political committee)
who makes a contribution to the reporting
committee during the reporting period, whose
contribution or contributions have an aggregate
amount or value in excess of $200 within the
calendar year (or election cycle, in the case
of an authorized committee of a candidate for
Federal office), or in any lesser amount if the
reporting committee should so elect, together
with the date and amount of any such
contribution;
(B) political committee which makes a
contribution to the reporting committee during
the reporting period, together with the date
and amount of any such contribution;
(C) authorized committee which makes a
transfer to the reporting committee;
(D) affiliated committee which makes a
transfer to the reporting committee during the
reporting period and, where the reporting
committee is a political party committee, each
transfer of funds to the reporting committee
from another political party committee,
regardless of whether such committees are
affiliated, together with the date and amount
of such transfer;
(E) person who makes a loan to the reporting
committee during the reporting period, together
with the identification of any endorser or
guarantor of such loan, and the date and amount
or value of such loan;
(F) person who provides a rebate, refund, or
other offset to operating expenditures to the
reporting committee in an aggregate amount or
value in excess of $200 within the calendar
year (or election cycle, in the case of an
authorized committee of a candidate for Federal
office), together with the date and amount of
such receipt; and
(G) person who provides any dividend,
interest, or other receipt to the reporting
committee in an aggregate value or amount in
excess of $200 within the calendar year (or
election cycle, in the case of an authorized
committee of a candidate for Federal office),
together with the date and amount of any such
receipt;
(4) for the reporting period and the calendar year
(or election cycle, in the case of an authorized
committee of a candidate for Federal office), the total
amount of all disbursements, and all disbursements in
the following categories:
(A) expenditures made to meet candidate or
committee operating expenses;
(B) for authorized committees, transfers to
other committees authorized by the same
candidate;
(C) transfers to affiliated committees and,
where the reporting committee is a political
party committee, transfers to other political
party committees, regardless of whether they
are affiliated;
(D) for an authorized committee, repayment of
loans made by or guaranteed by the candidate;
(E) repayment of all other loans;
(F) contribution refunds and other offsets to
contributions;
(G) for an authorized committee, any other
disbursements;
(H) for any political committee other than an
authorized committee--
(i) contributions made to other
political committees;
(ii) loans made by the reporting
committees;
(iii) independent expenditures;
(iv) expenditures made under section
315(d) of this Act; and
(v) any other disbursements; and
(I) for an authorized committee of a
candidate for the office of President,
disbursements not subject to the limitation of
section 315(b);
(5) the name and address of each--
(A) person to whom an expenditure in an
aggregate amount or value in excess of $200
within the calendar year is made by the
reporting committee to meet a candidate or
committee operating expense, together with the
date, amount, and purpose of such operating
expenditure;
(B) authorized committee to which a transfer
is made by the reporting committee;
(C) affiliated committee to which a transfer
is made by the reporting committee during the
reporting period and, where the reporting
committee is a political party committee, each
transfer of funds by the reporting committee to
another political party committee, regardless
of whether such committees are affiliated,
together with the date and amount of such
transfers;
(D) person who receives a loan repayment from
the reporting committee during the reporting
period, together with the date and amount of
such loan repayment; and
(E) person who receives a contribution refund
or other offset to contributions from the
reporting committee where such contribution was
reported under paragraph (3)(A) of this
subsection, together with the date and amount
of such disbursement;
(6)(A) for an authorized committee, the name and
address of each person who has received any
disbursement not disclosed under paragraph (5) in an
aggregate amount or value in excess of $200 within the
calendar year (or election cycle, in the case of an
authorized committee of a candidate for Federal
office), together with the date and amount of any such
disbursement;
(B) for any other political committee, the name and
address of each--
(i) political committee which has received a
contribution from the reporting committee
during the reporting period, together with the
date and amount of any such contribution;
(ii) person who has received a loan from the
reporting committee during the reporting
period, together with the date and amount of
such loan;
(iii) person who receives any disbursement
during the reporting period in an aggregate
amount or value in excess of $200 within the
calendar year (or election cycle, in the case
of an authorized committee of a candidate for
Federal office) in connection with an
independent expenditure by the reporting
committee, together with the date, amount, and
purpose of any such independent expenditure and
a statement which indicates whether such
independent expenditure is in support of, or in
opposition to, a candidate, as well as the name
and office sought by such candidate, and a
certification, under penalty of perjury,
whether such independent expenditure is made in
cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or
at the request or suggestion of, any candidate
or any authorized committee or agent of such
committee;
(iv) person who receives any expenditure from
the reporting committee during the reporting
period in connection with an expenditure under
section 315(d) in the Act, together with the
date, amount, and purpose of any such
expenditure as well as the name of, and office
sought by, the candidate on whose behalf the
expenditure is made; and
(v) person who has received any disbursement
not otherwise disclosed in this paragraph or
paragraph (5) in an aggregate amount or value
in excess of $200 within the calendar year (or
election cycle, in the case of an authorized
committee of a candidate for Federal office)
from the reporting committee within the
reporting period, together with the date,
amount, and purpose of any such disbursement;
(7) the total sum of all contributions to such
political committee, together with the total
contributions less offsets to contributions and the
total sum of all operating expenditures made by such
political committee, together with total operating
expenditures less offsets to operating expenditures,
for both the reporting period and the calendar year (or
election cycle, in the case of an authorized committee
of a candidate for Federal office); [and]
(8) the amount and nature of outstanding debts and
obligations owed by or to such political committee; and
where such debts and obligations are settled for less
than their reported amount or value, a statement as to
the circumstances and conditions under which such debts
or obligations were extinguished and the consideration
therefor[.]; and
(9) for any reportable foreign contact (as defined in
subsection (j)(3))--
(A) the date, time, and location of the
contact;
(B) the date and time of when a designated
official of the committee was notified of the
contact;
(C) the identity of individuals involved; and
(D) a description of the contact, including
the nature of any contribution, donation,
expenditure, disbursement, or solicitation
involved and the nature of any activity
described in subsection (j)(3)(A)(ii)(II)
involved.
(c)(1) Every person (other than a political committee) who
makes independent expenditures in an aggregate amount or value
in excess of $250 during a calendar year shall file a statement
containing the information required under subsection (b)(3)(A)
for all contributions received by such person.
(2) Statements required to be filed by this subsection shall
be filed in accordance with subsection (a)(2), and shall
include--
(A) the information required by subsection
(b)(6)(B)(iii), indicating whether the independent
expenditure is in support of, or in opposition to, the
candidate involved;
(B) under penalty of perjury, a certification whether
or not such independent expenditure is made in
cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the
request or suggestion of, any candidate or any
authorized committee or agent of such candidate; and
(C) the identification of each person who made a
contribution in excess of $200 to the person filing
such statement which was made for the purpose of
furthering an independent expenditure.
(3) The Commission shall be responsible for expeditiously
preparing indices which set forth, on a candidate-by-candidate
basis, all independent expenditures separately, including those
reported under subsection (b)(6)(B)(iii), made by or for each
candidate, as reported under this subsection, and for
periodically publishing such indices on a timely pre-election
basis.
(d)(1) Any person who is required to file a statement under
subsection (c) or (g) of this section, except statements
required to be filed electronically pursuant to subsection
(a)(11)(A)(i) may file the statement by facsimile device or
electronic mail, in accordance with such regulations as the
Commission may promulgate.
(2) The Commission shall make a document which is filed
electronically with the Commission pursuant to this paragraph
accessible to the public on the Internet not later than 24
hours after the document is received by the Commission.
(3) In promulgating a regulation under this paragraph, the
Commission shall provide methods (other than requiring a
signature on the document being filed) for verifying the
documents covered by the regulation. Any document verified
under any of the methods shall be treated for all purposes
(including penalties for perjury) in the same manner as a
document verified by signature.
(e) Political Committees.--
(1) National and congressional political
committees.--The national committee of a political
party, any national congressional campaign committee of
a political party, and any subordinate committee of
either, shall report all receipts and disbursements
during the reporting period.
(2) Other political committees to which section 323
applies.--
(A) In general.--In addition to any other
reporting requirements applicable under this
Act, a political committee (not described in
paragraph (1)) to which section 323(b)(1)
applies shall report all receipts and
disbursements made for activities described in
section 301(20)(A), unless the aggregate amount
of such receipts and disbursements during the
calendar year is less than $5,000.
(B) Specific disclosure by state and local
parties of certain non-federal amounts
permitted to be spent on federal election
activity.--Each report by a political committee
under subparagraph (A) of receipts and
disbursements made for activities described in
section 301(20)(A) shall include a disclosure
of all receipts and disbursements described in
section 323(b)(2)(A) and (B).
(3) Itemization.--If a political committee has
receipts or disbursements to which this subsection
applies from or to any person aggregating in excess of
$200 for any calendar year, the political committee
shall separately itemize its reporting for such person
in the same manner as required in paragraphs (3)(A),
(5), and (6) of subsection (b).
(4) Reporting periods.--Reports required to be filed
under this subsection shall be filed for the same time
periods required for political committees under
subsection (a)(4)(B).
(f) Disclosure of Electioneering Communications.--
(1) Statement required.--Every person who makes a
disbursement for the direct costs of producing and
airing electioneering communications in an aggregate
amount in excess of $10,000 during any calendar year
shall, within 24 hours of each disclosure date, file
with the Commission a statement containing the
information described in paragraph (2).
(2) Contents of statement.--Each statement required
to be filed under this subsection shall be made under
penalty of perjury and shall contain the following
information:
(A) The identification of the person making
the disbursement, of any person sharing or
exercising direction or control over the
activities of such person, and of the custodian
of the books and accounts of the person making
the disbursement.
(B) The principal place of business of the
person making the disbursement, if not an
individual.
(C) The amount of each disbursement of more
than $200 during the period covered by the
statement and the identification of the person
to whom the disbursement was made.
(D) The elections to which the electioneering
communications pertain and the names (if known)
of the candidates identified or to be
identified.
(E) If the disbursements were paid out of a
segregated bank account which consists of funds
contributed solely by individuals who are
United States citizens or nationals or lawfully
admitted for permanent residence (as defined in
section 101(a)(20) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(20)))
directly to this account for electioneering
communications, the names and addresses of all
contributors who contributed an aggregate
amount of $1,000 or more to that account during
the period beginning on the first day of the
preceding calendar year and ending on the
disclosure date. Nothing in this subparagraph
is to be construed as a prohibition on the use
of funds in such a segregated account for a
purpose other than electioneering
communications.
(F) If the disbursements were paid out of
funds not described in subparagraph (E), the
names and addresses of all contributors who
contributed an aggregate amount of $1,000 or
more to the person making the disbursement
during the period beginning on the first day of
the preceding calendar year and ending on the
disclosure date.
(3) Electioneering communication.--For purposes of
this subsection--
(A) In general.--(i) The term
``electioneering communication'' means any
broadcast, cable, or satellite communication
which--
(I) refers to a clearly identified
candidate for Federal office;
(II) is made within--
(aa) 60 days before a
general, special, or runoff
election for the office sought
by the candidate; or
(bb) 30 days before a primary
or preference election, or a
convention or caucus of a
political party that has
authority to nominate a
candidate, for the office
sought by the candidate; and
(III) in the case of a communication
which refers to a candidate for an
office other than President or Vice
President, is targeted to the relevant
electorate.
(ii) If clause (i) is held to be
constitutionally insufficient by final judicial
decision to support the regulation provided
herein, then the term ``electioneering
communication'' means any broadcast, cable, or
satellite communication which promotes or
supports a candidate for that office, or
attacks or opposes a candidate for that office
(regardless of whether the communication
expressly advocates a vote for or against a
candidate) and which also is suggestive of no
plausible meaning other than an exhortation to
vote for or against a specific candidate.
Nothing in this subparagraph shall be construed
to affect the interpretation or application of
section 100.22(b) of title 11, Code of Federal
Regulations.
(B) Exceptions.--The term ``electioneering
communication'' does not include--
(i) a communication appearing in a
news story, commentary, or editorial
distributed through the facilities of
any broadcasting station, unless such
facilities are owned or controlled by
any political party, political
committee, or candidate;
(ii) a communication which
constitutes an expenditure or an
independent expenditure under this Act;
(iii) a communication which
constitutes a candidate debate or forum
conducted pursuant to regulations
adopted by the Commission, or which
solely promotes such a debate or forum
and is made by or on behalf of the
person sponsoring the debate or forum;
or
(iv) any other communication exempted
under such regulations as the
Commission may promulgate (consistent
with the requirements of this
paragraph) to ensure the appropriate
implementation of this paragraph,
except that under any such regulation a
communication may not be exempted if it
meets the requirements of this
paragraph and is described in section
301(20)(A)(iii).
(C) Targeting to relevant electorate.--For
purposes of this paragraph, a communication
which refers to a clearly identified candidate
for Federal office is ``targeted to the
relevant electorate'' if the communication can
be received by 50,000 or more persons--
(i) in the district the candidate
seeks to represent, in the case of a
candidate for Representative in, or
Delegate or Resident Commissioner to,
the Congress; or
(ii) in the State the candidate seeks
to represent, in the case of a
candidate for Senator.
(4) Disclosure date.--For purposes of this
subsection, the term ``disclosure date'' means--
(A) the first date during any calendar year
by which a person has made disbursements for
the direct costs of producing or airing
electioneering communications aggregating in
excess of $10,000; and
(B) any other date during such calendar year
by which a person has made disbursements for
the direct costs of producing or airing
electioneering communications aggregating in
excess of $10,000 since the most recent
disclosure date for such calendar year.
(5) Contracts to disburse.--For purposes of this
subsection, a person shall be treated as having made a
disbursement if the person has executed a contract to
make the disbursement.
(6) Coordination with other requirements.--Any
requirement to report under this subsection shall be in
addition to any other reporting requirement under this
Act.
(7) Coordination with internal revenue code.--Nothing
in this subsection may be construed to establish,
modify, or otherwise affect the definition of political
activities or electioneering activities (including the
definition of participating in, intervening in, or
influencing or attempting to influence a political
campaign on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate
for public office) for purposes of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986.
(g) Time for Reporting Certain Expenditures.--
(1) Expenditures aggregating $1,000.--
(A) Initial report.--A person (including a
political committee) that makes or contracts to
make independent expenditures aggregating
$1,000 or more after the 20th day, but more
than 24 hours, before the date of an election
shall file a report describing the expenditures
within 24 hours.
(B) Additional reports.--After a person files
a report under subparagraph (A), the person
shall file an additional report within 24 hours
after each time the person makes or contracts
to make independent expenditures aggregating an
additional $1,000 with respect to the same
election as that to which the initial report
relates.
(2) Expenditures aggregating $10,000.--
(A) Initial report.--A person (including a
political committee) that makes or contracts to
make independent expenditures aggregating
$10,000 or more at any time up to and including
the 20th day before the date of an election
shall file a report describing the expenditures
within 48 hours.
(B) Additional reports.--After a person files
a report under subparagraph (A), the person
shall file an additional report within 48 hours
after each time the person makes or contracts
to make independent expenditures aggregating an
additional $10,000 with respect to the same
election as that to which the initial report
relates.
(3) Place of filing; contents.--A report under this
subsection--
(A) shall be filed with the Commission; and
(B) shall contain the information required by
subsection (b)(6)(B)(iii), including the name
of each candidate whom an expenditure is
intended to support or oppose.
(4) Time of filing for expenditures aggregating
$1,000.--Notwithstanding subsection (a)(5), the time at
which the statement under paragraph (1) is received by
the Commission or any other recipient to whom the
notification is required to be sent shall be considered
the time of filing of the statement with the recipient.
(h) Reports From Inaugural Committees.--The Federal Election
Commission shall make any report filed by an Inaugural
Committee under section 510 of title 36, United States Code,
accessible to the public at the offices of the Commission and
on the Internet not later than 48 hours after the report is
received by the Commission.
(i) Disclosure of Bundled Contributions.--
(1) Required disclosure.--Each committee described in
paragraph (6) shall include in the first report
required to be filed under this section after each
covered period (as defined in paragraph (2)) a separate
schedule setting forth the name, address, and employer
of each person reasonably known by the committee to be
a person described in paragraph (7) who provided 2 or
more bundled contributions to the committee in an
aggregate amount greater than the applicable threshold
(as defined in paragraph (3)) during the covered
period, and the aggregate amount of the bundled
contributions provided by each such person during the
covered period.
(2) Covered period.--In this subsection, a ``covered
period'' means, with respect to a committee--
(A) the period beginning January 1 and ending
June 30 of each year;
(B) the period beginning July 1 and ending
December 31 of each year; and
(C) any reporting period applicable to the
committee under this section during which any
person described in paragraph (7) provided 2 or
more bundled contributions to the committee in
an aggregate amount greater than the applicable
threshold.
(3) Applicable threshold.--
(A) In general.--In this subsection, the
``applicable threshold'' is $15,000, except
that in determining whether the amount of
bundled contributions provided to a committee
by a person described in paragraph (7) exceeds
the applicable threshold, there shall be
excluded any contribution made to the committee
by the person or the person's spouse.
(B) Indexing.--In any calendar year after
2007, section 315(c)(1)(B) shall apply to the
amount applicable under subparagraph (A) in the
same manner as such section applies to the
limitations established under subsections
(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B), (a)(3), and (h) of such
section, except that for purposes of applying
such section to the amount applicable under
subparagraph (A), the ``base period'' shall be
2006.
(4) Public availability.--The Commission shall ensure
that, to the greatest extent practicable--
(A) information required to be disclosed
under this subsection is publicly available
through the Commission website in a manner that
is searchable, sortable, and downloadable; and
(B) the Commission's public database
containing information disclosed under this
subsection is linked electronically to the
websites maintained by the Secretary of the
Senate and the Clerk of the House of
Representatives containing information filed
pursuant to the Lobbying Disclosure Act of
1995.
(5) Regulations.--Not later than 6 months after the
date of enactment of the Honest Leadership and Open
Government Act of 2007, the Commission shall promulgate
regulations to implement this subsection. Under such
regulations, the Commission--
(A) may, notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and
(2), provide for quarterly filing of the
schedule described in paragraph (1) by a
committee which files reports under this
section more frequently than on a quarterly
basis;
(B) shall provide guidance to committees with
respect to whether a person is reasonably known
by a committee to be a person described in
paragraph (7), which shall include a
requirement that committees consult the
websites maintained by the Secretary of the
Senate and the Clerk of the House of
Representatives containing information filed
pursuant to the Lobbying Disclosure Act of
1995;
(C) may not exempt the activity of a person
described in paragraph (7) from disclosure
under this subsection on the grounds that the
person is authorized to engage in fundraising
for the committee or any other similar grounds;
and
(D) shall provide for the broadest possible
disclosure of activities described in this
subsection by persons described in paragraph
(7) that is consistent with this subsection.
(6) Committees described.--A committee described in
this paragraph is an authorized committee of a
candidate, a leadership PAC, or a political party
committee.
(7) Persons described.--A person described in this
paragraph is any person, who, at the time a
contribution is forwarded to a committee as described
in paragraph (8)(A)(i) or is received by a committee as
described in paragraph (8)(A)(ii), is--
(A) a current registrant under section 4(a)
of the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995;
(B) an individual who is listed on a current
registration filed under section 4(b)(6) of
such Act or a current report under section
5(b)(2)(C) of such Act; or
(C) a political committee established or
controlled by such a registrant or individual.
(8) Definitions.--For purposes of this subsection,
the following definitions apply:
(A) Bundled contribution.--The term ``bundled
contribution'' means, with respect to a
committee described in paragraph (6) and a
person described in paragraph (7), a
contribution (subject to the applicable
threshold) which is--
(i) forwarded from the contributor or
contributors to the committee by the
person; or
(ii) received by the committee from a
contributor or contributors, but
credited by the committee or candidate
involved (or, in the case of a
leadership PAC, by the individual
referred to in subparagraph (B)
involved) to the person through
records, designations, or other means
of recognizing that a certain amount of
money has been raised by the person.
(B) Leadership pac.--The term ``leadership
PAC'' means, with respect to a candidate for
election to Federal office or an individual
holding Federal office, a political committee
that is directly or indirectly established,
financed, maintained or controlled by the
candidate or the individual but which is not an
authorized committee of the candidate or
individual and which is not affiliated with an
authorized committee of the candidate or
individual, except that such term does not
include a political committee of a political
party.
(j) Disclosure of Reportable Foreign Contacts.--
(1) Committee obligation to notify.--Not later than 1
week after a reportable foreign contact, each political
committee shall notify the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Commission of the reportable
foreign contact and provide a summary of the
circumstances with respect to such reportable foreign
contact. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, not later
than 1 week after receiving a notification from a
political committee under this paragraph, shall submit
to the political committee, the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives, and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate written or electronic
confirmation of receipt of the notification.
(2) Individual obligation to notify.--Not later than
3 days after a reportable foreign contact--
(A) each candidate and each immediate family
member of a candidate shall notify the
treasurer or other designated official of the
principal campaign committee of such candidate
of the reportable foreign contact and provide a
summary of the circumstances with respect to
such reportable foreign contact; and
(B) each official, employee, or agent of a
political committee shall notify the treasurer
or other designated official of the committee
of the reportable foreign contact and provide a
summary of the circumstances with respect to
such reportable foreign contact.
(3) Reportable foreign contact.--In this subsection:
(A) In general.--The term ``reportable
foreign contact'' means any direct or indirect
contact or communication that--
(i) is between--
(I) a candidate, an immediate
family member of the candidate,
a political committee, or any
official, employee, or agent of
such committee; and
(II) an individual that the
person described in subclause
(I) knows, has reason to know,
or reasonably believes is a
covered foreign national; and
(ii) the person described in clause
(i)(I) knows, has reason to know, or
reasonably believes involves--
(I) an offer or other
proposal for a contribution,
donation, expenditure,
disbursement, or solicitation
described in section 319; or
(II) coordination or
collaboration with, an offer or
provision of information or
services to or from, or
persistent and repeated contact
with, a covered foreign
national in connection with an
election.
(B) Exceptions.--
(i) Contacts in official capacity as
elected official.--The term
``reportable foreign contact'' shall
not include any contact or
communication with a covered foreign
national by an elected official or an
employee of an elected official solely
in an official capacity as such an
official or employee.
(ii) Contacts for purposes of
enabling observation of elections by
international observers.--The term
``reportable foreign contact'' shall
not include any contact or
communication with a covered foreign
national by any person which is made
for purposes of enabling the
observation of elections in the United
States by a foreign national or the
observation of elections outside of the
United States by a candidate, political
committee, or any official, employee,
or agent of such committee.
(iii) Exceptions not applicable if
contacts or communications involve
prohibited disbursements.--A contact or
communication by an elected official or
an employee of an elected official
shall not be considered to be made
solely in an official capacity for
purposes of clause (i), and a contact
or communication shall not be
considered to be made for purposes of
enabling the observation of elections
for purposes of clause (ii), if the
contact or communication involves a
contribution, donation, expenditure,
disbursement, or solicitation described
in section 319.
(C) Covered foreign national defined.--
(i) In general.--In this paragraph,
the term ``covered foreign national''
means--
(I) a foreign principal (as
defined in section 1(b) of the
Foreign Agents Registration Act
of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611(b)))
that is a government of a
foreign country or a foreign
political party;
(II) any person who acts as
an agent, representative,
employee, or servant, or any
person who acts in any other
capacity at the order, request,
or under the direction or
control, of a foreign principal
described in subclause (I) or
of a person any of whose
activities are directly or
indirectly supervised,
directed, controlled, financed,
or subsidized in whole or in
major part by a foreign
principal described in
subclause (I); or
(III) any person included in
the list of specially
designated nationals and
blocked persons maintained by
the Office of Foreign Assets
Control of the Department of
the Treasury pursuant to
authorities relating to the
imposition of sanctions
relating to the conduct of a
foreign principal described in
subclause (I).
(ii) Clarification regarding
application to citizens of the united
states.--In the case of a citizen of
the United States, subclause (II) of
clause (i) applies only to the extent
that the person involved acts within
the scope of that person's status as
the agent of a foreign principal
described in subclause (I) of clause
(i).
(4) Immediate family member.--In this subsection, the
term ``immediate family member'' means, with respect to
a candidate, a parent, parent-in-law, spouse, adult
child, or sibling.
* * * * * * *
enforcement
Sec. 309. (a)(1) Any person who believes a violation of this
Act or of chapter 95 or chapter 96 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 has occurred, may file a complaint with the Commission.
Such complaint shall be in writing, signed and sworn to by the
person filing such complaint, shall be notarized, and shall be
made under penalty of perjury and subject to the provisions of
section 1001 of title 18, United States Code. Within 5 days
after receipt of a complaint, the Commission shall notify, in
writing, any person alleged in the complaint to have committed
such a violation. Before the Commission conducts any vote on
the complaint, other than a vote to dismiss, any person so
notified shall have the opportunity to demonstrate, in writing,
to the Commission within 15 days after notification that no
action should be taken against such person on the basis of the
complaint. The Commission may not conduct any investigation or
take any other action under this section solely on the basis of
a complaint of a person whose identity is not disclosed to the
Commission.
(2) If the Commission, upon receiving a complaint under
paragraph (1) or on the basis of information ascertained in the
normal course of carrying out its supervisory responsibilities,
determines, by an affirmative vote of 4 of its members, that it
has reason to believe that a person has committed, or is about
to commit, a violation of this Act or chapter 95 or chapter 96
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the Commission shall,
through its chairman or vice chairman, notify the person of the
alleged violation. Such notification shall set forth the
factual basis for such alleged violation. The Commission shall
make an investigation of such alleged violation, which may
include a field investigation or audit, in accordance with the
provisions of this section.
(3) The general counsel of the Commission shall notify the
respondent of any recommendation to the Commission by the
general counsel to proceed to a vote on probable cause pursuant
to paragraph (4)(A)(i). With such notification, the general
counsel shall include a brief stating the position of the
general counsel on the legal and factual issues of the case.
Within 15 days of receipt of such brief, respondent may submit
a brief stating the position of such respondent on the legal
and factual issues of the case, and replying to the brief of
general counsel. Such briefs shall be filed with the Secretary
of the Commission and shall be considered by the Commission
before proceeding under paragraph (4).
(4)(A)(i) Except as provided in clauses (ii) and subparagraph
(C), if the Commission determines, by an affirmative vote of 4
of its members, that there is probable cause to believe that
any person has committed, or is about to commit, a violation of
this Act or of chapter 95 or chapter 96 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, the Commission shall attempt, for a period of at
least 30 days, to correct or prevent such violation by informal
methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion, and to
enter into a conciliation agreement with any person involved.
Such attempt by the Commission to correct or prevent such
violation may continue for a period of not more than 90 days.
The Commission may not enter into a conciliation agreement
under this clause except pursuant to an affirmative vote of 4
of its members. A conciliation agreement, unless violated, is a
complete bar to any further action by the Commission, including
the bringing of a civil proceeding under paragraph (6)(A).
(ii) If any determination of the Commission under clause (i)
occurs during the 45-day period immediately preceding any
election, then the Commission shall attempt, for a period of at
least 15 days, to correct or prevent the violation involved by
the methods specified in clause (i).
(B)(i) No action by the Commission or any person, and no
information derived, in connection with any conciliation
attempt by the Commission under subparagraph (A) may be made
public by the Commission without the written consent of the
respondent and the Commission.
(ii) If a conciliation agreement is agreed upon by the
Commission and the respondent, the Commission shall make public
any conciliation agreement signed by both the Commission and
the respondent. If the Commission makes a determination that a
person has not violated this Act or chapter 95 or chapter 96 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the Commission shall make
public such determination.
(C)(i) Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), in the case of a
violation of a qualified disclosure requirement, the Commission
may--
(I) find that a person committed such a violation on
the basis of information obtained pursuant to the
procedures described in paragraphs (1) and (2); and
(II) based on such finding, require the person to pay
a civil money penalty in an amount determined, for
violations of each qualified disclosure requirement,
under a schedule of penalties which is established and
published by the Commission and which takes into
account the amount of the violation involved, the
existence of previous violations by the person, and
such other factors as the Commission considers
appropriate.
(ii) The Commission may not make any determination adverse to
a person under clause (i) until the person has been given
written notice and an opportunity to be heard before the
Commission.
(iii) Any person against whom an adverse determination is
made under this subparagraph may obtain a review of such
determination in the district court of the United States for
the district in which the person resides, or transacts
business, by filing in such court (prior to the expiration of
the 30-day period which begins on the date the person receives
notification of the determination) a written petition
requesting that the determination be modified or set aside.
(iv) In this subparagraph, the term
``qualified disclosure requirement'' means any
requirement of--
(I) subsections (a), (c), (e), (f),
(g), or (i) of section 304; or
(II) section 305.
(v) This subparagraph shall apply with respect to violations
that relate to reporting periods that begin on or after January
1, 2000, and that end on or before December 31, 2023.
(5)(A) If the Commission believes that a violation of this
Act or of chapter 95 or chapter 96 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 has been committed, a conciliation agreement entered
into by the Commission under paragraph (4)(A) may include a
requirement that the person involved in such conciliation
agreement shall pay a civil penalty which does not exceed the
greater of $5,000 or an amount equal to any contribution or
expenditure involved in such violation.
(B) If the Commission believes that a knowing and willful
violation of this Act or of chapter 95 or chapter 96 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 has been committed, a
conciliation agreement entered into by the Commission under
paragraph (4)(A) may require that the person involved in such
conciliation agreement shall pay a civil penalty which does not
exceed the greater of $10,000 or an amount equal to 200 percent
of any contribution or expenditure involved in such violation
(or, in the case of a violation of section 320, which is not
less than 300 percent of the amount involved in the violation
and is not more than the greater of $50,000 or 1,000 percent of
the amount involved in the violation).
(C) If the Commission by an affirmative vote of 4 of its
members, determined that there is probable cause to believe
that a knowing and willful violation of this Act which is
subject to subsection (d), or a knowing and willful violation
of chapter 95 or chapter 96 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, has occurred or is about to occur, it may refer such
apparent violation to the Attorney General of the United States
without regard to any limitations set forth in paragraph
(4)(A).
(D) In any case in which a person has entered into a
conciliation agreement with the Commission under paragraph
(4)(A), the Commission may institute a civil action for relief
under paragraph (6)(A) if it believes that the person has
violated any provision of such conciliation agreement. For the
Commission to obtain relief in any civil action, the Commission
need only establish that the person has violated, in whole or
in part, any requirement of such conciliation agreement.
(6)(A) If the Commission is unable to correct or prevent any
violation of this Act or of chapter 95 or chapter 96 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, by the methods specified in
paragraph (4), the Commission may, upon an affirmative vote of
4 of its members, institute a civil action for relief,
including a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining
order, or any other appropriate order (including an order for a
civil penalty which does not exceed the greater of $5,000 or an
amount equal to any contribution or expenditure involved in
such violation) in the district court of the United States for
the district in which the person against whom such action is
brought is found, resides, or transacts business.
(B) In any civil action instituted by the Commission under
subparagraph (A), the court may grant a permanent or temporary
injunction, restraining order, or other order, including a
civil penalty which does not exceed the greater of $5,000 or an
amount equal to any contribution or expenditure involved in
such violation, upon a proper showing that the person involved
has committed, or is about to commit (if the relief sought is a
permanent or temporary injunction or a restraining order), a
violation of this Act or chapter 95 or chapter 96 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
(C) In any civil action for relief instituted by the
Commission under subparagraph (A), if the court determines that
the Commission has established that the person involved in such
civil action has committed a knowing and willful violation of
this Act or of chapter 95 or chapter 96 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, the court may impose a civil penalty which does
not exceed the greater of $10,000 or an amount equal to 200
percent of any contribution or expenditure involved in such
violation (or, in the case of a violation of section 320, which
is not less than 300 percent of the amount involved in the
violation and is not more than the greater of $50,000 or 1,000
percent of the amount involved in the violation).
(7) In any action brought under paragraph (5) or (6),
subpenas for witnesses who are required to attend a United
States district court may run into any other district.
(8)(A) Any party aggrieved by an order to the Commission
dismissing a complaint filed by such party under paragraph (1),
or by a failure of the Commission to act on such complaint
during the 120-day period beginning on the date the complaint
is filed, may file a petition with the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia.
(B) Any petition under subparagraph (A) shall be filed, in
the case of a dismissal of a compliant by the Commission,
within 60 days after the date of the dismissal.
(C) In any proceeding under this paragraph the court may
declare that the dismissal of the complaint or the failure to
act is contrary to law, and may direct the Commission to
conform with such declaration within 30 days, failing which the
complainant may bring, in the name of such complainant, a civil
action to remedy the violation involved in the original
complaint.
(9) Any judgment of a district court under this subsection
may be appealed to the court of appeals, and the judgment of
the court of appeals affirming or setting aside, in whole or in
part, any such order of the district court shall be final,
subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States
upon certiorari or certification as provided in section 1254 of
title 28, United States Code.
(11) If the Commission determines after an investigation that
any person has violated an order of the court entered in a
proceeding brought under paragraph (6), it may petition the
court for an order to hold such person in civil contempt, but
if it believes the violation to be knowing and willful it may
petition the court for an order to hold such person in criminal
contempt.
(12)(A) Any notification or investigation made under this
section shall not be made public by the Commission or by any
person without the written consent of the person receiving such
notification or the person with respect to whom such
investigation is made.
(B) Any member or employee of the Commission, or any other
person, who violates the provisions of subparagraph (A) shall
be fined not more than $2,000. Any such member, employee, or
other person who knowingly and willfully violates the
provisions of subparagraph (A) shall be fined not more than
$5,000.
(b) Before taking any action under subsection (a) against any
person who has failed to file a report required under section
304(a)(2)(A)(iii) for the calendar quarter immediately
preceding the election involved, or in accordance with section
304(a)(2)(A)(i), the Commission shall notify the person of such
failure to file the required reports. If a satisfactory
response is not received within 4 business days after the date
of notification, the Commission shall, pursuant to section
311(a)(7), publish before the election the name of the person
and the report or reports such person has failed to file.
(c) Whenever the Commission refers an apparent violation to
the Attorney General, the Attorney General shall report to the
Commission any action taken by the Attorney General regarding
the apparent violation. Each report shall be transmitted within
60 days after the date the Commission refers an apparent
violation, and every 30 days thereafter until the final
disposition of the apparent violation.
(d)(1)(A) Any person who knowingly and willfully commits a
violation of any provision of this Act which involves the
making, receiving, or reporting of any contribution, donation,
or expenditure--
(i) aggregating $25,000 or more during a calendar
year shall be fined under title 18, United States Code,
or imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both; or
(ii) aggregating $2,000 or more (but less than
$25,000) during a calendar year shall be fined under
such title, or imprisoned for not more than 1 year, or
both.
(B) In the case of a knowing and willful violation of section
316(b)(3), the penalties set forth in this subsection shall
apply to a violation involving an amount aggregating $250 or
more during a calendar year. Such violation of section
316(b)(3) may incorporate a violation of section 317(b), 320,
or 321.
(C) In the case of a knowing and willful violation of section
322, the penalties set forth in this subsection shall apply
without regard to whether the making, receiving, or reporting
of a contribution or expenditure of $1,000 or more is involved.
(D) Any person who knowingly and willfully commits a
violation of section 320 involving an amount aggregating more
than $10,000 during a calendar year shall be--
(i) imprisoned for not more than 2 years if the
amount is less than $25,000 (and subject to
imprisonment under subparagraph (A) if the amount is
$25,000 or more);
(ii) fined not less than 300 percent of the amount
involved in the violation and not more than the greater
of--
(I) $50,000; or
(II) 1,000 percent of the amount involved in
the violation; or
(iii) both imprisoned under clause (i) and fined
under clause (ii).
(E) Any person who knowingly and willfully commits a
violation of subsection (j) or (b)(9) of section 304 or section
302(j) shall be fined not more than $500,000, imprisoned not
more than 5 years, or both.
(F) Any person who knowingly and willfully conceals or
destroys any materials relating to a reportable foreign contact
(as defined in section 304(j)) shall be fined not more than
$1,000,000, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
(G)(i) Any person who knowingly and willfully commits a
violation of section 319 which involves a foreign national
which is a government of a foreign country or a foreign
political party, or which involves a thing of value consisting
of the provision of opposition research, polling, or other non-
public information relating to a candidate for election for a
Federal, State, or local office for the purpose of influencing
the election, shall be fined under title 18, United States
Code, or imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both.
(ii) In clause (i), each of the terms ``government of a
foreign country'' and ``foreign political party'' has the
meaning given such term in section 1 of the Foreign Agents
Registration Act of 1938, as Amended (22 U.S.C. 611).
(2) In any criminal action brought for a violation of any
provision of this Act or of chapter 95 or chapter 96 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, any defendant may evidence their
lack of knowledge or intent to commit the alleged violation by
introducing as evidence a conciliation agreement entered into
between the defendant and the Commission under subsection
(a)(4)(A) which specifically deals with the act or failure to
act constituting such violation and which is still in effect.
(3) In any criminal action brought for a violation of any
provision of this Act or of chapter 95 or chapter 96 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the court before which such
action is brought shall take into account, in weighing the
seriousness of the violation and in considering the
appropriateness of the penalty to be imposed if the defendant
is found guilty, whether--
(A) the specific act or failure to act which
constitutes the violation for which the action was
brought is the subject of a conciliation agreement
entered into between the defendant and the Commission
under subparagraph (a)(4)(A);
(B) the conciliation agreement is in effect; and
(C) the defendant is, with respect to the violation
involved, in compliance with the conciliation
agreement.
* * * * * * *
contributions and donations by foreign nationals
Sec. 319. (a) Prohibition.--It shall be unlawful for--
(1) a foreign national, directly or indirectly, to
make--
(A) a contribution or donation of money or
other thing of value, or to make an express or
implied [promise to make a contribution or
donation] promise to make such a contribution
or donation, in connection with a Federal,
State, or local election;
(B) a contribution or [donation] donation of
money or other thing of value, or to make an
express or implied promise to make such a
contribution or donation, to a committee of a
political party; or
(C) an expenditure, independent expenditure,
or disbursement for an electioneering
communication (within the meaning of section
304(f)(3)); or
[(2) a person to solicit, accept, or receive a
contribution or donation described in subparagraph (A)
or (B) of paragraph (1) from a foreign national.]
(2) a person to solicit, accept, or receive (directly
or indirectly) a contribution or donation described in
subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1), or to
solicit, accept, or receive (directly or indirectly) an
express or implied promise to make such a contribution
or donation, from a foreign national.
(b) As used in this section, the term ``foreign national''
means--
(1) a foreign principal, as such term is defined by
section 1(b) of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of
1938 (22 U.S.C. 611(b)), except that the term ``foreign
national'' shall not include any individual who is a
citizen of the United States; or
(2) an individual who is not a citizen of the United
States or a national of the United States (as defined
in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act) and who is not lawfully admitted for
permanent residence, as defined by section 101(a)(20)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1101(a)(20)).
(c) Clarification of Treatment of Provision of Certain
Information as Contribution or Donation of a Thing of Value.--
For purposes of this section, a ``contribution or donation of
money or other thing of value'' includes the provision of
opposition research, polling, or other non-public information
relating to a candidate for election for a Federal, State, or
local office for the purpose of influencing the election,
regardless of whether such research, polling, or information
has monetary value, except that nothing in this subsection
shall be construed to treat the mere provision of an opinion
about a candidate as a thing of value for purposes of this
section.
* * * * * * *
----------
DAVID L. BOREN NATIONAL SECURITY EDUCATION ACT OF 1991
* * * * * * *
TITLE VIII--NATIONAL SECURITY SCHOLARSHIPS, FELLOWSHIPS, AND GRANTS
* * * * * * *
SEC. 810. FUNDING.
(a) Fiscal Years 1993 and 1994.--Amounts appropriated to
carry out this title for fiscal years 1993 and 1994 shall
remain available until expended.
(b) Fiscal Years 1995 and 1996.--There is authorized to be
appropriated from, and may be obligated from, the Fund for each
of the fiscal years 1995 and 1996 not more than the amount
credited to the Fund in interest only for the preceding fiscal
year under section 804(e).
(c) Funding From Intelligence Community Management Account
for Fiscal Years Beginning With Fiscal Year 2005.--In addition
to amounts that may be made available to the Secretary under
the Fund for a fiscal year, the Director of National
Intelligence shall transfer to the Secretary from amounts
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account
[for each fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year 2005,] for
each of fiscal years 2005 through 2021 $8,000,000 to carry out
the scholarship, fellowship, and grant programs under
subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C), respectively, of section
802(a)(1).
(d) Fiscal Years Beginning With Fiscal Year 2022.--In
addition to amounts that may be made available to the Secretary
under the Fund for a fiscal year, there is authorized to be
appropriated to the Secretary for each fiscal year, beginning
with fiscal year 2022, $8,000,000, to carry out the
scholarship, fellowship, and grant programs under subparagraphs
(A), (B), and (C), respectively, of section 802(a)(1).
SEC. 811. ADDITIONAL ANNUAL AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
(a) In General.--In addition to amounts that may be made
available to the Secretary under the Fund for a fiscal year,
there is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary for
each fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year 2003,
[$10,000,000] $16,000,000, to carry out the grant program for
the National Flagship Language Initiative under section
802(a)(1)(D).
(b) Funding From Intelligence Community Management Account
for Fiscal Years Beginning With Fiscal Year 2005.--In addition
to amounts that may be made available to the Secretary under
the Fund for a fiscal year, the Director of National
Intelligence shall transfer to the Secretary from amounts
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account
[for each fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year 2005,] for
each of fiscal years 2005 through 2021 $6,000,000 to carry out
the grant program for the National Flagship Language Initiative
under section 802(a)(1)(D).
(c) Availability of Appropriated Funds.--Amounts made
available under this section shall remain available until
expended.
SEC. 812. FUNDING FOR SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM FOR ADVANCED ENGLISH LANGUAGE
STUDIES BY HERITAGE COMMUNITY CITIZENS.
(a) Funding From Intelligence Community Management Account.--
In addition to amounts that may be made available to the
Secretary under the Fund for a fiscal year, the Director of
National Intelligence shall transfer to the Secretary from
amounts appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account [for each fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year
2005,] for each of fiscal years 2005 through 2021 $2,000,000 to
carry out the scholarship programs for English language studies
by certain heritage community citizens under section
802(a)(1)(E).
(b) Fiscal Years Beginning With Fiscal Year 2022.--In
addition to amounts that may be made available to the Secretary
under the Fund for a fiscal year, there is authorized to be
appropriated to the Secretary for each fiscal year, beginning
with fiscal year 2022, $2,000,000, to carry out the scholarship
programs for English language studies by certain heritage
community citizens under section 802(a)(1)(E).
[(b)] (c) Availability of Funds.--Amounts made available
under [subsection (a)] this section shall remain available
until expended.
* * * * * * *
Disclosure of Directed Rule Making
H.R. 7856 does not specifically direct any rule makings
within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 551.
Duplication of Federal Programs
H.R. 7856 does not duplicate or reauthorize an established
program of the Federal Government known to be duplicative of
another Federal program, a program that was included in any
report from the Government Accountability Office to Congress
pursuant to section 21 of Public Law 111-139, or a program
related to a program identified in the most recent Catalog of
Federal Domestic Assistance.
Hearings
For the purposes of Section 103(i) of H. Res. 6 of the
116th Congress, the following hearings were used to develop or
consider H.R. 7856--
1. The Committee held a hearing ``National Security
Implications of the Rise of Authoritarianism Around the
World'' on February 26, 2019. The Committee received
testimony from the Honorable Madeleine K. Albright, the
Honorable Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Dr. Teng Biao and Dr.
Andrea Kendall-Taylor.
2. The Committee held a hearing ``Putin's Playbook:
The Kremlin's Use of Oligarchs, Money, and Intelligence
in 2016 and Beyond'' on Thursday, March 28, 2019. The
Committee received testimony from the Honorable Michael
McFaul, Mr. Steven Hall, Ms. Heather Conley, and Mr.
Eric Lorber.
3. The Committee held a closed hearing ``Fiscal Year
2020 Intelligence Community Budget Request Overview''
on April 3, 2019.
4. The Committee held a closed hearing ``Fiscal Year
2020 Central Intelligence Agency Program Budget Request
Hearing'' on May 2, 2019.
5. The Committee held a closed hearing ``Fiscal Year
2020 National Security Program Budget Request Hearing''
on May 8, 2019.
6. The Defense Intelligence and Warfighter Support
Subcommittee held a closed hearing ``Fiscal Year 2020
Defense Intelligence Agency and Military Services
Budget Request Hearing'' on May 9, 2019.
7. The Committee held a closed hearing
``Compartmented FY 2020 Budget Request'' on May 14,
2019.
8. The Committee held a hearing ``Mission Imperative:
Diversity and Inclusion in the Intelligence Community''
on May 23, 2019. The Committee received testimony from
the Honorable Kari Bingen, Mrs. Rita Sampson, and Mr.
Harry Coker.
9. The Committee held a hearing ``National Security
Implications of Climate Change'' on June 5, 2019. The
Committee received testimony from Mr. Peter Kiemel, Mr.
Jeff Ringhausen, and Dr. Rod Schoonover.
10. The Committee held a hearing ``Lessons from the
Mueller Report: Counterintelligence Implications of
Volume 1'' on June 12, 2019. The Committee received
testimony from Mrs. Stephanie Douglas, Mr. Robert
Anderson, and Mr. Andrew McCarthy.
11. The Committee held a hearing ``National Security
Challenges of Artificial Intelligence, Manipulated
Media, and ``Deepfakes'' on June 13, 2019. The
Committee received testimony from Mrs. Danielle Citron,
Mr. Jack Clark, Dr. David Doermann, and Mr. Clint
Watts.
In addition, the Committee held numerous briefings,
roundtables, and a markup to develop and consider H.R. 7856.
MINORITY VIEWS
BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW
Despite the partisanship and impropriety of the Majority's
actions throughout this Congress, the Minority sought in good
faith, and consistent with past practices, to produce a
bipartisan Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA).
In the past, annex provisions impacting intelligence
activities and operations were based on documented facts.
General principles of legislative drafting require that facts
be established before legislation is produced. This is
particularly true in the case of the IAA and its annex, which
authorize some of the most sensitive programs protecting the
American people. Facts are paramount and politics should play
no role. However, the annex accompanying H.R. 7856, and the
bill itself, repeatedly use undocumented claims, as well as
partisan politics, to justify funding profile changes or
restrictions on intelligence activities. The Minority strongly
objects to this approach, which is geared toward achieving
purely political outcomes.
Past practices at the Intelligence Committee also included
a commitment to producing a bill without provisions designed
for the political advantage of either party. The Majority was
fully informed well in advance of the markup that the Minority
objected to several provisions, particularly those in Titles V
and VII, which are clear political hit jobs aimed at President
Trump. The Majority even agreed that certain provisions were
targeted at the Administration. The Minority nevertheless
attempted, in good faith, to reach a bipartisan compromise on
these provisions. The Majority walked away from the
negotiations.
The Chairman claimed during the pre-markup ``Strawman''
meeting that he wanted to work toward a bipartisan agreement
prior to markup. Actions, however, speak louder than words. The
Chairman did not reengage with the Minority after that meeting.
In fact, the Majority unilaterally, and without notice,
stripped the bill and annex of previously agreed-upon
compromises, including Republican Member priorities.
Furthermore, the Majority made many of the explicitly political
provisions mentioned above even more blatantly political and,
less than 48 hours before markup, stacked the bill with
political poison pills. Those highly partisan and objectionable
provisions are described in detail below.
H.R. 7856 is the first partisan IAA voted out of the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) in a
decade.\1\ At markup, the Minority offered an amendment to
strike 39 provisions from the legislative text to remove
provisions that the Minority objected to for a variety of
reasons. The sheer volume of objectionable provisions
demonstrates how deeply partisan this legislation is.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\H. Rep. No. 112-72 (2011) (Conf. Rep. for H.R. 754).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Minority's amendment proposed striking all provisions
that presented an unresolved policy dispute in addition to
striking the provisions which the Minority disagreed with due
to their partisan nature and purpose.
The Minority's amendment proposed striking numerous
provisions that were not fully vetted with the Minority. Some
of these provisions were added mere days before markup, leaving
the Minority unable to determine whether legislation was the
most appropriate way to resolve a perceived, though sometimes
unapparent, policy concern. The amendment also proposed
striking certain provisions which were modified during pre-
markup negotiations, only to have those previously-agreed upon
modifications removed when the Majority ended negotiations and
produced a partisan bill.
The Minority's amendment proposed striking certain
reporting requirements and limitations placed on funds. There
is a concerning trend by Committee Democrats to require that
Intelligence Community (IC) reports be produced in an
unclassified form and publicly released. On many topics, the
Minority believes this is inappropriate, since it provides our
foreign adversaries the opportunity to understand and exploit
U.S. intelligence capabilities and contingencies. The Minority
further believes that the limitations placed on certain IC
activities by this bill present unknown risks to national
security, to continuing U.S. operations, and to the safety of
U.S. personnel.
Out of an abundance of caution, the Minority believes
striking such provisions to be the appropriate course of
action.
THE REPUBLICAN MINORITY'S SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS
The Minority's amendment proposed striking section 303,
which requires the IC to provide public notice on or before the
date that an IC element provides support for a Federal, State,
local, or Tribal government response to civil disobedience or
domestic civil disturbances. During negotiations, the Minority
objected that this provision, as written, would essentially
require public notice as soon as IC assets were lawfully
deployed. This would create a force protection issue since
violent criminals, including members of violent anarchist
groups, would be aware of the presence of IC assets in real
time. The Minority fails to understand the rationale for this
provision, unless the Majority's desire is to somehow ``even
the odds'' in confrontations between law enforcement and
criminals. Accordingly, the Minority requested that the public
notification requirement contained in this provision be
removed, but that the quarterly congressional notification
requirement be preserved. That would advance legitimate
congressional oversight of domestic IC activities, while
removing the likelihood of force protection issues. This
Majority rejected that reasonable request.
The amendment proposed striking section 304. Section 304
was an unvetted, last minute addition to the IAA clearly
included to make a political statement about actions taken by
President Trump and his Administration. The Minority cannot
support its inclusion in the bill.
The amendment also proposed striking section 306, which
raises the threshold for congressional notification of new IC
facility construction from $1 million to $2 million. The
Minority believes that the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI) has not been a responsible steward of
taxpayer funds in prior facility construction projects, a
conclusion which is supported by multiple independent audits by
the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community and the
Government Accountability Office.
The amendment proposed striking section 309 which was also
a last minute, unvetted addition to the IAA. Because the
Minority is not aware of the impetus of the provision, the
policy gaps it supposedly addresses, and whether the provision
is the most appropriate way to approach the problem, we cannot
support its inclusion in the bill.
The amendment proposed striking section 402. The Minority
would have supported this provision if the Majority had made a
minor modification to allow the Ombudsman position to be filled
by either a current or former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
official. This modification was strongly requested by the CIA
and it did not appear that the Majority had an objective reason
to deny the request.
The amendment also proposed striking section 408, which
would remove the existing sunset on the Climate Security
Advisory Council and grant additional and expansive authorities
to ODNI. The Minority objected to this approach when it was
attempted in Fiscal Year 2020. The Majority inserted this
section into the bill days before markup, with no warning,
fully aware of the Minority's position on such a provision. As
further evidence of the Minority's good faith effort to reach
an agreement, we did not object to section 903, which expands
the existing reporting requirement for the Council. This
reporting requirement allowed for a measured approach to
determine if an intelligence gap related to climate security
existed, and if so, whether the solution would be to create an
entire new Center. That reporting requirement, and the sunset
currently in law, had the bipartisan support of the Committee,
while this permanent approach does not. The Majority knew that
the insertion of this section would be a political poison pill,
and nevertheless chose to include it.
The amendment proposed striking section 501, which was
included in this bill because the Majority disagreed with
President Trump's exercise of his constitutional authority to
fire an executive branch official. In a good faith attempt to
reach a non-politicized agreement, the Minority requested
striking the limitation on the President's authority while
preserving the requirement that when an Inspector General is
fired, his or her office notify Congress of all pending
complaints, investigations, and other matters the Inspector
General was working on. This modification would, in an
apolitical manner, act as a check on future Presidents' firing
of Inspectors General for improper reasons by enhancing
opportunities for congressional oversight. The Majority
rejected this reasonable request.
The amendment proposed striking section 502 for similar
reasons. The Majority's objective in this provision is to limit
President Trump's authority--and that of any future President--
to name the person he/she sees fit as an Acting Inspector
General. The Minority believes that the Majority included this
provision not only because of their disdain for President
Trump, but also because the Majority wants unelected Executive
branch officials, not the President, to run the Executive
branch. Despite the Majority's bad faith efforts, the Minority
tried, in good faith, to meet halfway on this provision by
suggesting modifying this provision to be a ``sense of
Congress.'' Including a ``sense of Congress'' that someone
appointed to the position of Acting Inspector General should be
qualified for that position would make clear what Congress
expects of the Executive branch. The Majority rejected that
reasonable offer.
The amendment proposed striking sections 504 and 506, which
were only included in this bill as a continuation of the
Majority's hyper-partisan impeachment of President Trump. Both
provisions give IC whistleblowers special statutory
protections--not enjoyed by any other whistleblowers--drafted
specifically to criminalize otherwise lawful actions taken by
the Trump Administration. Section 504 is nothing less than an
ex post facto indictment of President Trump and his
Administration. Section 506 is an attempt to rectify the false
claims made by the Majority in their hyper-partisan
impeachment--namely, that the whistleblower had a ``statutory
right'' to anonymity. This provision would impose legal
liability for ``a knowing and willful or negligent disclosure''
of a whistleblower's identity or the fact of the existence of a
whistleblower complaint and would provide whistleblowers with a
federal private right of action against their colleagues.
Giving a federal employee a private right of action against a
fellow employee for the ``negligent,'' meaning inadvertent,
disclosure of a whistleblower's identity or the existence of a
complaint, regardless of whether that employee even knew about
the complaint, is profoundly irresponsible.
The amendment proposed striking section 601. This provision
contains a broad and complicated grant of new authorities to an
office that currently exists within ODNI. The Minority
questioned what the Majority's goals for this provision were,
and whether this approach was reasonable in light of those
goals. The Minority believes that prior failures of a similar
type at ODNI caution against a large reorganization of
substantive responsibilities which would impact the entire IC
without proper due diligence. The Majority had agreed to work
on modifying this provision to come to a compromise;
unfortunately, the Majority walked away from negotiations and
section 601 of H.R. 7856 does not contain the Minority's input.
The amendment also proposed striking section 603, which
grants authority for additional outreach and education for the
arts to all IC elements. Numerous IC elements have demonstrated
a need for authorities to conduct outreach and education for
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM). Only
CIA, however, has documented a need for this authority to be
applied to the arts due to the agency's unique mission
requirements. As such, the Minority continues to support STEM
education and outreach authorities to all IC elements, but only
supports expanding such authorities for arts-related education
and outreach to CIA. The Minority believes it is irresponsible
to grant or rescind authorities without understanding the
impact of doing so. If additional IC elements were to
demonstrate to the Committee the need for these authorities
related to the arts, the Minority would reconsider.
The Minority's amendment proposed striking all provisions
contained in Title VII, which are written as amendments to the
Federal Election Campaign Act and are therefore outside this
Committee's jurisdiction. The Majority was fully aware that the
Minority would not support a bill with Title VII included.
However, when the Majority determined, days before the markup,
that they would end the bipartisan negotiations and produce a
partisan bill, they added even more political poison pills to
Title VII that are clearly meant to target President Trump.
Section 701 would require employees, officials, and agents
for a presidential campaign, as well as the candidate and his
or her immediate family, to report certain foreign contacts to
the Federal Election Commission (so the information will be
made public) and to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
Section 701 also requires that the FBI provide notice of
receipt of these foreign contact reports to the campaign and to
this Committee. The Minority strongly objects to this
provision. This Committee was established to oversee the
conduct of intelligence and intelligence-related activities of
the U.S. government, which a presidential campaign is clearly
not part of. The Majority's attempt to insert this Committee
into the oversight of presidential campaigns--and to give it
oversight of the Federal Election Commission--is inappropriate
and constitutes a blatant partisan swipe at President Trump and
his family. In requiring that most foreign contacts--even those
of a relatively benign or unserious nature--be reported to the
Committee that conducted the first partisan impeachment in
American history, this provision would lead to more, not fewer,
``scandals'' based on political differences rather than facts.
This is because the Minority believes that this information,
even if classified, will nevertheless find its way from this
Committee into the media.
Section 702 mandates the creation of a reporting structure
for the new requirements outlined in section 701. The Minority
is concerned about the potential for abuse by the FBI. Over the
past four years, we have learned from the DOJ IG, the FISA
Court, and many other sources how the FBI abused its
counterintelligence authorities to perpetuate investigations
into the Trump campaign. This new foreign contact reporting
scheme will undoubtedly lead to more counterintelligence
investigations into presidential campaigns. Given the
experience with the Crossfire Hurricane investigation, Congress
has no reason to trust that the FBI will not improperly surveil
the campaign staffers who report foreign contacts.
Section 703 makes the knowing and willful violation of the
reporting requirement a felony with a maximum fine of $500,000,
and the knowing and willful concealment or destruction of
materials relating to a reportable foreign contact a felony
with a maximum fine of $1,000,000. These outrageous fines are
twice and four-times, respectively, more than the penalty for
the knowing and willful disclosure of classified
information,\2\ or the penalty for killing a member of
Congress,\3\ or the penalty for the development of a biological
weapon,\4\ or the penalty for harboring or concealing spies.\5\
The Minority believes that the Majority is using the size of
the criminal penalties in section 703 to make a political
statement, which is an interesting approach given the
Majority's long-stated concerns with overcriminalization in
this country.
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\2\18 U.S.C. Sec. 798.
\3\18 U.S.C. Sec. 351(a).
\4\18 U.S.C. Sec. 175(a).
\5\18 U.S.C. Sec. 792.
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Section 704 requires an annual report from the FBI to this
Committee detailing the foreign contact notifications they
received from campaigns and any investigative actions taken as
a result. The Minority believes this promotes the ongoing
politicization of intelligence, and worries about the potential
damage to any ongoing FBI counterintelligence investigations,
as well as U.S. national security, if information from this
annual report were to leak to the press. The structure of this
provision suggests its real intent is to ensure information is
leaked for political purposes.
Section 711 expands the definition of a ``thing of value''
to include ``the provision of opposition research, polling, or
other non-public information relating to a candidate . . . for
the purpose of influencing the election, regardless of whether
such . . . has monetary value.'' The Majority has made no
attempt to hide that this provision was written in direct
response to Special Counsel Robert Mueller's decision not to
charge Donald Trump Jr. with a campaign finance violation. The
provision also makes it a crime for a person to ``directly or
indirectly'' receive an ``express or implied promise'' of such
a contribution. The Minority wonders how an individual
``indirectly'' receives an ``implied promise,'' and further
believes that this provision is overly broad, deeply political,
clearly targeting President Trump and his family, and has no
relation to the business of this Committee.
The amendment proposed striking section 801, which severely
limits the availability of funds for certain ongoing IC
activities until an unclassified version of a report on the
death of Jamal Khashoggi is provided to the Committee. This
report has already been provided to the Committee in classified
form, and the IC has warned that any further declassification
of the information contained in the report could compromise
sources and methods. Therefore, the Majority's language seeks
to force the IC to either release an almost entirely redacted
report, which achieves nothing in the way of transparency, or
to compromise national security by declassifying the report.
The Minority therefore cannot support this provision.
The amendment proposed striking section 802, which limits
the availability of funds related to certain air strikes in
Yemen. As initially drafted, the potential impact of this
limitation was unclear to the Minority. A last-minute
modification to the language provoked further questions about
the language, as the need for this modification was not
explained to the Minority. Due to the potentially unknown
impacts to national security, the Minority supports removing
this provision from the bill.
The reporting requirements contained in sections 803, 804,
805, 807, and 822 were all last-minute additions to the IAA
after the Majority walked away from negotiations. Given that
these provisions were unvetted with the Minority, we would
strike these provisions.
Finally, the reporting requirements contained in sections
811, 812, 813, 821, 906, 908, and 911 are not necessarily on
topics or issues with which the Minority disagrees. However, as
previously stated, there is a concerning trend of mandating
that reports drafted by the IC be produced in an unclassified
form and publicly released. On many topics, the Minority
believes this is an inappropriate step for the IC to take,
since it provides our foreign adversaries the opportunity to
understand and exploit U.S. intelligence capabilities and
contingencies.
In addition to the unclassified amendment described above,
the Minority offered three en bloc amendments to the classified
annex to strike 25 provisions. While we are unable to debate
the merits of these provisions publicly, the bases for our
opposition to these 25 classified provisions include:
disagreements over the premise of the language--i.e., the
factual basis asserted remains in dispute; disagreements over
limitations imposed on IC elements which appear politically
motivated; disagreements over specific spending cuts which will
impact the national security of the United States as well as
the safety of our military forces overseas; disagreements over
the imposition of punitive spending controls to restrict
spending until certain conditions--which are themselves
objectionable--are met; and disagreements over the merits of
provisions which seek to micromanage or impose unnecessary
requirements on the IC--particularly in light of tenuous and
largely anecdotal justifications.
If the amendments described herein had been approved, the
Minority indicated we would fully support the resulting
legislation. Unfortunately, the Majority rejected all but one
amendment to the classified annex.
Republican Members cannot support an Intelligence
Authorization Act that exploits the IC for partisan political
purposes, as the Majority has done with H.R. 7856. We deeply
regret that the Majority has chosen to act in this manner.
It did not have to be this way. It is this way because the
Majority has weaponized intelligence to serve manifestly
political goals. It is this way because the Majority has failed
in their duty to this Committee, to this Congress, and to the
American people.
The Republican Minority urges our colleagues to vigorously
oppose H.R. 7856.
Sincerely,
Devin Nunes,
Ranking Member.
[all]