

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**MISSION IMPOSSIBLE – THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM**

by

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ABSTRACT

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As the Global War on Terrorism enters its fourth year, we see more and more signs of stress on our Armed Forces. Our troop commitments to both Iraq and Afghanistan look to remain at a significant level for at least the next few years if our experience in the Balkans is any indicator. The U.S. Army, to include both the Active Component and the Reserve Component is and will remain the major force provider for this and future operations. Given the current force mix between the AC and RC, the Army National Guard will continue to provide a significant portion of ground troops to this Theater of Operations. Today, the ARNG finds itself in probably the most turbulent and challenging time in its 350 year history. Simply put, for the first time in its history the Guard is being asked to fight a major war while maintaining a peacetime posture. At the same time, we are embarking on a road of unparalleled transformation across the Total Army. I believe the ARNG is stretched beyond its reasonable limits and that the continued use of the ARNG in this way will quickly break the organization. Couple this with the emerging Homeland Security requirements facing DOD, and I believe it is time to reevaluate the roles and missions of the ARNG. My intent for this paper is to review some historical challenges the Guard has always faced, examine the major challenges associated with the Global War on Terrorism and offer some possible solutions to these issues.

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PREFACE

The Army National Guard is and will continue to be a vital part of the "Total Army" and the National Security Strategy. The dedication and commitment of our citizen-soldiers has been proven over a 350 year history, but perhaps never more than the past three years. I am continually amazed at the professionalism, dedication and patriotism displayed by our Guard soldiers. Their sacrifice is difficult for Active Duty soldiers to understand and often marginalized or discounted by our nation's citizens. Many Guardsmen who read this paper will label it as another attack on the National Guard by an Active duty officer with no real understanding of the National Guard and the Reserve Component. This could not be farther from the truth.

First, I have walked in your shoes. I proudly served for almost five years in the Nebraska National Guard as tank crewman and then a platoon leader in 1st Battalion, 195th Armor Regiment. Secondly, I spent three years as an AC/RC officer assigned to the Resident Training Detachment for 8th Battalion, 229th Aviation Regiment (USAR) as a senior Captain and junior Major. Finally, I have served along side several National Guard and Reserve units in both combat and peacekeeping operations including Desert Storm, SFOR and most recently during Operation Iraqi Freedom. I believe this gives me a unique and more objective perspective with regards to the Army National Guard than most other officers, Active or Reserve.

This paper is intended to briefly examine the Guard's current challenges and issues in a critical and objective manner and offer some possible strategies for the future. As many will point out, this work is long on the discussion of problems and short on specifics for solutions. It was simply not possible or practical, to provide a detailed examination of these tough issues, but hopefully it sparks additional debate in an effort to improve the Army National Guard.

I am convinced that the Army National Guard can not endure for long under the current circumstances and demands of the Global War on Terrorism. Although I do believe that we need to change our paradigm on how we use the Guard and all that goes with that, there are some fundamental truths regarding our Reserve Components that we can not ignore. Transformation is about change and change is always difficult. The nation can ill afford a National Guard that is ineffective or worse, broken. The Army needs a strong and viable Army National Guard. We can not accomplish our mission without them.

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MISSION IMPOSSIBLE – THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

This victory belongs...to the Regulars, to the Reserves, to the National Guard.
This Victory belongs to the finest fighting force this nation has ever known in its history.¹

- President George Bush

BACKGROUND

Since the early part of the Twentieth Century the United States Army has operated as three separate armies, the Regular Army or Active Component (AC), the Army Reserve (USAR) and the Army National Guard (ARNG). This system, born from the U.S. Constitution and developed through a civil war and two world wars has coexisted in an uneasy, sometimes dysfunctional, sometimes cohesive, but always a competitive relationship for over 200 years. The two major players on this team of three are the Regular Army and the Army National Guard. The Army National Guard is the nation's oldest military organization, tracing its proud history all the way back to 1636 and the Massachusetts Bay Colony militia. Steeped in history and public service, the National Guard sees itself as the ultimate owner of national defense.² Citizens in peace and soldiers in war, Guardsmen have long provided the critical link between society and the military and affirmed the intentions of the founding fathers for a small standing Army complemented by citizen-soldiers.³ The ARNG has undergone considerable change over the past 350+ years from a frontier militia in our early history, to the predominate force provider (volunteers) during the conflicts of the 19th century, to a professional reserve force in the 20th century. No one would argue the importance of the modern National Guard or its contributions in every major American conflict of the 20th century save the Vietnam War.

Today the Guard plays a critical role on the War on Terrorism and continues to prove its worth in protecting America from both natural and manmade disasters. The National Guard is unique among the world's military forces as they have both a federal and state mission. This is an extremely important aspect of the National Guard and defines not only who they are but how they operate. Also unique to the National Guard is the power it derives from the constitution which empowered Congress to "provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia".⁴ Although the National Guard's federal reserve role has probably increased beyond the wildest imagination of the founding fathers, it is still a state-administered force as outlined in the constitution in which the states enjoy a significant amount of autonomy.

Before we continue, it is important that we quickly review the differences between the National Guard and the Army Reserve. As both are part of the Reserve Component, they are

often confused with each other. Although there are many similarities, there are four distinct differences. First the USAR is a federal force with no real domestic mission or allegiance to any particular state. The Chief of Staff of the Army, through the Chief of Army Reserve, trains, equips and administers the USAR. Secondly, the USAR has minimal combat units assigned (less than 1%); CS and CSS units make up the vast majority of the USAR. Third, the USAR maintains a large pool of Individual Ready Reservists (IRR) designed for individual augmentation of Active Army units as needed. The Guard really has no equivalent. A final and very important difference is the political clout and power of the National Guard, both in Congress and in the states through its powerful lobby organization the National Guard Association. The USAR has no counter balance for this and therefore is often steam rolled by the National Guard. A good example of this is the power-play by the National Guard in the early 1990's to strip most of the USAR's aviation assets away and transfer them to the ARNG. In fact, it is not unusual for the Army and the National Guard to be on opposite sides of an issue within Congress. Many believe the Guard has a better lobby on Capital Hill than any other service, save perhaps the United States Marine Corps.

Currently the ARNG with just over 350,000 soldiers makes up more than one-half of the Total Army's combat forces and one-third of its support forces. Major formations include; 8 combat divisions, 15 enhanced separate brigades, 17 artillery brigades, 7 aviation brigades/groups, 3 military police brigades and 2 Special Forces groups along with a host of combat service and combat service support units.⁵ The figures below show the breakout of the ARNG and its contribution to the Total Army




FIGURE 1 ARNG COMPOSITION VS THE TOTAL ARMY

INTRODUCTION

We have to make our reliance on the Guard and Reserves real. No longer will the lyrics be any good. If we make it real in the eyes of the Reserve Components, then it will be real for the country

- General Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.

Up until the post-Korean war the Regular Army was historically a relatively small and self contained force that required augmentation only during times of major conflict or war. This not only was fiscally prudent, but consistent with the founding fathers belief in a small professional army supported by state militias and their citizen-soldiers. The Militia Act of 1903 was the benchmark legislation that repealed the antiquated Militia Act of 1792 and converted the volunteer militia into the National Guard.⁶ In the simplest terms, Guard units received increased federal funding and equipment and in return, the Guard was to conform to federal standards for training and organization and would conduct a specified number of armory drills each year.⁷ A final tweaking of the National Guard prior to its first test in World War I came with the Militia Act of 1908 which gave the president full authority to call out the Guard during national emergencies, removed limits on the guards length of federal service and allowed the Guard to be used outside of the United States. It also directed that the National Guard would be called to active duty before the raising of any other volunteer units making it the primary military reserve and significantly enhancing the Guards stature.⁸

The National Defense Act of 1933 is the birth of the modern National Guard as we know it today. This act made the Guard “a part of the Army at all times” by conferring dual status on the Guard and creating an entirely new organization - the National Guard of the United States.⁹ This legislation more clearly defined the Guard’s roles and missions in relation to the state and federal government. Throughout the period encompassing World War I and World War II the relationship between the Regular Army and the Guard was complex to say the least. Animosity between the two organizations was the norm and not the exception, fueled by the Army’s lack of respect for the Guard and the Guard’s political power and paranoia of being marginalized or absorbed. However, despite the many problems and challenges faced by this “Two Army” system, all could agree on the mission of the Guard – to act as the Regular Army’s back-up, a force in reserve to be mobilized when circumstances required an expanded Army. Both the nation’s leaders and the National Guard foresaw a limited use of the Guard in the future, primarily in times of national emergency or declaration of war, the Korean conflict being a perfect example.

All that changed in 1973 when the Defense Department (DoD) implemented the Total Force Policy. Although the Vietnam War exceeded the capabilities of the Active Army, the Johnson and Nixon administrations did not mobilize the reserves in any significant way, but instead expanded the Army with the draft.¹⁰ Dissatisfied with both the military and political ramifications of the decision not to mobilize the reserves for Vietnam, coupled with the significant reduction of the Active Army following the war and finally the end of the draft in 1974, DoD and the Army were forced to reevaluate their defense policy.¹¹ As early as mid 1970, then Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird espoused a "Total Force policy concept" that called for the reserves to bear more of the direct burden for national defense and for all services to better integrate the reserves in planning, programming, manning and equipping.¹² However, it was not until Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger issued a forceful memorandum on August 22, 1973 putting teeth into the Total Force Policy and forcing all services to integrate their active and reserve forces "into a homogeneous whole". It also directed the services to provide necessary resources to improve reserve component readiness.¹³ This policy not only initiated many needed changes within the ARNG and USAR, but forever changed the relationship between the Active Army and the Reserves.

The Total Army policy (the Army's equivalent of the Total Force policy) boiled down to its basic premise is this; The Reserves are no longer a "force in reserve" but a key cog in the United States Army machine.¹⁴ The Reserves were now entrusted with many missions requiring early deployment in support of the Regular Army. No longer only to be used for major conflicts or wars, the reserves would be used for a wide variety of worldwide missions, requiring increased unit readiness and early deployment capability. As a result, today the Army can no longer conduct even the most minor operations without some sort of assistance from the Reserve Component. This total force policy in effect created three equal partners within the greater Army, the AC, ARNG and USAR. The Army would have almost two decades before the total force policy would be tested and it would need every minute to prepare.

Desert Storm was the first major test of this policy and ultimately was judged a success, but not without some major problems and a host of minor issues that needed to be addressed. Major issues included: readiness of combat formations, leader qualification/certification, equipment shortfalls/incompatibility and post-mobilization training (all historic militia shortcomings).¹⁵ The Army spent much of the 1990s developing fixes for these problems. Solutions included establishment of the Enhanced Separate Brigade (eSB) concept¹⁶, fielding more modern equipment to the RC and implementing the Bold Shift initiatives.¹⁷ During this same time however, we continued to escalate our use of the ARNG in operations across the

globe as the Army found itself stretched thin from repeated deployments to world trouble spots (Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kuwait, and Kosovo). With the events of September 11, 2001, the United States declared war on terror worldwide. The war is now in its fourth year and with the invasion of Iraq in 2003 most agree that it will be a long war. While Desert Storm was a success story for the "Total Army Concept", it was a relatively short test from mobilization to victory to demobilization.

Today the ARNG finds itself in probably the most turbulent and challenging time in its 350 year history. Simply put, it is being asked to fight a global war, while simultaneously conducting a massive organizational transformation, all while remaining in a peacetime posture. We are asking our citizen-soldiers to fight a protracted war, across the globe, as a part time participant on a long term basis. The million dollar question then becomes - Can the ARNG sustain its current OPTEMPO and transform itself without breaking the Organization? My intent for this paper is to briefly look at some of the ARNG's major historical and systematic challenges to readiness and their impact on today's Guard and then to focus on the major problems the ARNG faces in their role in the GWOT. I postulate that these major problems are in the "too hard to do box" for the Guard and I offer "a way" in which we might modify the ARNG's role and mission to better support Homeland Defense while at the same time not breaking the Guard as an organization

HISTORICAL/SYSTEMATIC CHALLENGES

LEADER TRAINING AND EDUCATION

The competence of our leadership, from platoon to Division level, has always been critical to the success of the Army. Most military professionals would agree that this is the most important ingredient to fighting, surviving and winning on the battlefield of today. The three Pillars of the Army's leadership development program are institutional training (resident formal military schools), operational assignments, and self development. The ARNG leader is severely disadvantaged in all three of these areas as compared to his active duty counterpart.

The ARNG has significant challenges in developing its leaders in a system that allows only 39 training days a year for the basic Guardsman. The first major obstacle in developing competent and professional junior leaders at both the officer and NCO level is self inflicted. The ARNG commissions many of its own officers in state run OCS academies, in contrast to the Active Army and USAR which commission through the three "resident" programs (OCS, ROTC or USMA). Although, the programs are run IAW Department of the Army policy, there are inevitable disparities among the various state programs and deviations in techniques, if not

standards.¹⁸ Compounding this problem is the limited training time; most are approximately 54 training days spread over 12-14 months and lack a full-time professional cadre. Consider then that almost one-third of the ARNG Lieutenant's are a product of these state OCS programs.

Secondly, although Guardsmen undergo the same basic combat training as their AC counterparts, the Guardsman cannot often attend the subsequent resident military education courses within his field or branch. These courses are therefore often "exported" to the Guard and run locally or provided by correspondence, which may or may not have a short resident phase. Guard soldier's receive the same educational credit as a soldier who attends the resident course and subsequently is assigned based on his military education. This creates a leader who on paper is qualified for either advancement or a job position, but in fact is much less capable and prepared than someone who has attended the resident training. Much of this inexperience can be dealt with at the lower level (company and below) but are compounded at higher levels and consequently have more far reaching effects on the organization and its soldiers. In my considerable experience with the RC, this is most pronounced at the field grade officer level (O4-O6) and at the senior NCO level (E7-E9)

Operational assignments are clearly a challenge for a significant portion of the ARNG. With only 39 training days a year, it is impossible for the average guardsman to reap the professional benefits of the varied operational experience afforded the AC soldier. Perhaps more importantly, many do not receive the professional coaching and mentoring they need from their superiors. This is a direct reflection of the quality of the senior leadership mentioned above and the lack of time afforded to do this.¹⁹ However, this is one of the positive aspects of the current OPTEMPO the ARNG is experiencing in the GWOT. As more and more units are deployed for extended periods (12-24 months) Guard soldiers and their leaders gain invaluable experience at the tactical level. Working closely with AC units and soldiers not only helps with experience based learning, but promotes better understanding and teamwork between the AC and RC. Thousands of leaders within the Guard are gaining invaluable operational experience with assignments to Iraq and Afghanistan.

FULL-TIME SUPPORT

The ARNG has two types of full-time employees, the Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) program and the Military Technician (MT) program. This full-time support is critical in supporting the traditional guardsman in the areas of organizing, administering, recruiting and training support. The AGR program consists of U.S. Code Title 10 and Title 32 members. AGR Title 10 members generally serve in federal level jobs, while Title 32 members serve in positions within

the State.²⁰ Most ARNG technicians are dual status employees, meaning they work full-time at the armory during the week as civilians providing mostly administrative and training support and then put on a uniform as a traditional guardsman during training drills.

Full-time support is also a major challenge for the Guard. The most obvious problem is shortage of AGR personnel and full-time technicians. In a recent GAO report to Congress, fourteen of the fifteen esB's reported as their number one problem undermining readiness was lack of full-time support personnel.²¹ This problem has carried on to today, where most units are manned at between 60-70% of their requirements.²² However, this does not address the real underlying problem with the Guard's full-time force, that of tactical inexperience and competence. Even if units were filled to 100% of their full-time positions this problem remains. The bottom line is that although AGR soldiers are expected to maintain the same professional standards in technical and tactical competence as their Regular Army counterparts, they do not and can not stack up against the active duty soldier.²³ This fact, which is often disputed by senior Guard leaders, but obviously clear in most head to head comparisons with AC counterparts, often is not the fault of the AGR soldier. The very nature of their job as an administrator and "paper pusher" makes it extremely difficult for the AGR soldier or full-time technician to maintain his tactical and technical competence. He is virtually desk bound between drill weekends providing personnel and administrative support to his unit members, planning and coordinating future training and just conducting the normal day to day operations required to run a unit. In contrast, active component personnel in comparable positions execute as well as administer and plan.

The AGR and MT program suffers other problems that affect the quality of the full-time force and ultimately unit readiness. The AGR system is riddled with "cronyism", especially Title 32 positions, where often it is not "what you can do" (performance), but "who you know" that is important. Another problem lies in States hanging on to their best AGR officers and NCOs for their entire career. Several ARNG officers have shared with me that it is SOP for the best and brightest AGR officers to remain at the State level where they can be "taken care of", while less capable officers are assigned to positions at the NGB or in other Title 10 positions. Although not always the case, these homesteaders are short changed when it comes to professional development.

MOS QUALIFICATION AND PROFICIENCY

This has always been a peacetime challenge for any militia force, but as warfare and the tools of warfare have become more complex it continues to be a significant problem for the

ARNG and directly effects combat readiness. The ARNG has worked this issue hard throughout the 1990's and soldier MOS qualification has dramatically improved in all 15 eSBs, meeting the Army's goal of having 85% of soldiers trained in their military specialty, up from 43% in 1993.²⁴ The percentage of leaders (officer and NCO) who have completed professional development courses for their grade level has also greatly improved, but still fails to meet the Army's stated goal for eSBs. Although, the rest of the ARNG has shared in this upswing, they do not come close to meeting this standard. As of March 2004 only 68% of the ARNG's personnel overall were qualified in their MOS.²⁵

The basic reason behind this shortfall is the inability or unwillingness of Guardsman to attend training when it is scheduled or available. MOS training usually requires attendance at a resident military school for an extended period of time and this is problematic for the citizen soldier to schedule around his civilian job and often is just not a priority. This problem is compounded when matched with a soldier's deployability status. A recent GAO study found that eSBs were filled, on average to almost 96%, with approximately 90% MOS qualified, but personnel trained and available for deployment averaged only 76%.²⁶ This has in part caused the ARNG to initiate over 74,000 personnel transfers from one unit to another to bring deploying units up to minimum standards.

TRAINING LIMITATIONS

Senior Guard leadership is always quick to point out that they provide a "big bang for the buck" and what a great bargain they are to the nation. Almost any briefing you receive from the Guard will invariably show the forces they bring to the fight and the low cost to the taxpayer (only 10% of the Army's budget). The implied comparison to the Active Army is inescapable and none too subtle. But statistical numbers of personnel, units and equipment is not what is really relevant. Combat readiness of those personnel, units and equipment is what is truly important. This is where the ARNG falls woefully short of its advertised capability. The average citizen soldier is allowed 39 days a year to train for his wartime mission. However, even this number is misleading as anyone associated with the Guard understands the difference between available training time and effective training time. A review of a typical yearly training calendar for any Guard unit will show many non-training related events laid over the year, to include personnel administration, equipment maintenance, medical requirements and inspections to name a few.²⁷ All of these events are necessary and important to both the unit and the soldier, but they still take away critical training time to the commander and degrade combat readiness. Travel time is another thief of effective training time for the commander, especially for units that must train

away from populated areas. On average an ARNG battalion is located more than 100 miles from its headquarters, 130 miles from its major equipment site, 150 miles from its major training area and 65 miles from a rifle range.²⁸ This was a significant issue for me as an Armor Platoon leader in the Nebraska National Guard. Our state training area, where we could execute platoon level maneuver was almost a 3 hour drive from the Armory. The closest major military installation for my unit was Fort Carson, Colorado, more than 7 hours away.

GWOT CHALLENGES

Although there are many challenges currently facing the ARNG in the conduct of the Global War on Terrorism, I believe there are four primary issues facing the Guard today; OPTEMPO, transformation, unit readiness and the ill defined Homeland security mission.

OPTEMPO

No one can dispute the patriotism, dedication and loyalty of the more than 164,000 Army National Guardsmen that have been brought to active duty since 9-11. They have preformed admirably in all parts of the world. Currently there are approximately 92,000 deployed around the world, with an additional 33,000 on alert for deployment in the next six months.²⁹ Of the 116 Military Police units in the ARNG, all 116 have been mobilized and/or deployed since 9-11. Twenty of them have been deployed overseas twice.³⁰ Of the 15 Enhanced Brigades (esB) in the ARNG all but two have either been called up in the past three years or are currently serving on active duty. Currently in Iraq the ARNG makes up 32% of the total force of 110, 000 Army troops and 44% of combat forces.³¹ This is the situation the ARNG finds itself in today. The bottom line is that the ARNG has been operating for over two years as an active duty force, with no end in sight.




FIGURE 2 AVERAGE DAYS OF DUTY PERFORMED BY RESERVE COMPONENT FORCES
FY1990-2004³²

Just recently, we have seen the early signs of stress fractures beginning to form within the ARNG. Recruiting and retention are both down. A year ago the ARNG fell 7800 soldiers short of its recruiting goal, while for FY 2004 they came up almost 10% short of its goal of 56,000 new recruits.³³ Although not a significant problem yet, retention in specific MOS which are in high demand in the GWOT (Military Police, Civil Affairs and aviation support) all show substantial downward trends.³⁴ When coupled with the growing group of frustrated and angry Guard families and their representatives in state and federal government concerned with long mobilization periods and repeated deployments, additional cracks can be seen. The gathering storm of protest comes after months of concern inside and outside the Army that an over-reliance on the Guard and Reserve very well could shatter the Reserve system.




FIGURE 3 ARNG PERSONNEL UTILIZATION FY 2002-2003

Surprisingly, the senior leadership within the ARNG seems little disturbed by these facts. In comments given back in September 2004, LTG Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, appeared optimistic, citing the Guards achieving 100% of its retention mission for FY2004 despite missing its recruitment goal by almost 7000.³⁵ For the first quarter of FY2005 the ARNG had fallen nearly 15,000 troops short of its authorized level of 350,000.³⁶ Again, LTG Blum indicated he was not overly concerned stating – “Its not a train wreck. Its not a crisis. But it bears watching”.³⁷ He indicated that the drop in Active duty soldiers joining the Guard

after their AC service was complete as the major reason. This is in stark contrast to the comments of LTG James Helmly, Chief of the Army Reserve, who in a blunt memo to the CSA on 20 December 2004, indicated that due to current demands in Iraq and Afghanistan the USAR was in "grave danger" of being able to meet its current mission's and that the Army Reserve "was rapidly degenerating into a broken force".³⁸ It is difficult to understand why there is such a discrepancy in outlooks from the two different reserve component commanders, considering they recruit from the same source and their OPTEMPO is nearly identical. A survey conducted in the summer of 2004, by the Army again suggests looming problems for the ARNG later this year. Almost 43% of the over 11,000 guardsmen surveyed who will be returning from overseas deployments in the next 3-6 months have indicated that they intend to leave the service when their enlistments are up.³⁹ The proposed solution by National Guard Bureau is to offer \$15,000 bonuses to active-duty soldiers who join the Guard and for Guard soldiers who REUP for 6 additional years. These recruiting/retention bonuses are unprecedented in the history of the Guard. Again, we must ask ourselves is this business as usual?

This unrealistic optimism is nothing new for the Guard. In the age old fight between the Regular Army and the Militia, we have seen this time and time again. Senior Guard leadership routinely overstate the abilities and readiness of their units, while down-playing their problems and challenges. If we buy into their rhetoric and their implied favorable comparison to the Active Army, we have to question why we even need a full-time Army.⁴⁰ In reality, the facts of post-mobilization never bear this out, with even the best Guard units requiring significant training prior to deployment. General Schoomaker, the Army Chief of Staff, seems to have a more realistic view. His comments to congress in July 2004 indicated that he expected the 2005 and 2006 recruiting and retention within the RC to be a "real challenge".⁴¹

TRANSFORMATION

The CSA has embarked on an accelerated transformation program that will require all three components of the Total Army to transform while we are at war. This again is the situation the ARNG must confront for the near term future. One could easily argue that transformation will have an even bigger impact on the RC force with its citizen-soldier make up, shortage of full-time personnel, lack of experience with new equipment and the diversity of mission sets (combat, domestic support and homeland security). Finally throw in the current OPTEMPO and signs point to an organization that will be slower and more difficult to transform.

The first major issue of ARNG transformation is simply equipment. Much of the Guards equipment is old and in need of replacement. The Guard is still experiencing significant

shortages of HUMVEEs, SINGARS radios, chemical/biological detection equipment, night vision devices and modern helicopters.⁴² These are not only required to increase readiness, but more importantly for interoperability reasons with the Active Army. To address this issue for deploying units to Iraq, Guard units now fall in on AC equipment left in country. But this is rapidly “using up” equipment at 3 to 5 times its normal yearly OPTEMPO, not to mention equipment losses due to combat. This makes a viable fielding plan difficult for the Guard as much of the new equipment coming off the assembly lines is sent to Iraq or units heading to Iraq. The fielding of modern equipment however, is not only a major budget issue for the Guard, but has a major impact on training soldiers and units who would require to operate this new equipment.

The next issue concerning transformation is centered on the ARNG's Division Redesign Study⁴³ completed in 1998 and the ARNG Restructuring Initiative⁴⁴ of 2002. Both of these will have major impacts on the force structure of the ARNG over the next ten years. Over time, they will convert specified combat units into CS and CSS units to address support requirements within both the ARNG and the Total Army. They will also convert a sizeable portion of the Guard's combat formations into the new Unit of Action (UA) structure, to better support combatant commanders.⁴⁵ Both of these initiatives will require significant resources (dollars, infrastructure, training and dedicated personnel) to be accomplished successfully. At best, this will be a significant challenge when much of the resources and talent are being used in the GWOT.

The final major transformation issue is focused around procedures and automation. The ARNG is undertaking a huge effort to meet the DOD's vision of a “paperless environment” These efforts will include a host of new computer systems to bring the Guard in line with the Active Army and the USAR. These include the new Electronic Records Management System (ERMS), an automated selection board system and the Strategic Readiness System (SRS), which will meet the Army's guidance of a more accurate and holistic way in which units report readiness.⁴⁶ All of these initiatives are needed to enable the Guard to be an effective team player in the 21st century. But with limited resources, particularly in full-time support, equipment and training support it is difficult to see how the Guard will accomplish this given its current OPTEMPO.

UNIT READINESS

To date the ARNG has done an excellent job in fielding units for deployment. Although there are plenty of horror stories of post-mobilization training problems, both at the individual and collective level, to date these have had little impact on deployments. The two major

challenges facing the Guard Bureau today in fielding a unit for deployment are personnel shortages within the selected unit and post-mobilization training.

Personnel shortages have always plagued the ARNG. It is not an issue of the aggregate as the Guard has continually met or exceeded its recruiting and retention goals over the past ten years. It is a problem of the right number of trained soldiers in the right units. To date, the vast majority of ARNG combat forces used in GWOT have come from the esB's. These units are the best trained, best equipped and best manned units within the Guard. The activation of the 42nd Infantry Division (New York) in June 2004 was the first ARNG division to be called up for service in the GWOT. But this is really an aberration, since only the division headquarters, aviation units and minor support units were activated. All of the Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) for the division are non-organic esBs (116th from Idaho, 278th from Tennessee and 256th from Louisiana) from all over the United States.

Here in lie's the problem. The ARNG has been forced to patch work units together as they prepare for deployment. First comes the significant personnel transfers required to bring units up to 100% for deployment. Next comes another influx of personnel after initial medical screening, personnel deferments and waivers, followed a month or two later by soldiers who had to attend required individual training before joining their unit. Finally, comes the last minute additions to replace losses to UCMJ, family hardships and medical problems. This personnel issue has a huge impact on unit training and ultimately effects unit readiness as they assume the mission in theater. As of July 2004, the ARNG had initiated over 74,000 personnel transfers to fill-out deploying units.⁴⁷ As stated earlier, these personnel issues have been mitigated, through longer post-mobilization training and the "make it happen" attitude within the Guard. However, the 2nd order of effects of this reality are about to hit the ARNG like a sledge hammer. Hundreds of non-deploying units within the ARNG have been gutted to provide the necessary personnel to units mobilizing for deployment. Although a workable policy in the short term, and one used successfully during Desert Storm, this becomes a "war stopper" in any long term commitment. This ultimately self defeating policy should come to a head in late 2005 with the mobilization of Guard units for OIF IV.

Within post-mobilization training, many of the Army's planning assumptions for the RC were flawed and invalid. These included that RC units would arrive at the mobilization station at or above the 85% MOS qualified. Second, that the post-mobilization training sites would be empty or near empty of Active Army units which would compete for resources. Third, that the Army would not have to conduct simultaneous large scale mobilization and demobilization. And finally, that RC units that support mobilizations and demobilizations would not be needed

beyond 24 months.⁴⁸ Significant post-mobilization training challenges are focused on 5 basic issues; leader competence and experience, unit cohesion (team building), competition for resources at the post-MOB site, shortages of support personnel to assist in training and equipment shortages. None of these by themselves is insurmountable, but taken together they present the ARNG with a huge obstacle in preparing forces for deployment and combat which will only get worse as the war continues.

Both of these issues are also affected by the very political nature of reserve call-ups. There is a great deal of frustration within both FORSCOM and the two CONUSAs (who are responsible to train and equip units that are federalized) over the delays in identifying, announcing and calling up RC units. Unfortunately, the decision to call-up an RC unit is just as much about political impact, especially in an election year, than it is about military requirements or strategy. This is especially true in the Guard, which has visibility and power in both congress and state governments.

HOMELAND SECURITY MISSION

The National Guard and Reservists will be more involved in homeland security, confronting acts of terror and the disorder our enemies may try and create⁴⁹

- President George W. Bush

The events of September 11 2001 propelled the issue of Homeland Security (HLS) to the first priority of the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Military Strategy (NMS) and perhaps most importantly the American people.⁵⁰ Clearly the National Guard, given its wide domestic experience and community based roots, will play a major role in HLS. However, over the past 3+ years, since 9-11, the current administration and DoD have struggled to clearly define the military's roles, missions and responsibilities in Homeland defense.

The establishment of NORTHCOM was a major step forward in focusing DoD and its assets on the HLS mission. Unfortunately they are plagued with significant problems including few assigned forces, "turf wars" between subordinate commands (1st and 5th Army, Joint Task Force-Civil Support and others), dual and triple hatted commanders and the monumental task of coordinating with a host of US government inter-agencies, as well as local agencies. When all is said and done the ARNG should find itself at the center of the military's efforts in regard to HLS. The US Commission on National Security in the 21st Century suggested that the National Guard be the focus for the HLD mission. They recommended that the Guard be properly trained and adequately equipped to take on the homeland security as their primary mission.⁵¹ This is

almost intuitive given that the Guard would most often be the first military force on the scene in any emergency due to its proximity. With nearly 3,300 facilities in more than 2,700 communities around the country they can quickly respond with medical transportation, security and manpower support to local first responders.⁵² Since 9-11 the ARNG has proven its ability to perform a wide range of Home Land Defense missions effectively, proving that they should be the DoD's first choice for the HLS mission. However, this expanded mission can not come without a cost. We can not expect the ARNG to take on this greatly expanded mission without relieving them of some portion of their current responsibilities. HLD will require organizational, equipment and training changes within the Guard to meet this expanded mission.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It should be clear to even the most ardent supporter of the "Total Army" policy and the National Guard, that we can not continue down our current path in use of the Guard in support of GWOT. Despite some band-aid type fixes applied so far, I believe the ARNG will be broken as a fighting force within a few short years, if not sooner. The "Total Army concept" was developed to integrate the RC in short duration operations requiring limited RC forces or in a full-mobilization type scenario in response to a national emergency. I do not believe that the current situation with GWOT was a considered COA within the "Total Army" policy. Today, as many experts agree, conflict and not peace will be the normal state of affairs in the world for the foreseeable future. What changes must be made in relation to our use of the ARNG for the future?

Short term – This is an Army problem and not just a National Guard problem. The single biggest impact the Active Army can have to mitigate the challenges I have described above is provide quality leadership in formations. I propose that we conduct a cross fertilization between all three components of the Army. By placing experienced and competent leaders (NCOs, staff officers and commanders) within ARNG formations we at least partially mitigate every single challenge that faces a unit preparing for deployment and combat. I am not proposing we replace all key leaders within a mobilized unit with Active duty personnel. Rather, we would identify those positions in a unit that need to be filled due to shortages or unqualified leaders and fill this limited number of positions with Active Army personnel. This will also have the advantage of freeing up much of the full-time support in the way of AGR and Mil-tech personnel to focus on training non-deploying units along with mobilization and demobilization.

Funding is another key short-term fix. We must invest the required resources into the National Guard. At present Guard units normally only receive additional resources upon

mobilization. If we do not make additional resources available to the rest of the Guard now, then we can expect to continue to spiral downward in readiness with respect to non-deployed units (who may eventually deploy in the future). We must put the Guard in a war-time posture, at least for the next 2-3 years.

Recruiting will remain critical over the next few years to ensure we maintain a combat ready Army National Guard. We must take the necessary steps to ensure a quality force. Accessions command has already taken steps to beef-up recruiting across the "Total Army" by increasing the number of recruiters out in the field. The Army needs to go beyond this by aggressively targeting non-supportive civilian employers with legal action, providing additional enlistment bonuses for new recruits, by providing additional incentives for soldiers who will reenlist and developing a strategic communications plan to ensure support from the American people, specifically parents of high school age men and women. This is the first time in our nations history we have fought a protracted war with an all-volunteer force. No one can deny that to this point it has worked, but as discussed above, we are seeing many signs of stress on the system. The question then becomes can we sustain an all-volunteer force during a long term war. No matter the answer, in the short term we must make the all-volunteer system work, as that is all we have.

Long-term – First we must continue our reevaluation of the force mix between the Active Component and the Reserve Component. In hindsight, and through painful experience, it is clear that the Active Army gave up too much structure to the reserves in the areas of CS, CSS and special units (civil affairs, PSYOPS) during the post-cold war drawdown. This was one of the priorities of General Schoomaker when he assumed his duties in 2003 and we need to complete this review and rapidly implement it.

Next, is the fact that the Active Army is simply too small for our current and projected OPTEMPO. Again, the CSA has taken steps to temporarily increase the size of the Active Army by 30,000 troops and although he and the Secretary of Defense continue to claim the Army only requires this for the near-term (3-5 years), many believe this will have to be left in place permanently. This is just another part of the force mix re-balance between AC and RC. The 1990s have given us a glimpse of future commitments the US Army can expect in the 21st Century. Add this to the Expeditionary nature of future conflicts and crisis areas and it is clear to many for the need for a larger Active Army. In the end we may find that 30,000 troops are still not enough.

Finally and certainly most controversial is the fact that we must relook the role of the National Guard. Although a political minefield, the near-term future, points to a system that can

not be sustained and must be modified. It is clear that the “Total Army” concept was not intended to work in our current national security environment. We have the perfect opportunity over the next 5 years to leverage transformation and truly adapt to this extremely challenging environment. With their dual mission (federal and state) the ARNG is perfectly suited for the expanded homeland security role. Many units are already partially trained in this area and many more have extensive experience over the past three years in this role. But this must be a zero sum game. If they pick up additional missions in this area, I believe they must give up other missions.

My proposal is simple in concept, slightly more difficult in implementation, but extremely complex and controversial given the political power and clout of the Guard. First, I do not propose we scrap the Total Army concept. It has proven itself and the wisdom of its creators over the past 25 years. In simple terms I propose that we more clearly delineate the missions of the Guard and Reserves, giving each a primary mission, thereby focusing their energies and resources. It is clear that in the future, homeland security will be one of the growth sectors of our government. The Guard is ideally suited for this role and this is where we need to focus the Guard. The USAR is the “federal reserve force” and requires no consideration of state politics for its use. It was created in 1908 for this very purpose. Let’s give the USAR the primary mission of providing the major back-up to the Regular Army across the full-spectrum (Combat Arms, Combat Support and Combat Service Support). In most cases this can be accomplished with the transfer of current units and personnel slots across the two components with little to no aggregate growth. This will probably mean a limited loss of structure and slots within the Guard and a corresponding increase within the USAR, but that is the topic for another paper. Below is the proposed mission breakdown between the ARNG and the USAR in priority.

ARNG	USAR
1. Homeland Security, along with limited domestic first response missions	1. Provide rotational forces for long term limited world wide contingencies
2. Domestic support and disaster relief (traditional state mission)	2. Significant early response forces to support the Active Army
3. Limited early response forces for mobilization to support the Active Army	3. Homeland Security (national emergency or major homeland threat)
4. Full-mobilization to support Active Army (national emergency or major war)	4. Full-mobilization to support Active Army (national emergency or major war)

FIGURE 4 MISSION BREAKDOWN BETWEEN ARNG AND USAR

CONCLUSION

"We recognize the need to be sensitive to the demands placed on the individual National Guardsman, Reservist and really...their families. As true citizen-soldiers, our Guardsmen must devote time to their families, civilian occupations or education. If we intrude upon you for every trouble, we may find it hard to keep the very best soldiers that characterize the Guard today"⁵³

- President George Bush

It was clear to the President more than a decade ago, after a relatively short war during Desert Storm, that the Guard has its limitations concerning how often it can be called to service. Given the current world situation, we have no option, for the near future, but to continue to use the RC in the War on Terror. However, let's not bury our heads in the sand and hope that this situation goes away quickly or never returns. We must adapt to the enemy and the strategic environment by developing a more workable policy concerning our reserve forces. A recent GAO report to Congress (April of 2004) stated that "The High level of Army Guard Forces needed for federal mission's for the foreseeable future represents a fundamental change from the Guard's traditional role as a strategic reserve".⁵⁴ Over 51% of the ARNG has been alerted or activated for federal missions related to the GWOT, both here at home and overseas.⁵⁵ With no end in sight, it doesn't take a military genius to see this train wreck coming. We must take this challenge head on as "an Army" and not as separate components (AC and RC). The past three years have been a real challenge to the "Total Army" but our soldiers and leaders have risen to the challenge and have made it work. We owe them better in the future. Let's prevent the next train wreck!

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ENDNOTES

¹ Presidential Address to Congress March 6, 1992

² David J. MacMillan, *The War Between the Armies: Conflict Along the Road to a Total Force*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 10 April 2000), 2

³ Ibid.

⁴ U.S. Constitution. Article I, Section 8.

⁵ The United States Army website; available from, <<http://www.army.mil/tools.html>> Internet; accessed 29 September 2004

⁶ Michael D. Doubler, *I am the Guard: A History of the Army National Guard, 1636-2000* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000), 144

⁷ Ibid., 144

⁸ Ibid., 151

⁹ Jeffery A. Jacobs, *The Future of the Citizen-Soldier Force* (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1994), 39

¹⁰ Ibid., 1

¹¹ Ibid., 2

¹² Michael D. Doubler, *I am the Guard: A History of the Army National Guard, 1636-2000* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000), 147

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Jacobs, 2.

¹⁵ General Accounting Office, *National Guard: Peacetime Training did not adequately prepare Combat Brigades for Gulf War* (Washington D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, September 1991), 3.

¹⁶ Fifteen ARNG Enhanced Separate Brigades, often referred to as E-Brigades, were established in 1995 as a result of the Total Army Analysis 003. These brigades are manned, equipped and funded at a much higher level than the rest of the ARNG. They are intended as a force that can be rapidly mobilized and trained for early deployment contingencies

¹⁷ Beginning in 1992, the Chief of Staff and the Commander in Chief of FORSCOM, in collaboration with the reserve components, directly promoted the "One Team—One Standard" concept through a major initiative known as BOLD SHIFT. BOLD SHIFT traced its origins to readiness problems within the reserve components during DESERT STORM. BOLD SHIFT consisted of seven interrelated training and readiness programs designed to improve the readiness of the Reserve Components. Cornerstone to this initiative was placing significant numbers of Active duty soldiers into reserve units.

¹⁸ Jacobs, 79

¹⁹ Jacobs, 83.

²⁰ Bryan W. Wampler, Managing the Army National Guard Full-Time Force, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 10 April 2000), 1.

²¹ General Accounting Office, *Army National Guard: Enhanced Brigade Readiness Improved but personnel and workloads are problem* (Washington D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, June 2000), 11.

²² General Accountability Office, *Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for Future Overseas and Domestic Missions* (Washington D.C.: U.S. General Accountability Office, November 2004), 9.

²³ Jacobs, 80.

²⁴ General Accounting Office, *Army National Guard: Enhanced Brigade Readiness Improved but personnel and workloads are problem* (Washington D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, June 2000), 8.

²⁵ Ibid., 10.

²⁶ General Accountability Office, *Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for Future Overseas and Domestic Missions* (Washington D.C.: U.S. General Accountability Office, November 2004), 7.

²⁷ Martin Binkin and William W. Kaufmann, *US Army Guard and Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1989), 98

²⁸ Ibid., 99

²⁹ Greg Jaffe, "Caught Off Guard", *The Wall Street Journal*, 4 August 2004, sec A, p.1

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ John Hendren, "National Guard falls short in hitting troop levels", *LA Times*, 26 January 2005; available from <<http://www.latimes.com>>; Internet; accessed 28 January 2005.

³² General Accountability Office, *Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Address Long-term Reserve Force Availability and Related Mobilization and Demobilization Issues* (Washington D.C.: U.S. General Accountability Office, September 2004), 13

³³ Jane McHugh and Sean Naylor, "Guard Recruiting Mission falls Short of Goal." *Army Times*, 4 October 2004, p.23

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Sandra I. Erwin, "Army downplaying concerns about Overstressed Force." *National Defense*, September 2004, 29

³⁶ John Hendren, "National Guard falls short in hitting troop levels", *LA Times*, 26 January 2005; available from <<http://www.latimes.com>>; Internet; accessed 28 January 2005.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Tom Bowman, "Army Reserve Fast Becoming Broken force," *Baltimore Sun*, 5 January 2005; available from <<http://www.baltimoresun.com>> Internet; accessed 7 January 2005.

³⁹ Greg Jaffe, "Caught Off Guard", *The Wall Street Journal*, 4 August 2004; available from <<http://www.wallstreetjournal.com>>Internet. Accessed 28 November 2004.

⁴⁰ Michael D. Doubler, *I am the Guard: A History of the Army National Guard, 1636-2000* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000), 380

⁴¹ Erwin, 29

⁴² Steven Blum, *Army National Guard 2004 Posture Statement* (Arlington, VA: Army National Guard Director's Staff Group, 2004), 2

⁴³ The Army National Guard Division Redesign Study is a four-phase transformation project. Phases I and II of this study will involve the conversion of six brigades along with a portion of two divisions. The purpose is to address a long-standing U.S. Army concern regarding a lack of combat support and combat service support in the force structure

⁴⁴ This new initiative restructures a sizeable portion of the National Guard combat formations to better support the combatant commanders' requirements. The concept is to convert existing heavy and light combat structure to new designs that better support Combatant Commanders (including the new Northern Command) under the new defense strategy. Tentatively called Multi-Functional Divisions and Mobile Light Brigades, these new organizations will be first and foremost war-fighting organizations prepared for full-spectrum operations. The first unit could begin conversion as early as Fiscal Year 2005

⁴⁵ Blum, 3

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ General Accounting Office, *Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard use in Overseas and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges* (Washington D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 29 April 2004), 2

⁴⁸ General Accounting Office, *Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard use in Overseas and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges* (Washington D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 29 April 2004), 2

⁴⁹ M Tina Hynson, *The National Guard and its Role in Homeland Security*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 9 April 2002),1

⁵⁰ Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*. Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 30 September 2001. Chapter III, 18

⁵¹ Hynson, 18

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ President George Bush's address to the National Guard Association in Salt Lake City Utah, September 15 1992.

⁵⁴ General Accounting Office, *Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard use in Overseas and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges* (Washington D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 29 April 2004), 7

⁵⁵ General Accounting Office, *Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard use in Overseas and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges* (Washington D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 29 April 2004), 11

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