[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ASSESSING THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY'S EFFORTS TO COUNTER UNMANNED
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT, MANAGEMENT,
AND ACCOUNTABILITY
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 31, 2022
__________
Serial No. 117-49
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov/
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
47-767 PDF WASHINGTON : 2022
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas John Katko, New York
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey Clay Higgins, Louisiana
J. Luis Correa, California Michael Guest, Mississippi
Elissa Slotkin, Michigan Dan Bishop, North Carolina
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey
Al Green, Texas Ralph Norman, South Carolina
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Mariannette Miller-Meeks, Iowa
Eric Swalwell, California Diana Harshbarger, Tennessee
Dina Titus, Nevada Andrew S. Clyde, Georgia
Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida
Kathleen M. Rice, New York Jake LaTurner, Kansas
Val Butler Demings, Florida Peter Meijer, Michigan
Nanette Diaz Barragan, California Kat Cammack, Florida
Josh Gottheimer, New Jersey August Pfluger, Texas
Elaine G. Luria, Virginia Andrew R. Garbarino, New York
Tom Malinowski, New Jersey
Ritchie Torres, New York
Hope Goins, Staff Director
Daniel Kroese, Minority Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, MANAGEMENT, AND ACCOUNTABILITY
J. Luis Correa, California, Chairman
Dina Titus, Nevada Peter Meijer, Michigan, Ranking
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey Member
Ritchie Torres, New York Dan Bishop, North Carolina
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (ex Diana Harshbarger, Tennessee
officio) John Katko, New York (ex officio)
Lisa Canini, Subcommittee Staff Director
Eric Heighberger, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
Geremiah Lofton, Subcommittee Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY
Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey, Chairwoman
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida,
Dina Titus, Nevada Ranking Member
Josh Gottheimer, New Jersey Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey
Elaine G. Luria, Virginia Ralph Norman, South Carolina
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (ex Mariannette Miller-Meeks, Iowa
officio) John Katko, New York (ex officio)
Alex Marston, Subcomittee Staff Director
Kathryn Maxwell, Minority Subcomittee Staff Director
Alice Hayes, Subcomittee Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable J. Luis Correa, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight, Management, and Accountability:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Peter Meijer, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Oversight, Management, and Accountability:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Bonnie Watson Coleman, a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Transportation and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
The Honorable Carlos A. Gimenez, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Florida, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Transportation and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
Witnesses
Ms. Samantha Vinograd, Acting Assistant Secretary for
Counterterrorism, Threat Prevention, and Law Enforcement,
Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 11
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 13
Rear Admiral Scott W. Clendenin, Assistant Commandant for
Response Policy, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 19
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 13
Mr. Austin Gould, Acting Deputy Executive Assistant Administrator
for Operations Support, Transportation Security Administration,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 13
Mr. Dennis J. Michelini, Deputy Executive Assistant Commissioner
for Air & Marine Operations, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 22
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 13
Appendix
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Samantha Vinograd. 45
Question From Chairman J. Luis Correa for Samantha Vinograd...... 45
Questions From Chairwoman Bonnie Watson Coleman for Samantha
Vinograd....................................................... 45
Question From Chairman J. Luis Correa for Scott W. Clendenin..... 46
Question From Chairman J. Luis Correa for Austin Gould........... 46
Question From Chairman J. Luis Correa for Dennis Michelini....... 46
ASSESSING THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY'S EFFORTS TO COUNTER
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
----------
Thursday, March 31, 2022
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Oversight, Management, and Accountability,
and the
Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in
room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. J. Luis Correa
[Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight, Management, and
Accountability] presiding.
Present from the Subcommittee on Oversight, Management, and
Accountability: Representatives Correa, Payne, Titus, Torres,
Jackson Lee, Meijer, Bishop, and Harshbarger.
Present from the Subcommittee on Transportation and
Maritime Security: Representatives Watson Coleman, Gottheimer,
Luria, Gimenez, Van Drew, Norman, Miller-Meeks, and Guest.
Chairman Correa. The Subcommittees on Oversight,
Management, and Accountability, and Transportation and Maritime
Security will now come to order. Without objection, the Chair
is authorized to declare the subcommittees in recess at any
time.
Let me start by thanking everyone for joining us today. I
would like to thank Chairwoman Watson Coleman and Ranking
Member Gimenez of the Transportation and Maritime Security
Subcommittee for coming together with Ranking Member Meijer and
me to hold this very important hearing.
We are here today to discuss the Department of Homeland
Security's use of its authority to mitigate threats posed by
drones. This authority to counter unmanned aircraft systems,
known as C-UAS authority, was granted by Congress to the
Department of Homeland Security in 2018.
Since then, drone use has only increased in popularity and
skies above our country have never been more crowded. While
many of these drones are operated by hobbyists, photographers,
and journalists who pose no threat to the American people, the
technology has also been used by malicious actors who seek to
compromise homeland security in a number of ways.
Most frequently, these threats have taken the form of
surveillance, undermining law enforcement missions and the
smuggling of narcotics and other illicit materials. There is
also the potential for drones to carry an explosive payload to
target either persons or facilities. Even drone operators who
pose no malicious threat may inadvertently threaten or cause
dangerous interference around airports, natural disaster sites,
and sporting events.
There is no denying that with the increasing availability
and use of these unmanned aircraft systems, we must be able to
respond quickly and effectively to any immediate security
threat. However, with all missions the Department undertakes,
the response to these threats must be Constitutionally
protected, establishing and protecting for privacy, civil
rights, and civil liberties.
For example, civil liberties groups have raised concerns
that freedom of the press may be at risk since DHS can limit
journalists from flying drones above protests or natural
disaster sites, areas that there is a strong public interest in
providing information to our constituents. Additionally, the
groups point out the conflicts with the right of due process.
For example, if a drone hobbyist inadvertently crosses the
invisible line that is restricted space, their private property
can and will be seized without the approval of a judge.
Privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties protections are
the cornerstone of our democracy. As DHS grapples with the very
real threat posed by drones, we must be constantly on guard to
make sure that civil rights, our democracy, is protected. It is
a fine line for the Department to walk, and engagement from DHS
Offices of Privacy and Civil Rights and Civil Liberties to
oversee the use of this authority is important in this process.
Today, we look forward to hearing more about how the
Department has worked with these offices and walks the line
between mitigating threats and protecting the rights every
American citizen has. With the Government's C-UAS authority set
to expire in October, we have a tremendous opportunity, a great
opportunity here to examine how DHS has used its authority and
thus far what changes can be needed when the committee
considers reauthorization.
I look forward to hearing from our panel of witnesses
today, who represent some of the Department components that are
most actively engaged in C-UAS or drone activity.
[The statement of Chairman Correa follows:]
Statement of Chairman J. Luis Correa
March 31, 2022
We're here to discuss the Department of Homeland Security's use of
its authority to mitigate threats posed by drones. This authority to
counter unmanned aircraft systems, known as C-UAS authority, was
granted by Congress to the Department of Homeland Security, among
others, in 2018.
Since then, drone use has only increased in popularity and the
skies above our country have never been more crowded. While many of
these drones are operated by hobbyists, photographers, and journalists
who pose no threat to the American people, the technology has also been
used by malicious actors who seek to compromise homeland security in a
variety of ways.
Most frequently, these threats have taken the form of surveillance
undermining a law enforcement mission, and the smuggling of narcotics
and other illicit materials. There is also the potential for drones to
carry an explosive payload to a targeted person or facility. Even drone
operators who pose no malicious threat may inadvertently cause
dangerous interference around airports, natural disaster sites, and
sporting events.
There can be no denying that with the increasing availability and
use of these unmanned aircraft systems, DHS must be able to respond
quickly and effectively to any immediate security threat. However, as
with all missions the Department undertakes, the response to this
threat must respect Constitutionally-established protections for
privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.
For example, civil liberties groups have raised concerns that
freedom of the press is at risk since DHS could limit journalists from
flying drones above protests or natural disaster sites--areas where
there is a strong interest in providing information to the public.
Additionally, the groups point out conflicts with the right to due
process. If a drone hobbyist, for example, inadvertently crosses an
invisible line that is restricted airspace, their private property can
be seized without approval from a judge.
Privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties protections are the
cornerstone of our democracy. As the Department grapples with the very
real threat posed by drones, there must be guardrails for those who
mean no harm. It is a fine line for the Department to walk, and
engagement from the DHS Offices of Privacy and Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties to oversee the use of this authority is a vital part of the
process.
Today, I look forward to hearing more about how the Department has
worked with these offices and walks the line between mitigating threats
and protecting the rights every American citizen is afforded.
With the Government's C-UAS authority set to expire in October, we
have the opportunity to examine how DHS has used its authority thus far
and what changes may be needed when the committee considers
reauthorization.
I look forward to hearing from our panel of witnesses today, who
represent some of the Department components that are most actively
engaged on C-UAS.
Chairman Correa. With that, I thank all of you for joining
us today. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of this
committee, the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Meijer, for his
opening comments.
Mr. Meijer. Thank you, Chairman Correa, Chairwoman Watson
Coleman, and Ranking Gimenez for holding this hearing. I also
want to thank our witnesses for joining us to talk about
unmanned aircraft systems.
Unmanned aircraft systems, commonly known as drones, are
becoming a ubiquitous part of our lives. Just like any other
technology, they can be used for both good and bad ends. Just
within the Department of Homeland Security, but along with
other Government agencies, we use UAS to support firefighting
and search-and-rescue operations, to support disaster relief,
but also to help secure our borders.
But as the commercial market for UAS continues to expand,
there is an increased threat posed by these drones. Commercial
drones, as we have seen, can threaten our airports, our
critical infrastructure, and high-profile events, whether
intentionally or accidentally. To address this growing threat
Congress passed the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018 to
give DHS the authority to protect certain assets where there is
a National security risk posed by drones.
However, the authorities in this legislation do not cover
such areas as large domestic airports. The bill also required
DHS to assess current Federal, State, and local authorities to
counter this threat.
I have to point out that DHS's report, which the committee
received just a few months ago, is 2\1/2\ years late. For an
authority that was intensely negotiated among the interagency
as well as various Congressional committees of jurisdiction,
such delinquency is unacceptable.
Nevertheless, the report found that State and local law
enforcement entities are extremely limited in what they can do
to counter the threats posed by UAS because of laws put in
place to protect, importantly, citizens' privacy. Specifically,
Federal laws such as the Wiretap Act of 1968 and the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, while still relevant and important
in the fight to protect civil liberties, were passed long
before drones were commonplace or even on the periphery of our
imaginations. These laws effectively limit who can respond to
UAS incident and how. Specifically, current statute makes it
illegal for State and local law enforcement to intercept
communications or access a computer without authorization.
While these are necessary steps to take to counter a
threatening drone, the existing restrictions on local law
enforcement make it nearly impossible to track down the
operator of such a drone.
Furthermore, many of our critical infrastructure sites are
privately owned and their owners are responsible for the
protection of these facilities. The United States has 16
critical infrastructure sectors whose assets and networks are
so vital that any damage or destruction to them could have a
debilitating effect on our National and economic security.
Despite the importance of these facilities, their owners also
lack legal authorities to buy and operate counter-drone
technologies to protect against a threatening UAS.
Today we need to examine carefully the restrictions caused
by previous legislation in addition to the lack of clearly-
defined authorities which has resulted in a quagmire of laws
that Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies are at
risk of violating if they attempt to interfere with a
threatening drone.
This problem is substantial when we consider that
terrorists and criminals promote the use of drone technology
for illicit means. These groups can buy commercial drones to
carry and drop explosive payloads, smuggle drugs, and conduct
surveillance.
I know that just last week Chief Border Patrol Agent Brian
Hastings used technology to counter-surveil drug smugglers. The
smugglers were using a drone to scout areas for law enforcement
before sending bundles of drugs across the border, so effective
means of opposition ISR.
Thanks to Border Patrol's ability to use counter-UAS
technology they were able to seize over 600 pounds of
marijuana. I am curious to hear how frequent this type of
occurrence is and whether they have increased over the past 5
years with the proliferation of off-the-shelf drones.
Congress has put forward some legislation to address this
threat. For example, to prevent terrorists from using drones
for nefarious purposes I cosponsored with Representative
McCaul, the Ranking Member on Foreign Affairs, the Stop Iranian
Drones Act to prevent Iran and Iranian-aligned terrorist
organizations and militia groups from buying commercial drones
and parts to use in attacks against the United States and
allied nations. This type of legislation is a step in the right
direction, but there is far more to do.
But I am looking forward to hearing today from all of you,
specifically from DHS, on two things. First, I want to know
what DHS is doing to work with other Federal agencies and State
and local law enforcement partners to mitigate drones and how
effective this coordination has been. Second, to hear what DHS
needs based on the demonstrated experience with UAS,
particularly on our Southern Border, to mitigate this threat
more effectively.
Given that the authorities granted in this act expire in
October, we need now to decide how and to what extent we should
move forward with these authorities. To that end I think DHS
needs to make its case on whether Congress should renew these
authorities, should modify them, extend them, because as of
right now, I don't think we have made that case yet. But I am
hopeful that DHS can provide clarity and can help us improve
the handling of new authorities granted by Congress for
evolving threats to homeland security.
Thank you again to the Chairs, the Ranking Member, and the
witnesses. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Meijer follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Peter Meijer
Thank you, Chairman Correa, Chairwoman Watson Coleman, and Ranking
Member Gimenez, for holding this hearing. I also want to thank our
witnesses for joining us to talk about unmanned aircraft systems (UAS).
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), commonly known as ``drones,'' are
becoming a ubiquitous part of our lives. Just like any other
technology, they can be used to good and bad ends. The Department of
Homeland Security and other Government agencies use UAS to:
support firefighting and search-and-rescue operations,
to provide disaster relief, and
to help secure our borders.
But, as the commercial market for UAS continues to expand, there is
an increased threat posed by drones. Commercial drones can threaten our
airports, our critical infrastructure, and high-profile events, whether
intentionally or accidentally.
To address this growing threat, Congress passed the Preventing
Emerging Threats Act of 2018. This Act gave DHS the authority to
protect certain assets when there is a National security risk posed by
drone. However, the authorities in this legislation did not cover such
things as large, domestic airports.
The bill also required DHS to assess current Federal, State, and
local authorities to counter this threat. I have to point out that
DHS's report, which the committee just received a few months ago, is
2\1/2\ years late. For an authority that was intensely negotiated among
the interagency, as well as various Congressional committees of
jurisdiction, such delinquency is absolutely unacceptable.
Nevertheless, the report found that State and local law enforcement
entities are extremely limited in what they can do to counter threats
posed by UAS because of laws that were put in place to protect
citizens' privacy. Specifically, Federal laws such as the Wiretap Act
of 1968 and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, while still
relevant, were passed long before drones were commonplace.
These laws effectively limit who can respond to a UAS incident and
how. Specifically, current statute makes it illegal for State and local
law enforcement to intercept communications or access a computer
without authorization. These are necessary steps to take to counter a
threatening drone, yet the existing restrictions on local law
enforcement make it nearly impossible to track down the operator of a
drone.
Furthermore, many of our critical infrastructure sites are
privately owned, and their owners are responsible for protecting these
facilities. The United States has 16 critical infrastructure sectors
whose assets and networks are so vital that any damage or destruction
to them could have a debilitating effect on our National and economic
security. Despite the importance of these facilities, their owners also
lack the legal authority to buy and operate counter drone technologies
to protect against a threatening drone.
Today, we need to examine carefully the restrictions caused by
previous legislation in addition to the lack of clearly defined
authorities that has resulted in a quagmire of laws that Federal,
State, and local law enforcement agencies are at risk of breaking if
they attempt to interfere with a drone.
This problem is substantial when we consider that terrorists and
criminals promote the use of drone technology for illicit means. These
groups can buy commercial drones to carry and drop explosive payloads,
smuggle drugs, and conduct surveillance. I know that just last week,
Chief Border Patrol Agent Brian Hastings used technology to counter
surveil drug smugglers. The smugglers were using a drone to scout areas
for law enforcement before sending bundles of drugs across the border.
Thanks to Border Patrol's ability to use counter UAS technology, it was
able to seize over 600 lbs. of marijuana. I'm curious to hear how
frequent this type of occurrence is and whether they have increased
over the past 5 years.
Congress has put forward some legislation to address this threat.
For example, to prevent terrorists from using drones for nefarious
purposes, I cosponsored Representative McCaul's Stop Iranian Drones
Act. This bill will prevent Iran and Iranian-aligned terrorist and
militia groups from buying commercial drones and parts that can be used
in attacks against the United States and our partner nations.
This type of legislation is a step in the right direction, but we
need to do better.
I'm looking forward to hearing from all of you on this.
Specifically, I'd like to hear from DHS on 2 things:
First, I want to know how DHS works with other Federal
agencies, and State and local law enforcement partners, to
mitigate drones and how effective this coordination is.
Second, I want to hear what DHS needs, based on its
experience with drones, particularly at our Southern Border, to
mitigate them more effectively.
Given that the authorities granted in the Act expire in October, we
need to decide how--and to what extent--we should move forward with
these authorities. To that end, I think DHS needs to make its case on
whether Congress should renew these authorities. As of now, I don't
think DHS has done so, but I am hopeful that DHS can provide us some
clarity and can improve its handling of new authorities granted by
Congress for evolving threats to homeland security.
Thank you again, to the Chairs, the Ranking Member, and the
witnesses, and I yield back.
Chairman Correa. Thank you, Mr. Meijer. The Chair now
recognizes the Chairwoman of the Subcommittee on Transportation
and Maritime Security, the gentlewoman from New Jersey, Mrs.
Watson Coleman, for her opening statement.
Chairwoman Watson Coleman. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you to all of our witnesses for joining us
today for this critical and timely discussion.
In 2018, Congress granted DHS and DOJ unlimited authority
to mitigate drones posing critical threats to specific
facilities or, in other words, to engage in what we call C-UAS.
This authority expires in the fall and it falls to Congress to
determine whether to reauthorize, eliminate, or reform it. As
October approaches, it is imperative that we open up this
important conversation to the public, and privacy and civil
liberties stakeholders in particular, through forums such as
this hearing.
For years DHS, together with DOJ and FAA, has briefed this
committee on the threats that militias and unauthorized drones
pose to the homeland. Though we can't discuss everything we
have learned in this setting, we know the threats are real.
Drones are cheap to produce and purchase. Operators,
whether malicious or unwitting, can cause major problems when
they fly drones into restricted airspaces.
Drones wreaked havoc upon Gatwick Airport in London for a
few days in 2018, causing thousands of flight cancellations. In
my home State of New Jersey, air traffic at the Newark Liberty
International Airport was shut down for an hour-and-a-half when
drones breached its protect airspace in 2019.
We have seen drones interrupt sporting events and cause
disruption. One could imagine drones facilitating more serious
harm to our Nation's security, whether through hostile
surveillance of sensitive Government facilities or critical
infrastructure or even used in kinetic attacks.
As drones become more ubiquitous and more advanced, these
risks are only going to grow. According to the FAA, there are
currently 850,000 registered drones in the United States,
including 300,000 commercial drones and 500,000 recreational
drones.
To be clear, drones provide many benefits to society.
Journalists are using drones to cover the news. Hobbyists are
using drones to enjoy their weekends. Businesses and
governments are using them to inspect infrastructure, survey
land, and monitor crops.
As with all new technologies, we can't focus just on the
risks or the benefits. We need to balance both. In this spirit,
I do have some questions about Section 124n, the Government's
C-UAS authority as it is currently constructed.
When we create limited exceptions to laws like the wiretap,
as this authority does, we must consider fundamental
principles, like privacy and due process. When we place limits
on the use of a technology, like drones that journalists use
every day to cover protests, natural disasters, and other
matters of core public interest, as this authority does, we
must consider the First Amendment of the Constitution and the
freedom of the press.
That means that we need a clear understanding of how DHS is
interpreting key terms in the statute and ensuring the
statute's First and Fourth Amendment protections are held. We
must ask ourselves as we look forward what more can we do to
ensure privacy and civil liberty unions' protections are baked
in at every level of DHS's C-UAS planning and operations?
While I am looking forward to hearing from our witnesses
about the real threats posed by drones as well as DHS's
response to these threats, I am equally eager to learn about
the Department's approach on questions of privacy and civil
liberties.
Homeland security may be about protecting our Nation's
critical assets, but there is no asset more critical than our
values. I look forward to engaging in this public conversation
as we work to determine an appropriate path forward on these
issues.
I want to thank our witnesses for joining us as well as for
their efforts to ensure our Nation is prepared for the long
list of drone-related threats that we may face.
I yield back.
[The statement of Chairwoman Watson Coleman follows:]
Statement of Chairwoman Bonnie Watson Coleman
March 31, 2022
In 2018, Congress granted DHS and DOJ a limited authority to
mitigate drones posing critical threats to specific facilities. Or in
other words, to engage in what we call C-UAS. This authority expires in
the fall--and it falls to Congress to determine whether to reauthorize,
eliminate, or reform it. As October approaches, it is imperative that
we open up this important conversation to the public--and privacy and
civil liberties stakeholders in particular--through forums such as this
hearing.
For years, DHS, together with DOJ and FAA, has briefed this
committee on the threats that malicious and unauthorized drones pose to
the homeland. Though we can't discuss everything we've learned in this
setting, we know the threats are real. Drones are cheap to produce and
purchase, and operators, whether malicious or unwitting, can cause
major problems when they fly drones into restricted airspaces.
Drones wreaked havoc upon Gatwick Airport in London for a few days
in 2018, causing thousands of flight cancellations, and in my home
State of New Jersey, air traffic at Newark Liberty International
Airport was shut down for an hour-and-a-half when drones breached its
protected airspace in 2019.
We've seen drones interrupt sporting events and cause disruption.
And one could imagine drones facilitating more serious harm to our
Nation's security, whether through hostile surveillance of sensitive
Government facilities or critical infrastructure, or even use in
kinetic attacks.
As drones become more ubiquitous and more advanced, these risks are
only going to grow. According to the FAA, there are currently 850,000
registered drones in the United States, including 300,000 commercial
drones and 500,000 recreational drones. To be clear, drones provide
many benefits to society. Journalists are using drones to cover the
news. Hobbyists are using drones to enjoy their weekends. Businesses
and governments are using them to inspect infrastructure, survey land,
and monitor crops.
As with all new technologies, we can't focus just on the risks or
the benefits. We need to balance both. In this spirit, I do have some
questions about Section 124n--the Government's C-UAS authority--as it
is currently constructed. When we create limited exceptions to laws
like the Wiretap Act--as this authority does--we must consider
fundamental principles like privacy and due process.
When we place limits on the use of a technology like drones that
journalists use every day to cover protests, natural disasters, and
other matters of core public interest--as this authority does--we must
consider the First Amendment of the Constitution and the freedom of the
press.
That means we need a clear understanding of how DHS is interpreting
key terms in the statute and ensuring the statute's First and Fourth
Amendment protections are upheld. And we must ask ourselves, as we look
forward: What more can we do to ensure privacy and civil liberties
protections are baked-in at every level of DHS's C-UAS planning and
operations?
While I am looking forward to hearing from our witnesses about the
real threats posed by drones, as well as DHS's response to these
threats, I am equally eager to learn about the Department's approach on
questions of privacy and civil liberties. Homeland security may be
about protecting our Nation's critical assets, but there is no asset
more critical than our values.
I look forward to engaging in this public conversation as we work
to determine an appropriate path forward on these issues. I want to
thank our witnesses for joining us, as well as for their efforts to
ensure our Nation is prepared for the long list of drone-related
threats we face.
Chairman Correa. Thank you, Madam Chair. The Chair now
recognizes the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on
Transportation and Maritime Security, the gentleman from
Florida, Mr. Gimenez, for an opening statement. Welcome, sir.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Correa,
Chairwoman Watson Coleman, and Ranking Member Meijer for
holding this hearing today.
The number of unmanned aircraft systems, commonly known as
drones, in our Nation's airspace is increasing. Their technical
capabilities are continually improving. The evolving threat of
drones used by unknown or maligned actors present a challenge
in keeping our country's transportation systems, critical
infrastructure, and borders secure.
In 2018, reports of drone sightings near the runways of
London's Gatwick Airport caused the cancellation of 1,000
flights over the Christmas holidays, negatively impacting about
140,000 passengers and resulting in a significant economic
impact. In the United States this year, there have already been
two commercial flights whose pilots were forced to take evasive
action to avoid collision with a drone.
DHS is currently testing technology to detect and track and
identify drones entering restricted airspace. Last year I was
pleased to visit the TSA test bed at my home airport of Miami
International. I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses
on how security and surveillance technology can be used at
airports and surface transportation sites Nation-wide to
protect the traveling public.
The number and sophistication of drones at the Southwest
Border has also increased over the last several years. I am
particularly concerned that transnational criminal
organizations are using drones to move migrants and narcotics
across the border and conduct surveillance on Customs and
Border Protection personnel. It appears that the use of drones
for illicit border activity is wide-spread and it is a critical
element of these groups' operations.
I thank the witnesses for being here today to discuss what
capabilities DHS is using to counter drones through the
authorities Congress gave them in the Preventing Emerging
Threats Act of 2018. Thank you, Chairman and Madam Chairwoman,
and I yield back the balance of my time.
[The statement of Ranking Member Gimenez follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Carlos Gimenez
Thank you, Chairman Correa, Chairwoman Watson Coleman, and Ranking
Member Meijer for holding this hearing today.
The number of unmanned aircraft systems, commonly known as drones,
in our Nation's air space is increasing and their technical
capabilities are continuously improving. The evolving threat of drones
used by unknown or malign actors present a challenge in keeping our
country's transportation systems, critical infrastructure, and borders
secure.
In 2018, reports of drone sightings near the runway at London's
Gatwick airport caused the cancellation of 1,000 flights over the
Christmas holiday, negatively impacting 140,000 passengers and
resulting in a significant economic impact. In the United States this
year, there have already been two commercial flights whose pilots were
forced to take evasive action to avoid collision with a drone.
DHS is currently testing technology to detect, track, and identify
drones entering restricted airspace. Last year, I was pleased to visit
the TSA test bed at my home airport of Miami International. I look
forward to hearing from today's witnesses on how security and
surveillance technology can be used at airports and surface
transportation sites Nation-wide to protect the traveling public.
The number and sophistication of drones at the Southwest Border has
also increased over the last several years. I'm particularly concerned
that transnational criminal organizations are using drones to move
migrants and narcotics across the border and conduct surveillance of
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) personnel. It appears that the use
of drones for illicit cross border activity is wide-spread and a
critical element of these groups' operations.
I thank the witnesses for being here today to discuss what
capabilities DHS is using to counter drones through the authorities
Congress gave them in the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018.
Thank you, Chairman and Madame Chairwoman, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
Chairman Correa. Members are reminded that the committee
will operate according to the guidelines laid out by the
Chairman and Ranking Member in their February 3 colloquy
regarding remote procedures. Without objection, Members on the
subcommittee shall be permitted to sit and question the
witnesses. Additional Member statements may be submitted for
the record.
[The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]
Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
March 31, 2022
In 2018, Congress granted the Department of Homeland Security and
the Department of Justice limited authority to counter the threat posed
by unmanned aircraft systems. That authority is set to expire this
October, leaving this committee responsible for assessing how DHS has
conducted its C-UAS mission and what changes may be needed before
Congress reauthorizes or reforms that authority.
Drones are more affordable and accessible than ever. From families
capturing vacation memories to journalists covering major National news
events, millions of Americans operate drones responsibly and safely
each year. But, when used nefariously, drones can pose a great threat
to public safety and National security.
Malicious actors have used drones to smuggle illicit materials
across borders and into prisons and have disrupted air travel and law
enforcement activities. Some drone operators just fail to understand
the rules and may disrupt major public events, transportation systems,
or other sensitive locations simply by accident. Whether the operator
is flying innocently or maliciously, the Department must be able to
respond quickly, assess the threat, and ensure any actions to mitigate
a drone uphold Americans' Constitutional rights to privacy, civil
rights, and civil liberties.
It is essential that we continue to protect the freedom of the
press, including when journalists use drones to capture images of major
news stories, whether it be destruction following a natural disaster or
large protest gatherings. We must also ensure that drone operators,
many of whom are merely backyard hobbyists, do not have their private
property seized and destroyed by the Government for minor, accidental
infractions. With that in mind, I am particularly interested in hearing
from our witnesses on how, specifically, a drone threat is mitigated
and what steps are taken to preserve the rights of Americans against
unnecessary search and seizure.
The upcoming sunset of the Department's C-UAS authority provides
Congress with an opportunity to conduct a stringent assessment of the
current authority, its strengths, and its shortcomings, before choosing
whether and how to reauthorize counter-drone activities.
I look forward to learning more from our witnesses, each with their
own perspective on how the Department has used its C-UAS authority,
about how they have grappled with responding efficiently to threats
while protecting privacy and civil liberties.
Chairman Correa. Now I would like to welcome our panelists.
Our first witness is Ms. Samantha Vinograd, the acting
assistant secretary for Counterterrorism and Threat Prevention
at the Department of Homeland Security. She began her career as
a deputy U.S. Treasury attache to Iraq; subsequently served on
the National Security Council. She was previously a CNN
national security analyst, a senior advisor at the Biden
Institute, and a visiting fellow at the University of Chicago
Institute for Politics.
Our second witness, Rear Admiral Scott Clendenin. He served
as then-U.S. Coast Guard assistant commandant for response
policy. He is responsible for the U.S. Coast Guard policy in 7
operational mission areas, including defense operations and law
enforcement. Before that, he served afloat for 14 years at sea
on Coast Guard cutters conducting multi-mission patrols in the
Atlantic, Pacific, and throughout the Caribbean.
Our third witness is Austin Gould, the acting deputy
executive assistant administrator for operation support at the
Transportation Security Administration. He is responsible for
strengthening TSA's operational capabilities and driving
mission performance through analysis and innovation. Prior to
joining TSA, Mr. Gould served as a captain in the U.S. Coast
Guard. During his 30-year Coast Guard career he worked in a
variety of operational and acquisition management positions.
Our final witness, Mr. Dennis Michelini, deputy executive
assistant commissioner of air and marine operations at Customs
and Border Protection. He began his Federal law enforcement
career in 1995 as a U.S. Border Patrol agent. In 2000, he
became an aircraft pilot and joined AMO. From 2013 to 2016, he
served as director of air operations, where he was responsible
for UAS operations and the employment of new UAS technologies
throughout the CBP environment.
Deep breath. Without objection, the witnesses' full
statements will be inserted into the record. Now I am going to
ask each witness to summarize their statements for 5 minutes,
beginning with Ms. Samantha Vinograd. Welcome, ma'am.
STATEMENT OF SAMANTHA VINOGRAD, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM, THREAT PREVENTION, AND LAW ENFORCEMENT,
OFFICE OF STRATEGY, POLICY, AND PLANS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Vinograd. Chairman Correa, Chairwoman Watson Coleman,
Ranking Member Gimenez, Ranking Member Meijer, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittees, thank you for
inviting the Department of Homeland Security to be with you
today.
I began my Government service under the Bush administration
in 2007 as a civil servant at Treasury both in Iraq and
Washington, DC. I subsequently served on the National Security
Council in a variety of roles. I was honored to rejoin
Government service last February at the Department of Homeland
Security as senior counselor and later as acting assistant
secretary for counterterrorism, threat prevention, and law
enforcement. It has been an honor to serve bipartisan
administrations on critical National security and homeland
security issues affecting our country.
Let me be very clear at the outset. The Department of
Homeland Security considers our C-UAS mission to be twofold: We
are focused on using our authority to mitigate credible
threats; No. 2, the safety and security of DHS missions. At the
same time, in doing so, we are just as focused as protecting
privacy and civil rights and civil liberties. I look forward to
sharing with you how we are accomplishing both aspects of our
C-UAS mission.
DHS is judiciously implementing the authorities that
Congress granted in the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018
to conduct C-UAS operations. These operations respond to the
evolving and dynamic UAS threat environment and ensure that
privacy and civil rights and civil liberties are protected. The
Department exercises this authority to protect National
security and public safety while minimizing the impact to the
National airspace system.
Technological advances have accelerated UAS capabilities
across commercial and recreational applications. Their compact
size and often low cost make them suitable for performing a
variety of beneficial mission sets. UAS play a transformative
role in fields such as transport and delivery, emergency
response, critical infrastructure management, agriculture, and
more.
DHS supports the lawful use of UAS. We are only concerned
with malicious or illicit use by threat actors. We do know that
the scale and scope of UAS threats are increasing. We are
deeply concerned about UAS weaponization, smuggling,
surveillance, disruption, and the fostering of other illicit
activities, particularly at airports and in border regions. My
colleagues today will provide additional details on what we are
seeing from a threat perspective and how DHS is responding.
We also know that as we look toward the future, emerging
technologies will expand the boundaries of what is possible for
threat actors. We are positioning ourselves to remain ahead of
technology curve through dedicated research, testing, training,
and evaluation efforts.
The Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018 grants DHS and
the Department of Justice relief from several Federal criminal
statutes when performing C-UAS actions identified in the act,
which allows us to engaging in very specific electronic
detection and electronic mitigation through intercepting the
communications between a control device--a command device and
the UAV itself. This authority explicitly enables the
protection of designated-covered facilities or assets from
credible UAS threats that relate to specific DHS mission sets.
The act also authorizes DHS and DOJ to protect NSSE and SEAR
events, a provision of support to State, local, Tribal, and
territorial law enforcement upon the request of the chief
executive officer of the respective State or territory for mass
gathering that are limited to a specific time frame and
location, as well as the protection of an active Federal law
enforcement investigation.
DHS successfully coordinated over 250 operational C-UAS
deployments and 30 research, testing, training, and evaluation
events since the authorities were granted, consistent with the
requirements outlined in the act. In those deployments, DHS has
never caused undue interference with the National airspace.
Importantly, our Privacy Office has seen no cause to implement
a privacy compliance review or to engage in another form of a
privacy investigation since the authority was granted.
To ensure consistent application of C-UAS authorities
across the Department, DHS established a C-UAS Program
Management Office. This office manages and supports C-UAS
activities to ensure component alignment, DHS is a large
organization, with departmental strategy and policy guidance.
This is especially important, for example, for our
coordination with the FAA. The PMO has worked closely with the
FAA to develop objective standards that define critical
elements of coordination at the Department. Moreover, the
Secretary issued DHS-wide policy guidance which requires
components to establish their own internal C-UAS policies. The
policy guidance establishes formal processes for components to
obtain deployment authorizations.
Chairman Correa. Ms. Vinograd, I am going to ask you to
summarize and conclude your statement.
Ms. Vinograd. Certainly. DHS applies a multi-layered
approach to promoting privacy and civil rights and civil
liberties, which I will articulate today, both at the
Department-wide level and the component level. We also are
focused on ensuring transparency and promoting First Amendment-
protected activities when we do work with the FAA to implement
temporary flight restriction.
I am very honored to be with you here today and look
forward to answering your questions with respect to gaps in our
authorities and the way forward with respect to the threat
landscape. Thank you, sir.
[The joint prepared statement of Ms. Vinograd, Mr.
Clendenin, Mr. Gould, and Mr. Michelini follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of Samantha Vinograd, Scott W. Clendenin,
Austin Gould, and Dennis J. Michelini
Thursday, March 31, 2022
Chairwoman Watson Coleman, Chairman Correa, Ranking Member Gimenez,
Ranking Member Meijer, and distinguished Members of the subcommittees,
thank you for inviting us to testify regarding emerging threats posed
by the malicious use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS \1\ or
``drones''\2\) in the United States and the missions of the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) to counter such threats. DHS continues to
judiciously implement the authorities Congress granted through
enactment of the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018 (the ``Act''),
codified at 6 U.S.C. 124n, to conduct UAS detection and counter-
unmanned aircraft system (C-UAS)\3\ activities in response to the
evolving and dynamic threat environment, while ensuring the protection
of privacy and civil rights and civil liberties. The Department takes
implementation of its C-UAS authorities seriously, exercising them to
protect National security and public safety while preserving the rights
of the public and working with the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) to minimize impact to the National airspace system (NAS).
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\1\ The term ``unmanned aircraft system'' means an unmanned
aircraft and associated elements (including communication links and the
components that control the unmanned aircraft) that are required for
the operator to operate safely and efficiently in the National airspace
system. See 49 U.S.C. 44801.
\2\ For the purposes of this statement, ``drone'' refers to the
aircraft portion of a UAS.
\3\ The term ``counter-UAS system'' means a system or device
capable of lawfully and safely disabling, disrupting, or seizing
control of an unmanned aircraft or unmanned aircraft system. See 49
U.S.C. 44801. Although this term, as defined in statute, does not
encompass UAS detection, references to ``C-UAS'' activities throughout
this testimony are intended to include both UAS detection and
mitigation activities.
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Technological advances have accelerated UAS capabilities across a
variety of commercial and recreational applications. Their compact size
and often low cost make them suitable for many beneficial applications,
performing critical tasks with minimal risk and expense. A wide
spectrum of domestic users--including industry, private citizens, and
Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments--are using
or expect to use UAS, which may play a transformative role in fields
such as transport and delivery, critical infrastructure management,
agriculture, search and rescue, disaster response, public safety,
coastal security, military training, and others. Estimates suggest that
rapidly advancing UAS technology and integration of drones into the NAS
will result in new innovations and generate economic growth and
opportunity for businesses and private citizens. DHS supports the
lawful use of UAS, including by commercial and recreational users. Like
all technology, however, UAS can be exploited for malicious use by
threat actors, threatening National security and public safety, which
is the major concern of DHS.
Our joint testimony today describes threats to the U.S. homeland
posed by the malicious use of drones and how we use our authorities to
protect against these threats. We explain our tiered approach to
implementation and governance of C-UAS authorities, including
compliance with existing laws and regulations, issuing Department and
component-level policy guidance, and specific privacy, civil rights,
and civil liberties documentation that surpasses statutory
requirements. Our testimony underscores the processes required to gain
Departmental approval and authorization to conduct C-UAS activities,
which are designed to protect privacy, civil rights, and civil
liberties, safeguard aviation safety, and ensure leadership review of
every deployment. Additionally, we will provide examples of DHS
components' C-UAS activities, including testing and operational
deployments by the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), and Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Finally,
we highlight gaps in the Department's current authorities that sunset
on October 5, 2022--as noted in the DHS C-UAS Assessment delivered to
Congress in December 2021--and we indicate the Department's intention
to request reauthorization and expansion of its C-UAS authorities to
remedy such gaps to address dynamic and evolving threats.
threats to the u.s. homeland from the malicious use of uas
The malicious use of UAS is increasing and diversifying in the
United States and abroad. The threat can take several forms, including
kinetic attacks with payloads of firearms, explosives, or weapons of
mass destruction; the illicit trafficking of narcotics or contraband;
surveillance against law enforcement; cyber attacks against wireless
devices or networks; foreign intelligence; and corporate espionage or
theft of intellectual property. The availability of highly-capable,
low-cost UAS has led to expanded use by threat actors. This has
required DHS to grow its domain awareness and response capability
efforts to identify and counter smaller, more agile, and less
attributable threats across its mission spaces.
We are most concerned with UAS weaponization, smuggling,
surveillance, disruption, and the fostering of other illicit activity,
particularly in venues where DHS already conducts its missions
including airports, border regions, protective operations, National
Special Security Events (NSSE), Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR)
events, and mass gatherings. Throughout border regions, CBP personnel
have observed UAS used to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance of
their operations and have identified a multitude of unmanned aircraft
that were deemed as credible threats \4\ or enabling other criminal
activity such as smuggling, trafficking, and conveyance of illicit
materials. At critical infrastructure, key resource sites, sensitive
Government facilities, and Federal properties Nation-wide, CBP and
Federal Protective Service (FPS) personnel have observed UAS operations
that appear to conduct intelligence gathering, physical security
observation, and strategic reserves assessments on behalf of threat
actors. U.S. Secret Service (USSS) officers have identified UAS
violating temporary flight restrictions put in place by the FAA to
protect the President and other Government leaders, the type of threats
exemplified by the assassination attempt on Venezuelan President Maduro
utilizing explosives-laden drones in 2018. TSA and the Cybersecurity
and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) continue to engage with
transportation sector and critical infrastructure partners to improve
stakeholder response capabilities and reaction times to UAS threats.
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\4\ Defined by the Secretary of Homeland Security as, ``The
reasonable likelihood that a UAS or unmanned aircraft activity, if
unabated, would: (i) Inflict or otherwise cause physical harm to a
person; (ii) inflict or otherwise cause damage or harm to assets,
facilities or systems; (iii) interfere with the operational mission,
including movement, security, and protection, of a covered facility or
asset; (iv) facilitate unlawful activity; (v) conduct unauthorized
surveillance or reconnaissance; or (vi) result in unauthorized access
to, or disclosure of, classified, sensitive or otherwise lawfully
protected information.''
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As we look toward the future, emerging technologies will expand the
boundaries of what is possible for threat actors. Capabilities such as
controlling multiple drones with one remote, autonomous flight plans,
obstacle avoidance, extended communications ranges, and prolonged
battery life require constant reevaluation of the Department's
prevention and response tactics. Remaining adaptive and proactive in
countering UAS threats as they evolve is critical to DHS in executing
its missions. Through research, testing, training, and evaluation
efforts (RTTE), spearheaded by the DHS Science and Technology (S&T)
Directorate, and as recurring innovation and simulation efforts across
the interagency mature, we are positioning ourselves to remain ahead of
the technology curve.
current dhs c-uas authority and its use
The Act grants DHS and the Department of Justice (DOJ) relief from
several Federal criminal statutes, namely from provisions of Titles 18
and 49 that generally prohibit aircraft sabotage, computer fraud and
abuse, interference with the operation of a satellite, wiretapping, and
use of pen registers and trap-and-trace devices, to take certain
actions to detect and defeat UAS posing a credible threat. The actions
authorized in the Act include electronic detection, electronic
mitigation through communications signal intercept and interruption,
kinetic/physical mitigation, and device seizure. This authority
expressly enables the protection of designated ``covered facilities or
assets''\5\ from credible UAS threats that relate to specific DHS
mission sets, including those covered by CBP, FPS, USCG, and USSS. The
Act also authorizes protection of shared DHS and DOJ mission sets
including protection of NSSE and SEAR events, a provision for support
to State, local, territorial, or Tribal law enforcement (upon request
of the chief executive officer of the respective State or territory)
for mass gatherings that are limited to a specific time frame and
location, and the protection of an active Federal law enforcement
investigation, emergency response, or a security function that is
limited to a specified time frame and location.
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\5\ Defined in the Preventing Emerging Threats Act as any facility
asset that is identified as high-risk and a potential target for
unlawful unmanned aircraft activity by the Secretary or the Attorney
General, in coordination with the Secretary of Transportation with
respect to potentially impacted airspace, through a risk-based
assessment; is located within the United States; and directly relates
to an authorized DHS mission, or authorized joint DHS or DOJ mission,
See 6 U.S.C. 124n(k)(3).
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Consistent with requirements outlined in the Act and in
coordination with the FAA, DHS successfully coordinated 246 operational
C-UAS deployments and 30 RTTE events since the authorities were
granted. We continue to collaborate closely with the FAA on each
deployment to minimize potential impact to the NAS. By partnering with
interagency colleagues such as DOJ, Department of Defense (DOD) Joint
C-UAS Office (JCO), and North American Aerospace Defense Command
(NORAD), our understanding of UAS activity across all domestic
environments is maturing, enhancing our ability to differentiate
malicious activity from authorized flights, counter credible UAS
threats, and share relevant information and data. We see these
collaborations and open communication channels as a foundation of
shared success to protect the homeland.
policy and guidance governing dhs's use of c-uas authorities
To ensure consistent application of C-UAS authorities across all
components, DHS established a C-UAS Program Management Office (PMO)
within the Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans (PLCY). The PMO
manages and supports C-UAS activities to ensure component alignment
with Departmental strategy and policy guidance and serves as a single
point of contact for interagency partners.
This is especially true for coordination with the FAA. The PMO has
worked closely with the FAA to develop an agreed-upon set of objective
standards that define critical elements of coordination at the
Department level, component level, and operational deployment level.
Due to the sensitivities of deploying and operating C-UAS equipment and
legal implications associated with relief from provisions of Titles 18
and 49 through the Act, it is imperative to have formal and streamlined
C-UAS governance and communication structures in place. Objective
standards ensure DHS maintains compliance with existing laws and
regulations.
We recognize the critical importance of maintaining the safety and
security of the NAS and coordinate with the FAA to develop repeatable
processes for safe and efficient deployments of C-UAS technology. The
resulting objective standards create consistency across all DHS
components by establishing common definitions, guidelines for
conducting risk-based assessments, including coordination with the FAA
for assessments of the impact to nearby airport communications and
aircraft navigation devices, reporting protocols when C-UAS equipment
is ``activated'' or ``transmitting,'' data retention standards and
assessment of the need for other airspace protections, such as flight
restrictions.
In addition to these agreed-upon objective standards, the Secretary
issued the DHS C-UAS Policy Guidance on September 10, 2019 requiring
DHS components to establish their own internal C-UAS policies, conduct
assessments to document the protection of privacy, civil rights, and
civil liberties, and develop operational plans for each unique C-UAS
deployment, among other requirements.
process for authorizing the use of c-uas authorities
Recognizing the complexity and nuances associated with deploying C-
UAS equipment domestically, the DHS Secretary's C-UAS Policy Guidance
establishes formal processes for obtaining C-UAS deployment
authorizations. Major process steps include DHS components identifying
a ``covered facility or asset'' to be designated, coordinating with FAA
so they may assess potential impacts to the NAS and evaluate the need
and regulatory basis for establishing flight restrictions, and
receiving authorization from the Secretary to conduct C-UAS activities
pursuant to the Act.
All deployments require components to conduct a risk-based
assessment prior to requesting the statutorily required designation of
a ``covered facility or asset'' from the Secretary. This assessment
includes an evaluation of traditional risk elements such as threat,
vulnerability, and consequence but also considers collateral risk that
C-UAS systems pose to the NAS. DHS provides the FAA with C-UAS
equipment operating frequencies so the FAA may evaluate potential
interference with nearby airport communications or aircraft avionics
(radio frequency spectrum deconfliction). When deconfliction is
complete and the FAA has reviewed the operating plan, DHS and the FAA
sign a coordination memorandum indicating required coordination steps
are complete. The Secretary then designates the requested facility or
asset as a ``covered facility or asset'' and authorizes the component
to take C-UAS actions pursuant to the Act.
DHS and FAA coordinated these processes to enable the FAA to ensure
deployments do not negatively impact the NAS, to provide details on how
authorities are used, and to ensure senior leadership visibility and
concurrence with operations. We work collaboratively with the FAA to
successfully protect a wide range of areas, events, and mass gatherings
from UAS threats and continuously review our processes and protocols to
streamline tasks where possible.
how privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties are protected during c-
uas activities
DHS is committed to protecting the security of the Nation and its
values. Those values include respecting the civil rights, civil
liberties, and personal privacy of its citizens and visitors, as well
as conducting operations with openness and accountability.
Understanding how C-UAS equipment works is essential to considering
the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties implications of its use.
While drones generally operate on the same frequencies used by publicly
available communication networks such as cellular, Bluetooth, and wi-
fi, they use an individual network created between the drone and a
controller. Some C-UAS equipment DHS uses identifies those
communication networks and determines that the link is between a drone
and its controller. DHS is unable to access other content on the
operator's phone or device if it is being used to control the drone.
In general, the term ``mitigation'' involves an interruption of the
signal from the drone operator's controller to the drone itself. An
interruption causes the drone to enter into its pre-programmed recovery
protocol, which is often to fly to its pre-designated ``home'' location
or to simply hover in place. In cases where sending a drone ``home''
does not decrease the threat, some C-UAS equipment emulates a
controller, thereby overpowering the signals from the operator's
controller and allowing the C-UAS equipment operator to send the drone
to a new ``home'' location or a DHS-preferred render safe location. Of
import, C-UAS equipment is not constantly transmitting in the radio
frequency spectrum; rather, it is generally only transmitting for
seconds at a time, and only on the rare occasion when a mitigation
action is under way.
The Act includes strong privacy protections. Authorized DHS
components may intercept or acquire command and control (C2)
communications to or from a UAS, as an exercise of DHS C-UAS authority,
but only to the extent necessary to support C-UAS actions authorized by
the Secretary. DHS components may only intercept, acquire, access,
maintain, or use communications to or from a UAS in a manner consistent
with the First and Fourth Amendments to the Constitution and other
applicable Federal laws and Department policies. In addition to those
privacy protections in the Act, the Department applies Section 222 of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (as amended) to require all component
C-UAS programs to submit a Privacy Threshold Assessment (PTA) and
obtain Privacy Office approval prior to deploying C-UAS technology. The
Privacy Office uses the PTA to determine the need for a Privacy Impact
Assessment (PIA), which includes measures to mitigate privacy risks.
DHS published multiple C-UAS PIAs for public consumption consistent
with requirements outlined in the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
We continue to protect privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties
by ensuring that RTTE activities collect only information authorized by
law and needed to identify and address UAS threats. Component policies
include measures to respect the lawful use of UAS without compromising
the protection of a ``covered facility or asset.'' Additionally, we
developed procedures and incorporated them into Departmental and
component-level policy guidance and operational plans to ensure
consistency in C-UAS information handling. PLCY issued detailed
guidance for developing UAS communication collection, retention, and
sharing procedures, as well as addressing privacy, civil rights, and
civil liberties considerations to components as an annex to the DHS
Secretary's C-UAS Policy Guidance. These policies are currently
undergoing review and revision consistent with lessons learned.
The FAA is a great partner for DHS, supporting the Department's
efforts to protect ``covered facilities or assets'' while preserving
access to the airspace for those operating UAS compliantly. When DHS
requests temporary flight restrictions (TFRs) to accompany C-UAS
activities, the FAA notifies the public of restrictions and provides
the means to request a waiver should they have a legitimate need to
participate in protected First Amendment activities. Additionally, by
collaborating with the FAA to determine if temporary flight
restrictions are needed, coordinate waiver requests within the flight
restricted area, and issue notices to the public, we ensure those
operating UAS compliantly in the area understand the limitations and
potential actions that can be taken should they violate airspace
restrictions.
examples of dhs components' c-uas activities, testing, and operational
deployments \6\
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\6\ The USSS and FPS have also conducted C-UAS deployments, but
those deployments are not summarized in this written testimony.
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United States Coast Guard (USCG)
The USCG has safeguarded the American people and promoted National
security, border security, and economic prosperity in a complex and
evolving threat environment for over 230 years. As the principal
Federal agency responsible for maritime safety and security in U.S.
ports and inland waterways and along more than 95,000 miles of U.S.
coastline, the USCG works collaboratively with relevant stakeholders to
combat threats to the homeland and critical infrastructure, and the
novel threats posed by UAS are increasingly concerning to USCG leaders.
From 2017 through 2021, the USCG observed a significant increase in
suspicious UAS sightings over/near maritime assets and facilities, such
as refineries and ferry/cruise ship terminals. Over the same period,
UAS interfered with or crashed into USCG assets, ferries, cruise ships,
and commercial vessels over 80 times. Since the enactment of the Act,
the USCG conducted 26 separate C-UAS events requiring FAA approval,
including 2 NSSEs and 5 SEAR events.
Currently, there are no flight restrictions over commercial
maritime critical infrastructure, and owners and operators at those
facilities consistently express their concern about threats posed to
facilities by UAS. The USCG views the ability for these critical
infrastructure facilities to obtain flight restrictions as an important
step in securing the airspace in the maritime and port environments and
is working with the FAA to address these concerns.
In preparation for C-UAS operations, the USCG conducts an event-
specific review of privacy documentation, including any relevant PIAs,
to measure the sufficiency of protocols to ensure civil liberties and
privacy rights of those individuals affected by C-UAS operations. The
USCG also collaborates closely with the FAA so the FAA may assess
potential impacts on the NAS and the need for a temporary flight
restriction and potentially issue public notices advising UAS operators
and the public of the location and time period when restrictions are in
place.
In addition, the USCG coordinates all C-UAS activities with the
FAA, the C-UAS PMO, and other relevant law enforcement stakeholders to
ensure appropriate frequency and spectrum management protocols are
followed.
Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
Since its creation following the attacks on September 11, 2001, the
TSA has dedicated itself to strengthening our Nation's transportation
systems while ensuring freedom of movement for people and commerce.
Drones are one of the latest threats to TSA's mission, and developing
ways to deter and prevent potential harm from malicious activity to
aviation and other transportation system sectors is one of TSA's top
priorities.
In December 2018, reports of UAS sightings close to the runway at
London's Gatwick Airport caused the cancellation of 1,000 flights over
the Christmas holiday, adversely affecting approximately 140,000
passengers and resulting in severe economic impacts. The UAS operators
were never apprehended and the resulting 36 hours of halted commercial
air traffic and cascading international aviation system impacts
illustrates the significant effects an unauthorized UAS can have on the
surrounding airspace. Since the Gatwick incident, the number of UAS
sightings reported increased every year, with the TSA receiving almost
1,900 reports of drones operating near airports in 2021, more than
double the amount reported in 2020. Already this year, two commercial
pilots took evasive action to avoid a drone collision: Air France
Flight 007 departing New York for Paris and Sunset Aviation Flight 283
arriving in Atlanta from Orlando.
While TSA's mission is not explicitly called out in the Act, DHS,
including TSA, is prepared to protect airports pursuant to the Act's
authority to use C-UAS for the protection of an active Federal law
enforcement investigation, emergency response, or security function,
that is limited to a specified time frame and location. TSA requires
every airport Federal Security Director (FSD) to develop and update a
Tactical Response Plan (TRP) to support detection, tracking,
identification, and in the event of a persistent threat and upon the
emergency direction of the Secretary, mitigation of UAS threats at
airports. The TRP documents TSA's preparation and response measures to
address both errant and malicious UAS activity at and around the
airport. FSDs conduct annual C-UAS exercises to test these plans with
participation from State, local, Tribal, and territorial partners
including airport authorities and other Federal agencies, such as the
FAA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
TSA also established a UAS Threat and Vulnerability Assessments
Unit to conduct comprehensive UAS-specific Joint Vulnerability
Assessments (JVAs) at airports most at risk from errant or malicious
UAS incidents. TSA uses these UAS JVAs to refine TRPs, define site-
specific response plans, work with airport authorities and law
enforcement partners to improve information-sharing procedures, and
recommend courses of action for the future. Since February 2021, TSA
conducted 17 full UAS-specific JVAs.
Looking to the future, TSA established technology test beds at
Miami International Airport and Los Angeles International Airport and
is evaluating UAS detection technology for operational effectiveness in
the airport environment, in coordination with DHS S&T and the FAA. TSA
tests a range of technologies at the sites, including radar, thermal
imaging, and electro-optical cameras. TSA uses a continuous technology
testing cycle in its UAS test beds to keep up with the rapidly-evolving
UAS technology market and meet the needs of the interagency,
transportation facilities, and industry.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
CBP continues to experience high numbers of incidents involving
illicit use of unmanned aircraft systems to facilitate unlawful
movement of people and narcotics across the Southwest Border.
Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) and possibly Foreign State
Actors use UAS to conduct unauthorized surveillance of CBP personnel
and operations to pass information to contacts on the ground on where
to guide noncitizens or transport illegal drugs to circumvent law
enforcement. Sensor records, pilot and agent sightings, and other
sources of information also indicate the increasing use of drones to
transport illegal drugs and other contraband across the border. This
illicit activity threatens the safety of our front-line personnel,
poses a collision risk to our aircraft, and adversely affects our
border security operations.
Over a recent 5-month period, CBP sensors captured more than 30,500
drone flights within close proximity of the Southwest Border, of which
4,458 took place during nighttime hours. Additionally, more than 14,000
of these flights exceeded the FAA-regulated altitude of 400 feet, some
nearly reaching altitudes of 4,000 feet. Among all these flights, there
were only about 4,300 unique drone IDs, indicating that use of drones
for illicit cross-border activity is not only wide-spread, but also
organized and an integrated element of TCO operations.
The Act has enabled CBP to begin taking responsible C-UAS actions
against systems that pose a credible threat to covered facilities or
assets along the Southwest Border. Consistent with the Act and the DHS
Secretary's Policy Guidance, CBP implemented a C-UAS policy and
subsequent operations plan in July 2020 after extensive discussion and
review to ensure lawful and efficient operational implementation. The
overall volume of UAS traffic rapidly expanded in the past few years,
and CBP is committed to identifying and targeting illicit activity
while protecting lawful commercial and recreational use.
Currently, CBP operates C-UAS devices at select, high-risk
locations along the Southwest Border. Operations target specific
credible threats and do not involve persistent surveillance of all the
border regions. Authorization for CBP C-UAS operations requires a
credible threat determination that involves extensive analysis and
evidence of the threat, including reports of visual observations and
correlation with actionable information and other law enforcement
information. All C-UAS operations adhere to authorized statutory and
policy parameters to ensure operational integrity and compliance with
all legal restrictions and privacy protections.
C-UAS operations are an essential capability to address evolving
UAS threats and CBP implemented its risk-based C-UAS approach within a
framework that ensures rigorous analysis and clear documentation of a
credible threat to identify and target nefarious operators and devices
amongst the increasing amount of drone traffic. Since CBP's
implementation of C-UAS operations in July 2020, there were five
credible UAS threats mitigated, affirmation of CBP's deliberate,
targeted, and diligent application of its C-UAS authority.
C-UAS authorities will become even more critical as the UAS threat
evolves. Less than a year ago, the Jalisco New Generation Cartel
attacked Mexican law enforcement and a rival cartel with explosives
deployed from drones. These incidents, along with indications that TCOs
are pursuing the use of larger drones with more maneuverability, more
payload capacity, and greater capability--to fly longer, higher, and
further--are concerning trends. CBP needs these critical authorities to
continue efforts to counter rapidly evolving threats and expand its
risk-based implementation of C-UAS operations to additional locations
along the Southwest and Northern Borders.
gaps in current dhs authority
On December 21, 2021, DHS submitted the interagency coordinated and
statutorily-required DHS C-UAS Assessment to evaluate drone threats to
domestic critical infrastructure and airports, evaluate current
Federal, State, local, territorial, or Tribal (SLTT) law enforcement
authorities to counter drone threats, and identify additional
improvements needed for security. The assessment notes the accelerated
technological evolution of drone capabilities across a variety of
commercial and recreational applications. As UAS capabilities advance,
technologies to detect, identify, monitor, and track UAS must also
advance.
The assessment also explains how current legal authorities do not
expressly authorize DHS to conduct certain persistent UAS detection and
mitigation activities, leaving our Nation's large hub airports and
critical infrastructure vulnerable to intentional UAS threats and
unintentional hazards. Additionally, the assessment identified gaps in
existing authorities that limit the abilities of SLTT law enforcement
to effectively deter unauthorized activities, respond to incidents, and
enforce laws and regulations. Specific authority for protecting
airports and transportation systems combined with a community-based
approach to UAS detection would help set both the stage for improved
air domain awareness and foundation for threat discrimination and
mitigation efforts. These concerns are detailed in the Assessment.
DHS has been working closely with the administration and
interagency partners on a legislative proposal to request
reauthorization of our current C-UAS authorities. The Department's
approach to reauthorization is grounded in its assessment of the
evolving threat landscape as well as addressing key gaps and
vulnerabilities that we have identified. We look forward to engaging
with you, your staff, and other key stakeholders on those authorities.
conclusion
DHS is committed to countering the threat of malicious UAS activity
facing the homeland. We are grateful for the continued support of
Congress and to our fellow departments and agencies for their support
and contributions in this effort. Together we can raise the domestic
UAS security baseline, disrupt attacks, and hold accountable those who
perpetrate these acts. Thank you again for the opportunity to testify
today and we look forward to your questions.
Chairman Correa. Thank you very much, ma'am. I recognize
Rear Admiral Clendenin to summarize his statement in 5 minutes
as well. Welcome, sir.
STATEMENT OF SCOTT W. CLENDENIN, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR
RESPONSE POLICY, U.S. COAST GUARD, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Admiral Clendenin. Good morning, sir. Chairwoman Coleman,
Chairman Correa, Ranking Member Gimenez, Ranking Member Meijer,
and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for
the opportunity to discuss the Coast Guard's capabilities to
counter the emerging threats posed by the malicious use of
unmanned aircraft systems in the United States.
As the principal Federal agency responsible for the safety
and security of U.S. ports, inland waterways, and along more
than 95,000 miles of coastline, the Coast Guard works
collaboratively with relevant stakeholders to combat threats in
the Nation and maritime critical infrastructure and key
resources. The novel threats posed by UASes are increasingly
concerning as a proliferation of small UAS continues to
increase in the maritime domain.
Over the last 4 years, the Coast Guard observed significant
increases in UAS activity in the maritime domain as well as an
acceleration in the rate of suspicious UAS sightings over or
near maritime assets or facilities, such as ferries and cruise
ship terminals and refineries. Over the same period, UAS
interfered with or crashed into Coast Guard assets, ferries,
cruise ships, and other commercial vessels over 80 times. These
numbers, which are concerning, only represent the events that
were formally reported, verified, and analyzed.
UAS usage in the maritime domain requires additional risk
consideration as a part of the operational planning cycle. This
is important because there are no flight restrictions or
commercial maritime critical infrastructure and key resources.
And the owners and operators of those facilities have
consistently expressed their concern about the threats posed to
their facilities by UAS.
The Coast Guard views the ability for maritime critical
infrastructure and key resources, facilities owners and
operators to obtain flight restrictions as an important step in
securing the airspace over the maritime environment, and is
working with the Federal Aviation Administration to address
these concerns. In addition, the Coast Guard coordinates all
counter-UAS activities with the Federal Aviation
Administration, the Department's Counter-UAS Program, and other
relevant law enforcement stakeholders to ensure appropriate
frequency and spectrum management protocols are followed to
mitigate National airspace system impacts.
Since the enactment of the Preventing Emerging Threats Act
the Coast Guard has conducted 26 separate counter-UAS events
requiring Federal Aviation Administration coordination,
including 5 special event assessment rating and 2 National
special security events. Before deploying its counter-UAS
capabilities for these types of events, the Coast Guard
conducts a thorough review to ensure the appropriate protection
of civil liberties and privacy rights for those individuals who
could be impacted by counter-UAS operations.
The Coast Guard also closely collaborates with the Federal
Aviation Administration for the generation and release of
public notices advising UAS operators and the public of the
location and time period when the Coast Guard will be
conducting those operations. We take our responsibility to
protect the maritime critical infrastructure and key resources
and events with the maritime nexus seriously and we look
forward to the renewal of the counter-UAS authorities granted
by the Preventing Emerging Threats Act, which enabled counter-
UAS operations in support of the Nation.
Thank you for your enduring support to the Coast Guard and
your interest in this growing mission area. I look forward to
your questions.
Chairman Correa. Thank you very much for your testimony. I
now recognize Mr. Gould to summarize his statement for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF AUSTIN GOULD, ACTING DEPUTY EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR FOR OPERATIONS SUPPORT, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Gould. Good morning, Chairman Correa, Chairwoman Watson
Coleman, Ranking Member Meijer, Ranking Member Gimenez, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittees. Thank you for the
opportunity to discuss TSA's counter-unmanned aircraft systems,
or C-UAS, activities.
From its creation in the aftermath of 9/11, TSA has
dedicated itself to strengthening the security of our Nation's
transportation systems while ensuring the freedom of movement
of people and commerce. Unmanned aircraft systems represent a
recent challenge to this security.
As you may recall, in December 2018, London's Gatwick
Airport was shut down for 33 hours following drone sightings
over the airport. This was a wake-up call for the aviation
sector. The result of the shutdown was the cancellation or
delay of over 1,000 flights, disrupted travel plans for around
140,000 passengers, and economic losses estimated in the tens
of millions of dollars.
The United States has also seen instances where aviation
operations were disrupted by drones. In January 2019, 1 month
after the Gatwick incident, Newark Liberty International
Airport in New Jersey was closed for over an hour after a drone
sighting. In March 2021, the Greensboro/High Point Airport in
North Carolina closed for 2\1/2\ hours due to drone sightings.
TSA has seen a steady increase in UAS events reported near
transportation systems. For calendar year 2021, nearly 2,000
UAS events were reported to TSA. This was a 110 percent
increase over the previous year. Of those events, about 1,500
occurred near airports, including 686 near major or Core 30
airports. While most of these events did not impact air
operations, I want to highlight that since the beginning of
2021, 49 of these events required an aircraft to take evasive
action and 5 of these were commercial flights.
In October 2018, Congress passed the Preventing Emerging
Threats Act, providing DHS and DOJ the authority to use
counter-UAS systems to protect certain covered facilities and
assets as determined by the Secretary and the Attorney General.
While TSA was not provided specific authority in the act, the
law provides limited authority for DHS to carry out activities
related to the protection of an active Federal law enforcement
investigation, emergency response, or security function that is
limited to a specific time frame and location. To that end,
response to a persistent drone at an airport constitutes such
an emergency response.
After the Gatwick event, Federal agencies, including the
Department of Justice, Department of Defense, Federal Aviation
Administration, and the Department of Homeland Security drafted
a Concept of Operations outlining how the Federal Government
would carry out actions to mitigate a similar event at one of
the Core 30 U.S. airports. This CONOPS designated TSA as the
lead Federal agency for such a response. Any use of TSA's
authority for response to a threat would include Secretary
approval and close coordination with the Federal Aviation
Administration.
Since the passage of the act and signature of the CONOPS,
TSA is prepared to protect airports and threats posed by UAS.
TSA maintains a team of Federal air marshals to execute DHS-
authorized UAS response at covered facilities or assets. TSA
also uses this team to conduct UAS-specific joint vulnerability
assessments, or JVAs. Since February 2021, TSA has conducted
these JVAs at 17 of the Core 30 airports and will complete the
remaining by the end of 2022.
TSA also requires the Federal security director, or FSD, at
every airport to develop a tactical response plan which
outlines roles and responsibilities during a UAS event. Federal
security directors conduct annual tabletop exercises of these
plans with local stakeholders, including airport authorities,
local law enforcement, the Federal Aviation Administration, and
other Federal agencies.
Last, to support the development of C-UAS capability in
airports TSA has established a technology test bed at the Miami
International Airport where TSA, in coordination with DHS S&T
and the Federal Aviation Administration, evaluates, detect,
track, and identify technology, including radar, thermal
imaging, and electro-optical cameras. These tests do not
currently involve counter or mitigating capability and are
intended to assess the performance of tracking technology in an
airport and ensure that technology complies with DHS outlined
privacy measures. The results will help us understand which
technologies are effective in actual airport environments.
Thanks to your support TSA has the funding it needs to
establish a second test bed at Los Angeles International
Airport, one of the top airports for reported sightings. This
funding will help us determine what equipment is best suited to
identify threats.
I appreciate the committee's interest in this important
issue. I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you.
Chairman Correa. Thank you, sir. Now I recognize Mr.
Michelini to summarize his statement for 5 minutes. Welcome,
sir.
STATEMENT OF DENNIS J. MICHELINI, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
COMMISSIONER FOR AIR & MARINE OPERATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS AND
BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Michelini. Thank you, sir. Good morning, Chairs Correa,
Watson Coleman, and Ranking Members Gimenez and Meijer. It is
an honor to be here today on behalf of the U.S. Customs and
Border Protection to discuss CBP's counter-UAS operations.
I started my career in border security more than 27 years
ago, first with the U.S. Border Patrol and then transitioning
to Air and Marine Operations. Nearly 10 years of my law
enforcement career have been dedicated to UAS activities and I
have witnessed first-hand the evolution of the UAS threat at
our borders.
There are three areas I would like to highlight: The
current threat of UASes at and near the border; how the
critical authorities granted by the Preventing Emerging Threats
Act enables us to respond; and the importance of improving
domain awareness to identify, deconflict, and mitigate credible
threats.
Transnational criminal organizations use drones to conduct
unauthorized surveillance of law enforcement personnel and
their activities. This results in organized criminals on the
ground becoming acutely aware of law enforcement's location.
With that information criminals and smugglers are then able to
evade detection by law enforcement and facilitate the unlawful
movement of people and illegal drugs into the country.
Additionally, drones transport goods. Although they have
limited payload capacities, the potential risk is significant.
For example, a hobby drone can manage about 4\1/2\ pounds of
payload. If that 4\1/2\ pounds was strictly fentanyl with a 10
percent purity, that single drone would be transporting 80,000
legal doses into the United States. That is one drone.
The overall volume of UAS traffic, both for legitimate
recreational and commercial purposes and criminal intent, has
rapidly expanded in the past few years. Over a recent 5-month
period, CBP sensors captured more than 30,000 drone flights
within close proximity of the Southwest Border. Nearly 15
percent of those occurred at night, which is in violation of
FAA daytime operational regulations, and nearly half exceeded
the FAA regulated altitude of 400 feet, some reaching altitudes
of 4,000 feet. However, among these more than 30,000 flights,
there were only about 4,300 unique drone IDs, indicating repeat
violations by the same UAS operators.
This illicit use of UAS threatens the safety of CBP's
front-line personnel, poses a risk to our aircraft, and
adversely affects our border security operations. However,
thanks to Congress' passage of the Preventing Emerging Threats
Act, CBP has been enabled to take targeted and deliberate
counter-UAS actions.
Consistent with the act and DHS policy, CBP implemented a
counter-UAS policy and subsequent operation plans in July 2020
to ensure efficient and appropriate application of this
authority. As authorized by DHS Secretary, CBP operates
counter-UAS devices at select active locations on the Southwest
Border and targets specific threats to covered facilities or
assets while ensuring the protection of civil rights and civil
liberties.
Authorization for counter-UAS operations is a methodical
and thoughtful process. It requires a credible threat
determination based on extensive analysis and evidence.
Since CBP's implementation of the counter-UAS operations
there have been a number of credible UAS threats mitigated. As
operations expand we will continue to apply our counter-UAS
authority with the same prudent and targeted application to
effectively identify nefarious operators and devices amongst
the expansive amount of legitimate drone traffic.
As technology evolves, counter-UAS authorities will become
even more critical. We have seen evidence of TCOs pursuing the
use of larger drones with more maneuverability, more payload
capacity, and greater capability to fly longer, higher, and
further. This means that we will require a continued commitment
to achieving persistent domain awareness.
Having the ability to fully understand the environment in
which a threat is operating is critical to protecting lives and
countering criminal organizations. With your continued support
CBP will further efforts to counter this rapidly-evolving
threat and expand our risk-based, data-driven implementation of
counter-UAS operations.
I thank you for the opportunity to appear today and look
forward to your questions.
Chairman Correa. Thank you, sir, for your statement. I want
to thank all the witnesses today. I will remind the
subcommittee that we will each have 5 minutes to question the
panel and I will recognize myself for 5 minutes of questions.
I will start out by, Mr. Michelini, if I may, I was
disturbed by your statement because it shows the emerging
threat of these drones in many ways. That is the defense side.
What about the offensive side? Are you looking at using--are we
using drones at the Northern and Southern Border to make sure
that we are looking, observing those things that are going on
at our borders?
Mr. Michelini. Absolutely. Small UAS and drones, both
rather large up at altitude, or small UAS as deployed by both
USBP and OFO, are used extensively. But in the context of
counter-UAS it is that environment where you can understand who
is the players on each side. That gets very, very complicated
without the sophistication of a domain awareness technology out
there.
But to go back to your opening statement, absolutely, both
law enforcement and, of course, the cartels are using small UAS
for their benefit.
Chairman Correa. So, if I may ask, clearly when we develop
policy we coordinate with Federal, local, State agencies to
make sure that we are all on the same page. Do we do that also
dealing with the Canadian authorities or the Mexican
authorities and other nations that we may have to coordinate
when it comes to drone activity?
Mr. Michelini. We absolutely do. Within the United States
we coordinate, of course, with the FAA and State and local for
any kind of work we are doing along the Southwest Border. There
is a lot of coordination that has to get done between manned
and unmanned, these small UASes, in the environment of the
Southwest Border on the U.S. side. When dealing with, for
instance, Mexico, there are resource restraints on either side,
and so while we can be mitigating threats from small UASes
crossing the border back and forth, and through further
investigations, both us and the Mexican law enforcement can
work together.
But I would have to say is on a case-by-case basis with
just----
Chairman Correa. When you say you can work together, what
do you need to actually work together between consistently?
Mr. Michelini. Well, yes, at the ground level the
relationships are fantastic, again, with resources available.
There is a lot of moving parts on the Southwest Border.
On the northern side, for the detection that we employ,
that is done by just us on the U.S. side. That is I am not
aware of any mitigation capabilities or domain awareness for
small UAS on the southern side.
Chairman Correa. Mr. Michelini, my questions are really
directed at trying to anticipate this area that is already a
very threatening emerging challenge. We would love to, as
policy makers, get ahead of it, so that as we move forward we
were there instead of what we should have, could have. Let us
get ahead of this threat.
Second of all, let me move in my last 2 minutes to Ms.
Vinograd. To what extent has the Department of Homeland
Security included the Office of Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties and Privacy Office in developing your guidelines and
policies?
Ms. Vinograd. Chairman, thank you for such an important
question. As I mentioned, the Department's C-UAS mission is to
mitigate credible threats to the safety and security of DHS
missions and to do so in a way that is consistent with privacy
and civil rights and civil liberties. DHS conducts every single
C-UAS operation consistent with the privacy provisions and
civil rights and civil liberty provisions in the act as well as
the First and Fourth Amendment and other relevant Federal
statutes.
The Department does have DHS-wide policy guidance that has
a specific annex on privacy and civil rights and civil
liberties, developed in close coordination with our chief
privacy officer and civil rights and civil liberties officer.
Further, every component that engages in C-UAS operations has
component-specific privacy and civil rights and civil liberties
guidance. Every authorized individual within the Department
that engages in C-UAS operations is required to receive
training specifically on the act and the existing privacy and
civil rights and civil liberties provisions.
Finally, sir, the Department has published a public privacy
impact assessment. Every component program, in coordination
with our privacy officer, every component program must be
accompanied by a privacy threshold assessment and, where
needed, a specific privacy impact assessment.
Chairman Correa. Thank you very much for your comments. It
seems that I am out of time. I will now recognize the Ranking
Member of the committee, Mr. Meijer, for 5 minutes of
questions.
Mr. Meijer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to get a little
bit more into the authorities, Mr. Michelini. Since CBP started
using the authorities in the act in late 2021, you mentioned
several of the UAS incidents had been mitigated and the drug
seizures that have resulted and the arrests that have followed
from those. How is CBP looking at continued use of the
authorities and what is the alternative if there is an
expiration of these authorities in October?
Mr. Michelini. Well, the authorities are essential for both
domain awareness, seeing the threat environment, and mitigating
the nonparticipant actors that you want to. It would be very
hard to go forward in an environment where the authorities ere
not established. It is--I am sorry, sir.
Mr. Meijer. Please.
Mr. Michelini. It is a tidal change what is happening with
small UAS strategically on the interplay between what is going
on on the Southwest Border. I think you are going to hear it
from any of the members here today and the panelists, the
change is--we have had 5 near misses with small UAS in the last
year and a half. In an environment, in a helicopter like I used
to fly where there is not supposed to be a lot of players
around, that is pretty staggering. We have had just in the last
year-and-a-half thousands of crossers of small UAS. It is a
subject that has to get addressed and I believe the Department
is doing an excellent job of moving forward in a thorough and
methodical fashion to get this done.
Mr. Meijer. Rear Admiral Clendenin, kind-of a similar
question on your side. You know, obviously, CBP, there is a
little bit more flexibility when we are talking about an
international border and some of the restrictions and implicit
authorities there. But within kind-of Coast Guard's broader
domain or just homeland security in general, what is your view
on how--what restrictions would we put in place or what
opportunities that we currently have to protect the homeland,
to protect against, you know, counter-UAS if these authorities
were to expire in October?
Admiral Clendenin. Ranking Member, in short, we would not
be able to conduct these operations without the provisions of
the Preventing Emerging Threats Act. Right now the provisions
are sufficient for our operations as we run them, but we also
share the concern of the proliferation of the use of UAS around
secure facilities and assets. So we would look forward to the
continuation of the PETA act, sir.
Mr. Meijer. Thank you. Shifting a little bit to Mr. Gould,
can you explain TSA's role in protecting against UAS around
commercial airports? I know you mentioned kind-of those top 30
airports, but does TSA need additional authority to be able to
successfully protect, you know, a broader array of airports? I
represent Grand Rapids, Michigan, and we are not a top 30
airport, you know, we are top 100. What does the expansion of
that counter-UAS capability look like? As I mentioned, is there
additional authorities needed to protect a broader array of
civil aviation assets?
Mr. Gould. Yes, sir. Thank you very much for that question.
The authority we have right now allows us to, as you said,
conduct counter-UAS operations in Core 30 airports subject to
the approval of the Secretary. That omits airports like you
mentioned, your home airport.
Right now we are involved in doing joint vulnerability
assessments of these larger airports, which identify drone
launching sites, potential areas for surveillance where a drone
operator can cause an issue at an airport. We also do our
tactical response plans and our exercises annually. We are
radically advancing our knowledge of UAS activity around
airports through our test bed in Miami.
However, our ability to respond is purely reactive at this
point. I believe that authorities that would allow us to be
more proactive, particularly in terms to detect, track, and
identify, to assess when there is a threat, where it is coming
from, and respond accordingly will be essential moving forward.
Thank you.
Mr. Meijer. Thank you. No, and I think, you know, obviously
we are looking at both the accidental and the intentional use
of UAS to cause harm. You know, Mr. Michelini, as you
mentioned, you wouldn't expect border airspace at lower
altitudes to be congested, but when you have rotary wing assets
that are going through and potentially running into these, you
know, it is only a matter of time before we lose the alliance
of some of our brave folks who are guarding down there.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Correa. Thank you very much. I now recognize
Chairwoman Watson Coleman for 5 minutes of questions.
Chairwoman Watson Coleman. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman, and thank you to the witnesses for sharing your
information. I want to start with a question to Secretary
Vinograd. How frequently or regularly does DHS interact with
and collaborate with the civil rights and civil liberties
entities that expressed concern about this bill and this
authority?
Ms. Vinograd. Chairwoman, thank you. The Department of
Homeland Security is working through the Office--our chief
privacy officer and the Office of Privacy as well as our Office
of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties does engage with members of
the communities that you have mentioned.
Further, as we look forward and as we acknowledge the
escalating threat environment as well as the need to
judiciously apply any authorities that DHS currently has or may
be granted going forward, DHS is committed to continuing
engagement with members of the communities that you described
to ensure that we understand the concerns.
Chairwoman Watson Coleman. Thank you, Assistant Secretary.
I want to get a handle on understanding how regularly you
interact, get feedback from, and give information to these
organizations and entities because they have serious concerns.
I get it that drones can be really a real threat, those that
are intentionally malicious and those that are innocent. But
what I want to know is, how--to what degree are we respecting
those concerns of those agencies or entities? So, how regularly
does your Department, whatever office it is, interact with
them?
Ms. Vinograd. Chairwoman----
Chairwoman Watson Coleman. If at all.
Ms. Vinograd. Chairwoman, thank you. I can tell you today
that we regularly interact with members of those communities. I
am happy to follow up with you after this hearing with more
specific information and details on those interactions.
I will say this----
Chairwoman Watson Coleman. Thank you.
Ms. Vinograd [continuing]. The C-UAS program at DHS is not
a surveillance program. It is used to mitigate credible
threats. The C-UAS program is also deeply focused on
transparency.
Chairwoman Watson Coleman. I am there with you. I am there
with you. I really appreciate your willingness to get to me
after the fact. I specifically would like to know what DHS's
policy is and actually what it has done as it relates to
consistent, dependable interaction and collaboration with these
groups. So, through the Chairman of this subcommittee meeting,
I would like to ask that information be sent to us.
Again, I would like to ask you what data precisely is
captured during a UAS mitigation? Do you believe DHS could
under the current statute capture additional data or are there
existing statutory protections against capturing more data than
is strictly necessary to mitigate the UAS?
Ms. Vinograd. Chairwoman, thank you. Under the provisions
of the act DHS currently only collects data on the signal
between the control device and the UAV. That includes, for
example, telemetry and location information. Currently, the
Department of Homeland Security does not collect and is not
able to access, for example, call logs or text messages or the
contents, let us say, of what the control device actually is.
Further, consistent with the act, DHS only retains that
data for under 180 days. Again, it is not the intent of any C-
UAS operations to collect any personal information that may be
related to the control device or the UAV. DHS has judiciously
respected these provisions in the act and will continue to do
so going forward.
Chairwoman Watson Coleman. Listen, I did have another
question, but I really don't have enough time, so let me just
share this. I am someone that believes that drones are a
potential threat, that they are a real threat, and that we do
need to have protection of our safety and security. I also
believe very, very intently that our values are mightily
important to protect as well, and that is our privacy, our due
process, and things of that nature.
So, I am very much interested at some point in just hearing
what you think is missing, what you think you all need more of,
how you respond to some of the areas that we think there needs
to be a clarity in understanding exactly what you can engage in
and how you can engage in and how you can act when you issue
warrants, et cetera.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield, but there are
so many more questions that we do have with regard to the
implementation, the appropriate implementation, of legislation
of this nature. I yield back.
Chairman Correa. Mrs. Watson Coleman, I couldn't agree with
you more. So many more questions. Thank you very much for
those.
I would like to recognize now the Ranking Member of the
Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security, the
gentleman from Florida, Mr. Gimenez, for 5 minutes of
questions. Welcome, sir.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Chairman Correa. I also couldn't
agree more with Chairwoman Watson Coleman about not only is it
a threat, the coming threat, we have a threat now, but I think
it is actually going to get worse. So I have a series of
questions.
First, I want to relay something that happened to me in
like around 2017. I had the privilege of going to Israel as the
mayor of Miami-Dade to look at technology. I can tell you that
the Israelis were extremely concerned about drones, especially
around the airport, Ben Gurion Airport. That is why really at
MIA we have a pilot program right now because of that concern
that came out of that trip to Israel.
There are two concerns that I have. The current technology
is piloted unmanned air systems, but I am actually more
concerned about future technology, or maybe current technology,
which is unpiloted unmanned aircraft systems, basically a
system where you can actually tell it what to do and it goes
off. Right now we have lot of capability in intercepting and
interfering with communications with piloted, you know,
unmanned air systems. I don't believe we have any capability
about unpiloted because they are not being piloted by anybody.
They are basically intelligent.
Going back, though, to the border, Mr. Michelini, you see
thousands of unmanned air systems flying around all the time at
the Southern Border. You see them, you detect them, you know
what they're doing and all that. What can you do about them?
Mr. Michelini. The commanded and non-commanded, those are
complicated subjects that I think in a--there are some options
out there, but I think we should maybe talk about that in a
closed hearing for that.
Mr. Gimenez. Fair enough.
Mr. Michelini. But for the piloted one, it is not just what
you see, it is the preponderance of what you don't see. I had a
story I can remember hearing like a year-and-a-half ago is one
of the first times we put--we turned on these devices, they saw
40 or 45--and by the way, these are not--the ranges of what
they see are not very far. They saw 40 targets that nobody was
aware of. Both counter drone on the--it was counter, counter
for the--on the Mexican side, and also, small UASs crossing the
border. So, the amount out there is really staggering. This
authorization, though, is the foundation to how we are going to
address our domain awareness gaps on the Southwest Border. It
is essential to keep this running.
Mr. Gimenez. Do you have the authority to take them down if
they are considered to be a threat?
Mr. Michelini. We do mitigate. We do mitigate small UAS. It
is a methodical process. We set up an area that we have a high
risk and we walk through a process that is built to trickle
down from the DHS policy straight to CBP. So, we do have that
authority.
Mr. Gimenez. Now, Mr. Gould, I still have a concern, a
major concern of we can see them, we can interrupt them,
interrupt their capabilities once they get into a--there is a
zone, right? There is a barrier. There is like a fence, right?
Those piloted unmanned aerial systems we could do something
about, or many of them. It is the unpiloted aerial systems that
really concern me and the capabilities that they may have in
the future, especially carrying destructive payloads, OK, into
an airport. Do you have the authority now to take these down if
they cross over into restricted air space?
Mr. Gould. Sir, DHS has the authority to mitigate counter-
UAS in accordance with an emergency response or a security
incident like I discussed in my opening statement. As a lead
Federal agency, TSA is--TSA is the lead Federal agency under
that authority. In terms of having the capability to actually
do that today, we do not.
Mr. Gimenez. Fair enough.
Mr. Gould. We are focused on detect, track, and identify. I
would like to highlight your concern. I met with the Center for
the Protection of National Infrastructure, which is the United
Kingdom's version of infrastructure protection, prior to this
hearing to discuss the Gatwick incident. They believe that at
least on some of those flights, when Gatwick shut down it was a
drone operating exactly as you said. No connection to a ground
control station, purely by GPS waypoints. Difficult to detect,
difficult to interdict.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I think that we need
to probe further into this about what we are doing about are we
funding sufficient research in order to obtain offensive
capability, a defensive capability which is offensive in
nature, we are basically taking them down. Because I really do
believe that it is a matter of when, not if, some--a major
event is going to be happening either at the border, or is
going to be happening at one of our airports, or one of our
transportation hubs through the use of these unmanned systems.
Thank you, and I yield back.
Chairman Correa. Mr. Gimenez, I couldn't agree with you
more. What I would like to do is follow up with a closed
discussion with Mr. Michelini on some of these issues at the
border and these drones. So, I would like to have the staff try
to schedule that. Thank you very much. Now, I would like to
recognize Mr. Payne for 5 minutes of questions. Welcome, sir.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Correa. Welcome.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, sir. Mr. Gould, several unmanned
aircraft systems incursions have been reported at airports and
the one you mentioned at Newark Liberty International in
January 2019, where planes were altered and diverted for over
an hour as you stated. Would you briefly discus the ability of
drones to disrupt airport operations and what impact this has
on travelers and airport employees. Are there measures Congress
can take to support Transportation Security Administration to
address this threat?
Mr. Gould. Thank you very much for the question, sir. With
respect to the incident, New York Liberty--or New Jersey--
Newark Liberty International Airport, the drone actually was
not that close to Newark. It was flying at 35,000 feet over
Teterboro Airport, which is a municipal airport sort-of
adjacent to Newark.
Mr. Payne. Yes.
Mr. Gould. But it was in a flight path for Newark
International Airport. Thirty-five hundred feet is far above
the altitude that a drone operator is allowed to fly. They are
limited to 400 feet. It was high enough to interfere with a
flight path. That interference at an airport is--has an
exceptional, exceptional effect. Flights need to be diverted.
They need to be rerouted. Airports sometimes are large enough
where you can just use a different runway. However, the drones
are mobile. If it was someone who was determined to really
cause a disruption to the air space, they could just relocate
the drone to the new air space that is being used.
So, it is a significant problem with a cascading effect of
airport delays, inconvenience to travelers, disruption of
airport workers, disruption of security. It is a very, very
significant event.
Sir, I am not sure if you had more than that that you
asked. I couldn't quite hear the end of your question.
Mr. Payne. I asked what could Congress do to help you along
the way in addressing, you know, to support the TSA in
addressing the threat?
Mr. Gould. Sir, thank you very much for that. I think, like
the other witnesses, I think renewal of this authorization is
essential. From TSA's perspective, not only to Mr. Meier's
question earlier about would we go beyond the core 30 airports,
which increased authorities would allow us to do, it would also
allow us to protect other modes of transportation because this
is not unique to the airport environment. Pipelines,
refineries, railroads are all subject to unmanned aerial
systems incursions that right now we do not any authority to
respond to. Thank you.
Mr. Payne. OK. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, in light of the
size of the committee today, I will yield back.
Chairman Correa. Thank you, Mr. Payne. Now, I recognize Mr.
Bishop for 5 minutes of questions. Welcome, sir.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Chairman Correa. Mr. Michelini, as I
am listening and I understand there is this authority needs to
be renewed. I don't know the details in the confines of the
authority, but what I think I heard you say or it comes out in
the testimony in the memos I have looked at, is there is a lot
of--there are a lot of drones flying back and forth across the
U.S.-Mexico border. Is that correct?
Mr. Michelini. That is correct.
Mr. Bishop. I don't think your microphone came on. But that
is correct.
Mr. Michelini. Correct.
Mr. Bishop. OK. You gave a couple figures. I don't know
whether they include both things that are drones just on the
U.S. side and those going back and forth, but you mentioned
4,300 unique IDs. In other words, 4,300 different drones up in
the air and 30,000 flights in the last 6 months. Is that what
you said?
Mr. Michelini. That were recorded, correct.
Mr. Bishop. That you recorded. You know, so, anyway we get
new terms, you know. We got UAS and then we got C-UAS, counter-
USOs, I would say anti-drone mechanisms, that you got
available. Sounds like they are surveillance things so you can
pick out more of them. Is that right? You can find them. You
can see them.
Mr. Michelini. So, with the counter-UAS technology we have,
it--I want you to think of it as both, you know, to detect and
mitigate. Typical radar that is used in the manned aviation
environment, they are not really picking this up. So, when we
started down this process of counter-UAS, it was both the
technologies to detect and then the technologies with the
authorities to mitigate.
Mr. Bishop. So, mitigate, if I read the memo or it was
maybe a summary of the memo correctly, it sounds like you can
maybe jam a transmitter and force the thing to land or
something. Is that sort-of the right idea?
Mr. Michelini. Right. There is communication between--not
to go down that other line--but there is communication between
the operator and the small UAS or drone. When the communication
is just interrupted, usually what happens is, whether you own a
small UAS or not, it will have a return to home or some sort of
land function to it.
Mr. Bishop. OK. So, I get it. I get mitigation sounds
pretty timid and so does that when I hear it described. I mean,
Mr. Gimenez asked a question, do you have the authority to take
them down? I can't understand. Maybe you could just help me
understand. Are there legitimate reasons for cross-border drone
flights? Because we don't allow anybody--I mean, well, we are
not supposed to allow anybody to come into the United States.
Unfortunately, in the current state of affairs, we allow tons
of people to come into the United States illegally. But I don't
understand the reason that we would allow drones to come into
the United States. Why don't we shoot them down?
Mr. Michelini. Well, in a kinetic response like that, we
don't--we haven't--CBP is mitigating by bringing them out of
the sky. They are returning to the ground, but we have not done
kinetic responses like that.
Mr. Bishop. Yes, I guess I am asking as a policy matter if
you are able to speak to it. Maybe not, I will get Ms.
Vinograd, but--if that is the right pronunciation of your name.
Forgive me, I didn't catch that earlier. But what is the policy
reason? I am just thinking about it from the perspective of
Americans watching this hearing that may say, well, why would
we allow? Staff had a notation in the memo that one drone has
had 1,500 flights across the border. I don't understand why we
permit that.
Mr. Michelini. Well, it is not for not trying, sir. This is
a brand-new technology that we are forwarding to the Southwest
Border. What we look for are specific areas that there is a
high risk, multiple crossers, and then we set up with what
technology we have, and we begin a, you know, a con op, an
operation in that location. But it has, like I said, there is a
lot going on right now that this Act is helping us finally
target and address.
Mr. Bishop. I hear you. I am concerned about whether the
Act goes far enough, I guess, is what I am trying to ask about.
Mr. Michelini. Understood.
Mr. Bishop. So, I get that you said that the drones are
used by Mexican cartels, both to detect your movements and
locations so that they can facilitate smuggling with it. I
think you said they are flying in drugs. We know what a small
quantity of fentanyl will do.
Mr. Michelini. Mm-hmm.
Mr. Bishop. So, they can fly drugs into the United States.
Mr. Michelini. Yes, in small amounts. But again, just the
idea of being overhead to help move a group that might be
backpackers with drugs, which could be even more, is a
fantastic strategic tool by the cartels. So, both are very
nefarious and very dangerous.
Mr. Bishop. Yes. Yes, how do I pronounce your name?
Ms. Vinograd. My last name is Vinograd.
Mr. Bishop. Vinograd.
Ms. Vinograd. Indeed.
Mr. Bishop. I beg your pardon. Ms. Vinograd, you are the
policy person here.
Ms. Vinograd. Yes.
Mr. Bishop. Why are we content to let Mexican cartels
operate drones to cross the United States border? Why don't we
take them down? Why isn't that a threat to the United States
National security? We wouldn't allow airplanes to fly in, would
we?
Ms. Vinograd. We would not. Let me assure you, sir, that
the Department does not believe that it is appropriate or
acceptable for cartels or transnational criminal organizations,
more generally, to bring illicit substances across the border.
Currently, the Secretary has designated parts of the Southwest
Border as a covered facility or asset, which gives my CBP
colleagues the authority to track--excuse me--to detect,
identify, track, and mitigate C-UAS that pose a credible threat
to DHS mission sets.
At this juncture, CBP, and I will defer to my CBP
colleague, feels confident that they have the appropriate
authorities as well as operational plan to mitigate these
threats. We are consistently reviewing the threat environment,
both as it pertains to what parts of the border are designated
as covered facilities or assets, and whether additional
mitigation technologies are needed. In a closed hearing, sir,
we would be glad to go into further details on what those
mitigation techniques look like.
Mr. Bishop. My time has expired, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Correa. Thank you. I just wanted to follow up on
your comments, which is I would love to, in a closed hearing,
talk to Ms. Vinograd and Mr. Michelini about how many of those
are actually real threats? How many of those are just people,
knuckleheads, who don't understand that this toy is actually
causing possible dangers to themselves and other people and
other assets?
You know, you go down to the local store, you buy one of
these drones. You decide to fly it up. I just I am wondering if
this is an educational issue where people don't understand this
is not a toy in the context of its use. Anyway, we will talk
about that in a closed session later on.
Now, I would like to recognize Ms. Titus from Nevada for 5
minutes of questions.
Ms. Titus. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just going back
to Mr. Bishop's point about why don't we shoot them down? I
don't think it is quite that simple. I don't think you start
firing off rockets to shoot down drones in neighborhoods or
along the border or along the river where people live and all.
Could maybe Mr. Gould just address that? Some of the problems
that would exist if we just start firing off rockets to shoot
down these drones.
Mr. Gould. Well, thank you for the question, ma'am. Right
now, from a TSA perspective, we are focused solely on detect,
track, and identify in the airport environment. Airports have a
lot of ambient energy. Detection systems that might work in a
very open area will be adversely affected by that ambient
energy. Our ability to mitigate a drone event at an airport
really is predicated on our ability to find it and ensure that
it has some sort of nefarious intent or inadvertent
encroachment on an air space.
With respect to mitigation, like I said from a TSA
perspective, we are not quite there yet. We do consider the
communications link disruption that will bring the drone down
to a safe landing either by the operator or in a predetermined
location. In terms of actual kinetic responses like had been
discussed, we are not really contemplating that yet.
Ms. Titus. Well, and just to continue that conversation. I
know that in Las Vegas a lot of people are using drones within
that 5-mile parameter around McCarran Airport to try to take
pictures of the Las Vegas Strip, which is right at the heart of
my district. You know, they know they are not supposed to be
there. I don't know if you consider taking pictures of the
Strip nefarious or not, but certainly, they cause harm. Often
they make a plane have to be diverted or can't take off or
something like that. Could you talk a little bit more about
what we could do as Members of Congress to help you deal with
those kinds of threats?
Mr. Gould. Well, right now, thank you very much to the
Congress for funding our test bed----
Ms. Titus. I am sorry, I can't hear you.
Mr. Gould [continuing]. In Miami and soon to be Los Angles
so we can do detect, track, and identify activities.
Ms. Titus. Hello? I lost you. Reed? I lost him.
Mr. Gould. Ma'am, are you there?
Ms. Titus. Reed?
Chairman Correa. Hello?
Ms. Titus. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. I can't--they just
turned off.
Chairman Correa. We are here. Can you hear us?
Ms. Titus. I can't hear them.
Chairman Correa. Ms. Titus, can you hear us? Hello?
Ms. Titus. I didn't touch anything.
Chairman Correa. A drone attack. Can you answer the
question, if you can.
Mr. Gould. Would you like me to finish the response?
Chairman Correa. Yes, please.
Mr. Gould. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am well
aware of the drone situation in Las Vegas as well. The Las
Vegas Strip is a very attractive location for people to film.
There was a commercial aviation aircraft on final approach to
Las Vegas that was actually tailed by a drone, photographing it
not too, too long ago.
So, back to our detect, track, and identify mission that we
are testing out in Miami, I cannot emphasize the importance of
that work enough. It allows us to quantify the problem in the
airport environment and to expand it to other airports. In
Miami, specifically, we had about 105 reports of UAS in the
last year from a visual reporting perspective using technology
down there that never exceeds 20,000. Now, these are not all
near the airport. It is in the greater Miami area. But many of
them are clustered around the airport. Pursuing our detect,
track, and identify capability will help us address that
problem. Thank you, ma'am.
Ms. Titus. Thank you. Well, Mr. Chairman, maybe we can work
on some of that, it could be helpful to address this problem
with TSA.
Chairman Correa. Ms. Titus, you have a minute left.
Ms. Titus. That is all right. I will yield back. That was
mainly what I was concerned about. Thank you.
Chairman Correa. Thank you, Ms. Titus. Now, I would like to
recognize the gentlelady from Mrs. Harshbarger--the gentlelady
from Tennessee, Mrs. Harshbarger. Ma'am.
Mrs. Harshbarger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am a
gentlelady. Thank you to the witnesses today. I do have some
concerns and I would like to direct question to Mr. Michelini.
You know, it was--you mentioned that these drones go from 400
foot to 4,000 and, you know, it is the same offenders time
after time. There are going to be larger drones used to
increase the payload that they are carrying.
You know, I have read reports that the drug cartels are
using these drones to facilitate the movement of drugs, illegal
drugs over the Southwest Border.
I guess my question is, I know Mr. Gimenez was talking
about taking these drones out, but from what I understand, you
can render the software useless and you can cut those off. I am
looking at a recent report about a U.S. provider, Vector
Graphics, editing software who closed access to the services
for those drones. Is that a possibility? Do you know the make
and model and what type? You have listed that there has been
4,300 drones identified because you do have to register those.
But, you know, my question is what capabilities does CBP have
to counter these transcriminal--transnational criminal and drug
trafficking organizations on the border? Can we do that with
that software?
Mr. Michelini. We absolutely can. I mean, for the hardware
and software that we utilize across the Southwest Border, we
can--we use other metrics necessarily than just their ID
number. It is a little complicated in that we are working very
close with the FAA and that is how we deconflict what may be a
rancher or somebody flying their small UAS and a nefarious
character using a small UAS. It is not quite as easy as to do
with a manned aircraft where it is on a radar target and you
can see it. First you have to set up these counter-UAS devices
and detect it.
One of the problems, though, is you could buy a small UAS
right now and it might have a ceiling. It might have a built-in
ceiling of 400 feet. If you take it out and try to fly it, the
software knows where it is. Well, when you hear these examples
about them flying higher, either that was pre-software or
people have gone around the software kind-of limits on their
platforms. So, while you can, you know, this is just how crime
works is while you can set software limits in a piece of
machinery, once you buy it, though, things can be altered.
Mrs. Harshbarger. Yes. Well, that is crazy. You know, 4,000
foot that is--that is BFR for a small aircraft, you know, a
personal aircraft, personal pilot. So, you know, that is a
little bit crazy. Do you know the models or which drones, I
guess, you are confiscating more of? That is why I am asking.
Or the make and model----
Mr. Michelini. We do know----
Mrs. Harshbarger [continuing]. Of those drones? Because,
you know, DJI is a Chinese drone. I am just questioning what
you are seeing.
Mr. Michelini. Well, they command about 80 percent of the
market. So, predominantly, we would see that company. I don't
have on me right now the specifics of the companies that we are
tracking or the few that we have interdicted but that is
information I could get to you.
Mrs. Harshbarger. Yes, that would be great. You know, and
like you say, they can alter that software later on. It is
terrible but we see the increase of drugs and the increase in
the payload that they, you know, drop across the border is we
already have problems. So, that is just going--it is not going
to mitigate it all. It is just going to increase the problem
with the drug flow. So, with that, Chairman, I thank you for
your time and I yield back.
Chairman Correa. Thank you, ma'am. Now, I would like to
recognize the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, for 5
minutes of questions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
Ranking Members of the respective Transportation and Oversight
Committee. This is a continuous important issue and an issue
that we should certainly focus on. Again, to the witnesses, let
me express my appreciation.
Let me just simply say this is really about saving lives. I
guess I immediately think of, in addition to the other elements
of this problem, is loss of life in a flying commercial
airline. Let me ask Rear Admiral Clendenin, if I would, and Mr.
Gould, what is it most of all that DHS or the Department would
like to do in the future to be more protective or to really to
cease or to bring down the potential damage with the use of
drones by individuals and possibly terrorists?
Admiral Clendenin. Thank you, Congresswoman. So, right now,
we have the authorities and the capabilities we need to
complete our pilot program. Once we complete our pilot program,
we will move to what we call program of record, a more
permanent both in the types of systems we acquire and the
numbers that we need to support our maritime security
operations. As we do that, we will communicate with the
Department and with the administration and with Congress for
any additional needs. But as we stand right now, we have what
we need to complete the pilot as long as we can continue the
PETA authorization.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Gould.
Mr. Gould. Ma'am, thank you for the question as well. Right
now, our authorities are--DHS's authorities are limited to the
core 30 airports. They are very reactive and they are for a
limited time, limited duration, for a very discrete event. In
the future, I believe that additional authorities for other
airport environments, as well as other modes of transportation,
are essential. As I said before, pipelines, rail systems, major
terminals, cruise ships, they are all subject to the same sort
of nefarious drone activities we see at an airport. Being able
to go beyond the core 30 airports to those other modes of
transportation, I think, is very important. Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Gould, I am going to continue with you
because I thank you for that openness. I don't think many
Members, except for your testimony, realize that you have a
limitation when we have over 300 million people and the land
mass that we have here in the United States. Why don't you
probe that a little bit more as to how dangerous it is to leave
these other elements out of oversight and the authorization
that you would need.
Ms. Vinograd. Chairwoman, if I may just jump in for one
moment. Thank you for articulating some of the gaps in existing
DHS authorities. The administration will be in the very near
future submitting a legislative proposal to Congress that
articulates the gaps that we seek to address in the
reauthorization process.
I will note that in the statutory assessment that was
provided to Congress in December, the administration did review
and articulate gaps that we do see, which include the proactive
and persistent protection of airports by DHS. DHS currently
does not have the authority to engage in that proactive and
persistent activity further.
We have articulated that airports do not have the authority
to, for example, purchase equipment to, unto themselves, engage
in detection and mitigation of unmanned aircraft system
threats. So, we look forward to submitting that legislative
proposal to you and to addressing these gaps based on the
escalating threat environment.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank you. I think I had posed the
question to Mr. Gould as to the extent of the potential danger
to TSA. Mr. Gould.
Mr. Gould. Ma'am, I agree with my colleague from the
Department on where we are at on this. Drones present a threat
in the airport environment and the transportation environment
writ large. It is a very challenging threat. It is a very
dynamic threat. The proliferation of drones are growing
significantly. Detecting them, identifying friend from foe,
legitimate operations from perhaps malicious operators, is a
true challenge in transportation venues. It is one that we need
to address with the whole-of-Government solution. I am very
pleased----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Gould [continuing]. With our emergency--oh, go ahead,
ma'am, sorry.
Ms. Jackson Lee. No, I just said thank you very much. Let
me just get in a last question of how much are we fearful of
terrorist utilization of these drones? Someone can quickly
answer.
Ms. Vinograd. We are deeply concerned by the potential use
of malicious threat actors including terrorist organizations
related to the use of unmanned aircraft systems.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, I look forward to working with the
committee and working with the administration for a very
important issue. I thank the witnesses for their testimony. Mr.
Chairman, I thank you for your indulgence. I yield back.
Chairman Correa. Thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee. Any other
Members wish to ask questions under this first round of
questioning? Seeing none, I would ask the committee if anybody
would like a second run of questions? That is an affirmative.
Ranking member.
Mr. Gimenez. It is just not a question, really. I really
want to push forward with this committee looking at what we are
doing as a Nation to, you know, we can detect them. We know
they are there. What can we do about it, OK? We need to do--we
need to work on the capabilities of doing something about it
sooner rather than later. So, I would hope that this committee
can have a closed session on that in the near future. Thank
you.
Chairman Correa. Mr. Gimenez, I would just comment that I
concur with you. Before we get there, I would like to have that
closed session with some of these folks here to get a better
picture of what we are facing and what action we need to at
least to begin to address the emerging threats.
Mr. Gimenez. If I could just make one more comment. We
don't have to shoot missiles at them, OK? So, I mean, I want to
get that off the table, OK? There are other ways that you can
mitigate and have an offensive capability, a defensive
capability against these without being missiles. I, you know,
in the news, the Israelis are doing some stuff with this.
Anyway, that is some of the things that we really need to look
at.
Chairman Correa. Mr. Gimenez, I totally agree with you
because I think it starts out with education. Again, take care
of the knucklehead factor, which are people just think it is
cute to fly their drone into an airport area, which without
understanding the implications after that. Then you got that
criminal element. Then we go to the next level of action. Mr.
Bishop, you had some questions, please.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Correa. Five minutes, go.
Mr. Bishop. I am going to pursue the same avenue. I do
think, to Ms. Titus' point, I certainly don't think we should
be firing missiles at drones in Las Vegas. A lot of things
happen in Las Vegas. I think that would be a bad modification.
I see----
Chairman Correa. Well, it would stay in Las Vegas, right?
Mr. Bishop. It would stay in Las Vegas, I am not sure. I
think we are conflating a couple pieces of this that require
different responses. So, Mr. Gould, I am very sensitive to the
difficulties of figuring out how to mitigate the problem of
drones, both the nefarious ones and ones that are just sort-of
idiots operating their drone around to take pictures around
U.S. airports. I get that.
I see a very different picture in terms of cross-border
flights from Mexico. So, Mr. Michelini, I will sort-of return
to you. It is funny, you know, I know it is--you guys are
engaged in very sophisticated business. I appreciate that you
are. But we always kind-of revert to language like we are going
to mitigate the threat, which doesn't really tell me what the--
and then it turns out you are jamming their signal so they got
to land their drone. That doesn't really seem to do it to me.
So, to Mr. Gimenez' point, I don't even know what it
requires. I don't profess to be a technical expert. But I want
to ask again because you have said that there are cross-border
flights to bring in drones, or at least that potential exists.
You said there are cross-border flights, you know, in large
numbers. I can't think of a legitimate reason for a cross-
border drone flight from Mexico. Now, if one goes from the
United States over to that side, I really can't see why that
would be either, unless they are yours.
So, what is the reason that would be legitimate for there
to be a cross-border drone flight? There appear to be lots of
them. Why would it be, in your judgment, reasonable to limit
our policy to, at best, the mitigation you have described,
which is causing that drone to land? I can tell you that I
don't think if you blew up a bunch of Mexican cartel drones,
particularly the heavy ones you are talking about, I don't
think they would keep doing it.
Mr. Michelini. No. Well, first of all, you are absolutely
correct that there should be no cross-border flights of small
UASs, right? That is illegal. Part 107 does not allow that. The
same before, you can't go above 400 feet without a waiver, and
there are no cross-border flights. To use that word that you
brought up, mitigation, that is what we do though. The aircraft
will either flutter down to the ground where we are or return.
But it is incapable then of--it is done. We have stopped that
threat in that case.
Mr. Bishop. Is it technically not possible to destroy them?
Mr. Michelini. I can just tell you since I have been in
this program, we haven't run down that corridor yet. So, it is
just something that hasn't been explored.
Chairman Correa. Is the answer to that question one under
behind closed doors? I think we can discuss it.
Mr. Michelini. Well, we can probably pursue. I am sure--
like I am sure DOD, who has authority to do this is in a
different category than us. Like again, this is a brand-new
authority for us. It is only a few years old. We have taken a
very careful way to go forward with it. That is exactly where
we are right now. We feel pretty comfortable with where we are,
and in absolutely growing these capabilities. We just haven't
entertained that one.
Chairman Correa. Thank you. I am going to recognize Mrs.
Harshbarger, who would like to----
Mr. Bishop. Mr. Chairman, could I ask one more? I have
still----
Chairman Correa. Sure.
Mr. Bishop [continuing]. Time still here.
Chairman Correa. OK, go ahead. Go ahead.
Mr. Bishop. Or it was before they clicked. Just one thing
further. You know, I noticed that in September of last year,
FAA issued a no-fly order for drones for a period of time
because there were so many in the air. It was really
triggered--I got the impression it was directed at news
organizations because they were having this influx of Haitian
migrants at the time. If you can do that, why couldn't you just
follow the same course and issue--get an FAA order to have no
flights across the border?
Mr. Michelini. So the TFR, the temporary flight restriction
that was set up, again, you have to appreciate that is just set
up for people who are willing to participate, right? So, if you
are a cartel member and you set up a no-fly zone somewhere, you
wouldn't necessarily follow it. So, we are back to the category
we were before where we have to detect them and mitigate the
threat.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Correa. Thank you, Mr. Bishop. Now, again, Mrs.
Harshbarger, you are recognized for 5 minutes of questions,
ma'am.
Mrs. Harshbarger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have one
other question for Mr. Michelini. You stated that you keep
seeing the same offenders over and over. Are these people not
being prosecuted when you do find them and you know that they
are accountable for these illegal drones and illegal drug
smuggling or whatever they are doing? Or are they not being
prosecuted? If not, why not?
Mr. Michelini. They are absolutely being prosecuted. So,
when we do identify a drone to mitigate or follow the response,
there are a couple of actions we could take. We can run an
investigation. Many times, we can track the drone and know
where it is landing and taking off. Then, of course, both law
enforcement on both sides of the border can act out legal
proceedings. So, that is the case. We do respond and make
arrests to illegal drone use.
Mrs. Harshbarger. So, are they being allowed to be repeat
offenders again then even if they are held accountable? I guess
I don't understand that part.
Mr. Michelini. No. So, the data point where we said there
are some unique IDs that have flown--that have flown back and
forth, that just means we haven't got to them yet. Once we do
make arrests, then the court proceedings would go as they do.
Mrs. Harshbarger. OK. All right. Thank you for that. With
that, I yield back, sir.
Mr. Gimenez. Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Correa. Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee is recognized for 5
minutes of questions. Ms. Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes, thank you so very much, Mr. Chairman.
This is fascinating, overwhelming, and creating a sense of, I
think, warranted fear. This may be a line of questioning that,
Mr. Chairman, I join you in a Classified circumstance. But I
would like someone to say, give me the sense of what is the
depth of the problem. Meaning that is this a growing problem?
With the proliferation of baby drones that 5-year-olds are
getting for Christmas presents, which may not go up more than a
certain amount, but who knows what level is purchased. What is
the depth of the problem, if I can either get that from the
Assistant Secretary for Counter Terrorism? As well, the depth
of the problem around airports. I want to focus around the
commercial flying industry and the potential for a catastrophic
incident because of the proliferation of drones and whoever can
take that question.
Ms. Vinograd. Thank you. I agree with all the adjectives
that you used and more. The threat environment is escalating
both in terms of scale and the scope of the threats associated
with unmanned aircraft systems. Because of technological
advances, as well as the low cost of these UAVs, their
maneuverability, the low risk to the operator, as well as the
fact that many people think they are fun, these are becoming a
platform and a tool of choice. To be clear, they serve a lot of
beneficial purposes.
We are very aware that because of the factors that I laid
out, UAV traffic is increasing significantly. What that means
is that just proportionally speaking, both unintentional
hazards and maligned uses of UAVs are going to create more
credible threats to DHS missions. That is why we are focused on
addressing any gaps in our existing authorities. Congresswoman,
you asked about airports. Thank you for asking this question. I
will turn to my colleague from TSA in a moment. But we have
significant data and unfortunately actual incidents that point
to increasing threats to airports.
As I previously mentioned, DHS currently doesn't have the
authority to engage in proactive and persistent C-UAS
operations at domestic hub large airports. That was indicated
in the statutory assessment that we provided to you. So, in
summary, because the threats are going to increase, that
logically means that the threats in and around these airports
are also going to increase. We, in the legislative proposal
that the administration will soon provide to Congress, very
much look forward to working with all of you in addressing
these critical gaps.
Mr. Gould. Ma'am, thank you also----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Gould [continuing]. From a TSA perspective for that
question. I agree with my colleague from the Department. The
airport environment is where unmanned aircraft systems and
commercial aircraft can just come into contact. You know,
airplanes are trying to land or take off. People are flying
drones around. It just is inherently a high-risk operation.
But it doesn't even have to be that close to the airport.
Like I said before when Newark Liberty was shut down in 2019,
the drone was at 3,500 feet over an adjacent airport, but it
was high enough to interfere with a flight path for Newark
Liberty. That creates issues with potential mid-air collisions.
It creates problems when aircraft have to take evasive action,
which happened 49 times in the past year involving 5 commercial
flights as well.
But it doesn't even have to be a mid-air collision that
really causes a problem. A drone incursion on an airport that
was somehow militarized could create a problem with an aircraft
just sitting on the ground fully fueled or being fueled. Like I
said earlier, the number of incidents that we see around
airports is quite staggering. The visual reports that we get
are just a tiny fraction of what technical data shows us is
really occurring around the airport. It is a significant
problem and one that we really do need to address.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I will just
simply say the witnesses have been excellent and a clarion call
has been made and I look forward to working with the
administration and our agencies on this. I am laser-focused, if
I might, on the airports and surrounding areas. I think, Mr.
Gould and Ms. Vinograd, you have given us a pictorial power
story that should not be cited as over-exaggeration, but a call
to action because that is our obligation, both Congress and the
Executive. I thank you for the future offering of this
legislation, which I hope to be a part of to be able to help
solve this problem and secure America's skies, as well as the
American people.
Chairman Correa. Thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Gimenez,
you had some thoughts.
Mr. Gimenez. Yes, thank you again. Some more comments.
Look, we do have some capabilities against piloted unmanned
aircraft. But my fear is that the capabilities of these
unmanned aircraft is getting more and more sophisticated.
Really for nefarious purposes, they can be unpiloted and just
given a mission. The drone will carry out the mission, period.
You can't knock it down because it is not being--it is not
communicating to anybody. It is all internal.
So, that is why I think we need to have something of a
closed session and talk about these issues and then also the
issues how do you actually--how can you actually, you know,
knock them down? Because as you said, it is not about a mid-air
collision. We can have a drone go into a--a militarized drone
go into an airport and cause havoc and destruction and loss of
life.
So, it is a great danger. Something that has been
identified for some years and it is going to happen. You know,
I am telling you it is going to happen, OK? So, you know, we
need to be prepared for it, and we need to stop it in any way
possible. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Correa. Thank you, Mr. Gimenez. Any other Members
wish to comment or question our witnesses? Seeing none, I just
wanted to thank our witnesses here today. Just to remind folks
that we are talking about 4,000 feet, 5,000 feet up in the air,
but also another area that we should consider. That is, you
know, 15 feet off the ground, back yards. More and more people
at home are sitting at home Sunday afternoon in their back
yards, then you have a drone come in to essentially observe
what you are doing as a private citizen. These are privacy
issues, and we need to address them as well.
So, with that being said, I want to thank the witnesses for
their valuable testimony, and the Members for their most
important questions. Mrs. Miller-Meeks, did you want to ask
some questions, 5 minutes?
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Yes, I would, if I can.
Chairman Correa. Of course, please.
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chair and Ranking Member
Gimenez. Mr. Michelini, I have read reports and I have seen
first-hand on trips to the border that drug cartels are using
drones to facilitate movement of drugs and illegal migrants
over the Southwest Border. I know you alluded to this in your
testimony. Can you describe and if it happened during my
absence, I apologize, what the CBP has seen and then what
capabilities do you have to counter transnational criminal and
drug trafficking organizations on the border?
Mr. Michelini. So, what we have--so, as far as counter
small UAS and what we have seen, I think you might have been
out. But we had 5 near-misses just with our own aircraft and a
small UAS in the last year-and-a-half. We have had 6,500
illegally cross the border since August 2021, that we have
seen. Again, this is really important to, just to go what Mr.
Gould is saying, it is just what you see, right? Where you have
your capabilities. Then 1,700 illegal crossings since January.
The illegal crossings are just one category of it. The
other category is just parking drones so you--so the cartels
would create a sense of domain awareness of where they want to
go. Whether that is how you cross via port of entry or how you
cross between ports of entry, and then how law enforcement on
the U.S. side is reacting to how you are crossing. So, it is a
great tool for the cartels. You know, again, they don't have
First or Fourth Amendment. They don't have any concerns, right?
They are just operating at will.
So, we have developed from DHS lead a con op on how we
execute counter-UAS operations on the Southwest Border.
Presently, we have 2 covered locations and we will intend to
expand it. All within a judicial, you know, concise process to
ensure we are doing this within our authorities. It is a
process and we are moving forward and I think we have had some
great successes and we have had a lot to learn. It is like
every other person sitting here, it is an uphill battle right
now. But, you know, in a moment like this, I think there is
some clarity on where we need to go.
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. So, given the increased usage of
unmanned aerial drones from both the CBP side, U.S. side, and
from the cartels, and that we have supply chain issues, is
there a supply chain problem that you are experiencing in
relationship to getting the equipment that you need?
Mr. Michelini. I am sorry, I wouldn't be aware if there is
a supply chain problem on that. But I can look into that for
you.
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Thank you. Ms. Vinograd, the authority
that Congress granted to DHS to counter UAS in certain
circumstances sunsets in October 2022. Can you speak--and if
you already have, again, my apologies--about DHS's plan to seek
an extension of that authority?
Ms. Vinograd. Thank you. An expiration in DHS's authority
to engage in protective measures against credible threats to
the safety and security of DHS missions would result in
significant risk to all of our homeland security. As such, DHS
in partnership with other members of the administration, will
in the very near future be providing to Congress a legislative
proposal to seek reauthorization to address the elevating and
escalating threat landscape.
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Thank you. I look forward to seeing that
document. Thank you to our witnesses and thank you, Chair. I
appreciate the opportunity to ask a question. I yield back.
Chairman Correa. Thank you, Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Anybody else
want to jump in? Questions, thoughts? Seeing none, again, I
thank the witnesses for their testimony, Members for their
questions. Members of the subcommittee may have additional
questions for the witnesses and we ask you to respond, the
witnesses, expeditiously in writing to those questions.
The Chair reminds Members that the committee's record will
remain open for 10 business days. Without objection, this
committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Samantha Vinograd
Question 1a. The counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS)
authorities provided by Congress to DHS allow the Department to
``mitigate a credible threat that an unmanned aircraft system or
unmanned aircraft poses to the safety or security of a covered facility
or asset.''
Please explain how DHS defines a ``credible threat,'' and how the
Department assesses a credible threat?
Question 1b. What is the process for identifying and designating a
``covered facility or asset''?
Question 1c. Once an unmanned aircraft system has been deemed a
credible threat to a covered facility or asset, what additional
approvals are needed to mitigate the threat?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question From Chairman J. Luis Correa for Samantha Vinograd
Question. I understand that DHS plans to establish uniform
guidelines and policies for those in need of counter-unmanned aircraft
systems (C-UAS) to request such assistance.
How has DHS engaged with stakeholders, such as critical
infrastructure owners and State, local, Tribal and territorial law
enforcement while developing guidelines and policies for requesting C-
UAS assistance?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Chairwoman Bonnie Watson Coleman for Samantha Vinograd
Question 1a. In September 2019, the Secretary of Homeland Security
issued the DHS Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS) Policy
Guidance, requiring DHS components to conduct assessments to document
the protection of privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. We have
heard concerns about the ways in which these authorities could impact
privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties, so I want to be very clear
on how DHS has used its authorities.
Please identify any instances in which DHS has used its C-UAS
authorities against a drone owned or operated by a journalist or news-
gathering organization.
Question 1b. Please identify any instances in which DHS has used
its C-UAS authorities against a drone owned or operated by a non-
journalist nonetheless engaged in an activity closely associated with
the First Amendment, such as a participant of a peaceful protest or
demonstration.
Question 1c. Has any individual or organization made a legal claim
against DHS for utilizing C-UAS authorities in a manner that violates
the Constitution, statutory or regulatory privacy or due process
protections, or the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018 itself? If
so, please describe the circumstances.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2a. Counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS) authorities
allow DHS to seize or use reasonable force to destroy any drone that
poses a credible threat to a ``covered facility or asset.'' Civil
liberties groups have argued that the Preventing Emerging Threats Act
of 2018 authorizes the Government to seize or destroy private property
without adequate due process.
What privacy and civil liberties stakeholders has DHS collaborated
with since the enactment of this Act and how often has it engaged with
these stakeholders?
Question 2b. How does DHS typically mitigate drones? Does
mitigation involve seizure or destruction? Please describe the
mitigation process and what happens to the drone once it is on the
ground.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. The Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018 authorizes
DHS to intercept, acquire, or access communications to or from unmanned
aircraft systems (UAS) only in support of an authorized counter-
unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS) action.
Once a UAS has been intercepted and rendered safe, what is the
process to gain additional information about the operator and their
purpose? Has DHS sought a warrant to obtain additional information once
a UAS is on the ground? If so, how many times?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question From Chairman J. Luis Correa for Scott W. Clendenin
Question. According to the Federal Aviation Administration, there
are currently 854,694 registered drones in the United States, including
321,370 commercial drones and 529,820 recreational drones. Although
most use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) is lawful, such systems can
be exploited for malicious use by bad actors, threatening security and
public safety. The threat can take several forms, including kinetic
attacks with payloads of explosives, surveillance against law
enforcement, and foreign intelligence gathering, just to name a few.
Has the UAS threat been particularly more present in a specific
geographic area or with a certain type of infrastructure (e.g., ports,
border, etc.)?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question From Chairman J. Luis Correa for Austin Gould
Question. According to the Federal Aviation Administration, there
are currently 854,694 registered drones in the United States, including
321,370 commercial drones and 529,820 recreational drones. Although
most use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) is lawful, such systems can
be exploited for malicious use by bad actors, threatening security and
public safety. The threat can take several forms, including kinetic
attacks with payloads of explosives, surveillance against law
enforcement, and foreign intelligence gathering, just to name a few.
Has the UAS threat been particularly more present in a specific
geographic area or with a certain type of infrastructure (e.g., ports,
border, etc.)?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question From Chairman J. Luis Correa for Dennis Michelini
Question. According to the Federal Aviation Administration, there
are currently 854,694 registered drones in the United States, including
321,370 commercial drones and 529,820 recreational drones. Although
most use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) is lawful, such systems can
be exploited for malicious use by bad actors, threatening security and
public safety. The threat can take several forms, including kinetic
attacks with payloads of explosives, surveillance against law
enforcement, and foreign intelligence gathering, just to name a few.
Has the UAS threat been particularly more present in a specific
geographic area or with a certain type of infrastructure (e.g., ports,
border, etc.)?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
[all]