[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DHS'S EFFORTS TO DISRUPT TRANSNATIONAL
CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT, MANAGEMENT,
AND ACCOUNTABILITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 28, 2021
__________
Serial No. 117-26
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
45-929 PDF WASHINGTON : 2021
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas John Katko, New York
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey Clay Higgins, Louisiana
J. Luis Correa, California Michael Guest, Mississippi
Elissa Slotkin, Michigan Dan Bishop, North Carolina
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey
Al Green, Texas Ralph Norman, South Carolina
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Mariannette Miller-Meeks, Iowa
Eric Swalwell, California Diana Harshbarger, Tennessee
Dina Titus, Nevada Andrew S. Clyde, Georgia
Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida
Kathleen M. Rice, New York Jake LaTurner, Kansas
Val Butler Demings, Florida Peter Meijer, Michigan
Nanette Diaz Barragan, California Kat Cammack, Florida
Josh Gottheimer, New Jersey August Pfluger, Texas
Elaine G. Luria, Virginia Andrew R. Garbarino, New York
Tom Malinowski, New Jersey
Ritchie Torres, New York
Hope Goins, Staff Director
Daniel Kroese, Minority Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Clerk
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, MANAGEMENT, AND ACCOUNTABILITY
J. Luis Correa, California, Chairman
Dina Titus, Nevada Peter Meijer, Michigan, Ranking
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey Member
Ritchie Torres, New York Dan Bishop, North Carolina
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (ex Diana Harshbarger, Tennessee
officio) John Katko, New York (ex officio)
Lisa Canini, Subcommittee Staff Director
Eric Heighberger, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
Geremiah Lofton, Subcommittee Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable J. Luis Correa, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight, Management, and Accountability:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Peter Meijer, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Oversight, Management, and Accountability:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Witnesses
Mr. Francis J. Russo, Acting Deputy Executive Assistant
Commissioner, Operations Support, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Mr. John A. Condon, Acting Assistant Director, International
Operations, Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Appendix
Questions From Chairman J. Luis Correa for Francis J. Russo...... 35
Questions From Hon. Dan Bishop for Francis J. Russo.............. 35
Questions From Hon. Diana Harshbarger for Francis J. Russo....... 36
Questions From Chairman J. Luis Correa for John A. Condon........ 36
Questions From Hon. Dan Bishop for John A. Condon................ 37
Questions From Hon. Diana Harshbarger for John A. Condon......... 37
DHS'S EFFORTS TO DISRUPT TRANSNA- TIONAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS IN
CENTRAL AMERICA
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Wednesday, July 28, 2021
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Oversight, Management,
and Accountability,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:59 p.m., via
Webex, Hon. Lou Correa [Chairman of the subcommittee]
presiding.
Present: Representatives Correa, Titus, Meijer, Bishop, and
Harshbarger.
Chairman Correa. Good afternoon. The hearing on Committee
on Homeland Security Oversight will now come to order. Without
objection, the Chair is authorized to declare the subcommittee
in recess at any point. Let's begin by thanking everyone today
for joining us.
Over the last few months, this subcommittee has had the
opportunity to look closely at some of the factors that push
people from Central America and Mexico to leave their homes and
travel to the United States border. We have heard about
crippling effects of the recent natural disasters, wide-spread
poverty, COVID-19, as well as the pervasive presence of
corruption which stifles progress, economic progress, and
maintains inequality.
Today, I look forward to diving more deeply into some of
these issues the Department of Homeland Security is working on
to combat both abroad and at home, primarily violence and
instability caused by transnational criminal organizations.
These TCOs are far-reaching criminal enterprises that seek to
profit from a wide variety of illicit schemes including drug
trafficking, smuggling migrants, money laundering, and
extortion. Their activities affect migration at almost every
level.
These TCOs are often connected to the local gangs that
spread violence and fear in Central America, providing the
weapons and legitimacy that allows these gangs to continue
preying on the most vulnerable of the vulnerable. This is
particularly true in the Northern Triangle countries of
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, which have some of the
highest homicide rates in the world, and where this violence is
disproportionately directed toward women and girls. The
extortion, kidnapping, and threat of violence perpetrated by
these gangs is one of the main reasons why people leave their
homes and go north. Additionally, TCOs are typically either
directly connected to the groups that smuggle migrants across
the borders or will allow those smugglers to pass through the
territory they control for a fee, generating, of course,
millions of dollars a year from the exploitations of those who
seek a better life.
For many who hope to escape violence by leaving their
homes, the journey can be as perilous. It is estimated that
about 80 percent of the women and girls who migrate from the
Northern Triangle face sexual violence along the way. Migrants
are also highly susceptible to robbery and, of course,
kidnapping. The same connections that allow TCOs to guarantee
passage free from legal hassle also allow them to victimize
migrants with impunity. Therefore, key to the success of
President Biden's efforts to slow irregular migration will have
to be a continued focus on the detection and disruption of
these TCOs and their many illegal activities.
We have with us today two witnesses from the Department of
Homeland Security to outline how they are supporting the
President's goal and how they are working to implement the
President's goals. For years, the Department has undertaken
efforts to degrade the influence of TCOs that have in foreign
countries and at the border and even in the United States
created such chaos. Customs and Border Protection utilizes a
combination of personnel, technology, and information gathering
to monitor the flows of goods and people across the border,
while Immigration and Customs Enforcement seeks to investigate
the crimes perpetrated by these TCOs and ensure prosecution
both at home and abroad. Additionally, DHS participates in
several interagency task forces that coordinate the TCO
investigation efforts of DHS, the Department of Justice, and
State and local law enforcement.
Under the Biden administration, DHS will participate in two
new interagency task forces to enhance enforcement efforts
against human smuggling, and these are Operation Sentinel and
Joint Task Force Alpha. These collaborations ensure that DHS is
part of a unified effort to attack and dismantle these criminal
organizations as quickly and as effectively as possible. We
must remember that in these nefarious and resilient criminal
networks, we must remember who the real enemy is, and not those
that they leave behind in terrible situations.
[The statement of Chairman Correa follows:]
Statement of Chairman J. Luis Correa
July 28, 2021
Over the last few months, this subcommittee has had the opportunity
to look closely at some of the factors that push the people of Central
America and Mexico to leave their homes and travel to the U.S. border.
We have heard about the crippling effects of recent natural disasters
and wide-spread poverty, as well as the pervasive presence of
corruption, which stifles progress and maintains inequality.
Today I look forward to diving more deeply into an issue that the
Department of Homeland Security is working to combat both abroad and at
home: The violence and instability caused by transnational criminal
organizations (TCOs). TCOs are far-reaching criminal enterprises that
seek to profit from a wide variety of illicit schemes including drug
trafficking, migrant smuggling, money laundering, and extortion. Their
activities affect migration at almost every level.
TCOs are often connected to the local gangs that spread violence
and fear in Central America, providing the weapons and legitimacy that
allows these gangs to continue preying on vulnerable communities. This
is a particular problem in the Northern Triangle countries of
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, which have some of the highest
homicide rates in the world, and where this violence is
disproportionately directed toward women and girls. The extortion,
kidnapping, and threat of violence perpetrated by these gangs is one of
the main reasons why people leave their homes and migrate north.
Additionally, TCOs are typically either directly connected to the
groups that smuggle migrants across borders or will allow the smugglers
to pass through the territory they control for a fee, generating
millions of dollars a year from the exploitation of those who seek a
better life.
For many who hope to escape violence by leaving their homes, the
journey can prove just as perilous.
It is estimated that approximately 80 percent of women and girls
who migrate from the Northern Triangle face sexual violence along the
way. Migrants are also highly susceptible to robbery and kidnapping.
The same connections that allow TCOs to guarantee passage free from
legal hassles, also allow them to victimize migrants with impunity.
Therefore, key to the success of President Biden's efforts to slow
irregular migration will have to be a continued focus on the detection
and disruption of these TCOs and their many illegal activities.
We have with us today two witnesses from the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) to outline how they are supporting the President's goal.
For years, the Department has undertaken efforts to degrade the
influence TCOs have in foreign countries, at the border, and even in
U.S. cities. Customs and Border Protection utilizes a combination of
personnel, technology, and information gathering to monitor the flow of
goods and people across the border, while Immigration and Customs
Enforcement seeks to investigate the crimes perpetrated by TCOs and
ensure prosecution both at home and abroad.
Additionally, DHS participates in several interagency task forces
that coordinate the TCO investigation efforts of DHS, the Department of
Justice, and State and local law enforcement.
Under the Biden administration, DHS will participate in two new
interagency task forces to enhance enforcement efforts against human
smuggling: Operation Sentinel and Joint Task Force Alpha. These
collaborations ensure that DHS is part of a unified effort to attack
and dismantle these criminal organizations as effectively as possible.
We must remember that it is these nefarious and resilient criminal
networks who are the real enemy here, and not those who leave behind
impossible situations in the hope for something better.
Chairman Correa. With that, I want to thank you for joining
us today. Now, I would like to recognize the Ranking Member of
the subcommittee, the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Meijer, for
an opening statement.
Mr. Meijer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing today, and I look forward to having a frank and in-
depth discussion with our witnesses. I hope we can delve into
the reality of the situation in the Northern Triangle and get a
better sense of the threat that these transnational criminal
organizations, or TCOs as the Chairman mentioned, pose to the
region and how they are fueling the exodus of families and
civilians across our Southern Border.
While this is the third hearing that our subcommittee has
held on the Northern Triangle region in an effort to better
understand the range of push factors contributing to migration,
this is the first one we have had with Government witnesses.
This allows us the chance to hear directly from CBP and HSI
about the threat posed by TCOs in the area and the affect that
they are having on citizens in those countries as they travel
through Mexico and to our Southern Border.
As I stated in the first hearing, this administration has
compounded the problem at the border by failing to adequately
dissuade those who seek to illegally cross. Although I do not
fault those who seek a better life for their families, we now
find ourselves in a border crisis where too many individuals
and families have been making that choice to enter the United
States illegally at the encouragement of the administration.
On July 14, we passed a threshold of over 1 million border
crossings in the last fiscal year. There are many reasons why
people in the Northern Triangle choose to migrate, and we have
discussed those at length in previous hearings. But it is clear
that many actions taken by the administration have resulted in
this crisis. On June 15, the administration provided an update
on the actions that have been taken to improve the border
crisis and highlighted a number of accomplishments, including a
significant reduction in the number of unaccompanied children
being held in Customs and Border Protection facilities. What
that announcement failed to mention, however, is the issue has
not been resolved. Just last month, we hit an unfortunate new
record of over 15,000 unaccompanied minors who were encountered
by CBP at the border. The bottleneck has simply been shifted
from CBP to Health and Human Services and disbursed throughout
the country including in our third Congressional district.
HHS is now responsible for housing these unaccompanied
minors. In the first hearing on the topic that we held, the
subcommittee heard from Sheriff Steve Hinkley of Calhoun
County, Michigan, in our district, as he described the strain
that the shift in administration policy has placed on local law
enforcement and the lack of coordination and assistance
provided by the Federal Government in enacting this new
procedure. Unfortunately, there are instances of unaccompanied
minors, as well as adults, arriving at our Southern Border as a
result of human trafficking operations. I look forward to
engaging with our witnesses today to learn more about their
agency's efforts to combat criminal organizations in the region
that conduct these operations and determine what additional
resources DHS may need in order to prevent future humanitarian
and security crises in the region. I am hopeful we will use
this opportunity today to engage on specific strategies and
potential solutions that Congress and the administration can
pursue together in order to productively address these
challenges in a responsible and effective way.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, again, for holding this hearing. I
look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
[The statement of Ranking Member Meijer follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Peter Meijer
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing today.
I look forward to having a frank and in-depth discussion with our
witnesses today, and I hope we can delve into the reality of the
situation in the Northern Triangle and get a better sense of the threat
that these Transnational Criminal Organizations, or TCOs, pose to the
region and how they are fueling the exodus of families and civilians
from the area to our Southern Border.
While this is the third hearing that this subcommittee has held on
the Northern Triangle region in an effort to better understand the
range of push factors that contribute to migration, this is the first
one we've had with Government witnesses. This allows us the chance to
hear directly from CBP and HSI about the threat posed by TCOs in the
area and the effect they have on citizens of those countries as they
travel through Mexico to our Southern Border.
As I stated in the first hearing, this administration has
compounded the problem at the border by failing to adequately dissuade
those who want to illegally cross our borders. Although I do not fault
those who seek a better life for their families, we now find ourselves
in a border crisis where too many individuals and families have been
making the choice to enter the United States illegally at the
encouragement of the administration.
On July 14, we passed the threshold of 1 million border crossings
in the last fiscal year. There are many reasons why people in the
Northern Triangle choose to migrate, and we have discussed those at
length in the previous hearings. It is clear, however, that many
actions taken by this administration have resulted in the crisis we're
still seeing today.
On June 15, the administration provided an update on the actions
that have been taken to improve the border crisis and highlighted a
number of accomplishments, including a significant reduction in the
number of unaccompanied children being held in Customs and Border
Protection facilities. What the administration's announcement fails to
mention, however, is that the issue has not been resolved. Just last
month, we hit an unfortunate new record of 15,253 unaccompanied minors
who were encountered by CBP at the border.
The bottleneck has simply been shifted from CBP to Health and Human
Services, which is now responsible for housing unaccompanied minors
around the country, including at a facility in my district. In the
first hearing on this topic, this committee heard from Sheriff Steve
Hinkley of Calhoun County Michigan, as he described the strain that the
shift in administration policy has placed on local law enforcement, and
the lack of coordination and assistance provided by the Federal
Government in enacting this new procedure.
Unfortunately, there are instances of unaccompanied minors, as well
as adults, arriving at our Southern Border as a result of human
trafficking operations. I am looking forward to engaging with our
witnesses today to learn more about their agencies' efforts to combat
criminal organizations in the region that conduct these kinds of
operations and determine what additional resources DHS may need to
prevent future humanitarian and security crises in the region.
I am hopeful that we will use this opportunity today to engage on
specific strategies and potential solutions that Congress and the
administration can pursue together in order to productively address
these challenges in a responsible and effective way.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for holding this hearing. I look
forward to hearing from our witnesses.
Chairman Correa. I thank the Ranking Member. Members are
also reminded that the committee will operate according to the
guidelines laid out by the Chairman and Ranking Member in their
February 3 colloquy regarding remote procedures. The Chair now
recognizes the Chairman of the full committee, which is not
here. So, we move on to the Ranking Member, also not here.
Statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]
Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
July 28, 2021
As the subcommittee has learned through its recent hearings, many
of the root causes of migration from Central America are interrelated.
Transnational criminal organizations are an example. Violence fueled by
these organizations' efforts to control migration routes in the region
has led to some of the highest crime rates in the world. Crime has
caused thousands to flee in fear of their lives, especially minors who
are often targeted by local gangs.
The ability of criminal organizations to bribe government officials
and exploit weak judicial systems in Central American countries allows
them to operate with impunity. The Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) has had long-standing efforts focused on addressing the many
threats transnational criminal organizations pose to the United States.
But actions by the Trump administration to dismantle some of these
efforts may have limited the Department's effectiveness. For example,
we now know that President Trump's DHS worked to undermine--and
ultimately shutdown--a joint task force that coordinated Department-
wide efforts to address border threats.
Repeated cuts to U.S. foreign assistance in Central America and
failure to hold corrupt politicians accountable also made conditions in
the region worse over the past 4 years. The influx of migrants to the
U.S. Southern Border created new opportunities for criminal
enterprises. Smugglers are charging large sums to help desperate
migrants make the journey north. In turn, these payments fund fees
charged by the larger criminal organizations who control access to key
border crossing routes. Sadly, we have all heard too many stories of
migrants being assaulted, robbed, or abandoned along the way.
I applaud the Biden administration for taking action to address
these challenges and to strengthen DHS's capacity to combat criminal
organizations. In April, Secretary Mayorkas announced the creation of
Operation Sentinel, a collaborative effort led by U.S. Customs and
Border Protection to counter migrant smuggling operations. In June, the
Department of Justice formed a joint task force with DHS to enhance
U.S. law enforcement efforts against human smuggling and trafficking
groups operating in Mexico and the Northern Triangle.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about these
initiatives and ways Congress can support DHS's efforts to combat
transnational criminal organizations and further strengthen border
security.
Chairman Correa. OK. What I would like to do is now move to
welcoming our witnesses. The first witness we have is Mr.
Francis Russo. He is the acting deputy executive assistant
commissioner for operation support at the Customs and Border
Protection Office. In his role, he supports CBP operations
across 8 subcomponents, including offices of intelligence,
international affairs. Mr. Russo has served in multiple roles
since joining Customs Service in 1995, including as assistant
director for border security in the New York Field Office.
Our second witness is Mr. John Condon. Mr. Condon is the
acting assistant director for Homeland Security Investigations
internal operations within Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
He is responsible for 81 international offices in 53 countries.
His responsibilities include planning, directing, managing, and
coordinating all policies, procedures, and guidelines
concerning international investigative activities. He
previously served in several roles including ICE's regional
attache for the Caribbean. Without objection, the witnesses'
full statements will be inserted into the record. I now ask
each witness to summarize their statements in 5 minutes
beginning with Mr. Russo. Welcome, sir.
STATEMENT OF FRANCIS J. RUSSO, ACTING DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, OPERATIONS SUPPORT, U.S. CUSTOMS AND
BORDER PROTECTION
Mr. Russo. Good afternoon, Chairman Correa, Ranking Member
Meijer, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank
you for the opportunity to testify today about transnational
organized crime in Central America and U.S. Customs and Border
Protection's efforts to dismantle it.
As you are aware, transnational criminal organizations, or
TCOs, are heavily involved in smuggling a combination of human
beings, weapons cache, or narcotics. Essentially, anything with
a high profit margin. They operate seamlessly across
international borders exploiting supply chains, financial
flows, corrupt officials, and overburdened law enforcement
without regard for human life. They pose a clear threat to
National security and public safety.
It is estimated that TCOs profit anywhere from $200 million
to $2.3 billion alone for smuggling migrants from the Northern
Triangle to the Southwest Border. Desperate migrants pay TCO-
connected human smuggling groups thousands of dollars to aid on
their journey to escape violence, natural disasters, food
insecurity, and poverty at home. Smugglers control where these
illegal border crossings occur, often abandoning migrants in
remote and dangerous areas. Last month, CBP conducted 9,500
rescues in these areas and rescued 81 percent more individuals
this year than last fiscal year. Unfortunately, we have also
confirmed 300 deaths this year.
This callous activity creates border security gaps that
TCOs seek to exploit. While agents are busy processing large
groups or rescuing migrants, TCOs move illicit narcotics or
other contraband elsewhere across the border.
CBP leverages key partnerships and sound analytics to
combat TCOs. Joint Task Force Alpha, our newest initiative,
includes partnerships with Federal prosecutors along the
Southwest Border supported by law enforcement agents and
analysts from ICE and CBP. The task force is enhancing the
Department of Justice's ability to investigate and prosecute
the most prolific and dangerous human smuggling and trafficking
groups operating in Mexico and the Northern Triangle.
Complementing Task Force Alpha, Operation Sentinel is a CPB-led
initiative to counter TCOs affiliated with migrant smuggling.
It is supported by ICE, USCIS, the U.S. Department of State,
the U.S. DEA, and the FBI.
The operation targets and disrupts those individuals
responsible for sending structured payments facilitating human
smuggling. We are mapping the networks while targeting their
members, associates, and their assets. Examples include
revocation of travel documents, suspension and debarment, and
freezing of bank accounts and other financial assets tied to
TCO logistical networks. To date, Operation Sentinel has
yielded the revocation of more than 150 visas associated with
TCO members and their associates, preventing these individuals
from traveling to the United States or using their visas to
enter foreign countries. In addition, our foreign partners have
frozen overseas bank accounts, curbing the ability of TCOs to
access the proceeds of their illicit activities.
Operation Sentinel has identified multiple businesses for
suspension or debarment, precluding those associated with TCOs
and their affiliates from participating in Federal programs.
To support Operation Sentinel, CBP recently announced the
partnership with the National Insurance Crime Bureau to prevent
companies linked to migrant smuggling from securing insurance
for their commercial enterprises. NICB's network of 1,200
companies includes more than 80 percent of the Nation's
property-casualty insurance companies. Their partnership,
combined with CBP's suspension and debarment program protects
the public interest, the public's money, and the integrity of
Federal programs by ensuring that Federal agencies only conduct
business with those engaged in lawful enterprise.
Starting in June, CBP personnel deployed to Guatemala to
provide advisory and capacity-building expertise to the
government of Guatemala to improve border security efforts,
target human smuggling groups, and enhance trade and customs
modernization. The initiative coordinated closely with the
State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement seeks to manage migration and the growing number of
non-citizen unaccompanied children transiting through and from
Guatemala.
In addition, CBP's National Targeting Center known as the
NTC in Sterling, Virginia uses Classified law enforcement
commercial and open-source information in innovative ways to
identify high-risk travelers and shipments at the earliest
point possible to mitigate threats at and beyond the border.
The NTC collaborates closely with Federal, State, and local
partners including HSI's Human Smuggling Unit to dismantle
special interest migrant facilitation networks prioritized for
action through ICE, HSI's Extraterritorial Criminal Travel
program. Finally, the NTC actively participates in the
transnational organize crime watch-listing program, accounting
for a large percentage of all U.S. Government nominations to
the program.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear today, and I look
forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Russo follows:]
Prepared Statement of Francis J. Russo
July 28, 2021
Chairman Correa, Ranking Member Meijer, and Members of the
subcommittee, it is my honor to appear before you today to discuss the
threats posed to the United States by transnational criminal
organizations (TCOs) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP)
efforts to disrupt and dismantle them.
the threat of tco s and migrant smuggling
The United States faces persistent threats from innovative and
constantly-evolving transnational criminal networks whose collaborative
efforts seek to gain illicit financial benefits by causing harm,
inflicting damage, corrupting officials, undermining security efforts,
and degrading the State. These international networks, one subset of
which are known as TCOs, adjust organizationally and shift alliances to
acquire new specialized talent, sources, and access privileges to
improve long-term earnings, efficiencies, and operations. Successful
TCOs exploit existing logistical chains and financial flows and
diversify their portfolios to move multiple illicit items such as
drugs, money, counterfeit goods, individuals, and weapons. TCOs conduct
their operations without regard for human life and have proven to be
highly capable, profitable, powerful, dangerous, elusive, and extremely
resilient. In short, TCOs pose a significant threat to both National
security and to public safety.
Human smugglers--many with ties to TCOs--engage in the crime of
unlawfully bringing people into the United States, or unlawfully
transporting and harboring people already in the United States, in
deliberate evasion of immigration law. It is estimated that TCOs profit
anywhere between $200 million and $2.3 billion alone for smuggling
migrants from the Northern Triangle to the Southwest Border.\1\
Desperate migrants often pay human smuggling groups thousands of
dollars to aid them on their journey. These smugglers and TCOs profit
by exploiting people who are seeking a better life. Violence, natural
disasters, food insecurity, and poverty have long existed in Mexico and
the Northern Triangle countries of Central America, all of which have
become more severe during the COVID-19 pandemic. TCOs exploit these
trends and deceive desperate people about our country's laws, while
also abusing and exploiting them on their journey north. While the
number of CBP encounters along the Southwest Border dropped
dramatically in fiscal year 2020 over the previous year's numbers, the
number of encounters for fiscal year 2021 to date is higher than all of
fiscal year 2019, which were the highest in about a decade. In June,
CBP migrant encounters jumped to over 188,000 people. Thirty-four
percent of encounters in June 2021 were individuals who had at least
one prior encounter in the previous 12 months, compared to an average
1-year re-encounter rate of 14 percent for fiscal years 2014-2019. The
number of unique new encounters in June 2021 was 123,838. The number of
unique individuals encountered to date during the fiscal year is
454,944 compared to 489,760 during the same time period in 2019.
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\1\ See, https://www.rand.org/news/press/2019/04/22.html.
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Many who make the journey become sick, injured, or traumatized.
Some even lose their lives. Alarmingly, transnational smuggling
organizations often abandon migrants in remote and dangerous areas,
leading to a dramatic rise in the number of rescues CBP performs. In
June 2021, CBP conducted 9,500 rescues Nation-wide and has rescued 81
percent more individuals in fiscal year 2021 than all of fiscal year
2020. Despite these successful rescues, many other migrants fail to get
the help they need in time. CBP has confirmed over 300 migrant deaths
so far in fiscal year 2021, compared to 250 in all of fiscal year 2020.
Around a third of these are heat-related deaths in the dangerous
terrain of the desert, mountains, or brush. Around 18 percent are
water-related, often in the rivers and canals that make up our border
with Mexico.
Human smuggling poses a substantial threat to the homeland by
creating conduits that allow contraband and persons seeking to harm the
United States to clandestinely enter the country. Smugglers control
where and how these illegal migrant border crossings take place,
putting human lives at risk to create gaps in border security. While
agents are diverted to process large groups or to conduct migrant
rescues, TCOs are using these diversions to move illicit narcotics or
other contraband elsewhere across the border. These same TCOs, through
diversified criminal activities, are responsible for the movement of
illicit drugs entering the United States. Of note, CBP continues to see
a surge in fentanyl seizures, with fiscal year 2021 seizures through
June 2021 78 percent greater than all of fiscal year 2020. The TCOs
often use many of the same resources and logistical nodes to move
proceeds from their illicit activities from the United States to
Mexico. TCOs continually adjust their operations to avoid detection and
interdiction by law enforcement, and--like legitimate businesses--are
quick to take advantage of improved technology, cheaper transportation,
and better distribution methods.
cbp's response
To confront TCOs and other threat networks, CBP has embraced a
counter-network approach. This effort leverages CBP's unique
authorities, data holdings, Intelligence Enterprise, and partnerships
to illuminate, disrupt, degrade, and dismantle networks that pose a
threat to the homeland and its interests. CBP's international
collaboration and integration with the interagency counter-network
community optimizes the collective global effort, which identifies
options for intelligence-driven, risk-mitigating responses.
Our success at identifying, degrading, and disrupting transnational
networks depends on our ability to execute CBP's counter-network
approach on two fronts--partnerships and sound analytical methodology.
On the former, CBP front-line agents, officers, trade, and intelligence
professionals must work hand-in-hand with the whole of Government, as
well as international partners. On the latter, CBP must have the
systems and processes in place to efficiently detect, collect, and
analyze threat network data, and the ability to rapidly respond with
intelligence-driven operations. Developing these relationships and
capabilities, together with taking these actions will enable CBP to
proactively identify and stop threats before they arrive at U.S.
borders.
Partnerships
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and CBP are
partnering with the U.S. Attorney General in a new initiative--Joint
Task Force Alpha--that is combining the investigative, prosecutorial,
and capacity-building efforts of both DHS and the Department of Justice
(DOJ). Joint Task Force Alpha was recently formed to investigate and
prosecute the most prolific and dangerous human smuggling and
trafficking groups operating in Mexico and the Northern Triangle
countries of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.\2\ The task force
consists of Federal prosecutors along the Southwest Border along with
law enforcement agents and analysts from DHS's Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) and CBP. The FBI and the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) are also task force members, which is seeking to
enhance the DOJ's on-going efforts to fight corruption in Northern
Triangle countries. The Justice Department is increasing its focus on
investigations, prosecutions, and asset recoveries relating to
corruption in the Northern Triangle through its Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act enforcement program, counter-narcotics prosecutions, and
Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative. In addition, adopting a task
force approach, the Department of Justice's Office of Prosecutorial
Development (OPDAT) and International Criminal Investigative Training
Assistance Program personnel--including new Northern Triangle anti-
corruption legal advisors--are working with Northern Triangle
prosecutors and investigators to build corruption cases in those
countries themselves, as well as to develop leads that can be pursued
by the Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative.
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\2\ See, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-announces-
initiatives-combat-human-smuggling-and-trafficking-and-fight.
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Task Force Alpha is working closely with Operation Sentinel, a
recently-announced DHS operation focused on countering TCOs affiliated
with migrant smuggling. CBP has taken the lead on Operation Sentinel,
which is a collaborative effort with ICE's Homeland Security
Investigations (HSI), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, the
U.S. Department of State, the FBI, and DEA.
Partners in Operation Sentinel are targeting all personnel and
identifiable resources that TCOs require to operate. One of the main
lines of effort for Operation Sentinel is to target and disrupt those
individuals responsible for sending structured payments for human
smuggling, which may include proceeds from illicit drugs. Utilizing the
full breadth of domestic and foreign authorities, data, analytic
capability and capacity, Operation Sentinel is mapping the
organizations' networks; targeting their members, associates, and
assets; and employing a series of targeted actions and sanctions
against them. Examples of these actions include:
Revocation of travel documents
Suspension and debarment
Freezing of bank accounts and other financial assets tied to
TCO logistical networks.
To date, Operation Sentinel partners in the State Department have
revoked more than 150 visas associated with TCO members and their
associates, preventing these individuals from traveling to the United
States and from using their U.S. visas as entry documents in foreign
countries. Operation Sentinel has also identified multiple entities for
U.S. Government-wide suspension and/or debarment, which would preclude
TCO members, their affiliates, and their associated businesses from
Federal programs. The operation has also worked with foreign partners
to freeze overseas accounts, curbing TCOs' ability to send and receive
the financial proceeds of their illicit activities.
To complement Operation Sentinel, CBP also recently announced a
partnership with the National Insurance Crime Bureau (NICB) to prevent
companies associated with smuggling migrants into the United States
from securing insurance for their commercial enterprises. The NICB is
the insurance industry's premier association dedicated to predicting,
preventing, and prosecuting insurance crime. Their extensive network of
more than 1,200 member companies includes more than 80 percent of the
Nation's property-casualty insurance companies. Following CBP's
determination to suspend or debar a particular company or individual,
NICB will inform their members of the suspended or debarred entity. The
Government-wide suspension and debarment system exists to protect the
public interest, the public's money, and the integrity of Federal
programs by ensuring that Federal agencies only conduct business with
presently responsible persons.
In addition to Task Force Alpha and Operational Sentinel, DHS also
commissioned a comprehensive plan led by both CBP and ICE-HSI to
disrupt the illicit flow of firearms, firearms components, and
ammunition from the United States into Mexico. The culmination, known
as Operation Without a Trace, provides a joint platform for CBP and
ICE-HSI personnel to target, and investigate the financing,
transportation, and communications methods employed by firearms
procurement and smuggling networks to disrupt and dismantle their
illegal gun trafficking operations. This is done in collaboration with
the Department of Justice's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives. Under Without a Trace, ICE and CBP launched a public
information campaign, including public service announcements in land
and air ports of entry, to publicize the scope and results of Operation
Without a Trace and to increase public awareness about how to provide
confidential tips regarding cross-border weapons trafficking
activities. Since the initiative's inception in fiscal year 2020,
Operation Without a Trace has achieved significant success preventing
Mexico-bound gun trafficking, resulting in the initiation of 353
investigations, the execution of 227 arrests, the service of 62 search
warrants, and the seizure of 542 firearms, nearly 500,000 rounds of
ammunition, and $16.5 million in illicit currency.
In partnership with the Department of State Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, CBP is supporting the United
States' initiative to address the root causes of irregular migration
from Central America. In coordination with the Vice President of the
United States' visit to Guatemala, CBP personnel deployed to Guatemala
in early June to provide advisory and capacity-building expertise to
the government of Guatemala to improve border security efforts, target
human smuggling groups, and enhance trade and customs modernization.
The initiative, known as the Guatemala Advisory Assistance Root Causes
Deployment, is in response to the National Security Council request for
a 90-day plan to manage migration and the growing number of noncitizen
unaccompanied children transiting through and sourcing out of
Guatemala.
CBP also continues to collaborate with the government of Mexico on
border security matters, irregular migration flows, and efforts to
enhance bilateral information sharing, targeting, and mentoring. On
June 29, CBP hosted an engagement between Acting Commissioner Miller
and a delegation from the Mexican Embassy led by Ambassador Esteban
Moctezuma Barragan to discuss dynamic information and knowledge sharing
to identify, disrupt, and manage cross-border risks. CBP continues to
engage government of Mexico counterparts to share information and
jointly target human smuggling networks and transnational criminal
organizations.
Sound Analytical Methodology
Sound analytical methodology centers on providing timely and
actionable intelligence to our front-line officer and agents, decision
makers, and partners. To strengthen our intelligence posture in
responding to this complex threat environment, CBP's Intelligence
Enterprise (IE) was established in 2017 as a cohesive, threat-based,
data-driven, and operationally-focused effort to leverage the
collective intelligence capabilities and expertise across CBP's
operational components, including Air and Marine Operations (AMO),
Office of Field Operations, Office of Trade, and USBP.
To enhance its intelligence capacity, the CBP IE established
investment priorities that support a whole-of-agency approach to
countering various border threats, such as the use of a common
reporting platform to timely share and disseminate threat information
to disparate offices. CBP's IE was also responsible for launching the
CBP Watch, a situational awareness facility that provides trend
analysis and real-time feedback to better support the Agency's
operational front line 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
CBP's National Targeting Center (NTC) is another critical component
of our comprehensive, analytical border security and management
strategy. The NTC emphasizes partnerships, both cultivating new ones
and maintaining existing relationships. It provides real-time
actionable information to strategic foreign and domestic partners
through such programs as the Container Security Initiative, Immigration
Advisory Program/Joint Security Program, International Targeting
Center, and liaison locations abroad. CBP's NTC hosts liaisons in
Sterling, Virginia from key agencies and international partners to
actively share critical information. Over two dozen domestic and
foreign partners are represented at the NTC.
These programs and partnerships effectively enhance global domain
awareness and targeting capabilities while enabling the interdiction of
travel and cargo threats at their origin. The NTC coordinates
mitigation efforts across agencies and foreign partners to interdict
high-risk shipments and uses risk-based strategies to identify TCOs and
drug trafficking organizations. The NTC uses tools such as the
Automated Targeting System and subject-matter expertise to analyze,
assess, and segment risk at every state of the trade and travel life
cycles. It uses Classified law enforcement, commercial, and open-source
information in innovative ways to identify high-risk travelers and
shipments at the earliest point possible and coordinates with CBP staff
as well as interagency and foreign partners to take appropriate action.
Currently, the NTC is supporting over 20 transnational organized
crime-related investigations encompassing all organizational elements
(e.g., command/control/finance/logistics). The NTC is also
collaborating on over 50 trade-based money-laundering cases and
supporting OFAC designations under the Foreign Kingpin Act. The NTC
closely collaborates with HSI's Human Smuggling Unit in the
identification, analysis, disruption, and dismantling of special
interest migrant facilitation networks prioritized for interagency
action through HSI's Extraterritorial Criminal Travel program. Finally,
the NTC actively participates in the transnational organized crime
watch-listing program.
CBP is also working to increase detection of threats from
transnational organized crime before they arrive at the U.S. borders by
closing gaps in domain awareness in the air, land, and maritime
environments. AMO's Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) manages the
air and maritime domain awareness of the Department, and is critical in
detecting, identifying, and coordinating a response to threats to
National security. The use of tools such as the Air and Marine
Operations Surveillance System integrates various radar feeds into a
consolidated system that provides both air and marine track data, thus
providing air and maritime situational awareness that can inform
operations and is shared with strategic partners.
In fiscal year 2020, AMOC successfully evaluated detections of over
300,000 air targets. These capabilities will continue to increase the
information and data collection that helps feed the CBP intelligence
cycle for analysis and building a comprehensive understanding of the
logistical supply chains TCOs use to further illicit activity. From
these activities CBP is actively engaged in addressing the key maritime
and air threat areas of San Diego, Puerto Rico/Caribbean, the Pacific
Northwest, the Great Lakes, and the Gulf of Mexico with these varying
technologies. In particular, maritime smuggling on the Southern
California coastline has been on the rise. Between fiscal year 2019 and
fiscal year 2020, San Diego Sector experienced a 92 percent increase of
apprehensions in the maritime domain. San Diego Sector has made over
900 arrests to date this fiscal year, putting CBP on track for an
additional 40 percent increase by the end of the fiscal year. Finally,
in January 2021, AMO, in coordination with Joint Interagency Task
Force--South (JIATF-S) and Servicio Nacional Aeronaval, conducted an
integrated air and sea operation in Panama for 84 days utilizing
Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) technology to detect, identify, and
facilitate the interdiction of maritime surface vessels attempting to
use the Eastern Pacific and Panamanian Territorial Waters to smuggle
people and contraband. This operation resulted in 539 mission hours,
and 9,995 pounds of cocaine and 10,210 pounds of marijuana seized or
disrupted.
conclusion
TCOs pose a significant threat to U.S. National security, and acute
dangers to migrants as TCOs not only seek to profit from their
exploitation but also have little regard for their well-being, exposing
them to violent encounters, injury, and death. TCOs are directly
involved in sexual assaults, human trafficking, and abandonment of
vulnerable migrants--including minor children.
CBP continues to work closely with its National and international
partners on multiple levels to identify and disrupt the illicit
activities and lucrative profits of TCOs. This layered approach reduces
our dependence on any one point of contact or program to stop the flow
of narcotics, people, and other contraband, and extends our zone of
security outward, ensuring our physical border is neither the first nor
the last line of defense. Through a series of administrative and
enforcement actions, CBP has improved its sources and information-
collection methodology related to foreign operations. We will continue
to use this information to strengthen our ability to identify and
interdict not only narcotics, but also other illicit and unsafe
products and people that would harm Americans.
As the Nation's largest law enforcement agency, CBP must always
operate within legal boundaries to guard U.S. borders against those who
operate outside of the law. CBP must lead the Nation in developing a
well-informed, agile, and seamless global network that will inform and
inspire integration, cooperation, and comprehensive actions. This
network must be able to persistently evolve its capabilities to serve
common interests in combating terrorism and violent extremism and
defining, prioritizing, and disrupting TCOs.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to
your questions.
Chairman Correa. Thank you, Mr. Russo. I now call on Mr.
Condon to summarize his comments in 5 minutes. Welcome, sir.
STATEMENT OF JOHN A. CONDON, ACTING ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, HOMELAND SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS,
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Condon. Thank you, sir. Chairman Correa, Ranking Member
Meijer, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank
you for the opportunity to appear before you. Today, I will
focus on the role U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Homeland Security Investigations plays in identifying,
disrupting, and dismantling transnational criminal
organizations associated with the Northern Triangle countries
of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.
As the principal investigative component of the Department
of Homeland Security, HSI conducts criminal investigations into
the illegal movement of goods, money, technology, people, and
contraband into and out of and throughout the United States.
HSI has more than 10,000 employees in over 200 cities Nation-
wide and 81 locations around the world.
In the Northern Triangle, HSI has attache offices in
Guatemala City, Guatemala, San Salvador, El Salvador, and
Tegucigalpa, Honduras. Each of the Northern Triangle attache
offices also has a Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit,
or TCIU, made up of foreign law enforcement, customs and
immigration officials, and prosecutors who undergo a strict
vetting process and complete robust training. HSI works with
TCIU personnel to provide intelligence and resources to allow
our partners to take enforcement actions under their country's
authorities.
The close relationship built by HSI's TCIU program have led
to unique opportunities to share information with Northern
Triangle law enforcement counterparts. Operation Gatehouse is
an initiative that deploys TCIU officers from the Northern
Triangle countries to the United States and to assist HSI
offices and Federal, State, and local partners with
investigating MS-13 members. Pushing our borders out to address
threats before they reach the United States is a priority for
HSI.
Through our Operation Citadel, HSI identifies, disrupts,
and dismantles TCOs and terrorist support networks by targeting
mechanisms used to move migrants, illicit funds, and contraband
throughout the region. Citadel provides training and capacity-
building including using cross border operations to enhance
foreign partners' investigative and information-sharing
capabilities. Through the Biometric Identification
Transnational Migration Alert program, also known as BITMAP,
HSI trains and equips foreign law enforcement officers to
collect biometric and biographic data on suspects of interest.
Foreign law enforcement partners share their BITMAP information
with HSI and this data is used to populate U.S. databases to
identify transnational criminals, known or suspected
terrorists, and gang members and prevent their travel to the
United States.
HSI's National Air Trafficking Initiative, or NATI,
addresses the transportation of narcotics from source countries
to the United States by air, which is the preferred method of
smuggling by many Colombian and Mexican drug cartels. HSI
disrupts these smugglings routes by shutting down the
transshipment of cocaine through Guatemala and Belize. NATI has
resulted in historic interdictions, arrests, and seizures
striking a serious blow to TCOs exploiting our Nation's
borders.
To complement its international focus, HSI's efforts
continue at our domestic field offices where HSI special agents
respond to and investigate criminal schemes that are
encountered or identified in the United States. HSI special
agents combat narcotics smuggling by launching complex criminal
investigations to take down sophisticated networks that
produce, transport, broker, finance, and sell and distribute
drugs. HSI further disrupts TCO operations by identifying and
seizing the significant currency and assets attained through
their criminal activities.
TCOs also require a steady supply of firearms and
ammunition. HSI special agents investigate criminal
organizations responsible for financing, procurement,
brokering, transportation, and dissemination of firearms in
support of these TCOs. These efforts take weapons off our
streets and prevent the smuggling of U.S. arms. HSI and its
partners have dismantled pipelines used to smuggle undocumented
noncitizens through Central and South America, seized millions
of dollars from entities actively violating U.S. immigration
and money-laundering statues, and dismantled networks of
transportation and harboring cells that endanger undocumented
noncitizens by exposure, abandonment, or unsafe transportation
methods.
Joint Task Force Alpha, JTFA, initiated by DOJ and launched
with DHS, is a multi-agency operation to dismantle TCOs engaged
in human smuggling in Mexico and/or through the Northern
Triangle to the United States via the Southwest Border. HSI is
a partner in JTFA and has identified dozens of smuggling
organizations that have been designated as significant priority
cases for this initiative.
Thank you, again, for the opportunity to appear before you
today and for your continued support of HSI and the critical
investigative role it plays in investigating the TCOs that
facilitate and profit from our cross-border crimes. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Condon follows:]
Prepared Statement of John A. Condon
Wednesday, July 28, 2021
introduction
Chairman Correa, Ranking Member Meijer, and distinguished Members
of the Subcommittee on Oversight, Management, and Accountability: Thank
you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
efforts of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Homeland
Security Investigations (HSI) to secure the homeland from transnational
crime and threats. My statement will focus on the important role HSI
plays internationally and domestically in identifying, disrupting, and
dismantling transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) emanating from
and associated with the Northern Triangle countries of Guatemala, El
Salvador, and Honduras.
the hsi mission
As the principal investigative component of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), HSI is a premier global law enforcement
organization responsible for conducting Federal criminal investigations
into the illegal cross-border movement of goods, money, technology,
people, and other contraband into, out of, and throughout the United
States. HSI's workforce consists of more than 10,000 employees,
including special agents, criminal analysts, and mission support
personnel assigned to over 220 cities across the United States and over
81 locations around the world.
In collaboration with its strategic partners in the United States
and abroad, HSI special agents gather evidence used to identify and
build criminal cases against TCOs, terrorist networks and facilitators,
and other criminal elements that threaten the homeland. HSI works with
prosecutors to indict and arrest violators, execute criminal search
warrants, seize criminally-derived money and assets, and take other
actions designed to disrupt and dismantle criminal organizations
operating around the world. These efforts protect the National security
and public safety of the United States.
the nature of the threat
TCOs represent a significant threat to our Nation and our
communities. During the last two decades, TCOs have expanded
dramatically in size, scope, and impact, which poses a significant
threat to National security. HSI is deep focused on the threat of TCOs
and targets TCOs at every critical location in the cycle:
Internationally, in cooperation with foreign counterparts, where
transnational criminal and terrorist organizations operate; at our
Nation's physical border and ports of entry, in coordination with U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), where the smugglers attempt to
exploit America's legitimate trade, travel, and transportation systems;
and in cities throughout the United States, where criminal
organizations earn substantial profits off of their illicit activities.
Mexico is a major source of production, as well as a transit
country, for illicit drugs destined for the United States, including
marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine, heroin, and, more recently,
fentanyl. Mexico is not only a source of fentanyl production; it is
also a transit country for fentanyl and precursor chemicals originating
from Asia. In the last two decades, Mexico has also become the largest
transit country for South American-sourced cocaine destined for the
United States. The Northern Triangle (El Salvador, Honduras, and
Guatemala) countries serve as transit points for these drugs. Often,
aircraft are used to transport narcotics from Venezuela and Colombia,
destined to Honduras and Guatemala, for subsequent land transportation
through Mexico and into the United States.
Transnational gangs from this region represent another threat to
our Nation's safety and security. La Mara Salvatrucha, also known as
``MS-13,'' is a gang operating throughout the United States and
Northern Triangle countries. Members and associates of MS-13 are
expected to protect the name, reputation, and status of the gang from
rival gang members and other persons. MS-13 members require that all
individuals show respect and deference to the gang and its membership.
To accomplish this, MS-13 members and associates are expected to use
any means necessary to force respect from those who show disrespect,
including acts of intimidation and violence. HSI-led investigations
have linked MS-13 gang members to a variety of organized criminal
activity, including drug trafficking, extortion, and homicide.
Another significant concern for our country, human smuggling,
involves the provision of a service--typically transportation,
navigation, or fraudulent documents--to facilitate an individual's
unauthorized entry into the United States. Harsh terrains and travel
conditions, combined with the potential detection by law enforcement
and the threat of violence posed by cartels controlling territory along
smuggling routes across Central America and Mexico, make it difficult
for migrants to travel from their home countries and reach our borders
without the assistance of human smugglers. Criminal organizations play
a major role in facilitating the smuggling of these noncitizens from
their home countries and across our borders. U.S.-bound human smuggling
and related criminal activities are estimated by the Homeland Security
Operational Analysis Center to produce revenues of between $2 billion
to $6 billion per year.
While human smuggling may constitute the initial crime facilitating
the illicit movement of people to our borders, the criminality does not
stop there. In some cases, migrants become victims of human
trafficking--a crime of exploitation that does not require movement--
when criminal networks introduce force, fraud, or coercion into
smuggling schemes to induce victims into forced labor or commercial sex
acts.
HSI's investigations have also demonstrated that perpetrators of
human smuggling and trafficking often concurrently or subsequently
commit other transnational crimes such as gang activity, identity, and
benefit fraud, money laundering, bulk cash smuggling, narcotics
smuggling, arms trafficking, and terrorism and other National security-
related crime.
hsi response to tco s
The multi-faceted, complex, transnational nature of the crimes
surrounding TCOs requires an equally robust and layered investigative
response, which HSI implements on multiple fronts. This starts abroad,
where HSI has the largest international investigative presence within
DHS, comprised of 81 offices in 53 countries with 41 visa security
screening posts. This wide-spread presence continues domestically,
where HSI special agents and criminal analysts respond to and pursue
investigations into transnational organized crime. Both at home and
abroad, HSI special agents utilize a broad and unique range of legal
authorities; leverage strategic relationships; and provide resources,
technology, and training in support of a whole-of-Government approach
to combating the TCO threat.
International Operations
HSI's international presence is a key facet of its approach to
countering transnational organized crime. HSI special agents abroad
develop and foster relationships with host government law enforcement
partners to exchange information, coordinate and support
investigations, and facilitate enforcement actions and prosecutions to
deter the ability of TCOs to smuggle drugs, people, and other
contraband into and out of the United States. HSI and its foreign
counterparts identify and target sources of supply and identify and
disrupt transportation and smuggling routes. These efforts enable HSI
and its partners to prevent dangerous narcotics and other illicit goods
from reaching our borders, or to stop illicit southbound flows of
illegally-derived currency or weapons.
HSI maintains three attache offices in the Northern Triangle
countries--HSI Guatemala City, HSI San Salvador and HSI Tegucigalpa--
and is expanding the HSI footprint in these locations.
Each of the Northern Triangle Attache offices has a Transnational
Criminal Investigative Unit (TCIU), funded by HSI, which plays a
critical role in its law enforcement efforts within the region. In
2011, HSI established the TCIU program to increase its reach in the
fight against TCOs. HSI TCIUs comprise foreign law enforcement
officials, customs officers, immigration officers, and prosecutors who
undergo a strict vetting process and complete robust training. HSI
TCIUs facilitate information exchange and rapid bilateral
investigations involving violations that HSI has the authority to
investigate, including narcotics smuggling; human smuggling and
trafficking; weapons trafficking; money laundering and bulk cash
smuggling; and other transnational criminal activity. More than 430
vetted and trained foreign law enforcement officers comprise the 13
TCIUs throughout the world. HSI special agents are uniquely positioned
to partner with TCIU personnel to provide critical intelligence and
resources to allow our partners to take appropriate enforcement action
under the authority of the host country.
The Northern Triangle TCIUs have achieved significant law
enforcement success in concert with HSI. In fiscal year 2020, pursuant
to investigations and operations targeting transnational criminal
activity, the HSI Guatemala City TCIU, the largest in the Northern
Triangle, made 599 arrests, and seized $1,036,206 USD, 31,164.78 pounds
of cocaine, 11 aircraft, 17 firearms, and 10 vehicles. In fiscal year
2020, the HSI San Salvador TCIU made 94 arrests and seized $52,499 USD,
121 pounds of cocaine, 9 firearms, and 5 vehicles. In fiscal year 2020,
the HSI Tegucigalpa TCIU made 99 arrests, and seized 1,078 pounds of
cocaine, an aircraft, and 2 firearms.
The close relationships built by HSI's TCIU program have led to
unique opportunities to share information with law enforcement
counterparts in the Northern Triangle in support of international
efforts to combat TCOs in the region. In March 2021, HSI reinitiated
the Operation CENTAM/Northern Triangle Initiative, deploying special
agents to HSI attache offices within the Northern Triangle to assist
with targeting MS-13 gang members and other Northern Triangle-based
TCOs operating in or connected to the United States. The initiative
also focuses on developing and furthering Organized Crime Drug
Enforcement Task Force investigations across the United States and in
the Northern Triangle countries. The agents coordinate with HSI Attache
office personnel, TCIU members, local law enforcement, and other
Federal agencies to augment, assist, and provide expertise to advance
investigations into TCOs.
In May 2018, HSI initiated Operation Gatehouse, an initiative that
deploys TCIU officers from Northern Triangle countries to the United
States to assist HSI domestic field offices with targeting and
investigating MS-13 gang members within the United States. As part of
their assigned duties, TCIU officers assist HSI with criminal gang
investigations and work closely with Federal, State, and local partners
to identify, disrupt, and dismantle transnational criminal gangs and
organizations. Most recently, in May 2021, HSI deployed TCIU personnel
from El Salvador and Honduras to HSI domestic field offices in
furtherance of Gatehouse.
Recognizing the regional nature of TCOs within South and Central
America, HSI launched Operation Citadel to identify, disrupt, and
dismantle TCOs and terrorist support networks by targeting the
mechanisms used to move migrants, illicit funds, and contraband
throughout the region. Citadel provides resources to enhance foreign
partners' investigative, intelligence, and information-sharing
capabilities to counter transnational threats and organized crime. In
turn, this assistance provides HSI the ability to expand domestic and
international investigations well beyond U.S. borders and to more
effectively target the illicit pathways exploited by TCOs. Citadel
facilitates training and capacity-building through cross-border
operations with partner nation TCIUs, undercover operations, judicially
approved wire intercepts, and document and media exploitation at ports
of entry and along smuggling routes.
Investigative activities also include sensitive site exploitation/
evidence collection and biometric collection of extraterritorial
criminal travel (ECT) subjects of special interest. HSI's ECT program
is a partnership between HSI and the U.S. Department of Justice's (DOJ)
Criminal Division, Human Rights, and Special Prosecutions Section. The
program uses expert dedicated investigative, prosecutorial, and
intelligence resources to target and aggressively pursue, disrupt, and
dismantle foreign-based transnational human smuggling networks. ECT
supports the highest-priority human smuggling investigations posing the
greatest National security and public safety threats. These include
investigations concerning special interest non-citizens and
investigations that pose a significant humanitarian concern, to include
maritime smuggling events, extortion, kidnapping, and corruption, among
others.
Pushing our borders out to effectively identify and mitigate
threats before they reach the United States remains a priority for DHS,
HSI, and our counterparts. A key tool in this fight is the Biometric
Identification Transnational Migration Alert Program (BITMAP). Pursuant
to BITMAP, HSI trains and equips TCIUs and other cooperating foreign
law enforcement officers to collect and share biometric and biographic
data on suspects of particular interest, such as third-country
nationals who are encountered by foreign law enforcement agencies at or
along irregular border-crossing check points, illicit pathways,
airports, seaports, jails, detention centers, and specialized mobile
units. Foreign law enforcement partners share their collected BITMAP
information with HSI, and this biometric data is used to populate U.S.
databases and subsequently identify transnational criminals; known or
suspected terrorists; gang members; and other persons of interest and
prevent their travel to the United States. BITMAP information is also
used to provide host-nation law enforcement partners with actionable
intelligence related to terrorist, criminal, and National security
threats.
The National Air Trafficking Initiative (NATI) is an HSI-led
initiative to address the transportation of narcotics from source
countries to the United States by air, which is the preferred method of
smuggling by many Colombian and Mexican drug cartels. HSI has partnered
with CBP Air and Marine Operations, and other Federal agencies to HSI's
efforts to disrupt these smuggling routes by shutting down the
transshipment of cocaine through Guatemala and Belize. These efforts
have resulted in a decrease of air deliveries of narcotics. This
investigation has resulted in historic interdictions, arrests, and
seizures that have assisted several domestic HSI offices with their
transnational narcotics smuggling investigations. To date, NATI has
resulted in 63 arrests and the seizure of 59 aircraft valued at over
$23 million, $15 million in U.S. currency, over 33,000 kilograms of
cocaine, and 27 firearms, striking a serious blow to TCOs exploiting
our Nation's borders and furthering the efforts to disrupt and
dismantle TCOs.
Domestic Operations
To complement its international focus, HSI's efforts continue at
the border and within our domestic field offices, where HSI special
agents respond to and investigate criminal schemes that are encountered
or identified in the United States. Along the border, many
investigations begin as reactive cases in response to seizures of
drugs, money, guns, or other contraband, or to interdictions or
apprehensions of undocumented noncitizens. Leads are also developed
through a variety of other methods, including referrals from Federal,
State, and local law enforcement partners; confidential informants and
sources of information; tip line or social media reporting; community
relations and public affairs outreach; criminal analysis/targeting; and
information gleaned from existing operations.
Upon receiving information into a potential crime, HSI uses the
full breadth of its authorities and expertise to pursue the
investigation and attack all aspects of the organizations responsible.
HSI special agents work diligently to expand their cases to complex,
multi-jurisdictional investigations targeting key individuals,
communications, logistics networks, and vulnerabilities within a TCO's
command structure. To do this, HSI special agents use sophisticated
investigative tools and techniques to collect evidence and conduct
operations designed to disrupt and dismantle TCO operations and
mitigate the threat they pose to the homeland. These actions occur at
home and abroad, involve key U.S. and foreign law enforcement
partnerships, and require significant, long-term manpower and resource
commitments.
While HSI conducts these activities in furtherance of the full
spectrum of crimes that HSI investigates, the crimes that TCOs in the
Northern Triangle most often pursue are the smuggling of narcotics and
undocumented noncitizens into the United States; the smuggling of
weapons and currency out of the United States; and the illegal
operations of transnational gangs.
To combat narcotics smuggling, HSI special agents launch complex
criminal investigations designed to expose and take down sophisticated
networks that produce, transport, broker, finance, sell, and distribute
illegal drugs. These efforts have resulted in some of the most
significant arrests of traffickers and seizures of illicit drugs across
the globe. HSI also continues to expand its Border Enforcement Security
Task Force (BEST) footprint across the United States and uses this
model to ensure a comprehensive interagency response to the continuous
border security, public safety, and National security threat posed by
drug trafficking organizations. HSI-led BEST teams--comprising officers
from HSI's Federal, State, and local partners--eliminate barriers and
leverage the authorities and resources of HSI's partners in the fight
to identify, investigate, disrupt, and dismantle TCOs at every level of
operation.
To mitigate the human smuggling threat, HSI focuses its
investigative efforts on smuggling networks that pose a National
security and public safety risk, jeopardize lives, or engage in
violence, abuse, hostage-taking, or extortion. In coordination with
domestic and international partners, HSI targets and investigates all
links in the human-smuggling chain, including overseas recruiters and
organizers, fraudulent document vendors and facilitators, corrupt
officials, financial facilitators, and transportation and employment
infrastructures that facilitate and benefit from human smuggling. As a
result, HSI and its partners have disrupted the efforts of several
organizations attempting to smuggle humans into the United States from
special interest countries, identified and dismantled pipelines used to
smuggle undocumented noncitizens through Central and South America,
seized millions of dollars from entities actively violating U.S.
immigration and money-laundering statutes, and dismantled networks of
transportation and harboring cells that endanger undocumented
noncitizens by exposure, abandonment, or unsafe transportation methods.
TCOs, including narcotics and human smuggling organizations,
generate significant proceeds from their crimes, often in cash. To keep
their proceeds and associated activities away from the scrutiny of
financial regulators and law enforcement agencies, criminal actors
avoid traditional financial institutions by repatriating their illicit
proceeds across our borders through conveyances such as commercial and
private aircraft, passenger and commercial vehicles, maritime vessels,
and pedestrian crossings at our land borders. HSI diligently pursues
these violations in an effort to disrupt TCO operations by identifying
and seizing currency and assets attained through their criminal
activities.
TCOs also require a steady supply of firearms and ammunition to
assert control over the territory where they operate, eliminate rival
criminal organizations, and resist Government operations. In response,
HSI focuses its weapons smuggling investigations on disrupting the
illicit flow of firearms, firearms components, and ammunition from the
United States to other countries. HSI special agents investigate
individuals and criminal organizations that are responsible for the
financing, procurement, brokering, transportation, and dissemination of
firearms in support of TCOs. These efforts take weapons off the streets
of our communities and prevent the smuggling of U.S. arms to other
countries where they can be used to commit acts of violence.
TCOs such as MS-13 represent a significant threat to public safety
in communities throughout the United States. Gangs commit violent
crimes and facilitate criminal activity such as narcotics and firearms
trafficking, sex trafficking, human smuggling and trafficking, and
corruption. To combat this threat, HSI conducts multi-jurisdictional
and international investigations that target gang leadership, members,
and associates in the United States and abroad. HSI works closely with
the Department of Justice to prosecute gang members and enterprises,
often pursuing Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO)
Act, Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering (VICAR), and criminal
conspiracy charges to disrupt and dismantle gang operations and
organizations.
From narcotics smuggling to bulk cash smuggling to transnational
gang violations, the investigations HSI conducts out of its domestic
field offices represent an important part of the U.S. Government's
efforts to disrupt and dismantle TCOs linked to the Northern Triangle.
joint task force alpha
DHS and DOJ continue to identify strategies to counter the TCOs
facilitating and profiting from the increased influx of migrants
originating from Central America and Mexico and transiting to the
United States. Joint Task Force Alpha (JTFA) is one facet of the U.S.
Government's response to this problem.
Initiated by DOJ and launched in partnership with DHS, JTFA is a
multiagency operation designed to identify, target, investigate, and
prosecute known TCOs engaged in human smuggling from Mexico and/or
through the Northern Triangle countries to the United States via the
Southwest Border. HSI is a primary partner of DOJ in this initiative.
The aim of JTFA is to proactively investigate and prosecute those who
are smuggling and trafficking individuals into the United States, with
a particular focus on individuals and networks who abuse, exploit, or
endanger those being smuggled; pose National security threats; or have
links to transnational organized crime. In addition to investigations
and prosecutions in the United States, JTFA seeks to work closely with
foreign partners to ensure a coordinated, international response to
illicit cross-border human smuggling.
Drawing upon a wide range of resources across the Government, JTFA
leverages and synchronizes the intelligence, interdiction,
investigative, and prosecutorial capabilities of HSI, CBP, and other
partners to maximize efforts to counter transnational human smuggling
networks that operate from and through Central America and Mexico to
the United States. By unifying efforts and capitalizing upon the
authorities, knowledge, and specialized skillsets and capabilities of
each partner agency, the JTFA is better positioned to more effectively
counter, mitigate, disrupt and ultimately dismantle the most
significant human smuggling TCOs operating along and facilitating
movement to the Southwest Border.
Enhancing effective prosecution of HSI human smuggling
investigations is a key component of JTFA's mission. Through fiscal
year 2020 and thus far in fiscal year 2021, HSI has initiated more than
3,800 new human smuggling investigations, 69 of which have been
designated as significant priority cases for HSI. DOJ has evaluated and
identified a subset of these cases for inclusion in the initial JTFA
efforts and will be the foundation of DOJ's prosecutorial focus.
As the primary law enforcement entities involved in JTFA, HSI, and
CBP field components review existing JTFA priority investigations and
threats. Additionally, HSI and CBP jointly develop targeting,
interdiction, investigative, and prosecutorial strategies for each new
JTFA investigation. Field components lean on their respective local
research and analytical components as much as possible to maximize
information sharing and coordination of investigative and enforcement
efforts.
HSI plays a critical role in the implementation of this initiative
alongside its U.S. and international partners. HSI coordinates
interdictions, investigations, and enforcement actions domestically and
internationally; conducts intelligence analysis and document and media
exploitation; facilitates deconfliction through established interagency
centers; and supports prosecution and training. HSI has committed to
doing this through assigning dedicated special agents and intelligence
analysts to the JTFA at the headquarters level, within multiple
domestic field offices, and within attache offices in Central America
and Mexico; by capitalizing on its strong foreign law enforcement
partnerships; by leveraging existing international programs such as its
TCIUs, BITMAP, and Operation Citadel; and by using its expert human and
technological analysis capabilities. The integration of HSI's
operations with the activities of DOJ, CBP, and other partner agencies
participating in JTFA facilitates increased cooperation and unity-of-
effort across all levels of Government, domestically and abroad, in the
fight to counter TCOs engaged in human smuggling, transnational gang
activity, and other forms of cross-border crime that jeopardize the
safety and security of the homeland.
conclusion
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today and
for your continued support of HSI and the critical investigative role
it plays in investigating the TCOs that facilitate and profit from
cross-border crimes. HSI remains committed to its mission to secure the
homeland from transnational crime and threats and to uphold the
National security and public safety of the United States.
Chairman Correa. Thank you, Mr. Condon. I thank our
witnesses for their testimony. I will remind the subcommittee
that we each will have 5 minutes to question the panel. I will
now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questions.
First, a question for both of you. The nature of these
multi-international TCOs has made it difficult to prosecute
these networks, but really it is crucial that those who violate
U.S. laws are brought to justice. It is even more important
that these individuals know that we are watching and there will
be a price to be paid should they violate our laws. What kind
of jurisdictional authority do each of your components have to
investigate and prosecute these TCOs that operate outside the
United States? Mr. Russo.
Mr. Russo. Mr. Chairman, we couldn't agree with you any
more. You know, that is where Operation Sentinel is a clear
focus because our efforts include the ability to work with our
foreign partners to freeze bank accounts. That is, you know,
getting right into their pockets making sure----
Chairman Correa. So, Mr. Russo, let me interrupt you. Do we
have the cooperation of our foreign partners----
Mr. Russo. We do, sir.
Chairman Correa [continuing]. To do so?
Mr. Russo. We do, sir.
Chairman Correa. Mexico?
Mr. Russo. Absolutely.
Chairman Correa. El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras?
Mr. Russo. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. We are there. We just
recently deployed staff, including intelligence analysts and
officers and agents to Guatemala. Our first deployment was in
June where we sent 16 employees down there to work with the
government of Guatemala to open up checkpoints, to conduct
inspections. We have conducted even in just the first month
while we have been down there, over 7,000 inspections of
individuals. We have identified 50 individuals that are
engaging in human smuggling. So, the efforts are there.
Chairman Correa. So, you have identified them. What next?
Mr. Russo. What is next is to turn them over--we have
turned them over to the government of Guatemala for
prosecution.
Chairman Correa. What about turning them over to the U.S.
Government for prosecution?
Mr. Russo. Well, I would imagine that those efforts, you
know, would have to continue in the future. But we are not
there yet.
Chairman Correa. The reason I say that, Mr. Russo, is that
I am of the belief that a foreign national who commits crimes
is more concerned about ending up in a U.S. jail than they
would in a jail in other parts of the world. I think it is a
bigger deterrent if you put them in our jails as it is in a
foreign jail.
Mr. Russo. We agree, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Correa. Mr. Condon, any thoughts?
Mr. Condon. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. I think for the HSI
perspective, we do get very good cooperation from our partners.
In fact, we do that primarily through our TCIU initiative where
we have vetted teams of law enforcement officials that we work
very cohesively with. Just yesterday, our team in El Salvador
arrested--or excuse me--in Honduras, arrested 32 Honduran
nationals for human smuggling violations.
Chairman Correa. Thirty-two hundred?
Mr. Condon. Thirty-two.
Chairman Correa. Thirty-two.
Mr. Condon. Thirty-two. That was the equivalent--and with
that operation what they are able to do with our TCIU is share
that information rapidly. When we do that, we can employ things
like our biometrics BITMAP program to share those biometrics
with CBP immediately and other partners to ensure that these
folks are fully identified. We also exploit there any kind of
data rapidly through our TCIUs there in close partnership with
our task force officers. We are able then to build our
investigations further from that standpoint. Without these
individuals being in the United States, we can start and push
that threat further out and then start our investigation.
Chairman Correa. Gentlemen, you mentioned a number in terms
of arrests. I think both of you said less than 100. So, my
question would be, is this enough to make a dent or is this a
drop in the bucket?
Mr. Russo. Well, Mr. Chairman, the operation that we
alluded to is Operation Sentinel and it just started in May.
So, you know, we believe that that operation as it unfolds and
as the phases of that operation continue we will have some
major successes.
Chairman Correa. Mr. Condon.
Mr. Condon. Yes, sir. Similarly, through the Joint Task
Force Alpha, through work with our partners such as CBP and
Department of Justice, we have identified at least 20 cases or
investigations to put under that umbrella for the large-scale
significant investigations that are being coordinated and
ideally, will be prosecuted here in the United States for the
most impact. That is being done through Joint Task Force Alpha.
Chairman Correa. I am out of time, but hopefully with a
incentive, my Members here will do another set of round of
questions. But my next question later on I will ask is, you
have got Operation Alpha and Sentinel. Clearly, we have had
other operations before. How are you coordinating or how is the
legacy of prior successes or lessons learned being incorporated
into Alpha and Sentinel? How are we essentially working across
what I would call silos?
Homeland Security is big. It was created 20 years ago to
coordinate across Government agencies. My concern is we are
still operating under silos and that we haven't quite gotten
there. So, in the next round I am going to ask for you to
address those questions. If I can, I will turn to our Ranking
Member, Mr. Meijer, for his 5 minutes of questions.
Mr. Meijer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree wholeheartedly
on seeking more strong criminal deterrents. Just briefly on
that question of silos. I think we saw with the--when the DEA
started to have that ability to engage in bringing back some of
the narco traffickers in the late 1980's and 1990's to the
United States a strong deterrent capability came in there.
Clearly, this is a human trafficking component is a multi-
billion--potentially a multi-billion dollar industry for a lot
of these same organizations that just, you know, when we think
about the scourge of drugs versus human smuggling and what that
does to the border, I think we have been approaching that
through two different lenses.
But shifting to my question directed specifically to Mr.
Condon. Sir, if you could provide just an overview briefly of
HSI's TCIU, the Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit, just
what it does, some of the challenges that are facing it today
in carrying out its mission.
Mr. Condon. Thank you, sir. So, the TCIU program is HSI's
partnership with our host nation partners where we bring along
law enforcement officials or Immigration and Customs officials
from each of these countries, especially the Northern Triangle.
We vet them. We utilize polygraphs. We have a very intense
training program that we bring them to to the United States in
Georgia where we present the training. We also incorporate
their prosecutors as part of this or identify prosecutors to go
through the similar sort of training and capacity building.
Through that, we also have them--we work with the State
department in their host nation to have them in a separate sort
of facility, oftentimes, away from their typical police
headquarters. They focus largely speaking on these crimes.
Basically, we build their capacity. We help them to be able to
investigate and interdict and prosecute these types of crimes
in their home countries. But also, just as importantly, to
share information with us appropriately to pass information and
leads back and support our domestic cases is part of the goal
to prosecute and dismantle these organizations largely here in
the United States.
Mr. Meijer. Thank you. So, focusing on that training,
having some segregation of office locations so that it is kind-
of clear there is a separate mission for them within their host
nation country. But so I am clear, you are not authorized to
pay them directly.
Mr. Condon. No, sir. Also, the only thing we--DOJ entities
are allowed to pay salary stipends, however, DHS does lack
that. So, there are times where we do lose our officers because
these officers are obviously very--the pay for these officers
by their home countries is very, very low. So, oftentimes,
other USG agencies are able to provide some salary stipends.
So, one of the things that does hamper us slightly there is
the--or not slightly, but does hamper us is the inability to
kind-of mirror that.
Mr. Meijer. Then, obviously, and I think it is smart to
have that segregation of that office, but still I could only
imagine that transnational criminal organizations in a Northern
Triangle country are able to exert tremendous influence
potentially within the government by, obviously, offering
financial renumeration otherwise. So, is that a concern on that
oversight of that potential for some of the individuals you are
partnering with to, obviously, be under a kind-of clear threat,
but also, get----
Mr. Condon. Yes,----
Mr. Meijer [continuing]. Taken off the mission?
Mr. Condon [continuing]. Very much so. Yes, very much so.
We try to in addition to the financial inducements, you know,
up their professional standards, you know, the mission focus
and, you know, so much what we, you know, as best we can here
in the United States, but definitely the financial inducements
it is a clear challenge.
Mr. Meijer. Then just shifting real quick. Last week,
actually in this same hearing room, we had an Intelligence and
Counterterrorism Subcommittee hearing about the use of
cryptocurrency by TCOs in Central America, but also otherwise.
Are you seeing any--this could go to either of you--are you
seeing any challenges in terms of, you know, you mentioned
Operation Sentinel to debar businesses from Federal contracts,
to work with those insurance agencies, any challenges of
transnational criminal organizations that you have been seeing
doing an end-run around some of our financial, you know, money
laundering or in other operations on the financial side by
using cryptocurrency as an end-run?
Mr. Condon. For the Northern Triangle, and we just
confirmed with our offices there, we have not seen that to any
great lengths in the Northern Triangle. We are seeing that
further down range, if you will, in Colombia and other areas.
But, yes, in the Northern Triangle, no. However, we are taking
steps to get ahead of that. We are incorporating training for
our TCIUs. We are also--we have also funded a very small--it is
in the nascent stages of small sort-of cyber centers. One in
Panama, one in Guatemala to help sort-of build capacity there
in the cyber realm for these TCIUs and our host nation partners
to try to at least get somewhat ahead of this curve when it
does hit. It is only matter of time. Right now, not so
prevalent in Latin America--excuse me--Central America.
Mr. Meijer. Thank you. You know, again, you know, strong
partners here and looking to shore up any ways we can of
finding ways in which our current approach is not as strong.
So, potentially it could be. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield
back.
Chairman Correa. Thank you very much, Mr. Meijer. Now, I
call Ms. Titus for 5 minutes of questions. Ma'am?
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our
witnesses. I will just start with a question to Mr. Russo. You
know that TCOs are diversifying their revenue sources. You know
it better than anybody. One of the things they are doing is
turning to resource extraction and wildlife trafficking. These
illegal actions not only harm our wildlife species and our
environment, but they have also led to an increase in violence
as environmental conservationists who attempt to stop poachers
have been attacked and killed in some instances.
The last Congress I had a bill that passed. It was called
the Rescuing Animals with Rewards Act. It made wildlife
trafficking part of the State Department's whistleblower
program. It goes a long way toward combating trafficking. I am
glad that we have it. But we need to stop this method of
illicit funding and financing when criminals try to bring these
animals across our borders. I just wonder what you are doing to
disrupt this kind of supply chain, as it were, and how you can
try to help protect our wildlife and also our environment and
the people who are engaged in protecting those two things
themselves?
Mr. Russo. Thank you, Congresswoman. We work very well with
Fish and Wildlife at the ports of entry to really look at that
specific threat. When we encounter any of these animals that
come across, we are quick to turn to Fish and Wildlife to
investigate all of these threats and working with HSI as well.
The threats, as you say, they come far and wide and they all
lead back to these transnational organized crime syndicates.
Our job is really to take each single one of these cases and
work it from cradle to grave. So, that is what we are doing.
Ms. Titus. Well, thank you. I appreciate hearing that. I
would ask to both of you, you know, so often the people who
migrate here come up through Central America and Mexico are
really victims of the lawless and violent activities of these
organizations. I know you work with community-based
organizations that have some direct experience dealing with
these victims. But I wonder if you engage at all with migrants
themselves, especially women to find out how you can better
understand their experiences and how you can collaborate with
local NGO's or civic organizations to try to deal with the
problem and help these victims maybe even before they get on
the road.
Mr. Russo. So, Congresswoman, we obviously encounter and
engage with all of these poor migrants coming across and we
understand the struggles that they face. We do interview them
and we talk to them at length to understand what it is that
they are dealing with, but also to understand how it is that
these TCOs are operating. We think that by engaging with them
and talking to them more and more we can help them more and
help dismantle these TCOs. The migrants are taken care of by
us. We have medical contractors that we have employed
throughout the facilities on the Southwest Border, including
trauma care for them as well. So, that is part of our efforts
going forward.
Ms. Titus. Thank you. Mr. Condon, you want to add to that?
Mr. Condon. Similar to what Mr. Russo said. Obviously, Mr.
Russo encounters more of these folks in the border and what we
do is--if we were similarly to find--encounter these folks in
the interior, we would follow the same in post-arrest
interviews and ensure that their care and safety was adequately
taken care of and work with our local State health officials
and police officials to ensure, you know, all their needs were
met should they be victims of violence or coercion and, you
know, forced labor and things like that nature.
Ms. Titus. I would think that would be important for human
trafficking as well. It is kind-of like neighborhood policing
if you feel comfortable talking to law enforcement, you are
much more likely to give them some information that could be
helpful to keep the whole neighborhood safe. I would think that
these migrants if they feel like they can trust you, they would
be able to give you some pretty good information you could use
to help address the problem.
Mr. Russo. That is correct, Congresswoman. You know, when
these individuals, you know, understand that they have been
taken advantage of, they are happy to talk to us.
Ms. Titus. Right.
Chairman Correa. Thank you, Ms. Titus.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, and I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Correa. Thank you. Thank you very much. I call on
Mr. Bishop for 5 minutes of questions, sir.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, you have
a way of putting things sometimes. I have noticed that a number
of occasions. You asked a question a moment ago of the
witnesses about whether the efforts to interdict or counter the
cartels are a drop in the bucket. Mr. Russo, I was struck. I
hadn't had a chance to read your statement beforehand. I was
struck by what you said about the cartel--I have always
wondered and I have heard about the cartels earning tremendous
revenues from the flow of migrants across the border. So, I
looked at your--I pulled the statement and I just want to--it
bears emphasis. So, what is in your statement is, it is
estimated that cartels profit anywhere between $200 million and
$2.3 billion alone for smuggling migrants from the Northern
Triangle to the Southwestern Border. You cited a Rand
Corporation source, I believe, from 2019. I don't know whether
this--this is quite a big range. I would assume that that
revenue is in proportion to the flow, right? So, the more
people that come, the more the cartels earn, right?
Mr. Russo. Congressman, that would make sense. But there
are a lot of factors that go into those numbers. That is----
Mr. Bishop. I am sure.
Mr. Russo. That is why the range is so wide.
Mr. Bishop. Yes.
Mr. Russo. It really depends.
Mr. Bishop. I was just asking really for that point. I
mean, it is a point of obvious agreement. I think it does make
a tremendous amount of sense. You have men and women who are
undertaking risks to their lives and working hard to interdict
and counter these cartels. Homeland Security Investigations has
people who are taking risks to their lives and you made
reference to other people who might cooperate with you being at
risk. The American taxpayers carry a tremendous amount of
expense for those efforts. But to the point about whether it is
a drop in the bucket, if the flow is large enough, those
efforts kind of get washed out, don't they? Mr. Russo.
Mr. Russo. I wouldn't necessarily agree, Congressman. To
us, every single one of these cases can help us dismantle a
network. As we work these cases and especially now as we are
working to look at the logistics and the finances behind these
groups, every single encounter that we make is an encounter
that can help us bring down these networks. So, you know,
obviously it can seem like a drop in the bucket right now, but
as we continue to work together and as we continue to look at
the networks behind these smuggling and TCOs, I think we are
going to make--we are going to make quite a difference.
Mr. Bishop. Well, I appreciate your spirit and the can-do
attitude that you bring to it. But I ask you, sir, and I don't
say this because I want to demoralize the efforts that you and
your men and women bring to this task, either of you in your
departments, but I think it bears emphasis. Because policy
makers up here need to hear if policy is being set in
Washington to facilitate huge flows, unprecedented in the last
21 years, flows across the border, does that not demoralize the
men and women that pursue your responsibilities? Mr. Russo.
Mr. Russo. I think the men and women of CBP, and I am sure
I speak for HSI and ICE as well, we are dedicated to doing our
job. You know, it doesn't matter the volume of the threat for
us. It is about doing our job and doing it to the best of our
ability.
Mr. Bishop. So, if the coyotes are across the Rio Grande as
they are paid $6,000 a pop for migrants coming across and they
are ridiculing and cursing and jeering the CBP borders on our
side, you don't think that has an impact on their morale?
Mr. Russo. It could have an impact, Congressman. But, you
know, our job remains the same. Our job is to protect the
borders and to protect this country.
Mr. Bishop. Well, I admire you. I particularly admire those
line officers and the investigators that you have, sir, Mr.
Condon, for the way they persist in the face of misguided
policy. I wonder if you have--and so I have got about maybe a
chance to ask one more question. I have so many to ask. But I
understood along the way that it was anticipated the Biden
administration has been saying that this massive surge we are
seeing across the border was going to peter out. It was
seasonal. It happens every spring and it was going to stop,
hasn't stopped. Mr. Condon or Mr. Russo, do you have any
insight as to why that prediction has turned out not to be
correct?
Mr. Condon. I will defer to Mr. Russo on the migrant
influence for the specific numbers being encountered.
Mr. Russo. The numbers have not gone down. I mean, I am
sure you have seen the numbers, Congressman. You know, we
encountered 188,000 individuals in June. Migration flows, you
know, what we have seen over the last 40, 50 years, they really
do ebb and flow. So, you know, with COVID, with natural
disasters, those are all push factors that lead to some of
these migration issues.
Mr. Bishop. God bless the law enforcement folks that work
for the United States of America on behalf and through--under
your charge. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Russo. Thank you, Congressman.
Chairman Correa. Thank you very much, Mr. Bishop. Before I
move to our next, Mrs. Harshbarger. I just want to say that you
bring up some good issues, which is a drop in the bucket,
migration flows, patterns, and deterrents. I am hoping we can
have a few more hearings on these issues because one of the
things that I have heard over and over again, big push factor
is the economy. I mean, over the last few years, Chinese
imports of textiles have devastated not only the Carolinas in
our country, but they have decimated the economies in Central
America. Now with COVID-19, you have these push factors that
continue to push folks.
Mr. Bishop, I will tell you, I went to El Paso, but I also
went to Tijuana. In El Paso, you have a situation of the
migrant children. In Tijuana, you have under Section 42 of the
Health Code, deportations of families. I went in to interview a
lot of those families there in the Tijuana or the Mexican side
of the border. It was interesting because they weren't talking
6,000, they were talking 10,000 per family per smuggling
attempt. A lot of those families----
Mr. Bishop. Inflation, Mr. Chairman. It is inflation.
Chairman Correa. Good God, that is hyperinflation, sir.
Their comment was, I sold everything I had back home to make
the trip. What they were doing on the Mexican side of the
border with help of NGO's, I would say, trying to figure out
how to get back home and try to figure out what they were going
to go back to do. Because they had bet everything and had lost.
So, a lot of these issues are important because as we talk
about U.S. aid to Central America, what it is going to, what it
is supposed to do, versus the dynamics. Some people would say
the border. I would say the dynamics of the American continent
as they continue to unfold. We have got to anticipate what is
going on.
Right now, it is shocking to see how much money is being
made off of smuggling. It almost seems like it is competing
with illegal drugs in terms of profit centers. So, to
anticipate where do they go next? What is the next profit
center? Where is this money being invested? How do we create a
deterrent? It is very interesting issues for policy makers.
Policies that have to be made based on the facts that you are
presenting to us don't want to operate up here, pontificate
based on philosophy or perspective, but rather let the facts
drive the solution.
That is what I would like to do is continue to work with
you and try to figure out this whole thing that, you know, I
will be honest with all of us. If we are honest, we only look
at south of the border when we see smoke. We only act when we
see fire. This thing has been going on for 50 years. As long as
we don't see it, as long as it stays invisible, you know what,
it is not there. Now it is there.
We have got to focus on this for the next couple of decades
to figure it out. It is not going to be one easy solution, but
a number of solutions designed to implement a public policy
designed to stabilize. I say that stabilize this continent that
right now isn't looking good from a--you know, Mexico just had
the great elections. Great elections. Hundred political
candidates were assassinated. Where did you hear that? Did you
read that anywhere? We have got challenges. I am hoping, you
know, my quick commercial here is we have got a lot of work to
do in this committee and I am hoping to work with our
witnesses. So, thank you very much for bringing up those
comments.
Now, I will turn to Mrs. Harshbarger, for her 5 minutes of
comments. Thank you.
Ms. Harshbarger. Thank you, Chairman Correa, and thank you
to the witnesses today. We all know this is a huge problem and,
you know, I guess one of the concerns that I have is that in a
lot of rural areas, especially in Guatemala, there has been
chaos because of the pandemic, but it strengthened the narco
trafficking in those areas. As a pharmacist, you know, we see
that drugs are coming in unimpeded and the process going way
down. So, when you talk to these law enforcement agents, they
are just--it is unbelievably hard to counter some of the things
that are happening. But if you live in Guatemala, for God
sakes, even the local governments and the people there, you
know, sometimes they become beholden to these people because
they have no other choice. You know, that just tears the
society apart. No wonder they want to migrate to this country.
Now, I have learned that these Guatemalan authorities are
allowing some of these people that live there the property
rights to be violated by taking their land, some of these narco
traffickers. I just wondered what do you think we can do about
that? How can we stabilize that government to keep them from
wanting to come over and, you know, it is a bad situation. It
is not those people's faults, but we have to step in and say,
if we help you, what is it we can do to make things more
efficient and to make that government responsible and
accountable for what they do?
Mr. Russo. Congresswoman, we agree with you. From a CBP
perspective, the deployment of our agents and officers and
intel analysts to Guatemala is a step in the right direction.
It is our ability to mentor, train the Guatemalan government
officials. We work with their mobile targeting interdiction
unit to help them understand about anti-corruption so that they
can better, you know, conduct operations in Guatemala. So, that
is what we are trying to do while we are there.
Ms. Harshbarger. Yes. You know, we were at the border with
the Ranking Member down--well, it was in April. HSI said, all
we want to do is we want to be able to--we don't need more
laws, we just want to be able to use the ones we have on the
books already. I guess my question is, what is it that--how are
their hands being tied to where they can't combat what is going
over? We found out some of the modalities they use to get these
people to come in and shuffle these drugs through social media,
with TikTok, and some of these other things. I mean, it is a
travesty that we are not doing something about that. But on
your end, what do you see that you are not able to do that you
should be doing and you should have the authority to do, sirs?
Mr. Condon. From the HSI perspective, social media and
maybe misinformation on social media is a challenge. It is
something that I think many agencies are dealing with and we
are kind-of coping with that and developing strategies. But
also similar to what Mr. Russo is doing, we work hand-in-hand
with CBP and Central America to eliminate or mitigate much of
that corrupt focus and to work with our vetted teams to try to,
again, build that professionalization in order to, again, to
keep those threats from coming to the United States. The more
and more we do that, the less strain you are going to have on
the U.S. law enforcement and its related organizations. That is
the main focus for us. But the challenge for the social media
and those types of things is a small drop in the bucket, but we
are beginning to help train our TCIUs and others on how to
combat that social misinformation, how to work more closely in
the cyber realm. But it is, again, in the nascent stages. So,
that would be--that is kind-of the main drivers at least on the
international side to try to push and to try to work and
mitigate that further down range before it gets here to the
United States.
Ms. Harshbarger. Well, you know, in my opinion and many of
my colleagues on both sides of the aisle, you know, these
cartels are the biggest criminal threat to our Nation, period.
We have to do more to subdue them and, you know, closing the
border would be a perfect example. Making sure that when we do
deliver aid, money, whatever it is to these triangle countries,
that we hold them accountable and we have some kind of outcome
system set in place so we know that when we give that in good
faith that they are going to fight and help those people and
make them want to stay there. That is the bottom line.
Thank you so much, gentlemen. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Correa. Thank you, Mrs. Harshbarger. Now, without
objection, I would like to go on to a second set of questions,
if I can. Gentlemen, I am going to follow up where I left off,
which was you are doing the job of finding a needle in a
haystack. You have got some great organizations, a lot of work,
Project Alpha, Project Sentinel. You have incorporated probably
a lot of the work you have done in the past through other
agencies. Do you feel you are doing enough to coordinate the
resources of Department of Homeland Security so that you can be
successful?
Mr. Russo. Mr. Chairman, you spoke of silos and I have been
in this agency for the better part of 25 years, and I can tell
you that we have come a long way. I speak for ICE as well when
I say this because we work hand-in-hand. We have over 260
employees who are assigned to task force offices across the
Nation. They work with the HIDTAs, the High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Areas. They work with HSI, with the DEA, with the
FBI, and all the State and local partners. Those relationships
have never been stronger than they are today.
We are breaking down those silos. Really, when you look at
Operation Sentinel, it is a perfect example of that because we
are not doing this alone. We are working with all of our
partners to build these cases and I just think that we are in a
much better place today than we ever were.
Chairman Correa. Mr. Condon.
Mr. Condon. Similarly, I would agree with Mr. Russo as
well. We, again, cradle to grave--cradle, the beginning to the
end, just about everything we do is in conjunction with CBP. In
this day and age of data analytics, it just it makes sense and
there is no reason not to.
Further, one of the best tools we bring is our border
enforcement security task forces. That is recognizing that, you
know, these border issues they go into the interior, they
affect a lot of communities and there is a lot of shared
interest. There is the violence that is spawned from some of
these things. The smuggling events that create disruptions.
Opioids that come in through, you know, Asia or through China
or through Mexico at the express consignment hubs. We have
initiated border and security task forces in Memphis, northern
Kentucky in Louisville to try to combat that and bring our
State and local partners, even into that realm of the opioid
issues and try to show them and help break down those barriers
when they have intelligence, to share that directly on the
impact of where these illicit things are coming into. Further,
the border enforcement security task forces, there are 80 of
them around the country, including seaports and airports and
try to bring that similar subset in so you have everybody in
the room. That includes State, local, Tribal----
Chairman Correa. Mr. Condon, let me interrupt you. I only
got a couple of minutes here. Fusion centers, we have one in
Orange County. I work very closely with my local sheriff. He is
always complaining to us that, you know, he is kind-of the
stepchild when it comes to resources. When it comes to
coordinating, he complains that the Fed, Federal agencies, it
is a one-way street when it comes to sharing information.
I say that to you because I think of the border as one
piece of a bigger puzzle. We cannot overlook the fact that for
smuggling, for drugs, for these other elements to be
successful, there has to be a connection in the United States.
That means good intel from people working in the community,
good intel from folks that are seeing who the drug dealer is.
Good intel from seeing where things begin to unfold in the
United States side. Would you say that we are working enough
with these local folks, fusion centers? Fusion centers, as you
know, are where the sheriff, the police officer, the FBI agent,
some of the others, get together, you know, 30 people to try to
figure this out at the street level. It is a question for both
of you.
Mr. Condon. I would say, while always there is work to be
done, I would say it is better than ever. I know HSI puts a
premium on being responsive to State and local officials. It is
really not tolerated. It is not part of our ethos to be--to not
work with them and not respond out to their calls and not to
share, more importantly, because that is the only way this
works when you share that information. It is not just to get
Federal prosecutions, right? Oftentimes, it is best to get a
State prosecution. Oftentimes, there is the crime, the
localized violence that really is impactful to human beings,
right, that the State and local officials are very well-
equipped to handle. The smaller scale has more impact. So, we
definitely put a premium on that. We want to make sure that
that doesn't happen so we do focus on that greatly.
Chairman Correa. Mr. Russo.
Mr. Russo. Mr. Chairman, when it comes to these cases, we
are prosecution-agnostic. All we care about is stopping the
threat. We will work with anyone. We do work with everyone. We
have countless cases of helping State and locals. I can speak
to New York because, you know, that is where I most recently
worked. The work we did to dismantle MS-13 gangs in New York is
just one example of how we work with them.
Chairman Correa. Thank you very much. I am out of time so,
I will turn to our Ranking Member Mr. Meijer, for 5 minutes of
questions.
Mr. Meijer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate this
second round. You know, I was with Mrs. Harshbarger and our
Ranking Member down at the border in April. You know, it was--
it was enlightening to kind-of to see the reality and that
consequence, but also understanding that that flow of
individuals is not just--well, it is largely a product on the
demand side of those push and pull factors. But on that
facilitation side, that there is a very long tail there.
I guess, my first question to Mr. Russo, in the past
several months, has there been, you know, I know there are
dozens of nationalities represented among those who are seeking
to cross the border. We have a very strong, you know,
significant majority that are coming from Northern Triangle
countries, but also others from Central America, South America,
and even farther afield. Have we seen any shifts in those
nationalities over the past several months?
Mr. Russo. Not really. In looking at the numbers, it is
pretty much the same as it has been. When you look at the
188,000 encounters that we had last month, there is also a
percentage of individuals that are coming across multiple
times. So, there is that percentage as well. But in terms of
the diversity of it, it pretty much is the same, the majority
being from Mexico.
Mr. Meijer. Then just from the portion that are not from
Latin America originally, I know there are some individuals who
seek to cross our border who will fly into airports in the
region from Africa or from parts of Asia. Then kind-of seek
that land route to circumvent a lot of our passport security
checks. I am aware of some of those other activities on that
interdiction side. But I guess the broader question, when do
those individuals interact with a human trafficking smuggling
network? Is that communication something that takes place when
they are in Latin America or is there a communication prior, to
your awareness? Maybe Mr. Condon.
Mr. Russo. It depends. It depends and I will turn to
Assistant Director Condon for a greater answer. But I will tell
you that even in Guatemala recently, we encountered 12
Uzbekistan nationals in this latest operation that we ran. So,
it is happening for sure. But in terms of where they are coming
from or where they are encountered, John?
Mr. Meijer. I guess not just where encountered, but just at
what point do you assess that they start to get within the
protection or the assistance of a TCO?
Mr. Condon. So, depending on where and in what part of the
region it is encountered, sometimes the human smuggling
organizations have to interact with two to three cartels or
TCOs, right? Who is control of each, you know, territory, if
you will. Oftentimes, it is just to diversify their portfolios.
TCOs that wouldn't ordinarily be involved in human smuggling
now they have taken that on as sort-of a, you know, to expand
their business and diversify, right? So, not to evade the
question, per se, but it kind of depends on at what point at
each process and how much communication they have had. But it
is very connected. A lot of times it is the human smuggling
organizations that start and initiate that before moving up to
different parts in the region.
Mr. Meijer. I have exhausted the majority of my questions.
But just, Mr. Chairman, I really appreciate this hearing and I
appreciate our witnesses. I think it is essential that we don't
try to--we don't wait until we shift to the next thing, right?
It was drug trafficking, then it became trafficking of
individuals. I don't know to what degree, you know, some of our
kind-of laws or loosening of regulations in the United States
have maybe shifted the demand structure a little bit on their
revenue streams. But, you know, those illicit entities, those
organizations, the transnational criminal organizations they
are making money hand over foot and by the way, those 200
million to 1.2 billion, just to be clear that is profit. Not
revenue, but profit.
Chairman Correa. I can only imagine----
Mr. Condon. Correct.
Chairman Correa [continuing]. Where that money came from.
Mr. Meijer. It is profit. Yes, not revenue, profit. I mean,
that, I mean, you take net present value of a company like
that, you know, you can list it on NASDAQ.
Chairman Correa. Mr. Meijer, I can only imagine, I mean,
that is a lot of assets to be sold somewhere to generate that
kind of--the massive transfer of wealth that is going on from
the very poor to the criminal organizations is unbelievable.
What is that long-term consequence socially in those Central
American countries? Good questions. Thank you very much, sir,
and I am going to turn to----
Mr. Meijer. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Correa [continuing]. Mr. Bishop for 5 minutes of
questions if you so desire.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have got a couple
more. So, and I was thinking about what you just said. I was
thinking about Ms. Titus' questions earlier. I guess $2.3
billion of profits have probably paid to set up some other
operations like resource extraction and the wildlife
trafficking. It all is, I mean, that is how businesses are
built and this is in a weird sort of way, it is a business. I
don't want to be its logistics arm, which is what I think we
have become.
Let me ask this. I saw an article and I am not sure of what
it was quoting from, but it just came out that 50,000 migrants
have been released in the United States without a court date.
So, at some point in time, there was a change in process since
the inauguration this year to not put a court date anymore
because they don't show up at court dates. But I guess you get
numbers you can't give but so many out. So, they stopped doing
that, but they are required to report--migrants are required to
report to their local ICE office within 60 days. I read that 13
percent have so far shown up. So, that is 6,700 have showed up,
16,000 have not and are past the 60-day window to report. That
leaves many others, obviously, who are not past the 90 days--or
60 days, but is that--and I don't know who would know more
about that. Mr. Condon, perhaps I will address the question to
you and you can pass it if you wish. But does that sound
accurate and is that a surprise?
Mr. Condon. Sir, I just--only because I come from the
investigations branch----
Mr. Bishop. Yes.
Mr. Condon [continuing]. That is not my bailiwick or area
of expertise. But I definitely would like the chance to get
back with you on that question, if I could.
Mr. Bishop. Yes, Mr. Russo, do you know the answer?
Mr. Russo. Yes, Congressman, I am sorry. We do not have
those numbers or I don't have those numbers in front of me.
Mr. Bishop. Yes.
Mr. Russo. I am happy to take that back.
Mr. Bishop. You said, Mr. Russo, in answering a question a
moment ago, that out of the 188,000 encountered in June, some
of those came in multiple times. I don't know how to ask the
question. If it was somebody visiting a website, they call them
unique visitors. But how many unique border crossers then among
that 188,000?
Mr. Russo. From what I recall, it was about 104,000 of the
188,000.
Mr. Bishop. OK. Of those 104,000, how many of those 104,000
actually stayed in the United States?
Mr. Russo. I don't recall the number but, you know, a large
percentage of those were returned under Title 42.
Mr. Bishop. Mm-hmm. You don't have an estimate for the
number that remained?
Mr. Russo. I don't have the number, but it is a high--I
remember it is a high percent.
Mr. Bishop. I know you don't have the number. Do you have
an estimate of the number?
Mr. Russo. I would say about 80, 85 percent.
Mr. Bishop. Go back so, OK.
Mr. Russo. Yes.
Mr. Bishop. So, 20 percent, 20, 25 percent stay.
Mr. Russo. Mm-hmm.
Mr. Bishop. Twenty, 25,000 people, roughly.
Mr. Russo. Correct.
Mr. Bishop. Once these individuals--how are the people who
stay, how are they transported elsewhere within the United
States?
Mr. Russo. So, we coordinate with HHS and with ICE to
determine transportation, so.
Mr. Bishop. Maybe I will ask Mr. Condon. How are they
transported within the United States?
Mr. Condon. From----
Mr. Bishop. The folks who remain, 20-, 25,000 last month
they remained. Where did they go?
Mr. Condon. Again, I would have to defer to our co-branch
of ERO just to get those facts and figures for you, if I could.
Mr. Bishop. You do not know?
Mr. Condon. No.
Mr. Bishop. You do not know in general?
Mr. Condon. As far as how they get transported from?
Mr. Bishop. Yes.
Mr. Condon. No, I do not as far as that process goes.
Mr. Bishop. OK. I saw a recent article that a law
enforcement source within CBP says that ICE Office of
Enforcement and Removal Operations will start issuing cell
phones with tracking apps in lieu of using ankle monitoring
bracelets for whoever that has been appropriate for to date. Is
there any truth to that report, Mr. Condon?
Mr. Condon. Sir, I am unaware of that. But, again, I will
have to get back with you on that one and check with our ERO
counterparts on that, if I could, please.
Mr. Bishop. OK.
Chairman Correa. Get back to both of us. I am very
interested in that information as well.
Mr. Bishop. Are ICE officers still consistently issuing
Notices to Appear?
Mr. Condon. Similarly, again, I would have to check and get
back to you on that with our ERO counterparts for that one.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Bishop. I think I will stop there, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you.
Chairman Correa. A lot of work to do. A lot of questions. I
want to thank the witnesses for being here today. We will
continue to call on you to help us with some of the facts and
try to get a better grasp of the challenge ahead of us and how
to best come up with the best public policy to effectively
address the challenges. I want to thank you for being here
today, for your time. I want to remind the Members that if they
have any additional questions for the witnesses, to submit them
to the witnesses. I ask the witnesses to respond as quickly as
possible. The Chair reminds the Members that the committee
record will remain open for 10 business days. Without
objection, the committee stands adjourned. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 3:05 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Chairman J. Luis Correa for Francis J. Russo
Question 1a. The multi-national nature of transnational criminal
organizations has made it difficult for the United States Government to
prosecute those who violate U.S. laws. However, doing so is crucial to
preventing future lawlessness.
What role do Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and
Customs Enforcement play in efforts to extradite foreign citizens to
the United States for breaking American laws overseas?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1b. What authorities are available to your agencies and
what impediments do they face?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. Both Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and
Customs Enforcement work with foreign partners in Central America and
Mexico to investigate and prosecute transnational criminal
organizations operating in those countries; however, issues like
systemic government corruption or distrust may undermine these efforts.
Please describe the varying levels of cooperation your agencies
receive from Central American nations and Mexico in efforts to codify
the principals of the rule of law: ensuring all persons, institutions,
and entities are held equally accountable to laws that are publicly
promulgated, independently adjudicated, and consistent with
international human rights principles.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3a. The tactics that transnational criminal organizations
(TCOs) utilize are always evolving, and their involvement in the
smuggling of migrants across the U.S. border varies based on location
and which criminal organization is involved.
Please describe how TCOs are currently enabling migrant trafficking
from Central America?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3b. What are the typical amounts charged and services
provided?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3c. How have the models changed and adapted over time?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3d. What differences are there across the region, if any?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Hon. Dan Bishop for Francis J. Russo
Question 1a. There was an article saying 50,000 migrants released
in the United States without a court date--what policy was changed or
altered to allow this?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1b. Is it accurate to say 13 percent of released
immigrants have showed up to the ICE office as reported, 6,700 showed
up, 16,000 haven't and have passed the 60-day window to show up? Do you
have an estimate of how many released immigrants?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. Of the 104,000 border crossers that returned multiple
times (out of the 188,000 total), how many actually stayed in the
United States? What is the number and percentage of how many stayed and
how many were returned under Title 42?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. How are the individuals who stay in the United States
transported elsewhere within the United States from holding facilities?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. There was an article saying that cell phones will start
being issued instead of ankle monitors moving forward--will this be the
policy and what is the justification for this?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5. Are ICE officers still consistently issuing Notices to
Appear?*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Scoop: 50,000 migrants released; few report to ICE: https://
www.axios.com/migrant-release-no-court-date-ice-dhs-immigration-
33d258ea-2419-418d-abe8-2a8b60e3c070.html.
Exclusive: ICE will issue cell phones to released migrants: https:/
/www.breitbart.com/border/2021/07/15/exclusive-ice-will-issue-cell-
phones-to-released-migrants/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Hon. Diana Harshbarger for Francis J. Russo
Question 1. I appreciated the witness' responses to my questions
regarding TCOs creating chaos and instability along narco-trafficking
routes in the Northern Triangle countries. These situations also erode
the conditions necessary for legitimate businesses to create economic
opportunities necessary to counter migration. Could you please provide
further response regarding what more the United States can do--directly
or in conjunction with our international partners--to address the
problem of Guatemalan authorities failing to uphold property rights
against land invasions that occur with increasing frequency--sometimes
with the support of narco-traffickers that seek to illegal land on
occupied land?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. Additionally, Mr. Condon noted that ICE is focusing on
training and working with vetted partners in host countries to address
such threats further down range, before they get to the United States.
Could you please provide the committee with greater detail as to the
different ways the threats posed by such activity manifest themselves
at our border? Could you also identify specifically which TCO's are
engaged in activity that poses these threats and the countries in which
those TCOs are engaged in this activity?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Chairman J. Luis Correa for John A. Condon
Question 1a. The multi-national nature of transnational criminal
organizations has made it difficult for the United States Government to
prosecute those who violate U.S. laws. However, doing so is crucial to
preventing future lawlessness.
What role do Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and
Customs Enforcement play in efforts to extradite foreign citizens to
the United States for breaking American laws overseas?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1b. What authorities are available to your agencies and
what impediments do they face?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. Both Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and
Customs Enforcement work with foreign partners in Central America and
Mexico to investigate and prosecute transnational criminal
organizations operating in those countries; however, issues like
systemic government corruption or distrust may undermine these efforts.
Please describe the varying levels of cooperation your agencies
receive from Central American nations and Mexico in efforts to codify
the principals of the rule of law: Ensuring all persons, institutions,
and entities are held equally accountable to laws that are publicly
promulgated, independently adjudicated, and consistent with
international human rights principles.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3a. The tactics that transnational criminal organizations
(TCOs) utilize are always evolving, and their involvement in the
smuggling of migrants across the U.S. border varies based on location
and which criminal organization is involved.
Please describe how TCOs are currently enabling migrant trafficking
from Central America?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3b. What are the typical amounts charged and services
provided?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3c. How have the models changed and adapted over time?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3d. What differences are there across the region, if any?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Hon. Dan Bishop for John A. Condon
Question 1a. There was an article saying 50,000 migrants released
in the United States without a court date--what policy was changed or
altered to allow this?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1b. Is it accurate to say 13 percent of released
immigrants have showed up to the ICE office as reported, 6,700 showed
up, 16,000 haven't and have passed the 60-day window to show up? Do you
have an estimate of how many released immigrants?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. Of the 104,000 border crossers that returned multiple
times (out of the 188,000 total), how many actually stayed in the
United States? What is the number and percentage of how many stayed and
how many were returned under Title 42?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. How are the individuals who stay in the United States
transported elsewhere within the United States from holding facilities?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. There was an article saying that cell phones will start
being issued instead of ankle monitors moving forward--will this be the
policy and what is the justification for this?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5. Are ICE officers still consistently issuing Notices to
Appear?*
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* Scoop: 50,000 migrants released; few report to ICE: https://
www.axios.com/migrant-release-no-court-date-ice-dhs-immigration-
33d258ea-2419-418d-abe8-2a8b60e3c070.html.
Exclusive: ICE will issue cell phones to released migrants: https:/
/www.breitbart.com/border/2021/07/15/exclusive-ice-will-issue-cell-
phones-to-released-migrants/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Hon. Diana Harshbarger for John A. Condon
Question 1. I appreciated the witness' responses to my questions
regarding TCOs creating chaos and instability along narco-trafficking
routes in the Northern Triangle countries. These situations also erode
the conditions necessary for legitimate businesses to create economic
opportunities necessary to counter migration. Could you please provide
further response regarding what more the United States can do--directly
or in conjunction with our international partners--to address the
problem of Guatemalan authorities failing to uphold property rights
against land invasions that occur with increasing frequency--sometimes
with the support of narco-traffickers that seek to illegal land on
occupied land?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. Additionally, Mr. Condon noted that ICE is focusing on
training and working with vetted partners in host countries to address
such threats further down range, before they get to the United States.
Could you please provide the committee with greater detail as to the
different ways the threats posed by such activity manifest themselves
at our border? Could you also identify specifically which TCO's are
engaged in activity that poses these threats and the countries in which
those TCOs are engaged in this activity?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
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