[Senate Hearing 111-659]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-659
ASSESSING CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEACE IN SUDAN
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 26, 2010
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
61-711 PDF WASHINGTON : 2010
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC
area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC
20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
David McKean, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
------------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin, Chairman
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware BOB CORKER, Tennessee
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Almquist, Katherine, former USAID Assistant Administrator for
Africa, Washington, DC......................................... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Giffen, Alison, deputy director of the Future of Peace Operations
Program, The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC........... 11
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Isakson, Hon. Johnny, U.S. Senator from Georgia, opening
statement...................................................... 3
Mozersky, David, associate director of Humanity United, Redwood
City, CA....................................................... 19
Prepared statement........................................... 21
Richard, Anne, vice president for Government Relations and
Advocacy, International Rescue Committee, Washington, DC....... 24
Prepared statement........................................... 26
(iii)
ASSESSING CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEACE IN SUDAN
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 26, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on African Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Russell D.
Feingold (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Feingold, Isakson, and Wicker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN
Senator Feingold. The hearing will come to order.
And on behalf of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee
on African Affairs, I welcome all of you to this hearing
entitled ``Assessing Challenges and Opportunities for Peace in
Sudan.''
And, of course, I'm honored to be joined by the ranking
member of this subcommittee, Senator Isakson. I'll invite him
to deliver some opening remarks in just a moment.
Today's hearing builds upon the hearing that our full
committee held 2 weeks ago with the President's Special Envoy
for Sudan, General Gration. The stakes are incredibly high as
we move closer to Southern Sudan's vote on self-determination,
which is set for January 2011.
The hearing, 2 weeks ago, made clear that not enough
progress has been made to resolve contentious issues and
address governance and security challenges in advance of the
referendum. I am glad the Obama administration is scaling up
its diplomatic and programmatic efforts in this regard, but the
time is short. I hope we will discuss, today, what specifically
can and must be achieved over the next 8 months to increase the
chances of a peaceful, orderly referendum process.
On a related note, I am pleased that President Obama, on
Monday, signed into law the LRA Disarmament and the Northern
Uganda Recovery Act, a bill that I authored with Senator Sam
Brownback.
The Lord's Resistance Army is a transnational problem.
They've wreaked havoc in Southern Sudan in the past. And their
ability to do so in the future should not be underestimated. In
fact, the Voice of America reported just last week that the LRA
have launched new attacks in Southern Sudan. As preparations
for the referendum continue, we need to consider the impact of
this transnational threat, as well as others.
Now, at the same time as we work toward peace in the South,
we cannot lose sight of our priorities in Sudan, particularly
in Darfur. Shortly after the full committee hearing, 2 weeks
ago, the State Department released a statement condemning
recent offensive actions by the Government of Sudan in Darfur.
I was pleased to see this statement, but fighting in Darfur has
reportedly continued. I hope we can discuss today how we can
get back on track with a viable process toward peace in Darfur.
Seven years on, millions of people remain displaced by the
conflict in Darfur. They continue to face rampant insecurity,
even if the fighting has changed in nature. This includes
approximately 300,000 Darfurian refugees who now reside in
eastern Chad.
The U.N. peacekeeping mission, MINURCAT, is reportedly set
to withdraw from eastern Chad, which could put those civilians
in danger and restrict humanitarian access even further.
Further endangering civilians is unacceptable, and the
international community should work to ensure that there is a
clear, viable strategy for their protection.
Finally, while the elections may be over, we should
continue to look for ways to push for an opening of democratic
space, and for the civil and political rights of all Sudanese
people. This is critical if we're to see the end of violence as
an instrument of politics in Sudan.
Given the already repressive environment in Northern Sudan,
I am disappointed that the National Congress Party has cracked
down on the media, several journalists, opposition leaders, and
activists in the wake of the election. The international
community should speak out forcefully against this new wave of
repression.
Now, we have a great lineup of witnesses this afternoon to
discuss these issues.
First we will hear from Katherine Almquist, former USAID
Assistant Administrator for Africa. Ms. Almquist recently
published a report, in the Council of Foreign Relations, on the
likely triggers of renewed civil war in Sudan, and possible
U.S. policy options. Ms. Almquist has extensive experience
working on Sudan inside of government, as both a former USAID
Assistant Administrator for Africa and former USAID Mission
Director for Sudan. She has testified before this subcommittee
before and I am pleased to welcome her back.
Second, we will hear from Alison Giffen, deputy director of
the Future of Peace Operations Program at the Stimson Center.
In that role, Ms. Giffen is leading the program's efforts to
strengthen civilian protection mechanisms and increase global
preparedness to respond to mass atrocities. Ms. Giffen has more
than a dozen years' experience monitoring and advocating on
human rights and humanitarian issues. She previously served as
Oxfam Great Britain's advocacy and strategy coordinator in
Sudan.
Next, we will hear from David Mozersky, associate director
of Humanity United. Mr. Mozersky has been involved in conflict
prevention work in Sudan and East Africa since 2001, with a
specific interest in mediation efforts and regional peace
processes. Before joining Humanity United, he worked for 6
years for the International Crisis Group, covering Sudan; most
recently, as the Horn of Africa project director.
Finally, we will hear from Anne Richard, vice president for
government relations and advocacy for the International Rescue
Committee. The International Rescue Committee has been
operating in Sudan since 1981, and currently helps more than
450,000 people in Southern Sudan with essential services. IRC
was also delivering humanitarian aid to around 2 million people
in Darfur, North and East Sudan, until March 2009, when it was
expelled by the Government of Sudan. Ms. Richard, herself, has
extensive experience working on humanitarian issues, both
inside and outside of government.
So, I thank all of you for being here. I ask that you keep
your remarks to 5 minutes or less so we have plenty of time for
questions and discussion. And, of course, we'll submit your
longer written statements for the record.
It's now my pleasure to turn to my friend and distinguished
ranking member, Senator Isakson, for his opening comments.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNY ISAKSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA
Senator Isakson. Well, thank you very much, Chairman
Feingold. And I would like to thank Chairman Kerry for the
previous hearing we had, a few weeks ago, with General Gration.
And I would note--General Gration, we appreciate you being
in the audience today at this hearing. You're doing great work
in the Sudan, and we appreciate it very much.
I welcome our panelists today.
Having visited Darfur and Sudan last year--in fact, almost
this week last year, so it's been exactly a year ago--I am
aware, firsthand, of the tragedy in Darfur, and also the
tenuous nature of the North/South relations, as well as the
critical date that's coming up very soon, in terms of the
secession referendum, which I guess is scheduled for January.
The potential for critical problems is tremendous, but
there's potential for opportunity and hope, as well. And the
United States needs to be a key player in trying to help the
country, first, stay unified; and second, find some kind of a
cure, if we can, for the tragedy that is taking place in
Darfur.
I welcome our panelists that are here to testify today. I
look forward to your testimony.
And, again, I thank the chairman for calling the hearing.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Senator Isakson.
I welcome General Gration, as well. Thank him for his
dedication.
And now we'll begin with Ms. Almquist.
STATEMENT OF KATHERINE ALMQUIST, FORMER USAID ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR FOR AFRICA, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Almquist. Thank you, Chairman Feingold and Senator
Isakson, for having me here today.
I would just like to note that the views I express today
will be those of my own, and not the Africa Center or the
National Defense University.
Sudan faces the very real prospect of renewed violence
between North and South over the next 12 to 18 months. Under
the terms of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, a
referendum in Southern Sudan must be held by January 2011 to
determine whether it remains united with the North or secedes
from it.
Given that popular sentiment in the South overwhelmingly
favors secession, two basic scenarios are conceivable. The
South secedes peacefully, through a credible referendum
process, or the CPA collapses and the South returns to a fight
for independence.
The likely triggers of a renewed civil war between North
and South concern the referenda on self-determination, border
flashpoints, and oil. Renewed civil war will have far-reaching
consequences for other parts of Sudan, as well, limiting the
potential to address the situation in Darfur and to avoid
potential conflicts in other marginalized areas of the North.
Prospects for resolving the conflict in Darfur will dim
further, and likely expire, in the event of a renewed North/
South war. In the event of the violent secession of the South,
neither Khartoum nor the Darfur rebel movements will be
motivated to seek their own meaningful negotiated settlement.
Khartoum's tolerance of the U.N./AU peacekeeping mission in
Darfur may cease. And delivery of food and other emergency
assistance to more than 4.7 million Darfuris current reliance
on international aid will be virtually impossible.
As I'm sure we'll hear from the other witnesses, delivery
of humanitarian assistance, at the present time, still remains
a very dangerous and challenging proposition. The rising
kidnappings of humanitarian workers and a tax on peacekeepers
demonstrates the most fundamental challenge of Darfur that must
still be addressed; that of security. Until basic security is
restored, voluntary return of IDPs will not happen, and
recovering reconstruction programs to stabilize Darfur and
prepare for development will not be feasible.
The risks of a violent breakup of the country are,
therefore, immense. And yet, the scenario is by no means
inevitable. Ultimately, the Sudanese will determine whether the
country advances toward peace and stability, or declines into
conflict and security.
For its part, the Government of Southern Sudan must
continue to demonstrate the political will and strength of
leadership to confront the challenges of a nascent state, and
to accept the massive external assistance it needs to help
establish transparent, accountable, and durable institutions of
governance. A frequently heard view is that a new state of
Southern Sudan will not be viable, upon independence.
It's noteworthy that the Government of Sudan is a mere 5
years old, with very little legacy of governance to build on
since Sudan's independence in 1956 or the colonial era
preceding that. Expectations for the performance of this
nascent state must be attenuated with the reality that no
nation-state has developed its capacity to function in such
recordbreaking time. Mistakes will be made, and sustained
patience and partnership with the South will be needed as it
assumes responsibilities for full sovereignty.
With respect to the North, the key question to be answered,
post-referendum, is whether the National Congress Party will
use its control over the government to return to its original
Islamist agenda, or will instead pursue the reforms mandated in
the CPA for both North and South, to build a multiethnic,
multicultural, multiparty, democratic, and decentralized state.
Mr. Chairman, as the principal proponent and overseer of
the CPA, the United States has a variety of near term and
longer term policy measures it could adopt to help avert a
renewed civil war and preserve its credibility as a peacemaker
in Sudan and in Africa.
The United States can best support the parties by helping
to ensure an environment that motivates them to keep the peace.
Washington can do this by focusing them, in the near term, on
the critical outstanding issues: border demarcation, oil
revenue-sharing arrangements, the resolution of citizenship
status for southerners remaining in the North after
independence, and vice versa; and the establishment of the
Referenda Commission; and by generating ideas to break these
logjams, if asked; and further, by articulating the minimum
redlines for an internationally acceptable transition to post-
referendum status.
Over the longer term, the United States should coordinate
multilateral efforts among the international special envoys to
Sudan, in developing a common agenda for focusing the parties
on these critical issues pre- and post-referenda, and in close
coordination with the AU's President Mbeki and U.N. SRSG, Haile
Menkerios. Particular attention should also be paid to China,
Egypt, and the Arab League, given their influence with
Khartoum, along with Sudan's other neighbors. Ministerial-level
attention, and higher, will be needed from the P5 and the
international witnesses of the CPA to hold the parties to
implement the final stages of the agreement.
The United States should lead by example in recognizing the
South will not remain peacefully united with the North after
January 2011, and in preparing for an independent South.
International support for self-determination should be
unambiguously affirmed, without prejudice toward unity, and
backed by preparations to recognize and assist an independent
Southern Sudan. Time is of the essence.
The United States should lay the foundation now for
upgrading relationship with the Government of Southern Sudan,
as soon as the outcome of the referendum is validated. It
should also be prepared with an even greater assistance package
than it has yet provided to support the southern government, as
well as the state- and local-level institutions, and to spur
economic growth.
In a situation with a plethora of urgent needs, both the
Government of Southern Sudan and its international partners
need to pay greater attention to securing stability for the
South. Thus far, much effort has been paid to the
professionalization of the SPLA; and, while there is more left
to be done in this regard, a similar commitment is needed to
address critical law-and-order functions, such as policing and
the judiciary.
Mr. Chairman, whether South Sudan secedes violently or not,
United States interests in Sudan will continue to be affected
by Khartoum's calculations, and communicating the United States
interest in fostering a more democratic, accountable government
for the people of Northern Sudan, as well as in ensuring a
stable, peaceful neighbor for an independent South, will be
essential for managing this relationship.
The trajectory of the bilateral relationship should be
predicated on how the NCP treats the political opposition,
civil society, and media; and on the government's willingness
to transform, as demonstrated through its actions, in pursuit
of peace in Darfur, popular consultations in Southern Kordofan
and Blue Nile states; and in movement on key issues, such as
land reform, security reform, civil service reform,
decentralization, and freedom of the press, respect for human
rights, and opening of political space.
Within this context, and prior to the referenda, the
administration should publicly begin a process to determine the
restoration of full relations with Khartoum, and prepare for a
focused development assistance package for Northern Sudan,
pending the peaceful referenda in the South and Abyei and
resolution of the conflict in Darfur.
I'll close my remarks there.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Almquist follows:]
Prepared Statement of Katherine J. Almquist, Former USAID Assistant
Administrator for Africa, Washington, DC
Chairman Feingold, Senator Isakson and members of the subcommittee,
thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss the challenges and opportunities for peace in Sudan.
Sudan faces the prospect of renewed violence between north and
south over the next 12 to 18 months. Under the terms of the 2005
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended Sudan's bloody civil
war--which claimed 2 million lives and displaced 4 million more--a
referendum in southern Sudan must be held by January 2011 to determine
whether it remains united with the north or secedes from it. Given that
popular sentiment in the south overwhelmingly favors secession, two
basic scenarios are conceivable: the south secedes peacefully through a
credible referendum process or the CPA collapses and the south fights
for independence. There is no scenario in which the south remains
peacefully united with the north beyond 2011. Further complicating
prospects for averting renewed violence are the ongoing conflict in
Darfur and potential conflicts in other marginalized areas of the
north. The violent secession of the south would hinder efforts to
resolve these conflicts, as well as increase the prospect for greater
internecine fighting among historic rivals in the south. The resulting
significant loss of life and widespread political unrest would threaten
regional stability and challenge U.S. interests in Africa.
The likely triggers of renewed civil war between north and south
over the next 12 to 18 months concern the referenda on self-
determination, border flashpoints, and oil. While ultimately the
Sudanese will determine peace and stability or conflict and insecurity,
Washington has at its disposal a variety of near term and longer term
policy measures it could adopt to help avert a renewed civil war.
challenges ahead
Renewed civil war in Sudan would present an acute policy challenge
to the United States in Africa. A major new outbreak of violence, with
all its attendant humanitarian consequences, would put considerable
pressure on the United States to respond and prevent further bloodshed.
The U.S. role as the principal broker of the CPA, the existence of
widespread public concern in the United States on Darfur, and the
concern that renewed conflict could spill over and destabilize
neighboring countries add to these pressures.
In the worst-case scenario, a renewed north-south conflict could
plunge the country into a chaotic and deadly situation of total war if
the political opposition and armed movements in the north, south,
Darfur, and east organized and coordinated their combat strategies. In
the more probable scenario of CPA collapse leading to a resumption of
generalized north-south war or even a partial resumption of
hostilities, the civilian toll is still likely to be high. Both the
northern military--the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF)--and the southern
military--the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)--are large land
armies and have acquired advanced weaponry and training for their armed
forces during the interim period. Khartoum retains air superiority over
the south and can be expected to resume its bombing raids aimed at
terrorizing civilians.
Small arms remain pervasive throughout the civilian population in
the south despite recent disarmament efforts by the Government of
Southern Sudan (GOSS). Violence in southern Sudan is already rising at
an alarming rate; in 2009, communal violence in the south surpassed the
level of violence in Darfur, displacing some 350,000 people and killing
more than 2,500. Khartoum is widely suspected of helping to foment this
violence through its standard practice of destabilization through local
proxy forces and should be expected to increase its nefarious activity
in the south along these communal fault lines, as well as by providing
ongoing support for the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), in an effort to
make the south appear ungovernable and therefore unfit for its
referendum on self-determination. Finally, retributive violence against
minorities in Khartoum, Juba, and other important cities in the north
and south with a mix of populations (southerners living in the north
and vice versa) can be expected in the event of the collapse of the CPA
and a resumption of hostilities.
The catastrophic humanitarian consequences of a violent secession
will demand that the United States work closely with the United Nations
and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to access needy populations
throughout Sudan with food and emergency relief. Conditions for
humanitarian relief will be difficult, if not impossible, in many
areas. The NCP will likely cut off humanitarian access in the north and
Darfur, ruling out international humanitarian relief efforts. In the
south, humanitarian actors could revert to cross-border operations via
Kenya and Uganda even without Khartoum's assent (as occurred during the
civil war); humanitarian flights and convoys, however, would be again
vulnerable to possible air attack.
Prospects for resolving the conflict in Darfur will dim further and
likely expire in the event of a renewed north-south war. Since the
start of 2010, Khartoum has taken the offensive against two of the
major outstanding rebel movements in Darfur, the Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Movement-Abdul Wahid (SLM-AW).
Similar to the outbreak of violence in Darfur in 2003 and its
escalation in 2004, Khartoum appears to be banking that the focus of
the international community--and particularly that of the United
States--will be diverted to the CPA (in this case securing the
referendum), allowing it to take more aggressive action in Darfur while
continuing to participate in the peacemaking efforts of the U.N./AU
joint mediator, Djibril Bassole, and the Qatari government in Doha.
In the event of the violent secession of south Sudan, neither
Khartoum nor the Darfur rebel movements will be motivated to seek a
meaningful negotiated settlement. Khartoum's tolerance of the U.N.-AU
mission in Darfur (UNAMID) may cease, and it may conclude that forcibly
returning the 2.7 million IDPs to their homes is its best option to end
international involvement in Darfur. At the same time, humanitarian
access would become very difficult, if permitted at all, denying food
and other emergency assistance to the more than 4.7 million people in
Darfur currently reliant on international aid.
As the principal proponent and overseer of the CPA, U.S.
credibility as a peacemaker in Sudan and Africa will be affected by
whether and how the United States supports the south's path to
independence. Without the unequivocal support of the United States and
the international community for the south's right to self-
determination, it will have no incentive to seek this peacefully and
avoid renewed conflict. Moreover, the rebel movements in Darfur will
conclude that the United States and the international community are not
trustworthy guarantors of a settlement with Khartoum, thus eliminating
the possibility of a political arrangement that restores stability in
Darfur and allows the voluntary return of IDPs to their homes. In the
wake of domestic advocacy campaigns on Darfur, pressure for greater
U.S. action will grow at the same time that U.S. credibility and
leverage in Sudan and the region is compromised.
In the event that the referendum passes credibly, preparations will
need to have been underway for a two-state reality. With respect to the
south, a frequently heard view is that a new state of Southern Sudan
will not be viable upon independence, given its weak institutional
capacity, signs of corruption, and proclivity for communal violence.
Yet it is noteworthy that the GOSS is a mere 5 years old, without any
legacy of governance structures or physical infrastructure from the
past 54 years of independence, or the preceding 50 years of colonial
rule, on which to build. In nearly every sense the project of the GOSS,
whether an autonomous region of a federated Sudan or a newly
independent state, is one of nation and state construction, not
reconstruction.
Expectations for the performance of this nascent state must be
attenuated with the reality that no nation-state has developed its
capacity to function as a sovereign state in such recordbreaking time,
and care must be taken to pace external demands with available
resources and realistic timeframes. Mistakes will be made and decisions
taken which do not fit into the box of international best practice, but
so long as the fundamental aspirations of the southern Sudanese
leadership are for the betterment of its people, as I believe they
currently are, then sustained patience
and partnership are due to the GOSS as it assumes the responsibilities
of full sovereignty.
For its part, the GOSS must continue to demonstrate the political
will and strength of leadership to confront the challenges of a nascent
state entirely dependent on natural resource extraction and foreign
assistance and to accept massive external assistance to help establish
transparent, accountable, and durable institutions of governance. In a
situation with a plethora of urgent needs, both the Government of
Southern Sudan and its international partners need to pay greater
attention to securing the stability of the south. Thus far, much effort
has been paid to the professionalization of the SPLA, and while there
is more left to be done in this regard, a similar commitment is needed
to address critical law and order functions such as policing and the
judiciary.
With respect to the north, the key question to be answered post-
referendum is whether the National Congress Party (NCP) will use its
control over the government to return to its original Islamist agenda
or will instead pursue the reforms mandated in the CPA for both north
and south--to build a multiethnic, multicultural, multiparty democratic
and decentralized state.
triggers for violent outbreak
The likely triggers of renewed civil war between north and south
over the next 12 to 18 months concern the referenda on self-
determination, border flashpoints, and oil. Elections held in April
2010 passed with limited violence, though they were seriously flawed
and did not meet international standards of credibility.
The Referenda
The clearest tripwire for return to war between north and south is
delay of the Southern Sudan referendum beyond January 2011, or
manipulation or denial of the results by the NCP. In addition to the
referendum on independence for the south, the CPA also affords the
volatile and oil-rich region of Abyei, historically part of the south
but currently part of the north, its own referendum to decide whether
to follow the south's decision or to stay in the north. Given Abyei's
symbolic significance to Southern Sudan, any serious movement by the
north or outside actors to postpone or defer either of these referenda
could collapse the CPA and embolden those within the south who agitate
for a unilateral declaration of independence. The SPLM leadership would
be unable to resist popular pressure for such action, even though it
would likely provoke the north to secure the oil fields militarily and
to terminate transfers of oil revenues to the south, plunging the two
parties back into war.
The NCP's utmost concern is political survival, which assumes
continued access to oil revenues and, ideally, would not entail a
referendum on southern independence. At a minimum, the NCP will attempt
to make the southern referendum as costly as possible for southerners,
both to gain maximum leverage in post-referendum negotiations as well
as to showcase its resistance to southern secession and the division of
the country. If Khartoum assesses ambivalence or outright support from
the international community in delaying the referenda, any inclination
within the party to uphold the CPA will crumble and the likelihood of
southern agitation in response to northern intransigence will mount.
In two other contested areas in northern Sudan--the states of
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile--the CPA provides each a lesser option
for popular consultations at the end of the interim period to review
and possibly amend the constitutional, political, and administrative
arrangements of these states with the national government; the CPA does
not allow for these areas to participate in the south's referendum on
independence in spite of their alliance with the south's struggle for
self-determination. Dissatisfaction with being denied self-
determination combined with mounting disappointment with the popular
consultation process due to delays and perceived manipulation will fuel
hard-line sentiment to return to war in pursuit of a better solution
for the former SPLM-held areas. Already state elections in Southern
Kordofan have been postponed due to controversial census results and
constituency demarcation; they must be conducted as quickly as possible
after the census recount is completed in mid-June so that the process
of popular consultation may move forward.
Border Flashpoints
The CPA provides for the demarcation of the north-south border
before the referendum takes place. At stake are the disposition of some
of the most productive oil reserves in Sudan, constituency delimitation
for the elections and referenda, and traditional access to land and
grazing routes. A joint committee of the parties to resolve contested
portions of the border has not finalized its work, with the four or
five most contentious border issues outstanding (comprising some 20
percent of the border) and awaiting resolution by the Presidency.
During the interim period, both the SAF and the SPLA have rearmed
and repositioned themselves along the border particularly around
strategic oil fields. Joint Integrated Units of the two forces, as
mandated by the CPA, exist in name only and are themselves sources of
considerable volatility. As the end of the interim period nears, the
chances of either accidental escalation through weak command and
control of junior officers or intentional escalation to secure vital
oil fields will rise. Numerous potential flashpoints exist; the most
prominent of which centers on Abyei.
In May 2008, the SAF's 31st brigade attacked the SPLA and burned
the town center to the ground. Intense diplomatic pressure and the
ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in July 2009 helped to
calm simmering tensions, but potential for conflict to flare between
the African Ngok Dinka and the Arab Misseriya tribes, and by extension
the SPLA and the SAF, remains high. The SAF's 31st brigade remains just
north of the town. Further, the Misseriya are blocking the demarcation
of Abyei's northern border, per the Permanent Court of Arbitration's
ruling, and the U.N. mission in Sudan (UNMIS) has yet to gain
peacekeeping access to the vital Heglig oil fields that are located in
this area. Scaled-up presence and monitoring of UNMIS along the north-
south border is imperative as quickly as possible, as is resolution of
its status in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan post-referendum.
Oil
Given that most of Sudan's currently active oil fields are on the
southern side of the north-south border and that the only pipeline for
transporting oil to the coast for export runs north to Port Sudan on
the Red Sea, negotiation of acceptable terms for oil revenue sharing
post-referendum, particularly in the eventuality of southern
independence, will be a significant indicator of the prospects for a
smooth referendum process and beyond. A basic deal between north and
south will be imperative to secure the NCP's tolerance of the
referendum process and respect for its outcome. Uncertainty about the
dispensation of oil revenues and pipeline service fees will not only
discourage NCP cooperation with a credible referendum process but
encourage it to tighten its security around the active fields. This, in
turn, will further provoke the SPLM to disrupt the pipeline or attack
the oil fields; the NCP likely underestimates this risk, believing its
control of the pipeline gives it ultimate leverage in oil revenue
negotiations.
recommendations for averting renewed civil war
While there is immense risk of a violent breakup of the country, it
is by no means inevitable. The Sudanese will determine peace and
stability or conflict and insecurity. And yet Washington has at its
disposal a variety of near-term and short-term policy measures it could
adopt to help avert a renewed civil war.
The least costly and most effective option for the United States
would be to redouble bilateral and multilateral diplomatic action to
provide pressure as well as incentives for the parties to honor their
commitment to the CPA, which has provided peace--however temporary--
between north and south for the first time in 22 years and now needs to
be consolidated through a credible referendum process. The
administration maintains leverage over Khartoum because of the range of
economic and political measures it has already imposed, vitiating
Khartoum's international legitimacy, and it must sustain a unified
message of incentives and pressures toward the NCP to achieve its
objectives for Sudan as a whole.
In the near term, the United States should lead by example in
recognizing that the south will not remain peacefully united with the
north after January 2011 and in preparing for an independent south.
International support for self-determination should be unambiguously
affirmed without prejudice toward unity, and it must be backed by
preparations to recognize and assist an independent Southern Sudan. The
United States should lay the foundation now for upgrading relations
with the GOSS and nominating an ambassador as soon as the outcome of
the referendum is validated. It should also be prepared with an even
greater assistance package than it has yet provided, particularly to
support the GOSS, state, and local level institutions of governance as
well as to spur economic growth. Continued assistance to
professionalize the SPLA will also be vital, as will even more
assistance to build a competent police force and other institutions to
maintain the rule of law, as I noted earlier.
In the event of a violent secession, all nonhumanitarian assistance
for an independent south should be contingent on a finding by the
President, notified to Congress, that the south faithfully upheld its
commitments under the CPA and that the south was not responsible for
initiating the violence. The United States could further lead the donor
community in mobilizing the resources for a post-referendum peace
dividend, which is critical to securing stability in the south and
building a capable, accountable government.
The United States can best support the parties by helping to ensure
an environment that motivates them to keep the peace. Washington can do
this by focusing them in the near term on the critical outstanding
issues, by generating ideas to break logjams if asked, and by
articulating the minimum redlines for an internationally acceptable
transition to post-referendum status. Prereferenda, the most critical
issues are the demarcation of the 1,300-mile north-south border, oil
revenue--sharing arrangements post-separation, and resolution of
citizenship status for southerners remaining in the north after
independence, and vice versa. Arrangements for the referenda and
popular consultations are lagging, requiring critical attention and
greater coordination of effort and resources to support the parties.
The administration should not attempt to negotiate any of the
outstanding issues, but it could deploy senior diplomats with
relationships with key northern and southern leaders to nurture the
transition process, in addition to the frequent visits of the
President's special envoy and in close coordination with the African
Union's President Mbeki and the United Nations' Special Representative
of the Secretary General Haile Menkerios.
As soon as possible, the U.N. Security Council should codify
consensus expectations of the international community with respect to
the final benchmarks of the CPA and closely oversee the readiness of
the U.N. for the most likely contingencies. Specifically, the Security
Council should reaffirm January 2011 as the date for the southern and
Abyei referenda through a resolution or Presidential statement that
details realistic penalties for each party if it were to renege on the
CPA. It should also require a detailed transition plan from UNMIS,
assuming an independent south; ensure that UNMIS is positioned at
hotspots along the north-south border and inside Southern Sudan; and
provide UNMIS with the resources and manning it needs to counter the
threats to civilian life that are already present.
The United States should lead the international community in
pressing for the establishment of the commissions for the referenda as
well as supporting their function; time is already short and technical
preparations lag far behind. Concerted, coordinated, and public
diplomatic pressure must be kept on the parties, particularly the NCP,
to move expeditiously in establishing the Southern Sudan Referendum
Commission and Abyei Referendum Commission and launching the popular
consultations. A key element in this regard will be a competent,
transparent, and timely complaint and dispute resolution process.
Financial and technical support for the referenda must also be
forthcoming from the international community.
Over the longer term, the United States should lead multilateral
efforts among the P5+1 (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United
States, and European Union) special envoys to Sudan in developing a
common agenda for focusing the parties on the critical issues pre- and
post-referenda, in close coordination with President Mbeki and Haile
Menkerios. Particular attention should also be paid to China, Egypt,
and the Arab League given their influence with Khartoum, along with
Sudan's other neighbors--Chad, Libya, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda,
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central Africa Republic.
Ministerial level intervention and focus from the P5+1 and the
international witnesses of the CPA (Kenya and Uganda on behalf of IGAD,
Egypt, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom, United States,
African Union, European Union, IGAD Partners Forum, League of Arab
States, United Nations) is critical to hold the parties to implement
the final stages of the agreement and to carry forward its spirit of
Sudan as a multiethnic, multicultural, diverse, decentralized, and
democratic state through the national constitutional review processes
that both northern and southern Sudan will each undergo following a
vote for secession by the south.
Whether south Sudan secedes violently or not, U.S. interests in
Sudan will continue to be affected by Khartoum's calculations over the
long term, and communicating the United States interest in fostering a
more democratic, accountable government for the people of northern
Sudan as well as in ensuring a stable, peaceful neighbor for an
independent south will be essential for managing this relationship. The
trajectory of the bilateral relationship should be predicated on how
the NCP treats the political opposition, civil society, and media and
on the government's willingness to transform as demonstrated through
its actions in pursuit of peace in Darfur, popular consultations in
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states, land reform, security reform,
civil service reform, decentralization, freedom of the press, respect
for human rights, and opening up of political space.
Prior to the referenda, the administration should publicly begin a
process to determine the restoration of full relations with Khartoum
and prepare for a focused development assistance package for northern
Sudan, pending the peaceful secession of the south and resolution of
the conflict in Darfur. In the event that the President determines and
notifies to Congress credible and peaceful referenda, as well as a
political settlement and a return to stability in Darfur, the
administration should then move forward with the development assistance
package for the north and begin the process of repealing sanctions
according to the specific requirements for which the sanctions were
imposed.
By contrast, if Khartoum reneges on its commitments in the CPA or
promotes continued conflict in Darfur, U.S. assistance should be
limited to humanitarian response, and the U.S. should seek further
multilateral punitive economic and political measures against Khartoum.
This should include pressing Sudan's European trading partners to adopt
tougher commercial sanctions against the north if it reneges on the CPA
(and to indicate their intent to do so prior to the referenda).
A commonly held view is that Khartoum only responds to increased
pressure; already many advocates are calling for threats of punitive
action and further isolation to help prevent Khartoum from reneging on
the southern referendum. This option could include bilateral threats of
military action, such as threats to blockade Port Sudan, launch air
strikes against strategic targets, or enforce a no-fly zone over the
country. The value of making these threats depends on (1) Khartoum's
perception of the likelihood of their implementation; (2) the
effectiveness of the intended action on achieving its objective; and
(3) the tradeoffs associated with each punitive measure.
For instance, an effective blockade of Port Sudan would disrupt
arms flows and major economic activity for the north, severely
challenging the regime's survival. The impact of the blockade would
need to be balanced, however, with the political and civil unrest
likely to ensue in northern Sudan, the spillover effect on the south,
and the economic harm the south would suffer from the loss of oil
revenue. Another option is to impose a no-fly zone over parts of Sudan.
Given the size and location of the country, however, most military
analysts assess it would be difficult for the U.S. Government or allied
forces to sustain such an operation. Any military options would be
costly for the United States at a time when military resources and
political capital, particularly in the Muslim world, are stretched
thin. In light of these factors, Khartoum is likely to conclude that
Washington will not follow through on military threats, and it will
correctly assume that the U.N. Security Council will not back
multilateral military action given the veto power of China and Russia--
two of Khartoum's principal arms suppliers and, in the case of China,
Sudan's largest trading partner.
Some also advocate other multilateral punitive actions, such as the
threat of tougher sanctions and/or the imposition of a full arms
embargo against Sudan. Support in the U.N. Security Council is
similarly unlikely, however. Even if consensus could be reached in the
Security Council, Khartoum's largest arms supplier is Iran, for whom
U.N.-imposed embargoes are meaningless; any arms embargo would
therefore be partial at best and would likely disproportionately affect
the south.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Ms. Almquist.
And I want to acknowledge we're joined by Senator Wicker,
and thank him for engaging me and so many members of the
committee on this issue frequently. And I'm very pleased to be
working with him on this issue, as well.
Ms. Giffen.
STATEMENT OF ALISON GIFFEN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE FUTURE OF
PEACE OPERATIONS PROGRAM, THE HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Giffen. Chairman Feingold, Senator Isakson, and members
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on
African Affairs, thank you for the opportunity to join this
important and timely discussion on assessing challenges and
opportunities for peace in Sudan.
I am pleased that the subcommittee is looking at this issue
through a whole-of-Sudan lens. Shifting attention of the
international community from one Sudan crisis to another has
undermined initial investments in sustainable progress toward
peace for the whole country.
A comprehensive approach is critical and will be a theme
that I will return to throughout my remarks.
As you know, Sudan's history has been marked by two civil
wars and various local and regional conflicts. This has left
the country with very few years of experience with peace, and
an overreliance on militaries, militias, and proxies to
maintain control within its borders.
Although the 2005 peace deal was called the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement, it failed to address the decade-long conflict
in Eastern Sudan, the then-raging conflict in the western
region of Darfur, and the many violent fractures within the
SPLA and with other organized militia and armed actors
throughout the South. Finally, it failed to address the
involvement of neighboring actors in these various conflicts.
Outright conflict between the major parties of the CPA is a
major threat to regional and international security, going
forward. However, the fragile or failed follow-on deals aimed
at solving these regional and local conflicts are just as
likely to unravel into widespread violence against civilians.
Success in Sudan requires juggling competing and sometimes
contradictory policy priorities. For example, we need to take
immediate steps to help guard against various undesirable
scenarios related to the 2011 referenda while we continue to
invest in longer term solutions.
My remarks today will focus on three immediate actions that
the international community should take during the narrow
window of opportunity leading up to and following the
referendum in January 2011 for prevention and mitigation of
widespread violence.
I've included more detail on the challenges Sudan faces,
and recommendations for investment in sustainable security over
the long term, in my testimony submitted for the record.
As we look toward the 2011 referenda, the government's
capacity and will in Northern and Southern Sudan remain
insufficient to prevent and mitigate widescale violence.
Unfortunately, the safety net that civil society, U.N.
peacekeeping operations, and international aid agencies can
sometimes provide, in the absence of state capacity, has
alarming gaps in the case of Sudan. But, the international
community has time to take steps that could bolster security,
and prevent or mitigate outbreaks of violence against
civilians.
First, we must raise awareness of national security forces'
responsibilities and obligations under law. Donors, including
the United States, should ensure that the Government of
Southern Sudan's police and army are receiving training in
international humanitarian law, refugee law, and domestic and
international human rights law, including training in
preventing and fighting sexual violence.
The training should be scenario-based and appropriate to
forces with high rates of illiteracy. Although there is
inadequate time before the referenda to fully professionalize
these forces, such training may help to sensitize security
forces to their responsibilities and obligations under domestic
and international law.
Second, we must improve peacekeeping operations' ability to
protect civilians under threat. Although the U.N. Security
Council has helpfully prioritized protection in UNAMID's and
UNMIS's current mandates, the missions lack the assets,
mobility, and flexibility to effectively execute this
objective.
UNAMID and UNMIS should develop comprehensive missionwide
protection strategies. Their current strategies are neither
comprehensive nor effective. UNMIS and UNAMID should develop
contingency plans for possible scenarios, including worst-case
scenarios that can be taken off the shelf for immediate
implementation. UNMIS should expand the use of temporary
operating bases and long-range patrols to reach areas where
violence is likely to erupt.
Third, we must increase access to vulnerable populations
and potential crisis areas. One of the greatest challenges to
international crisis prevention and response efforts,
throughout Sudan, is the inability to access vulnerable
populations.
In addition to the role that the U.N. peacekeeping
operations have in maintaining stability and access, high-level
diplomacy by the U.N., special envoys, and other international
actors, is key to negotiating access with the Government of
Sudan or other armed actors, and monitoring compliance over the
coming year.
I have focused my remarks on immediate steps that the
international community can take, in relation to domestic and
international security forces, during what will likely be a
volatile time. These activities should not be pursued at the
expense of other political lines of effort. I cannot stress
enough the important role of diplomacy at the strategic and
national level, complemented by conflict negotiation and
mediation at the local and national level. Nevertheless, I will
leave a discussion of the role of strategic-level political
efforts for other witnesses to address in greater detail.
Thank you for continuing to bring attention to the
challenges and opportunities for peace in Sudan through
hearings like this. I am honored to have been asked to testify
and I welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Giffen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Alison Giffen, Deputy Director, Future of Peace
Operations Program, The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC
Chairman Feingold, Senator Isakson, and members of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs, thank
you for the opportunity to join this important and timely discussion
on, ``Assessing Challenges and Opportunities for Peace in Sudan.''
I am pleased that the subcommittee is looking at this issue through
a ``whole-of-Sudan lens.'' A comprehensive approach is a critical
component to achieving sustainable peace and security, and will be a
theme that I will come back to often in my remarks.
As you know, Sudan's history has been marked by two civil wars, and
various local and regional conflicts. This has left the country with
very few years of experience with peace, and an overreliance on
militaries, militias, and proxies to maintain control within Sudan's
borders. Although the deal that brought an end to the active conflict
between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People's Liberation
Army (SPLA) in 2005 was called the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA),
it failed to address the decade-long conflict in eastern Sudan, the
then-raging conflict in the western region of Darfur, and the many
fractures within the SPLA and other organized militia and armed actors.
There have been many subsequent efforts to address these security
challenges, but they have yielded mixed results. The Juba Declaration
(January 2006) paved the way for more than a dozen warring militias to
be integrated into the SPLA.\1\ The Darfur Peace Agreement (May 2006)
was stillborn and was followed by a proliferation of armed actors. The
East Sudan Peace Agreement (October 2006) resulted in tenuous peace,
although wealth and governance reform dividends remain largely
undelivered. Outright conflict between the major parties to the CPA is
a major threat to regional and international security. However, these
fragile follow-on security deals at the local and regional level are as
likely to unravel into widespread violence against civilians and
humanitarian crises. Finally, the shifting attention of the
international community from one Sudan crisis to another has undermined
initial investments in sustainable progress toward peace for the whole
country.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ John Young. ``South Sudan Defence Forces in the Wake of the
Juba Declaration.'' Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of
International Studies, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Success in Sudan requires talent, persistence, and investment to
juggle competing, and sometimes contradictory, policy priorities. For
example, we must be able to identify and address the various
flashpoints for violence throughout Sudan. Each requires a tailored
response at the local level. At the same time, we must remain attentive
to the relationships between local conflicts, and national and regional
dynamics. And we need to take immediate steps to help guard against
various undesirable scenarios related to the 2011 referenda, while we
continue to invest in longer term solutions.
This testimony will explore three potential triggers of widespread
violence in Sudan, immediate steps the United States and international
community should take in the months leading up to and following the
referenda to prevent and mitigate widespread violence as well as longer
term steps that should be pursued to achieve sustainable peace and
security in Sudan.
challenges to peace
There are three major areas of potential wide-scale violence in
Sudan over the coming years:
(1) Between northern and southern Sudan: The 5-year interim period
between the signing of the CPA and the expected 2011 referenda was
designed to give the main parties additional time to build trust and
negotiate some of the most sensitive issues including how to manage a
census, elections, border demarcation, and ultimately the referenda.
However, 5 years was not enough time to make unity attractive, build a
functioning government in Southern Sudan and the transitional areas,
and reform the security sector. Moreover, there was little incentive
for the major parties to adhere to the CPA's foundational security
protocols, namely to disarm and demobilize, in the face of unfinished
negotiations and when trust between parties remained precarious.
In direct contravention of the security protocols, the parties have
reportedly continued to arm and move provocatively toward sensitive
border areas. As evidenced in Abyei and Malakal, with tensions high,
small clashes between even low-ranking members of the armed forces have
the potential to escalate quickly into widespread violence. Local
tensions over land and resources in areas along the still-undetermined
north-south border are also incendiary. These communities were armed
and used as proxies by the main parties throughout the civil war.
Rumors abound that the parties are arming and stoking the flames
between rival tribes and communities. Whether or not the rumors are
true, community perceptions could serve as accelerants to conflict.
Tensions are simmering between parties and within communities. A number
of forthcoming benchmarks including: border demarcation, negotiation of
resource rights, the implementation and results of an ill-defined and
little-understood popular consultation process in Southern Kordofan and
Blue Nile, and the process leading up to and following the referenda
for Abyei and Southern Sudan could all spark violence at the local, and
subsequently national level.
(2) In southern Sudan: Southern Sudanese expectations have been
hard to meet during the interim period, given the level of need, and
the resources and time available to meet them. In building a government
virtually from scratch in Southern Sudan, international efforts and
funding were slow to get off the ground. Initiatives focused on
strengthening the capacity of the central government in Juba. These
efforts occurred at the expense of the state and local governments
despite the fact that these government institutions are the most
appropriate and effective at providing essential services and security.
Similarly, security sector reform (SSR) has focused on the army at
the expense of the police and judiciary. Inattention to the police is
particularly troubling given the way demobilization was pursued in
Southern Sudan. In an attempt to decrease the ranks of the SPLA, SSR
programs have led to the demobilization of the army into the police,
resulting in a Southern Sudan Police Service (SSPS) that is untrained
in civilian safety and security measures. An additional challenge to
training and executing basic police tasks is the 90 percent illiteracy
rate of the SSPS. Moreover, the growing SSPS payroll, a result of the
influx of demobilized SPLA, saps resources that could pay for equipment
and training.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Alfred Sebit Lokuji, Abraham Sewonet Abatneh, Chaplain Kenyi
Wani. ``Police Reform in Southern Sudan.'' The North South Institute.
June 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given the absence of a functioning police force, Southern Sudanese
communities continue to rely on the SPLA, the United Nations Mission in
Southern Sudan (UNMIS), traditional leaders, and--due to the
availability of small arms and weapons--the arming of their own
communities for security. The proliferation of small arms in a vacuum
of state security has resulted in increasingly deadly conflicts over
cattle and resources, conflicts that last year killed 2,500 people,
displaced more than 390,000, while increasingly targeting women,
children, and the elderly.\3\ The overreliance on the SPLA for internal
security, and lack of appropriate laws and governance structures has
also led to tensions and clashes between the SPLA and SSPS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Joint NGO Briefing Paper January 2010, ``Rescuing the Peace in
Southern Sudan.'' U.N. OCHA, Humanitarian Update Southern Sudan Issue
No. 1, 17 February 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite the focus on reforming the SPLA, the integration of
militias into the SPLA resulted in a large force that is difficult to
feed and equip, let alone professionalize. Integrated militias and
individual soldiers unhappy with their salaries (which are not paid,
delayed, or are skimmed by superiors) continue to prey on the
communities they are meant to protect, resulting in violence against
civilians and community mistrust.
(3) In northern Sudan: The biggest security challenge in northern
Sudan remains a centralized, opaque, and oppressive government without
the will or capacity to provide security and essential services in an
equitable and accountable manner. The most evident symptom of this
threat is the ongoing--and I want to emphasize the nature of
``ongoing''--conflict in Darfur. Though the conflict changed from the
initial period of 2004, it has remained largely the same since 2006.
The epicenter of violence shifts, and erupted most recently in Jebel
Marra and Jebel Moon. Armed actors continue to splinter and
proliferate, and attacks against civilians persist.
The parties to the conflict are keenly aware of the power of
information and perception. They have gone to great lengths to control
information, as evidenced by the continued restrictions on access to
conflict areas, most recently Jebel Moon. Space for civil society, the
press, and international NGOs to operate in northern Sudan opens and
closes at the will of the GOS. The government in northern Sudan has
systematically silenced and slowly chipped away at independent civil
society, the press, international aid agencies, and the United Nations.
The expulsion of 13 humanitarian agencies and the dissolution of
three national NGOs on March 4, 2009, targeted organizations providing
protection programming for communities, humanitarian coordination, and
information on threats to, and vulnerabilities of, civilians
(activities that are fundamental to effective humanitarian assistance).
While large scale death was adverted, the expulsions severely
undermined the quality of assistance and protection programming
throughout northern Sudan (including post-conflict eastern Sudan and
the transitional areas). The expulsions also undercut the gathering and
reporting of information about threats to, and vulnerabilities of,
communities. This kind of information is key to preventing and
responding to protection threats, and to the kind of contingency
planning that needs to occur in preparation for and the wake of the
2011 referenda. Moreover, the increasing insecurity and attacks against
humanitarians and the U.N. has resulted in a diminished presence
outside of the main cities, undermining the delivery of essential
services and information about dynamics on the ground. A tree that
falls in the forest does make a sound even if there are no
internationals there to hear it. Conflict, violence against civilians
and humanitarian needs persist in Darfur even if there are no
internationals monitoring or reporting it.
The root causes of Sudan's conflicts--including the monopolization
of power and resources among a minority, a system maintained through
marginalization and oppression--will continue to undermine progress in
negotiations on Darfur, and risk sparking renewed conflict and
humanitarian crises in other marginalized areas of northern Sudan.
As we look toward the 2011 referenda, the governments' capacity and
will in northern and southern Sudan remain unable to prevent and
mitigate wide-scale violence on their own. Unfortunately, the safety
net that civil society, U.N. peacekeeping operations, and international
aid agencies can sometimes provide in the absence of state capacity has
alarming gaps.
immediate steps to prevent and protect
The concept of protecting civilians is broad and evolving. The term
is used by diverse stakeholders to describe efforts to protect
civilians from physical violence, secure their rights to access
essential services, and create a secure environment for civilians over
the long term. Armed actors have a dual responsibility to protect
civilians. At a minimum, in the case of armed conflict, armed actors
must adhere to international humanitarian law in, and abide by,
domestic and international human rights and criminal law in cases that
don't reach the threshold of armed conflict. However, third-party
military operations are increasingly tasked with proactively protecting
civilians in the midst of conflict by preventing or responding to
threats and attacks against civilians.
Raise awareness of national security forces' responsibilities and
obligations under law: Donors, including the United States, should
ensure that the Government of Southern Sudan's (GOSS) police and army
are receiving training in international humanitarian law, refugee law,
and domestic and international human rights law, including training in
preventing and fighting sexual violence. The training should be
scenario-based and appropriate to forces with high rates of illiteracy.
Although there is inadequate time before potential conflict related to
the CPA benchmarks and referenda to fully professionalize these forces,
such training may help to sensitize SPLA troops and SSPS officers to
their responsibilities and obligations under domestic and international
law. The ICRC, as well as appropriate U.N. and other international
agencies, should continue efforts to raise awareness of security forces
and other armed actors in northern Sudan of their obligations under
domestic and international law.
Improve peacekeeping operations' ability to protect civilians under
threat: UNMIS and the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in
Darfur (UNAMID) are tasked with providing proactive protection to
prevent violence against civilians in their areas of operation. Both
UNAMID and UNMIS have taken notable steps to implement this task. Both
missions have developed protection strategies and the civilian and/or
military leadership of these operations have issued protection
directives. Unfortunately, the protection strategies were not
comprehensive, and as such, did not provide adequate guidance to
personnel executing them. Further, a lack of training on how best to
develop, prioritize, and interpret these protection strategies and
related directives has undermined effective implementation.
Although the U.N. Security Council has helpfully prioritized
protection in UNAMID's and UNMIS's current mandates, the missions lack
the assets, mobility, and flexibility to effectively execute this
objective. Information gathering, analysis, and sharing on protection
threats and vulnerabilities--the starting point to providing effective
protection--remains inadequate. Finally, civilian and military
components tasked with protection, including the ground troops, lack an
understanding of their mandate and often have no background or training
on what protection means in practice.
There is insufficient time, international will, and resources to
overhaul UNAMID and UNMIS in advance of the referenda.\4\ However,
there are steps that can and must be taken in coming months.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Erin A. Weir and Limnyuy Konglim, ``Sudan: No Complacency on
Protecting Civilians.'' Refugees International, 8 April 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
First, UNAMID and UNMIS should develop comprehensive missionwide
protection strategies. Developing and implementing such strategies
requires consultation horizontally across the various civilian and
military components of a mission, and vertically between the tactical
and the strategic level. The missions' leadership and the U.N.
Secretariat need to discuss the missionwide strategy and/or other
directives to protect with troop and police contributing countries to
ensure they are willing to undertake these tasks and are trained
accordingly.
An early version of UNAMID's 2010 protection strategy demonstrated
a lack of consultation with key protection actors external to the
mission. The draft strategy had a misplaced emphasis on creating
conditions for recovery, development, and returns, rather than focusing
on protecting civilians from immediate threats of physical violence.
Although the status quo cannot continue, moving to recovery and return
amidst active conflict over scarce resources and land risks spreading/
intensifying conflict. Moreover, many of Sudan's internally displaced
and refugees may be unable or unwilling to return home given the lack
of land reform, lack of services, and loss of traditional methods of
livelihood and income generation.
Producing a comprehensive missionwide strategy is an end in itself.
Effective protection is dependent on a network of protection
stakeholders within and outside a peacekeeping mission, including
humanitarian actors and the communities under threat. Developing the
strategy can create trust, lines of communication for gathering and
sharing information, and innovative ways to leverage scarce resources--
all critical tools in the face of crisis and escalating violence.
Neither UNAMID nor UNMIS will be able to predict, prevent, or respond
to every protection threat in their areas of responsibility, but they
can effectively prepare to prevent and respond to rising insecurity and
violence against civilians, based on appropriate intelligence and early
warning.
Second, UNMIS and UNAMID should develop contingency plans for
possible scenarios, including worse-case scenarios that can be taken
off the shelf for immediate implementation. Such planning can help an
underresourced mission predict and preposition in potential areas of
conflict. UNMIS's preparation in advance of the Abyei border
demarcation did just that.
Third, UNMIS should expand the use of temporary operating bases and
long-range patrols to reach areas where violence is likely to erupt.
UNMIS has used long-range patrols and temporary operating bases in the
past to prevent and mitigate tribal violence. These tactics do more
than deter violence through their presence. They often include a mix of
civilian and military efforts that provide mediation and diffuse
tensions. These contingency plans must be developed in consultation
with communities, local authorities and government officials (when
appropriate), and international humanitarian and development actors
within and across the two missions.
Increase access to vulnerable populations and potential crisis
areas: One of the greatest challenges to international crisis
prevention and response efforts throughout Sudan is the inability to
access vulnerable populations. A lack of infrastructure (particularly
in the transitional areas and southern Sudan) and lawlessness combined
with government or armed actor obstruction of access (particularly in
the north) keep many areas of Sudan out of reach. Increased access
could enable the delivery of essential services and peace dividends in
a way that can mitigate, rather than exacerbate, competition over
already scarce resources. When conflict has erupted, access is critical
to evacuating international staff, providing safe areas for civilians,
and providing services that prevent other negative humanitarian
consequences. The U.N. peacekeeping operations have a role to play in
maintaining stability and security to enable access. In addition, high-
level diplomacy by the U.N., special envoys, and other international
actors is key to negotiating access with the Government of Sudan or
other armed actors and monitoring compliance over the coming year.
Moreover, the international community should be planning and
negotiating with communities and government officials to establish
potential safe areas for civilians to use, and in which essential goods
and services might be prepositioned.
I have focused my remarks on immediate steps that the international
community can take in relation to domestic and international security
forces during what will likely be a volatile time. These activities
should not be pursued at the expense of other political lines of
effort. In fact, to be effective, they must be nested in political
strategies. I cannot stress enough the important role of diplomacy at
the strategic and national level, as well as conflict negotiation and
mediation at the local and national level. Nevertheless, I will leave a
discussion of the role of strategic-level political efforts for other
witnesses to address in greater detail.
investing in the long-term security
If there is a relatively peaceful outcome following the referenda,
the need for SSR in southern Sudan should continue. SSR programs have
thus far been late in supporting the development of: (1) Effective
security strategies, and (2) management, governance, and oversight
structures. Best practice demonstrates that effective SSR begins with
national consultations on every level (from community leaders and the
public to the highest political and security levels) to develop and
coalesce a national conception of security. Such a process helps to
foster domestic ownership and lead to the development of an effective
security strategy. The United States should coordinate with other
donors to ensure these foundational elements are a priority following
the interim period.
Donors should increasingly focus on creating domestic capacity for
police training, mentoring, and oversight. Donors should also provide
technical assistance to the Ministry of Interior, but they must
increasingly look toward the decentralization of these organs to the
state and local level.
Civilian disarmament will also be key to longer term security.
Disarmament is most effective when: (1) The reach of state security
services is extended and able to address security needs, and (2) a
comprehensive approach is taken to disarm communities simultaneously
and voluntarily. Developing and implementing a comprehensive strategy
that crosses states takes time because it requires understanding
dynamics and tensions between communities, identifying how supply and
demand works across borders, and building trust between stakeholders in
the process.\5\ Without functioning state security organs, civilians
will be reluctant to disarm over the next year at a time of increasing
tension. Doing so in an ad hoc approach can leave communities
vulnerable to attack. The ad hoc, forced disarmament initiatives
undertaken by the SPLA has resulted in violence. The international
community should continue to discourage this approach.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ The Center for International Governance Innovation, ``Security
Sector Reform Monitor, Southern Sudan,'' April 2010, No. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, land reform and negotiation of resource use and
distribution is critical to sustainable security. Laws governing land
ownership and the exploitation of those laws have been a root cause of
conflict. In addition to acting as a root cause and current driver of
the conflict in Darfur, large portions of the population have been
displaced into densely populated environments, overstretching scarce
resources, such as water. This must be addressed in any peace
agreement. Successful land reform will hinge upon the inclusion of
civil society in the dialogue.
Other war-affected areas in Sudan are also affected by land and
resource issues. Migration routes continue to be a nexus for tension
and violence during the dry season, and have been exploited and
manipulated by parties to conflicts. In some areas of southern Sudan,
SPLA soldiers continue to occupy land and extract resources as payment
for liberating the area. Mass movements of the population to urban
centers seeking economic opportunities or fleeing violence over
previous decades have created marginalized communities vulnerable to
further displacement, abuse, and depredation.
Finding ways to allow resource sharing of oil revenues at the
national and state level is important, as Sudan's GDP remains dependant
on oil revenues. Nevertheless, the use and distribution of land and
other resources at the local level is critical.
u.s. policy toward sudan
Sudan's challenges are complex and any opportunities for success
will involve multiple stakeholders. Under past administrations and in
the early months of this administration, the United States Government
failed to communicate and coordinate effectively with other allies. In
the past, failure to coordinate approached to Sudan among international
allies has diluted diplomatic resources, and left fractures in the
international community prone to exploitation by the Government of
Sudan and other parties to Sudan's multiple conflicts. However, I have
been encouraged by the development and implementation of U.S. policy
over the past 6 months, as it appears to be increasingly coordinated
internally and with other allies and stakeholders.
U.S. policy toward Sudan is at its most effective when coordinated
with the United Nations, the five permanent members of the U.N.
Security Council, members of the AU and League of Arab States, and
countries neighboring Sudan. U.S. Special Envoy Jonathan Scott
Gration's efforts to communicate and coordinate with other special
envoys is a welcome step. Similarly, humanitarian assistance and
development aid is most effective when delivered in coordination with
other donors, especially during difficult economic times.
I have witnessed the impact on the ground of constructive,
coordinated U.S. diplomacy and aid. Humanitarian access in Darfur was
gradually opened in 2005 due to joint efforts of donors and the United
Nations. Diminished access and operating space is in part a result of
disinvestment in high-level monitoring mechanisms. Quick and
coordinated diplomatic action helped prevent a protection crisis in
Kalma camp in September 2007, when the Government of Sudan introduced
plans to forcefully disarm the camp. Kalma camp hosts over 80,000
displaced persons, and a government advancement on the camp would have
resulted in forced displacement and death as demonstrated in the
government incursion on Kalma Camp in August 2008.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ On 25 August, government security forces surrounded Kalma Camp,
one of Darfur's largest camps for internally displaced persons. The
government asserted the operation was a move to forcefully disarm
individuals that were reportedly armed within the camp. UNAMID
condemned the government's use of excessive force during the operation,
which resulted in 64 killed, 117 wounded, and obstructed humanitarian
access.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I have been particularly impressed and encouraged by this
administration's interest in improving institutions and mechanisms--
including peacekeeping operations--to effectively protect civilians.
U.S. efforts under the previous administration in combination with
other donors proved to be essential to ensuring greater resources for,
and attention to, the protection of civilians by both UNAMID and UNMIS.
However, we are still in early stages of this administration's policy
implementation, and have yet to see real results on the ground in
Sudan.
Preventing and mitigating conflict in Sudan is important to
regional and international security. The coming year presents
particular risks.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, Ms. Giffen.
Mr. Mozersky.
STATEMENT OF DAVID MOZERSKY, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR OF HUMANITY
UNITED, REDWOOD CITY, CA
Mr. Mozersky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Isakson, and
other members of the committee, for the opportunity to testify
today at this important time for the people of Sudan.
I have a written statement, and ask that it be included in
the record in its entirety.
Sudan is facing challenges of a historic magnitude.
Southern Sudan's self-determination referendum, in January
2011, will likely create--likely result in the creation of a
new country in the south. And ensuring that events unfold
peacefully will require sustained and high-level leadership
from the U.S. Government, and more consistent coordination
among the broader international community.
As a guarantor of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement
and author of the Abyei Protocol, the United States has a
unique responsibility and role to play.
There's a genuine risk of renewed North/South war in the
months ahead. Southerners are expected to vote for secession in
January's referendum, if the vote is free and fair. Most
Southern Sudanese and the Southern ruling SPLM view the January
9 vote as set in stone. And any attempts to delay or manipulate
the vote will be a shortcut back to war.
Pushing against this political deadline is a complex
technical process leading up to the referendum, with a
significant number of steps still to be agreed to and
implemented, while the relationship between the parties
continues to suffer from intense mistrust.
Given the absolute southern commitment to the January date
and the high risk of conflict that would flow from any
backsliding, I would urge the U.S. Government to be vocal--
early, often, and at the highest level possible--in reaffirming
its commitment to seeing that the referendum is held on time,
and the outcome respected. Vice President Biden's upcoming trip
to Africa is a good place to start this process.
Despite these challenges, openings exist to help promote a
sustainable peace, whatever the outcome of the referendum.
Allow me to briefly outline three conflict-prevention
opportunities.
The first is to support early negotiations between North
and South on post-referendum arrangements. Early negotiations
can provide guarantees to the governments in Juba and Khartoum,
as well as affected communities, that their core interests and
livelihoods will continue to be protected, regardless of the
outcome of the vote. We should be pushing for mutually
beneficial arrangements that encourage continued cooperation
and peaceful engagement between the two sides.
The importance of early dialogue is most obvious in the oil
sector. The bulk of Sudan's oil lies in the South, yet the sole
pipeline passes through the north. Failure to reach a deal
could lead to fears in the north that the referendum will mean
economic suicide or lead to a collapse of government revenue-
generation in the South, either of which would make a return to
war more plausible.
An equally important discussion is on issues of citizenship
and nationality. There are worrying signs about the status of
the 1.5 million southerners in the north, including the risk of
massive forcible displacement back to the South. While
citizenship criteria will be the sovereign choice for the
government, the international community must ensure that, at a
minimum, there are guarantees for sufficient protection of
minority rights. Humanitarian contingency planning should also
be prioritized, in case the worst comes to pass.
On the other hand, a more generous agreement on citizenship
options and minority rights will open up a series of win-win
solutions on other issues that can help anchor a sustainable
peace, such as facilitating agreements on cross-border grazing
access for pastoralist populations along the border who could
otherwise be spoilers, encouraging North/South economic
cooperation; and handling the tens of thousands of northerners
in the SPLA, and southerners in the Sudan Armed Forces, who may
find themselves cut from their mother armies in the event of
secession.
Second, the U.S. Government should promote the creations of
a demilitarized zone between the SPLA and Sudan Armed Forces
along the North/South border, with U.N. forces monitoring and
enforcing the arrangement. Though still contested in parts, the
border is the de facto front line between the northern and
southern armies.
With Sudan heading into a period of high tension and
uncertainty, separating the armies can help ensure that a
return to war requires a formal policy decision out of Juba or
Khartoum, and does not come about accidentally through a local
conflict that escalates to engulf the armies, as occurred with
the earlier fighting in Abyei and Malakal.
The third opportunity requires that we look beyond the end
of the CPA in July 2011, and begin to plan for the fallout in
both North and South. There are no guarantees that the progress
seen over the CPA's lifetime will continue. We must promote new
processes, before the end of the year, that encourage inclusive
and consultative governance, and that can survive beyond the
referendum.
If we assume a southern secession vote in the referendum,
then North and South Sudan both face a new set of challenges,
as outlined in my testimony, including the need for greater
transparency, protection of human rights, and inclusiveness in
government. I'm happy to speak to this in greater detail during
the questions.
U.S. leadership could be catalytic on two fronts in the
coming months. The first relates to the recent elections. Their
lack of credibility was widely reported, and they left millions
unsatisfied. But, they were elections, and valuable lessons
were learned. The next step is to ensure that elections are
held again in North and South in 4 or 5 years' time so those
lessons can be applied and processes improved. The United
States should lead the international community in putting the
expectation of continued multiparty elections back on the
table.
The second recommendation is to begin promoting, now, the
importance of inclusive and consultative processes in North and
South for the drafting and development of the new
constitutions, post-CPA. These processes will create a new
legal framework for one, and perhaps two, countries. Ensuring
they're inclusive and consultative will go a long way toward
shaping the kind of countries they'll govern.
The United States should also continue to support the
popular consultation processes in southern Kordofan and Blue
Nile. And any United States engagement with Khartoum should
include a focus on national government reform, issues of good
governance and human rights, and combating the culture of
impunity that drives Sudan's conflict cycle.
Finally, we must recognize that the ongoing conflict in
Darfur is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. The
war in Darfur will continue to be a cause of immense human
suffering and instability throughout Sudan. The international
community must continue to push for improved security,
unimpeded humanitarian access, and the meaningful inclusion of
civil society in the peace process.
I want to thank you again, Mr. Chairman, Senator Isakson,
and other members of the committee, for the opportunity to
testify. And I look forward to answering your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mozersky follows:]
Prepared Statement of David Mozersky, Associate Director of Humanity
United, Redwood City, CA
Mr. Chairman, Senator Isakson, and other members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today at this
important time for the people of Sudan. I have a written statement and
ask that it be included in the record in its entirety.
This hearing comes at a critical moment: The challenges facing
Sudan in the coming year are of historic magnitude. The future of the
country will be reshaped, for better or for worse. Southern Sudan's
self-determination referendum in January 2011 will likely result in the
creation of a new independent country in the South. Yet, the risks
ahead are great. Ensuring that events unfold peacefully will require
sustained and high-level leadership from the international community--
including the United States. As a guarantor of the 2005 Comprehensive
Peace Agreement, or CPA, and the author of the Abyei Protocol, the U.S.
Government has a unique and important responsibility to help provide
leadership and support to the people of Sudan in the months and years
ahead.
It is widely expected that southerners will vote for secession, if
the vote is free and fair. Some in the international community are
beginning to exhibit reservations about the approaching referendum
date, and the mounting list of matters that need to be implemented
before the January vote. This includes unresolved issues between North
and South that could sow the seeds for future conflict and governance
and capacity challenges in the South that could be exacerbated post-
referendum. Despite these concerns, the referendum remains a rallying
cry for southern Sudanese, a common objective after two long and costly
civil wars dating back more than 50 years. The developments of the
coming period will have implications for all nine of Sudan's
neighboring countries and the entirety of the African Continent. The
African Union (AU), for instance, is built on the principle of the
sanctity of existing borders and there is already much concern among AU
Member States about the potential fall-out from Sudan splitting in two.
There is a genuine risk of a return to large-scale North-South
conflict in the runup to the referendum and the fault lines for the
coming months are becoming clearer. The referendum is the only
nonnegotiable redline in the CPA for the South and the southern-
dominated Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). The January 9 vote
is set in stone and I believe that any attempts to delay, backtrack, or
manipulate the vote will be a shortcut back to war. Pushing against
this political deadline is a complex and ambiguous technical process
and a significant number of steps still to be implemented. These steps
include the formation of the Southern and Abyei referendum commissions,
followed by the clarification of voter eligibility in the southern and
Abyei referenda, with voter registration scheduled to be completed by
July. Each of these steps requires some sort of agreement between the
National Congress Party (NCP) and the SPLM, yet the relationship
between the parties continues to suffer from intense mistrust.
We can expect the NCP to drag its feet on procedural discussions in
order to either extract greater concessions from the SPLM on post-2011
negotiations or to try to push back the referendum date given the
already tight timeline before January. The response of the U.S.
Government and the broader international community will be critical to
determining how this transpires. Given the absolute southern commitment
to the January date, as per the CPA, and the high risk of conflict that
would flow from any backsliding, I would urge the U.S. Government to be
vocal--early, often, and at the highest level possible--in reaffirming
its commitment to seeing that the referendum is held on time per the
terms of the peace agreement. The CPA is a contract between the parties
in Sudan, the U.S. Government, and the other international signatories.
We must all live up to this responsibility and ensure that the terms of
the agreement are implemented as originally agreed upon.
Despite the risks outlined above, there exist some important
opportunities to help avoid the worst case scenarios and to promote
sustainable peace and stability, whatever the outcome of the
referendum. Allow me to briefly outline three openings that currently
exist for conflict prevention efforts, where U.S. Government leadership
and support to existing international efforts could have an important
impact in ensuring a peaceful future for all Sudanese.
The first opportunity is to provide full and active support to
early negotiations between North and South on post-referendum
arrangements, to help ensure that these talks succeed. The greatest
risk of conflict in the months ahead stems from uncertainties about the
implications of the referendum on people's livelihoods, as well as
national and economic interests--particularly in the context of a vote
for independence. This uncertainty will lead to zero-sum calculations
on the referendum and increase the chances of violence, particularly if
key actors perceive that they stand to lose from the referendum going
ahead or from a particular outcome. The importance of early
negotiations on post-referendum arrangements is to provide some early
guarantees to the governments in Juba and Khartoum, as well as affected
communities, that their core interests and livelihoods will continue to
be protected regardless of the outcome of the vote. What's more, these
agreements will shape the nature of future relations between North and
South. Where possible, we should be pushing for mutually beneficial
arrangements that encourage continued cooperation and peaceful
engagement between North and South.
The importance of this early dialogue is most obvious in the oil
sector. The bulk of Sudan's oil lies in the South, yet the sole
pipeline for export passes through the North. Oil revenue currently
provides the majority of government revenue for both the national and
southern governments. A threat to that revenue source could quickly
torpedo the ability of the governments in Juba or Khartoum to rule
effectively post referendum. An early deal on continued cooperation in
the oil sector in the event of a secession vote will provide
reassurance that southern oil can continue to make the journey to
international markets via Port Sudan and that some share of revenue
from oil can still be counted on in both Juba and Khartoum in the near
and middle term. By contrast, the failure to reach such a deal is
likely to lead to fears among the NCP that the referendum will mean
economic suicide. From that perspective, a return to war or an attempt
to recapture some of the southern oil fields seems entirely plausible.
While an oil deal matters for the economies of both North and
South, an equally important set of negotiations are those related to
issues of citizenship and nationality. The immediate fear is the status
of the 1.5 million southerners currently living in the North, should
the South vote for secession. There are worrying signs about Khartoum's
intent toward this population, including possibly stripping southerners
of citizenship, and the resulting threat of massive forcible
displacement back to the South, which could lead to outright conflict
between North and South. While the citizenship criteria will ultimately
be the sovereign choice of the government, the international community
must ensure that at a minimum there are guarantees for sufficient
protection of minority rights and that rights and responsibilities
under international law are upheld. Here, there is an important
precedent to build on. In 2004, Sudan signed the Four Freedoms
Agreement with Egypt, whereby each government granted the right to
work, and the rights of movement, residence, and ownership to each
other's citizens. If Khartoum and Juba could be persuaded to make a
similar public commitment at this early stage, it would go a long way
toward reducing the risk of a preventable humanitarian catastrophe and
toward building the framework for a sustainable peace between North and
South.
The discussion on citizenship and minority rights has implications
for a range of other highly charged post-referendum issues. The goal
should be to find win-win solutions and to encourage continued North-
South cooperation and interaction, both as a short-term safety net for
vulnerable populations and as a basis for a sustainable long-term
peace. A more generous agreement on citizenship options and minority
rights will be crucial for opening up a series of pro-peace, mutually
beneficial arrangements and will help facilitate a soft landing for all
parties post-referendum. For example, such an arrangement opens the
door for agreements on cross-border grazing access for pastoralist
populations who reside along the border. It encourages a soft border
and facilitates North-South economic cooperation, an important pillar
for long-term peace. And it increases options available for the tens of
thousands of northerners in the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)
and southerners in the Sudan Armed Forces who may find themselves cut
from their mother armies in the event of a secession vote, a serious
and immediate security concern. These issues address the people most
directly affected by the referendum. It remains to be seen if the
effect will be positive or negative, but a package of win-win solutions
begins with the question of citizenship and minority rights, and a
strong U.S. position on these issues could be of tremendous value in
helping to shape the direction of the process in a positive way,
benefitting the people and reducing the risk of war.
The second conflict prevention opportunity is related, in that it
too seeks to help reduce the chances of war along the border.
Specifically, the U.S. Government should promote the creation of a
demilitarized zone between the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)
and Sudan Armed Forces along the North-South border, with U.N. forces
monitoring and enforcing the arrangement. Though still contested in
parts, the North-South border is the de facto front line between the
northern and southern armies. Tens of thousands of troops are deployed
there, among and between the communities who call this area home. There
have been a handful of clashes between the two armies over the past 5
years--all of them have been started by a local conflict that has
quickly escalated to fighting between the armies. Communities along the
border are generally aligned along the North-South axis. Establishing a
demilitarized zone would help to separate local tensions from national
fault lines and help to avoid a violent incident from escalating to a
full return to war. With Sudan heading into a period of high tension
and tremendous uncertainty, separating the armies doesn't make a return
to war impossible, but it does help ensure that a return to war is a
policy decision out of Juba or Khartoum--and not just an escalation of
local conflict that engulfs the armies (as occurred in the fighting
Malakal in 2007 and in Abyei in 2008). The U.N. mission could help
monitor the pullback of forces and patrol such a demilitarized zone.
This kind of setup could be a game changer, reducing the tension along
the border and promoting stability in the transitional areas of Abyei,
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, helping reduce the ambiguity
associated with the proliferation of arms and paramilitary groups in
Sudan, and reducing the risk of a return to large-scale war.
The third opportunity for conflict prevention requires that we look
beyond the referendum timeline and begin to plan for the fallout in
both North and South. In either a unity or secession scenario, the
terms of the CPA--the main framework for politics, and international
engagement for the past 5 years--are due to expire in July 2011. The
current interim national constitution will need to be renegotiated and
there are no guarantees that the limited progress seen over the CPA's
lifetime will continue. We must work to promote the creation of
processes over the 7 months remaining this year that encourage
inclusive and consultative governance and that will survive beyond the
referendum.
If we assume a southern secession vote in the referendum, then
North and South Sudan both face a new and potentially more difficult
set of challenges. In the South, the challenges of nation-building will
be great and the recent elections have highlighted dangerous
intrasouthern divisions that could be exacerbated once the unifying
event of the referendum is over. The elections also demonstrated
worrying heavy-handedness at times by southern security forces against
opposition candidates, the media, and civil society. These trends must
be monitored closely. As part of any U.S. support to the South, we must
be consistently be pushing the principles of transparency and
inclusiveness in the exercise of nation building that lies ahead.
The situation in the North post-referendum is equally worrying. The
April elections in the North delivered the intended result for
Khartoum. Since that time, there has been a series of post-election
government crackdowns and arrests of opposition, independent media, and
civil society activists. A post-referendum North will still face an
active rebellion in Darfur, and Sudan's long history of center-
periphery conflict will likely continue, but without the South in the
mix. In short, while the referendum may allow the South to opt out of
one set of problems, many of Sudan's long-term troubles will remain.
The United States can help reduce the chances of new conflict in
vulnerable areas in the North by continuing to support the popular
consultation processes in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, and helping
to ensure that these processes succeed. Any U.S. engagement with
Khartoum should be focused on issues of good governance and combating
the culture of impunity that drives the cycle of conflict. The U.S and
the region have a stake in the nature and direction of a post-
referendum North, but getting this right will require policy planning
that stretches beyond the short term.
There are two specific recommendations for initiating longer term
processes, where U.S. leadership could be catalytic. The first relates
to the recent elections: Their lack of credibility, particularly in the
North, but also in the South, was widely reported, and they left
millions of people unsatisfied. But they were elections. Valuable
lessons were learned and experiences accumulated. The next step is to
ensure that elections are held again in the North and the South in 4 or
5 years time, so that those lessons can be applied and processes
improved. The U.S. should lead the international community in putting
the expectation of another round of multiparty elections back on the
table. The second recommendation is to promote the importance of an
inclusive and consultative process in North and South for the drafting
and development of the new constitutions, post-CPA. These processes
will create a new legal framework for one, perhaps two, new countries.
Ensuring they are inclusive and consultative will go a long way toward
shaping the kind of countries they're likely to govern. While much of
the coming period will require the U.S. to react to events, there are
opportunities to proactively lead and help shape processes that can pay
dividends for peace, stability, and democracy down the road.
Finally, we must recognize that the ongoing conflict in Darfur is
likely to continue for the foreseeable future. The level of fighting
has increased significantly in 2010, and recent weeks have seen a
number of heavy clashes between government forces and the JEM, which
led to the latter's withdrawal from the Doha peace process. The war in
Darfur will continue to be a cause of immense human suffering and
instability throughout Sudan. The international community must continue
to push for improved security, unimpeded humanitarian access for the
U.N. and aid organizations, and the meaningful inclusion of civil
society in the peace process. The United States should insist that the
U.N. be allowed to conduct a humanitarian needs assessment, so we can
better reduce current suffering and continue to work for a long-term
solution.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, sir.
And now we'll go to Ms. Richard.
STATEMENT OF ANNE RICHARD, VICE PRESIDENT FOR GOVERNMENT
RELATIONS AND ADVOCACY, INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Richard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator
Isakson, Senator Wicker, and members of the subcommittee for
the opportunity to testify today on this issue of assessing
challenges and opportunities for peace in Sudan.
I appreciate your offer to have our full testimony put in
the record.
The International Rescue Committee has been one of the
largest providers of aid in Southern Sudan for decades.
IRC has over 250 staff working in Southern Sudan. Of this
number, over 225 are, themselves, Sudanese. There are 20
expatriates working for us there. In looking at the challenges
to our work, I think it helps if you can put yourself in the
shoes of one of our Sudanese colleagues, trying to do a good
job and do something constructive in a very challenging
situation. First, you must realize that your job is sometimes
dangerous, as your fellow citizens are under great stress and
living in a pressure-cooker environment.
Just in getting ready for this testimony and talking to our
field staff, they told us of a couple of instances, that are in
the testimony, where SPLA soldiers were unhappy because they
were underpaid and they resorted to violence or they threatened
violence to some of their fellow citizens.
In Southern Sudan, war and its aftermath has led to the
deterioration of traditional ways to mediate disputes. Youth
are no longer under the control of chiefs, and can instigate or
exacerbate violence, including violence at or around schools.
Communities have also seen the proliferation of small arms. The
absence of institutions that promote justice and the rule of
law, such as police, courts, and prisons, means that tension
can quickly escalate to violence. Once an outbreak of violence
occurs, it becomes difficult to break the cycle and stop
retaliatory attacks.
Security challenges for humanitarians range from being
targets of violence to having great difficulty gaining access
to the most isolated people and places. Many bush airstrips,
used to provide humanitarian aid during the civil war, have
fallen into disrepair. These airstrips once served as a
lifeline, as they were often the only access to remote
communities. Last October, 75 bush airstrips across Southern
Sudan were classified by the World Food Programme as unusable
``no-go'' zones.
Second, if you were one of my colleagues in Southern Sudan,
you would also realize that the welfare of your family and
friends is in great jeopardy because of widespread poverty and
lack of development. The human development indicators for the
Southern Sudanese are really shocking. Less than half the
population has access to safe drinking water. A pregnant woman
in Southern Sudan has a greater chance of dying from pregnancy-
related complications than a woman almost anywhere else in the
world. One in seven children will die before their fifth
birthday. Only one quarter of the citizenry in Southern Sudan
has access to medical care. And of those people, 85 percent of
them get it from NGOs and church groups instead of their own
government. And, finally, close to 90 percent of Sudanese women
cannot read, in the South.
In sum, Southern Sudan is one of the least-developed
regions of the world. It is slightly larger than France, but it
only has 50 kilometers of paved roads. And the rest of the
human development indicators are near the bottom of the scale.
Yet, this region may soon be its own country. Whatever
happens after the referendum of January 9, 2011, basic needs
for health care and clean water will not disappear overnight.
Third, as a Sudanese IRC worker, you fear for the future of
your country. You know that government capacity is weak, and
that you cannot rely on your own government to provide you with
services, like health and education, roads to market, and a
functioning police force.
Finally, you also have a sinking feeling that the rest of
the world will soon forget about Southern Sudan. Future aid
flows remain uncertain.
The 2011 referendum is rapidly approaching, and many
countries see this as a deadline and an end of a process,
rather than merely a step on a road toward a better life for
the Southern Sudanese.
So, very quickly, IRC offers the following recommendations.
The Southern--Southern Sudan cannot move forward without
both humanitarian and longer term development assistance. We
need both of these things at the same time, which, I think, is
not fully appreciated sometimes, where we would like to see
them pushed along to economic development. The situation's not
there yet. The--it's not ripe.
Second, U.S. Government should continue bilateral funding
to Southern Sudan, and should also push other donors to
continue to contribute. The United States and the international
community need to plan for aid beyond the referendum. We should
be thinking out beyond than just the immediate next few months.
The Government of Southern Sudan must move beyond a focus
on civilian disarmament and instead strengthen the ability of
its military and police to protect civilians.
Frankly, Sudan's ruling elites need to engage with the
country's diverse populations and bring an end to the politics
of exclusion and conflict. Citizens should participate in the
big decisions facing their country.
And, at the same time, we would recommend that everything
be done to increase humanitarian access, by restoring those
bush airstrips and getting roads in better condition.
Despite a very challenging work environment, our staff and
their colleagues from other NGOs--nongovernmental
organizations--daily attempt to educate children, protect women
and girls, provide health care, and strengthen weak
institutions. This corps of humanitarians and development
experts, largely made up of Sudanese citizens, are committed to
building a country and helping the South recover from years of
civil war.
The International Rescue Committee urges the U.S.
Government to remain committed to peace in Sudan, and to
continue to play a constructive role.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing on this
very important subject. We're very grateful.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Richard follows:]
Prepared Statement of Anne C. Richard, Vice President, Government
Relations & Advocacy, International Rescue Committee, Washington, DC
Chairman Feingold, Ranking Member Isakson, and members of the
committee, Please let me begin by saying that I appreciate the
opportunity to appear here today, along with my colleagues to testify
on the issue of assessing challenges and opportunities for peace in
Sudan. My name is Anne Richard and I represent the International Rescue
Committee.
Founded in 1933, the IRC is a global leader in emergency relief,
rehabilitation, protection of human rights, post-conflict development,
resettlement services and advocacy for those uprooted or affected by
violent conflict and oppression. The IRC is on the ground in over 40
countries, providing emergency relief, relocating refugees, and
rebuilding lives in the wake of disaster. Through 22 regional offices
in cities across the United States, we help refugees resettle in the
United States and become self-sufficient.
The IRC has been one of the largest providers of aid in Southern
Sudan for 30 years, delivering emergency relief and post-conflict
assistance. Today, our programs are designed to save lives, mitigate
the effects of conflict and help communities to sustain themselves.
Following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005, the IRC has
focused on four areas: health care; governance and rights; child and
youth protection and development; and gender-based violence. The IRC
directly supports 450,000 people in five states: Central and Eastern
Equatoria, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Unity and Lakes.
humanitarian, development, and security challenges in southern sudan
IRC has over 250 staff in country. Of this number, over 225 are
Sudanese. There are 20 expatriates working for us in Southern Sudan. In
looking at the challenges to our work, I think it helps to consider
these from the perspective of one of our staff. Put yourself, if you
can, in the shoes of a Southern Sudanese staff member of the IRC
working in the remote, underserved villages of Unity State in Southern
Sudan.
First, you must realize that your job is sometimes dangerous as
your fellow citizens are under great stress and living in a pressure-
cooker environment. Earlier this month one of our staff members
reported: ``A beating took place next to our compound this afternoon,
and our guard reported that it was soldiers beating up the SPLA finance
guy who was giving them a smaller salary. It sounded quite bad. Again,
this was very public and in the middle of the village for all to see.''
IRC managers were also receiving reports that soldiers were staying at
a nearby clinic--a primary health care unit--and continuing to demand
food from women in the community, including the wives of IRC staff.
In Southern Sudan, war and its aftermath has led to the
deterioration of traditional ways to mediate disputes. Youth are no
longer under the control of chiefs and can instigate or exacerbate
violence. Communities have also seen the proliferation of small arms.
These facts and the absence of institutions that promote justice and
the rule of law (police, courts, prisons) mean that tension can quickly
escalate to violence. Once an outbreak of violence occurs, it becomes
difficult to break the cycle and stop retaliatory attacks.
Security challenges for humanitarians range from being targets of
violence to having great difficulty gaining access to the most isolated
of our beneficiaries. According to the January 2010 joint NGO report
entitled ``Rescuing the Peace in Southern Sudan,'' many bush airstrips
used to provide humanitarian aid during the civil war have fallen into
disrepair. These airstrips once served as a lifeline, as they were
often the only access to remote communities. Yet as of October 2009, 75
bush airstrips across Southern Sudan had been classified by the World
Food Programme (WFP) as restricted.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Oxfam et al., ``Rescuing the Peace in Southern Sudan,'' joint-
NGO report, January 9, 2010: 17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, you also realize that the welfare of your family and
friends is in jeopardy because of widespread poverty and the lack of
development. Less than half the population has access to safe drinking
water. A pregnant woman in Southern Sudan has a greater chance of dying
from pregnancy-related complications than a woman almost anywhere else
in the world. One in seven children will die before their fifth
birthday. Only one quarter of the citizenry in Southern Sudan has
access to medical care, and 85 percent of care is provided by NGOs and
church groups instead of the government. Close to 90 percent of
Southern Sudanese women cannot read.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Oxfam et al., 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In sum, Southern Sudan is one of the least developed regions in the
world. In a region the size of France with only 50 km of paved road,
human development indicators sit near the bottom of the scale. Yet this
region may soon be its own country. Regardless of what happens after
the referendum of January 9, 2011, basic needs for health care and
clean water will not disappear overnight. Nor will the pressing need
for development.
Third, you fear for the future of your country. You know that
government capacity is weak and you see little evidence that things are
improving. Much of the investment taking place has been focused on the
town of Juba and there are few signs of economic development elsewhere.
The overall amount of technical assistance provided to the government
is quite small. A recent report contrasted the 150 foreign technical
experts and advisers serving now in the ministries in Southern Sudan to
the 3,000 that reported to duty in post-war Mozambique in 1990.
You know that you cannot rely on the government to provide you with
the services like health and education, roads to market and a
functioning police force.
And, finally, you also have a sinking feeling that the rest of the
world will soon forget about Southern Sudan. Future aid flows remain
uncertain. The 2011 referendum is rapidly approaching and many
countries may see this deadline as the end of the peace process and of
their interest in Sudan, rather than merely a step on a road toward a
better life for the Southern Sudanese.
targeting challenges: aid
What can be done to help the people of Southern Sudan? An important
step is to improve the delivery of aid.
Over the past 2 years, the major government donors of aid to
Southern Sudan sought to increase aid coordination and intended to
shift most of their aid from bilateral aid to pooled funding
mechanisms, such as the World Bank's Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF).
However, the pooled funding mechanisms have been bogged down in
bureaucracy and very little money has been made available through them
to date. In addition, the MDTF requires contributions from the
Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), which the GOSS has been unable to
meet, as GOSS revenue has suffered immensely from the financial crisis
and the plunge in oil prices. Currently, many donor governments have
concluded that the MDTF has been a failure, and several have pulled out
(such as the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, among others).
Discussions continue among donor governments about whether to
divert existing funds or contribute new funds into alternative pooled
mechanisms that are designed better. However, even if another mechanism
or interim solution is devised, it will be at least 6 months before
these funds would flow, as award procedures would need to be developed,
calls for proposals released, and awards issued. Pooled funding is a
good concept in theory but difficult in practice because it does not
allow implementing partners the opportunity to build relationships,
report back to and advocate directly with donor governments.
Aid to Southern Sudan also exemplifies a broader challenge across
many countries, where there is confusion about when aid for
humanitarian purposes and aid for longer term development are needed.
Many donor governments concerned about Southern Sudan would like to see
a phase out of humanitarian aid and a move toward programs that promote
economic recovery and development. In 2009, however, analysts saw how
development indicators fell, tensions rose and humanitarian programs
remained vital for many people even as the 2010 elections and 2011
referendum drew nearer. It is very hard to secure multiyear funding in
order to run long-term programs to build the capacity of government
institutions, strengthen health care and educational systems, and
contribute to a functioning economy in a setting that desperately needs
it when, at the same time, health conditions remain at emergency
levels. Donors should recognize the need for both kinds of assistance,
especially in such a complex and challenging setting as Southern Sudan.
It is essential that the U.S. Government continue bilateral funding
to Southern Sudan. We also ask that the U.S. Government push the donors
that are contributing to pooled funding mechanisms to get them
unblocked as soon as possible given that the referendum is just 7
months away. The U.S. Government should also advocate for both
humanitarian and long-term development funding. Finally, U.S.
policymakers must be realistic about the large amount of resources,
both human and financial, that will be required for rebuilding in the
South.
Reductions or delays in the provision of basic services and in
building up the capacity of government of South Sudan will exacerbate
tensions around the referendum. If secession is the outcome, people
will expect a ``secession-dividend'' just as the signing of the CPA led
to high expectations for an immediate ``peace dividend''--a peace
dividend that, 5 years later, has hardly materialized.
targeting challenges: support for a safe and credible referendum
In addition to improving the delivery of aid, other governments and
international organizations should do everything possible to ensure
that the safe and credible referendum takes place as scheduled. A
January 2010 Chatham House report, commissioned by the IRC and written
by Sudan expert Eddie Thomas, states: ``The international community
needs to continue to support Popular Consultations and the referendum
while recognizing that these processes will complicate politics in
regions of Sudan that are not at peace.'' \3\ Thomas goes on to explain
that these processes, which were meant to help Sudanese people
determine their own future freely, now run the risk of perpetuating
violence. But they must be completed on schedule, because the big
deadline of the Southern referendum cannot be altered without enormous
risks.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Thomas, Eddie, ``Decisions and Deadlines: A Critical Year for
Sudan,'' Chatham House report, January 9, 2010: 8.
\4\ Thomas, 16-17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is urgent that the international community, including countries
that are Sudan's neighbors, the African Union and the United Nations,
provides immediate mediation and support to Sudan's parties to resolve
outstanding issues and help stage a referendum. A successful
referendum, in which the Southern Sudanese determine their own future,
is Sudan's best chance for peace.
The Chatham House report also points out that delays in reaching
political agreements and adopting laws on referendums and Popular
Consultations will put impossible pressures on electoral bureaucracies
in the coming 12 months. Donors should commit now to help mitigate
those pressures with their resources.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Thomas, 19-20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If the people choose secession, it is imperative that the two
parties to the CPA reach deals on security arrangements, oil revenues,
water rights, assets and liabilities, currency, nationality and a host
of other issues. If the people choose unity, these issues will not
disappear and will still need review. Primary responsibility for these
processes lies with the two parties, however countries that have
supported the CPA, along with foreign investors, need to work together
to limit the possibility of failure.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Thomas, 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
improving efforts to enhance local capacities for conflict prevention
and mitigation, civilian protection, and humanitarian access
Processes called for in the CPA, such as the peaceful demarcation
of a populous and troubled border that intersects millions of lives and
livelihoods, require Sudan's ruling class to engage with the
population. These are processes that depend on millions of people
understanding, calculating, speaking and acting for them to work. The
failure to complete these processes is often presented as rooted in the
suspicions of the two parties. They are also examples of the state's
seeming inability to relinquish coercion and engage with wider
populations.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Thomas, 21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sudan's powerful elites must avoid perpetuating the politics of
exclusion and conflict and help citizens participate in the big
decisions facing the country.
Civilian policing, which is the role of the Southern Sudan Police
Service (SSPS), is weak. The police have shown limited capacity in
regards to civilian protection. Building a trained police force
typically takes more than 10 years, however at 5 years on the SSPS lack
training, equipment, radios, cars, and uniforms and civilians are often
better armed than the police. Because this police force lacks the
capacity to uphold its mandate, the responsibility of policing
continues to fall to the SPLA. This is now, and will continue to be, a
crucial responsibility for the SPLA during and after the referendum
period.
For improving protection of civilians and to ensure humanitarian
access, the U.N. mission in Sudan should deploy Temporary Operating
Bases (TOBs) and initiate preemptive patrolling in 13 areas in Southern
Sudan where potential intercommunal violence has been identified in
order to provide a deterrent presence. UNMIS should monitor the GOSS-
led forced civilian disarmament process in Jonglei, Warrap, and Lakes
states. They should also expand the contingency planning exercise in
Abyei to other areas, by developing concrete local protection
strategies to provide safe spaces for civilians in case of an eruption
of violence.
The GOSS, with support from international partners, must move
beyond a focus on civilian disarmament to strengthening the ability of
its military and police to provide effective internal security and
protect civilians.
recommendations
To summarize, the IRC offers the following recommendations:
--The U.S. Government and the international community must realize that
Southern Sudan cannot move forward without both humanitarian and
long-term development funding.
--The U.S. Government should continue bilateral funding to Southern
Sudan. The U.S. Government should also push donors that are
contributing to pooled funding mechanisms to get them unblocked
quickly as the referendum is only 7 months away.
--With support from international partners, the GOSS must move beyond a
focus on civilian disarmament and instead strengthen the ability of
its military and police to provide effective internal security and
protect civilians.
--Numerous agreements must be made on a wide range of complex processes
before January 2011. Sudan's ruling elites need to engage with the
country's diverse populations, if they are to avoid perpetuating
the politics of exclusion and conflict and help citizens
participate in the big decisions facing the country.
--To increase humanitarian access to remote communities, the GOSS
should start to restore the 75 bush airstrips across Southern Sudan
that the World Food Programme classified as ``no-go'' in October
2009. These airstrips once served as a lifeline to hard to reach
communities.
As I mentioned before, Southern Sudan is a region where one in
seven children will die by their fifth birthday; less than 50 percent
of the population has clean drinking water; and a pregnant mother has a
greater chance of dying in childbirth than anywhere else in the entire
world. No matter what the outcome, these issues will not disappear come
January 2011. Despite a very challenging work environment, our staff
and their colleagues from other nongovernmental organizations daily
attempt to educate children, protect women and girls, provide health
care and strengthen weak institutions. This corps of humanitarians and
development experts--largely made up of Sudanese citizens--are
committed to building a country and helping the South recover from
years of civil war. The International Rescue Committee urges the U.S.
Government to remain committed to peace in Sudan also and to continue
to play a constructive role in helping to spur development and ensure
security, especially in the south.
Senator Feingold. I thank all of you for your important
testimony.
I'll begin with a 7-minute round of questions.
Ms. Almquist, let me start with you. This is something I
asked General Gration, almost 2 weeks ago. In the event that
the National Congress Party takes actions to disrupt the
referendum process, what do you see as the viable policy
options for the United States? And, in your view, what steps
should the administration take now to ensure that we are
prepared to act, in the event of that scenario?
Ms. Almquist. First, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the
question.
I think, first of all, we have some lessons to learn from
the recently concluded--or almost concluded elections process.
One state, that of southern Kordofan, most notably, still needs
to have their election. And that's--I just make a note of that,
because it's very important for the popular consultation
process there, and for preventing an outbreak of violence in
that critical area.
Now, I think that we need to be vocal now, up front, ahead
of the referenda, about what the critical benchmarks are for a
baseline process. I'm not sure that we were as explicit as we
could have been, publicly. I'm sure there were many
communications privately to the parties, in terms of a free and
fair election process.
You know, the more that we can say now, the more that we
can get the other witnesses of the CPA to repeat those
messages, especially those who perhaps are perceived as more
friendly and closer to Khartoum, you know, I think the greater
likelihood that we'll see behavior match the expectations that
we would all like to have for the referenda.
It's entirely predictable, I think, that there will be
stalling and foot-dragging, in terms of the negotiations and
the standing up for the Referenda Commission. Both the Southern
Sudan Referendum Commission and the Abyei Referendum Commission
are still waiting on the formation of the new governments from
the recently concluded elections. That needs to happen as
quickly as possible, and with as much vocal pressure as
possible from the United States and other key members. And
then, to keep on track, each step of the way, with the process
as it goes, and to hold them account publicly.
I think the United States has exhausted most of its
bilateral or unilateral measures for economic sanctions and
other pressures--on Khartoum, in particular--since we have a
full range of sanctions, as you all know, in place already.
You know, what we need to do is to now broaden, I think,
the chorus of voices that are saying consistent messages, and
then to have the U.N. Security Council and other key bodies,
especially the African Union and the IGAD, to be on top of the
parties as this process goes forward.
Delay is inevitable, I think, in some respects, given the
shortness of time between now and January 2011, but it's not
acceptable, in terms of an ultimate subversion of the process
that needs to happen.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
Ms. Giffen, what can we realistically expect from the U.N.
missions, Sudan UNMIS, in terms of civilian protection in
Southern Sudan? In your view, where should they focus their
resources in the runup to the referendum, as well as in the
aftermath of the referendum?
Ms. Giffen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We're actually advising that UNMIS, in particular, put
together a protection strategy that maps out all of the various
scenarios and all of the various risks in Southern Sudan, and
then goes through a prioritization process, looking at other
actors that provide protection, outside of the mission. UNMIS
can't be expected to provide protection for all of the people
in Southern Sudan, particularly given its shortfalls in
mobility and assets.
Having said that, I do think that we've seen quite notable
progress from UNMIS over the last year, on protection. They've
done some really innovative work with long-range patrols and
with mobile operating bases. Where they have heard early on
that tribal violence, for example, is heating up in an area,
they have gone out with joint protection teams of both
civilians and militaries to do mediation and try and defuse the
violence. This is exactly the kind of action that we need going
forward.
I think the situation in Jonglei state, right now, is
particularly concerning, and it is a perfect example of both
frustration over the elections, as well as tribal violence,
where you have former SPLA leaders that were formerly militia,
who are now rebelling against the SPLA in protest of the state
election results. This is the kind of thing that can quickly
escalate into larger scale violence. I was pleased to see that
the U.N.--not initially, but soon after--offered to go in and
offered to negotiate with one of the actors that is rebelling.
And that's exactly what we are looking for, from the political
level. We also need to see that from the military and the other
civilian components of UNMIS.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
Mr. Mozersky, I'm intrigued by your idea of creating a
demilitarized zone between the SPLA and the Sudan Armed Forces
along the North/South border, and with U.N. forces monitoring
and enforcing the arrangement. Is this something that the U.N.
mission, in Sudan could undertake with its current mandate? And
is this idea on the table in the negotiations that are going on
between the parties, at this point?
Mr. Mozersky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It's not on the table at the moment, and it won't implement
itself. It will only become a reality if the international
community puts it on the table and attempts to broker these
negotiations between the parties. UNMIS will never be able--the
U.N. will never be in a position to create a buffer zone, or a
demilitarized zone, without the compliance of the parties. So,
it would have to be the outcome of a negotiation between the
Government of Sudan and the Government of Southern Sudan.
I would suggest that it makes a lot of sense, and we should
prioritize that as--among the talking points with the northern
and southern governments.
In terms of mandate, I think it depends, in part, on the
outcome of those negotiations, whether there's an armed
component that's requested to stand between the armies, or
more--or just a civilian monitoring component. But, now is the
time to begin those discussions, because, again, the--removing
the possibility of an accidental return to war, I think, can
drastically reduce the risk of large-scale conflict.
Senator Feingold. And, Mr. Mozersky, in the aftermath of
the 2011 referendum, if the South votes in favor of secession,
what leverage and opportunities will remain for encouraging the
NCP to undertake further or greater reform? And, more
generally, what do you think will be the impact on the rest of
Sudan, politically and otherwise, if secession actually occurs?
Mr. Mozersky. I think there's cause for serious concern
about the status of Northern Sudan, post-referendum, if the
South secedes. Some of the concerns were raised by the two
previous speakers. And it's one reason that I would encourage
us to take advantage of the opportunity that exists now, in the
runup to the referendum, to create processes that--for
inclusivity, for consultation, that will exist beyond the
referendum.
The challenge is that the framework, the CPA, will expire
in July 2011. And it's been--that includes virtually all the
entry points for international engagement, at the moment. We
have to think creatively, both about creating a new--terms for
a new narrative and new engagement with the Government of
Sudan, but also make clear what those parameters are. And they
have to do with inclusivity in government. They have to do with
stepping back from some of the more draconian security measures
that we've seen, both in the runup and aftermath of the
election. And clearly a resolution of the Darfur conflict is
critical to that.
The alternative is, I think, an escalation of conflict in
Northern Sudan. That's the direction that things will likely
head if the Government of Sudan goes down a path of minority
rule, greater exclusivity in governance. And that's something
to be avoided, at all costs.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
I'll have further questions in another round.
But, now, Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mozersky, in listening to--in reading your testimony,
as quickly as I could while listening to your testimony, as
well, without some preventative work done now, you have
significant concerns over what's going to happen, post-
referendum. Is that correct?
Mr. Mozersky. That is correct.
Senator Isakson. What is being done now, of a preventative
nature, either on hydrocarbon or the oil situation, or
security, from a standpoint of police and protection? Is
anything going on? Is there a forum in which that's taking
place that's meaningful?
Mr. Mozersky. The--on the first--there's a forum, but it
hasn't launched yet.
Senator Isakson. Yes.
Mr. Mozersky. The elections, predictably, sucked up all
political attention and awareness, both in Sudan and from the
international community. So, there's an intention and a
commitment by the parties to begin, hopefully soon, a process
of negotiations on post-2011 issues--post-referendum issues--
with support from international actors, including the African
Union Panel.
On oil, in particular, there have not been any formal
negotiations, that I'm aware of. Norway has offered, and I
believe has been accepted by both parties, to provide
particular assistance. But, there's a long way to go between--
nowhere, basically--talking about the parameters of the forum
and actually getting down to business and working out these
details.
I would say, though, that the parties don't need to
negotiate full details on all these post-referendum issues by
January. What they need, at a minimum, is a framework agreement
that can provide sufficient guarantees for the shape, the
framework of the outcomes, prior to January. If they have a
framework or agreement on principles--on oil-sharing, on
grazing rights, on citizenship, and on security arrangements--
then those four issues, alone, will reduce the risk of tension,
I think, reduce the risk of a zero-sum perception, heading into
the referendum. And some of the additional details can,
potentially, be worked out after the fact.
On security, I would echo the comments made by some of the
other speakers. I think there's a long way to go. In the South,
in particular, a lot of the focus has gone on reforming the
army, at the expense of other security services. In Northern
Sudan, we haven't even seen reform of the army. There was a
process for security-sector reform built into the CPA, both
North and South, that never really got off the ground. So, I
would echo earlier comments, that it's a high-priority issue.
Senator Isakson. Well, given the experience we had in Iraq
with the hydrocarbon law and the sharing of wealth, where you
had oil in one place and recipients in another, 6 months is a
short timeframe to negotiate what will happen. Is it enough
time to put together those principles, where they could do it
when it's post-referendum, do you think?
Mr. Mozersky. I think it is. I think it is. And there's a
fundamental fork in the road, early on, which is whether
they'll look for a continued revenue-sharing model. So, maybe
they tweak the percentages. At the moment, 50 percent of
Southern--of revenue from Southern oil goes to the South, 50
percent goes to the national government, so whether they seek
to maintain a revenue-sharing model, or whether the South opts
to move to a fee-for-service model, where they'll pay for
pipeline rental, and pay for the refinery, and what have you.
And the second option is more politically popular in Southern
Sudan, but it implies greater challenges.
They need to have agreement on the principles--or
sufficient agreement on the principles, so that there are
guarantees in place that the day after the referendum oil will
still get to market. Oil revenue currently provides the
majority of government revenue in both Khartoum and Juba. So,
there needs to be enough in place that the governments don't
view the referendum with fear, as something that will torpedo
their economies. And part of that solution will require
international guarantors to that agreement.
Senator Isakson. Ms. Giffen, you commented about security
very comprehensively. Based on my visit to Sudan, a year ago, I
have grave concerns that there's enough security, manpower,
materiel, et cetera, to do the complicated security issues that
were talked about by both you and Ms. Richard. Just by securing
access to vulnerable populations, alone, seems to me a task
herculean. How do you think we best move toward doing that? Or
what would it take, if you were the king and you could make the
rules? [Laughter.]
Ms. Giffen. I think that's a difficult question to answer,
given the number of challenges throughout Sudan.
Having said that, if we are only talking about the United
Nations Mission in Sudan--UNMIS--they did some very good
preplanning when the Abyei Arbitration Tribunal was preparing
to release its decision on the Abyei Border Commission's
decision. UNMIS was able to move troops to an area, and move
logistics to an area, to try and be prepared if something was
going to occur. Preventive action is probably the best we can
hope for, given the limitations of a U.N. peacekeeping
operation.
If it comes to the National Security Forces, I do think
we're limited to what I suggested in my statement, which is
really trying to do as much training on what their
responsibilities and obligations are. Security-sector reform
has been quite slow. It has been very focused on the army.
There has been very little focus on the police. It's also been
very focused at the central level, at the expense of the state
and locality, which, of course, are best at providing security.
So, without a functioning police, the SPLA is being relied
on both for public security and as Anne Richard mentioned, they
do tend to prey on the people that they are meant to protect,
if they aren't receiving their salaries, et cetera. So, they
are not, in some cases, a reliable tool to create security,
especially when there's tribal dissidence between the SPLA that
has been deployed to an area that is of another tribe.
So, I would suggest, again, just the preventive measures
that the U.N. has, thus far, shown. They know where these
hotspots are. They know along the border there are some
hotspots. They know, in Jonglei, where the hotspots are. And
they can get there, with enough time.
Senator Isakson. Are we going to do a second round, Mr.
Chairman?
Thank you very much.
Senator Feingold. Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Members of the panel, 35 organizations representing Sudan
advocates and Sudanese expatriates have sent an open letter to
President Obama, calling on him to relieve General Gration of
his duties.
I note that General Gration is in the audience today. And I
appreciate his attendance.
How have these calls been viewed in the North and South?
And then, specifically, part B is, How do leaders in the South
view the United States? Do they view our participation as that
of a neutral and disinterested party?
We'll just start with Ms. Almquist, and go down the table.
Ms. Almquist. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
I believe that--first of all, I should say I haven't been
to Northern or Southern Sudan since these calls have been made.
And so, this is my opinion, based on a number of years of
experience and in talking with individuals from here.
Now, I think, in general, the more consistent a message
that can come from the United States, the more effective the
message will be on all parties in North and South. I think
right now a challenge that we have in Khartoum, at that level,
is a lack of clarity on their side--on the NCP's side--in terms
of differing views, from within the administration, on, you
know, policy questions, and particularly whether an attitude of
engagement, as I think General Gration has tried to put
forward, and to--you know, to sincerely talk with them, in
terms of seeking different behaviors from them, or a more
isolationist policy, a harder line approach, which we have seen
in the past--if that would move behavior in many of these
directions that we would find more acceptable and in keeping
with the universal norms of human rights.
I think my own experience, having participated in and
watched the negotiations for Naivasha, and also with a number
of the Darfur processes and N'Djamena and then Abuja, is that
we do see more movement out of Khartoum when we engage with
them. We have to talk with them. And we have to do that based
on principles. And we have to do that being consistent, in
terms of our messages and what we're seeking in that
relationship.
But, we need a framework and a context for that discussion
with them, and for a relationship that goes beyond, sort of,
our checklist of, you know, ``We don't like these, you know, 10
things that you've done today, in terms of your population in
various parts of the country.'' And I think that's the real
challenge for the United States. And, I think, probably--and I
don't know the authors of the letter that has been sent to
President Obama, but I think differing views and perspectives
on that are still out there.
And the clearer the administration can be, and the more
supportive it can be of its special envoy, and have all of the
voices pulling in a common policy direction, the greater our
leverage is with Khartoum; and also with the South. I think
that they sometimes are confused by what they perceive as
differences of messages. I don't think the South has really
ever seen the United States as a neutral and impartial
observer. We've been very clear, throughout the North/South
war, that the South was the aggrieved party and victim of the
conflict. That doesn't mean that they weren't without fault and
doing a number of things and actions that we would not condone
or support. But, in basic terms, we supported the Southerners'
right to self-determination, and that's why we have the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement that we have today.
So, I do think that we have a special role to play with the
South, in terms of being able to then work with them as we face
these last tests of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and
moving into this next phase of, most likely, an independent
Southern Sudan. And, again, our consistency of message is very
important as we approach those moments and carry that forward
beyond.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
Ms. Giffen.
And I would ask the members of the panel to be mindful that
we're limited on our time.
Ms. Giffen. I will just build on what Ms. Almquist said,
which is, in addition to having a consistent message and
coordination internally, it's very important, when dealing
with--whether it's the Government of Sudan or the Government of
Southern Sudan--to be coordinated with, not only our allies,
but also others who are stakeholders in Sudan.
So, in the past, there have been a number of times when
diplomacy has not been as coordinated as it could be between,
for example, special envoys or others. The problem with the
failure to coordinate is that first, it dilutes our diplomatic
leverage, and second, it creates fissures between the different
messages that the government is getting and that the government
can then exploit.
So, I think it's quite important that work that the special
envoy has been doing with the other five special envoys, to try
and coordinate messages and work together--that's a key point
to having influence over the Government of Sudan. And when we
have had impact in opening up access--humanitarian access or
moving forward on peacekeeping operations--it's often been
because it's been coordinated with the United Nations and other
donors.
Senator Wicker. Mr. Mozersky.
Mr. Mozersky. I'll plead ignorance on the first, because
I'm not sure how the calls for Special Envoy Gration's
resignation have been viewed.
But, I will echo that--the last point that Alison made. I
think there's been a noticeable improvement, in the last 2 to 3
months, in international coordination in Sudan. From a
situation 6 months ago where you had a proliferation of high-
level actors on the international side, there's beginning to be
a coherence that's emerging, in terms of what that
international mechanism looks like.
Having said that, I will reiterate the point I made during
my testimony, that I think high-level--higher level U.S.
engagement in the period ahead is welcome. This is a unique and
dangerous moment in time. And the U.S. Government has a unique
role to play in sending messages, not just to the Sudanese, but
to the region and to the broader international community, of
the United States commitment to see the CPA implemented in
full, see that the referendum goes forward peacefully--I think,
is extremely valuable.
In the South, the United States is viewed as an ally. The
United States is viewed as a partner, and an important partner
in the international community, on whom Southern Sudanese are
relying in the period ahead. And there are great expectations
for the type of assistance and type of support that will come
from Washington and from the U.S. Government.
Thank you.
Senator Wicker. And finally, Ms. Richard.
Ms. Richard. Thank you.
Very briefly, I don't watch the activities of the special
envoy's office closely enough to give him a grade. But, I will
say, in his defense, that he has met with the NGOs several
times, and been very open, in talking to us. He really hustled,
after we were invited to leave Darfur, to improve humanitarian
access to Darfur, after we were forced out last year. And I
think it's an impossible job. I think it's a really, really
difficult job.
I would suspect that our folks on the ground overseas, in
South Sudan, are less concerned about who's filling that role,
but, instead, that that role be supported by the Obama
administration. And that their main concern right now is that
the world not lose interest in the coming months, and that the
world stay engaged, beyond the referendum. And they're very
concerned, right now, that there's no multiyear funding, that
projects are all just, sort of, hanging fire, waiting to see
what happens in the referendum. It's not a constructive way to
engage.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
Senator Feingold. I'll begin a second round.
Back to Mr. Mozersky. Could you comment on the cohesiveness
of the National Congress Party, and whether there are
differences of opinion within it as to how to approach the
referendum and its aftermath?
Mr. Mozersky. I can do my best, but the caveat is built in.
I think that's the million-dollar question, and it remains
a question mark. There are--we--there's a--been a public
commitment from President Bashir to respect the outcome of the
referendum; to allow it to happen, or ensure that it does
happen, and that, if the South votes for secession, to be the
first one to recognize it.
I think it's important to note that the likely dispute
between North and South is not going to come on the actual vote
for secession or unity; it will come on whether or not the
voter turnout threshold was met. So, the referendum law
includes a 60--a threshold of 60 percent of registered voters
that have to turn out for the vote to be legitimate; and then a
50-plus-1 on secession or unity. And on that, the key
population becomes the Southern Sudanese in Northern Sudan.
So, you have--again, the rough estimate is 1\1/2\ million
Southerners, who were undercounted in the census, but the
census is not necessarily the criteria for determining voter
eligibility for the referendum. And so, there's fears that,
from the NCP side, they may try to manipulate the voter turnout
procedures--voter registration and then voter turnout
procedures for that. And that could lead to a very dangerous
situation, where we have one number coming out from Khartoum,
another number coming up Juba, without a clear mechanism for
how to resolve that. So, building transparency into the
process, from now--not just in the South, but also in the
North--I think, is very important for that.
Having said that, it--which doesn't answer the different
schools of thought within the NCP--I personally believe that
there is a peaceful way forward. I think that there's a
constellation of agreements that can--whereby the South can
secede peacefully, that protect the core economic interests of
Northern Sudan, that protect the core economic of Southern
Sudan, as well as the rights and interests of the populations
along the border. And I believe that a lot of our attention,
over the next 7 to 8 months, needs to go in helping to support
that process, to reduce the logic of war and to increase the
logic of peace. It doesn't have to be a losing scenario from
anyone's perspective. It can--there are win-win arrangements
here.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, sir.
Ms. Almquist, as you know, the administration is beginning
an effort to scale up our diplomatic, development, and conflict
mitigation efforts in Southern Sudan. From your experience
working in government, what recommendations would you offer for
this effort? What are the keys to its success? And what can
Congress do to help?
Ms. Almquist. Thank you.
I'm aware, in general, of the diplomatic surge and
increased efforts to put more staff on the ground, particularly
in Juba. And I think that those are probably in order. I know,
firsthand, the challenges of the platform that the U.S.
Government has in Sudan, in the South, in Khartoum, in Darfur,
and in trying to work across the three areas. And it's an
incredibly complicated set of issues, in terms of the
rudimentary nature of the environment that is being worked in,
and then the various political and bureaucratic challenges of
each of those locales. And so, I'm sure the headaches are
immense as one tries to do that.
I think it's all the more important, therefore, to be very
strategic and efficient in use of resources. And, while more
hands on deck probably does help--again, without knowing the
specifics of what kinds of hands those are and how they'll be
deployed--I'd say that we need to look beyond just the sheer
numbers of staff that we have on the ground. How are they best
able to implement resources and deploy them in support of the
Government of Southern Sudan, in the case of the South? How are
we best able to support our partners in Darfur, and in the
East, and in the two areas that will face popular consultation,
and then, of course, in Abyei? And the answers are probably
somewhat different for each of those locations.
So, I think it does take a bit more nuanced approach. And I
think that, while we need to prepare for the eventuality of
Southern independence, and that will require more functions for
the United States in the South, that are currently being
carried out by the mission and the platform in Khartoum, we
also need to maintain those missions and functions in the
North, and to continue our engagement there. So, I think it's,
overall, quite complicated.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
Ms. Richard, in my opening remarks I mentioned the large
number of Darfuri refugees who remain in eastern Chad. What are
the conditions for these refugees? How will they likely be
affected, in addition to the Chadians who were displaced in
eastern Chad, when the U.N. peacekeeping force, MINURCAT,
begins to withdraw from the region, as was agreed by the
Security Council yesterday?
Ms. Richard. Well, if you are a refugee and you flee to
Chad, things must be pretty bad where you're coming from,
because Chad is a very challenging place to live. IRC supports
around 58,000 Darfuri refugees in two camps. And we also help
another 20,000 Chadians who live nearby.
We're very concerned about MINURCAT--the possibility of
MINURCAT leaving, coming to an end, as we would be anyplace
we're working, where there's the need for a U.N. peacekeeping
operation. The need for security, as I said in my remarks, is
just one of those fundamental things that--without which, it's
very hard for us to do our jobs. And so, in many ways, all the
work that we try to do to help people, whether it's food
distributions in a camp or health care or protecting children
and women and girls, it can't take place if there's violence
erupting around us. So, we're very concerned about that.
Senator Feingold. Finally, I'd welcome any of your thoughts
on this. As international attention refocuses on the CP in
Southern Sudan, I'm concerned, of course, that the NCP may be
is trying a new repression to consolidate its power in the
North. We've seen, in the past, how the NCP can effectively
manipulate the international community's narrow focus on one
region or conflict, at the expense of another. So, going
forward, how can we avoid this? How can the United States and
the international community ensure that our enhanced focus on
the referendum in South does not detract from our other
priorities in other parts of Sudan, as has been well
articulated by Ms. Giffen and others already today? Whoever
would like to take that.
Ms. Almquist. Well, maybe I'll start by just saying that--I
think a message that's already been said--and Dave said it most
clearly in his testimony--is that we have to be vocal. We have
to continue to pay attention to the whole of Sudan. We, just
like the parties, get--have a carrying capacity in terms of our
own agendas. And we do become singularly focused--or more
singularly focused on some issues than others. And so, I think,
for starters, we have to be mindful of the key issues, and
continue to call the parties to account on Darfur, as well as
on North/South and the next steps of the CPA process.
So, for starters, I think we have to make sure that those
issues are out there on the radar screen. And when things
happen that aren't acceptable, like the offensives in Darfur
and the use of aerial bombardments, we need to say that
publicly. And we need to get other voices to say that publicly.
I think the international attention really does make a
difference, and keeping that steady drumbeat.
It's hard to do it, you know, every day, on, you know,
three or four different issues. And so, there is some
selectivity that has to be there. But, I think we and others
have tried to identify some of the most critical issues to pay
attention to. And we have to be able to manage a Darfur agenda
at the same time as a North/South agenda, and not suborn one to
the other. Both are critical for the future of Sudan.
Senator Feingold. Ms. Giffen, do you want to say something
else about that?
Ms. Giffen. Yes, thank you.
One of the things that I always appreciate about the way in
which the U.S. Government presence worked on the ground in
Sudan was the way in which it coordinated with others. We are
not the only ones there. We work quite well with other donor
nations that are in places that we are not. And I think that
that's particularly important at this moment in Darfur, in the
East, and in the Three Areas. After the expulsion of the 13
international agencies and the dissolution of the three
national agencies in Northern Sudan, the information network
and the protection network that was there was pretty much
gutted.
As a result, we don't hear the same information that we
used to hear about the violations that are occurring, about the
needs that exist on the ground.
I often use the metaphor, that when a tree falls in a
forest, it does make a sound, even if there's nobody there to
hear it. There are violations occurring in Darfur, even if
there are no internationals there to report it.
I get quite worried when U.N. OCHA is no longer producing
the same kind of information that they used to on the number of
displaced, the number of needs that are out there, because they
can't do independent assessments, and/or because they don't
have the capacity. Without OCHA and without those agencies that
were providing most of that information, we have very little
information to try and figure out what is going to happen, from
a preventive point of view. So, UNAMID doesn't know where to
move. We don't know when to try, as an international community,
to condemn something or prevent something from happening.
And so, it is critical that we work with the other donors
that are on the ground, the few NGOs that are left, to try and
track what's happening so that we can take preventive measures
before things happen.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
On that note, I'm going to turn over to Senator Isakson for
his questions.
Senator Isakson. Ms. Giffen, in your first recommendation
on intermediate steps to prevent and protect citizens, you
referred to the donor countries, including the United States,
and I'm going to quote this, ``should ensure that the
Government of Southern Sudan's police and army are receiving
training in international humanitarian law, refugee law, and
domestic and international human rights law, including training
and preventing fight--training and preventing, fighting sexual
violence.'' And you were specific with the Southern Sudanese
police and military. Is their propensity--do you think they
have a propensity to use those types of tactics--sexual
violence against women and inhumanitarian treatment of refugees
and others? They have the potential to do that if there's a
secession?
Ms. Giffen. Unfortunately, the SPLA is a combination of a
number of different actors, including a number of militias that
were integrated into the SPLA following the 2006 Juba
Declaration. That meant that there were thousands and thousands
of armed actors that were integrated into the SPLA without
previous formal training.
Now, there's been quite a few attempts to do battalion-by-
battalion or unit-by-unit training in Southern Sudan, but the
size of that army is difficult to feed and equip, let alone to
professionalize in the time that we've had. Not to mention
there has been very little incentive for the SPLM to demobilize
and disarm the SPLA, given we're coming up on the referendum,
with the exception of the fact that the SPLA absorbs quite a
large percentage of the budget of the Government of Southern
Sudan. And so, there have been some efforts to get ghost
officers off the books, et cetera.
But, yes, there is, I think, quite a bit of potential for
the SPLA to commit violence against civilians. We already know
that the SPLA are involved in human rights abuses. They are
preying on communities that they're meant to protect. They have
been involved in starting some of the conflicts that we've seen
with tribal leaders, et cetera. So, the potential is definitely
there. And I think that human rights training would be a good
use of funding in preparation for a secession.
Senator Isakson. And I suppose, then, if an unfortunate
incident, like another civil war, broke out post-referendum,
that those type of tactics, you're afraid, would spread as the
conflict spread.
Ms. Giffen. Unfortunately, in both the first and the second
civil war in Sudan, these types of tactics, attacks against
civilians, were used by almost all sides. I suspect that, if we
were to go back to a situation like that, that those tactics
would be used again.
Again, we talked about a demilitarized zone between the
North and the South. I think that that is potentially an
important step. But, a lot of the insecurity that could happen
isn't going to happen between a line of SPLA against a line of
SAF. It is likely that it's going to be small conflicts in
sensitive areas, through proxies and militias that have been
stirred up, where tension is there over resource issues. These
smaller conflicts could then serve as an accelerant to larger
conflict that spreads. That's my concern.
If we can keep the SAF and the SPLA separated through a
demilitarized zone or in some other fashion, and then try to
put out these other initially smaller fires, I think that isn't
a bad way to go. But, there will be attacks against civilians;
it is going to be that type of war, if we go back to war.
Senator Isakson. I think Ms. Almquist made a good statement
for all of us to adhere to. We tend to talk about the Sudan in
terms of North, South, and Darfur, in three parts, when it's a
whole. Because, I know, Ms. Richard, when I was there a year
ago, we were told that the use of rape as a tactic against
women and children was dissipating in Darfur from what it had
been. Is it still dissipating? Or is it still present?
Ms. Richard. I can't answer that question, Senator, because
we're no longer in Darfur.
Senator Isakson. OK.
Ms. Richard. But, certainly the refugees, who come to Chad
have suffered from sexual violence. And so, our programs there
are very important.
You know, anytime you have a chaotic situation with this
sort of potent mix of conflict and people fleeing, the most
vulnerable people can come--can be preyed upon. And that's why
I think using peacetime to train soldiers on how to protect
citizens, and the importance of doing that, is such a good use
of our aid dollars.
Senator Isakson. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks, to our panelists today.
Senator Feingold. Senator Isakson, I agree--this is an
excellent panel, and I want to thank you.
And I want to thank Senator Isakson for his very hard work
on this subcommittee.
I think a panel like this makes a big difference as we move
forward. So, thank you.
And that concludes the hearing.
[Whereupon, at 3:43 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]