[House Report 117-156]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
117th Congress } { Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session } { 117-156
======================================================================
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022
_______
October 28, 2021.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Schiff, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
MINORITY VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 5412]
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was
referred the bill (H.R. 5412) to authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 2022 for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes,
having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an
amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do pass.
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Intelligence community management account.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Sec. 301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 303. Temporary authority for paid leave for a serious health
condition.
Sec. 304. Harmonization of whistleblower protections.
Sec. 305. Congressional oversight of certain special access programs.
Sec. 306. Clarification of requirement for authorization of funding for
intelligence activities.
Sec. 307. Authorization of support by Director of National Intelligence
for certain activities relating to intelligence community workforce.
Sec. 308. Requirements for certain employment activities by former
intelligence officers and employees.
Sec. 309. Non-reimbursable detail of intelligence community personnel
to assist with processing and resettlement of refugees, parolees, and
other aliens from Afghanistan.
Sec. 310. Authority for transport of certain canines associated with
force protection duties of intelligence community.
Sec. 311. Development of definitions for certain terms relating to
intelligence.
Sec. 312. Support for and oversight of Unidentified Aerial Phenomena
Task Force.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Sec. 401. National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center.
Sec. 402. Clarification of certain responsibilities of Director of
National Intelligence.
Sec. 403. Responsibility of Director of National Intelligence regarding
National Intelligence Program budget concerning Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
Sec. 404. Climate Security Advisory Council.
Subtitle B--Other Elements
Sec. 411. Protection of certain facilities and assets of Central
Intelligence Agency from unmanned aircraft.
Sec. 412. Modification of National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
personnel management authority to attract experts in science and
engineering.
Sec. 413. Requirements for termination of dual-hat arrangement for
Commander of the United States Cyber Command.
Sec. 414. National Space Intelligence Center.
Sec. 415. Procurement by Federal Bureau of Investigation of Chinese
products and services.
Sec. 416. Counterintelligence units at non-intelligence community
Federal departments and agencies.
Sec. 417. Detection and monitoring of wildfires.
TITLE V--ANOMALOUS HEALTH INCIDENTS AND OTHER HEALTH CARE MATTERS
Sec. 501. Compensation and professional standards for certain medical
officers of Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 502. Medical advisory board of Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 503. Report on protocols for certain intelligence community
employees and dependents.
Sec. 504. Inspector General of Central Intelligence Agency review of
Office of Medical Services.
Sec. 505. Clarification of effect of certain benefits relating to
injuries to the brain.
TITLE VI--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES
Sec. 601. National Intelligence Estimate on security situation in
Afghanistan and related region.
Sec. 602. Report on likelihood of military action by countries of the
South Caucasus.
Sec. 603. Report on intelligence collection posture and other matters
relating to Afghanistan and related region.
Sec. 604. Report on threat posed by emerging Chinese technology
companies.
Sec. 605. Report on cooperation between China and United Arab Emirates.
Sec. 606. Report on propagation of extremist ideologies from Saudi
Arabia.
Sec. 607. Report on effects of sanctions by United States.
TITLE VII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
Sec. 701. Pilot program for security vetting of certain individuals.
Sec. 702. Intelligence assessment and reports on foreign racially
motivated violent extremists.
Sec. 703. Periodic report on positions in intelligence community that
can be conducted without access to classified information, networks, or
facilities.
Sec. 704. Biennial reports on foreign biological threats.
Sec. 705. Annual reports on domestic activities of intelligence
community.
Sec. 706. Annual reports on certain cyber vulnerabilities procured by
intelligence community and foreign commercial providers of cyber
vulnerabilities.
Sec. 707. Improvements to annual report on demographic data of
employees of intelligence community.
Sec. 708. National Intelligence Estimate on escalation and de-
escalation of gray zone activities in great power competition.
Sec. 709. Report on certain actions taken by intelligence community
with respect to human rights and international humanitarian law.
Sec. 710. Briefing on trainings relating to blockchain technology.
Sec. 711. Report on prospective ability to administer COVID-19 vaccines
and other medical interventions to certain intelligence community
personnel.
Sec. 712. Report on potential inclusion within intelligence community
of the Office of National Security of the Department of Health and
Human Services.
Sec. 713. Reports relating to Inspector General of Defense Intelligence
Agency.
Sec. 714. Report on rare earth elements.
Sec. 715. Report on plan to fully fund the Information Systems Security
Program and next generation encryption.
Sec. 716. Review of National Security Agency and United States Cyber
Command.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term
``congressional intelligence committees'' has the meaning given
such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3003).
(2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2022
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the following elements of the United States Government:
(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) The Department of Defense.
(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(5) The National Security Agency.
(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(7) The Coast Guard.
(8) The Department of State.
(9) The Department of the Treasury.
(10) The Department of Energy.
(11) The Department of Justice.
(12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
(14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(16) The Department of Homeland Security.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts.--The amounts authorized to be
appropriated under section 101 for the conduct of the intelligence
activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of
section 101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations prepared to accompany this Act.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--
(1) Availability.--The classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the
President.
(2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph (3),
the President shall provide for suitable distribution of the
classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection
(a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule, within the
executive branch.
(3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly
disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any
portion of such Schedule except--
(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50
U.S.C. 3306(a));
(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget;
or
(C) as otherwise required by law.
SEC. 103. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the
Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2022 the sum of
$619,000,000.
(b) Classified Authorization of Appropriations.--In addition to
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community
Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for
fiscal year 2022 such additional amounts as are specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund $514,000,000 for fiscal year
2022.
TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
SEC. 301. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed
to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity
which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of
the United States.
SEC. 302. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY
LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement,
and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in
such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
SEC. 303. TEMPORARY AUTHORITY FOR PAID LEAVE FOR A SERIOUS HEALTH
CONDITION.
(a) Authorization of Paid Leave for a Serious Health Condition for
Employees of Elements of the Intelligence Community.--
(1) In general.--Title III of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3071 et seq.) is amended by inserting after
section 304 the following:
``SEC. 305. TEMPORARY AUTHORITY FOR PAID LEAVE FOR A SERIOUS HEALTH
CONDITION.
``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Paid serious health condition leave.--The term `paid
serious health condition leave' means paid leave taken under
subsection (b).
``(2) Serious health condition.--The term `serious health
condition' has the meaning given the term in section 6381 of
title 5, United States Code.
``(3) Son or daughter.--The term `son or daughter' has the
meaning given the term in section 6381 of title 5, United
States Code.
``(b) Paid Serious Health Condition Leave.--During the period
specified in subsection (f), and notwithstanding any other provision of
law, a civilian employee of an element of the intelligence community
shall have available a total of 12 administrative workweeks of paid
leave during any 12-month period for one or more of the following:
``(1) In order to care for the spouse, or a son, daughter, or
parent, of the employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or
parent has a serious health condition.
``(2) Because of a serious health condition that makes the
employee unable to perform the functions of the employee's
position.
``(c) Treatment of Serious Health Condition Leave Request.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an element of the
intelligence community shall accommodate an employee's leave schedule
request under subsection (b), including a request to use such leave
intermittently or on a reduced leave schedule, to the extent that the
requested leave schedule does not unduly disrupt agency operations.
``(d) Rules Relating to Paid Leave.--During the period specified in
subsection (f), and notwithstanding any other provision of law--
``(1) an employee of an element of the intelligence
community--
``(A) shall be required to first use all accrued or
accumulated paid sick leave before being allowed to use
paid serious health condition leave; and
``(B) may not be required to first use all or any
portion of any unpaid leave available to the employee
before being allowed to use paid serious health
condition leave; and
``(2) paid serious health condition leave--
``(A) shall be payable from any appropriation or fund
available for salaries or expenses for positions within
the employing element;
``(B) may not be considered to be annual or vacation
leave for purposes of section 5551 or 5552 of title 5,
United States Code, or for any other purpose;
``(C) if not used by the employee before the end of
the 12-month period described in subsection (b) to
which the leave relates, may not be available for any
subsequent use and may not be converted into a cash
payment;
``(D) may be granted only to the extent that the
employee does not receive a total of more than 12 weeks
of paid serious health condition leave in any 12-month
period;
``(E) shall be used in increments of hours (or
fractions thereof), with 12 administrative workweeks
equal to 480 hours for employees of elements of the
intelligence community with a regular full-time work
schedule and converted to a proportional number of
hours for employees of such elements with part-time,
seasonal, or uncommon tours of duty; and
``(F) may not be used during off-season (nonpay
status) periods for employees of such elements with
seasonal work schedules.
``(e) Implementation.--
``(1) Consistency with serious health condition leave under
title 5.--The Director of National Intelligence shall carry out
this section in a manner consistent, to the extent appropriate,
with the administration of leave taken under section 6382 of
title 5, United States Code, for a reason described in
subparagraph (C) or (D) of subsection (a)(1) of that section,
including with respect to the authority to require a
certification described in section 6383 of such title.
``(2) Implementation plan.--Not later than 1 year after the
date of enactment of this section, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees an implementation plan that includes--
``(A) processes and procedures for implementing the
paid serious health condition leave policies under
subsections (b) through (d) during the period specified
in subsection (f);
``(B) an explanation of how such implementation will
be reconciled with policies of other elements of the
Federal Government, including the impact on elements
funded by the National Intelligence Program that are
housed within agencies outside the intelligence
community;
``(C) the projected impact of such implementation on
the workforce of the intelligence community, including
take rates, retention, recruiting, and morale, broken
down by each element of the intelligence community; and
``(D) all costs or operational expenses associated
with such implementation.
``(3) Directive.--Not later than 90 days after the Director
of National Intelligence submits the implementation plan under
paragraph (2), the Director of National Intelligence shall
issue a written directive to implement this section, which
directive shall take effect on the date of issuance.
``(f) Duration of Authority.--The authority and requirements under
subsections (b) through (d) shall only apply during the 3-year period
beginning on the date on which the Director of National Intelligence
issues the written directive under subsection (e)(3).
``(g) Annual Report.--During the period specified in subsection (f),
the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees an annual report that--
``(1) details the number of employees of each element of the
intelligence community who applied for and took paid serious
health condition leave during the year covered by the report;
``(2) includes updates on major implementation challenges or
costs associated with paid serious health condition leave; and
``(3) includes a recommendation of the Director with respect
to whether to extend the period specified in subsection (f).''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents at the
beginning of such Act is amended by inserting after the item
relating to section 304 the following:
``Sec. 305. Temporary authority for paid leave for a serious health
condition.''.
(b) Applicability.--Section 305 of the National Security Act of 1947,
as added by subsection (b), shall apply with respect to leave taken in
connection with a serious health condition (as defined in subsection
(a) of such section 305) that occurs or continues to exist during the
period specified in subsection (f) of such section.
SEC. 304. HARMONIZATION OF WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS.
(a) Prohibited Personnel Practices in the Intelligence Community.--
(1) Threats relating to personnel actions.--
(A) Agency employees.--Section 1104(b) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3234(b)) is
amended, in the matter preceding paragraph (1)--
(i) by striking ``Any employee of an agency''
and inserting ``Any employee of a covered
intelligence community element or an agency'';
and
(ii) by inserting ``, or threaten to take or
fail to take,'' after ``take or fail to take''.
(B) Contractor employees.--Section 1104(c)(1) of such
Act (50 U.S.C. 3234(c)(1)) is amended, in the matter
preceding subparagraph (A), by inserting ``, or
threaten to take or fail to take,'' after ``take or
fail to take''.
(2) Protection for contractor employees against reprisal from
agency employees.--Section 1104(c)(1) of such Act (50 U.S.C.
3234(c)(1)), as amended by paragraph (1)(B) of this subsection,
is further amended, in the matter preceding subparagraph (A),
by inserting ``of an agency or'' after ``Any employee''.
(3) Enforcement.--Subsection (d) of section 1104 of such Act
(50 U.S.C. 3234) is amended to read as follows:
``(d) Enforcement.--The President shall provide for the enforcement
of this section consistent, to the fullest extent possible, with the
policies and procedures used to adjudicate alleged violations of
section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code.''.
(b) Retaliatory Revocation of Security Clearances and Access
Determinations.--
(1) Enforcement.--Section 3001(j) of the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)) is
amended--
(A) by redesignating paragraph (8) as paragraph (9);
and
(B) by inserting after paragraph (7) the following:
``(8) Enforcement.--Except as otherwise provided in this
subsection, the President shall provide for the enforcement of
this section consistent, to the fullest extent possible, with
the policies and procedures used to adjudicate alleged
violations of section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States
Code.''.
(2) Tolling of deadline for appeal of prohibited reprisal.--
Section 3001(j)(4) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)(4)) is
amended--
(A) in subparagraph (A), by inserting ``(except as
provided by subparagraph (D))'' after ``within 90
days''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following new
subparagraph:
``(D) Tolling.--The time requirement established by
subparagraph (A) for an employee or former employee to
appeal the decision of an agency may be tolled if the
employee or former employee presents substantial
credible evidence showing why the employee or former
employee did not timely initiate the appeal and why the
enforcement of the time requirement would be unfair,
such as evidence showing that the employee or former
employee--
``(i) did not receive notice of the decision;
or
``(ii) could not timely initiate the appeal
because of factors beyond the control of the
employee or former employee.''.
(c) Correction of Definition of Agency.--Section 3001(a)(1)(B) of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C.
3341(a)(1)(B)) is amended by striking ``and'' and inserting ``or''.
(d) Establishing Consistency With Respect to Protections for
Disclosures of Mismanagement.--
(1) Security clearance and access determinations.--Section
3001(j)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)(1)) is amended--
(A) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by striking ``gross
mismanagement'' and inserting ``mismanagement''; and
(B) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking ``gross
mismanagement'' and inserting ``mismanagement''.
(2) Personnel actions against contractor employees.--Section
1104(c)(1)(B) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3234(c)(1)(B)) is amended by striking ``gross mismanagement''
and inserting ``mismanagement''.
(e) Protected Disclosures to Supervisors.--
(1) Personnel actions.--
(A) Disclosures by agency employees to supervisors.--
Section 1104(b) of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 3234(b)), as amended by subsection
(a)(1)(A), is further amended, in the matter preceding
paragraph (1), by inserting ``a supervisor in the
employee's direct chain of command, or a supervisor of
the employing agency with responsibility for the
subject matter of the disclosure, up to and including''
before ``the head of the employing agency''.
(B) Disclosures by contractor employees to
supervisors.--Section 1104(c)(1) of such Act (50 U.S.C.
3234(c)(1)), as amended by subsection (a), is further
amended, in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by
inserting ``a supervisor in the contractor employee's
direct chain of command, or a supervisor of the
contracting agency with responsibility for the subject
matter of the disclosure, up to and including'' before
``the head of the contracting agency''.
(2) Security clearance and access determinations.--Section
3001(j)(1)(A) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)(1)(A)) is amended, in
the matter preceding clause (i), by inserting ``a supervisor in
the employee's direct chain of command, or a supervisor of the
employing agency with responsibility for the subject matter of
the disclosure, up to and including'' before ``the head of the
employing agency''.
(f) Establishing Parity for Protected Disclosures.--Section 1104 of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3234) is further amended--
(1) in subsection (b), as amended by subsections (a)(1)(A)
and (e)(1)(A)--
(A) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as
subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively, and moving
such subparagraphs, as so redesignated, 2 ems to the
right;
(B) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), as
redesignated and moved by subparagraph (A) of this
paragraph, by striking ``for a lawful disclosure'' and
inserting the following: ``for--
``(1) any lawful disclosure''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following:
``(2) any lawful disclosure that complies with--
``(A) subsections (a)(1), (d), and (g) of section 8H
of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.);
``(B) subparagraphs (A), (D), and (H) of section
17(d)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949
(50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(5)); or
``(C) subparagraphs (A), (D), and (I) of section
103H(k)(5); or
``(3) if the actions do not result in the employee unlawfully
disclosing information specifically required by Executive order
to be kept classified in the interest of national defense or
the conduct of foreign affairs, any lawful disclosure in
conjunction with--
``(A) the exercise of any appeal, complaint, or
grievance right granted by any law, rule, or
regulation;
``(B) testimony for or otherwise lawfully assisting
any individual in the exercise of any right referred to
in subparagraph (A); or
``(C) cooperation with or disclosing information to
the Inspector General of an agency, in accordance with
applicable provisions of law in connection with an
audit, inspection, or investigation conducted by the
Inspector General.''; and
(2) in subsection (c)(1), as amended by subsections (a) and
(e)(1)(B)--
(A) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) and (B) as
clauses (i) and (ii), respectively, and moving such
clauses, as so redesignated, 2 ems to the right;
(B) in the matter preceding clause (i), as
redesignated and moved by subparagraph (A) of this
paragraph, by striking ``for a lawful disclosure'' and
inserting the following: ``for--
``(A) any lawful disclosure''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following:
``(B) any lawful disclosure that complies with--
``(i) subsections (a)(1), (d), and (g) of section 8H
of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.);
``(ii) subparagraphs (A), (D), and (H) of section
17(d)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949
(50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(5)); or
``(iii) subparagraphs (A), (D), and (I) of section
103H(k)(5); or
``(C) if the actions do not result in the contractor employee
unlawfully disclosing information specifically required by
Executive order to be kept classified in the interest of
national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs, any lawful
disclosure in conjunction with--
``(i) the exercise of any appeal, complaint, or
grievance right granted by any law, rule, or
regulation;
``(ii) testimony for or otherwise lawfully assisting
any individual in the exercise of any right referred to
in clause (i); or
``(iii) cooperation with or disclosing information to
the Inspector General of an agency, in accordance with
applicable provisions of law in connection with an
audit, inspection, or investigation conducted by the
Inspector General.''.
(g) Clarification Relating to Protected Disclosures.--Section 1104 of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3234) is further amended--
(1) by redesignating subsections (d) and (e) as subsections
(f) and (g), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:
``(d) Rule of Construction.--Consistent with the protection of
sources and methods, nothing in subsection (b) or (c) shall be
construed to authorize--
``(1) the withholding of information from Congress; or
``(2) the taking of any personnel action against an employee
who lawfully discloses information to Congress.
``(e) Disclosures.--A disclosure shall not be excluded from this
section because--
``(1) the disclosure was made to an individual, including a
supervisor, who participated in an activity that the employee
reasonably believed to be covered under subsection (b)(1)(B) or
the contractor employee reasonably believed to be covered under
subsection (c)(1)(A)(ii);
``(2) the disclosure revealed information that had been
previously disclosed;
``(3) the disclosure was not made in writing;
``(4) the disclosure was made while the employee was off
duty;
``(5) of the amount of time which has passed since the
occurrence of the events described in the disclosure; or
``(6) the disclosure was made during the normal course of
duties of an employee or contractor employee.''.
(h) Correction Relating to Normal Course Disclosures.--Section
3001(j)(3) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)(3)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``Disclosures.--'' and all that follows
through ``because--'' and inserting ``Disclosures.--A
disclosure shall not be excluded from paragraph (1) because--
'';
(2) by striking subparagraph (B);
(3) by redesignating clauses (i) through (v) as subparagraphs
(A) through (E), respectively, and moving such subparagraphs,
as so redesignated, 2 ems to the left;
(4) in subparagraph (D), as so redesignated, by striking
``or'' at the end;
(5) in subparagraph (E), as redesignated by paragraph (3), by
striking the period at the end and inserting ``; or''; and
(6) by adding at the end the following:
``(F) the disclosure was made during the normal
course of duties of an employee.''.
(i) Clarification Relating to Rule of Construction.--Section
3001(j)(2) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)(2)) is amended by inserting ``or clearance
action'' after ``personnel action''.
(j) Clarification Relating to Prohibited Practices.--Section
3001(j)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)(1)), as amended by this section, is further
amended by striking ``over'' and inserting ``to take, direct others to
take, recommend, or approve''.
(k) Technical Correction.--Section 3001(j)(1)(C)(i) of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C.
3341(j)(1)(C)(i)) is amended by striking ``(h)'' and inserting ``(g)''.
(l) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report assessing the extent to which protections provided under
Presidential Policy Directive 19 (relating to protecting whistleblowers
with access to classified information) have been codified in statutes.
SEC. 305. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF CERTAIN SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS.
(a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 501 the
following new section (and conforming the table of contents at the
beginning of such Act accordingly):
``SEC. 501A. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF CERTAIN SPECIAL ACCESS
PROGRAMS.
``(a) Reports and Notifications.--At the same time that the Secretary
of Defense submits any report or notification under section 119 of
title 10, United States Code, that relates to a covered special access
program or a new covered special access program, the Secretary shall
also submit such report or notification to the congressional
intelligence committees.
``(b) Briefings.--On a periodic basis, but not less frequently than
semiannually, the Secretary of Defense shall provide to the chairmen
and ranking minority members of the congressional intelligence
committees, and to any staff of such a committee designated by either
the chair or ranking member for purposes of this subsection, a briefing
on covered special access programs. Each such briefing shall include,
at a minimum--
``(1) a description of the activity of the program during the
period covered by the briefing; and
``(2) documentation with respect to how the program has
achieved outcomes consistent with requirements documented by
the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of
Defense.
``(c) Notifications on Compartments and Subcompartments.--
``(1) Requirement.--Except as provided by paragraph (2), a
head of an element of the intelligence community may not
establish a compartment or a subcompartment under a covered
special access program until the head notifies the
congressional intelligence committees of such compartment or
subcompartment, as the case may be.
``(2) Waiver.--
``(A) Determination.--On a case-by-case basis, the
Director of National Intelligence may waive the
requirement under paragraph (1). Not later than two
days after making such a waiver, the Director shall
notify the congressional intelligence committees of the
waiver, including a justification for the waiver.
``(B) Submission.--Not later than 30 days after the
date on which the Director makes a waiver under
subparagraph (A), the head of the element of the
intelligence community for whom the waiver was made
shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees the notification required under paragraph
(1) relating to such waiver.
``(d) Annual Reports.--
``(1) Requirement.--On an annual basis, the head of each
element of the intelligence community shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on covered
special access programs administered by the head.
``(2) Matters included.--Each report shall include, with
respect to the period covered by the report, the following:
``(A) A list of all compartments and subcompartments
of covered special access programs active as of the
date of the report.
``(B) A list of all compartments and subcompartments
of covered special access programs terminated during
the period covered by the report.
``(C) With respect to the report submitted by the
Director of National Intelligence, in addition to the
matters specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B)--
``(i) a certification regarding whether the
creation, validation, or substantial
modification, including termination, for all
existing and proposed covered special access
programs, and the compartments and
subcompartments within each, are substantiated
and justified based on the information required
by clause (ii); and
``(ii) for each certification--
``(I) the rationale for the
revalidation, validation, or
substantial modification, including
termination, of each covered special
access program, compartment, and
subcompartment;
``(II) the identification of a
control officer for each covered
special access program; and
``(III) a statement of protection
requirements for each covered special
access program.
``(e) Covered Special Access Program Defined.--In this section, the
term `covered special access program' means a special access program
that receives funding under the National Intelligence Program or the
Military Intelligence Program, relates to an intelligence or
intelligence-related activity, or both.''.
(b) First Report.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the head of each element of the intelligence
community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees the
first report required under section 501A(d)(1) of the National Security
Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a).
(c) Conforming Repeal.--Section 608 of the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (division N of Public Law 115-31; 131 Stat.
833; 50 U.S.C. 3315) is amended by striking subsection (b).
SEC. 306. CLARIFICATION OF REQUIREMENT FOR AUTHORIZATION OF FUNDING FOR
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
Paragraph (1) of section 504(a) of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 3094(a)) is amended to read as follows:
``(1) those funds were specifically authorized by Congress
for use for such intelligence or intelligence-related
activities; or''.
SEC. 307. AUTHORIZATION OF SUPPORT BY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
FOR CERTAIN ACTIVITIES RELATING TO INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY WORKFORCE.
Title X of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3191 et seq.)
is amended by inserting after section 1024 the following new section
(and conforming the table of contents at the beginning of such Act
accordingly):
``SEC. 1025. AUTHORIZATION OF SUPPORT BY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE FOR CERTAIN WORKFORCE ACTIVITIES.
``(a) Authorization.--The Director may, with or without
reimbursement, obligate or expend amounts authorized to be appropriated
or otherwise made available for the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence for covered workforce activities for the purpose of
supporting a covered workforce activity of an element of the
intelligence community.
``(b) Covered Workforce Activity Defined.--In this section, the term
`covered workforce activity' means an activity relating to--
``(1) recruitment or retention of the intelligence community
workforce; or
``(2) diversity, equality, inclusion, or accessibility, with
respect to such workforce.''.
SEC. 308. REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTAIN EMPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES BY FORMER
INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES.
(a) Modifications to Requirement.--
(1) In general.--Section 304 of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3073a) is amended to read as follows:
``SEC. 304. REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTAIN EMPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES BY FORMER
INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES.
``(a) Temporary Restriction.--An employee of an element of the
intelligence community who occupies a covered intelligence position may
not occupy a covered post-service position during the 30-month period
following the date on which the employee ceases to occupy a covered
intelligence position.
``(b) Covered Post-service Employment Reporting.--
``(1) Requirement.--During the 5-year period beginning on the
date on which an employee ceases to occupy a covered
intelligence position, the employee shall--
``(A) report covered post-service employment to the
head of the element of the intelligence community that
employed such employee in such covered intelligence
position upon accepting such covered post-service
employment; and
``(B) annually (or more frequently if the head of
such element considers it appropriate) report covered
post-service employment to the head of such element.
``(2) Regulations.--The head of each element of the
intelligence community shall issue regulations requiring, as a
condition of employment, each employee of such element
occupying a covered intelligence position to sign a written
agreement requiring the regular reporting of covered post-
service employment to the head of such element pursuant to
paragraph (1).
``(c) Penalties.--
``(1) Criminal penalties.--A former employee who knowingly
and willfully violates subsection (a) or who knowingly and
willfully fails to make a required report under subsection (b)
shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, or
imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both. Each report
under subsection (b) shall be subject to section 1001 of title
18, United States Code.
``(2) Security clearances.--The head of an element of the
intelligence community shall revoke the security clearance of a
former employee if the former employee knowingly and willfully
fails to make a required report under subsection (b) or
knowingly and willfully makes a false report under such
subsection.
``(d) Provision of Information.--
``(1) Training.--The head of each element of the intelligence
community shall regularly provide training on the reporting
requirements under subsection (b) to employees of that element
who occupy a covered intelligence position.
``(2) Written notice.--The head of each element of the
intelligence community shall provide written notice of the
reporting requirements under subsection (b) to an employee when
the employee ceases to occupy a covered intelligence position.
``(e) Annual Reports.--
``(1) Requirement.--Not later than March 31 of each year, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on covered post-
service employment occurring during the year covered by the
report.
``(2) Elements.--Each report under paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
``(A) The number of former employees who occupy a
covered post-service position, broken down by--
``(i) the name of the employer;
``(ii) the foreign government, including by
the specific foreign individual, agency, or
entity, for whom the covered post-service
employment is being performed; and
``(iii) the nature of the services provided
as part of the covered post-service employment.
``(B) A certification by the Director that--
``(i) each element of the intelligence
community maintains adequate systems and
processes for ensuring that former employees
are submitting reports required under
subsection (b);
``(ii) to the knowledge of the heads of the
elements of the intelligence community, all
former employees who occupy a covered post-
service position are in compliance with this
section;
``(iii) the services provided by former
employees who occupy a covered post-service
position do not--
``(I) pose a current or future threat
to the national security of the United
States; or
``(II) pose a counterintelligence
risk; and
``(iv) the Director and the heads of such
elements are not aware of any credible
information or reporting that any former
employee who occupies a covered post-service
position has engaged in activities that violate
Federal law, infringe upon the privacy rights
of United States persons, or constitute abuses
of human rights.
``(3) Form.--Each report under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
``(f) Notification.--In addition to the annual reports under
subsection (e), if a head of an element of the intelligence community
determines that the services provided by a former employee who occupies
a covered post-service position pose a threat or risk described in
clause (iii) of paragraph (2)(B) of such subsection, or include
activities described in clause (iv) of such paragraph, the head shall
notify the congressional intelligence committees of such determination
by not later than 7 days after making such determination. The
notification shall include the following:
``(1) The name of the former employee.
``(2) The name of the employer.
``(3) The foreign government, including the specific foreign
individual, agency, or entity, for whom the covered post-
service employment is being performed.
``(4) As applicable, a description of--
``(A) the risk to national security, the
counterintelligence risk, or both; and
``(B) the activities that may violate Federal law,
infringe upon the privacy rights of United States
persons, or constitute abuses of human rights.
``(g) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Covered intelligence position.--The term `covered
intelligence position' means a position within an element of
the intelligence community that, based on the level of access
of a person occupying such position to information regarding
sensitive intelligence sources or methods or other
exceptionally sensitive matters, the head of such element
determines should be subject to the requirements of this
section.
``(2) Covered post-service employment.--The term `covered
post-service employment' means direct or indirect employment
by, representation of, or any provision of advice or services
relating to national security, intelligence, the military, or
internal security to, the government of a foreign country or
any company, entity, or other person whose activities are
directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled,
financed, or subsidized, in whole or in major part, by any
government of a foreign country.
``(3) Covered post-service position.--The term `covered post-
service position' means a position of employment described in
paragraph (2).
``(4) Employee.--The term `employee', with respect to an
employee occupying a covered intelligence position, includes an
officer or official of an element of the intelligence
community, a contractor of such an element, a detailee to such
an element, or a member of the Armed Forces assigned to such an
element.
``(5) Former employee.--The term `former employee' means an
individual--
``(A) who was an employee occupying a covered
intelligence position; and
``(B) who is subject to the requirements under
subsection (a) or (b).
``(6) Government of a foreign country.--The term `government
of a foreign country' has the meaning given the term in section
1(e) of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C.
611(e)).''.
(2) Application.--Such section 304, as amended by paragraph
(1), shall apply with respect to employees who occupy covered
intelligence positions (as defined in such section) on or after
the date of the enactment of this Act.
(3) Revised regulations.--
(A) Submission.--Not later than 90 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the head of each
element of the intelligence community shall submit to
the congressional intelligence committees new or
updated regulations issued under such section 304, as
amended by paragraph (1).
(B) Certification.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees--
(i) a written certification for each head of
an element of the intelligence community who
has issued the updated regulations under such
section 304, as amended by paragraph (1); and
(ii) for each head of an element of the
intelligence community who has not issued such
updated regulations, an explanation for the
failure to issue such updated regulations.
(4) Initial report.--In the first report submitted by the
Director of National Intelligence under subsection (e) of such
section 304, as amended by paragraph (1), the Director shall
include an assessment of the licensing requirements under the
Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) and
recommendations with respect to strengthening the activities
regulated under such section 304.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the beginning of
such Act is amended by striking the item relating to section 304 and
inserting the following new item:
``Sec. 304. Requirements for certain employment activities by former
intelligence officers and employees.''.
SEC. 309. NON-REIMBURSABLE DETAIL OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL
TO ASSIST WITH PROCESSING AND RESETTLEMENT OF
REFUGEES, PAROLEES, AND OTHER ALIENS FROM
AFGHANISTAN.
Section 113A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3049) is
amended--
(1) by striking ``An officer'' and inserting ``(a) In
General.--An officer'';
(2) by striking ``section'' both places it appears and
inserting ``subsection''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(b) Processing and Resettlement of Refugees, Parolees, and Other
Aliens From Afghanistan.--An officer or employee of an element of the
intelligence community may be detailed to another element of the United
States Government on a non-reimbursable basis for the purpose of
providing assistance with the processing and resettlement of refugees,
parolees, and other aliens, from Afghanistan, as jointly agreed to by
the heads of the receiving and detailing elements, for a period not to
exceed 1 year. This subsection does not limit any other source of
authority for reimbursable or non-reimbursable details. A non-
reimbursable detail made under this subsection shall not be considered
an augmentation of the appropriations of the receiving element of the
United States Government.''.
SEC. 310. AUTHORITY FOR TRANSPORT OF CERTAIN CANINES ASSOCIATED WITH
FORCE PROTECTION DUTIES OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.)
is amended by inserting after section 116 the following new section
(and conforming the table of contents at the beginning of such Act
accordingly):
``SEC. 116A. AUTHORITY FOR TRANSPORTATION OF CERTAIN CANINES ASSOCIATED
WITH FORCE PROTECTION DUTIES OF INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
``(a) Transportation.--For purposes of section 1344 of title 31,
United States Code, the transportation of federally owned canines
associated with force protection duties of an element of the
intelligence community between the residence of an officer or employee
of the element and various locations that is essential for the
performance of the force protection duty shall be deemed essential for
the safe and efficient performance of intelligence duties.
``(b) Officers and Employees Covered.--In the administration of
section 1344 of title 31, United States Code, an officer or employee of
an element of the intelligence community shall be treated as being
listed in subsection (b).''.
SEC. 311. DEVELOPMENT OF DEFINITIONS FOR CERTAIN TERMS RELATING TO
INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Development.--Not later than September 30, 2023, the Director of
National Intelligence and the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence and Security, in consultation with the heads of the
elements of the intelligence community, shall jointly develop and
publish definitions for the following terms:
(1) Acoustic intelligence.
(2) All-source intelligence.
(3) Communications intelligence.
(4) Critical intelligence.
(5) Cyber-threat intelligence.
(6) Electronic intelligence.
(7) Explosive ordnance intelligence.
(8) General military intelligence.
(9) Imagery intelligence.
(10) Instrumentation signals intelligence.
(11) Intelligence-related activity.
(12) Joint intelligence.
(13) Measurement and signature intelligence.
(14) Medical intelligence.
(15) Open-source intelligence.
(16) Operational intelligence.
(17) Scientific and technical intelligence.
(18) Signals intelligence.
(19) Strategic intelligence.
(20) Tactical intelligence.
(21) Target intelligence.
(22) Technical intelligence.
(23) Such others terms as may be jointly determined necessary
by the Director of National Intelligence and the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security.
(b) Application to Activities of Intelligence Community.--The
Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that the definitions
developed under subsection (a) are used uniformly across activities of
the intelligence community with respect to the corresponding terms
specified in such subsection.
(c) Notice of Modifications.--The Director of National Intelligence
and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees notification of any modification
by the Director and Under Secretary to a definition of a term specified
in subsection (a) following the initial publication of the definition
under such subsection.
(d) Definitions.--In this section, the terms ``congressional
intelligence committees'' and ``intelligence community'' have the
meanings given such terms in section 3 of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
SEC. 312. SUPPORT FOR AND OVERSIGHT OF UNIDENTIFIED AERIAL PHENOMENA
TASK FORCE.
(a) Availability of Data on Unidentified Aerial Phenomena.--The
Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that each element of the
intelligence community with data relating to unidentified aerial
phenomena makes such data available immediately to the Unidentified
Aerial Phenomena Task Force, or successor entity, and to the National
Air and Space Intelligence Center.
(b) Quarterly Reports.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than quarterly
thereafter, the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force, or
successor entity, shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report on the findings of the Unidentified Aerial
Phenomena Task Force, or successor entity.
(2) Contents.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1)
shall include, at a minimum, the following:
(A) All reported unidentified aerial phenomena-
related events that occurred during the period covered
by the report.
(B) All reported unidentified aerial phenomena-
related events that occurred during a period other than
the period covered by the report but were not included
in an earlier report.
(3) Form.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in classified form, consistent with the protection of
intelligence sources and methods.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means the following:
(A) The congressional intelligence committees.
(B) The Committees on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives and the Senate.
(2) Unidentified aerial phenomena task force.--The term
``Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force'' means the task
force established by the Department of Defense on August 4,
2020, to be led by the Department of the Navy, under the Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and
Security.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
SEC. 401. NATIONAL COUNTERPROLIFERATION AND BIOSECURITY CENTER.
(a) Redesignation of Center.--Section 119A of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3057) is amended by striking ``National Counter
Proliferation Center'' each place it appears and inserting ``National
Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center''.
(b) Establishment and Head.--Subsection (a) of such section is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (1)--
(A) by striking ``government tools to prevent'' and
inserting ``government tools to--
``(A) prevent'';
(B) by striking the period at the end and inserting
``; and''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new
subparagraph:
``(B) lead integration and mission management of all
intelligence activities pertaining to biosecurity and foreign
biological threats.''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(4) The Director of the National Counterproliferation and
Biosecurity Center shall serve as the principal coordinator for the
intelligence community, and as the principal advisor to the Director of
National Intelligence, with respect to biosecurity and foreign
biological threats.''.
(c) Missions and Objectives.--Subsection (b) of such section is
amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (1) through (7) as
subparagraphs (A) through (G), respectively, and moving such
subparagraphs, as so redesignated, 2 ems to the right;
(2) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), as so
redesignated, by striking ``In establishing'' and inserting the
following:
``(1) Counterproliferation.--In establishing''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(2) Biosecurity.--In establishing the National
Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center, the President
shall address the following missions and objectives to ensure
that the Center serves as the lead for the intelligence
community for the integration, mission management, and
coordination of intelligence activities pertaining to
biosecurity and foreign biological threats, regardless of
origin:
``(A) Ensuring that the elements of the intelligence
community provide timely and effective warnings to the
President and the Director of National Intelligence
regarding emerging foreign biological threats,
including diseases with pandemic potential.
``(B) Overseeing and coordinating the collection and
analysis of intelligence on biosecurity and foreign
biological threats in support of the intelligence needs
of the Federal departments and agencies responsible for
public health, including by conveying collection
priorities to elements of the intelligence community.
``(C) Coordinating intelligence support to the
Federal departments and agencies responsible for public
health, including by ensuring that intelligence
pertaining to biosecurity and foreign biological
threats is disseminated among appropriately cleared
personnel of such departments and agencies.
``(D) Coordinating with the Federal departments and
agencies responsible for public health to encourage
information sharing with the intelligence community.
``(E) Identifying gaps in the capabilities of the
intelligence community regarding biosecurity and
countering foreign biological threats and providing to
the Director of National Intelligence recommended
solutions for such gaps, including by encouraging
research and development of new capabilities to counter
foreign biological threats.''.
(d) Conforming Amendments.--Such section is further amended--
(1) by striking ``counter proliferation'' each place it
appears and inserting ``counterproliferation''; and
(2) in the section heading, by striking ``counter
proliferation'' and inserting ``counterproliferation and
biosecurity'' (and conforming the table of sections at the
beginning of such Act accordingly).
(e) References.--Any reference in any law, regulation, guidance,
instruction, or other document of the United States Government to the
National Counter Proliferation Center shall be deemed to refer to the
National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center.
SEC. 402. CLARIFICATION OF CERTAIN RESPONSIBILITIES OF DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
Section 102A(f)(8) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3024(f)(8)) is amended by striking ``such other functions'' and
inserting ``such other intelligence-related functions''.
SEC. 403. RESPONSIBILITY OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REGARDING
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM BUDGET CONCERNING
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.
Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024) is
amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(aa) Responsibility of Director of National Intelligence Regarding
National Intelligence Program Budget Concerning Federal Bureau of
Investigation.--(1) Consistent with subsection (c)(5)(C), the Director
of National Intelligence shall, after consultation with the Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, ensure that the programs and
activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that are part of the
National Intelligence Program are executed in a manner that conforms
with the requirements of the national intelligence strategy under
section 108A and the National Intelligence Priorities Framework of the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (or any successor
mechanism established for the prioritization of such programs and
activities).
``(2) Consistent with subsection (c)(5)(C), the Director of National
Intelligence shall ensure that the programs and activities that are
part of the National Intelligence Program, including those of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, are structured and executed in a
manner than enables budget traceability.''.
SEC. 404. CLIMATE SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL.
(a) Reports.--Subsection (d) of section 120 of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3060) is amended--
(1) by striking ``Not later'' and inserting the following:
``(1) Requirement.--Not later''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(2) Matters included.--Each report under paragraph (1)
shall include a description of any obstacles or gaps relating
to--
``(A) the Council fulfilling its duties and
responsibilities under subsection (c); or
``(B) the responsiveness of the intelligence
community to the climate security needs and priorities
of the policymaking elements of the Federal
Government.''.
(b) Extension of Sunset; Technical Amendments.--Such section 120 is
amended--
(1) in subsection (b)(1)(B)(v), by inserting ``and Security''
after ``for Intelligence'';
(2) by redesignating the second subsection (e) as subsection
(f); and
(3) in subsection (e), by striking ``the date that is 4 years
after the date of the enactment of this section'' and inserting
``December 31, 2025''.
Subtitle B--Other Elements
SEC. 411. PROTECTION OF CERTAIN FACILITIES AND ASSETS OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FROM UNMANNED AIRCRAFT.
The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.)
is amended by inserting after section 15 the following new section:
``SEC. 15A. PROTECTION OF CERTAIN FACILITIES AND ASSETS OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FROM UNMANNED AIRCRAFT.
``(a) Authority.--In accordance with subsection (b), the Director
shall have the same authority for the Agency as is available to the
Secretary of Homeland Security for the Department of Homeland Security
and the Attorney General for the Department of Justice under section
210G of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 124n), and shall be
subject to the same limitations and requirements under such section.
``(b) Administration.--For purposes of subsection (a)--
``(1) the reference in subsection (i) of section 210G of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 124n) to `the date that
is 4 years after the date of enactment of this section' shall
be deemed to be a reference to `October 5, 2026';
``(2) the term `appropriate congressional committees' as
defined in paragraph (1) of subsection (k) of such section
shall be deemed to mean the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
``(3) the term `covered facility or asset' as defined in
paragraph (3) of such subsection (k) shall be deemed to mean
installations, property, and persons--
``(A) that are located in the United States;
``(B) for which the Director may provide protection
pursuant to section 5(a)(4) or 15(a)(1) of this Act;
and
``(C) that the Director identifies as high-risk and a
potential target for unlawful unmanned aircraft
activity.''.
SEC. 412. MODIFICATION OF NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY TO ATTRACT EXPERTS
IN SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING.
Section 1599h(b)(2)(A) of title 10, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by striking ``paragraph (1)(B)'' and inserting
``subparagraph (B) of paragraph (1)''; and
(2) by inserting ``or employees appointed pursuant to the
first subparagraph (G) of such paragraph to any of 2 positions
of administration or management designated by the Director of
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency for purposes of
this subparagraph'' after ``this subparagraph''.
SEC. 413. REQUIREMENTS FOR TERMINATION OF DUAL-HAT ARRANGEMENT FOR
COMMANDER OF THE UNITED STATES CYBER COMMAND.
Section 1642 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328; 130 Stat. 2601), as amended by section
1636 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020
(Public Law 116-92; 133 Stat. 1748), is further amended--
(1) by striking subsections (a), (b), and (c), and inserting
the following new subsections:
``(a) Limitation on Termination of Dual-hat Arrangement.--The
Secretary of Defense may not terminate the dual-hat arrangement until
the date on which the Secretary submits to the appropriate committees
of Congress the certification under subsection (b)(1). The Secretary
shall implement such termination by not later than the first day of the
fiscal year following the fiscal year in which the Secretary submits
such certification.
``(b) Annual Submission of Information.--Together with the defense
budget materials for fiscal year 2023, and annually thereafter until
the termination of the dual-hat arrangement, the Secretary of Defense,
in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report containing
either of the following:
``(1) A certification that the United States Cyber Command
has met each of the following conditions:
``(A) Sufficient operational infrastructure has been
deployed to meet the unique cyber mission needs of the
United States Cyber Command.
``(B) Sufficient command and control systems and
processes have been established for planning,
deconflicting, and executing military cyber operations.
``(C) Capabilities have been established to enable
intelligence collection and operational preparation of
the environment for cyber operations consistent with
the United States Cyber Command reaching full
operational status.
``(D) Mechanisms have been established to train cyber
operations personnel, test cyber capabilities, and
rehearse cyber missions.
``(E) The United States Cyber Command has achieved
full operational capability.
``(2) If the Secretary, in coordination with the Director, is
not able to make the certification under paragraph (1)--
``(A) an identification of the items contained in the
defense budget materials that are related to meeting
the conditions specified in such paragraph; and
``(B) an assessment of the funding required to meet
such conditions during the period covered by the
future-years defense program under section 221 of title
10, United States Code.'';
(2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c); and
(3) in subsection (c), as so redesignated, by adding at the
end the following new paragraph:
``(3) Defense budget materials.--The term `defense budget
materials' has the meaning given that term in section 231(f) of
title 10, United States Code.''.
SEC. 414. NATIONAL SPACE INTELLIGENCE CENTER.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) Section 9081 of title 10, United States Code, establishes
the United States Space Force as an Armed Force within the
Department of the Air Force to, as stated in subsection (c) of
such section--
(A) provide freedom of operation for the United
States in, from, and to space;
(B) conduct space operations; and
(C) protect the interests of the United States in
space.
(2) The National Air and Space Intelligence Center,
headquartered at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, is the
primary source for foreign air and space threat analysis within
the intelligence enterprise of the Air Force.
(3) Section 8041 of the Department of Defense Appropriations
Act, 2020 (division A of Public Law 116-93; 133 Stat. 2345)
prohibits the establishment of a new field operating agency
using funds made available under that Act, although the
Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of a military department
may waive the prohibition in cases where the relevant Secretary
determines that the establishment will reduce the personnel or
financial requirements of the relevant department.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) space has become increasingly contested, congested, and
competitive, mandating an expanded need for space intelligence;
(2) to support this increasingly complex operational
environment, the Space Force should have its own intelligence
organization dedicated to providing the Joint Combat forces
with the required intelligence and analysis to support
operations;
(3) a prominent factor in the basing decision should consider
that co-locating the National Space Intelligence Center with
the National Air and Space Intelligence Center at Wright-
Patterson Air Force Base will provide an operational and
geographic synergy, which will greatly benefit combat
operations across the air and space operational environments;
(4) the Air Force has requested authority to establish the
National Space Intelligence Center as a field operating agency
to ensure the appropriate prioritization of analytic effort for
the space domain, enhance responsiveness to national-level
customers, and align command relationships with the Director of
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance of the Space
Force; and
(5) establishing the National Space Intelligence Center as a
field operating agency would be a resource-neutral
administrative realignment of billets, and would facilitate a
lean and agile space intelligence enterprise.
(c) Exception.--Notwithstanding section 8041 of the Department of
Defense Appropriations Act, 2020 (division A of Public Law 116-93; 133
Stat. 2345), or any other provision of law prohibiting the
establishment of a field operating agency, the Secretary of the Air
Force may establish the National Space Intelligence Center as a field
operating agency of the Space Force to perform the analysis and
production of scientific and technical intelligence on foreign space
and counter-space threat capabilities in the support of the Space
Force.
SEC. 415. PROCUREMENT BY FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION OF CHINESE
PRODUCTS AND SERVICES.
(a) Security Assessment.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation may not procure a Chinese product or service unless,
before such procurement, the Counterintelligence Division of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation--
(1) conducts a security assessment of such product or
service, including with respect to any physical or cyber
vulnerabilities; and
(2) makes a recommendation to the Director regarding such
proposed procurement.
(b) Submission.--Not later than 30 days after the date on which the
Counterintelligence Division of the Bureau conducts a security
assessment under subsection (a), the Director shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a copy of such assessment and the
recommendation under paragraph (2) of such subsection.
(c) Chinese Product or Service Defined.--In this section, the term
``Chinese product or service'' means a product or service provided by
an entity that is owned or controlled by, or otherwise connected to,
the government of China.
SEC. 416. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE UNITS AT NON-INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES.
(a) Establishment.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation shall establish counterintelligence units in the
departments and agencies described in subsection (b). Such units shall
be composed of officers of the Counterintelligence Division of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(b) Departments and Agencies Described.--The departments and agencies
described in this subsection are the following departments and agencies
of the United States Government:
(1) The Department of Agriculture.
(2) Any other department or agency that the Director, in
coordination with the Director of National Intelligence,
determines appropriate.
(c) Duties.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
shall ensure that each counterintelligence unit established under
subsection (a) in a department or agency described in subsection (b)
carries out the following duties:
(1) Conducts assessments, in coordination with the leadership
of the department or agency, to determine the
counterintelligence posture of the department or agency,
including any components thereof.
(2) Informs and consults with the leadership of the
department or agency, including any components thereof, and
provides recommendations with respect to any
counterintelligence threats identified by the intelligence
community.
(3) Provides such administrative and technical support as is
necessary to develop, in coordination with the leadership of
the department or agency, a plan to eliminate or reduce the
threats described in paragraph (2).
(4) Serves as the primary point of contact for the department
or agency with respect to counterintelligence for the
intelligence community.
(d) Intelligence Community Support.--The heads of the elements of the
intelligence community shall ensure that relevant counterintelligence
information is provided to counterintelligence units established under
subsection (a) in a manner that is consistent with the need to protect
sources and methods.
SEC. 417. DETECTION AND MONITORING OF WILDFIRES.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the Director
of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, in accordance with
relevant provisions of law, should continue to manage the systems of
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency that enable the FireGuard
program of the Department of Defense.
(b) Report.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the heads of
the departments and agencies of the United States Government and other
organizations that constitute the National Interagency Fire Center, and
any other relevant organization the Director determines appropriate,
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a coordinated
interagency report that--
(1) explains how to leverage existing resources to improve
processes and organization alignment;
(2) identifies future opportunities to improve the ability to
detect and track wildfires and support firefighting efforts;
and
(3) includes an explication of the relevant authorities with
respect to the matters under paragraphs (1) and (2).
(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; and
(2) the congressional defense committees (as defined in
section 101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code).
TITLE V--ANOMALOUS HEALTH INCIDENTS AND OTHER HEALTH CARE MATTERS
SEC. 501. COMPENSATION AND PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS FOR CERTAIN MEDICAL
OFFICERS OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.)
is amended by adding at the end the following new section:
``SEC. 26. COMPENSATION AND PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS FOR CERTAIN MEDICAL
OFFICERS.
``(a) Office of Medical Services.--There is in the Agency an Office
of Medical Services.
``(b) Compensation.--Beginning not later than 1 year after the date
of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2022, each medical officer of the Office of Medical Services who meets
the qualifications under subsection (c) shall be compensated during a
pay period pursuant to a pay range that is equal to the pay range
published in the Federal Register pursuant to section 7431(e)(1)(C) of
title 38, United States Code (for the corresponding pay period), for a
physician in the Veterans Health Administration in the District of
Columbia region with a medical subspecialty that is the equivalent of
the medical subspecialty of the officer.
``(c) Clinical Practice Qualifications.--A medical officer meets the
qualifications under this subsection if the officer provides direct
care services to patients in connection with the official duties of the
officer and--
``(1) maintains current, active, full, and unrestricted
licensure or registration as a physician from a State, the
District of Columbia, or a commonwealth or territory of the
United States;
``(2) holds active board certification and maintains
accreditation in an American Board of Medical Specialties
direct care clinical specialty; and
``(3) except as provided in subsection (d), maintains a
minimum of 160 hours per year of clinical practice in an
accredited clinic or hospital facility that is not affiliated
with the Central Intelligence Agency.
``(d) Exception for Overseas Service.--If a medical officer is a
medical officer located in a duty station outside of the United States
pursuant to a permanent change of station and greater than 50 percent
of the official duties of the officer in such duty station involve
direct patient care, the officer, in lieu of performing the minimum
hours under subsection (c)(3) on an annual basis, may perform up to 480
hours of clinical practice as specified in such subsection prior to
such change of station, to fulfil in advance the requirement under such
subsection for up to 3 years.
``(e) Clinical Practice Hours.--The head of the Office of Medical
Services shall make available to medical officers excused absence time
to allow for the maintenance of clinical practice hours in accordance
with subsection (c)(3).''.
SEC. 502. MEDICAL ADVISORY BOARD OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) Establishment.--The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), as amended by section 501, is further amended by
adding at the end the following new section:
``SEC. 27. MEDICAL ADVISORY BOARD.
``(a) Establishment.--The Director shall establish within the Agency
a medical advisory board (in this section referred to as the `Board').
``(b) Duties.--The Board shall--
``(1) conduct a study on the Office of Medical Services of
the Agency, and submit reports regarding such study, in
accordance with subsection (c); and
``(2) upon request, provide advice and guidance in connection
with any independent review of the Office conducted by an
inspector general.
``(c) Study.--
``(1) Objectives.--In conducting the study under subsection
(b)(1), the Board shall seek to--
``(A) contribute to the modernization and reform of
the Office of Medical Services;
``(B) ensure that the activities of the Office are of
the highest professional quality; and
``(C) ensure that all medical care provided by the
Office is provided in accordance with the highest
professional medical standards.
``(2) Reports.--The Board shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees, in writing--
``(A) interim reports on the study; and
``(B) a final report on the study, which shall--
``(i) set forth in detail the findings of the
study and the recommendations of the Board,
based on such findings and taking into
consideration the objectives under paragraph
(1), regarding any changes to the activities of
the Office of Medical Services; and
``(ii) include, as applicable, any additional
or dissenting views submitted by a member of
the Board.
``(d) Membership.--
``(1) Number and appointment.--The Board shall be composed of
11 members, appointed as follows:
``(A) 2 members appointed by the Chairman of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives.
``(B) 2 members appointed by the ranking minority
member of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
``(C) 2 members appointed by the Chairman of the
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
``(D) 2 members appointed by the Vice Chairman of the
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
``(E) 3 members appointed by the Director of National
Intelligence.
``(2) Chairperson.--During the first meeting under subsection
(e)(1), the members of the Board shall elect a Chairperson of
the Board. In addition to meeting the criteria under paragraph
(3), the Chairperson may not be an employee, or former
employee, of the Agency.
``(3) Criteria.--The members appointed under paragraph (1)
shall meet the following criteria:
``(A) Each member shall be a recognized expert in at
least 1 medical field, as demonstrated by appropriate
credentials.
``(B) Each member shall possess significant and
diverse medical experience, including clinical
experience.
``(C) Each member shall hold a security clearance at
the top secret level and be able to access sensitive
compartmented information.
``(4) Terms.--
``(A) In general.--Each member, including the
Chairperson, shall be appointed or elected, as
applicable, for the life of the Board.
``(B) Vacancies.--Any vacancy in the Board occurring
prior to the expiration of the term under subparagraph
(A) shall be filled in the manner in which the original
appointment or election was made.
``(5) Compensation and travel expenses.--
``(A) Compensation.--Except as provided in
subparagraph (B), each member of the Board, including
the Chairperson, may be compensated at not to exceed
the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay in
effect for a position at level IV of the Executive
Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States
Code, for each day during which that member is engaged
in the actual performance of the duties under
subsection (b).
``(B) Exception for federal employees.--Members of
the Board, including the Chairperson, who are officers
or employees of the United States shall receive no
additional pay by reason of the service of the member
on the Board.
``(C) Travel expenses.--Each member of the Board,
including the Chairperson, while away from the home or
regular places of business of the member in the
performance of services for the Board, may be allowed
travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of
subsistence, in the same manner as persons employed
intermittently in the Government service are allowed
expenses under section 5703 of title 5, United States
Code.
``(6) Detailees.--
``(A) In general.--Upon request of the Board, the
Director of National Intelligence may detail to the
Board, without reimbursement from the Board, any of the
personnel of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence to assist in carrying out the duties under
subsection (b). Any such detailed personnel shall
retain the rights, status, and privileges of the
regular employment of the personnel without
interruption.
``(B) Clearance.--Any personnel detailed to the Board
under subparagraph (A) shall possess a security
clearance in accordance with applicable laws and
regulations concerning the handling of classified
information.
``(e) Meetings.--
``(1) Board meetings.--The Board shall meet not less
frequently than on a quarterly basis.
``(2) Meetings with congress.--The Board shall meet with the
congressional intelligence committees on a biannual basis.
``(f) Information Access.--
``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), the
Board may secure directly from any department or agency of the
United States Government information necessary to enable it to
carry out the duties under subsection (b) and, upon request of
the Chairperson of the Board, the head of that department or
agency shall furnish such information to the Board.
``(2) Exception.--The Director (without delegation) may deny
a request for information made by the Board pursuant to
paragraph (1), regardless of the agency from which such
information is requested.
``(3) Notification requirement.--If the Director denies a
request under paragraph (2), not later than 15 days after the
date of such denial, the Director shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a written notification of
such denial.
``(4) Briefings.--The Director shall ensure that the Board
receives comprehensive briefings on all activities of the
Office of Medical Services, including by promptly scheduling
such briefings at the request of the Board.
``(g) Termination.--The Board shall terminate on the date that is 5
years after the date of the first meeting of the Board.
``(h) Definitions.--In this section, the terms `congressional
intelligence committees' and `intelligence community' have the meanings
given such terms in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3003).''.
(b) Deadline for Appointments; First Meetings.--
(1) Deadline for appointments.--Each member of the medical
advisory board established under section 27 of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (as added by subsection (a)),
including the Chairperson, shall be appointed or elected, as
applicable, in accordance with subsection (d) of such section
by not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act.
(2) First board meeting.--Not later than 30 days after the
first date on which at least 7 members of the Board described
in paragraph (1) hold the security clearance and are able to
access information in accordance with subsection (d)(3)(C) of
such section 27, the Board shall meet. During such meeting, the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall provide to
the Board a comprehensive briefing on all aspects of the Office
of Medical Services of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) First meeting with congress.--Not later than 30 days
after the date of the briefing under paragraph (2), the Board
described in such paragraph shall meet with the staff members
of the congressional intelligence committees to discuss topics
for the Board to examine in carrying out the duties under
subsection (b) of such section 27.
SEC. 503. REPORT ON PROTOCOLS FOR CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
EMPLOYEES AND DEPENDENTS.
(a) In General.--Beginning not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the President shall develop, for uniform
implementation across the elements of the intelligence community, each
of the protocols described in subsections (c) through (f). Such
protocols shall be subject to review and revision on a periodic basis,
and any implementation of such protocols shall be conducted in
accordance with applicable laws and current clinical and professional
practices of the interagency medical community.
(b) Privacy.--No data collected pursuant to any protocol under this
section may be used for research or analytical purposes without the
written consent of the individual from whom such data was collected
with respect to such use.
(c) Protocol on Baseline Medical Testing.--The protocol described in
this subsection is a protocol for conducting baseline medical testing
of covered employees, covered individuals, and the dependents of
covered employees who are included on the overseas travel orders of the
covered employee, with respect to anomalous health incidents. Such
protocol shall set forth the required elements of such baseline medical
testing, such as--
(1) standard lab collection and testing of relevant
biofluids;
(2) the conduct of relevant visual and auditory examinations;
(3) the conduct of Acquired Brain Injury Tool assessments, or
other relevant assessments for balance, eye motion, and
cognition;
(4) the assessment of relevant medical histories; and
(5) the conduct of any other standard relevant medical or
neurological examinations, testing, or assessments.
(d) Protocols on Post-incident Medical Testing.--The protocols
described in this subsection are protocols to enable voluntary medical
testing and the coordination of treatment for covered employees,
covered individuals, and the dependents of covered employees, following
a reported anomalous health incident, such as--
(1) a protocol that sets forth elements, similar to the
elements described in subsection (c), of such testing;
(2) a protocol pertaining to the voluntary testing and
treatment for victims of anomalous health incidents who are
children;
(3) a protocol for ensuring that all victims of anomalous
health incidents receive access to prompt and consistent
medical treatment, including from medical professionals holding
appropriate security clearances and medical professionals with
expertise in child care;
(4) a protocol for ensuring that all victims of anomalous
health incidents are offered options for psychological
treatment for the effects of such incidents; and
(5) a protocol for ensuring that any testing, evaluation, or
collection of biofluids or other samples following a reported
anomalous health incident may be compared against the baseline
for the victim of the anomalous health incident, to the extent
the individual participated in the baseline medical testing,
consistent with subsections (b) and (c).
(e) Protocol on Information Collection, Storage, and Safeguarding.--
The protocol described in this subsection is a protocol for the
collection, storage, and safeguarding of information acquired as a
result of the protocols described in subsections (c) and (d).
(f) Protocol on Reporting Mechanisms.--The protocol described in this
subsection is a protocol for the reporting of matters relating to
anomalous health incidents by covered employees, covered individuals,
and the dependents of covered employees, including the development of a
system for the adjudication of complaints regarding medical treatment
received by such covered employees, covered individuals, and dependents
of covered employees.
(g) Report and Briefings.--
(1) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report on the protocols described in subsections (c) through
(f).
(2) Elements.--Such report shall include the following
elements:
(A) A copy of each protocol under this section.
(B) A description of the following:
(i) Any interagency agreements, authorities,
or policies required to effectively implement
the protocols under this section.
(ii) Any new facilities, medical equipment,
tools, training, or other resources required to
effectively implement such protocols.
(C) A timeline for the implementation of the
protocols under this section, including a proposal for
the prioritization of implementation with respect to
various categories of covered employees and the
dependents of covered employees.
(3) Briefing.--Not later than 60 days following the date of
submission of the report under paragraph (1), and biannually
thereafter, the Director shall provide to the congressional
intelligence committees a briefing regarding the implementation
of the protocols under this section.
(h) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Covered employee.--The term ``covered employee'' means an
individual who is an employee, assignee, or detailee of an
element of the intelligence community.
(2) Covered individual.--The term ``covered individual''
means a contractor to an element of the intelligence community.
(3) Dependent of a covered employee.--The term ``dependent of
a covered employee'' means, with respect to a covered employee,
a family member (including a child), as defined by the Director
of National Intelligence.
(4) Victim of an anomalous health incident.--The term
``victim of an anomalous health incident'' means a covered
employee, covered individual, or dependent of a covered
employee, who is, or is suspected to have been, affected by an
anomalous health incident.
SEC. 504. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REVIEW OF
OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES.
(a) Review.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency,
in coordination with, and with the support of, the Inspector General of
the Intelligence Community, shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report containing a review of the
responsibilities, authorities, resources, and performance of the Office
of Medical Services of the Central Intelligence Agency (in this section
referred to as the ``Office'').
(b) Matters Included.--The review under subsection (a) shall include
the following:
(1) A detailed description of the responsibilities and
authorities of the Office, as set forth in Federal law and any
applicable regulation, policy, or other document of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
(2) A detailed description of the budgetary, human, and other
resources available to the Office, including with respect to
employees and any other personnel.
(3) An assessment of the ability of the Office to
consistently discharge the responsibilities of the Office, with
an emphasis on the provision of medical treatment and care by
personnel of the Office, including with respect to--
(A) the roles of personnel of the Office, and of
senior officials of the Agency outside of the Office,
in determining what medical evaluation, treatment, and
care should be provided in a particular case, including
the provision of specialty care by medical personnel
outside of the Office;
(B) whether personnel of the Office consistently
provide appropriate and high-quality medical treatment
and care in accordance with standards set independently
by the professional medical community;
(C) whether the Office has sufficient human and other
resources, including personnel with specialized
background, qualifications, or expertise, to
consistently provide high-quality medical treatment and
care in accordance with standards set independently by
the professional medical community;
(D) whether personnel of the Office, including
personnel claiming specialized medical backgrounds and
expertise, are required by the Agency to maintain
current board certifications or other certifications
and licenses, and the extent to which the Office
verifies such certifications and licenses;
(E) the extent to which the Office makes consistent
and effective use of the specialized medical
background, qualifications, and expertise of the
personnel of the Office in providing medical treatment
and care;
(F) an assessment of whether personnel of the Office
who provide medical treatment and care, or who make
decisions with respect to such treatment or care, are
required to have extensive clinical or other experience
in directly treating patients, including in areas
requiring specialized background, qualifications, or
expertise;
(G) any factors that have frustrated or delayed the
provision of medical treatment and care by personnel of
the Office in significant cases; and
(H) any factors that have frustrated or could
frustrate prompt detection, effective oversight, and
swift remediation of problems within the Office,
including such factors that frustrate or delay the
provision of medical treatment and care in significant
cases.
(c) Independent Advice.--In conducting the review under subsection
(a), the Inspector General may obtain the advice of the medical
advisory board established under section 502.
(d) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in an
unclassified form to the extent practicable, consistent with the
protection of intelligence sources and methods, but may include a
classified annex.
SEC. 505. CLARIFICATION OF EFFECT OF CERTAIN BENEFITS RELATING TO
INJURIES TO THE BRAIN.
(a) Personnel of Central Intelligence Agency.--Subsection (d) of
section 19A of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C.
3519b), as added by the HAVANA Act of 2021, is amended by adding at the
end the following new paragraph:
``(5) No effect on other benefits.--Payments made under
paragraph (2) are supplemental to any other benefit furnished
by the United States Government for which a covered dependent,
covered employee, or covered individual is entitled, and the
receipt of such payments may not affect the eligibility of such
a person to any other benefit furnished by the United States
Government.''.
(b) Personnel of Department of State.--Subsection (i) of section 901
of title IX of division J of the Further Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2020 (22 U.S.C. 2680b), as added by the HAVANA Act of 2021, is
amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(5) No effect on other benefits.--Payments made under
paragraph (2) are supplemental to any other benefit furnished
by the United States Government for which a covered dependent,
dependent of a former employee, covered employee, former
employee, or covered individual is entitled, and the receipt of
such payments may not affect the eligibility of such a person
to any other benefit furnished by the United States
Government.''.
TITLE VI--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES
SEC. 601. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON SECURITY SITUATION IN
AFGHANISTAN AND RELATED REGION.
(a) Requirement.--The Director of National Intelligence, acting
through the National Intelligence Council, shall produce a National
Intelligence Estimate on the situation in Afghanistan and the covered
region.
(b) Matters.--The National Intelligence Estimate produced under
subsection (a) shall include, with respect to the 2-year period
beginning on the date on which the Estimate is produced, an assessment
of the following:
(1) The presence in Afghanistan (including financial
contributions to the Taliban, political relations with the
Taliban, military presence in the covered region, economic
presence in the covered region, and diplomatic presence in the
covered region) of China, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, and any other
foreign country determined relevant by the Director,
respectively, and an assessment of the potential risks, or
benefits, of any such presence, contributions, or relations.
(2) Any change in the threat to the United States homeland or
United States entities abroad as a result of the withdrawal of
the Armed Forces from Afghanistan on August 31, 2021, including
an assessment of the risk of al-Qaeda or any affiliates
thereof, the Islamic State of Iraq and ash Sham-Khorasan or any
affiliates thereof, or any other similar international
terrorist group, using Afghanistan as a safe haven for
launching attacks on the United States and its interests
abroad.
(3) The political composition and sustainability of the
governing body of Afghanistan, including an assessment of the
ability of the United States Government to influence the
policies of such governing body on the following:
(A) Counterterrorism.
(B) Counternarcotics.
(C) Human rights (particularly regarding women and
girls and traditionally targeted ethnic groups).
(D) The treatment and safe transit of Afghans holding
special immigrant visa status under section 602 of the
Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009 (8 U.S.C. 1101
note) and other Afghans who, during the period
beginning in 2001, assisted efforts of the United
States in Afghanistan or the covered region.
(4) The effect on the covered region, and Europe, of refugees
leaving Afghanistan.
(5) The commitments of the Taliban relating to
counterterrorism, including an assessment of--
(A) whether such commitments required under the
agreement entered into between the United States
Government and the Taliban in February 2020, have been
tested, or will be tested during the 2-year period
covered by the Estimate, and what such commitments
entail;
(B) whether any additional commitments relating to
counterterrorism agreed to by the Taliban pursuant to
subsequent negotiations with the United States
Government following February 2020, have been tested,
or will be tested during the 2-year period covered by
the Estimate, and, if applicable, what such commitments
entail;
(C) any benchmarks against which the Taliban are to
be evaluated with respect to commitments relating to
counterterrorism; and
(D) the intentions and capabilities of the Taliban
with respect to counterterrorism (as such term is
understood by the United States and by the Taliban,
respectively), including the relations of the Taliban
with al-Qaeda or any affiliates thereof, the Islamic
State of Iraq and ash Sham-Khorasan or any affiliates
thereof, or any other similar international terrorist
group.
(c) Submission to Congress.--
(1) Submission.--Not later than one year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees the National Intelligence
Estimate produced under subsection (a), including all
intelligence reporting underlying the Estimate.
(2) Form.--The National Intelligence Estimate shall be
submitted under paragraph (1) in classified form.
(d) Public Version.--Consistent with the protection of intelligence
sources and methods, at the same time as the Director submits to the
congressional intelligence committees the National Intelligence
Estimate under subsection (c), the Director shall make publicly
available on the internet website of the Director an unclassified
version of the key findings of the National Intelligence Estimate.
(e) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Covered region.--The term ``covered region'' includes the
following countries:
(A) China.
(B) The Gulf Cooperation Council countries, including
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates.
(C) India.
(D) Iran.
(E) Pakistan.
(F) Tajikistan.
(G) Turkey.
(H) Turkmenistan.
(I) Uzbekistan.
(2) United states entity.--The term ``United States entity''
means a citizen of the United States, an embassy or consulate
of the United States, or an installation, facility, or
personnel of the United States Government.
SEC. 602. REPORT ON LIKELIHOOD OF MILITARY ACTION BY COUNTRIES OF THE
SOUTH CAUCASUS.
(a) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report assessing the likelihood
of a South Caucasus country taking military action against another
country (including in Nagorno-Karabakh or any other disputed
territory). Such report shall include an indication of the strategic
balance in the region, including with respect to the offensive military
capabilities of each South Caucasus country.
(b) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(c) South Caucasus Country Defined.--In this section, the term
``South Caucasus country'' means any of the following:
(1) Armenia.
(2) Azerbaijan.
(3) Georgia.
SEC. 603. REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION POSTURE AND OTHER MATTERS
RELATING TO AFGHANISTAN AND RELATED REGION.
(a) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation
with the heads of elements of the intelligence community determined
relevant by the Director, shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on the collection posture of the
intelligence community and other matters relating to Afghanistan and
the covered region.
(b) Matters.--The report under subsection (a) shall include the
following:
(1) A detailed description of the collection posture of the
intelligence community with respect to Afghanistan, including
with respect to the following:
(A) The countering of terrorism threats that are
directed at the United States homeland or United States
entities abroad.
(B) The finances of the Taliban, including financial
contributions to the Taliban from foreign countries
(particularly from China, Iran, Russia, and any other
foreign country in the Arab Gulf region (or elsewhere)
determined relevant by the Director, respectively).
(C) The detection, and prevention of, any increased
threat to the United States homeland or United States
entities abroad as a result of the withdrawal of the
United States Armed Forces from Afghanistan on August
31, 2021, including any such increased threat resulting
from al-Qaeda or any affiliates thereof, the Islamic
State of Iraq and ash Sham-Khorasan or any affiliates
thereof, or any other similar international terrorist
group, using Afghanistan as a safe harbor.
(2) A detailed description of any plans, strategies, or
efforts to improve the collection posture described in
paragraph (1)(A), including by filling any gaps identified
pursuant to such paragraph.
(3) An assessment of the effect of publicly documenting
abuses engaged in by the Taliban, and a description of the
efforts of the intelligence community to support other
departments and agencies in the Federal Government with respect
to the collection and documentation of such abuses.
(4) An assessment of the relationship between the
intelligence community and countries in the covered region,
including an assessment of the following:
(A) Intelligence and information sharing with such
countries.
(B) Any change in the collection posture of the
intelligence community with respect to the nuclear
activities of such countries as a result of the
withdrawal of the United States Armed Forces from
Afghanistan on August 31, 2021.
(C) The collection posture of the intelligence
community with respect to the presence of such
countries in Afghanistan (including financial
contributions to the Taliban, political relations with
the Taliban, military presence in Afghanistan, economic
presence in Afghanistan, and diplomatic presence in
Afghanistan) and the understanding of the intelligence
community regarding the potential risks, or benefits,
of any such presence, contributions, or relations.
(D) The ability of the intelligence community to use
the airspace of any such countries.
(5) An assessment of any financial contributions to the
Taliban from foreign countries (particularly from China, Iran,
Russia, and any other foreign country in the Arab Gulf region
(or elsewhere) determined relevant by the Director,
respectively) made during the year preceding the withdrawal of
the United States Armed Forces from Afghanistan on August 31,
2021.
(c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in
classified form, but shall include an unclassified summary.
(d) Biannual Updates.--On a biannual basis during the 5-year period
following the date of the submission of the report under subsection
(a), the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the
heads of the elements of the intelligence community determined relevant
by the Director, shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees an update to such report.
(e) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Covered region.--The term ``covered region'' includes the
following countries:
(A) China.
(B) The Gulf Cooperation Council countries, including
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates.
(C) India.
(D) Iran.
(E) Pakistan.
(F) Tajikistan.
(G) Turkey.
(H) Turkmenistan.
(I) Uzbekistan.
(2) United states entity.--The term ``United States entity''
means a citizen of the United States, an embassy or consulate
of the United States, or an installation, facility, or
personnel of the United States Government.
SEC. 604. REPORT ON THREAT POSED BY EMERGING CHINESE TECHNOLOGY
COMPANIES.
(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation
with the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and
Analysis and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the
threat to the national security of the United States posed by emerging
Chinese technology companies.
(b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a) shall include
the following:
(1) An assessment of the threat to the national security of
the United States posed by emerging Chinese technology
companies, including with respect to--
(A) the practices of the companies and their
relationships to the government of China;
(B) the security of the communications, data, and
commercial interests of the United States; and
(C) the privacy interests of United States persons.
(2) An assessment of the ability of the United States to
counter any such threat, including with respect to different
tools that could counter such a threat.
(c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in
classified form, but if so submitted shall include an unclassified
executive summary.
(d) Emerging Chinese Technology Companies Defined.--In this section,
the term ``emerging Chinese technology companies'' means a Chinese
technology company, including a company listed on the Science and
Technology Innovation Board of the Shanghai Stock Exchange, that the
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis
determines poses a significant threat to the national security of the
United States.
SEC. 605. REPORT ON COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA AND UNITED ARAB EMIRATES.
(a) Requirement.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with the heads of elements of the intelligence community
that the Director determines appropriate, shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report containing the
following:
(1) Details on the cooperation between China and the United
Arab Emirates regarding defense, security, technology, and
other strategically sensitive matters that implicate the
national security interests of the United States.
(2) The most recent, as of the date of the report, quarterly
assessment by the intelligence community of measures that the
United Arab Emirates has implemented to safeguard technology of
the United States and the reliability of any assurances by the
United Arab Emirates (with respect to both current assurances
and assurances being considered as of the date of the report).
(3) A certification by the Director regarding whether such
assurances described in paragraph (2) are viable and sufficient
to protect technology of the United States from being
transferred to China or other third parties.
(b) Form.--The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in
classified form, but if so submitted shall include an unclassified
executive summary.
SEC. 606. REPORT ON PROPAGATION OF EXTREMIST IDEOLOGIES FROM SAUDI
ARABIA.
(a) Report.--Not later than February 1, 2022, the Director of
National Intelligence, in consultation with other relevant Federal
departments and agencies, shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on the threat of extremist ideologies
propagated from Saudi Arabia and the failure of the Government of Saudi
Arabia to prevent the propagation of such ideologies. Such report shall
include a detailed description of--
(1) the role of governmental and nongovernmental entities and
individuals of Saudi Arabia in promoting, funding, and
exporting ideologies, including so-called ``Wahhabist
ideology'', that inspire extremism or extremist groups in other
countries; and
(2) the practical and strategic consequences for vital
national security interests of the United States as a result of
such promotion, funding, or export.
(b) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 607. REPORT ON EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS BY UNITED STATES.
(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation
with the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and
Analysis, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report on how covered countries respond to sanctions imposed by the
United States.
(b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a) shall include
the following:
(1) An assessment of whether sanctions imposed by the United
States on entities, individuals, or the governments of covered
countries have caused those countries to alter their behavior.
(2) An assessment of the effectiveness of--
(A) continuing such sanctions; and
(B) imposing additional sanctions.
(c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in
classified form, but if so submitted shall include an unclassified
executive summary.
(d) Covered Country Defined.--In this section, the term ``covered
country'' means--
(1) China;
(2) Iran;
(3) Russia; and
(4) any other foreign country the Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis determines appropriate.
TITLE VII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
SEC. 701. PILOT PROGRAM FOR SECURITY VETTING OF CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS.
(a) Establishment.--The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
and Security may establish a pilot program to identify risks associated
with individuals who are performing unclassified research funded by the
Department of Defense who would not otherwise undergo Federal personnel
vetting.
(b) Elements.--In carrying out the pilot program under this section,
the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security may--
(1) identify the size of the population to be vetted under
the pilot program;
(2) establish a process to obtain information from
individuals to be vetted under the pilot program;
(3) determine the criteria to evaluate national security
risks to research funded by the Department of Defense from
individuals who are participating in such research;
(4) establish a process to conduct vetting, including
referrals to appropriate counterintelligence and law
enforcement entities, for the population to be screened under
the pilot program; and
(5) carry out the process described in paragraph (4) with
respect to the population to be screened under the pilot
program.
(c) Report.--Before commencing the pilot program under this section,
the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing
details of the planned elements of the pilot program under subsection
(b).
(d) Briefings.--Not less frequently than annually during the 3-year
period beginning on the date that is 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
and Security shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees
a briefing on the status of the pilot program under this section.
(e) Termination.--The authority to conduct the pilot program under
this section shall terminate on the date that is 5 years after the date
of the enactment of this Act.
(f) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; and
(2) the congressional defense committees (as such term is
defined in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code).
SEC. 702. INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT AND REPORTS ON FOREIGN RACIALLY
MOTIVATED VIOLENT EXTREMISTS.
(a) Intelligence Assessment.--
(1) Requirement.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, acting through the Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center, in coordination with the Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Under Secretary of
Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis, and in
consultation with other relevant Federal departments and
agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees an intelligence assessment on significant threats to
the United States associated with foreign racially motivated
violent extremist organizations.
(2) Elements.--The assessment under paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) A list of foreign racially motivated violent
extremist organizations that pose a significant threat
to the national security of the United States.
(B) With respect to each such organization--
(i) an overview of the membership, ideology,
and activities;
(ii) a description of any transnational links
to the United States or United States persons;
(iii) a description of the leadership, plans,
intentions, and capabilities;
(iv) whether (and if so, to what extent)
foreign governments or their proxies provide
any manner of support to such organizations,
including a list of each such foreign
government or proxy;
(v) a description of the composition and
characteristics of the members and support
networks, including whether (and if so, to what
extent) the members are also a part of a
military, security service, or police;
(vi) a description of financing and other
forms of material support;
(vii) an assessment of trends and patterns
relative to communications, travel, and
training (including whether and to what extent
the organization is engaged in or facilitating
military or paramilitary training);
(viii) an assessment of the radicalization
and recruitment, including an analysis of the
extremist messaging motivating members and
supporters; and
(ix) whether (and if so, to what extent)
foreign governments have sufficient laws and
policies to counter threats to the United
States associated with the organization,
including best practices and gaps.
(C) An assessment of the status and extent of
information sharing, intelligence partnerships, foreign
police cooperation, and mutual legal assistance between
the United States and foreign governments relative to
countering threats to the United States associated with
foreign racially motivated violent extremist
organizations.
(D) An assessment of intelligence gaps and
recommendations on how to remedy such gaps.
(E) An opportunity analysis regarding countering such
threats, including, at a minimum, with respect to
mitigating and disrupting the transnational nexus.
(3) Standards.--The intelligence assessment under paragraph
(1) shall be conducted in a manner that meets the analytic
integrity and tradecraft standards of the intelligence
community.
(4) Form.--The intelligence assessment under paragraph (1)
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex in electronic form that is fully indexed and
searchable. In carrying out this paragraph, the officials
specified in paragraph (1) shall--
(A) ensure that the assessment is unclassified to the
extent possible; and
(B) ensure that the assessment is drafted in a way to
maximize the ability to share the assessment, including
the classified annex, with the entities under paragraph
(5).
(5) Sharing.--Consistent with the protection of classified
information, the Director of National Intelligence, acting
through the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center,
in coordination with the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for
Intelligence and Analysis, shall share the intelligence
assessment under paragraph (1) with--
(A) appropriate Federal departments and agencies;
(B) Joint Terrorism Task Forces and the Domestic
Terrorism-Hate Crimes Fusion Cell of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation;
(C) State, local, and Tribal law enforcement
officials, including officials who operate within
State, local, and regional fusion centers through the
Department of Homeland Security State, Local, and
Regional Fusion Center Initiative established in
accordance with section 210A of the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 124h); and
(D) appropriate foreign governments, including
foreign intelligence services and foreign police, and
international institutions, that partner with the
United States on countering significant threats
associated with foreign racially motivated violent
extremist organizations.
(b) Report.--
(1) Requirement.--Not later than 150 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, acting through the Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center, in coordination with the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, and in a manner consistent with
the authorities and responsibilities of such Secretary or
Director, shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report on the use of Federal laws, regulations,
and policies by the Federal Government to counter significant
threats to the United States and United States persons
associated with foreign racially motivated violent extremist
organizations.
(2) Elements.--The report under paragraph (1) shall include
the following:
(A) An identification, description, and assessment of
the use and efficacy of, Federal laws, regulations, and
policies used by the Federal Government to address
significant threats to the United States and United
States persons associated with foreign racially
motivated violent extremist organizations, including
pursuant to--
(i) section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C.
485) and section 119 of the National Security
Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3056), particularly with
respect to the coordination and integration of
all instruments of national power;
(ii) Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001
note), as amended;
(iii) the designation of foreign terrorist
organizations under section 219 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1189);
(iv) the designation of specially designated
terrorists, specially designated global
terrorists, or specially designated nationals
and blocked persons, pursuant to Executive
Orders 13886, 13372, and 13224 and parts 594,
595, 596, and 597 of title 31, Code of Federal
Regulations;
(v) National Security Presidential
Memorandums 7 and 9, particularly with respect
to the sharing of terrorism information and
screening and vetting activities; and
(vi) any other applicable Federal laws,
regulations, or policies.
(B) An assessment of whether (and if so, to what
extent and why) such Federal laws, regulations, and
policies are sufficient to counter such threats,
including a description of any gaps and specific
examples to illustrate such gaps.
(C) Recommendations regarding how to remedy the gaps
under subparagraph (B).
(3) Privacy and civil liberties assessment.--Not later than
180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, in consultation
with the civil liberties and privacy officers of the Federal
departments and agencies the Board determines appropriate,
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
report containing--
(A) an assessment of the impacts on the privacy and
civil liberties of United States persons concerning the
use or recommended use of any Federal laws,
regulations, and policies specified in paragraph (2);
and
(B) recommendations on options to develop protections
to mitigate such impacts.
(4) Form.--The reports under paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex in electronic form that is fully indexed and searchable.
In carrying out this paragraph, the officials responsible for
submitting such reports shall ensure that the reports are
unclassified to the extent possible.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
the Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on the Judiciary of
the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the
Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate.
(2) Terrorism information.--The term ``terrorism
information'' has the meaning given that term in section
1016(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485(a)).
(3) United states person.--The term ``United States person''
has the meaning given that term in section 105A(c) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3039).
SEC. 703. PERIODIC REPORT ON POSITIONS IN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY THAT
CAN BE CONDUCTED WITHOUT ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION, NETWORKS, OR FACILITIES.
Section 6610 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020
(50 U.S.C. 3352e) is amended--
(1) by striking ``this Act and not less frequently than once
every 5 years thereafter,'' and inserting ``this Act, and
biennially thereafter,''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new sentence: ``Such
report shall take into account the potential effect of
maintaining continuity of operations during a covered national
emergency (as defined by section 303 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (division W of Public
Law 116-260)) and the assessed needs of the intelligence
community to maintain such continuity of operations.''.
SEC. 704. BIENNIAL REPORTS ON FOREIGN BIOLOGICAL THREATS.
(a) Requirement.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3231 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new
section (and conforming the table of contents at the beginning of such
Act accordingly):
``SEC. 1111. BIENNIAL REPORTS ON FOREIGN BIOLOGICAL THREATS.
``(a) Reports.--On a biennial basis until the date that is 10 years
after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2022, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a comprehensive
report on the activities, prioritization, and responsibilities of the
intelligence community with respect to foreign biological threats
emanating from the territory of, or sponsored by, a covered country.
``(b) Matters Included.--Each report under subsection (a) shall
include, with respect to foreign biological threats emanating from the
territory of, or sponsored by, a covered country, the following:
``(1) A detailed description of all activities relating to
such threats undertaken by each element of the intelligence
community, and an assessment of any gaps in such activities.
``(2) A detailed description of all duties and
responsibilities relating to such threats explicitly authorized
or otherwise assigned, exclusively or jointly, to each element
of the intelligence community, and an assessment of any
identified gaps in such duties or responsibilities.
``(3) A description of the coordination among the relevant
elements of the intelligence community with respect to the
activities specified in paragraph (1) and the duties and
responsibilities specified in paragraph (2).
``(4) An inventory of the strategies, plans, policies, and
interagency agreements of the intelligence community relating
to the collection, monitoring, analysis, mitigation, and
attribution of such threats, and an assessment of any
identified gaps therein.
``(5) A description of the coordination and interactions
among the relevant elements of the intelligence community and
non-intelligence community partners.
``(6) An assessment of foreign malign influence efforts
relating to such threats, and a description of how the
intelligence community contributes to efforts by non-
intelligence community partners to counter such foreign malign
influence.
``(c) Form.--Each report submitted under subsection (a) may be
submitted in classified form, but if so submitted shall include an
unclassified executive summary.
``(d) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Covered country.--The term `covered country' means--
``(A) China;
``(B) Iran;
``(C) North Korea;
``(D) Russia; and
``(E) any other foreign country--
``(i) from which the Director of National
Intelligence determines a biological threat
emanates; or
``(ii) that the Director determines has a
known history of, or has been assessed as
having conditions present for, infectious
disease outbreaks or epidemics.
``(2) Foreign biological threat.--The term `foreign
biological threat' means biological warfare, bioterrorism,
naturally occurring infectious diseases, or accidental
exposures to biological materials, without regard to whether
the threat originates from a state actor, a non-state actor,
natural conditions, or an undetermined source.
``(3) Foreign malign influence.--The term `foreign malign
influence' has the meaning given such term in section 119C(e).
``(4) Non-intelligence community partner.--The term `non-
intelligence community partner' means a Federal department or
agency that is not an element of the intelligence community.''.
(b) First Report.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees the first report
required under section 1111 of the National Security Act of 1947, as
added by subsection (a).
SEC. 705. ANNUAL REPORTS ON DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES OF INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of
Homeland Security conduct vital work in enforcing the rule of
law and safeguarding the people of the United States from harm;
(2) the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 (Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3638) sought to facilitate
greater information sharing between law enforcement and
intelligence communities for the purpose of thwarting attacks
on the homeland from international terrorist organizations;
(3) National Intelligence Program funds should be expended
only in support of intelligence activities with a foreign
nexus, consistent with the definition of ``intelligence''
provided by Congress in section 3 of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003); and
(4) the intelligence community should not engage in the
collection, assessment, or analysis of information that
pertains exclusively to United States persons absent a foreign
nexus.
(b) Requirement.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3231 et seq.), as amended by section 704, is further amended by
adding at the end the following new section (and conforming the table
of contents at the beginning of such Act accordingly):
``SEC. 1112. ANNUAL REPORTS ON THE DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
``(a) Reports.--Not later than January 31 of each year, the Director
of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report--
``(1) identifying all domestic activities undertaken by each
element of the intelligence community during the prior fiscal
year; and
``(2) for each activity identified under paragraph (1), a
statement of the legal authority authorizing such activity to
be undertaken.
``(b) Form.--Each report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.''.
(c) First Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees the first report
required under section 1112 of the National Security Act of 1947, as
added by subsection (a).
SEC. 706. ANNUAL REPORTS ON CERTAIN CYBER VULNERABILITIES PROCURED BY
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND FOREIGN COMMERCIAL
PROVIDERS OF CYBER VULNERABILITIES.
(a) Requirement.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3231 et seq.), as amended by section 705, is further amended by
adding at the end the following new section (and conforming the table
of contents at the beginning of such Act accordingly):
``SEC. 1113. ANNUAL REPORTS ON CERTAIN CYBER VULNERABILITIES PROCURED
BY INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND FOREIGN COMMERCIAL
PROVIDERS OF CYBER VULNERABILITIES.
``(a) Annual Reports.--On an annual basis through 2026, the Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the National
Security Agency, in coordination with the Director of National
Intelligence, shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report containing information on foreign commercial
providers and the cyber vulnerabilities procured by the intelligence
community through foreign commercial providers.
``(b) Elements.--Each report under subsection (a) shall include, with
respect to the period covered by the report, the following:
``(1) A description of each cyber vulnerability procured
through a foreign commercial provider, including--
``(A) a description of the vulnerability;
``(B) the date of the procurement;
``(C) whether the procurement consisted of only that
vulnerability or included other vulnerabilities;
``(D) the cost of the procurement;
``(E) the identity of the commercial provider and, if
the commercial provider was not the original supplier
of the vulnerability, a description of the original
supplier;
``(F) the country of origin of the vulnerability; and
``(G) an assessment of the ability of the
intelligence community to use the vulnerability,
including whether such use will be operational or for
research and development, and the approximate timeline
for such use.
``(2) An assessment of foreign commercial providers that--
``(A) pose a significant threat to the national
security of the United States; or
``(B) have provided cyber vulnerabilities to any
foreign government that--
``(i) has used the cyber vulnerabilities to
target United States persons, the United States
Government, journalists, or dissidents; or
``(ii) has an established pattern or practice
of violating human rights or suppressing
dissent.
``(3) An assessment of whether the intelligence community has
conducted business with the foreign commercial providers
identified under paragraph (2) during the 5-year period
preceding the date of the report.
``(c) Form.--Each report under subsection (a) may be submitted in
classified form.
``(d) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Commercial provider.--The term `commercial provider'
means any person that sells, or acts as a broker, for a cyber
vulnerability.
``(2) Cyber vulnerability.--The term `cyber vulnerability'
means any tool, exploit, vulnerability, or code that is
intended to compromise a device, network, or system, including
such a tool, exploit, vulnerability, or code procured by the
intelligence community for purposes of research and
development.''.
(b) First Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
and the Director of the National Security Agency shall jointly submit
to the appropriate congressional committees the first report required
under section 1113 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by
subsection (a).
SEC. 707. IMPROVEMENTS TO ANNUAL REPORT ON DEMOGRAPHIC DATA OF
EMPLOYEES OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Section 5704(c) of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020
(50 U.S.C. 3334b(c)) is amended--
(1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking
``After making available a report under subsection (b), the
Director of National Intelligence shall annually provide a
report'' and inserting ``Not later than March 31 of each year,
the Director of National Intelligence shall provide a report'';
and
(2) by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the following new
paragraph:
``(1) demographic data and information on the status of
diversity and inclusion efforts of the intelligence community,
including demographic data relating to--
``(A) the average years of service;
``(B) the average number of years of service for each
level in the General Schedule, Senior Executive
Service, Senior Intelligence Service, or equivalent;
and
``(C) career categories;''.
SEC. 708. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON ESCALATION AND DE-
ESCALATION OF GRAY ZONE ACTIVITIES IN GREAT POWER
COMPETITION.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) The conventional power of the United States has driven
foreign adversaries to a level of competition that does not
always depend on military confrontation with the United States.
(2) Rather than challenging the United States in a manner
that could provoke a kinetic military response, foreign
adversaries of the United States have turned to carrying out
gray zone activities to advance the interests of such
adversaries, weaken the power of the United States, and erode
the norms that underpin the United States-led international
order.
(3) Gray zone activity falls on a spectrum of attribution and
deniability that ranges from covert adversary operations, to
detectible covert adversary operations, to unattributable
adversary operations, to deniable adversary operations, to open
adversary operations.
(4) To adequately address such a shift to gray zone activity,
the United States must understand what actions tend to either
escalate or de-escalate such activity by our adversaries.
(5) The laws, principles, and values of the United States are
strategic advantages in great power competition with
authoritarian foreign adversaries that carry out gray zone
activities, because such laws, principles, and values increase
the appeal of the governance model of the United States, and
the United States-led international order, to states and
peoples around the world.
(6) The international security environment has demonstrated
numerous examples of gray zone activities carried out by
foreign adversaries, including the following activities of
foreign adversaries:
(A) Information operations, such as efforts by Russia
to influence the 2020 United States Federal elections
(as described in the March 15, 2021, intelligence
community assessment of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence made publicly available on March
15, 2021).
(B) Adversary political coercion operations, such as
the wielding of energy by Russia, particularly in the
context of Ukrainian gas pipelines, to coerce its
neighbors into compliance with its policies.
(C) Cyber operations, such as the use by China of
cyber tools to conduct industrial espionage.
(D) Provision of support to proxy forces, such as the
support provided by Iran to Hezbollah and Shia militia
groups.
(E) Provocation by armed forces controlled by the
government of the foreign adversary through measures
that do not rise to the level of an armed attack, such
as the use of the China Coast Guard and maritime
militia by China to harass the fishing vessels of other
countries in the South China Sea.
(F) Alleged uses of lethal force on foreign soil,
such as the 2018 poisoning of Sergei Skripal in London
by Russia.
(G) The potential use by an adversary of technology
that causes anomalous health incidents among United
States Government personnel.
(b) National Intelligence Estimate.--
(1) Requirement.--The Director of National Intelligence,
acting through the National Intelligence Council, shall produce
a National Intelligence Estimate on how foreign adversaries use
gray zone activities to advance interests, what responses by
the United States (or the allies or partners of the United
States) would tend to result in the escalation or de-escalation
of such gray zone activities by foreign adversaries, and any
opportunities for the United States to minimize the extent to
which foreign adversaries use gray zone activities in
furtherance of great power competition.
(2) Matters included.--To the extent determined appropriate
by the National Intelligence Council, the National Intelligence
Estimate produced under paragraph (1) may include an assessment
of the following topics:
(A) Any potential or actual lethal or harmful gray
zone activities carried out against the United States
by foreign adversaries, including against United States
Government employees and United States persons, whether
located within or outside of the United States.
(B) To the extent such activities have occurred, or
are predicted to occur--
(i) opportunities to reduce or deter any such
activities; and
(ii) any actions of the United States
Government that would tend to result in the
escalation or de-escalation of such activities.
(C) Any incidents in which foreign adversaries could
have used, but ultimately did not use, gray zone
activities to advance the interests of such
adversaries, including an assessment as to why the
foreign adversary ultimately did not use gray zone
activities.
(D) The effect of lowering the United States
Government threshold for the public attribution of
detectible covert adversary operations, unattributable
adversary operations, and deniable adversary
operations.
(E) The effect of lowering the United States
Government threshold for responding to detectible
covert adversary operations, unattributable adversary
operations, and deniable adversary operations.
(F) The extent to which the governments of foreign
adversaries exercise control over any proxies or
parastate actors used by such governments in carrying
out gray zone activities.
(G) The extent to which gray zone activities carried
out by foreign adversaries affect the private sector of
the United States.
(H) The international norms that provide the greatest
deterrence to gray zone activities carried out by
foreign adversaries, and opportunities for
strengthening those norms.
(I) The effect, if any, of the strengthening of
democratic governance abroad on the resilience of
United States allies and partners to gray zone
activities.
(J) Opportunities to strengthen the resilience of
United States allies and partners to gray zone
activities, and associated tactics, carried out by
foreign adversaries.
(K) Opportunities for the United States to improve
the detection of, and early warning for, such
activities and tactics.
(L) Opportunities for the United States to galvanize
international support in responding to such activities
and tactics.
(3) Submission to congress.--
(A) Submission.--Not later than 1 year after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees the
National Intelligence Estimate produced under paragraph
(1), including all intelligence reporting underlying
the Estimate.
(B) Notice regarding submission.--If at any time
before the deadline specified in subparagraph (A), the
Director determines that the National Intelligence
Estimate produced under paragraph (1) cannot be
submitted by such deadline, the Director shall (before
such deadline) submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report setting forth the reasons why the
National Intelligence Estimate cannot be submitted by
such deadline and an estimated date for the submission
of the National Intelligence Estimate.
(C) Form.--Any report under subparagraph (B) shall be
submitted in unclassified form.
(4) Public version.--Consistent with the protection of
intelligence sources and methods, at the same time as the
Director submits to the congressional intelligence committees
the National Intelligence Estimate under paragraph (1), the
Director shall make publicly available on the internet website
of the Director an unclassified version of the key findings of
the National Intelligence Estimate.
(5) Definitions.--In this subsection:
(A) Gray zone activity.--The term ``gray zone
activity'' means an activity to advance the national
interests of a State that--
(i) falls between ordinary statecraft and
open warfare;
(ii) is carried out with an intent to
maximize the advancement of interests of the
state without provoking a kinetic military
response by the United States; and
(iii) falls on a spectrum that ranges from
covert adversary operations, to detectible
covert adversary operations, to unattributable
adversary operations, to deniable adversary
operations, to open adversary operations.
(B) Covert adversary operation.--The term ``covert
adversary operation'' means an operation by an
adversary that--
(i) the adversary intends to remain below the
threshold at which the United States detects
the operation; and
(ii) does stay below such threshold.
(C) Detectible covert adversary operation.--The term
``detectible covert adversary operation'' means an
operation by an adversary that--
(i) the adversary intends to remain below the
threshold at which the United States detects
the operation; but
(ii) is ultimately detected by the United
States at a level below the level at which the
United States will publicly attribute the
operation to the adversary.
(D) Unattributable adversary operation.--The term
``unattributable adversary operation'' means an
operation by an adversary that the adversary intends to
be detected by the United States, but remain below the
threshold at which the United States will publicly
attribute the operation to the adversary.
(E) Deniable adversary operation.--The term
``deniable adversary operation'' means an operation by
an adversary that--
(i) the adversary intends to be detected and
publicly or privately attributed by the United
States; and
(ii) the adversary intends to deny, to limit
the response by the United States, and any
allies of the United States.
(F) Open adversary operation.--The term ``open
adversary operation'' means an operation by an
adversary that the adversary openly acknowledges as
attributable to the adversary.
(c) Requirement to Develop Lexicon.--
(1) Requirement.--The Director of National Intelligence,
acting through the National Intelligence Council, shall develop
a lexicon of common terms (and corresponding definitions for
such terms) for concepts associated with gray zone activities.
(2) Considerations.--In developing the lexicon under
paragraph (1), the National Intelligence Council shall include
in the lexicon each term (and the corresponding definition for
each term) specified in subsection (b)(5), unless the National
Intelligence Council determines that an alternative term (or
alternative definition)--
(A) more accurately describes a concept associated
with gray zone activities; or
(B) is preferable for any other reason.
(3) Report.--
(A) Publication.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall publish a report containing the
lexicon developed under paragraph (1).
(B) Form.--The report under subparagraph (A) shall be
published in unclassified form.
SEC. 709. REPORT ON CERTAIN ACTIONS TAKEN BY INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
WITH RESPECT TO HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW.
(a) Report.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination
with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of
the National Security Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on certain actions taken
by the intelligence community with respect to human rights and
international humanitarian law.
(b) Elements.--The report under subsection (a) shall include the
following:
(1) A detailed explanation of whether, and to what extent,
each element of the intelligence community has provided
intelligence products relating to the efforts of the Secretary
of State and the Secretary of Treasury regarding the
categorization, determinations on eligibility for assistance
and training, and general understanding, of covered entities
that commit, engage, or are otherwise complicit in, violations
of human rights or international humanitarian law.
(2) A detailed explanation of whether, and to what extent,
each element of the intelligence community has provided
intelligence products relating to any of the following:
(A) Section 7031(c) of the Department of State,
Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations
Act, 2020 (division G of Public Law 116-94; 8 U.S.C.
1182 note).
(B) The visa restriction policy of the Department of
State announced on February 26, 2021, and commonly
referred to as the ``Khashoggi Ban''.
(C) The annual report requirement of the Department
of Defense under section 1057 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (131 Stat.
1572).
(D) The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability
Act (subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114-328; 22
U.S.C. 2656 note).
(3) A detailed explanation of the following processes:
(A) The process of each element of the intelligence
community for monitoring covered entities for
derogatory human rights or international humanitarian
law information.
(B) The process of each element of the intelligence
community for determining the credibility of derogatory
human rights or international humanitarian law
information.
(C) The process of each element of the intelligence
community for determining what further action is
appropriate if derogatory human rights or international
humanitarian law information is determined to be
credible.
(4) An unredacted copy of each policy or similar document
that describes a process specified in paragraph (3).
(5) A detailed explanation of whether, with respect to each
element of the intelligence community, the head of the element
has changed or restricted any activities of the element in
response to derogatory human rights or international
humanitarian law information.
(6) Examples of any changes or restrictions specified in
paragraph (5) taken by the head of the element of the
intelligence community during the two years preceding the date
of the submission of the report.
(c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(d) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Covered entity.--The term ``covered entity''--
(A) means an individual, unit, or foreign government
that--
(i) has a cooperative relationship with the
United States Government; or
(ii) is the target of an intelligence
collection activity carried out by the United
States Government; but
(B) does not include an employee of the United States
Government.
(2) Derogatory human rights or international humanitarian law
information.--The term ``derogatory human rights or
international humanitarian law information'' means information
tending to suggest that a covered entity committed,
participated, or was otherwise complicit in, a violation of
human rights or international humanitarian law, regardless of
the credibility of such information, the source of the
information, or the level of classification of the information.
(3) Violation of human rights or international humanitarian
law.--The term ``violation of human rights or international
humanitarian law'' includes a violation of any authority or
obligation of the United States Government related to human
rights or international humanitarian law, without regard to
whether such authority or obligation is codified in a provision
of law, regulation, or policy.
SEC. 710. BRIEFING ON TRAININGS RELATING TO BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY.
(a) Briefing.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the
congressional intelligence committees a briefing on the feasibility and
benefits of providing training described in subsection (b).
(b) Training Described.--Training described in this subsection is
training that meets the following criteria:
(1) The training is on cryptocurrency, blockchain technology,
or both subjects.
(2) The training may be provided through partnerships with
universities or private sector entities.
SEC. 711. REPORT ON PROSPECTIVE ABILITY TO ADMINISTER COVID-19 VACCINES
AND OTHER MEDICAL INTERVENTIONS TO CERTAIN
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL.
(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, in consultation
with the elements of the intelligence community and relevant public
health agencies of the United States, shall jointly develop and submit
to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the
prospective ability of the intelligence community to administer COVID-
19 vaccines, and such other medical interventions as may be relevant in
the case of a future covered national emergency, to covered personnel
(particularly with respect to essential covered personnel and covered
personnel deployed outside of the United States).
(b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a) shall include
an assessment of the following:
(1) The prospective ability of the elements of the
intelligence community to administer COVID-19 vaccines
(including subsequent booster shots for COVID-19), to covered
personnel, and whether additional authorities or resources are
necessary for, or may otherwise facilitate, such
administration.
(2) The potential risks and benefits of granting the
additional authorities or resources described in paragraph (1)
to the Director, the Under Secretary, or both.
(3) With respect to potential future covered national
emergencies, including future outbreaks of an infectious
pandemic disease or similar public health emergencies, the
following:
(A) The ability of the intelligence community to
ensure the timely administration of medical
interventions to covered personnel during the covered
national emergency.
(B) Whether additional authorities or resources are
necessary to ensure, or may otherwise facilitate, such
timely administration, including with respect to the
ability of the Director or Under Secretary to provide
an alternative means of access to covered personnel
with reduced access to the interventions provided by
the respective element.
(C) The potential risks and benefits of granting the
additional authorities or resources described in
subparagraph (B) to the Director, the Under Secretary,
or both.
(4) A summary of the findings of the survey under subsection
(c).
(c) Survey.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, and prior to submitting the report under subsection (a),
the Director and the Under Secretary shall jointly conduct a survey to
determine the process by which each element of the intelligence
community has administered COVID-19 vaccines to covered personnel, to
inform continued medical care relating to COVID-19 and future responses
to covered national emergencies. Such survey shall address, with
respect to each element, the following:
(1) The timeline of the element with respect to the
administration of COVID-19 vaccines prior to the date of the
enactment of this Act.
(2) The process by which the element determined when covered
personnel would become eligible to receive the COVID-19 vaccine
(including if certain categories of such personnel became
eligible before others).
(3) A general approximation of the percentage of covered
personnel of the element that received the COVID-19 vaccine
from the element versus through an alternative means (such as a
private sector entity, foreign government, State, or local
government), particularly with respect to covered personnel
deployed outside of the United States.
(4) Any challenges encountered by the element with respect to
the administration of COVID-19 vaccines prior to the date of
the enactment of this Act.
(5) Any other feedback determined relevant for purposes of
the survey.
(d) Privacy Considerations.--In carrying out the report and survey
requirements under this section, the Director, the Under Secretary, and
the heads of the elements of the intelligence community shall ensure,
to the extent practicable, the preservation of medical privacy and the
anonymity of data.
(e) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Covered national emergency.--The term ``covered national
emergency'' has the meaning given such term in section 303 of
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (50
U.S.C. 3316b).
(2) Covered personnel.--The term ``covered personnel'' means
personnel who are--
(A) employees of, or otherwise detailed or assigned
to, an element of the intelligence community; or
(B) funded under the National Intelligence Program or
the Military Intelligence Program.
(3) Essential covered personnel.--The term ``essential
covered personnel'' means covered personnel deemed essential
to--
(A) continuity of operations of the intelligence
community;
(B) continuity of operations of the United States
Government; or
(C) other purposes related to the national security
of the United States.
(4) National intelligence program.--The term ``National
Intelligence Program'' has the meaning given such term in
section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3003).
SEC. 712. REPORT ON POTENTIAL INCLUSION WITHIN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
OF THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES.
(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination
with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report on the potential
advantages and disadvantages of adding the Office of National Security
of the Department of Health and Human Services as a new element of the
intelligence community.
(b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a) shall include
the following:
(1) An assessment of the following:
(A) The likelihood that the addition of the Office of
National Security as a new element of the intelligence
community would increase connectivity between other
elements of the intelligence community working on
health security topics and the Department of Health and
Human Services.
(B) The likelihood that such addition would increase
the flow of raw intelligence and finished intelligence
products to officials of the Department of Health and
Human Services.
(C) The likelihood that such addition would
facilitate the flow of information relating to health
security topics to intelligence analysts of various
other elements of the intelligence community working on
such topics.
(D) The extent to which such addition would clearly
demonstrate to both the national security community and
the public health community that health security is
national security.
(E) Any anticipated impediments to such addition
relating to additional budgetary oversight by the
executive branch or Congress.
(F) Any other significant advantages or disadvantages
of such addition, as identified by either the Director
of National Intelligence or the Secretary of Health and
Human Services.
(2) A joint recommendation by the Director of National
Intelligence and the Secretary of Health and Human Services as
to whether to add the Office of National Security as a new
element of the intelligence community.
(c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; and
(2) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Health, Education, Labor,
and Pensions of the Senate.
SEC. 713. REPORTS RELATING TO INSPECTOR GENERAL OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY.
(a) Report on Responses by Inspector General to Substantiated
Allegations.--
(1) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report on allegations of reprisal or abuse of
authority determined to be substantiated by the Inspector
General of the Defense Intelligence Agency during the 5-year
period preceding the date of the enactment of this Act.
(2) Matters included.--The report under paragraph (1) shall
include, with respect to each allegation determined to be
substantiated during the 5-year period specified in such
paragraph, a description of the following:
(A) Details of each substantiated allegation.
(B) The rank or grade of the individuals involved in
the allegation.
(C) Any disciplinary action recommended by the
Inspector General in response to the allegation, or, if
the Inspector General recommended no disciplinary
action be taken in response, any justification for such
recommendation.
(D) Any disciplinary action taken by the relevant
manager of the Defense Intelligence Agency in response
to the allegation.
(E) Whether the relevant manager reduced, or declined
to take, a disciplinary action recommended by the
Inspector General in response to the allegation.
(F) Any justification from the relevant manager
regarding the decision to take, reduce, or decline to
take, a disciplinary action recommended by the
Inspector General in response to the allegation.
(G) The process by which Defense Intelligence Agency
management reviews and makes decisions regarding
disciplinary actions in response to substantiated
allegations, including--
(i) the criteria applied by management in
making the decision to take, reduce, or decline
to take, a disciplinary action;
(ii) a description of which managers have the
authority to make such decisions, including the
rank or grade of the managers; and
(iii) a description of any formal or informal
appeals processes available with respect to
such decisions.
(3) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted
in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(b) Report on Processes for Ensuring Independence of Inspector
General.--
(1) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees and the Council of the Inspectors General on
Integrity and Efficiency established under section 11 of the
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) a report on the
processes of the Defense Intelligence Agency for ensuring the
independence of the position of the Inspector General of the
Defense Intelligence Agency.
(2) Matters included.--The report under paragraph (1) shall
include a description of the following:
(A) The selection criteria used by the Director in
the appointment of the Inspector General.
(B) The methods used by the Director to ensure the
independence of the position of the Inspector General,
including--
(i) the process for vetting candidates for
such position for independence from leadership
of the Defense Intelligence Agency and from
officials occupying positions in the Defense
Intelligence Senior Executive Service; and
(ii) the process for evaluating such
candidates for conflicts of interest.
(3) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted
in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(c) Assessment by Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency.--
(1) Assessment.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Council of the Inspectors
General on Integrity and Efficiency shall--
(A) conduct an assessment of the effectiveness of the
selection criteria and methods specified in subsection
(b)(2) with respect to the position of the Inspector
General of the Defense Intelligence Agency; and
(B) submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report containing the results of such
assessment.
(2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1)(B) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
SEC. 714. REPORT ON RARE EARTH ELEMENTS.
(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination
with the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of
the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of
Energy, and any other head of an element of the intelligence community
that the Director of National Intelligence determines relevant, shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on rare
earth elements.
(b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a) shall include
the following:
(1) An assessment coordinated by the National Intelligence
Council of--
(A) long-term trends in the global rare earth element
industry;
(B) the national security, economic, and industrial
risks to the United States, and to the partners and
allies of the United States, with respect to relying on
foreign countries for rare earth mining and the
processing or production of rare earth elements;
(C) the intentions of foreign governments with
respect to limiting, reducing, or ending access of the
United States or the partners and allies of the United
States to--
(i) rare earth elements; or
(ii) any aspect of the rare earth mining,
processing, or production chain; and
(D) opportunities for the United States, and for the
partners and allies of the United States, to assure
continued access to--
(i) rare earth elements; and
(ii) the rare earth mining, processing, or
production chain.
(2) A description of--
(A) any relevant procurement, use, and supply chain
needs of the intelligence community with respect to
rare earth elements;
(B) any relevant planning or efforts by the
intelligence community to assure secured access to rare
earth elements;
(C) any assessed vulnerabilities or risks to the
intelligence community with respect to rare earth
elements;
(D) any relevant planning or efforts by the
intelligence community to coordinate with departments
and agencies of the United States Government that are
not elements of the intelligence community on securing
the rare earth element supply chain; and
(E) any previous or anticipated efforts by the Supply
Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task
Force established under section 6306 of the Damon Paul
Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020
(50 U.S.C. 3370) with respect to rare earth elements.
(c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(d) Rare Earth Elements Defined.--In this section, the term ``rare
earth elements'' includes products that contain rare earth elements,
including rare earth magnets.
SEC. 715. REPORT ON PLAN TO FULLY FUND THE INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY
PROGRAM AND NEXT GENERATION ENCRYPTION.
(a) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report on the resources necessary to fully
fund the Information Systems Security Program during the period covered
by the most recent future-years defense program submitted under section
221 of title 10, United States Code--
(1) to address the cybersecurity requirements of the
Department of Defense; and
(2) for the adoption of next generation encryption into
existing and future systems.
(b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a) shall include
the following:
(1) An assessment by the Chief Information Officer of the
Department of Defense, in coordination with the chiefs of the
Armed Forces and in consultation with the Director of the
National Security Agency, of the additional resources required
to fund the Information Systems Security Program at a level
that satisfies current and anticipated cybersecurity
requirements of the Department.
(2) An identification of any existing funding not currently
aligned to the Program that is more appropriately funded
through the Program.
(3) A strategic plan, developed in coordination with the
chiefs of the Armed Forces and in consultation with the
Director of the National Security Agency, that provides
options, timelines, and required funding by the Armed Forces or
a component of the Department, for the adoption of next
generation encryption into existing and future systems.
(c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in
classified form.
(d) Briefing.--Not later than 30 days after the date on which the
Secretary submits the report under subsection (a), the Chief
Information Officer of the Department and the Director of the National
Security Agency shall jointly provide to the appropriate congressional
committees a briefing on the report.
(e) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Appropriations, and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Appropriations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate.
SEC. 716. REVIEW OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY AND UNITED STATES CYBER
COMMAND.
(a) Review Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Inspectors General of the National Security
Agency, Intelligence Community, and Department of Defense shall jointly
complete a review of the National Security Agency and the United States
Cyber Command.
(b) Elements.--The review required by subsection (a) shall include
assessment of the following:
(1) Whether and what resources, authorities, activities,
missions, facilities, and personnel are appropriately being
delineated and used to conduct the intelligence and
cybersecurity missions at the National Security Agency as well
as the cyber offense and defense missions of the United States
Cyber Command.
(2) The extent to which current resource-sharing arrangements
between the National Security Agency and the United States
Cyber Command lead to conflicts of interest in directing
intelligence collection in support of United States Cyber
Command missions rather than foreign intelligence collection.
(3) The intelligence analysis and production conducted by the
United States Cyber Command using National Security Agency
authorities, with a focus on analytic integrity and
intelligence oversight to ensure proper analysis is informing
mission operations.
(4) The number of personnel detailed from the National
Security Agency to the United States Cyber Command, including
from which offices such personnel have been detailed, and an
assessment of the mission impact on the sponsoring office.
(c) Report and Brief.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Inspectors General of the National Security
Agency, Intelligence Community, and Department of Defense shall jointly
submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the
congressional defense committees (as defined in section 101(a) of title
10, United States Code) a report and provide such committees a briefing
on the findings of the inspectors general with respect to the review
completed under subsection (a).
Purpose
The purpose of H.R. 5412, the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (the Act), is to authorize the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United
States Government for Fiscal Year (FY) 2022.
Classified Annex and Committee Intent
The classified annex to this report includes the classified
schedule of authorizations and associated explanatory and
directive language. The classified schedule of authorizations
is incorporated directly into the legislation by Section 102 of
the bill. Elements of the Intelligence Community shall strictly
comply with all Committee direction and other guidance set
forth in the classified annex.
The classified annex and classified schedule of
authorizations have been made available for review by all
Members of the House of Representatives, on conditions set by
the Committee at the time of its consideration of H.R. 5412.
Scope of Committee Review
The bill authorizes United States intelligence and
intelligence-related activities within the jurisdiction of the
Committee, including the National Intelligence Program (NIP)
and the Military Intelligence Program (MIP), the Homeland
Security Intelligence Program (HSIP), and the Information
Systems Security Program (ISSP).
The NIP consists of all activities of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), as well as
intelligence, intelligence-related, and counterintelligence
activities conducted by: the Central Intelligence Agency; the
Department of Defense, including the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and
certain activities of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and
Air Force; the Department of Energy; the Department of Justice,
including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug
Enforcement Administration; the Department of Homeland
Security, including the U.S. Coast Guard and intelligence
elements of DHS; the Department of State; and the Department of
the Treasury.
The MIP consists of certain activities of the
Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security,
intelligence, intelligence-related, and counterintelligence
activities of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force,
the Marine Corps and Space Force, Special Operations Command,
other elements of the Department of Defense and Combat Support
Agencies, including the Defense Intelligence Agency, the
National Security Agency, the National Geospatial Agency, and
certain activities of the National Reconnaissance Office.
The Committee has exclusive or concurrent legislative,
authorizing, and oversight jurisdiction of these activities--
and exclusive jurisdiction to study the sources and methods of
the Intelligence Community.
Committee Views
H.R. 5412, the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2022
(the Act) authorizes the activities of, and funding for, the 18
elements comprising the United States Intelligence Community.
Because most of the intelligence budget involves classified
programs, the bulk of the Committee's recommendations each year
are found in the classified annex accompanying the bill.
Committee Statement Regarding Anomalous Health Incidents
The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022
advances the Committee's continuing, bipartisan efforts with
respect to anomalous health incidents, or ``AHIs''--which
Intelligence Community (IC) and other United States personnel
have suffered for years. From the earliest reports of ``Havana
Syndrome'' onward, an utmost priority for the Committee has
been to enable a vigorous and comprehensive response by the
U.S. Government.
In exercise of its legislative and oversight jurisdiction,
and during the 116th and 117th Congresses, the Committee has
focused on ensuring that:
Victims of AHIs are strongly encouraged--at
all levels, including by senior and supervisory
personnel--to come forward with their accounts
immediately and to seek treatment, without fear of
being disbelieved, or of other negative consequences;
Throughout the Executive Branch, clear
processes and procedures are established and
implemented for reporting, analyzing, and disseminating
information about AHIs;
Victims and their families promptly receive
medical care and support of the highest quality, and
without encountering bureaucratic obstacles or delays,
including in pursuit of specialized care for traumatic
brain injuries and in planning for potential long-term
physiological and psychological effects;
Every effort is undertaken throughout the
Executive Branch in order to determine the cause or
causes of AHIs, and thereafter immediately to report
any relevant information to Congress and the American
people; and that
Any actor responsible for these injuries is
swiftly held to account.
During the 117th Congress, the Committee's Members and
staff have been, and continue to be, regularly briefed on all
facets of AHI matters, including the direct experiences of AHI
victims and their families. These engagements indicated
deficiencies, some of them quite serious, in how AHI issues
were handled by the IC in the past--especially with respect to
the provision and adequacy of medical care.
Informed by these oversight activities, the IAA takes
remedial steps, among other things by:
Incentivizing doctors in the CIA's Office of
Medical Services (OMS) to maintain their medical
accreditation, and requiring that such doctors be
afforded time to maintain clinical practice;
Creating an expert advisory board to assist
with a top-to-bottom modernization of OMS;
Mandating a comprehensive review by IC
Inspectors General of OMS; and
Requiring the President to develop uniform
protocols for voluntary, pre-deployment testing--or
``baselining''--of individuals, and comprehensive
treatment and care of individuals (and their families)
following an AHI. The IAA further requires creation of
protocols that encourage the reporting of AHIs and for
handling complaints or concerns regarding the
government's treatment of employees who report an AHI.
***
The Committee welcomes the Administration's visible and
serious efforts related to providing care to those harmed by
AHIs, and to prioritizing investigation of AHI's cause or
causes. The Committee notes in particular the significant
advances within the IC during the past year, regarding the
reporting of AHIs and the provision of medical treatment to
affected personnel.
As important as these steps have been, a great deal remains
to be done. The Committee remains concerned that, despite the
Administration's initiatives, and repeated legislative
interventions by Congress, the Executive Branch's AHI policies
are not uniform across Departments and agencies. Some victims
also continue to be frustrated in their attempts to report
AHIs, and are afforded inconsistent or slow access to important
treatment and benefits. Going forward, it will be imperative
for the Executive Branch to make sure that, in every case, the
highest possible quality care and support is provided,
expeditiously, to AHI victims and their families. That is a
central goal of the IAA's AHI-related provisions, and of the
HAVANA Act and related measures championed by the Committee.
The Committee underscores, to the public and to all U.S.
personnel and their families, its enduring commitment to
providing all necessary resources and authorities--so as to
guarantee that AHI victims and their families receive care and
support; to quickly determine the origins of this most serious
threat to U.S. national security; and to swiftly hold those
responsible to account.
Committee Statement Regarding Domestic Terrorism
During the previous administration, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) assessed that ``white supremacist
extremists (WSEs)--will remain the most persistent and lethal
threat in the Homeland.'' Acting Secretary Chad Wolf noted in
his preface to DHS's Homeland Threat Assessment, issued in
October 2020, that he was ``particularly concerned about white
supremacist violent extremists'' who have become
``exceptionally lethal'' over the past few years.
The Committee shares this deep concern about the threat of
WSEs. To better understand and focus on this threat, the
Committee included in this Act Section 702, which aims to
improve federal intelligence agencies' ability to prioritize
the threat of Racially Motivated Violent Extremists (RMVEs),
especially WSEs, which are the most concerning such group. In
particular, Sec. 702 adopts H.R. 4038, an act authored by
Subcommittee Chairman Andre Carson, ``to direct the Director of
National Intelligence to submit to Congress an intelligence
assessment on threats to the United States associated with
foreign violent White supremacist extremist organizations.''
The provision also aims to address intelligence gaps about this
threat, including regarding white supremacist extremists'
objectives and operational structure.
While the Committee is deeply concerned about the domestic
terrorist threat, the Committee is also mindful of the
importance of protecting the civil rights and civil liberties
of United States persons, and notes that the Intelligence
Community plays a vital role in response to that threat.
Oversight Findings and Recommendations
With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, the Committee held multiple
hearings, briefings, and other engagements on the classified
budgetary issues raised by H.R. 5412. The bill, as reported by
the Committee, reflects conclusions reached by the Committee in
light of this oversight activity.
General Performance Goals and Objectives
Broadly stated, the goals and objectives of H.R. 5412 are
to authorize the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government for Fiscal Year
2022. The classified annex accompanying the legislation
reflects in detail the Committee's specific performance goals
and objectives with respect to classified programs.
Non-Duplication of Federal Programs
With respect to clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, no provision of H.R. 5412
establishes or reauthorizes a program of the Federal Government
that is known to be duplicative of another Federal program, a
program that was included in any report from the Government
Accountability Office to Congress pursuant to section 21 of
Public Law 111-139, or a program related to a program
identified in the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic
Assistance.
Committee Consideration
The Committee marked up H.R. 5412 on September 30, 2021.
Chairman Schiff offered an amendment in the nature of a
substitute, which the Committee adopted by unanimous consent.
No other amendments were offered, and the bill as amended was
approved and ordered to be reported to the House by voice vote.
Unclassified Committee Direction
Expediting Comprehensive Processing and Resettlement of Vulnerable
Afghans
A continuing Committee priority is the safe evacuation and
resettlement of vulnerable foreign nationals fleeing
Afghanistan--to include Afghan women and girls, and Afghans and
others who assisted the United States or its mission before its
departure from Afghanistan on August 30, 2021. In that regard,
Section 309 of the Act authorizes non-reimbursable details by
Intelligence Community (IC) personnel to other Executive Branch
agencies, for the purpose of assisting with the processing and
resettlement of refugees, parolees, and other aliens at risk of
being harmed by the Taliban.
The Committee urges Departments and agencies of the
Executive Branch to make full and innovative use of this
processing and resettlement authority, and of all other related
authorities and capabilities, in order to ensure that such
persons are evacuated and resettled safely. The Committee also
instructs each relevant IC element to continue to provide
regular, timely updates to the Committee regarding both
processing and resettlement efforts, and any challenges or
issues relating to those efforts.
Intelligence Lessons Learned regarding Afghanistan
The Committee directs the Director of National
Intelligence, in consultation with key heads of elements of the
Intelligence Community (IC) as determined appropriate, to
create a task force to conduct a review of the intelligence
analysis provided by IC elements beginning in September 2018,
and up and until the United States withdrawal from Afghanistan
on August 31, 2021, and to submit a corresponding report based
on that review no later than June 30, 2022. The review, and
corresponding report, shall include:
1. An objective overview of the intelligence
analysis, products, briefings, and any other relevant
information provided by key intelligence elements in
connection with deliberations relating to Afghanistan
policy during the relevant time period, including
counterterrorism (CT), the future stability of the
Afghanistan government under President Ghani, the
ability of that government to withstand the United
States' withdrawal, the threat of terrorist
organizations, including Al Qaeda and ISIS-K as a
result of potential U.S. withdrawal, and any other
relevant issues the element reported on during that
period;
2. An assessment of the accuracy of those
intelligence materials, including taking into account
the extent and quality of information that was
available to analysts at the time the assessments were
made;
3. An assessment as to whether the IC provided
sufficient intelligence materials relating to, and had
a sufficient understanding of, the evolving dynamics
within Afghanistan, including the subsequent timing of
the fall of the Afghanistan government to the Taliban;
4. An assessment of what factors, such as
intelligence gaps, and/or limitations in analytic
tradecraft, information sharing, and/or other issues,
limited the accuracy or usability of the intelligence
materials;
5. An assessment of ways to improve the assessment,
collection, usability, and information sharing, both
internally among the key intelligence elements and
between the IC and the Executive Branch, of
intelligence materials, based on the limitations
identified in (4);
6. An assessment of how to apply the limitations and
issues identified in the report to improve U.S.
intelligence collection, monitoring, and deterrence in
Afghanistan over the next two years, including in the
areas of CT, and the U.S. interaction with the Taliban
and/or any intelligence elements in Afghanistan; and
7. An overview of lessons learned as applied to
future, comparable missions.
Afghanistan's Tactical Intelligence Capture
A significant amount of intelligence was collected by
tactical military units over the past two decades of conflict
in Afghanistan. The Committee acknowledges the challenge in
capturing intelligence data from echelons, units, and groups,
but believes this information should be appropriately retained
for further use as necessary or appropriate. Further, this data
should be standardized and formatted in order to effectively
share operational intelligence and intelligence mission data
across the joint force.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence and Security in coordination with the
Defense Intelligence Agency to provide a briefing to the
Committee by February 4, 2022, on how the Department will
properly utilize, standardize, and format this data, as well as
ensure long-term access to this information across relevant
echelons, units, branches, and commands within the Department.
DNI Reporting on Saudi Entities Linked to Murder of Jamal Khashoggi
The Committee welcomes the Director of National
Intelligence's (DNI) submission of the unclassified report
required by the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2021 (P.L. 116-260) confirming the culpability of Saudi
government officials in the brutal murder of United States
resident and journalist Jamal Khashoggi.
To further inform the Committee's and Congress' ongoing
oversight regarding any possible role of Saudi government-
affiliated entities and individuals in this heinous act,
especially amid public reports implicating the Saudi Public
Investment Fund, the Committee directs the DNI to produce an
unclassified report, if needed with a classified annex, no
later than March 1, 2022, that lists all of the Saudi entities,
if any, that the Intelligence Community (IC) assesses as having
been linked to the killing. The report shall detail the IC's
confidence in that assessment, as well as a summary of all
relevant information--unclassified and classified--that
informed the IC's assessment. The DNI shall make this report
available to the congressional intelligence committees, the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives,
and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
Biodefense Steering Committee
The Committee directs the Director of National Intelligence
(DNI), in coordination with the heads of such other elements of
the Intelligence Community (IC) as the DNI may determine
relevant, to submit to the congressional intelligence
committees by no later than June 30, 2022, a report on the
efforts of the IC to support the Biodefense Steering Committee
in the implementation of the National Biodefense Strategy. Such
report shall at minimum include:
1. A description of previous, ongoing, and planned IC
efforts or activities in support of the Committee's, or
any successor's, implementation of the National
Biodefense Strategy by the Biodefense Steering
Committee;
2. An inventory and assessment of any existing IC
strategy, plan, or policy of the IC, or interagency
agreement entered into by the IC, that relates to the
provision of support to the Biodefense Steering
Committee, including for the implementation of the
National Biodefense Strategy; and
3. A description of assessed opportunities for the IC
to further enhance the capabilities and effectiveness
of the Biodefense Steering Committee with respect to
its implementation of the National Biodefense Strategy.
Such report may be submitted in classified form but should
include an unclassified executive summary.
Examining the Use of Other Transaction Authority
The barrier to entry for commercial entities to work with
the Intelligence Community (IC) is high. Federal contracting
and acquisitions processes can be complex, and the IC in
particular has strict security and background check
requirements that can be difficult for companies, particularly
those that are new and small, to meet. It is the belief of the
Committee that the IC underutilizes versatile models of
acquisition, like Other Transaction Authority (OTA), for work
with these nontraditional partners.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Director of National
Intelligence to submit to the congressional intelligence
committees, by no later than May 31, 2022, a written report on
the use of OTA procurement by IC elements for research and
prototyping activities. The report shall examine and detail the
current use of OTA and identify additional areas in which IC
elements could leverage OTA for more efficient and innovative
acquisition.
Security and Resiliency of Intelligence Community
The Committee is concerned that the Intelligence
Community's (IC) cyber infrastructure and capabilities are at
risk of supply chain vulnerabilities that could compromise key
elements of our national security. Recent revelations confirm
that near-peer competitors have heavily invested in the
capability to penetrate the IC's communications infrastructure.
Those reports present substantial questions about our supply
chain vulnerabilities. To counter this challenge, the Committee
directs the Director of National Intelligence to develop an
acquisition strategy that ensures that critical communications
technologies remain secure and resilient in the face of current
and future cyber threats.
When developing a strategy for the construction of, or
upgrades to, IC communications, the Committee directs IC
procurement and acquisition officers to consider mission
effectiveness and operational suitability prioritizing factors
such as:
1. Components and devices that are engineered,
sourced, and manufactured domestically;
2. The accessibility-risk of components and devices
responsible for routing and disseminating information,
and mitigation measures supported by deterministic
systems authoritatively certified and deployed to
isolate network communications;
3. The cost of reconfiguring systems in response to
dynamic mission requirements and challenges;
4. Physical, logistical, or operational measures to
mitigate insider threats; and
5. Consistent with the IC's desire to evaluate energy
efficiencies and long-term costs, consideration shall
also be given to whether the systems will support next
generation technologies and readily incorporate
upgrades, reduce the size of the data centers, moderate
energy consumption, use clean energy alternatives, and
decrease the area needed for rack space and other
essential hardware.
Intelligence Sharing Frameworks
The Committee notes the importance of intelligence and
resource sharing agreements as well as the need to further
strengthen connections with alliance countries and others as a
key component of fully implementing the National Intelligence
and National Defense Strategies.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense,
and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, to provide
a report to the Committee by May 20, 2022, outlining the
current intelligence and resource sharing agreements between
the United States and Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the
United Kingdom (the Five Eyes); as well as the risks, benefits,
and feasibility of expanding such intelligence and resource
sharing agreements to South Korea, Japan, India, Germany, and
France.
The report shall include a catalogue of the current
agreements for Five Eyes intelligence and resource sharing
agreements, including the date of any relevant or recent
updates, and changes which may be made to increase efficiency
and/or enhance security. It shall also include the current
significant intelligence and resource sharing efforts among
other partner countries, and the risk/gain factors which may be
considered for any future intelligence or resource sharing
opportunities with countries to include South Korea, Japan,
India, Germany, France, and any other countries deemed
appropriate.
IC Support to DoD Emerging Technology Steering Committee
The Committee continues to encourage the Intelligence
Community (IC) to fully engage and coordinate with appropriate
science and technology counterparts in the Federal Government
to address national and military intelligence scientific and
technological priorities. The Strategic Technologies and
Advanced Research (STAR) Subcommittee report from 2020
highlighted the need for stronger leadership within the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence to coordinate and
integrate science and technology efforts across the defense and
intelligence enterprise.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Director of National
Intelligence to submit to the congressional intelligence
committees by no later than April 29, 2022, a report about the
IC's interactions with, or activities undertaken in explicit
support of, the Department of Defense's steering committee on
emerging technology and national security threats, as
established by Section 236 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (P.L.
116-283).
DNI Reporting on the United Arab Emirates
The Committee is concerned with multiple, credible public
reports that the Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE)
has engaged in troubling activities contrary to United States
interests, including: security and defense cooperation with
adversaries of the United States, most especially China;
recruited former U.S. intelligence personnel to engage in
surveillance and related activities that may have violated the
privacy of American citizens; and prolonged the Saudi-led war
in and contributed to a fragmentation of Yemen.
To further inform the Committee's ongoing oversight and in
light of ongoing Emirati efforts focused on influencing
Congress and the U.S. Government, including efforts to secure
the most advanced U.S. weapons and technology, the Committee
directs the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to produce
an unclassified report, if needed with a classified annex, no
later than March 1, 2022, detailing the Intelligence
Community's (IC) assessment as to whether the UAE's actions and
interests are aligned with the United States, including but not
limited to the following areas:
1. Stabilizing Libya and supporting the
internationally-recognized government;
2. Ending the war in Yemen;
3. Reducing Arab-Israeli tensions and sustainably
resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict;
4. Promoting and respecting human rights, including
prohibitions under international law against torture
and the repression of journalists;
5. Containing the spread of Chinese influence as well
as the growth of Chinese technological capabilities,
including through the theft or unapproved acquisition
of U.S. technology;
6. Sustainably combatting international terrorists
that pose a confirmed threat to the United States; and
7. Preventing the proliferation of unmanned and
autonomous weapons systems.
The DNI shall submit this report to the congressional
intelligence committees as well as the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate.
DNI Reporting on the Declassification and Public Release of Documents
Related to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks
The Committee supports the President's decision to order a
declassification review of documents related to the September
11 terrorist attacks, including previously classified documents
related to Saudi Arabia's involvement. The Committee has long
pressed, on a bipartisan basis, for the release of this
information and the passage of time has mitigated concerns over
sources and methods. As such, the Committee is strongly
committed to closely overseeing the declassification process to
ensure that all Intelligence Community elements adhere to the
President's guidance to apply the maximum degree of
transparency allowed by law when conducting the review and
encourages the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to
expeditiously complete the classification process and public
release of these documents.
To advance its ongoing oversight, the Committee directs the
DNI to produce to the congressional intelligence committees,
within 30 days of the enactment of this Act and no later than
January 15, 2022, a report containing the following elements:
(1) a schedule for expeditiously completing the
declassification process and public release of these documents;
and (2) a written explanation of the processes and procedures
that will govern the review and declassification of documents,
to include the processes that the DNI will utilize to arbitrate
any disagreements between elements. In addition, if there is
any instance in which documents cannot be declassified during
this process, the Committee directs the DNI to provide a
written justification to the congressional intelligence
committees as to why it cannot declassify such documents.
Cyber Notification Requirements
The Intelligence Community (IC) is a high priority target
for foreign cyber actors. The private companies who contract
with the IC on technical, analytic, or other types of support
are similarly at risk, but often lack requirements for
notifying the U.S. Government, including Congress, of a breach.
Identifying, assessing, and sharing information related to a
cyber-attack is critical to stopping a more widespread attack
and protecting U.S. national security.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI), in coordination with relevant elements as
the DNI deems appropriate, to brief the congressional
intelligence committees on the IC's process for identifying,
assessing, and disseminating information related to a cyber-
attack or intrusion affecting IC contract companies or their
networks, including efforts by the relevant elements to share
and receive information relating to such attacks with such
companies. Further, the Committee directs the DNI to notify the
congressional intelligence committees within 10 days of
discovering a compromise to any IC contractor's unclassified or
classified networks.
Required Training for IC Personnel
The Committee recognizes that the Federal Government's
ability to maintain safe and respectful workplaces is essential
to the recruitment and retention of personnel. Anti-harassment
and anti-discrimination training that is clear and accessible
can ensure that employees are aware of their rights and
responsibilities, and can foster more inclusive workplaces.
Therefore, the Committee encourages elements of the
Intelligence Community to implement mandatory anti-harassment
and anti-discrimination training for supervisors and non-
supervisors, as well as bystander intervention training and
executive leadership training related to harassment,
discrimination, and related retaliation. Such training should
follow best practices in the field, as studied by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission's Select Task Force on the
Study of Harassment in the Workplace. The Committee further
directs the Director of National Intelligence to provide a
report to the congressional intelligence committees on these
efforts by no later than June 30, 2022.
Prevalence of Nondisclosure Clauses Related to Harassment,
Discrimination and Related Retaliation
The Committee recognizes that nondisclosure agreements
related to experiences of workplace harassment, discrimination,
and related retaliation may interfere with the Federal
Government's ability to maintain safe and respectful workplaces
and attract and retain personnel by deterring victims from
coming forward to participate in future investigations,
shielding perpetrators from reputational harm and
accountability, and leaving victims confused about their legal
rights and vulnerability to legal action. The William M. (Mac)
Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2021 (P.L. 116-283) recognized the potential negative impact of
nondisclosure agreements by barring such agreements if they
prohibit or restrict federal employees or applicants for
employment from disclosing to Congress, the Special Counsel,
the Inspector General of an agency, or any other agency
component responsible for internal investigation or review, any
information that relates to any violation of any law, rule,
regulation, mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of
authority, a substantial and specific danger to public health
or safety, or any other whistleblower protection.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI), in consultation with other heads of
elements that the DNI deems appropriate, to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees by no later than April
29, 2022, an unclassified report on the prevalence of
nondisclosure clauses related to experiences of workplace
harassment, discrimination, and related retaliation in the
Intelligence Community. Such report shall include a
comprehensive review of employment contracts, settlements, and
other agreements. If such clauses are utilized, the report
shall detail in what circumstances those clauses are utilized,
the rationale for usage, and any efforts to move away from the
use of nondisclosure clauses.
Strategy for Integration of Gender-Based Issues in Intelligence
The Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017 (H.R. 2484 and
S. 1141) became Public Law and demonstrates the sense of
Congress that the United States must be a global leader in
promoting women's participation in conflict prevention,
management, and resolution, as well as post-conflict relief and
recovery efforts. In addition, studies have found, based on
empirical data, that the fate of a nation is inextricably tied
to the status of the women within it and that the subordination
of women fatally jeopardizes the security and stability of
global democracies. Further, it is the sense of this Committee
that women are uniquely posed to provide essential and distinct
insight, information, and analysis in unstable or potentially
violent contexts, and to detect early signs of radicalization
and intervene before individuals begin to act with violence,
including because women oftentimes are able to access
populations and sites that men cannot for the purposes of
gathering key intelligence regarding potential threats to
stability and security. And, when women are involved in peace
processes, resulting agreements are more sustainable, partially
due to unique access to wider community groups and the
necessity of women to rebuild society within nations. Women's
participation can also foster stability, and prevent factors
that challenge the effectiveness and implementation of peace
agreements, such as corruption.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI), in coordination with the heads of other
elements of the Intelligence Community (IC) as the DNI deems
appropriate, to submit to the congressional intelligence
committee by no later than April 29, 2022, a strategy for
integrating gender-based issues and perspectives into
intelligence collection, analysis, and tradecraft. Such
strategy shall at minimum address the benefits, drawbacks, and
feasibility of:
1. Developing a training curriculum, to be made
available across the IC, that addresses gender-related
issues in intelligence collection, analysis, and
tradecraft; and
2. Implementing a requirement that introductory
analytic trainings offered by elements of the IC
include a module addressing gender-related issues in
intelligence collection, analysis, and tradecraft.
Accessibility in the IC
Building an inclusive workforce and ensuring that the
Intelligence Community (IC) remains a desirable employer for
individuals of all backgrounds is a national security
imperative. The Committee strongly encourages nascent and
ongoing efforts to improve accessibility for persons with
disabilities who aspire to join or are currently part of the IC
workforce.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI), in consultation with the heads of other
elements that the DNI deems appropriate, to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees, by no later than April
29, 2022, a report that at minimum:
1. Provides an update on the IC's status and
implementation of relevant executive orders,
guidelines, and laws, including Executive Order 14035
and ICPG 110.1 (``Employment of Individuals with
Disabilities'');
2. Documents the number of instances within the past
10 years that an IC element has invoked an exception
to:
a. Sec. 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, as amended;
b. The Architectural Barriers Act of 1968; or
c. Any other law or executive order
pertaining to enhancing accessibility for
persons with disabilities in the Federal
Government;
3. Describes anticipated or current activities or
policies of the IC to increase the availability of
reasonable accommodations for information technology
and accessible workplace facilities for persons with
disabilities, including mechanisms for applicants to
initiate and track accommodation requests, such as
through formalized platforms; and
4. Describes anticipated or current opportunities for
the IC to recruit and hire more persons with
disabilities, including through the Department of
Labor's Workforce Recruitment Program, or through other
initiatives that address travel, accommodations, and
security clearance concerns during the recruiting and
onboarding process.
DNI Reporting on the Intelligence Community's Compliance with the
Freedom of Information Act
The Committee applauds the Director of National
Intelligence's (DNI) commitment to transparency, and believes
that compliance with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and
the timely and appropriate processing of FOIA requests is a
critical part of that commitment. Therefore, the Committee
directs the DNI, in coordination with heads of elements of the
Intelligence Community (IC) as the DNI deems appropriate, and
by no later than June 1, 2022, to submit to the Committee a
written report on compliance by IC elements with the FOIA. The
report shall contain a detailed list, sorted by element, of:
1. The number of outstanding FOIA requests and how
long ago they were filed;
2. The number of instances over the last five years
in which the element provided a ``Glomar Response'' and
asserted that it could ``neither confirm nor deny'' the
existence of the records requested under the FOIA;
3. The number, for each of the following categories,
of FOIA requests in which the requester initiated legal
action in United States District Court in the last five
years challenging the element's:
a. Failure to respond in a timely fashion;
b. Decision not to release records in whole
or in part; and
c. Adequacy of the search used to locate
responsive records.
In addition, the report shall contain specific
recommendations for how to enhance the FOIA process and ensure
timely responses by IC entities, including the need for
additional resources or any other reforms to ensure rigorous
and appropriate responses to FOIA requests.
Metrics for Modern Best Practices in Software Development
Modern best practices for software development frequently
rely on a set of standardized processes known as development,
security, and operations (DevSecOps). DevSecOps combine
software development and operations, with security integrated
throughout every phase of the development lifecycle.
Standardized DevSecOps metrics such as availability, change
lead time, and time to Authorization to Operate (ATO), among
others, are vitally useful in assessing and understanding
software development programs' adherence or deviation from
modern best practices. Furthermore, many of these metrics can
be collected in an automated fashion, allowing for rapid and
frequent scoring of programs that can help predict future
success or failure. It is clear to the Committee that different
Intelligence Community (IC) elements are evolving to a
DevSecOps approach at different rates.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Intelligence Community
Chief Information Officer to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees, by no later than May 31, 2022, a
written report exploring adherence to modern best practices of
software development programs throughout the IC. The report
shall include, at a minimum:
1. Identification of the relevant metrics for
programs' adherence to modern DevSecOps practices;
2. Identifications of programs and elements that
struggle with best practices, and recommendations to
migrate them towards best practices;
3. A plan to standardize automation of metrics across
the IC; and
4. A discussion of any barriers preventing the
adoption of DevSecOps practices throughout the IC.
Intelligence Collection Prioritization on Advanced Technologies of
Adversaries
The Committee recognizes that strategic competitors and
adversaries of the United States are innovating rapidly to
develop and exploit technology-enabled tools that may harm the
United States and allies of the United States. The Committee is
concerned that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE) has
not adequately prioritized collection of these emerging
scientific and technical developments. The Committee believes
the DIE must prioritize collection of emerging technologies of
strategic competitors and adversaries of the United States to
better understand those capabilities and intentions.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence and Security to provide a briefing to
the congressional intelligence committees no later than March
15, 2022, on steps taken within the DIE to prioritize
collection of emerging technologies being pursued by strategic
competitors and adversaries of the United States, including
developments in biotechnology, artificial intelligence and
machine learning, lethal autonomous weapons, hypersonic
weapons, and directed energy weapons.
Department of Defense transformation through Project GAMECHANGER
The Committee awaits complete implementation of the
congressional intelligence and defense committees' direction
contained in Section 1626 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (P.L. 115-91). Core to the
congressional intent for Section 1626 was first, the creation
of a framework to more effectively manage elements of the
Intelligence Community (IC), which are also Combat Support
Agencies, and second, the reconciliation of variances in the
definitions used by the Department and/or IC and clear
codification of those terms.
The Committee supported the Department's creation of
project GAMECHANGER as one of the ways to effectively answer
Section 1626's direction. Further, the Committee supports the
Department's continued maturation of the GAMECHANGER
technology. This unique defense innovation effort will
transform the way the Department sets policy, updates doctrine,
and manages critical guidance documents. It is imperative that
the GAMECHANGER technology be managed properly, effectively
scaled, and transitioned to programs of record.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Undersecretary of
Defense for Intelligence and Security and the Director of the
Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, in consultation with the
Chief Data Officer and Comptroller, to provide a briefing to
the Committee no later than February 4, 2022, on the current
usage inside the Department of GAMECHANGER, as well as an
approved plan of action and milestones to transition
GAMECHANGER to a program of record by the Fiscal Year 2024
budget request.
Office of the Undersecretary for Defense Intelligence and Security
Oversight and Structure
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) report entitled,
``Defense Intelligence and Security: DoD Needs to Establish
Oversight Expectations and to Develop Tools that Enhance
Accountability'' (GAO-21-295), raised certain issues about the
ways the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence & Security (OUSD(I&S)) provides oversight and
ensures accountability of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise
(DIE) and the Defense Security Enterprise (DSE).
The report contained two recommendations. First, that the
Secretary of Defense should ensure that the USD(I&S)
establishes clear expectations for oversight, including
refining business rules for governance bodies and clarifying
key oversight terms. Second, that the Secretary of Defense
should ensure that the USD(I&S) develops tools to enhance
accountability--such as through strategies or other mechanisms
with identified goals, desired outcomes, and performance
metrics--for specific intelligence and security mission areas
and use these tools to conduct oversight. The Department
concurred with both recommendations.
The Committee appreciates USD(I&S)' acknowledgment of and
work to address these recommendations, including an independent
review of authorities and responsibilities assigned by statute
and policy recommendations for organization staffing, optimum
assignments of existing staffing, and other alignment of Roles
and Missions--a longstanding interest item for the Committee.
However, the Committee is concerned that, like certain
recommendations from the 2018 USDI Roles and Missions study,
certain actions will stall and fail to be fully implemented.
Therefore, the Committee directs the USD(I&S) to provide
updates to the implementation of the GAO recommendations to the
Committee on a quarterly basis. Further, the Committee
understands that the review conducted by the Institute for
Defense Analyses (IDA) is due no later than September 1, 2022.
The Committee directs that USD(I&S) present a plan of action
and milestones for implementation of accepted recommendations,
to include those resulting from the IDA analysis, no later than
December 1, 2022, and that the accepted recommendations be
fully implemented no later than October 1, 2023.
Hypersonic Aircraft
The Committee is encouraged by recent efforts to mature the
technologies necessary to develop high Mach and hypersonic
aircraft. The Committee is also aware of ongoing investments by
the Department of Defense (DoD) and private industry to develop
high Mach flight for both defense and commercial applications.
The Committee believes the Intelligence Community (IC) must
ensure it is postured to leverage the development of hypersonic
flight systems for intelligence related mission requirements.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence and Security, the Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering, and the Director of
National Intelligence (DNI) to jointly brief the congressional
intelligence committees on their efforts to incorporate
hypersonic flight research and development into the Fiscal Year
2023 budget request no later than March 31, 2022.
The Committee further directs the Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering and the DNI, in
coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence and Security, to provide the congressional
intelligence committees a report no later than June 1, 2022, on
the utility of establishing a joint DoD-IC program office to
coordinate activities related to high Mach and hypersonic
aircraft development programs. This report will include at a
minimum:
1. A recommended timeline for establishing a joint
program office;
2. An overview of how a program office will develop
program requirements in consultation with the user
community;
3. An overview of the remaining engineering
challenges associated with producing high Mach and
hypersonic aircraft; and
4. An assessment of the personnel, training, and
logistical support requirements high Mach and
hypersonic aircraft will generate.
DIA Workforce Issues
The Committee is concerned about the inherent isolation
required of intelligence professionals and the lack of external
resources or support due to the sensitive nature of their work.
An additional challenge is the effects of COVID-19 on the
workforce, including the added stress of crisis operations and
shiftwork, which may exacerbate any underlying negative or
challenging management culture or working environments.
The Committee applauds the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA) for creating the Office of the Surgeon General and for
internally realigning personnel, programs, and funding to
consolidate existing medical, behavioral health, and wellness
professionals under a single organization. The Committee
strongly supports efforts to streamline workforce support
mechanisms across DIA's therapeutic and medical services,
particularly the renewed focus on mental health. However,
continuing to collect, monitor, and respond to regular data and
feedback will be critical to ensuring the health of current
personnel and the creation or sustainment of programs to retain
a talented, diverse workforce.
Therefore, the Committee directs DIA to notify the
Committee within 10 days of the launch of any agency,
Directorate, or Career Field annual or ad hoc workforce
engagement or climate surveys, including the topic, rationale,
accessibility, lead subject office or work unit, and timeframe.
The Committee also directs the DIA, within 30 days of
completion of such survey, to provide an initial summary of the
results of such surveys, for example, participation rates and
demographics, with full results made available to the Committee
within 90 days of completion of the survey. Further, the
Committee directs DIA to provide a briefing, by March 1, 2022,
on plans to ensure such surveys are available on both
classified and unclassified systems and that exit surveys or
exit interviews with the Office of the Ombuds are mandatory for
all departing or permanently separating employees.
Additionally, the Committee directs DIA to provide a
report, by September 30, 2022, on the data from the Office of
the Ombuds, Equal Employment Opportunity Office (EEO), Employee
Management Relations, and any other employee resource for
seeking help with a perceived hostile work environment,
reprisal, harassment, or abuse of authority. This report should
include the total number of consultations related to a
supervisor, chain of command, or management culture, the nature
of the complaint, whether or not the complaint resulted in a
formal EEO or Inspector General review or report, the
consulting office's recommendations to the supervisory chain or
the office in question, and the management actions taken in
response. DIA should provide a briefing on the initial results
of this study and any challenges in implementation by March 30,
2022.
Finally, the Committee directs DIA to provide a briefing,
by February 14, 2022, on the mechanism by which supervisors
receive feedback, including from peers and subordinates, on
their ability to create and maintain a healthy and supportive
workplace environment either as part of annual performance
reviews or through regular training, development, or coaching,
and the feasibility of conducting 360-degree performance
reviews.
Congressional Applicant Referrals for the Defense Intelligence Agency
Members of Congress receive hundreds of applications for
United States Military Academies every year. However, with only
two slots allowed per Member, a significant number of highly
qualified, motivated young Americans must look elsewhere for
their education, and for the opportunity to serve their
country. Many of these talented students go on to join the
military through other avenues, but a large number would be
ideally suited to careers as civilian intelligence officers and
may be unaware of the opportunities that exist. Further, the
geographic diversity represented by these candidates could add
critical insight into the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
officer corps and further strengthen DIA's representation of
American communities.
DIA provides internship and scholarship opportunities for
undergraduate and graduate students to gain valuable national
security work experience and an opportunity to serve their
country. For many, this experience leads to a full-time career
with DIA or an Intelligence Community partner after graduation.
Therefore, the Committee directs DIA to provide, by January
31, 2022, information about DIA student and internship programs
so that those candidates not selected for a Military Academy
appointment may receive details about available DIA programs,
application requirements, and application deadlines. This
information shall be provided to Members' personal offices to
be made available to prospective student applicants.
NSA's Cyber Collaboration Center and Cyber Deterrence
The Committee supports the National Security Agency's (NSA)
establishment of the Cyber Collaboration Center to provide
greater information sharing between government and private
industry. The Committee recognizes that cybersecurity is a
national problem that benefits uniquely from private sector
insights.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Director of NSA, by no
later than May 2, 2022, to submit to the Committee a written
description of how the Cyber Collaboration Center works with
the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) to
disseminate cyber threat information and what, if any, overlap
exists between NSA and CISA with regard to collaboration with
private industry.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no
change is proposed is shown in roman):
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
short title
That this Act may be cited as the ``National Security Act of
1947''.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
* * * * * * *
Title I--Coordination for National Security
* * * * * * *
Sec. 116A. Authority for transportation of certain canines associated
with force protection duties of intelligence community.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 119A. National [Counter Proliferation] Counterproliferation and
Biosecurity Center.
* * * * * * *
Title III--Miscellaneous
* * * * * * *
[Sec. 304. Reporting of certain employment activities by former
intelligence officers and employees.]
Sec. 304. Requirements for certain employment activities by former
intelligence officers and employees.
Sec. 305. Temporary authority for paid leave for a serious health
condition.
* * * * * * *
Title V--Accountability for Intelligence Activities
* * * * * * *
Sec. 501A. Congressional oversight of certain special access programs.
* * * * * * *
TITLE X--EDUCATION IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
* * * * * * *
Subtitle C--Additional Education Provisions
* * * * * * *
Sec. 1025. Authorization of support by Director of National Intelligence
for certain workforce activities.
* * * * * * *
TITLE XI--OTHER PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
Sec. 1111. Biennial reports on foreign biological threats.
Sec. 1112. Annual reports on the domestic activities of the intelligence
community.
Sec. 1113. Annual reports on certain cyber vulnerabilities procured by
intelligence community and foreign commercial providers of
cyber vulnerabilities.
* * * * * * *
TITLE I--COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
* * * * * * *
responsibilities and authorities of the director of national
intelligence
Sec. 102A. (a) Provision of Intelligence.--(1) The Director
of National Intelligence shall be responsible for ensuring that
national intelligence is provided--
(A) to the President;
(B) to the heads of departments and agencies of the
executive branch;
(C) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
senior military commanders;
(D) to the Senate and House of Representatives and
the committees thereof; and
(E) to such other persons as the Director of National
Intelligence determines to be appropriate.
(2) Such national intelligence should be timely, objective,
independent of political considerations, and based upon all
sources available to the intelligence community and other
appropriate entities.
(b) Access to Intelligence.--Unless otherwise directed by the
President, the Director of National Intelligence shall have
access to all national intelligence and intelligence related to
the national security which is collected by any Federal
department, agency, or other entity, except as otherwise
provided by law or, as appropriate, under guidelines agreed
upon by the Attorney General and the Director of National
Intelligence.
(c) Budget Authorities.--(1) With respect to budget requests
and appropriations for the National Intelligence Program, the
Director of National Intelligence shall--
(A) based on intelligence priorities set by the
President, provide to the heads of departments
containing agencies or organizations within the
intelligence community, and to the heads of such
agencies and organizations, guidance for developing the
National Intelligence Program budget pertaining to such
agencies and organizations;
(B) based on budget proposals provided to the
Director of National Intelligence by the heads of
agencies and organizations within the intelligence
community and the heads of their respective departments
and, as appropriate, after obtaining the advice of the
Joint Intelligence Community Council, develop and
determine an annual consolidated National Intelligence
Program budget; and
(C) present such consolidated National Intelligence
Program budget, together with any comments from the
heads of departments containing agencies or
organizations within the intelligence community, to the
President for approval.
(2) In addition to the information provided under paragraph
(1)(B), the heads of agencies and organizations within the
intelligence community shall provide the Director of National
Intelligence such other information as the Director shall
request for the purpose of determining the annual consolidated
National Intelligence Program budget under that paragraph.
(3)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall
participate in the development by the Secretary of Defense of
the annual budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any
successor program or programs.
(B) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide
guidance for the development of the annual budget for each
element of the intelligence community that is not within the
National Intelligence Program.
(4) The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure the
effective execution of the annual budget for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities.
(5)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall be
responsible for managing appropriations for the National
Intelligence Program by directing the allotment or allocation
of such appropriations through the heads of the departments
containing agencies or organizations within the intelligence
community and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
with prior notice (including the provision of appropriate
supporting information) to the head of the department
containing an agency or organization receiving any such
allocation or allotment or the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
(B) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, pursuant to
relevant appropriations Acts for the National Intelligence
Program, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
shall exercise the authority of the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget to apportion funds, at the exclusive
direction of the Director of National Intelligence, for
allocation to the elements of the intelligence community
through the relevant host executive departments and the Central
Intelligence Agency. Department comptrollers or appropriate
budget execution officers shall allot, allocate, reprogram, or
transfer funds appropriated for the National Intelligence
Program in an expeditious manner.
(C) The Director of National Intelligence shall monitor the
implementation and execution of the National Intelligence
Program by the heads of the elements of the intelligence
community that manage programs and activities that are part of
the National Intelligence Program, which may include audits and
evaluations.
(6) Apportionment and allotment of funds under this
subsection shall be subject to chapter 13 and section 1517 of
title 31, United States Code, and the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 621 et seq.).
(7)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide a
semi-annual report, beginning April 1, 2005, and ending April
1, 2007, to the President and the Congress regarding
implementation of this section.
(B) The Director of National Intelligence shall report to the
President and the Congress not later than 15 days after
learning of any instance in which a departmental comptroller
acts in a manner inconsistent with the law (including permanent
statutes, authorization Acts, and appropriations Acts), or the
direction of the Director of National Intelligence, in carrying
out the National Intelligence Program.
(d) Role of Director of National Intelligence in Transfer and
Reprogramming of Funds.--(1)(A) No funds made available under
the National Intelligence Program may be transferred or
reprogrammed without the prior approval of the Director of
National Intelligence, except in accordance with procedures
prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence.
(B) The Secretary of Defense shall consult with the Director
of National Intelligence before transferring or reprogramming
funds made available under the Military Intelligence Program or
any successor program or programs.
(2) Subject to the succeeding provisions of this subsection,
the Director of National Intelligence may transfer or reprogram
funds appropriated for a program within the National
Intelligence Program--
(A) to another such program;
(B) to other departments or agencies of the United
States Government for the development and fielding of
systems of common concern related to the collection,
processing, analysis, exploitation, and dissemination
of intelligence information; or
(C) to a program funded by appropriations not within
the National Intelligence Program to address critical
gaps in intelligence information sharing or access
capabilities.
(3) The Director of National Intelligence may only transfer
or reprogram funds referred to in paragraph (1)(A)--
(A) with the approval of the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget; and
(B) after consultation with the heads of departments
containing agencies or organizations within the
intelligence community to the extent such agencies or
organizations are affected, and, in the case of the
Central Intelligence Agency, after consultation with
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(4) The amounts available for transfer or reprogramming in
the National Intelligence Program in any given fiscal year, and
the terms and conditions governing such transfers and
reprogrammings, are subject to the provisions of annual
appropriations Acts and this subsection.
(5)(A) A transfer or reprogramming of funds may be made under
this subsection only if--
(i) the funds are being transferred to an activity
that is a higher priority intelligence activity;
(ii) the transfer or reprogramming supports an
emergent need, improves program effectiveness, or
increases efficiency;
(iii) the transfer or reprogramming does not involve
a transfer or reprogramming of funds to a Reserve for
Contingencies of the Director of National Intelligence
or the Reserve for Contingencies of the Central
Intelligence Agency;
(iv) the transfer or reprogramming results in a
cumulative transfer or reprogramming of funds out of
any department or agency, as appropriate, funded in the
National Intelligence Program in a single fiscal year--
(I) that is less than $150,000,000, and
(II) that is less than 5 percent of amounts
available to a department or agency under the
National Intelligence Program; and
(v) the transfer or reprogramming does not terminate
an acquisition program.
(B) A transfer or reprogramming may be made without regard to
a limitation set forth in clause (iv) or (v) of subparagraph
(A) if the transfer has the concurrence of the head of the
department involved or the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency (in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency). The
authority to provide such concurrence may only be delegated by
the head of the department involved or the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency (in the case of the Central
Intelligence Agency) to the deputy of such officer.
(6) Funds transferred or reprogrammed under this subsection
shall remain available for the same period as the
appropriations account to which transferred or reprogrammed.
(7) Any transfer or reprogramming of funds under this
subsection shall be carried out in accordance with existing
procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications for the
appropriate congressional committees. Any proposed transfer or
reprogramming for which notice is given to the appropriate
congressional committees shall be accompanied by a report
explaining the nature of the proposed transfer or reprogramming
and how it satisfies the requirements of this subsection. In
addition, the congressional intelligence committees shall be
promptly notified of any transfer or reprogramming of funds
made pursuant to this subsection in any case in which the
transfer or reprogramming would not have otherwise required
reprogramming notification under procedures in effect as of the
date of the enactment of this subsection.
(e) Transfer of Personnel.--(1)(A) In addition to any other
authorities available under law for such purposes, in the first
twelve months after establishment of a new national
intelligence center, the Director of National Intelligence,
with the approval of the Director of the Office of Management
and Budget and in consultation with the congressional
committees of jurisdiction referred to in subparagraph (B), may
transfer not more than 100 personnel authorized for elements of
the intelligence community to such center.
(B) The Director of National Intelligence shall promptly
provide notice of any transfer of personnel made pursuant to
this paragraph to--
(i) the congressional intelligence committees;
(ii) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate
and the House of Representatives;
(iii) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or
from the Department of Defense, the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives; and
(iv) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or
from the Department of Justice, to the Committees on
the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of
Representatives.
(C) The Director shall include in any notice under
subparagraph (B) an explanation of the nature of the transfer
and how it satisfies the requirements of this subsection.
(2)(A) The Director of National Intelligence, with the
approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
and in accordance with procedures to be developed by the
Director of National Intelligence and the heads of the
departments and agencies concerned, may transfer personnel
authorized for an element of the intelligence community to
another such element for a period of not more than 2 years.
(B) A transfer of personnel may be made under this paragraph
only if--
(i) the personnel are being transferred to an
activity that is a higher priority intelligence
activity; and
(ii) the transfer supports an emergent need, improves
program effectiveness, or increases efficiency.
(C) The Director of National Intelligence shall promptly
provide notice of any transfer of personnel made pursuant to
this paragraph to--
(i) the congressional intelligence committees;
(ii) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or
from the Department of Defense, the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives; and
(iii) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or
from the Department of Justice, to the Committees on
the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of
Representatives.
(D) The Director shall include in any notice under
subparagraph (C) an explanation of the nature of the transfer
and how it satisfies the requirements of this paragraph.
(3)(A) In addition to the number of full-time equivalent
positions authorized for the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence for a fiscal year, there is authorized for such
Office for each fiscal year an additional 100 full-time
equivalent positions that may be used only for the purposes
described in subparagraph (B).
(B) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the Director of
National Intelligence may use a full-time equivalent position
authorized under subparagraph (A) only for the purpose of
providing a temporary transfer of personnel made in accordance
with paragraph (2) to an element of the intelligence community
to enable such element to increase the total number of
personnel authorized for such element, on a temporary basis--
(i) during a period in which a permanent employee of
such element is absent to participate in critical
language training; or
(ii) to accept a permanent employee of another
element of the intelligence community to provide
language-capable services.
(C) Paragraph (2)(B) shall not apply with respect to a
transfer of personnel made under subparagraph (B).
(D) For each of the fiscal years 2010, 2011, and 2012, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees an annual report on the
use of authorities under this paragraph. Each such report shall
include a description of--
(i) the number of transfers of personnel made by the
Director pursuant to subparagraph (B), disaggregated by
each element of the intelligence community;
(ii) the critical language needs that were fulfilled
or partially fulfilled through the use of such
transfers; and
(iii) the cost to carry out subparagraph (B).
(4) It is the sense of Congress that--
(A) the nature of the national security threats
facing the United States will continue to challenge the
intelligence community to respond rapidly and flexibly
to bring analytic resources to bear against emerging
and unforeseen requirements;
(B) both the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence and any analytic centers determined to be
necessary should be fully and properly supported with
appropriate levels of personnel resources and that the
President's yearly budget requests adequately support
those needs; and
(C) the President should utilize all legal and
administrative discretion to ensure that the Director
of National Intelligence and all other elements of the
intelligence community have the necessary resources and
procedures to respond promptly and effectively to
emerging and unforeseen national security challenges.
(f) Tasking and Other Authorities.--(1)(A) The Director of
National Intelligence shall--
(i) establish objectives, priorities, and guidance
for the intelligence community to ensure timely and
effective collection, processing, analysis, and
dissemination (including access by users to collected
data consistent with applicable law and, as
appropriate, the guidelines referred to in subsection
(b) and analytic products generated by or within the
intelligence community) of national intelligence;
(ii) determine requirements and priorities for, and
manage and direct the tasking of, collection, analysis,
production, and dissemination of national intelligence
by elements of the intelligence community, including--
(I) approving requirements (including those
requirements responding to needs provided by
consumers) for collection and analysis; and
(II) resolving conflicts in collection
requirements and in the tasking of national
collection assets of the elements of the
intelligence community; and
(iii) provide advisory tasking to intelligence
elements of those agencies and departments not within
the National Intelligence Program.
(B) The authority of the Director of National Intelligence
under subparagraph (A) shall not apply--
(i) insofar as the President so directs;
(ii) with respect to clause (ii) of subparagraph (A),
insofar as the Secretary of Defense exercises tasking
authority under plans or arrangements agreed upon by
the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National
Intelligence; or
(iii) to the direct dissemination of information to
State government and local government officials and
private sector entities pursuant to sections 201 and
892 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121,
482).
(2) The Director of National Intelligence shall oversee the
National Counterterrorism Center, the National
Counterproliferation Center, and the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center and may establish such
other national intelligence centers as the Director determines
necessary.
(3)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall prescribe,
in consultation with the heads of other agencies or elements of
the intelligence community, and the heads of their respective
departments, personnel policies and programs applicable to the
intelligence community that--
(i) encourage and facilitate assignments and details
of personnel to national intelligence centers, and
between elements of the intelligence community;
(ii) set standards for education, training, and
career development of personnel of the intelligence
community;
(iii) encourage and facilitate the recruitment and
retention by the intelligence community of highly
qualified individuals for the effective conduct of
intelligence activities;
(iv) ensure that the personnel of the intelligence
community are sufficiently diverse for purposes of the
collection and analysis of intelligence through the
recruitment and training of women, minorities, and
individuals with diverse ethnic, cultural, and
linguistic backgrounds;
(v) make service in more than one element of the
intelligence community a condition of promotion to such
positions within the intelligence community as the
Director shall specify; and
(vi) ensure the effective management of intelligence
community personnel who are responsible for
intelligence community-wide matters.
(B) Policies prescribed under subparagraph (A) shall not be
inconsistent with the personnel policies otherwise applicable
to members of the uniformed services.
(4) The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure
compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States
by the Central Intelligence Agency and shall ensure such
compliance by other elements of the intelligence community
through the host executive departments that manage the programs
and activities that are part of the National Intelligence
Program.
(5) The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure the
elimination of waste and unnecessary duplication within the
intelligence community.
(6) The Director of National Intelligence shall establish
requirements and priorities for foreign intelligence
information to be collected under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), and provide
assistance to the Attorney General to ensure that information
derived from electronic surveillance or physical searches under
that Act is disseminated so it may be used efficiently and
effectively for national intelligence purposes, except that the
Director shall have no authority to direct or undertake
electronic surveillance or physical search operations pursuant
to that Act unless authorized by statute or Executive order.
(7)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall, if the
Director determines it is necessary, or may, if requested by a
congressional intelligence committee, conduct an accountability
review of an element of the intelligence community or the
personnel of such element in relation to a failure or
deficiency within the intelligence community.
(B) The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation
with the Attorney General, shall establish guidelines and
procedures for conducting an accountability review under
subparagraph (A).
(C)(i) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide
the findings of an accountability review conducted under
subparagraph (A) and the Director's recommendations for
corrective or punitive action, if any, to the head of the
applicable element of the intelligence community. Such
recommendations may include a recommendation for dismissal of
personnel.
(ii) If the head of such element does not implement a
recommendation made by the Director under clause (i), the head
of such element shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a notice of the determination not to implement the
recommendation, including the reasons for the determination.
(D) The requirements of this paragraph shall not be construed
to limit any authority of the Director of National Intelligence
under subsection (m) or with respect to supervision of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
(8) The Director of National Intelligence shall perform [such
other functions] such other intelligence-related functions as
the President may direct.
(9) Nothing in this title shall be construed as affecting the
role of the Department of Justice or the Attorney General under
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
(g) Intelligence Information Sharing.--(1) The Director of
National Intelligence shall have principal authority to ensure
maximum availability of and access to intelligence information
within the intelligence community consistent with national
security requirements. The Director of National Intelligence
shall--
(A) establish uniform security standards and
procedures;
(B) establish common information technology
standards, protocols, and interfaces;
(C) ensure development of information technology
systems that include multi-level security and
intelligence integration capabilities;
(D) establish policies and procedures to resolve
conflicts between the need to share intelligence
information and the need to protect intelligence
sources and methods;
(E) develop an enterprise architecture for the
intelligence community and ensure that elements of the
intelligence community comply with such architecture;
(F) have procurement approval authority over all
enterprise architecture-related information technology
items funded in the National Intelligence Program; and
(G) in accordance with Executive Order No. 13526 (75
Fed. Reg. 707; relating to classified national security
information) (or any subsequent corresponding executive
order), and part 2001 of title 32, Code of Federal
Regulations (or any subsequent corresponding
regulation), establish--
(i) guidance to standardize, in appropriate
cases, the formats for classified and
unclassified intelligence products created by
elements of the intelligence community for
purposes of promoting the sharing of
intelligence products; and
(ii) policies and procedures requiring the
increased use, in appropriate cases, and
including portion markings, of the
classification of portions of information
within one intelligence product.
(2) The President shall ensure that the Director of National
Intelligence has all necessary support and authorities to fully
and effectively implement paragraph (1).
(3) Except as otherwise directed by the President or with the
specific written agreement of the head of the department or
agency in question, a Federal agency or official shall not be
considered to have met any obligation to provide any
information, report, assessment, or other material (including
unevaluated intelligence information) to that department or
agency solely by virtue of having provided that information,
report, assessment, or other material to the Director of
National Intelligence or the National Counterterrorism Center.
(4) The Director of National Intelligence shall, in a timely
manner, report to Congress any statute, regulation, policy, or
practice that the Director believes impedes the ability of the
Director to fully and effectively ensure maximum availability
of access to intelligence information within the intelligence
community consistent with the protection of the national
security of the United States.
(h) Analysis.--To ensure the most accurate analysis of
intelligence is derived from all sources to support national
security needs, the Director of National Intelligence shall--
(1) implement policies and procedures--
(A) to encourage sound analytic methods and
tradecraft throughout the elements of the
intelligence community;
(B) to ensure that analysis is based upon all
sources available; and
(C) to ensure that the elements of the
intelligence community regularly conduct
competitive analysis of analytic products,
whether such products are produced by or
disseminated to such elements;
(2) ensure that resource allocation for intelligence
analysis is appropriately proportional to resource
allocation for intelligence collection systems and
operations in order to maximize analysis of all
collected data;
(3) ensure that differences in analytic judgment are
fully considered and brought to the attention of
policymakers; and
(4) ensure that sufficient relationships are
established between intelligence collectors and
analysts to facilitate greater understanding of the
needs of analysts.
(i) Protection of Intelligence Sources and Methods.--(1) The
Director of National Intelligence shall protect intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
(2) Consistent with paragraph (1), in order to maximize the
dissemination of intelligence, the Director of National
Intelligence shall establish and implement guidelines for the
intelligence community for the following purposes:
(A) Classification of information under applicable
law, Executive orders, or other Presidential
directives.
(B) Access to and dissemination of intelligence, both
in final form and in the form when initially gathered.
(C) Preparation of intelligence products in such a
way that source information is removed to allow for
dissemination at the lowest level of classification
possible or in unclassified form to the extent
practicable.
(3) The Director may only delegate a duty or authority given
the Director under this subsection to the Principal Deputy
Director of National Intelligence.
(j) Uniform Procedures for Classified Information.--The
Director of National Intelligence, subject to the direction of
the President, shall--
(1) establish uniform standards and procedures for
the grant of access to sensitive compartmented
information to any officer or employee of any agency or
department of the United States and to employees of
contractors of those agencies or departments;
(2) ensure the consistent implementation of those
standards and procedures throughout such agencies and
departments;
(3) ensure that security clearances granted by
individual elements of the intelligence community are
recognized by all elements of the intelligence
community, and under contracts entered into by those
agencies;
(4) ensure that the process for investigation and
adjudication of an application for access to sensitive
compartmented information is performed in the most
expeditious manner possible consistent with applicable
standards for national security;
(5) ensure that the background of each employee or
officer of an element of the intelligence community,
each contractor to an element of the intelligence
community, and each individual employee of such a
contractor who has been determined to be eligible for
access to classified information is monitored on a
continual basis under standards developed by the
Director, including with respect to the frequency of
evaluation, during the period of eligibility of such
employee or officer of an element of the intelligence
community, such contractor, or such individual employee
to such a contractor to determine whether such employee
or officer of an element of the intelligence community,
such contractor, and such individual employee of such a
contractor continues to meet the requirements for
eligibility for access to classified information; and
(6) develop procedures to require information sharing
between elements of the intelligence community
concerning potentially derogatory security information
regarding an employee or officer of an element of the
intelligence community, a contractor to an element of
the intelligence community, or an individual employee
of such a contractor that may impact the eligibility of
such employee or officer of an element of the
intelligence community, such contractor, or such
individual employee of such a contractor for a security
clearance.
(k) Coordination With Foreign Governments.--Under the
direction of the President and in a manner consistent with
section 207 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C.
3927), the Director of National Intelligence shall oversee the
coordination of the relationships between elements of the
intelligence community and the intelligence or security
services of foreign governments or international organizations
on all matters involving intelligence related to the national
security or involving intelligence acquired through clandestine
means.
(l) Enhanced Personnel Management.--(1)(A) The Director of
National Intelligence shall, under regulations prescribed by
the Director, provide incentives for personnel of elements of
the intelligence community to serve--
(i) on the staff of the Director of National
Intelligence;
(ii) on the staff of the national intelligence
centers;
(iii) on the staff of the National Counterterrorism
Center; and
(iv) in other positions in support of the
intelligence community management functions of the
Director.
(B) Incentives under subparagraph (A) may include financial
incentives, bonuses, and such other awards and incentives as
the Director considers appropriate.
(2)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
personnel of an element of the intelligence community who are
assigned or detailed under paragraph (1)(A) to service under
the Director of National Intelligence shall be promoted at
rates equivalent to or better than personnel of such element
who are not so assigned or detailed.
(B) The Director may prescribe regulations to carry out this
paragraph.
(3)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall prescribe
mechanisms to facilitate the rotation of personnel of the
intelligence community through various elements of the
intelligence community in the course of their careers in order
to facilitate the widest possible understanding by such
personnel of the variety of intelligence requirements, methods,
users, and capabilities.
(B) The mechanisms prescribed under subparagraph (A) may
include the following:
(i) The establishment of special occupational
categories involving service, over the course of a
career, in more than one element of the intelligence
community.
(ii) The provision of rewards for service in
positions undertaking analysis and planning of
operations involving two or more elements of the
intelligence community.
(iii) The establishment of requirements for
education, training, service, and evaluation for
service involving more than one element of the
intelligence community.
(C) It is the sense of Congress that the mechanisms
prescribed under this subsection should, to the extent
practical, seek to duplicate for civilian personnel within the
intelligence community the joint officer management policies
established by chapter 38 of title 10, United States Code, and
the other amendments made by title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law
99-433).
(D) The mechanisms prescribed under subparagraph (A) and any
other policies of the Director--
(i) may not require an employee of an office of
inspector general for an element of the intelligence
community, including the Office of the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community, to rotate to a
position in an office or organization of such an
element over which such office of inspector general
exercises jurisdiction; and
(ii) shall be implemented in a manner that exempts
employees of an office of inspector general from a
rotation that may impact the independence of such
office.
(4)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B) and
subparagraph (D), this subsection shall not apply with respect
to personnel of the elements of the intelligence community who
are members of the uniformed services.
(B) Mechanisms that establish requirements for education and
training pursuant to paragraph (3)(B)(iii) may apply with
respect to members of the uniformed services who are assigned
to an element of the intelligence community funded through the
National Intelligence Program, but such mechanisms shall not be
inconsistent with personnel policies and education and training
requirements otherwise applicable to members of the uniformed
services.
(C) The personnel policies and programs developed and
implemented under this subsection with respect to law
enforcement officers (as that term is defined in section
5541(3) of title 5, United States Code) shall not affect the
ability of law enforcement entities to conduct operations or,
through the applicable chain of command, to control the
activities of such law enforcement officers.
(D) Assignment to the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence of commissioned officers of the Armed Forces shall
be considered a joint-duty assignment for purposes of the joint
officer management policies prescribed by chapter 38 of title
10, United States Code, and other provisions of that title.
(m) Additional Authority With Respect to Personnel.--(1) In
addition to the authorities under subsection (f)(3), the
Director of National Intelligence may exercise with respect to
the personnel of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence any authority of the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency with respect to the personnel of the
Central Intelligence Agency under the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.), and other
applicable provisions of law, as of the date of the enactment
of this subsection to the same extent, and subject to the same
conditions and limitations, that the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency may exercise such authority with respect to
personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) Employees and applicants for employment of the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence shall have the same
rights and protections under the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence as employees of the Central Intelligence
Agency have under the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949,
and other applicable provisions of law, as of the date of the
enactment of this subsection.
(n) Acquisition and Other Authorities.--(1) In carrying out
the responsibilities and authorities under this section, the
Director of National Intelligence may exercise the acquisition
and appropriations authorities referred to in the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) other
than the authorities referred to in section 8(b) of that Act
(50 U.S.C. 403j(b)).
(2) For the purpose of the exercise of any authority referred
to in paragraph (1), a reference to the head of an agency shall
be deemed to be a reference to the Director of National
Intelligence or the Principal Deputy Director of National
Intelligence.
(3)(A) Any determination or decision to be made under an
authority referred to in paragraph (1) by the head of an agency
may be made with respect to individual purchases and contracts
or with respect to classes of purchases or contracts, and shall
be final.
(B) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the Director of
National Intelligence or the Principal Deputy Director of
National Intelligence may, in such official's discretion,
delegate to any officer or other official of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence any authority to make a
determination or decision as the head of the agency under an
authority referred to in paragraph (1).
(C) The limitations and conditions set forth in section 3(d)
of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C.
403c(d)) shall apply to the exercise by the Director of
National Intelligence of an authority referred to in paragraph
(1).
(D) Each determination or decision required by an authority
referred to in the second sentence of section 3(d) of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 shall be based upon
written findings made by the official making such determination
or decision, which findings shall be final and shall be
available within the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence for a period of at least six years following the
date of such determination or decision.
(4)(A) In addition to the authority referred to in paragraph
(1), the Director of National Intelligence may authorize the
head of an element of the intelligence community to exercise an
acquisition authority referred to in section 3 or 8(a) of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403c and
403j(a)) for an acquisition by such element that is more than
50 percent funded under the National Intelligence Program.
(B) The head of an element of the intelligence community may
not exercise an authority referred to in subparagraph (A)
until--
(i) the head of such element (without delegation)
submits to the Director of National Intelligence a
written request that includes--
(I) a description of such authority requested
to be exercised;
(II) an explanation of the need for such
authority, including an explanation of the
reasons that other authorities are
insufficient; and
(III) a certification that the mission of
such element would be--
(aa) impaired if such authority is
not exercised; or
(bb) significantly and measurably
enhanced if such authority is
exercised; and
(ii) the Director of National Intelligence issues a
written authorization that includes--
(I) a description of the authority referred
to in subparagraph (A) that is authorized to be
exercised; and
(II) a justification to support the exercise
of such authority.
(C) A request and authorization to exercise an authority
referred to in subparagraph (A) may be made with respect to an
individual acquisition or with respect to a specific class of
acquisitions described in the request and authorization
referred to in subparagraph (B).
(D)(i) A request from a head of an element of the
intelligence community located within one of the departments
described in clause (ii) to exercise an authority referred to
in subparagraph (A) shall be submitted to the Director of
National Intelligence in accordance with any procedures
established by the head of such department.
(ii) The departments described in this clause are the
Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department
of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the Department
of State, and the Department of the Treasury.
(E)(i) The head of an element of the intelligence community
may not be authorized to utilize an authority referred to in
subparagraph (A) for a class of acquisitions for a period of
more than 3 years, except that the Director of National
Intelligence (without delegation) may authorize the use of such
an authority for not more than 6 years.
(ii) Each authorization to utilize an authority referred to
in subparagraph (A) may be extended in accordance with the
requirements of subparagraph (B) for successive periods of not
more than 3 years, except that the Director of National
Intelligence (without delegation) may authorize an extension
period of not more than 6 years.
(F) Subject to clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (E), the
Director of National Intelligence may only delegate the
authority of the Director under subparagraphs (A) through (E)
to the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence or a
Deputy Director of National Intelligence.
(G) The Director of National Intelligence shall submit--
(i) to the congressional intelligence committees a
notification of an authorization to exercise an
authority referred to in subparagraph (A) or an
extension of such authorization that includes the
written authorization referred to in subparagraph
(B)(ii); and
(ii) to the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget a notification of an authorization to exercise
an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) for an
acquisition or class of acquisitions that will exceed
$50,000,000 annually.
(H) Requests and authorizations to exercise an authority
referred to in subparagraph (A) shall remain available within
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for a
period of at least 6 years following the date of such request
or authorization.
(I) Nothing in this paragraph may be construed to alter or
otherwise limit the authority of the Central Intelligence
Agency to independently exercise an authority under section 3
or 8(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C. 403c and 403j(a)).
(o) Consideration of Views of Elements of Intelligence
Community.--In carrying out the duties and responsibilities
under this section, the Director of National Intelligence shall
take into account the views of a head of a department
containing an element of the intelligence community and of the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(p) Responsibility of Director of National Intelligence
Regarding National Intelligence Program Budget Concerning the
Department of Defense.--Subject to the direction of the
President, the Director of National Intelligence shall, after
consultation with the Secretary of Defense, ensure that the
National Intelligence Program budgets for the elements of the
intelligence community that are within the Department of
Defense are adequate to satisfy the national intelligence needs
of the Department of Defense, including the needs of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of the
unified and specified commands, and wherever such elements are
performing Government-wide functions, the needs of other
Federal departments and agencies.
(q) Acquisitions of Major Systems.--(1) For each intelligence
program within the National Intelligence Program for the
acquisition of a major system, the Director of National
Intelligence shall--
(A) require the development and implementation of a
program management plan that includes cost, schedule,
security risks, and performance goals and program
milestone criteria, except that with respect to
Department of Defense programs the Director shall
consult with the Secretary of Defense;
(B) serve as exclusive milestone decision authority,
except that with respect to Department of Defense
programs the Director shall serve as milestone decision
authority jointly with the Secretary of Defense or the
designee of the Secretary; and
(C) periodically--
(i) review and assess the progress made
toward the achievement of the goals and
milestones established in such plan; and
(ii) submit to Congress a report on the
results of such review and assessment.
(2) If the Director of National Intelligence and the
Secretary of Defense are unable to reach an agreement on a
milestone decision under paragraph (1)(B), the President shall
resolve the conflict.
(3) Nothing in this subsection may be construed to limit the
authority of the Director of National Intelligence to delegate
to any other official any authority to perform the
responsibilities of the Director under this subsection.
(4) In this subsection:
(A) The term ``intelligence program'', with respect
to the acquisition of a major system, means a program
that--
(i) is carried out to acquire such major
system for an element of the intelligence
community; and
(ii) is funded in whole out of amounts
available for the National Intelligence
Program.
(B) The term ``major system'' has the meaning given
such term in section 4(9) of the Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act of 1949 (41 U.S.C. 403(9)).
(r) Performance of Common Services.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall, in consultation with the heads of
departments and agencies of the United States Government
containing elements within the intelligence community and with
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, coordinate the
performance by the elements of the intelligence community
within the National Intelligence Program of such services as
are of common concern to the intelligence community, which
services the Director of National Intelligence determines can
be more efficiently accomplished in a consolidated manner.
(s) Pay Authority for Critical Positions.--(1)
Notwithstanding any pay limitation established under any other
provision of law applicable to employees in elements of the
intelligence community, the Director of National Intelligence
may, in coordination with the Director of the Office of
Personnel Management and the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, grant authority to the head of a
department or agency to fix the rate of basic pay for one or
more positions within the intelligence community at a rate in
excess of any applicable limitation, subject to the provisions
of this subsection. The exercise of authority so granted is at
the discretion of the head of the department or agency
employing the individual in a position covered by such
authority, subject to the provisions of this subsection and any
conditions established by the Director of National Intelligence
when granting such authority.
(2) Authority under this subsection may be granted or
exercised only--
(A) with respect to a position that requires an
extremely high level of expertise and is critical to
successful accomplishment of an important mission; and
(B) to the extent necessary to recruit or retain an
individual exceptionally well qualified for the
position.
(3) The head of a department or agency may not fix a rate of
basic pay under this subsection at a rate greater than the rate
payable for level II of the Executive Schedule under section
5313 of title 5, United States Code, except upon written
approval of the Director of National Intelligence or as
otherwise authorized by law.
(4) The head of a department or agency may not fix a rate of
basic pay under this subsection at a rate greater than the rate
payable for level I of the Executive Schedule under section
5312 of title 5, United States Code, except upon written
approval of the President in response to a request by the
Director of National Intelligence or as otherwise authorized by
law.
(5) Any grant of authority under this subsection for a
position shall terminate at the discretion of the Director of
National Intelligence.
(6)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall notify the
congressional intelligence committees not later than 30 days
after the date on which the Director grants authority to the
head of a department or agency under this subsection.
(B) The head of a department or agency to which the Director
of National Intelligence grants authority under this subsection
shall notify the congressional intelligence committees and the
Director of the exercise of such authority not later than 30
days after the date on which such head exercises such
authority.
(t) Award of Rank to Members of the Senior National
Intelligence Service.--(1) The President, based on the
recommendation of the Director of National Intelligence, may
award a rank to a member of the Senior National Intelligence
Service or other intelligence community senior civilian officer
not already covered by such a rank award program in the same
manner in which a career appointee of an agency may be awarded
a rank under section 4507 of title 5, United States Code.
(2) The President may establish procedures to award a rank
under paragraph (1) to a member of the Senior National
Intelligence Service or a senior civilian officer of the
intelligence community whose identity as such a member or
officer is classified information (as defined in section
606(1)).
(u) Conflict of Interest Regulations.--The Director of
National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the
Office of Government Ethics, shall issue regulations
prohibiting an officer or employee of an element of the
intelligence community from engaging in outside employment if
such employment creates a conflict of interest or appearance
thereof.
(v) Authority To Establish Positions in Excepted Service.--
(1) The Director of National Intelligence, with the concurrence
of the head of the covered department concerned and in
consultation with the Director of the Office of Personnel
Management, may--
(A) convert competitive service positions, and the
incumbents of such positions, within an element of the
intelligence community in such department, to excepted
service positions as the Director of National
Intelligence determines necessary to carry out the
intelligence functions of such element; and
(B) establish new positions in the excepted service
within an element of the intelligence community in such
department, if the Director of National Intelligence
determines such positions are necessary to carry out
the intelligence functions of such element.
(2) An incumbent occupying a position on the date of the
enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2012 selected to be converted to the excepted service under
this section shall have the right to refuse such conversion.
Once such individual no longer occupies the position, the
position may be converted to the excepted service.
(3) A covered department may appoint an individual to a
position converted or established pursuant to this subsection
without regard to the civil-service laws, including parts II
and III of title 5, United States Code.
(4) In this subsection, the term ``covered department'' means
the Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security,
the Department of State, or the Department of the Treasury.
(w) Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statements Intelligence
Community Addendum.--The Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with the heads of the appropriate elements of the
intelligence community and the Secretary of State, shall
provide to the President, the congressional intelligence
committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate an addendum to each Nuclear Proliferation Assessment
Statement accompanying a civilian nuclear cooperation
agreement, containing a comprehensive analysis of the country's
export control system with respect to nuclear-related matters,
including interactions with other countries of proliferation
concern and the actual or suspected nuclear, dual-use, or
missile-related transfers to such countries.
(x) Requirements for Intelligence Community Contractors.--The
Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the
head of each department of the Federal Government that contains
an element of the intelligence community and the Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency, shall--
(1) ensure that--
(A) any contractor to an element of the
intelligence community with access to a
classified network or classified information
develops and operates a security plan that is
consistent with standards established by the
Director of National Intelligence for
intelligence community networks; and
(B) each contract awarded by an element of
the intelligence community includes provisions
requiring the contractor comply with such plan
and such standards;
(2) conduct periodic assessments of each security
plan required under paragraph (1)(A) to ensure such
security plan complies with the requirements of such
paragraph; and
(3) ensure that the insider threat detection
capabilities and insider threat policies of the
intelligence community apply to facilities of
contractors with access to a classified network.
(y) Fundraising.--(1) The Director of National Intelligence
may engage in fundraising in an official capacity for the
benefit of nonprofit organizations that--
(A) provide support to surviving family members of a
deceased employee of an element of the intelligence
community; or
(B) otherwise provide support for the welfare,
education, or recreation of employees of an element of
the intelligence community, former employees of an
element of the intelligence community, or family
members of such employees.
(2) In this subsection, the term ``fundraising'' means the
raising of funds through the active participation in the
promotion, production, or presentation of an event designed to
raise funds and does not include the direct solicitation of
money by any other means.
(3) Not later than 7 days after the date the Director engages
in fundraising authorized by this subsection or at the time the
decision is made to participate in such fundraising, the
Director shall notify the congressional intelligence committees
of such fundraising.
(4) The Director, in consultation with the Director of the
Office of Government Ethics, shall issue regulations to carry
out the authority provided in this subsection. Such regulations
shall ensure that such authority is exercised in a manner that
is consistent with all relevant ethical constraints and
principles, including the avoidance of any prohibited conflict
of interest or appearance of impropriety.
(z) Analyses and Impact Statements Regarding Proposed
Investment Into the United States.--(1) Not later than 20 days
after the completion of a review or an investigation of any
proposed investment into the United States for which the
Director has prepared analytic materials, the Director shall
submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representative copies of such analytic materials, including
any supplements or amendments to such analysis made by the
Director.
(2) Not later than 60 days after the completion of
consideration by the United States Government of any investment
described in paragraph (1), the Director shall determine
whether such investment will have an operational impact on the
intelligence community, and, if so, shall submit a report on
such impact to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of
the House of Representatives. Each such report shall--
(A) describe the operational impact of the investment
on the intelligence community; and
(B) describe any actions that have been or will be
taken to mitigate such impact.
(aa) Responsibility of Director of National Intelligence
Regarding National Intelligence Program Budget Concerning
Federal Bureau of Investigation.--(1) Consistent with
subsection (c)(5)(C), the Director of National Intelligence
shall, after consultation with the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, ensure that the programs and
activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that are part
of the National Intelligence Program are executed in a manner
that conforms with the requirements of the national
intelligence strategy under section 108A and the National
Intelligence Priorities Framework of the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence (or any successor mechanism
established for the prioritization of such programs and
activities).
(2) Consistent with subsection (c)(5)(C), the Director of
National Intelligence shall ensure that the programs and
activities that are part of the National Intelligence Program,
including those of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, are
structured and executed in a manner than enables budget
traceability.
* * * * * * *
non-reimbursable detail of other personnel
Sec. 113A. [An officer] (a) In General._An officer or
employee of the United States or member of the Armed Forces may
be detailed to the staff of an element of the intelligence
community funded through the National Intelligence Program from
another element of the intelligence community or from another
element of the United States Government on a non-reimbursable
basis, as jointly agreed to by the heads of the receiving and
detailing elements, for a period not to exceed three years.
This [section] subsection does not limit any other source of
authority for reimbursable or non-reimbursable details. A non-
reimbursable detail made under this [section] subsection shall
not be considered an augmentation of the appropriations of the
receiving element of the intelligence community.
(b) Processing and Resettlement of Refugees, Parolees, and
Other Aliens From Afghanistan.--An officer or employee of an
element of the intelligence community may be detailed to
another element of the United States Government on a non-
reimbursable basis for the purpose of providing assistance with
the processing and resettlement of refugees, parolees, and
other aliens, from Afghanistan, as jointly agreed to by the
heads of the receiving and detailing elements, for a period not
to exceed 1 year. This subsection does not limit any other
source of authority for reimbursable or non-reimbursable
details. A non-reimbursable detail made under this subsection
shall not be considered an augmentation of the appropriations
of the receiving element of the United States Government.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 116A. AUTHORITY FOR TRANSPORTATION OF CERTAIN CANINES ASSOCIATED
WITH FORCE PROTECTION DUTIES OF INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
(a) Transportation.--For purposes of section 1344 of title
31, United States Code, the transportation of federally owned
canines associated with force protection duties of an element
of the intelligence community between the residence of an
officer or employee of the element and various locations that
is essential for the performance of the force protection duty
shall be deemed essential for the safe and efficient
performance of intelligence duties.
(b) Officers and employees covered.--In the administration of
section 1344 of title 31, United States Code, an officer or
employee of an element of the intelligence community shall be
treated as being listed in subsection (b).
* * * * * * *
national [counter proliferation] counterproliferation and biosecurity
center
Sec. 119A. (a) Establishment.--(1) The President shall
establish a [National Counter Proliferation Center] National
Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center, taking into
account all appropriate [government tools to prevent]
government tools to--
(A) prevent and halt the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, their delivery
systems, and related materials and
technologies[.]; and
(B) lead integration and mission management of all
intelligence activities pertaining to biosecurity and
foreign biological threats.
(2) The head of the [National Counter Proliferation Center]
National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center shall be
the Director of the [National Counter Proliferation Center]
National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center, who shall
be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence.
(3) The [National Counter Proliferation Center] National
Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center shall be located
within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(4) The Director of the National Counterproliferation and
Biosecurity Center shall serve as the principal coordinator for
the intelligence community, and as the principal advisor to the
Director of National Intelligence, with respect to biosecurity
and foreign biological threats.
(b) Missions and Objectives.--[In establishing]
(1) Counterproliferation._In establishing the
[National Counter Proliferation Center] National
Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center, the
President shall address the following missions and
objectives to prevent and halt the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems,
and related materials and technologies:
[(1)] (A) Establishing a primary organization
within the United States Government for
analyzing and integrating all intelligence
possessed or acquired by the United States
pertaining to proliferation.
[(2)] (B) Ensuring that appropriate agencies
have full access to and receive all-source
intelligence support needed to execute their
[counter proliferation] counterproliferation
plans or activities, and perform independent,
alternative analyses.
[(3)] (C) Establishing a central repository
on known and suspected proliferation
activities, including the goals, strategies,
capabilities, networks, and any individuals,
groups, or entities engaged in proliferation.
[(4)] (D) Disseminating proliferation
information, including proliferation threats
and analyses, to the President, to the
appropriate departments and agencies, and to
the appropriate committees of Congress.
[(5)] (E) Conducting net assessments and
warnings about the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, their delivery systems, and
related materials and technologies.
[(6)] (F) Coordinating [counter
proliferation] counterproliferation plans and
activities of the various departments and
agencies of the United States Government to
prevent and halt the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, their delivery systems,
and related materials and technologies.
[(7)] (G) Conducting strategic operational
[counter proliferation] counterproliferation
planning for the United States Government to
prevent and halt the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, their delivery systems,
and related materials and technologies.
(2) Biosecurity.--In establishing the National
Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center, the
President shall address the following missions and
objectives to ensure that the Center serves as the lead
for the intelligence community for the integration,
mission management, and coordination of intelligence
activities pertaining to biosecurity and foreign
biological threats, regardless of origin:
(A) Ensuring that the elements of the
intelligence community provide timely and
effective warnings to the President and the
Director of National Intelligence regarding
emerging foreign biological threats, including
diseases with pandemic potential.
(B) Overseeing and coordinating the
collection and analysis of intelligence on
biosecurity and foreign biological threats in
support of the intelligence needs of the
Federal departments and agencies responsible
for public health, including by conveying
collection priorities to elements of the
intelligence community.
(C) Coordinating intelligence support to the
Federal departments and agencies responsible
for public health, including by ensuring that
intelligence pertaining to biosecurity and
foreign biological threats is disseminated
among appropriately cleared personnel of such
departments and agencies.
(D) Coordinating with the Federal departments
and agencies responsible for public health to
encourage information sharing with the
intelligence community.
(E) Identifying gaps in the capabilities of
the intelligence community regarding
biosecurity and countering foreign biological
threats and providing to the Director of
National Intelligence recommended solutions for
such gaps, including by encouraging research
and development of new capabilities to counter
foreign biological threats.
(c) National Security Waiver.--The President may waive the
requirements of this section, and any parts thereof, if the
President determines that such requirements do not materially
improve the ability of the United States Government to prevent
and halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
their delivery systems, and related materials and technologies.
Such waiver shall be made in writing to Congress and shall
include a description of how the missions and objectives in
subsection (b) are being met.
(d) Report to Congress.--(1) Not later than nine months after
the implementation of this Act, the President shall submit to
Congress, in classified form if necessary, the findings and
recommendations of the President's Commission on Weapons of
Mass Destruction established by Executive Order in February
2004, together with the views of the President regarding the
establishment of a [National Counter Proliferation Center]
National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center.
(2) If the President decides not to exercise the waiver
authority granted by subsection (c), the President shall submit
to Congress from time to time updates and plans regarding the
establishment of a [National Counter Proliferation Center]
National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center.
(e) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that a
central feature of [counter proliferation] counterproliferation
activities, consistent with the President's Proliferation
Security Initiative, should include the physical interdiction,
by air, sea, or land, of weapons of mass destruction, their
delivery systems, and related materials and technologies, and
enhanced law enforcement activities to identify and disrupt
proliferation networks, activities, organizations, and persons.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 120. CLIMATE SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL.
(a) Establishment.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall establish a Climate Security Advisory Council for the
purpose of--
(1) assisting intelligence analysts of various
elements of the intelligence community with respect to
analysis of climate security and its impact on the
areas of focus of such analysts;
(2) facilitating coordination between the elements of
the intelligence community and elements of the Federal
Government that are not elements of the intelligence
community in collecting data on, and conducting
analysis of, climate change and climate security; and
(3) ensuring that the intelligence community is
adequately prioritizing climate change in carrying out
its activities.
(b) Composition of Council.--
(1) Members.--The Council shall be composed of the
following individuals appointed by the Director of
National Intelligence:
(A) An appropriate official from the National
Intelligence Council, who shall chair the
Council.
(B) The lead official with respect to climate
and environmental security analysis from--
(i) the Central Intelligence Agency;
(ii) the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research of the Department of State;
(iii) the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency;
(iv) the Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence of the Department
of Energy;
(v) the Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Intelligence and
Security; and
(vi) the Defense Intelligence Agency.
(C) Three appropriate officials from elements
of the Federal Government that are not elements
of the intelligence community that are
responsible for--
(i) providing decision makers with a
predictive understanding of the
climate;
(ii) making observations of our Earth
system that can be used by the public,
policymakers, and to support strategic
decisions; or
(iii) coordinating Federal research
and investments in understanding the
forces shaping the global environment,
both human and natural, and their
impacts on society.
(D) Any other officials as the Director of
National Intelligence or the chair of the
Council may determine appropriate.
(2) Responsibilities of chair.--The chair of the
Council shall have responsibility for--
(A) identifying agencies to supply
individuals from elements of the Federal
Government that are not elements of the
intelligence community;
(B) securing the permission of the relevant
agency heads for the participation of such
individuals on the Council; and
(C) any other duties that the Director of
National Intelligence may direct.
(c) Duties and Responsibilities of Council.--The Council
shall carry out the following duties and responsibilities:
(1) To meet at least quarterly to--
(A) exchange appropriate data between
elements of the intelligence community and
elements of the Federal Government that are not
elements of the intelligence community;
(B) discuss processes for the routine
exchange of such data and implementation of
such processes; and
(C) prepare summaries of the business
conducted at each meeting.
(2) To assess and determine best practices with
respect to the analysis of climate security, including
identifying publicly available information and
intelligence acquired through clandestine means that
enables such analysis.
(3) To assess and identify best practices with
respect to prior efforts of the intelligence community
to analyze climate security.
(4) To assess and describe best practices for
identifying and disseminating climate intelligence
indications and warnings.
(5) To recommend methods of incorporating analysis of
climate security and the best practices identified
under paragraphs (2) through (4) into existing analytic
training programs.
(6) To consult, as appropriate, with other elements
of the intelligence community that conduct analysis of
climate change or climate security and elements of the
Federal Government that are not elements of the
intelligence community that conduct analysis of climate
change or climate security, for the purpose of sharing
information about ongoing efforts and avoiding
duplication of existing efforts.
(7) To work with elements of the intelligence
community that conduct analysis of climate change or
climate security and elements of the Federal Government
that are not elements of the intelligence community
that conduct analysis of climate change or climate
security--
(A) to exchange appropriate data between such
elements, establish processes, procedures and
practices for the routine exchange of such
data, discuss the implementation of such
processes; and
(B) to enable and facilitate the sharing of
findings and analysis between such elements.
(8) To assess whether the elements of the
intelligence community that conduct analysis of climate
change or climate security may inform the research
direction of academic work and the sponsored work of
the United States Government.
(9) At the discretion of the chair of the Council, to
convene conferences of analysts and nonintelligence
community personnel working on climate change or
climate security on subjects that the chair shall
direct.
(d) Annual Report.--[Not later]
(1) Requirement._Not later than January 31, 2021,
and not less frequently than annually thereafter, the
chair of the Council shall submit, on behalf of the
Council, to the congressional intelligence committees a
report describing the activities of the Council as
described in subsection (c) during the year preceding
the year during which the report is submitted.
(2) Matters included.--Each report under paragraph
(1) shall include a description of any obstacles or
gaps relating to--
(A) the Council fulfilling its duties and
responsibilities under subsection (c); or
(B) the responsiveness of the intelligence
community to the climate security needs and
priorities of the policymaking elements of the
Federal Government.
(e) Sunset.--The Council shall terminate on [the date that is
4 years after the date of the enactment of this section]
December 31, 2025.
[(e)] (f) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Climate security.--The term ``climate security''
means the effects of climate change on the following:
(A) The national security of the United
States, including national security
infrastructure.
(B) Subnational, national, and regional
political stability.
(C) The security of allies and partners of
the United States.
(D) Ongoing or potential political violence,
including unrest, rioting, guerrilla warfare,
insurgency, terrorism, rebellion, revolution,
civil war, and interstate war.
(2) Climate intelligence indications and warnings.--
The term ``climate intelligence indications and
warnings'' means developments relating to climate
security with the potential to--
(A) imminently and substantially alter the
political stability or degree of human security
in a country or region; or
(B) imminently and substantially threaten--
(i) the national security of the
United States;
(ii) the military, political, or
economic interests of allies and
partners of the United States; or
(iii) citizens of the United States
abroad.
* * * * * * *
TITLE III--MISCELLANEOUS
* * * * * * *
[SEC. 304. REPORTING OF CERTAIN EMPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES BY FORMER
INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES.
[(a) In General.--The head of each element of the
intelligence community shall issue regulations requiring each
employee of such element occupying a covered position to sign a
written agreement requiring the regular reporting of covered
employment to the head of such element.
[(b) Agreement Elements.--The regulations required under
subsection (a) shall provide that an agreement contain
provisions requiring each employee occupying a covered position
to, during the two-year period beginning on the date on which
such employee ceases to occupy such covered position--
[(1) report covered employment to the head of the
element of the intelligence community that employed
such employee in such covered position upon accepting
such covered employment; and
[(2) annually (or more frequently if the head of such
element considers it appropriate) report covered
employment to the head of such element.
[(c) Definitions.--In this section:
[(1) Covered employment.--The term ``covered
employment'' means direct employment by, representation
of, or the provision of advice relating to national
security to the government of a foreign country or any
person whose activities are directly or indirectly
supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or
subsidized, in whole or in major part, by any
government of a foreign country.
[(2) Covered position.--The term ``covered position''
means a position within an element of the intelligence
community that, based on the level of access of a
person occupying such position to information regarding
sensitive intelligence sources or methods or other
exceptionally sensitive matters, the head of such
element determines should be subject to the
requirements of this section.
[(3) Government of a foreign country.--The term
``government of a foreign country'' has the meaning
given the term in section 1(e) of the Foreign Agents
Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611(e)).]
SEC. 304. REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTAIN EMPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES BY FORMER
INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES.
(a) Temporary Restriction.--An employee of an element of the
intelligence community who occupies a covered intelligence
position may not occupy a covered post-service position during
the 30-month period following the date on which the employee
ceases to occupy a covered intelligence position.
(b) Covered Post-service Employment Reporting.--
(1) Requirement.--During the 5-year period beginning
on the date on which an employee ceases to occupy a
covered intelligence position, the employee shall--
(A) report covered post-service employment to
the head of the element of the intelligence
community that employed such employee in such
covered intelligence position upon accepting
such covered post-service employment; and
(B) annually (or more frequently if the head
of such element considers it appropriate)
report covered post-service employment to the
head of such element.
(2) Regulations.--The head of each element of the
intelligence community shall issue regulations
requiring, as a condition of employment, each employee
of such element occupying a covered intelligence
position to sign a written agreement requiring the
regular reporting of covered post-service employment to
the head of such element pursuant to paragraph (1).
(c) Penalties.--
(1) Criminal penalties.--A former employee who
knowingly and willfully violates subsection (a) or who
knowingly and willfully fails to make a required report
under subsection (b) shall be fined under title 18,
United States Code, or imprisoned for not more than 5
years, or both. Each report under subsection (b) shall
be subject to section 1001 of title 18, United States
Code.
(2) Security clearances.--The head of an element of
the intelligence community shall revoke the security
clearance of a former employee if the former employee
knowingly and willfully fails to make a required report
under subsection (b) or knowingly and willfully makes a
false report under such subsection.
(d) Provision of Information.--
(1) Training.--The head of each element of the
intelligence community shall regularly provide training
on the reporting requirements under subsection (b) to
employees of that element who occupy a covered
intelligence position.
(2) Written notice.--The head of each element of the
intelligence community shall provide written notice of
the reporting requirements under subsection (b) to an
employee when the employee ceases to occupy a covered
intelligence position.
(e) Annual Reports.--
(1) Requirement.--Not later than March 31 of each
year, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report on covered post-service employment occurring
during the year covered by the report.
(2) Elements.--Each report under paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) The number of former employees who occupy
a covered post-service position, broken down
by--
(i) the name of the employer;
(ii) the foreign government,
including by the specific foreign
individual, agency, or entity, for whom
the covered post-service employment is
being performed; and
(iii) the nature of the services
provided as part of the covered post-
service employment.
(B) A certification by the Director that--
(i) each element of the intelligence
community maintains adequate systems
and processes for ensuring that former
employees are submitting reports
required under subsection (b);
(ii) to the knowledge of the heads of
the elements of the intelligence
community, all former employees who
occupy a covered post-service position
are in compliance with this section;
(iii) the services provided by former
employees who occupy a covered post-
service position do not--
(I) pose a current or future
threat to the national security
of the United States; or
(II) pose a
counterintelligence risk; and
(iv) the Director and the heads of
such elements are not aware of any
credible information or reporting that
any former employee who occupies a
covered post-service position has
engaged in activities that violate
Federal law, infringe upon the privacy
rights of United States persons, or
constitute abuses of human rights.
(3) Form.--Each report under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
(f) Notification.--In addition to the annual reports under
subsection (e), if a head of an element of the intelligence
community determines that the services provided by a former
employee who occupies a covered post-service position pose a
threat or risk described in clause (iii) of paragraph (2)(B) of
such subsection, or include activities described in clause (iv)
of such paragraph, the head shall notify the congressional
intelligence committees of such determination by not later than
7 days after making such determination. The notification shall
include the following:
(1) The name of the former employee.
(2) The name of the employer.
(3) The foreign government, including the specific
foreign individual, agency, or entity, for whom the
covered post-service employment is being performed.
(4) As applicable, a description of--
(A) the risk to national security, the
counterintelligence risk, or both; and
(B) the activities that may violate Federal
law, infringe upon the privacy rights of United
States persons, or constitute abuses of human
rights.
(g) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Covered intelligence position.--The term
``covered intelligence position'' means a position
within an element of the intelligence community that,
based on the level of access of a person occupying such
position to information regarding sensitive
intelligence sources or methods or other exceptionally
sensitive matters, the head of such element determines
should be subject to the requirements of this section.
(2) Covered post-service employment.--The term
``covered post-service employment'' means direct or
indirect employment by, representation of, or any
provision of advice or services relating to national
security, intelligence, the military, or internal
security to, the government of a foreign country or any
company, entity, or other person whose activities are
directly or indirectly supervised, directed,
controlled, financed, or subsidized, in whole or in
major part, by any government of a foreign country.
(3) Covered post-service position.--The term
``covered post-service position'' means a position of
employment described in paragraph (2).
(4) Employee.--The term ``employee'', with respect to
an employee occupying a covered intelligence position,
includes an officer or official of an element of the
intelligence community, a contractor of such an
element, a detailee to such an element, or a member of
the Armed Forces assigned to such an element.
(5) Former employee.--The term ``former employee''
means an individual--
(A) who was an employee occupying a covered
intelligence position; and
(B) who is subject to the requirements under
subsection (a) or (b).
(6) Government of a foreign country.--The term
``government of a foreign country'' has the meaning
given the term in section 1(e) of the Foreign Agents
Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611(e)).
SEC. 305. TEMPORARY AUTHORITY FOR PAID LEAVE FOR A SERIOUS HEALTH
CONDITION.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Paid serious health condition leave.--The term
``paid serious health condition leave'' means paid
leave taken under subsection (b).
(2) Serious health condition.--The term ``serious
health condition'' has the meaning given the term in
section 6381 of title 5, United States Code.
(3) Son or daughter.--The term ``son or daughter''
has the meaning given the term in section 6381 of title
5, United States Code.
(b) Paid Serious Health Condition Leave.--During the period
specified in subsection (f), and notwithstanding any other
provision of law, a civilian employee of an element of the
intelligence community shall have available a total of 12
administrative workweeks of paid leave during any 12-month
period for one or more of the following:
(1) In order to care for the spouse, or a son,
daughter, or parent, of the employee, if such spouse,
son, daughter, or parent has a serious health
condition.
(2) Because of a serious health condition that makes
the employee unable to perform the functions of the
employee's position.
(c) Treatment of Serious Health Condition Leave Request.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an element of the
intelligence community shall accommodate an employee's leave
schedule request under subsection (b), including a request to
use such leave intermittently or on a reduced leave schedule,
to the extent that the requested leave schedule does not unduly
disrupt agency operations.
(d) Rules Relating to Paid Leave.--During the period
specified in subsection (f), and notwithstanding any other
provision of law--
(1) an employee of an element of the intelligence
community--
(A) shall be required to first use all
accrued or accumulated paid sick leave before
being allowed to use paid serious health
condition leave; and
(B) may not be required to first use all or
any portion of any unpaid leave available to
the employee before being allowed to use paid
serious health condition leave; and
(2) paid serious health condition leave--
(A) shall be payable from any appropriation
or fund available for salaries or expenses for
positions within the employing element;
(B) may not be considered to be annual or
vacation leave for purposes of section 5551 or
5552 of title 5, United States Code, or for any
other purpose;
(C) if not used by the employee before the
end of the 12-month period described in
subsection (b) to which the leave relates, may
not be available for any subsequent use and may
not be converted into a cash payment;
(D) may be granted only to the extent that
the employee does not receive a total of more
than 12 weeks of paid serious health condition
leave in any 12-month period;
(E) shall be used in increments of hours (or
fractions thereof), with 12 administrative
workweeks equal to 480 hours for employees of
elements of the intelligence community with a
regular full-time work schedule and converted
to a proportional number of hours for employees
of such elements with part-time, seasonal, or
uncommon tours of duty; and
(F) may not be used during off-season (nonpay
status) periods for employees of such elements
with seasonal work schedules.
(e) Implementation.--
(1) Consistency with serious health condition leave
under title 5.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall carry out this section in a manner consistent, to
the extent appropriate, with the administration of
leave taken under section 6382 of title 5, United
States Code, for a reason described in subparagraph (C)
or (D) of subsection (a)(1) of that section, including
with respect to the authority to require a
certification described in section 6383 of such title.
(2) Implementation plan.--Not later than 1 year after
the date of enactment of this section, the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees an implementation plan that
includes--
(A) processes and procedures for implementing
the paid serious health condition leave
policies under subsections (b) through (d)
during the period specified in subsection (f);
(B) an explanation of how such implementation
will be reconciled with policies of other
elements of the Federal Government, including
the impact on elements funded by the National
Intelligence Program that are housed within
agencies outside the intelligence community;
(C) the projected impact of such
implementation on the workforce of the
intelligence community, including take rates,
retention, recruiting, and morale, broken down
by each element of the intelligence community;
and
(D) all costs or operational expenses
associated with such implementation.
(3) Directive.--Not later than 90 days after the
Director of National Intelligence submits the
implementation plan under paragraph (2), the Director
of National Intelligence shall issue a written
directive to implement this section, which directive
shall take effect on the date of issuance.
(f) Duration of Authority.--The authority and requirements
under subsections (b) through (d) shall only apply during the
3-year period beginning on the date on which the Director of
National Intelligence issues the written directive under
subsection (e)(3).
(g) Annual Report.--During the period specified in subsection
(f), the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees an annual report that--
(1) details the number of employees of each element
of the intelligence community who applied for and took
paid serious health condition leave during the year
covered by the report;
(2) includes updates on major implementation
challenges or costs associated with paid serious health
condition leave; and
(3) includes a recommendation of the Director with
respect to whether to extend the period specified in
subsection (f).
* * * * * * *
TITLE V--ACCOUNTABILITY FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
* * * * * * *
SEC. 501A. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF CERTAIN SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS.
(a) Reports and Notifications.--At the same time that the
Secretary of Defense submits any report or notification under
section 119 of title 10, United States Code, that relates to a
covered special access program or a new covered special access
program, the Secretary shall also submit such report or
notification to the congressional intelligence committees.
(b) Briefings.--On a periodic basis, but not less frequently
than semiannually, the Secretary of Defense shall provide to
the chairmen and ranking minority members of the congressional
intelligence committees, and to any staff of such a committee
designated by either the chair or ranking member for purposes
of this subsection, a briefing on covered special access
programs. Each such briefing shall include, at a minimum--
(1) a description of the activity of the program
during the period covered by the briefing; and
(2) documentation with respect to how the program has
achieved outcomes consistent with requirements
documented by the Director of National Intelligence and
the Secretary of Defense.
(c) Notifications on Compartments and Subcompartments.--
(1) Requirement.--Except as provided by paragraph
(2), a head of an element of the intelligence community
may not establish a compartment or a subcompartment
under a covered special access program until the head
notifies the congressional intelligence committees of
such compartment or subcompartment, as the case may be.
(2) Waiver.--
(A) Determination.--On a case-by-case basis,
the Director of National Intelligence may waive
the requirement under paragraph (1). Not later
than two days after making such a waiver, the
Director shall notify the congressional
intelligence committees of the waiver,
including a justification for the waiver.
(B) Submission.--Not later than 30 days after
the date on which the Director makes a waiver
under subparagraph (A), the head of the element
of the intelligence community for whom the
waiver was made shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees the
notification required under paragraph (1)
relating to such waiver.
(d) Annual Reports.--
(1) Requirement.--On an annual basis, the head of
each element of the intelligence community shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees a report
on covered special access programs administered by the
head.
(2) Matters included.--Each report shall include,
with respect to the period covered by the report, the
following:
(A) A list of all compartments and
subcompartments of covered special access
programs active as of the date of the report.
(B) A list of all compartments and
subcompartments of covered special access
programs terminated during the period covered
by the report.
(C) With respect to the report submitted by
the Director of National Intelligence, in
addition to the matters specified in
subparagraphs (A) and (B)--
(i) a certification regarding whether
the creation, validation, or
substantial modification, including
termination, for all existing and
proposed covered special access
programs, and the compartments and
subcompartments within each, are
substantiated and justified based on
the information required by clause
(ii); and
(ii) for each certification--
(I) the rationale for the
revalidation, validation, or
substantial modification,
including termination, of each
covered special access program,
compartment, and
subcompartment;
(II) the identification of a
control officer for each
covered special access program;
and
(III) a statement of
protection requirements for
each covered special access
program.
(e) Covered Special Access Program Defined.--In this section,
the term ``covered special access program'' means a special
access program that receives funding under the National
Intelligence Program or the Military Intelligence Program,
relates to an intelligence or intelligence-related activity, or
both.
* * * * * * *
funding of intelligence activities
Sec. 504. (a) Appropriated funds available to an intelligence
agency may be obligated or expended for an intelligence or
intelligence-related activity only if--
[(1) those funds were specifically authorized by the
Congress for use for such activities; or]
(1) those funds were specifically authorized by
Congress for use for such intelligence or intelligence-
related activities; or
(2) in the case of funds from the Reserve for
Contingencies of the Central Intelligence Agency and
consistent with the provisions of section 503 of this
Act concerning any significant anticipated intelligence
activity, the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency has notified the appropriate congressional
committees of the intent to make such funds available
for such activity; or
(3) in the case of funds specifically authorized by
the Congress for a different activity--
(A) the activity to be funded is a higher
priority intelligence or intelligence-related
activity;
(B) the use of such funds for such activity
supports an emergent need, improves program
effectiveness, or increases efficiency; and
(C) the Director of National Intelligence,
the Secretary of Defense, or the Attorney
General, as appropriate, has notified the
appropriate congressional committees of the
intent to make such funds available for such
activity;
(4) nothing in this subsection prohibits obligation
or expenditure of funds available to an intelligence
agency in accordance with sections 1535 and 1536 of
title 31, United States Code.
(b) Funds available to an intelligence agency may not be made
available for any intelligence or intelligence-related activity
for which funds were denied by the Congress.
(c) No funds appropriated for, or otherwise available to, any
department, agency, or entity of the United States Government
may be expended, or may be directed to be expended, for any
covert action, as defined in section 503(e), unless and until a
Presidential finding required by subsection (a) of section 503
has been signed or otherwise issued in accordance with that
subsection.
(d)(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided by law,
funds available to an intelligence agency that are not
appropriated funds may be obligated or expended for an
intelligence or intelligence-related activity only if those
funds are used for activities reported to the appropriate
congressional committees pursuant to procedures which
identify--
(A) the types of activities for which nonappropriated
funds may be expended; and
(B) the circumstances under which an activity must be
reported as a significant anticipated intelligence
activity before such funds can be expended.
(2) Procedures for purposes of paragraph (1) shall be jointly
agreed upon by the congressional intelligence committees and,
as appropriate, the Director of National Intelligence or the
Secretary of Defense.
(e) As used in this section--
(1) the term ``intelligence agency'' means any
department, agency, or other entity of the United
States involved in intelligence or intelligence-related
activities;
(2) the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives and the Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate; and
(3) the term ``specifically authorized by the
Congress'' means that--
(A) the activity and the amount of funds
proposed to be used for that activity were
identified in a formal budget request to the
Congress, but funds shall be deemed to be
specifically authorized for that activity only
to the extent that the Congress both authorized
the funds to be appropriated for that activity
and appropriated the funds for that activity;
or
(B) although the funds were not formally
requested, the Congress both specifically
authorized the appropriation of the funds for
the activity and appropriated the funds for the
activity.
* * * * * * *
TITLE X--EDUCATION IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
* * * * * * *
Subtitle C--Additional Education Provisions
* * * * * * *
SEC. 1025. AUTHORIZATION OF SUPPORT BY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE FOR CERTAIN WORKFORCE ACTIVITIES.
(a) Authorization.--The Director may, with or without
reimbursement, obligate or expend amounts authorized to be
appropriated or otherwise made available for the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence for covered workforce
activities for the purpose of supporting a covered workforce
activity of an element of the intelligence community.
(b) Covered Workforce Activity Defined.--In this section, the
term ``covered workforce activity'' means an activity relating
to--
(1) recruitment or retention of the intelligence
community workforce; or
(2) diversity, equality, inclusion, or accessibility,
with respect to such workforce.
* * * * * * *
TITLE XI--ADDITIONAL MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
SEC. 1104. PROHIBITED PERSONNEL PRACTICES IN THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' means an executive
department or independent establishment, as defined
under sections 101 and 104 of title 5, United States
Code, that contains an intelligence community element,
except the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(2) Covered intelligence community element.--The term
``covered intelligence community element''--
(A) means--
(i) the Central Intelligence Agency,
the Defense Intelligence Agency, the
National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency, the National Security Agency,
the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, and the National
Reconnaissance Office; and
(ii) any executive agency or unit
thereof determined by the President
under section 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) of
title 5, United States Code, to have as
its principal function the conduct of
foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence activities; and
(B) does not include the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
(3) Personnel action.--The term ``personnel action''
means, with respect to an employee in a position in a
covered intelligence community element (other than a
position excepted from the competitive service due to
its confidential, policy-determining, policymaking, or
policy-advocating character) or a contractor employee--
(A) an appointment;
(B) a promotion;
(C) a disciplinary or corrective action;
(D) a detail, transfer, or reassignment;
(E) a demotion, suspension, or termination;
(F) a reinstatement or restoration;
(G) a performance evaluation;
(H) a decision concerning pay, benefits, or
awards;
(I) a decision concerning education or
training if such education or training may
reasonably be expected to lead to an
appointment, promotion, or performance
evaluation; or
(J) any other significant change in duties,
responsibilities, or working conditions.
(4) Contractor employee.--The term ``contractor
employee'' means an employee of a contractor,
subcontractor, grantee, subgrantee, or personal
services contractor, of a covered intelligence
community element.
(b) Agency Employees.--[Any employee of an agency] Any
employee of a covered intelligence community element or an
agency who has authority to take, direct others to take,
recommend, or approve any personnel action, shall not, with
respect to such authority, take or fail to take, or threaten to
take or fail to take, a personnel action with respect to any
employee of a covered intelligence community element as a
reprisal [for a lawful disclosure] for--
(1) any lawful disclosure of information by the
employee to the Director of National Intelligence (or
an employee designated by the Director of National
Intelligence for such purpose), the Inspector General
of the Intelligence Community, a supervisor in the
employee's direct chain of command, or a supervisor of
the employing agency with responsibility for the
subject matter of the disclosure, up to and including
the head of the employing agency (or an employee
designated by the head of that agency for such
purpose), the appropriate inspector general of the
employing agency, a congressional intelligence
committee, or a member of a congressional intelligence
committee, which the employee reasonably believes
evidences--
[(1)] (A) a violation of any Federal law,
rule, or regulation; or
[(2)] (B) mismanagement, a gross waste of
funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial
and specific danger to public health or safety.
(2) any lawful disclosure that complies with--
(A) subsections (a)(1), (d), and (g) of
section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978
(5 U.S.C. App.);
(B) subparagraphs (A), (D), and (H) of
section 17(d)(5) of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(5)); or
(C) subparagraphs (A), (D), and (I) of
section 103H(k)(5); or
(3) if the actions do not result in the employee
unlawfully disclosing information specifically required
by Executive order to be kept classified in the
interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign
affairs, any lawful disclosure in conjunction with--
(A) the exercise of any appeal, complaint, or
grievance right granted by any law, rule, or
regulation;
(B) testimony for or otherwise lawfully
assisting any individual in the exercise of any
right referred to in subparagraph (A); or
(C) cooperation with or disclosing
information to the Inspector General of an
agency, in accordance with applicable
provisions of law in connection with an audit,
inspection, or investigation conducted by the
Inspector General.
(c) Contractor Employees.--(1) Any employee of an agency or
of a contractor, subcontractor, grantee, subgrantee, or
personal services contractor, of a covered intelligence
community element who has authority to take, direct others to
take, recommend, or approve any personnel action, shall not,
with respect to such authority, take or fail to take, or
threaten to take or fail to take, a personnel action with
respect to any contractor employee as a reprisal [for a lawful
disclosure] for--
(A) any lawful disclosure of information by the
contractor employee to the Director of National
Intelligence (or an employee designated by the Director
of National Intelligence for such purpose), the
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, a
supervisor in the contractor employee's direct chain of
command, or a supervisor of the contracting agency with
responsibility for the subject matter of the
disclosure, up to and including the head of the
contracting agency (or an employee designated by the
head of that agency for such purpose), the appropriate
inspector general of the contracting agency, a
congressional intelligence committee, or a member of a
congressional intelligence committee, which the
contractor employee reasonably believes evidences--
[(A)] (i) a violation of any Federal
law, rule, or regulation (including
with respect to evidence of another
employee or contractor employee
accessing or sharing classified
information without authorization); or
[(B) gross mismanagement] (ii)
mismanagement, a gross waste of funds,
an abuse of authority, or a substantial
and specific danger to public health or
safety.
(B) any lawful disclosure that complies with--
(i) subsections (a)(1), (d), and (g) of
section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978
(5 U.S.C. App.);
(ii) subparagraphs (A), (D), and (H) of
section 17(d)(5) of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(5)); or
(iii) subparagraphs (A), (D), and (I) of
section 103H(k)(5); or
(C) if the actions do not result in the contractor
employee unlawfully disclosing information specifically
required by Executive order to be kept classified in
the interest of national defense or the conduct of
foreign affairs, any lawful disclosure in conjunction
with--
(i) the exercise of any appeal, complaint, or
grievance right granted by any law, rule, or
regulation;
(ii) testimony for or otherwise lawfully
assisting any individual in the exercise of any
right referred to in clause (i); or
(iii) cooperation with or disclosing
information to the Inspector General of an
agency, in accordance with applicable
provisions of law in connection with an audit,
inspection, or investigation conducted by the
Inspector General.
(2) A personnel action under paragraph (1) is prohibited even
if the action is undertaken at the request of an agency
official, unless the request takes the form of a
nondiscretionary directive and is within the authority of the
agency official making the request.
(d) Rule of Construction.--Consistent with the protection of
sources and methods, nothing in subsection (b) or (c) shall be
construed to authorize--
(1) the withholding of information from Congress; or
(2) the taking of any personnel action against an
employee who lawfully discloses information to
Congress.
(e) Disclosures.--A disclosure shall not be excluded from
this section because--
(1) the disclosure was made to an individual,
including a supervisor, who participated in an activity
that the employee reasonably believed to be covered
under subsection (b)(1)(B) or the contractor employee
reasonably believed to be covered under subsection
(c)(1)(A)(ii);
(2) the disclosure revealed information that had been
previously disclosed;
(3) the disclosure was not made in writing;
(4) the disclosure was made while the employee was
off duty;
(5) of the amount of time which has passed since the
occurrence of the events described in the disclosure;
or
(6) the disclosure was made during the normal course
of duties of an employee or contractor employee.
[(d) Enforcement.--The President shall provide for the
enforcement of this section.]
(f) Enforcement.--The President shall provide for the
enforcement of this section consistent, to the fullest extent
possible, with the policies and procedures used to adjudicate
alleged violations of section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United
States Code.
[(e)] (g) Existing Rights Preserved.--Nothing in this section
shall be construed to--
(1) preempt or preclude any employee, contractor
employee, or applicant for employment, at the Federal
Bureau of Investigation from exercising rights provided
under any other law, rule, or regulation, including
section 2303 of title 5, United States Code; or
(2) repeal section 2303 of title 5, United States
Code.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 1111. BIENNIAL REPORTS ON FOREIGN BIOLOGICAL THREATS.
(a) Reports.--On a biennial basis until the date that is 10
years after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a comprehensive report on the
activities, prioritization, and responsibilities of the
intelligence community with respect to foreign biological
threats emanating from the territory of, or sponsored by, a
covered country.
(b) Matters Included.--Each report under subsection (a) shall
include, with respect to foreign biological threats emanating
from the territory of, or sponsored by, a covered country, the
following:
(1) A detailed description of all activities relating
to such threats undertaken by each element of the
intelligence community, and an assessment of any gaps
in such activities.
(2) A detailed description of all duties and
responsibilities relating to such threats explicitly
authorized or otherwise assigned, exclusively or
jointly, to each element of the intelligence community,
and an assessment of any identified gaps in such duties
or responsibilities.
(3) A description of the coordination among the
relevant elements of the intelligence community with
respect to the activities specified in paragraph (1)
and the duties and responsibilities specified in
paragraph (2).
(4) An inventory of the strategies, plans, policies,
and interagency agreements of the intelligence
community relating to the collection, monitoring,
analysis, mitigation, and attribution of such threats,
and an assessment of any identified gaps therein.
(5) A description of the coordination and
interactions among the relevant elements of the
intelligence community and non-intelligence community
partners.
(6) An assessment of foreign malign influence efforts
relating to such threats, and a description of how the
intelligence community contributes to efforts by non-
intelligence community partners to counter such foreign
malign influence.
(c) Form.--Each report submitted under subsection (a) may be
submitted in classified form, but if so submitted shall include
an unclassified executive summary.
(d) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Covered country.--The term ``covered country''
means--
(A) China;
(B) Iran;
(C) North Korea;
(D) Russia; and
(E) any other foreign country--
(i) from which the Director of
National Intelligence determines a
biological threat emanates; or
(ii) that the Director determines has
a known history of, or has been
assessed as having conditions present
for, infectious disease outbreaks or
epidemics.
(2) Foreign biological threat.--The term ``foreign
biological threat'' means biological warfare,
bioterrorism, naturally occurring infectious diseases,
or accidental exposures to biological materials,
without regard to whether the threat originates from a
state actor, a non-state actor, natural conditions, or
an undetermined source.
(3) Foreign malign influence.--The term ``foreign
malign influence'' has the meaning given such term in
section 119C(e).
(4) Non-intelligence community partner.--The term
``non-intelligence community partner'' means a Federal
department or agency that is not an element of the
intelligence community.
SEC. 1112. ANNUAL REPORTS ON THE DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Reports.--Not later than January 31 of each year, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report--
(1) identifying all domestic activities undertaken by
each element of the intelligence community during the
prior fiscal year; and
(2) for each activity identified under paragraph (1),
a statement of the legal authority authorizing such
activity to be undertaken.
(b) Form.--Each report under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
SEC. 1113. ANNUAL REPORTS ON CERTAIN CYBER VULNERABILITIES PROCURED BY
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND FOREIGN COMMERCIAL
PROVIDERS OF CYBER VULNERABILITIES.
(a) Annual Reports.--On an annual basis through 2026, the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of
the National Security Agency, in coordination with the Director
of National Intelligence, shall jointly submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report containing
information on foreign commercial providers and the cyber
vulnerabilities procured by the intelligence community through
foreign commercial providers.
(b) Elements.--Each report under subsection (a) shall
include, with respect to the period covered by the report, the
following:
(1) A description of each cyber vulnerability
procured through a foreign commercial provider,
including--
(A) a description of the vulnerability;
(B) the date of the procurement;
(C) whether the procurement consisted of only
that vulnerability or included other
vulnerabilities;
(D) the cost of the procurement;
(E) the identity of the commercial provider
and, if the commercial provider was not the
original supplier of the vulnerability, a
description of the original supplier;
(F) the country of origin of the
vulnerability; and
(G) an assessment of the ability of the
intelligence community to use the
vulnerability, including whether such use will
be operational or for research and development,
and the approximate timeline for such use.
(2) An assessment of foreign commercial providers
that--
(A) pose a significant threat to the national
security of the United States; or
(B) have provided cyber vulnerabilities to
any foreign government that--
(i) has used the cyber
vulnerabilities to target United States
persons, the United States Government,
journalists, or dissidents; or
(ii) has an established pattern or
practice of violating human rights or
suppressing dissent.
(3) An assessment of whether the intelligence
community has conducted business with the foreign
commercial providers identified under paragraph (2)
during the 5-year period preceding the date of the
report.
(c) Form.--Each report under subsection (a) may be submitted
in classified form.
(d) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Commercial provider.--The term ``commercial
provider'' means any person that sells, or acts as a
broker, for a cyber vulnerability.
(2) Cyber vulnerability.--The term ``cyber
vulnerability'' means any tool, exploit, vulnerability,
or code that is intended to compromise a device,
network, or system, including such a tool, exploit,
vulnerability, or code procured by the intelligence
community for purposes of research and development.
* * * * * * *
----------
INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004
* * * * * * *
TITLE III--SECURITY CLEARANCES
SEC. 3001. SECURITY CLEARANCES.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) The term ``agency'' means--
(A) an executive agency (as that term is
defined in section 105 of title 5, United
States Code);
(B) a military department (as that term is
defined in section 102 of title 5, United
States Code); [and] or
(C) an element of the intelligence community.
(2) The term ``authorized investigative agency''
means an agency designated by the head of the agency
selected pursuant to subsection (b) to conduct a
counterintelligence investigation or investigation of
persons who are proposed for access to classified
information to ascertain whether such persons satisfy
the criteria for obtaining and retaining access to such
information.
(3) The term ``authorized adjudicative agency'' means
an agency authorized by law, regulation, or direction
of the Director of National Intelligence to determine
eligibility for access to classified information in
accordance with Executive Order 12968.
(4) The term ``highly sensitive program'' means--
(A) a government program designated as a
Special Access Program (as that term is defined
in section 4.1(h) of Executive Order 12958 or
any successor Executive order); or
(B) a government program that applies
restrictions required for--
(i) restricted data (as that term is
defined in section 11 y. of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(y));
or
(ii) other information commonly
referred to as ``sensitive
compartmented information''.
(5) The term ``current investigation file'' means,
with respect to a security clearance, a file on an
investigation or adjudication that has been conducted
during--
(A) the 5-year period beginning on the date
the security clearance was granted, in the case
of a Top Secret Clearance, or the date access
was granted to a highly sensitive program;
(B) the 10-year period beginning on the date
the security clearance was granted in the case
of a Secret Clearance; and
(C) the 15-year period beginning on the date
the security clearance was granted in the case
of a Confidential Clearance.
(6) The term ``personnel security investigation''
means any investigation required for the purpose of
determining the eligibility of any military, civilian,
or government contractor personnel to access classified
information.
(7) The term ``periodic reinvestigations'' means
investigations conducted for the purpose of updating a
previously completed background investigation--
(A) every 5 years in the case of a top secret
clearance or access to a highly sensitive
program;
(B) every 10 years in the case of a secret
clearance; or
(C) every 15 years in the case of a
Confidential Clearance.
(8) The term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(A) the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Committees on Armed
Services, Homeland Security, Government Reform,
and the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives; and
(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence and
the Committees on Armed Services, Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, and the
Judiciary of the Senate.
(9) Access determination.--The term ``access
determination'' means the determination regarding
whether an employee--
(A) is eligible for access to classified
information in accordance with Executive Order
12968 (60 Fed. Reg. 40245; relating to access
to classified information), or any successor
thereto, and Executive Order 10865 (25 Fed.
Reg. 1583; relating to safeguarding classified
information with industry), or any successor
thereto; and
(B) possesses a need to know under such an
Order.
(b) Selection of Entity.--Except as otherwise provided, not
later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the President shall select a single department, agency, or
element of the executive branch to be responsible for--
(1) directing day-to-day oversight of investigations
and adjudications for personnel security clearances,
including for highly sensitive programs, throughout the
United States Government;
(2) developing and implementing uniform and
consistent policies and procedures to ensure the
effective, efficient, and timely completion of security
clearances and determinations for access to highly
sensitive programs, including the standardization of
security questionnaires, financial disclosure
requirements for security clearance applicants, and
polygraph policies and procedures;
(3) serving as the final authority to designate an
authorized investigative agency or authorized
adjudicative agency;
(4) ensuring reciprocal recognition of access to
classified information among the agencies of the United
States Government, including acting as the final
authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes involving
the reciprocity of security clearances and access to
highly sensitive programs pursuant to subsection (d);
(5) ensuring, to the maximum extent practicable, that
sufficient resources are available in each agency to
achieve clearance and investigative program goals;
(6) reviewing and coordinating the development of
tools and techniques for enhancing the conduct of
investigations and granting of clearances; and
(7) not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2014, and consistent with subsection (j)--
(A) developing policies and procedures that
permit, to the extent practicable, individuals
alleging reprisal for having made a protected
disclosure (provided the individual does not
disclose classified information or other
information contrary to law) to appeal any
action affecting an employee's access to
classified information and to retain their
government employment status while such
challenge is pending; and
(B) developing and implementing uniform and
consistent policies and procedures to ensure
proper protections during the process for
denying, suspending, or revoking a security
clearance or access to classified information
following a protected disclosure, including the
ability to appeal such a denial, suspension, or
revocation, except that there shall be no
appeal of an agency's suspension of a security
clearance or access determination for purposes
of conducting an investigation, if that
suspension lasts no longer than 1 year or the
head of the agency or a designee of the head of
the agency certifies that a longer suspension
is needed before a final decision on denial or
revocation to prevent imminent harm to the
national security.
(c) Performance of Security Clearance Investigations.--(1)
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, not later than 180
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
shall, in consultation with the head of the entity selected
pursuant to subsection (b), select a single agency of the
executive branch to conduct, to the maximum extent practicable,
security clearance investigations of employees and contractor
personnel of the United States Government who require access to
classified information and to provide and maintain all security
clearances of such employees and contractor personnel. The head
of the entity selected pursuant to subsection (b) may designate
other agencies to conduct such investigations if the head of
the entity selected pursuant to subsection (b) considers it
appropriate for national security and efficiency purposes.
(2) The agency selected under paragraph (1) shall--
(A) take all necessary actions to carry out the
requirements of this section, including entering into a
memorandum of understanding with any agency carrying
out responsibilities relating to security clearances or
security clearance investigations before the date of
the enactment of this Act;
(B) as soon as practicable, integrate reporting of
security clearance applications, security clearance
investigations, and determinations of eligibility for
security clearances, with the database required by
subsection (e); and
(C) ensure that security clearance investigations are
conducted in accordance with uniform standards and
requirements established under subsection (b),
including uniform security questionnaires and financial
disclosure requirements.
(d) Reciprocity of Security Clearance and Access
Determinations.--(1) All security clearance background
investigations and determinations completed by an authorized
investigative agency or authorized adjudicative agency shall be
accepted by all agencies.
(2) All security clearance background investigations
initiated by an authorized investigative agency shall be
transferable to any other authorized investigative agency.
(3)(A) An authorized investigative agency or authorized
adjudicative agency may not establish additional investigative
or adjudicative requirements (other than requirements for the
conduct of a polygraph examination) that exceed requirements
specified in Executive Orders establishing security
requirements for access to classified information without the
approval of the head of the entity selected pursuant to
subsection (b).
(B) Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), the head of the entity
selected pursuant to subsection (b) may establish such
additional requirements as the head of such entity considers
necessary for national security purposes.
(4) An authorized investigative agency or authorized
adjudicative agency may not conduct an investigation for
purposes of determining whether to grant a security clearance
to an individual where a current investigation or clearance of
equal level already exists or has been granted by another
authorized adjudicative agency.
(5) The head of the entity selected pursuant to subsection
(b) may disallow the reciprocal recognition of an individual
security clearance by an agency under this section on a case-
by-case basis if the head of the entity selected pursuant to
subsection (b) determines that such action is necessary for
national security purposes.
(6) The head of the entity selected pursuant to subsection
(b) shall establish a review procedure by which agencies can
seek review of actions required under this section.
(e) Database on Security Clearances.--(1) Not later than 12
months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Director of the Office of Personnel Management shall, in
cooperation with the heads of the entities selected pursuant to
subsections (b) and (c), establish and commence operating and
maintaining an integrated, secure, database into which
appropriate data relevant to the granting, denial, or
revocation of a security clearance or access pertaining to
military, civilian, or government contractor personnel shall be
entered from all authorized investigative and adjudicative
agencies.
(2) The database under this subsection shall function to
integrate information from existing Federal clearance tracking
systems from other authorized investigative and adjudicative
agencies into a single consolidated database.
(3) Each authorized investigative or adjudicative agency
shall check the database under this subsection to determine
whether an individual the agency has identified as requiring a
security clearance has already been granted or denied a
security clearance, or has had a security clearance revoked, by
any other authorized investigative or adjudicative agency.
(4) The head of the entity selected pursuant to subsection
(b) shall evaluate the extent to which an agency is submitting
information to, and requesting information from, the database
under this subsection as part of a determination of whether to
certify the agency as an authorized investigative agency or
authorized adjudicative agency.
(5) The head of the entity selected pursuant to subsection
(b) may authorize an agency to withhold information about
certain individuals from the database under this subsection if
the head of the entity considers it necessary for national
security purposes.
(f) Evaluation of Use of Available Technology in Clearance
Investigations and Adjudications.--(1) The head of the entity
selected pursuant to subsection (b) shall evaluate the use of
available information technology and databases to expedite
investigative and adjudicative processes for all and to verify
standard information submitted as part of an application for a
security clearance.
(2) The evaluation shall assess the application of the
technologies described in paragraph (1) for--
(A) granting interim clearances to applicants at the
secret, top secret, and special access program levels
before the completion of the appropriate full
investigation;
(B) expediting investigations and adjudications of
security clearances, including verification of
information submitted by the applicant;
(C) ongoing verification of suitability of personnel
with security clearances in effect for continued access
to classified information;
(D) use of such technologies to augment periodic
reinvestigations;
(E) assessing the impact of the use of such
technologies on the rights of applicants to verify,
correct, or challenge information obtained through such
technologies; and
(F) such other purposes as the head of the entity
selected pursuant to subsection (b) considers
appropriate.
(3) An individual subject to verification utilizing the
technology described in paragraph (1) shall be notified of such
verification, shall provide consent to such use, and shall have
access to data being verified in order to correct errors or
challenge information the individual believes is incorrect.
(4) Not later than one year after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the head of the entity selected pursuant to
subsection (b) shall submit to the President and the
appropriate committees of Congress a report on the results of
the evaluation, including recommendations on the use of
technologies described in paragraph (1).
(g) Reduction in Length of Personnel Security Clearance
Process.--(1) The head of the entity selected pursuant to
subsection (b) shall, within 90 days of selection under that
subsection, develop, in consultation with the appropriate
committees of Congress and each authorized adjudicative agency,
a plan to reduce the length of the personnel security clearance
process.
(2)(A) To the extent practical the plan under paragraph (1)
shall require that each authorized adjudicative agency make a
determination on at least 90 percent of all applications for a
personnel security clearance within an average of 60 days after
the date of receipt of the completed application for a security
clearance by an authorized investigative agency. Such 60-day
average period shall include--
(i) a period of not longer than 40 days to complete
the investigative phase of the clearance review; and
(ii) a period of not longer than 20 days to complete
the adjudicative phase of the clearance review.
(B) Determinations on clearances not made within 60 days
shall be made without delay.
(3)(A) The plan under paragraph (1) shall take effect 5 years
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(B) During the period beginning on a date not later than 2
years after the date after the enactment of this Act and ending
on the date on which the plan under paragraph (1) takes effect,
each authorized adjudicative agency shall make a determination
on at least 80 percent of all applications for a personnel
security clearance pursuant to this section within an average
of 120 days after the date of receipt of the application for a
security clearance by an authorized investigative agency. Such
120-day average period shall include--
(i) a period of not longer than 90 days to complete
the investigative phase of the clearance review; and
(ii) a period of not longer than 30 days to complete
the adjudicative phase of the clearance review.
(h) Reports.--(1) Not later than February 15, 2006, and
annually thereafter through 2011, the head of the entity
selected pursuant to subsection (b) shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a report on the progress
made during the preceding year toward meeting the requirements
of this section.
(2) Each report shall include, for the period covered by such
report--
(A) the periods of time required by the authorized
investigative agencies and authorized adjudicative
agencies for conducting investigations, adjudicating
cases, and granting clearances, from date of submission
to ultimate disposition and notification to the subject
and the subject's employer;
(B) a discussion of any impediments to the smooth and
timely functioning of the requirements of this section;
and
(C) such other information or recommendations as the
head of the entity selected pursuant to subsection (b)
considers appropriate.
(i) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to
be appropriated such sums as may be necessary for fiscal year
2005 and each fiscal year thereafter for the implementation,
maintenance, and operation of the database required by
subsection (e).
(j) Retaliatory Revocation of Security Clearances and Access
Determinations.--
(1) In general.--Agency personnel with authority
[over] to take, direct others to take, recommend, or
approve personnel security clearance or access
determinations shall not take or fail to take, or
threaten to take or fail to take, any action with
respect to any employee's security clearance or access
determination in retaliation for--
(A) any lawful disclosure of information to
the Director of National Intelligence (or an
employee designated by the Director of National
Intelligence for such purpose) or a supervisor
in the employee's direct chain of command, or a
supervisor of the employing agency with
responsibility for the subject matter of the
disclosure, up to and including the head of the
employing agency (or employee designated by the
head of that agency for such purpose) by an
employee that the employee reasonably believes
evidences--
(i) a violation of any Federal law,
rule, or regulation; or
(ii) [gross mismanagement]
mismanagement, a gross waste of funds,
an abuse of authority, or a substantial
and specific danger to public health or
safety;
(B) any lawful disclosure to the Inspector
General of an agency or another employee
designated by the head of the agency to receive
such disclosures, of information which the
employee reasonably believes evidences--
(i) a violation of any Federal law,
rule, or regulation; or
(ii) [gross mismanagement]
mismanagement, a gross waste of funds,
an abuse of authority, or a substantial
and specific danger to public health or
safety;
(C) any lawful disclosure that complies
with--
(i) subsections (a)(1), (d), and
[(h)] (g) of section 8H of the
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C.
App.);
(ii) subparagraphs (A), (D), and (H)
of section 17(d)(5) of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C. 3517(d)(5)); or
(iii) subparagraphs (A), (D), and (I)
of section 103H(k)(5) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3033(k)(5)); and
(D) if the actions do not result in the
employee or applicant unlawfully disclosing
information specifically required by Executive
order to be kept classified in the interest of
national defense or the conduct of foreign
affairs, any lawful disclosure in conjunction
with--
(i) the exercise of any appeal,
complaint, or grievance right granted
by any law, rule, or regulation;
(ii) testimony for or otherwise
lawfully assisting any individual in
the exercise of any right referred to
in clause (i); or
(iii) cooperation with or disclosing
information to the Inspector General of
an agency, in accordance with
applicable provisions of law in
connection with an audit, inspection,
or investigation conducted by the
Inspector General.
(2) Rule of construction.--Consistent with the
protection of sources and methods, nothing in paragraph
(1) shall be construed to authorize the withholding of
information from Congress or the taking of any
personnel action or clearance action against an
employee who lawfully discloses information to
Congress.
(3) [Disclosures.--
[(A) In general.--] Disclosures._A disclosure
shall not be excluded from paragraph (1)
because-- [A disclosure shall not be excluded
from paragraph (1) because--]
[(i)] (A) the disclosure was made to a
person, including a supervisor, who
participated in an activity that the employee
reasonably believed to be covered by paragraph
(1)(A)(ii);
[(ii)] (B) the disclosure revealed
information that had been previously disclosed;
[(iii)] (C) the disclosure was not made in
writing;
[(iv)] (D) the disclosure was made while the
employee was off duty; [or]
[(v)] (E) of the amount of time which has
passed since the occurrence of the events
described in the disclosure[.]; or
[(B) Reprisals.--If a disclosure is made
during the normal course of duties of an
employee, the disclosure shall not be excluded
from paragraph (1) if any employee who has
authority to take, direct others to take,
recommend, or approve any personnel action with
respect to the employee making the disclosure,
took, failed to take, or threatened to take or
fail to take a personnel action with respect to
that employee in reprisal for the disclosure.]
(F) the disclosure was made during the normal
course of duties of an employee.
(4) Agency adjudication.--
(A) Remedial procedure.--An employee or
former employee who believes that he or she has
been subjected to a reprisal prohibited by
paragraph (1) may, within 90 days (except as
provided by subparagraph (D)) after the
issuance of notice of such decision, appeal
that decision within the agency of that
employee or former employee through proceedings
authorized by subsection (b)(7), except that
there shall be no appeal of an agency's
suspension of a security clearance or access
determination for purposes of conducting an
investigation, if that suspension lasts not
longer than 1 year (or a longer period in
accordance with a certification made under
subsection (b)(7)).
(B) Corrective action.--If, in the course of
proceedings authorized under subparagraph (A),
it is determined that the adverse security
clearance or access determination violated
paragraph (1), the agency shall take specific
corrective action to return the employee or
former employee, as nearly as practicable and
reasonable, to the position such employee or
former employee would have held had the
violation not occurred. Such corrective action
may include back pay and related benefits,
travel expenses, and compensatory damages not
to exceed $300,000.
(C) Contributing factor.--In determining
whether the adverse security clearance or
access determination violated paragraph (1),
the agency shall find that paragraph (1) was
violated if a disclosure described in paragraph
(1) was a contributing factor in the adverse
security clearance or access determination
taken against the individual, unless the agency
demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence
that it would have taken the same action in the
absence of such disclosure, giving the utmost
deference to the agency's assessment of the
particular threat to the national security
interests of the United States in the instant
matter.
(D) Tolling.--The time requirement
established by subparagraph (A) for an employee
or former employee to appeal the decision of an
agency may be tolled if the employee or former
employee presents substantial credible evidence
showing why the employee or former employee did
not timely initiate the appeal and why the
enforcement of the time requirement would be
unfair, such as evidence showing that the
employee or former employee--
(i) did not receive notice of the
decision; or
(ii) could not timely initiate the
appeal because of factors beyond the
control of the employee or former
employee.
(5) Appellate review of security clearance access
determinations by director of national intelligence.--
(A) Appeal.--Within 60 days after receiving
notice of an adverse final agency determination
under a proceeding under paragraph (4), an
employee or former employee may appeal that
determination in accordance with the procedures
established under subparagraph (B).
(B) Policies and procedures.--The Director of
National Intelligence, in consultation with the
Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense,
shall develop and implement policies and
procedures for adjudicating the appeals
authorized by subparagraph (A).
(C) Congressional notification.--Consistent
with the protection of sources and methods, at
the time the Director of National Intelligence
issues an order regarding an appeal pursuant to
the policies and procedures established by this
paragraph, the Director of National
Intelligence shall notify the congressional
intelligence committees.
(6) Judicial review.--Nothing in this section shall
be construed to permit or require judicial review of
any--
(A) agency action under this section; or
(B) action of the appellate review procedures
established under paragraph (5).
(7) Private cause of action.--Nothing in this section
shall be construed to permit, authorize, or require a
private cause of action to challenge the merits of a
security clearance determination.
(8) Enforcement.--Except as otherwise provided in
this subsection, the President shall provide for the
enforcement of this section consistent, to the fullest
extent possible, with the policies and procedures used
to adjudicate alleged violations of section 2302(b)(8)
of title 5, United States Code.
[(8)] (9) Inclusion of contractor employees.--In this
subsection, the term ``employee'' includes an employee
of a contractor, subcontractor, grantee, subgrantee, or
personal services contractor, of an agency. With
respect to such employees, the term ``employing
agency'' shall be deemed to be the contracting agency.
* * * * * * *
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INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017
* * * * * * *
DIVISION N--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017
* * * * * * *
TITLE VI--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
* * * * * * *
SEC. 608. IMPROVEMENT IN GOVERNMENT CLASSIFICATION AND
DECLASSIFICATION.
(a) Review of Government Classification and
Declassification.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall--
(1) review the system by which the Government
classifies and declassifies information;
(2) develop recommendations--
(A) to make such system a more effective tool
for the protection of information relating to
national security;
(B) to improve the sharing of information
with partners and allies of the Government; and
(C) to support the appropriate
declassification of information; and
(3) submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report with--
(A) the findings of the Director with respect
to the review conducted under paragraph (1);
and
(B) the recommendations developed under
paragraph (2).
[(b) Annual Certification of Controlled Access Programs.--
[(1) In general.--Not less frequently than once each
year, the Director of National Intelligence shall
certify in writing to the congressional intelligence
committees whether the creation, validation, or
substantial modification, including termination, for
all existing and proposed controlled access programs,
and the compartments and subcompartments within each,
are substantiated and justified based on the
information required by paragraph (2).
[(2) Information required.--Each certification
pursuant to paragraph (1) shall include--
[(A) the rationale for the revalidation,
validation, or substantial modification,
including termination, of each controlled
access program, compartment and subcompartment;
[(B) the identification of a control officer
for each controlled access program; and
[(C) a statement of protection requirements
for each controlled access program.]
* * * * * * *
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949
* * * * * * *
SEC. 15A. PROTECTION OF CERTAIN FACILITIES AND ASSETS OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FROM UNMANNED AIRCRAFT.
(a) Authority.--In accordance with subsection (b), the
Director shall have the same authority for the Agency as is
available to the Secretary of Homeland Security for the
Department of Homeland Security and the Attorney General for
the Department of Justice under section 210G of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 124n), and shall be subject to
the same limitations and requirements under such section.
(b) Administration.--For purposes of subsection (a)--
(1) the reference in subsection (i) of section 210G
of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 124n) to
``the date that is 4 years after the date of enactment
of this section'' shall be deemed to be a reference to
``October 5, 2026'';
(2) the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
as defined in paragraph (1) of subsection (k) of such
section shall be deemed to mean the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate; and
(3) the term ``covered facility or asset'' as defined
in paragraph (3) of such subsection (k) shall be deemed
to mean installations, property, and persons--
(A) that are located in the United States;
(B) for which the Director may provide
protection pursuant to section 5(a)(4) or
15(a)(1) of this Act; and
(C) that the Director identifies as high-risk
and a potential target for unlawful unmanned
aircraft activity.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 19A. SPECIAL RULES FOR CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS INJURED BY REASON OF
WAR, INSURGENCY, HOSTILE ACT, TERRORIST ACTIVITIES,
OR INCIDENTS DESIGNATED BY THE DIRECTOR.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Covered dependent.--The term ``covered
dependent'' means a family member (as defined by the
Director) of a covered employee who, on or after
September 11, 2001--
(A) accompanies the covered employee to an
assigned duty station in a foreign country; and
(B) becomes injured by reason of a qualifying
injury.
(2) Covered employee.--The term ``covered employee''
means an officer or employee of the Central
Intelligence Agency who, on or after September 11,
2001, becomes injured by reason of a qualifying injury.
(3) Covered individual.--The term ``covered
individual'' means an individual who--
(A)(i) is detailed to the Central
Intelligence Agency from other agencies of the
United States Government or from the Armed
Forces; or
(ii) is affiliated with the Central
Intelligence Agency, as determined by the
Director; and
(B) who, on or after September 11, 2001,
becomes injured by reason of a qualifying
injury.
(4) Qualifying injury.--The term ``qualifying
injury'' means the following:
(A) With respect to a covered dependent, an
injury incurred--
(i) during a period in which the
covered dependent is accompanying the
covered employee to an assigned duty
station in a foreign country;
(ii) in connection with war,
insurgency, hostile act, terrorist
activity, or an incident designated for
purposes of this section by the
Director; and
(iii) that was not the result of the
willful misconduct of the covered
dependent.
(B) With respect to a covered employee or a
covered individual--
(i) an injury incurred--
(I) during a period of
assignment to a duty station in
a foreign country;
(II) in connection with war,
insurgency, hostile act, or
terrorist activity; and
(III) that was not the result
of the willful misconduct of
the covered employee or the
covered individual; or
(ii) an injury incurred--
(I) in connection with an
incident designated for
purposes of this section by the
Director; and
(II) that was not the result
of the willful misconduct of
the covered employee or the
covered individual.
(b) Adjustment of Compensation for Total Disability Resulting
From Certain Injuries.--
(1) Increase.--The Director may increase the amount
of monthly compensation paid to a covered employee
under section 8105 of title 5, United States Code.
Subject to paragraph (2), the Director may determine
the amount of each such increase by taking into
account--
(A) the severity of the qualifying injury;
(B) the circumstances by which the covered
employee became injured; and
(C) the seniority of the covered employee.
(2) Maximum.--Notwithstanding chapter 81 of title 5,
United States Code, the total amount of monthly
compensation increased under paragraph (1) may not
exceed the monthly pay of the maximum rate of basic pay
for GS-15 of the General Schedule under section 5332 of
such title.
(c) Costs for Treating Qualifying Injuries.--The Director may
pay the costs of treating a qualifying injury of a covered
employee, a covered individual, or a covered dependent, or may
reimburse a covered employee, a covered individual, or a
covered dependent for such costs, that are not otherwise
covered by chapter 81 of title 5, United States Code, or other
provision of Federal law.
(d) Authority To Make Payments for Qualifying Injuries to the
Brain.--
(1) Definitions.--In this subsection:
(A) Covered dependent.--The term ``covered
dependent'' has the meaning given such term in
subsection (a), except that the assigned duty
station need not be in a foreign country.
(B) Qualifying injury.--The term ``qualifying
injury'' has the meaning given such term in
subsection (a), except that the assigned duty
station need not be in a foreign country.
(2) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision
of law but subject to paragraph (3), the Director may
provide payment to a covered dependent, a covered
employee, and a covered individual for a qualifying
injury to the brain.
(3) Limitations.--
(A) Appropriations required.--Payment under
paragraph (2) in a fiscal year may only be made
using amounts appropriated in advance
specifically for payments under such paragraph
in such fiscal year.
(B) Matter of payments.--Payments under
paragraph (2) using amounts appropriated for
such purpose shall be made on a first come,
first serve, or pro rata basis.
(C) Amounts of payments.--The total amount of
funding obligated for payments under paragraph
(2) may not exceed the amount specifically
appropriated for providing payments under such
paragraph during its period of availability.
(4) Regulations.--
(A) In general.--The Director shall prescribe
regulations to carry out this subsection.
(B) Elements.--The regulations prescribed
under subparagraph (A) shall include
regulations detailing fair and equitable
criteria for payment under paragraph (2).
(5) No effect on other benefits.--Payments made under
paragraph (2) are supplemental to any other benefit
furnished by the United States Government for which a
covered dependent, covered employee, or covered
individual is entitled, and the receipt of such
payments may not affect the eligibility of such a
person to any other benefit furnished by the United
States Government.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 26. COMPENSATION AND PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS FOR CERTAIN MEDICAL
OFFICERS.
(a) Office of Medical Services.--There is in the Agency an
Office of Medical Services.
(b) Compensation.--Beginning not later than 1 year after the
date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2022, each medical officer of the Office of Medical
Services who meets the qualifications under subsection (c)
shall be compensated during a pay period pursuant to a pay
range that is equal to the pay range published in the Federal
Register pursuant to section 7431(e)(1)(C) of title 38, United
States Code (for the corresponding pay period), for a physician
in the Veterans Health Administration in the District of
Columbia region with a medical subspecialty that is the
equivalent of the medical subspecialty of the officer.
(c) Clinical Practice Qualifications.--A medical officer
meets the qualifications under this subsection if the officer
provides direct care services to patients in connection with
the official duties of the officer and--
(1) maintains current, active, full, and unrestricted
licensure or registration as a physician from a State,
the District of Columbia, or a commonwealth or
territory of the United States;
(2) holds active board certification and maintains
accreditation in an American Board of Medical
Specialties direct care clinical specialty; and
(3) except as provided in subsection (d), maintains a
minimum of 160 hours per year of clinical practice in
an accredited clinic or hospital facility that is not
affiliated with the Central Intelligence Agency.
(d) Exception for Overseas Service.--If a medical officer is
a medical officer located in a duty station outside of the
United States pursuant to a permanent change of station and
greater than 50 percent of the official duties of the officer
in such duty station involve direct patient care, the officer,
in lieu of performing the minimum hours under subsection (c)(3)
on an annual basis, may perform up to 480 hours of clinical
practice as specified in such subsection prior to such change
of station, to fulfil in advance the requirement under such
subsection for up to 3 years.
(e) Clinical Practice Hours.--The head of the Office of
Medical Services shall make available to medical officers
excused absence time to allow for the maintenance of clinical
practice hours in accordance with subsection (c)(3).
SEC. 27. MEDICAL ADVISORY BOARD.
(a) Establishment.--The Director shall establish within the
Agency a medical advisory board (in this section referred to as
the ``Board'').
(b) Duties.--The Board shall--
(1) conduct a study on the Office of Medical Services
of the Agency, and submit reports regarding such study,
in accordance with subsection (c); and
(2) upon request, provide advice and guidance in
connection with any independent review of the Office
conducted by an inspector general.
(c) Study.--
(1) Objectives.--In conducting the study under
subsection (b)(1), the Board shall seek to--
(A) contribute to the modernization and
reform of the Office of Medical Services;
(B) ensure that the activities of the Office
are of the highest professional quality; and
(C) ensure that all medical care provided by
the Office is provided in accordance with the
highest professional medical standards.
(2) Reports.--The Board shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees, in writing--
(A) interim reports on the study; and
(B) a final report on the study, which
shall--
(i) set forth in detail the findings
of the study and the recommendations of
the Board, based on such findings and
taking into consideration the
objectives under paragraph (1),
regarding any changes to the activities
of the Office of Medical Services; and
(ii) include, as applicable, any
additional or dissenting views
submitted by a member of the Board.
(d) Membership.--
(1) Number and appointment.--The Board shall be
composed of 11 members, appointed as follows:
(A) 2 members appointed by the Chairman of
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
of the House of Representatives.
(B) 2 members appointed by the ranking
minority member of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
(C) 2 members appointed by the Chairman of
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate.
(D) 2 members appointed by the Vice Chairman
of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate.
(E) 3 members appointed by the Director of
National Intelligence.
(2) Chairperson.--During the first meeting under
subsection (e)(1), the members of the Board shall elect
a Chairperson of the Board. In addition to meeting the
criteria under paragraph (3), the Chairperson may not
be an employee, or former employee, of the Agency.
(3) Criteria.--The members appointed under paragraph
(1) shall meet the following criteria:
(A) Each member shall be a recognized expert
in at least 1 medical field, as demonstrated by
appropriate credentials.
(B) Each member shall possess significant and
diverse medical experience, including clinical
experience.
(C) Each member shall hold a security
clearance at the top secret level and be able
to access sensitive compartmented information.
(4) Terms.--
(A) In general.--Each member, including the
Chairperson, shall be appointed or elected, as
applicable, for the life of the Board.
(B) Vacancies.--Any vacancy in the Board
occurring prior to the expiration of the term
under subparagraph (A) shall be filled in the
manner in which the original appointment or
election was made.
(5) Compensation and travel expenses.--
(A) Compensation.--Except as provided in
subparagraph (B), each member of the Board,
including the Chairperson, may be compensated
at not to exceed the daily equivalent of the
annual rate of basic pay in effect for a
position at level IV of the Executive Schedule
under section 5315 of title 5, United States
Code, for each day during which that member is
engaged in the actual performance of the duties
under subsection (b).
(B) Exception for federal employees.--Members
of the Board, including the Chairperson, who
are officers or employees of the United States
shall receive no additional pay by reason of
the service of the member on the Board.
(C) Travel expenses.--Each member of the
Board, including the Chairperson, while away
from the home or regular places of business of
the member in the performance of services for
the Board, may be allowed travel expenses,
including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in
the same manner as persons employed
intermittently in the Government service are
allowed expenses under section 5703 of title 5,
United States Code.
(6) Detailees.--
(A) In general.--Upon request of the Board,
the Director of National Intelligence may
detail to the Board, without reimbursement from
the Board, any of the personnel of the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence to
assist in carrying out the duties under
subsection (b). Any such detailed personnel
shall retain the rights, status, and privileges
of the regular employment of the personnel
without interruption.
(B) Clearance.--Any personnel detailed to the
Board under subparagraph (A) shall possess a
security clearance in accordance with
applicable laws and regulations concerning the
handling of classified information.
(e) Meetings.--
(1) Board meetings.--The Board shall meet not less
frequently than on a quarterly basis.
(2) Meetings with congress.--The Board shall meet
with the congressional intelligence committees on a
biannual basis.
(f) Information Access.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2),
the Board may secure directly from any department or
agency of the United States Government information
necessary to enable it to carry out the duties under
subsection (b) and, upon request of the Chairperson of
the Board, the head of that department or agency shall
furnish such information to the Board.
(2) Exception.--The Director (without delegation) may
deny a request for information made by the Board
pursuant to paragraph (1), regardless of the agency
from which such information is requested.
(3) Notification requirement.--If the Director denies
a request under paragraph (2), not later than 15 days
after the date of such denial, the Director shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
written notification of such denial.
(4) Briefings.--The Director shall ensure that the
Board receives comprehensive briefings on all
activities of the Office of Medical Services, including
by promptly scheduling such briefings at the request of
the Board.
(g) Termination.--The Board shall terminate on the date that
is 5 years after the date of the first meeting of the Board.
(h) Definitions.--In this section, the terms ``congressional
intelligence committees'' and ``intelligence community'' have
the meanings given such terms in section 3 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
----------
TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE
* * * * * * *
SUBTITLE A--GENERAL MILITARY LAW
* * * * * * *
PART II--PERSONNEL
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 81--CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES
* * * * * * *
Sec. 1599h. Personnel management authority to attract experts in
science and engineering
(a) Programs Authorized.--
(1) Laboratories of the military departments.--The
Secretary of Defense may carry out a program of
personnel management authority provided in subsection
(b) in order to facilitate recruitment of eminent
experts in science or engineering for such laboratories
of the military departments as the Secretary shall
designate for purposes of the program for research and
development projects of such laboratories.
(2) DARPA.--The Director of the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency may carry out a program of
personnel management authority provided in subsection
(b) in order to facilitate recruitment of eminent
experts in science or engineering for research and
development projects and to enhance the administration
and management of the Agency.
(3) DOTE.--The Director of the Office of Operational
Test and Evaluation may carry out a program of
personnel management authority provided in subsection
(b) in order to facilitate recruitment of eminent
experts in science or engineering to support
operational test and evaluation missions of the Office.
(4) Strategic capabilities office.--The Director of
the Strategic Capabilities Office may carry out a
program of personnel management authority provided in
subsection (b) in order to facilitate recruitment of
eminent experts in science or engineering for the
Office.
(5) DIU.--The Director of the Defense Innovation Unit
may carry out a program of personnel management
authority provided in subsection (b) in order to
facilitate recruitment of eminent experts in science or
engineering for the Unit.
(6) Joint artificial intelligence center.--The
Director of the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center
may carry out a program of personnel management
authority provided in subsection (b) in order to
facilitate recruitment of eminent experts in science or
engineering for the Center. The authority to carry out
the program under this paragraph shall terminate on
December 31, 2024.
(7) NGA.--The Director of the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency may carry out a program of
personnel management authority provided in subsection
(b) in order to facilitate recruitment of eminent
experts in science or engineering for research and
development projects and to enhance the administration
and management of the Agency.
(7) SDA.--The Director of the Space Development
Agency may carry out a program of personnel management
authority provided in subsection (b) in order to
facilitate recruitment of eminent experts in science or
engineering for research and development projects and
to enhance the administration and management of the
Agency. The authority to carry out the program under
this paragraph shall terminate on December 31, 2025.
(8) United states cyber command.--The Commander of
United States Cyber Command may carry out a program of
personnel management authority provided in subsection
(b) in order to facilitate the recruitment of eminent
experts in computer science, data science, engineering,
mathematics, and computer network exploitation within
the headquarters of United States Cyber Command and the
Cyber National Mission Force.
(b) Personnel Management Authority.--Under a program under
subsection (a), the official responsible for administration of
the program may--
(1) without regard to any provision of title 5
governing the appointment of employees in the civil
service--
(A) in the case of the laboratories of the
military departments designated pursuant to
subsection (a)(1), appoint scientists and
engineers to a total of not more than 40
scientific and engineering positions in such
laboratories;
(B) in the case of the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency, appoint individuals
to a total of not more than 140 positions in
the Agency, of which not more than 5 such
positions may be positions of administration or
management of the Agency;
(C) in the case of the Office of Operational
Test and Evaluation, appoint scientists and
engineers to a total of not more than 10
scientific and engineering positions in the
Office;
(D) in the case of the Strategic Capabilities
Office, appoint scientists and engineers to a
total of not more than 5 scientific and
engineering positions in the Office;
(E) in the case of the Defense Innovation
Unit, appoint scientists and engineers to a
total of not more than 5 scientific and
engineering positions in the Unit;
(F) in the case of the Joint Artificial
Intelligence Center, appoint scientists and
engineers to a total of not more than 5
scientific and engineering positions in the
Center;
(G) in the case of the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, appoint individuals to a
total of not more than 7 positions in the
Agency, of which not more than 2 such positions
may be positions of administration or
management in the Agency;
(G) 3 in the case of the Space
Development Agency, appoint individuals to a
total of not more than 10 positions in the
Agency, of which not more than 3 such positions
may be positions of administration or
management of the Agency; and
(H) in the case of United States Cyber
Command, appoint computer scientists, data
scientists, engineers, mathematicians, and
computer network exploitation specialists to a
total of not more than 10 scientific and
engineering positions in the Command;
(2) notwithstanding any provision of title 5
governing the rates of pay or classification of
employees in the executive branch, prescribe the rates
of basic pay for positions to which employees are
appointed under paragraph (1)--
(A) in the case of employees appointed
pursuant to [paragraph (1)(B)] subparagraph (B)
of paragraph (1) to any of 5 positions
designated by the Director of the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency for purposes
of this subparagraph or employees appointed
pursuant to the first subparagraph (G) of such
paragraph to any of 2 positions of
administration or management designated by the
Director of the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency for purposes of this
subparagraph, at rates not in excess of a rate
equal to 150 percent of the maximum rate of
basic pay authorized for positions at Level I
of the Executive Schedule under section 5312 of
title 5; and
(B) in the case of any other employee
appointed pursuant to paragraph (1), at rates
not in excess of the maximum rate of basic pay
authorized for senior-level positions under
section 5376 of title 5; and
(3) pay any employee appointed under paragraph (1),
other than an employee appointed to a position
designated as described in paragraph (2)(A), payments
in addition to basic pay within the limit applicable to
the employee under subsection (d).
(c) Limitation on Term of Appointment.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2),
the service of an employee under an appointment under
subsection (b)(1) may not exceed four years.
(2) Extension.--The official responsible for the
administration of a program under subsection (a) may,
in the case of a particular employee under the program,
extend the period to which service is limited under
paragraph (1) by up to two years if the official
determines that such action is necessary to promote the
efficiency of a laboratory of a military department,
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the
Office of Operational Test and Evaluation, the
Strategic Capabilities Office, the Defense Innovation
Unit, the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, or the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, as applicable.
(d) Maximum Amount of Additional Payments Payable.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section or section
5307 of title 5, no additional payments may be paid to an
employee under subsection (b)(3) in any calendar year if, or to
the extent that, the employee's total annual compensation in
such calendar year will exceed the maximum amount of total
annual compensation payable at the salary set in accordance
with section 104 of title 3.
* * * * * * *
----------
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017
* * * * * * *
DIVISION A--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS
* * * * * * *
TITLE XVI--STRATEGIC PROGRAMS, CYBER, AND INTELLIGENCE MATTERS
* * * * * * *
Subtitle C--Cyberspace-Related Matters
* * * * * * *
SEC. 1642. LIMITATION ON TERMINATION OF DUAL-HAT ARRANGEMENT FOR
COMMANDER OF THE UNITED STATES CYBER COMMAND.
[(a) Limitation on Termination of Dual-hat Arrangement.--The
Secretary of Defense may not terminate the dual-hat arrangement
until the date on which the Secretary and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff jointly certify to the appropriate
committees of Congress that--
[(1) the Secretary and the Chairman carried out the
assessment under subsection (b);
[(2) each of the conditions described in paragraph
(2)(C) of such subsection has been met; and
[(3) termination of the dual-hat arrangement will not
pose risks to the military effectiveness of the United
States Cyber Command that are unacceptable to the
national security interests of the United States.
[(b) Assessment.--
[(1) In general.--The Secretary and the Chairman
shall jointly assess the military and intelligence
necessity and benefit of the dual-hat arrangement.
[(2) Elements.--The assessment under paragraph (1)
shall include the following elements:
[(A) An evaluation of the operational
dependence of the United States Cyber Command
on the National Security Agency.
[(B) An evaluation of the ability of the
United States Cyber Command and the National
Security Agency to carry out their respective
roles and responsibilities independently.
[(C) A determination of whether the following
conditions have been met:
[(i) Robust operational
infrastructure has been deployed that
is sufficient to meet the unique cyber
mission needs of the United States
Cyber Command and the National Security
Agency, respectively.
[(ii) Robust command and control
systems and processes have been
established for planning,
deconflicting, and executing military
cyber operations and national
intelligence operations.
[(iii) The tools, weapons, and
accesses used in and available for
military cyber operations are
sufficient for achieving required
effects and United States Cyber Command
is capable of acquiring or developing
such tools, weapons, and accesses.
[(iv) Capabilities have been
established to enable intelligence
collection and operational preparation
of the environment for cyber
operations.
[(v) Capabilities have been
established to train cyber operations
personnel, test cyber capabilities, and
rehearse cyber missions.
[(vi) The Cyber Mission Force has
achieved full operational capability
and has demonstrated the capacity to
execute the cyber missions of the
Department, including the following:
[(I) Execution of national-
level missions through
cyberspace, including
deterrence and disruption of
adversary cyber activity.
[(II) Defense of the
Department of Defense
Information Network.
[(III) Support for other
combatant commands, including
targeting of adversary military
assets.
[(c) Biannual Briefing.--
[(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the
date of the enactment of this subsection and biannually
thereafter, the Secretary of Defense and the Director
of National Intelligence shall provide to the
appropriate committees of Congress briefings on the
nature of the National Security Agency and United
States Cyber Command's current and future partnership.
Briefings under this subsection shall not terminate
until the certification specified in subsection (a) is
issued.
[(2) Elements.--Each briefing under this subsection
shall include status updates on the current and future
National Security Agency-United States Cyber Command
partnership efforts, including relating to the
following:
[(A) Common infrastructure and capability
acquisition.
[(B) Operational priorities and partnership.
[(C) Research and development partnership.
[(D) Executed documents, written memoranda of
agreements or understandings, and policies
issued governing such current and future
partnership.
[(E) Projected long-term efforts.]
(a) Limitation on Termination of Dual-hat Arrangement.--The
Secretary of Defense may not terminate the dual-hat arrangement
until the date on which the Secretary submits to the
appropriate committees of Congress the certification under
subsection (b)(1). The Secretary shall implement such
termination by not later than the first day of the fiscal year
following the fiscal year in which the Secretary submits such
certification.
(b) Annual Submission of Information.--Together with the
defense budget materials for fiscal year 2023, and annually
thereafter until the termination of the dual-hat arrangement,
the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of
National Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress a report containing either of the
following:
(1) A certification that the United States Cyber
Command has met each of the following conditions:
(A) Sufficient operational infrastructure has
been deployed to meet the unique cyber mission
needs of the United States Cyber Command.
(B) Sufficient command and control systems
and processes have been established for
planning, deconflicting, and executing military
cyber operations.
(C) Capabilities have been established to
enable intelligence collection and operational
preparation of the environment for cyber
operations consistent with the United States
Cyber Command reaching full operational status.
(D) Mechanisms have been established to train
cyber operations personnel, test cyber
capabilities, and rehearse cyber missions.
(E) The United States Cyber Command has
achieved full operational capability.
(2) If the Secretary, in coordination with the
Director, is not able to make the certification under
paragraph (1)--
(A) an identification of the items contained
in the defense budget materials that are
related to meeting the conditions specified in
such paragraph; and
(B) an assessment of the funding required to
meet such conditions during the period covered
by the future-years defense program under
section 221 of title 10, United States Code.
[(d)] (c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the
Committee on Appropriations, and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the
Committee on Appropriations, and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives.
(2) Dual-hat arrangement.--The term ``dual-hat
arrangement'' means the arrangement under which the
Commander of the United States Cyber Command also
serves as the Director of the National Security Agency.
(3) Defense budget materials.--The term ``defense
budget materials'' has the meaning given that term in
section 231(f) of title 10, United States Code.
* * * * * * *
----------
SECTION 901 OF TITLE IX OF DIVISION J OF THE FURTHER CONSOLIDATED
APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2020
SEC. 901. SPECIAL RULES FOR CERTAIN MONTHLY WORKERS' COM-PENSATION
PAYMENTS AND OTHER PAYMENTS FOR DEPARTMENT OF STATE
PERSONNEL UNDER CHIEF OF MISSION AUTHORITY.
(a) Adjustment of Compensation for Certain Injuries.--
(1) Increase.--The Secretary of State or the head of
any other Federal agency may pay an additional monthly
monetary benefit, provided that the covered employee is
receiving benefits under section 8105 or 8106 of title
5, United States Code, and may determine the amount of
each monthly monetary benefit amount by taking into
account--
(A) the severity of the qualifying injury;
(B) the circumstances by which the covered
employee became injured; and
(C) the seniority of the covered employee,
particularly for purposes of compensating for
lost career growth.
(2) Maximum.--Notwithstanding chapter 81 of title 5,
United States Code, the total amount of monthly
compensation increased under paragraph (1) may not
exceed the monthly pay of the maximum rate of basic pay
for GS-15 of the General Schedule under section 5332 of
such title.
(b) Costs for Treating Qualifying Injuries.--The Secretary of
State may pay the costs of or reimburse for diagnosing and
treating--
(1) a qualifying injury of a covered employee for
such costs, that are not otherwise covered by chapter
81 of title 5, United States Code, or other provision
of Federal law; or
(2) a covered individual, or a covered dependent, for
such costs that are not otherwise covered by Federal
law.
(c) Information Exchange.--To avoid duplicate or otherwise
improper payments under this subsection, the Secretary of
Labor, the Secretary of State, and, as appropriate, the head of
any other Federal agency paying benefits under this section
shall exchange information about the amounts paid for treatment
of qualifying injuries.
(d) Regulations.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall--
(1) prescribe regulations ensuring the fair and
equitable implementation of this section; and
(2) submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives such regulations.
(e) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Covered dependent.--The term ``covered
dependent'' means a family member (as defined by the
Secretary of State) of a employee who, on or after
January 1, 2016--
(A) accompanies the employee to an assigned
duty station in a foreign country under chief
of mission authority; and
(B) becomes injured by reason of a qualifying
injury.
(2) Covered employee.--The term ``covered employee''
means an employee of the Federal Government who, on or
after January 1, 2016, becomes injured by reason of a
qualifying injury and was assigned to a duty station in
the Republic of Cuba, the People's Republic of China,
or another foreign country designated by the Secretary
of State pursuant to subsection (f), but does not
include an individual receiving compensation under
section 19A of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 3519b).
(3) Covered individual.--The term ``covered
individual'' means an individual who, on or after
January 1, 2016, becomes injured by reason of a
qualifying injury and is--
(A) detailed to a duty station in the
Republic of Cuba, the People's Republic of
China, or another foreign country designated by
the Secretary of State pursuant to subsection
(f); or
(B) affiliated with the Department of State,
as determined by the Secretary of State.
(4) Qualifying injury.--The term ``qualifying
injury'' means the following:
(A) With respect to a covered dependent, an
injury incurred--
(i) during a period in which the
covered dependent is accompanying an
employee to an assigned duty station in
the Republic of Cuba, the People's
Republic of China, or another foreign
country designated by the Secretary of
State pursuant to subsection (f);
(ii) in connection with war,
insurgency, hostile act, terrorist
activity, or other incident designated
by the Secretary of State; and
(iii) that was not the result of the
willful misconduct of the covered
dependent.
(B) With respect to a covered employee or a
covered individual, an injury incurred--
(i) during a period of assignment to
a duty station in the Republic of Cuba,
the People's Republic of China, or
another country designated by the
Secretary of State pursuant to
subsection (f);
(ii) in connection with war,
insurgency, hostile act, terrorist
activity, or other incident designated
by the Secretary of State; and
(iii) that was not the result of the
willful misconduct of the covered
employee or the covered individual.
(f) Designation by the Secretary of State of Another Foreign
Country or Duty Station.--The Secretary of State may designate
another foreign country for the purposes of this section,
provided that the Secretary reports such designation to the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee
on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and
includes in such report a rationale for each such designation.
The Secretary of State may not designate an added foreign
country or duty station for purposes of providing additional
monetary benefit pursuant to subsection (a), (b), or (i) for a
qualifying injury to covered employees, covered dependents, or
covered individuals under this section unless the Secretary of
State--
(1) provides to the Committees on Foreign Relations
of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
the House of Representatives 30 days' notice of the
designation of a particular additional country or duty
station and the rationale for such addition; and
(2) provides no such additional monetary benefit
pursuant to subsection (a), (b), or (i) to covered
employees, covered dependents, or covered individuals
for a qualifying injury until the 30-day notice period
expires, unless there is written agreement by both the
Chair and Ranking Members of both the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that
there is no objection to proceeding with provision of
such monetary benefit compensation in less than 30
days.
(g) Treatment of Amounts.--For purposes of section 104 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, amounts paid pursuant to this
section shall be treated as amounts described in subsection
(a)(5) of such section.
(h) Application.--
(1) Adjustment of compensation provision.--
Subsections (a) and (b) shall apply with respect to--
(A) payments made to covered employees (as
defined in such section) under section 8105 or
8106 of title 5, United States Code, beginning
on or after January 1, 2016; and
(B) diagnosis or treatment described in
subsection (b) occurring on or after January 1,
2016.
(2) Other payment provision.--Payment under
subsection (i) may be made available for a qualifying
injury (as defined in such subsection) that occurs
before, on, or after the date of the enactment of the
Helping American Victims Afflicted by Neurological
Attacks Act of 2021.
(3) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this section
shall limit, modify, or otherwise supersede chapter 81
of title 5, United States Code, the Defense Base Act
(42 U.S.C. 1651 et seq.), or section 19A of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3519b).
Monetary benefits and treatment expenses paid under
this section shall not be considered payments under any
workers' compensation law.
(i) Other Injuries.--
(1) Definitions.--In this subsection:
(A) Covered dependent.--The term ``covered
dependent'' has the meaning given such term in
subsection (e), except that the assigned duty
station need not be in the Republic of Cuba,
the People's Republic of China, or another
foreign country.
(B) Covered employee.--The term ``covered
employee'' has the meaning given such term in
subsection (e), except that the assigned duty
station need not be in the Republic of Cuba,
the People's Republic of China, or another
foreign country.
(C) Covered individual.--The term ``covered
individual'' has the meaning given such term in
subsection (e), except that the assigned duty
station need not be in the Republic of Cuba,
the People's Republic of China, or another
foreign country.
(D) Qualifying injury.--The term ``qualifying
injury'' has the meaning given such term in
subsection (e), except that the assigned duty
station need not be in the Republic of Cuba,
the People's Republic of China, or another
foreign country.
(2) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision
of law but subject to paragraph (3), the Secretary of
State or other agency head with an employee may provide
payment to a covered dependent, a dependent of a former
employee, a covered employee, a former employee, and a
covered individual for a qualifying injury to the
brain.
(3) Limitations.--
(A) Appropriations required.--Payment under
paragraph (2) in a fiscal year may only be made
using amounts appropriated in advance
specifically for payments under such paragraph
in such fiscal year.
(B) Matter of payments.--Payments under
paragraph (2) using amounts appropriated for
such purpose shall be made on a first come,
first serve, or pro rata basis.
(C) Amounts of payments.--The total amount of
funding obligated for payments under paragraph
(2) may not exceed the amount specifically
appropriated for providing payments under such
paragraph during its period of availability.
(4) Regulations.--
(A) In general.--The Secretary or other
agency head described in paragraph (2) that
provides payment under such paragraph shall
prescribe regulations to carry out this
subsection.
(B) Elements.--The regulations prescribed
under subparagraph (A) shall include
regulations detailing fair and equitable
criteria for payment under paragraph (2).
(5) No effect on other benefits.--Payments made under
paragraph (2) are supplemental to any other benefit
furnished by the United States Government for which a
covered dependent, dependent of a former employee,
covered employee, former employee, or covered
individual is entitled, and the receipt of such
payments may not affect the eligibility of such a
person to any other benefit furnished by the United
States Government.
* * * * * * *
----------
DAMON PAUL NELSON AND MATTHEW YOUNG POLLARD INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION
ACT FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018, 2019, AND 2020
* * * * * * *
DIVISION E--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018, 2019,
AND 2020
* * * * * * *
SUBDIVISION 1
* * * * * * *
TITLE LVII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
Subtitle A--Reports and Briefings
* * * * * * *
SEC. 5704. COLLECTION, ANALYSIS, AND DISSEMINATION OF WORKFORCE DATA.
(a) Modification of Requirement for Annual Report on Hiring
and Retention of Minority Employees.--
(1) Expansion of period of report.--Subsection (a) of
section 114 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3050) is amended by inserting ``and the
preceding 5 fiscal years'' after ``fiscal year''.
(2) Clarification on disaggregation of data.--
Subsection (b) of such section is amended, in the
matter before paragraph (1), by striking
``disaggregated data by category of covered person from
each element of the intelligence community'' and
inserting ``data, disaggregated by category of covered
person and by element of the intelligence community,''.
(b) Initial Reporting.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and subject to
paragraph (3), the Director of National Intelligence
shall make available to the public, the appropriate
congressional committees, and the workforce of the
intelligence community a report which includes
aggregate demographic data and other information
regarding the diversity and inclusion efforts of the
workforce of the intelligence community.
(2) Contents.--A report made available under
paragraph (1)--
(A) shall include unclassified reports and
barrier analyses relating to diversity and
inclusion efforts;
(B) shall include aggregate demographic
data--
(i) by segment of the workforce of
the intelligence community and grade or
rank;
(ii) relating to attrition and
promotion rates;
(iii) that addresses the compliance
of the intelligence community with
validated inclusion metrics, such as
the New Inclusion Quotient index score;
and
(iv) that provides demographic
comparisons to the relevant
nongovernmental labor force and the
relevant civilian labor force;
(C) shall include an analysis of applicant
flow data, including the percentage and level
of positions for which data are collected, and
a discussion of any resulting policy changes or
recommendations;
(D) shall include demographic data relating
to participants in professional development
programs of the intelligence community and the
rate of placement into senior positions for
participants in such programs;
(E) shall include any voluntarily collected
demographic data relating to the membership of
any external advisory committee or board to
which individuals in senior positions in the
intelligence community appoint members; and
(F) may include data in proportions or
percentages to account for concerns relating to
the protection of classified information.
(c) Updates.--[After making available a report under
subsection (b), the Director of National Intelligence shall
annually provide a report] Not later than March 31 of each
year, the Director of National Intelligence shall provide a
report (which may be provided as part of an annual report
required under another provision of law) to the workforce of
the intelligence community (including senior leadership), the
public, and the appropriate congressional committees that
includes--
[(1) demographic data and information on the status
of diversity and inclusion efforts of the intelligence
community;]
(1) demographic data and information on the status of
diversity and inclusion efforts of the intelligence
community, including demographic data relating to--
(A) the average years of service;
(B) the average number of years of service
for each level in the General Schedule, Senior
Executive Service, Senior Intelligence Service,
or equivalent; and
(C) career categories;
(2) an analysis of applicant flow data, including the
percentage and level of positions for which data are
collected, and a discussion of any resulting policy
changes or recommendations; and
(3) demographic data relating to participants in
professional development programs of the intelligence
community and the rate of placement into senior
positions for participants in such programs.
(d) Expand the Collection and Analysis of Voluntary Applicant
Flow Data.--
(1) In general.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall develop a system to collect and
analyze applicant flow data for as many positions
within the intelligence community as practicable, in
order to identify areas for improvement in attracting
diverse talent, with particular attention to senior and
management positions.
(2) Phased implementation.--The collection of
applicant flow data may be implemented by the Director
of National Intelligence in a phased approach
commensurate with the resources available to the
intelligence community.
(e) Identify Additional Categories for Voluntary Data
Collection of Current Employees.--
(1) In general.--The Director of National
Intelligence may submit to the Office of Management and
Budget and to the appropriate congressional committees
a recommendation regarding whether the intelligence
community should voluntarily collect more detailed data
on demographic categories in addition to the race and
ethnicity categories specified in the statistical
policy directive issued by the Office of Management and
Budget entitled ``Standards for Maintaining,
Collecting, and Presenting Federal Data on Race and
Ethnicity''.
(2) Process.--In making a recommendation under
paragraph (1), the Director of National Intelligence
shall--
(A) engage in close consultation with
internal stakeholders, such as employee
resource or affinity groups;
(B) ensure that there is clear communication
with the workforce of the intelligence
community--
(i) to explain the purpose of the
potential collection of such data; and
(ii) regarding legal protections
relating to any anticipated use of such
data; and
(C) ensure adherence to relevant standards
and guidance issued by the Federal Government.
(f) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Applicant flow data.--The term ``applicant flow
data'' means data that tracks the rate of applications
for job positions among demographic categories.
(2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the
Select Committee on Intelligence, and the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Homeland Security, the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(3) Diversity.--The term ``diversity'' means
diversity of persons based on gender, race, ethnicity,
disability status, veteran status, sexual orientation,
gender identity, national origin, and other demographic
categories.
* * * * * * *
SUBDIVISION 2
* * * * * * *
TITLE LXVI--SECURITY CLEARANCES
* * * * * * *
SEC. 6610. PERIODIC REPORT ON POSITIONS IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
THAT CAN BE CONDUCTED WITHOUT ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION, NETWORKS, OR FACILITIES.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
[this Act and not less frequently than once every 5 years
thereafter,] this Act, and biennially thereafter, the Director
of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report that reviews the intelligence
community for which positions can be conducted without access
to classified information, networks, or facilities, or may only
require a security clearance at the secret level. Such report
shall take into account the potential effect of maintaining
continuity of operations during a covered national emergency
(as defined by section 303 of the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (division W of Public Law 116-260))
and the assessed needs of the intelligence community to
maintain such continuity of operations.
* * * * * * *
MINORITY VIEWS
The Republican Members of the Committee are increasingly
concerned about the Administration's use of the Intelligence
Community (IC) for purposes outside of the collection,
exploitation, and dissemination of foreign intelligence as
defined in the National Security Act. Longstanding bipartisan
support for the IC's mission is jeopardized by the blurring of
lines between U.S. Government entities responsible for domestic
activities, including law enforcement, and those responsible
for the collection of intelligence against foreign adversaries.
Congress authorizes and funds the development of powerful
tools for use by America's spy agencies. We do so with the
understanding, reflected in both law and policy, that the
purpose of the IC is to acquire information on foreign threats.
This singular focus enhances our confidence that we'll avoid a
reoccurrence of the dark days in which the Central Intelligence
Agency and National Security Agency were used by the Executive
Branch to target Americans based on their political views. This
focus is also necessitated by the complexity and magnitude of
the threats faced by the United States from our foreign
adversaries.
As Members of the Committee, we recognize that limitations
on domestic activities can make the mission of the IC more
challenging. We also understand that the tools and capabilities
of the IC could potentially enhance the domestic missions of
the U.S. Government, such as the prosecution of domestic
violent extremists. However, unlike our authoritarian
adversaries--such as the People's Republic of China--the
efficiency of domestic surveillance is not the objective of the
U.S. Government. First and foremost, we must ensure the rights
of the American people are not infringed.
While we support the vigorous prosecution of all criminal
acts carried out by domestic violent extremists, the IC cannot
be involved in tracking, investigating, or analyzing such
threats other than when law enforcement identifies a potential
foreign nexus to those criminal acts. If federal law
enforcement agencies lack the resources to prevent and
prosecute persistent and lethal domestic threats, the Executive
Branch should request those resources from the appropriate
Congressional committees of jurisdiction rather than improperly
utilizing National Intelligence Program funds for this purpose.
In order for Congress to conduct rigorous oversight and to
ensure that the IC's resources are not being improperly used,
we must obtain the information we need from the Executive
Branch. That is why Section 705 of this Act creates a
permanent, annual requirement for every IC element to report to
this Committee about every domestic activity it engaged in
during the prior fiscal year. Such reports will likely include
many mundane and unobjectionable activities, such as conducting
security clearance investigations, running insider threat
programs, or other administrative functions. But the annual
reports may also shed light on activities that are improper for
elements of the IC. This will allow the Committee to make
yearly decisions, as part of our annual Intelligence
Authorization Act process, about which domestic Intelligence
Community activities should be authorized and to identify those
that should be prohibited.
Sincerely,
Devin Nunes.
Michael Turner.
Brad Wenstrup.
Chris Stewart.
Rick Crawford.
Elise Stefanik.
Markwayne Mullin.
Trent Kelly.
Darin LaHood.
Brian Fitzpatrick.
[all]