[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
UNDERSTANDING THE HOMELAND THREAT
LANDSCAPE--CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE 112TH CONGRESS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 9, 2011
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Serial No. 112-1
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Jane Harman, California
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Henry Cuellar, Texas
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Laura Richardson, California
Tim Walberg, Michigan Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Islands
Joe Walsh, Illinois Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Brian Higgins, New York
Ben Quayle, Arizona Jackie Speier, California
Scott Rigell, Virginia Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Billy Long, Missouri Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Mo Brooks, Alabama
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security....................................................... 1
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Laura Richardson, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California:
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Witnesses
Hon. Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Department of Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Mr. Michael E. Leiter, Director, National Counterterrorism
Center:
Oral Statement................................................. 17
Prepared Statement............................................. 20
For the Record
The Honorable Brian Higgins, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York:
Letter From Secretary Janet Napolitano, August 9, 2010......... 34
Appendix
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi
for Janet Napolitano........................................... 61
UNDERSTANDING THE HOMELAND THREAT LANDSCAPE--CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE
112TH CONGRESS
----------
Wednesday, February 9, 2011
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in Room
311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Peter T. King [Chairman
of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives King, Lungren, McCaul, Bilirakis,
Broun, Miller, Walberg, Cravaack, Walsh, Meehan, Quayle,
Rigell, Long, Duncan, Farenthold, Brooks, Thompson, Sanchez,
Harman, Jackson Lee, Cuellar, Clarke of New York, Richardson,
Christensen, Davis, Higgins, Speier, Richmond, Clarke of
Michigan, and Keating.
Chairman King [presiding]. The Committee on Homeland
Security will come to order. The committee is meeting today to
hear testimony from Homeland Security Secretary Janet
Napolitano and National Counterterrorism Director Michael
Leiter on the homeland threat landscape. I look forward to the
hearing, and I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
I want to welcome our returning and new committee Members
to this, the first hearing of the 112th Congress. We also
welcome back Secretary Napolitano and Director Leiter to the
committee and thank them for appearing today, as they have done
in the past.
While she is not here yet, let me also take the opportunity
to recognize the outstanding service of Representative Jane
Harman, who has announced that she will be leaving Congress to
run the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Jane
Harman has been a leader on this committee.
She has been a leader in the Congress. No one since
September 11, 2001, and even before that, for that matter, has
been more knowledgeable or informed or dedicated to
intelligence and homeland security issues, and her departure is
a loss to both sides of the aisle. We certainly--we hope
everyone, I believe--we certainly wish her well in her new
role.
Let me also express my deepest sympathy to the family of
David Hillman, a retired CBP officer who was killed by a
suicide bomb in Kandahar while working as a boarder mentor and
adviser. There are other CBP personnel, Michael Lachowsky,
Terry Sherrill, and Vernon Rinus, who were also injured in the
attack. Our thoughts and prayers are with them all.
To me that just personifies the level of patriotism that
CBP officers demonstrate no matter where they happen to be
located. They perform a tremendous service to our country.
Also, we should never forget there are members of the DHS
family serving all around the world, working to protect the
homeland.
Ms. Harman has just arrived.
We said very good things about you, Jane. Again, great to
have you here. Thank you.
As we begin the work of the 112th Congress, the goal of the
committee today is to get a comprehensive review of the
terrorist threats facing our Nation. Today we will be in an
open, unclassified session, and so I would ask that the
Secretary and the Director if they could report back to us any
Members' questions which might require a classified response.
The top priority for the committee is to counter the
serious and evolving terrorist threats facing our country.
Let's put our work in context. A number of committee Members
recently went out to the NCTC and heard from Director Leiter in
a classified setting about threats and plots against the United
States and our allies.
As we approach the 10th anniversary of September 11, we are
constantly reminded that terrorists continue to plot to kill
Americans at home and abroad. According to Attorney General
Holder, in the last 2 years alone there have been 126 people
indicted for terrorist-related activity, including 50 U.S.
citizens.
There was the Times Square bomber Shahzad. There was the
Fort Hood terrorist, Army Major Hasan. There was the Little
Rock recruiting center shooter, the New York City subway
bomber, the Mumbai plotter David Headley. There is Jihad Jane,
dozens of individuals in Minnesota, and so many other plots and
cases--Portland, Oregon; Ashburn, Virginia; Riverdale section
of the Bronx; Dallas, Texas; Springfield, Illinois; John F.
Kennedy Airport; Fort Dix; Baltimore. We can go through an
entire list of cases just in the last several years.
Homegrown radicalization is a growing threat, and one we
cannot ignore. This shift, as far as I am concerned, is a game
changer that presents a serious challenge to law enforcement
and the intelligence community. Indeed, Attorney General Holder
said that he loses sleep at night thinking of the young men in
this country who were raised in this country who are being
radicalized and willing to take up arms against their own
Nation.
Just last week, Senator Joe Lieberman and Senator Susan
Collins released a bipartisan Senate Homeland Security
Committee report examining the events leading up to the
terrorist attack at Fort Hood. The report concluded that the
Department of Defense should confront the threat of
radicalization to violent Islamist extremism amongst service
members explicitly and directly, unquote.
I believe this statement is true for the entire Government.
We must confront this threat explicitly and directly. That is
why I intend to hold a hearing next month examining the threat
of domestic radicalization in the Muslim community.
Because of policies the United States has implemented since
September 11, the threat from al-Qaeda has evolved, but it is
still deadly. Because of the layers of defense that we have set
in place that we have put in motion, it is very difficult for
al-Qaeda to launch an attack similar to what happened on
September 11. Obviously, it is possible, but it is much more
difficult for them, and they have realized that.
They have adapted their strategy and their tactics so they
are now recruiting from within the country, and they are
looking for people who are under the radar screen, people who
are living here legally, people who have green cards, people
who are citizens, people who have no known terrorist activity.
Again, probably the classic example of that would be Zazi
in New York, who was raised in Queens, went to high school, had
a small business in lower Manhattan, and was brought back to
Afghanistan for training and came back as a liquid explosive
bomber attempting to blow up the New York subways.
So that is the type of person we have to be looking for.
The good side of that, I suppose, is that al-Qaeda feels it
cannot launch a major attack from the outside, and it also
means that they cannot send a type of fully trained and skilled
terrorist to this country. The downside of it is that these
terrorists are people living under the radar screen, who are
very difficult to detect.
On certain issues that I have a particular interest in, one
is the threat of chemical and biological weapons, which is why
I believe the Securing the Cities Program is so important,
because it is very likely that the next attack against a major
city in this country will be launched from the suburbs, similar
to what happened in Madrid and London.
A nightmare scenario is to have that attack involve a dirty
bomb, which would put that metropolitan area basically off-
limits, besides the massive loss of human life that would
result. So that is a program the Secretary and I discussed. We
are particularly interested in pursuing that. But in any event,
there can be no doubt that the threat against the United States
remains extremely high, and we must remain vigilant and never
allow the memories of 9/11 to fade.
With that, I recognize the distinguished Ranking Member of
the committee, Mr. Thompson form Mississippi, for any statement
he may have.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
holding today's hearing. I want to join you in welcoming
Secretary Napolitano and Director Leiter.
But before we hear their testimony on the threat posed by
terrorism, I want to encourage my colleagues to remember that
our words travel far beyond these four walls. For several weeks
we have seen protests across North Africa and the Middle East.
In many ways these protests represent a demand for democracy.
Yet we know that this is the same region that has been home to
some of those who call for jihad.
The United States, the world's only remaining superpower,
occupies a providential position. If we take the right action,
many of our concerns about a terrorist threat from this region
could be significantly reduced. That is why I want to ensure
that our examination of the global threat from terrorist
activities does not complicate the job being done by the State
Department and others in this administration. We must recognize
that this predominantly Muslim area of the world is seeking to
embrace democracy. Let us take care that nothing we do or say
here today works to undermine those efforts.
Since September 11, the threat of terrorist attacks has
become an undeniable and unsettling feature of American
society.
However, combating the terrorist threat depends on accurate
intelligence and an unbiased assessment of the size, scope,
depth, and breadth of this threat.
The lessons learned from past wars are clear. We cannot
defeat an enemy that we do not know. Unreliable information,
personal opinions or narrow agendas cannot inform our
assessment of a threat to our Nation.
We have seen the results of unreliable intelligence in
Iraq. Our examination of a global threat must look at the
vulnerabilities within commerce, transportation, and all
aspects of our modern lives.
We must find and eliminate these vulnerabilities, focus on
what we can do, and keep the Nation safe.
We can secure an airplane. We can secure the border. We can
secure Federal buildings. We can secure a chemical plant or a
nuclear facility.
We must not become distracted from our basic mission to
keep this Nation safe and maintain the security of the people.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to bid farewell to my
colleague from California. She has demonstrated her commitment
to the security of this Nation by her service on the
intelligence committee and this committee.
We will miss her, but we wish her happiness in her new
undertaking.
Again, I want to thank you.
I want to thank the witnesses and look forward to hearing
their testimony.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
I want to encourage my colleagues to remember that our words travel
far beyond these far walls.
For several weeks, we have seen protests across North Africa and
the Middle East. In many ways, these protests represent a demand for
democracy. Yet we know that this same region has been home to some who
have called for jihad.
The United States--the world's only remaining super power--occupies
a providential position. If we take the right action, many of our
concerns about a terrorist threat from this region could be
significantly reduced.
That is why I want to ensure that our examination of the global
threat from terrorist activity does not complicate the job being done
by the State Department and others in this administration. We must
recognize that this predominantly Muslim area of the world is seeking
to embrace democracy. Let us take care that nothing we do or say here
today works to undermine those efforts.
Since September 11, the threat of terrorist attack has become an
undeniable an unsettling feature of American society. However,
combating the terrorist threat depends on accurate intelligence and an
unbiased assessment of the size, scope, depth and breadth of the
threat.
The lessons learned from past wars are clear--we cannot defeat an
enemy we do not know. Unreliable information, personal opinion, or
narrow agendas cannot inform our assessment of a threat to our nation.
We have seen the result of unreliable intelligence in Iraq. Our
examination of the global threat must look at the vulnerabilities
within commerce, transportation, and all aspects of our modern lives.
We must find and eliminate these vulnerabilities, focus on what we can
do, and keep this Nation safe.
We can secure an airplane. We can secure the border. We can secure
a Federal building.We can secure a chemical plant or a nuclear
facility. We must not become distracted from our basic mission to keep
this Nation safe and maintain the security of the people.
Chairman King. Thank you, Mr. Thompson.
Now we ask unanimous consent to recognize the gentlelady
from California, Ms. Harman, 1 minute or as much time as she--
--
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Ranking
Member Thompson. Welcome to our witnesses.
This is probably my last hearing on this committee. As all
of you know, I know this, including the new Members, I have
worked my heart out for many years in this Congress to keep our
homeland safe.
It has been an honor to be one of the initial Members of
this committee and to have chaired its Intelligence
Subcommittee for 4 years.
I just want to thank all the Members, and I want to thank
all the staff for the effort we have made so far together.
To these two witnesses, who are both dear friends of mine,
I want to thank you for the effort you make.
Finally, let me urge that the best present you could all
give me is to find a way to get more jurisdiction in this
committee, which ought to be--and I know the Secretary agrees
with this--the central point in the House of Representatives
for oversight and focus on this critical subject of keeping our
homeland safe.
So, once again, thank you all for your good wishes. I am
just moving down the street. I am really not leaving this
place. Thank you very much.
I yield back.
Chairman King. Thank you, Jane.
I remind the Members of the committee that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Hon. Richardson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Laura Richardson
I would like to thank Chairman King and Ranking Member Thompson for
convening this hearing today focusing on the ever-evolving threat of
terrorist attacks against the homeland and the current state of
America's efforts to counter these threats. I would like to thank our
distinguished panel of witnesses for appearing before the committee
today to discuss what progress has been made in this area and what else
needs to be done.
The events that occurred on the morning of September 11, 2001 had a
profound impact on the lives of every American. The terrifying images
of commercial airliners flying into the World Trade Centers are
engraved in people's hearts and minds forever.
Even though the attacks occurred nearly 10 years ago, we are
constantly reminded of the effects of that day. Whether we're going
through airport security to board a plane to see our family for the
holidays or we're reuniting with a loved one who just returned from
Afghanistan, possible threats and attacks continue to loom large over
each and every aspect of our lives. For example, the events of that
tragic morning forced us to recognize that we now live in a new world,
with new threats, and that in order to combat these threats we must be
willing to change and improve our tactics.
After these devastating events, our Government initiated a number
of unprecedented changes to our National security infrastructure in
order to address these new threats. For instance, in 2002 the
Department of Homeland Security was created with the stated goal of
preparing, preventing, and responding to domestic emergencies,
specifically terrorism. Additionally, we initiated sweeping
improvements to our transportation security and made great strides in
securing our Nation's borders and ports. And in the hills and valleys
of Afghanistan, our soldiers continue to fight against al-Qaeda and its
allies to ensure that those who wish to do or train others to do
America harm are brought to justice.
However, as we will discuss today, terrorism has become an ever-
evolving threat. We no longer face a threat from just one group of
people or even from just one ideology. From Joe Stack, who flew a plane
into an IRS building to Faishal Shazhad, the American citizen who
attempted to blow up a car bomb in Times Square, we have learned that
we must constantly be changing our tactics to ensure we have the
ability to effectively combat and neutralize the changing methods of
terrorists.
As the representative of the 37th district, I understand the need
for law enforcement to constantly modify and assess anti-terror
strategies in order to protect potential targets in their communities.
My Congressional district abuts the Nation's largest ports, contains
oil refineries that produce more than 1 million barrels per day, and is
home to a number of gas treatment and petrochemical facilities that
present a target-rich environment for those seeking to do us harm.
These challenges represent a new and emerging need for us to be
increasingly more vigilant in understanding and combating the ever-
evolving threat of terrorism.
Finally, in the pursuit of these counterterrorism efforts, we must
constantly be aware of the fact that these strategies must not undercut
the very principles they are attempting to defend. In our zeal to
combat terrorism and protect our country, we must be careful not to
wrongly accuse our people because of how they look, where they live, or
their cultural background. To be safe, it is necessary that we also be
smart. It is my hope and belief that my fellow colleagues will remain
mindful of these important principles of which this great country was
founded upon.
Thank you again Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Thompson, for
convening this very important hearing today. I look forward to hearing
from our distinguished panel of witnesses on these issues. I yield back
my time.
Chairman King. As I mentioned, we are pleased to have two
very distinguished witnesses today on this topic most important
in the entire Government as Secretary Napolitano, who is third
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, overseeing
over 200,000 employees.
I have to say, on the record, that she has worked very
closely with us. She does not let partisan lines divide us and
she probably meets with us more than she wants to, but she
meets on a regular basis.
She is always on the phone, both with compliments and
criticisms. I never know when I am going to get a call from the
Secretary. But, again, she is totally dedicated. Whatever
differences we have, are ones of policy and no one has ever
questioned her dedication or her ability.
Similarly, Mike Leiter has served as the head of National
Counterterrorism Center for 3\1/2\ years under two Presidents,
done a truly outstanding job in that capacity.
Prior to that, he was in the military. He was assistant to
the U.S. attorney and, again, absolutely dedicated to combating
international terrorism and protecting the homeland.
So I would ask that the witnesses, your entire statements
will appear in the record. I have asked you to summarize the
testimony but because of the importance of it, obviously, I am
not going to cut you off.
But I just ask you to keep in mind that many Members here
today do have questions for you. With that, I now recognize
Secretary Napolitano.
Secretary Napolitano.
STATEMENT OF HON. JANET NAPOLITANO, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Secretary Napolitano. Well, thank you, Chairman King,
Ranking Member Thompson, Members of the committee, for the
opportunity to appear before you today to testify on the
terrorist threat to the United States and what the Department
of Homeland Security and the NCTC are doing to combat it.
I also have to echo the thoughts about Representative
Harman. You will be missed. You have been totally dedicated to
this effort. That effort has been producing results in terms of
safety of the American people.
I also have to echo your thoughts about the amount of
Congressional oversight of this department. We added up the
111th Congress, and our Department testified over 285 times. I
testified over 20 times myself.
I think that was the most of any Cabinet official. That, of
course, requires a lot of preparation and work. We provided
over 3,900 substantive briefings to different committees of the
Congress.
So Chairman King, Ranking Member Thompson, you and I have
all discussed this. But that amount of oversight does have
impact. So I thought I would just mention that.
So let me turn now to the subject and the very important
subject of today's hearing. There is no question that we have
made many important strides in securing our country from
terrorism since 9/11.
But the threat continues to evolve. In some ways, the
threat today may be at its most heightened state since the
attacks nearly 10 years ago. In addition to the core al-Qaeda
group, which still represents a threat to the United States,
despite its diminished capabilities, we now face threats from a
number of al-Qaeda associates that share its violent extremist
ideology.
Among these groups, we are also seeing an increased
emphasis on recruiting Americans and Westerners to carry out
attacks. These groups are trying to recruit people to carry out
attacks.
They have connections to the West, but who do not have
strong ties to terrorist groups that could possibly tip off the
intelligence community.
They are also encouraging individuals in the West to carry
out their own small-scale attacks, which require less of the
coordination and planning that could raise red flags and lead
to an attack disruption.
This means that the threat has evolved in such a way that
we have to add to our traditional counterterrorism strategies,
which, in the past, have looked at the attack as coming from
abroad.
The realities of today's threat environment also means that
State and local law enforcement officers will more often be in
the first position to notice the signs of a planned attack.
So our focus must be on aiding law enforcement and helping
to provide them with the information and resources they need to
secure their own communities from the threats they face.
To this end, the Department of Homeland Security is working
to counter violent extremism here at home by helping law
enforcement use many of the same techniques and strategies that
have proven successful in combating violence in Americans
communities.
DHS is moving forward in this area, based on the
recommendations provided to us by the experts on the Homeland
Security Advisory Council.
We are releasing the first iteration of a community-
oriented policing curriculum for front-line officers, which is
aimed at helping them to counter violent extremism in their
communities.
That curriculum is being focus grouped right now down at
FLETC. We are sharing among State and local officers
unclassified case studies about the size of violent extremism.
We are helping communities to share with each other best
practices about forming productive community partnerships.
This way, law enforcement across can better know what works
and what does not.
We are helping law enforcement to reach out to American
communities, to include them as partners in the effort to
combat the presence of violent extremism in our country.
Americans of all stripes resoundingly reject violence,
which we must use as an important tool in countering violent
extremism here at home.
DHS is also expanding our own outreach to communities, and
conducting these initiatives in a way consistent with
Americans' rights and liberties.
At the same time, we are building a new homeland security
architecture that guards against the kinds of threats we are
seeing right here at home.
There are four major parts of this architecture I want to
mention here today.
The first are the joint terrorism task forces, which are
led by the FBI. These task forces bring together agencies and
jurisdictions to jointly investigate terrorism cases.
DHS has hundreds of personnel supporting the 104 JTTFs
across the country.
The second is the network of State-and locally-run fusion
centers that bring together agencies and jurisdictions to share
information about the threat picture and what it means for our
communities.
This information sharing and analytical work complements
the investigative work done by the JTTFs.
DHS is intent on helping these fusion centers to develop
their core capabilities to share and analyze information and to
provide State and local law enforcement with useful, actionable
information they can use to better protect their own
communities.
We are supporting fusion centers in many ways. Among them,
we are providing DHS personnel to work in them and are
providing properly cleared law enforcement personnel with
classified threat information.
The third is the Nation-wide Suspicious Activity Reporting
initiative, or the SAR initiative. We are working closely with
our partners at the Department of Justice on this project.
The SAR initiative creates a standard process for law
enforcement to identify, document, vet and share reports of
suspicious incidents or behaviors associated with specific
threats of terrorism.
The reports then can be used to identify and share a
broader trend.
To date, the SAR initiative is under various stages of
implementation at 33 sites that cover two-thirds of the
American population. It should be fully implemented across the
country by September.
We are also working with DOJ and major law enforcement
associations to provide SAR training to all front-line
enforcement officers in the country. They will learn how to
properly make, vet, share, and analyze reports in accordance
with best practices and with regard to civil rights and civil
liberties. Thousands of officers have already been trained, and
we expect to train virtually all front-line officers in the
country by this fall.
The pilots of the SAR program have proven its tremendous
value to law enforcement, and I believe it will be a critical
tool in strengthening the ability of law enforcement to protect
our communities from acts of terrorism.
The fourth piece of the new homeland security architecture
that I want to mention is the ``If You See Something, Say
Something'' campaign. This campaign focuses on the positive
role Americans can play in our own security. It focuses on
fostering the kind of public vigilance that we know is critical
to the success of community-oriented policing.
We constantly see examples of why this sort of vigilance is
so important, not just in the attempted Times Square bombing
last May, but also just last month in Spokane, Washington, when
city workers noticed a suspicious backpack and notified police
before an MLK Day parade.
DHS is rolling out this campaign across the country and in
many important sectors, including passenger rail, Amtrak,
sports stadiums--you may have seen it in the stadium at the
Super Bowl--retail stores, and more.
Now, on top of these four pieces, last month, I also
announced changes to the National Terrorism Advisory System. We
are replacing the old system of color-coded alerts with a new
system that aims to provide more useful information to the
public and to those who need it.
This new system was developed collaboratively by a
bipartisan group and with the consultation of law enforcement.
It reflects our need to be ready, while also promising to tell
Americans everything we can when new threat information affects
them.
In addition, to what I have mentioned here today, there are
numerous other areas of action I have detailed in my written
statement, Mr. Chairman, and ask that that statement be
included in the record.
Now, thank you again for inviting me to testify today. I
look forward to working with this committee and its leadership
in this new Congress as we continue to make progress in
securing our Nation. I will be happy to take your questions
once you have heard from Director Leiter.
[The statement of Secretary Napolitano follows:]
Prepared Statement of Janet Napolitano
February 9, 2011
Chairman King, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the
committee: Thank you for the opportunity to testify today about the
changing terrorist threat that the United States faces, and how the
Department of Homeland Security is responding. I am glad to be here
today with my colleague, Director Leiter. I look forward to continuing
to work with this committee and its leadership in this new Congress,
and I expect that, working together, we will continue to make great
strides in securing our country.
the response to a changing threat
Since 9/11, the United States has made important progress in
securing our Nation from terrorism. Nevertheless, the terrorist threat
facing our country has evolved significantly in the last ten years--and
continues to evolve--so that, in some ways, the threat facing us is at
its most heightened state since those attacks. This fact requires us to
continually adapt our counterterrorism techniques to effectively
detect, deter, and prevent terrorist acts.
Following 9/11, the Federal Government moved quickly to build an
intelligence and security apparatus that has protected our country from
the kind of large-scale attack, directed from abroad, that struck us
nearly 10 years ago. The resulting architecture yielded considerable
success in both preventing this kind of attack and limiting, though not
eliminating, the operational ability of the core al-Qaeda group that is
currently based in the mountainous area between Afghanistan and
Pakistan.
Today, however, in addition to the direct threats we continue to
face from al-Qaeda, we also face growing threats from other foreign-
based terrorist groups that are inspired by al-Qaeda ideology but have
few operational connections to the core al-Qaeda group. Perhaps most
crucially, we face a threat environment where violent extremism is not
defined or contained by international borders. Today, we must address
threats that are homegrown as well as those that originate abroad.
One of the most striking elements of today's threat picture is that
plots to attack America increasingly involve American residents and
citizens. We are now operating under the assumption, based on the
latest intelligence and recent arrests, that individuals prepared to
carry out terrorist attacks and acts of violence might be in the United
States, and they could carry out acts of violence with little or no
warning.
Over the past 2 years, we have seen the rise of a number of
terrorist groups inspired by al-Qaeda ideology--including (but not
limited to) al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) from Yemen, al-
Shabaab from Somalia, and Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)--that are
placing a growing emphasis on recruiting individuals who are either
Westerners or have connections to the West, but who do not have strong
links to terrorist groups, and are thus more difficult for authorities
to identify. We saw this, for instance, in the case of Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab, who is accused of attempting to detonate explosives
aboard a Detroit-bound plane on December 25, 2009; and Faisal Shahzad,
who attempted to detonate a bomb in Times Square in May of last year.
These groups are also trying to inspire individuals in the West to
launch their own, smaller-scale attacks, which require less of the
advanced planning or coordination that would typically raise red flags.
The logic supporting these kinds of terrorist plots is simple: They
present fewer opportunities for disruption by intelligence or law
enforcement than more elaborate, larger-scale plots by groups of
foreign-based terrorists.
This threat of homegrown violent extremism fundamentally changes
who is most often in the best position to spot terrorist activity,
investigate, and respond. More and more, State, local, and Tribal
front-line law enforcement officers are most likely to notice the first
signs of terrorist activity. This has profound implications for how we
go about securing our country against the terrorist threat, and
requires a new kind of security architecture that complements the
structure we have already built to protect America from threats coming
from abroad.
Over the past 2 years, the Department of Homeland Security has been
working diligently to build this new architecture in order to defend
against this evolving threat. There are two dimensions of this
architecture that I will discuss today before I detail other major
developments in our defenses against terrorism over the past year.
The first part of our effort is working directly with law
enforcement and community-based organizations to counter violent
extremism at its source, using many of the same techniques and
strategies that have proven successful in combating violence in
American communities. Law enforcement at the State, local, and Federal
levels are leveraging and enhancing their relationships with members of
diverse communities that broadly and strongly reject violent extremism.
Second, DHS is focused on getting resources and information out of
Washington, DC and into the hands of State and local law enforcement,
in order to provide them with the tools they need to combat the threats
their communities face. Because State and local law enforcement are
often in the best position to first notice the signs of a planned
attack, our homeland security efforts must be interwoven in the police
work that State, local, and Tribal officers do every day. We must make
sure that officers everywhere have a clear understanding of the
tactics, behaviors, and other indicators that could point to terrorist
activity. Accordingly, DHS is improving and expanding the information-
sharing mechanisms by which officers on the beat are made aware of the
threat picture and what it means for their communities. DHS is doing so
in alignment with the vision of Congress and the direction the
President has set for a robust information sharing environment. These
efforts include providing training programs for local law enforcement
to help them identify indicators of terrorist activity, as well as our
work with our partners at the Department of Justice (DOJ) on the
Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative, which has created
a standardized system for reporting suspicious activity so that this
information can be analyzed against National trends and shared across
jurisdictions. And we are encouraging Americans to alert local law
enforcement if they see something that is potentially dangerous through
the ``If You See Something, Say Something'' campaign. The kind of
vigilance that this campaign promotes has helped to foil terrorist
plots in the past, including last month in Spokane, Washington.
Taken together, these steps lay a strong foundation that police and
their partners across the country can use to protect their communities
from terrorism and violence. While many kinds of violent motivations
threaten our security,\1\ these initiatives are helping to build a
strong foundation of preparedness that will be embedded in the fabric
of cities and towns across the Nation. Indeed, what we are building to
secure America from every type of attack is a homeland security
architecture that helps law enforcement everywhere protect their
communities from any type of attack. This homeland security
architecture will be paired with efforts to better understand the risk
confronting the homeland, and to protect the privacy rights and civil
liberties of all Americans.
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\1\ An examination of 86 terrorist cases in the United States from
1999 to 2009 by the Institute for Homeland Security Solutions
(``Building on Clues: Examining Successes and Failures in Detecting
U.S. Terrorist Plots, 1999-2009,'' October 2010) shows that nearly half
of those cases were related to al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda-inspired ideology,
with the remainder due to a number of other violent extremist
motivations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
countering violent extremism (cve)
Since 2009, more than two dozen Americans have been arrested on
terrorism-related charges. More broadly, a report last month from the
New York State Intelligence Center, the fusion center for the State of
New York, examining 32 major terrorism cases in the United States
related to al-Qaeda-like ideology since 9/11, shows that 50 of the 88
individuals involved in those plots were U.S. citizens at the time of
their arrests, and among those citizens, a clear majority of were
natural-born.\2\
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\2\ New York State Intelligence Center, ``The Vigilance Project: An
Analysis of 32 Terrorism Cases Against the Homeland,'' December 2010.
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This report demonstrates why we must confront the threat of
homegrown violent extremism in order to truly secure our country. We
have a clear path forward to guide our efforts on this front. The
Homeland Security Advisory Council's (HSAC) Countering Violent
Extremism Working Group--comprised of security experts, elected
officials, law enforcement leaders, community leaders, and first
responders from around the country--has provided DHS with a number of
recommendations on how to support local law enforcement and community-
based efforts to identify and combat sources of violent extremism.
One major recommendation was to develop a CVE curriculum for State
and local law enforcement that is focused on community-oriented
policing, and that would help enable front-line personnel to identify
activities that are indicators of potential terrorist activity and
violence. We have now developed the first iteration of this curriculum,
through partnership with the Major Cities Chiefs Association, the
International Association of Chiefs of Police, the Department of
Justice, the Counter Terrorism Academy, and the Naval Postgraduate
School. The first training with this CVE curriculum will take place
this month at DHS' Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC). Law
enforcement from New York, Detroit, the Twin Cities, Chicago,
Washington DC, and Los Angeles are invited to participate. This
curriculum will continue to be developed and refined in consultation
with our partners, and it will become widely available through regional
policing institutes, in addition to FLETC. The eventual goal is to
include this curriculum in the basic and in-service training that is
provided to all new law enforcement personnel.
In forming these kinds of community-based partnerships, it is
important that communities learn from each other about what works in
countering violent extremism. To support this effort, we work closely
with a diverse collection of religious, ethnic, and community
organizations. As the President said in his State of the Union address,
in the face of violent extremism, ``we are responding with the strength
of our communities.'' A vast majority of people in every American
community resoundingly reject violence, and this certainly includes the
violent, al-Qaeda-style ideology that claims to launch attacks in the
name of their widely rejected version of Islam. We must use these facts
as a tool against the threat of homegrown violent extremism. In
conjunction with these communities and with the Department of Justice
and the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment, we
have published guidance on best practices for community partnerships,
which has been distributed to local law enforcement across the country.
DHS also holds regular regional meetings--which include State and local
law enforcement, State and local governments, and community
organizations--in Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis. These
regional meetings have enabled participants to provide and receive
feedback on successful community-oriented policing and other programs
aimed at preventing violence.
DHS has also issued, and continues to compile, unclassified case
studies that examine recent incidents involving terrorism so that State
and local law enforcement, State and local governments, and community
members can understand the warning signs that could indicate a
developing terrorist attack. These case studies focus on common
behaviors and indicators regarding violent extremism to increase
overall situational awareness and provide law enforcement with
information on tactics, techniques, and plans of international and
domestic terrorists.
DHS has also conducted ``deep dive'' sessions with the intelligence
directors of major city police departments and with the leadership of
State and major urban area fusion centers. DHS leaders meet with these
individuals to discuss case studies, terrorist techniques, and current
or novel indicators of terrorism, so that these leaders can inculcate
these lessons in their own institutions.
The United States Government as a whole is also working with our
international allies who have experience with homegrown terrorism. The
State Department has the lead for these international activities, but
DHS is also working with foreign governments that share many of our
security concerns. In the past several months, DHS has participated in
bilateral conferences with partners in Canada and the United Kingdom on
countering violent extremism, and these and additional conversations
will continue to leverage lessons our partners have learned that may
benefit law enforcement in the United States.
We will also leverage grant programs to support training and
technical assistance in building community partnerships and local
participation in the SAR Initiative. Pending our fiscal year 2011
appropriation, DHS, the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
(COPS) within DOJ, and the DOJ Bureau for Justice Assistance within the
DOJ are working together to develop a joint grant resource guide for
State and local law enforcement that leverages relevant funds and
programs for community-oriented policing. At the same time, DHS is
expanding engagement through our Privacy Office and our Office for
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties to help DHS personnel and law
enforcement on the ground better understand and identify threats and
mitigate risks to our communities while ensuring these efforts respect
the rights enjoyed by all Americans.
supporting law enforcement with the information and resources they need
As I mentioned above, a major role of the Department of Homeland
Security is to get information and resources out of Washington, DC and
into the hands of law enforcement throughout the country. Local law
enforcement, community groups, citizens, and the private sector play as
much of a role in homeland security as the Federal Government. That is
why we emphasize that ``homeland security starts with hometown
security.''
DHS has been working to expand our efforts to build the capacities
of State, local, Tribal, and territorial law enforcement over the past
2 years to support four main priorities. First, the information and
intelligence provided to States and local authorities should be timely,
actionable, and useful to their efforts to protect local communities
from terrorism and other threats. Second, we should support State and
local law enforcement efforts to recognize the behaviors and indicators
associated with terrorism, and incorporate this knowledge into their
day-to-day efforts to protect their communities from terrorist acts
violent crime. Third, we should ensure that information about
terrorism-related suspicious activity is shared quickly among all
levels of government, so that information from the front lines can be
factored into larger analytic efforts regarding the threat picture
across the whole country. Fourth, we should encourage a ``whole of
Nation'' approach to security, where officers on the ground are
supported by an informed, vigilant public that plays a key role in
helping to secure our country against new and evolving threats.
We have dedicated significant resources to building four major
pieces of our new homeland-security architecture to work towards these
goals. The four pieces are Joint Terrorist Task Forces (JTTFs), State
and major urban area fusion centers, the Nation-wide SAR Initiative,
and the ``If You See Something, Say Something'' campaign.
Joint Terrorism Task Forces
A critical piece of the homeland security architecture is the
mechanism created to jointly investigate terrorism cases: the Joint
Terrorism Task Forces led by the FBI. Hundreds of DHS personnel from
eleven DHS components are currently working to support and participate
in the 104 JTTFs across the country, all of which marshal resources
from a number of sources to jointly conduct terrorism investigations.
Our Nation's JTTFs have been successful in mitigating the terrorist
threat in a number of instances, including in the investigation of
Najibullah Zazi, who was arrested in 2009 for a terrorist plot to
attack the New York transit system. In that case, several FBI field
offices and their JTTFs (including the New York JTTF) contributed to
efforts in identifying Zazi, conducting surveillance of him, and
arresting Zazi before he could execute his attack, while also
identifying Zazi's associates.
Fusion centers
The second element is the network of State and major urban area
fusion centers, which serve as focal points for information sharing
among all levels of government. While JTTFs are investigative teams
that bring agencies together to investigate particular terrorism cases,
fusion centers are analytical and information-sharing entities that
bring agencies together to assess local implications of threat
information in order to better understand the general threat picture.
These centers analyze information and identify trends to share timely
intelligence with Federal, State, and local law enforcement including
DHS, which then further shares this information with other members of
the intelligence community. In turn, DHS provides relevant and
appropriate threat information from the intelligence community back to
the fusion centers. Today, there are 72 State- and locally-run fusion
centers in operation across the Nation, up from a handful in 2006. Our
goal is to make every one of these fusion centers a center of analytic
excellence that provides useful, actionable information about threats
to law enforcement and first responders. To do this, we have deployed
68 experienced DHS intelligence officers to fusion centers across the
country. We are committed to having an officer in each fusion center.
DHS further supports fusion centers through the grants process, and, as
fusion centers become fully operational, by deploying the Homeland
Security Data Network to provide access to classified homeland security
threat information to qualified personnel. Our support for fusion
centers is focused on supporting them to fully achieve four baseline
capabilities: the ability to receive classified and unclassified
threat-related information from the Federal Government; the ability to
assess the local implications of threat-related information through the
use of risk assessments; the ability to further disseminate to
localities threat information, so local law enforcement can recognize
behaviors and indicators associated with terrorism; and the ability to
share, when appropriate, locally-generated information with Federal
authorities, in order to better identify emerging threats. The
Department of Justice also work closely with fusion centers to ensure
that the analytical work of fusion centers and the investigative work
of JTTFs complement each other.
Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative
The third piece of our homeland security architecture that I
described earlier is the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting, or
SAR, Initiative, which DHS is working closely with DOJ in order to
expand and improve. The Nationwide SAR Initiative creates a standard
process for law enforcement to identify, document, vet, and share
reports of suspicious incidents or behaviors associated with specific
threats of terrorism. The reports then can be used to identify broader
trends. To date, the SAR Initiative is under various stages of
implementation at 33 sites that cover two-thirds of the American
population, and it should be fully implemented across the country by
September of this year.
Importantly, this initiative also trains frontline, analytic, and
executive personnel to recognize behaviors and indicators associated
with terrorism, and to distinguish them from non-suspicious and legal
behaviors. Thus far, more than 13,000 frontline Federal, State, and
local law enforcement personnel across the country have received SAR
training, and it is expected that virtually all frontline law
enforcement personnel in the United States--hundreds of thousands of
officers--will receive this training by the autumn of this year, thanks
in large part to the partnership of the International Association of
Chiefs of Police, the Major Cities Chiefs Association, the Major County
Sheriffs' Association, and the National Sheriffs' Association. As part
of the SAR Initiative, we are also installing information-sharing
technologies within DHS that enable suspicious activity reports that
are vetted by specially trained analysts to be forwarded to JTTFs and
to be accessible to other fusion centers and DHS offices. In
conjunction with the Nationwide SAR Initiative, DHS is also working to
provide reporting capability directly to owners and operators of
critical infrastructure.
The initial stages of this program have underscored the value of
this initiative. For example, over the 2 years it was involved in the
pilot, one major city reported that implementation of the initiative
resulted in seventeen reports related to an open FBI terrorism case.
Over those same 2 years, a total of 393 reports were accepted by local
JTTFs for further investigation, and local investigations resulted in
90 additional arrests for weapons offenses and related charges.
Separately, as the media has already reported, a Chicago Police
Department officer filed a suspicious activity report in summer 2009
about David Coleman Headley based on observations the officer made in a
Chicago park. Headley was subsequently tied to the terrorist attacks in
Mumbai in November of 2008 and was arrested on U.S. charges as well. In
addition, fusion centers in New York, Florida, and Virginia used
suspicious activity reports and other documents to identify associates
of both Faisal Shahzad and Najibullah Zazi.
``If You See Something, Say Something''
The fourth element of the homeland security architecture I
referenced is the effort to spread awareness about the role the public
plays in our security. The vigilance of Americans continues to help
save lives and aid law enforcement and first responders. We saw this
last month in the brave responses of many Americans in the moments
after the shootings in Tucson, when members of the public subdued the
shooter. We saw how the vigilance of the public can prevent an attack
when a potentially deadly bomb was found prior to the start of a Martin
Luther King Day parade in Spokane, Washington, after several city
workers noticed a suspicious backpack and reported it to police. Of
course, we all remember how last May, a street vendor alerted police to
smoke coming from a car and helped to save lives during the attempted
bombing in Times Square. Time and time again, we see vivid examples of
why the American public's vigilance is a critical part of our security.
To foster this vigilance, we have taken a public awareness campaign
with a familiar slogan--``If You See Something, Say Something,''
initially used by New York's Metropolitan Transit Authority and funded
in part by DHS--and are spreading it across the country. This program
is based on those tenets of community-oriented policing that enable the
public to work closely with local law enforcement to protect their
communities from crime. The campaign outlines a positive role that
Americans can play in our shared security. This public education effort
is being expanded to places where the Nationwide SAR Initiative is
already being implemented, so we can ensure that calls to authorities
will be handled appropriately and in an environment where privacy and
civil-liberties protections are in place. The campaign has already been
launched in a number of State and local jurisdictions, as well as
within several key sectors, including Amtrak, the general aviation
community, the Washington Metro, New Jersey Transit, with the NFL and
the NCAA, the commercial services sector at hotels and major landmarks
such as the Mall of America in Minnesota, and National retailers like
Walmart; and at Federal buildings protected by the Federal Protective
Service.
In addition to these four major pieces of our homeland security
architecture, we are further enhancing our Nation's defenses against
threats through reforms we have made to the DHS grants and the grant
process. Our State and local partners everywhere are struggling to pay
their bills and fund vital services. As a former governor, I know the
hard choices they face. But it is critical to our National security
that local communities maintain and continue to strengthen their public
safety capabilities. In 2010, DHS awarded $3.8 billion to States,
cities, law enforcement, and first responders to strengthen
preparedness for acts of terrorism, major disasters and other
emergencies. We are also changing the grant process to help them
stretch these dollars even further. We have eliminated red tape by
streamlining the grant process; expanded eligible expenses to fund
maintenance and sustainability; and made it easier for fire grants to
be put to work quickly to rehire laid-off firefighters and protect the
jobs of veteran firefighters.
We also are making significant changes to the National Terrorism
Advisory System (NTAS), which will make the system a better tool for
disseminating information about threats both to the public and to
specific sectors. Last month, I announced the end of the old system of
color-coded alerts, and that we are moving forward on a 90-day
implementation period in which state and local governments, law
enforcement agencies, private and non-profit sector partners, airports,
and transport hubs will transition to this new system.
Americans have a stake in our collective security, and we trust
them to do their part in our shared responsibility for our Nation's
security. The new system is built on the simple premise that when a
threat develops that could impact the public, we will tell the public
and provide whatever information we can.
The new system reflects the reality that we must always be on alert
and ready. When we have information about a specific, credible threat,
we will issue a formal alert with as much information as possible. The
alert may also be limited; depending on the nature of the threat,
alerts may be issued only to law enforcement, or, for example, to a
segment of the private sector such as shopping malls or hotels.
Alternately, the alert may be issued more broadly to the American
people. The alert may ask Americans to take certain actions, or to look
for specific suspicious behavior. And alerts will have an end date.
This new system was developed collaboratively. It was largely the
work of a bipartisan task force that included law enforcement, former
mayors and governors, and members of the previous administration. I
look forward to continuing to work with our many partners and with this
committee to improve this system as it moves forward.
strengthening vulnerable sectors
In addition to building this foundation, DHS has also been at work
strengthening sectors that have been--and continue to be--targets of
attacks.
Commercial aviation
The latest threat information indicates that commercial aviation is
still the top target of terrorists, a fact that is underscored by the
terrible bombing in Moscow's Domodedovo airport last month. The
attempted terrorist attack on Christmas day 2009 illustrated the global
nature of the threat to aviation. That incident involved a U.S. plane
flying into a U.S. city, but it endangered individuals from at least 17
foreign countries. The alleged attacker, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, is
a Nigerian citizen educated in the United Kingdom. He received training
in terrorist tactics in Yemen, purchased his ticket in Ghana, and flew
from Nigeria to Amsterdam before departing for Detroit.
After this attempted terrorist attack, the U.S. Government moved
quickly to strengthen security. We took immediate steps to bolster
passenger screening, while addressing larger systemic issues on a
global scale. We launched a global initiative to ensure international
aviation security efforts were stronger, better coordinated, and
designed to meet the current threat environment. With the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the United Nations body responsible
for air transport, we held five regional aviation security summits
which resulted in five major regional aviation security declarations,
and worked closely with U.S. and international airline and airport
trade associations and airline CEOs on a coordinated, international
approach to enhancing aviation security. These meetings culminated in
the ICAO Triennial Assembly at the beginning of October, where the
Assembly adopted a historic Declaration on Aviation Security, which
forges a historic new foundation for aviation security that will better
protect the entire global aviation system from evolving terrorist
threats.
DHS coupled these international efforts with significant advances
in domestic aviation security. We have deployed additional behavior
detection officers, air marshals, and explosives-detection canine
teams, among other measures, to airports across the country. Through
the Recovery Act, we accelerated the purchase of Advanced Imaging
Technology machines for deployment to airports around the country, and
currently have 486 deployed. The President's fiscal year 2011 budget
request would provide funding for a further 500 AIT machines for
deployment to our Nation's airports. We are also purchasing and
deploying more portable explosive detection machines, Advanced
Technology X-ray systems, and bottled liquid scanners. In addition, in
April 2010, the United States implemented new, enhanced security
measures for all air carriers with international flights to the United
States that use real-time, threat-based intelligence to better mitigate
the evolving terrorist threats. And in November, DHS achieved a major
aviation security milestone called for in the 9/11 Commission Report,
as 100 percent of passengers on flights within or bound for the United
States are now being checked against Government watch lists.
The global supply chain
In addition to our on-going efforts to enhance international
aviation security, last month I announced a new partnership with the
World Customs Organization to enlist other nations, international
bodies, and the private sector to strengthen the global supply chain.
As illustrated this past October by a thwarted plot to conceal
explosive devices onboard cargo aircraft bound for the United States
from Yemen, the supply chain is a target for those who seek to disrupt
global commerce.
Securing the global supply chain is an important part of securing
both the lives of people around the world as well as the stability of
the global economy. Beyond the immediate impact of a potential attack
on passengers, transportation workers and other innocent people, the
longer-term consequences of a disabled supply chain could quickly
snowball and impact economies around the world. One consequence, for
example, could be that people across the world would find empty store
shelves for food, serious shortages in needed medical supplies, or
significant increases in the cost of energy.
To secure the supply chain, we first must work to prevent
terrorists from exploiting the supply chain to plan and execute
attacks. This means, for example, working with customs agencies and
shipping companies to keep precursor chemicals that can be used to
produce improvised explosive devices (IEDs) from being trafficked by
terrorists. We must also protect the most critical elements of the
supply chain, like central transportation hubs, from attack or
disruption. This means strengthening the civilian capacities of
governments around the world, including our own, to secure these hubs;
establishing global screening standards; and providing partner
countries across the supply chain with needed training and technology.
Finally, we must make the global supply chain more resilient, so that
in case of disruption it can recover quickly. Trade needs to be up and
running, with bolstered security, if needed, as quickly as possible
after any kind of event.
I am confident the global community can make great strides on all
of these fronts in 2011. Just as the nations of the world were able to
make historic progress on enhancing international aviation security in
2010, so too can we make global supply chain security stronger,
smarter, and more resilient this year.
Surface transportation
DHS has also taken major steps to strengthen security for surface
transportation, including passenger rail and mass transit. Many of the
steps I have already described are especially important in helping to
secure that environment. We conducted the initial launch of the
National ``If You See Something, Say Something'' campaign at Penn
Station in New York, in conjunction with Amtrak. The Nationwide SAR
Initiative is also geared toward detecting signs of terrorism in mass
transit hubs and vehicles like train stations, buses, or rail cars.
This initiative includes as law enforcement partners the Amtrak Police
Department as well as all police agencies serving rail networks in the
Northeast corridor, providing officers to use this upgraded reporting
system to refer suspicious activity to DHS and the FBI. This is in
addition to the intelligence sharing that the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) conducts with Amtrak on an on-going basis, and the
information-sharing work conducted by the Public Transportation
Information Sharing Analysis Center. TSA special operation teams, known
as Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams, work with
local partners to support several thousand operations every year. The
expansion of the Nation-wide SAR Initiative will continue to include
our partners in the transportation sector.
We are moving forward on the implementation of the 20
recommendations made in the Surface Transportation Security Assessment,
released in April as part of an administration-wide effort to address
surface transportation security. DHS has the lead on 19 of these
recommendations; to date we have completed five of the recommendations
\3\ and are making significant progress toward implementing the
remainder. We are also in the rulemaking process to require background
checks and security training for public transit employees, and to
require vulnerability assessments and security plans for high-risk
public transportation agencies, railroads, and bus operators. All of
these actions will help to address a landscape where the threats to
these systems are clear.
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\3\ The completed recommendations are: Number 1, Cross Modal Risk
Analyses; Number 3, Evaluate and Rank Critical Surface Transportation
Systems and Infrastructure; Number 12, Gap Analysis of Existing Risk
Tools and Methodologies; Number 15, SecureTM and
FutureTECHTM Programs; and Number 18, Transportation
Research & Development Input Process.
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Cybersecurity
At the same time that we work to strengthen the security of our
critical physical infrastructure, we are also working to secure
cyberspace--an effort that requires coordination and partnership among
the multitude of different entities in both the Government and private
sector that share responsibility for important cyber infrastructure.
Indeed, in just the last year, we have seen the full spectrum of cyber
threats, from denial-of-service attacks and spamming to attacks with
spyware. However, we have made--and are continuing to make--substantial
progress at building the capability necessary to address cyber
incidents on a National level.
DHS has expanded its capabilities to further secure cyberspace.
Last year, we entered into a new agreement with the Department of
Defense and National Security Agency to enhance our capabilities to
protect against threats to civilian and military computer systems and
networks. Through this agreement, personnel from DHS and the DOD are
now able to call upon the resources from each other and the NSA in
order to respond to attacks against our interlinked networks. We also
continue to expand the number of cyber experts working for DHS, a
number which has increased about fivefold in the past 2 years.
The Cyber Storm III exercise was another milestone in 2010. This
exercise simulated a large-scale cyber attack on our critical
infrastructure and involved participants from DHS and seven Cabinet-
level Federal agencies, but also from 13 other countries and 11 States.
It represented an important test for the country's National Cyber
Incident Response Plan.
DHS has opened and is now growing the National Cybersecurity and
Communications Integration Center (NCCIC), which is a 24/7 watch-and-
warning center that works closely with both government and private-
sector partners. In 2011, DHS will complete the deployment of the
EINSTEIN 2 threat detection system across the Federal space. In
addition, the Department will continue to develop, and begin
deployment, of EINSTEIN 3, which will provide DHS with the ability to
automatically detect and counter malicious cyber activity.
conclusion
The terrorist threat to the homeland is, in many ways, at its most
heightened state since 9/11. This threat is constantly evolving, and,
as I have said before, we cannot guarantee that there will never be
another terrorist attack, and we cannot seal our country under a glass
dome. However, we continue to do everything we can to reduce the risk
of terrorism in our Nation.
Our efforts are guided by a simple premise: To provide the
information, resources, and support that the hardworking men and women
of DHS, our Federal partners, and State, local, Tribal, and territorial
first responders need to effectively prevent and recover from acts of
terrorism and to mitigate the threats we face. This support helps to
build the kind of foundation that can guard against--and bounce back
from--any kind of attack, from newly emerging threats to specific
sectors that have been terrorist targets in the past. Working with our
Federal partners, law enforcement across the country, the private
sector, and the American public, we are making great progress in
addressing today's evolving terrorist threats.
Chairman King, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the
committee: Thank you for inviting me to testify today. I can now take
your questions.
Chairman King. Thank you, Secretary Napolitano. Your
statement will be made part of the record, your full statement.
I will now recognize Director Mike Leiter. Director Leiter.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL E. LEITER, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER
Mr. Leiter. Thank you, Chairman King, Ranking Member
Thompson, Members of the committee. Thank you for having me,
with Secretary Napolitano.
I hate to sound like a broken record, but I do want to add
my personal thanks to Congresswoman Harman, who has been a
leader in intelligence and homeland security for many years
now.
She has been a staunch supporter of NCTC. The one anecdote
I would pass along beyond the laws you have worked on, the
oversight you have provided, Congresswoman Harman came out and
spent about 2\1/2\ hours with a packed room of analysts, about
50 or 60 men and women, to talk to them about what it was like
to be a senior woman in National security. Those young analysts
came out glowing about their experience. I think it was the
personal touch that you provided which helped, I think, inspire
another generation of National security leaders. So thank you
very much.
I also want to thank the committee for coming out and
visiting NCTC. I think the opportunity to see young analysts
and the ways in which NCTC and DHS are so entwined in our work
on a daily basis was a great opportunity.
As Chairman King noted, the past 2 years have obviously
highlighted the many dangers associated with a geographically
and ideologically diverse group of terrorists that seek to harm
the United States and our allies. These threats are not only
from outside our borders, but increasingly from within.
Although we have made enormous strides in combating and
reducing the likelihood of some complex catastrophic attacks by
al-Qaeda from Pakistan, we continue to face threats from many
other corners.
I will briefly outline those remarks and, again, ask that
my full record be made part of the--my full statement be made
part of the record. To begin, I will touch on the threats that
we face. Today, al-Qaeda and its allies in Pakistan still pose
a threat, despite degradation suffered from extensive and
sustained counterterrorism operations over the past several
years and accelerated over the past 2 years.
Al-Qaeda, we believe in Pakistan is at one of its weakest
points in the past decade, and it is continuously being forced
to react to a reduced safe haven and personnel losses.
But it remains a very determined enemy. Of course, Osama
bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri maintain al-Qaeda's unity and
strategic focus on the United States and other Western targets.
At least five disrupted plots in Europe during the past 5
years, including the plot to attack U.S. airliners transiting
between the United Kingdom and the United States, in addition
to disrupted cells in the United Kingdom, Norway, and attacks
against newspaper offices in Denmark demonstrate al-Qaeda in
Pakistan's steadfast intentions.
We are also concerned about future homeland attacks from
one of al-Qaeda's key allies within the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas, or the FATA, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, TTP, the
group that trained Faisal Shahzad, the Times Square bomber from
May 1 of last year, as well as the potential threat from other
al-Qaeda original allies within the Pakistan and Afghanistan
region.
Also on Pakistan, we remain focused on Lashkar-e-Taiba, the
group behind the 2008 Mumbai attacks, which remains a threat to
a variety of interests in South Asia. Although LET has not yet
conducted attacks in the West, it does have individuals who
have been trained who have been involved in attacks, and it
could pose a threat to the homeland and Europe, in addition to
destabilizing South Asia more broadly.
Of course, we continue to view Yemen as a key base of
operations from which al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula can and
has planned and executed attacks. Over the past year, AQAP
expanded operations against the homeland, including, of course,
the December 2009 attack, and its follow-on effort to down two
U.S.-bound cargo planes in October 2010.
In addition to these specific attacks, A.Q. has made
several appeals last year to Muslims to conduct attacks on
their own initiative. Specifically, over the past year, AQAP
released four issues of its magazine, English magazine Inspire,
which attempts to persuade adherence to launch attacks on their
own in the West.
East Africa remains a key operating area for al-Qaeda
associates, as well. Of course, last year, for the first time,
they struck outside of Somalia, killing 74, including one
American in Uganda, and they continue to attract violent
extremists from across the globe, including from the United
States.
Now, these were mostly threats from outside the country. As
the Chairman noted, we are extremely concerned with homegrown
violent extremists here in the United States. Plots disrupted
in Washington, DC, Oregon, Alaska, and Maryland during the past
year were indicative of a common cause rallying independent
extremists to attack the homeland. Homegrown violent extremists
have yet to demonstrate a sophisticated ability, but as Fort
Hood demonstrated, attacks need not be sophisticated to be
quite deadly.
Now, although time doesn't permit me to go into all of the
threats we watch, I would just like to highlight, in addition
to these threats, we continue to watch al-Qaeda in North Africa
and Iraq, Hezbollah and its targeting of U.S. interests
globally, and also other terrorist groups, including Greek
anarchists that recently sent letter bombs to embassies in Rome
and elsewhere.
In light of this changing dynamic, we have significantly
evolved our capabilities to try to reduce the likelihood of a
successful attack. Most notably, as you saw last week or 2
weeks ago in your visit, NCTC established a pursuit group that
is designed to track down tactical leads that can lead to the
discovery of threats and against the homeland. As I hope you
saw, the pursuit group has repeatedly identified and passed to
our operational partners like DHS key leads which might
otherwise have been missed.
We are, of course, also focused on continuing to lead
information integration across the U.S. Government for
counterterrorism purposes. We have always had access to a
plethora of databases, but in conjunction with DHS, FBI, and
others, we have further developed over the past year an
information technology architecture which aims to improve our
ability to detect this new sort of threat.
Finally, as this committee knows quite well,
counterterrorism efforts are not just about stopping attacks,
but also trying to address the upstream factors that drive
violent extremism. Our focus as a general matter is
undercutting the terrorist narrative and building safe and
resilient communities, not NCTC operationally, but with our
partners like DHS, in conjunction with other parts of the U.S.
Government.
Specifically, on behalf of the National security staff, we
are coordinating interagency planning in partnership with
departments and agencies across the U.S. Government. Where
appropriate, we are helping to support and coordinate the
Federal Government's engagement with American communities where
terrorists are already focusing their recruiting efforts.
In my view, while government has an important role in
implementing these strategies, we along with DHS view the
private-sector and community institutions as key players in
countering radicalization. We believe strongly that addressing
radicalization requires community-based solutions service to
local dynamics and needs.
In coordination with FBI and DHS, NCTC developed a
community awareness briefing that conveys unclassified
information about the realities of current terrorist
recruitment to the homeland on the internet so communities can
be mobilized to fight the same fight that we are involved in.
Chairman King, Ranking Member Thompson, and all the Members
of the committee, thank you very much again for having us here
today. As you know well, despite the improvements, perfection
in this endeavor is not possible. We are working every day, 24
hours a day, tirelessly to try to stop the next attack, but we
cannot guarantee 100 percent safety.
In this regard, I believe we must continue to foster
domestic resilience while highlighting the ultimate futility of
al-Qaeda's fight. Without your leadership--and, again, without
Ms. Harman's leadership--we would not have made the strides
that we have. I very much look forward to taking your questions
and working with you for years to come. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Leiter follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael E. Leiter
February 9, 2011
introduction
Chairman King, Ranking Member Thompson, distinguished Members of
the committee, thank you for the opportunity today to discuss the
current state of the terrorist threat to the Homeland and the U.S.
Government's efforts to address the threat. I am pleased to join
Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano here today--one of the
National Counterterrorism Center's (NCTC) closest and most critical
partners.
The past 2 years have highlighted the growing breadth of terrorism
faced by the United States and our allies. Although we and our partners
have made enormous strides in reducing some terrorist threats--most
particularly in reducing the threat of a complex, catastrophic attack
by al-Qaeda's senior leadership in Pakistan--we continue to face a
variety of threats from other corners. These of course include those
commonly referred to as ``homegrown terrorists'' who have long-standing
ties to the United States and who are often inspired by al-Qaeda's
ideology. While these newer forms of threats are less likely to be of
the same magnitude as the tragedy this Nation suffered in September
2001, their breadth and simplicity make our work all the more
difficult.
In response, and especially since the failed December 25 attack of
2009, the counterterrorism community broadly and NCTC specifically have
pursued numerous reforms to reduce the threat to the American people
and our allies. These reforms address a wide variety of areas,
including prioritizing CT activities across the intelligence community,
clarifying counterterrorism analytic responsibilities, and improving
information integration. Perhaps most notably, NCTC created a new
analytical effort, the Pursuit Group, to help track down tactical leads
that can lead to the discovery of threats aimed against the Homeland or
U.S. interests abroad. None of these reforms are a panacea, but in
combination I believe they reduce the likelihood of a successful
attack.
Finally, while defending against current threats we must remain
focused on denying al-Qaeda and its affiliates a new generation of
recruits--especially in the homeland. In that light, NCTC has remained
at the forefront of identifying, integrating, coordinating, and
assessing efforts that aim to undercut the terrorism narrative and
prevent the radicalization and mobilization of new additional
terrorists.
al-qaeda and its allies in pakistan pose threat despite degradation
While al-Qaeda in Pakistan remains focused on conducting attacks in
the West, the group must balance that intent with concerns for its
security. Sustained CT pressure on al-Qaeda in Pakistan has degraded
the group's capabilities, leaving it at one of its weakest points in
the past decade.
During the past 2 years, al-Qaeda's base of operations in
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) has been
restricted considerably, limiting its freedom of movement and
ability to operate. The group has been forced to react
continuously to personnel losses that are affecting the group's
morale, command and control, and continuity of operations.
Al-Qaeda continues to prize attacks against the U.S. Homeland and
our European allies above all else. We remain vigilant to the
possibility that despite the degradation of the organization, al-Qaeda
already may have deployed operatives to the West for attacks. Al-
Qaeda's senior-most leaders--Usama Bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri--
maintain al-Qaeda's unity and strategic focus on U.S. targets,
especially prominent political, economic, and infrastructure targets.
Europe is a key focus of al-Qaeda plotting. At least five
disrupted plots during the past 5 years--including a plan to
attack airliners transiting between the United Kingdom and the
United States, disrupted cells in the United Kingdom and
Norway, and two disrupted plots to attack a newspaper office in
Denmark--demonstrate al-Qaeda's steadfast intentions.
We remain concerned about future Homeland attacks from one of al-
Qaeda's key allies in the FATA, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the
group that trained the bomber who failed in his attempt in 2010 to
detonate a bomb in Times Square. TTP is an alliance of militant groups
that formed in 2007 with the intent of imposing its interpretation of
sharia law in Pakistan and expelling the Coalition from Afghanistan.
TTP leaders maintain close ties to senior al-Qaeda leaders, providing
critical support to al-Qaeda in the FATA and sharing some of the same
global violent extremist goals.
Other al-Qaeda allies in Pakistan, the Haqqani network and Harakat-
ul Jihad Islami (HUJI), have close ties to al-Qaeda. Both groups have
demonstrated the intent and capability to conduct attacks against U.S.
persons and targets in the region, and we are looking closely for any
indicators of attack planning in the West.
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT)--another Pakistan-based Sunni extremist
group--poses a threat to a range of interests in South Asia. Its
previous attacks in Kashmir and India have had a destabilizing effect
on the region, increasing tensions and brinkmanship between New Delhi
and Islamabad, and we are concerned that it is increasing its
operational role in attacks against Coalition forces in Afghanistan.
Although LT has not previously conducted attacks in the West, LT--or
individuals who trained with LT in the past--could pose a threat to the
Homeland and Europe, particularly if they were to collude with al-Qaeda
operatives or other like-minded terrorists.
the increasing threat from al-qaeda's regional affiliates
As al-Qaeda's affiliates continue to develop and evolve, the threat
posed by many of these groups to U.S. interests abroad and the Homeland
has grown. The affiliates possess local roots and autonomous command
structures and represent a talent pool that al-Qaeda leadership may tap
to augment operational efforts.
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).--We continue to view
Yemen as a key battleground and regional base of operations from which
AQAP can plan attacks, train recruits, and facilitate the movement of
operatives. We assess AQAP remains intent on conducting additional
attacks targeting the Homeland and U.S. interests overseas and will
continue propaganda efforts designed to inspire like-minded individuals
to conduct attacks in their home countries.
AQAP has orchestrated many attacks in Yemen and expanded
external operations to Saudi Arabia and the Homeland, including
the assassination attempt on a Saudi Prince in August 2009, the
attempted airliner attack during December 2009, and its follow-
on effort to down two U.S.-bound cargo planes in October 2010
using explosives-laden printer cartridges.
Anwar al-Aulaqi, a dual U.S.-Yemeni citizen and a leader
within AQAP, played a significant role in the attempted
airliner attack and was designated in July as a specially
designated global terrorist under E.O. 13224 by the U.S.
Government and the UN's 1267 al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions
Committee. Al-Aulaqi's familiarity with the West and his
operational role in AQAP remain key concerns for us.
AQAP's use of a single operative using a prefabricated
explosive device in their first attempted Homeland attack, and
the lack of operatives associated with their second attempted
attack, minimized its resource requirements and reduced visible
signatures that often enable us to detect and disrupt plotting
efforts.
Al-Qaeda Operatives in East Africa and Al-Shabaab.--East Africa
remains a key operating area for al-Qaeda associates and the Somalia-
based terrorist and insurgent group al-Shabaab. Some al-Shabaab leaders
share al-Qaeda's ideology, publicly praising Usama Bin Ladin and
requesting further guidance from him, although Somali nationalist
themes are also prevalent in their public statements and remain one of
the primary motivations of rank-and-file members of al-Shabaab. The
Somalia-based training program established by al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda
continues to attract foreign fighters from across the globe, to include
recruits from the United States. At least 20 U.S. persons--the majority
of whom are ethnic Somalis--have traveled to Somalia since 2006 to
fight and train with al-Shabaab. In June and July 2010, four U.S.
citizens of non-Somali descent were arrested trying to travel to
Somalia to join al-Shabaab.
Omar Hammami, a U.S. citizen who traveled to Somalia in 2006
and is now believed to be one of al-Shabaab's most prominent
foreign fighters, told the New York Times last year that the
United States was a legitimate target for attack. The potential
for Somali trainees to return to the United States or locations
in the West to launch attacks and threaten Western interests
remains a significant concern.
This past year, al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for its
first transnational attack outside of Somalia--the suicide
bombings in Kampala, Uganda in July that killed 74 people
including one American. Al-Shabaab leaders have vowed
additional attacks in the region.
Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).--AQIM is a
threat to U.S. and other Western interests in North and West Africa,
primarily through kidnap-for-ransom operations and small-arms attacks,
though the group's recent execution of several French hostages and
first suicide bombing attack in Niger last year highlight AQIM's
potential attack range. Disrupted plotting against France and
publicized support for Nigerian extremists reveal the group's
continuing aspirations to expand its influence. Sustained Algerian
efforts against AQIM have significantly degraded the organization's
ability to conduct high-casualty attacks in the country and compelled
the group to shift its operational focus from northern Algeria to the
vast, ungoverned Sahel region in the south.
Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).--On-going CT successes against AQI--to
include the deaths of the group's top two leaders last year in a joint
Iraqi/U.S. military operation--have continued to put pressure on the
organization. However, despite these on-going setbacks, AQI remains a
key al-Qaeda affiliate and has maintained a steady attack tempo within
Iraq, serving as a disruptive influence in the Iraqi Government
formation process and a threat to U.S. forces. We are concerned that
AQI remains committed to al-Qaeda's global agenda and intent on
conducting external operations, to include in the U.S. Homeland.
homegrown extremist activity remains elevated
In addition to threats emanating from outside the country, we also
remain concerned that homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) continue to
pose an elevated threat to the Homeland. Plots disrupted in Washington,
DC, Oregon, Alaska, and Maryland during the past year were unrelated
operationally, but indicate that the ideology espoused by al-Qaeda and
its adherents is motivating, or being used as a justification by,
individuals to attack the Homeland. Key to this trend has been the
development of a U.S.-specific narrative, particularly in terrorist
media available on the internet that motivates individuals to violence.
This narrative--a blend of al-Qaeda inspiration, perceived
victimization, and glorification of past Homegrown plotting--addresses
the unique concerns of like-minded, U.S.-based individuals. HVEs
continue to act independently and have yet to demonstrate the
capability to conduct sophisticated attacks, but as Fort Hood shooter
Nidal Hasan demonstrated, attacks need not be sophisticated to be
deadly.
Similar to 2009, arrests of HVEs in the United States in
2010 remained at elevated levels, with four plots disrupted in
the Homeland. The individuals involved were motivated to carry
out violence on the basis of a variety of personal rationales,
underscoring the continued intent by some HVEs to take part in
violence despite having no operational connections to
terrorists overseas.
Increasingly sophisticated English-language propaganda that
provides extremists with guidance to carry out Homeland attacks
remains easily accessible via the internet. English-language
web forums also foster a sense of community and further
indoctrinate new recruits, both of which can lead to increased
levels of violent activity.
The prominent profiles of U.S. citizens within overseas
terrorist groups--such as Omar Hammami in al-Shabaab and Anwar
al-Aulaqi in AQAP--may also provide young U.S.-based
individuals with American role models in groups that in the
past may have appeared foreign and inaccessible. These
individuals have also provided encouragement for homegrown
extremists to travel overseas and join terrorist organizations.
al-qaeda and affiliates sustain media campaign
Al-Qaeda senior leaders issued significantly fewer video and audio
statements in 2010 than 2009. As previously, public al-Qaeda statements
rarely contained a specific threat or telegraphed attack planning, but
they continue to provide a window into the group's strategic
intentions.
Al-Qaeda spokesmen continued to call for violence against Western
targets, including appeals last year for Muslims to conduct attacks on
their own initiative, and they reiterated assertions that U.S. outreach
to Muslims is deceptive. Bin Ladin, al-Zawahiri, and American spokesman
Adam Gadahn also released statements that decried the evils of climate
change and expressed sympathy for Muslims affected by severe flooding
in Pakistan, probably in an effort to bolster the group's image among
mainstream Muslims.
AQAP since September has released three issues of Inspire--the
group's English-language on-line magazine produced by its media wing--
including a ``Special Edition'' in November that glorified the group's
disrupted 29 October cargo plot.
our evolving response: lessons from 12/25 and beyond
In light of this dynamic terrorist landscape, the CT Community has
significantly evolved to improve our chances of disrupting terrorist
attacks before they occur and reducing the likelihood that attacks will
be successful. These reforms address a wide variety of areas, including
prioritizing CT reforms across the intelligence community, clarifying
counterterrorism analytic responsibilities, improving our ability to
develop tactical leads like the identity of a future Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab by creating NCTC's ``Pursuit Group,'' expanding
watchlisting resources and modifying watchlisting criteria,
accelerating information integration across key interagency data
holdings, and continuing to prioritize sharing of intelligence with
State, local, and Tribal partners.
With respect to our improved ability to develop tactical leads, 1
year ago I directed the creation of a new ``Pursuit Group'' within
NCTC, which now focuses exclusively on information that could lead to
the discovery of threats aimed against the Homeland or U.S. interests
abroad. The Pursuit Group's six analytical teams work with our IC
partners to identify and examine as early as possible leads that could
become terrorist threats; to pursue unresolved and non-obvious
connections; and to inform in a timely manner appropriate U.S.
Government entities for action. Although I cannot discuss these
findings in an unclassified setting, I can inform the committee that
the Pursuit Group has repeatedly identified key leads that would have
otherwise been missed amidst a sea of uncorrelated data.
We are also continuing to implement revamped watchlisting
protocols, and--in conjunction with the FBI and DHS--we have made major
improvements to the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (i.e.,
the classified backbone of terrorist watchlisting also known as
``TIDE'') to better support watchlisting, information sharing, and
analysis. In addition, a comprehensive training program has been
developed for the counterterrorism community involved in watchlisting
and screening to ensure consistent application of watchlisting
standards across the U.S. Government. Finally, I restructured NCTC's
directorates to bring improved focus to terrorist identities; the new
directorate brings additional resources to bear to enhance watchlisting
records and fuse biometric and biographic watchlisting data.
Supporting all of these and other NCTC missions, NCTC has continued
to lead information integration across the counterterrorism community.
NCTC has long had appropriate access to a plethora of databases that
span every aspect of terrorism information, but over the past year in
conjunction with the ODNI, DHS, CIA, NSA, DOD, and DOJ (including FBI),
we have further developed an Information Technology infrastructure to
better meet the demands of the evolving threat. Such steps include the
enhancement of a ``Google-like'' search across databases, and the
development of a ``CT Data Layer'' to discover non-obvious terrorist
relationships so that analysts can examine potential findings more
efficiently. All of these efforts are being pursued vehemently, but
they also require careful consideration of complex legal, policy, and
technical issues as well as the implementation of appropriate privacy,
civil liberty, and security protections.
And as we improve our ability to counter the evolving threat, we
remain focused on sharing intelligence outside the ``Federal family.''
Working with and through DHS and FBI, NCTC's Interagency Threat
Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) continues to bridge the
intelligence information gap between traditional intelligence agencies
and State, local, Tribal (SLT) partners, playing a pivotal role in
assisting Federal partners in interpreting and analyzing intelligence
intended for dissemination to SLT mission partners.
countering violent extremism
As this committee knows well, counterterrorism efforts are not just
about stopping plots but must also include addressing ``upstream
factors'' that drive violent extremism. NCTC continues to play a
significant role in this realm, both overseas and at home. Pursuant to
our authorities under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act, NCTC helps identify, integrate, coordinate, and assess U.S.
Government efforts that aim to counter and prevent the recruitment and
radicalization of a new generation of terrorists. Our focus is on both
near- and long-term efforts to undercut the terrorist narrative and
promote safe and responsive communities, thereby minimizing the pool of
people who would support violent extremism.
More specifically, NCTC works with colleagues in Federal, State,
local and Tribal governments; with international partners; and with the
private sector to integrate all elements of National power to counter
and prevent violent extremism. We are coordinating an interagency
planning effort to address domestic radicalization. Where appropriate,
NCTC is also helping support and coordinate the Federal Government's
engagement with American communities where terrorists are focusing
their recruiting efforts.
In all of our efforts we work closely with security agencies such
as DHS and FBI, as well as non-traditional Federal partners such as the
Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of
Education. For example, NCTC participated in an event with the
Department of Education where five school districts came together to
discuss unique challenges facing schoolchildren of Somali descent,
including targeted recruitment efforts by al-Shabaab. These non-
security partners offer expertise in social services and the capacity
to act on the local and community level. By coordinating and
integrating a broad community of interest, NCTC ensures a ``whole of
government'' approach that is vital to addressing and preventing
radicalization.
While Government has an important role in developing and
implementing strategies, we view the private sector and community
institutions as key players in directly countering radicalization, and
we believe strongly that addressing radicalization requires community-
based solutions that are sensitive to local dynamics and needs. In this
regard, NCTC has engaged the private sector to provide forums in which
to examine these issues. Specifically, we recently participated in an
event hosted by a prominent think tank that brought together private
technology experts and community members in order to explore ways to
counter terrorist narratives on the internet.
NCTC in coordination with FBI and DHS has also worked with
community leaders, State and local governments and law enforcement
involved in countering violent extremism to understand how governments
can effectively partner with their communities. It has become clear
that Government can play a significant role by acting as a convener and
facilitator that informs and supports--but does not direct--community-
led initiatives. Based on this, NCTC has developed a Community
Awareness Briefing that conveys unclassified information about the
realities of terrorist recruitment in the Homeland and on the internet.
The briefing aims to educate and empower parents and community leaders
to combat violent extremist narratives and recruitment. NCTC has
presented the briefing to communities--including Muslim American
communities--around the country, leveraging, when possible, existing
U.S. Government engagement platforms such as DHS and FBI roundtables.
conclusion
Chairman King and Ranking Member Thompson, I want to thank you for
the opportunity to testify before your committee today. Together we
have made great strides in reducing the likelihood of a successful
terrorist attack--especially a catastrophic one. But as you know well,
perfection is no more possible in counterterrorism than it is in any
other endeavor. NCTC and the entire counterterrorism community work
tirelessly to reduce the likelihood of attack but we cannot guarantee
safety. In this regard, I believe we must continue to foster resilience
domestically while highlighting the futility of al-Qaeda's fight.
Without your leadership, the strides we have jointly made to
counter the terrorist threat would not be possible. Congress's
continued support is critical to the Center's mission to lead our
Nation's effort to combat terrorism at home and abroad by analyzing the
threat, sharing that information with our partners, and integrating all
instruments of National power to ensure their coordinated application
and thereby maximize our effectiveness at combating the threat. I look
forward to continuing our work together in the years to come.
Chairman King. Thank you, Director Leiter. I thank both
witnesses for their testimony.
Secretary Napolitano, 2 years ago, when you made your first
statement before this committee, I pointed out the fact that
you do not use the word ``terrorist'' or ``terrorism'' even
once. In today's statement, you used it more than 60 times. Is
that a reflection of the growing terrorist threat? Is it a
reflection of the changing emphasis within the administration?
Or is it just something that happened?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, I think my initial statement
before the committee was one of several speeches, and it just
happened to be the one that didn't use the word ``terrorism.''
But the plain fact of the matter is, is that I spend the
bulk of my time working on counterterrorism-related activities.
It can be in the TSA world. It can be in the CBP world. It can
be with intel and analysis and working with our fusion centers
with the NCTC and others, but this is a top priority for us.
Mr. Chairman, one area that is really not up to bat today
but is a new one and is also one I think we need to watch out
for is the whole word of cyber and cybersecurity and how that
is going to interconnect with the terrorist----
Chairman King. Yes. In fact, Chairman Lungren--is going to
be working on that extensively during the year. How prepared do
you believe the Department is to deal with the threat from
biological, chemical, radiological weapons?
Secretary Napolitano. Yes. Now that is an extraordinarily
difficult area in the sense that we are still working on--at
the science and technology level on things like detection
mechanisms that are effective in all areas. Mr. Chairman, I
think I would say that we are more prepared now than we were 2
years ago. Two years ago we were more prepared than 2 years
before then. But there is still much work to be done.
That is why we have funded and are continuing to fund
pilots of different types with laboratories and universities
and actually private-sector entities around the country,
particularly in the CBRN arena. That is why those things are so
important. Securiing the Cities is an example of that.
Chairman King. Thank you. Director Leiter, with the
splintering of these--the development of these various splinter
groups, how much control do you see coming from al-Qaeda
central to those groups? If there is not control, is that good
or bad?
Mr. Leiter. Mr. Chairman, I think there remains certainly
ideological inspiration from al-Qaeda's senior leadership but
less and less operational control. I think that is in large
part due to the offensive pressure that we are applying to al-
Qaeda in Pakistan.
I think to some extent that is quite good. It reduces the
likelihood again of a large-scale organized attack. I think the
negative aspects of it is it allows the franchises to innovate
on their own. In the case of al-Qaeda and the Arabian Peninsula
in Yemen and folks like Anwar al-Awlaki they have been quite
successful at being innovators that make our jobs more
challenging.
Chairman King. Not to be, I guess, grading them, but would
say that al-Awlaki is at least a severe threat today as Bin
Laden?
Mr. Leiter. I actually consider al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula with al-Awlaki as a leader within that organization
probably the most significant risk to the U.S. homeland. I am
hesitant to rank them too quickly, but certainly up there.
Chairman King. Would al-Awlaki be the one who has been the
most successful as far as radicalizing through the internet?
Mr. Leiter. I think al-Awlaki is probably--certainly is the
most well-known English-speaking ideologue who is speaking
directly to folks here in the homeland. There are several
others who we are concerned with but I think al-Awlaki probably
does have the greatest audience and the like. So in that sense
he is the most important.
Chairman King. How effective do you find Inspire?
Mr. Leiter. It is a difficult question. Mr. Chairman. We
obviously look at Inspire. It is spiffy. It has got great
graphics and in some sense we think probably speaks to
individuals who are likely to be radicalized. Frankly there is
very little new information in Inspire. So to that extent it is
not I don't think something revolutionary and new in the
substance. But again, in the way it conveys the message it is
useful and we think it is attractive to English speakers.
Chairman King. How concerned are you at the possibility of
messages or signals being sent through Inspire?
Mr. Leiter. I think I would take that more in a classified
setting, but as a general matter I think Inspire is attempting
not to build a secret network between AQAP folks in the United
States or other English-speaking countries. It is more looking
to what the title suggests, inspire them to act on their own.
Chairman King. Secretary Napolitano, in your State of the
Homeland Security speech, you mentioned D-block and the
President made reference to it in his State of the Union
speech. We don't have the details yet. Can you give us any
indication of when it will be formally unveiled or what the
specific details of D-block will be?
Secretary Napolitano. I don't know the exact date. We will
find that for you, Mr. Chairman. But I know the President is
intent on working with the Congress to set aside the D-block
for public safety. It is something that both our Department and
the Department the Justice advocated very strongly within the
administration. But I don't know the exact date when they are
going to approach the Congress about the legislative change
that will----
Chairman King. I look forward to working with you and the
administration on that.
Secretary Napolitano. Indeed.
Chairman King [continuing]. Ranking Member, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
holding this hearing. Secretary Napolitano, in your testimony
you went to great lengths to describe your involvement in the
homeland relative to home-grown terrors. Law enforcement
agencies have also talked about neo-Nazis, environmental
extremists and anti-tax groups as more prevalent than al-Qaeda-
inspired terrorist organizations. Have you looked at this to
see if that in fact is the truth?
Secretary Napolitano. Representative Thompson, not in that
sense. I mean, we don't have like a scorecard. The plain fact
of the matter is, is that from a law enforcement, terrorist
prevention perspective we have to prepare law enforcement and
communities for both types of acts.
Mr. Thompson. Well Mr. Leiter, given what has occurred in
the last 2 years here in this country, have you been able to
analyze what that threat looks like?
Mr. Leiter. Congressmen, by law the National
Counterterrorism Center only looks at international terrorism
or that inspired by international terrorism. So my analysts do
not actually look at some of the groups that you described in
your question to the Secretary.
Mr. Thompson. But you do communicate to the people. Am I
correct? On the domestic side.
Mr. Leiter. We generally work through the Department of
Homeland Security and the FBI, who has the direct operational
responsibility.
Mr. Thompson. Madam Secretary, could you help me with that?
Secretary Napolitano. In what sense?
Mr. Thompson. Relative to the information in terms of
individuals who are being a threat to the homeland. I am trying
to look at it in a broader sense. Sometimes we tend to narrow
the focus. But I think what we have to do in looking at the
threat is look at the entire threat. Can you share with the
committee some of those other threats that you have deemed
necessary to address?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, what we are focused on is
helping law enforcement and communities look for the tactics,
the techniques, the behaviors that would indicate that a
violent act, a terrorist act, is impending. Now, some of those
are inspired by Islamist groups, Al-Qaeda and so forth. Others
can be inspired by, like, anti-government groups flying a plane
into the IRS building, for example.
So the JPTS are the ones on which we have members who case-
by-case analyze what was the motivation of a particular actor
at a particular time. I would say, Representative Thompson,
that we see a variety of different types of motivations in
addition to the Islamist motivation that we are here talking
about right now.
Mr. Thompson. For the sake of the record, give us some of
those varieties.
Secretary Napolitano. They can be anti-Federal Government
type of motivation. I mentioned the individual who flew the
plane into the IRS building. Tim McVeigh. I worked on the
Oklahoma City bombing case. Would be another great--I don't
want to say great example--another example of that sort of
motivation. It can be a variety of other things. As Mike
indicated, the FBI works directly on those cases, has
operational lead for their investigations.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Leiter, let's take an international
situation. The incident that occurred in October with the
printer bomb. Were you involved in that?
Mr. Leiter. Yes, we were.
Mr. Thompson. Can you share with the committee, if you can,
whether or not security gaps like that are being reviewed going
forward, so that others hopefully will be closed?
Mr. Leiter. Congressmen, I can. Then I will also defer
again to Secretary Napolitano, who has some broader
responsibilities for cargo. Actually even before that event we
were obviously concerned with the possibility of using cargo in
a terrorist attack. You only have to look back at the Lockerbie
bombing to know that this is something that could occur.
Since that event, we have worked at NCTC and the
intelligence community to find new ways to support DHS to
sharpen our ability to find individuals or shippers who we
consider high-risk so those packages can be put through further
screening. I think as Secretary Napolitano will echo, it is a
challenge.
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, Representative Thompson, even
prior to October we had assembled an international initiative
similar to what we have been doing on passenger air travel with
respect to cargo. It involves the World Customs Organization,
the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the
International Maritime Organization.
What we are doing is working to have international
standards requirements, and also working with the private
sector who are the main air shippers. This of course was an air
shipment. We are now screening 100 of at-risk cargo that is on
a passenger plane inbound to the United States, which is
something we had not had the capability of doing until the last
year. We continue to work across the world, across different
nodes of transportation, across different types of cargo,
across different types of personnel who handle that cargo to
secure the entire supply chain.
Mr. Leiter. Congressmen, if I could just add one point. I
think this is an area where the cooperation between DHS and
NCTC has really improved and been stellar over the past year.
Not just with cargo, but with screened personnel. The movement
now of information as we see a threat in the intelligence
stream about a country or a name or a region and where we think
an attack might be coming to, that movement is moving--that
information is moving in real time to DHS so DHS can rapidly
adjust their screening protocol. Again, that is happening on an
hourly basis.
Chairman King. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Madam Secretary, Director Leiter. In November
2009, I attended the Fort Hood memorial service just north of
my district in Texas and saw the 13 combat boots, the rifles,
talked to the soldiers who had been shot that day. They
described how the Major Hasan said, ``Allahu Akbar.'' It was
very dramatic.
Some said that wasn't an act of terrorism. I said it was. I
think it is the deadliest attack we have had since 9/11.
Since that time, the Senate has issued a report called, ``A
Ticking Time Bomb.'' In that report, it talks about how the
Joint Terrorism Task Force in San Diego had information about
Major Hasan's contacts with what you described, Director, as
the most dangerous threat to the United States' security, and
that is Awlaki. Unfortunately, that information was not shared
with the commander, General Cone at Ford Hood, who I talked to,
and I said, ``Wouldn't you have liked to have known that?''
When the attack took place, the FBI agent was quoted as
saying, ``You know who that is? That is our boy. That is our
boy.''
Can you tell this committee and the American people what
happened that day and what Major Hasan's connections are to the
terrorist community?
Mr. Leiter. Congressman, to begin, I would just say at
NCTC, within about 48 hours of that attack, we designated that
a terrorist attack in what we call the worldwide incident
tracking system. So from our perspective, it was--as soon as we
had the initial indication of the motivation, we counted it as
a terrorist attack. It can always change back; in this case, it
hasn't.
With respect to his connection to Awlaki and AQAP--and I
want to be very careful here, because obviously this is still a
case for prosecution--but we have said publicly it looks to us
like inspiration, rather than direction.
Finally, your question about what happened, I want to be
careful not to speak for either Director Mueller or the
Department of Defense. I think they said quite clearly at the
time that information was not shared effectively between the
FBI and Department of Defense. They have taken remedial action
to address some of that.
I know on--for NCTC's part, since then, we have worked with
the FBI to produce improved training materials and training for
field offices, so there really is no question for the next
special agent when he is investigating a case that he will
recognize the telltale signs of radicalization and moving
towards mobilization, and not just convey that to the
Department of Defense, but probably be more aggressive in
following that up.
Mr. McCaul. I mean, I think the American people--it is hard
to understand--you know, you have to--and we can talk about
infiltration of the military and what the threat is there, but
it is hard for the average citizen to understand how the FBI
could have this kind of information, that you have a major at
the biggest installation in the United States in contact with
one of the biggest threats to the security of the United
States, and yet that information is not shared at all.
I think that is a major breakdown. I hope--and I know that
is not totally within your purview and your jurisdiction, but I
sure hope we can fix that--fix that problem.
Mr. Leiter. Congressman, I will say, again, I do know that
the Department of Defense and FBI now have a much tighter
relationship, so that information is shared. During the
investigation, it was shared with a Department of Defense agent
on the JTTF, but not shared back to the Army. We have also
since then expanded NCTC's access to some of that granular
information that was the basis for the investigation, so NCTC
can help to fill those gaps and make sure the information is
properly shared.
Mr. McCaul. Okay.
Madam Secretary, you were quoted in the Hill newspaper as
saying that, with respect to the border, that the border--it is
inaccurate to state that the border is out of control.
We had a briefing with Border Patrol. They said that about
44 percent of the border is under operational control. As you
well know, the killings, the violence going on, you know,
coming from Arizona, me coming from Texas, I would say my
constituents do view it as an out-of-control state.
The special interest aliens have--has increased by 37
percent. Those are persons coming from countries that may have
potentially terrorist influences. There was recently a
potential terrorist that was found in the trunk of a car, paid
a Mexican cartel drug dealer $5,000 to sneak across the border.
Could you just clarify the statement, in terms of your
statement that it is not out of control down there?
Secretary Napolitano. Oh, absolutely. First--and I will
give you the full talk that I gave at UTEP.
But the border--thanks in part to the bipartisan efforts of
the Congress--has more manpower, technology, and infrastructure
than ever before. The numbers in terms of seizures that need to
go up are going up, and the numbers in terms of illegal
immigration are going way down.
The communities that are along the border--San Diego,
Nogales, El Paso, and so forth--are among, in terms of violent
crime statistics, are among the safest in the United States.
So what I was saying at that--from which I am quoted in
part was to the cartels in Mexico: Don't bring your violence
that you are doing in Juarez, et cetera, over into the United
States. You will be met with an overwhelming response.
It is true that there are crimes on this side of the
border. The murder of a rancher in Arizona is one example. But
it is inaccurate to extrapolate from that to say that the
entire border is out of control.
With respect to the 44 percent number, I think it is
important to recognize that operational control is a very
narrow term of art in Border Patrol lingo. Basically, it is
restricted to where you have individual agents located.
It does not take into account infrastructure. It does not
take into account technology, which is a force multiplier, as
you know, so that I think it would be inaccurate to take from
that number or that phrase to say, well, that means the other
percentage of the border, 56 percent, is out of control. That
would not be accurate.
Chairman King. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentlelady from California, Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank both of you for being before us again.
Secretary Napolitano, I am still worried about this whole
issue of overstays with respect to visas, in particular because
I belong to a couple groups that deal with the Europeans. As
you know, the European Union is having a difficult time
understanding why we accept some and not some others on Visa
Waiver.
So I would like to know 2 things. First, can you discuss
the security measures with respect to somebody being able to
come from a country where there is Visa Waiver going on and how
that might be infiltrated by someone like al-Qaeda to get
people over here? Second, what progress are we making on the
exit part of US-VISIT?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, in terms of Visa Waiver, what
we have is ESTA. What ESTA does is that it gives us advanced
information on someone traveling to the United States on a visa
waiver----
Ms. Sanchez. Is it working? Have we seen any places where
someone or some cell group might be, in fact, trying to come in
that particular way?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, let me just say that it is
working in terms of smoothly identifying individuals coming
across. You know, we deal with so many passengers every day.
So, from a systemic point of view, it is working.
However, I think it important to say that there is--no
system, no matter how well working, is a 100 percent guarantee
that someone will not be able, ultimately, to infiltrate it. It
may be somebody about whom we have no advance information; it
may be somebody who has managed to steal an identity of someone
else.
This is, unfortunately, a business in which we cannot give
guarantees. What we can do and what we are doing is maximizing
our ability to catch somebody ahead of time and minimize the
risk that they will be infiltrated.
In terms of visa overstays, in addition to U.S. Exit, let
me just suggest that one of the most effective investments the
Congress can make is in ICE investigative agents, because they
are the ones that really find the visa overstays and get them
into proceedings.
So one of the things we are looking at doing as we move
forward in the budget process is being able to staff ICE
appropriately in that regard.
Ms. Sanchez. You stated earlier, in response to one of my
colleague's questions, that you believe that all this
technology that we have been using at the border, in particular
with respect to Mexico, is a force multiplier.
The entire time that I was the chair of the Border
Subcommittee, we would get both GAO and Border Patrol saying
they didn't know if some of this technology was actually going
to require that we have more people or that we actually get
that savings that we intuitively think should come from that.
Do you have a new study, do you have new numbers, do you
have something that is showing that relationship? Because the
entire time that I was the chair, which was for about 3 years,
we have on record people saying that maybe it doesn't lower the
amount of body power that we need.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, you still need manpower. I
mean, technology is no substitute for manpower. But you are
never going to have enough money to put a Border Patrol agent
every 100 yards along the thousands of miles of border.
So you have to have technology and infrastructure as a
three-legged stool as part of a system. Then you have to have
interior enforcement inside the country to back that up.
One of the reasons that I stopped the SBInet program was so
that we could redeploy those moneys into technologies that we
know work, that we know are force multipliers, that enable, for
example, a small forward-operating base near the Tohono O'odham
nation in Arizona to be a deterrent and be able to cover a
larger distance than otherwise they would be able to do.
Ms. Sanchez. Last--and this would be to our other guest--I
represent a very large Arab Muslim community in our Nation,
have the second-largest community mosque, if you will. We have
had a lot of situations with FBI probes and local infiltration,
et cetera. What are the safeguards that we now have in place so
that we aren't sending people into mosques and trying to elicit
proactively somebody to create some sort of terrorist attack?
Mr. Leiter. Well, Congresswoman, I want to be a bit
careful, because although I am familiar with them, I am
certainly no expert on the FBI domestic intelligence operating
guidelines and the attorney general guidelines.
What I can tell you is the FBI, approved by the attorney
general, has very strict guidelines on the level of
intrusiveness and what they can do based on specific
information about individuals not having radical thoughts, but
moving to action, which should be terrorist actions.
One of the key requirements is that no investigations can
be predicated on the exercise of first amendment rights. There
always has to be additional evidence on which to predicate an
investigation that would then lead to some of the tools that
you referenced.
Ms. Sanchez. Has that always been the case? Because we have
documented cases, of course, even out in the press and out in
the public where the fact of the matter was there was
instigation of these things within the mosque by our own
undercover.
Mr. Leiter. I can tell you that the current attorney
general guidelines were developed during the end of the Bush
administration and ultimately approved under the Obama
administration and signed by the current attorney general.
The key piece here, if I may, is that you have to--
obviously, there are going to be places where you have to do
law enforcement investigations. In my view you have to have a
balanced approach, not just those law enforcement
investigations, but you have to engage with those communities,
with other non-law enforcement elements of the U.S. Government
to make clear that this is not an adversarial situation. In
fact, this is a partnership.
As you know well, many of our tips to uncover active
terrorist plots in the United States have come from the Muslim
community. So we have to make quite clear that the communities
are part of the solution and not part of the problem. You do
that through using a variety of tools, not just law
enforcement.
Chairman King. The time of the gentlelady has expired.
Dr. Broun of Georgia.
Mr. Broun. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary, Director, appreciate you all being here today. I
have several pressing questions for both of you, and in my
limited amount of time, it will allow for only one or two, and
I trust that you will send a prompt response to my written
questions.
My first question is for both of you, but I would like the
Director to give me a written response, but I would like to
address this particularly here in this hearing.
Secretary, most terrorist experts believe that given the
list of incidents of homegrown radicals--and trained terrorist
recruits, the United States is now a little different from
Europe in terms of having a domestic terrorist problem
involving the immigrant as well as indigenous Muslims as well
as converts to Islam.
However, in April 2010 the Obama administration announced
that it intended to remove religious terms such as ``Islamic
extremism'' from the National security strategy. Moreover, in a
May 2010 speech at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, the deputy national security adviser for homeland
security and counterterrorism, John Brennan, stated that the
administration would not ``describe our enemy as jihadist or
Islamist.''
Do you believe that by disregarding the ideological factor
behind the recent rise in domestic and international terrorism
mainly by Islamic extremism the administration is inhibiting
our ability to address and combat this dangerous trend?
Secretary Napolitano. Representative, without having seen
John Brennan's speech or having recently reviewed the National
security strategy, let me, if I might, respond to that in
writing. I would venture to say that what the concern was is
that in addition to Islamist terrorism or Islamist-inspired
terrorism, we not overlook other types of extremism that can be
homegrown and that we indeed have experiences with, as I
described to Representative Thompson.
But as our testimony here today indicates, we understand
full well that Islamist-inspired, al-Qaeda-inspired, however
you want to call it terrorism, be it coming from abroad were
now being homegrown, it is part and parcel of the security
picture that we now have to deal with in the United States.
Mr. Broun. Well, I appreciate that--I went through security
TSA not long ago, and I went through it. There was a guy who
followed me that obviously was of Arabian and or Middle Eastern
descent. Both of us were not patted down. There was a grandma
who followed me, and she was patted down. There was a small
child with her. He was patted down. I have yet to see a grandma
try to bomb any U.S. facility with chemicals in her bloomers,
so I think we need to focus on those who want to do us harm.
Secretary Napolitano. Representative, if I might respond to
that, because that is a common complaint that I----
Mr. Broun. I saw it myself.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, I know. Let me just suggest,
first of all, that when we add random screening to whatever we
are doing, it has to be truly random. Otherwise, you use the
value of unpredictability.
Second, I would be happy to have you briefed in a
classified setting about how when we set firm rules about we
won't screen this kind of person or that kind of person, that
our adversaries, they know those rules, and they attempt to
train and get around them.
Mr. Broun. Well, thank you. I would appreciate that
briefing.
We have to focus on those people who want to do us harm.
This administration and your Department are seen to be very
adverse to focusing on those entities that want to do us harm
and have even at times back when your spokesman came and
testified before this committee, he would not even describe
that Fort Hood massacre as a terrorist threat and talked about
an alleged attack.
I think this is unconscionable. We have to focus on those
people who want to harm us. The people who want to harm us are
not grandmas, and it is not little children. It is the Islamic
extremist. There are others, and I want to look into those,
too, but your own Department has described people who are pro-
life, who are--who believe in the Constitution, and military
personnel as being potential terrorists.
Now, come on. Give me a break. We do need to focus on the
folks who want to harm us. I encourage you to maybe take a step
back and look and see how we can focus on those people who want
to harm us. We have to profile these folks. You all have not
been willing to do so, in my opinion. I hope that you will look
at this issue, because I think it is absolutely critical for
the safety of our Nation and for the American citizens.
I will submit the other questions for written comment.
Thank you both for being here.
Secretary Napolitano. Mr. Chairman, may I make a response
to that?
Chairman King. Yes.
Secretary Napolitano. First of all, Representative, there
are hundreds of thousands of men and women in my Department.
They come to work every day to protect the American people. The
writing or the document I think you are referencing was
something that was actually drafted at the end of the Bush
administration and issued by mistake at the beginning of this
administration. I would point out that we just established that
in the Hasan matter, he is a terrorist, and he was an active
duty military individual.
Chairman King. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from New York, my colleague, Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman King. New Member of the committee. Good to have
you aboard, Brian.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, the Peace Bridge connects my community,
western New York, to southern Ontario. It is the busiest
passenger crossing at the northern border and is a vital
economic asset to western New York and to the country and of
profound National security importance.
We are advancing a project to reduce congestion at the
Peace Bridge by building a new span and customs facilities, but
our progress has been slowed in part due to ambiguous and
sometimes conflicting communications from the Department of
Homeland Security. Specifically, confusion exists about whether
the project would include pre-clearance, a shared border
management strategy, but would locate the American customs
plaza on the Canadian side of the bridge.
On August 20, 2009, you wrote to me that pre-clearance was
not possible, because it would require the United States accept
a lower level of security at the Peace Bridge than at any other
U.S. port of entry or require Canada to accept actions contrary
to its charter of rights and freedoms.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter that letter into the
record.
Chairman King. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
Submitted For the Record by Hon. Brian Higgins
August 20, 2009.
The Honorable Brian Higgins,
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
Dear Representative Higgins: Thank you for your March 26, 2009
letter regarding land preclearance for border crossings between
Buffalo, New York, and Fort Erie, Ontario. Public Safety Canada
Minister Peter Van Loan, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and
Representatives Louise Slaughter and John McHugh have also asked me to
personally look into the shared border management issue.
The United States and Canada negotiated in good faith on a pilot
program for land preclearance between 2005 and 2007. Although our two
governments were able to reach agreement on some key issues,
negotiations ended in 2007 when a mutually acceptable framework could
not be reached due to sovereignty issues for both the United States and
Canada.
Implementing the proposed land preclearance framework would have
required the United States to accept a lower level of security at a
land preclearance crossing than at any other U.S. port of entry or
required Canada to accept actions contrary to its Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. U.S. Government concerns included limited U.S. law
enforcement authority, the right of individuals to withdraw
applications, limitations on fingerprint collection and sharing, and
potential future interpretations of the Charter. The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) subsequently developed a concept that would
have deployed U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers to Canada to
perform primary inspection and reserved all authority to conduct
secondary inspections on U.S. soil, but Canada was not interested in
pursuing that option and suggested that attention shift to other
efforts to facilitate low-risk commercial traffic.
Since the beginning of the land preclearance negotiations, there
have been significant improvements at the Peace Bridge that have
facilitated travel and trade, and more are planned. These include an
expanded number of truck lanes, a redesign of the plaza, the creation
of a new pedestrian lane and expanded passenger processing terminal,
the creation of a dedicated NEXUS lane and opening of a second
enrollment center, and the installation of radio frequency
identification (RFID) technology. Current plans to redesign the U.S.
plaza at the Peace Bridge, long term plans to build a companion bridge,
and the expected saturation of the traveling public with WID-enabled
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative-compliant documents, are expected
to address long-standing challenges of limited capacity and outdated
infrastructure. These improvements will lead to the relief sought
through land preclearance well before it would have been possible to
implement land preclearance.
Having reviewed the significant legal and sovereignty issues that
were at the heart of the decision to terminate negotiations, as well as
the current situation on the ground, I have decided DHS will not be
reopening negotiations on land preclearance at the Peace Bridge.
However, DHS will continue to engage with Canada on preclearance issues
more generally and will continue to explore new ideas for creating
additional efficiencies at our shared ports of entry. I welcome your
input, as well as the input of public and private sector stakeholders,
in these endeavors to further enhance the flow of legitimate trade and
travel at the Peace Bridge and the U.S.-Canadian border more generally.
Thank you again for your interest in homeland security, and your
commitment to the physical security and economic well-being of the
United States and Canada. A similar response was sent to Representative
Christopher J. Lee, who cosigned your letter. Should you need
additional assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.
Yours very truly,
Janet Napolitano.
Mr. Higgins. Yet in response to recent media inquiries on
the issue, the Department of Homeland Security officials have
issued vague responses that have caused confusion about the
status of the pre-clearance proposal.
Madam Secretary, we need clarity from the Department of
Homeland Security on this issue in order for this important
project to proceed, so can you please tell us does the position
of the Department of Homeland Security remain consistent with
your letter that due to security and constitutional obstacles
that cannot be overcome, the Peace Bridge project will not
include locating the American customs facilities in Canada?
Is it your position that the Department of Homeland
Security will not reopen negotiations on pre-clearance at the
Peace Bridge and that the pre-clearance proposal is for the
purposes of this project dead?
Secretary Napolitano. Representative, I will be very clear.
We have looked into pre-clearance on the Canadian side. We
cannot do it. The position has not changed. When and if the
bridge and the facilities are expanded on the U.S. side, we are
fully prepared to provide the staffing and support for that on
the U.S. side.
We understand the importance of the span for trade and
tourism and so forth, but we are not going to be able to
resolve the pre-clearance issues in Canada.
Mr. Higgins. Okay.
I yield back. Thank you.
Chairman King. The gentlelady from Michigan, Mrs. Miller.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think I will follow
up a bit of my colleague from New York, who raised sort of a
northern border issue.
If I could talk a bit, Secretary and Director--and, first
of all, thank you both for coming, and we appreciate your
service to the Nation sincerely--we have a lot of people on the
committee that talk about the southern border, and, believe me,
I am not minimizing. I recognize the challenges that we have on
the southern border and the safety of our Nation. But I do
sometimes think we forget, almost, about the northern border.
One of my colleagues said there was 44 percent of
operational control on the southern border. According to the
GAO report that came out last week, we have less than 2 percent
under operational control of our 4,000-mile--with our
wonderful, wonderful trading partner--our biggest trading
partner is not Mexico, it is Canada by a huge, huge margin. As
you mentioned, the Peace Bridge in Buffalo, which is, I think
we have always thought, sort of the third-busiest crossing, I
think the first in passenger.
But in my district and my colleague from Detroit, Mr.
Clarke, where he has the Ambassador Bridge, which is the
busiest commercial artery on the northern tier, the Windsor
Tunnel there, and the Blue Water Bridge in my district, which
is 30 minutes, 30 miles to the north, it is the second-busiest
border crossing. The Canadian national rail tunnel runs under
the St. Clair River there, as well.
We were very concerned about what the GAO said about
essentially no operational control, for all practical purposes,
along the northern border. I would just like to address that a
bit, because as we think about our wonderful trading partner,
our neighbors of Canada, there are several Islamic terrorists,
extremist groups that are represented there, as you are well
aware.
I thought it was interesting, with the GAO report coming
out, on the heels of that, President Obama and Prime Minister
Harper came out with a U.S.-Canadian agreement, which was a
wonderful step forward--they are going to put this working
group together, but talking about some of the various unique
challenges, dynamics along our shared border, how we can have
interagency cooperation, sharing of intelligence, et cetera, et
cetera.
So from a high-tech perspective of the kinds of resources
that I think we--are necessary along the--obviously, we are not
going to build a 4,000-mile-long fence along the northern
border. So certainly the kind of technology that we need to be
utilizing there, as well as low-tech--low-tech, K9s. There are
about 60 K9s, as I understand it, at El Paso. There are zero at
the Blue Water Bridge and maybe one at the Ambassador Bridge.
So, believe me, I am not minimizing what is happening on
the southern border, but for everything to be going on the
southern border at the expense of the northern border, I think
we need to have a bit of a balance.
Even the UAV missions, which I am heavily an advocate of,
now with a ground mission at Corpus Christi--and I know we do
have one along the more northern part of our border, but I
think in the Detroit--certainly, Michigan, New York sector,
having those kinds of--we need those kinds of technologies,
off-the-shelf hardware, essentially, that has worked extremely
well in theater that the taxpayers have already paid for, that
we can utilize along the northern border.
So I just raise this as a concern. Perhaps when we think
about threats from abroad, et cetera, they are not all going to
come on an airplane from Amsterdam. Of course, as the
terrorists think to cripple our Nation, and they think about
doing it economically, just to use the Blue Water again as an
example, at that, as it comes into the United States, that is
the genesis for I-69, I-94, two of the most major trade routes
that we have.
As my colleague talked about, what we consider to be
reverse inspection, that is another thing we have been trying
to advocate for. Could we have reverse inspection so that we
are inspecting things before they start coming across our major
infrastructure, as well?
So I raise some of these questions. I am not sure who I am
directing them all to.
Secretary Napolitano. I think they are mine. Mike is going
like this.
Mr. Leiter. All yours.
Mrs. Miller. Thanks, Secretary.
Secretary Napolitano. I will be brief, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, again, on the GAO report, we are--I encourage
the committee, the term ``operational control'' is a very
narrow term of art. It does not reflect the infrastructure and
technology and all the other things that happen at the border,
and so it should not be used as a substitute for an overall
border strategy.
One of the most significant things that has happened in the
last month, quite frankly--or even in the last year--was Prime
Minister Harper, President Obama signing the shared security
strategy, border strategy between our two countries.
It is our No. 1 trading partner. Canada is now beginning to
do or conducting some of the same kinds of things around its
perimeter that we used to be concerned about coming across
inland on the border. We will be working more in light of this
shared vision statement on an integrated northern border
strategy. Indeed, we have prepared one. It is in review right
now at the OMB.
Because as you recognize, Representative, borders are--they
are law enforcement jurisdictions, and you have to protect the
borders in that regard, but they are also huge trade
jurisdictions, and you have to be able to move legitimate trade
and commerce.
We are very much in favor of looking at ways to pre-clear
certain things before they--cargo, for example, before it gets
to the border so that we can relieve the pressure on the lines.
The technology for being able to do that kind of thing gets
better all the time. So that is one of the things we will be, I
am sure, working on and implementing over the coming months and
years.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you. I know my time has expired, but I
would just also point out, in regards to the TIDE list, without
quantifying it, it is much higher--there are much higher hits
on the northern border than they are on the southern border
with the TIDE list, much higher.
Mr. Leiter. Congresswoman, I will just say that I have been
working extremely closely, going up to Ottawa since 2005. It is
a very different set of challenges on that border, but it is
one that we are acutely engaged on with the Canadians who are
an excellent partner in information-sharing and the like.
So although we talk about it less than the southern border
quite often, that--I don't want to leave anyone with the
impression that it is not a very high priority for us and the
Canadians.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman King. Now to the other side of the aisle, one of
the more enthusiastic new Members, Mr. Clarke of Michigan.
Mr. Clarke of Michigan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
for calling this meeting.
Thank you, Secretary Napolitano, Director Leiter. You know,
I want to make sure that I address you directly, but I have to
speak into this mic.
Secretary Napolitano. That is okay.
Mr. Clarke of Michigan. All right. Okay.
Secretary Napolitano. We are good.
Mr. Clarke of Michigan. I want to thank Chair Miller for
outlining the importance of the busiest international border
crossing in North America, which is in the city of Detroit, and
also the fact that we have a large airport, which is an
international hub.
This makes this area at high risk of attack and also high
impact, in case of a natural disaster or other emergency. In
the event of such an emergency, it will be local police, local
firefighters, our local emergency medical providers that will
be the first to respond. My concern, though, is with the
security of those first responders. I realize that this
Department cannot be the local law enforcement or first
responders.
Last week, I visited a police precinct in Detroit, which a
few hours earlier had been attacked by a lone gunman who tried
to kill virtually every officer in that precinct, to find out
that that precinct needed a metal detector that would have cost
$5,000, but because of the city's budget restraints, couldn't
afford that.
I am aware that many of the grant programs are awarded on a
competitive basis or based by formula. There are some
districts, some areas that will get resources, some that won't.
In your written testimony, Madam Secretary, you rightfully
say that homeland security starts here with hometown security.
What types of resources in addition to the grants are available
to protect our first responders so they can be in a good
position to protect our citizens in case of an attack or other
emergency?
Secretary Napolitano. Representative, I would suggest, in
addition to the grants, some of which are formula-driven,
others of which are based on analysis of risk and threat, one
of the--or two of the things that are of direct assistance to
our first responders are, A, training.
That is why as we do our countering violent extremism
curricula, we are testing it at FLETC with representatives of
the chiefs' association, the sheriffs' associations, and others
who would have to implement this on the ground.
The second is information sharing, so that they have
maximum access to actionable intelligence.
Now, the latter probably would not help much in the case of
a lone wolf gunman. Those are--and I will ask Director Leiter
of his comments on that. But the lone wolf-type situation is
almost impossible to prevent from a law enforcement
perspective.
So when you deal with the first responders, you deal with
maybe early tips that somebody is getting ready to come in and
then the ability to respond very effectively. That is SWAT
training and equipment and the like.
Mr. Leiter. Congressman, what I would say is, immediately
after the Mumbai attacks in November 2008, we started working
with DHS and FBI to look at the techniques that were used in
India and how U.S. law enforcement and Homeland Security would
be able to respond.
Out of that, we created a scenario that has been used in
Chicago and other cities by the local authorities in
conjunction with the Federal authorities to see what kind of
response could be brought.
Recently, we combined with FEMA, and we now have a program
for each of--I think it is the eight FEMA sectors. The last
one, the first one was run in Philadelphia just several weeks
ago, involved over 300 people, including the Philadelphia
police chief, DHS, FEMA, FBI, again, running through a scenario
like Mumbai with multiple shooters.
Because you are absolutely right: It is going to be the
Detroit police or the Philadelphia police that are there first.
How do they respond? What specialized tools can the U.S.
Government bring to bear? Certainly we would be happy to work
with--I think it is Sheriff Bouchard or the Detroit Police
Department or others to get that sort of training in
conjunction with DHS and FBI to Detroit.
Chairman King. The gentleman from Pennsylvania is
recognized, Mr. Meehan.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity to be with you here today.
I have noticed that the gentlewoman from California has
departed, but I did want to take a moment on the record to
express my regret that I will not have the opportunity to work
so directly with her, having been given the opportunity to
chair the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, and it would have
created that chance. I think--I spoke to my staff--it is a
little bit like finally making it to the Yankees and realizing
that they just traded away Derek Jeter.
I am very grateful for your presence here today and for
helping us set the table.
Let me ask both Madam Secretary and Director Leiter, I came
on to this issue just 5 days after September 11, like many of
each of us did in different capacities, as United States
Attorney.
But we are sitting here now 10 years later. We have done a
lot. We have done a lot right. I think the gravest marker of
what we have done right is the incredible record of safety in
the American homeland in that 10-year period.
But we have also spent a lot of money. As you said, Madam
Secretary, we have had hundreds of thousands of people deployed
in this--we have--right.
What are we doing now to begin to look back at what we are
doing and say, hey, where are we going wrong?
Where are we creating redundancies? What does our process
now, 10 years later, for asking some tough questions about
whether we could be doing something better?
Or if we are doing something that--you know, the
institution keeps moving forward because it is there. But maybe
it is not the best expenditure of dollars, making tough
choices.
Secretary Napolitano. I will take that one first,
Representative--say we are always asking those hard questions.
It--I begin every morning with an intel briefing and I think my
briefers will tell you, it begins with hard questions, why,
where, how, what could have been done to prevent, what is
needed, et cetera.
With respect to those dollars, we all appreciate the fiscal
discipline needed by our Department, even--you know, even
though it is security and everyone says they want to protect
security, we still have a duty to really protect dollars and
use them in the wisest possible fashion.
So it is everything from procurement reform that we have
undertaken, acquisition management, which sounds really
government-ese.
But I will tell you, it is those kinds of things that help
find projects before they get too far along, that are not
really going to work or be value added to the process.
Then, the third--and we have literally found hundreds of
millions of dollars, that we have built into our budgets now,
of cost avoidances, using some of those just plain old
management techniques.
Lastly, I think that our ability and the--just the--and I
have seen it just even over the last 2 years, the increasing
integration and leveraging of the data resources that NCTC has
with its pursuit teams, with our incredible data resources that
we collect on the customs and the TSA side.
The ability to leverage those resources together is a
Homeland Security kind of architecture that we just plain
didn't have before, and allows us to make maximum use of the
dollars we do get.
But I ask the Director if he has anything to----
Mr. Leiter. Congressman, I have three quick points. But I
will open with the fact that the Yankees have traded a lot of
greats. They keep on winning, so----
Yes, but it is much to my chagrin.
Chairman King. I share the Director's chagrin.
Mr. Leiter. The Mets keep making a lot of trades and not
winning.
Three quick points, Congressman. First, the amount of
change that already goes on is really quite incredible.
Ms. Sanchez asked about the visa waiver program. The way in
which we screen--ask the travelers today, compared to how we
screened them a year ago, is radically different.
So it really has not been a steady state in the first
place. There have been lots of twists and turns. Unless you are
kind of in the counterterrorism trenches, you don't necessarily
know that is going on. Second, we, of course, try to learn
lessons from our failures. But we also do a lot of gaming to
try and figure out what the next attack will be and how we have
to shape things.
Now, that is an imperfect science, and you are going to end
up going down some wrong paths.
But there are significant things like that, as I said to
Congressman Clark about gaming here domestically of about a
Mumbai-style attack, when you look at that, do we have the
right resources, do we have the right communications, what
could we buy, even though we haven't seen that event here in
the United States yet.
The third is, Congressman, NCTC has a statutory
responsibility to do net assessments, and that is looking both
at the changed enemy, our U.S. capabilities and the changed
global environment, including here in the United States.
We provide that annual net assessment along with targeted
net assessments to the White House. We also work closely with
the Office of Management and Budgets to try to look across all
of these expenditure centers and see which are being the most
effective.
I will tell you that that is a huge challenge, because
simply identifying what satisfies part of a counterterrorism
purpose, as you can imagine, is very difficult. The Department
of Homeland Security is a perfect example.
It is not just counterterrorism what CBC does. It is
immigrant smuggling, it is drugs, it is all of these pieces.
So trying to parse this out remains a challenge, but one
that I think--especially over the last 2 years--we have made
some good progress on.
Mr. Meehan. I agree with the--I am not looking at it just
from--although in this day and age, we are paying particular
attention to how the dollars are spent--but some--also
technique as well.
I mean, at what point in time do we reach a tipping point?
While I ascribe to the belief that we are doing the right
things--hear people say, hey, when I have to walk through an
airport screener and make the decision about whether I am
groped or photographed, you know, are we going too far along?
We keep pushing where--I went to that UPS terminal. The
impact of trying to push off further and further the screening
of the packages, at some point, it is going to have an impact
on their ability to do business.
I mean, where do we make those analyses? They are tough
choices. But we say, hey, maybe we are overcompensating in
order to try to create some sense of safety.
Or is it necessary?
Chairman King. The gentleman's time has expired. We can
answer the question.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, thank you, Congressman.
Well, first, with respect to the AITs and the pat-downs, it
was very interesting, but between Thanksgiving and Christmas,
that heavy travel season, fewer than 1 percent of travelers
opted out of using the AITs.
As you may have seen, we are now piloting the next
software, which will be even less invasive and will allow us to
do fewer pat-downs.
But the plain fact of the matter is, we do that because,
from a security and intelligence perspective, and just looking
at what Abdulmutallab did, going into Detroit in Christmas
2009, we know they try to hire non-metallic-based explosives to
get on a plane.
We know that aviation, be it cargo or passenger, continues
to be a target.
So that is something that we have, you know, had to deal
with. The TSA administrator, who is the former Deputy Director
of the FBI, has to deal with it on a daily basis.
We are working with UPS and FedEx and the other major
shippers on how we secure cargo. We are moving toward kind of a
trusted shipper regime so that cargo can move and we can meet
the needs of real-time inventory.
That is part of the global cargo supply chain initiative I
was describing earlier. They are part and parcel of how we are
devising that strategy.
So we are not just sitting here, as the Government,
figuring this out. We have the private sector, who has to move
those planes and move that cargo, helping us.
Mr. Leiter. Because, I will simply add, I think, almost
everything we do in counterterrorism, there is a second-order
effect. If we increase screening, that is going to affect
people's perceptions.
If we increase investigations domestically, that is going
to affect the community.
We have to build into those required and necessary
preventive steps additional programs to address those second-
order effects so you are not worsening the situation
inadvertently.
Again, that applies to screening. It applies to homegrown
extremism. It applies to overseas efforts.
Chairman King. Virgin Islands.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome and
thank you for the great job you are doing with these tremendous
challenges that the country faces, to both of you.
My first question is to both of you. I want to focus on
another part of the southern border that I don't think gets
enough attention.
As the representative from the U.S. Virgin Islands, where a
district where I even seek acts, I am always concerned that not
enough attention is being paid to the Caribbean, either in
assessing the risks or in building strong partnerships that we
need in that region.
So do you feel comfortable that the Department and the
Center are seeking and getting adequate information from the
Caribbean, and even from South and Central America, where there
are countries that are friendly with areas in the world that
have radical Islamic extremism?
Or are there any efforts, for example, to prevent
radicalization, reduce the likelihood of radicalization or to
help the governments in those countries to strengthen their
capabilities to do so?
Secretary Napolitano. Representative, I have myself asked
somewhat similar questions, in part because of the increase in
special interest aliens that we are seeing get up to the
Mexican border, what are the routes, how are they getting
across.
It is a terrorism issue. It can be a human trafficking
issue, a drug trafficking issue----
Mrs. Christensen. All of this.
Secretary Napolitano [continuing]. And all of the above. In
this open setting, I would prefer not to give more of a
detailed answer except to say that I share your concern to make
sure that we not lose sight of this part of the world as we
plan our protection strategies.
We will be happy to sit with you in a classified setting to
give you more information.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you.
Mr. Leiter. Representative, I would largely say the same
thing. I think there actually are some interesting pieces that
I can't go into in open setting, with a particular focus to
radicalization and movement of travelers.
Mr. Leiter. We do spend significant time on the Caribbean.
I will also tell you that there has been good cooperation
in the past, for example, I believe it was 2007, the Cricket
World Cup, it was held in the Caribbean.
That provided an opportunity to help the region develop
more effective screening of travelers. So there are some steps
that the U.S. Government has taken to enable them.
Of course, more towards South America, we have on-going
concerns about the influence of terrorist states, sponsors of
terrorism in that region and their presence.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you.
I have also been away from the committee for a while. But
while I was here before, I did put a lot of pressure on the
then Secretary to beef up the Office of House Affairs and to
make sure that lines of authority and response were clear
between them and the Department of Health and Human Services
and that they work seamlessly together.
Given your response to the question about biological
threats, what role does this office play, and are they
adequately staffed, resources and placed to be effective?
Secretary Napolitano. We are working very closely with the
Department of Health and Human Services on a number of
scenarios, pandemic planning being one, but also medical
countermeasures, in the light of--if there were to be a
biologic attack.
We have been working with them on protocols, who would do
what, when, and where? Do we have the surge capacity to handle,
say, if there were to be an anthrax attack? We have been table-
topping some of these things.
So, Representative, the work between our departments, I
think, has been very good. I am not able right now at the table
to say, do they have enough resources? All I can say is that we
believe the biologic threat is real, and we believe it is
something that we need to keep maturing our efforts about.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you.
Director Leiter, from some of the reading that I did in
preparation for this, it seems that there are still some turf
battles and disalignment, I guess I would call it, regarding
lines of authority and some stove-piping within the
intelligence community, which would be very dangerous if it
does exist.
So where is the communication and the integration and the
collaboration? Is it where it needs to be in the intelligence
community?
Mr. Leiter. Like every Government official, I will say, it
is good. It can always get better. But now I do want to give
you some perspective, having been doing this since 2004, and
where we are today, it is night and day.
Secretary Napolitano and I sit on what is called the
Counterterrorism Resource Council, which is chaired by Jim
Clapper. It includes Bob Mueller, the Director of the FBI, the
Director of DIA, Leon Panetta, Director of CIA. Over the past
year, we have met every 2 weeks to delve in as senior leaders
for hours on end about how we can integrate our missions
better.
That is night and day, again, from where we were in 2004 or
2005. Frankly, it is night and day from where we were in 2009.
So I think there are always some tensions when organizations
are trying to do the right thing and think they are trying to
do the right thing and someone else disagrees. Not all of that
tension is bad.
On the terrorism issue, I think--I have never seen it
better integrated than it is today.
Just one other point about integration, you mentioned the
Health and Human Services. We are integrated with them and DHS.
They are in charge of refugee resettlement. They play a
critical role in helping us work with new immigrant communities
to reduce the likelihood of radicalization.
Again, that sort of partnership between the
counterterrorism community and an organization that is
responsible for refugee resettlement, 4 years ago, never
existed at all.
Chairman King. Time of the gentlelady has expired.
The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Quayle.
Mr. Quayle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to Madam
Secretary and Director Leiter for being here and giving us the
testimony on a very important subject.
Madam Secretary, while I was reading your testimony and
listening to your opening statement, the one thing that I was a
little puzzled--and it surprised me--was the lack of emphasis
on the southern border and how we are going to continue to
protect the southern border.
The reason that I was a little surprised by that is because
the rise and the escalation of the violence between the drug
cartels and the Mexican government as they continue to try to
tamp down on the various drug cartels that are really ravaging
the various areas along our southern border.
So the reason I was sort of--and that was the reason I was
surprised. Was it left out of there just because--do you think
that we have operational control of the southern border? Or was
it just not part of this particular testimony?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, thank you, Representative. It
was not emphasized in this testimony, because I didn't think it
was within the scope of this particular hearing.
I will send you the speech I gave in El Paso about a week-
and-a-half ago specifically to the southwest border. In the
major point I made there, a major point, was that, while we are
working with Mexico on the unprecedented level of violence
there, as the cartels fight for territory, separate, terrible
crimes aside--and there have been some--but we have not seen
systemically that violence come across the border.
What I have told and been very public about to these
cartels is don't bring that over our border into the United
States. We will respond very, very vigorously.
The communities along the border themselves, you can talk
to Mayor Sanders in San Diego or the mayor of El Paso and
others, and they will say themselves, they are--from a safety
standpoint--among the safest in the country. We want to keep it
that way.
Then, last, you referenced operational control. I think you
are the third member now. As I have said before and I will say
again, that is a very narrow term of art in Border Patrol lingo
and doesn't--and should not be construed as kind of an overall
assessment of what is happening at the border.
Mr. Quayle. Okay. I understand that. You mentioned El Paso.
You mentioned Yuma. You mentioned San Diego. These are areas
where the Border Patrol agents have been actually beefed up,
and we actually have barriers, and these are the areas that
have actually had the expenses put down there. We have seen the
apprehensions--and you had stated in your statement over in El
Paso about the apprehensions going down.
But do you know how many illegal immigrants have crossed
the border, the southern border, in the last 2 years or year?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, it is an estimate. It used to
be that the estimate was that we were catching 1 in 3. I think
the commissioner would testify, if he were here today, that
that number--we are catching a much higher percentage.
It is a combination of things, of the Congress, what it has
invested in this border, the manpower, the technology, the
infrastructure. The area that is my top focus down there is the
Tucson sector. We do have some fencing in Nogales, as you know,
but we are continuing to basically surge manpower and
technology into that sector to shut it down.
Mr. Quayle. Well, and from that, if you look at the--what
has been happening, where the National Guard troops are going
to be taken out, starting June through August, is that correct?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, their current term ends in, I
believe, June. I don't know that a decision has been made as to
whether they will continue or not. That will be an interagency
process with the Department of Defense and also the White House
involvement.
Mr. Quayle. Now, when we talk about statistics--and
statistics can always be skewed a different way--how well do
you think that it actually represent what is going on, on the
southern border, when most of the statistics revolve around
apprehension and not a really good understanding of what is
going on in the rural parts of the border, where there is not
as much enforcement and a lot of ranchers and the like are
getting inundated from what the reports that they give with
drug smugglers and human smugglers across their properties?
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, I think you are talking about
the rural areas of the Tucson sector. As I have said before,
that is where we are really flooding resources now, shut some
of that down. We are in constant touch through my office with
the sheriffs along the entire border.
The sheriffs tend to have the--you know, the rural areas,
because they have the areas outside of municipalities. We are
working directly with them and--on where we need to put
resources, what they need.
For example, one of the needs they had last year was help
paying overtime, and we did move overtime money--Representative
Miller is not here, so I think I can say it--from the northern
border down to the southern border to help cover some of that
overtime.
We keep looking for efforts like that, but I can guarantee
you, Representative, that this is something that gets daily
attention at the department.
Mr. Leiter. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Chairman King. The gentleman from Massachusetts is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Keating. Mr. Chair, thank you. Thank you, Ranking
Member Thompson.
Chairman King. Welcome aboard.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Secretary Napolitano, for being
here.
I am a new Member, but I am coming from a decade of law
enforcement experience, dealing with a lot of these issues as a
prosecutor. In fact, one of my last cases just a few months ago
dealt with an issue that really called into very serious
question the issues of aviation and transportation security. It
is a situation--dealing with the 100 percent you had in
November for successfully checking everyone that is on the
watch list and making sure on inbound U.S. travels, as well as
within the country, that they are checked.
But in my case, it wasn't involving a person that had a
ticket. It wasn't even involving a person that had a false
identification. What occurred in that case is a young man, 16-
year-old young man, Delvonte Tisdale from North Carolina, had
stowed himself into the wheel well of that plane. It departed
from Charlotte, and his body was found in Milton,
Massachusetts, when the landing gear of that plane was coming
down.
Despite the tragedy of losing a young man like that, it
raised enormous questions about tarmac security. His video
never showed up with investigations, to my knowledge, in the
airport, and it didn't even show up near the perimeter.
So what really I am concerned about is: What is being done
by Homeland Security for safety on the tarmac that is vital for
our aviation security? What other agencies are you working with
in that respect?
Because if it wasn't this young man that just stowed
himself for his own reasons, if that had been a person with
more nefarious motivation, think of what would have happened to
that 737 commercial airliner or any of the other airliners that
were there at that time. It really raised enormous concerns
about aviation safety, and I would like you to address what is
being done on the tarmac, as well.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, a couple of things. One is, I
will--I am going to ask TSA to respond directly to your
question, Representative. The question of who controls what
part of the airport, it is a combination.
We work with the local airport authority on the areas of--
and we set standards and requirements for things like the
perimeter. They are to carry out those standards and
requirements.
Clearly, if somebody, a 16-year-old, is able to circumvent
those standards and requirements and get into the wheel well of
a plane, there has been a breakdown. So I can't sit here, tell
you what the after-action analysis was as to how that happened
and what corrective action has been taken, but I can share with
you that I suspect that that already has occurred and we will
get it to you.
Mr. Keating. I appreciate that.
Mr. Leiter, were you aware of this incident at all? You
know--and, really, the concern is not just which agency is
catching the ball at a certain time. It is, there has to be a
seamless way for the agencies to deal with this locally or all
the invasive procedures are there when you are getting a ticket
are for naught.
Mr. Leiter. Congressman, I was aware, but only through the
press reports. I remember it took some time to figure out that
he was actually set away on the plane when the body was first
found. What we have been concerned about for quite some time,
not just here in the United States but overseas, the insider
threat to aviation.
Those individuals who, even if they are not sneaking in,
have credentials either to restricted areas of an airport or
work for an airline, understand the watchlisting procedures,
understand the screening procedures. I know DHS and NCTC work
together with the airline industry to discuss those
vulnerabilities, screen individuals and the like. But we will
certainly continue to work with Secretary Napolitano on this
case to see whether or not there is a broader perimeter issue.
Mr. Keating. I would welcome that information. I can speak
for myself and I think for the members of the committee. This
is an area that we will work with you on because these are
really serious questions, not just in the Boston area but also
in the Charlotte area.
Secretary Napolitano. In the Charlotte area, yes, right.
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
Chairman King. The gentleman from Virginia. Mr. Rigell is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Rigell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Napolitano,
thank you for being here and Director Leiter.
Last night the House fell short of the votes necessary to
extend certain parts of the Patriot Act. Could you just comment
on that please? The ramifications if those provisions are not
extended.
Mr. Leiter. Congressmen, as I testified before several
years ago when this was up, the Patriot Act remains a very
important tool, especially with respect to home-grown
extremists. So from my perspective, to have the Patriot Act
expire on February 28 would be extremely problematic and would
reduce our ability to detect terrorists.
Mr. Rigell. Many of my constituents, and I share their
view, I have a deep concern about abuse of these powers. I
would like to know, and my constituents would like to know,
what specific practical steps are being taken to properly
balance this tension that does exist between our freedom and
our security? So if you could unpack that a bit, I would
appreciate it.
Mr. Leiter. Absolutely, Congressmen. I think it is a more-
than-reasonable concern. There are significant authorities and
there need to be protections. There are three basic provisions.
The business records provision, the lone wolf, and the roving
wiretap.
First of all, I would say that in almost all cases there
are very, very similar tools already being used in the criminal
context. But in fundamentally all of these provisions there is
a rigorous set of oversight both within the Executive Branch
but also through the FISA court, the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act court. So in the case of business records, a
showing has to be provided to the FISA court of the
appropriateness of the order. They then also can do oversight
of those records and the like.
So I think this is, in the words of Ronald Reagan, this is
trust and verify. It is trusting it will do it right but then
it is verifying that we are doing it right through independent
means, such as the FISA court.
Mr. Rigell. Are there examples within the Department where
you have identified an abuse where an employee has abused his
or her power and you have actually taken action and----
Mr. Leiter. Congressmen, I apologize. I am not quite the
right witness for that. I really have to defer to the
Department of Justice. I know in other contexts NCTC has had
situations where, for example, U.S. person information was not
protected to the way we expect it to and require it. We have
disciplined those individuals and we have submitted those
findings back to the Department of Justice, our inspector
general and our civil liberties protection officer. So----
Mr. Rigell. Director, that is a fair answer. I have the
privilege of representing Virginia's Second District, home to a
beautiful port entrance to the Chesapeake Bay. So port security
is a great concern to me. I notice that again it wasn't really
listed in the opening statement as a high-level concern. So
please address where on the order of threat assessment does
port security come in.
Secretary Napolitano. I will take that one, Representative.
Again, it was not in the statement because of the title of the
hearing and what we thought the scope of the hearing was. But
port security is keenly important for a whole number of
reasons.
Our ports are where we--around our ports are where we have
a lot of our chemical facilities. The safety of containers
bringing cargo into the United States and how they are handled,
the ability of the Coast Guard to protect the ports. They serve
as the captains of the ports. So we have major initiatives
underway in all of those areas.
In particular, we are working globally on the security of
the supply chain, which really--with the International Maritime
Organization. Because that affects how cargo is actually
brought across the seas and into the United States.
Mr. Rigell. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman King. It is almost time to expire. I would just
add to that that there has been close cooperation between the
committee and the Department for at least 5 years in both
administrations on the issue of port security. It is a major,
major issue and it will definitely be addressed throughout the
next 2 years. I can assure you of that. Also, not to speak for
the Secretary, but--Department takes it very seriously.
The gentlelady from California, Ms. Speier, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you Madam
Secretary and Director Leiter. You know, I think at the outset
I would like to say I think you have the toughest jobs around.
It is easy for us to sit here and poke holes but you always
have to be anticipating where the next threat is coming from.
We have porous borders. We have a system where, if I
understand it correctly, waiver programs could easily allow a
terrorist to come to this country. I realize that we probably
have it because we have comity between our countries and the
like. I worry about the lack of exit tracking of visas.
I worry also about cargo surveillance. I had a briefing
last week in my district from local mechanics who are concerned
about all of the repair work being done offshore now. They
showed me pictures in El Salvador of a repair facility where
you just showed your ID as you came in. There was no tracking.
You could have phony ID. No one would know.
You can anticipate that there are lots of holes still out
there and that al-Qaeda and any number of other terrorists are
seeing those same holes. From your perspectives, each of you,
what do you think is the biggest hole that we have to close?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, Representative, thank you for
your kind words. I have gotten out of the business of ranking
because it is fluid. It evolves. It changes based on what the
current intel is. It requires us to react to what has occurred
and also to be thinking ahead.
With respect to the situation you referenced in El
Salvador, one of the things that I--to me that illustrates is
the absolute importance of good intel gathering and sharing.
Not just within the United States, but abroad.
When something is--significant is trying to infiltrate a
port and get something like a radioactive or biological weapon
inside a cargo container, say for example our ability to know
ahead of time to be tipped off to know what to look for, as
what happened in October with the air cargo plane, absolutely
critical. So as we move forward, strengthening and enlarging
those intelligence-gathering relationships is also very
important.
Mr. Leiter. Congresswoman, I first of all also thank you
and I will say Secretary Napolitano has a harder job than I do.
I am also loathe to actually give you what our greatest
vulnerabilities are because I know al-Qaeda and other
terrorists are listening to what we are seeing, and I don't
want them to know what I think are our greatest
vulnerabilities. I am happy to talk to you about that in a
closed setting.
What I will say is we have to look at both our greatest
vulnerabilities in terms of likelihood and consequences. There
are a lot of things that could happen where we have weaknesses,
but the consequences of an attack along that angle really might
not be that significant. So we have to balance trying to stop
the most common attack or the most likely attack with the one
that has the greatest consequences.
In that respect, the Chairman raised chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear weapons. I don't think that is remotely
the most likely avenue of al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda inspired
terrorists to attack this country, but the consequences of that
would be so great we have to invest very significant resources
to guard against it.
Ms. Speier. To follow up on the El Salvador issue,
shouldn't we be requiring American airlines--not American
Airlines but American airlines--to make sure they have strong
kinds of security systems in place when they are doing the work
offshore? It appears they do not and we don't require them to.
Secretary Napolitano. Representative, I need to know more
about the El Salvador situation, but as I testified earlier we
are now requiring 100 percent screening of all in-bound, high-
risk cargo that is on a passenger plane. Those are terms that
would--that meet--require certain levels be met. We actually do
work with the American flag carriers on those. They are part
and parcel of this system, even from international ports.
Mr. Leiter. Congresswoman, I will simply add if I could the
challenge you identify is unique neither to El Salvador nor to
aviation. The counterterrorism effort is truly a global effort
and it is why we spend so much time with our overseas partners
on aviation security, port security, intelligence, information
sharing. We are very reliant on our partners doing what we
think needs to be done to keep the homeland safe.
Chairman King. The gentlelady's time has expired. The
gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Duncan, is recognized.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary and Director Leiter, thank you for being
here today.
I wanted to first off thank the gentleman from the Virginia
Tidewater for mentioning the PATRIOT Act and asking a line of
questionings to ensure there are constitutional rights as free
Americans aren't trampled.
I consider myself a Tea Party congressman, and many of my
colleagues here in the freshman class feel the same way. So
during the course of getting to this office, we were questioned
a lot about certain things that the United States were doing
with regard to patriotic Americans, who may label themselves as
Tea Party folks, who peacefully assemble and petition the
Government for redress of grievances, all the first amendment
rights that we have.
So I am concerned, and they are concerned in South
Carolina, about a report of April 2009 from your Department
titled ``Right Wing Extremism: Current Economic and Political
Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment.''
We understand that the House has passed a resolution of inquiry
in the last Congress, and this committee held hearings on it.
To my knowledge that document has never been retracted or
corrected.
So the question for you today is: Does your Department
consider military veterans or groups dedicated to single
issues, patriotic Americans, a threat to homeland security and
high risk to engage in extremist activity?
Secretary Napolitano. I think that is for me. As I said
earlier in this hearing, Representative, that was a report that
was begun under the prior administration and issued by mistake
by our Department before it had been properly edited.
Now, to the point, of course, we don't consider patriotic
Americans to be terrorism threats. Of course, we work closely
with our military. My Department--we have now--we have had
aggressive hiring within military and veterans coming back, and
we have now almost 50,000 veterans in my Department, not to
mention active-duty Coast Guard. So we are heavily military
reliant, dependent and interconnected.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you for that, by the way.
Secretary Napolitano. There you go. Now, I think a larger
point is that as we do our work, we cannot categorize by
ethnicity or religion or any of those sorts of things. We have
to make decisions based on intelligence and intelligent sharing
and risk about particular individuals.
That is the way that we have directed it be done in our
Department. That is what is required under the United States
Constitution. While the FBI is not here today and the
Department of Justice is not here, they have very strict
standards in that regard.
Mr. Duncan. What can you do or what steps have you taken to
ensure this type of reporting as demonstrated doesn't happen
again? Because in my opinion we have targeted a quote in that
report, and we never retracted that. So I just don't want that
to happen again.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, that report is no longer
available. Congressman, I would simply say that I have been the
Secretary for almost 2 years since then, and you have not seen
a similar report come out of the Department.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you very much.
I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman King. The gentlelady from California, Ms.
Richardson, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Richardson. Yes. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to our two witnesses who are here today for your
frankness and efforts to work with this committee.
Just a couple of questions that I have. One is there is
much discussion here in the House in terms of reducing budgets
back to 2008 levels. Madam Secretary, I would like to hear your
opinion. If in fact that were to go into effect, how would that
impact your Department? What would you specifically see might
need to be cut, since we are not provided any of that
direction?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, that is a very difficult
question to answer, but this Congress in a bipartisan way has
been building this Department. It put 22 some-odd the agencies
together. It gave us probably the most varied group of missions
of any Department, and they touch directly on the safety and
security of the American people.
They have asked us to protect our ports. They have asked us
to protect our borders. They have asked us to protect our
communities against terrorists, whether international or
homegrown. They have asked us to protect our cyber walls. We
have been building to meet those missions. That is what we do.
So we are going to be, and the President is going to be, I
think, very careful in his request. We are under the same
fiscal discipline demand as every other department, and we
ought to be. There are some places where I think we can
eliminate redundancies and save, and we are constantly looking
for those.
But to simply take a big old thing and say we will go back
to 2008 without understanding operational impacts for this kind
of work would probably not be what I would advise from a
budgetary standpoint.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you for that comment. I think it is
very helpful to us all.
My second question is we have several trade agreements that
are on the horizon. Korea is here--probably soon Colombia and
Panama coming. You have heard several questions having to do
with the ports. When we asked the question, when you first
became Secretary, about implementing the 9/11 recommendations,
one of your responses was, well, in order for us to do that, we
would have to do all these new agreements.
How involved have you been with the current trade
agreements that are on the table, if at all? If you have, do
you see the possibility of us implementing some of these 9/11
recommendations with those possible trading partners?
Secretary Napolitano. Representative, I have not personally
been involved in negotiating those trade agreements. We will
have to get back to you as to whether individuals and the
Department may have been. So I am just going to delete my
answer at that for now.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. I would say in particular Korea is of
great concern. It is my understanding it is coming, and we want
to make sure that for any future agreements, that Mr. Kirk is
keeping in mind what we need to achieve for this committee.
My second question, building upon previous questions of my
colleagues, in this particular committee we will be having an
upcoming hearing about looking at the potential radicalization
of Muslims in this country. As I just heard your response, your
department, you don't evaluate based upon race or religion and
so on. You are basing your decisions on intelligence.
So if that is the case, what percentage, if you have one,
could you say occurs in terms of people that we need to be
concerned about. Would you say 50 percent Muslim? Would you say
50 percent, you know, if you could give us kind of a general
idea?
Mr. Leiter. It is a absolutely tiny percentage of the U.S.
Muslim population and, frankly, the global Islamic population
are those that we are concerned with at the National
Counterterrorism Center. If you look at the numbers, they are
significant in terms of number of attacks we have, but in terms
of the broader Muslim community within the United States, it is
a minute percentage of that population.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you.
With my remaining 49 seconds, I have been doing some work
looking at cogs in continuity of government. I think the
Department has done an amazing job of coordinating various
agencies and being prepared.
I think, though, the last ones that are ready happen to be
us as elected officials, and so I just wanted to say, Madam
Secretary, I plan on working with your folks to really explore
how can we better prepare from the local, State, and Federal
level as elected officials when we have to step forward when
that disaster occurs, that we know who to call, we know where
to go, and we know how to be helpful and not a hindrance in the
process.
Secretary Napolitano. Thank you.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman King. Time of the gentlelady has expired.
The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Farenthold, is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. Farenthold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
At the risk of being redundant, I am probably the fifth or
sixth person here who is going to express some concern over the
44 percent operational control number. I think you have done an
admirable job defining that as a term of art.
What I would like to ask is let's take the word
``operation'' out of there and define ``control'' as what the
average American would say. What percentage control do you
think we have of either of our borders now--or both of our
borders?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, I think in terms of manpower,
technology, infrastructure, we have the effective control over
the great majority of both borders, particularly at the ports.
Then we are using manpower and new technologies to help us
between the ports.
It is a project that is never ending. We are relentless in
it. We recognize that when you are a country as large as ours
with that kind of land borders we have, that you are never
going to seal those borders. That is an unrealistic
expectation.
But I would say my top priority in terms of the effective
control is the Tucson sector of the southwest border.
Mr. Farenthold. You also mentioned that you didn't feel
like some of the violence from Mexico is spilling over into the
United States annual crime. Just as a personal aside, I would
like to take issue with that, because I really do believe that
what we have is a very effective distribution network of
narcotics that come into this country that I am very concerned
could be exploited by terrorists and used for bringing in the
tools of the terrorist trade.
The easy availability of drugs in this country I think is
an indication that we really don't have the level of control
that we would all like to hold. That is----
Secretary Napolitano. Indeed. One of the things that--all I
will say in open setting is that we have for some time been
thinking ahead about what would happen if, say, al-Qaeda were
to unite with the Zetas, one of the drug cartels. I will just
leave it at that.
Mr. Leiter. Congressman, if I could just add, one of the
things we did post-December 2009 attack in looking at other
possible avenues is we embed it for the first time several DEA
agents and analysts within NCTC to try to make sure that
counter narcotics and counterterrorism information was being
shared effectively.
Mr. Farenthold. Great.
Then just, kind of, jumping over to the TSA--and I realize
this is probably outside of the scope of this hearing or
something that we might want to take in a more classified
environment--but where are we with respect to implementing a
trusted traveler program that might mitigate the impact of law-
abiding Americans of having to undergo these intrusive TSA
searches?
My 21-year-old daughter had the misfortune of having a
false positive display on one of the body scanners just last
weekend and was subjected to a search that I think would rise
to the level of sexual assault in most States. The Trusted
Traveler Program seems like a way that it would pay for itself
by user fees to alleviate that burden on at least the people
who chose to take advantage of it.
Secretary Napolitano. Absolutely. We are moving as swiftly
as we can, trusted shippers, trusted travelers. We have well
over 100,000 Americans signed up for trusted traveler air
programs, like Global Entry. I would be happy to sign your
daughter up, by the way.
But I think that is the way to go. I mean, we need to have
some way to effectively separate passengers and cargo that we
need to pay specific attention to from those we don't. We will
always have to do some random searches. Unpredictability always
has to be a tool in the toolbox. But we need to--we need to be
working toward a system where we have better ways to tier and
focus on who needs to go through what kind of screening or what
needs to go through what kind of screening. That is what we are
working toward, Representative.
Mr. Farenthold. Do you think it might be a cost-effective
way to use Global Entry also for domestic flights, use
something very similar to that infrastructure, and maybe a
cost-effective way to implement it?
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, we are looking at that right now
as a possibility.
Mr. Farenthold. Thank you.
Chairman King. The gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I am
very grateful for this hearing and welcome, Secretary and
Director Leiter, for what I think is an important discussion.
Let me lay a premise for a series of questions very
quickly. The people of Mexico, many of us who live on the
border view them as our friend. But I do believe that there is
a war going on. For us to ignore that--it is a drug war. It is
a violent war. It is human smuggling. It is a war.
When you have two young teenage boys, high school, leave to
cross the border for what is perceived as an innocent activity
at this juncture and wind up dead, this is--and you can count
thousands who have died. We have a vicious and violent war.
So my first question--and I am just going to ask a series--
is, as we look to the border, is the Homeland Security
Department--and, of course, Customs and Border Protection as
the agency--able to decipher the--and I think our flow of
undocumented individuals coming across the border, I think, has
actually gone down.
But the point is--and I think you might confirm that--to
that kind of war, versus individuals who have come to reunite
with family members, whether you agree or disagree to come to
work. Has the administration moved away from a concept of
comprehensive immigration and border security as being partners
in trying to fix the problem for us? That is the first
question.
The other question is to compliment TSA for the progress it
has made. I still think--even though I am a proponent of
ensuring our rail is safe, and I hope that the administration
will look at the legislation we had last year that did not
move--and I am hoping to work with this majority and this
committee to do it again, H.R. 2200, with my colleague, Ranking
Member Thompson, and I and Republican Members of this committee
joined in on.
Aviation still seems to be the most attractive target. In
your perspective, are we where we need to be in aviation
security? Can you affirmatively tell me that we are not going
to go through the battle of 2001, which is to expand
privatization of airport security, when we are making enormous
progress, and I think we are being responsible?
We have a new and enriched democracy with diverse persons
of many different faith. So I will ask the question that I have
heard that has been answered before on dealing with our friends
of the Muslim faith, specifically, Madam Secretary--and I will
provide you with a letter--I would like to have an
investigation on a Houston imam who was a family person and had
a religious visa approved. Shortly thereafter, it was either
disapproved and that person was deported. We all know that,
once deported, it is a complicated process, leaving his family
destitute, and we can't imagine the circumstances of that. I
think that is very harsh.
I will ask the broader question as to how we address the
policies of religious visas. Are we going to see the Muslim
community unfairly targeted? Because they have a right to their
faith, as well, though we are aware that we all must be
diligent.
Last, I would be interested in an answer--is about our
cultural competency and the reach in that Department to be
diverse and whether or not we have a diverse leadership, which
would be under your ship, Director Leiter, you, Madam
Secretary, and that includes African-Americans, Hispanics,
Asians, Anglos, and, of course, the faith represented by
Muslims.
Secretary Napolitano. Representative, let me take some of
those in order, and we can respond more fully.
Chairman King. Secretary, if you would try to keep the
answers about 3 or 4 minutes.
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, I will try to keep it short. I
am sorry, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Napolitano. TSA privatization, the administrator
has concluded not to expand privatization for a number of
reasons, some of which are security-related, some of which are
cost-related. He has announced that policy. As you know, the
administrator is the former Deputy Director of the FBI.
With respect to the Mexican border and the drug war in
Mexico, we are highly cognizant of the amount of violence going
on in Mexico, the number of deaths associated with that
violence, particularly in the northern states of Mexico. We are
working very closely with the Calderon administration on that.
We have individuals in Mexico themselves working on these
issues, but--and we are being very, very vigilant about that
war being brought across our border. I will say it again to the
cartels: Do not bring that war into the United States. But we
need to work with Mexico to end the war.
The administration remains committed to immigration reform
and looks forward to working with----
Ms. Jackson Lee. That includes comprehensive and border
security?
Secretary Napolitano. Indeed. Then, last, with respect to
the particular case of the religious visa that you referenced,
why don't I simply get that from you and I will respond in
writing?
Ms. Jackson Lee. I would appreciate it. Just the cultural
diversity issue and including Muslims at the Department of
Homeland Security.
Secretary Napolitano. I would be happy--why don't I respond
in writing to that?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, could I just raise an
inquiry to you, please? I would appreciate it if we could have
a classified briefing on the border, on the southern border,
particularly as it relates to drug cartels and the intermeshing
between issues of terrorism or the porousness that is created
and the distinction--and that would be my perspective--
separating out undocumented persons that may be coming for
work--these people.
Chairman King. I will work with our staff to make sure we
do that. There is bipartisan interest in that, I can assure
you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very
much.
Chairman King. The time of the gentlelady has expired.
The gentleman from Missouri, you are up next, if you want.
Okay. Then I will yield to the--not yield, I will--yes, yield
to the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it.
Madam Secretary, we have previously discussed the
importance of the Visa Security Program and the need to expand
ICE's visa security units to additional high-risk areas around
the world. I understand that recent budget guidance to DHS for
fiscal year 2012 from the Office of Management and Budget does
not propose additional funding for the Visa Security Program
and directs ICE to reconsider its deployment of personnel
overseas for this purpose. I find this recommendation, of
course, very troubling.
The ICE personnel that are deployed overseas to high-risk
visa issuing posts are uniquely qualified to review visa
applications and to identify individuals who might be
attempting to enter the United States to do us harm. Do you
agree with the OMB recommendation, the guidance regarding the
Visa Security Program?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, let me--if I might,
Representative--the President's budget request is not yet out.
It will be out on Monday. I believe my first hearing on the
budget is next Thursday--yes, next Thursday. I think if I might
ask your forbearance and respond to budget-related questions at
that time.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. But I would like to keep in touch with
you on this vital issue----
Secretary Napolitano. Duly noted.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bilirakis. One more question. As you are aware,
terrorists involved in both the 1993 and 2001 World Trade
Center attacks entered the United States on student visas,
later violating their terms. I have long been concerned that
there are inadequate security controls in the student visa
issuance process. I have similar concerns about the process to
monitor visa holders' compliance once they enter the United
States. How concerned are you about the fraudulent use of
student visas, or any visas for that matter?
Mr. Leiter. We look at all types of visas. But,
Congressman, I think you are absolutely right. There is a
history with student visas. There is an on-going interest in
student visas. So we have built in some extra protections on
student visas, both for monitoring and cooperation with the
countries that often sponsor those students for additional
counterterrorism screening.
Mr. Bilirakis. I would like to get with you--I have some
recommendations of my own, as well.
Mr. Leiter. Very happy to do that.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Thank you very much.
Chairman King. The gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Richmond,
is recognized.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We heard several points about our port security. As we talk
about trade deals, I guess my question to you, Madam Secretary,
is that, is there a way to evaluate or to inform us of, for
example, South Korea and their port security? Because our
security is based on how well they do their job over there.
So as these trade agreements come up and as they are
negotiated, I think it is very important for people in my
district, which has the port of New Orleans and all the trade
down there, to get some information on that.
Secretary Napolitano. Congressman, yes. We will respond to
you in writing on that. I know one of our six international
locations for our maritime cargo scanning technology was in
Busan in the Republic of Korea. So we will get some information
to you.
Mr. Richmond. Second, watching what happened down in
Louisiana with the B.P. Horizon incident, how safe are our
rigs?
Give me an assessment on, for example, our LOOP, which
supplies a lot of oil and stuff for the rest of the country.
So looking at how long it would take to get a backup or to
potentially stop the flow of oil, how safe are our German rigs
that are off the coast of all of our Gulf States?
Secretary Napolitano. Congressman, I have been on the LOOP
and met with those individuals. There are extensive security
precautions that are taken around that area.
So there are no guarantees in this business. I think the
Director and I would both agree on that.
But do I think they are taking all reasonable security
precautions? I feel that they are.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you, Mr. Acting Chairman. I yield back
the remainder of my time.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. Thank you.
Congressman Davis.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very----
Mr. Bilirakis. You are recognized.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, Mr. Leiter, thank you both very much for
being here and for your patience.
As a new Member of this committee, let me just ask if you
would quickly help me sharpen my understanding of what we
define and designate as being terrorism or acts of terror.
Mr. Leiter. Congressman, there are numerous definitions
within Federal law about what terrorism is.
The National Counterterrorism Center uses one of those,
which is premeditated, politically-motivated violence by a non-
state actor.
So the key piece there--key pieces, it usually comes down
to is politically motivated violence.
Mr. Davis. Madam Secretary, I am very interested and very
concerned about the impact of illegal narcotics on life in our
country and, indeed, throughout the world.
We know that Afghanistan supplies about 90 percent of the
opium trade. There are also questions about its relationship to
funding the Taliban and its relationship with al-Qaeda.
Could you tell me what our goals are there from a DHS
vantage point? I mean, what are we attempting to do in that
region?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, Congressman, I think a better
person to address that question to you would be the Secretary
of Defense.
But what our goal is at DHS, working with the government of
Afghanistan--I was just there between Christmas and New
Year's--is to assist them in building their civilian capacity
to have control of their own borders, particularly their ports
of entry, and to be able to have the infrastructure, the
technology, and the trained and vetted units necessary to do
that.
Mr. Leiter. Congressman--I am sorry--if I could just add,
is, as you know, the Drug Enforcement Agency has a significant
presence in Afghanistan and works--and part of this is
important from the terrorism perspective, because, as you say,
some of those funds do go to support the Taliban and could
effectively go to al-Qaeda if they are not already.
I think it is an important piece to note, because it simply
highlights the moral depravity on this front, too, and really
the hypocrisy of the organization, al-Qaeda and the Taliban, of
pursuing what they are viewing as a vision of Islam while still
maintaining and shipping heroin and opium overseas.
Mr. Davis. Of course, I come from Chicago, which is
considered to be by many, and certainly those of us who are
there, the transportation capital of the world.
We place a great deal of focus and interest on airline
security, airline safety.
But I also have some concern about what we are doing in
relationship to truck transport, buses, the large numbers of
people who make use of them, and, of course, rail.
Could you elaborate a bit on what we are doing in those
areas to make sure that there is security and safety?
Secretary Napolitano. Indeed, Congressman, and we have a
whole surface transportation program and strategy that we will
make available to you now.
It is a little bit different because so much of it is
controlled locally, bus systems, subway systems and the like.
I think Chicago is fortunate because they have built now
some extensive security in this, at least in the--within the
municipal limits that come into a hub area so there could be
some effective monitoring of surface transportation.
But we have added so-called VIPER teams, which are
intermodal transportation security teams, dogs, explosive trace
detection equipment in the surface transportation environment.
We have made grants and grant guidance available to
localities for things of this nature as well.
Mr. Davis. Well, let me just thank you very much and let
me, again, as other Members have done, commend you for what I
think the outstanding work is that you do. I certainly look
forward to working more closely with both of you.
Secretary Napolitano. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Davis. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, sir. It doesn't appear that
anyone else is here.
So I thank the witnesses. Thanks for the extra time, for
your valuable testimony, and the Members, of course, for their
questions.
The Members of the committee may have some additional
questions for the witness. We will ask you respond to these
questions in writing, please.
The hearing record will be held open for 10 days.
Without objection, the committee stands adjourned. Thank
you.
[Whereupon, at 12:31 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Janet Napolitano
Question 1. Madam Secretary, in your testimony you stated that ``in
some ways, the threat facing us is at its most heightened state'' since
9/11. This statement was given with little context and seems to imply
an added security threat, yet the committee was not provided any new
threat information. Moreover, there was no change to the National
Threat Advisory System that is still on the DHS website or the new
threat advisory pilot program you have announced to replace the color-
coded system. Why is the threat facing the Nation at its ``most
heightened state,'' since 9/11?
Answer. The terrorist threat facing our country has evolved
significantly in the last 10 years, and continues to evolve. We face a
threat environment where violent extremism is not defined or contained
by international borders as evidenced by the Times Square bomber as
well as the individual recently arrested in eastern Washington State
for allegedly placing a bomb along the route of a Spokane parade in
January. Today, we must address threats that are homegrown as well as
those that originate abroad. As former Secretaries of Homeland Security
have noted on several occasions, the threat of terrorism will never be
completely eliminated and therefore, we will continue to operate under
a heightened state of security. The Secretary's annual Congressional
testimony on the homeland threat landscape (February 9, 2011), the
Director of National Intelligence Annual Threat Assessment (February
10, 2011), and other such vehicles will inform this baseline. The new
advisory system will only be initiated for terrorist threats to the
homeland that rise above and beyond this baseline.
From December 2009 through 2010, there were seven attempted
terrorist attacks or disrupted plots in the homeland. Two of
these operations were linked to al-Qaeda affiliates, one to an
al-Qaeda ally, and four to homegrown violent extremists. Most
did not reach the execution phase or the intended target, all
were operational failures, and none resulted in significant
casualties. Nevertheless, al-Qaeda and its affiliates almost
certainly perceive the failed attacks as both valuable
propaganda opportunities and radicalization and recruitment
tools that further its anti-Western narrative.
Mohamed Osman Mohamud's failed attempt in November 2010 to
allegedly bomb a Christmas celebration in Portland, OR
represents a recent example of the increasing threat from
homegrown violent extremists--Americans radicalized in the
United States, acting independently of foreign terrorist
organizations like al-Qaeda.
The United States and our allies also face a threat from Westerners
who have traveled overseas to receive terrorist training--with the
intention of returning to conduct attacks at home. This presents
numerous challenges as the individuals' status as Westerners provides a
simpler method for terrorists to infiltrate the homeland while also
increasing the groups' operational planners' knowledge of Western
targets and security practices.
Since 2008, U.S. persons, including confessed al-Qaeda
operatives Najibullah Zazi and David Headley--the Chicago-based
individual who also confessed to being a Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)
operative--as well as confessed failed Times Square bomber
Faisal Shahzad, have traveled to Pakistan for terrorist
purposes and, upon their return to the United States, were able
to operate under the radar of law enforcement, in some cases
for long periods of time.
The past 18 months have also featured the emergence of Western
ideologues--particularly American citizens like Anwar al-Awlaki, Omar
Hammami, and Adam Gadahn--publishing increasingly sophisticated
English-language propaganda on behalf of al-Qaeda and its affiliates.
The increasing availability on the internet of their materials
espousing violent extremism and providing practical operational advice,
combined with social networking tools that facilitate violent extremist
communication, complicates the challenge of addressing the threat to
the homeland.
These violent extremist ideologues--al-Awlaki in
particular--have also spearheaded recent efforts to provide
Americans and other Westerners with the ability to
independently plan and execute their own terrorist attacks--
without the need to travel overseas for training--through
English-language propaganda.
Finally, we are currently witnessing an evolution in terrorist
tactics. Terrorist attacks targeting the United States are trending
towards smaller-scale operations executed on a compressed planning
cycle that are perceived as successes, regardless of whether they
caused physical damage. Violent extremist propaganda praised even
operational failures in the West, spinning them as successful in
causing economic damage, defeating existing security measures, and
forcing the West to spend billions in security upgrades, while
highlighting the operations' relatively low cost and ease of planning
and execution. We are concerned that the perceived successes of such
smaller-scale attacks portends that these operations will occur with
greater frequency and offer fewer opportunities for disruption.
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's (AQAP's) English-
language propaganda magazine--referencing the disrupted October
2010 plot to send explosive-laden packages on aircraft--
boasted: ``To bring down America we do not need to strike big .
. . it is more feasible to stage smaller attacks that involve
less players and less time to launch and thus we may circumvent
the security barriers America worked so hard to erect.''
In the same edition, AQAP noted that the October 2010 plot
was part of its ``strategy of a thousand cuts''--intending to
``bleed the enemy to death'' and noted that despite the West's
success in intercepting the parcels, the $4,200 operation would
force the United States and its allies to spend ``billions'' on
security upgrades.
Question 2. The latest Moscow airport suicide attack underscores
what seems to be a troubling new trend: Terrorist attacks on soft
targets in transportation infrastructure, such as pre-security baggage
claims and subways. As you know, in other airports across the world, it
is not uncommon to be inspected as soon as you enter the premises. What
can we take away from the Moscow attack for our own airport security
here at home? What strategy does DHS have in place to address terrorist
attacks on soft targets, including shopping malls, pre-security baggage
claims, and mass transit?
Answer. One of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) primary
strategies is to work with our partners in the intelligence community
and in Federal, State, and local law enforcement to identify and
prevent threats before they are carried out. Simultaneously, we work
with airport authorities and other stakeholders to implement a layered
security approach to mitigate the threat of terrorist attacks against
soft targets.
The terrorist attack at Moscow's Domodedovo International Airport
demonstrates the importance of having an effective security plan in
place at our Nation's airports. There are various layers of security at
U.S. airports designed to help prevent or deter this type of an attack.
The primary responsibility for security outside of the checkpoints
rests with the airport operator, as detailed in the airport security
plan that each airport operator submits to the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA). Additionally, TSA personnel, including Behavior
Detection Officers, Transportation Security Inspectors, and Federal Air
Marshals, are engaged and trained to look for anomalies as they provide
security, with local airport police, throughout both the public and
secure areas of our Nation's airports or any other venue where they are
dispatched. I also cannot overstate the importance of public awareness
and engagement in alerting law enforcement and security personnel to
unusual behavior or activities by individuals. It is why I have placed
so much emphasis on the ``If You See Something, Say Something'' program
to solicit assistance from the public and further enhance security in
airports and elsewhere.
In light of the Moscow Domodedovo International Airport attack, TSA
has increased security in the public areas of all airports both by
conducting visible and covert operations. TSA has also developed the
tactical response plan (TRP), which details the actions necessary at
the field level to support the overall TSA operational response to
various scenarios. All of our measures augment the existing security
measures employed in all modes of transportation and may be used in
combination with each other.
Additional information regarding TSA's mitigation strategy and
response plans for a similar attack are considered sensitive security
information and can be discussed during a thorough briefing on this
topic at your convenience.
Following the Moscow Domodedovo International Airport attack, the
DHS Office for Bombing Prevention (OBP) released a Quick Look Report on
TRIPwire that provided details on the device and the tactics used to
State, local, Tribal, and territorial law enforcement to inform
domestic prevention and deterrence efforts. TRIPwire is DHS's 24/7 on-
line, information-sharing network of current terrorist IED tactics,
techniques, and procedures, including design and emplacement
considerations.
DHS's Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) has a variety of
programs to prepare for and address the threat of terrorist attacks on
soft targets, including shopping malls, airports, hotels, sports
venues, and other public gathering facilities.
IP has developed and provided to State, local, Tribal, and
territorial agencies a series of reports, known collectively as
the Infrastructure Protection Report Series (IPRS), that
provide information on characteristics and common
vulnerabilities of various types of critical infrastructure,
potential indicators of terrorist activity, and associated
protective measures to mitigate risks. IP has developed 360
IPRS reports, including reports for airports, shopping malls,
hotels, sports venues, and other public gathering facilities.
IP's OBP provides Surveillance Detection and Soft Target
Awareness Training to State and local law enforcement officers
and private sector facility security personnel to develop
awareness of terrorist threats to critical infrastructure and
educate participants on strategies for detecting and mitigating
these threats.
IP's field-deployed Protective Security Advisors (PSAs) have
conducted numerous outreach efforts to raise awareness of terrorist
threats to soft targets and provide tools and resources to mitigate the
threat. These outreach efforts included joint Office of Intelligence
and Analysis and IP briefings on the terrorist threats, attacks,
tactics, and potential protective measures. Notably, and to cite just
two examples, these efforts reached 490 hotel, lodging, and major
retail facilities in 2009, and 338 sports league venues in 2010.