[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
EXAMINING DHS'S MANAGEMENT OF TRUSTED TRAVELER PROGRAMS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
BORDER SECURITY, FACILITATION,
AND OPERATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 30, 2020
__________
Serial No. 116-84
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
43-957 PDF WASHINGTON : 2021
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Mike Rogers, Alabama
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island Peter T. King, New York
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Kathleen M. Rice, New York John Katko, New York
J. Luis Correa, California Mark Walker, North Carolina
Xochitl Torres Small, New Mexico Clay Higgins, Louisiana
Max Rose, New York Debbie Lesko, Arizona
Lauren Underwood, Illinois Mark Green, Tennessee
Elissa Slotkin, Michigan John Joyce, Pennsylvania
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri Dan Crenshaw, Texas
Al Green, Texas Michael Guest, Mississippi
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Dan Bishop, North Carolina
Dina Titus, Nevada Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey
Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey Mike Garcia, California
Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
Val Butler Demings, Florida
Hope Goins, Staff Director
Chris Vieson, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER SECURITY, FACILITATION, AND OPERATIONS
Kathleen M. Rice, New York, Chairwoman
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey Clay Higgins, Louisiana, Ranking
J. Luis Correa, California Member
Xochitl Torres Small, New Mexico Debbie Lesko, Arizona
Al Green, Texas John Joyce, Pennsylvania
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Michael Guest, Mississippi
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (ex Mike Rogers, Alabama (ex officio)
officio)
Alexandra Carnes, Subcommittee Staff Director
Emily Trapani, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Kathleen M. Rice, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Border
Security, Facilitation, and Operations:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Clay Higgins, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Louisiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border
Security, Facilitation, and Operations:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Witness
Mr. Robert E. Perez, Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
EXAMINING DHS'S MANAGEMENT OF TRUSTED TRAVELER PROGRAMS
----------
Wednesday, September 30, 2020
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Border Security,
Facilitation, and Operations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in
room 310, Cannon House Office Building, and via Webex, Hon.
Kathleen M. Rice [Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Rice, Correa, Torres Small,
Clarke, Higgins, Lesko, and Guest.
Miss Rice. The Subcommittee on Border Security,
Facilitation, and Operations will come to order.
Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare the
subcommittee in recess at any point.
Good morning. We are convening today in our continued
effort to understand why this committee received inaccurate and
misleading testimony from the DHS regarding its decision to ban
residents of New York State from Trusted Traveler Programs like
Global Entry.
On February 5, Senior DHS Official Chad Wolf wrote to New
York officials to inform them of the ban without notifying
Congress and the Members of the New York State delegation who
sit on this authorizing committee.
Mr. Wolf cited New York's Green Light law as justification
for the ban, stating that the law, ``compromises CBP's ability
to confirm whether an individual applying for a TTP membership
meets program eligibility requirements.''
Mr. Wolf then stated, ``Because the act prevents DHS from
accessing New York DMV records in order to determine whether a
TTP applicant or re-applicant meets program eligibility
requirements, New York residents will no longer be eligible to
enroll or re-enroll in CBP's Trusted Traveler Programs.''
After that announcement, this committee continued to
receive inaccurate and misleading testimony that repeated the
central claims made in Mr. Wolf's letter, that New York State
was unique in denying this access to DMV records. At a minimum,
the testimony gave a false impression about both the uniqueness
of New York State's Green Light law and the supposed
ramifications of CBP's inability to access New York State's DMV
information.
In March, for example, Mr. Wolf told the committee, quote:
New York law specifically prohibits CBP from going into that
DMV database. They need information contained there that they
can only get there to vet Trusted Travelers. They have done
that above and beyond any other State. There is no other State
that prohibits that information. So that is specifically why we
took that action with New York and for that action alone.
In summary, the committee was led to believe that New York
was the only State that didn't provide DMV information to CBP
and that such information was so critical to vetting applicants
to the Trusted Traveler Programs that, because New York didn't
provide it, CBP had to ban all New York State residents from
applying or re-applying for the program.
While the ban was in place for New York State residents,
including for residents who already participated in the program
and who were prescreened and deemed trustful, it had a
detrimental, chilling effect at our Northern Border. Then all
of a sudden, over the summer, the ban was lifted, and we
learned that other U.S. jurisdictions provide the same access
to their DMV records to CBP as New York did, yet residents of
these jurisdictions were not banned from participating in the
Trusted Traveler Programs.
In fact, today's witness, Mr. Robert Perez, made this clear
in a supplemental declaration he submitted on the matter to the
district court in New York. We also learned information that
raises questions about whether DMV data is actually used to vet
every Trusted Traveler Program applicant. Unfortunately, we
learned this information only from the court filings in this
case on this issue.
DHS did not proactively reach out to the committee or
correct the committee's understanding until the committee wrote
to DHS after reading the filings, and we are here today because
we still don't have the necessary information from CBP on their
decision.
There appears to be only 2 explanations for the inaccurate,
misleading testimony the committee received from DHS. Either
senior DHS officials had a shared and profoundly inaccurate
understanding of how the programs they manage actually work,
which would be extremely troubling in its own right, or the
only other option is that senior officials intentionally
obfuscated key details about the applicant vetting process in
order to justify a completely political decision to declare all
New York residents ineligible for participation in the program.
The President wanted to punish New York for its Green Light
law, and this was the retribution, plain and simple. In a
transcribed interview with the committee, Mr. John Wagner,
CBP's former deputy executive assistant commissioner, informed
us that he, ``should have been aware that two territories gave
CBP no DMV information.'' He also said he, ``should have known
that several States and other jurisdictions did not share
driver histories.''
So why didn't he and other senior officials know this? We
still don't have the answer to that, and DHS has refused to
cooperate with the committee's investigation. DHS has not
provided the documents we requested. DHS has not made available
for transcribed interviews the employees we requested. During
the course of an entirely voluntary interview with Mr. Wagner,
DHS's attorneys repeatedly halted straightforward lines of
questioning, effectively undermining the purpose of interview.
Today DHS provided only 1 of the 4 witnesses this committee has
requested.
We hope that Mr. Perez can tell us which explanation is
correct, but we will continue our investigation until we know
for sure.
Further, given that the Department stated that DMV data is
so critical to assessing the eligibility of applicants to the
Trusted Traveler Programs, we would also like to know whether
the enrollment of applicants from other States or territories
that provide only some or no DMV data has created risks.
Similarly, we would like to know exactly what DMV data CBP
receives regarding applicants from foreign nations, including
whether that data is reliably accurate.
Obviously, we also want to know why DHS officials do not
understand the programs they manage and whether this is
creating security risks. I, therefore, call on DHS to
immediately provide all the documents we have requested and to
provide complete answers to our questions. This information is
essential for our Nation's security.
I look forward to hearing Mr. Perez's testimony, and I
thank him for appearing.
[The statement of Chairwoman Rice follows:]
Statement of Chairwoman Kathleen M. Rice
September 30, 2020
We are convening today in our continued effort to understand why
this committee received inaccurate and misleading testimony from DHS
regarding its decision to ban residents of New York State from Trusted
Traveler programs, like Global Entry.
On February 5, senior DHS official Chad Wolf wrote to New York
officials to inform them of the ban, without notifying Congress and the
Members of the New York State delegation who sit on this authorizing
committee. Mr. Wolf cited New York's Green Light Law as justification
for the ban, stating that the law ``compromises CBP's ability to
confirm whether an individual applying for TTP membership meets program
eligibility requirements.''
Mr. Wolf then stated, ``Because the Act prevents DHS from accessing
New York DMV records in order to determine whether a TTP applicant or
re-applicant meets program eligibility requirements, New York residents
will no longer be eligible to enroll or re-enroll in CBP's Trusted
Traveler Programs.''
After that announcement, this committee continued to receive
inaccurate and misleading testimony that repeated the central claims
made in Mr. Wolf's letter--that New York State was unique in denying
this access to DMV records. At a minimum, the testimony gave a false
impression about both the uniqueness of New York State's ``Green Light
Law'', and the supposed ramifications of CBP's inability to access New
York State DMV information.
In March, for example, Mr. Wolf told the committee, ``New York law
specifically prohibits CBP from going into that DMV database. They need
information contained there that they can only get there to vet trusted
travelers. They've done that above and beyond any other State, there is
no other State that prohibits that information so, that['s]
specifically why we took that action with New York and for that action
alone.''
In summary, the committee was led to believe that: (1) New York was
the only State that didn't provide DMV information to CBP, and (2) such
information was so critical to vetting applicants to the Trusted
Traveler program that because New York didn't provide it, CBP had to
ban all New York State residents from applying or re-applying for the
program.
While the ban was in place for New York State residents--including
for residents who already participated in the program and who were pre-
screened and deemed trustful--it had a detrimental, chilling effect at
our Northern border. Then all of a sudden, over the summer, the ban was
lifted, and we learned that other U.S. jurisdictions provide the same
access to their DMV records to CBP as New York did. Yet residents of
these jurisdictions were not banned from participating in the Trusted
Traveler programs. In fact, today's witness, Mr. Robert Perez, made
this clear in the supplemental declaration he submitted on the matter
to the District Court.
We also learned information that raises questions about whether DMV
data is actually used to vet every Trusted Traveler program applicant.
Unfortunately, we learned this information ONLY from the court filings
on this issue. DHS did not proactively reach out to the committee or
correct the committee's understanding until the committee wrote to DHS,
after reading the filings. And we're here today because we still don't
have the necessary information from CBP on their decision.
There appears to be only 2 explanations for the inaccurate and
misleading testimony the committee received from DHS. Either senior DHS
officials had a shared and profoundly inaccurate understanding of how
the programs they manage actually work, which would be extremely
troubling in its own right. Or, option No. 2, senior officials
intentionally obfuscated key details about the applicant vetting
process in order to justify a completely political decision to declare
all New York residents ineligible for participation in the program.
The President wanted to punish New York for its ``Green Light
Law.'' And this was the retribution. Plain and simple. In a transcribed
interview with the committee, Mr. John Wagner, CBP's former deputy
executive assistant commissioner, informed us that he, ``should've been
aware'' that 2 territories gave CBP no DMV information. He also said
he, ``should've known'' that several States and other jurisdictions did
not share driver histories. So why didn't he and other senior officials
know this? We still don't know. And DHS has refused to cooperate with
the committee's investigation.
DHS has not provided the documents we requested. DHS has not made
available for transcribed interviews the employees we requested.
During the course of an entirely voluntary interview with Mr.
Wagner, DHS attorneys repeatedly halted straight-forward lines of
questioning, effectively undermining the purpose of the interview. And
today, DHS provided only 1 of the 4 witnesses this committee has
requested. We hope that Mr. Perez can tell us which explanation is
correct, but we will continue our investigation until we know for sure.
Further, given that the Department stated that DMV data is so
critical to assessing the eligibility of applicants to the Trusted
Traveler programs, we would also like to know whether the enrollment of
applicants from other States or territories that provide only some or
no DMV data has created risks.
Similarly, we would like to know exactly what DMV data CBP receives
regarding applicants from foreign nations, including whether that data
is reliably accurate. Obviously, we also want to know why DHS officials
do not understand the programs they manage, and whether this is
creating security risks.
I therefore call on DHS to immediately provide all of the documents
we have requested and to provide complete answers to our questions.
This information is essential for our Nation's security.
Miss Rice. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of
the subcommittee, the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Higgins,
for an opening statement.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Chairwoman Rice.
Thank you, Deputy Commissioner Perez, for being here today.
Madam Chairwoman, I was saddened to hear of the passing of
CBP Officer Carlo Cayabyab in California. I would like to
express my condolences to his family and the entire agency.
Last year, New York State passed legislation referred to as
the Green Light law. This law has arguably made communities
throughout the entire country less safe. The law barred New
York State driver's license and vehicle registration
information, driving-related criminal history information,
driver's license and corrections images, among other
information that is commonly requested by law enforcement, from
being divulged on residents, from being shared with Customs and
Border Protection, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
The sponsor of this law said before the State assembly that
it would only impact investigations on immigration-related
violations and that criminal investigations would not be
impacted. However, criminal investigations have indeed been
impacted by this State's law. The totality of negative
consequences are much farther reaching.
All 4 U.S. Attorneys for the State of New York have had
press releases in February, stating that the Green Light law is
impacting active criminal investigations across the board. CBP
and ICE are on the front lines of defending homeland from
terrorism; transnational crime; dangerous gang members;
narcotics, including fentanyl; counterfeit products, including
pharmaceuticals; human trafficking; child exploitation; and
other very important missions.
The Green Light law limits the Department's situational
awareness at border crossings, interior checkpoints, and where
high volumes of drug and human smuggling interdictions occur.
Peace officer patrol stops and homeland security
investigations, including criminal activity on the dark net,
are all impacted by the Green Light law.
There are more than 19 million residents of New York State.
New York State-licensed vehicles and travelers transit borders,
seaports, and airports across the country. The impact of the
law is not New York-specific. It affects communities throughout
the United States. The Green Light law also requires an
individual to be notified if CBP or ICE request information
about them outside the scope of the exception. If an ICE
officer is investigating a human trafficking case involving an
illegal immigrant who resides in New York State and attempts to
access related DMV data, the State law requires that individual
to be tipped off. That is contrary to law enforcement
procedures across the country and does not help criminal
investigations.
The Green Light law wrongfully assumes that State DMV data
is mainly accessed for civil immigration and violation
purposes. The reality is that more than 86 percent of
individuals arrested by ICE in fiscal year 2019 had criminal
convictions or pending charges.
The Green Light law furthers the left's agenda to rather
tie the hands of Federal law enforcement, to ignore some
Federal immigration laws, and to attack and call for the
dismantlement of ICE and CBP. Not all of my colleagues across
the aisle feel this way, but it is part of the National
narrative and is directed by my Democratic colleagues.
The fracturing of information shared between Federal,
State, and local law enforcement is not a good idea. This law
values the ability of an illegal immigrant to get a driver's
license over the safety and security of the homeland. The New
York State legislation knew it had gone too far. They amended
the original language in April of this year to allow for some
information to flow to CBP, and I applaud that effort. However,
what could have been a good-faith effort to come together and
fix this problem devolved into an escalated attack on law
enforcement by making it a felony to share DMV information with
CBP or ICE outside of narrow exceptions. It is an easy mistake
to make.
This move is a direct contradiction to the 9/11 Commission
Report on the importance of information sharing. It
intentionally poisons the well with Federal, State, and local
partners on joint task forces to counterterrorism, gang
violence, and drug trafficking, all seen as the best practice
to keep violent criminals off the streets.
Instead of speaking about dangerous precedent the Green
Light law has set, some of my colleagues seem more concerned
with taking shots at the administration. In an election year,
we have seen that from both sides. This committee should be
objective about our observations and conclusions. It is
interesting that we would attempt to impact career Department
of Homeland Security officials just weeks before an election.
It is undeniable that New York State took unprecedented
action in blocking CBP and ICE access to DMV information
currently available to all other Federal, State, and local law
enforcement. This is unique to New York. It is not 100 percent
unique complexities of this law that were uncovered as the
investigation unfolded, but New York is certainly alone in the
totality of this circumstance.
Today I would like to hear on the record about how this New
York State law is still negatively impacting CBP's Homeland
Security missions. I want case examples on the record about the
hoops CBP must still jump through to secure the homeland and
what more needs to be done reverse this well-intended but
perhaps shortsighted law. I want to know if someone residing in
the country illegally who receives a New York State-issued
driver's license can obtain NEXUS status which, in some
instances, acts in lieu of a passport. I want an update on
data-sharing agreements made to ensure CBP can fully vet
Trusted Traveler applicants.
[The statement of Ranking Member Higgins follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Clay Higgins
September 30, 2020
Thank you Chairwoman Rice, and thank you Deputy Commissioner Perez
for being here today.
Last year, New York State passed legislation, referred to as the
Green Light Law, that has disturbingly made communities throughout the
entire country less safe.
The law barred New York State driver's license and vehicle
registration information, driving-related criminal history information,
driver's license and corrections images, among other information on
residents from being shared with Customs and Border Protection and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
The sponsor of this law said before the State Assembly that it
would only impact investigations of immigration-related violations . .
. and that criminal investigations would not be impacted.
However, criminal investigations have in fact been impacted by this
State law and the totality of negative consequences are much farther
reaching.
All 4 U.S. attorneys for the State of New York put out a press
release in February sounding the alarm that the Green Light Law is
impacting active criminal investigations across the board.
CBP and ICE are on the front lines of defending the homeland from
terrorism, transnational crime, dangerous gang members, narcotics
including fentanyl, counterfeit products including pharmaceuticals,
human trafficking, child exploitation, among other important missions.
The Green Light Law limits the Department's situational awareness
at border crossings, interior checkpoints where high volumes of drug
and human smuggling interdictions occur, peace officer patrol stops,
and homeland security investigations including criminal activity on the
Darknet.
There are more than 19 million residents of New York State. New
York State licensed vehicles and travelers transit borders, sea ports,
and airports across the country. The impact of the law is not New York-
specific, it effects communities throughout the United States.
The Green Light law also requires an individual to be notified if
CBP or ICE requests information about them outside the scope of the
exception.
If an ICE officer is investigating a human trafficking case
involving an illegal immigrant who resides in New York State and
attempts to access related DMV data, State law requires that individual
to be tipped off. That is shameful.
The Green Light Law wrongfully assumes that State DMV data is
mainly accessed for civil immigration violation purposes. The reality
is more than 86 percent of individuals arrested by ICE in fiscal year
2019 had criminal convictions or pending charges.
The Green Light Law furthers the far left's agenda to tie the hands
of Federal law enforcement, ignore Federal immigration laws, attack and
call for the dismantlement of ICE and CBP, and fracture information
sharing between Federal, State, and local law enforcement. This law
values the ability of an illegal immigrant to get a driver's license
over the safety and security of the homeland.
The New York State legislature knew that it went too far. That's
why they amended the original language in April of this year to allow
for some information flow to CBP.
But what could have been a good-faith effort to come together and
right the original wrong turned into an escalated attack on law
enforcement by making it a FELONY to share DMV information with CBP or
ICE outside narrow exceptions.
This move flies in the face of the 9/11 Commission Report on the
importance of information sharing. It intentionally poisons the well
with Federal, State, and local partners on joint task forces to counter
terrorism, gang violence, and drug trafficking seen as a best practice
to keep violent criminals off the streets.
Instead of speaking out about the dangerous precedent the Green
Light Law has set, my colleagues on the other side of the aisle seem
more concerned with taking shots at the administration and career DHS
officials right before the election.
It is undeniable that New York State took unprecedented action in
blocking CBP and ICE access to DMV information currently available to
all other Federal, State, and local law enforcement.
Today I want to hear on the record about how this New York State
law is still negatively impacting CBP's homeland security missions.
I want case examples on the record about the hoops CBP must still
jump through to secure the homeland, and what more needs to be done to
reverse this short-sighted law.
I want to know if someone residing in the country illegally who
receives a New York State-issued driver's license can obtain NEXUS
status, which in some instances acts in lieu of a passport.
I want an update on data-sharing agreements being made to ensure
CBP can fully vet trusted traveler applicants.
I yield back.
Mr. Higgins. I yield back.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Miss Rice. I thank the Ranking Member.
Members are reminded that the subcommittee will operate
according to the guidelines laid out by the Chairman and
Ranking Member in the July 8 colloquy. Member statements may be
submitted for the record.
[The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
September 30, 2020
The issue that brings us here is our on-going effort to understand
why we were misled about the Department's decision to exclude New York
residents from Customs and Border Protection's Trusted Traveler
programs. DHS's arbitrary and unjustified decision had the potential to
limit economic activity by increasing wait times at Ports of Entry and
to create unnecessary hardship for hundreds of thousands of American
travelers.
As the Chairwoman noted, DHS's explanation for seeking to punish
New York residents in this way is now called into serious question.
While New York's ``Green Light Law'' did limit CBP's access to DMV
data, other States and territories were providing no or only limited
DMV data to CBP when New York residents were cut off from Trusted
Traveler Programs. And yet, no other State or territory was targeted as
New York was. In fact, the residents of other jurisdictions that
provided no or only some DMV data to CBP apparently continued to be
enrolled in the Trusted Traveler programs.
Last month, DHS claimed that its officials made statements that
were, and I quote, ``true to the best of their knowledge at the time
they were made.'' DHS then provided to the committee a few documents it
provided to the Court, claimed that these corrected our record, and
said, and I quote: ``we hope the Committee accepts this explanation.''
Let me be clear: We don't accept.
Either DHS officials intentionally made misleading statements to
this committee, or the officials charged with managing an essential
Homeland Security program were ignorant about the program's operation.
We are here to find out which it was.
We are also here because in this matter as in so many other
matters, the Department has refused to cooperate with the committee's
investigation. In seeking clarity about the decision to exclude the
residents of an entire State from CBP's Trusted Traveler programs, the
committee has requested interviews and documents, but DHS has declined
to fulfill either request. Even today, the subcommittee requested 4
witnesses from the Department, but has received only 1.
In fact, the Department even had the gall to allege that by seeking
to understand the facts and circumstances surrounding the inaccurate
and misleading testimony we received, the committee is acting
improperly. Let me be clear about a few things on which I hope all
committee Members will agree.
It is never improper for this committee to ask questions of the
Department. We will never simply accept inaccurate or misleading
testimony or information--and it is absurd for the Department to
suggest that we have an obligation to do so. This committee has both
the authority and the duty to carry out oversight over the activities
and decisions of DHS, and we will continue to use every investigative
tool available to us to combat the Department's stonewalling.
Finally, as Chairman, I guarantee that this committee will continue
its efforts to hold this Department accountable for the many arbitrary,
unjustifiable, and apparently politically-motivated decisions it has
made under this administration until we find out the truth about these
actions.
Miss Rice. Without objection, Members not sitting on the
subcommittee will be permitted to participate in today's
hearing.
I now welcome our witness. Our witness today is Mr. Robert
Perez, the deputy commissioner for U.S. Customs and Border
Protection. In this role, he serves as the agency's senior
career official, overseeing the personnel who work every day to
protect our Nation's borders. During his 28-year career in
Federal law enforcement, Mr. Perez has also served as the
director of field operations in CBP's New York field office and
in Detroit, Michigan, and held various other positions at CBP
headquarters.
Without objection, the witness's full statement will be
inserted in the record.
I would now ask Mr. Perez if he would like to summarize his
statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT E. PEREZ, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, U.S. CUSTOMS
AND BORDER PROTECTION
Mr. Perez. Thank you, Chairwoman Rice, Ranking Member
Higgins, and Members of the subcommittee. Thank you again for
the opportunity to discuss U.S. Customs and Border Protection's
Trusted Traveler Programs and other related issues relating the
State of New York's Green Light law.
CBP's Trusted Traveler Programs are designed to provide
pre-approved, low-risk travelers with expedited arrival
processing at our Nation's ports of entry. CBP uses Department
of Motor Vehicle, or DMV, data, along with other law
enforcement information, to determine program eligibility of
new and existing applicants.
Earlier this year, New York residents were declared
ineligible for CBP's Trusted Traveler Programs due to the lack
of sharing of DMV information with CBP. At the time of that
decision, it was our understanding that New York stood alone in
not providing DMV information to CBP. While New York remains
unique to our knowledge in terminating our access to all DMV
information, CBP has since discovered other jurisdictions that
do not provide DMV information to our agency either in whole or
in part.
Immediately following the discovery of additional
jurisdictions, CBP provided clarifying statements to the court
in the Southern District of New York prevent any
misunderstandings made during the course of that on-going
litigation. As well, I appreciated the opportunity to brief the
Members of the committee, of this committee, and of the New
York Congressional delegation on the details of this matter
back on August 4 and August 5 of this year.
We also began accepting applications for enrollment into
our Trusted Traveler Programs from New York State residents and
soon thereafter began engaging the other States and U.S.
territories to identify a path forward for our agency to
receive the relevant DMV information we believed was being
provided but that, in fact, was not.
While CBP regrets the confusion caused by this situation,
it is important to note the serious concerns that remain with
New York's Green Light law, which explicitly prohibits DMV
records from being shared with CBP. I share these concerns with
the committee today as the deputy commissioner of CBP but also
informed by my nearly 28 years in law enforcement, including
having previously served as the director of CBP in New York
City for over 8 years. I can personally attest to the
importance of information sharing among the law enforcement
community there, arguably the bedrock of effective law
enforcement throughout the United States.
Contrary to facilitating effective law enforcement, on
April 3 of this year, the State of New York amended its Green
Light law to permit the sharing of DMV information with CBP
only as necessary for individuals seeking acceptance into a
Trusted Traveler Program or to facilitate vehicle imports and
exports. However, this amendment also made it a class E felony
to access, use, or share DMV information with CBP in violation
of the statute, potentially presenting risks of personal
liability for our personnel, as well as to our State and local
law enforcement partners.
Specifically, the law still prevents CBP from accessing,
using, or sharing DMV records for other important mission-
related purposes, including identifying vehicles used in
illicit activity, verifying the identity of a vehicle's owner
before a traffic stop, and utilizing the information for
investigations into criminal activities, such as narcotics
trafficking, identity fraud, gang affiliation, and terrorism.
In contrast, the Trusted Traveler Program vetting
limitations we discovered, while important, have likely only
prevented CBP from identifying potentially disqualifying
information for program applicants and members from certain
jurisdictions based on misdemeanor motor vehicle offenses.
What is more concerning are the threats to officer and
agent safety and the safety of the communities they serve.
Under the laws like that of New York, an officer and agent
approaching a stopped vehicle may not know if the registered
owner or occupants are associated with a lookout or active
warrant and may be unaware of prior involvement in illegal or
suspicious activity. Of equal concern is the inability to
freely share relevant information with State and local law
enforcement partners in the pursuit and interest of public
safety.
As a career law enforcement officer charged with protecting
the security of our country and the American people, I find it
professionally unacceptable that anyone would consider limiting
information sharing among law enforcement agencies,
particularly with the knowledge of the tragic lessons we have
all learned from past attacks on our Nation.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Perez follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert E. Perez
September 30, 2020
Chairwoman Rice, Ranking Member Higgins, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
to discuss U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Trusted Traveler
Programs (TTPs) and related issues regarding the State of New York.
When New York residents were declared ineligible for CBP's TTPs, it was
with the understanding that New York State was unique in its decision
to stop sharing all State Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV)
information with CBP. While New York remains unique, to our knowledge,
in affirmatively terminating our access to all DMV information, as you
are aware, during the course of related litigation, CBP became aware
that some other jurisdictions also do not provide some or all DMV
information to the agency. CBP has clarified earlier statements made
during the course of litigation through additional filings to prevent
any misunderstandings.
overview
To provide some background, on June 17, 2019, the New York State
Legislature passed the Driver's License Access and Privacy Act, also
known as the New York ``Green Light Law.'' The law explicitly
prohibited DMV records from being shared with any ``agency that
primarily enforces immigration law,'' specifically including CBP and
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). On December 12, 2019, 2
days before the Green Light Law went into effect, New York terminated
CBP's access to NY DMV data via Nlets. Nlets, the International Justice
and Public Safety Network, allows for the sharing of law enforcement,
criminal justice, and public safety information. CBP utilizes it to
access State DMV information in order to conduct its mission
responsibilities. After the Green Light Law went into effect, CBP
operators immediately began receiving error messages through Nlets,
indicating they were no longer authorized to view NY DMV data that they
previously had been able to view. The operators promptly notified
Headquarters of the problem. New York's action prevented CBP and ICE
from accessing relevant information needed for many of the agencies'
mission responsibilities, including aspects of an individual's criminal
history that only the State DMV maintains.
On February 5, 2020, Acting DHS Secretary Chad Wolf sent a letter
to the acting commissioner and executive deputy commissioner of the New
York Department of Motor Vehicles, notifying them of DHS's decision to
suspend the eligibility of New York residents to enroll or re-enroll in
CBP's TTPs because New York's law prevented CBP from accessing New York
DMV records to determine whether a TTP applicant or re-applicant met
program eligibility requirements.
On April 3, 2020, as part of its fiscal year 2020-21 budget, New
York amended its Green Light Law to permit the sharing of DMV
information with CBP ``as necessary for an individual seeking
acceptance into a trusted traveler program, or to facilitate vehicle
imports and/or exports.'' These amendments, however, also made it a
class E felony to access, use or share DMV information in violation of
the statute, potentially presenting risks of personal liability for CBP
personnel as well as State and local partners interacting with CBP.
Specifically, as amended, the law continues to prevent CBP from
accessing, using or sharing DMV records for other important mission-
related purposes, including identifying vehicles being used in illicit
activity, verifying the identity of a vehicle's owner before a traffic
stop, and investigating activities such as terrorism and human
smuggling.
Information-sharing and local, State, and Federal partnerships have
always been the bedrock of effective law enforcement in the United
States. As we learned from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and
other such tragedies in the United States, and as discussed in detail
in the 9/11 Commission Report, the lack of information sharing among
law enforcement agencies can have catastrophic consequences. Indeed,
one of the primary reasons that the Department of Homeland Security was
created was to ensure greater information sharing among the Nation's
various law enforcement partners.
To clarify again, at the time New York residents were declared
ineligible for TTPs on February 5, 2020, it was with the understanding
that New York State had stopped providing DMV data to CBP that is
necessary to effectively screen TTP applicants, and that New York was
unique in its decision to stop sharing this information. CBP maintains
that DMV information is important to inform TTP vetting, and to our
knowledge, New York remains unique in actively terminating CBP's access
to full DMV queries while having previously provided the information.
However, CBP has since become aware that there are other jurisdictions
that do not provide some or all DMV information to the agency.
This awareness came in connection with preparing a response to a
July 10, 2020 filing in a lawsuit pending in the Southern District of
New York wherein plaintiffs made specific assertions that New York was
not the only State that did not provide CBP access to DMV information.
While Plaintiffs' assertions were based on information that pertained
to ICE, further inquiry in pursuit of investigating plaintiffs'
specific allegations, revealed that 5 States, Connecticut, Florida,
Illinois, New Jersey, and Hawaii, as well as the District of Columbia
and Puerto Rico provide access to driver's license information
(referred to as the Driver's License Query) via Nlets, but do not
currently provide access to driver history information, including
driving-related criminal histories (referred to as the Driver History
Query). CBP uncovered that the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and
all States except New York, Hawaii, and Missouri, provide vehicle
registration information (referred to as the Vehicle Registration
Query) in response to CBP's standard Nlets queries. In addition, CBP
determined that 2 territories, Guam and the U.S. Virgin Islands, do not
participate in Nlets DMV-related queries, meaning that their DMV
records are not available to CBP or other Nlets users. While CBP lacked
access to DMV information for those jurisdictions, it continued to
accept, vet, and--when appropriate--approve TTP applications from these
States, territories, and the District of Columbia.
Upon the discovery of this additional information, CBP ensured that
it maintained full candor with the courts in the Southern District of
New York and the District of Columbia that are currently overseeing
litigation regarding the Department's February 5th Decision, explaining
what had been revealed and how it impacted what the Government had
conveyed in each litigation matter.
how cbp operators are addressing the now-known discrepancies
Now that CBP is aware of variances in its access to DMV information
among domestic jurisdictions, CBP is reaching out to those
jurisdictions where it does not receive responses to all DMV-related
Nlets queries to determine how CBP can access this data to ensure we
receive all information necessary to conduct full and effective TTP
vetting.
in closing
As mentioned earlier in my testimony, after New York residents were
declared ineligible to participate in TTPs, New York State amended its
law to allow sharing of State DMV records with CBP ``as necessary for
an individual seeking acceptance into a trusted traveler program . . .
'' Although New York has not yet restored CBP's access to DMV records,
CBP has restored the ability of New York residents to apply for TTPs,
including Global Entry, NEXUS, Secure Electronic Network for Travelers
Rapid Inspection (referred to as ``SENTRI''), and Free and Secure Trade
(referred to as ``FAST''). CBP's concern was--and continues to be--the
integrity of TTPs, which are intended to provide travel facilitation
benefits to pre-approved travelers who have been deemed to be low-risk.
We are hopeful that the New York DMV will soon restore CBP's access to
DMV records pursuant to its amended law.
CBP needs to be able to utilize all available information--
including DMV data--as part of the risk-assessment process to make an
informed determination regarding an applicant's eligibility for TTPs.
DMV data is used to confirm identities, addresses, and vehicle
registrations of applicants, as well as to identify potentially
disqualifying information.
While the absence of this vetting criteria likely has not prevented
CBP from identifying applicants linked to terrorism or serious crimes,
it has likely prevented CBP from identifying potentially disqualifying
information related to motor vehicle offenses rising to the level of a
misdemeanor conviction or offense.
CBP will continue to seek access to information derived from all
DMV queries via Nlets to ensure that it can effectively execute all of
its mission responsibilities in securing the homeland.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to your
questions.
Miss Rice. I thank the witness for his testimony.
I will remind the subcommittee that we will each have 5
minutes or so, since there is, I think, only 3 of us, as long
as the witness is OK with that, to question the witness.
I will now recognize myself for questions.
Mr. Perez, we now know from the filings made by the
Department of Justice in Federal district court in New York and
from your own supplemental declaration in that case that there
were other U.S. jurisdictions that provided limited or even no
DMV data to CBP like New York did.
According to DOJ'S filings, Guam and the Virgin Islands,
``do not provide any DMV data to any user of the Nlets system
that CBP queried to get DMV data.'' Further and, again, I will
quote, ``the District of Columbia, the U.S. territories, Puerto
Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands and 6 States--New York,
Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, and Hawaii--do not
provide responses to CBP for queries for driver history
query.''
Yet, without this access, CBP continued to process and
approve applications for TTPs for residents of Connecticut,
Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, Hawaii, District of Columbia,
Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
So my first question, Mr. Perez, is: Do you know why Mr.
Wolf claimed that he had to ban the residents of New York State
from the program while DHS continued to process applications
for residents from these other jurisdictions I just named?
Mr. Perez. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
So, from CBP's perspective, what I can tell you is that at
the time and only up until sometime in July during the court
proceedings, when some questions were asked and we subsequently
did a deep dive technologically on our OIT systems to see what
exactly was being returned to us by way of responses, it was
only then that we as an agency became aware of what was being
transmitted, the returns we were receiving, and the lack of
response versus negative responses, if you will. That is what
unearthed ultimately this--these nuances, if you will, or
differences in these other States as you listed in the
territories where we were getting partial returns and some
returns for those who were in the program, in the Nlets'
platform to transmit that information. In the cases of
territories, it was then made aware that they were not even
transmitting into the platform.
So that was everybody's understanding up until that point
in time and not unlike--again, without getting into too much
detail--but not unlike I shared in the briefings I provided
last month, it wasn't until and it was only because, through
the Trusted Traveler Programs, that we queried in batches.
Because of the volumes of information that come back and forth
there, the way that that system had been designed and one of
the things we are fixing is the manner in which those returns
come back.
So those flags were not readily evident, and it was only
after that deep dive that we were made aware that then, other
than New York, we had this--these other anomalies with the
other States. If I can make one other point, New York still
remains very unique in this regard. When we query into New
York, even as I sit here today, New York provides a definitive
response that reads ``ORI,'' which means the organization's
identifier restricted. They singularly are still the only State
and territory as I sit here that I am aware of that provides us
that affirmative negative response to a query, and this is in
light and even despite the fact that, back in April, they said
they would turn it on at least for the Trusted Traveler
Programs. To date, they have not.
But that in and of itself presents and gives the people on
our staff a much more readily identifiable response as opposed
to these very unique systems across every State. They all do it
differently. It is a very challenging IT system. Again, I don't
want to bore with you those details.
Miss Rice. So the IT system that you did the deep dive on
when you were looking more into this, that has always been
within your ability to do a deep dive into that system to get
additional information. Is that correct?
Mr. Perez. Well, it was our staff who did that deep dive.
Miss Rice. What I am asking you just----
Mr. Perez. Correct.
Miss Rice [continuing]. Yes, yes or no.
Mr. Perez. Yes, it was our folks who----
Miss Rice. So, well before this, you had access to that
information in order to do a deep dive to understand exactly
what information you would get from the various States. If you
wanted to, you could do that deep dive. But it wasn't until
this happened that you did.
Mr. Perez. Correct.
Miss Rice. OK. So here is my question. You have said on
numerous occasions: Our understanding was that New York was
unique.
What I am trying to understand is, what was that based on
if you made that decision that New York was unique before you
ever did that deep dive? So what was that understanding that
you and others had that made New York so unique?
Mr. Perez. So, so----
Miss Rice. Can I just say this? I didn't mean to interrupt,
but I am going to. I apologize.
I think it is really important to put my questions in light
of other things that were happening around the time, from the
time that New York passed the Green Light law. After that was
passed, a New York colleague of ours, Elise Stefanik, she
apparently made reference to how Cuomo's Green Light law was
hindering local law enforcement. She did that through a tweet,
which was re-tweeted by the President of the United States,
which tells us that he was aware, I mean, of this Green Light
law and re-tweeted what Stefanik, Congresswoman Stefanik said
about it. He has--the President has also made comments on
multiple occasions about punishing States that he perceives as
sanctuary States.
So I think it is important to kind-of put all of this in
light of that. Right? New York passes the Green Light law.
Elise Stefanik says it is going to hinder law enforcement. The
President retweets that. He makes multiple statements about
punishing sanctuary States, sanctuary cities like New York City
and New York State, and then, after the actual enactment of
Green Light law, which came at the end of last year, this
action is taken.
So I am trying to understand what your understanding and
your colleague's understanding was based on, if it wasn't based
on any deep dive that was done at the time that New York State
residents were banned from the program.
Mr. Perez. So, thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
So, again, from my perspective, and I can tell you, again,
from the CBP perspective, what we were basing our understanding
on and the lack of anything that told us at the time that
required anything further than what we had been doing for
years, candidly, in a very complex IT exchange, if you will, by
virtue of what is transmitted by 50 States, territories, and
the like that is very unique in the returns for specifically
Trusted Traveler Programs, there is nothing that made the
agency at the time readily aware of any of these anomalies. We
own that issue. I mean, that is the truth. That is part of what
it is that we have subsequently begun to fix once we discovered
those anomalies.
Miss Rice. So but, Mr. Perez, I understand what you are
saying. OK.
But once New York was banned, Mr. Katko, my colleague from
New York, our colleague from New York, me, I know Congresswoman
Clarke from New York, we all started sounding the bell. Why is
New York being punished when other States withhold the same
information? So it is not as if you at CBP or Mr. Wolf were not
aware that there were claims that New York State was being
treated differently than other States similarly situated.
So Mr. Wolf claimed that he had to ban the residents of New
York State from the program while, at the same time, DHS
continued to process applications for residents from those
other jurisdictions. Why?
Mr. Perez. So, if I may, Madam Chairwoman, a very specific
difference that still remains with respect to what was
occurring, even then, with New York. New York banned and
stopped transmitting any and every bit of information that they
were prior and still capable of transmitting. That is still
unique. What was happening with the other States and
territories, we were still receiving these returns. Again,
there was nothing that we were aware of readily by virtue of
what we were receiving from those returns with respect to the
Trusted Traveler Program that would have alerted us to the fact
that there was one of several aspects of the data that was
being provided to us that was, in fact, not being returned.
Miss Rice. So, Mr. Perez----
Mr. Perez. Because we were receiving information from every
single one of those jurisdictions. We were receiving something
from them, from the ones who were in the----
Miss Rice. But it was not enough. It was not enough.
This is my question.
Mr. Perez. Uh-huh.
Miss Rice. Shouldn't the agency charged with running this
program know how it actually functions? I mean, how could you
not know how these programs worked before you banned 19 million
people from participating in them? Actually a more disturbing
question is: It doesn't seem that all of the States that we
have identified that were similarly situated--I didn't say
exact--but similarly situated as where New York was, still to
this day Mr. Wolf has taken no action against those States to
ban any of the residents from those States from participating
in the Trusted Traveler Program.
So can you understand why the perception and perhaps, when
we get to the bottom of this, the reality looks as if New York
State was being punished because it was, in the President of
the United States' words, a sanctuary State? Can you
understand, just yes or no, the perception that New York State
was being punished, the residents? Not Cuomo, because he can go
wherever he wants. I am talking about the thousands of people
in New York State who rely on the Trusted Traveler Program to
travel for work, their livelihood, to put food on the table.
Can you understand that that is the appearance? Yes or no?
Mr. Perez. Madam Chairwoman, I can absolutely understand
how some people----
Miss Rice. Yes. Or----
Mr. Perez [continuing]. Might get that impression.
Miss Rice. OK. I am just asking you----
Mr. Perez. I am here to tell you that that----
Miss Rice [continuing]. If you can----
Mr. Perez [continuing]. Is absolutely not the case.
Miss Rice. I am just asking you that. OK. So now----
Mr. Perez. All right. But it was not the case, Madam Chair.
Respectfully, I am just letting you know that, as the senior
career official in CBP, I can--speaking for CBP, we were basing
what it is we were doing on what we understood the facts to be
at that time.
Miss Rice. OK. Now----
Mr. Perez. Solely that.
Miss Rice. Was there communication, whether through email
or reports, within your agency that talked about your
understanding about how New York was unique?
Mr. Perez. I would imagine there were emails.
Miss Rice. Great.
Mr. Perez. I am not sure there----
Miss Rice. So----
Mr. Perez [continuing]. Are emails.
Miss Rice. Thank you.
Mr. Perez. I am pretty sure there are some.
Miss Rice. OK.
Mr. Perez. There were staff-level discussions----
Miss Rice. Yes.
Mr. Perez [continuing]. About that----
Miss Rice. That----
Mr. Perez [continuing]. Looking into the matter.
Miss Rice. That makes sense.
So, in July, the committee requested 4 categories of
documents from the Department regarding the decision to exclude
New York State residents from the TTP Program. No documents
have been provided by the Department in response to the
committee's request.
Do you have any documents with you here today that can shed
some light on why, where this understanding came from that New
York was unique?
Mr. Perez. I don't have them with me today. But what I can
share with you, Madam Chair, is that those are actively being
worked on. I know the committee appreciates, I know you
appreciate that sometimes it takes time to go through and
compile everything that is being asked. But, more importantly,
there is a complicating factor here, as the attorneys in our
agency and the Department have shared with me, that is the on-
going open litigation that just requires further review and
analysis before those documents are provided. But my
understanding is, as soon as we are ready, we will provide and
be responsive to that request.
Miss Rice. It is not that heavy a lift, I would think. I
mean, you have them all in your possession. It doesn't take
lawyers that long to figure out what is relevant to a request
from a committee that has oversight over the agency.
But I think it has more to do with this, I am afraid: In
July of this year, DHS announced that they were lifting the ban
on New York State residents applying and re-applying for
Trusted Traveler Programs. That was on July 23. That same day,
following DHS's announcement that they were lifting the ban,
Federal Judge Jesse Furman of the Southern District of New York
asked DHS how the reversal would affect the lawsuit that was
presently pending before Judge Furman.
At that time the Government, the Government, not us, not
this committee, not Ds, not Rs--it was not a political thing--
the Government sent a letter, withdrawing their motion to
dismiss the case because they discovered that the motion and
their case was based on inaccurate and misleading statements
made by DHS officials concerning the differences between New
York's law and similar ID laws across the country.
Now, in order for the Southern District, I believe, which
was the issuing agency, to come to that conclusion, they had to
have in their possession some kind of paperwork or oral
testimony that enabled them to come to the determination that
your assumptions, your understandings were incorrect and, in
fact, possibly false, which is why they withdrew it from a
judge because they did not want to give the imprimatur of their
office and the credibility that goes with it to people and an
agency that had given inaccurate, misleading, potentially
knowingly false information. So I think it is important to
kind-of put it in the context of that too.
I have gone over my 5 minutes. I now recognize the Ranking
Member, Mr. Higgins, for his questions.
Thank you, Mr. Perez.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Deputy Commissioner Perez, thank you for your 28 years of
service in law enforcement to our country.
Let me clarify that I have a lot of friends across the
aisle and 2 of my colleagues across the aisle that I have the
deepest respect for are seated before you here today, and I
know that Madam Chairwoman has a passionate and very focused
representation for the people of New York.
From my perspective, as my background in law enforcement
and yours, we must recognize that that is--the purity of that,
the seeking of truth here, because I believe that I think we
can resolve this thing. I would like to see it resolved. I
would like to fix it and move on. We have obligations for this
committee.
So, that being said, when a Customs--it has been indicated
that this is somehow politically-driven, and I understand that
suspicion in today's environment in America. But when a Customs
and Border Patrol protection officer or ICE, dealing with
transnational crime, gangs, narcotics, counterfeit products,
human trafficking, when they call in for data on someone that
they are enacting with, they have reasonable suspicion and they
need background data on, is anyone worried about tweets? Do you
know of an officer out there that checks the President's tweets
before he moves forward with an inquiry?
Mr. Perez. I would expect not, Ranking Member.
Mr. Higgins. I don't know of any.
Mr. Perez. No.
Mr. Higgins. You are focused on that interaction at that
moment in order to accomplish that mission and peacefully and
within the parameters of the Constitution and in recognition of
the civil rights of that individual you move forward with that
interaction. Nobody is checking any tweets.
Commissioner, it is my understanding that CBP uses the
National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System that is
referred to as Nlets to access State, territory, and local-
level data that could preclude an applicant from qualifying for
a CBP Trusted Traveler Program. What happened after the Green
Light law went into effect when your officers attempted to
query information from Nlets for Trusted Traveler Programs
vetting? Did an error message appear?
Mr. Perez. It did, Ranking Member, as I mentioned
previously. There was a very specific and singular response,
singular in the sense that there is no other State or territory
that I am aware that provides this type of response.
Mr. Higgins. Right.
Mr. Perez. No ORI restriction.
Mr. Higgins. Let's move there to the interest of time. The
Nlets website states it has over 150 message types including
DMV-related data. We have learned that there are a few States
and territories that do not provide some or all DMV data times
but still provide a range of data types in Nlets.
Was New York State the only jurisdiction that returned an
error message for all data types when CBP attempted to query a
Trusted Traveler Programs vetting?
Mr. Perez. It is my understanding that, yes, specifically
stating ORI restricted.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you.
It was pointed out that Guam and the Virgin Islands did not
provide DMV-related data through Nlets, while still providing
other data. Did you receive error messages from Guam and the
Virgin Islands?
Mr. Perez. No, not that I am aware of.
Mr. Higgins. To the best of your knowledge, has Nlets data
ever been used to disqualify a resident of Guam or the U.S.
Virgin Islands from a CBP Trusted Traveler Program?
Mr. Perez. Not that I am aware of.
Mr. Higgins. Has the Department initiated conversations
with Guam and the Virgin Islands and jurisdictions that are
only sharing partial DMV data to work out an agreement to
access that data? If so, what is the status of those
conversations?
Mr. Perez. Thank you, Ranking Member. We have. We
immediately began to initiate those conversations with all
those jurisdictions. Varying states of status across the board,
again, given the difference between capability of each of the
States and the territory, whether they even have the
information readily available. Some don't even gather it up and
automate it. It is really, as you alluded to earlier, 150 types
of data that is in this system. It is literally, when you are
dealing with the entire country and all the U.S. territory, all
over the place, if I may, and that makes it a bit complex.
Nonetheless, by and large, we are getting receptivity to
the request. In the end, we expect to get all the data we
require from all the States and the territories.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you for your answers.
If the Chairwoman will indulge, I would like to give the
commissioner an opportunity to respond to the phrase
``political retribution.'' It has been presented that this,
that the actions taken that we are discussing here today by CBP
are retribution for New York's position on some things and the
President's tweet. It has been used by the New York State
Attorney General, the term ``political retribution,'' and it
has been echoed by the Majority to describe the Department's
decision to exclude New York State residents from enrolling or
re-enrolling in CBP Trusted Traveler Programs earlier this
year.
I don't believe that accusation is true. Again, with the
spirit of trying to get past this thing and seek a resolution,
would you like, would you care to comment on that accusation
that the CBP actions----
Mr. Perez. Thank you, Ranking Member.
Mr. Higgins [continuing]. Are based on political
retribution.
With your answer, I will close, Madam Chair.
Mr. Perez. Pardon me and thank you, Ranking Member.
Again, as I mentioned just a moment ago, from my
perspective, from where I sit in my position in representing
this agency, I assure you that it was not. It was based on the
facts at that time and, frankly, the facts that still remain.
New York remains unique, unique in the returns when what it is
we are trying to access DMV data. We are totally shut out as an
agency from getting anything from New York wherein they have
the capability to provide that data to us readily and, in fact,
prior to this Green Light law, they did. That remains unique
and even before they made the amendment to their law in April,
which made it a class E felony to share data and where they
provided for the ability to at least share partial for the use
of the Trusted Traveler Programs.
Again, as I sit here today, we still receive nothing from
New York, absolutely nothing. We get the return that, from the
system, as I referred to before, being restricted, that
negative message, and that is a unique acceptance as speculate
of New York's Green Light law and the impact that it continues
to have on CBP.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, sir.
Madam Chair, I yield.
My time has expired.
Miss Rice. The Chair now recognizes--thank you, Mr. Ranking
Member.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Correa.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Perez, welcome. Thank you for being here today.
Mr. Perez. Thank you, Congressman.
Mr. Correa. I wanted to follow up with some of your
statements that you just made a little while ago in terms of
facts.
You mention that the Green Light law of the State of New
York came to your attention when you started getting error
messages essentially from IT inquiries, so to speak. Yet you
all knew that this Green Light law and its specifics was
heading your way before it was actually implemented. Yes? No?
Mr. Perez. I don't recall specifically myself having
knowledge and when it is I became aware of when they passed the
law. I know, Congressman, that they passed it earlier in the
summer. It became effective or we began, the officers, the
agents on the front line began getting the messages----
Mr. Correa. In my----
Mr. Perez [continuing]. Error messages in December of last
year.
Mr. Correa. The reason I am asking that is that your
professional organization--and, as you said, it is a very
complicated job you have to do, and I anticipate your
Government relations people are pretty up on this stuff. So
they can tell you way in advance that this is what is going to
happen. If you don't have those capabilities, I am getting
concerned about what capabilities you really have.
State of California passed a driver's license law 5, 6,
years ago. I was in the State legislature when that happened. I
can tell you that ICE was in Sacramento talking to us about the
law's implications way before it was passed, way before it was
signed. So, for you to say that you only figured out that this
law, New York Green Light law, was going to create challenges
for you after it was implemented kind-of leaves me puzzled
here.
Mr. Perez. So, if I may, Congressman, I don't recall any
outreach and any exchange, at least from the CBP level, of
any----
Mr. Correa. From the State of New York legislature.
Mr. Perez. From the State of New York.
Mr. Correa. So you-all--is it your statement, Mr. Perez,
that you were caught completely off-guard with the Green Light
law and its applications and its details until after it was
actually signed into law?
Mr. Perez. My personal understanding is, my personal answer
to that is yes----
Mr. Correa. For the whole Department?
Mr. Perez [continuing]. That it was not in law.
Mr. Correa. So you are saying----
Mr. Perez. But I am also not aware of the agency being
consulted or asked by New York State----
Mr. Correa. Well, but you--you would be----
Mr. Perez [continuing]. For any----
Mr. Correa [continuing]. Following this. But you would be
following this at an agency whose business it is to follow this
kind of legislation. You did it in the State of California, and
New York has got New York has got 20 million residents. So you
figure you would probably have a heads-up on this. Just a
statement.
Mr. Perez. Uh-huh.
Mr. Correa. SENTRI program, Trusted Traveler Program----
Mr. Perez. Right.
Mr. Correa [continuing]. It is a very complex application
process. Very extensive. You go into a person's criminal
background. You look at a lot of records. Yes? No?
Mr. Perez. For the Trusted Traveler Programs.
Mr. Correa. Yes.
Mr. Perez. Pardon me, Congressman. Yes.
Mr. Correa. Yes.
Mr. Perez. Uh-huh. Uh-huh.
Mr. Correa. So understanding how and when the DMV
information is used is important. So in a supplemental
declaration where Mr. Acosta, who I wish would have been here
today, he stated, and I am going to quote him. He said: While
available DMV records may manually be queried through National
Law Enforcement Telecommunications System by TTP, vetting
officers to complete their assessment in determining program
eligibility and admissibility for the TTP applications does not
as a matter of policy require that vetting officers initiate
manual queries of NI for every TTP applicant, but as a matter
of practice, a vetting officer may at his discretion initiate
manual query available DMV recovered.
So my question is, is DMV data always used to vet every
applicant, the Trusted Traveler Program?
Mr. Perez. The DMV----
Mr. Correa. Let me repeat that.
Mr. Perez. Yes.
Mr. Correa. Is DMV data always used to vet every applicant
to the Trusted Traveler Programs?
Mr. Perez. The DMV data is part of the totality of data
that we rely upon.
Mr. Correa. Is it always used?
Mr. Perez. Yes, it is my understanding that it is.
Mr. Correa. It is always used.
Mr. Perez. It is part of the information.
Mr. Correa. DMV data is always used by vetting officers.
DMV data is always required, Trusted Traveler Program.
Mr. Perez. It is my understanding, Congressman, that the
DMV data is part of the suite of information and queries done
uniformly to assess the risks associated with an applicant who
is trying to participate in the Trusted Traveler Program.
Again, as I mentioned before, it was through the analysis and
the deeper analysis on what it is we were actually returning, a
no-response versus positive and negative responses,
essentially, and that discovery of what was coming to us in its
totality versus what was coming to us in pieces and/or
incomplete, that then we subsequently identified that there was
some jurisdictions that were not providing us total--the total
information from the DMV that we required. If I can make a
comment about California's----
Mr. Correa. Will you indulge us, Madam Chair?
Miss Rice. Yes.
Mr. Correa. Go ahead.
Mr. Perez. Thank, Congressman.
I think it is important distinction--I am glad you raise
it--in California, Congressman, just about the practicality of
what was enacted there because, again, I think it is important
for the committee to understand and know how the New York law
still stands unique. When it comes to data sharing and the
utilization of the data itself, while California and other
States that have passed Green Light laws has some restriction
on use of the DMV data that we receive, it has no bearing, none
whatsoever, on what it is we need to do with other law
enforcement missions, on how it is we adjudicate the Trusted
Traveler Program, and our ability to share is absolutely
unhampered. We do still get returns from California.
Mr. Correa. Let me ask you.
Mr. Perez. Very different than what is happening in New
York.
Mr. Correa. If I can interrupt you.
Mr. Perez. Please.
Mr. Correa. In this year of 2020, what percentage of
applicants have DMV data been used as part of the vetting
process for the Trusted Traveler Programs?
Mr. Perez. My understanding is, again, that is that part of
the----
Mr. Correa. A hundred percent?
Mr. Perez [continuing]. Standard protocol. That is part of
the standard protocol. Now from a practical perspective, just
to be clear, Congressman, if I may, respectfully, now that we
know that, while we have been querying DMV information and
believing that, for example, the U.S. territories that have not
had the capability to provide that to us, clearly we have been
adjudicating some applications where those returns had not been
returning to us. So----
Mr. Correa. So your statement is you have been adjudicating
and essentially approving Trusted Traveler Programs in other
jurisdictions outside of New York without having DMV
information.
Mr. Perez. That is what we have discovered. That is what
exactly we are remedying at the moment, Congressman.
Mr. Correa. So I guess, if you may indulge me, Madam Chair,
you shut down New York for not providing you that information,
but there are other jurisdictions that you continue to work
with when New York was shut down, given the DMV information or
lack thereof. Yes? No?
Mr. Perez. So it is my understanding that at the time that
that and subsequent to that decision being made with New York,
there were conversations with New York to try to find a
mutually-agreeable remedy and path forward.
Mr. Correa. But what I am saying, Mr. Perez, and I don't
want to be argumentative with you.
Mr. Perez. Please, no, please.
Mr. Correa. I am just trying to get the facts here.
You shut down New York because they wouldn't give you DMV
information. Yet other jurisdictions continue to have their
Trusted Traveler Program applications approved without DMV
information. It is your statement here today to this committee
that you just didn't know that you were processing other
jurisdictions. So you continued to process them, but New York
kind-of came to your attention, and, therefore, you shut them
down.
Mr. Perez. So that is not exactly correct, Congressman.
Mr. Correa. OK.
Mr. Perez. If I could explain, I am going explain it, what
and how that played out.
New York was the sole entity, State, or territory, that
shut us down from something that was already being provided
for. All the other States and territories that were providing
something, we were getting some DMV information. What we
unearthed and what we discovered was that there was one aspect
of the multiple queries, the driver history, OK, that was not
being returned by some of these other----
Mr. Correa. But----
Mr. Perez [continuing]. States.
Mr. Correa. Madam Chair, I am just--final statement here.
Mr. Perez. Please.
Mr. Correa. Mr. Perez, I am just trying to figure out.
Again, some jurisdictions didn't provide any or some. New York,
you discovered, was not going to. Therefore, you gave them
separate treatment.
Mr. Perez. We at the time believed that New York was unique
in not providing anything. It was our belief that those----
Mr. Correa. Couldn't you----
Mr. Perez [continuing]. Returns----
Mr. Correa. Couldn't you check that in your database to
show that you had other jurisdictions where the Trusted
Traveler Program was being approved despite not having that DMV
information?
Mr. Perez. That what was we only unearthed later on in
July, Congressman. Again, at the time that we shut New York
down, it was our understanding and our belief that we were
getting the returns on the DMV information complete from every
other jurisdiction. It was only after later on, months later,
that we discovered otherwise.
Mr. Correa. Madam Chair, if I can, just a quick concluding
statement.
I hear what you are saying. I am bothered, though, because
you took action against the State of New York without fully
vetting the facts. So it is almost as though you are punishing
New York for what they are doing. Yet the other jurisdictions
continue to operate and get the benefits of Trusted Traveler
Program without providing the DMV information. That to me is an
act of punishment against a certain jurisdiction, and in my
opinion as elected officials, as Government officials here to
serve the public, our citizens, you are supposed to serve the
citizens, and for you to take that kind of action without
knowing the facts raises a lot of alarms.
The State of New York, like the State of California, we are
trying to operate a system or economy or society based on what
we have to work with. We have a horrible immigration system.
Last time it was we had an immigration reform bill was under
the great California President Reagan. Today, in California,
what we try to do is make sure that people that drive in our
streets know how to drive--that means they have a driver's
license--are insured, and that when the police officer pulls
them over, they have an ID, and we know who they are. That is
why we want to have people driving with driver's licenses. It
is not to provide anybody with any privileges. It is a public
policy issue, and that is what we try to do.
You know, I am sad because you took action against the
State of New York that you didn't have to, if you kind-of went
back and just checked your records and see who was not
providing you with DMV records all this time.
Madam Chair, thank you very much.
Miss Rice. I thank you, Mr. Correa.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi,
Mr. Guest.
Mr. Guest. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Commissioner Perez, I thank you for being here. I thank you
and the men and women that serve underneath you for the service
that you provide every day to our country. As we talk about the
Trusted Traveler Program, there is actually several different
programs underneath the Trusted Traveler Program. Is that
correct?
Mr. Perez. Correct, Congressman, yes.
Mr. Guest. I was able to find at least 5: The TSA PreCheck
being one, the Global Entry program, the NEXUS program, the
SENTRI program, and the FAST program. Would all 5 of those
programs be underneath the global umbrella, if you will, of the
Trusted Traveler Program?
Mr. Perez. They would be, Congressman. The only
clarification I will make is that the TSA PreCheck is
administered by a different agency other than CBP--TSA,
obviously, and the Department of Homeland Security. So we in
CBP don't have oversight regarding the implementation of that
program. All the other programs you mentioned are run by CBP.
Mr. Guest. Talk about just the general purpose of these
programs, specifically the one that CB--the programs that CBP
administered.
Mr. Perez. So it really is a risk-management, a very
critical, important risk-management tool, that it enables to us
identify, again, pre-vetted, low-risk travelers that we can
subsequently, you know, approve for this Trusted Traveler
status so that, when they are traveling across the borders,
whether it be an airport, a seaport, or a land border, they get
expedited privilege and the ability to clear the border in a
faster manner, thereby reducing the burden on the front-line
men and women of the agency and how it is they assess risk,
which becomes, again, very critical in an ever-present
environment of finite resources when you are trying to identify
serious risks to the homeland.
Mr. Guest. So for an individual to qualify for any of these
programs that we just listed, there is a vetting process that
you have discussed. Is that correct?
Mr. Perez. That is correct, Congressman.
Mr. Guest. Is information sharing between agencies, is that
necessary to properly vet individuals that are applying for any
of the programs under the Trusted Traveler Program?
Mr. Perez. So, directly so, not so much, only in that the
vetting process is very much an internal process in CBP.
Nonetheless, because we are querying and leveraging other
systems as well. With respect to performing those background
checks, they are, as you might imagine, at times and can be
informed by that interagency collaboration.
Mr. Guest. OK. That is what I want to talk about. So, when
I am talking information sharing for the purpose of this, it is
important that you and the Federal Government be able to access
other information data systems, State systems, Federal systems
to properly vet individuals to see if they would be a proper
candidate from one of these programs. Is that right?
Mr. Perez. It is, Congressman. Again, the vetting program
itself for these different programs, the vetting process is
something that is CBP-centric, but nonetheless, again, further
informed by all that interagency collaboration and how those
collaborations, how that data exchange, how that information
exchange does inform our other holdings that are leveraged in
order to assess risk and do background checks and vetting of
anybody who applies into these programs.
Mr. Guest. Commissioner, let me ask you this: Is DMV-
related data information, is that one data set that you rely on
to vet applicants for this program?
Mr. Perez. It is.
Mr. Guest. Is it your belief--and I know, based on
testimony earlier, is it your belief that, if that DMV
information is available that it is always used? There may be
times where the information--we know there are certain States
that don't--because of State laws that don't provide that
information. But when available, that is one of the subsets of
data that is used to vet travelers for this program?
Mr. Perez. It is, Congressman. In fact, those queries are
readily being made, and those are the returns that we get back,
as I described earlier.
Mr. Guest. All right. Let me close with this: When we have
States and/or territories that either, No. 1, refuse to provide
the information at all or, in some cases, where they severely
limit the information that they are sharing, does that have the
potential to make the traveling public less safe? It would seem
to me one fewer data sets that you or the agency would be able
to look at. So, in theory, by refusing to share information
with CBP, refusing to share information with the Federal
Government, could that put members of the traveling public at
risk if an individual was to qualify for one of the programs
under the Trusted Traveler Program, but yet, there be
information that was withheld that may have flagged that
individual and prevented them from being cleared?
Mr. Perez. Absolutely, Congressman, and it really takes us
to, I think, another very troubling aspect, uniquely troubling
aspect of New York's Green Light law, you know, aside from just
the Trusted Traveler Programs, the inability to share that
information for all sorts of other enforcement purposes and
mission sets. Not just for CBP, and not just for the impact it
has immediately on us, but the impact it has with our State and
local partners and any of those who might otherwise be able to
share that information with us over the course of
investigations of all types, as I mentioned in my opening
statement, that might then further inform not just DMV data
that comes to us but other systems and holdings and
investigations that could inform us as to why somebody might
not be otherwise eligible or found to be eligible for a low-
risk travel program.
Mr. Guest. One last question: Do you believe that New York
State's Green Light law, does it negatively impact public
safety?
Mr. Perez. My professional opinion is absolutely, yes.
Mr. Guest. No further questions, Madam Chairwoman. I yield
back.
Miss Rice. Thank you, Mr. Guest.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from New York, Ms.
Clarke.
Ms. Clarke. I thank you, Chairwoman Rice, and I thank
Ranking Member Higgins.
Today's hearing follows Mr. Wolf's appearance before the
committee in March where I asked him several questions about
the decision to ban New York residents from participating in
the Trusted Traveler Program. For example, I asked, and I
quote, ``can you please explain how it makes the United States
safer to allow residents of several foreign countries to enroll
in the Global Entry program but to bar residents of New York
State?''
After some back and forth, Mr. Wolf said DHS did not have
all of the information it required to vet an applicant from New
York. Mr. Wolf also said, and I quote, ``what I had to take
into account was making sure that the whole Global Entry system
was not compromised.'' Then I asked, ``whether there was no
other way of doing that other than banning all New Yorkers,''
and Mr. Wolf eventually said, and I quote, ``there isn't; there
is not.''
You can understand, then, Mr. Perez, how it was a surprise
to me when, in early September, you filed a supplemental
declaration with the District Court in which you said, and I
quote, ``while CBP officers responsible for vetting TTP
applications, including applications to the Global Entry
program, do consider DMV record information in their
adjudication of such applications based on information
identified by CBP. On July 17, 2020, it is now clear that DMV
data is not and was not at the time of my signature or my
previous declaration available, either in whole or in part, to
the TTP vetting officers for a number of jurisdictions,
including New York.''
Mr. Perez, how could CBP have been unaware prior to July 17
of the fact that some jurisdictions were not providing some or
all of the data that Mr. Wolf claimed were so essential to
vetting applicants to the Trusted Traveler Programs that New
York residents had to be excluded from the program because New
York wasn't providing this data?
Mr. Perez. So, thank you, Congresswoman. I will try to
explain that again without, you know, getting too far into the
technical weeds, as I will say, but I do want to also make one
other statement as well, to that end, because Congressman
Correa too. I want you all to know that, you know, CBP, we own
the fact that we attested to and were under the impression that
we were receiving all this data and that we were absolutely
convinced that this data was coming back to us and then
subsequently unearthed it in back of July. So we own that. That
is something we are owning and we are fixing, and I just want
to make sure that that gets on the record, that clearly.
So, just to go back again and try to explain to you,
Congresswoman, how that played out, the way it was explained to
me by our OIT, our Office of Information Technology
professionals, is as follows, is that, because of the nature of
the queries and how they are typically run in batches, the
volume associated with that and then the technical aspects of
how those returns come back to the agency when those queries
were made, there was nothing readily evident that we were not
receiving the data that was being queried from any of those
jurisdictions. It was not clear by virtue of the fact that, for
most, save the U.S. territories who were not transmitting at
all, we were receiving something. We were getting some sort of
positive return on those queries whereas with New York, which
is still true, we were getting a unique identifier informing
the agency that the query and the information therein being
asked for was restricted. That was unique then with respect to
the queries, and it is my understanding that remains unique.
Ms. Clarke. Mr. Perez----
Mr. Perez. Nonetheless, without again getting into the
myriad of the complexities of the IT systems, we are immersed
in fixing those and working, again, with the States, with the
territories to find a path forward so they can give us the
completed information, but that is essentially how that played
out to, my understanding.
Ms. Clarke. Understood.
Mr. Perez. I hope that explains it.
Ms. Clarke. Mr. Perez--understood. Mr. Perez, wouldn't you
then agree that there was a serious security breach beyond what
you were doing with New York if, in fact, those data points
were not being processed by all these other jurisdictions?
Mr. Perez. I would not, Congresswoman. I would not
characterize it like that at all. In fact, as I mentioned in
my----
Ms. Clarke. I just wanted to get your characterization
because you sanctioned New York State while you are now saying
that you would not characterize the fact that you didn't have
the detailed information coming from all these other
jurisdictions. Sounds very contradictive, but let me move on.
Given that Mr. Wolf claimed that New York's DMV data was so
essential to determining eligibility for enrollment in the
Trusted Traveler Program that New Yorkers had to be thrown out
of the program because New York wasn't providing that data,
what security risk has CBP created in our Nation by enrolling
applicants from U.S. jurisdictions that have provided limited
or no DMV data to CBP?
Mr. Perez. So, to that point, Congresswoman, not unlike I
mentioned in my opening statement, that we would have otherwise
and might have approved applications that would have provided
for some sort of DMV-related offenses of the Trusted Traveler
applicants who would have been found otherwise disqualified by
virtue of some DMV-related misdemeanor issues. Other than that,
there is no other subsequent consequence of what it is and how
it is, you know, with respect to the risks of who it is that
was let into that program. However, I must----
Ms. Clarke. So, essentially, you are saying that there is
none. Then why did Mr. Wolf claim that DMV data was needed to
vet applicants in the first place? Was he ignorant of the
facts, or was he misleading the committee?
Mr. Perez. In order to be approved into a Trusted Traveler
Program, Congresswoman, we expect that all those applicants
meet the strictest thresholds with respect to what it is those
qualifications are. That includes getting the information that
we require from DMV, DMVs around the country and from the
territories, in order to potentially identify disqualifying
data. The inherent risk associated from a National security
perspective by virtue of our ability to leverage criminal
information by a wide array of other types of sources,
including interagency collaboration and our own holdings, is
separate and apart in how it is that we go ahead and vet and
approve folks for a privilege, a privilege to be able to come
across a border in a much more expedited fashion and be deemed
low-risk. Nonetheless, that privilege, that privilege also does
lean on the DMV information that we get from those DMV
locations and their DMV offices from around the country. There
may be, again, some violations, particularly for people who
drive cars, that are DMV-related that would disqualify you from
a Trusted Traveler Program.
Ms. Clarke. On that note, Mr. Perez, yes, it is a
privilege, and it is a privilege that U.S. citizens are
afforded. But while New York residents were being prohibited
from enrolling in the Trusted Travelers Program, did CBP
continue enrolling foreign nationals in the program?
Mr. Perez. We were, Congresswoman. Those are by way of
bilateral--specific bilateral arrangements made with those
foreign governments in order to have some of their nationals
apply into the program. They are very strictly, you know, laid
out as far as requirements and what need to be met. The vetting
capabilities, because of, you know, dealing with different
governments and different countries, they are all unique. So,
again, those are specific agreements brought to and about by
virtue of collaboration with those foreign governments and our
counterparts. Then, subsequently, upon approval from both
countries of the potential applicants, are those individuals
subsequently approved into the program.
I might add that one of the aspects that we do ask the
foreign governments to bring to bear and to collate and analyze
on their end is related, you know, DMV-like and or driver-
related offenses therein as well.
Ms. Clarke. Madam Chair, I have gone over my time. I will
yield back. If there is an additional round, I have some
additional questions. Thank you.
Miss Rice. Thank you, Ms. Clarke.
Mr. Perez, if I could just say, you have said numerous
times during your testimony here today that--you know, you said
you didn't want to get into the technical weeds with Members of
Congress, and yet, that is exactly why we are here. In fact, we
tried to get transcribed interviews which are a great way to be
able to kind-of dive into and get into the weeds not in this
setting, and you were not made available for that purpose. So I
am imploring you to please feel free to get into the weeds
because it is only by getting to the weeds that we are going to
truly understand what happened here, so thank you for that.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Arizona, Mrs.
Lesko.
Mrs. Lesko. Thank you, Madam Chair. I do not have any
questions. I will just make a brief comment. I thank the
gentleman for coming to testify today. Thank you for your work.
Thank you for your employees' work to keep our country safe.
I have to say I continue to be mystified by my Democratic
colleagues who somehow think it is awful that, if a State
decides not to share information that is vital for National
security with a Federal agency in order to get Trusted Traveler
Program, which is just a courtesy--it is not, like, a right for
everybody to have--that somehow they think that is bad. I think
it is a good thing.
So I applaud you for keeping our country safe, keeping our
community safe, and standing up for what I believe the majority
of Americans would agree with.
With that, I yield back.
Miss Rice. Thank you, Mrs. Lesko.
We will now go into Round 2 of questions, and I will
recognize myself for 5--hopefully 5 minutes.
Mr. Perez, on June 22, the committee wrote to DHS seeking
documents and information regarding the Trump administration's
decision to permit Mr. Nigel Farage to travel to the United
States from the United Kingdom despite travel restrictions in
place to protect against the spread of the coronavirus
pandemic. They allowed him to travel so that he could attend a
campaign rally staged by President Trump in Tulsa, Oklahoma.
The committee requested these documents by June 26. As with so
many of our other document requests, this one too has gone
unanswered.
Do you know the date by which the Department will provide
to the committee all of the documents it has requested
regarding the process of approving Mr. Farage to visit the
United States to attend President Trump's political rally?
Mr. Perez. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I am not, but I
will gladly take that back to inquire on your behalf.
Miss Rice. Thank you.
Mr. Perez. Uh-huh.
Miss Rice. The decision by CBP to admit to the United
States a foreign national who happens to be an ally of the
President provides an interesting counterpoint to the
administration's efforts to intentionally disadvantage U.S.
citizens residing in New York. At the time Mr. Farage was
admitted, an Executive Order was in effect suspending the entry
into the United States of people who had been in the United
Kingdom in the previous 14-day period. I will also note that,
at the time, Mr. Farage was the leader of a political party but
did not appear to have any official position.
When committee staff requested further information from CBP
regarding Mr. Farage's travel to the United States, CBP
provided an email that stated that Mr. Farage was initially,
``denied boarding while attempting to fly from the United
Kingdom to the United States,'' but, ``after conducting a
thorough review of the relevant facts and circumstances,'' DHS
determined Mr. Farage's travel would be permissible under an
exemption that allowed entry to, ``any alien whose entry would
be in the National interest.'' Do you know what National
interest was served by permitting Mr. Farage to enter the
United States?
Mr. Perez. I am not aware, Madam Chairwoman, of the exact
exemptions that were applied when Mr. Farage was allowed to
enter.
Miss Rice. Well, I just told you.
Mr. Perez. Right.
Miss Rice. I quoted that his travel was determined to be
permissible under an exemption that allowed entry to, ``any
alien whose entry would be in the National interest.''
Mr. Perez. So, pardon me, Madam Chairwoman. So, just for
clarification, what I am not aware of are the particular
details that would have led to him being eligible for that
exemption. I was not aware of his travel.
Miss Rice. Were you part of that decision making,
determining that it was in the National interest to allow him
into the United States?
Mr. Perez. Not that I recall, Madam Chairwoman.
Miss Rice. Do you know who made that decision?
Mr. Perez. It would have been either--depending on the
exemption, if I am not mistaken, it would have been either
senior staff at the agency, meaning CBP or the Department,
depending on the waiver. So I would have to go back and get
that.
Miss Rice. So, when you say senior staff at CBP, who
specifically would you be referring to?
Mr. Perez. It would have been in the Office of Field
Operations which is, again, the entity within CBP that oversees
entry into the ports of entry for travelers.
Miss Rice. If it wasn't CBP, as you said it could have been
CBP or people at the Department, meaning DHS, who would have
made the decision at DHS?
Mr. Perez. Well, it would have been hinged upon--my
understanding is it hinged upon the authority that was being
leveraged. Again, my presumption is it would have been more so
ours, but there may be other exemptions, again, depending on
which one was being utilized that fall under the purview of the
Department's authority, but I would have to go back to double
check that, Madam Chairwoman.
Miss Rice. So, just to clarify, it seems that if you are
allowing entry into this country based on it being in the
National interest, that that is a decision, applying that
exemption is a decision that would have to be made, according
to you, at the very top of either CBP or DHS?
Mr. Perez. Well, it would have been made at a senior level
within our agency, not necessarily having to come to my level.
That authority would have been and was subsequently delegated
down, again, at an Executive level, nonetheless.
Miss Rice. Did Mr. Wolf make this decision, as far as you
know?
Mr. Perez. I have--that is nothing that I am aware of at
all. That would not be typical at all.
Miss Rice. Are you aware of any communication with the
Trump campaign vis-a-vis the decision making, finding this to
be in the National interest?
Mr. Perez. Not at all. None that I am aware of, Madam
Chairwoman.
Miss Rice. Thank you. I don't have any further questions.
I will now recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, the
Ranking Member, Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Deputy Commissioner, it occurs to me about our task force.
The amendment of the New York law earlier this year which,
perhaps, was a good-faith intention to fix this thing, I
readily admit that, but I don't know of any interactions that
were requested at the time that the legislature, the State
legislature, was making those amendments to the law. I don't
know if there was a great deal of interaction with CBP or ICE
or DHS in general to arrive at a language of the law, as
amended, that would fix the thing.
Because to make it a felony to share DMV information with
CBP or ICE outside of narrow exceptions, how does that impact
our task force activities with other Federal law enforcement
agencies like DEA, U.S. Marshals? Can you explain how the Green
Light law, as amended, has impacted DHS's relationships with
other Federal law enforcement agencies, specifically regarding
joint terrorism task forces, et cetera?
Mr. Perez. Thank you, Ranking Member, and that was as
troubling as any development that came up subsequently with
respect to the evolution of New York's Green Light law, the
lack of the ability to share information. But then, you know,
frankly, the cooling effect, if you will, from a practical
perspective of now the consequence, potentially, for anybody to
share that information by virtue of the class E felony.
Mr. Higgins. Please explain to America because--I know
because of my background, and maybe many in Washington here and
Congress do as well, but clarify, a task force, as it meets and
moves forward, it is a bunch of guys in a room, you know, at
some undisclosed location talking about the developments in the
case. So how could another Federal law enforcement agent not
share data that he had access to with members of the task force
that included ICE or Customs and Border Protection? This
information is designed to be shared. That is what the task
force does, to combine their investigative conclusions and what
their suspicions are, et cetera, to arrive at the next step in
that task force investigation. So how has it impacted the
realities of your task force operations? I am very curious
about that.
Mr. Perez. So, thank you, Ranking Member. I guess I would
describe it in this way. As you alluded to, those task force
environments are dynamic environments, and in many respects,
they are imperfect. They are imperfect insofar that it is by
bringing the task force and all of those varying elements
together that one enables the other in a very dynamic way. Over
the decades that I have been in this profession, I've seen the
evolution of the utility and being able to readily share on the
front line what it is and all that it is that each and every
agency, law enforcement professional, can bring by way of
experience and actual information and data to bear when looking
for solutions, answers, and leads, if you will, on the
multitude of threats that we are pursuing in the interest of
public safety.
The impact of not being able to share readily, you know,
again, at the very least, I would imagine that it is awkward
for those who are involved in that, if not quite difficult and
concerning because, again, now, in the case of New York, there
is a very real consequence by way of a criminal conviction.
Mr. Higgins. Yes. Orange is awkward.
Mr. Perez. Thank you.
Mr. Higgins. Orange is awkward. So let me ask in the
interest of, perhaps, moving toward some potential resolution
here. If the criminal impact of sharing information under the
amended New York law was further amended based upon deeper
communications between CBP, DHS, ICE, and the New York
legislature, do you see--can you just answer us candidly, is
there a way forward there if all parties were willing to
address the amended law?
Mr. Perez. I believe so, Ranking Member. In fact, we have--
amongst the outreach we have done, as I mentioned earlier, to
all those other jurisdictions with respect to the DMV
information, we have reached back to New York now as well and
asked them, frankly, because back in April, part of their
amendment was to turn some information back on in the interest
of being able to vet for Trusted Traveler. So we have done that
outreach at least to begin with that. They have yet to respond
to us and turn that information on. But to your question, I
believe so. There is always a path forward in order for people
to understand more acutely what the perhaps unintended
consequences of some of what it is they have done truly are.
Again, as somebody who worked in New York City directing
this agency for over 8 years, I will tell you that,
particularly in that State, but throughout the country because
that information is being leveraged and utilized throughout the
country at times by virtue of the nature of the investigations
that are being had and the linkages that are being made by
officers and agents in this role all over the country, that has
a very, very serious impact on our ability to, again, do all
the other type of work that we do in order to keep our
communities safe.
Mr. Higgins. So thank you for your answers.
Madam Chair, thank you for holding this hearing today, and
I close my questions on that hopeful note.
Miss Rice. Thank you, Mr. Higgins.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Correa.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Madam Chair.
If I can, sir, I just had a couple of follow-up questions.
I agree with Mr. Higgins; the more information, the better. I
believe a lot of the bad guys that would do us harm are outside
the country and inside the country too. We have got a lot of
domestic terrorism, a rise in domestic terrorism, so I think
the share of information is important. I hope we can get there
respecting the objectives of the States in terms of their
public safety objectives as well as yours as well.
You touched on something interesting, which was the Foreign
Traveler Program under the Trusted Traveler Program, and you
mentioned something about the DMV-like data. So I think there
is, like, 11 countries that we have the--kind-of a Foreign
Trusted Traveler program. Is that correct? So is that sharing
of the information with those 11 countries similar DMV data?
Tell me. Is that--first of all, do we have treaties with those
countries? Do we have sharing agreements, sharing data
agreements with them? Help me understand a little bit more
about how we work with these foreign nations to make sure we
are all secure.
Mr. Perez. Absolutely, Congressman. I don't have the list
readily available. I am looking to see----
Mr. Correa. Assume it is 11.
Mr. Perez. Yes. It is a little more than a dozen different
countries, and what it is, essentially, these are, again, very
specific bilateral agreements made with those----
Mr. Correa. They are bilateral per Nation?
Mr. Perez. Right. With us per Nation, you know, directly
with our counterparts to, in fact, not just meet but oftentimes
exceed what it is that we typically would require with respect
to Trusted Traveler, you know, Program vetting.
Now, again, when we are talking to foreign countries, not
all of them are created equal in what it is that they can
provide, meaning the data and the information that they are
able to procure, the data sharing arrangements that we have.
So, again, it is a very select group that actually has gotten
to that point where we have been able to make these
arrangements.
What I was referring to, because it is one of the questions
that I particularly asked myself as we were expanding, and I
was learning more about that type of expansion, was whether or
not DMV-like and/or driver-associated histories and driver-
associated information by way of violations and misdemeanors,
not unlike we weigh those details into consideration for
vetting into our TTP programs here in the United States, if
that was something we were asking the foreign countries to vet
on their side as well as part of these bilateral arrangements,
and it is. Now, they are the ones, again, ultimately who are
verifying all those checks for us. We are doing our
verifications from our end. It is, once both, countries agree
to a certain applicant being eligible to join the program that
that applicant is ultimately let in.
Mr. Correa. When I was in the State legislature, we
addressed the issues of criminal code across State lines and
trying to figure out whether what you did in one State----
Mr. Perez. Right.
Mr. Correa [continuing]. Applied to the State of
California, if it would meet the elements of a crime. In
thinking about your job across international lines, DMV type of
data, is that kind-of something that you do, try to figure out
whether a person who is applying for a Trusted Traveler Program
from another country, they would meet your qualifications in
terms of similar behavior that you would find objective in the
United States and in another country? Do you have specific
elements or things that you look at?
Mr. Perez. So the answer--the short answer is yes,
Congressman. Your understanding, how you described it, is my
understanding as well. But again, a lot of that criteria, a lot
of all of that is done in the front end to make sure that both
countries understand exactly what the expectation is on the
applicants.
Without getting into too much detail on the specific
vetting, which we gladly will provide much more greater detail
to the committee in a closed session because I would rather not
get into specifics because of the----
Mr. Correa. We would like--I would like that. I would like
that, yes.
Mr. Perez. We will gladly share that. But what I can give
you just, you know, kind-of, you know, minor points, generally,
you know, the different types of violations that are associated
with, you know, a motor vehicle, you know, Division of Motor
Vehicle or something therein that might not otherwise rise to
being a criminal violation, you know, necessarily. Or, you
know, there could be some sort of presentation that was less
than accurate. It might have been, you know, some other type
of, you know, driving and/or vehicular violation or license-
related violation that administratively raises some red flags
with respect to potential eligibility into the programs. But,
again, there is a longer, more detailed list there that, again,
we will gladly share in a closed session.
Mr. Correa. Madam Chair, if you will again indulge me with
one further question.
Interesting that we talk about DMV-like data, bilateral
agreements with other countries, sharing of data. Again, from
my State experience, we used to have the State attorney general
in the State of California working with foreign Attorney
Generals and sharing other data because this is an interesting
area. Bad guys, bad people all over the world, and you want to
make sure you have those folks under surveillance. So do you
look at other data beyond just DMV data when it comes to the
Trusted Traveler Program?
Mr. Perez. Oh, very much so, Congressman. Very much so. Not
only here, but with respect to those same bilateral
arrangements. That is, frankly, a huge part of what it is we do
when we vet for these Trusted Traveler Programs. We are leaning
on a multitude of holdings, not just our own but in the
interagency, to make sure that people, you know, actually are--
that we can confidently, frankly, afford the privilege for
those who we deem low-risk. It is a terrific tool. We have over
9\1/2\ million participants in the Trusted Traveler Programs
now, and it is a terrifically important tool for us to manage
risk. So, again, those thresholds, those expectations are high,
and we do leverage a multitude of law enforcement information
to make those decisions.
Mr. Correa. Madam Chairwoman, I want to thank you very
much, and I would just ask that we consider having a private
discussion on some of the details of the Foreign and Trusted
Traveler Program.
With that, I yield.
Miss Rice. I absolutely agree, Mr. Correa, absolutely, and
thank you.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from New York, Ms.
Clarke.
Ms. Clarke. I thank you again, Madam Chair. I thank Ranking
Member Higgins.
Mr. Perez, my time is short. I have a number of questions
about the decision-making process. When did you first become
aware that New York had enacted the Green Light law and that it
would cut off CBP's access to the DMV database?
Mr. Perez. So, Congresswoman, to the best of my
recollection, when I personally became aware was in December of
last year when it was reported to me that we were, as an
agency, making these queries into New York's DMV database via
the Nlets system which is the segue into those queries and
receiving the negative returns that we were receiving. So I was
made aware or I recall being made aware in December last year.
Ms. Clarke. So how did you become aware? Can you be more
explicit about that?
Mr. Perez. To the best of my recollection, Congressman, it
was shared with me by staff at the agency.
Ms. Clarke. OK. According to a few documents produced by
the Department to the committee, on December 30th of 2019, a
memo was sent to the heads of DHS operational components
stating that, and I quote, ``certain State legislatures have
passed laws restricting their respective Department of
Vehicles, DMV agencies, from sharing information with the
Department.'' This memo went on to instruct, ``each operational
component to conduct an assessment of the impact of these laws
and respond by January 15, 2020.''
Did you have any role in developing or reviewing CBP's
response to DHS's query?
Mr. Perez. I don't recall, Congressman. As you mention it,
I do have a vague recollection of the ask, but I don't recall
that I actually reviewed the response that went back to the
Department. It would have been an Executive subordinate to me
that would have been tasked with providing and compiling that
information.
Ms. Clarke. The limited production provided to the
committee includes assessments returned by several DHS
agencies, including a memo from the U.S. Secret Service. The
Secret Service memo clearly acknowledges that there were
limitations on that agency's access to DMV information.
For example, the Secret Service memo states that, and I
quote, ``all States participate in driver history sharing
except Illinois, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.'' As
such, it is clear that DHS knew very early this year, and
perhaps even earlier, that there were at least some limitations
on the sharing of data related to driver's license with at
least one DHS operational component.
Were you aware in January that there were limits on at
least the Secret Service's access to some DMV data, and if not,
when did you become aware?
Mr. Perez. So I was not, Congresswoman, and I have only
became aware, frankly, of some of these other agencies other
than ICE, you know, and some of their limitations, you know
as--over the last couple of months as I have, you know, been
really, really having to, you know, familiarize myself with the
totality of particularly the court proceeding and what has been
going on with the court case up in New York.
But a very important point here is that there is a clear
distinction and can be a clear distinction with respect to what
a State, you know, might be sharing with one agency versus what
a State is, in fact, sharing with another. In other words,
meaning that by virtue of the Secret Service, as you mentioned,
not being able to get returns or get information or some types
of information for certain States would not necessarily
preclude and/or mean that CBP wasn't actually getting that
information.
Ms. Clarke. A document dated January 8, 2020, and labeled
Memorandum for the Acting Deputy Secretary for Mark Morgan,
Acting Commissioner, with the subject, and I quote, ``New York
Green Light law, Implications and Recommendations,'' was
produced to the committee. Again, much of it is redacted. Did
you have any role in composing or reviewing this document or in
making any of its recommendations regarding possible response
to the Green Light law? If so, what was your role?
Mr. Perez. So I do not recall the specifics, but if it was
signed by the Commissioner, the Acting Commissioner of the
agency, I would absolutely expect that I did review that memo
and approved it to be put forth for his signature. Again, I
just don't have recollection, and I don't have it with me. I
don't have recollection of the particular aspects of what was
included there, but I absolutely would have reviewed, more
likely than not, that document.
Ms. Clarke. The document states, and I quote, ``CBP first
recommends engaging with the State of New York to resolve the
restricted access prior to implementing any of the
recommendations identified below.''
To your knowledge, did that happen? If not, why not?
Mr. Perez. I don't recall to what extent, and again, the
timing, Congresswoman. I do understand that there was some
engagement between the Department and the State of New York,
but I don't recall that we in CBP had any subsequent
discussions and/or back and forth with the folks in the State
of New York.
Ms. Clarke. Much of the memo is redacted. Will you tell us
what all the different recommendations presented to the Acting
Deputy Secretary were?
Mr. Perez. I don't recall, again, the content of the memo,
Congresswoman, and again, not familiar with the redactions
made. Nonetheless, again, I gladly could take back your
question and see what, if anything, more can be provided to you
other than what has already been shared.
Ms. Clarke. Were you ever involved in any discussion with
personnel from CBP or DHS regarding how the Department would
respond to New York's enactment of the Green Light law? If so,
what discussions were you involved in, and when did they occur,
who participated, and what was discussed?
Mr. Perez. So I was personally involved with several
discussions, and I was sharing with the DHS--my DHS
counterparts and superiors as well as agency, you know,
superiors and counterparts the facts as I knew them and how the
Green Light law in New York affected and continues to affect
CBP. Again, there was several conversations. I don't--I
couldn't tell you specifically how many and when. I would have
to go back and try to take a look at that. But, nonetheless, I
assure you that I was involved in those conversations providing
the facts as I knew them with respect to the New York Green
Light law. Pardon me.
Ms. Clarke. Was Mr. Wolf involved in any of these
conversations?
Mr. Perez. Pardon me?
Ms. Clarke. Was Mr. Wolf involved in any of these
conversations?
Mr. Perez. To the best of my recollection, yes. I would
have been at times briefing the then-Acting Secretary along
with, again, other superiors of the Department and of the
agency.
Ms. Clarke. When did you first become aware that New York
residents might be excluded from the Trusted Traveler Program,
and how did you become aware?
Mr. Perez. So, really, Congresswoman, I am going to
respectfully say I'm not--you know, because that Department
came from--or that decision came from the Department, I really
don't feel it appropriate for me to get into the particular
details of the deliberative process of how that decision came
about. What I can share with you is that, ultimately, DHS made
the decision.
Ms. Clarke. No. My question was, when did you first become
aware?
Mr. Perez. To the best of my recollection, I became aware
when the decision was made and was shared with the State of New
York. That is to the best of my recollection.
Ms. Clarke. How did you become aware?
Mr. Perez. Again, to the best of my recollection, I was
made aware of the decision when the decision was ultimately
made and shared with the State of New York. I may have--it may
have been shared with me somewhat previously to that, but I
just don't recall.
Ms. Clarke. Who informed you?
Mr. Perez. Again, Madam Congresswoman, I am going to
respectfully just say that I don't believe it appropriate for
me to get into the particulars of the deliberative process of
that decision making within the Department, and I just,
candidly, don't have a recollection of who particularly would
have informed me. What I can assure you is that I was--I was--
on behalf of this agency, providing facts that would have
informed the ultimate decision makers in what it is that we
would and should be considering with respect to that decision.
Ms. Clarke. Respectfully, I am not asking about your
deliberations. Someone had to have informed you that this
decision to exclude New York was moving forward. All I am
asking is, who informed you?
Mr. Perez. I don't--I just don't recall, Congresswoman.
That would have came--that would have come from the Department.
A decision was made by the Department. Who specifically
informed me, I just don't recall.
Ms. Clarke. All right. Who made the decision that the
response would be to exclude New York residents from the
Trusted Traveler Program? You don't recall?
Mr. Perez. That decision ultimately--I believe it is a
matter of public record. I believe it was a letter that was
received by the State of New York from the Acting Secretary,
so, again, the decision ultimately came from the Department.
Ms. Clarke. So it came from Mr. Wolf?
Mr. Perez. I believe that that was the written
correspondence. I believe it was his signature on the written
correspondence. That is to the best of my recollection.
Ms. Clarke. Were you told why this action would be taken,
and if so, what were you told?
Mr. Perez. Congresswoman, again, with all due respect, I
think that is particularly--you know, it is directly about the
deliberative process, and I am just letting you know that I
was, you know, providing the advice and the facts as I knew it
as best I could from CBP's perspective on what should inform
the ultimate decision that was made. At the time, I, you know,
gave those facts as best as I could and with everything that we
had available to us in order to provide to the decision makers
the most amount of information that they could possibly have
prior to making that decision.
Ms. Clarke. So what actions did you take or order within
CBP to implement this decision?
Mr. Perez. Once the decision was made, we immediately
stopped accepting new applications for the Trusted Traveler
Programs and renewals from residents from the State of New
York.
Ms. Clarke. Madam Chair, with all due respect, we are the
oversight body of this agency, and I am highly insulted by the
fact that we could have an officer from this agency say to me
that he does not have to share with us the information of their
deliberations. This is the height of insult to the American
people, and I believe that this requires that we have a secured
environment in which to have this conversation. If this can
happen to New York State, it can happen to any State in the
Union at the whim of any individual within any administration,
and this is not what the American people have asked of us to
do.
I yield back to you, Madam Chair, but I have to say that,
Mr. Perez, you have to be better than this. I yield back.
Miss Rice. Thank you, Ms. Clarke. I agree that, given the
limited answers that we have gotten here today, I think it
would be a good idea to continue this conversation in a secure
location.
So, Mr. Perez, let me just say this: I thank you for
showing up today because that is more than Mr. Acosta--who is
the actual director of the TTP, the Trusted Traveler Program--
it is more than he did. It is more than Mark Morgan, who is the
acting commissioner of CBP, did. It is more than Scott Glabe
who is, get ready for this, the senior official performing the
duties of under secretary for strategy policy and plans and
assistant secretary for trade and economic security, Department
of Homeland Security. That is a mouthful. So you have done more
than those 3 have done. What I take exception to is that you
have consistently downplayed your own title. You are the deputy
commissioner of CBP. That is a job with enormous
responsibility, enormous discretion, and enormous access to how
decisions are made within the Department. You, in fact, are
listed multiple times, seemingly in 4 different email
discussions in the privilege log, in court documents, which
indicate that you were fairly involved in the process of how
all of these decisions were made. So I just want to be clear
that we know that there are many documents that are likely
responsive to the requests that this committee made in July. We
know this because a report, dated September 4, 2020, and filed
by the office of the acting U.S. attorney for the Southern
District of New York with the district court indicates that
Department of Justice officials reviewed, and I quote, ``more
than 2,000 emails and documents'' regarding this issue. It is
extremely likely that many of these materials would be
responsive to the committee's 4 categories of requests.
Let me also be clear that the existence of any type of
litigation is not relevant--is not relevant--to the
Department's obligation to provide to this committee the
documents the committee has requested. You make it very
difficult for us to engage in our Constitutional responsibility
of having oversight over these agencies, and I hope that the
Ranking Member will agree with me that this is not a political
issue. This is an issue of allowing committees, Congressional
committees, to do their required oversight.
So I am asking you specifically, Mr. Perez. By what date,
and I need a specific date, will you provide to the committee
all the documents that we have requested, noting that these
documents have already been identified and likely assembled,
given the statement that was made by DOJ through the Southern
District in its report to the district court?
Mr. Perez. I will gladly take that back, Madam Chair, to
find out when, exactly, you should all expect us to be able to
provide that. Right now, I can't give you a specific date, but
I will gladly take that back to give you--in an attempt to give
you a specific date of when it is you should expect those
responses to be provided.
Miss Rice. I think that you are in a high enough position
to be able to give me that answer now, but I will give you,
let's say, I don't know, until the end of the week so you can
tell us because these documents have been requested. We know
that they have been reviewed. We know that they have been
collated. We know that the Southern District has access to them
as well. Again, they said that they reviewed more than 2,000
emails and documents specifically on this issue that we are
inquiring about.
So, again, I want to thank you for showing up. I want to
thank you for your patience here today and for giving answers
that, although I think could have been fleshed out a little
more, I respect the fact that you are agreeing to give us
answers that will go deeper into the weeds, to use your
language, in a secure setting, and we will take you up on that.
I am going to defer to the Ranking Member for any closing
comments he would like to make.
Mr. Higgins. Just briefly.
Deputy Commissioner Perez, are you deputy commissioner of
Customs and Border Protection?
Mr. Perez. I am, sir.
Mr. Higgins. Are you the Acting Secretary of the Department
of Homeland Security?
Mr. Perez. No, I am not, sir.
Mr. Higgins. Is it righteous that this committee would ask
you questions regarding your own personal knowledge and actions
of the performance of your duty as the deputy commissioner of
Customs and Border Protection?
Mr. Perez. Absolutely. Glad to respond to those.
Mr. Higgins. Would you consider it righteous or within the
parameters of appropriate questioning of chain of command for
us to ask you as the deputy commissioner of Customs and Border
Protection about internal discussions and deliberations of the
Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security?
Mr. Perez. Again, I would respectfully say that I do not
believe so. Nonetheless, having to provide a response and take
the question, that is why I am here, and I gladly take the
question, nonetheless.
Mr. Higgins. Yes, sir.
Mr. Perez. I don't believe----
Mr. Higgins. I am an elected representative of the House of
Representatives for the Third District of Louisiana, south
Louisiana. We have seniority chain of command, so to speak,
within our Conference, the Republican Conference. My colleagues
have a similar chain of command within the Democratic Caucus.
My own office has internal deliberations that are unknown to
other offices, you could imagine. There is no way that I can
answer questions regarding the deliberations and the internal
communications of our leadership's--the means by which they
arrive at conclusions. That would be Leader McCarthy or my
colleague, Representative Steve Scalise. They issue their
statements, and we are included because we are part of that
Conference. The same thing happens across the aisle. But if
someone asks me how Leader McCarthy--what the deliberations
were and the specifics were, what the conversations were within
his office, I wouldn't be able to answer it because I wasn't
there. So I think that my colleague earlier indicated that you
were somehow withholding data that you should divulge, but
within every organization where a chain of command exists,
there are parameters that we should stay within regarding
responding to questions.
So I thank you for appearing before us today. I think you
have been candid and forthright in your answers.
I thank my colleague and friend, Madam Chair, for holding
this hearing today.
Miss Rice. Thank you, Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins, my friend, I think that we all know how our
individual leaders come to the conclusions that they come to.
We just choose not to express them publicly, and that may be
the case here as well.
So, Mr. Perez, again, thank you so much for attending. With
that, I want to thank you for your testimony and the Members
for their questions.
The Members of the subcommittee may have additional
questions for the witness, and we ask that you respond
expeditiously in writing to those questions.
Without objection, the committee record shall be kept open
for 10 days.
Hearing no further business, the subcommittee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:56 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]