



US FOREIGN POLICE ADVISING: THE CASE OF VIETNAM

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Editor



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US Foreign Police Advising: The Case of Vietnam

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Preface

The genesis of this project stemmed from a unique opportunity to connect with the highly respected Colonel (COL) Charles Nguyen Tan Cuon, a retired police administrator from Vietnam. COL Nguyen was born in 1925 in Saigon, the son of the former Vietnam Minister of Security. With public service and safety in mind, he quickly rose through the ranks of the police force, holding several highly esteemed positions throughout his career and commanding over 5,000 police.

COL Nguyen's policing experiences are unique. First, COL Nguyen was a police leader during peace and war times. He commanded a police force during the Vietnam War, where police were the first line of defense against insurgents, fighting and collecting intelligence for the military in addition to their regular duties of keeping order and responding to crimes. Second, COL Nguyen engaged with multiple foreign entities who were either fighting the Viet Cong, offering police assistance, or both. While managing his police units, he also negotiated with Australian forces in his district and worked with police advisors from the US, among other nations providing service to South Vietnam, officially known as the Republic of Vietnam (RoV) at that time. COL Nguyen developed a close relationship with some of his advisors, including Mr. Frank Clark from the US Agency for International Development (USAID). When Saigon fell, COL Nguyen fled with his family to the US, settling in Rockville, Maryland.

With his breadth of experiences leading various aspects of a police force during peace and war times, COL Nguyen has much to contribute to our understanding of policing, especially foreign police advising. His wealth of knowledge is particularly applicable to US foreign police advising today, given the US contribution to rebuilding police forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as service to policing agencies in various other countries. Thus, the US Army War

College organized a series of interviews with COL Nguyen and his USAID advisor, Mr. Frank Clark. Their experiences are interwoven with academic literature in the chapters to follow.



Figure 1: Clark and COL Nguyen at the US Army War College in 2016.

This project greatly benefited from the assistance of many contributors. We are grateful to COL Nguyen for sharing his wisdom and experiences, from which we learned so much. Our gratitude extends to Mr. Frank Clark for his service. Similarly, we appreciate Major Phu Tan Nguyen, M.D. and USAF Lt. Col. (Ret.) Larry Bouchat for conducting the interviews. The generous assistance of the US Army War College cannot be understated; we thank the institution for including us in this important project. Specifically, this project is the brainchild of Dr. Karen Finkenbinder and brought to fruition by the efforts of J. Scott Braderman of the Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute at the US Army War College. We also would like to acknowledge student assistants who helped with various tasks, including Michael P. Posteraro, Jr., Daniela Barberi, Eunsil Yoo and Christopher Haraszkiwicz.

Section I

Background: US Involvement in Vietnam

Foreign assistance in policing is not a new phenomenon, but often we fail to consider the past, while planning for the future. Since 1989, the role of the US in several stability operations has increased, such as: Panama (1989), Somalia (1992), Haiti (1994, 2004), Bosnia (1995), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001), and Iraq (2003). Additionally, US military and civilian organizations have been used to rebuild military and police forces and to provide logistics to international forces (El Salvador, 1991; East Timor, 1999). With the intention of avoiding past mistakes in future stability activities, we have endeavored to capture the lessons from Vietnam policing development. The operational environment in Vietnam was similar to Afghanistan and Iraq, in that police development was initiated during the conflict, in a dangerous environment that was difficult for civilian development actors to work in, thus requiring a large military police advising contingent. Police advising in what was then RoV also incorporated USAID and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) advisors, as well as those from other countries, but that is beyond the scope of this anthology of lessons learned. The lessons derived from the US intervention in Vietnam have important implications for foreign advising today and in the future.

The United States government (USG) established diplomatic relations with Vietnam in 1950, following its limited independence within the French Union; France continued to oversee Vietnam's defense and foreign policy. In 1954, Vietnamese nationalists fighting for full independence defeated France, and the now-divided Vietnam entered into two decades of civil war. The USG did not recognize North Vietnam's government. The US maintained an embassy in RoV, and entered the war on the South's side against the North. In 1975, just prior to RoV's surrender to

North Vietnamese forces, the USG closed its Embassy and evacuated all Embassy personnel.

After the fall of RoV, the country was reunified under communist rule. In 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia following border clashes. US policy held that normalization of its relations with Vietnam were based on withdrawal of the Vietnamese military from Cambodia. As part of a comprehensive political settlement, the US and Vietnam agreed to continue cooperation on prisoner of war/missing in action (POW/MIA) issues and on other humanitarian concerns. In 1995, the US announced the formal normalization of diplomatic relations with Vietnam. In 2015, the US and Vietnam marked the 20th anniversary of diplomatic relations.

The USG supports a strong, independent, and prosperous Vietnam that respects human rights and the rule of law. US relations with Vietnam have become increasingly cooperative and broad-based in the years since political normalization. Vietnam is a partner in nonproliferation regimes, including the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Vietnam takes advantage of expertise, equipment, and training available under the Export Control and Related Border Security program. With the support of the US Department of Energy's Megaports Initiative, Vietnam is installing radiation detection equipment to help detect and identify weapons of mass destruction and their components at the commercial port of Cai Mep-Vung Tau. The US and Vietnam also signed an agreement on counternarcotics and hold regular dialogue on human rights.

In the 1980s, Vietnam introduced market reforms, opened up the country for foreign investment, and improved the business climate. Vietnam has become one of the fastest-growing economies in the world. Vietnam's rapid economic transformation and global integration has lifted millions out of poverty and has propelled the country to the ranks of lower-middle-income status. US assistance in Vietnam

focuses on consolidating gains to ensure sustainable economic development, while promoting good governance and the rule of law. Assistance projects aim to deepen regulatory reforms, improve the capacity and independence of Vietnam's judicial and legislative bodies, and promote more effective public participation in the law and regulation-making processes

Chapter 1 describes the National Police in Vietnam at the time of the Vietnam War. Cheyenne Bennese and Christopher Haraszkiwicz illuminate the motivations of the United States involvement and how their support affected the development of the National Police. In Chapter 2, Emily Shirk and Michael Posteraro, Jr. provide the history of the Vietnam Police and their responsibilities during the Vietnam War and introduce the key source for this monograph: COL Nguyen. To conclude this section, Drew Tush and Michael Posteraro, Jr. in Chapter 3 describe the United States Agency of International Development (USAID) and its role in the Vietnam War. Tush and Posteraro also introduce Mr. Frank Clark, COL Nguyen's USAID advisor, with whom COL Nguyen had a close relationship. In Chapter 4, Justin Krovic describes how American policing ideology affects foreign countries such as Vietnam, who receive American military intervention during wartime. Joseph Ortiz addresses police deviance and corruption, their effects on a department as a whole, as well as their relationship with communism in Chapter 5. Ortiz explains how Social Learning Theory offers strategies to eliminate deviant opportunities within a police department. In Chapter 6, Alexa Lorance examines famous cases of police brutality in the US from the 1960s to 2015 and compares those incidents of police brutality in Vietnam, and the resultant public outcry. Section II concludes with Abayomi Ayoola's findings in Chapter 7, which defines terrorism and analyzes how different policing methodologies neutralize terrorist efforts and generate greater community-police relationships. Chapter 8 by Eunsil Yoo introduces US

policing policies in Vietnam, as well as current US foreign police assistance activities, then concludes with lessons learned based upon experiences from Vietnam Wars and insight from COL Nguyen. Finally, Dr. Karen Finkenbinder outlines the way forward for future advisors.

Chapter 1

The Vietnam National Police

by Cheyenne Bennese and Christopher Haraszkievicz

Prior to the onset of the Vietnam War, policing in Vietnam was unstable, lacking control and unity. In May of 1961, President Kennedy sent 400 Green Berets to South Vietnam as “special advisors” to train the South Vietnamese soldiers. The number of advisors during President Kennedy’s term eventually exceeded 16,000. Significant changes did not develop in the Vietnamese Police until 1962, when South Vietnamese President Ngo Diem issued a decree to form the National Police (Friedman, 2012; Nguyen, 2006; “South Vietnam-National Police,” n.d.; Thompson et al., 1971). These changes were greatly influenced by support from the US Government (USG). In 1964, Congress gave President Lyndon B. Johnson substantial authorities for waging the conflict in Vietnam; however, Congress never relinquished Constitutional checks and balances, such as funding and raising of troops. In March 1965, President Johnson deployed the first US combat troops to assist police and military forces in South Vietnam, and to protect the American air base in Da Nang. The American people initially supported the deployment of the 3,500 Marines to South Vietnam, who joined the nearly 23,000 American military advisors already in Vietnam.

At first, the National Police were disliked by many of the deployed Americans. Occasionally, carousing soldiers on pass ran afoul of the National Police, who were enforcing law and order (Friedman, 2012). The National Police were underpaid; therefore, requesting bribes from disorderly American troops was all too enticing. This did not sit well with the USG as the corruption presented a bad image among the Vietnamese citizens (Friedman, 2012).

The USG decided to take action, motivating the National Police to undergo major reforms. From 1967 to 1972, the US spent \$155 million in support to the National Police (Friedman, 2012). Further, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) played an integral role in helping the police maintain law and order (Friedman, 2012; Walton, 1968). Many US police officers also provided technical support and advice to the National Police (Walton, 1968). The USG supported a Public Safety Program to properly train and equip the police officers, thus improving relations between the Vietnamese citizens and the police (Friedman, 2012). The Vietnamese government instituted an information campaign to enhance the image of the National Police, depicting the police as serving the people. Police conducted inspections and searches of cars and homes, resulting in the confiscation of innumerable weapons and ammunition that could have been utilized by the Viet Cong (Friedman, 2012).

During the Vietnam War, US grand strategy was the global containment of communism. To deter communist aggression, the United States depended on nuclear weapons, conventional forces, and allies. This strategic approach sought to prevent a world war or fight limited wars only. The domino theory argued that communist aggression would never stop at one country but would continue until it dominated regions and then the world. For Vietnam, the domino theory stated that after South Vietnam fell, North Vietnam would invade Cambodia, then Thailand, then Malaysia, thereby dominating the South China Sea.

Additionally, the USG developed two different types of ideology to defeat the North and the communist threat. The first strategy was a containment policy (Gaddis, 2005). Containment was the idea that one cannot just outright destroy the opponent; one can contain the opponent to its current holdings. By buffering and supporting the areas that could come under the influence of communism, the US

would contain the communist threat. The US implemented a communism containment policy in the North (Gaddis, 2005). USG did not see communism as a sustainable form of government, either socially or economically; thus, containment was considered a viable option to counter communism.

The second communism defeat strategy was the domino theory (Gaddis, 2005). This theory supported the idea that in any unstable parts of the world – Asia, Africa, South America, and the Middle East – if a country adopted communism with the support of Russia, then the surrounding countries would also become communist governments. Just like dominos, if one communist country is knocked down, the surrounding countries will eventually fall. President Eisenhower adopted this theory to ensure that any parts of the world under Russian influence would become a USG area of intervention to counter the communist influence (Gaddis, 2005). While the United States and the Russians would not fight each other directly due to the potential for atomic war, they confronted each other through other countries in proxy wars. Both the containment strategy and the domino theory played prevalent roles during the Cold War, becoming the primary factors for the increased support from the US to South Vietnam.

Originally, the National Police consisted of about 17,000 officers, but its presence did not extend to rural areas (Thompson et al., 1971). With the help of the USG, the police force grew to nearly 120,000 men (Friedman, 2012). Starting in 1968, police forces gradually expanded their influence to the villages (“South Vietnam-National Police,” n.d.; Thompson et al., 1971). The Vietnamese police showed great appreciation for the support they received from the US. While the US provided assistance and advice, it encouraged the police to exercise initiative and reduced assistance in kind (Walton, 1968).

The National Police ultimately secured Saigon City, 44 provinces, and 2,000 villages in Vietnam (Walton, 1968).

Included in the National Police was the combat branch of the police: the Police Field Force (Walton, 1968). This branch was more heavily armed than the regular police, with machine guns, mortars and grenades. The force was organized into 50 companies of 184 men each, trained to combat the Viet Cong and guerrilla attacks (Walton, 1968).

Not only were the National Police required to perform normal police functions, they also had the added responsibility of security control ("South Vietnamese-National Police," n.d.). Like any other police force, their primary duty was to protect their citizens and deter crime (Thompson et al., 1971). They also had the special role of detecting terrorism and placed great emphasis on countering communist subversion (Thompson et al., 1971). An additional force, the Special Force, was integral in monitoring small scale attacks by guerrilla units. They focused on overall communist threats, sabotage and espionage attempts to gain information (Thompson et al., 1971).

The dual roles of the National Police created great hardship during the War. The National Police were often the first responders to Viet Cong attacks ("South Vietnam-National Police," n.d.). They endured the brunt of guerrilla attacks and responded to many of the suicide attacks, putting their lives at great risk even though they were not the military (Friedman, 2012; Walton, 1968). As the first line of defense, the National Police were naturally a target of the Viet Cong (Walton, 1968). They endured frequent bombings at the National Police headquarters in Saigon and at various checkpoints (Friedman, 2012). Annually, about 1,000 police officers were killed by communist forces (Friedman, 2012).

North Vietnam initiated the conflict in 1960, but after seven years of fighting they had not achieved much progress. Backed by the Russians, they devised a plan to have an all-out offensive attack during the holiday of Tet. China advised against the Tet Offensive, but North Vietnam rebuffed the advice. Tet is a New Year holiday celebrated

in Southeast Asian cultures. Tet normally coincided with a ceasefire so that soldiers and civilians could celebrate the holiday (Schmitz, 2005). The plan of the North Vietnamese was to attack and capture as much territory as possible, including Saigon. The Viet Cong initiated the attack in over 100 different cities on January 31, 1968, which came as a surprise to the Republic of Vietnam and US military. While the Tet Offensive was a surprise attack, it failed, and within a few weeks, the Republic of Vietnam and US military pushed the Viet Cong back over the borders, almost completely destroying them (Willbanks, 2007). Almost 820 Vietnamese police officers were killed and 1,620 were wounded during the Tet Offensive (Friedman, 2012).

Acting as a military presence also created great confusion in the National Police. By having the additional paramilitary task of acting as a military entity, there were difficulties with command and control. Often, the distinction between being a police officer and a soldier was not clear cut (Thompson et al., 1971). Additionally, it was often difficult to determine who was in charge and whose orders were most pertinent (Thompson et al., 1971). This created a strain on officers as there was growing tension between the superiors (Thompson et al., 1971).

By 1973, the majority of the American troops had withdrawn from Vietnam. North Vietnam attacked again in 1975 and occupied Saigon until May of the same year. The focal point of the war was not to overthrow the North Vietnam government because doing so would encourage Russia and China to join the war. The war's objective was to ensure the RoV government could fight on its own, which was highlighted by the USG support for the National Police.

Toward the end of the war, there were growing anxieties about the follow-on effects of the war. Many feared a cease-fire would only increase the burden on the police, as military forces were forbidden from engaging in any offensive operations (Thompson et al., 1971). Further, many

police officers were concerned that political unrest might ensue following the war, due to a lack of order within society (Thompson et al., 1971).

The aftermath of the war catalyzed the importance of the National Police (“South Vietnam-National Police,” n.d.). Vietnam experienced many expected post-war problems, such as instability, putting great emphasis on the National Police to maintain law and order (“South Vietnam-National Police,” n.d.).

Chapter 2

US Foreign Police Advising through USAID in the Vietnam War

by Michael Paul Posteraro, Jr. and Drew Tush

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which administers civilian aid to foreign countries in need, was heavily involved in the Vietnam War, providing a great deal of foreign police advising to Vietnamese police, including COL Nguyen. This chapter opens with a partial history of the United States becoming a major player in the Vietnam War, a brief background on the dual role of the Vietnamese police, and an introduction into USAID's support for RoV.

Background

The disaccord in Vietnam originated during World War II, when Ho Chi Minh became president and instituted communism in the Democratic State of Vietnam, or North Vietnam (Moyer, 2007). Beginning in 1945, communists took control of major cities, which met with opposition from French colonists – a conflict that persisted until the French withdrawal in 1954 (Moyer, 2007). By that time, Vietnam had already endured several years of turbulent conflict, which contributed to Vietnam's political chaos, economic collapse, and underdevelopment (Hall, 2009). The Geneva Accords divided Vietnam along the 17th parallel, with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the north, retaining its communist government under Ho Chi Minh, and the non-communist Republic of Vietnam in the south, led by President Ngo Dinh Diem, who was heavily influenced by American advisors (Hall, 2009; Moyer, 2007; Rotter, 1999). However, conflict ensued, as Ho Chi Minh initiated a plan to invade and dominate RoV (Moyer, 2007).

Between 1950 and 1965, the USG gradually inserted itself into Vietnam's dissension, implementing a strategy of containment to stem the spread of communism, as the US simultaneously grappled with Russia in the Cold War (Rotter, 1999). It is worth mentioning that Ho Chi Minh's ideals solidified within Russia's communist regimes. In 1922, Ho Chi Minh attended the Fourth World Congress of the Communist International in Russia, where he organized and collaborated with Russian and Asian revolutionaries (Fischer, 1954). Despite the US recent end to the conflict with Korea, they feared Vietnam would align with China's communist regime, ultimately dispersing communism further around the globe and eradicating democracy (Moyer, 2007; Rotter, 1999).

US President Dwight D. Eisenhower supported the RoV government to stop the spread of communism from the North. To that end, President Eisenhower deployed military advisors and CIA agents to train military personnel and police forces in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism techniques. In 1961, President John F. Kennedy sent more than 400 soldiers trained by Special Operation Forces (i.e., Green Beret) to teach the RoV force counterinsurgency techniques to thwart the Communist guerrillas (Rotter, 1999). In August 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson requested a Congressional resolution allowing him to "take all necessary measures to repel an armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression" (Summers, 1995, p. 23). This resolution initiated US bombing north of the 17th parallel in 1965, while also allowing for the deployment of over 3,500 Marines to RoV, officially starting the war between the United States and North Vietnam (Moyer, 2007; Rotter, 1999). US involvement officially ended in 1973 when the US negotiated a peace treaty with North Vietnam, although fighting between the north and the south continued until Saigon fell under the control of North Vietnam in 1975.

Every battle during the Vietnam War was fought in the South, not in the secluded jungle terrain, which had significant implications for civilians and especially their police. Many police officers lost their lives during the conflict with the Viet Cong. Although fighting conventional crime was still the primary policing role, they also were tasked to assume a counterinsurgency and counterterrorism role as well. COL Nguyen, a high-ranking police administrator in RoV, recalled:

...the Police played a crucial role in securing and protecting citizens against crime, violence and manifestation, and performing 90% of civilian administration including identification, licensing, exit/entry control, economic security, public health and safety.... Most of our time was spent on clandestine activities to identify, track, investigate and prevent the communist surges. We often had to find a balance between making immediate arrests as elements were exposed and being patient with surveillance to [gain a greater understanding of the network structure]. (Nguyen, 2012)

Fighting War and Crime: A Brief Background on the National Police

To effectively aid military and paramilitary forces attempting to battle the Viet Cong insurgency, the National Police had to acquire intelligence, maintain public order, and many times personally combat the Viet Cong. Unfortunately, the National Police faced many problems associated with their rapid expansion in 1964. The force experienced inauspicious effects on management and administration, which tied directly to inadequately defined and often overlapping jurisdiction. The police were centrally administered and operationally decentralized. Commanding a decentralized police force with a centralized directorate is rather arduous when the

directors are not immersed in the action. An example of this was when they realized that more police officers, funding, and mobilization were required after the Tet Offensive of 1968 left 818 officers dead and 1,620 wounded. Because of the National Police's immeasurable amount of responsibilities and duties, special units were created (e.g., Marine Police, Police Special Branch and the National Police Field Force) with a specialized duty for combatting the Viet Cong (Pike, 2011).

To adapt to these changes, the police underwent swift expansion. In 1965, the Marine Police were created to combat the Viet Cong in waterborne areas, which included 3,000 navigable miles of inland waterways, primarily in the Mekong Delta area (Pike, 2011). The Marine Police were comprised of two operating units: the River Group and the Sea group. The River Group was responsible for patrolling the delta area of Vietnam, and the Sea Group was responsible for patrolling the coastal waters beyond the harbors (Swann, 1969).

Another specialized unit called the Special Branch was curated to analyze intelligence and supervise the capture of individuals suspected of political treason against the state. The Special Branch was also the only branch particularly trained and entrusted with the task of identifying and eradicating the Viet Cong infrastructure ("Part III: Elements Charged With Specific Revolutionary Development Roles", 1966).

The National Police Field Force (NPFF) was established in January 1966 with a subdivision in each province called the Provincial Field Force (PFF) (Pike, 2011). The PFF's main purpose was to annihilate the Viet Cong network in all Vietnam villages, hamlets, and districts. The PFF maintained a consistent presence within rural areas to ensure the Viet Cong's resurgence in these areas ("Data On GVN Field Force/Police", 1968-71). The PFF was comprised of lightly armed tactical elements. Every

member was fully trained as a patrolman combined with further training in counterinsurgency and military operations (Handbooks For Military Support Of Pacification, 1968). The PFF's light armament translated into high mobility. They also were in charge of riot and crowd control during spontaneous crisis situations. The fifth PFF Battalion was responsible for protecting the Saigon Municipal Police, and dealing with internal security and defense. This unit was in charge of operations against local Viet Cong in response to the Special Branch's targeted intelligence products. The PFF addressed all riot and civil disruptions, managed operations supporting the pacification program, and oversaw resource control. At first, this unit was heavily tied with the US and the Vietnam Army, but by 1970, they predominantly operated independently. During operations with the military, they gave insight on local terrain and culture, thus providing for more targeted searches and the appropriate application of the use of force (Pike, 2011). The PFF was equipped and trained to suppress village guerrilla groups in order to aid the local uniformed police. Platoons were stationed in rural areas to maintain a persistent presence, and each platoon was accountable for one village (USAID, 1966).

This rapid structural expansion of police forces produced unintended negative effects, largely through expeditious and subpar training, as well as poor and deficient police enforcement. These adverse effects were clear after beliefs surfaced about the Viet Cong acquiring supplies through illegal trafficking from Saigon. Due to the aforementioned deficiencies, Viet Cong infiltrations were prevalent; therefore, police training had to be specialized for each new branch (USAID, 1966).

Training

The length of all police training was the same, but differed according to the unique operational mandates of the specialized branches. For example, there were certain requirements that police must meet before joining the

National Police Field Force. Early on, an average National Police cadet was a young adult male with only a sixth-grade education. Many of the recruits had no experience with law or law enforcement, and many had never driven an automobile. Still, the recruits were literate, which was a valuable asset. At first, the training course was only six weeks long, but in January 1966, the course was extended to 12 weeks (USAID, 1966). COL Nguyen, a high-ranking police manager, who also lectured at the Police Academy, described police training during his tenure:

Police Officers were required to have a high school degree, Police Academy training, [a] three-month law course, and focused studies in counter-manifestation [of all Viet Cong networks], trafficking, or counter-terrorism. Patrol Officers typically had a military background since they were recruited from the Ranger School for the NPFF. Police Chiefs were required to have in-depth knowledge of civil and administration [law]. Service Chiefs and Adjutants/Deputies further focused on criminal investigation, intelligence and operation[al] planning. To me, important character traits were honesty; loyalty to order, structure; devotion to country; and a passion for Police work (Nguyen, 2012).

The National Police Field Force (NPFF) deserves special attention in this discussion, as this branch was responsible for riot and crowd control during spontaneous crisis situations and for internal security and defense. The NPFF also was in charge of operations against local Viet Cong insurgents (Pike, 2011). NPFF recruits received police and paramilitary training in the police academy. Paramilitary training followed the military model, teaching recruits self-discipline, time management, confidence in performance, conformity to departmental policies, and following orders

– despite how unsatisfactory they may be. Paramilitary training also included drill and ceremony, chain of command, teamwork and resiliency to stress (Gundy, 2007). The Special Branch specialized in intelligence acquisition, and was the sole provider of intelligence products. The Commander of the NPFF Training Center was responsible for discipline, housing, feeding, and other supervisory duties. Several special courses afforded the recruits were leadership training, instructor training, radio operations, field maintenance, first aid, motor and armament, and driving. Once a cadet completed his training, he was assigned to a certain area for two years. After finishing the initial two years, the officer was then eligible for advanced training, which included interrogation and counter-intelligence classes predominantly offered due to the war (Kerwin, 1968). Any additional training was offered by foreign advisors.

Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support Program

Given the role of the Vietnamese police in combating insurgents, the US (through the CIA) and the RoV government established the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support program (CORDS) in 1967, which combined rural programs with military operations (Schoux, n.d.). CORDS integrated civilians and civilian agencies into military hierarchical structures for better coordination in combatting the insurgency – namely, to attempt to eliminate the Viet Cong insurgents and their encompassing network (Clinton, 2007). CORDS was responsible for allocating American advisors to support operations of terrestrial task forces (Moyar, 1997). The first public safety advisors attempted to train the national police in counterinsurgency.

United States Agency for International Development

USAID was created during John F. Kennedy's Presidency after the US became involved in the Vietnam War. This program was designed to give assistance and help to Vietnam in the 1960s during the war. USAID's mission was to promote peace and prosperity by impacting foreign economic and social developments (USAID, 2015). As the fighting between RoV and the Communist North Vietnam continued, President Johnson employed USAID as day to day operations and assistance to RoV through programs such as CORDS.

At USAID's inception, only 17 foreign police officials had been trained to take part in police advising in Vietnam, in contrast to the 114 foreign police advisors at the end of the Vietnam War. This was important for both the Vietnamese and the US military personnel, alike, as they knew they would be fighting beside allies with the same level of training and quality of people (McHugh, 1994).

In understanding relations of the advisors around Vietnam, Special Police and the Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU, an elite paramilitary counter-terrorism team) gained more reliable data through intelligence-collected counterpart procedures (Moyar, 1997). Most of these advisors spoke Vietnamese or had excellent interpreters (Moyar, 1997). In comparison to CIA advisors, Special Police and PRU had better communications and reliable intelligence (Moyar, 1997).

Following the heavy deployment of US troops to Vietnam, some RoV Army forces focused on wresting control of the villages and their people away from the Viet Cong, which was a task known as pacification. Pacification advisors, who tended to be district level US military and civilian advisors, often had challenges capturing communists with intelligence (Moyar, 1997). CIA advisors conducted

interrogations of non-military personnel in Province Interrogation Centers (Moyar, 1997). The CIA advisors were centralized around Special Police questioning, and employed RoV interpreters (Moyar, 1997). Some CIA personnel, who oversaw Province Interrogation Centers, were excellent in gathering information from prisoners (Moyar, 1997).

However, by 1963, failure was inevitable. When the new CIA chief arrived in Saigon, he noticed that the heads of the local police chief and his family were impaled on stakes. Disgusted by what he saw, he organized small counter-terror teams. These teams were charged with attacking the Viet Cong directly. At the same time, based on Viet Cong cruelty and their employment of unconventional fighting techniques, the CIA decided to train the police in sophisticated interrogation techniques, e.g., torture (McCoy, 2011). Controversy and criticism emerged, as many of the Third World nations were already violating conventional human rights. Combining the human rights violations with the newly acquired interrogation tactics was a recipe for disaster (McCoy, 2011). These methods inevitably failed to defeat the Viet Cong.

In 1969, the National Police shifted from central policing in Saigon to the countryside and the villages. They established police stations in many villages and towns to help combat crime and terrorism (McCoy, 2011). These rural police officers were trained by their advisors to gather intelligence through interrogating suspects using torture, such as threats, physical suffering, and psychological torment (McCoy, 2011). In contrast to these advanced interrogation techniques, advisors also taught positive leadership skills and ethical virtues. Before the war, the police were highly unorganized, poorly led and plagued by corruption. The Americans tried to combat these problems, even though they employed such techniques to pursue their own agenda of eradicating communism. The effectiveness of these programs is questionable, as President Diem had little support from the advisors in RoV. Many of the advisors

felt that he was too egotistical and stubborn, depending too much on the Americans for help. Many of the advisors also felt President Diem would fall out of power within days of an American departure.

Continuing USAID Efforts in Vietnam

Despite the fact that the Kennedy administration enacted the USAID bill back in the early 1960s, the programs did not start to show a positive surplus until around 1989. Over the course of 15-20 years since the early 1990s, there has been a rise in aid for children from Vietnam (Libraries, 2010). A lot of the almost 330 million US dollars in aid given to Vietnam currently goes towards causes such as AIDS eradication, influenza treatment and prevention, improving the economy and promoting higher levels of education. US aid to Vietnam continues to increase dramatically. Assistance in health has increased by 69%, the economy has grown 14%, humanitarian assistance was raised by 13%, and education and government has grown an additional 4% (Libraries, 2010).

One major USAID program is Agent Orange Clean Up in Vietnam. Agent Orange was an aerial herbicide employed by the RoV and the US forces to defoliate rural and forested areas, thus depriving the Viet Cong guerrillas of food and concealment. Agent Orange not only destroyed forests, but also affected exposed soldiers and citizens. According to the United States Department of Veteran Affairs (2015), Agent Orange is an unwanted byproduct of herbicides. Due to these powerful and harmful chemicals that were used as a war tactic, USAID partnered with Vietnam to clean up the after-effects. The USG Ambassador stated that the plans are to dig up the ground that was contaminated, enabling it to breakdown to safe levels for the Vietnamese people (USAID, 2012).

Section II.
Police Advising in Vietnam:
A Case Study of the Police Advising
Experiences of COL Nguyen

At the time of the Vietnam War, the RoV's main police force was referred to as the National Police, and they were paramount in the fight between the Viet Cong and the Republic of Vietnam. Their dual responsibility was difficult, because they were combatting crime while simultaneously fighting a war. Therefore, in order to maximize support for the US and RoV, the US sent advisors over to provide guidance, education, and support for the police as they strove to tackle both jobs. Due to how imperative they were in Vietnam's counterinsurgency efforts, the National Police are described in greater detail in this section.

The description of the National Police and the issues that surround police are illuminated by Colonel Charles Nguyen Tan Cuon ("COL Nguyen"), a former high-ranking police administrator with the National Police. For this reason, COL Nguyen will be introduced before discussing the National Police. During his time as a police administrator in RoV, COL Nguyen had several advisors from the USG, including Frank Clark, a policing advisor through USAID. As such, the material in the chapters to follow draw heavily from COL Nguyen's experiences.

Introducing COL Nguyen

COL Nguyen was a police administrator with the National Police. In an array of offices, COL Nguyen advocated open communication with advisors, especially with foreign allies operating within his jurisdiction. For example, a General of Korea collaborated with COL Nguyen on the Korean brigade. As Commander, COL Nguyen led his police force

against both crime and the Viet Cong (Nguyen, 2012). COL Nguyen's experiences are crucial to better understand US foreign police advising, as COL Nguyen had advisors from the USG and other countries. This section of the monograph connects COL Nguyen's wisdom with research literature on foreign police advising.

As background, COL Nguyen was born in Saigon, Vietnam on November 2, 1925. His parents, Joachim Nguyen Tan Cuong and Marie Lacouture, were French citizens. He described his family's background of service:

Our family has a rich history of civil service. My Vietnamese (paternal) grandfather was Governor of Cho Lon, the largest province in Vietnam with a predominant Chinese community. My French (maternal) grandfather was the Chief Prosecutor (Procureur Generale) and later, Chief Judge of Indochina, which was comprised of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia under French rule. My father was appointed Minister of Security for seven consecutive administrations, [while holding] the dual post of Minister of Youth and Sports.

I grew up in the southern central highland city of Da Lat, where our extended family made a comfortable living in government, railroad administration, horse breeding, agriculture and commerce. I was educated within the French Catholic Lasalle Taberd school system, in which the curriculum emphasized philosophy, history, theology, natural sciences and mathematics.

When I was 20 years old, I attended a French college preparing to study law and become a judge as my family had hoped, but World War II (WWII) changed my plans. When the Japanese Army invaded Indochina during WWII, I was mobilized within the French Army and later captured as a prisoner

of war. After the Japanese were defeated and WWII ended, I worked as Security Inspector for the Surete Federale Francaise, the equivalent of the FBI, which controlled intelligence and criminal investigation across Indochina. When the French left Vietnam, the Vietnamese government requested my transfer to the Vietnamese Police. (Nguyen, 2012)

In the Vietnamese Police force, COL Nguyen held several leadership positions. He quickly rose to the Chief of Police of Vinh Binh Province in 1952, moving to the Chief of Police of the Binh Duong Province two years later. From 1959-1961, he was the Chief of the Operations Service at the National Police Headquarters, and then became a Lecturer at the National Police Training Center from 1961-1963. COL Nguyen resumed his management duties as the Police Chief of Tuyen Duc Province and Dalat City from 1963-1964 before returning to the National Police Headquarters as the Chief of the Coordinating Service from 1964-1965. As his career progressed, he was given more responsibility:

Successively, I became Police Chief of provinces, including Commander of the Police Special Branch in Region 3, controlling 10 provinces and Vung Tau City (1968-1971). Later as Chief of Special Operations Service, I was also nominated as General Secretary of the combined anti-terrorism center at Saigon comprised of US, Korean and Australian military forces. (Nguyen, 2012)

He continued his career in leadership positions with the Vietnamese National Police, while lecturing part-time at the Academy. When Saigon fell, he fled to the United States and settled in Rockville, Maryland.

Chapter 3

Police Leadership during Wartime

by Jarrett Gilbert

Naturally, when someone hears about war, the first thoughts that come to mind are military combat, casualties and politics. However, within regions where war is taking place, everyday life changes and many suffer from these changes. During these times of war, not only are military forces conducting combat operations, but the police are decisively engaged in maintaining law and order. During the Vietnam War, the police had their own war to deal with to keep their communities safe. The war affected many things in Vietnam, but some of the biggest changes were to policing functions, adopting different styles of policing with help from other police agencies around the world. Chiefs of police had to change the way they managed their police department during the war. Some of the biggest changes were to communications, hiring and training practices, and the evaluation system. There were different styles of management and leadership among the police. One police chief, who was very successful in leading his police departments, was COL Nguyen.

One of the many police departments COL Nguyen was in charge of during the Vietnam War was Region 3, which was of most importance because of its proximity to Saigon (Nguyen, 2015). Saigon was the capital of RoV and was the target of many communist attacks. Region 3 spanned 10 provinces and Vung Tau City.

The Vietnam National Police had about 130,000 officers and was considered a paramilitary service (Nguyen, 2012). The police were organized to support an elected administration, though the police were not elected. In the Khanh Hoa Province, COL Nguyen commanded about 5,000 officers. Under Nguyen's command, he had three deputies who specialized in criminal investigation, intelligence, and operations planning. COL Nguyen appointed a Chief of

Police for each district, and created a police post in every village with a six to twelve police officers.

In Vietnam, policing was focused on prevention. The three main areas of policing activities were internal security to counter anti-government and anti-establishment movements, intelligence gathering specifically to target communists, and criminal investigation to counter criminal activities (Nguyen, 2012). The Vietnamese police followed two models: the French Police model to exploit information to gain the element of surprise, and the CIA model based on surveillance, which returned the best results (Nguyen, 2012). During a time of political instability in Vietnam, the police played a crucial role. The police in Vietnam under COL Nguyen were responsible for securing and protecting citizens against violence and crime, as well as collecting intelligence for military use (Nguyen, 2012). Beyond being the first responders to criminal and military emergencies, the police performed many different tasks associated with civilian administration, to include citizen identification, exit-entry passports, and economic security (Nguyen, 2012).

The National Police had two different kinds of police: uniformed police for traffic and special police, who did not wear uniforms (Nguyen, 2015). Today, about 15% of Vietnam police officers are women (Nguyen, 2006), although female police officers comprised a small proportion of the police force during the Vietnam War. COL Nguyen had women officers under his command, but they were not in uniform (Nguyen, 2015). The female police officers, known as “Swans,” would go to crime scenes to collect information for COL Nguyen. The use of undercover Swans to gain intelligence was a main goal for the police; collecting intelligence on insurgents was extremely difficult for the Swans’ male counterparts during the war because they were suspected of being spies (Nguyen, 2015). In COL Nguyen’s technical compound in Saigon, he had about 500 female technicians, who were trained in the US for fingerprinting (Nguyen, 2015).

COL Nguyen's leadership strategies would have to change sometimes during times of conflict. COL Nguyen and his command would change their strategy according to the terrorist's tactics in a specific region (Nguyen, 2015). In Saigon City, they would have to use politics and more diplomacy as a police force. In general, COL Nguyen did not favor any specific leader or political group, as they changed all the time, but he worked for his country, as it will always stay the same (Nguyen, 2015). In this manner, COL Nguyen displayed the value of neutral competence in his police management style. Neutral competence refers to the idea that government service should be politically neutral, and the government should focus on the abilities and skills of workers to do the job at hand instead of favoring political allegiances (Stohr & Collins, 2014). COL Nguyen may have remained politically neutral throughout his career, but the officers under him were influenced by political parties. Regardless of political allegiances, the officers are sworn to obey the orders of the police department's leadership (Nguyen, 2015).

Citizens of Vietnam, in general, trusted and respected the police. This respect can be credited to the involvement the police played in the citizens' daily lives and businesses. Community conflict can occur when a community feels that police are treating them unfairly (Domonoske, 2006). Communities felt neglected during the Vietnam War, where in small problems would normally have been handled swiftly, issues were ignored or responses were delayed as the primary focus was on countering communist infiltration during the war. COL Nguyen and his police force used their connections within the community to settle conflicts. COL Nguyen, as the police chief, effectively employed persuasion techniques to mitigate community conflict in order to prevent rises in crime (Domonoske, 2006).

COL Nguyen's police force reflected an open organization, which is an organization that is affected by

its environment. Open organizations are usually physically located in communities and tasked with serving the public (Stohr & Collins, 2014). The relationship between the police and community is essential for community policing, which was an informal goal of COL Nguyen and his police force. It was COL Nguyen's belief that the police and the community should be able to communicate freely in order to help each other, and propagated this belief to his subordinates. In community policing, trust is grown quicker and more often, as any community issues would be brought to the police directly. The community policing helps with the CIA model of policing, which focuses on gathering information on any imminent threats to the area. COL Nguyen viewed policing as prevention, so he used his relationships with the community to receive information (Nguyen, 2012).

In COL Nguyen's area of responsibility, there were communist infiltrations, but the police did not know who the communists in their area were until they made themselves known (Nguyen, 2012). COL Nguyen's military experience and previous knowledge of communists swayed his way of thinking in this situation. COL Nguyen adopted a heuristic way of thinking in regards to fighting against communists; heuristics refers to individuals judging the occurrence of an event happening based on the subject's availability in an individual's memory (Garner, 2008, pg.13). When COL Nguyen was tasked with dealing with communists, he remembers everything he went through during the war in the fight against communists. Most of COL Nguyen's police force spent their time trying to identify, track, investigate, and prevent the communist surges (Nguyen, 2012). The CIA model made operations challenging for COL Nguyen, as often the need for surveillance to identify entire networks outweighed the desire to make immediate arrests. This balancing act was essential to achieving the long-term goal of eliminating the communist presence (Nguyen, 2012). Communists were involved in occupation, terrorism, and

manifestation (Nguyen, 2012). According to COL Nguyen, the communists aimed to kill as many citizens as possible to create fear and chaos while avoiding capture (Nguyen, 2012). Today, similar events are happening throughout the world as violent extremists try to kill as many people as possible to inspire fear and chaos. Currently, police officers worldwide are taking the same approach as COL Nguyen and his officers did as they try to find a balance in making immediate arrests and being patient with surveillance. Police must use discretion when making arrests and when acting in rapid response or emergency situations (Domonoske, 2006). COL Nguyen and his police officers were required to use discretion when arresting communists and when deciding to use physical or lethal force.

The environment of Vietnam affected the way COL Nguyen managed his police force on a daily basis. The Vietnam War was a very complex operational environment requiring a high level of coordination (Sklansky, 2011). COL Nguyen had to devise new, more discreet approaches to daily policing in such an environment (Sklansky, 2011). Vietnam's complex environment called for COL Nguyen to be a true leader to influence groups and systems to address complex needs (Sklansky, 2011). Many leaders fail to fix these issues because they treat the problems with standard management solutions, but COL Nguyen believed that every officer should step up and be a leader in his police force because members of the community look at each officer as leaders of the community. Instead of training individuals to become better leaders, police organizations should improve leadership as an organization. This way of improving leadership shies away from only training those individuals in the top tier of the police force, and instead focuses on training every officer to be a true leader.

COL Nguyen's leadership style of influencing an individual or group to comply using one's charisma, persuasion, power or other behaviors, was paramount to the

success of the police force under his leadership (Schafer, 2010). COL Nguyen's ultimate goal was to protect the citizens inside his province and to keep communists out of his area of command. Most policing agencies have little or no protocols to develop current or future leaders (Schafer, 2010). Resource limitations in time, money, and access to quality education can be an explanation for the shortage of effective leaders inside the Vietnam police force (Schafer, 2010), which likely was the result of the war in Vietnam. COL Nguyen and his police were allocated police advisors to assist in educating them on best practices in policing. Studies show that the top five characteristics that contribute to police leader efficacy are honesty and integrity, caring for the needs of employees, strong communication skills, strong work ethic, and approachability (Schafer, 2010). The top five characteristics that contribute to police leader inefficacy are ineffective communication, neglecting the needs of police officers, questionable ethics and integrity, poor work ethic, and inability to delegate (Schafer, 2010). Some indicators to assess a leader's efficacy are the achievement of goals and key tasks, development of subordinates, and the management of a positive organizational morale (Schafer, 2010). COL Nguyen displayed these indicators by removing communist insurgents, bringing in advisors to aid his police officers, and ensuring police moral remained high.

COL Nguyen wanted advisors to come into his police force and teach them new methods. Frank Clark was a USAID advisor who helped COL Nguyen with logistics. Mr. Clark provided transport, equipment, and weapons for COL Nguyen and his police force, and Mr. Clark assisted in providing additional security. COL Nguyen's CIA advisor provided intelligence and funding for all operations against any communist activities. Mr. Freanick provided significant help in gathering intelligence to assist in the targeting of communists within the provinces. COL Nguyen also had a US Special Forces captain to train the Police Field Force. He

employed open communications with all his advisors and gave them full access to the police force. The police force resources were stretched thin, which left his officers with little time for classroom instruction. Instead, the officers received on-the-job training from advisors.

The roles of COL Nguyen's military and civilian advisors were different. Both required an understanding of the long-term goals of the police. They gained an understanding with regular engagement across many of COL Nguyen's organizations. The US Special Forces Captain specialized in training that did not require significant change. COL Nguyen's advisors had no authority to use force on the civilians of Vietnam because the US had no policing authority in Vietnam. Based on the nature of operations, COL Nguyen and the Americans would discuss the level of support needed to ensure they followed the Vietnamese Police authority (Nguyen, 2012).

COL Nguyen believed his advisors made a difference in his police force. The US advisors delivered perspectives that prepared COL Nguyen and his police force to act more proactively and strategically in handling security risks. His advisors provided training that improved the police force's everyday interactions with civilians. As one of the unique aspects of the police force mission was to assist the public in fighting fires, the US Special Forces Captain provided training on firefighting. However, COL Nguyen felt that the communication between his US military and civilian advisors was lacking, so he often felt the need to synchronize the advisors so that they could learn from one another (Nguyen, 2012).

COL Nguyen reported that he became a better police officer during his time in Vietnam. Policing taught him to have honesty and integrity. Police officers should be composed, observant, unassuming, and vigilant. COL Nguyen had officers all around him, who had high potential and a strong character. In a police force, trust and empowerment

throughout the police structure creates a stronger and more united police force. COL Nguyen learned to be respectful and fair when assessing officers and take every opportunity to help develop his officers. His community policing style led him to build trust and relationships with civilians, so they would seek help from the police before breaking any laws. As an officer, COL Nguyen sought to change perspectives and behavior. The relationships that COL Nguyen built with other officers during the war lasted a lifetime (Nguyen, 2012).

Chapter 4

Police Training During Wartime

by Justin Krovic

Policing is an extremely dynamic occupation. Police officers are fundamentally charged with maintaining order, enforcing governmental laws, and combating threats to the general public. These responsibilities are tremendously challenging given the instability of the environment in which police are expected to operate. Establishment of an effective police force in such a setting can be accomplished, in part, through demanding training programs. Police academies provide a learning atmosphere in which police recruits are introduced to the policing profession, trained in various disciplines relating to the field, and instilled with the confidence essential to succeed in their careers (Caro, 2011). Academy training must also reflect the current social situation and relevant concerns of society that the police are expected to alleviate (Caro, 2011). During times of national crisis or conflict when the police are thrust into more of a militaristic function, academy training can experience a drastic shift in curriculum. This is especially true when the police are formed, trained, and influenced by foreign involvement during wartime. In particular, Vietnam has had a long-standing influential foreign presence within its borders due to tyrannical conquest, exploitation of resources, and constant conflict. Throughout the Vietnam conflict in the 1960s-1970s, the Vietnamese National Police experienced a separation from their long-standing French influence and incorporated newfound tactics provided by American advisors in the wake of a highly volatile predicament. The American involvement in the formulation and training of a foreign police force, as experienced during the Vietnam conflict, echoes today in the wake of Middle Eastern conflict and American occupancy in the Middle East.

Background on the Influence of Western Policing

Maintaining order has been the enduring function of the police since their inception. Early forms of policing units were typically communal peace officers, who patrolled specific geographical regions with virtually no form of structured training and relied heavily on other community members to assist them in their daily duties (Cordner & Shain, 2011). In addition, the expectations and responsibilities of police officers were extremely ambiguous and could vary largely between even the most closely located areas. Furthermore, because of this arbitrariness, the police were politically dependent and were often used to extend the influence of the governing political party, then discarded when that party forfeited their power. Professionalism in policing began in Western culture with the pioneering principles brought about by Sir Robert Peel through the Metropolitan Police Act of 1829 in London, England (Dinnen & Braitwaite, 2009). Peelian principles called for the formation of a structured administrative body in policing to organize, train, incorporate, and evaluate appointed personnel in the profession (Ibid, 2009). Organized highly along military lines, this newfound institution incorporated graded authority, stringent appearance standards, and a formal training regimen (Ibid, 2009). The underlying factor in the establishment of such an organized police force was to effectively combat crime in metropolitan areas in the early to mid-1800s (Ibid, 2009). This traditional theory of policing, although effective in the organization of policing administration and establishing expectations for the police, did little to account for the unpredictability and complex environment in which police operate (Conti, 2006). This western style of policing was nonetheless adopted overwhelmingly and incorporated in a majority of developed nations. In addition, underdeveloped nations that were under western control, such as Vietnam, eventually incorporated this form of police organization (Dinnen & Braitwaite, 2009).

Foreign Police Training in Vietnam

Fascination, and fluctuating crime, led to world-wide research and modification of policing practices and organization following the implementation of Peelian policing principles (Dinnen & Braitwaite, 2009). Formal training for police officers began to incorporate a larger variance of roles and duties, while also introducing officers to real-world scenario training, much like a militaristic approach to training (Bradford & Pynes, 1999). This proved instrumental in training officers for potential emergency management and operations in hostile conditions. Throughout the early to mid-1900s, there was an increased need for reactive police training given the tumultuous state of Europe (Barr & Sereseres, 2001). In addition, the mounting instability in Southeast Asia, primarily Vietnam and Korea in the 1950s, led to an increase of western influence in the region. With military operations in Korea subsiding by 1953, Vietnam became the next worldwide hotspot for military presence for the next 20 years (Burris, 2008). However, the Vietnam conflict would not only become the notoriously negative plight of the American military effort, it would also demonstrate American ambitious mentorship into police training that would echo a few decades later during Middle Eastern conflicts (Huong & Fry, 2005).

Periods of war have dramatic effects on all aspects of a civilization. Vietnam has been a war-torn country for nearly its entire existence. Disputing political regimes, colonialism, and foreign influence are all part of Vietnam's historical portfolio. With the withdrawal of the French presence in the late 1940s and the eradication of Japanese occupancy shortly after, a communist movement began to sweep Vietnam through the efforts of the self-proclaimed ruler of Vietnam, Ho Chi Min, who had concentrated control in the northern region of Vietnam (Burris, 2008). President Harry Truman, following the conclusion of World War II,

emphasized thwarting such totalitarian rule in the Middle East and Asia (Burris, 2008). Therefore, American military and aid began to escalate in the southern region of Vietnam, and ultimately resulted in total military occupation and operations. This foreign military involvement, as well as the menacing reality of conflict, led to radical modifications to RoV police training.

US Involvement in Training Police during Conflict

There are three distinct roles that police assume during a conflict situation: crisis response, support/augmentation of military forces, and maintaining public order (Lau, Li, Mak, & Chung, 2004). During the Vietnam conflict, the Vietnamese National Police Force was primarily concerned with counter-intelligence, interrogation, and providing training for smaller communal departments in RoV to assist locally stationed military units (Nguyen, 2015). The police were also responsible for maintaining municipal public order and providing security for citizens amidst the ensuing turmoil of military occupation (Lau et al., 2004). COL Nguyen described the emphasis of professionalism and attention to detail that he instilled in police recruits during his tenure: “First you should be polite, and be a good man and good uniform, and when you come you should be polite and you should salute first. I ask would you like to give me your ID? I don’t ask, do you have an ID? ...Always polite” (Nguyen, 2015).

Although there are conspiracy debates over whether the American government participated in the clandestine training, support, and financing of various radical groups, political regimes, and military units throughout history, there is undoubted transparency in the American involvement in coordinated police training and development during the Vietnam conflict (Barr & Sereseres, 2001). This included the organization of the Vietnamese National Police Force

and USAID appropriations to fund the development of more sophisticated police training (Barr & Sereseres, 2001). In addition, USAID advisors were assigned to act as conduits between Vietnamese police administrators and American military personnel, government personnel, and the intelligence community to improve communications between these different entities and enhance training efforts (Garatti & Rudnitski, 2007). US military strategy, tactics, and policy were incorporated into police training at the academy level and into continual training for seasoned officers (Conti & Nolan III, 2005). The enhanced communication and US principled training greatly improved cohesion between military forces and the police, which was indispensable during times of national conflict (Modell & Haggerty, 1991). Although the military presence of US forces in Vietnam was quite lengthy, the subsequent eradication of those forces following military “victory” leaves a now identifiable norm regarding US involvement in foreign countries, particularly for military and diplomatic purposes (Garatti & Rudnitski, 2007).

There also is substantial discussion, and even protest, regarding the effectiveness of American influence in foreign countries and the subsequent changes to a particular region following American occupancy (Barr & Sereseres, 2001). During the 1960s and 1970s, there was constant strife concerning American foreign interests in operations in Vietnam between a largely anti-war division of the population and a heavy-handed American governing body (Huong & Fry, 2005). Despite conflicting views on foreign presence and the assumed American totalitarian approach, the overarching question remained the same: “Does American involvement work?” Answering this seemingly rational question is rather daunting. Intentions are, unfortunately, much more practical than implementation. The extent to which American resources are asserted to combat militaristic, and in recent years terroristic, threats are astronomical (Burris, 2008).

However, the reverberating effects of combat are not met with such prowess and constant scrutiny as formulating a police force in a tumultuous region of the world such as Vietnam (Huong & Fry, 2005). This same debate is currently held regarding the recent US involvement in police training and diplomatic implementation in the Middle East following nearly two decades of American criticized involvement in the region (Modell & Haggerty, 1991).

Applying Vietnam Lessons to Today's Foreign Police Advising

There are two primary correlations regarding the US influence seen in police training in recent years in the Middle East, and US influence in police training experienced during the Vietnam conflict. The first correlation is the fact that both instances of US influence in police training occurred during, and subsequently following, military operations (Burris, 2008). The two overreaching events that tend to initiate US response and intervention in foreign countries are war and national tragedy, such as terrorist attacks or devastating natural disasters. Typically, police training influenced by US involvement during wartime supports military operations and in turn is provided by military operatives or government officials (Conti & Nolan III). In recent years, privatized contractors are supplementing military led training, while still implementing a fundamental emphasis on military tactics and strategy (Werth, 2011). This more modern approach to police training, as well as strict paramilitary training for police officers, has had controversial implications. Lowest bidding for training contracts leads to underdeveloped training programs for officers, which can ultimately lead to enhanced police casualties and corruption of the force (Werth, 2011). In addition, outfitting and training officers in a militaristic fashion can lead to an increased divide between the citizens and police (Werth, 2011).

The second primary correlation between US led police training during the Vietnam conflict and the training provided in contemporary times, particularly in Iraq, is that after intense efforts to develop and establish the police force, a vacuum was created following an abrupt evacuation of US forces while providing only a small contingent to further guide police forces (Garatti & Rudnitski, 2007). Although there was continuous attention given to police training during military involved operations, the subsequent removal of troops and support personnel from the region following “victory,” ultimately hindered the full capacity development of the police forces. Interestingly, even though the favorable popularity for initial engagement in these two particular conflicts was tremendously different, the disdain for involvement in these conflicts reached similar heights nearing the end of US occupation (Huong & Fry, 2005). Although there seemed to be an immense concern for the livelihood of citizens in both of these war-torn countries, the growing majority of the US citizenry despised governmental interest in foreign affairs, and advocated for the removal of military troops in the regions (Modell & Haggerty, 1991).

Given the turbulent environment in which police officers are expected to operate, they must receive quality training that prepares them for the trials and tribulations they may encounter on a day-to-day basis during the performance of their duties. Police academies achieve this need and provide police officers with initial scenario, tactics, strategy, and confidence training needed to be successful at their jobs. However, during periods of conflict, this training can be influenced heavily by support to military occupation and the social needs of the area. Although military tactics and strategy may be effective skills to teach during wartime, after the occupying threat is dissolved, these skills can have detrimental effects on the social environment of a nation.

Chapter 5

Police Deviance

by Joseph Ortiz

Employing police officers and expecting them to perform their duties requires a set of behavioral expectations and a high level of responsibility to accomplish their goals in a way that is acceptable to the public. Deviance begins to undermine this public trust. Police officers who engage in deviant activities may have values and goals that are inconsistent with their department. Furthermore, these officers may use their position for personal gain or to avoid a particular outcome. Police officers also may be slowly molded in such a way that they become deviant over time. Therefore, deviant activities must be found and eliminated, while promoting leaders with integrity.

This chapter continues with a discussion of the definition and concept of police deviance. Individual officer deviance is differentiated from systemic corruption, followed by the link between corruption and communism. Theories of deviance are applied to these situations, along with preventive suggestions. The chapter concludes that police deviance should be immediately addressed to reduce its effects on the police community and the public they serve.

Police Deviance

The concept of police deviance contains a wide array of functions that represent an undermining of the purpose of policing and the mission of the police organization. At the basic level, opportunities for behavioral misconduct by members of the police are most often the subject of news articles and public scrutiny. Deviance, on the other hand, is the illicit activities in which police take part, and the majority of such incidents go unpunished or unnoticed. Misconduct, therefore, is the intentional circumventing of departmental rules and procedures (Punch, 2000). Lastly, criminal deviant activity facilitated by police officers is defined as

those officers who break the law by accepting bribes or by committing acts, such as selling drugs or committing theft (Punch, 2000). Receiving goods or services for conducting illicit activities, or overlooking illicit activities in exchange for goods or services, is defined as police corruption (Punch, 2000). Police corruption can be individual or systemic.

Systemic Corruption

Police corruption is differentiated into two levels. The rotten apple theory suggests that one individual, who participates in deviant behavior, can affect a larger group (Punch, 2003). However, research suggests that corruption is not limited to individual officers. In fact, deviance flourishes when supervisors tolerate officers' deviant actions, and when the larger police subculture supports police deviance (Lee, Lim, Moore & Kim, 2013). Indeed, corruption occurs at a systemic level; this larger problem can be described as rotten orchards (Punch, 2003). Rotten orchards suggest that corruption is more widespread than previously thought, and that corruption is occurring on several levels to include society, individual institutions, and with larger organizations.

Police organizations can become deviant in two ways—by adopting goals and means that are deviant (Sherman, 1978). Organizations are constructed to accomplish a set of societal goals, which are often set aside in order to accomplish other goals of increasing importance (Sherman, 1978). As a result, the manifestation of these deviant goals is for the survival of the organization itself. The influence of organizational goals comes from political interest groups, from within the community, as well as from various other sources. These goals may clash and render the organization unable to accomplish them or by accomplishing them with a deviant means. Sherman (1978) suggests that police organizations employ deviant means as a way to suppress crime, so injustice does not occur. This suggests

that the goal of fighting crime is met with opposition by the concept of due process, another goal in itself.

Because systemic corruption involves entire organizations, not just individual police officers, reform requires an exhaustive effort in regards to the extensiveness of deviance (Punch, 2003). Corruption is not limited to any one country; in fact, corruption can occur worldwide. Thus, combating corruption in any given country requires a great deal of attention. Vietnam will be used as a case study to explore the relationship between police corruption and communism.

Communism and Police Corruption in Vietnam

Research suggests that corruption is more apparent in countries that have adopted communism (Sandholtz and Taagepera, 2005). Communism has an effect on corruption in two ways: (1) the influence on the economy; and (2) the influence on cultural practices. Economically, fewer opportunities and entrance barriers to establish industry ensure that levels of competition remain low. This concept suggests that the increase of governmental regulation and policies will result in oligopolies that heavily influence the market. One such influence is that of the police which may receive payment in exchange for not enforcing a particular rule or law. Culturally, communism changes social perspectives based on the typical or expected behavior of the people associated with it. Furthermore, people learn concepts and values through the process of socialization, while also setting behavioral expectations (Sandholtz & Taagepera, 2005). Corruption is a learned behavior that can be a socially acceptable construct within a community or region.

Around the time of the Vietnam War, with the spread of communism influencing Indochina, police corruption and other police deviance was present throughout the region. COL Nguyen revealed that police corruption was extensive

within Vietnam, coinciding with the rising popularity of communism through the region. COL Nguyen stated that “an honest man is very rare in Vietnam” and “many [Vietnamese] policemen and every branch in the Army [were corrupt during this time]” (Nguyen, 2015). COL Nguyen suggests that corruption was a normal construct, recollecting a time where the transportation of goods by the Chinese was stopped at a checkpoint by Vietnamese police: “the Chinese, he smiles as he hides twenty Vietnamese dollars [in his hand]” (Nguyen, 2015). This occurrence is the result of a shakedown, which is defined as receiving money for not making an arrest or filing a complaint (Punch, 2000).

During World War II, the economy of Vietnam declined significantly, which had profound economic effects, such as work and food shortages, as well as low wage incomes. COL Nguyen stated that “[the] salary is not enough for a family ... the policemen ... are very glad when they eat with us ...” (Nguyen, 2015). The effects of communism and World War II created hardships on the Vietnamese people, inclusive of police officers. Opportunities for deviance and corruption are more prevalent in areas where an economic depression is present. It is no wonder, then, that the Vietnamese populous, as well as the police, at times resorted to deviant means to accomplish a set of goals. In fact, research of Vietnamese police deviance by the Human Rights Watch (Adams, 2014) suggests that a sense of public insecurity regarding the police scales upward as violence towards citizens increases. COL Nguyen (2015) stated that “people ... critique the police”, referring to the Vietnamese attitude towards police. The systemic corruption of the police organization trickles down to individual officers, where deviance plays out on the streets.

Social Learning Theory and Deviant Opportunity

Social learning theory holds that deviant behavior is learned and reinforced by others. New recruits are gradually introduced to deviance as they learn to accept it to be a part of the group (Punch, 2000). Managing police deviance therefore begins with the individualistic approach by modifying the behavior of one officer in an attempt to begin a spread of values and beliefs which represent the department. Police deviance is tough to manage, as widespread organizational reform is often necessary to eliminating deviance and corruption, while also ensuring recruits are not socialized into a deviance subculture.

A police subculture may have its own set of values and beliefs, as well as behavioral expectations that are not consistent with acceptable behavior (Chappell & Piquero, 2004). As a result of this subculture, police officers tend to spend significant time with each other, thus reinforcing negative behavior. Acceptable deviance within the subculture occurs when police officers who engage in these group-supported acts are not defined as deviant (Barker, 1977). Some examples include receiving free meals, shakedowns, protection for vice crimes, and many others. Officers are provided with many opportunities for deviance. The structure and peer group support provided to officers create an environment readily accessible for assimilation into corrupt activity with little chance of being caught. In addition, the behavior of reporting fellow officers is looked down upon, and the reporting officer often will be disciplined (Barker, 1977).

Social learning theory can be applied managerially to reduce police deviance by reinforcing positive behavior and by the adoption of acceptable goals, beliefs and values. Police organizations need to focus on modifying negative police attitudes to provide a fairer and more just police department (Chappell & Piquero, 2004).

Deviant Analysis and Prevention

Through their daily activities, police have ample opportunity to engage in deviant activities (Barker, 1977; Felson & Clarke, 1998). An analysis of departmental policies, procedures, recruitment strategies, and training elements must be conducted to ensure police officers are effective and maintain a positive image for the department, as well as the community or region the department represents. Perry (2001) suggests a method of deselection, where officers are only promoted if they exhibit extraordinary standards of integrity and performance. This process will ensure that high standards are upheld, so that trust can be maintained between the officer, the department and the community. The concept of deselection already is apparent in many police organizations; however, some organizations lack the resources to recruit ideal officers. The influence of systems theory, the dynamic interaction of information with the environment, is a critical component in the establishment of effective policing policy and procedures. This process allows for feedback and evaluation to properly assess those policy and procedures and enable needed modification.

The prevention of deviance therefore necessitates a three-part strategy to be deployed by a police organization. The first strategy is to mandate a rotational deployment assignment of police officers to a particular area that is more susceptible to corruption, which will prevent officers from becoming complacent within the assigned areas. Although random assignment is typically not effective in reducing crime, the goal of the department in this context is to prevent police corruption. Removing a police officer from the temptation and opportunity for deviance will reduce the likelihood that it will surface at all. Bribes often are made to persuade police officers look the other way; therefore, a change of scenery will discourage this opportunity.

The second strategy is to retain high caliber police officers – those who are the most trustworthy – while promoting those who demonstrate leadership qualities. These officers will influence peer groups positively and will not tolerate deviance of fellow officers. Furthermore, individuals are receptive to fair promotional standards and often feel empowered by receiving commendations and personal recognition (Perry, 2001). This implies that officers who maintain an honest and trustworthy environment, and recognize those who are of the similar caliber, will have a lower potential for deviance. In doing so, police officers who participate in deviant acts will be shamed from the peer group. In addition, officers who display these high qualities should be promoted throughout the ranks to demonstrate a tiered environment of core values and beliefs.

The third strategy refers to recruitment and disciplinary measures. Those who are seeking employment to serve the public will need to be held to a higher standard, and those who are already police officers will need to be severely disciplined for any deviant actions. Those who abide by these strategies, reflect leadership abilities, and portray trustworthiness and honesty that will be viewed as a prime example of integrity (Perry, 2001).

Punch (2000) suggests a similar approach to deter police deviance by promoting acts of integrity. With this approach, police organizations must place significant weight on ethical practices with the establishment of clear and concise policies and procedures. Police organizations must provide an environment free from negative judgement, and that provides positive encouragement to those who come forward to resolve personal issues. Effective educational strategies should be employed so that officers are able to learn from the mistakes of prior officers. Providing an environment that has open discussion regarding ethical dilemmas and resolution strategies will enable new recruits to properly assess and prevent situational deviance. Furthermore, an

organization should recognize, award, and protect those who provide evidence of officer deviance, thus ensuring deviant acts are disciplined accordingly. Punch (2000) provides another strategy for the deterrence of police deviance by suggesting that a standardization committee be formed to uphold professional standards and ethics. This committee can provide insight and guidance under an attorney-client privilege protocol, where information is held in secrecy, and where standards can be reinforced. Lastly, Punch (2000) suggests that police deviance is not a new concept and that persistent actions from police leaders are necessary for prevention.

Final Thoughts

Police deviance is not a new concept by any means. Unpunished criminal activity that is conducted by police officers needs to be eliminated by promoting ethical beliefs and by standardizing common values and integrity guidelines. The concept of social learning further enhances the goal of eliminating police deviance by association. Those who are deviant will often be exposed, removed from the group, or disciplined accordingly. Furthermore, removing the opportunity for deviance will reduce the occurrence of the practice. Preventing deviance will require a strategy of rotating assignments, promoting leaders that exhibit integrity, and recruiting police officers, who share values and beliefs consistent with the mission of the organization. A standardization committee should be implemented to ensure effective practices are maintained.

Chapter 6

Police Violence

by Alexa Keys

Violence by police is an ongoing and long-lasting issue throughout the United States. Although some perceive that police brutality and misconduct are greater now than ever before, improper police behaviors were most prevalent in the years between 1960-1970. Further, there have been many cases of police violence reported over the centuries. Examples of police misconduct include, but are not limited to, the following:

- police brutality;
- dishonesty;
- fraud;
- coercion;
- torture to force confessions;
- abuse of authority; and
- sexual assault, including the demand for sexual favors in exchange for leniency (California Innocence Project (CIP), 2015).

One reason it seems as though police misconduct is higher is the use of social media, which sensationalizes cases. Some of the more well-known cases of purported police brutality in the US include Rodney King (Los Angeles), Michael Brown (Ferguson) and Freddie Gray (Baltimore).

Not only does violence by police occur in the United States, but in other countries as well. Although violence takes place in different countries, times and cultures, police misconduct still has similar effects. The violence that citizens experience by police is tragic and creates a divide in police and community relations. Even with every case being different, they all share something similar: they all leave long lasting effects on the community and police departments.

COL Nguyen provided opinion on police deviance during the Vietnam War, specifically, incidents he witnessed

as a police manager, different types of corruption, a well-known execution that occurred in Vietnam, and the backlash from the Vietnamese people towards the police. His personal experiences show how police deviance affects everyone.

History of Police Misconduct

Reflecting on police deviance that has occurred within US borders, many cases occurred between 1960-1970, which happened as a byproduct of the recurring protests surrounding the Civil Rights movement, the student movement, the anti-Vietnam War movement, the gay rights movement, the women's movement, and more. All of these protests have one major thing in common: they all questioned the legitimacy of the police.

During this era, minorities and students saw rioting and resisting police on television for the first time (Kelling & Moore, 1988). Due to this occurrence, the public began to question the police and their motives. In turn, police leaders attempted to diversify their departments by accepting additional minorities and women into the force, as well as supplementing training and upgrading recruitment in prospect of acquiring police legitimacy.

An example of a protest that negatively impacted authorities occurred in the spring of 1970 during a protest against the Vietnam War. President Richard Nixon announced a need for more soldiers, meaning 150,000 young men were about to serve their country, unwillingly, as part of the draft (Kifner, 2010). This created massive outcry; students were outraged by this so-called necessity and Kent State University students began protesting. Protestors there became violent, which led to the deployment of Ohio National Guardsmen to the campus. When the guardsmen arrived, the students began throwing stones at them. Soon after, altercations arose, consisting of gunfire that injured nine students and killed four others (Foner & Garraty, 1991). What can be

inferred from this protest, as well as many others, is that violent protests were, and are still, not the answer; they only create further disorder and a disconnect between the public and police departments as a whole.

During the civil rights movement, there was an abundance of widely recognized police brutality, but not enough to make a change toward desegregation. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was one of the main advocates for these civil rights protests and was part of the 1963 Project C, The Birmingham Campaign. While giving his famous “I Have A Dream” speech, King stated, “We must forever conduct our struggle on the high plane of dignity and discipline. We must not allow our creative protest to degenerate into physical violence. Again and again we must rise to the majestic heights of meeting physical force with soul force” (Online Speech Bank, 2001). Essentially, King wanted the people to have silent and non-violent protests to show the country that even without violence, the police would still attack them with brutal acts.

Protestors began peaceful boycotts and protests in Birmingham, Alabama, where King was arrested. In addition, protestors were shooed away by police with fire hoses and police dogs. Again, even though the protests were non-violent, there was still a presence of police brutality because Birmingham was such a segregated area and did not accept blacks under any circumstances. As unfortunate as the Project C was, segregation changed there because of the media broadcast of the mistreatment of blacks, making it impossible to ignore (PBS, 2015).

Rodney King

Following the Vietnam War, police brutality and police corruption still occurred in the United States. There are many reports of violence by police, some of which became so famous and well known that the names of these citizens

became regular household names. For instance, Rodney King was arrested shortly before his 26th birthday in Los Angeles (LA), California. King was pulled over for speeding, but instead of pulling over, he led the police officers on a high-speed chase through LA. Once King was stopped, the officers forced him out of the car and began to beat him to the ground with excessive force – specifically 56 baton blows – as well as clubbing and kicking him. As a result, King sustained broken bones all over his body. All of this violence occurred in just 81 seconds (Polner, 1992). The use of force was seen as racially motivated and was captured on video. The horrific footage caused public outrage and allowed King to be released without any charges (CNN, 2012).

When the attack came to trial, the defense attorneys decided it best to move the trial outside of LA to Simi Valley, due to the media affecting the LA citizens' opinions. Simi Valley, predominantly a white community, ensured the jury was largely white with two people from minority groups; none of which were African-Americans (Biography, 2015). The jury acquitted the officers, causing massive tension in the city and all over the world, culminating in destructive riots.

The riots began in Los Angeles on April 29, 1992, and lasted for multiple days. Looting and arson were prevalent during the riots and resulted in about 50 deaths due to a variety of reasons, such as pulling people out of their cars and beating them, weapons fire within the riots, burning to death, stabbings, and heart attacks due to the stress of the riots going on outside of their homes (NY Times, 1992). LA enforced curfews, and even Rodney King made a plea for calmness on May 1, 1992, saying, "People, I just want to say, can we all get along? Can we get along? Can we stop making it horrible for the older people and the kids?" (CNN, 2012).

Once the riots came to a halt, the United States Department of Justice filed charges against the four officers involved in the beating of King. Half of the officers were

found guilty, and the other two were acquitted once again. Juries in part accepted defense arguments that the beating of King was a failure of Los Angeles Police Department Use of Force policy which required compliance from a subject before officers could attempt to handcuff the subject. As King never complied, officers continued to strike with the batons, the approved use of force. The failure of the supervisor on the scene to deviate from short-sighted policy allowed officers to continue the beating. King received \$3.8 million for damages and injuries. Although this seems like a good amount of money, in comparison to the effect it had on King and the city of LA, it is minuscule (Biography, 2015).

In 1997, Mr. Parks, the chief of police in LA, realized the department needed to make a change in order to keep their community safer and happier. A couple of these changes included the implementation of cameras, a multicultural police force, and a new policing style. The implementation of cameras insured that unacceptable behavior would be recorded and individuals held responsible for their actions, making the community feel safer. A multicultural police force with African-American and Hispanic officers ensured the public would not feel they were being treated differently due their race. Lastly, the policing style went from a paramilitary to a community policing style. This style builds a relationship with the community, so when an event like the Rodney King case occurs, there is a better chance the citizens will take time to hear the police officer's side of the story (Morris, 2012).

Ferguson

Another famous case took place in Ferguson, Missouri, where an 18-year-old African-American male named Michael Brown was at a local liquor store and allegedly stole a box of Swisher cigars. While Brown was walking back to his home, Officer Wilson spotted him and believed him

to match the description for the alleged thief. Once Officer Wilson ordered him to stop, an altercation broke out. Brown began to run and Wilson fired 12 rounds, killing Brown (Buchanan, 2015).

A jury found Officer Wilson not guilty because forensic evidence supported Officer Wilson's version of events that had Brown reaching into the police car at the time he was shot. However, witnesses in support of Brown lied to the press and the jury and testified that Brown had his "hands up." Because of the lack of trust in the community of the police, similar to the case of Rodney King, Project C, and the Kent State shootings, riots began, leading to burned buildings, citizens throwing objects such as stones at police officers and their patrol cars, and sporadic gunfire. The officers were forced to protect themselves and bystanders.

One of the main findings after the Ferguson shooting was that the population of Ferguson is mainly African-American, contrary to the police department. Out of 53 officers in Ferguson, only four were black. Although this racial disparity may not have been the predominant cause of this case, it definitely affected the community reaction. If a specific race in a community feels segregated from and not represented within the police force, then any actions taken against them will feel racially motivated. Like in the King case, a more ethnically diverse police force with a community policing mandate might have averted such an explosive situation (Buchanan, 2015). Unfortunately, as is often the case, the officers involved, even when they are acquitted, are unable to return to policing (Officer Wilson's family was threatened and he resigned from policing).

Freddie Gray

Another recent case of police brutality in the US involved another young, African-American male named Freddie Gray. In the spring of 2015, two officers on bicycle patrol in Baltimore, Maryland spotted Freddie Gray walking by, and when eye contact was made, Gray made a run for it. This gave the officers enough suspicion to chase after Gray and tackle him. While this take down was happening, Gray asked for an inhaler, which was not given to him; the first reckless act of the officers. After the officers searched Gray, the only item they found on him was a knife, which is legal in the state of Maryland. However, the officers decided to call a police van and proceeded to take him into custody on a weapon's charge.

When the van arrived to pick up Gray, he was put inside with no seatbelt: a second reckless act. While driving to central booking, the driver stopped multiple times; he did not bother to buckle Gray during any of these stops, leaving Gray handcuffed and shackled in the back of a van with no safety belt. At the third stop, while the driver checked on Gray, Gray asked for medical assistance because he could not breathe and was denied medical attention a second time.

Almost at the station, the driver responded to a call for another arrest. As the driver was putting the new arrestee into the van, the driver realized Gray was unresponsive. The driver provided no medical assistance to Gray and simply proceeded to the station. Upon arrival, Gray was not breathing and was transported to the hospital, where he passed away a week later (Almukhtar, 2015).

It was determined that Gray died from a severe spinal injury likely caused by the rough ride in the van. The officers involved in this incident were all removed from duty immediately and suspended with pay (Barajas, 2015). These officers have all been tried with multiple charges ranging from second-degree assault to second-degree murder. All

officers were tried separately and acquitted. The Department of Justice decided on October 5, 2017, to conduct a non-criminal, internal disciplinary trial for the officer, over the breach of internal protocol for not securing Mr. Gray in the van. The family was awarded \$6.4 million, which does not bring back Freddie Gray (Stolberg, 2015).

As for the community, the reaction was also similar to the previous cases. Multiple riots and protests took place including violence causing upwards of \$9 million in damages to the city. Not only were buildings of innocent business owners set on fire, but also innocent individuals' vehicles and other property were destroyed. Tensions became so high during this time that the National Guard was called in to help, as well as police departments from surrounding areas. The aftermath violence brought more awareness and attention to the situation (Barrabi, 2015).

Vietnam Violence

While police misconduct occurred in the US, police corruption and brutality also occurred in Vietnam. One of the most publicized police brutality cases in Vietnam is the execution in Saigon of a Viet Cong captain. This execution took place in the middle of the city, where the Viet Cong captain was shot in the face. This was one of many executions during the war, but this one stood out because RoV General Loan shot the captain in the presence of a cameramen and a photographer. The photographer captured this gruesome image right as the bullet was exiting the skull of the Viet Cong captain, making this photo exceptionally graphic. People all over the world saw the photo on television and in local newspapers (Thomas, 1998).

Although this picture caused an emotional outcry, it was not enough to stop the war, which ended seven years later. Within these seven years, the

mistreatment of Vietnamese citizens by police continued day in and day out. COL Nguyen was asked if he was familiar with the execution, and supported the handling of the event by the news. “I don’t support the way Gen. Loan executed the man. He was a political commander, but I don’t like it. Neither a Vietnamese, nor American general should do that. I question why the general had to execute him, because the tribunal would condemn him to death. So why the need for execution?” (Nguyen, 2015).

COL Nguyen’s wife added, “Well I have to tell you a story about Gen. Loan. When we came over to the United States, we had an annual reunion of the police with a lottery. I happened to win his [Gen. Loan’s] watch, a very, very expensive watch. I didn’t keep it; I gave it back to him. I disagree with him [COL Nguyen]. If the VC killed my friend, I would execute him immediately, no matter what!” (Nguyen, 2015). COL Nguyen continued, “When I worked with the [RoV president], many of my colleagues [oversaw] executions and assassinations [of] the really bad Viet Cong, simply to show [they were] anti-communist” (Nguyen, 2015). COL Nguyen (2015) further conveyed that he would not personally execute communists because then his subordinates would be capable of carrying out such actions. Therefore, if his subordinates carry out executions without following the rules, he could punish them because he had not set the example that it is acceptable to conduct such executions without the approval of the governing bodies. Had he carried out extra judicial executions, then he would have no grounds to punish his subordinates for doing so.

Indeed, the brutality that the RoV general portrayed was unacceptable and most definitely shocking. When asked if the execution in Saigon had

any backlash from citizens, COL Nguyen's (2015) opinion was that, "You know I think the majority of the [population was against it. However, no one criticized the event because the general is a very powerful man. Even though I was his subordinate, in my heart, I did not support this".

This is an unfortunate realization and commonality among countries, wherein the population does not always agree with the actions of the government, but remain silent and refrain from protest in an attempt to change it. Just like during the US Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s, there was a great deal of racial discrimination and mistreatment by police, but much of the population turned their heads until it became impossible to ignore. Clearly, the Vietnamese citizens reacted the same way to this type of mistreatment because, as COL Nguyen believes, many people did not agree with this execution, but no one wanted to criticize the decision of someone so powerful, such as an RoV general.

Unfortunately, not ensuring the government holds police officers accountable for mistreatment further enables such actions without recourse. COL Nguyen, as a police manager, tried to ensure brutality was prevented by reminding his staff to be honest men. When asked if extensive corruption occurred in Vietnam and how he would handle it as a police manager, he responded by saying, "I think it is true of many policemen ... but unfortunately not only police, every branch in the Army... as well. [When I identify non-corrupt police officers, I congratulate] and decorate them with a police order and ...medal, ... [for being] an honest man, [because honest men are] very rare in Vietnam" (Nguyen, 2015). As an example of police corruption, COL Nguyen (2015) shared a story. When he was a police manager, he controlled the

flow of traffic on the highways. There, the police established many checkpoints. Chinese trucks loaded with merchandise and goods would stop at the checkpoints for inspection, and the Chinese drivers would bribe the police officers with 20 Vietnamese dollars to pass through without being inspected.

In more recent times, Vietnam has had significant amounts of police deviance within their borders to the extent that the deviance has drawn the attention of the Human Rights Watch. In the article titled, *Vietnam: Pervasive Deaths, Injuries in Police Custody*, the Human Rights Watch found 44 out of 58 provinces in Vietnam have endured some degree of police deviance. The majority of the deviance resulted in the injury of detained individuals, most of whom were only being held for minor infractions. Examples of those victims include Nguyen Mau Thuan, who was detained for a neighborhood dispute, and Le Phuc Hung, who was held for stealing water pipes. Both were beaten to death while in custody (Human Right Watch, 2014).

In addition to the two previously listed individuals, Ngo Thanh Kieu was arrested and taken from his home on May 12, 2012, for being a suspect in a string of burglaries in Tuy Hoa City. While in custody, Kieu suffered terrible rubber baton beatings from five officers, while he was handcuffed and shackled to a chair. The beatings ultimately resulted in his death. The initial verdict handed down by the People's Court of Tuy Hoa City sentenced the five officers to six months to five years in jail, but the People's Court of Phu Yen Province annulled the sentence. The commuted sentences resulted in two officers receiving probation and the other three were given short term prison sentences (DurianAsean, 2014).

Numerous victims of police brutality in Vietnam have not survived detention abuse, and those who have survived have encountered awful mistreatment by police. The police officers always deny the allegations of police brutality and

blame their deaths on other circumstances, often blaming doctors' treatment as the cause of their death. Many victims, lucky enough to live, were generally coerced into false confessions and lived the rest of their life in a prison cell (Human Rights Watch, 2014).

Even though these reports of police deviance are accurate, Vietnam denies the allegations. Media coverage in Vietnam is subpar in regards to police misconduct. Without media coverage, the police officers' abuse of power continues without repercussions (Greenslade, 2014). Vietnam needs to improve and ensure all citizens are afforded due process. Until then, police brutality will continue, while innocent individuals suffer (VOA, 2014).

The Effected Community

Indeed, the community is widely affected by the police officers' decisions. The history of police brutality in the United States is certainly repetitive, but not nearly as common place as in other societies. As early as the 1960s, similar cases and patterns continuously repeat themselves. When the public is upset over government decisions, including those made by police officers, there tends to be a violent outcry, which includes riots and protests. Although riots and protests bring awareness of police unjustness to the entire population, they certainly are not the answer. Martin Luther King Jr stated, "We must not allow our creative protest to degenerate into physical violence" (Online Speech Bank, 2001). As such, the police must intervene to maintain the safety of the general population, and thus appear to be more of a savior, than a merchant of indiscriminate and unwarranted force, thus countering the original protest intention. Creating culturally representative police forces with recurrent interaction with the community, so they are seen as public advocates and representatives of the local government, will certainly make a difference in the way the community feels towards situations like these.

Chapter 7
Combating Terrorism through Community
Policing in Vietnam
by Abayomi Ayoola

The war on terrorism has had many lost souls and has been the most expensive war with the least degree of support from other countries. Terrorism is the effective use of violence to bring forth fear (Pressman & Flockton, 2014). Terrorism may be motivated by political, religious, or ideological ideals. The goal of terrorism is to instill fear in the population and force a government to change its political attitude. Violent extremism is similar to terrorism, but has subtle differences. While not all extremists resort to terrorism, all terrorists are extremists, but the question remains: Does employing an extreme political, religious, or ideological view necessarily entail terrorism (Pressman & Flockton, 2014)? Pressman and Flockton (2014) argue that while extremism does not require violent actions, terrorism always requires violence to achieve some political goals. Violent extremism is different to terrorism in terms of the intention to cause fear and terror in civilians or decision makers. For example, violent environmentalists or violent anti-abortionists perhaps may use violent means in their actions, but generally have not indicated the intention to kill people indiscriminately or destroy facilities to cause fear in the public domain (Pressman & Flockton, 2014).

After September 11, 2001, American policing experienced a time of critical change and development, when the nation's security needs increased profoundly following the terrorist assaults on American soil. In a moderately short time, police reconsidered their key missions, the nature of policing techniques, and the character of their relationship with the community they serve (Weisburd & Braga, 2006). Community policing in the 21st century greatly altered the receptivity of police and their collaboration with the

community, especially focusing on their security concerns. England and Germany reappraised their preparation of the police force and reconsidered the role policing plays in counteracting terrorism through policing innovations including preventive policing (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009). Preventive policing can be characterized as any activity completed by police with the aim of recognizing and interceding before the occurrence of a particular crime; one strategy to do so is partnering with the public. Cooperation with the community builds trust, and, as such, the population feels more comfortable sharing threat information with the police. Such dynamic police and community relations may tend to reduce the potential for oppressive police behavior as the public is more compliant with police proceedings. Due to the more profound influx of information from community networks, police can be more selective in areas requiring surveillance where there is a perceived lack of community participation in policing support. Common investigative techniques, requiring varying degrees of government oversight and court approval, are wire-tapping, email capture, human and camera surveillance of suspects in open areas, as well as surveillance in hotel rooms and private living arrangements. Cutting edge technologies have provided policing, security and intelligence services with visualization tools to identify and avert terrorism, becoming a central component of counter-terrorism strategies. This expanded dependence on innovative tools was not just a result of its availability and decreased cost, but also public pressure on the government to manage the threat of terrorism. Camera systems enable police to observe remote locations without a physical presence, thus enabling the collection of intelligence from unwary criminal elements; a task normally requiring multiple personnel on foot and driving, which tended to highlight their activity to the perpetrator.

Another counterterrorism policing strategy includes high policing. High policing agencies collate data, analyze

the information to develop finished intelligence products, such as threat assessments, and disseminate intelligence on a need-to-know basis. The intelligence products are stored in various formats, then destroyed when they have lost their relevance. There are two fundamental differences between high policing security intelligence and low policing or criminal intelligence. First, police forces collect pertinent intelligence to build a criminal case, while high policing intelligence focuses more on the threat of crime to national and regional security (Brodeur, 2007). Actionable intelligence is the second fundamental difference, where intelligence spurs an organization to act. In this sense, intelligence-led policing leads to an arrest, while high policing is continually compiled, and only acted upon when there are no justifiable alternatives (Brodeur, 2007). One concern with high policing, though, is its effects on public attitudes toward police (Jonathan, 2010; Jonathan-Zamir & Weisburd, 2013).

Public opinion towards police, especially their authenticity, is essential for creating an open dialogue with the public and for police legitimacy (Tyler, 2004). Public attitudes towards police legitimacy could be influenced by the inclusion of police in counter-terrorism efforts (Jonathan, 2010; Jonathan-Zamir & Weisburd, 2013). Police strengths in Vietnam and other majority rule nations raised their level of readiness by including police in counter-terrorism efforts (Bayley & Weisburd 2009). Community based policing can impact terrorist efforts, as the community, with its increased trust in the police, provides valuable information on terrorist activities and networks. Community policing is not an effortless endeavor, as it requires an implementation strategy and organizational commitment. Community policing is a decentralized activity, which encourages two-way communication between police and the general population. COL Nguyen implemented a problem-oriented policing model, requiring a responsive police force, which

offered neighborhood dispute resolution assistance down to the household-level through community organizations and crime prevention programs. COL Nguyen felt that the absence of group insights through community engagement would prompt further hardline policing actions.

The participation of police in Vietnam security matters creates new issues. Police inclusion in Vietnam security is a characteristic extension of their traditional roles of responding to community security concerns and reacting to crises, for example, riots and natural catastrophes (Nguyen, 2015). In spite of the fact that police agencies in Vietnam considered terrorism as a potential threat to community security, they had little involvement in planning the country's security capacity to respond to terrorist events. However, neighborhood organizations did not consider countering terrorist activities as a policing function requiring the allocation of assets and personnel (Nguyen, 2015).

COL Nguyen felt his strategy was effective as no incidents of terrorism occurred in his jurisdiction during the Vietnam War. His counter terrorism strategy was employed slightly differently between two urban areas: Saigon City and Nha Trang city; Saigon City required a more politically tactful approach when handling governmental issues (Nguyen, 2015). One of the new policing responsibilities of COL Nguyen's strategy was to leverage non-military, non-uniformed officers in local communities to investigate, identify, and destroy terrorist networks. Such new policing roles likely increase police investment in high policing, which is focused more on strategic issues at the macro level, rather than local crime and disorder (Brodeur, 1983; Brodeur & Dupeyron, 1993).

As mentioned in Chapter 3, under the strategy of prevention, there were three main areas of policing activities: internal security to counter anti-government and anti-establishment movements, intelligence gathering specifically to target communists, and criminal investigation

to counter criminal activities (Nguyen, 2012). The French policing model exploited information to gain advantage through the element of surprise, while the CIA model was more methodical and based on surveillance, which in both war and peace time returned the best results. The police played a crucial role during a time of political instability by securing and protecting citizens against crime and violence. During this time, police performed approximately 90% of civilian administration programs, due in large part to the degree of trust and respect the population had in the police, as they often engaged the police for advice on community concerns. Policing is about prevention, so COL Nguyen and his fellow police officers cultivated relationships with the community to show their sincerity and a willingness to serve, in order to develop a synergistic relationship, and enhance communication between the police and its citizens to identify and disrupt threats to the community, such as terrorists. Risk has a long history of negative outcomes in crisis management. Risk lies in the shadow between the known and the obscure. Governments and corporations have greatly increased their focus on risk-based methodologies when conducting vital strategic planning (Manning, 2006). In the Vietnam case with COL Nguyen at the lead, risk paid off in maintaining public safety.

Section III

Applying Lessons Learned to US Foreign Advising Today

For more than half a century, the USG has supported police forces of foreign countries during wars, as well as in post-conflict regions, through foreign police assistance programs with the goal of building peace and maintaining safety. US government agencies provided advice and training on modifying policing systems and strategies based on previous experiences and the change in society.

In this section, we will discuss the change of US foreign police assistance since the Vietnam War and lessons learned from the Vietnam War for the US foreign policing assistance today. First, we will present US foreign policing advising in Vietnam by summarizing the previous chapters in this book. Second, we will show several trends of the US foreign police assistance and practical activities today. We will conclude by discussing lessons learned for the current US foreign police assistance by comparing lessons learned of police advising in Vietnam with existing systems and activities.

Chapter 8

Lessons Learned and Best Practices

by Eunsil Yoo

US Foreign Policing Advising in the Late 20th Century

The USG supported civil and paramilitary police organizations, and trained foreign police officers through the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) and the United State Agency for International Development (USAID) from 1954 to 1974. The ICA initiated programs for supporting foreign police forces and then USAID, established in 1961 as a successor organization of ICA, provided diverse programs such as technical advice, training, and equipment. In addition to the foreign policing advising overseas, USAID trained over 5,000 foreign police officers from 77 countries through the International Police Academy (IPA) in Washington D.C. Additionally, the USG provided specialized courses for over 3,000 officers through agencies other than the IPA using USAID funds (Keller, 2010). As the numbers above indicate, US foreign policing advisory efforts operated successfully within and outside of the country.

The USG efforts during the Vietnam War exemplified the trend of foreign policing advising in the middle of the 20th century, with democratic countries actively combatting communism (Clinton, 2007). In 1965, the US government became involved in the Vietnam War, and because the police were the front line of defense, US policing advisors supported the RoV national police. However, the advisors often overlooked the cultural differences and the nature of the relationship between the RoV police and their supported communities. Unlike the rise of community-based policing in the US, foreign policing advising tended to be operation-based policing by focusing on combatting communists.

During the Vietnam War, police violence was a serious concern, which is outlined in chapter 6 and 7 of this book. The economic system and culture in Vietnam had a negative impact on increased police corruption. Moreover, the policing activities in Vietnam that focused on combatting communism resulted in conflict within local communities. According to COL Nguyen's interviews, the problem of police deviance was even harder to solve because of a hierarchical system and authoritative culture that discouraged those who might want to speak out against such corruption.

After the Vietnam War, criticism increased over foreign policing assistance. Reports of police brutality led to the diminution of foreign policing advising activities (Keller, 2010). US legislation prohibited the application of foreign assistance funds to the training and financing of law enforcement within or outside of the US Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act in 1974 essentially ended all USAID police training and assistance programs. Today's foreign police assistance is operated under a different system from the Vietnam War era.

Current US Foreign Police Assistance ***Trends of Foreign Policing Assistance***

The values and meaning of foreign policing advising have changed over several decades. After the Vietnam War, the USG encountered severe criticism about its military intervention and foreign assistance. Governmental agencies needed to improve their strategies for successor activities. Today, the USG focuses on peace and security from a long-term strategy and planning perspective. These trends take the form of peacebuilding and peacekeeping activities, security sector reform, and community-based policing.

Peacebuilding and Peacekeeping. Since the 1990s, a peace agenda has been promoted all over the world. Governmental and nongovernmental organizations involved

in international conflicts realized previous short-term strategies actually led to further violent conflicts in host nations. War-time strategies rarely consider the necessary steps to maintain peace or consolidate gains in a post-conflict environment (Mitchell, 2008). The idea of peacebuilding normally falls into the “post-conflict reconstruction” environment, and encompasses “the overlapping agendas for peace and development in support of conflict prevention, conflict management and post conflict reconstruction” (Tschirgi, 2003). The USG often employs political intervention, financial support and institutional reforms as tactics to rebuild peace following conflict.

Peacebuilding was developed as an evolution of peacekeeping and should be a component of peacekeeping missions. From a short-term perspective, political intervention and the incorporation of the international community are essential in peacebuilding. Non-governmental organizations advocate for international organizations and foreign governments providing support to peacebuilding and peacekeeping missions focusing on long-term objectives to solve root-causes of conflict and develop communities – if they want to truly support the host nation (Mitchell, 2008). The USG recognizes that each peacebuilding and peacekeeping strategy will vary depending on the needs of the conflict areas.

Security Sector Reform (SSR). Since the early 2000s, the USG has employed a comprehensive approach to security sector reform, coordinating the planning and implementation efforts of the defense, development and diplomatic departments. Security Sector Reform (SSR) refers to “reform efforts directed at the institutions, processes, and force that provide security and promote the rule of law” (Department of State, Department of Defense, & the USAID, 2009). Specifically, the US foreign assistance framework identifies SSR “as a key program area in support of the Peace and Security foreign policy objective and

security sector governance as a program element in support of the Governing Justly and Democratically foreign policy objective” (Department of State, Department of Defense, & the USAID, 2009). The US government emphasizes that their programs and activities are based on the host nation’s history, culture, legal framework, and institutions in the process of SSR.

Further, the USG effectively guides the relevant agencies’ implementation strategies through several SSR principles: (1) support host nation ownership; (2) incorporate principles of good governance and respecting human rights; (3) balance operational support with institutional reform; (4) link security and justice; (5) foster transparency; and (6) do no harm (Department of State, Department of Defense, & USAID, 2009). These principles are essential to achieve security in post conflict environments from the long-term perspective without severe conflicts against host nation communities.

In addition to Security Sector Reform, police reform plays a key role in securing peace in a community and the peacebuilding process. Police reform, including the changing of power relationships, organizational culture and respect for human rights, contributes to building trust between the community and police (O’Neil, 2005). In fact, it is very difficult to reform police in the post-conflict areas. Militarized police in conflict areas are closely connected with military activities even after the conflicts (Mani, 1999). In the case of El Salvador from 1992-1994, even though the government received financial and training assistance for police reform from the US Department of Justice International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), police officers were difficult to separate from military personnel because of repeated military interference in the police reform process.

Community-based policing. The trend of foreign policing assistance has moved from operation-based

policing toward community-based policing. Community-based policing means that positive relationships with the community plays a vital role in effective policing and requiring restructuring police systems and organization. The objective of community-based policing is to have citizens and police partner together to identify and effectively address crime and disorder (Department of Justice, 2007). The benefit of community policing is the development of strong, positive relationships between police and the general public, which contributes to a culture of lawfulness and general voluntary compliance with criminal laws (Department of State, 2016). Community-based policing has evolved since it was formally developed in the 1960s. However, it was not applied to the foreign policing assistance until the later part of 1990s, as it was not seen as an effective measure for combatting communism or counterinsurgency in stability operations. Community-based policing has been implemented as a counter to increased conflict between police and their respective communities.

In the process of foreign policing advising, civilian police are encouraged to develop partnerships with citizens and identify problems by building trust, which is the foundation of this principle (Groenewald & Peake, 2004). Fundamental principles of community-based policing include: (1) policing by consent, not coercion; (2) the police as part of the community, not apart from it; (3) the police and community working together to identify community needs; (4) the police, public and other agencies working together in partnership; and (5) tailoring the business of policing to meet community needs (Groenewald & Peake, 2004, p. 34). These principles provide police officers with guides to build relationships with communities and achieve security together. The USG requires foreign policing advisors to inculcate these community-based policing principles into the host nation police officers.

In summary, the trends of foreign police assistance have evolved over the last several decades to include ideas of peacebuilding and peacekeeping, security sector reform (SSR), and community-based policing. The next section reviews how these ideas and values are implemented into foreign police advising.

The Systems of Foreign Policing Assistance

In the today's foreign policing assistance policy, diverse organizations including the USG departments and private companies cooperatively provide advice and training to host nation police. This section will show the organizations involved in the policy implementation and their roles in interagency coordination and then review how the systems operate.

Interagency coordination. The Department of State's (DOS) Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) is the lead USG agency for justice sector development and foreign police assistance. INL is responsible for developing the long-term strategy with implementation and funding assistance from USAID, ICITAP, and another Department of Justice agency, the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT). The Department of Defense provides support to foreign police assistance, when requested by the Department of State (Keller, 2010). INL, ICITAP and USAID are involved in the development, bidding, and awarding of contracts for police trainers, with much of the onus shifting to the Department of Defense in a non-permissive, post-conflict environment.

Since 2009, USAID has been involved in civilian police development and reform in over 20 countries. USAID cooperates with other government agencies to support international civilian police efforts. Since the end of the Cold War, DOS's INL has played a key role in developing and

operating international criminal justice programs in post-conflict nations, specifically focusing on the development of civilian law enforcement organizational structures and capability. US federal law enforcement agencies also provide support staff and trainers for these training initiatives.

DOJ's ICITAP and OPDAT concentrate on sustainable institutional development in the justice sector in post-conflict or developing countries. ICITAP supports foreign governments to develop their law enforcement institutions, protect human rights, and combat corruption, crime, and terrorism. OPDAT's programs are part of the Department of Justice's two-pronged law enforcement strategy: first, an operational prong, targeting transnational criminal organizations; and second, a capacity-building prong, designed to increase the ability of our foreign counterparts to investigate and prosecute these criminal groups before their criminal activities reach the United States. The programs cooperate with other organizations such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to leverage their operational law enforcement training and technical assistance capabilities. DOD's primary role is building the capacity of foreign military and paramilitary forces. DOD supports other organizations in developing civilian police agencies. Under a Transitional Public Security initiative, DOD maintains public order in post conflict scenarios until host nation or international forces are able to assume these functions. As shown above, today's foreign policing assistance functions through interagency cooperation.

Civilian Police (CIVPOL). Many Civilian police (CIVPOL) programs are sponsored by the United Nations. In UN parlance, police are UNPOL and can be individual police officers (IPO) or formed police units (FPU). DOS has supported these programs since 1994, through police training and advising assistance. CIVPOL aims at promoting peace and stability in areas recovering from conflict by supporting host nation police forces to develop modern,

democratic indigenous police forces to help ensure that peace and stability can be sustained, even after international peacekeepers depart. DOS contracts with private companies to recruit, select, equip and deploy individual civilian police. These contracted civilian police officers work with US military in some mission areas, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, or are seconded to international organizations such as the United Nations (US Department of State, 2008). The civilian agencies provide training and assistance to aid-recipient countries through allocated funds from successive waivers and exceptions to Section 660 and through new authorizations provided outside the Foreign Assistance Act (Buchanan, 2011).

INL's Office of Civilian Police and Rule of Law Programs (INL/CIV) administers police training, while also providing programs for prosecutorial, judicial, and correctional development. As of 2009, INL/CIV managed over 1,600 deployed US police in several foreign countries (US Department of State, INL/CIV, 2008). However, it is difficult to determine how many of these US police are contracted by this program or other programs. INL administers the programs using International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE).

Special Training Teams and Programs in Iraq and Afghanistan. Police assistance is no longer exclusively a civilian police responsibility. DOD was authorized to coordinate police training and assistance in Iraq in 2004 and Afghanistan in 2005 as part of US stabilization and reconstruction efforts (Buchanan, 2011, p. 9). During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) created the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) concept to train and equip Iraqi police forces. Several private companies, such as DynCorp International and Military Professional Resources Inc., provided 882 personnel to execute the CPATT tasks of host nation police assessment, training, and mentoring.

Moreover, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), that has a UN approved mandate, made a concerted effort to embed US advisors with Afghan police and security forces from 2009 to 2010. In the fall of 2009, ISAF initiated the Village Stability Operations (VSO) program to develop effective local security forces, the Afghan Local Police (ALP), for selected remote villages in Afghanistan (Rust, 2011). These special programs supplemented the host nation national army and police force while cooperating with US military in the mission areas. Under this concept, the Afghan government conducted oversight and could vet and train local security forces, but the local forces were largely autonomous, taking orders from local Shuras. These ALP forces built on the concept of the Afghan tradition of local defense. However, police assistance conducted by DOD has been widely criticized.

As shown above, the USG has transitioned the foreign policing assistance systems to a more long-term perspective. In order to reduce the abuse of US police power in host nations, different government agencies are involved in the foreign policing assistance and recruit civilian police through the private companies. The USG departments have tried to overcome the limitation of current systems through special training teams and programs.

Lessons Learned

The USG improved their foreign policing assistance systems and programs based on their experiences in the Vietnam Wars and successor operations during the last 50 years. This section will discuss lessons learned for current US foreign police assistance based on COL Nguyen and his US advisor's experiences in Vietnam.

Understanding the culture of the host nation

Understanding the culture of the host nation is a key issue in the success of foreign policing assistance. The US military and police advisors were involved in the Vietnam War to combat against the spread of communism; however, they had insufficient understanding of the Vietnamese people and their culture to succeed in their roles as advisors (Clark, 2012). Misconceptions or prejudice against foreign counterparts' involvement in governmental and security affairs has a negative impact on the relationship with local communities, often resulting in police corruption or violence. Clark (2012) pointed out that policing advisors, conversely, need host nation police officers' and communities' help and advice to conduct their duties effectively in foreign cultures. Advisors should learn the host nation culture and share the differences between US and host nation culture in order to build relationships with the host nation police officers and communities.

However, foreign police advisors need to identify host nation customs that thwart effective policing and develop advising strategies to overcome these entrenched practices. Even though host nation police officers learned new techniques from their advisors, the tendency is to quickly return to their former organizational culture and values after the departure of the foreign advisors (Keller, 2010; Kramer, Gaffney, Megahan, & Dempsey, 2008). For this reason, the USG tried to build a positive organizational culture by encouraging collaborative, partnered operations with their Afghan counterparts to highlight the efficacy of the new techniques, while also focusing on building relationships with community leaders through special programs, such as the Village Stability Operations (Rust, 2011). Police reform must be tailored to local conditions and needs, while also aligning with host nation national programs.

Providing appropriate support by understanding local environments

Foreign policing advisors can train host nation police officers effectively and support communities with appropriate resources when they understand the local environment. Modern equipment and resources are sometimes not useful in post-conflict regions. COL Nguyen (2012, 2015) introduced an example whereby Harley-Davidson motorcycles were provided for patrolling, but they were too big for the narrow roads. On the other hand, some resources are well received, such as in the instance of a US advisor who provided a fire truck because the RoV police were responsible for assisting in putting out fires and the local police did not have a fire department. Oversupply of resources takes up more space and adds extra expenses; therefore, the USG should effectively manage the provision of supplies and only allocate sufficient goods to meet the police officers' and communities' needs.

Advising strategy may differ depending on regions within the same country. In Vietnam, police officers had to not only combat North Vietnamese military forces, but also counter the Viet Cong insurgency in RoV (Clinton, 2007). Some areas rife with Viet Cong guerrillas required significant anti-terrorist tactics training, while also introducing intelligence gathering skills to differentiate the Viet Cong from local populations. In addition, some advisors needed to consider the influence of mass media or diplomatic power on foreign policing advising strategies in urban areas, such as Sai Cong, which was a common operating area for the press and nonprofit organizations (Nguyen, 2015). Advising strategies need to consider a spectrum of local influences on host nation police training and operations.

The permissive nature of the operational environment has a significant impact on policing activities. In a permissive environment, policing should focus on law enforcement with traditional and critical police techniques, such as investigation and community policing. In a non-permissive environment,

police advising must be extended to include a paramilitary element by focusing on responding to insurgent, terrorist, or other major violent activity (Kramer et al., 2008). Therefore, understanding local environments or contexts contributes to providing appropriate supports to the local communities.

The relationship with the host nation police officers

A mutual respect relationship with the host nation police officers plays a key role in foreign policing advising. Clark (2012) stated that open communication is important to the development of a personal and business relationship with mentored police officers. One way to establish such a relationship is to make an effort to understand their culture and communicate with them frequently.

Moreover, cooperation with host nation police officers is critical for police reformation. COL Nguyen (2015) emphasized the importance of discussion with advisors when opinions differ on specific issues. Discussion between advisors and host nation police officers leads to improved police officer abilities by taking an active role in ensuring that both sides understand the same principles. Therefore, advisors should encourage host nation police officers to discuss diverse issues and concerns they face in the workplaces.

Cooperation with other organizations or advisors

Cooperation and coordination with other organizations is important to ensure continuity of effort and reduce conflicting advising principles. During the Vietnam War, several organizations from different countries – such as Australian, Korean, UN and US police – cooperated with one another to support RoV police officers. The challenge was that the disparate advising elements did not share important counterinsurgency information with others and did not coordinate their daily routine. For example, COL Nguyen (2015a, b) used to patrol his district with police officers

from different counties at night in order to more effectively deal with problems caused by foreigners. Foreign policing advisors should carry out their duties in concert with the diverse organizations in the same region.

Moreover, cooperation between military and police forces is inevitable in conflict situations. The boundary between external and internal security becomes ambiguous in combat zones or post conflict environments, leading to the overlap of some security roles for military and police forces. During the Vietnam War, one objective of the pacification operation was to provide security for the people through force (Andrade & Willbanks, 2006). COL Nguyen intoned that the police rule for use of force and duties were closely connected with military force; therefore, foreign policing advisors and host nation police officers should cooperate with the military force strategically to achieve security in the host nations.

Foreign policing advisors also need to share their advising strategies with other advisors. The USG provided each local police officer with several advisors depending on their work duties. COL Nguyen, who had three advisors, mentioned the three advisors needed to have commonality and coordination in their advising and support strategy to better support the advisees. Although the need for cooperation with other organizations has increased, the USG does not have an integrated organization for foreign policing assistance, and often contracts civilian police through private companies. Different agencies and international groups must cooperate with one another in post-conflict areas to ensure the success of foreign policing assistance.

Transition from stability policing to community-based policing

Security is important after the support teams leave the conflict zone. Policing in wars tends to focus on combatting terrorism by cooperating with military force in stability

operations. Unlike during wartime, policing in non-conflict, permissive environments requires close ties to the local community. Transitioning of policing strategies from a conflict to a permissive environment needs to focus on maintaining security and public order. However, many countries experienced that a militarized police force has a negative impact on building a democratic society after conflict (Clark, 2012; Mani, 2011). COL Nguyen (2015b) also pointed out that a militarized police during wars makes building trust with residents difficult. From the long-term perspective, advisors need to train host nation police officers on community-based policing tactics.

Today's foreign police advisors have experienced similar concerns from police advising in the Vietnam War. Even though the military force performed police functions during the initial response, local police forces play a key role in the stability of the community in post-conflict countries. Keller (2010) pointed out that civilian police training by military personnel is not appropriate for a transition to community-based policing after the stability policing. Military personnel tends to focus on higher end stability policing tasks such as "riot control, convoy security, motorized patrolling, establishing checkpoints, and weapons training" (Keller, 2010, p. viii). In both OIF and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), contracted training teams often failed to distinguish between stability policing and community-based policing functions. The current foreign policing assistance trend is to train host nation police on community-based policing.

As shown above, understanding host nation culture and environment and collaboration with different individuals and organizations play a key role in successful foreign policing advising in host nations. Although the systems and activities of foreign policing assistance changed since the Vietnam War, the experiences in the war still provide meaningful lessons for current US foreign policing assistance.

Summary

The US government has supported foreign countries in conflict areas since the middle of the 1900s. The experience of the Vietnam War and successive operations influenced the evolution of foreign policing assistance. All over the world, peacebuilding is one of the predominant concepts in foreign assistance policy and practice from a long-term perspective. The USG is pursuing a more sustainable foreign policing advising model through security sector reform. The goal of USG foreign policing advising is to support host nation police to independently maintain security and public order within their local communities.

In order to succeed, current foreign policing advising needs to learn lessons from the previous experience. Understanding the host nation culture and environment is important to provide appropriate support in a post-conflict environment, while also enhancing ties to the local communities. A mutual relationship with host nation police officers and the institution of a community-based policing model ultimately results in sustainable security by encouraging a collaborative relationship between the police and the community to identify causes of conflict.

On the other hand, the USG's reliance on contracts with private companies to deploy civilian police to provide foreign police advising leads to the expenditure of a considerable amount of time on contracts without the assurance of a synergistic effort (Keller, 2010). In addition, the places or areas where the police trainers or advisors operate are limited because of contract restrictions. Without a single USG entity to ensure the integrity of the foreign police advising effort, disparate and uncoordinated efforts with limited authorities will continue to erode the efficacy of the effort. Finally, the USG must carefully research and adapt their procedures based on lessons learned, lest they are doomed to repeat the same failures of the past.

Chapter 9

Looking toward the Future: Does One Size Fit All?

by Karen Finkenbinder, Ph.D.

The Department of Defense and State Department continue to send advisors to enhance the security sector (military and police). Though as a general rule the US Department of Defense does not advise civilian police, there are exceptions in force – generally to enhance counter-terrorism and counter-trafficking efforts. One would hope we are getting better at it but sadly, that is not necessarily the case. Often, we forget our history. We tend not to inculcate the lessons we learned in past forays and have to learn them all over again. Congress has recognized this – in large part because of Congressional mandated reports from the Special Inspector General for Iraq and Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGIR/SIGAR). Many of the reports bemoan the lack of knowledge within DOD when asked to do police training, mentoring and advising. Their reports candidly discussed the wishes of the host nations to have non-militarized police and DOD's implementation that militarizes the police.

But, as noted in Chapter 8, police advising ordinarily falls under the authority of the Department of State and it uses a variety of implementing partners to do such advising. The Department of Justice, US Agency for International Development, and others can implement a variety of programs that build the police capabilities to provide democratic policing. Similarly, as provided in Chapter 8, a variety of international actors provide police development.

Additionally, other international organizations send police advisors and, occasionally, police officers that will have executive missions in which they serve as police officers, not just advisors. The European Union (EU), The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), The African Union (AU) and other international and regional

organizations, government and non-governmental, all have some capacity to provide assistance at varying levels to police. One of the hard lessons yet to be learned is that police cannot be developed outside the broader governance issues. And, military development cannot outpace police and police development cannot outpace the other areas of criminal justice (judiciary and prisons).

10 US Code § 333 codifies into permanent US law the authority of the Department of Defense to provide equipment, services, and training to the national security forces of one or more foreign countries for the purpose of building capacity to do one or more of the following: Counterterrorism, Counter-weapons of mass destruction, Counter-illicit drug trafficking, Counter-transnational organized crime, Maritime/border security, military Intelligence, or activities that contribute to an international coalition operations (P.L. 114-328, Section 1241(d)(1)). As police are considered security forces, this has many civilian police development experts concerned. To allay such concerns, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), manages and executes the program through implementing agencies. The various country teams (located at the US Embassy), work through the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) to nominate proposals to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff for approval. But, this new authority, focused on longer-term capacity building, requires capacity building programs be “jointly planned and developed” with the State Department. Ostensibly, this will ensure that resources are used in a holistic manner to achieve common national goals and the USG is integrated in its efforts.

Similarly, after debacles in recent efforts in which the means used (i.e., training and equipping) were unable to achieve the desired objective (end), often at great expense, efforts have been made to strengthen monitoring and assessment of all USG security cooperation efforts. In 2017, the Department of Defense issued instructions that

require all security cooperation programs to “accurately and transparently report to stake holders on the outcomes and sustainability of programs” and to conduct assessments, monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E) of all programming (DODI 5132.14, January 13, 2017). Additionally, this instruction requires that lessons learned be disseminated. This will mean that any future police advising using funds from 10 US Code § 333 must have the appropriate AM&E.

Advisor-Prep Programs

There also are several programs to prepare advisors for their assignments. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) has its own training program. Most of their Ministry of Defense Advisor (MoDA) assignments are to Afghanistan; though, this is rapidly changing. At present, there are MoDAs in far-ranging places such as Indonesia, Ukraine, Botswana, and Georgia (DSCA, 2018). The advisor training program is two months – much of it working in a hostile/austere environment, as the program is still very Afghanistan-centric. The US Institute for Peace (USIP) also has an advising support program to prepare advisors to contribute to international assistance missions (USIP, 2018).

The US Army has developed Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) that consist of highly-experienced soldiers that deploy to a unit to advise ministries of defense. At present, there is an SFAB in Afghanistan. Though not designed to advise police, they have two military police on their staff that can act as a conduit between police and military advising efforts (Bonin, 2018).

The Department of Justice International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), an implementing partner for the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) and Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism (S/CT), the Department of Defense combatant commands, and for

the US Agency for International Development has developed its own model for promoting Sustainable Institutional Law Enforcement Development (SILED).

In-Country Analysis and Sustainable Development

Sustainable Institutional Development is a commonly used term that defines a goal of international development: “technical assistance, mentoring, training, and internships that help host country police improve their capacity and efficiency of operations, their ability to serve their citizens, their respect for human rights and human dignity, and their professional standards” (Beinhart, 2018). It is considered sustainable if it continues after the assistance ends. ICITAP proposes, and the author wholeheartedly agrees, that just training and equipping foreign police does not promote sustainable development. Instead, they promote a sequential model that requires extensive analysis. First, conduct a crime threat analysis of the country; second, conduct a job task analysis of the police that shows how the police are organized and what they do; third, conduct an institutional development analysis of all the police institutions; and lastly, conduct a training needs analysis to see what type of additional training is needed based on the results of the first three analyses. The model is displayed in Figure 1 (used by permission of ICITAP).



Figure 2: ICITAP SILED Model

As part of the in-country analysis, it is also wise to determine what the citizens expect of their police. Often, we ask the police what they do but not what they *should* do.

Recommendations for Future Advisors

Advising in Vietnam did not end in the 1970s. In 2015, the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), at the behest of the Secretary of Defense, sent a Ministry of Defense Advisor (MoDA) (the author) through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) to Vietnam to support Vietnam's development of peacekeeping units for support to the United Nations.

The advisor returned from Vietnam in 2017 with several general recommendations, not in any order of priority, for future advisors to Vietnam (and in general):

- **We are doing Security Cooperation, not Security Imposition.** Countries are suspicious of outsiders. We must tread lightly. It is better to aim for incremental, positive change and that is likely to help them identify their own gaps, their own solutions, and their own way forward. If we impose, we do not achieve that. Instead, we have “compliance” for the short term but not over the long haul. For enduring change, we need cooperative exploration of problems, gaps and jointly created solutions. Their plan is likely never going to look like ours and if does, it probably will not work for them.
- **Just because we can, does not mean we should.** We have a lot of capabilities and capacities and want to help – it is our nature. We should mentor what we know best and enable others with the expertise to do the rest. We can enable a country to advise that has a capability we do not possess. For example, if there is a need to create gendarme-type forces (GTF), we can enable countries like Italy and Spain that have GTF.
- **Sometimes the best thing to do is leave them alone.** We have a lot of people, in the USG and/or DOD, who want to visit Vietnam to help and it can overwhelm their system. We take away from their work; they cannot absorb all our goodness. We need to firmly resist many offers of assistance, no matter how well-meaning. We are one country; there are many other countries also assisting. We step on each other.

- **Map “Who’s Who in the Zoo.”** One of the first tasks an advisor should do is to develop a map of assistance – who is doing what in the country. This is a moving target – as trust develops, the host will share more and more information. Also, the advisor should develop relationships with those in other countries’ embassies. They will also share what they are doing. The coup de grace is when the host country hosts a partners’ meeting, brings in all their donors to the same room and gives them an update on assistance. Advisors should consider a donor management model. Vietnam chaired such a meeting. It demonstrates the host country is in charge of its donor management and sends a clear message to competing donors.
- **Enable regionally if possible.** One of our objectives is to build regional relationships; thus, if a country in the region has the expertise, we should look toward that regional partner for that expertise, even if at first glance, this might not be to our benefit. Graciousness towards partners goes a long way toward building good will and trust.
- **If we agree to do something, do it right.** If we agree to provide equipment or build a building, we need to do it. Our red tape and bureaucratic processes are such that our partners can lose hope before we come through. We should be as efficient as possible and stress how our processes are consistent with our laws. For example, if federal acquisition law requires a particular contracting process, then show them that and stress how it is designed to prevent corruption. In this way, any delays make sense and they will not assume

they are not important enough for us to do things quickly.

- **They will perform whether we think they are ready or not.** Whether we think they are ready or not, political decisions drive progress. For us to underestimate their capabilities does not square with what we have been made to understand in the past. We should not underestimate them. Vietnam has been invaded by the Mongols, French, China, and Americans – and it repelled them all.
- **Be flexible and sensitive.** Any good plan has to be flexible. The same holds true with an advisor assignment. Be prepared to constantly adjust and be sensitive to their national constraints and caveats.
- **Keep your sense of humor.** A good sense of humor is infectious and builds relationships. They want to know the person, not the job title. They also want to know that none of us (or our organizations) are perfect.
- **Be humble and a good listener.** Being open to learning from the host nation builds trust, inspires them to share more information and gives a better sense of what is really going on. Often, failing to provide information was not personal, it was coming from “on high” and they would be reprimanded for providing such information. One can learn a lot by being a sounding board.
- **Learn, learn, learn some more.** Being an advisor is life-changing. Advisors should learn their history, geography, culture – use every opportunity to experience them and their country. Travel the country and region when allowed. One of the most profound

places visited was the Son My Memorial (My Lai Massacre site). Vietnam is still healing from the wounds of its Civil War. It is not surprising to hear Southerners talk badly about Northerners and vice-versa. But, in the context of America, it makes sense. Share our own history – it helps put civil wars in perspective and give hope that things can be better.

- **Know/support the talking points of the US Embassy.** Everything you promote should be consistent with the Ambassador's talking points. He/she is the senior US representative. Any confusion between DOD and DOS can be clarified by the Country Team at the Embassy.

This is of course not an exhaustive list but these are the things that became apparent upon reflection. As a former police officer, I also had the opportunity to teach at the Federal Police Academy in Hanoi. Vietnam is making great strides in reforming their police. As is often the case – their training and education appear to be ahead of culturally-accepted implementation but they are moving toward a model consistent with the observations of Sir Robert Peel and the democratic policing model promoted by the US Government.

After completing the four-year police academy, Vietnam's police cadets can compete for Master's degrees. The Office of International and Executive Programs (OIEP), University of Maryland, co-manages a Joint Master's Degree in Justice Leadership with UMD and the People's Police Academy (PPA) in Vietnam. There is a similar program between Vietnam and Australia.

Concluding Thoughts

There is a Police Museum in Hanoi – just a few feet away from Hoa Lo Prison (the infamous Hanoi Hilton) which held American prisoners of war, most notably the late Senator John McCain. The police museum is free and provides a display of police involvement throughout Vietnam's history. The emphasis for the modern era is on those community policing activities that many of us associate with democratic policing. The staff are very friendly and most are volunteers from the police academy who enjoy the opportunity to practice their English.

The museum serves as a graphic reminder of past practices.

Evidence of the mistreatment of Vietnamese prisoners at the hands of the French colonists can be seen in Hoa Lo. The degrading treatment of the Vietnamese is poignant and so are the many photographs and equipment from American prisoners (though nothing is said of their torture). Nonetheless, Senator McCain first returned in 1985 and made several visits. He often said that he did not hold any grudge and, though some guards were cruel, he could not hold that against the Vietnamese (TIME History Series, 2018). Similarly, the Vietnamese have put the past to rest. They honor the American soldiers who stopped the My Lai Massacre (helicopter pilot, Chief Warrant Officer Thompson, Specialist 4 Larry Colburn, and Specialist 4 Glenn Andreotta) as heroes. The 1968 massacre, in which approximately 500 villagers (women, children, and elderly) were killed by Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, turned many Americans against the war.

As is often the case, our enemies become our friends. As one former high-ranking officer in the Vietnamese Army shared with the author, "We never blamed the American people, and most of us never blamed the soldiers. They were sent to Vietnam by politicians and they did what soldiers do. Just as our soldiers did their duty." (Nguyen, 2016).

After almost two decades of war, many soldiers prefer to be advisors (or support their efforts) so that war becomes unnecessary.

Lastly, my personal gratitude to Dr. Jennifer Gibbs and her undergraduate students for their willingness to support this project. It was an opportunity for the students to learn about a chapter in US history that is rapidly being forgotten and for them to tell us what they learned. Many thanks to Lt. Col. (Ret.) Larry Bouchat for helping us connect with Colonel Nguyen and Mr. Clark. And, most of all, our sincere thanks to the family of Colonel Nguyen (who sadly passed away before publication) and Mr. Frank Clark. We were so glad that we had the opportunity to learn from their experiences.

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
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