

DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. FORCES IN CENTRAL  
AFRICA AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LORD'S  
RESISTANCE ARMY DISARMAMENT AND  
NORTHERN UGANDA RECOVERY ACT

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HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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TUESDAY, OCTOBER 25, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,  
*Washington, DC.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o'clock a.m., in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. The committee will come to order. That was my gavel. We improvise. But before we begin, I'd like to acknowledge the presence of Ms. Evelyn Apoko.

Evelyn, is that you right there? Thank you, Evelyn. Evelyn, if you could stand a second? Thank you. Evelyn is an LRA survivor who has traveled to Washington to witness this important hearing firsthand. We thank her for coming and for her continued efforts on behalf of children impacted by this horrific conflict.

After recognizing myself and the ranking member, Mr. Berman, for 7 minutes each for our opening statements, I will recognize the chair and ranking member of the Africa Global Health and Human Rights Subcommittee for 3 minutes and the chair and ranking member of the Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee also for 3 minutes each for their opening remarks.

We will then hear from our witnesses and without objection the witnesses' prepared statements will be made a part of the record. And members may have 5 legislative days to insert statements and questions for the record subject to the length limitations in the rules.

The Chair now recognizes herself for 7 minutes. The Department of State has included the Lord's Resistance Army, LRA, on the "Terrorist Exclusion List" since 2001. In 2008, its leader, Joseph Kony, was designated as a "Specially Designated Global Terrorist" (SDGT). The LRA is responsible for one of the longest, most violent, yet most under reported conflicts in Africa—a conflict which has spread from Northern Uganda to South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Central African Republic—and threatens costly U.S. investments in peace and stability in the region. It is a predatory, guerilla force which has perpetrated some of the most deplorable human rights atrocities known to man.

The LRA makes no attempt to hold territories but murders, mutilates, tortures, rapes and loots with impunity. They move in small

groups with limited communication, striking remote villages, slaughtering civilians, abducting woman and children to serve as fighters, porters, and sex slaves. It has been estimated that more than 80 percent of the LRA is comprised of abducted children. These children are forced to commit atrocities in front of their families and participate in bizarre indoctrination rituals before being forced to fight. Those who manage to escape find it difficult, if not impossible, to return home.

But we are not here today to determine whether Joseph Kony is evil. We know that he is. We are here because in May 2010, the President signed into law the Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act. With the backing of thousands of committed advocates, including from my own District, and with over 200 co-sponsors in the House and some 64 co-sponsors in the Senate, the act enjoyed overwhelming support. It required the President to develop a comprehensive strategy to deal with the LRA and established that it shall be the policy of the United States to: "Provide political, economic, military, and intelligence support for viable multilateral efforts to protect civilians, apprehend or eliminate top LRA commanders, and disarm and demobilize remaining LRA fighters."

The President's strategy was released in November 2010. It set four strategic objectives: (1) increased protection of civilians;(2) apprehension to or "removal" of Kony and other senior LRA commanders; (3) promotion of defections from the LRA and the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of remaining LRA combatants; and lastly, provision of humanitarian relief to affected communities.

The strategy emphasized that the U.S. will "work with national government and regional organizations" to accomplish these goals. What steps did the U.S. undertake in the last year to achieve the objectives outlined in this strategy? That is what we will be focusing on with our witnesses.

Further, I would to ask our distinguished witnesses to summarize for the committee, what progress had been achieved toward meeting the strategic objectives before the President's recent announcement that U.S. troops were being deployed to central Africa? On October 14, 2011, the President transmitted a report, consistent with the War Powers Resolution, informing the Congress that: "In furtherance of the Congress' stated policy, I have authorized a small number of combat-equipped U.S. forces to deploy to central Africa to provide assistance to regional forces that are working toward the removal of Joseph Kony from the battlefield." He further stated: "Although the U.S. forces are combat equipped, they will only be providing information, advice, and assistance to partner nation forces, and they will not themselves engage LRA forces unless necessary for self-defense."

As the sole House committee of jurisdiction for the LRA Act and the primary committee of jurisdiction over the War Powers Act, it is incumbent upon us to ensure that this action complies with both the letter and the spirit of the law and further U.S. national security interests. Pertinent information related to this mission, such as the anticipated cost, the scope the duration of this deployment, was omitted from the report to Congress. We need clarity on the

rules of engagement, the mission parameters, and the definition of success, as well as how U.S. military presence in central Africa furthers U.S. national security interests and the objectives outlined in the President's November 2010 strategy. What is the precise nature of the assistance that will be provided to our partners, and how will these partners be vetted? Does the submission of the October 14th report to Congress start the clock on reporting and authorization requirements, consistent with the War Powers Resolution? If not, why? Does the administration interpret the LRA Act as an authorization of use of force?

We intend to address these issues and more throughout the course of the hearing.

Thank you to the Assistant Secretary Vershbow for attending and the Ambassador, for making yourselves available to testify on this very important issue today. We thank both of you, gentlemen.

I now am pleased to recognize my good friend, Mr. Berman, the ranking member for his opening remarks.

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. Two weeks ago, the Obama administration announced that it would send about 100 U.S. military advisors to central Africa to support regional efforts to defeat the Lord's Resistance Army or LRA. Following that announcement, many questions were raised about the deployment. Why the LRA? Why now? And what specific role will our forces play on the ground? This timely hearing provides an excellent opportunity to discuss those important issues.

As noted in President Obama's October 14th letter to the Speaker, and as reflected in the title of this hearing, it is Congress that played a leading role in putting the LRA on our foreign policy agenda. For years, the House and Senate passed resolutions drawing attention to the LRA's reign of terror. And in 2010, as noted, Congress passed The Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act. That bipartisan legislation which President Obama signed into law, required the administration to develop a comprehensive strategy for dismantling the LRA and protecting civilians throughout the region.

We've all heard about the horrors perpetrated by the LRA and its deranged leader, Joseph Kony: Mass killing, rape, mutilation of innocent civilians, children forced to kill their neighbors and family members, more than 20,000 children abducted and forced to become soldiers or sex slaves, nearly 2 million people displaced, and tens of thousands murdered.

While the LRA may not pose a direct national security threat to the U.S. in narrowly-defined terms, it does threaten the stability of a large swath of central Africa, the size of California. This region includes South Sudan, the newest nation in the world, whose independence efforts the U.S. strongly supported; Uganda, one of America's strongest allies in the fight against Al-Shabaab in Somalia, al-Qaeda linked terrorist organization; the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo, two countries that face significant challenges policing their territories and whose civilians are currently suffering the brunt of LRA's atrocities.

I believe it is squarely in our national interest to build the capacity of allied forces so that they can fight bad actors on their own

and to support our allies when they need assistance as we expect them to do for us.

The U.S. and the international community have long recognized that the LRA poses a serious threat to the stability of central Africa and have taken a number of steps to stop their barbaric behavior. In 2005, the International Criminal Court indicted Joseph Kony and three of his commanders for crimes against humanity. The U.S. placed the LRA on the terrorist exclusion list and Joseph Kony on the specially-designated global terrorist list.

From 2006 to 2008, Uganda tried to negotiate a peace agreement with the group only to have Kony walk away from the final deal. Uganda, Southern Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo then launched a joint military operation, but failed to apprehend Kony or stop the LRA.

I'm very hopeful that the administration's comprehensive strategy, including the deployment of a modest number of combat-equipped advisors will finally help turn the tide in the struggle against the LRA. While most of the focus has been on the military dimension of the strategy, it's important to remember that civilian-led programs are also an integral part of this effort. These include constant diplomatic engagement with all of the central Africa countries to maintain strong cooperation; a robust demobilization, disarmament, repatriation, resettlement, and reintegration program; effective public awareness campaigns to encourage child soldiers and mid-ranking LRA members to abandon the group; and reconstruction assistance for devastated communities.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about the goals and expectations for the military deployment, as well as the details of these critical civilian efforts.

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Berman, for your opening statement. I'm pleased to yield 3 minutes to Mr. Royce, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Madam Chairman. The LRA has been pillaging central Africa for a generation now under the sadistic Joseph Kony. That group exists for one reason: To kill, capture and to resupply for the next plunder. There is no other reason for the Lord's Resistance Army's existence. And this savagery has landed Kony and his LRA on U.S. terrorism lists. His targets are children; 70,000 girls and boys have been abducted and I must say it's good to see Evelyn here. We appreciate her efforts on behalf of other abducted girls and boys. But one boy told how he was forced to kill eight other children. The victims were surrounded in a circle. Children were forced to take turns bashing them with a bat in a collective kill. Now if this is not a crime against humanity, I don't know what is. And it was orchestrated by Kony. And with these horrors in mind, Congress passed legislation to counter the LRA threat.

We pressed the administration to be bold, to develop a plan to help apprehend or remove Joseph Kony and his top commanders from the battlefield. A broad coalition of young activists was key to passing this legislation. So the administration is now sending small teams, specializing in training foreign units to give information and advice. This is the reason the U.S. Africa Command was

created. This mission, which recognizes the need for a light footprint is targeted assistance. This is far from the peacekeeping model that has proven unsuccessful and wasteful elsewhere.

The U.S. has made a big commitment in South Sudan. The LRA threatens to destabilize this new country. We provided humanitarian relief when LRA attacks forced millions to flee their homes. This deployment seeks to eliminate the root of these problems and the need for these commitments.

The Africans aren't sitting on their hands. The Ugandans are fighting al-Qaeda terrorists in Somalia, but they'd like some help getting Kony. That is a fair deal. Sometimes just getting rid of one person does make a big difference. History is full of captivating leaders with bad ideas who do great damage. Liberian Charles Taylor devastated neighboring Sierra Leone. And after his removal, the region is mainly peaceful. Kony's removal won't guarantee peace, but it is the one thing that makes peace possible in that region. We tried this mission once before against Kony in late 2008. Let's succeed now at sidelining this terrorist.

Thank you. I yield back.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Royce. I'm pleased to yield 3 minutes to Mr. Payne, the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you very much for calling this very important hearing and Ranking Member Berman.

After years of congressional bipartisan support and resounding support from the American people, the administration has taken action to bring an end to the predatory military group known as the Lord's Resistance Army or the LRA. Over the last nearly 25 years, the LRA has murdered, raped, abducted tens of thousands of innocent men, women, and children. In June 2011 alone, the LRA reportedly carried out as many as 52 attacks, killing 32 civilians and abducting 39 while looting the villages. I was in Uganda in the early '90s when we heard about the Lord's Resistance Army who at that time, with the support of Bashir from Sudan, was reaping havoc on the community.

There is no doubt that without bold and sustained U.S. action, Joseph Kony, the brutal leader of the LRA and his gang, will increase their attacks on civilians and the abduction of children to be soldiers. Kony has taken advantage of the growing security vacuum in the LRA-affected areas and appears to be regrouping and reorganizing the LRA with the large number of senior commanders recently from the Central African Republic.

In August, I traveled with CARE to eastern Congo where I met with women who were raped and sexual violence was used as a weapon of war by Joseph Kony. I spoke to women there who had been victimized and some of them lost their children, ages 11 and 12, abducted from their villages.

I'm looking forward to hearing from our witnesses today about the details of the deployment and the strategy that will be used. I was very pleased that my friend, Senator Inhofe, recently stated on the Senate floor the statement that the LRA must be eliminated. And he said that we are not at war with the LRA. The troops are specifically prohibited from any kind of combat aside from self defense.

As you know, last year we passed the LRA Resistance, Disarmament in Northern Uganda Act and the bill directs the administration to develop a plan. The President announced expressly that the troops will follow the letter of the law.

I have gotten in my District alone over 13,000 people who have called or have written saying that we should do something to eliminate this scourge from the face of the earth. And I strongly support the President's action. We must eliminate this murderer of known people and we have a right to protect. I urge our Government to go after this with all earnest, with training the troops in Uganda to do the job.

With that, I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Payne, for that eloquent statement. I will now yield 1 minute to any members who wish to make opening statements. Mr. Fortenberry had indicated that he would like to make an opening statement. He's recognized for 1 minute.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Madam Chair, for convening this important and timely hearing. I believe that it's important for the public to know that we never take lightly the use of military force and personnel around the world. But the U.S. forces are engaged in more than 50 countries around the world and more than 1,000 forces are providing support in more than 20 African countries alone.

Many Americans are rightly concerned about the magnitude of our military presence throughout the world, but I am hopeful that this limited military and technical assistance mission which has been discussed and approved on multiple occasions by the House and the Senate is critical to both our national security as well as global stability.

Unfortunately, I fear there is widespread information about the current mission and even a defense of the Lord's Resistance Army. This body and good Americans watching the hearing right now know that the Lord's Resistance Army has terrorized central Africa with impunity for more than 25 years. It's leader, Joseph Kony, is a war criminal guilty of unspeakable crimes.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. The gentleman's time has expired. Thank you.

Mr. Carnahan is recognized for 1 minute.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Madam Chair, and Ranking Member Berman for holding this hearing regarding the U.S. Government's strategy to end atrocities of the Lord's Resistance Army in central Africa. With the administration's recent deployment of 100 military advisors to the region, this hearing is especially timely and helpful.

The LRA led by Joseph Kony has terrorized civilian populations in Uganda, Southern Sudan, Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for over two decades. Its tactics have included the employment of child soldiers, sexual violence, widespread killings, abductions and enslavement. The United Nations estimates that 385,000 people have been displaced as a result of LRA brutality.

Last Congress, this body took an important step in passing the LRA Disarmament in Northern Uganda Recovery Act reaffirming the U.S. efforts to support regional partners in combating the LRA.

The deployment of military advisors is but one pillar of the comprehensive strategy. I look forward to an update on this broader approach including humanitarian assistance, reconciliation and reintegration of post-conflict recovery.

Madam Chair, I yield back.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. I'm very pleased to yield my friend, Ms. Buerkle, the vice chair of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade.

Ms. BUERKLE. Thank you, Madam Chair. In the last decade, the LRA has killed thousands of innocent civilians, displaced hundreds of thousands of people and most horrifically, used thousands of abducted children to carry out its campaign of terror against the people of Uganda and their neighbors in central Africa.

The President's recent authorization of combat-equipped U.S. forces to deploy in central Africa to work with regional partners toward the removal of Joseph Kony is ostensibly in support of the 2010 strategic objectives.

I look forward to hearing the perspectives from our witnesses here this morning on the wisdom and on the effectiveness of the proposed actions involving U.S. forces in central Africa.

Thank you, Madam Chairman. I yield back.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. I thank the gentlelady. Mr. Connolly of Virginia is recognized.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you for our witnesses today. The LRA is a destabilizing presence in Africa. And the decision by the President to dispatch 100 military advisors to assist in the effort to address that threat is consistent, it seems to me, with congressional intent in the passage of previous legislation.

It is important and we need to hear in the testimony today, however, exactly what the rules of engagement are going to be and how the United States in a very specific and targeted way, which I certainly support, can be of assistance without being dragged into somebody else's right in central Africa. The President has demonstrated leadership in Libya in the fight against terrorism and I think he's demonstrated leadership here in this limited strategic and targeted intervention.

I yield back.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. Mr. Manzullo, the chair of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific is recognized for 1 minute.

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for calling this important hearing. The LRA is, without a doubt, a heinous and horrible group that have brutally murdered, tortured, and raped hundreds of thousands of people in Uganda, in the border regions between the Central African Republic, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In their reign of terror is obviously welcome our concern regarding the President's report to Congress is that this mission may be an expansion of U.S. military presence in a role that does not directly bolster the national security of our nation. The announcement that this was occurring, I believe came out on a Friday afternoon just before members were breaking for a week to go back for our District work periods.

I have a lot of concerns, a lot of anxious moments about whether or not the number of troops will grow to 200, 300 or even more. With this in mind and despite having these concerns I'll try to reserve judgment of this deployment until there's more information regarding the size and the scope of the operation including an exit strategy.

Thank you.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. I thank the gentleman. And now the chair is pleased to welcome our witnesses. First, I would like to welcome Donald Yamamoto. He is the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. He previously served as the U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia from November 2006 to July 2009; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and the Bureau of African Affairs from 2003 to 2006; and U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Djibouti from 2000 to 2003. We thank you for being here, Mr. Ambassador.

And then we will welcome Mr. Alexander Vershbow. He is currently the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, ISA. Prior to his appointment he served as U.S. Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from 1998 to 2001; U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation from 2001 to 2005; and U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea from 2005 to 2008.

I'd like to kindly remind our witnesses to keep your oral testimony to no more than 5 minutes and without objection, the witnesses' written statements will be inserted into the record. We will begin with you, Mr. Ambassador Yamamoto.

**STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD YAMAMOTO, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Thank you so very much, Madam Chairwoman, Congressman Berman, and the honored members of this committee. Thank you so very much for having this hearing here today on a very important and very difficult topic and for the opportunity to brief this committee on the implementation of the on-going U.S. strategy to help our regional partners mitigate, eliminate the threat posed by the Lord's Resistance Army.

We are deeply grateful for Congress' widespread bipartisan support for the LRA Disarmament in Northern Uganda Recovery Act that was signed last year. The legislation sent a very strong message, not only the support of Congress, but of the American people that we will help to protect civilians and bring an end to the LRA threat.

We also want to express our deep appreciation to the hundreds of thousands of Americans who have sent and mobilized and expressed their concern for the communities under siege by the LRA and also the people who are here today and those who have the courage to stand up to the atrocities of the LRA.

For two decades the LRA has terrorized innocent people across central Africa. The LRA has filled its ranks with abducting tens of thousands of children and forcing them to become child soldiers and sex slaves. From 2005 to 2006, the LRA moved from Uganda into the more remote border regions of Central Africa Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and what is now known as the

Republic of Southern Sudan. In that region, the LRA has continued to commit atrocities. The United Nations estimates that over 385,000 people are currently displaced in this region as a result of the LRA activities and according to the U.N., there have been over 250 attacks attributed to the LRA this year alone.

Over the recent years, regional militaries have worked together to pursue the LRA across a vast area of densely forested and difficult jungle terrain. They have had some success in reducing the LRA's numbers and keeping them from regrouping. However, as long as the LRA's leader, Joseph Kony, and other top commanders remain at large, the LRA will continue to pose its serious regional threat which undermines stability and development.

In its report to Congress in November 2010, our strategy centers on four areas: The increased protection of civilians, apprehension and removal of Joseph Kony and his senior LRA commanders from the battlefield, the promotion of defections from the LRA and support of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of remaining LRA fighters, and finally, the provision of continued humanitarian relief to afflicted areas.

Over the past year, the United States has continued to work with the United Nations, the African Union, and the regional governments to sustain and increase diplomatic and military pressure on the LRA. We have provided logistical support, training to the regional militaries pursuing the LRA. The United States has a strong interest in supporting our partners in the region to develop their capacity and to address the threats to peace and security posed by the LRA.

The United States is now deploying U.S. military advisors to improve our support to the regional coalition, to increase the likelihood of successful military operations against the LRA. And I would defer to my colleague, Ambassador Vershbow in the Department of Defense to describe the details of those operations.

We continue to consult with all the regional leaders and they have all said, granted their consent for the deployment of these advisors to the field. Remember, this is a short-term deployment with specific goals and objectives. We believe the U.S. advisors can provide critical capabilities to help regional forces succeed. We will regularly review and assess whether the advisors' effort is sufficient to enhance the regional effort to justify continued deployment.

Our Ambassadors and Embassy staff will work closely with these advisors and make sure that they are sensitive to civilian protection consideration and local regional political dynamics. The State Department has also deployed an officer to the region to help coordinate all of our efforts in the field to counter the LRA with the work of the advisors.

The administration is funding projects to help communities in the DRC that involve protection plans and join an early warning network. This includes setting up high frequency radios and cell phone towers. The same kind of early warning and basic telecommunication capacity does not yet exist across the border in the CAR. We recognize this gap and we hope to work with our partners over the coming year to help address this.

We will continue to call on the LRA fighters to peacefully disarm and leave the organization ranks and to come home. And currently, there are about 12,000 who have done so.

Over the coming months, we will continue to work with the regional governments to ensure that the rank-and-file fighters and abductees who escape the LRA have the necessary support to be reunited with their families and reintegrated into normal society.

Madam Chairwoman, again, we appreciate and we are grateful to you and the members of both the House and the Senate for this bipartisan support in countering the LRA. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Yamamoto follows:]

**Testimony for House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing:**  
*“The Deployment of U.S. Forces in Central Africa and Implementation of the Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act”*

**Ambassador Don Yamamoto,  
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs**

Madam Chairwoman, Congressman Berman, and Members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to brief the committee on implementation of the ongoing U.S. strategy to help our regional partners mitigate and eliminate the threat posed by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) both to innocent civilians and to regional stability. The United States has a strong interest in supporting our partners in Africa to develop their capacity to address threats to peace and security such as the LRA.

We appreciate Congress’ longstanding concern about the LRA, as demonstrated by the widespread bipartisan support for the LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act that was signed into law last year. This legislation sent a strong message of bipartisan Congressional support for a comprehensive effort to help protect civilians and bring an end to the LRA threat. We are committed to engaging with Congress and keeping you informed about the progress of our strategy as we move forward.

We also appreciate the hundreds of thousands of Americans who have mobilized and showed their concern for the communities under siege by the LRA. To respond to critical gaps, American non-governmental organizations have launched innovative initiatives to enhance community protection networks, track LRA attacks, and improve information-sharing. We will continue to work with these groups as we move forward.

For over two decades, the Lord’s Resistance Army has terrorized innocent people across central Africa. The LRA has filled its ranks by abducting tens of thousands of children and forcing them to become child soldiers and sex slaves. In 2005 and 2006, the LRA moved from Uganda into the remote border region of the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and what is now the Republic of South Sudan. In that region, the LRA has continued to commit atrocities. The United Nations (UN) estimates that over 385,000 people are currently displaced across the region as a result of LRA activity. According to the UN, there have been over 250 attacks attributed to the LRA in this year alone.

Over recent years, regional militaries have worked together to pursue the LRA across a vast area of densely forested and difficult jungle terrain. They have had some success in reducing the LRA's numbers and keeping them from regrouping. Abductees and low-level fighters have continued to escape from the LRA and reintegrate into their communities. However, as long as the LRA's leader Joseph Kony and other top commanders remain at large, the LRA will continue to pose a serious regional threat which undermines stability and development.

As reported to Congress in November 2010, our comprehensive strategy outlines four strategic objectives for ongoing U.S. support: (1) the increased protection of civilians, (2) the apprehension or removal of Joseph Kony and senior LRA commanders from the battlefield, (3) the promotion of defections from the LRA and support of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of remaining LRA fighters, and (4) the provision of continued humanitarian relief to affected communities.

The United States has worked over the last year with our partners at the African Union and United Nations to build consensus and enhance coordination toward addressing the LRA threat. In June, the African Union convened ministers from the four LRA-affected countries to discuss an initiative to enhance the capacity of the military effort against the LRA. In July, the United Nations Security Council met and condemned the ongoing attacks carried out by the LRA. The Security Council commended the important efforts of regional militaries and emphasized the importance of sustained, coordinated action.

Over the last year, the United States has continued to work with regional governments to sustain and increase military pressure on the LRA. We have provided support to the Ugandan military's efforts to pursue the LRA, in the form of logistical support and limited, non-lethal equipment. We have also trained and equipped a battalion of the Congolese military, which has been deployed to the LRA-affected area of the DRC. We are working with the militaries of CAR and South Sudan and are looking at ways we can support them as they increase their efforts to counter the LRA. As such, we will provide a small amount of equipment to the CAR Armed Forces. Our engagement with these regional militaries to help counter the LRA threat is connected to our larger objective of promoting security sector reform in Africa.

As you know, the United States is deploying advisors to improve our support to the regional coalition to increase the likelihood of successful military operations. My colleague from the Department of Defense will describe the details of this operation and the War Powers notification sent recently. But let me stress that our embassies have been in regular communication with all of the governments in each of the countries as we have developed this operation. They have all publicly welcomed increased U.S. support to address this longstanding menace. We will continue to consult with them and ensure their consent before we deploy any of the advisors to field locations.

This is a short-term deployment with specific goals and objectives. We are deploying these advisors to enhance the capacity of regional forces so they can conduct effective operations to bring Joseph Kony and LRA top commanders to justice and better protect civilians from the threat posed by the LRA. We believe the U.S. advisors can help provide critical capabilities to help regional forces achieve these objectives. We will regularly review and assess whether the advisory effort is sufficiently enhancing the regional effort to justify continued deployment. Continued deployment is also conditional on sustained commitment and cooperation by regional governments to address the LRA threat.

Our ambassadors and embassy staff will work closely with the U.S. military advisors and make sure they are sensitive to civilian protection considerations and local and regional political dynamics. The State Department has also deployed an officer to the region to help coordinate all of our efforts in the field to counter the LRA and work with the advisors.

Let me stress again that this is one part of our larger, comprehensive strategy being implemented through interagency coordination, and in partnerships with the United Nations, African Union, and other bilateral partners. The protection of civilians continues to be central to that strategy. We strongly support the UN peacekeeping forces in the DRC and South Sudan, and we continue to work with the UN to help augment their efforts in the LRA-affected region. At the same time, we are working with governments in the region, the UN, and other partners to reduce the vulnerability of LRA-affected communities and increase the capacity of communities to make decisions related to their own safety.

In the DRC, Invisible Children and other non-governmental organizations have done impressive work to enhance a high frequency radio network managed by the Catholic Church to provide an early warning capacity for LRA-affected communities. The Administration is funding projects to help communities develop

protection plans and join that network. This includes setting up high frequency radios and cell phone towers. The same kind of early warning and basic telecommunications capacity does not yet exist across the border in CAR. We recognize this gap, and we hope to work with our partners over the coming year to help address it.

At the same time, we continue to call on LRA fighters to peacefully disarm, leave the organization's ranks, and come home. Over the course of this conflict, more than 12,000 have come out of the bush and been reintegrated and reunited with their families through Uganda's Amnesty Act. We are supporting the rehabilitation and reintegration of former abducted youth. Over the coming months, we will continue to work with regional governments to ensure that rank and file fighters and abductees who escape from the LRA have the necessary support to be reunited with their families and reintegrated into normal society.

Finally, we continue to provide a significant amount of humanitarian assistance to LRA-affected populations in CAR, DRC and South Sudan. In Fiscal Year 2011, the United States provided more than \$18 million to support food security, humanitarian protection, health, and livelihoods initiatives for internally displaced persons, host community members, and other affected populations.

This humanitarian assistance is in addition to the assistance we provide to northern Uganda as it continues to recover from decades of the LRA conflict. Consistent with the LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act, the United States remains committed to supporting efforts to promote comprehensive reconstruction, transitional justice, and reconciliation in northern Uganda.

Madam Chairwoman, again, we appreciate Congress' strong bipartisan interest in countering the LRA. We look forward to working with you in the months ahead as this effort continues. As the President said upon signing the LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act last year, "We mourn those killed. We pray for those abducted to be freed, and for those wounded to heal. We call on the ranks of the LRA to disarm and surrender. We believe that the leadership of the LRA should be brought to justice."

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, sir.  
Ambassador Vershbow.

**STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ALEXANDER VERSHBOW,  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

Mr. VERSHBOW. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Congressman Berman, and distinguished members of the committee. I want thank you all for inviting me today to discuss with you our efforts to assist the central African militaries encountering the Lord's Resistance Army.

As has already been mentioned, there are four pillars to the administration's comprehension strategy to help our regional partners end the threat posed by the LRA. The second of these is the apprehension or removal of Joseph Kony and other top LRA commanders from the battlefield. That's the focus of DoD's efforts and will be the focus of my remarks this morning.

The Ugandan military in cooperation with other regional militaries has been pursuing the LRA for several years. They've reduced the LRA's strength significantly. The LRA has moved out of northern Uganda completely. It's now operating in small groups across the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Central African Republic and South Sudan. While weakened, LRA leader Joseph Kony and other top commanders remain at large and they continue to direct the group's members to commit unspeakable atrocities.

So consistent with the LRA Act and with the consent of the regional governments, we have deployed a small number of U.S. military personnel to the LRA-affected area to advise and assist the regional forces who are pursuing the LRA.

The personnel deploying under this mission will travel out to field locations with the regional forces where they will work in an advisory and liaison role. These U.S. personnel, which are primarily U.S. Army Special Forces, will collaborate with the regional militaries engaged in the counter LRA effort to strengthen information sharing, operational cooperation and overall effectiveness.

While the Department of Defense isn't in the lead with regard to the other pillars of the President's strategy, our advisors working alongside regional forces will be sensitive to the challenges of civilian protection and they'll work to ensure that protection considerations are incorporated into operational planning by our partners. They'll also seek to encourage defections and to strengthen the relationships in sharing of information between regional militaries and local populations, officials, and humanitarian actors.

The approach we're undertaking reflects lessons learned from prior regional operations in pursuit of the LRA and it is designed to fill key capabilities gaps by enhancing regional forces' ability to fuse intelligence with operational planning. This approach will deliver maximum operational impact while exposing U.S. forces to minimum risk. Although roughly 100 personnel will ultimately deploy for this mission, we expect that only a portion of the personnel will directly advise and assist forces in the field pursuing the LRA. Most of the U.S. personnel will carry out logistical and other functions to support the advisors.

To be clear, U.S. forces deploying to this mission will not themselves engage LRA forces, but given the potential need to defend themselves, they will be equipped for combat. That's why consistent with the War Powers Resolution, the administration provided a formal report to Congress on their deployment.

We appreciate the strong congressional interest in and support for this effort and we are committed to continuing to engage with the Congress to keep you informed about the progress of our effort as it moves forward. I would say that this is a great example of a joint initiative between the Executive and Legislative branches.

Despite the strong bipartisan support, we know that there are still many questions. Many of them were posed by you, Madam Chairman, and by Mr. Berman at the outset. I'd like to address several of these questions in the remainder of my remarks.

First regarding the purpose and timing of the deployment, we're providing advisors to the regional forces because Joseph Kony and the other senior leaders have proven unwilling to end the conflict peacefully and have continued to commit atrocities against innocent civilians. As you know, there was an opportunity for a negotiated peace agreement during the Juba talks in 2006, 2008, but they ended when Kony refused to sign and conducted new attacks and abductions. So regional governments have had to continue to pursue a military approach to end the LRA threat.

As for our regional partners, we have provided significant assistance to the region's militaries in recent years, training the 391st Battalion of the Democratic Republic of the Congo's armed forces, assisting in professionalization of the Sudan People's Liberation Army, providing equipment to the armed forces of the Central African Republic and supporting the Ugandan People's Defense Force, so it can both counter the LRA and maintain its critical presence in Somalia. But we think despite the assistance to date, the Ugandan and other regional militaries would benefit from increased capacity to acquire and process actionable information on the locations of LRA leaders and to convert that information quickly into operational plans.

The U.S. advisors deploying for the operation have the right skill sets to help address these capability shortfalls and the specific timing of the deployment was predicated in part upon the availability of the approach U.S. forces.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Vershbow follows:]

**Testimony for House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing:**

*“The Deployment of U.S. Forces in Central Africa and Implementation of the Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act”*

**Ambassador Alexander Vershbow  
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs**

Madam Chairman, Congressman Berman, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to discuss with you today our efforts to assist Central African militaries in countering the Lord’s Resistance Army.

As my distinguished colleague from the Department of State mentioned, there are four pillars to the Administration’s comprehensive strategy to help our regional partners end the threat posed by the LRA. The second of these pillars is the apprehension or removal of Joseph Kony and other top LRA commanders from the battlefield.

The Ugandan military, in cooperation with other regional militaries, has been pursuing the LRA and has reduced the LRA’s strength significantly. The LRA has moved out of northern Uganda completely and is now operating in small groups across the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic (CAR), and South Sudan. While weakened, the LRA leader Joseph Kony and the other top LRA commanders remain at large and continue to direct the group’s members to commit atrocities.

Consistent with the LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act and with the consent of the regional governments, we have deployed a small number of U.S. military personnel to the LRA-affected area to advise and assist the regional forces pursuing the LRA.

The U.S. personnel deploying as part of this mission will travel out to field locations with the regional forces, where they will work in advisor and liaison roles. These U.S. military personnel, which are primarily U.S. Army Special Forces, will collaborate with the regional militaries engaged in the counter-LRA effort to strengthen information-sharing, operational cooperation, and overall effectiveness.

While DoD is not in the lead with regard to the other pillars in the President's strategy, the DoD advisors working alongside the regional forces will be sensitive to the challenges of civilian protection and will work to ensure that protection considerations are incorporated into operational planning. They will also seek to encourage defections and to strengthen the relationships and sharing of information between regional militaries and local populations, officials, and humanitarian actors.

This approach reflects lessons learned from prior regional operations in pursuit of the LRA and is designed to fill key capabilities gaps by enhancing regional forces' ability to fuse intelligence with operational planning. This approach will deliver maximum operational impact while exposing U.S. forces to minimum risk. Although approximately 100 personnel will ultimately deploy for this mission, we expect that only a portion of those personnel will directly advise and assist the forces in the field pursuing the LRA. Most of the U.S. personnel will carry out logistical and other functions to support the advisors.

To be clear, the U.S. forces deploying for this mission will not themselves engage LRA forces unless necessary for self-defense. However, given the potential need to defend themselves, these forces will be equipped for combat. Therefore, consistent with the War Powers Resolution, the Administration provided a formal report to Congress on their deployment.

DoD appreciates the strong Congressional interest in, and support for, this effort to end the threat to civilians and to Central African regional stability posed by the LRA, and we are committed to continuing to engage with Congress and keeping you informed about the progress of this effort as it moves forward.

Despite the strong bipartisan support for this effort, as reflected by the LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act, DoD understands that there may still be questions about this deployment. I anticipate that these questions may relate to one or more of the following issues:

- The purpose and timing of this deployment;
- The professional capabilities and human rights records of the regional forces we are partnering with;
- Our exit strategy or how we will judge the success of this mission; and

- The national security interest that underpins this deployment.

These are all valid topics for discussion, so let me address them in turn.

The United States is providing advisors to the regional forces pursuing the LRA because Joseph Kony and other senior leaders have proven unwilling to end the conflict peacefully and have continued to commit atrocities against innocent civilians. The LRA had an opportunity to negotiate a peace agreement with the Government of Uganda during the Juba peace talks from 2006-2008. However, these talks ended in 2008 when Kony refused to sign the final peace agreement and conducted new attacks and abductions. As a result, the regional governments have been pursuing a military approach to ending the LRA threat.

The United States has provided significant assistance to the region's militaries in recent years, training the 391<sup>st</sup> Battalion of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, assisting in the professionalization of the Sudan People's Liberation Army, providing equipment to the Armed Forces of the Central African Republic, and supporting the Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF) so it can both counter the LRA and maintain its critical presence in Somalia.

Despite this assistance, the Ugandan and other regional militaries would benefit from increased capacity to acquire and process actionable information on the locations of LRA leaders and to convert that information quickly into operational plans. The U.S. advisors deploying for this operation have the right skill sets to help address these capability shortfalls, and the specific timing of this deployment was predicated in part upon the availability of the appropriate U.S. forces. This deployment marks a natural progression in our efforts to strengthen regional stability through increased cooperation with Central African militaries.

Today's hearing is focused on the military support that the United States is providing to the regional military effort, but I should emphasize that our broader efforts also include encouraging LRA fighters to peacefully disarm and working with regional governments to ensure that rank and file fighters and abductees who escape from the LRA have the support they need to be reunited with their families and reintegrated into society.

With regard to the professional capabilities and human rights records of the regional forces, I would emphasize that all units that our personnel train are subject to Leahy vetting. When we engage with foreign militaries, we promote a culture where commanders and soldiers are held accountable for their actions, and this effort is no different.

With regard to our exit strategy or how we will judge the success of this operation, let me reiterate the clear purpose of this advisory mission: to enhance the capacity of regional forces to protect their civilians and conduct effective military operations against the LRA. Although our advisors will be forward-deployed and providing operational advice during this operation, the purpose of this deployment is not fundamentally different from other training and advising missions that AFRICOM has executed in its area of operations, where U.S. personnel have likewise built the capacity of African forces to address security threats and more effectively protect their civilians. We will judge the degree to which our advisors have helped develop the necessary capability based on whether the regional forces have successfully apprehended or removed top LRA commanders from the battlefield, facilitated large numbers of defections from the group, reduced the number of LRA attacks, and professionalized the troops engaged in this effort such that they can conduct effective military operations against the LRA and better protect their citizens.

There are no doubt significant long-term challenges associated with building partner capacity in Africa, but this is a short-term deployment with specific goals and objectives. As part of the interagency decision to deploy these advisors, we agreed to closely monitor and assess whether the regional militaries that our forces are partnering with are sustaining their commitment and making sufficient progress toward our shared objectives. If we think adjustments to the mission are warranted over time, we will consider them. If we do not believe our collective efforts are resulting in significant progress, we will not continue this deployment.

Finally and most importantly, there is the question of the U.S. national interest in Central Africa, a region that remains bedeviled by a mix of non-state armed groups, underdevelopment, and ungoverned space. The LRA has exploited this environment for far too long, exacerbating the region's instability and causing unimaginable suffering among innocent civilians. As discussed in the U.S. National Security Strategy, it is in the interest of the United States to lend our support

to partners in Africa so they can address threats to their citizens and help achieve the conditions necessary for regional security and broad-based development.

Achieving this objective will not be easy. The LRA has been reduced to approximately 200 core fighters, but they are spread across a vast area of dense jungle terrain. However, my hope is that, with the advice and assistance of U.S. forces, our regional partners will soon succeed in finally freeing the long-suffering people of Central Africa from the terror of Joseph Kony and the LRA.

Thank you Madam Chairwoman. I welcome your questions.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Maybe we'll get to the rest.

Mr. VERSHBOW. Measuring success and what is the U.S. national interest.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. We'll ask you about that. Thank you very much. Thank you to both of you for excellent testimony. We will begin our question and answer segment now.

I wanted to ask you if the President's October 14, 2011 report to the Congress transmitted consistent with the War Powers Resolution trigger the reporting and authorization requirements under Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution and if not, why?

And secondly, what is the anticipated scope, duration and cost of this deployment and from where in the budget will those costs be absorbed? And how does this deployment square with the Department of Defense's effort to cut \$350 billion over the next 10 years. And the Secretary's suggestion to the House Armed Services Committee that cuts may force DoD to pull back from Africa.

Ambassador Vershbow?

Mr. VERSHBOW. Madam Chairman, on the war powers issues, I think the reason why we made the notification was based on one simple fact, that the nature of the weapons that our forces are carrying for self defense are considered—make those forces considered to be equipped for combat, a phrase that is in the War Powers Resolution itself. So even though they're not going to be engaging in combat, but only carrying those weapons for self defense, the fact that they're equipped for combat triggered the requirement to file a report to Congress when they are going to be entering the territory of a foreign nation.

I don't know if Don may have more on the legal aspects of that. I'm not a lawyer, but we can give you a more detailed response for the record, a full legal analysis.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. We would appreciate it because we have some of our members and I have many questions about the legal analysis of when the War Powers Act is triggered and what in this operation would constitute that and your interpretation of it.

Mr. VERSHBOW. Okay, we will do that.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Then on the cost, the scope, the duration, and from where these monies will be coming.

Mr. VERSHBOW. Well first, I think that the clear goal for this advisory mission is to enhance the capacity of the regional forces so that they can better protect their civilians, track down Joseph Kony, and end the threat posed by the LRA. So I think we will be measuring success in a number of ways. We'll be looking to see whether the regional forces are able to successfully apprehend or remove top LRA commanders from the battlefield. That would be a very clear-cut measure of success, whether we can encourage larger numbers of defections from the LRA, whether we can see a substantial reduction in LRA attacks, and whether we can see a visible and measurable degree of professionalization of the forces engaged in this effort so that they have greater capacity, both to protect their citizens and conduct counter-LRA operations.

But we have made very clear that this is not an open-ended commitment. As part of the decision to deploy our advisors, we have

agreed that there would be a review after several months in order to assess whether our advisors are making sufficient progress for our objectives. Continuing this deployment is conditional on a number of factors including a sustained commitment and sustained cooperation by the regional governments in addressing the LRA threat. So it is not open ended. We don't have a specific time line that we've adopted. As I said, we will be reviewing the state of affairs.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. I don't know that that answered the question, but we'll follow up with that. This has been going on sadly for so many years. What assurances can you offer that we won't be in this entrenched and expanded protracted conflict, as you point out?

Mr. VERSHBOW. I think that we've already seen a lot of progress by the Ugandan and other regional militaries in conducting this mission and reducing the LRA's numbers, inhibiting their efforts to regroup. So we think we're building on a fairly strong foundation here. But we do, as I said in my remarks, feel that the regional forces have been limited by their capacity to acquire and process actionable information and so that giving them the greater skills in terms of fusing intelligence with operational plans could create a significant improvement in their ability to track the leaders and hopefully take Kony and other leaders off of the battlefield.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. So I look forward to getting some written responses about the cost, the scope, the duration, where the funds are coming and about triggering the War Powers Act. So if you could provide that in writing, I'd be very grateful.

Mr. VERSHBOW. Okay.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Berman is recognized.

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. Just a few points. On the issue raised by the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Manzullo, regarding briefing, the fact is that the administration pursuant to congressional law prepared a strategy which specifically included references to a military objective to remove Joseph Kony and his top commanders from the battlefield and U.S. assistance in achieving that. It was a public document done almost a year ago and that doesn't even go into any classified private briefings on more specific subjects. So this has been out there for almost a year.

Secondly, I'd like to ask a few questions. First, the historically tense relationship between Uganda and Democratic Republic of the Congo, in light of that, do you see a Ugandan military as the force leading operations in DRC or will we have some of our Special Forces working with the DRC's 391st Battalion that was trained by AFRICOM?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Thank you very much, Congressman Berman. On the issue of Kony militarily, I think we need to focus that the approach is a multi-faceted comprehensive approach, not only militarily, but it has to be also addressing the problems with the crises from the victims who have been——

Mr. BERMAN. I understand that, but——

Mr. YAMAMOTO. The other issue is politically is to help politically, militarily, and economically, all these countries that are victims of Kony, to coordinate much better to go after Kony.

Mr. BERMAN. Will our forces be working with the Democratic Republic of the Congo's 391st Battalion?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. That's correct.

Mr. BERMAN. Yes?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Yes. That's correct. And in that effort, we have, the State Department, has trained the 391st Battalion. They're right now on the border area. The issue of Ugandan troops in the area, it has to be a coordination between the DRC and the Ugandan troops. And of course, the issue of sovereignty is to coordinate the work between those two forces and how they will corner Kony's forces and how they would eliminate.

The issue is—I'll give you one example. When we transferred the MONUC which was the DRC peacekeeping operations to MONUSCO, in there was one aspect of having a focus on the LRA and better coordination between these two forces. And that's something that we've been trying to do over the last decade.

Mr. BERMAN. Do you envision that our advisors will be deployed at the brigade level, at the platoon level? Are they authorized to be deployed with Ugandan forces in the field? Or is this more of a headquarters deployment?

Mr. VERSHBOW. Thank you. As Ambassador Yamamoto said first of all, anything we do will be based on full coordination and consent on the part of the respective governments. And while they've all come out in support of this initiative, we take nothing for granted. There will be continuing consultation to ensure that any steps we take to execute will be with their consent.

So it's certainly within the concept of operations that we would deploy forces forward into the DRC, possibly at the platoon level and/or at the headquarters level. It's what would be most effective and what our partners—

Mr. BERMAN. There's no artificial constraint on where you might deploy then?

Mr. VERSHBOW. No. But there will be full consultation.

Mr. BERMAN. I understand. But they could well be deployed at the platoon level in the field?

Mr. VERSHBOW. That's right. It's still in an advisory and assistance role.

Mr. BERMAN. I understand. What will the trainers be equipped with, our military trainers and advisors? When you say they're going to be combat equipped, that's what triggered the report.

Mr. VERSHBOW. I'd have to give you a specific answer after the hearing for the record. I mean they will basically be carrying small arms for their own self protection and there may be other communications gear of course. But beyond that, I think I'd like to consult with my colleagues back in the Joint Staff to give you a more specific answer for the record.

Mr. BERMAN. Okay, thank you, Madam Chairman.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. I would encourage the esteemed Ambassadors to be a little more precise about the answers to the questions that we're posing, but thank you for getting it for us later.

Mr. Royce, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Non-proliferation, and Trade is recognized for his questions.

Mr. ROYCE. The question I was going to ask has to do with the reality on the ground that the Ugandans have been doing some pretty heavy lifting in Somalia. They've been fighting and dying there, and given that effort, I've heard concerns that they might be a little distracted on the follow through on this. Obviously you have a different read.

Can you tell me your discussions with Uganda's Ambassador and how you read their willingness on this?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. I did meet with President Museveni on separate issues, but on this issue as well. We have had very close discussions with President Museveni as well as the other leaders. President Museveni is fighting a multi-frontal conflict, not only the LRA but also AMASOM in Somalia. It does not mean that he has lost or he is distracted because of these two conflicts. He is equally focused on both areas and both fronts. And on the LRA and the violence that has been perpetrated against Uganda that still sits very much in the psyche of the Ugandan people. When you still have 1.8 million who are displaced in the northern part, you still have 66,000 kids who are—

Mr. ROYCE. We understand that. But to the extent that we can keep him focused on this is going to be part of our task and then the other question is about Ugandans operating in Congolese territory. How are we planning to address this? Are you able to dialogue with the Congolese on that issue?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Yes. We spoke to President Kabila and we're trying to do processes in which he and President Museveni will arrange how these forces will coordinate their forces against the LRA.

Mr. ROYCE. What steps are you taking to try to improve intelligence, because that's been one of the big failings in the past, one of the missing pieces on the location of Kony and his commanders?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. The issue is trying to get the intelligence that each of these countries have and then to fuse it together and then to analyze it and that's why the U.S. military will be very helpful in that effort.

Mr. ROYCE. Let me suggest though that that is somewhat limited, their intelligence is somewhat limited. You've got the ability to utilize leaflets, radios, in order to try to get defectors. To the extent that you can get defectors out of the LRA, your boots on the ground are going to be able to advise and direct the Congolese and Ugandans. Will U.S. personnel be deployed in that kind of an effort? I would suggest it would be wise to do so.

Mr. VERSHBOW. The U.S. forces will be able to help advise and train the indigenous forces, improving their skills in terms of civil affairs, outreach to local communities, encouraging as you suggested, Congressman, that people provide tips to the forces, early warning.

Mr. ROYCE. We need better intel than we had in 2008 on that mission. And to do that, we're going to have to drive the intelligence-gathering capacity by getting defectors to come in and give us the information needed for that mission.

The Army Special Forces teams specializing in training foreign units are going to provide advice and assistance to these units. My expectation would be that you would have some at the platoon level, but I would imagine the bulk of them would be back in Ugan-

da coordinating the logistics and the intelligence and the communications. Would that be correct?

Mr. VERSHBOW. Yes, Congressman. The bulk of the overall roughly 100 people would be in Uganda, but small teams would deploy forward in partnership with the local forces to sort of help them improve their skills on the front line.

Mr. ROYCE. And Special Operations Command Africa is headed by Rear Admiral Brian Losey. He's a Navy SEAL who previously commanded U.S. forces in the Horn, so he knows the region well. Is he assigned to oversee this operation? I was wondering how that would be engineered.

Mr. VERSHBOW. I believe that is the case. It is under the overall direction of SOCAF, yes.

Mr. ROYCE. Well, I yield back, Madam Chairman. Thank you.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Royce. Mr. Payne, the ranking member of Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights Subcommittee is recognized.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. As I mentioned, I was at an IDP camp last month and visited with people from villages that had been disrupted by the LRA and they were in Goma. So we see the destruction that is continuing on. I think a number of people wonder well why are we going after the LRA and why should we care about Uganda?

I think we all know that Uganda has tremendous number of troops in Somalia. I had the chance to go to Mogadishu several years ago and saw them. As a matter of fact, I was escorted by the Ugandan troops throughout Mogadishu and they were doing an excellent job and I think that we have somewhat of a responsibility because of the fact that al-Qaeda is supporting Al-Shabaab. It was al-Qaeda that destroyed the USS Cole off of Yemen and so it's all connected. We wonder, well, why do we have any concern?

It's very clear why we ought to be there and the fact that Kenya now is being attacked by al-Qaeda because of them going after Somalis. The Kenyan Embassy was bombed because Kenya voted with the United States most of the times in the U.N., all the time, and was one of the strongest supporters of the U.S. democracy around the country. And therefore they were the target where hundreds and hundreds of Kenyans died, and the same thing with Tanzania, because of our relationship. So I think this business is kind of intertwined and I think that when countries are going out to support our causes around the world, I think at least we have a reciprocal for having 100 U.S. troops train folks there.

I just want to ask quickly, Ambassador Yamamoto, what impact will the elections in DRC have? How is that going and will any of this disruption of LRA impact on the election there?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. The elections in the DRC are very, very tight. It's not clear whether President Kabila could be reelected or the presence of the opposition from Tshisekedi to the others. The issue comes in as the commitment on the LRA operations by the DRC and Uganda still remains pivotal and we've discussed this closely with President Kabila and President Museveni.

Mr. PAYNE. What about President Bashir in Sudan? As you know, Bashir supported the LRA and its formation. That's when al-Qaeda was in Sudan. Bashir supported al-Qaeda and LRA to-

gether. Is there any evidence that Bashir government is supporting LRA today?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. We have not seen any of the intelligence or evidence since about the middle of 2002 and beyond. We have been, obviously, had very close discussions with the Sudanese military issue, but we've not seen evidence that there is support.

Mr. PAYNE. And what about the LRA's activity in Southern Sudan? As this new country is trying to put together its government, are the LRA there in any large numbers? And what has the SPLM been able to do? And will they be a part of the training?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. The LRA has been operating in Southern Sudan. Of course, the 285,000 who are displaced, part of them are in Southern Sudan as well as the CAR and DRC. But the forces of the LRA which is now depleted to probably around 150 to 200 core fighters, 800 total accompanying people, are either in the CAR or DRC area.

Mr. PAYNE. And what about a special advisor to the Great Lakes Region that's been suggested. I didn't use the word special envoy, but a special advisor. Is this in the making and what's the prospect of that?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. We are taking it under advisement, very serious advisement based on your recommendations, Congressman, and from your committee.

Mr. PAYNE. And the fact that we know that there's an expansion of mobile phones and FM radios, will you be using that technology to try to get words out to ask for deflection from LRA fighters?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. That's correct, sir. The US AID has provided cell towers and the use of cell phones and right now they're using UHF radios, but the cell towers now are—the communities are calling in on a regular basis to say where the LRA is located, so better communications and better coordination.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. Thank you.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Payne. Mr. Duncan of South Carolina is recognized.

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Back in the spring in March or April, the Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes was talking about the Libya involvement and he said this, "I think what we're doing is enforcing a resolution that has a very clear set of goals which is protecting the Libyan people, averting a humanitarian crisis in setting up a no-fly zone. Obviously, that involves kinetic military action, particularly on the front end. But again, the nature of our commitment is that we are not getting into an open-ended war, a land invasion in Libya."

And according to STRATFOR Global Intelligence, since 2008, the U.S. has helped finance regional military efforts to capture LRA commanders where the U.S. has spent \$497 million strengthening the Ugandan army. Presently, the LRA is estimated to have somewhere between 200 and 400 fighters which lacks the numbers, I think, or the weapons from what I understand for a sophisticated insurgency. So as we delve into this, I have to ask myself and ask you guys today before deciding to deploy approximately 100 U.S. military personnel, did the administration receive a request from Uganda, the DRC, CAR or the African Union to provide this assistance? I'll ask Ambassador Vershbow.

Mr. VERSHBOW. Well, this has been a continuing effort, as you've just said, Congressman. We've been working in partnership with the regional states and they have, I think, welcomed the assistance to date and I think they've been indicating that additional support would be needed.

We looked at the experience from 2008 when we did provide advisors to Uganda at the request.

Mr. DUNCAN. Did they specifically ask for boots on the ground, American personnel?

Mr. VERSHBOW. I think they understood, as we have judged, that they lack this critical capability of fusing intelligence with the operational plans that have been the main handicap to finishing the job. They have made substantial progress in degrading the LRA, but they're still out there. They're still committing atrocities. So I think they indicated that they would welcome this kind of hands-on training.

Mr. DUNCAN. So what we're doing is training, mainly. No predator drones, no—could you define kinetic military action? I'm struggling with that term. What does that mean?

Mr. VERSHBOW. I understand the term kinetic to mean the use of actual lethal force.

Mr. DUNCAN. Did we use kinetic military action in Libya which was lethal force?

Mr. VERSHBOW. At the front end of the operation, we used considerable kinetic force to take out the air defenses of Libya as part of the first week or 2 weeks of the operation. Then most of the kinetic activity was carried out by our partners and NATO allies who conducted the lion's share of the air strikes in the civil protection mission.

We did continue, when necessary, to support the suppression of enemy air defenses. And we did, on occasion, use armed predators for specific targets that no other ally had the capability to hit.

Mr. DUNCAN. Did we in this action and in Uganda, did we garner tangible financial or military support from other countries such as the U.K. and France, like we did in Libya or are we there alone?

Mr. VERSHBOW. There has been assistance by our partners. I would defer to my colleague who may know more.

Mr. DUNCAN. Is this a NATO action, I guess—

Mr. VERSHBOW. This is a U.S. initiative, but there's been other assistance over the years.

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Yes, we have very careful coordinations, French in CAR, the U.K. in Uganda, but yes, that's true in the sense that we're providing the bulk of the assistance as far as the military training, etcetera. The other donor communities are doing the other parts on humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation, reconciliation.

Mr. DUNCAN. How long do we anticipate the U.S. forces being there? Do we have some sort of time table at all?

Mr. VERSHBOW. We don't have a specific time table. We are talking, I think, months, but I wouldn't put a number on it at this point. But we will review the operation in a few months to see whether it's achieving the desired effect through this enhanced qualitative change in the nature of the training that we're providing and to see whether it's having effects on the ground in terms of further eroding the LRA.

Mr. DUNCAN. What do you define as success?

Mr. VERSHBOW. I think we define success first and foremost on the basis of whether Kony and other commanders are actually captured, whether we see further fracturing of the LRA and more defections, whether we see tangible improvement in our partners' capacities out in the field to succeed and that includes not just the kinetic parts of it, but in terms of whether they are also more capable of engaging with the local population to develop the climate in which people report on and turn in LRA sympathizers.

Mr. DUNCAN. When we put Americans in harm's way like this, I think we need to be very clear what we do. We need to be very clear when the President comes to Congress with the War Powers Resolution and I'm out of time, so I yield back, Madam Chair.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Mr. Carnahan is recognized.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you to our witnesses for being here today. I wanted to start with really a general question about how the U.S. is working with the international and regional partners to strengthen coordination. In particular, what are the strategies and approaches, both diplomatically and otherwise that the U.S. Government is utilizing to ensure a more effective collaboration among key actors to counter LRA efforts. And let me start with Ambassador Yamamoto.

Mr. YAMAMOTO. In that effort, we have not only been talking directly to the Presidents Kabila, Bozize, Salva Kiir and Museveni, at that level, but also within their command structures, militarily, as well as diplomatically to see how we can coordinate better on our efforts, not just militarily, but comprehensively against the LRA. That's the first of it.

The second thing is that we're talking to the African Union, to regional groups, as well as to the donor community, to see how we can all bring to bear some of our own specific assets that we have. For instance, we will do the military training program, U.K., France, others are doing humanitarian programs. The African Union is doing a lot on coordination from other countries.

Mr. CARNAHAN. And Ambassador Vershbow?

Mr. VERSHBOW. Well, I would also add that what we're doing in this specific case is a subset of the broader efforts that we are making throughout Africa to promote professionalization of militaries, to promote capacity of the African countries to solve their own problems. And part of that is to invite countries to participate in both bilateral and multi-national training and exercises which would hopefully inculcate a greater pattern of cooperation among them. I think this initiative in addition to hopefully achieving the specific goal of taking Joseph Kony off the battlefield will also encourage greater military cooperation among the four key states involved that would be a factor for longer term stability in the region so that we don't have to intervene in the future.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Let me next turn, I guess a more particular question for these operations. Is this, in your opinion, a unique model that is being used in central Africa? Or is this comparable to some other operations like in southern Philippines? Chairman Rohrabacher led a delegation there a few months ago where we got to see a unique operation there where a limited number of U.S.

military were advising, not engaging in combat, but trying to be very focused on the safe havens and training campus there.

Again, is this a unique model? Is this drawing on some other experiences in other places that have worked? And let me start with Ambassador Vershbow.

Mr. VERSHBOW. Congressman, this is not a unique model in the sense that training and equipping partner forces is something that we've done for many years in many parts of the world. My experience, if you look at my bio, is more in Europe. We've had training and equip programs to train the Bosnian armed forces after the Dayton Accords. We helped train the Georgia armed forces to try to deal with terrorist forces in the border regions with the Russian Federation. So each mission is tailored to the specific circumstances and the requirements of the partner involved. But this sort of advice and assist so that they can then deal with the problem more effectively and more professionally is a well-established model that has proven its value.

Mr. CARNAHAN. And Ambassador Yamamoto?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. And I think it's in the context of if you look at Africa as far as really good cooperation and coordination between the Department of Defense and Department of State and looking at how we can do training on not on a specific area, but also continent wide. For instance, as you know, the State Department has trained about 160,000 troops for peacekeeping operations in 24 countries. We use that also with the Department of Defense for guidance and advice and coordination. In this context as well, you have the State Department helping to do diplomatic coordination or doing also assistance as far as money-wise to provide logistical support and of course, DoD is providing the actual individuals to do some training. So those are issues that were kind of a model for this area, but also we're looking at other areas and parts of Africa.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Carnahan. Ms. Schmidt of Ohio is recognized.

Ms. SCHMIDT. Thank you very much. Ambassador Vershbow, I read your report and I'm a little confused by it. In one point, on page four, you refer to this as really nothing more than what we already do with AFRICOM that we have in place in Africa; and I've been over there and I've studied it, and that's basically, unless I'm wrong, an educational tool that we use to help African nations develop a more professional military. We also do some building of schools and hospitals on the ground. But you add in your report that the reason why we had to go, why the President had to go to Congress, is because there might be a potential need to defend themselves, the troops that are on the ground, and so, therefore, the War Powers Resolution was put in place.

What confuses me is this: Is this what we do under AFRICOM or is this different, because under AFRICOM there's always the danger that they might have to defend themselves so there wouldn't have to be any need to come to Congress and say the War Powers Act may be invoked? Or, are we really, and not just anticipating, but expecting some conflict to arise, so that this is a heads up? That's question number one.

Question number two, in the report you said that you felt we would be asking about the purpose and the timing of the deployment and how we are going to judge success of the mission, and yet I didn't hear any real clear answers as to what success is or the timing of this deployment.

And my final is this: I think we should, somebody should know what the cost is per day for these troops to be on the ground, just real costs right now and anticipated costs if they have to go into combat. So those are my questions.

Mr. VERSHBOW. Thank you, Congressman. Good questions. I'm sorry if my statement confused you a bit. I think that when we say that this is not fundamentally different from previous AFRICOM missions it's because the overall concept of training and advising and assisting partner forces is kind of the watchword of U.S. AFRICOM. We do it in other parts of the world, too, but I think we have a particular—

Ms. SCHMIDT. Right, we've created AFRICOM because we wanted specific attention to the region.

Mr. VERSHBOW. More attention and help develop a greater expertise of how to deal with the region than we have by borrowing forces from other combatant commanders.

Ms. SCHMIDT. Exactly.

Mr. VERSHBOW. This is a little different though in some of the specifics in the sense that we don't always put our advisors and trainers in the field with the forces that are going to be carrying out the actual military operations and that's what in this specific case led to the judgment by our military planners and commanders and then by the President when he approved this that despite their mission not including any engagement in combat, they could be in a hostile environment in some circumstances and that they should be carrying the kinds of weapons needed to defend themselves. And that's what, in turn, triggered the war powers notification. But we don't anticipate that they'll get into the midst of conflict, but I don't want to exclude that possibility. But they will have the capacity to defend themselves if the need should arise.

In terms of defining success, I think beyond the very specific metric of capturing or killing Joseph Kony and other commanders, it's going to be a judgment call as to whether our partners are making substantial gains, they're making effective use of the additional training, that they've learned this fusion of intelligence and operational planning that we think is the missing piece that has prevented them from going from reducing the LRA to actually eliminating the threat.

But we will consult with the Congress and inform you of our assessment of the operation as it unfolds because as I said, this is a unique example of executive legislative collaboration, so we want to work with you all the way along.

In terms of the cost, I apologize for not having the bottom line. I can actually say more about some of the State Department expenses than the DoD expenses. U.S. AFRICOM is drawing on existing operations and maintenance funding to support the operation, but we're still working on an overall cost assessment to give you that day-by-day estimate and we will provide it to the committee once that estimate has been refined.

Ms. SCHMIDT. I'm almost out of time. Do you have any idea when we're going to get that cost? I mean is it tomorrow, the next day? It should be relatively easy.

Mr. VERSHBOW. I don't want to give you a specific commitment. We'll try to get it to you very soon.

Ms. SCHMIDT. Thank you.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Ms. Schmidt. Mr. Connolly is recognized.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I'm sure Mr. Assistant Secretary, you can understand the sensitivity up here about the cost of military operations. The previous administration low balled the cost of Iraq and Afghanistan and here we are well in excess of \$1 trillion later, a significant contributor to the United States debt which so many of my colleagues express concern about. And yet, we accepted false assurances or very loose assurances about the cost of those engagements.

I think it's a reasonable question to ask, what is this going to cost? or what is your estimate of what it's going to cost? and to get that information obviously in a timely fashion. Let me ask, what is the rationale for putting troops, U.S. military advisors into Uganda? What is the goal?

Mr. VERSHBOW. Well, Congressman, first of all, I'll reiterate, we'll get you the cost figures as soon as we can.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you.

Mr. VERSHBOW. But this will certainly be much more modest than the costs of actual combat operations. As for the reasons why we're there, I think there's a continued threat to civilians and threat to stability in the region. We think that this very discrete, specific increase in the scale and form of our military assistance can make a difference in ending the threat of the LRA.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Okay, Mr. Assistant Secretary, so is the goal, given what you just said, to in fact, defeat the LRA and to disband it? Or is the goal to lessen the threat to civilian control in the region?

Mr. VERSHBOW. We would certainly hope that this additional support will lead to the breakthrough of capture of Joseph Kony and the other commanders and the literal destruction of the LRA, but we will not necessarily wait for that to happen. This is going to be an operation that runs in the months, not an open-ended operation. And we will evaluate whether the assistance has achieved its purpose in terms of raising the capacity of our partners and we may disengage even as they continue the fight on their own.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Okay, but is the ultimate goal the deposing of Mr. Kony and the dismemberment of the LRA?

Mr. VERSHBOW. That is the stated goal. That's one of the four parts of the strategy, removing the battlefield—

Mr. CONNOLLY. I think it's very important that we have a clear mission. Okay.

Mr. VERSHBOW. There's also a broader objective that we're serving which is to support partners in Africa so that they can address the threats to their citizens, to achieve stability, and become more productive contributors to security in the region and more broadly. We've seen some of them stepping up as has been mentioned in Somalia at great risk and loss of life. This is a problem that is debili-

tating for several countries, so to the extent that we can help them finally put an end to this threat, I think we'll help their security and make them better partners for us going forward.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Was there a perception in making this decision that our partners were on their own not capable of meeting that goal?

Mr. VERSHBOW. I think—yes, Congressman. The judgment was that while they've made a lot of progress, we've seen the LRA size reduced substantially, going that final distance to destruction of the LRA was something that they were not quite capable of and that this assistance could make the critical difference. So we thought it was a worthwhile investment to make.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Moving to 30,000 feet, a devil's advocate question for you, as well, Mr. Ambassador, what is the strategic interest of the United States in this in doing this? There are lots of unpleasant people in the world. There are lots of insurgencies and terrorist movements in the world. The United States obviously cannot try to dethrone every one of them. What is our strategic interest here?

Mr. VERSHBOW. Well, I would say that we've seen in today's world that everything is increasingly connected to the extent that eastern and northeastern Africa is unstable, under developed, an ungoverned space in which these kinds of rapacious extremists and terrorists can run amok. It ultimately can affect our interests. It creates the conditions in which other radical threats could emerge. We've seen the worst case in Somalia with both the breakdown of governance and the rise of the Al-Shabaab terrorist movement. While that is not directly linked to the LRA threat, it's all part of a challenge to stability in the region that ultimately jeopardizes our interest.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. Mr. Turner is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Madam Chair. A question for Ambassador Vershbow. If the stated goal is to decapitate the leadership of the LRA, as I understood from your question before, we are not using aerial drones or observation and would we be authorized to use predators to take out the leadership if they were seen and observed?

Mr. VERSHBOW. Congressman, at the present time, the use of drones is not envisaged in this operation. I think that the kind of intelligence that is most important to the success of this operation is the human intelligence gathered on the ground. That depends on closer ties between the military forces of the countries involved and the local population. And so our training and assistance has, as part of its broader objectives, helping them to acquire and make better use of that kind of ground intelligence that could make the difference.

I think the questions of authorities for drone strikes against extremists in terms—there's a more delicate matter which is probably not suitable for commenting on in this open session, but again, the focus is on advising and assisting the forces on the ground so that they can gather and use intelligence more effectively to do the job.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. I yield back.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Turner. Mr. Higgins also of New York is recognized.

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Madam Chair. The Lord's Resistance Army emerged from northern Uganda in the 1990s. Since that time has murdered, killed, mutilated some tens of thousands of people. Joseph Kony was indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the tribunal at The Hague. Kony is also designated as a specially-designated global terrorist. Some 300 fighters originating out of Uganda now more prevalent in central Africa.

I mean the United States deploys 100 military advisors who happen to be Special Forces. I think we should just call this what it is. It's a kill and capture mission. I would ask you to comment on that.

Mr. VERSHBOW. Well, Congressman, I think we certainly are trying to enhance the capacity of our partners to capture or kill Joseph Kony and other commanders, but they will be doing the actual military mission on the ground. We will be advising, assisting them so that they can be more effective in doing it.

So yes, I don't disagree with you on terms of one of the end results of this, if it works, but I think it makes sense from the United States' point of view to enable partners to act when they have the capacity to do so. As we've said, they have some capacity and they've done a lot and we've helped them get to this stage, but to go the final distance requires this additional support and we think it's a good investment in our long-term security and theirs.

Mr. HIGGINS. Ambassador?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Yes, you're absolutely correct. The main objective is to support these countries to do the jobs themselves and to build the capacity and that's what we've been trying to do for the last decade.

Mr. HIGGINS. I just think there's a tendency sometimes to dance around this stuff. And obviously Joseph Kony is a bad guy, doing bad things to otherwise good people in a region that is strategically important to us and I just think sometimes we need to call it what it is and this clearly, to me, not unlike our involvement with military advisors in other regions, troubled regions, of that region of central Africa, north Africa, and the Middle East. We send advisors there, obviously, very well trained. Have a particular expertise at doing certain things, in particular, taking bad people out and I think that this is indicative of that.

It's a religious group, the Lord's Resistance Army, presumably Islamists?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. No, it's not religious.

Mr. HIGGINS. Published reports indicate that it is.

Mr. YAMAMOTO. It uses images or statements as an ideology to justify their terror. I know that Kony said in the early days that he was related to Christ.

Mr. HIGGINS. Any relationship to al-Qaeda?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. We have not—

Mr. HIGGINS. Any relationship to the Janjaweed?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. No.

Mr. HIGGINS. I yield back.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Using the Lord's name in vain, not a good thing. I'm pleased to yield to Mr. Fortenberry.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Madam Chair. I want to return to a question that was posed earlier. It's important in light of that. We need to make sure that our efforts in the region are not discordant, that they're not piecemeal. We have requested through a number of hearings the reappointment of a special envoy to the Great Lakes Region.

Ambassador Yamamoto, you said we would continue to take that under advisement. We've gone this direction before, but can you explain, if you are resistant, as to why this has not happened or are there other concerns that we may not be aware of?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. As you know, we had the Special Envoy Howard Wolpe who did a fantastic job. I think after that the issue is to assess where do we go from here? And I think we heard loud and clear from the Congress that a special envoy is needed. We're taking that—

Mr. FORTENBERRY. How long has the position been vacant though? It's been some time.

Mr. YAMAMOTO. It's been over a year now, a year and a half.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Well, again, given the heightened intensity of these measures, I think this is the appropriate time to revisit this question with a certain sense of urgency.

Let's return, as well, to gain a broader understanding of who are the other international partners involved here, specifically in military operations. We talked about other international donors for relief work and then specifically what is the Ugandan army's effort going to be? It has been in the past to specifically demobilize Joseph Kony and the LRA.

Mr. YAMAMOTO. You're absolutely correct. The specific amount of assistance of militarily supporting the UPDF in this effort has been the United States. I mean \$40 million from the United States in the last 3 years, specifically aimed at providing logistical support as the LRA moved from Uganda into the CAR. The other countries are providing other types of support other than the military.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. You're talking about the affected countries, not other international donors?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. No, the other international donors, that's right. As far as the other countries are concerned, the Ugandans themselves are also providing support and assistance through providing their own equipment and military tactics and of course, the troops itself. The CAR, that is a coordination effort with the FACA troops by the Ugandans and the CAR because Ugandan troops are in the CAR in a sovereign country and that is the coordination between President Bozizé and President Museveni to work out those logistical issues.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Those two countries, then in a coordinated effort, are the primary drivers currently of the military operation, correct?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. But also the DRC is getting involved because the LRA has gone in and out between the CAR and DRC.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Are there other international countries such as France who are engaged militarily?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Only insofar as training the CAR troops.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. So France is involved in the CAR?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Yes.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. All right, what other international actors are involved beyond the military operation to coordinate disarmament efforts and rehabilitation efforts, reintegration efforts?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. The United Nations and the African Union. The United Nations from the DRC side which was the establishment of MONUSCO or the reestablishment of MONUSCO basically to coordinate those efforts between the FARDC troops in DRC and the UPDF and Uganda—

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Okay, I think we probably ought to stop using the acronyms because it gets too confusing too quickly.

Mr. YAMAMOTO. The Congolese troops and the Ugandan troops to coordinate together.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Okay, but then the African Union's involvement?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. The African Union is not as extensive as the U.N. It's basically the leadership under Chairman Ping and his group to talk to the leaders.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. I'm sorry, explain that further?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. In other words, to discuss with the Presidents and the leadership when these countries on the LRA problem and what more they need to get the job done.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. So African Union effectively is not involved here other than in conversation?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Discussions.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Is that a potential development?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. That's right. It is.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. The reason for pressing the issue is clearly that the United States cannot solve all problems for all people and you have been authorized by Congress to engage in this activity. And again, we're all hopeful for a positive and quick outcome. But to continue to press the international community for switch engagement as is appropriate as well needs to be a part of this broader, comprehensive effort.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Mr. Rohrabacher is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. First of all, let me just note that I don't know if I'm disappointed or what, but not even having a cost estimate for us coming before Congress, letting us know that there's a military operation, have the troops already been, are these 100 troops already been sent or are they on the way?

Mr. VERSHBOW. Only some of the initial personnel have arrived. The full 100 have not yet deployed.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So the mission is actually under way. You actually have some people who have already been sent, but you don't have a cost estimate of what it would cost? Even an estimate?

Mr. VERSHBOW. I apologize, Congressman. I'm embarrassed not to have a more specific answer for you. The forces that are already there are being funded by regular operations and maintenance funds, but when we get further along, there will be more costs incurred and we will definitely have that estimate for you before we reach that state.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I take it the 100 troops are also going to bring with them their equipment.

Mr. VERSHBOW. Correct.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Now I don't think it's our place to ask about specific equipment going into a combat area, but that's considerably costly as well.

I noticed in your testimony you said that this LRA has been reduced to approximately 200 core fighters? So it might be significant for us to know if the cost of this mission is going to be \$500 million or whether it's going to be \$100 million or \$20 million in terms of the cost of getting 200 fighters who are people who are criminals, we could basically call them, 200 organized criminals in central Africa.

I take it also that if they're reduced to 200 men and what we've got are the armies of these various countries you're talking about, we're talking about 200 men who are now fighting thousands of other armed troops, but we feel compelled to send 200 of our own troops there. I'm not sure whether or not that—I'll look closely at this and I think the American people will as well, whether or not this was a right decision.

Would you say that tribal loyalties have anything to do with the ongoing strength of the LRA?

Mr. VERSHBOW. I'll defer to my colleague who knows more about the context.

Mr. YAMAMOTO. The LRA obviously was originally a northern Uganda Acholi base, but right now it's kind of morphed because it has gone into—it does have groups from Southern Sudan, Congo, and the DCAR.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You would think tribal allegiances have something to do with the survivability of this and the effectiveness of the LRA?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. It's the open areas that are terribly hard to track people. That's his cover. That's how he's been able to escape for two decades without capture.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I take it that was a yes?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Yes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So we're sending our troops in take on head on this whole tribal challenge in Africa. Let me just note that that doesn't sound very good to me in terms of possible success, but there again, this force may be evil enough to justify sending our troops in.

Let me ask you, you were involved in Ethiopia. You were our Ambassador to Ethiopia.

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Yes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. During that time period there was a border dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Yes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That went up to arbitration.

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Yes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The arbitration ended up deciding what on whose favor?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. The EBC made a determination on the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right, and they decided basically that Eritrea had the rightful position, is that correct?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Only in the Bdame area. But the other area went to Ethiopia.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay, so did our Government at that time while you were Ambassador recommend that Ethiopia respect the arbiters or did we—we did?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. We did.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. When Ethiopia rejected the arbitration over our advice, what did we do and what was our Government's position on Ethiopia considering that we have since the time, that they decided not to settle their dispute through arbitration, but instead decided to thumb their nose at arbiters, have we provided Ethiopia with weapons and training and guns since then?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. We have not provided weapons. We have provided training because of their forces in Darfur and now in Abyei.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. So—but we haven't sold them any weapons or anything?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. No, no weapons.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. And Mr. Marino will now be recognized and I thank him because he will be asking questions that have been submitted through our committee's Web site which connects our constituents more directly to our work in Congress and we're also asking the public to enter their questions when we have the honor of having Secretary Clinton appear before our committee on Thursday.

So thank you, Mr. Marino, for using those questions.

Mr. MARINO. Thank you, Madam Chair. And in addition to the questions that were submitted to the committee, I have a Web site for my District and I asked my constituents to send questions to me prior to my hearings, so the questions I'm going to ask are going to be repetitive, but if you could answer them in a different light. Please bear in mind I have now less than 4½ minutes. Please be succinct and whoever feels that they can answer the question to satisfy my constituents, please jump in.

First question comes from Sharon, "Who will be paying for this troop deployment and what is the anticipated cost and how many troops will be involved for how long?"

Mr. VERSHBOW. The United States will be paying for this operation and as I've said sheepishly to Congressman Rohrabacher, we don't have precise costs, but I can assure him that it's like to be in the tens of millions of dollars, not the hundreds or the \$500 million. We think it's an investment worth making in terms of just advising and assisting local forces we can eliminate a very evil force from the earth.

Mr. MARINO. From Titus: "How will U.S. forces in central Africa help address widespread development needs of the region? And if the LRA is removed without making improvements to the economic and social stability of the region, then another military force could easily replace it."

Mr. YAMAMOTO. It's not much the U.S. military as it is the efforts of US AID, the U.S. diplomatic efforts in coordination with the international donor community, international organizations and the regional states to look at how we can establish economically develop these countries.

Mr. MARINO. From Michael: "What are the Europeans and other allies doing to help stop the LRA?"

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Raising consciousness, supporting, assisting what's rehabilitation, reconciliation, rehabilitation of victims, and also supporting the governments in their efforts to go after the LRA.

Mr. MARINO. How about any money?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. The assistance, right, and again, our money so far for the region has been around \$50 million in total for the last 3 years, just on the LRA operations, but then overall on the LRA operations, the Europeans, the U.N. and other organizations are also contributing money. I don't have the specific amount.

Mr. MARINO. This is from Greg: "Is this a peacekeeping/humanitarian mission or more of an advisory role?"

Mr. VERSHBOW. It's clearly an advisory mission, helping to prepare partner forces to do the job themselves more effectively, but it certainly has a humanitarian motivation, namely, that there's been long suffering for more than two decades by the population at the hands of the Lord's Resistance Army.

Mr. MARINO. This is from Danielle. First of all, and to show that I'm trying to cover both sides of the story here, "Thank you to the Members of Congress who have decided that the destruction of human life in central Africa at the hands of the LRA matters and have taken important action steps toward bringing peace to those affected? Could you gentlemen be more specific about the ways in which the troops deployed have been trained to advise, specifically in the hunt for Kony as opposed to other large-scale tactical planning?"

Mr. VERSHBOW. I think that it should be understood that our forces are going there to help train and improve the capabilities of the local militaries who will then carry out the actual operations in the field. The key thing we're hoping to help them with is fusing the intelligence information with the operational plan so that they can more quickly respond to reports that the LRA is active and engage and we hope eliminate the remaining leadership of the LRA. We're not taking on a combat role ourselves.

Mr. MARINO. Most of these questions were from my constituents in Pennsylvania 10, north central and northeast Pennsylvania, but here's my question. Do you have an exit strategy?

Mr. VERSHBOW. We do because we said from the outside that this is not an open-ended mission in terms of its goals or its duration. We certainly hope that it achieves the over-arching goal which is eliminating Joseph Kony and the other commanders from the battlefield, but we will not go on indefinitely even if that maximum goal isn't achieved. We will judge whether we've been effective in improving our partners' capacity to deal with the threat, to engage the LRA, to encourage more defections, to substantially reduce the threat and then we will pull back and we hope that they will be able to continue with this experience and training to finish the job.

Mr. MARINO. And quickly, this should be a yes or no from both of you, are we following the money or just handing a check over? Are we following the money or are we just handing a check over?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. We're accounting.

Mr. VERSHBOW. We're following the money as we will be there on the ground ensuring that what we use the taxpayers' money for is achieving positive results.

Mr. MARINO. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Marino, I don't know how that could have been answered with a yes or no, given two choices, but well done. And you have very wise constituents. They ask excellent questions and I encourage all of my members to try to bring in our constituents to the committee process. Thank you, Mr. Marino.

Mr. Sherman from California is recognized.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Yamamoto, in this enterprise, are we introducing American armed forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated?

I'm citing the War Powers Act.

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Right, I mean the reason why they're there is they're mainly for advice and support and assistance. However, if obviously to defend themselves they need to be fully equipped.

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, the U.S. Marines in the London Embassy would defend themselves. In Vietnam, we used the term training to mean American troops going out on combat missions when a company by indigenous forces. Are they in safe areas training or are they out training through engaging the enemy?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. I'll defer to my colleague.

Mr. VERSHBOW. Congressman, some of the training will take place in safe areas at bases far removed from the area of conflict, but under the mission approved by the President, our forces will have the possibility based upon what the commanders judge to be most effective and based on what the partners feel would be most effective to deploy to the field to advise and assist at the front line level. But we don't believe that it is highly likely that our forces will be engaged in hostilities.

Mr. SHERMAN. Will we be shooting at the enemy?

Mr. VERSHBOW. Only in self defense.

Mr. SHERMAN. Will be placing ourselves within 100 yards of the enemy such that self defense would obviously be necessary?

Mr. VERSHBOW. Congressman, I honestly don't know whether they would be within a 100 yards or 200. At this point, it's hypothetical because we're just at the early stages.

Mr. SHERMAN. I mean the Constitution said provides the Congress with authority to declare war and engage in war and now you're telling me that that decision will be made by lieutenants.

We've seen in Libya a terrible lesson brought home to the American people. If you shred the war powers provision of the Constitution, good things happen in the world. My fear is that you're going to be teaching the American people this lesson a second time, that is to say I think you may very well accomplish something good in eastern Africa, but will we do so in a way that constitutes a second intentional violation of the War Powers Act?

And both of you have been rather vague on what our forces are going to do except that lieutenants and captains and majors on the ground will decide what to do. Are these combat officers authorized to bring their forces into hostilities?

Mr. VERSHBOW?

Mr. VERSHBOW. I think the short answer is no, that the only condition in which they might use the weapons that they're carrying is if they're fired upon in an act of self defense. I would ask to defer to my legal experts at the Pentagon as exactly what—

Mr. SHERMAN. That's as good an answer as I'm likely to get. Let me shift over to Mr. Yamamoto. Let's say the mission changes and in fact it is necessary to introduce the armed forces of the United States into situations where imminent involvement and hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances. Will the administration follow the War Powers Act?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. We're following the War Powers Act in this instance.

Mr. SHERMAN. Are you acting in serendipity—acting parallel to the War Powers Act or are you conforming to the War Powers Act? Is that act the law of the land that you are following?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. We are expecting the intent of the U.S. Congress in providing that.

Mr. SHERMAN. Are you respecting the law or just kind of the free-floating intent?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. The law.

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay, so it's the law of the land and you're going to follow it. Is that correct?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Yes.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. That's all I need. I yield back.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Sherman. Mr. Rivera, my colleague from Florida is recognized.

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you, Madam Chair, and with your permission may I yield to my subcommittee chair, Mr. Rohrabacher?

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Absolutely.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. Let me just state for the record, even though we have questions that are pointed questions, that should not necessarily indicate whether we support or oppose this particular mission.

I happen to believe that missions like this are positive and can play a positive role and a positive strategy in post-Cold War strategy should be helping other people fight for their freedom. The cost is really an important factor because the United States can't afford to pay the price to win everyone else's freedom in the world.

The Libyan operation that this administration just engaged us in is perhaps a good example of that and if indeed the Libyans now and I would challenge the Libyan authorities now to step forward and announce that they will repay the United States for every dime that we spent in helping them win their freedom, we are in a financial crisis. They are sitting on the biggest deposits of oil and gas in the world. They should repay us. If indeed they do, then it was the right thing for us to help the people of Libya overthrow their tyrant.

If indeed the cost of this mission is repaid to us from those who benefit from it, then this type of mission, helping others fight

against evil forces in the world is justified and speaks well of the United States of America.

What doesn't speak well of us is when we become intertwined with dictatorships and that's why I am asking, have been asking questions about Ethiopia and I would ask our former Ambassador to Ethiopia was there an election held while you were Ambassador in Ethiopia?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. I came in after the election.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. After the election. Was that election that happened right before you became Ambassador, did the winners of that election then take over the government or did they arrest those who won the election?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. To answer your question—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. They arrested those who won the election, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. YAMAMOTO. The Parliament took out their seats because we negotiated with them behind the scenes to do so. The issue was the City Hall. They refused to—they did not take up their seats and in the context that they were arrested.

And we worked with the government and the communities—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You answered the question is that they arrested the ones who won the election. Those who lost the election stayed in power. Those who won the elections ended up in jail and during that time period, OPEC decided that there were several cases in Ethiopia, where American citizens owned property and the Ethiopian Government, now run by those who didn't win the election, but imprisoned those who did, had expropriated property of Americans and was illegally refusing to give it back to them.

Do you believe—and OPEC still has that standard, by the way, still is that finding. Do you agree with that finding?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. First, the Carter Center declared the election, the winners, the winners. They declared that the government of Meles had won as was their—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The government declared that?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. No, Carter Center. And we abide by what the Carter Center and the international observers had stated. Now the second issue is as far as the OPEC, the person you're referring to his property was confiscated under the communist—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I'm not talking about a person. I'm talking about the general theory that Americans have property claims that have not been adjudicated by the Ethiopian Government.

Mr. YAMAMOTO. We've tried to help adjudicate with the government.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We have. That's correct and that was why OPEC declared that Ethiopia was now no longer eligible for OPEC loan guarantees. They have not yet changed that policy, correct?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Because of restrictions.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. The restrictions were based on the fact that American citizens still had property claims that were not being met.

Now back to Ethiopia and Eritrea. There was an agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia to abide by an arbitration. In the end, it is my understanding that the arbiters actually decided at least for a major part of that in Eritrea's favor, yet we permitted the

Government of Ethiopia to renege on the agreement to follow the arbiters. Is that correct?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. No. In 2003, we announced that it was final and binding because the parties said so, so therefore we held both parties accountable to the results.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much and Mr. Rivera's time has expired.

I want to thank our witnesses for appearing before us. We look forward to your written answers and I remind the committee members, if you could join me to say hello to Evelyn Apoko. It is a true delight and an honor to have you here with us. Thank you.

And the committee is now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:54 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]



# A P P E N D I X



MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

**FULL COMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE**  
**COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS**  
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515-0128

**Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Chairman**

October 18, 2011

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to be held in **Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live, via the WEBCAST link on the Committee website at <http://www.hcfa.house.gov>)**:

**DATE:** Tuesday, October 25, 2011

**TIME:** 10:00 a.m.

**SUBJECT:** Deployment of U.S. Forces in Central Africa and Implementation of  
The Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act

**WITNESSES:** The Honorable Donald Yamamoto  
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs  
U.S. Department of State

The Honorable Alexander Vershbow (Invited)  
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs  
U.S. Department of Defense

**By Direction of the Chairman**

*The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202-225-5021 or least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee.*



**COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS**  
MINUTES OF FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

Day Tuesday Date 10/25/11 Room 2172 RHOB

Starting Time 10:01 A.M. Ending Time 11:55 A.M.

Recesses  ( \_\_\_ to \_\_\_ ) ( \_\_\_ to \_\_\_ )

**Presiding Member(s)**

*Rep. Heana Ros-Lehtinen*

*Check all of the following that apply:*

Open Session

Executive (closed) Session

Televised

Electronically Recorded (taped)

Stenographic Record

**TITLE OF HEARING:**

*Deployment of U.S. Forces in Central Africa and Implementation of the Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act*

**COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:**

*Attendance sheet attached.*

**NON-COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:**

**HEARING WITNESSES:** Same as meeting notice attached? Yes  No   
*(If "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.)*

**STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD:** *(List any statements submitted for the record.)*

*Sen. Inhofe, Rep. Smith, Rep. Connolly, & Rep. Bass*

**TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE** \_\_\_\_\_

or  
**TIME ADJOURNED** 11:55 A.M. ■

  
Jean Carroll, Director of Committee Operations

Hearing/Briefing Title: Deployment of U.S. Forces in central Africa and

Implementation of the Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act

Date: October 25, 2011

Present	Member
X	Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, FL
	Christopher Smith, NJ
	Dan Burton, IN
X	Elton Gallegly, CA
X	Dana Rohrabacher, CA
X	Donald Manzullo, IL
X	Edward R. Royce, CA
X	Steve Chabot, OH
	Ron Paul, TX
	Mike Pence, IN
	Joe Wilson, SC
	Connie Mack, FL
X	Jeff Fortenberry, NE
	Michael McCaul, TX
X	Ted Poe, TX
	Gus M. Bilirakis, FL
X	Jean Schmidt, OH
	Bill Johnson, OH
X	David Rivera, FL
	Mike Kelly, PA
	Tim Griffin, AK
X	Tom Marino, PA
X	Jeff Duncan, SC
X	Ann Marie Buerkle, NY
	Renee Ellmers, NC
X	Robert Turner, NY

Present	Member
X	Howard L. Berman, CA
	Gary L. Ackerman, NY
	Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, AS
X	Donald M. Payne, NJ
X	Brad Sherman, CA
	Eliot Engel, NY
	Gregory Meeks, NY
X	Russ Carnahan, MO
	Albio Sires, NJ
X	Gerry Connolly, VA
	Ted Deutch, FL
	Dennis Cardoza, CA
X	Ben Chandler, KY
X	Brian Higgins, NY
	Allyson Schwartz, PA
	Chris Murphy, CT
	Frederica Wilson, FL
	Karen Bass, CA
	William Keating, MA
	David Cicilline, RI

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE AT THE HEARING ON THE  
DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. FORCES IN CENTRAL AFRICA AND IMPLEMENTATION OF  
THE LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY DISARMAMENT AND NORTHERN UGANDA  
RECOVERY ACT, BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OCTOBER 25, 2011

I want to applaud my good friend Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen for holding this hearing, and thank her for allowing me to submit this testimony for the record.

I became involved in the fight against Joseph Kony and his murderous Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) 15 years ago when I first travelled to Central Africa. As the most travelled Senator to Africa in the history of the U.S. Senate, I know that for 20 years, Kony and his LRA have been responsible for one of the longest and most violent conflicts on the continent, and they continue to destabilize the countries of Central Africa.

Kony's and his LRA's brutality have created a region of terror and lawlessness that is open to the influences of extremist and terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda that have begun expanding operations throughout Africa. One million have been displaced. Tens of thousands have died. Thirty thousand children have been kidnapped and either killed, turned into 'Child Soldiers', sex slaves or mutilated by having their limbs, nose, lips and ears cut off (see attached graphic photos). Eliminating the LRA threat will help stabilize the region. The more stability we bring to Africa, the more secure America and the world is from terrorism.

The LRA is not a Christian organization. The Catholic Church in Uganda has disassociated and condemned Kony and the LRA. They are guilty of crimes against humanity, and the State Department has designated Kony a "global terrorist".


This is not a War Powers Resolution issue. Our troops will be carrying out policies congressionally mandated by law – the Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-172)-- which I helped pass in the Senate, and which calls on the U.S. to work with African governments to "apprehend or remove Joseph Kony and his top commanders from the battlefield." Our national security purpose there could not be clear.

There are already over 1,000 U.S. troops supporting twenty countries in Africa. The up to 100 U.S. forces deploying to Uganda will not be engaged in combat. They will train, equip and advise the Ugandan military forces carrying out this mission. This is not a Libya. Our assistance there will help build African military capacity in this region so that Africans can eliminate this threat, secure their own countries, and prevent the spread of terrorism.

For years, the U.S. ignored the growing threat in Afghanistan. We cannot afford to repeat that mistake in Africa. It is time to end Kony's reign of terror.

(See reverse)

## Who is Joseph Kony?




Joseph Kony, leader of the Lord's Resistance Army since 1987, combines cult fanaticism with ruthless military efficiency. In the past 20 years, Kony and his LRA have killed tens of thousands, displaced over 1 million and kidnapped more than 30,000 children to turn into 'child soldiers'. In 2005, the International Criminal Court charged Kony with 12 counts of crimes against humanity and 21 counts of war crimes. The U.S. Department of State has designated him a "global terrorist". He has yet to face justice for his actions. (Photo/AP)

Child Soldier



Victims of Joseph Kony and the LRA



PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, A  
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

*Smith*

**Opening Statement**  
**“Deployment of U.S. Forces in Central Africa and Implementation**  
**of The Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda**  
**Recovery Act”**

House Committee on Foreign Affairs  
October 25, 2011  
Rayburn 2172

Thank you, Madame Chairman, for calling this critical hearing about the recent deployment of 100 military advisers to Uganda to help African militaries fight the deadly Lord’s Resistance Army.

The United Nations estimates that more than 380,000 people have been displaced across the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan because of LRA attacks. More than 2 million Ugandans were displaced by this group before it was effectively expelled from that country.

The LRA is responsible for serious and widespread human rights abuses throughout the region, including murder, mutilation, abduction, sexual enslavement of women and children and forcing children to take part in incredibly vicious attacks – often on their own villages and even their own families. Since 2008 alone, it is estimated that the LRA has killed more than 2,400 people and abducted more than 3,400 others.

Two years ago, Congress passed and the President signed the Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act. That legislation calls for our government to develop a regional strategy to eliminate the threat posed by the LRA. While we should follow through on the implementation of this legislation, far more information is needed with respect to the deployment of our military personnel and the mission to which they have been assigned.

Critical questions have yet to be answered, such as whether we have clarified our role of engagement with the militaries in the region. Have we adequately ascertained that these militaries are capable of carrying out the mission? And what constitutes the completion point for this mission? Prior unsuccessful efforts to capture Joseph Kony have actually resulted in more massacres and devastation when the LRA retaliated against local populations. Are adequate safeguards in place to avoid such scenarios in the future?

While everything can and should be done to stop the ongoing human rights abuses being committed by Kony and those in league with him, we must not forget the disastrous outcome when U.S. special forces attempted to capture the Somali warlord, Mohammed Aided, in 1992. Congress and the Administration must ensure that the mission and its goals are achievable before we commit our military personnel.

I look forward to learning more from our distinguished witnesses.

Thank you Madame Chairman.



The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly (VA-11)  
 HCFA Full Committee Hearing: Deployment of U.S. Forces in Central Africa and Implementation of The Lord's  
 Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act  
 Tuesday, Oct. 25, 2011  
 10am

A 2005 arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) outlines the myriad crimes against humanity for which Joseph Kony and his Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) are infamous, including war crimes, rape, "forced enlisting of children," and "intentionally directing an attack against a civilian population."<sup>1</sup> An examination of the President's decision to deploy a total of 100 U.S. servicemembers to Uganda over the next month to "[work] toward the removal of Joseph Kony in the battlefield,"<sup>2</sup> requires an analysis of the statutory rationale behind the decision.

Context shows that recent efforts by the United States to counter the violent atrocities perpetrated by the LRA are not new. According to the State Department, "since 2008, the United States has provided over \$40 million in critical logistical support, equipment and training to enhance counter-LRA operations by regional militaries."<sup>3</sup> Moreover, section three of Public Law 111-172—The Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009—states, among other things, that:

It is the policy of the United States to work with regional governments toward a comprehensive and lasting resolution to the conflict in northern Uganda and other affected areas by—  
 (1) providing political, economic, military, and intelligence support for viable multilateral efforts to protect civilians from the Lord's Resistance Army, to apprehend or remove Joseph Kony and his top commanders from the battlefield in the continued absence of a negotiated solution, and to disarm and demobilize the remaining Lord's Resistance Army fighters;<sup>4</sup>

My colleagues and I are quite familiar with this text. On April 28, 2010, this Committee marked up the bill on which PL 111-172 is based—S. 1067—and passed it by voice vote. In accordance with section four of the law, the Administration subsequently sent a detailed strategy to Congress regarding U.S. efforts to mitigate and eliminate the threat to civilians and regional stability posed by the Lord's Resistance Army. That strategy outlines three parts of the strategy: protecting civilians, providing humanitarian assistance, and countering the LRA.<sup>5</sup>

Most recently, on October 14, the President "authorized a small number of combat equipped U.S. forces" to "act as advisors to partner forces" with "the goal of removing from the battlefield Joseph Kony and" his associates.<sup>6</sup> The total U.S. forces deployed over the next month will reach 100. The President was explicit in stating that "U.S. forces...will only be providing information, advice, and

<sup>1</sup> International Criminal Court, "Press Release: Warrant of Arrest unsealed against five LRA Commanders." Available at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menu/ICC/Press+and+Media/Press+Releases/2005/Warrant+of+Arrest+unsealed+against+five+LRA+Commanders.htm>.

<sup>2</sup> Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate Regarding the Lord's Resistance Army. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/14/letter-president-speaker-house-representatives-and-president-pro-tempore>.

<sup>3</sup> U.S. State Department, "Fact Sheet: U.S. Support to Regional Efforts to Counter the Lord's Resistance Army," October 24, 2011. Available at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/10/175523.htm>.

<sup>4</sup> PL 111-172, available at <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ172/html/PLAW-111publ172.htm>.

<sup>5</sup> October 24, 2011 State Department fact sheet.

<sup>6</sup> Letter from the President to the Speaker.

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly (VA-11)

assistance to partner nation forces."<sup>7</sup> In other words, U.S. forces will counsel our multilateral partners on the ground on how best to achieve the military goals outlined in Public Law 111-172, section three.

If this conflict escalates to a full-fledged military engagement on the part of U.S. forces, then Congress ought to reexamine the conflict, pursuant to the legislative branch's authorities outlined in Article I of the Constitution. I commend the Administration for producing witnesses before this Committee regarding the October 14 decision. I look forward to their testimony and to an update on U.S. actions to combat the LRA. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

### **Full Committee Hearing**

“Deployment of U.S. Forces in Central Africa and Implementation of The Lord’s  
Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act”

Representative Karen Bass | October 25, 2011

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#### **Opening Remarks:**

Thank you, Chairman for convening this hearing to address the enduring conflict in the Central African region. Thank you also to today’s witnesses for shedding further light on this crisis and US efforts to address it.

For over two decades the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has acted with seeming impunity --- terrorizing, populations in Uganda, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic. It is well documented that the LRA commits acts of unconscionable violence against civilian populations, including egregious and unspeakable acts of brutality against children. **The LRA has abducted, killed, raped, maimed and kidnapped the innocent.**

Our government has tracked, monitored and pursued an end to this situation, and advocate groups such as Human Rights Watch have thoroughly investigated these atrocities and documented terrible and violent acts.

It is without question that in the interest of our national security and foreign policy interests that the U.S. work to an effective end to this situation.

Congress passed legislation last year to broad bipartisan support to mitigate and eliminate the LRA threat. These efforts should continue until the violence is stopped, civilian populations protected and stability returned to the region.

Thank you and I look forward to the testimony of today's witnesses.

**Questions**

- Do you feel that you have the necessary resources to protect civilians in the event that the LRA retaliates against innocent communities caught in the middle of this conflict?
- Can you please provide specific details on how much this operation is expected to cost, what are the expectations of success and what is the review process to ensure a limited but effective engagement by U.S. forces?